March 4, 2014

A.C. No. 10179

(Formerly CBD 11-2985)

BENJAMIN Q. ONG, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. WILLIAM F. DELOS SANTOS, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

A lawyer's issuance of a worthless check renders him in breach of his oath to obey the laws. To accord with the
canon of professional responsibility that requires him to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and
promote respect for the law and legal processes, he thereby becomes administratively liable for gross misconduct.

Antecedents

In January 2008, complainant Benjamin Ong was introduced to respondent Atty. William F. Delos Santos by Sheriff
Fernando Mercado of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. After several calls and personal interactions between
them, Ong and Atty. Delos Santos became friends.1 In time, according to Ong, Atty. Delos Santos asked him to
encash his postdated check inasmuch as he was in dire need of cash. To reassure Ong that the check would be
funded upon maturity, Atty. Delos Santos bragged about his lucrative practice and his good paying clients.
Convinced of Atty. Delos Santos’ financial stability, Ong handed to Atty. Delos Santos on January 29, 2008 the
amount of P100,000.00 in exchange for the latter’s Metrobank Check No. 0110268 postdated February 29,
2008.2 However, the check was dishonored upon presentment for the reason that the account was closed.3 Ong
relayed the matter of the dishonor to Atty. Delos Santos, and demanded immediate payment, but the latter just
ignored him.4 When efforts to collect remained futile, Ong brought a criminal complaint for estafa and for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against Atty. Delos Santos.5 Ong also brought this disbarment complaint against Atty.
Delos Santos in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), which docketed the complaint as CBD Case No. 11-
2985.

Findings and Recommendation

of the IBP Bar Commissioner

In his Commissioner’s Report,6 IBP Bar Commissioner Jose I. Dela Rama, Jr. stated that Ong had sufficiently
established the existence of the dishonored check; and that Atty. Delos Santos did not file his answer despite notice,
and did not also present contrary evidence.7 He recommended that Atty. Delos Santos be held liable for violating
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and that the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for two years, plus the return of the amount of P100,000.00 to the
complainant,8 be meted on Atty. Delos Santos in view of an earlier disbarment case brought against him (Lucman v.
Atty. Delos Santos, CBD Case No. 09-253).

Resolution No. XX-2013-253

On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XX-2013-253 adopting and approving the
findings of IBP Commissioner Dela Rama, Jr.,9 to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution
as Annex "A," and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules and considering that Respondent violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Atty. William F. Delos Santos is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three
(3) years and ORDERED to RETURN the amount of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos to complainant
with legal interest within thirty days from receipt of notice.
 Issue

By issuing the worthless check, did Atty. Delos Santos violate Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility?

Ruling

We agree with the findings of the IBP but modify the recommended penalty.

Every lawyer is an officer of the Court. He has the duty and responsibility to maintain his good moral character. In
this regard, good moral character is not only a condition precedent relating to his admission into the practice of law,
but is a continuing imposition in order for him to maintain his membership in the Philippine Bar.10 The Court
unwaveringly demands of him to remain a competent, honorable, and reliable individual in whom the public may
repose confidence.11 Any gross misconduct that puts his moral character in serious doubt renders him unfit to
continue in the practice of law.12

Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 has been enacted in order to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the
legitimate public checking account users.13 The gravamen of the offense defined and punished by Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22, according to Lozano v. Martinez,14 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check, or any check that is
dishonored upon its presentment for payment and putting it in circulation; the law is designed to prohibit and
altogether eliminate the deleterious and pernicious practice of issuing checks with insufficient funds, or with no
credit, because the practice is deemed a public nuisance, a crime against public order to be abated. The Court has
observed in Lozano v. Martinez:

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in
the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to
the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in
circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking
system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.15 xxx

Being a lawyer, Atty. Delos Santos was well aware of the objectives and coverage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. If he
did not, he was nonetheless presumed to know them, for the law was penal in character and application. His
issuance of the unfunded check involved herein knowingly violated Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and exhibited his
indifference towards the pernicious effect of his illegal act to public interest and public order.16 He thereby swept
aside his Lawyer’s Oath that enjoined him to support the Constitution and obey the laws. He also took for granted
the express commands of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7,
Rule 7.03, viz:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A Lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

These canons, the Court has said in Agno v. Cagatan,17 required of him as a lawyer an enduring high sense of
responsibility and good fidelity in all his dealings, thus:

The afore-cited canons emphasize the high standard of honesty and fairness expected of a lawyer not only in the
practice of the legal profession but in his personal dealings as well. A lawyer must conduct himself with great
propriety, and his behavior should be beyond reproach anywhere and at all times. For, as officers of the courts and
keepers of the public's faith, they are burdened with the highest degree of social responsibility and are thus
mandated to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and honor. Likewise, the oath that lawyers swear
to impresses upon them the duty of exhibiting the highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor in their
relationships with others. Thus, lawyers may be disciplined for any conduct, whether in their professional or in their
private capacity, if such conduct renders them unfit to continue to be officers of the court.18

That his act involved a private dealing with Ong did not matter. His being a lawyer invested him – whether he was
acting as such or in a non- professional capacity – with the obligation to exhibit good faith, fairness and candor in his
relationship with others. There is no question that a lawyer could be disciplined not only for a malpractice in his
profession, but also for any misconduct committed outside of his professional capacity.19 His being a lawyer
demanded that he conduct himself as a person of the highest moral and professional integrity and probity in his
dealings with others.20

Moreover, in issuing the dishonored check, Atty. Delos Santos put into serious question not only his personal
integrity but also the integrity of the entire Integrated Bar. It cannot be denied that Ong acceded to Atty. Delos
Santos’ request for encashment of the check because of his complete reliance on the nobility of the Legal
Profession. The following excerpts from Ong’s testimony bear this out, to wit:

COMM. DELA RAMA: What did you feel when you were issued a bounced check by the respondent?

MR. ONG: Actually, the reason I even loaned him money because actually he was not even my friend. He was just
referred to me. The reason why I felt at ease to loan him money was because the sheriff told me that abogado eto. It
is his license that would be at stake that’s why I lent him the money.21

xxxx

COMM. DELA RAMA: In other words, what you are saying is that you felt betrayed when the lawyer issued a
bounced check in your favor.

MR. ONG

Yes, Commissioner.

COMM. DELA RAMA:

Why, what is your expectation of a lawyer?

MR. ONG

They uphold the law, they know the law. He

should not have issued the check if you know it cannot be funded because actually I have many lawyer friend[s] and
I have always high regard for lawyers.22

Atty. Delos Santos should always be mindful of his duty to uphold the law and to be circumspect in all his dealings
with the public. Any transgression of this duty on his part would not only diminish his reputation as a lawyer but
would also erode the public’s faith in the Legal Profession as a whole. His assuring Ong that he was in good
financial standing because of his lucrative law practice when the contrary was true manifested his intent to mislead
the latter into giving a substantial amount in exchange for his worthless post-dated check. Such actuation did not
speak well of him as a member of the Bar.

Accordingly, Atty. Delos Santos was guilty of serious misconduct, warranting appropriate administrative sanction.
Noting that the criminal complaint charging him with the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was already
dismissed, and that he already repaid to Ong the full amount of P100,000.00,23 both of which are treated as
mitigating circumstances in his favor, we find the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to suspend him
from the practice of law for a period of three years harsh. Thus, we reduce the penalty to suspension from the
practice of law to six months in order to accord with the ruling in Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v.
Carandang.24

ACCORDINGLY, the Court PRONOUNCES respondent ATTY. WILLIAM F. DELOS SANTOS GUILTY of violating
the Lawyer’s Oath, and Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility, and, accordingly, SUSPENDS HIM FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR A PERIOD
OF SIX MONTHS EFFECTIVE FROM NOTICE, with a stern warning that any similar infraction in the future will be
dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to Atty. Delos Santos'
personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

Footnotes

* Acting Chief Justice per Special Order No. 1644 dated February 25, 2014.

1
Rollo, pp. 2-3.
2
Id. at 3.
3
Id. at 6.
4
Id. at 3.
5
Id. at 4.
6
Id. at 55-60.
7
Id. at 56.
8
Id. at 55-56.
9
Id. at 54.
10
Manaois v. Deciembre, Adm. Case No. 5364, August 20, 2008, 562 SCRA 359, 363-364; Rural Bank of
Silay, Inc. v. Pilla, Adm. Case No. 3637, January 24, 2001, 350 SCRA 138, 145; Narag v. Narag, A.C. No.
3405, June 29, 1998, 291 SCRA 451, 463.
11
Sebastian v. Bajar, A.C. No. 3731, September 7, 2007, 532 SCRA 435, 448.
12
Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, A.M. No. 05-3-04-SC, July 22, 2005, 464
SCRA 32, 45; Grande v. De Silva, A.C. No. 4838, July 29, 2003, 407 SCRA 310, 313.
13
Magno v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96132, June 26, 1992, 210 SCRA 471, 478.
14
G.R. No. L-63419, 18 December 1986, 146 SCRA 323, 338.
15
Id. at 340.
16
Santos-Tan v. Robiso, A.C. No. 6383, March 31, 2009, 582 SCRA 556, 564.
17
A.C. No. 4515, July 14, 2008, 558 SCRA 1.
18
Id. at 17-18
19
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Carandang, A.C. No. 5700, January 30, 2006, 480
SCRA 512, 518.
20
Fernandez v. Cabrera III, A.C. No. 5623, December 11, 2003, 418 SCRA 1, 5.
21
Rollo, p. 45.
22
Id. at 47.
23
Id. at 39-43.
24
Supra note 19, at 519.
A.C. No. 7474 September 9, 2014

PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE L. MADRID, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 51, SORSOGON
CITY, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Complainant Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court has had enough of the respondent, a law practitioner, who
had engaged in the unethical practice of filing frivolous administrative cases against judges and personnel of the
courts because the latter filed a motion to inhibit the complainant from hearing a pending case. Hence, the
complainant has initiated this complaint for the disbarment of respondent on the ground of gross misconduct and
gross violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Antecedents

On February 7, 2007, Atty. Juan S.Dealca entered his appearance in Criminal Case No. 2006-6795, entitled "People
of the Philippines v. Philip William Arsenault" then pending in Branch 51 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Sorsogon City, presided by complainant Judge Jose L. Madrid.1 Atty. Dealca sought to replace Atty. Vicente Judar
who had filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for the accused. But aside from entering his appearance as counsel
for the accused, Atty. Dealca also moved that Criminal Case No. 2006-6795 be re-raffled to another Branch of the
RTC "[c]onsidering the adverse incidents between the incumbent Presiding Judge and the undersigned," where" he
does not appear before the incumbent Presiding Judge, and the latter does not also hear cases handled by the
undersigned."2

Judge Madrid denied Atty. Dealca’s motion to re-raffle through an order issued on February 14, 2007,3 viz:

xxxx

This Court will not allow that a case be removed from it just because of the personal sentiments of counsel who was
not even the original counsel of the litigant.

Moreover, the motion of Atty. Dealca is an affront to the integrity of this Court and the other Courts in this province
as hewould like it to appear that jurisdiction over a Family Court case is based on his whimsical dictates.

This was so because Atty. Dealca had filed Administrative as well as criminal cases against this Presiding Judge
which were all dismissed by the Hon. Supreme Court for utter lack ofmerit. This is why he should not have accepted
this particular case so as not to derail the smooth proceedings in this Court with his baseless motions for inhibition.
It is the lawyer’s duty to appear on behalf of a client in a case but not to appear for a client to remove a case from
the Court. This is unethical practice in the first order.

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the Motion of Atty. Juan S. Dealca is hereby DENIED. Relative to the Motion
to Withdraw as Counsel for the Accused filed by Atty. Vicente C. Judar dated January 29, 2007, the same is hereby
DENIED for being violative of the provisions of Section 26 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

So also, the Appearance of Atty. Juan S. Dealca as new counsel for accused Philip William Arsenault is likewise
DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Consequently, Judge Madrid filed a letter complaint4 in the Office of the Bar Confidant citing Atty. Dealca’sunethical
practice of entering his appearance and then moving for the inhibition of the presiding judge on the pretext of
previous adverse incidents between them.
On April 10, 2007, we treated the complaint as a regular administrative complaint, and required Atty. Dealca to
submit his comment.5

In his comment-complaint,6 Atty. Dealca asserted that Judge Madrid’s issuance of the February 14, 2007 order
unconstitutionally and unlawfully deprived the accused of the right to counsel, to due process, and to a fair and
impartial trial; that Judge Madrid exhibited bias in failing to act on the motion to lift and set aside the warrant ofarrest
issued against the accused; and that it should be Judge Madrid himself who should be disbarred and accordingly
dismissed from the Judiciary for gross ignorance of the law.

On July 17, 2007, the Court referred the matter to the IBP for appropriate investigation,report and
recommendation.7 Several months thereafter, the Court also indorsed pertinent documents in connection with A.M.
OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ, entitled "Joseph Yap III v. Judge Jose L. Madrid and Court Stenographer MerlynD.
Dominguez, both of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 51, Sorsogon City" (Yap v. Judge Madrid).8

On June 6, 2007, the Court in Yap v. Judge Madriddismissed for its lack of merit the administrative complaint
against Judge Madrid for allegedly falsifying the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing on March 4, 2005 in
Civil Case No. 2001-6842 entitled Joseph D. Yap V, et al. v. Joseph H. Yap III, but referred to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation the propensity of Atty. Dealca to file
administrative or criminal complaints against judges and court personnel whenever decisions, orders or processes
were issued adversely to him and his clients.9

In compliance with the referral,the IBP-Sorsogon Chapter submitted its report with the following findings and
recommendation:10

xxxx

The documentary evidence offered by complainants show that respondent Atty. Juan S. Dealca filed by himself (1)
Bar Matter No. 1197 and acting as counsel for the complainants (2) Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 04-2113-RTJ; (3)
OMB-L-C-05-0478-E;(4) Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ and (5) Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2191-RTJ.
These five (5) cases are factual evidence of the cases that respondent had filed by himself and as counsel for the
complainants against court officers, judges and personnel as a consequence of the IBP Election and incidents in
cases that respondent had handled as counselfor the parties in the said cases.

It will be noted that in Bar Matter No. 1197, the respondents were judges (Judge Jose L. Madrid & Judge Honesto A.
Villamor) and lawyers in IBP Sorsogon Chapters, who are no doubt officers of the court, and the case aroused (sic)
out ofthe unfavorable consensus of the IBP chapter members that was adverse to the position of the respondent.
The other four (4) cases aroused [sic] out of the cases handled by respondent for the complainants who failed to
secure a favorable action from the court.

Specifically, Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 04-2113-RTJ was a result of the case before the sala of Judge Jose L.
Madrid (RTC 51) entitled "Alita P. Gomez vs. Rodrigo Jarabo, et al.," for: Accion Publiciana and Damages, that was
handled by respondent for the complainant Alita Gomez. OMB-L-C-0478-E was an off shoot of Civil Case No. 2001-
6842 entitled "Marilyn D. Yap, Joseph D. Yap V, et al., vs. Joseph H. Yap III" for: Support pending before the sala
ofcomplainant Judge Jose L. Madrid (RTC 51). Respondent, after an unfavorable decision against defendant
Joseph H. Yap III, entered his appearance and pleaded for the latter. As a result of an adverse order, this
ombudsman case arose.

Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2191-RTJ was also a result of the Civil Case No. 5403 entitled "Salve Dealca
Latosa vs. Atty. Henry Amado Roxas, with Our Lady’s Village Foundation and Most Reverend Arnulfo Arcilla, DD as
third party defendant that was heard, tried, decided and pending execution before the sala of Judge Honesto A.
Villamor (RTC 52).

Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ was also a consequence of Civil Case No. 2001-6842 entitled
"Marilyn D. Yap, Joseph D. Yap V, et al., vs. Joseph H. Yap III" for Support pending before the sala of complainant
JudgeJose L. Madrid (RTC 51).
All these four (4) cases are precipitated by the adverse ruling rendered by the court against the clients of the
respondent that instead of resorting to the remedies available under the Rules of Procedure, respondent assisted
his clients in filing administrative and criminal case against the judges and personnel of the court.

The other documentary evidence of the complainants such as the (a) VERIFIED COMPLAINT dated March 7, 2003
in Civil Service Case entitled "EDNA GOROSPE-DEALCA vs. JULIANA ENCINASCARINO, et al.; (b) NOTICE OF
RESOLUTION on October 22, 2005 in Adm. Case No. 6334 entitled "SOFIAJAO vs. ATTY. EPIFANIA RUBY
VELACRUZ-OIDA" passed by the Board ofGovernors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines which Resolution No.
XVII-2005-92 provides: "RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner dismissing the case for lacks (sic) merit; (c) RESOLUTION of the Third Division of the
Supreme Court dated February 1, 2006 in Administrative Case No. 6334 (Sofia Jao vs. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-
Oida) – The notice of resolution dated October 22, 2005 ofthe Integrated Bar ofthe Philippines (IBP) dismissing the
case for lack of merit; (d) VERIFIED COMPLAINT in Adm. Case No. 6334 dated February 17, 2004 entitled "Sofia
Jao vs. Atty. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida" for: Malpractice (Forum Shopping), and (e) ORDER dated January 18,
2007 by Acting Presiding Judge RAUL E. DE LEON in Criminal Cases Nos. 2451 to 2454 entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Cynthia Marcial, et al. For: Falsification of Medical Records" which provides for the dismissal of the
cases against all the accused, do not show participation on the part of the respondent that he signed the pleadings,
although the verified complaint is one executed by the wife of the respondent. Moreover, these cases are pertaining
to persons other than judges and personnel of the court that are not squarely covered by the present investigation
against respondent, although, it is an undeniable fact that respondent had appeared for and in behalf of his wife, the
rest of the complainants in the Civil Service Case and Sofia Jao against Land Bank of the Philippines, the latter case
resulted in the administrative case of Atty. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida, respondent’s sister member of the Bar. All
these documentary evidence from (a) to (e) are helpful in determining the "PROPENSITY" of the respondent as a
member of the bar in resorting to harassment cases instead of going through the procedures provided for by the
Rules of Court in the event of adverse ruling, order or decision of the court.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that in view of the above-foregoings [sic], a penalty of
SUSPENSION in the practice of law for a period of six (6) monthsfrom finality of the decision be ordered against
respondent Atty. Juan S. Dealca.

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

IBP Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag ultimately submitted his Report and Recommendation 11 finding Atty.
Dealca guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility by filing frivolous
administrative and criminalcomplaints; and recommending that Atty. Dealca be suspended from the practice of law
for one year because his motion to inhibit Judge Madrid was devoid of factual or legal basis, and was grounded on
purely personal whims.

In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-41,12 the IBP Board of Governors modified the recommendation and dismissed the
administrative complaint for its lack of merit, thus:

RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED, the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and
APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of merit. Judge Madrid filed a petition,13 which the IBP
Board of Governors treated as a motion for reconsideration, and soon denied through its Resolution No. XX-2012-
545.14

Issues

(1) Did Atty. Dealca file frivolousadministrative and criminal complaints against judges and court personnel
in violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility?

(2) Was Atty. Dealca guilty of unethical practice in seeking the inhibition of Judge Madrid in Criminal Case
No. 2006-6795?

Ruling of the Court

We REVERSE Resolution No. XX-2012-545.

Atty. Dealca must guard against his own impulse of initiating unfounded suits

Atty. Dealca insists on the propriety of the administrative and criminal cases he filed against judges and court
personnel, including Judge Madrid. He argues that as a vigilant lawyer, he was duty bound to bring and prosecute
cases against unscrupulous and corrupt judges and court personnel.15

We see no merit in Atty. Dealca’s arguments.

Although the Court always admires members of the Bar who are imbued with a high sense of vigilance to weed out
from the Judiciary the undesirable judges and inefficient or undeserving court personnel, any acts taken in that
direction should be unsullied by any taint of insincerity or self interest. The noble cause of cleansing the ranks of the
Judiciary is not advanced otherwise. It is for that reason that Atty. Dealca’s complaint against Judge Madrid has
failed our judicious scrutiny, for the Court cannot find any trace of idealism or altruismin the motivations for initiating
it. Instead, Atty. Dealca exhibited his proclivity for vindictiveness and penchant for harassment, considering that, as
IBP Commissioner Hababag pointed out,16 his bringing of charges against judges, court personnel and even his
colleagues in the Law Profession had all stemmed from decisions or rulings being adverse to his clients or his side.
He well knew, therefore, that he was thereby crossing the line of propriety, because neither vindictiveness nor
harassment could be a substitute for resorting tothe appropriate legal remedies. He should now be reminded that
the aim of every lawsuit should be to render justice to the parties according to law, not to harass them.17

The Lawyer’s Oath is a source ofobligations and duties for every lawyer, and any violation thereof by an attorney
constitutes a ground for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action.18 The oath exhorts upon the members
of the Bar not to "wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit." These are not mere
facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable.19

As a lawyer, therefore, Atty. Dealca was aware of his duty under his Lawyer’s Oath not to initiate groundless, false
or unlawful suits. The duty has also been expressly embodied inRule 1.03, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility thuswise:

Rule 1.03 – A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any
man’s cause.

His being an officer of the court should have impelled him to see to it that the orderly administration of justice must
not be unduly impeded. Indeed, as he must resist the whims and caprices ofhis clients and temper his clients’
propensities to litigate,20 so must he equally guard himself against his own impulses of initiating unfounded suits.
While it is the Court’s duty to investigate and uncover the truth behindcharges against judges and lawyers, it is
equally its duty to shield them from unfounded suits that are intended to vex and harass them, among other things.21

Moreover, Atty. Dealca must be mindful of his mission to assist the courts in the proper administration of justice. He
disregarded his mission because his filing of the unfounded complaints, including this one against Judge Madrid,
increased the workload of the Judiciary. Although no person should be penalized for the exercise ofthe right to
litigate, the right must nonetheless be exercised in good faith.22 Atty. Dealca’s bringing of the numerous
administrative and criminal complaints against judges, court personnel and his fellow lawyers did not evince any
good faith on his part, considering that he made allegations against them therein that he could not substantially
prove, and are rightfully deemed frivolous and unworthy of the Court’s precious time and serious consideration.

Repeatedly denying any wrongdoing in filing the various complaints, Atty. Dealca had the temerity to confront even
the Court with the following arrogant tirade, to wit:

With due respect, what could be WRONG was the summary dismissal of cases filed against erring judges and court
personnel ‘for lack of merit’, i.e. without even discussing the facts and the law of the case.23
Atty. Dealca was apparently referring to the minute resolutions the Court could have promulgated in frequently
dismissing his unmeritorious petitions. His arrogant posturing would not advance his cause now. He thereby
demonstrated his plain ignorance of the rules of procedure applicable to the Court.The minute resolutions have
been issued for the prompt dispatch of the actions by the Court.24 Whenever the Court then dismisses a petition for
review for its lack of merit through a minute resolution, it is understood that the challenged decision or order,
together with all its findings of fact and law, is deemed sustained or upheld,25 and the minute resolution then
constitutes the actual adjudication on the merits of the case. The dismissal of the petition, or itsdenial of due course
indicates the Court’s agreement with and its adoption of the findings and conclusions of the court a quo.26

The requirement for stating the facts and the law does not apply to the minute resolutions that the Court issuesin
disposing of a case. The Court explained why in Borromeo v. Court of Appeals:27

The [Supreme] Court x x x disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as final and
executory, as where a case is patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the
decision appealed from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts of the case and the
applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the petition is filed merely to forestall the early execution of
judgment and for non-compliance with the rules. The resolution denying due course or dismissing the petition
always gives the legal basis.

xxxx

The Court is not ‘duty bound’ to render signed Decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate Decisions
and/or Minute Resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case.

The constitutionality of the minute resolutions was the issue raised in Komatsu Industries (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of
Appeals.28 The petitioner contended that the minute resolutions violated Section 14,29 Article VIII of the Constitution.
The Court, throughJustice Regalado, declared that resolutions were not decisions withinthe constitutional
contemplation, for the former "merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained and even ordinary
lawyers have all this time so understood it; and the petition to review the decisionof the Court of Appeals is not a
matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, hence there is no need to fully explain the Court’s denial since, for
one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeal’s decision." It pointed out that the
constitutional mandate was applicable only in cases submitted for decision, i.e., given due course to and after the
filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not where the petition was being refused due course, with
the resolutions for that purpose stating the legal basis of the refusal. Thus, when the Court, after deliberating on the
petition and the subsequent pleadings, decided to deny due course to the petition and stated that the questions
raised were factual, or there was no reversible error in the lower court’s decision, there was a sufficient compliance
with the constitutional requirement.30

II

Atty. Dealca violated Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Atty. Dealca maintains that Judge Madrid should have "in good grace inhibited himself" upon his motion toinhibit in
order to preserve "confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary."31 However, IBP Commissioner Hababag has
recommended that Atty. Dealca be sanctioned for filing the motion to inhibit considering that the motion, being
purely based on his personal whims, was bereft of factual and legal bases.32

The recommendation of IBP Commissioner Hababag is warranted.

Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts empowered to appear, prosecute and defend the legal causes for their
clients. As a consequence, peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved upon them by law. Verily, their
membership in the Bar imposes certain obligations upon them.33

In this regard, Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility pertinently state:

Canon 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial officers and
should insist on similar conduct by others.
 xxxx

Rule 11.04 — A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or haveno materiality to
the case.1âwphi1

In light of the foregoing canons, all lawyers are bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts, and to
promote confidence in the fair administration of justice. It is the respect for the courts that guarantees the stability of
the judicial institution; elsewise, the institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation.34

The motion to inhibit filed by Atty. Dealca contained the following averment, to wit:

Considering the adverse incidents between the incumbent Presiding Judge and the undersigned, he does not
appear before the incumbent Presiding Judge, andthe latter does not also hear cases handled by the undersignedx
x x.35 (Bold emphasis supplied)

Atty. Dealca’s averment that Judge Madrid did not hear cases being handled by him directly insinuated that judges
could choose the cases they heard, and could refuse to hear the cases in which hostility existed between the judges
and the litigants or their counsel. Such averment, if true at all, should have been assiduously substantiated by him
because it put in bad light not only Judge Madrid but all judges in general. Yet, he did not even include any
particulars that could have validated the averment. Nor did he attach any document to support it.

Worth stressing, too, is that the right of a party to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not
appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent in handling the case must be balanced with the
latter’s sacred duty to decide cases without fear of repression. Thus, it was incumbent upon Atty. Dealca to establish
by clear and convincing evidence the ground of bias and prejudice in order to disqualify Judge Madrid from
participating in a particular trial in which Atty. Dealca was participating as a counsel.36 The latter’s bare allegations of
Judge Madrid’s partiality or hostility did not suffice,37 because the presumption that Judge Madrid would undertake
his noble role to dispense justice according to law and the evidence and without fear or favor should only be
overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.38 As such, Atty. Dealca clearly contravened his duties as
a lawyer as expressly stated in Canon 11 and Rule 11.04, supra.

On a final note, it cannot escape our attention that this is not the first administrative complaint to be ever brought
against Atty. Dealca. In Montano v. Integrated Bar of the Philippines,39 we reprimanded him for violating Canon 22
1avv phi 1

and Rule 20.4, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and warned him that a repetition of the same
offense would be dealt with more severely. Accordingly, based on the penalties the Court imposed on erring lawyers
found violating Canon 1, Rule 1.03,40 and Canon 11, Rule 11.0441 of the Code, we deem appropriate to suspend Atty.
Dealca from the practice of law for a period one year. ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS and DECLARES
respondent ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA GUILTY of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.03 and Canon 11, Rule 11. 04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one year effective from notice
of this decision, with a STERN WARNING that any similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to Atty. Dealca's personal
record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to all courts in the country for their information
and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice
 SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 8084, August 24, 2015

PATROCINIA H. SALABAO, Complainant, v. ATTY. ANDRES C. VILLARUEL, JR., Respondent.

RESOLUTION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Patrocinia H. Salabao (complainant) against Atty. Andres C. Villaruel, Jr.
(respondent) for abuse of court processes in violation of Canons 10 and 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.1 After respondent filed his Answer2 we referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.3redarclaw

Factual Background

The facts pertinent to this complaint are summarized in the Report and Recommendation of Investigating
Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Complainant narrates that in 1995 she filed a case against Elmer Lumberio for his deceitful or fraudulent conduct of
taking her precious real property situated in Taguig City. After hearing, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162,
Pasig City issued its resolution in her favor in 2002.

Respondent then entered the picture as counsel for Lumberio. From then on, Complainant complained that
Respondent had made her suffer because of his abuse of processes and disregard for her rights as a litigant.

She narrates as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

In 2002, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 162, Pasig City which tried Civil Case No. 65147 issued its resolution in
her favor. In order to delay the case, Respondent brought the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals under CA-GR
CV No. 76360. The Court of Appeals decided in her favor on January 13, 2004 but Respondent again filed an
appeal before the Supreme Court under GR No. 167413. Lumberio lost and the case became final and executory.

Undeterred, respondent tried to defer the execution of the decision of the RTC, Branch 162, by bringing to the Court
of Appeals a Petition for Annulment of Judgment under CA-GR SP No. 97564. When rebuffed, he again appealed to
the Supreme Court under GR No. 181243 sans a clear or new arguments other than what he had presented before
the Court of Appeals.

Still, Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari seeking to annul the 29 November 2007 Order of the RTC before the
Court of Appeals under CA-GR SP No. 101992 which was however dismissed. From hereon, there was not stopping
the Respondent. Once again he filed a new complaint before the RTC of Mauban, Quezon, Branch 64 under Civil
Case No. 08-0666-M. Apart from this, Respondent filed several Motion, Inhibition and Contempt that were meant to
delay the resolution of the case. He likewise filed an administrative case against Judge Briccio Ygaña of RTC
Branch 153, Taguig City. Complainant then complained that Respondent had done more than enough to suppress
her rights as a winning litigant and filed this case for abuse of processes pursuant to Rule 10.03 and Rule 10.02 of
Canon 10 and Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

Respondent, for his part, denied the accusation and clarified that the several pleadings he had filed had centered on
the legality of the court's decision ordering the cancellation of the title of Lumberio in such ordinary proceeding for
cancellation of the title. To his mind, the said ordinary proceeding for cancellation of title before the RTC Branch
153, Taguig City was void because the law vests upon the government through the Solicitor General the power to
initiate a reversion case if there is such a ground to cancel the title issued by the Land Management Bureau in favor
of Lumberio.

With respect to the civil case before the RTC of Ma[u]ban, Branch 64, he explained that the said case does not
show that herein counsel committed any act of dishonesty which may subject him to any prosecution as he is just
exercising his profession to the best of his ability.4
In his Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner found at respondent "relentlessly filed petitions
and appeals in order to exhaust all possible remedies to obtain relief for his client"5 which he considered as
tantamount to "abusive and a spiteful effort to delay the execution of Judgment."6 He noted that after the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 162 issued a Resolution in Civil Case No. 65147 adverse to his client,
respondent filed a barrage of cases/pleadings such as an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the
RTC ruling, a petition for review with the Supreme Court which was denied for having been filed out of time; a
petition for annulment of the RTC judgment which was dismissed by the CA; another petition for review before this
Court which was again denied; a petition for certiorari which was dismissed by the CA; another civil case before the
RTC of Mauban, Quezon which was dismissed for "improper venue, res judicata, and violation of the anti-forum
shopping law"7 and that it involved the same issues as the one filed in Pasig RTC. Moreover, he filed several
inhibitions, motions and an administrative complaint against the presiding judge. The Investigating Commissioner,
stated:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
x x x [O]ne can immediately appreciate and see the abusive and spiteful conduct of Respondent. He as a lawyer
could have hardly missed knowing that his subsequent actions were merely meant to harass the opposing litigant as
in fact the Supreme Court had already issued its final ruling on the matter. After the ruling of the High Court,
Respondent should have known that the case had been finally adjudicated and no amount of judicial exercise could
turn the decision in his client's favor. From then on, he should have saved his efforts of filing cases and motions in
court, as they are futile anyway, because he has his duty to the court above that to his client.

Needless to state, the Respondent is found herein to have violated Canon 12, Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04 of the
CPR for which he should be meted with the appropriate administrative penalty.8

He thus recommended that respondent be meted out the penalty of suspension for four months.

In its Resolution No. XX-2013-251 dated 20 March 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration on July 20, 2013, stating that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
2. x x x he had only exhausted all possible remedies available under the premises;

xxxx

With all candor and honesty, undersigned believes that he was only doing his legal duty as a lawyer to exhaust all
legal remedies taking steps within its framework. He has not done any wrongdoing while taking such routes. He has
never been dishonest;

xxxx

4. Respondent believes that undersigned deserves an acquittal given the fact that it was not shown that he acted in
bad: faith in taking such legal remedies.

5. Respondent cannot also be charged with abuse of judicial process because complainant has other recourse
available to execute the said decision in her favor while there were petitions filed, complainant also did not allege
that respondent has abused the judicial process. The courts to which the said petitions were filed also did not cite
the respondent in contempt of court [nor was a warning] given.

xx x x

6. Moreover, respondent is now suffering from renal failure which requires him to undergo dialysis three (3) times in
a week. To suspend him for four months would mean that he would stop his dialysis for four moths [sic] which may
cause his immediate death. This Honorable Commission would not be too happy to see one of its members begging
for alms from PCSO and government officials to shoulder his dialysis of about P100,000.00 per month.9

In a subsequent Resolution No. XXI-2014-182 dated March 23, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors affirmed its
earlier Resolution and denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, saying that there was no cogent reason to
reverse the findings of the Commission on Bar Discipline.
The Court's Ruling
While it is true that lawyers owe "entire devotion" to the cause of their clients,10 it cannot be emphasized enough that
their first and primary duty is "not to the client but to the administration of justice."11 Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility states that "A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice." Thus, in the use of Court processes, the lawyer's zeal to win must be
tempered by the paramount consideration that justice be done to all parties involved, and the la|wyer for the losing
party should not stand in the way of the execution of a valid judgment. This is a fundamental principle in legal ethics
and professional responsibility that has iterations in various forms:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

The Lawyer's Oath:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

x x x I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to
the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Rule 138, Section 20, Rules of Court:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Duties of attorneys. - It is the duty of an attorney: xxxx

(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as
he believes to be honestly debatable under the law;

xxxx

(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding, or delay any man's
cause, from any corrupt motive or interest; (Emphasis supplied)

Code of Professional Responsibility:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any
man's cause.

Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.

Rule 12.02 - A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.

Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse Court
processes. (Emphasis supplied)

Because a lawyer is an officer of the court called upon to assist in the administration of justice, any act of a lawyer
that obstructs, perverts, or impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary
action against him.12redarclaw

In this case, the judgment in favor of complainant had become final and executory by July 27, 2005. Respondent
however proceeded to file no less than twelve (12) motions and cases in various courts subsequent to the Entry of
Judgment:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Regional Trial Court of Taguig City:

1. Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated April 27,2006

2. Motion to Admit Affidavit of Third-Party Claimant
3. Motion for Early Resolution
4. Motion to Observe Judicial Courtesy while the case is pending appeal with the Court of Appeals
5. Urgent Motion to Defer/Suspend Execution in view of the Order of the CA
6. Urgent Motion to Reconsider Order

Court of Appeals:

1. Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals
2. Motion for Reconsideration
3. Petition for Certiorari
4. Urgent Motion to Reiterate the Issuance of Order for Judicial Courtesy
Supreme Court:

1. Petition for Certiorari

2. Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order

From the nature and sheer number of motions and cases filed, it is clear that respondent's intention was to delay the
execution of the final judgment.

But even assuming for the sake of argument that respondent was only doing his duty as a lawyer to exhaust all legal
remedies to protect the interest of his client, his other actions belie his claim of good faith. Respondent filed a civil
case for damages with the Regional Trial Court of Mauban, Quezon in what was clearly a case of forum-shopping.
Moreover, respondent filed three Motions to Inhibit against the three judges hearing these cases, and even a motion
to cite the sheriff in contempt of court who was simply carrying out his duty to execute the decision.

In his defense, respondent argued that the Courts did not call attention to his improper behavior and dilatory tactics.
This is not true. In her Order inhibiting herself from the case, Judge Homena-Valencia stated:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
This presiding judge would like to emphasize that, having assumed her position as acting presiding judge of this
branch only last September 2005, she does not know any of the parties from Adam. As such, she could not be
inclined to show bias in favor of one of them. She refuses, however, to be drawn into a discussion, to put it mildly,
with respondent's counsel as to her knowledge of the law.

However, to obviate any suspicion as to her objectivity, she inhibits herself from further hearing this case although
the reasons stated by the defendant are not one of those provided for in the Rules for the voluntary inhibition of a
judge.

Respondent's counsel is hereby advised to be more professional in his language, he, being a lawyer, is first and
foremost an officer of the court.13

In the October 23, 2007 Decision14 of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 97564, respondent was rebuked for the misuse of
court processes, thus:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
This Petition for Annulment of Judgment is petitioner's last-ditch effort to defer the execution of the 31 July 2002
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 162, which has long attained finality.

xxxx

In epitome, to sustain petitioner's insinuation of extrinsic fraud is to make a mockery of Our judicial system. We take
exception to the unjustified delay in the enforcement of the RTC Decision dated 31 July 2002 which has long
become final and executory. This is obviously a spiteful ploy to deprive respondent of the fruits of her victory.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Annulment of Judgment is hereby DISMISSED.15

Moreover, in his Omnibus Order16 dated September 18, 2008, Judge Briccio C. Ygaña17 stated:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
This case is a clear example of how a party, aided by a smart lawyer, could unduly delay a case, impede the
execution of judgment or misuse court processes. Defendant and counsel are very lucky that the herein plaintiff has
the patience of Job. Should this case reach the attention of the Supreme Court, where the whole story will be
known, they will have a lot of explaining to do.18

It is quite clear that respondent has made a mockery of the judicial process by abusing Court processes, employing
dilatory tactics to frustrate the execution of a final judgment, and feigning ignorance of Ms duties as an officer of the
court. He has breached his sworn duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, and violated the
Lawyer's Oath, Rules 10.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Rule 138, Sec. 20 (c) and (g)
of the Rules of Court. In so doing, he is administratively liable for his actions.

Rule 138, Sec. 27 of the Rules of Court provides the penalties of disbarment and suspension as
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to
a case without authority so to do x x x.

In previous decisions involving abuse of court processes,19 this Court has imposed the penalty of suspension
ranging from six months to two years. In light of the following aggravating circumstances - multiplicity of motions and
cases filed by respondent, the malice evinced by his filing of various motions to prevent the judges and sheriff from
fulfilling their legal duties, feigned ignorance of his duties as an officer of the court, and his lack of remorse for his
actions - the Court finds that a penalty of suspension for 18 months would be commensurate to the damage and
prejudice that respondent has inflicted on complainant Salabao for his actions.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Andres C. Villaruel, Jr. is hereby found GUILTY of violation
of the Lawyer's Oath and Rules 10.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby
suspended from the practice of law for a period of eighteen (18) months.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and noted in Atty. Villaruel's record as a
member of the Bar.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Carpio, (Chairperson), Mendoza, Leonen, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

 A.C. No. 8172, April 12, 2016

ALEX NULADA, Complainant, v. ATTY. ORLANDO S. PAULMA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

The instant administrative case arose from a verified complaint1 for disbarment by reason of dishonesty and
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude filed by Complainant Alex Nulada (complainant) against respondent
Atty. Orlando S. Paulma (respondent).
The Facts

Complainant alleged that on September 30, 2005, respondent issued in his favor a check in the amount of
P650,000.00 as payment for the latter's debt. Because of respondent's standing as a respected member of the
community and his being a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Miagao,2 Province of Iloilo,
complainant accepted the check without question.3

Unfortunately, when he presented the check for payment, it was dishonored due to insufficient fluids. Respondent
failed to make good the amount of the check despite notice of dishonor and repeated demands, prompting
complainant to file a criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 224 against respondent,5 before
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Province of Iloilo, docketed as I.S. No. 2006-637,6 which issued a
Resolution7 dated May 26, 2006 recommending the filing of the appropriate information against respondent before
the Municipal Trial Court of Miagao, Province of Iloilo (MTC).8 Subsequently, said information was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 2604.9

After due proceedings, the MTC rendered a Decision10 dated October 30, 2008 finding respondent guilty of violation
of BP 22 and ordering him to pay the amount of P150,000.00 as fine, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of failure
to pay. Furthermore, he was ordered to pay: (1) the sum of P650,000.00 representing the amount of the check with
interest pegged at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum computed from the time of the filing of the complaint;
(2) filing fees in the amount of P10,000.00; and (3) attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00 plus appearance
fees of P1,500.00 per hearing.11

Records show that respondent appealed his conviction to the Regional Trial Court of Guimbal, Iloilo, Branch 67
(RTC), docketed as Criminal Case No. 346.12 In a Decision13 dated March 13, 2009, the RTC affirmed in toto the
MTC ruling. On April 16, 2009, the RTC Decision became final and executory.14

Prior to the promulgation of the RTC Decision, or on February 12, 2009, complainant filed this administrative
complaint before the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant.

In his defense,15 respondent denied that he committed dishonesty against complainant, as prior to September 30,
2005, he informed the latter that there were insufficient funds to cover the amount of the check. Respondent claimed
that he merely issued the check in order to accommodate a friend in whose favor he obtained the loan, stressing
that he did not personally benefit from the proceeds thereof.16 Unfortunately, said friend had died and respondent
had no means by which to pay for the amount of the check.17 He also claimed that complainant threatened him and
used his unfunded check to the latter's personal advantage.18

Thereafter, the Court, in its Resolution dated November 14, 2011,19 referred this administrative case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for its investigation, report, and recommendation.
The IBP's Report and Recommendation

After conducting mandatory conferences, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP issued a Report and
Recommendation20 dated June 26, 2013, recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
a period of six (6) months for violation of the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), as
well as for having been found guilty of a crime involving moral turpitude.21

It found that the offense for which respondent was found guilty of, i.e., violation of BP 22, involved moral turpitude,
and that he violated his lawyer's oath and the CPR when he committed the said offense. Stressing the importance of
the lawyer's oath, the IBP held that by his conviction of the said crime, respondent has shown that he is "unfit to
protect the administration of justice or that he is no longer of good moral character"22 which justifies either his
suspension or disbarment.23

Subsequently, or on October 10, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Notice of Resolution24 adopting and
approving with modification the IBP's Report and Recommendation dated June 26, 2013, suspending respondent
from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years for having violated the lawyer's oath and the CPR, as well as for
having been found guilty of a crime involving moral turpitude.25cralawred
The Issue Before the Court

The issue advanced for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondent should be administratively disciplined for
having been found guilty of a crime involving moral turpitude.
The Court's Ruling

The Court sustains the findings and conclusions of the CBD of the IBP, as approved, adopted, and modified by the
IBP Board of Governors.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, Or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally
or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Canon 1 of the CPR mandates all members of the bar "to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law x x
x." Rule 1.01 thereof specifically provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct." By taking the lawyer's oath, a lawyer becomes a guardian of the law and an indispensable
instrument for the orderly administration of justice.26 As such, he can be disciplined for any conduct, in his
professional or private capacity, which renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court.27cralawred

In Enriquez v. De Vera,28 the Court discussed the purpose and nature of a violation of BP 22 in relation to an
administrative case against a lawyer, as in this case, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[BP] 22 has been enacted in order to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the legitimate public
checking account users. The gravamen of the offense defined and punished by [BP] 22 [x x x] is the act of making
and issuing a worthless check, or any check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment and putting it in
circulation; the law is designed to prohibit and altogether eliminate the deleterious and pernicious practice of issuing
checks with insufficient funds, or with no credit, because the practice is deemed a public nuisance, a crime against
public order to be abated.

xxxx

Being a lawyer, respondent was well aware of the objectives and coverage of [BP] 22. If he did not, he was
nonetheless presumed to know them, for the law was penal in character and application. His issuance of the
unfunded check involved herein knowingly violated [BP] 22, and exhibited his indifference towards the pernicious
effect of his illegal act to public interest and public order. He thereby swept aside his Lawyer's Oath that enjoined
him to support the Constitution and obey the laws.29ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Clearly, the issuance of worthless checks in violation of BP Blg. 22 indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and
confidence reposed on him, shows such lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him
unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action.30

In this case, respondent's conviction for violation of BP 22, a crime involving moral turpitude, had been indubitably
established. Such conviction has, in fact, already become final. Consequently, respondent violated the lawyer's
oath, as well as Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, as aptly found by the IBP and, thus, must be subjected to
disciplinary action.

In Heenan v. Espejo,31 the Court suspended therein respondent from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years
when the latter issued checks which were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. In A-1 Financial Services, Inc. v.
Valerio,32 the same penalty was imposed by the Court to respondent who issued worthless checks to pay off her
loan. Likewise, in Dizon v. De Taza,33 the Court meted the penalty of suspension for a period of two (2) years to
respondent for having issued bouncing checks, among other infractions. Finally, in Wong v. Moya II,34 respondent
was ordered suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, because aside from issuing worthless
checks and failure to pay his debts, respondent also breached his client's trust and confidence to his personal
advantage and had shown a wanton disregard of the IBP's Orders in the course of its proceedings. Accordingly, and
in view of the foregoing instances when the erring lawyer was suspended for a period of two (2) years for the same
violation, the Court finds it appropriate to mete the same penalty to respondent in this case.

As a final word, it should be emphasized that membership in the legal profession is a privilege burdened with
conditions.35 A lawyer is required to observe the law and be mindful of his or her actions whether acting in a public
or private capacity.36 Any transgression of this duty on his part would not only diminish his reputation as a lawyer but
would also erode the public's faith in the legal profession as a whole.37 In this case, respondent's conduct fell short
of the exacting standards expected of him as a member of the bar, for which he must suffer the necessary
consequences.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Orlando S. Paulma is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
two (2) years, effective upon his receipt of this Resolution. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar act
will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in Atty. Paulma's personal record with the Office of the Bar Confidant, and
copies be served to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to
all the courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perez, Mendoza, Reyes,
Leonen, Jardeleza, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Peralta, J., on official leave.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A.C. No. 5951

JUTTA KRURSEL, Complainant

vs.
ATTY. LORENZA A. ABION, Respondent

RESOLUTION

PERCURIAM.:

In a verified Complaint,1 filed on January 23, 2003, complainant Jutta Krursel, a German national, charges
respondent Atty. Lorenza A. Abion with forgery, swindling, and falsification of a public document. She asks that
respondent be disbarred.2

Complainant alleges that she engaged the services of respondent to assist her in filing a case against Robinsons
Savings Bank - Ermita Branch and its officers, in relation to the bank's illegal withholding/blocking of her account.3

In March 2002, respondent filed, on complainant's behalf, a complaint against Robinsons Savings Bank and its
officers before the Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas for "Conducting Business in an Unsafe and
Unsound Manner in violation of Republic Act No. 8791 [.]"4

Without complainant's knowledge, respondent withdrew the complaint with prejudice through a letter5 dated April 15,
2002 addressed to the Monetary Board. Complainant claims that respondent forged her signature and that of a
certain William Randell Coleman (Coleman) in the letter.6 She adds that she never authorized nor acceded to
respondent's withdrawal ofthe complaint.7

Complainant was further surprised to discover two (2) Special Powers of Attorney dated March 7, 20028 and March
24, 2002,9 which appear to have her and Coleman's signature as principals. The documents constituted respondent
as

their attorney-in-fact to represent, to receive, sign in their behalf, all papers, checks, accounts receivables, wired
remittances, in their legal and extra legal effort:s to retrieve and unblock the peso and dollar savings accounts
opened up with the Robinsons Savings Bank at its branch office at Ermita, Manila, in order for her to withdraw and
to encash all their accounts, receivables, checks, savings, remittances.10

Again, complainant claims that the signatures were forged.11 She denies ever having executed a special power of
attorney for respondent.12

Complainant further alleges that on March 24, 2002, respondent filed before this Court a Complaint for "Writ of
Preliminary Prohibitive and Mandatory Injunction with Damages[.]"13 For such services, respondent demanded and
received the following amounts on May 7, 2002:

Php 225,000.00 - For filing fee to the Supreme Court

Php 55,000.00 - For Sheriff's Service Fee

Php 50,000.00 - For Atty. Soriano, Clerk of Court, to expedite matters

Php 330,000.00 - Total14 (Emphasis in the original)

Respondent failed to account for these amounts despite complainant's demands for a receipt.15 Complainant's
demand letter16 dated June 24, 2002 for accounting and receipts was attached to the Complaint as Annex E.

Instead of providing a receipt for the amounts received, respondent allegedly presented complainant a document
purporting to be an Order17 dated May 10, 2002 from this Court's First Division, resolving the case in complainant's
favor. The Order was purportedly signed by Atty. Virginia R. Soriano, "Division Clerk of the First Division of the
Supreme Court."18 Complainant sought the advice of Atty. Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr., who, in turn, wrote to Atty.
Virginia Ancheta-Soriano (Atty. Soriano) on July 30, 200219 inquiring about the supposed Order.20 Atty. Soriano
replied21 denying the signature as hers. She stated that the Order did not even follow this Court's format, and that, on
the contrary, the case had been dismissed.22

Finally, complainant alleges that in April 2002, while she was sick and in the hospital, respondent asked for
complainant's German passport to secure its renewal from the German Embassy.23 For this service, respondent
asked for the total amount of ₱440,000.00 to cover the following expenses:

May 20, 2002 - Php 40,000.00 -For Processing of Travel Papers

May 27, 2002 - Php 50,000.00 -For Additional Fee for the Travel Papers

June 3, 2002 - Php 350,000.00 - For the release of Travel Papers as required by Atty. O. Dizon, BID

Php 450,000.00 [sic ]24(Emphasis in the original)

These sums were allegedly not properly accounted for despite complainant's demand.25 Respondent eventually
presented a purportedly renewed German passport, which complainant rejected because it was obviously
fake.26 Complainant later found out that her original German passport was in the possession of Robinsons Savings
Bank.27

Complainant avers that respondent's malicious acts warrant her removal from the roster of lawyers.28 She adds that
she and Coleman filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City a criminal Complaint29 against
respondent for the unlawful acts committed against them.30

In the Resoluiion31 dated February 24, 2003, this Court required respondent to file her comment.

Copies of the February 24, 2003 Resolution were subsequently served on respondent's various addresses.
However, these were returned unserved with the notations "Unclaimed " "Party Moved Out " "Moved Out " and
"Party in Manila."32 This Court requested the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation, but respondent
could still not be found.33

In the Resolution34 dated October 10, 2011, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report, and recommendation.

On March 14, 2012, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines directed both parties
to appear for mandatory conference.35 However, copies of the Notice of Mandatory Conference were returned
unserved as both parties were stated to have "moved out."36

Hence, in the Order37 dated April 24, 2012, the Commission on Bar Discipline deemed the case submitted for
resolution on the basis of the Complaint (with attachments) filed before this Court.

In his Report and Recommendation38 dated July 6, 2013, Investigating Commissioner Peter Irving C. Corvera
recommended that respondent be disbarred for fabricating and forging Special Powers of Attorney and an order
from this Court, coupled with her exaction of money from complainant without receipt or accounting despite
demands.39 These acts are in culpable violation of Canon l;Rule 1.01; Canon 16, Rule 16.01; and Canon 17 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.40

In the Resolution41 dated October 10, 2014, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors adopted and
approved the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner. Respondent did not file a motion for
reconsideration or any other subsequent pleading.

On October 13, 2015, the Board of Governors transmitted its Resolution to this Court for final action under Rule 139-
B of the Rules of Court.42

The issue for resolution is whether respondent should be disbarred for committing forgery, falsification, and
swindling.
 I

At the outset, we cannot ignore this Court's several attempts to serve a copy of the February 24, 2003 Resolution
(requiring respondent to file a comment on the Complaint for disbarment) on respondent at her address on record
and at the different addresses provided by complainant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, only to be returned
unserved. On June 1, 2011, this Court requested the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation to locate
respondent, but to no avail.43 All these circumstances reveal that either respondent was disinterested in contesting
the charges against her or she was deliberately eluding the service of this Court's Resolutions to evade the
consequences of her actions.

Respondent's willful behavior has effectively hindered this Court's process service and unduly prolonged this case.
This evasive attitude is unbecoming of a lawyer, an officer of the court who swore to "obey the laws as well as the
legal orders of the duly constituted authorities."44

In Stemmerick v. Mas,45this Court held that proper notice of the disbarment proceedings was given to the respondent
lawyer who abandoned his law office after committing the embezzlement against his client. Thus:

Respondent should not be allowed to benefit from his disappearing act. He can neither defeat this Court's
jurisdiction over him as a member of the bar nor evade administrative liability by the mere ruse of concealing his
whereabouts. Thus, service of the complaint and other orders and processes on respondent's office was sufficient
notice to him.

Indeed, since he himself rendered the service of notice on him impossible, the notice requirement cannot apply to
him and he is thus considered to hav.e waived it. The law does not require that the impossible be done. Nemo
tenetur ad impossibile. The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility. Laws and rules must be interpreted in a
way that they are in accordance with logic, common sense, reason and practicality.

In this connection, lawyers must update their records with the IBP by informing the IBP National Office or their
respective chapters of any change in office or residential address and other contact details. In case such change is
not duly updated, service of notice on the office or residential address appearing in the records of the IBP National
Office shall constitute sufficient notice to a lawyer for purposes of administrative proceedings against
him.46 (Citations omitted)

Here, respondent's apparent disregard of the judicial process cannot be tolerated. Under the circumstances,
respondent is deemed to have waived her right to present her evidence for she cannot use her disappearance as a
shield against any liability she may have incurred.

Respondent's evasive attitude is tantamount to "a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court,"47 which alone is a ground for disbarment or suspension.

We proceed to address the charges raised in the Complaint.

II

Complainant claims that respondent forged her and Coleman's signatures in two (2) documents: first, in the Special
Powers of Attorney dated March 7, 200248 and March 24, 2002;49 and second, in respondent's April 15, 2002
letter50 withdrawing her complaint against Robinsons Savings Bank before the Monetary Board of the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas.

A comparison of the signature of complainant Jutta Krursel in her Complaint and Verification and Certification, on
one hand, and her contested signature in the Special Power of Attorney dated March 7, 2002, on the other, visibly
shows significant differences in the stroke, form, and general appearance of the two (2) signatures. The inevitable
conclusion is that the two (2) signatures were not penned by one person. Similarly, complainant's contested
signature under the Conforme portion in the April 15, 2002 letter of respondent clearly appears to have been forged.

Nonetheless, with respect to complainant's forged signature in the Special Power of Attorney, we find no other
evidence pointing to respondent as the author of the forgery. Jurisprudence51 creates a presumption that a person
who was in possession of, or made use of, or benefitted from the forged or falsified documents is the forger.
However, in this case, the facts are insufficient for us to presume that respondent forged complainant's signature.

Although the Special Power of Attorney may have been executed in respondent's favor-as it authorized her to
represent, receive, and sign papers, checks, remittances, accounts, and receivables on behalf of complainant-her
appointment as attorney-in-fact was only in relation to complainant's "legal and extra[-]legal efforts to retrieve and
unblock [complainant's] peso and dollar savings accounts with Robinsons Savings Bank, Ermita."52

The authority given was only in furtherance of complainant's employment of respondent's legal services. There was
no allegation or proof that respondent benefitted from or used the falsified document.53 Moreover, complainant had
possession of the Special Power of Attorney, a copy of which was attached to her Complaint. In all likelihood, the
Special Power of Attorney may not only have been known to complainant; she may have conformed to its
preparation all along.

However, the same conclusion cannot be made with regard to complainant's forged signature in the April 15, 2002
letter. In the Verification54 attached to the letter, respondent declared under oath that she caused the preparation of
the letter of withdrawal of the complaint with prejudice. She declared under oath that she also caused the conforme
of her clients after informing them of the facts, both as counsel and attorney-in-fact.

Thus, respondent committed serious acts of deceit in: (l) withdrawing the complaint with prejudice, without the
knowledge and consent of complainant; and (2) forging complainant's signature or causing her signature to be
forged in the April 15, 2002 letter, thus making it appear that complainant conformed to the withdrawal of the
complaint.

In Sebastian v. Calis:55

Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable. They reveal moral flaws in a
lawyer. They are unacceptable practices. A lawyer's relationship with others should be characterized by the highest
1âw phi1

degree of good faith, fairness and candor. This is the essence of the lawyer's oath. The lawyer's oath is not mere
facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable. The nature of the office of
an attorney requires that he should be a person of good moral character. This requisite is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice
of law. We have sternly warned that any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private
capacity, puts his moral character in serious doubt as a member of the Bar, and renders him unfit to continue in the
practice of law.56 (Citations omitted)

Respondent's deception constitutes a gross violation of professional ethics and a breach of her fiduciary duty to her
client, subjecting her to disciplinary action.57

III

Furthermore, we agree with the Committee on Bar Discipline's finding that complainant has sufficiently proven her
allegations regarding the falsified order.

The appearance of the purported May 10, 2002 Order58 in G.R. No. 152946 is markedly different from the orders and
resolutions of this Court. Indeed, it was later confirmed through the letter59 issued by Atty. Soriano, Clerk of Court of
the First Division, that there was no such order issued, that the signature there was not hers, and that the format did
not follow this Court's format.

Complainant avers that she paid substantial amounts of money to respondent in relation to the filing of the complaint
for injunction in G.R. No. 152946, though respondent did not issue any receipt or accounting despite her demands.
Instead, respondent allegedly furnished complainant with the fabricated May 10, 2002 Order purportedly ruling in
her favor. Complainant later found out that no such order existed. The case was already dismissed.

Respondent's acts amount to deceit, malpractice, or gross misconduct in office as an attorney.60 She violated her
oath to "do no falsehood"61 and to "conduct [her]self as a lawyer ... with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to
[her] clients."62 She also violated the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1. 01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

....

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

....

Rule 7.03 -A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

....

CANON 15. A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND
TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT.

....

CANON 17. A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF
THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18. A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

....

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep his client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable
time to the client's request for information.

Respondent's transgressions are grave and serious. She abused her legal knowledge and training. She took undue
advantage of the trust reposed on her by her client. Her misconduct exhibits a brazen disregard of her duties as a
lawyer. The advocate for justice became the perpetrator of injustice.

Aside from defrauding her client, respondent recklessly put Atty. Soriano's career in jeopardy by fabricating an
order, thus making a mockery of the judicial system. That a lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer of
the court cannot be overemphasized. She owes the courts of justice and its judicial officers utmost respect.63 Her
conduct degrades the administration of justice and weakens the people faith in the judicial system. She inexorably
besmirched the entire legal profession.

In Embido v. Pe, Jr.,64Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Salvador Pe, Jr. was found guilty of violating Canon 7, Rule
7.03 and was meted the penalty of disbarment for falsifying a court decision "in a non-existent court
proceeding."65 Thus:

Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent transactions can justify a lawyer's
disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. Specifically, the deliberate falsification of the court decision by
the respondent was an act that reflected a high degree of moral turpitude on his part. Worse, the act made a
mockery of the administration of justice in this country, given the purpose of the falsification, which was to mislead a
foreign tribunal on the personal status of a person. He thereby became unworthy of continuing as a member of the
Bar.66 (Citations omitted)

Respondent's unethical and unscrupulous conduct proves her unworthy of the public's trust and confidence. She
shamelessly transgressed all the things she swore to uphold, which makes her unfit to continue as a member of the
bar. Hence, we find no hesitation in removing respondent from the Roll of Attorneys.

However, we find a dearth of evidence to support complainant's claim as to the amounts demanded and received by
respondent, that is: (1) a total of ₱330,000.00 in relation to G.R. No. 152946; and (2) a total of ₱440,000.00 for the
renewal of complainant's passport. The demand letter dated June 24, 2002, attached to the Complaint as Annex E,
is not competent proof of the actual amounts paid to and received by respondent. The demand letter does not
contain the date when the addressee received the letter; this produces doubt as to whether the demand letter was
actually sent/delivered to respondent.

In administrative cases, it is the complainant who has the burden to prove, by substantial evidence,67 the allegations
in the complaint.68

WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Atty. Lorenza A. Abion GUILTY of gross misconduct in violation of the
Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. She is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.
The Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to remove the name of Lorenza A. Abion from the Roll of Attorneys.

This Resolution is without prejudice to any pending or contemplated proceedings to be initiated against respondent.

The Legal Office of the Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to file the appropriate criminal charges
against respondent for falsifying an order of this Court.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office
of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts in the country.

This Resolution takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

On Official Leave On Official Leave

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA* BIENVENIDO L. REYES*
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
Adm. Case No. 8108 July 15, 2014

DANTE LA JIMENEZ & LAURO G. VIZCONDE, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. FELISBERTO L. VERANO, JR., Respondent.

x-----------------------x

Adm. Case No. 10299

ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. FELISBERTO L. VERANO, JR., Respondent.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, CJ:

Before this Court is the Resolution1 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) finding
respondent Atty. Felisberto Verano liable for improper and inappropriate conduct tending to influence and/or giving
the appearance of influence upon a public official. The Joint Report and Recommendation submitted by
Commissioner Felimon C. Abelita III recommended that respondent beissued a warning not to repeat the same nor
any similar action, otherwise the Commission will impose a more severe penalty. The Commission adopted the said
ruling on 16 April 2013.2

The complainants in Administrative Case (A.C.) No. 8108 are Dante La Jimenez and Lauro G. Vizconde, while
complainant in Adm. Case No. 10299 is Atty. Oliver O. Lozano. At the time of the filing of the complaints,
respondent Atty. Verano was representing his clients Richard S. Brodett and Joseph R. Tecson.

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

Brodett and Tecson (identified in media reports attached to the Complaint as the "Alabang Boys") werethe accused
in cases filed by the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for the illegal sale and use of dangerous
drugs.3 In a Joint Inquest Resolution issued on 2 December 2008, the charges were dropped for lack of probable
cause.4

Because of the failure of Prosecutor John R. Resado to ask clarificatory questions during the evaluation of the case,
several media outlets reported on incidents of bribery and "cover-up" allegedly prevalent in investigations of the drug
trade.This prompted the House Committee on Illegal Drugs to conduct its own congressional hearings. It was
revealed during one such hearing that respondenthad prepared the release order for his three clients using the
letterhead ofthe Department of Justice (DOJ) and the stationery of then Secretary Raul Gonzales.5

Jimenez and Vizconde, in their capacity as founders of Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption (VACC), sent a
letter of complaint to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. They stated that respondent had admitted to drafting the
release order, and had thereby committed a highly irregular and unethical act. They argued that respondent had no
authority to use the DOJ letterhead and should be penalized for acts unbecoming a member of the bar.6

For his part, Atty. Lozano anchoredhis Complaint on respondent’s alleged violation of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which states that a lawyer shall upholdthe Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and
promote respectfor legal processes.7 Atty. Lozano contended that respondent showed disrespect for the law and
legal processes in drafting the said order and sending it to a high-ranking public official, even though the latter was
not a government prosecutor.8 Atty. Lozano’s verified ComplaintAffidavit was filed with the Committee on Bar
Discipline of the IBP and docketed as CBD Case No. 09-2356.9

Officers of the IBP, Cebu CityChapter, issued a Resolution condemning the unethical conduct of respondent and
showing unqualified support for the VACC’s filing of disbarment proceedings.10 On 27 February 2009, Atty. Lozano
withdrew his Complaint on the ground that a similar action had been filed by Dante Jimenez.11 On 2 June 2009, the
Court referred both cases to the IBP for consolidation, as well as for investigation, report and recommendation.
RESPONDENT’S VERSION

In his Comment, respondent alludes to the Joint Inquest Resolution dropping the charges against his clients for lack
of probable cause, arguing that the resolution also ordered the immediate release of Brodett and Tecson. He
reasoned that the high hopes of the accused, together with their families, came crashing down when the PDEA still
refused to release his clients.12 Sheer faith in the innocence of his clients and fidelity to their cause prompted him to
prepare and draft the release order. Respondent admits that perhaps he was overzealous; yet, "if the Secretary of
Justice approves it, then everything may be expedited."13 In any case, respondent continues, the drafted release
order was not signed by the Secretary and therefore remained "a mere scrap of paper with no effect at all."14

FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATING COMMISSIONER

The Commissioner noted that both complaints remained unsubstantiated, while the letter-complaint of Jimenez and
Vizconde had not been verified. Therefore, no evidence was adduced to prove the charges.

However, by his own admissions inparagraphs 11 and 12 of his Comment, respondent drafted the release order
specifically for the signature of the DOJ Secretary. This act of "feeding" the draft order to the latter was found to be
highly irregular, as it tended to influence a public official. Hence, Commissioner Abelita found respondent guilty of
violating Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended that he be issued a warning not to
repeat the same or any similar action.15

RULING OF THE COURT

We emphasize at the outset thatthe Court may conduct its own investigation into charges against members of the
bar, irrespective of the form of initiatory complaints brought before it. Thus, a complainant in a disbarment case is
not a direct party to the case, but a witness who brought the matter to the attention of the Court.16 By now, it is basic
that there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers. The real question for
determination in these proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges of a
member of the bar.17

As to Atty. Lozano’s withdrawal of his verified Complaint, we reiterate our ruling in Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos:

The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant does not, in any way,
exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest
of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit
and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven x x x. The complainant or the person who called the attention of
the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome
except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.Hence, if the evidence on record
warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of
the charges.18 (Emphasis supplied)

After a careful review of the records,we agree with the IBP in finding reasonable grounds to hold respondent
administratively liable. Canon 13, the provision applied by the Investigating Commissioner, states that "a lawyer
shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the
appearance of influencing the court." We believe that other provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility
likewise prohibit acts of influence-peddling not limited to the regular courts, but even in all other venues in the justice
sector, where respect for the rule of law is at all times demanded from a member of the bar.

During the mandatory hearing conducted by the Committee on Bar Discipline, respondent stated that the PDEA
refused to release his clients unless it received a direct order from the DOJ Secretary. This refusal purportedly
impelled him to take more serious action, viz.:

ATTY VERANO: x x x By Monday December 22 I think my only recourse was to see the Secretary himself
personally. The Secretary is the type of a person who opens his [sic] kasihe is very political also so he opens his
office. If I’m not mistaken that day because of the timing we will afraid [sic] that Christmas time is coming and that
baka nga sila maipit sa loob ng Christmas time. So the family was very sad x x x kung pwede ko raw gawan ng
paraan na total na-dismissed na ang kaso. So, what I did was thinking as a lawyer now…I prepared the staff to
make it easy, to make it convenient for signing authority that if he agrees with our appeal he will just sign it and send
it over to PDEA. So hinanda ko ho yon. And then I sent it first to the Office of the other Secretary si Blancaflor.

xxxx

So I think it’s a Tuesday I had to do something and I said I will see the Secretary first with the parents of Rodette,
yong nanay at saka tatay, so we went to see him after 1:00 o’clock or 1:30 in the afternoon. By then, that draft was
still with Blancaflor. Andon ho ang Secretary tinanggap naman kami, so we sat down with him x x x Pinaliwanag ho
namin inexplain x x x Anyway, sabi niya what can I do if I move on this, they will think that kasama rin ako dyan sa
Fifty Million na yan. Sabi ko, Your Honor, wala akong Fifty Million, hindi naman ho milyonaryo ang mga pamilyang
ito. So, sabi ko pwede ho bang maki-usap…sabi niya okay I will see what I can do. I will study the matter, those
particular words, I will study the matter. Tumuloy pa ho ang kwentuhan, as a matter of fact, 2 oras ho kami ron eh.
They were not pushing us away, he was entertaining us, and we were discussing the case.19

Respondent likewise stated that his "experience with Secretary Gonzales is, he is very open;" and that "because of
my practice and well, candidly I belong also to a political family, my father was a Congressman. So, he (Gonzalez)
knows of the family and he knows my sister was a Congresswoman of Pasay and they weretogether in Congress. In
other words, I am not a complete stranger to him."20 Upon questioning by Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco,
respondent admitted that he was personally acquainted with the Secretary; however, they were not that close.21

These statements and others made during the hearing establish respondent’s admission that 1) he personally
approached the DOJ Secretary despite the fact that the case was still pending before the latter; and 2) respondent
caused the preparation of the draft release order on official DOJ stationery despite being unauthorized to do so, with
the end in view of "expediting the case."

The way respondent conducted himself manifested a clear intent to gain special treatment and consideration from a
government agency. This is precisely the type of improper behavior sought to be regulated by the codified norms for
the bar. Respondentis duty-bound to actively avoid any act that tends to influence, or may be seen to influence, the
outcome of an ongoing case, lest the people’s faith inthe judicial process is diluted.

The primary duty of lawyers is not to their clients but to the administration of justice. To that end, their clients’
1âwphi1

success is wholly subordinate. The conduct of a member of the bar ought to and must always be scrupulously
observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to bythe lawyer, even
inthe pursuit of his devotion to his client’s cause, is condemnable and unethical.22

Rule 1.02 states: "A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system." Further, according to Rule 15.06, "a lawyershall not state or imply that he is able to
influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body." The succeeding rule, Rule 15.07, mandates a lawyer "to
impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness."

Zeal and persistence in advancing a client’s cause must always be within the bounds of the law.23 A self-respecting
independence in the exercise of the profession is expected if an attorney is to remain a member of the bar. In the
present case, we find that respondent fell short of these exacting standards. Given the import of the case, a warning
is a mere slap on the wrist that would not serve as commensurate penalty for the offense.

In Sylvia Santos vs. Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya- Chua, the Court saw fit to impose a six-month suspension against a
judge who likewise committed acts of influence peddling whenshe solicited ₱100,000.00 from complainant Santos
when the latter asked for her help in the case of her friend Emerita Muñoz, who had a pendingcase with the
Supreme Court, because respondent judge was a former court attorney of the high court.24 We find that the same
penalty is appropriate in the present case.

WHEREFORE,in view of the foregoing, Atty. Felisberto L. Verano, Jr. is found GUILTYof violating Rules 1.02 and
15.07, in relation to Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for which he is SUSPENDEDfrom the
practice of law for six (6) months effective immediately. This also serves as an emphaticWARNING that repetition of
any similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be appended to the respondent’s bar records. The Court Administrator is hereby directed
to inform the different courts of this suspension.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

(On official leave)

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

(On leave) (On official leave)

ARTURO D. BRION** DIOSDADO M. PERALTA*
Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 EN BANC

A.C. No. 10579, December 10, 2014

ERLINDA FOSTER, Complainant, v. ATTY. JAIME V. AGTANG, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This refers to the Resolution1 of the Board of Governors (BOG), Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), dated March
23, 2014, affirming with modification the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, who recommended the
suspension of respondent Atty. Jaime V. Agtang (respondent) from the practice of law for one (1) year for ethical
impropriety and ordered the payment of his unpaid obligations to complainant.

From the records, it appears that the IBP, thru its Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), received a complaint2, dated
May 31, 2011, filed by Erlinda Foster (complainant) against respondent for “unlawful, dishonest, immoral and
deceitful”3 acts as a lawyer.

In its July 1, 2011 Order,4 the IBP-CBD directed respondent to file his Answer within 15 days from receipt of the
order. Respondent failed to do so and complainant sent a query as to the status of her complaint. On October 10,
2011, the Investigating Commissioner issued the Order5 setting the case for mandatory conference/hearing on
November 16, 2011. It was only on November 11, 2011, or five (5) days before the scheduled conference when
respondent filed his verified Answer.6

During the conference, only the complainant together with her husband appeared. She submitted a set of
documents contained in a folder, copies of which were furnished the respondent. The Investigating
Commissioner7 indicated that the said documents would be reviewed and the parties would be informed if there was
a need for clarificatory questioning; otherwise, the case would be submitted for resolution based on the documents
on file. The Minutes8 of the mandatory conference showed that respondent arrived at 11:10 o’clock in the morning or
after the proceeding was terminated.

On December 12, 2011, the complainant filed her Reply to respondent’s Answer.

On April 18, 2012, complainant submitted copies of the January 24, 2012 Decisions9 of the Municipal Trial Court in
Small Claims Case Nos. 2011-0077 and 2011-0079, ordering respondent [defendant therein] to pay complainant
and her husband the sum of P100,000.00 and P22,000.00, respectively, with interest at the rate of 12% per annum
from December 8, 2011 until fully paid, plus cost of suit.10

Complainant’s Position

From the records, it appears that complainant was referred to respondent in connection with her legal problem
regarding a deed of absolute sale she entered into with Tierra Realty, which respondent had notarized. After their
discussion, complainant agreed to engage his legal services for the filing of the appropriate case in court, for which
they signed a contract. Complainant paid respondent P20,000.00 as acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for incidental
expenses.11

On September 28, 2009, respondent wrote a letter12 to Tropical Villas Subdivision in relation to the legal problem
referred by complainant. He then visited the latter in her home and asked for a loan of P100,000.00, payable in sixty
(60) days, for the repair of his car. Complainant, having trust and confidence on respondent being her lawyer,
agreed to lend the amount without interest. A promissory note13 evidenced the loan.

In November 2009, complainant became aware that Tierra Realty was attempting to transfer to its name a lot she
had previously purchased. She referred the matter to respondent who recommended the immediate filing of a case
for reformation of contract with damages. On November 8, 2009, respondent requested and thereafter received from
complainant the amount of P150,000.00, as filing fee.14 When asked about the exorbitant amount, respondent cited
the high value of the land and the sheriffs’ travel expenses and accommodations in Manila, for the service of the
summons to the defendant corporation. Later, complainant confirmed that the fees paid for the filing of Civil Case
No. 14791-65, entitled Erlinda Foster v. Tierra Realty and Development Corporation, only amounted to P22,410.00
per trial court records.15

During a conversation with the Registrar of Deeds, complainant also discovered that respondent was the one who
notarized the document being questioned in the civil case she filed. When asked about this, respondent merely
replied that he would take a collaborating counsel to handle complainant’s case. Upon reading a copy of the
complaint filed by respondent with the trial court, complainant noticed that: 1] the major differences in the documents
issued by Tierra Realty were not alleged; 2] the contract to buy and sell and the deed of conditional sale were not
attached thereto; 3] the complaint discussed the method of payment which was not the point of contention in the
case; and 4] the very anomalies she complained of were not mentioned. Respondent, however, assured her that
those matters could be brought up during the hearings.

On April 23, 2010, respondent wrote to complainant, requesting that the latter extend to him the amount of
P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 “in the moment of urgency or emergency.”16 Complainant obliged the request and gave
respondent the sum of P22,000.00.

On August 31, 2010, respondent came to complainant’s house and demanded the sum of P50,000.00, purportedly
to be given to the judge in exchange for a favorable ruling. Complainant expressed her misgivings on this
proposition but she eventually gave the amount of P25,000.00 which was covered by a receipt,17 stating that “it is
understood that the balance of P25,000.00 shall be paid later after favorable judgment for plaintiff Erlinda Foster.”
On November 2, 2010, respondent insisted that the remaining amount be given by complainant prior to the next
hearing of the case, because the judge was allegedly asking for the balance. Yet again, complainant handed to
respondent the amount of P25,000.00.18

On September 29, 2010, complainant’s case was dismissed. Not having been notified by respondent, complainant
learned of the dismissal on December 14, 2010, when she personally checked the status of the case with the court.
She went to the office of respondent, but he was not there. Instead, one of the office staff gave her a copy of the
order of dismissal.

On December 15, 2010, respondent visited complainant and gave her a copy of the motion for reconsideration. On
January 15, 2011, complainant went to see respondent and requested him to prepare a reply to the comment filed
by Tierra Realty on the motion for reconsideration; to include additional facts because the Land Registration
Authority would not accept the documents unless these were amended; and to make the additional averment that
the defendant was using false documents.

On January 18, 2011, respondent’s driver delivered to complainant a copy of the reply with a message from him that
the matters she requested to be included were mentioned therein. Upon reading the same, however, complainant
discovered that these matters were not so included. On the same occasion, the driver also asked for P2,500.00 on
respondent’s directive for the reimbursement of the value of a bottle of wine given to the judge as a present.
Complainant was also told that oral arguments on the case had been set the following month.19

On February 2, 2011, complainant decided to terminate the services of respondent as her counsel and wrote him a
letter of termination,20 after her friend gave her copies of documents showing that respondent had been acquainted
with Tierra Realty since December 2007. Subsequently, complainant wrote to respondent, requesting him to pay her
the amounts he received from her less the contract fee and the actual cost of the filing fees. Respondent never
replied.

Respondent’s Position

In his Answer,21 respondent alleged that he was 72 years old and had been engaged in the practice of law since
March 1972, and was President of the IBP Ilocos Norte Chapter from 1998 to 1999. He admitted the fact that he
notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale subject of complainant’s case, but he qualified that he was not paid his notarial
fees therefor. He likewise admitted acting as counsel for complainant for which he claimed to have received
P10,000.00 as acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for incidental fees. Anent the loan of P100,000.00, respondent
averred that it was complainant, at the behest of her husband, who willingly offered the amount to him for his
patience in visiting them at home and for his services. The transaction was declared as “no loan” and he was told
not to worry about its payment. As regards the amount of P150,000.00 he received for filing fees, respondent
claimed that the said amount was suggested by the complainant herself who was persistent in covering the
incidental expenses in the handling of the case. He denied having said that the sheriffs of the court would need the
money for their hotel accommodations. Complainant’s husband approved of the amount. In the same vein,
respondent denied having asked for a loan of P50,000.00 and having received P22,000.00 from complainant. He
also denied having told her that the case would be discussed with the judge who would rule in their favor at the very
next hearing. Instead, it was complainant who was bothered by the possibility that the other party would befriend the
judge. He never said that he would personally present a bottle of wine to the judge.

Further, respondent belied the Registrar’s comment as to his representation of Tierra Realty in the past.
Respondent saw nothing wrong in this situation since complainant was fully aware that another counsel was
assisting him in the handling of cases. Having been fully informed of the nature of her cause of action and the
consequences of the suit, complainant was aware of the applicable law on reformation of contracts. Finally, by way
of counterclaim, respondent demanded just compensation for the services he had rendered in other cases for the
complainant.

Reply of Complainant

In her Reply,22 complainant mainly countered respondent’s defenses by making reference to the receipts in her
possession, all evidencing that respondent accepted the amounts mentioned in the complaint. Complainant also
emphasized that respondent and Tierra Realty had relations long before she met him. While respondent was
employed as Provincial Legal Officer of the Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte, he was involved in the
preparation of several documents involving Flying V, an oil company owned by Ernest Villavicencio, who likewise
owned Tierra Realty. Complainant insisted that the amount of P100,000.00 she extended to respondent was never
considered as “no loan.”

On June 26, 2012, complainant furnished the Investigating Commissioner copies of the Resolution, dated June 20,
2012, issued by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Laoag City, finding probable cause against respondent for
estafa.23

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

In its July 3, 2012 Report and Recommendation,24 the Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of ethical
impropriety and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.

In its September 28, 2013 Resolution, the IBP-BOG adopted and approved with modification the recommendation of
suspension by the Investigating Commissioner and ordered respondent to return to complainant: 1) his loan of
P122,000.00; and 2) the balance of the filing fee amounting to P127,590.00.

Respondent received a copy of the said resolution on January 16, 2014 to which he filed a motion for
reconsideration.25 Complainant filed her opposition thereto, informing the IBP-BOG that an information charging
respondent for estafa had already been filed in court and that a corresponding order for his arrest had been
issued.26

In its March 23, 2014 Resolution, the IBP-BOG denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration but modified the
penalty of his suspension from the practice of law by reducing it from one (1) year to three (3) months. Respondent
was likewise ordered to return the balance of the filing fee received from complainant amounting to P127,590.00.

No petition for review was filed with the Court.

The only issue in this case is whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

The Court’s Ruling

The Court sustains the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with respect to
respondent’s violation of Rules 1 and 16 of the CPR. The Court, however, modifies the conclusion on his alleged
violation of Rule 15, on representing conflicting interests. The Court also differs on the penalty.

Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.” It is well-established that a lawyer’s conduct is “not confined to the performance of his professional duties.
A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is
whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether
it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.”27

In this case, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his professional and private
capacity. As a lawyer, he clearly misled complainant into believing that the filing fees for her case were worth more
than the prescribed amount in the rules, due to feigned reasons such as the high value of the land involved and the
extra expenses to be incurred by court employees. In other words, he resorted to overpricing, an act customarily
related to depravity and dishonesty. He demanded the amount of P150,000.00 as filing fee, when in truth, the same
amounted only to P22,410.00. His defense that it was complainant who suggested that amount deserves no iota of
credence. For one, it is highly improbable that complainant, who was then plagued with the rigors of litigation, would
propose such amount that would further burden her financial resources. Assuming that the complainant was more
than willing to shell out an exorbitant amount just to initiate her complaint with the trial court, still, respondent should
not have accepted the excessive amount. As a lawyer, he is not only expected to be knowledgeable in the matter of
filing fees, but he is likewise duty-bound to disclose to his client the actual amount due, consistent with the values of
honesty and good faith expected of all members of the legal profession.

Moreover, the “fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer the duty
to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client.”28 Money entrusted to a lawyer for a
specific purpose but not used for the purpose should be immediately returned. A lawyer’s failure to return upon
demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the
same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general
morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment.29

It is clear that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. As pointed out, he received various amounts from complainant but
he could not account for all of them. Worse, he could not deny the authenticity of the receipts presented by
complainant. Upon demand, he failed to return the excess money from the alleged filing fees and other expenses.
His possession gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of, and
in violation of the trust reposed in him by, the client.30 When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular
purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the
intended purpose. Consequently, if the lawyer does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must
immediately return the money to the client.31

Somewhat showing a propensity to demand excessive and unwarranted amounts from his client, respondent
displayed a reprehensible conduct when he asked for the amount of P50,000.00 as “representation expenses”
allegedly for the benefit of the judge handling the case, in exchange for a favorable decision. Respondent himself
signed a receipt showing that he initially took the amount of P 25,000.00 and, worse, he subsequently demanded
and received the other half of the amount at the time the case had already been dismissed. Undoubtedly, this act is
tantamount to gross misconduct that necessarily warrants the supreme penalty of disbarment. The act of demanding
a sum of money from his client, purportedly to be used as a bribe to ensure a positive outcome of a case, is not only
an abuse of his client’s trust but an overt act of undermining the trust and faith of the public in the legal profession
and the entire Judiciary. This is the height of indecency. As officers of the court, lawyers owe their utmost fidelity to
public service and the administration of justice. In no way should a lawyer indulge in any act that would damage the
image of judges, lest the public’s perception of the dispensation of justice be overshadowed by iniquitous doubts.
The denial of respondent and his claim that the amount was given gratuitously would not excuse him from any
liability. The absence of proof that the said amount was indeed used as a bribe is of no moment. To tolerate
respondent’s actuations would seriously erode the public’s trust in the courts.

As it turned out, complainant’s case was dismissed as early as September 29, 2010. At this juncture, respondent
proved himself to be negligent in his duty as he failed to inform his client of the status of the case, and left the client
to personally inquire with the court. Surely, respondent was not only guilty of misconduct but was also remiss in his
duty to his client.

Respondent’s unbecoming conduct towards complainant did not stop here. Records reveal that he likewise violated
Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, which states that “[a] lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the
client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend
money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he
is handling for the client.” In his private capacity, he requested from his client, not just one, but two loans of
considerable amounts. The first time, he visited his client in her home and borrowed P100,000.00 for the repair of
his car; and the next time, he implored her to extend to him a loan of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 “in the moment of
urgency or emergency” but was only given P22,000.00 by complainant. These transactions were evidenced by
promissory notes and receipts, the authenticity of which was never questioned by respondent. These acts were
committed by respondent in his private capacity, seemingly unrelated to his relationship with complainant, but were
indubitably acquiesced to by complainant because of the trust and confidence reposed in him as a lawyer. Nowhere
in the records, particularly in the defenses raised by respondent, was it implied that these loans fell within the
exceptions provided by the rules. The loans of P100,000.00 and P22,000.00 were surely not protected by the nature
of the case or by independent advice. Respondent’s assertion that the amounts were given to him out of the
liberality of complainant and were, thus, considered as “no loan,” does not justify his inappropriate behavior. The
acts of requesting and receiving money as loans from his client and thereafter failing to pay the same are indicative
of his lack of integrity and sense of fair dealing. Up to the present, respondent has not yet paid his obligations to
complainant.

Time and again, the Court has consistently held that deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes gross
misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are
instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not
only legal proficiency, but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the people’s
faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully perform their duties to
society, to the bar, the courts and their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations.32

Verily, when the Code or the Rules speaks of “conduct” or “misconduct,” the reference is not confined to one’s
behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of the lawyer’s professional duties, but also covers any
misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice of his profession, would show him to be unfit for the office
and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law vest him with. Unfortunately, respondent must be found
guilty of misconduct on both scores.

With respect to respondent’s alleged representation of conflicting interests, the Court finds it proper to modify the
findings of the Investigating Commissioner who concluded that complainant presented insufficient evidence of
respondent’s “lawyering” for the opposing party, Tierra Realty.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.” The relationship between a lawyer and his/her
client should ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality
that must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the client’s most confidential information to his/her lawyer for an
unhampered exchange of information between them. Needless to state, a client can only entrust confidential
information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer,
for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all dealings and transactions with the client. Part
of the lawyer’s duty in this regard is to avoid representing conflicting interests.”33 Thus, even if lucrative fees offered
by prospective clients are at stake, a lawyer must decline professional employment if the same would trigger the
violation of the prohibition against conflict of interest. The only exception provided in the rules is a written consent
from all the parties after full disclosure.

The Court deviates from the findings of the IBP. There is substantial evidence to hold respondent liable for
representing conflicting interests in handling the case of complainant against Tierra Realty, a corporation to which
he had rendered services in the past. The Court cannot ignore the fact that respondent admitted to having notarized
the deed of sale, which was the very document being questioned in complainant’s case. While the Investigating
Commissioner found that the complaint in Civil Case No. 14791-65 did not question the validity of the said contract,
and that only the intentions of the parties as to some provisions thereof were challenged, the Court still finds that the
purpose for which the proscription was made exists. The Court cannot brush aside the dissatisfied observations of
the complainant as to the allegations lacking in the complaint against Tierra Realty and the clear admission of
respondent that he was the one who notarized the assailed document. Regardless of whether it was the validity of
the entire document or the intention of the parties as to some of its provisions raised, respondent fell short of
prudence in action when he accepted complainant’s case, knowing fully that he was involved in the execution of the
very transaction under question. Neither his unpaid notarial fees nor the participation of a collaborating counsel
would excuse him from such indiscretion. It is apparent that respondent was retained by clients who had close
dealings with each other. More significantly, there is no record of any written consent from any of the parties
involved.

The representation of conflicting interests is prohibited “not only because the relation of attorney and client is one of
trust and confidence of the highest degree, but also because of the principles of public policy and good taste. An
attorney has the duty to deserve the fullest confidence of his client and represent him with undivided loyalty. Once
this confidence is abused or violated the entire profession suffers.”34

Penalties and Pecuniary Liabilities

A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney, for violation of
the lawyer’s oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the CPR.35 For the practice
of law is “a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and
who possess good moral character.”36 The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of
sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.37

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended on
any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral
conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath; (6) willful disobedience
of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willful appearance as an attorney for a party without authority. A
lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows
him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or unworthy to continue as an officer of
the court.

Here, respondent demonstrated not just a negligent disregard of his duties as a lawyer but a wanton betrayal of the
trust of his client and, in general, the public. Accordingly, the Court finds that the suspension for three (3) months
recommended by the IBP-BOG is not sufficient punishment for the unacceptable acts and omissions of respondent.
The acts of the respondent constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney. His incompetence
and appalling indifference to his duty to his client, the courts and society render him unfit to continue discharging the
trust reposed in him as a member of the Bar.

For taking advantage of the unfortunate situation of the complainant, for engaging in dishonest and deceitful
conduct, for maligning the judge and the Judiciary, for undermining the trust and faith of the public in the legal
profession and the entire judiciary, and for representing conflicting interests, respondent deserves no less than the
penalty of disbarment.38

Notably, the Court cannot order respondent to return the money he borrowed from complainant in his private
capacity. In Tria-Samonte v. Obias,39 the Court held that it cannot order the lawyer to return money to complainant if
he or she acted in a private capacity because its findings in administrative cases have no bearing on liabilities which
have no intrinsic link to the lawyer’s professional engagement. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only
issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. The only concern
of the Court is the determination of respondent’s administrative liability. Its findings have no material bearing on
other judicial actions which the parties may choose against each other.

To rule otherwise would in effect deprive respondent of his right to appeal since administrative cases are filed
directly with the Court. Furthermore, the quantum of evidence required in civil cases is different from the quantum of
evidence required in administrative cases. In civil cases, preponderance of evidence is required. Preponderance of
evidence is “a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.”40 In administrative
cases, only substantial evidence is needed. Substantial evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla but is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, would suffice to hold
one administratively liable.41 Furthermore, the Court has to consider the prescriptive period applicable to civil cases
in contrast to administrative cases which are, as a rule, imprescriptible.42

Thus, the IBP-BOG was correct in ordering respondent to return the amount of P127,590.00 representing the
balance of the filing fees he received from complainant, as this was intimately related to the lawyer-client
relationship between them. Similar to this is the amount of P50,000.00 which respondent received from complainant,
as representation expenses for the handling of the civil case and for the purported purchase of a bottle of wine for
the judge. These were connected to his professional relationship with the complainant. While respondent’s
deplorable act of requesting the said amount for the benefit of the judge is stained with mendacity, respondent
should be ordered to return the same as it was borne out of their professional relationship. As to his other
obligations, respondent was already adjudged as liable for the personal loans he contracted with complainant, per
the small claims cases filed against him.
All told, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, “the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for
his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession.”43 The
Court likewise aims to ensure the proper and honest administration of justice by “purging the profession of members
who, by their misconduct, have proven themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities of an attorney.”44

WHEREFORE, finding the respondent, Atty. Jaime V. Agtang, GUILTY of gross misconduct in violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, the Court hereby DISBARS him from the practice of law and ORDERS him to pay the
complainant, Erlinda Foster, the amounts of P127,590.00, P50,000.00 and P2,500.00.

Let a copy of this Decision be sent to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, (Chief Justice), Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Mendoza, Reyes,
Perlas-Bernabe, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Brion, J., on leave.
Peralta, J., no part.
Bersamin, Perez, and Jardeleza, JJ., on official leave.
A.C. No. 8000 August 5, 2014

CHAMELYN A. AGOT, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. LUIS P. RIVERA, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For the Court's resolution is a Complaint-Affidavit1 dated August 30, 2008 filed by complainant Chamelyn A. Agot
(complainant) against respondent Atty. Luis P. Rivera (respondent), charging him of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR) and the lawyer's oath for misrepresentation, deceit, and failure to account for and
return her money despite several demands.

The Facts

In her Complaint-Affidavit, complainant alleged that she was invited as maid of honor in her best friend’s wedding on
December 9, 2007 at the United States of America. To facilitate the issuance of her United States (US) visa,
complainant sought the services of respondent who represented himself as an immigration lawyer. Thus, on
November 17, 2007, they entered into a Contract of Legal Services (Contract),2 whereby respondent undertook to
facilitate and secure the release of a US immigrant visa in complainant’s favor prior to the scheduled wedding. In
consideration therefor, complainant paid respondent the amount of ₱350,000.00 as downpayment and undertook to
pay the balance of ₱350,000.00 after the issuance of the US visa.3 The parties likewise stipulated that should
complainant’s visa application be denied for any reason other than her absence on the day of the interview and/or
for records of criminal conviction and/or any court-issued hold departure order, respondent is obligated to return the
said downpayment.4 However, respondent failed to perform his undertaking within the agreed period. Worse,
complainant was not even scheduled for interview in the US Embassy. As the demand for refund of the
downpayment was not heeded, complainant filed a criminal complaint for estafa and the instant administrative
complaint against respondent.5

In his Comment6 dated December 5, 2008, respondent claimed that his failure to comply with his obligation under
the Contract was due to the false pretenses of a certain Rico Pineda (Pineda), who he had believed to be a consul
for the US Embassy and to whom he delivered the amount given by the complainant. Respondent elaborated that
he had a business relationship with Pineda on the matter of facilitating the issuance of US visas to his friends and
family, including himself. He happened to disclose this to a certain Joseph Peralta, who in turn referred his friend,
the complainant, whose previous US visa application had been denied, resulting in the execution of the Contract.
Respondent claimed that Pineda reneged on his commitments and could no longer be located but, nonetheless,
assumed the responsibility to return the said amount to complainant.7 To buttress his claims, respondent attached
pictures supposedly of his friends and family with Pineda as well as electronic mail messages (e-mails) purportedly
coming from the latter.8

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation9 dated April 17, 2010, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating
Commissioner found respondent administratively liable, and accordingly, recommended that he be meted the
penalty of suspension for a period of four (4) months, with a warning that a repetition of the same would invite a
stiffer penalty.10

The Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of engaging in deceitful conduct for: (a) misrepresenting
himself as an immigration lawyer; (b) failing to deliver the services he contracted; and (c) being remiss in returning
complainant’s downpayment of ₱350,000.00. The Investigating Commissioner did not lend credence to
respondent’s defense anent his purported transactions with Pineda considering that the latter’s identity was not
proven and in light of respondent’s self-serving evidence, i.e., photographs and e-mails, which were bereft of any
probative value.11
In a Resolution dated December 14, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted and approved the
aforesaid report and recommendation with the modification increasing the period of suspension to six (6) months
and ordering respondent to return the amount of ₱350,000.0012 to complainant within thirty (30) days from receipt of
notice, with legal interest from the date of demand.13

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for violating the
CPR.

The Court’s Ruling

After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the IBP’s findings, subject to the modification of the
recommended penalty to be imposed upon respondent.

As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of
morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.14 In this regard, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides:

CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LANDAND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

In the instant case, respondent misrepresented himself as an immigration lawyer, which resulted to complainant
seeking his assistance to facilitate the issuance of her US visa and paying him the amount of ₱350,000.00 as
downpayment for his legal services. In truth, however, respondent has no specialization in immigration law but
merely had a contact allegedly with Pineda, a purported US consul, who supposedly processes US visa applications
for him. However, respondent failed to prove Pineda’s identity considering that the photographs and e-mails he
submitted were all self-serving and thus, as correctly observed by the Investigating Commissioner, bereft of any
probative value and consequently cannot be given any credence. Undoubtedly, respondent’s deception is not only
unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal profession; it reveals a basic moral flaw that makes him
unfit to practice law.15

Corollary to such deception, respondent likewise failed to perform his obligations under the Contract, which is to
facilitate and secure the issuance of a US visa in favor of complainant. This constitutes a flagrant violation of Rule
18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, to wit:

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. Rule 18.03 – A
lawyer shall not neglecta legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.

Under Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve
the latter with competence, and to attend to such client’s cause with diligence, care, and devotion whether he
accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed upon him.16 Therefore, a lawyer’s neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client
constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be held administratively liable,17 as in this case.

Furthermore, respondent violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when he failed to refund the amount
of ₱350,000.00 that complainant paid him, viz.:

CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENTTHAT MAY
COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

xxxx
Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. x x x.

Verily, the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and prescribes on a lawyer a great fidelity
and good faith.18 The highly fiduciary nature of this relationship imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account for the
money or property collected or received for or from his client.19 Thus, a lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the
funds held by him on behalf of his client, as in this case, gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the
same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general
morality as well as of professional ethics.20

Anent the proper penalty for respondent’s acts, jurisprudence provides that in similar cases where lawyers
neglected their client’s affairs and, at the same time, failed to return the latter’s money and/or property despite
demand, the Court imposed upon them the penalty of suspension from the practice of law. In Segovia-Ribaya v.
Lawsin,21 the Court suspended the lawyer for a period of one (1) year for his failure to perform his undertaking under
his retainership agreement with his client and to return the money given to him by the latter. Also, in Jinon v.
Jiz,22 the Court suspended the lawyer for a period of two (2) years for his failure to return the amount his client gave
him for his legal services which he never performed. In this case, not only did respondent fail to facilitate the
issuance of complainant’s US visa and return her money, he likewise committed deceitful acts in misrepresenting
himself as an immigration lawyer, resulting in undue prejudice to his client. Under these circumstances, a graver
penalty should be imposed upon him. In view of the foregoing, the Court deems it appropriate to increase the period
of suspension from the practice of law of respondent from six (6) months, as recommended by the IBP, to two (2)
years.

Finally, the Court sustains the IBP's recommendation ordering respondent to return the amount of ₱350,000.00 he
received from complainant as downpayment. It is well to note that "while the Court has previously held that
disciplinary proceedings should only revolve around the determination of the respondent-lawyer's administrative and
not his civil liability, it must be clarified that this rule remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely
civil in nature - for instance, when the claim involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a transaction
separate and distinct [from] and not intrinsically linked to his professional engagement."23 Hence, since respondent
received the aforesaid amount as part of his legal fees, the Court finds the return thereof to be in order.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis P. Rivera (respondent) is found guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rules
16.01 and 16.03 of Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, effective upon the finality of this
Decision, with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. 1âw phi1

Furthermore, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainant Chamelyn A. Agot the legal fees he received from
the latter in the amount of ₱350,000.00 within ninety (90) days from the finality of this Decision. Failure to comply
with the foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent's record in this Court as attorney. Further, let copies of this
Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is
directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 EN BANC

A.M. No. 09-6-1-SC, January 21, 2015

RE: VIOLATION OF RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This case stemmed from three (3) letter-complaints for Violation of Rules on Notarial Practice endorsed to the Office
of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for appropriate action. The first letter-complaint,1 dated March 2, 2009, was filed by the
commissioned notaries public within and for the jurisdiction of Lingayen, Pangasinan, namely, Atty. Butch Cardinal
Torio, Atty. Nepthalie Pasiliao, Atty. Dominique Evangelista, and Atty. Elizabeth C. Tugade (complainants) before
the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Lingayen, Pangasinan (RTC-Lingayen) against Atty. Juan C.
Siapno, Jr. (Atty. Siapno) for notarizing documents without a commission.

In their letter, complainants alleged that Atty. Siapno was maintaining a notarial office along Alvear Street East,
Lingayen, Pangasinan, and was performing notarial acts and practices in Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City
without the requisite notarial commission. They asserted that Atty. Siapno was never commissioned as Notary
Public for and within the jurisdiction of Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City. Instead, he applied and was
commissioned to perform notarial functions by Executive Judge Anthony Sison of the RTC, San Carlos City,
Pangasinan from March 22, 2007 to December 31, 2008. His notarial commission, however, was never renewed
upon expiration. Complainants presented evidence supporting their allegations such as the pictures of Atty. Siapno’s
law office in Lingayen, Pangasinan; and documents to prove that Atty. Siapno performed acts of notarization in
Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City, to wit: (1) Addendum to Loan and Mortgage Agreement2 showing that the
Promissory Note was notarized before Atty. Siapno in Lingayen, Pangasinan in 2007; (2) Deed of Absolute
Sale,3 dated January 24, 2008, notarized in Natividad, Pangasinan; (3) Joint Affidavit of Two Disinterested Persons
Re: Given Name and Date of Birth,4 dated January 6, 2009, notarized in Dagupan City; and (4) Acknowledgement of
Debt,5 dated January 24, 2008, notarized in Dagupan City.

Complainants also averred that Atty. Siapno had delegated his notarial authority to his secretaries, Mina Bautista
(Bautista) and Mary Ann Arenas (Arenas), who wrote legal instruments and signed the documents on his behalf.

On March 17, 2009, the RTC-Lingayen forwarded the said letter-complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA)6 which, in turn, indorsed the same to the OBC.

The second letter-complaint7 was filed by Audy B. Espelita (Espelita) against Atty. Pedro L. Santos (Atty. Santos). It
alleged that in 2008, Espelita lost his driver’s license and he executed an affidavit of loss which was notarized by
Atty. Santos. The said affidavit, however, was denied for authentication when presented before the Notarial Section
in Manila because Atty. Santos was not commissioned to perform notarial commission within the City of Manila.

The third letter-complaint8 came from a concerned citizen reporting that a certain Atty. Evelyn who was holding
office at Room 402 Leyba Bldg., 381 Dasmariñas Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, had been notarizing and signing
documents for and on behalf of several lawyers.

In its Resolution,9 dated June 9, 2009, the Court directed the Executive Judge of the RTC-Lingayen to conduct a
formal investigation on the complaint against Atty. Siapno and Executive Judge Reynaldo G. Ros (Judge Ros) of the
RTC-Manila to conduct a formal investigation on the alleged violation of the Notarial Law by Atty. Santos, and the
illegal activities of a certain Atty. Evelyn, and thereafter, to submit a report and recommendation thereon.

Re: Complaint against Atty. Siapno

With regard to the complaint against Atty. Siapno, the Executive Judge conducted a hearing wherein the
complainants affirmed the allegations in their letter-complaint. For his part, Atty. Siapno denied the accusations and
averred that the law office in Lingayen, Pangasinan, was not his and that Bautista and Arenas were not his
secretaries.10
In her Report and Recommendation,11 the Executive Judge found that Atty. Siapno was issued a notarial
commission within the jurisdiction of Lingayen, Pangasinan, from January 20, 2003 to December 31, 2004 and
February 8, 2005 to December 3, 2006. His commission, however, was cancelled on June 8, 2006 and he was not
issued another commission thereafter. The Executive Judge found Atty. Siapno to have violated the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Commission when he performed notarial functions without commission and recommended that he be fined
in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).

The Court agrees with the findings of the Executive Judge but not to the recommended penalty.

A review of the records and evidence presented by complainants shows that Atty. Siapno indeed maintained a law
office in Lingayen, Pangasinan, just beside the law office of one of the complainants, Atty. Elizabeth Tugade. It was
also proven that Atty. Siapno notarized several instruments with an expired notarial commission outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court. Section 11, Rule III of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Jurisdiction and Term – A person commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts in any place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a period of two (2) years commencing the first day of January of
the year in which the commissioning is made, unless earlier revoked or the notary public has resigned under these
Rules and the Rules of Court.
Under the rule, only persons who are commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court which granted the commission. Clearly, Atty. Siapno could not perform notarial functions in
Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City of the Province of Pangasinan since he was not commissioned in the said
places to perform such act.

Time and again, this Court has stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless and routine act. It is invested
with substantive public interest that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.12 It must
be emphasized that the act of notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document
making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity. A notarial document is by law
entitled to full faith and credit upon its face, and for this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the
basic requirements in the performance of their duties.

By performing notarial acts without the necessary commission from the court, Atty. Siapno violated not only his oath
to obey the laws particularly the Rules on Notarial Practice but also Canons 1 and 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which proscribes all lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and
directs them to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, at all times.13

In a plethora of cases, the Court has subjected lawyers to disciplinary action for notarizing documents outside their
territorial jurisdiction or with an expired commission. In the case of Nunga v. Viray,14 a lawyer was suspended by the
Court for three (3) years for notarizing an instrument without a commission. In Zoreta v. Simpliciano,15 the
respondent was likewise suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years and was permanently
barred from being commissioned as a notary public for notarizing several documents after the expiration of his
commission. In the more recent case of Laquindanum v. Quintana,16 the Court suspended a lawyer for six (6)
months and was disqualified from being commissioned as notary public for a period of two (2) years because he
notarized documents outside the area of his commission, and with an expired commission.

Considering that Atty. Siapno has been proven to have performed notarial work in Ligayen, Natividad and Dagupan
City in the province of Pangasinan without the requisite commission, the Court finds the recommended penalty
insufficient. Instead, Atty. Siapno must be barred from being commissioned as notary public permanently and
suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.

Re: Complaints against Atty. Santos and Atty. Evelyn

In a letter,17 dated July 29, 2013, Judge Ros informed the Court that he could not have complied with the June 9,
2009 and August 4, 2009 orders of the Court because he was no longer the Executive Judge of the RTC-Manila at
that time. To date, no formal investigation has been conducted on the alleged violation of Atty. Santos and the
reported illegal activities of a certain Atty. Evelyn.

With respect to the complaints against Atty. Santos and a certain Atty. Evelyn, the Clerk of Court is ordered to RE-
DOCKET the same as separate administrative cases.
The incumbent Executive Judge of the RTC-Manila, whether permanent or in acting capacity, is ordered to conduct
a formal investigation on the matter and to submit his Report and Recommendation within sixty (60) days from
receipt of copy of this decision.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Juan C. Siapno, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2)
years and BARRED PERMANENTLY from being commissioned as Notary Public, effective upon his receipt of a
copy of this decision.

Let copies of this decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the Office of the Court Administrator, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and be recorded in the personal files of the
respondent.

With respect to the complaints against Atty. Pedro L. Santos and a certain Atty. Evelyn, the Clerk of Court is ordered
to RE-DOCKET them as separate administrative cases. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, is
ordered to conduct a formal investigation on the matter and to submit his Report and Recommendation within sixty
(60) days from receipt of a copy of this decision.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, (Chief Justice), Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr.,
Perez, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Brion, J., on official leave.

Endnotes:

1Rollo, pp. 17-19.

2
Id. at 21.
3
Id. at 24.
4
Id. at 25.
5
Id. at 26.
6 Id. at 15.
7
Id. at 3.
8
Id. at 10-13.
9 Id. at 27.
10 Id. at 143-144.
11
Id. at 139-147.
12St.
Louis University Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS) Faculty and Staff v. Dela Cruz, 531Phil. 213, 226
(2006); Zaballero v. Montalvan, 473 Phil. 18, 24 (2004).
13Nunga v. Viray, 366 Phil. 155, 161 (1999).
14 Id.
15 485 Phil. 395 (2004). 16 A.C. No. 7036, June 29, 2009, 591 SCRA 204. 17Rollo, p. 42.
A.C. No. 10573 January 13, 2015

FERNANDO W. CHU, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JOSE C. GUICO, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Fernando W. Chu invokes the Court's disciplinary authority in resolving this disbarment complaint against his former
lawyer, respondent Atty. Jose C. Guico, Jr., whom he has accused of gross misconduct.

Antecedents

Chu retained Atty. Guico as counsel to handle the labor disputes involving his company, CVC San Lorenzo Ruiz
Corporation (CVC).1 Atty. Guico’s legal services included handling a complaint for illegal dismissal brought against
CVC (NLRC Case No. RAB-III-08-9261-05 entitled Kilusan ng Manggagawang Makabayan (KMM) Katipunan CVC
San Lorenzo Ruiz Chapter, Ladivico Adriano, et al. v. CVC San Lorenzo Ruiz Corp. and Fernando Chu).2 On
September 7, 2006, Labor Arbiter Herminio V. Suelo rendered a decision adverse to CVC.3 Atty. Guico filed a timely
appeal in behalf of CVC.

According to Chu, during a Christmas party held on December 5, 2006 at Atty. Guico’s residence in Commonwealth,
Quezon City, Atty. Guico asked him to prepare a substantial amount of money to be given to the NLRC
Commissioner handling the appeal to insure a favorable decision.4 On June 10, 2007, Chu called Atty. Guico to
inform him that he had raised ₱300,000.00 for the purpose. Atty. Guico told him to proceed to his office at No. 48
Times Street, Quezon City, and togive the money to his assistant, Reynaldo (Nardo) Manahan. Chu complied, and
later on called Atty. Guico to confirm that he had delivered the money to Nardo. Subsequently, Atty. Guico instructed
Chu to meet him on July 5, 2007 at the UCC Coffee Shop on T. Morato Street, Quezon City. Atthe UCC Coffee
Shop, Atty. Guico handed Chu a copy of an alleged draft decision of the NLRC in favor of CVC.5 The draft
decision6 was printed on the dorsal portion of used paper apparently emanating from the office of Atty. Guico. On
that occasion, the latter told Chu to raise another ₱300,000.00 to encourage the NLRC Commissioner to issue the
decision. But Chu could only produce ₱280,000.00, which he brought to Atty. Guico’s office on July 10, 2007
accompanied by his son, Christopher Chu, and one Bonifacio Elipane. However, it was Nardo who received the
amount without issuing any receipt.7

Chu followed up on the status of the CVC case with Atty. Guico in December 2007. However, Atty. Guico referred
him to Nardo who in turn said that he would only know the status after Christmas. On January 11, 2008, Chu again
called Nardo, who invited him to lunch at the Ihaw Balot Plaza in Quezon City. Once there, Chu asked Nardo if the
NLRC Commissioner had accepted the money, but Nardo replied in the negative and simply told Chu to wait. Nardo
assured that the money was still with Atty. Guico who would return it should the NLRC Commissioner not accept it.8

On January 19, 2009, the NLRC promulgated a decision adverse to CVC.9 Chu confronted Atty. Guico, who in turn
referred Chu to Nardo for the filing of a motion for reconsideration. After the denial of the motion for reconsideration,
Atty. Guico caused the preparation and filing of an appeal in the Court of Appeals. Finally, Chu terminated Atty.
Guico as legal counsel on May 25, 2009.10

In his position paper,11 Atty. Guico described the administrative complaint as replete with lies and inconsistencies,
and insisted that the charge was only meant for harassment. He denied demanding and receiving money from Chu,
a denial that Nardo corroborated with his own affidavit.12 He further denied handing to Chu a draft decision printed
on used paper emanating from his office, surmising that the used paper must have been among those freely lying
around in his office that had been pilfered by Chu’s witnesses in the criminal complaint he had handled for Chu.13

Findings and Recommendation of the

IBP Board of Governors
IBP Commissioner Cecilio A.C. Villanueva found that Atty. Guico had violated Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon I of the
Code of Professional Responsibility for demanding and receiving ₱580,000.00 from Chu; and recommended the
disbarment of Atty. Guico in view of his act of extortion and misrepresentation that caused dishonor to and contempt
for the legal profession.14

On February 12, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the findings of IBP Commissioner Villanueva in its
Resolution No. XX-2013-87,15 but modified the recommended penalty of disbarment to three years suspension, viz.:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A," and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules and considering Respondent’s violation of Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Atty. Jose C. Guico, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3)
years with Warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely and Ordered to
Return the amount of Five Hundred Eighty Thousand (₱580,000.00) Pesos with legal interest within thirty (30) days
from receipt of notice.

Atty. Guico moved for reconsideration,16 but the IBP Board of Governors denied his motion for reconsideration on
March 23, 2014 in Resolution No. XXI-2014-173.17

Neither of the parties brought a petition for review vis-à-vis Resolution No. XX-2013-87 and Resolution No. XXI-
2014-173.

Issue

Did Atty. Guico violate the Lawyer’s Oath and Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon I of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for demanding and receiving ₱580,000.00 from Chu to guarantee a favorable decision from the
NLRC?

Ruling of the Court

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests on the complainant to establish respondent attorney’s liability
by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. Indeed, this Court has consistently required clearly preponderant
evidence to justify the imposition of either disbarment or suspension as penalty.18

Chu submitted the affidavits of his witnesses,19 and presented the draft decision that Atty. Guico had represented to
him as having come from the NLRC. Chu credibly insisted that the draft decision was printed on the dorsal portion of
used paper emanating from Atty. Guico’s office,20 inferring that Atty. Guico commonly printed documents on used
paper in his law office. Despite denying being the source of the draft decision presented by Chu, Atty. Guico’s
participation in the generation of the draft decision was undeniable. For one, Atty. Guico impliedly admitted Chu’s
insistence by conceding that the used paper had originated from his office, claiming only that used paper was just
"scattered around his office."21 In that context, Atty. Guico’s attempt to downplay the sourcing of used paper from his
office was futile because he did not expressly belie the forthright statement of Chu. All that Atty. Guico stated by way
of deflecting the imputation was that the used paper containing the draft decision could have been easily taken from
his office by Chu’s witnesses in a criminal case that he had handled for Chu,22 pointing out that everything in his
office, except the filing cabinets and his desk, was "open to the public xxx and just anybody has access to
everything found therein."23 In our view, therefore, Atty. Guico made the implied admission because he was fully
aware that the used paper had unquestionably come from his office.

The testimony of Chu, and the circumstances narrated by Chu and his witnesses, especially the act of Atty. Guico of
presenting to Chu the supposed draft decision that had been printed on used paper emanating from Atty. Guico’s
office, sufficed to confirm that he had committed the imputed gross misconduct by demanding and receiving
₱580,000.00 from Chu to obtain a favorable decision. Atty. Guico offered only his general denial of the allegations in
his defense, but such denial did not overcome the affirmative testimony of Chu. We cannot but conclude that the
production of the draft decision by Atty. Guico was intended to motivate Chu to raise money to ensure the chances
of obtaining the favorable result in the labor case. As such, Chu discharged his burden of proof as the complainant
to establish his complaint against Atty. Guico. In this administrative case, a fact may be deemed established if it is
supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion.24

What is the condign penalty for Atty. Guico?

In taking the Lawyer’s Oath, Atty. Guico bound himself to:

x x x maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; x x x support its Constitution and obey the laws as well
as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; x x x do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in court; x x x delay no man for money or malice x x x. The Code of Professional Responsibility echoes the Lawyer’s
Oath, to wit:

CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for
legal processes.1âwphi1

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in
the legal system.

The sworn obligation to respect the law and the legal processes under the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility is a continuing condition for every lawyer to retain membership in the Legal Profession.
To discharge the obligation, every lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client that would
involve defiance of the very laws that he was bound to uphold and obey,25 for he or she was always bound as an
attorney to be law abiding, and thus to uphold the integrity and dignity of the Legal Profession.26 Verily, he or she
must act and comport himself or herself in such a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of
the Legal Profession.27 Any lawyer found to violate this obligation forfeits his or her privilege to continue such
membership in the legal profession.

Atty. Guico willingly and wittingly violated the law in appearing to counsel Chu to raise the large sums of money in
order to obtain a favorable decision in the labor case. He thus violated the law against bribery and corruption. He
compounded his violation by actually using said illegality as his means of obtaining a huge sum from the client that
he soon appropriated for his own personal interest. His acts constituted gross dishonesty and deceit, and were a
flagrant breach of his ethical commitments under the Lawyer’s Oath not to delay any man for money or malice; and
under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility that forbade him from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. His deviant conduct eroded the faith of the people in him as an individual lawyer as
well as in the Legal Profession as a whole. In doing so, he ceased to be a servant of the law.

Atty. Guico committed grave misconduct and disgraced the Legal Profession. Grave misconduct is "improper or
wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of
duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment."28 There is no question that
any gross misconduct by an attorney in his professional or private capacity renders him unfit to manage the affairs
of others, and is a ground for the imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment, because good moral
character is an essential qualification for the admission of an attorney and for the continuance of such privilege.29

Accordingly, the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to suspend him from the practice of law for three
(3) years would be too soft a penalty. Instead, he should be disbarred,30 for he exhibited his unworthiness of
retaining his membership in the legal profession. As the Court has reminded in Samonte v. Abellana:31

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is granted the privilege to practice
law in this country should remain faithful to the Lawyer’s Oath. Only thereby can lawyers preserve their fitness to
remain as members of the Law Profession. Any resort to falsehood or deception, including adopting artifices to
cover up one’s misdeeds committed against clients and the rest of the trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to
continue enjoying the privilege to practice law and highlights the unfitness to remain a member of the Law
Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer stern disciplinary sanctions.
Lastly, the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Guico be ordered to return the amount of
₱580,000.00 to Chu is well-taken. That amount was exacted by Atty. Guico from Chu in the guise of serving the
latter’s interest as the client. Although the purpose for the amount was unlawful, it would be unjust not to require
Atty. Guico to fully account for and to return the money to Chu. It did not matter that this proceeding is administrative
in character, for, as the Court has pointed out in Bayonla v. Reyes:32

Although the Court renders this decision in an administrative proceeding primarily to exact the ethical responsibility
on a member of the Philippine Bar, the Court’s silence about the respondent lawyer’s legal obligation to restitute the
complainant will be both unfair and inequitable. No victim of gross ethical misconduct concerning the client’s funds
or property should be required to still litigate in another proceeding what the administrative proceeding has already
established as the respondent’s liability. x x x

ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. JOSE S. GUICO, JR. GUILTY of the
violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, and Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon I of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
DISBARS him from membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. His name is ORDERED STRICKEN from
the Roll of Attorneys.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to Atty. Guico’s personal
record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to all courts and quasi-judicial offices in the
country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On Leave)
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
ARTURO D. BRION*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
A.C. No. 8776

ANTONINA S. SOSA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. MANUEL V. MENDOZA, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before this Court is the Complaint for the disbarment/suspension of Atty. Manuel V. Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza) filed
on October 22, 2010 by Antonina S. Sosa (Ms. Sosa), for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility arising from non-payment of debt.1

This Court, in a Resolution dated April 18, 2012, referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.2

On May 11, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification the Investigating
Commissioner’s report and recommendation. The IBP resolved to suspend Atty. Mendoza from the practice of law
for six (6) months, likewise ordering him to return the amount of the debt with legal interest.3

On December 10, 2013, the IBP Director for Bar Discipline transmitted to this Court the Notice of the Resolution and
the records of the case.4

The Factual Background

Ms. Sosa alleged that on July 28, 2006, she extended a loan of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to
Atty. Mendoza at an interest of twenty-five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) to be paid not later than September 25,
2006. They agreed that a penalty or collection charge of ten percent (10%) per month shall accrue in case of
default.5

To ensure the payment of the obligation, Atty. Mendoza signed a promissory note and issued a postdated check for
P500,000.00.6

Atty. Mendoza failed to comply with his obligation on due date. Upon demand to pay, he requested Ms. Sosa not to
deposit the postdated check. She acceded and deferred the deposit of the check based on Atty. Mendoza’s promise
that he would later pay. The check was subsequently returned/dishonored after Ms. Sosa finally deposited it
sometime in October 2006; it was "Drawn Against Insufficient Funds." Ms. Sosa then obtained the services of a
lawyer, Atty. Ernesto V. Cabrera (Atty. Cabrera), to legally address Atty. Mendoza’s failure to pay.

On January 11, 2010, Atty. Cabrera sent a letter7 to Atty. Mendoza demanding payment of the loan plus interest and
collection charges. Atty. Mendoza ignored the demand letter despite receipt, as proven by the Registry Receipt and
Registry Return Receipt.8 Likewise, he did not, in any manner, contact Ms. Sosa to explain why he failed to pay.

In view of the repeated failure of Atty. Mendoza to pay, Ms. Sosa filed the complaint for disbarment or suspension,
charging Atty. Mendoza for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This Rule states that
"[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

Acting on the complaint, this Court required Atty. Mendoza to comment on the complaint in a Resolution dated
January 10, 2011.9 He filed an Urgent Motion for Extension on March 18, 2011,10 which this Court granted in a
Resolution dated October 19, 2011. Atty. Mendoza finally filed his Brief Comment on January 10, 2012.11

Atty. Mendoza admitted in his Brief Comment the existence of the loan and that it is a valid obligation. However, he
alleged that he only received One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) from one Elenita Cruz (Elenita), a friend
of the complainant. Atty. Mendoza did not attach an affidavit from Elenita nor any evidence proving that he only
received P100,000.00.12
 The Proceedings before the IBP

On July 4, 2012, Investigating Commissioner Honesto A. Villamor issued the Notice of Mandatory
Conference/Hearing scheduled on August 16, 2012.

When the case was called for hearing, only Atty. Cabrera appeared. Atty. Cabrera marked the complainant’s
documentary exhibits and the mandatory conference was subsequently declared terminated. The parties were then
directed to submit their respective verified position papers, documentary exhibits and/or affidavits of their witnesses,
if any, within fifteen (15) days.

In her position paper,13 Ms. Sosa reiterated her allegations in her Complaint-Affidavit. She argued that Atty. Mendoza
is liable not only administratively but also civilly.

Atty. Mendoza, in his Manifestation,14 admitted that (i) he arrived late during the scheduled hearing; (ii) he had on
hand Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P600,000.00); (iii) he was advised by the Hearing Officer to communicate with
the complainant’s counsel; and (iv) the validity of his obligation and that he has to pay the same.

Atty. Mendoza did not make good his offer to pay despite the express manifestation he made.15

The IBP Findings

The Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Mendoza liable not only administratively but also civilly. He gave
credence to Ms. Sosa’s allegations that Atty. Mendoza failed to pay the loan despite Ms. Sosa’s attempts to collect.
He also took notice of Atty. Mendoza’s admission that the obligation is valid.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted with modification the findings of the Investigating Commissioner. In a
Resolution dated May 11, 2013, the IBP ruled:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner x x x finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and considering that [the respondent] is
guilty of misconduct for his failure to pay a just and valid debt, Atty. Manuel V. Mendoza is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for six (6) months and Ordered to Return the amount of Five Hundred Thousand
(P500,000.00) to [the complainant] with legal interest.

The Court’s Ruling

We adopt with modification the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

This Court has held that any gross misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or in his private capacity is a ground
for the imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment because good character is an essential qualification for
the admission to and continued practice of law.16 Any wrongdoing, whether professional or non-professional,
indicating unfitness for the profession justifies disciplinary action.17

Gross misconduct is defined as "improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and definite rule
of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not a mere error
in judgment."18

Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is emphatic: "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct."

The facts of the case show that Atty. Mendoza engaged in improper or wrong conduct, as found under Rule 1.01, as
the failure to pay the loan was willful in character and implied a wrongful intent and not a mere error in judgment.

We find it undisputed that Atty. Mendoza obtained a loan in the amount of P500,000.00. He signed the promissory
note and acknowledgement receipt showing he received P500,000.00.19 Although he initially denied getting this
amount and claimed that he only received P100,000.00, he did not present any evidence to prove his claim. He later
also admitted the validity of his loan without qualification as to the amount.20

Also undisputed is the fact that Ms. Sosa tried to collect the amount due upon maturity but Atty. Mendoza failed to
pay. In fact, Ms. Sosa deferred depositing the postdated check upon Atty. Mendoza’s request, and based on his
promises that he would pay. Despite all these, he still failed to comply with his obligation. Worse, the check – when
finally deposited – was dishonored, a fact that Atty. Mendoza did not dispute.

Atty. Mendoza further claimed he had P600,000.00 on hand during the hearing with the IBP Investigating
Officer.21 He allegedly failed to deliver the amount to Ms. Sosa or her counsel because he arrived late.

We find Atty. Mendoza’s excuse to be flimsy. It could have been very easy for him to deliver the P600,000.00 to Ms.
Sosa if he had the real intention to pay. In fact, Ms. Sosa wrote, through her counsel, Atty. Mendoza asking him to
settle his obligation because of his manifestation that he already had the money.22

It is unclear to us why Atty. Mendoza ignored Ms. Sosa’s request for settlement after claiming that he already had
the needed funds. He was either lying he had the money, or had no intention of paying in the first place. Atty.
Mendoza was also not candid with the IBP Investigating Officer when he claimed he had P600,000.00 and that he
was ready to pay his obligation. What is clear is that his obligation remains outstanding after all these years.

In Yuhico v. Atty. Gutierrez23 this Court sitting en banc held:

We have held that deliberate failure to pay just debts constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be
sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and
vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high standard of
morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial system is
ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to their clients,
which include prompt payment of financial obligations. They must conduct themselves in a manner that reflects the
values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. [Emphasis
supplied.]

Other than his claim that he was disposing of real properties in order to settle his obligation,24 Atty. Mendoza failed to
explain why he failed to pay despite his admission of a just and valid loan. Whatever his reasons or excuses may
be, dire financial condition does not justify non-payment of debt, as we have held in Yuhico.25

We also reiterate that –

[A] lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts
and to his clients. No moral qualification for bar membership is more important than truthfulness and candor. To this
end nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the
confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the profession.

While it is true that there was no attorney-client relationship between respondent and complainant, it is well-settled
that an attorney may be removed or otherwise disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in the profession,
but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, showing him to be unfit for the office and
unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him.26 [Emphasis supplied and citations
omitted.]

The facts and evidence in this case clearly establish Atty. Mendoza’s failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer as
dictated by the lawyer's oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics,
thereby degrading not only his personal integrity but his profession as well.27

To reiterate, his failure to honor his just debt constitutes dishonest and deceitful conduct. This dishonest conduct
was compounded by Atty. Mendoza’s act of interjecting flimsy excuses that only strengthened the conclusion that he
refused to pay a valid and just debt.28
While we agree with the punishment meted out by the IBP, we differ with its recommendation ordering Atty.
Mendoza to pay the amount of the loan plus legal interest. 1âw phi 1

We take exception to the IBP’s order to pay only because the case before us is solely an administrative complaint
for disbarment and is not a civil action for collection of a sum of money. The quantum of evidence in these two types
of cases alone deters us from agreeing with the IBP’s order to pay; the administrative complaint before us only
requires substantial evidence to justify a finding of liability, while a civil action requires greater evidentiary standard
of preponderance of evidence.

A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the
respondent lawyer is a defendant.

Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken
and prosecuted solely for the public welfare.29

The purpose of disbarment is mainly to determine the fitness of a lawyer to continue acting as an officer of the court
and as participant in the dispensation of justice.30 The purpose of disbarment is to protect the courts and the public
from the misconduct of the officers of the court and to ensure the administration of justice by requiring that those
who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts and clients
may repose confidence.31

We are aware that jurisprudence has allowed a complainant in a disbarment case to collect an outstanding debt
from a lawyer.32 However, in the recent case of Heenan v. Atty. Espejo,33 this Court sitting en banc did not agree with
the IBP’s recommendation to order the erring lawyer to return the money he borrowed from the complainant. We
said in this case:

In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed
to continue as a member of the Bar. Our only concern is the determination of respondent’s administrative liability.
Our findings have no material bearing on other judicial action which the parties may choose to file against each
other. Furthermore, disciplinary proceedings against lawyers do not involve a trial of an action, but rather
investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. The only question for determination in these
proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. Thus, this
Court cannot rule on the issue of the amount of money that should be returned to the complainant.34 [Emphasis
supplied and citations omitted.]

We note that as in the facts of the present case, the respondent-lawyer in the Heenan case also did not deny the
validity of her loan nor did she proffer any reason for issuing unfunded checks.

As a final note, we understand the frustration of, and sympathize with Ms. Sosa in her present situation. However,
because the matter before us is not a civil action for the collection money, we cannot order Atty. Mendoza to pay his
outstanding loan. We can only clarify that our ruling in this case is without prejudice to any future civil or criminal
action that Ms. Sosa, if she so decides, may file against Atty. Mendoza in the future. Our action likewise is without
prejudice to any action we may take that is not based on the violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, ATTY. MANUEL V. MENDOZA is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of one

(1) year for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility with a STERN WARNING that
commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION*
Associate Justice
A.C. No. 10952

ENGEL PAUL ACA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. RONALDO P. SALVADO, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This refers to the October 11, 2014 Resolution1 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors (IBP-
BOG) which adopted and approved with modification the Report and Recommendation2 of the Investigating
Commissioner suspending Atty. Ronaldo P. Salvado (Atty. Salvado) from the practice of law.

The Complaint:

On May 30, 2012, Engel Paul Aca filed an administrative complaint3 for disbarment against Atty. Salvado for
violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.014 and Canon 7, Rule 7.035 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

Complainant alleged, among others, that sometime in 2010, he met Atty. Salvado through Atty. Samuel Divina (Atty.
Divina), his childhood friend; that Atty. Salvado introduced himself as a lawyer and a businessman engaged in
several businesses including but not limited to the lending business; that on the same occasion, Atty. Salvado
enticed the complainant to invest in his business with a guarantee that he would be given a high interest rate of 5%
to 6% every month; and that he was assured of a profitable investment due by Atty. Salvado as the latter had
various clients and investors.

Because of these representations coupled by the assurance of Atty. Salvado that he would not place his reputation
as a lawyer on the line, complainant made an initial investment in his business. This initial investment yielded an
amount corresponding to the principal plus the promised interest. On various dates from 2010 to 2011, complainant
claimed that he was again induced by Atty. Salvado to invest with promises of high rates of return.

As consideration for these investments, Atty. Salvado issued several post-dated checks in the total amount of
P6,107,000.00, representing the principal amount plus interests. All checks were drawn from PSBank Account
number 040331-00087-9, fully described as follows:

Check Number Date Issued Amount

0060144 August 14, 2011 P657 ,000.00

0060147 September 29, 2011 P 530,000.00

0060190 September 29, 2011 P60,000.00
0060194 October 16, 2011 P90,000.00

0060206 October 17, 2011 P2, 120,000.00

0060191 October 29, 2011 P1,060,000.00

0060195 November 16, 2011 P1,590,000.00

Upon presentment, however, complainant was shocked to learn that the aforementioned checks were dishonored as
these were drawn from insufficient funds or a closed account.

Complainant made several verbal and written demands upon Atty. Salvado, who at first, openly communicated with
him, assuring him that he would not abscond from his obligations and that he was just having difficulty liquidating his
assets and collecting from his own creditors. Complainant was even informed by Atty. Salvado that he owned real
properties that could serve as payment for his obligations. As time went by, however, Atty. Salvado began to avoid
complainant's calls and text messages. Attempts to meet up with him through common friends also proved futile.
This prompted complainant to refer the matter to his lawyer Atty. Divina, for appropriate legal action.

On December 26, 2011, Atty. Divina personally served the Notice of Dishonor on Atty. Salvado, directing him to
settle his total obligation in the amount of P747,000.00, corresponding to the cash value of the first two (2) PSBank
checks, within seven (7) days from receipt of the said notice.6 Nevertheless, Atty. Salvado refused to receive the
said notice when Atty. Divina's messenger attempted to serve it on him.

Sometime in April 2012, complainant yet again engaged the services of Atty. Divina, who, with his filing clerk and
the complainant's family, went to Atty. Salvado's house to personally serve the demand letter. A certain "Mark" who
opened the gate told the filing clerk that Atty. Salvado was no longer residing there and had been staying in the
province already.

As they were about to leave, a red vehicle arrived bearing Atty. Salvado. Complainant quickly alighted from his
vehicle and confronted him as he was about to enter the gate of the house. Obviously startled, Atty. Salvado told
him that he had not forgotten his debt and invited complainant to enter the house so they could talk. Complainant
refused the invitation and instead told Atty. Salvado that they should talk inside his vehicle where his companions
were.

During this conversation, Atty. Salvado assured complainant that he was working on "something" to pay his
obligations. He still refused to personally receive or, at the least, read the demand letter.

Despite his promises, Atty. Salvado failed to settle his obligations.

For complainant, Atty. Salvado's act of issuing worthless checks not only constituted a violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 (B.P. 22) or the "Anti-Bouncing Checks Law," but also reflected his depraved character as a lawyer. Atty.
Salvado not only refused to comply with his obligation, but also used his knowledge of the law to evade criminal
prosecution. He had obviously instructed his household staff to lie as to his whereabouts and to reject any
correspondence sent to him. This resort to deceitful ways showed that Atty. Salvado was not fit to remain as a
member of the Bar.

The Defense of the Respondent

On July 24, 2012, Atty. Salvado filed his Answer,7 denying that he told complainant that he had previously entered
into various government contracts and that he was previously engaged in some other businesses prior to engaging
in the lending and rediscounting business. Atty. Salvado asserted that he never enticed complainant to invest in his
business, but it was Atty. Divina's earnings of good interest that attracted him into making an investment. He further
stated that during their initial meeting, it was complainant who inquired if he still needed additional investments; that
it was Atty. Divina who assured complainant of high returns; and that complainant was fully aware that the money
invested in his businesses constituted a loan to his clients and/or borrowers. Thus, from time to time, the return of
investment and accrued interest when due – as reflected in the maturity dates of the checks issued to complainant-
could be delayed, whenever Atty. Salvado' s clients requested for an extension or renewal of their respective loans.
In other words, the checks he issued were merely intended as security or evidence of investment.

Atty. Salvado also claimed that, in the past, there were instances when he would request complainant not to deposit
a check knowing that it was not backed up by sufficient funds. This arrangement had worked until the dishonor of
the checks, for which he readily offered his house and lot located in Marikina City as collateral.

The Reply of Complainant

On August 30, 2012, complainant filed his Reply,8 pointing out that Atty. Salvado did not deny receiving money from
him by way of investment. Thus, he must be deemed to have admitted that he had issued several postdated checks
which were eventually dishonored. Atty. Salvado 's claim that it was complainant himself who prodded him about
making investments must be brushed aside for being self-serving and baseless. Assuming arguendo, that
complainant indeed made offers of investment, Atty. Salvado should have easily refused knowing fully well that he
could not fund the checks that he would be issuing when they become due. If it were true that the checks were
issued for complainant's security, Atty. Salvado could have drafted a document evidencing such agreement. His
failure to present such document, if one existed at all, only proved that the subject checks were issued as payment
for complainant's investment.9

Complainant also clarified that his complaint against Atty. Salvado was never meant to harass him. Despite the
dishonor of the checks, he still tried to settle the dispute with Atty. Salvado who left him with no choice after he
refused to communicate with him properly.

Thereafter, the parties were required to file their respective mandatory conference briefs and position papers. Atty.
1âwphi1

Salvado insisted that he had acted in all honesty and good faith in his dealings with the complainant. He also
emphasized that the title to his house and lot in Greenheights Subdivision, Marikina City, had been transferred in the
name of complainant after he executed a deed of sale as an expression of his "desire and willingness to settle
whatever is due to the complainant."10

Report and Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner

On January 2, 2014, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Salvado be meted a penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for six ( 6) months for engaging in a conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law and for behaving in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. Atty.
Salvado's act of issuing checks without sufficient funds to cover the same constituted willful dishonesty and immoral
conduct which undermine the public confidence in the legal profession.

The IBP-BOG Resolution

On October 11, 2014, the IBP-BOG adopted and approved the recommendation with modification as to the period of
suspension. The IBP-BOG increased the period of Atty. Salvado's suspension from six (6) months to two (2) years.

Neither a motion for reconsideration before the IBP-BOG nor a petition for review before this Court was filed.
Nonetheless, the IBP elevated to this Court the entire records of the case for appropriate action with the IBP
Resolution being merely recommendatory and, therefore, would not attain finality, pursuant to par. (b), Section 12,
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.11

The Court's Ruling

The parties gave conflicting versions of the controversy. Complainant, claimed to have been lured by Atty. Salvado
into investing in his businesses with the promise of yielding high interests, which he believed because he was a
lawyer who was expected to protect his public image at all times. Atty. Salvado, on the other hand, denied having
enticed the complainant, whom he claimed had invested by virtue of his own desire to gain profits. He insisted that
the checks that he issued in favor of complainant were in the form of security or evidence of investment. It followed,
according to Atty. Salvado, that he must be considered to have never ensured the payment of the checks upon
maturity. Atty. Salvado strongly added that the dishonor of the subject checks was "purely a result of his gullibility
and inadvertence, with the unfortunate result that he himself was a victim of failed lending transactions xxx."12

The Court sustains the findings of the IBP-BOG and adopts its recommendation in part.

First. A perusal of the records reveals that complainant's version deserves credence, not only due to the
unambiguous manner by which the narrative of events was laid down, but also by the coherent reasoning the
narrative has employed. The public is, indeed, inclined to rely on representations made by lawyers. As a man of law,
a lawyer is necessarily a leader of the community, looked up to as a model citizen.13 A man, learned in the law like
Atty. Salvado, is expected to make truthful representations when dealing with persons, clients or otherwise. For the
Court, and as the IBP-BOG had observed, complainant's being beguiled to part with his money and believe Atty.
Salvado as a lawyer and businessman was typical human behavior worthy of belief. The Court finds it hard to
believe that a person like the complainant would not find the profession of the person on whose businesses he
would invest as important to consider. Simply put, Atty. Salvado's stature as a member of the Bar had, in one way or
another, influenced complainant's decision to invest.

Second. It must be pointed out that the denials proffered by Atty. Salvado cannot belie the dishonor of the checks.
His strained explanation that the checks were mere securities cannot be countenanced. Of all people, lawyers are
expected to fully comprehend the legal import of bouncing checks. In Lozano v. Martinez,14 the Court ruled that the
gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check; that is, a check
that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal
sanctions, the making and circulation of worthless checks. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest,
the practice is proscribed by the law.

Hence, the excuse of "gullibility and inadvertence" deserves scant consideration. Surely, Atty. Salvado is aware that
promoting obedience to the Constitution and the laws of the land is the primary obligation of lawyers. When he
issued the worthless checks, he discredited the legal profession and created the public impression that laws were
mere tools of convenience that could be used, bended and abused to satisfy personal whims and desires. In Lao v.
Medel,15 the Court wrote that the issuance of worthless checks constituted gross misconduct, and put the erring
lawyer's moral character in serious doubt, though it was not related to his professional duties as a member of the
Bar. Covered by this dictum is Atty. Salvado's business relationship with complainant. His issuance of the subject
checks display his doubtful fitness as an officer of the court. Clearly, he violated Rule 1.01 and Rule 7.03 of the
CPR.

Third. Parenthetically, the Court cannot overlook Atty. Salvado's deceiving attempts to evade payment of his
obligations. Instead of displaying a committed attitude to his creditor, Atty. Salvado refused to answer complainant's
1âw phi 1

demands. He even tried to make the complainant believe that he was no longer residing at his given address. These
acts demonstrate lack of moral character to satisfy the responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers as
professionals and as officers of the court. The subsequent offers he had made and the eventual sale of his
properties to the complainant, unfortunately cannot overturn his acts unbecoming of a member of the Bar.

Fourth. The Court need not elaborate on the correctness of the Investigating Commissioner's reliance on
jurisprudence stating that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own and may proceed
independently of civil and criminal cases, including violations of B.P. 22.

Accordingly, the only issue in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers is the respondent's fitness to remain as a
member of the Bar. The Court's findings have no material bearing on other judicial actions which the parties may
choose to file against each other.16

All told, the Court finds that Atty. Salvado's reprehensible conduct warrants a penalty commensurate to his violation
of the CPR and the Lawyer's Oath.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Ronaldo P. Salvado GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rule 7 .03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a period
of two (2) years.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all
courts all over the country. Let a copy of this decision be attached to the personal records of the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 10605, February 17, 2016

BIENVENIDO T. CANLAPAN, Complainant, v. ATTY. WILLIAM B. BALAYO, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

Before this court is a verified Complaint1 filed by Bienvenido T. Canlapan, a retired Scout Executive2 of the Boy
Scout of the Philippines - Mayon Albay Council, against Atty. William B. Balayo for violation of Canon 1, Rules 1.01
and 1.03, and Canon 12, Rule 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

....

Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any
man's cause.

....

Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes.
Complainant avers that at the mandatory conference held on June 26, 2014 at 10 a.m., before Executive Labor
Arbiter Jose C. Del Valle, Jr., in connection with a money claim filed by complainant against the Boy Scouts of the
Philippines - Mayon Albay Council3 (Mayon Council), respondent arrogantly threw his arm toward the complainant
while menacingly saying: "Maski sampulo pang abogado darhon mo, dai mo makua ang gusto mo!" ("Even if you
bring ten lawyers here, you will not get what you want!")4

Respondent allegedly made this remark when complainant approached the Mayon Council representatives and told
them that complainant, not having been informed beforehand that Ervin O. Fajut (Fajut), Chair of the Mayon Council
would bring a lawyer, was placed at a disadvantaged position because he had none.5

Complainant was allegedly taken aback and felt humiliated by respondent's actuation, which showed a blatant
disrespect for the elderly considering that respondent was much younger.6 The incident was witnessed by Higino M.
Mata (Mata), First Vice Chair of the Mayon Council, who executed an Affidavit,7 and employees of the National
Labor Relations Commission, including the security guard.8

Complainant further avers that he expected the conference to be brief as it was called merely for him to confirm9 the
parties' amicable settlement as evidenced by the June 7, 2014 Memorandum Agreement,10 where the Mayon
Council agreed to pay complainant his accrued leave benefits in the total amount of P487,000.00 on an installment
basis. However, it became adversarial when Fajut reneged on the agreement allegedly due to respondent's
influence.11

Complainant faults respondent for impeding the enforcement of the signed compromise agreement dated June 7,
2014.12 This was allegedly in violation of a lawyer's duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice.13

Complainant never imagined that, in his twilight years and in his quest for justice, he would be publicly humiliated by
a young lawyer actively participating in the conference, who was neither a party to the labor case nor was
authorized by the Mayon Council to appear on its behalf.14

In his Comment15 dated December 1, 2014, respondent avers that he has assisted Fajut in several cases. In
addition, Fajut also consulted respondent on the legality of ordinances and resolutions submitted to his office as a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Malinao, Albay. When Fajut was elected Chair of the Mayon Council, he
asked respondent to help him on legal matters concerning his new role.16
Upon Fajut's invitation, respondent attended the Executive Meeting of the Mayon Council on June 7, 2014.17 In that
meeting, respondent saw how the Executive Committee was cajoled by Mata, First Vice Chair of the Mayon Council,
into agreeing to the Memorandum of Agreement without discussing its legality. The Agreement was presented to the
Executive Committee prepared and signed by complainant and by Jose Bonto, former acting Chairperson of the
Mayon Council.18

Respondent avers that after the Executive Meeting, a former employee of the Mayon Council informed Fajut that the
Agreement was illegal because its assertion that complainant never availed himself of sick leaves for 39 years was
not true.19

Thus, on June 10, 2014, Fajut allegedly consulted respondent at his office on the legality of the Memorandum of
Agreement dated June 7, 2014. Respondent, being himself a boy scout once, volunteered to render free legal
assistance to Fajut.20 After interviewing Fajut and examining the documents he brought, respondent rendered his
written legal opinion21 dated June 10, 2014.

Respondent further avers that on June 26, 2014, respondent happened to be at the Labor Arbiter's Office to attend
to three cases. While there, Fajut approached and asked respondent to make a special appearance for him as it
appeared that the Memorandum of Agreement was notarized by Notary Public Enrico Voltaire Rivera despite Fajut's
refusal to appear before the notary public. Fajut also said that he had been actively seeking the cancellation of the
Agreement.22

Respondent avers that the Acknowledgement portion23 of the Memorandum of Agreement showed that only
complainant and the witnesses appeared before the notary public and acknowledged their signatures on the
Agreement. There was no mention of Fajut, who was the signatory on behalf of the May on Council. Thus, to
prevent the perpetration of any fraud against the Mayon Council and/or Fajut, respondent agreed to make a special
appearance for the limited purpose of protesting the defective notarization of the Memorandum of Agreement.24

During the hearing, complainant allegedly became visibly angry and raised his voice against respondent because of
the legal opinion that he wrote. Respondent had no choice but to defend his legal opinion. Nonetheless, he raised
as an issue the fact of the improper notarization of the Memorandum of Agreement.25cralawred

At that point, allegedly to diffuse the tension, the Labor Arbiter asked to talk to the parties individually. While outside
the room, complainant pestered respondent and repeatedly exclaimed that it was unfair for Fajut to bring a lawyer
while complainant had none.26

Respondent avers that he replied in a matter-of-fact tone: "Maski pira pang abogado ang darahon mo, pareho man
sana ang resulta kaiyan" ("You can bring as many lawyers as you want, the result will be the same").27cralawred

Respondent further states that he did not flail his hands nor do anything threatening, menacing, defamatory, or
disrespectful towards complainant. He did not even raise his voice. Respondent was not arrogant in his dealings
with complainant. He only answered back because he was unduly provoked by complainant's persistent and
uncalled-for statements against him and his client, Fajut.28

Furthermore, to respondent's mind, whether complainant had a lawyer or not, the results would be the same: the
Memorandum of Agreement would not be approved by the Labor Arbiter because of the defective notarization.
Indeed, the Labor Arbiter required the parties to submit their position papers.29

On June 30, 2014, Fajut allegedly requested respondent to attend the Executive Committee meeting of the May on
Council and to explain the legal opinion that he wrote. During the meeting, respondent allegedly answered questions
from the members of the Executive Committee.30

Respondent avers that in all of these instances, he waived his fees as he wanted to donate his services to the Boy
Scouts. Furthermore, he acted only upon the request of Fajut, and not because of any corrupt motive or interest.31

Attached to the Comment is the Supporting Affidavit32 executed by Fajut on December 1, 2014, corroborating
respondent's allegations.
We find respondent guilty of conduct unbecoming of a lawyer and officer of the court for his disrespectful utterances
against an elderly. However, we dismiss the other charges imputed against him for lack of merit.

Complainant alleges that respondent's act of publicly berating and throwing his arm toward him, a senior citizen,
while menacingly saying, "Maski sampulo pang abogado darahon mo, dai mo makua ang gusto mo!"33 is indicative
of immoral conduct, disrespect for elders, and a total loss of moral fiber of the person.

Respondent denies that he flailed his hands or did anything menacing, antagonistic, or disrespectful towards
complainant. However, he admits that he uttered in a matter-of-fact tone, "Maski pira pang abogado ang darahon
mo, pareho man sana ang resulta kaiyan,"34 because of complainant's uncalled-for statements against him and
Fajut. This was corroborated by Fajut in his Affidavit.

The manner in which the remark was made is inconclusive in view of the conflicting testimonies of the witnesses.
Nonetheless, we find rude and disrespectful the utterances made by respondent against complainant, who was
already 70 years old at that time. The tenor of the message cannot t>e taken lightly. It was meant to annoy and
humiliate complainant. Not only was it ill-mannered; it was also unbecoming of a lawyer, considering that he did it to
an elderly and in front of co-litigants and National Labor Relations Commission employees.

Elderly people have, in our society, occupied a revered stature. We teach our children to treat elders with utmost
respect. A special week is dedicated to the elderly every year to give them recognition and honor in order to raise
the people's level of awareness of the important role senior citizens play in society.35

Under the 1987 Constitution, it is the duty of the family and the state to care for its elderly members.36 Pursuant to
this provision and the constitutional principles on social justice37 and priority of the elderly to an integrated and
comprehensive health delivery system,38 Republic Act No. 7432,39 otherwise known as the Senior Citizens Act, was
passed into law on April 23, 1992. Republic Act No. 7432, as amended by Republic Act No. 9257,40 grants certain
privileges and benefits to senior citizens in accordance with the following declared policies:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) To motivate and encourage the senior citizens to contribute to nation building;

(b) To encourage their families and the communities they live with to reaffirm the valued Filipino tradition of
caring for the senior citizens;

(c) To give full support to the improvement of the total well-being of the elderly and their full participation in
society considering that senior citizens are integral part of Philippine society;

(d) To recognize the rights of senior citizens to take their proper place in society. This must be the concern of
the family, community, and government;

(e) To provide a comprehensive health care and rehabilitation system for disabled senior citizens to foster their
capacity to attain a more meaningful and productive ageing; and

(f) To recognize the important role of the private sector in the improvement of the welfare of senior citizens and
to actively seek their partnership.
Republic Act No. 9994, otherwise known as the Expanded Senior Citizen Act of 2010, further amended the policies
and objectives, as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
 (a) To recognize the rights of senior citizens to take their proper place in society and make it a concern of the
family, community, and government;

(b) To give full support to the improvement of the total well-being of the elderly and their full participation in
society, considering that senior citizens are integral part of Philippine society;

(c) To motivate and encourage the senior citizens to contribute to nation building;

(d) To encourage their families and the communities they live with to reaffirm the valued Filipino tradition of
caring for the senior citizens;

(e) To provide a comprehensive health care and rehabilitation system for disabled senior citizens to foster their
capacity to attain a more meaningful and productive ageing; and

(f) To recognize the important role of the private sector in the improvement of the welfare of senior citizens and
to actively seek their partnership.
As servants of the law, lawyers must be model citizens and set the example of obedience to law. The practice of law
is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet high standards of legal proficiency and morality.41 Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility expresses the lawyer's fundamental duty to "uphold the Constitution, obey the
laws of the land[,] and promote respect for law[.]" Respondent's display of improper attitude and arrogance toward
an elderly constitute conduct unbecoming of a member of the legal profession and cannot be tolerated by this court.

Respondent also violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which enjoins lawyers to uphold the
dignity and integrity of the legal profession at all times. Rule 7.03 provides:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflect on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Furthermore, Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 requires a lawyer to employ respectful and restrained language in keeping with
the dignity of the legal profession.42 Although the remark was allegedly made in response to undue provocation and
pestering on the part of complainant, respondent should have exercised restraint. Notwithstanding his personal
opinion on the merits of complainant's claims (in light of the defective notarization in the Memorandum of Agreement
dated June 7, 2014), it was improper for respondent to state that even if complainant brought 10 (or as many)
lawyers as he wanted, he would not prosper in his claims against the Mayon Council. Careless remarks such as this
tend to create and promote distrust in the administration of justice, undermine the people's confidence in the legal
profession, and erode public respect for it. "Things done cannot be undone and words uttered cannot be taken
back."43

I11 feelings between litigants may exist, but they should not be allowed to influence counsels in their conduct and
demeanor towards each other or towards suitors in the case. As officers of the court and members of the bar,
lawyers are expected to be always above reproach.44 They cannot indulge in offensive personalities. They should
always be temperate, patient, and courteous both in speech and conduct, notl only towards the court but also
towards adverse parties and witnesses.45

In Santiago v. Oca:46
The Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer for "any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor," whether in his professional or private life because "good character is
an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for the continuance of such privilege."
Thus, it has been ruled:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
To note, "the possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to
warrant admission to the Bar and to retain membership in the legal profession." This proceeds from the lawyer's
duty to observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the Bar's integrity. Consequently, any errant
behavior on the part of a, lawyer, be it in the lawyer's public or private activities, which tends to show deficiency in
moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or
disbarment.47ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court,48 the respondent was suspended for three (3) months for his insulting
language in his motion for reconsideration amounting to disrespect toward this court. In Torres v. Javier,49 the
respondent was suspended for one (1) month for employing offensive and improper language in his pleadings.

In this case, we find suspension from the practice of law for one (1) month a reasonable sanction for respondent's
misconduct.

II

With respect to the other charges against respondent, we find them to have not been adequately proven.

Complainant avers that it was immoral and gross misconduct on the part of respondent, who was not a party to the
case, to prevent the due implementation of the Memorandum of Agreement dated June 7, 2014. Complainant
further points to the following statements of respondent as shown in the Minutes of the Executive Committee
Meeting dated June 30, 2014.50
Mr. Balayo, the counsel, averred that while the case may not be brought before the Ombudsman, a case may arise,
before any court, criminally, to which his client claims protection from and further averred that the Council may be
held liable, more those who voted in favor of the agreement.

....

Mr. Balayo again stressed the situation of "doing things right" and "doing the right thing." That while the board
wanted to do what is right, Mr. Canlapan however, was not able to bring his claim timely, and therefore; his right to
do so is already forfeited and waived under the Labor Code.51ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Complainant argues that the foregoing actuations of respondent violate Canon 12, Rule 12.04, which demands that
lawyers should not "unduly delay a case, impede the execution of judgment or misuse ¦court processes." He adds
that respondent should have encouraged the peaceful resolution of the labor case considering that the parties had
already signed the compromise agreement.

We find nothing improper in the actions and statements of respondent. What respondent did was a mere honest
effort to protect the interest of his client, the Chair of the Boy Scouts of trie Philippines - Mayon Albay Council. The
Boy Scouts of the Philippines is a public corporation or government instrumentality; hence, the money to be paid to
complainant is public money and subject to audit by the Commission on Audit.52 Hence, if the Memorandum of
Agreement causes any undue injury to any party, including the government, the parties to the Agreement can be
brought to court on administrative and/or criminal charges.

It was Fajut who went to respondent's office to seek legal advice after he was informed by a former Mayon Council
employee that the Agreement was invalid. Respondent rendered his legal opinion dated June 10, 2014 in response
to a query posed by Fajut pertaining to the legality of the payment of accrued sick leave benefits to complainjant. In
his opinion, respondent advised Fajut to retrieve the Compromise Agreement that he improvidently signed, to cause
its cancellation, or to move for its disapproval before the Labor Arbiter on the following grounds: (1) complainant
failed to preserit evidence (such as his Daily Time Record) to prove his factual claim that he never utilized his sick
leave and vacation leave for 39 years; and (2) even assuming that complainant's claim that he never availed himself
of sick leaves was factually true, there was no basis to approve a claim that goes back 39 years.

Respondent further explained that the Boy Scout of the Philippines Employees Manual showed that commutation of
unused sick leaves must be done at the end of each year. Necessarily, the claim of commutation to cash of unused
sick leaves for years 1975 to 2010 was already barred by Article 29153 of the Labor Code. Respondent advised that
at most, complainant could only claim benefits for a period of three (3) years.
Respondent appeared in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter on behalf of Fajut and only for the very limited
purpose of pointing out to the Labor Arbiter the defect in the notarization of the Memorandum of Agreement. It was
Fajut who approached respondent and asked him to make a special appearance on his behalf for the sole reason
that complainant cjiose to present to the Labor Arbiter a defectively notarized Agreement, one which a signatory
thereof actively tried to have cancelled in view of his doubts as to its validity.

Moreover, respondent's participation and statements in the June 30, 2014 Executive Committee meeting cannot be
characterized as malicious and unprofessional. The issue of the criminal liability of those who voted in favor of the
Agreement arose because of trie threats of criminal cases to be filed by a certain Mr. Redillas and a certain Mr.
Navarra, both former officers of the Mayon Council.54 It is clear that respondent was merely expressing his legal
opinion and not advocating any course of action.

We hold that the foregoing acts do not amount to obstruction of the administration of justice. It is the right qf every
lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice to those seeking relief. Respondent's assertiveness in espousing
with candor his client's cause was: merely in accord with his duty to act in the best interests of his client.55

WHEREFORE, this court finds Atty. William B. Balayo guilty of conduct unbecoming of a lawyer and violating Canon
1, Canon 7, Rule 7.03, and Canon 8, Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month, and WARNED that commission of the same or
similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Brion, J., on leave.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 EN BANC

A.C. No. 9574, June 21, 2016

MYRNA M. DEVEZA, Complainant, v. ATTY. ALEXANDER M. DEL PRADO, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before the Court is a Complaint-Affidavit1 for disbarment filed by Myrna M. Deveza (complainant) against
respondent Atty. Alexander M. Del Prado (Atty. Del Prado) for dishonesty and for acts unbecoming a lawyer.

In her complaint-affidavit, complainant alleged, among others, the following:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

2. The charge arose from the following facts:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(a) In February 2003, Atty. Alexander del Prado bought my lot located at No. 3242 Malvar St., Bragy. Pagasa,
Camarin, Caloocan City, consisting of 633.80 sq. meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
178828 of the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City for P1,500.00 per square meters on installment basis.

(b) To evidence the said sale, we executed a Contract to Sell. Atty. Del Prado took all the copies of the
Contract to Sell on the pretext that he will have the document notarized but he never gave me a copy of the
said document.

(c) Atty. Del Prado defaulted in his obligation to pay me the purchase price of the said lot by leaving a balance
of P565.950.00.

(d) When I sent him a demand letter for the payment of his obligation and/or rescission of sale, he called me
and told me that he will meet me and my son at Jollibee, Muñoz Branch, where he will pay his unpaid
balance. He likewise asked me to bring the title over the property.

(e) Upon meeting Atty. Del. Prado at Jollibee Muñoz Branch, he asked for the title of the property and I showed
it to him. Then Atty. Del Prado brought out a completely filled up Deed of Sale and he asked us to sign it
before he will give us his payment.

(f) After we have signed the Deed of Absolute Sale, he gave us P5,000.00 and he told us that he would have
the document first notarized before he will give us his complete payment. x x x
 (g) At that juncture, Atty. Del Prado tried to put inside his bag our title over the property but I was able to grab it
from him.

(h) Atty. Del Prado never paid us the balance of the purchase price for the lot he bought from us.

(i) [Worst], Atty. Del Prado used the Deed of Absolute Sale that he made us sign by means of fraud as
evidence in the civil case I filed against him for rescission of contract [that misled] the court.

x x x.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In a Resolution,3 dated September 3, 2012, the Court required Atty. Del Prado to comment on the complaint-affidavit
but failed to do so.

Pursuant to the Court Resolution,4 dated November 18, 2013, the complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

On June 18, 2014, the case was set for mandatory conference but only the counsel of complainant appeared.
Despite due notice, Atty. Del Prado did not attend the mandatory conference. The parties were then required to
submit their respective position papers but Atty. Del Prado again did not heed to the order of the IBP.

On September 2, 2014, the IBP-CBD, in its Report and Recommendation,5 stated that Atty. Del Prado's failure to
answer the complaint despite several notices and his continuous absence in the scheduled hearings shows his
flouting resistance to the lawful orders of the court and illustrates his despiciency for his oath of office as a lawyer.
The IBP-CBD recommended that Atty. Del Prado be meted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law and
as a member of the bar for a period of two (2) years.

In its Notice of Resolution No. XXI-2015-014,6 dated January 30, 2015, the IBP-Board of Governors adopted and
approved with modification the report and recommendation of the CBD and suspended Atty. Del Prado from the
practice of law for a period of five (5) years.

The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

The practice of law is a privilege bestowed only to those who show that they possess and continue to possess the
legal qualifications for it. As vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency
but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing.7 Because of their important role in the
society, the Court shall not hesitate to discipline a lawyer for any conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty, probity
and good demeanor, whether such conduct was committed in their professional or in private
capacity.8chanrobleslaw

Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates all lawyers to uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession. Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the same code proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. They should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any
degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal
profession.9chanrobleslaw

In the present case, Atty. Del Prado committed an act which fell short of the standard of the norm of conduct
required of every lawyer. He deceived the complainant by making her sign the deed of sale and making her believe
that he would pay in full the balance of the purchase price after he had the document notarized. Complainant waited
for Atty. Del Prado to make good his promise to pay but despite several demands, he continued reneging on his
obligation which prompted her to file a case against him.

Moreover, Atty. Del Prado wantonly disregarded the lawful orders of the Court and IBP-CBD to file his comment and
position paper and to appear in the mandatory conference despite due notice. His continued defiance of the orders
of the Court and the IBP-CBD is a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the court's authority which cannot be
tolerated.10 Atty. Del Prado should bear in mind that he is a lawyer and an officer of the court who is duty bound to
obey and respect the court processes. He must acknowledge, at all times, the orders of the Court and the IBP-CBD
in deference to their authority over him as a member of the bar.11chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Alexander Del Prado GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon
7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court hereby SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for Five (5)
years effective upon receipt of this decision with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be
dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this decision be furnished all courts in the country and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their
information and guidance. Let also a copy of this decision be appended to the personal record Atty. Alexander Del
Prado in the Office of the Bar Confidant.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-
Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Del Castillo, J., on official leave.

Endnotes:

1Rollo,
pp. 1-2.
2
Id. at 1-2.
3
Id. at 29.
4 Id. at 32.
5
Id. at 51-53.
6
Id. at 49-50.
7Bengco v. Atty. Bernardo, 687 Phil. 7, 16 (2012).
8Tomlin
II v. Atty. Moya II, 518 Phil. 325, 330 (2006).
9Maligsa v. Cabanting, 338 Phil. 912, 917 (1997).
10Supra
note 7, at 15.
11Toledo
v. Atty. Abalos, 374 Phil. 15, 18 (1999).
 EN BANC

March 10, 2015

A.C. No. 5816

DR. ELMAR 0. PEREZ, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG and ATTY. KAREN E. BAYDO, Respondents.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 for disbarment filed by Dr. Elmar 0. Perez (Dr. Perez) with the Office
of the Bar Confidant on August 27, 2002 against Atty. Tristan A. Catindig (Atty. Catindig) and Atty. Karen E. Baydo
(Atty. Baydo) (respondents) for gross immorality and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Facts

In her complaint, Dr. Perez alleged that she and Atty. Catindig had been friends since the mid-1960’s when they
were both students at the University of the Philippines, but they lost touch after their graduation. Sometime in 1983,
the paths of Atty. Catindig and Dr. Perez again crossed. It was at that time that Atty. Catindig started to court Dr.
Perez.2

Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr. Perez that he was already wed to Lily Corazon Gomez (Gomez), having married the
latter on May 18, 1968 at the Central Methodist Church in Ermita, Manila, which was followed by a Catholic wedding
at the Shrine of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City.3 Atty. Catindig however claimed that he only married Gomez
because he got her pregnant; that he was afraid that Gomez would make a scandal out of her pregnancy should he
refuse to marry her, which could have jeopardized his scholarship in the Harvard Law School.4

Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the process of obtaining a divorce in a foreign country to dissolve his
marriage to Gomez, and that he would eventually marry her once the divorce had been decreed. Consequently,
sometime in 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez obtained a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic. Dr. Perez
claimed that Atty. Catindig assured her that the said divorce decree was lawful and valid and that there was no
longer any impediment to their marriage.5

Thus, on July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United States of America
(USA). Their union was blessed with a child whom they named Tristan Jegar Josef Frederic.6
Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty. Catindig is a nullity since the divorce decree that was
obtained from the Dominican Republic by the latter and Gomez is not recognized by Philippine laws. When she
confronted Atty. Catindig about it, the latter allegedly assured Dr. Perez that he would legalize their union once he
obtains a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gomez under the laws of the Philippines. He also promised to
legally adopt their son.7

Sometime in 1997, Dr. Perez reminded Atty. Catindig of his promise to legalize their union by filing a petition to
nullify his marriage to Gomez. Atty. Catindig told her that he would still have to get the consent of Gomez to the said
petition.8

Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous letter9 in the mail informing her of Atty.
Catindig’s scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that sometime later, she came upon a love letter10 written and
signed by Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo dated April 25, 2001. In the said letter, Atty. Catindig professed his love to
Atty. Baydo, promising to marry her once his "impediment is removed." Apparently, five months into their
relationship, Atty. Baydo requested Atty. Catindig to put a halt to their affair until such time that he is able to obtain
the annulment of his marriage. On August 13, 2001, Atty. Catindig filed a petition to declare the nullity of his
marriage to Gomez.11

On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son; he moved to an upscale condominium in
Salcedo Village, Makati City where Atty. Baydo was frequently seen.12

In a Resolution13 dated October 9, 2002, the Court directed the respondents to file their respective comments, which
they separately did on November 25, 2002.14

Atty. Catindig, in his Comment,15 admitted that he married Gomez on May 18, 1968. He claimed, however, that
immediately after the wedding, Gomez showed signs that she was incapable of complying with her marital
obligations, as she had serious intimacy problems; and that while their union was blessed with four children, their
relationship simply deteriorated.

Eventually, their irreconcilable differences led to their de facto separation in 1984. They then consulted Atty.
Wilhelmina Joven (Atty. Joven), a mutual friend, on how the agreement to separate and live apart could be
implemented. Atty. Joven suggested that the couple adopt a property regime of complete separation of property.
She likewise advised the couple to obtain a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic for whatever value it may
have and comfort it may provide them.16

Thus, on April 27, 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez each executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed to a
Judge of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a
divorce action under its laws. Atty. Catindig likewise admitted that a divorce by mutual consent was ratified by the
Dominican Republic court on June 12, 1984. Further, Atty. Catindig and Gomez filed a Joint Petition for Dissolution
of Conjugal Partnership before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 133, which was granted on June 23,
1984.17

Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the foregoing, including the fact that the divorce decreed by the
Dominican Republic court does not have any effect in the Philippines. Notwithstanding that she knew that the
marriage of Atty. Catindig and Gomez still subsisted, Dr. Perez demanded that Atty. Catindig marry her. Thus, Atty.
Catindig married Dr. Perez in July 1984 in the USA.18

Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage was not valid since his previous marriage to Gomez
was still subsisting, and that he only married Dr. Perez because he loved her and that he was afraid of losing her if
he did not. He merely desired to lend a modicum of legitimacy to their relationship.19

Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr. Perez turned sour. Eventually, he left their home in October 2001
to prevent any acrimony from developing.20

He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he left Dr. Perez, claiming that his relationship with Dr. Perez started
to fall apart as early as 1997. He asserted that Atty. Baydo joined his law firm only in September 1999; and that
while he was attracted to her, Atty. Baydo did not reciprocate and in fact rejected him. He likewise pointed out that
Atty. Baydo resigned from his firm in January 2001.21

For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with Atty. Catindig. She claimed that Atty. Catindig began
courting her while she was employed in his firm. She however rejected Atty. Catindig’s romantic overtures; she told
him that she could not reciprocate his feelings since he was married and that he was too old for her. She said that
despite being turned down, Atty. Catindig still pursued her, which was the reason why she resigned from his law
firm.22

On January 29, 2003, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation within 90 days from notice.23

On June 2, 2003, the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) issued an Order24 setting the mandatory
conference of the administrative case on July 4, 2003, which was later reset to August 29, 2003. During the
conference, the parties manifested that they were already submitting the case for resolution based on the pleadings
already submitted. Thereupon, the IBP-CBD directed the parties to submit their respective position papers within 10
days from notice. Respondents Atty. Catindig and Atty. Baydo filed their position papers on October 17, 200325 and
October 20, 2003,26 respectively. Dr. Perez filed her position paper27 on October 24, 2003.

Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner

On May 6, 2011, after due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD issued a Report and
Recommendation,28 which recommended the disbarment of Atty. Catindig for gross immorality, violation of Rule
1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Investigating Commissioner pointed
out that Atty. Catindig’s act of marrying Dr. Perez despite knowing fully well that his previous marriage to Gomez still
subsisted was a grossly immoral and illegal conduct, which warrants the ultimate penalty of disbarment. The
Investigating Commissioner further opined that:

In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty. Catindig established a
pattern of grossly immoral conduct that warrants fustigation and his disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt or
unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree.

There is no dichotomy of morality. A lawyer and a professor of law, both in his official and personal conduct, must
display exemplary behavior. Respondent’s bigamous marriage and his proclivity for extramarital adventurism have
definitely caused damage to the legal and teaching professions. How can he hold his head up high and expect his
students, his peers and the community to look up to him as a model worthy of emulation when he failed to follow the
tenets of morality? In contracting a second marriage notwithstanding knowing fully well that he has a prior valid
subsisting marriage, Atty. Catindig has made a mockery of an otherwise inviolable institution, a serious outrage to
the generally accepted moral standards of the community.29

On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the charge against Atty. Baydo be dismissed
for dearth of evidence; Dr. Perez failed to present clear and preponderant evidence in support of the alleged affair
between the respondents.

Findings of the IBP Board of Governors

On December 10, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution,30 which adopted and approved the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

Atty. Catindig sought a reconsideration31 of the December 10, 2011 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors,
claiming that the Investigating Commissioner erred in relying solely on Dr. Perez’s uncorroborated allegations. He
pointed out that, under Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, a complaint for disbarment must be supported
by affidavits of persons having knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may
substantiate said facts. He said that despite the absence of any corroborating testimony, the Investigating
Commissioner gave credence to Dr. Perez’ testimony.
He also claimed that he had absolutely no intention of committing any felony; that he never concealed the status of
his marriage from anyone. In fact, Atty. Catindig asserted that he had always been transparent with both Gomez and
Dr. Perez.

The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution32 dated December 29, 2012, denied Atty. Catindig’s motion for
reconsideration.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether the respondents committed gross immorality, which would warrant their
disbarment.

Ruling of the Court

After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the parties and the circumstances of this case, the Court
agrees with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities
of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

In Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit,33 the Court held:

[T]he requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than
the possession of legal learning. Good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the legal
profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain one’s good standing in that exclusive and honored
fraternity. Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character. Such character expresses itself in
the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be
so because "vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he
deals with his client’s property, reputation, his life, his all."34 (Citation omitted)

In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be removed or suspended
from the practice of law, inter alia, for grossly immoral conduct. Thus:

Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to
a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis ours)

"A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral character,
honesty, probity or good demeanor."35 Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that
show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community. Immoral
conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a
high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s
sense of decency. The Court makes these distinctions, as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct
requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.36

Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to a grossly immoral conduct.
The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties and, ironically, from Atty. Catindig’s own admission,
indeed establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly immoral; it is not only corrupt and unprincipled, but
reprehensible to a high degree.

Atty. Catindig was validly married to Gomez twice – a wedding in the Central Methodist Church in 1968, which was
then followed by a Catholic wedding. In 1983, Atty. Catindig started pursuing Dr. Perez when their paths crossed
again. Curiously, 15 years into his first marriage and four children after, Atty. Catindig claimed that his first marriage
was then already falling apart due to Gomez’ serious intimacy problems.

A year after pursuing Dr. Perez, Atty. Catindig had a de facto separation from Gomez, dissolved their conjugal
partnership of gains, obtained a divorce decree from a court in the Dominican Republic, and married Dr. Perez in
the USA all in the same year. Atty. Catindig was so enchanted with Dr. Perez at that time that he moved heaven and
earth just so he could marry her right away – a marriage that has at least a semblance of legality.

From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that the divorce decree he obtained from the court in the Dominican
Republic was not recognized in our jurisdiction as he and Gomez were both Filipino citizens at that time. He knew
that he was still validly married to Gomez; that he cannot marry anew unless his previous marriage be properly
declared a nullity. Otherwise, his subsequent marriage would be void. This notwithstanding, he still married Dr.
Perez. The foregoing circumstances seriously taint Atty. Catindig’s sense of social propriety and moral values. It is a
blatant and purposeful disregard of our laws on marriage.

It has also not escaped the attention of the Court that Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the USA. Considering that
Atty. Catindig knew that his previous marriage remained valid, the logical conclusion is that he wanted to marry Dr.
Perez in the USA for the added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage
outside Philippine jurisdiction.

Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindig’s claim is true, it matters not that Dr. Perez knew that their
marriage is a nullity. The fact still remains that he resorted to various legal strategies in order to render a façade of
validity to his otherwise invalid marriage to Dr. Perez. Such act is, at the very least, so unprincipled that it is
reprehensible to the highest degree. 1âwphi1

Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez, and despite the various legal actions he resorted to in order to
give their union a semblance of validity, Atty. Catindig left her and their son. It was only at that time that he finally
decided to properly seek the nullity of his first marriage to Gomez. Apparently, he was then already entranced with
the much younger Atty. Baydo, an associate lawyer employed by his firm.

While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate from Dr. Perez to pursue Atty. Baydo, in itself, cannot be
considered a grossly immoral conduct, such fact forms part of the pattern showing his propensity towards immoral
conduct. Lest it be misunderstood, the Court’s finding of gross immoral conduct is hinged not on Atty. Catindig’s
desertion of Dr. Perez, but on his contracting of a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous
marriage to Gomez.

"The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that
outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes ‘a mockery
of the inviolable social institution of marriage.’"37 In various cases, the Court has held that disbarment is warranted
when a lawyer abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship with another woman who has borne him
a child.38

Atty. Catindig’s subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous one definitely manifests a deliberate
disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. By
his own admission, Atty. Catindig made a mockery out of the institution of marriage, taking advantage of his legal
skills in the process. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the
bar, which thus warrant the penalty of disbarment.

The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a
clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court
and as a member of the bar. Where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end
desired, disbarment should never be decreed. Nevertheless, in this case, the seriousness of the offense compels
the Court to wield its power to disbar, as it appears to be the most appropriate penalty.

Atty. Catindig’s claim that Dr. Perez’s allegations against him are not credible since they are uncorroborated and not
supported by affidavits contrary to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, deserves scant consideration. Verily,
Atty. Catindig himself admitted in his pleadings that he indeed married Dr. Perez in 1984 while his previous marriage
with Gomez still subsisted. Indubitably, such admission provides ample basis for the Court to render disciplinary
sanction against him.

There is insufficient evidence to prove the affair between the respondents.

The Court likewise agrees with the Investigating Commissioner that there is a dearth of evidence to prove the
claimed amorous relationship between the respondents. As it is, the evidence that was presented by Dr. Perez to
prove her claim was mere allegation, an anonymous letter informing her that the respondents were indeed having
an affair and the purported love letter to Atty. Baydo that was signed by Atty. Catindig.

The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys
the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his
complaint. The evidence required m suspens10n or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence.39

The presentation of the anonymous letter that was received by Dr. Perez only proves that the latter indeed received
a letter informing her of the alleged relations between the respondents; it does not prove the veracity of the
allegations therein. Similarly,. the supposed love letter, if at all, only provesAtty.that Catindig wrote Atty. Baydo a
letter professing his love for her. It does not prove that Atty. Baydo is indeed in a relationship with Atty. Catindig.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court resolves to ADOPT the recommendations
of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Tristan A. Catindig is found
GUILTY of gross immorality and of violating the Lawyer's Oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of Atty. Tristan A. Catindig in the Office of the Bar Confidant
and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Likewise, copies of this Decision shall be
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated by the Court Administrator to all appellate and trial
courts.

The charge of gross immorality against Atty. Karen E. Baydo 1s hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC M.V.F LEONEN FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA*

Associate Justice Associate Justice

A.C. No. 10676 September 8, 2015

ATTY. ROY B. ECRAELA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. IAN RAYMOND A. PANGALANGAN, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Disbarment1 filed by Atty. Roy B. Ecraela with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) on April 12, 2007 against Atty. Ian Raymond A. Pangalangan for his illicit
relations, chronic womanizing, abuse of authority as an educator, and "other unscrupulous activities" which cause
"undue embarrassment to the legal profession." Complainant claims that respondent's actions involve deceit,
malpractice, gross misconduct and grossly immoral conduct in violation of the Lawyer's Oath.

The Facts

Complainant and respondent were best friends and both graduated from the University of the Philippines (UP)
College of Law in 1990, where they were part of a peer group or barkada with several of their classmates. After
passing the bar examinations and being admitted as members of the Bar in 1991, they were both registered with the
IBP Quezon City.

Respondent was formerly married to Sheila P. Jardiolin (Jardiolin) with whom he has three (3) children. Complainant
avers that while married to Jardiolin, respondent had a series of adulterous and illicit relations with married and
unmarried women between the years 1990 to 2007. These alleged illicit relations involved:

a. AAA,2 who is the spouse of a colleague in the UP College of Law, from 1990 to 1992, which complainant
had personal knowledge of such illicit relations;

b. BBB, sometime during the period from 1992 to 1994 or from 1994 to 1996, despite being already married
to Jardiolin;
 c. CCC, despite being married to Jardiolin and while also being romantically involved with DDD;

d. DDD, sometime during the period from 2000 to 2002, despite still being married to Jardiolin and while still
being romantically .involved with CCC;

e. EEE, who is related to complainant, sometime during the period from May 2004 until the filing of the
Petition, while still being romantically involved with CCC.3

Complainant claims that respondent, with malice and without remorse, deceived CCC and DDD by representing
himself to be a bachelor, thereby convincing the two women to start a love affair with him, when in. truth, he was
then still married to Jardiolin.4

Aside from these illicit affairs, complainant avers that sometime during the period of 1998 to 2000, respondent, as a
lawyer of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC), represented the interest of Manila International
Airport Authority (MIAA) in cancellation proceedings filed by MIAA against Kendrick Development Corporation
(KOC). However, despite being a public officer and a government counsel, respondent conspired with Atty.
Abraham Espejo, legal counsel of KDC, and assisted KDC in its case, thereby sabotaging MIAA's case, and, in
effect, that of the Philippine Government.5

Complainant further claims that respondent even attempted to bribe then Solicitor Rolando Martin of the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) in exchange for the latter's cooperation in the dismissal of the cancellation proceedings
in favor of KDC. In return for his "earnest efforts" in assisting KDC in its case, respondent was allegedly rewarded
with a Toyota Corolla XL with plate number ULS-835 by Atty. Espejo. The vehicle was seen several times by
respondent's classmates and officemates being driven and parked by respondent in his own home and in the OGCC
premises itself.6

In connection with his involvement in the MIAA case, complainant claims that respondent was summoned in a
Senate inquiry concerning rampant faking of land titles in the Philippines, which included an investigation of the
alleged spurious land titles of KDC. In Senate Committee Final Report No. 367, the Senate Blue Ribbon and Justice
& Human Rights Committees recommended that respondent be investigated and prosecuted by the Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman) for graft and corruption, as well as disbarment or disciplinary sanction by this Court for
grave misconduct or violation of the Revised Penal Code.7

It was further alleged that, during the pendency of the Senate Inquiry, respondent even attempted to conceal the
evidence by requesting complainant's parents, spouses Marcelo F. Ecraela and Visitacion B. Ecraela, to have the
Toyota Corolla XL parked in their residence in Cainta, Rizal, for an indefinite period of time. Respondent's request,
however, was refused by the spouses when they learned that the vehicle was the subject of the Senate Inquiry.8

It appears from the documents presented by complainant that the Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding probable
cause against respondent, and an Information was thereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3
(b) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019.9 Complainant also claims that respondent abused his authority as an educator in
Manuel L. Quezon University, San Sebastian College, College of St. Benilde, and Maryknoll College, where
respondent induced his male students to engage in "nocturnal preoccupations" and entertained the romantic
gestures of his female students in exchange for passing grades.10 The Petition was docketed as CBD Case No. 07-
1973.

In an Order11 dated April 16, 2007, the Director for Bar Discipline, Honorable Rogelio A. Vinluan, required
respondent to file his verified answer.

In his undated Answer,12 respondent opted not to present any counter-statement of facts in supp01i of his defense.
Instead, respondent simply argued that the petition suffers from procedural and substantive infirmities, claiming that
petitioner failed to substantiate the allegations or charges against him. Respondent pointed out that Annex "J" of the
Petition entitled "Arguments in Support of the Disbarment" lacked formal requirements, and thus, should be treated
as a mere scrap of paper. Respondent also asserts that the e-mail messages attached to the petition were
inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of the Rules on Electronic Evidence.13 He claims that the identities
of the owners of the e-mail messages, as well as the allegations of illicit relations and abuse of authority, were not
properly established. Respondent further argues that the statements of complainant's witnesses were merely self-
serving and deserved scant consideration.
Complainant filed a Comment (to the Respondent's Answer),14 stating that the allegations in the complaint were
deemed admitted by reason of respondent's failure to make specific or even general denials of such in his Answer.

In his Reply (to the Comment filed by Complainant),15 respondent simply denied all of complainant's accusations in
the petition, allegedly for "lack of knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity
thereof."16

On August 3, 2007, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. (Commissioner Villadolid) set the
case for mandatory conference on August 28, 2007,17 which respondent failed to attend. It appears that respondent
filed a Motion to Cancel Hearing,18 praying for the resetting of the mandatory conference allegedly due to a
previously scheduled hearing on the same date. Respondent's motion was opposed by complainant and eventually
denied by Commissioner Villadolid in his Order19 dated August 28, 2007. In the same order, complainant's
Manifestation20 praying that subpoenas be issued to several persons who shall be complainant's hostile witnesses
was granted by Commissioner Villadolid. Accordingly, the case was scheduled for the presentation of complainant's
witnesses on September 11, 2007 and the respective subpoenas21 were issued.

A day before the scheduled hearing, the IBP-CBD received respondent's Motion for Reconsideration,22 praying that
the Order dated August 28, 2007 be set aside and that the hearing be reset to sometime during the third week of
October. In said motion, respondent informed the IBP-CBD that he has viral conjunctivitis or more commonly known
as "sore eyes" and has been ordered by the doctor to rest for at least one to two weeks while his eyes are being
treated. Attached to his motion were photocopies of two medical certificates, stating that a certain R. Pangalangan
was suffering from sore eyes.

During the scheduled hearing on September 11, 2007, complainant opposed petitioner's motion, arguing that based
on his personal verification with the court personnel of Branch 77 of Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Parafiaque
City, there was no case calendared for hearing on the date of the previous setting. Complainant also argued that
this is another ploy of respondent to delay the proceedings because he knew that complainant worked overseas and
was only in the country for a limited period of time. Finding merit in complainant's opposition, respondent's motion
was denied and complainant was allowed to present his witnesses.23 Complainant presented his witnesses, as
follows: Assistant Solicitor General Karl Miranda (ASG Miranda), Ms. Laarni Morallos (Ms. Morallos), Atty. Glenda T.
Litong (Atty. Litong), Atty. Emelyn W. Corpus (Atty. Corpus), Mr. Marcelo Ecraela, and Mrs. Visitacion Ecraela.

ASG Miranda testified on his participation in the KDC case as reflected in the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
Report, as well as on his recollection that the Senate Report had recommended the disbarment of respondent.

Ms. Morallos, Atty. Litong, and Atty. Corpus were presented to establish that the email messages submitted by
complainant indeed originated from respondent based on their familiarity with respondent, paiiicularly, the email
messages which contained references to his daughter, his relationship with complainant, and respondent's high
blood pressure.

Atty. Litong further testified that respondent personally introduced DDD to her as his girlfriend and that sometime in
2002 or 2003, she saw respondent with another girl in Glorietta despite still being married to his wife. Atty. Litong
also recalled encountering respondent at a party sometime in 2007 where he was with CCC, whom she perceived to
be respondent's girlfriend at that time. She also confirmed that respondent had, in more than one occasion, brought
with him his students during their drinking sessions and had even one student driving for him.

For her testimony, Atty. Corpus corroborated Atty. Litong's statements about respondent's preoccupations with his
students. Atty. Corpus also testified that ODD called her at her office sometime in 2000 or 2001 to inform her that
the latter had broken up with respondent upon learning that he was actually married. Atty. Corpus surmised based
on her telephone conversation with DDD that respondent did not tell the latter his actual marital status. Aside from
this, Atty. Corpus also recalled that during complainant's farewell party in February 2007, respondent introduced
CCC as his girlfriend of six years, or since the year 2000 or 2001.

To expedite the hearing, the spouses Ecraela were made to affirm the execution of their affidavits since their
testimonies were based on the affidavits that complainant included in his petition.

Once complainant's presentation of witnesses was concluded, the mandatory conference/hearing was terminated
and the parties were directed to submit their respective verified position papers with supporting documentary
evidence within thi1iy (30) days from receipt of the transcript of stenographic notes. After which, the case was
considered submitted for report and recommendation.

On September 18, 2007, the IBP-CBD received complainant's Manifestation (with Comments),24 pertaining to
respondent's Motion to Cancel Hearing and praying for the IBP-CBD to formally request for records from Branch 77
of MTC, Parañaque City to verify respondent's claim that he had a hearing in said court during the first scheduled
mandatory conference. On the same date, the IBP-CBD also received complainant's Compliance (with
Comments),25 submitting the certified photo copies of the Senate Committee Final Report No. 367, the Resolution
dated January 22, 2001 of the Ombudsman, and the Information dated June 30, 2003 filed with the Sandiganbayan.

On January 8, 2008, the IBP-CBD received complainant's Position Paper.26 Complainant thereafter filed two
Manifestations,27 asserting that respondent is already barred from submitting his verified position paper and that any
decision or judgment would have to be based solely on complainant's Verified Position Paper.28

Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner

After the case was submitted for report and recommendation, Commissioner Villadolid rendered a Report,29 finding
that there is more than sufficient evidence establishing respondent's gross misconduct affecting his standing and
moral character as an officer of the court and member of the bar.

On the issue of respondent's alleged violations of the Revised Penal Code30 and/or RA 301931 as reflected in the
Senate Report, the Ombudsman's Resolution, and the Information, Commissioner Villadolid found that despite
respondent's denials, complainant was able to present certified true copies of the relevant documents which support
his allegations in the petition.

As for the alleged illicit affairs of respondent, Commissioner Villadolid discredited complainant's asse1iion that
respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for his alleged adulterous relations with EEE. Based on the Rep01i,
complainant was not able to discharge the burden of proving the authenticity of the email messages pertaining to
this adulterous affair; thus, they were deemed inadmissible. However, Commissioner Villadolid found merit in
complainant's claim that respondent committed grossly immoral conduct by having illicit relations with ODD, CCC,
and BBB, all while still married to Jardiolin, to wit:

4.21 In engaging in such illicit relationships, Respondent disregarded the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows
protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. which as a lawyer he swore under oath to protect. The 1987
Constitution, specifically Article XV. Section 2 thereof clearly provides that marriage, an inviolable social institution.
is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the state.

xxxx

4.23 Moreover. Respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon I, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that .. a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct"'
nor shall a lawyer "engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in
public or private life. behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession".32

Accordingly, the IBP-CBD reached and gave the following conclusion and recommendation: V.
Conclusion/Recommendations

5.1 In view of the foregoing, and considering that there is more than sufficient evidence establishing Respondent's
gross misconduct affecting his standing and moral character as an officer of the court and member of the bar, this
Commissioner respectfully recommends that Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two
(2) years with a STERN WARNING that Respondent should reform his conduct in a manner consistent with the
norms prescribed by the Canons of Professional Responsibility.33

Findings of the IBP Board of Governors

On March 20, 2013, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued a Resolution34 adopting and approving, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Villadolid. As modified, the Board of Governors
disbarred respondent, thus:

RESOLUTION NO. XX-2013-280

CBD Case No. 07-1973

Atty. Roy B. Ecraela vs.

Atty. Ian Raymundo A. Pangalangan

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules and considering Respondent's violations of Article XV of the 1987 Constitution, Section 2,
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer's Oath,
Atty. Ian Raymundo A. Pangalangan is hereby DISBARRED and his name Ordered Stricken Off from the Roll of
Attorneys.

On July 9, 2013, the IBP received respondent's Motion for Reconsideration35 dated July 3, 2013, to which
complainant was required to submit his comment.36

For his part, complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration (of the IBP-CBD Report dated June 28, 2012)37 dated
August 17, 2013. Similarly, respondent was required to comment on complainant's motion in an Order38 dated
August 27, 2013. On the same date, complainant filed his Comment and/or Opposition (to the Respondent's Motion
for Reconsideration).39 Subsequently, respondent filed a Comment on/Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration
with Leave40 dated September 12, 2013, as well as a Reply to the Comment and/or Opposition41 dated September
20, 2013.

On May 3, 2014, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a resolution denying respondent's motion for
reconsideration.42 Thereafter, the Director for Bar Discipline forwarded the records of this case to this Court on
November 11, 2014.43

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether the respondent committed gross immoral conduct, which would warrant his
disbarment.

The Court's Ruling

After a thorough examination of the records, the Court agrees with the Board of Governors' resolution finding that
Atty. Pangalangan's grossly immoral conduct was fully supported by the evidences offered.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 1 - A LA WYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

xxxx

CANON 7 - A LA WYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not
engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life.
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
The practice of law is a privilege given to those who possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the
profession.44 Good moral character is not only required for admission to the Bar, but must also be retained in order
to maintain one's good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity.45

We are not unmindful of the serious consequences of disbarment or suspension proceedings against a member of
the Bar. Thus, the Court has consistently held that clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
imposition of administrative penalties on a member of the Bar. This, We explained in Aba v. De Guzman, Jr.:

Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater
weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that
which is offered in opposition thereto. Under Section I of Rule 133, in determining whether or not there is
preponderance of evidence, the court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the case; (b)
the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they
are testifying. the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the
witnesses' interest or want of interest. and also their personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in
the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the
greater number.

When the evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates,
the decision should be against the party with the burden of proof, according to the equipoise doctrine.

To summarize, the Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the
lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the
allegations in his complaint. The evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of
evidence. In case the evidence of the parties are equally balanced, the equipoise doctrine mandates a decision in
favor of the respondent.46

The IBP-CBD Report sufficiently showed by preponderant evidence the grounds by which respondent has been
found committing gross immorality in the conduct of his personal affairs. This Court has, in numerous occasions,
revoked the licenses of lawyers who were proven to have not only failed to retain good moral character in their
professional and personal lives, but have also made a mockery of the institution of marriage by maintaining illicit
affairs.

In Guevarra v. Eala, respondent Atty. Eala was disbarred because he showed disrespect for an institution held
sacred by the law, by having an extramarital affair with the wife of the complainant. In doing so, he betrayed his
unfitness to be a lawyer.47

A year later, Atty. Arnobit met the same fate as Atty. Eala when the Court revoked his privilege to practice law after
his philandering ways was proven by preponderant evidence in Arnobit v. Arnobit.48 We ruled:

As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of
good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. A member
of the bar and an officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping a
mistress but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the impression that he is
flouting those moral standards.

xxxx

The fact that respondent s philandering ways are far removed from the exercise of his profession would not save the
day for him. For a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual
practice of his profession, would show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges with which his
license and the law invest him. To borrow from Orbe v. Adaw, "[t]he grounds expressed in Section 27, Rule 138. of
the Rules of Court are not !imitative and are broad enough to. cover any misconduct x x x of a lawyer in his
professional or private capacity." To reiterate, possession of good moral character is not only a condition precedent
to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar.49
Similarly, in the more recent case of Dr. Elmar O. Perez v. Atty. Tristan Catindig,50 the Court disbarred respondent
Atty. Catindig for blatantly and purposefully disregarding our laws on marriage by resorting to various legal
strategies to render a facade of validity to his invalid second marriage, despite the existence of his first marriage.
We said:

The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that
outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance. which makes 'a mockery
of the inviolable social institution of marriage." In various cases, the Court has held that disbarment is warranted
when a lawyer abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship with another woman who has borne him
a child.51 (emphasis ours.)

In the present case, complainant alleged that respondent carried on several adulterous and illicit relations with both
married and unmarried women between the years 1990 to 2007, including complainant's own wife. Through
documentary evidences in the form of email messages, as well as the corroborating testimonies of the witnesses
presented, complainant was able to establish respondent's illicit relations with DOD and CCC by preponderant
evidence. Respondent's main defense against the alleged illicit relations was that the same were not sufficiently
established. In his answer, respondent simply argued that complainant's petition contains self-serving averments not
supported by evidence. Respondent did not specifically deny complainant's allegations and, instead, questioned the
admissibility of the supporting documents. Due to respondent's own failure to attend the hearings and even submit
1âw phi 1

his own position paper, the existence of respondent's illicit relations with DDD and CCC remain uncontroverted.

The IBP-CBD Report was correct when it found that respondent violated Article XV, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution, to wit:

4.21 In engaging in such illicit relationships, Respondent disregarded the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows
protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws, which as a lawyer he swore under oath to protect. The 1987
Constitution, specifically A1iicle XV, Section 2 thereof clearly provides that marriage, an inviolable social institution,
is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.52 (emphasis in the original.)

Aside from respondent's illicit relations, We agree with Commissioner Villadolid' s findings that respondent violated
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as Rule I 0.01 and Rule 10.03 thereof.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 10 - A LA WYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT. Rule 10.01 -A lawyer
shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be
misled by any artifice.

xxx

Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.

In the Petition, complainant alleged that respondent was the subject of a Senate Inquiry and had a pending case for
graft and corruption against him with the Sandiganbayan, to wit:

13. Respondent has been recommended by the Senate Blue Ribbon and Justice & Human Rights Committees to be
investigated and prosecuted by the Ombudsman, the same as contained in their "Committee Final Report No. 367"
herein attached as Annex D;

14. Respondent has also been recommended by the abovementioned committees to suffer the penalty of
disbarment, among others, as evidenced by the herein attached Annex D-1, and it is believed that a case for graft
and corruption against him is still pending with the Sandiganbayan."53

Instead of refuting these claims, respondent merely pointed out in his Answer that complainant failed to adduce
additional evidence that a case had been filed against him, and that complainant's statements were merely self-
serving averments not substantiated by any evidence. In his Reply, respondent even specifically denied
complainant's averments for "lack of knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity
thereof."

We agree with Commissioner Villadolid's findings in the IBP-CBD Report, viz:

4.8 It (sic) is thus indisputable that Respondent's pretensions in his Answer were made in attempt to mislead this
Commission. Respondent could have easily admitted or denied said allegations or explained the same, as he (sic)
clearly had knowledge thereof, however, he (sic) chose to take advantage of Complainant's position of being not
present in the country and not being able to acquire the necessary documents, skirt the issue, and mislead the
Commission. In doing so, he has violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that
"a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court" as well as Rule 10.01 and Rule 10.03 thereof which
states that "a lawyer should do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow
the court to be misled by any artifice" and that "a lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse
them to defeat the ends of justice."

4.9 Courts [as well as this Commission] are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers
appearing and pleading before them. Respondent, through his actuations, has been lacking in the candor required
of him not only as a member of the Bar but also as an officer of the Court. In view of the foregoing, the Commission
finds that Respondent has violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for which he
should be disciplined.54 (emphasis in the original.)

In denying complainant's allegations, respondent had no other intention but to mislead the IBP, which intention was
more so established because complainant was able to submit supporting documents in the form of certified true
copies of the Senate Report, the Ombudsman's Resolution, and Information.

We also agree with Commissioner Villadolid's finding that respondent violated the lawyer's oath which he took
before admission to the Bar, which states:

I, __________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines: I will support its
Constitution and obey laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; I will not wittingly nor willingly promote or sue any groundless, false
or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same: I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct
myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts
as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of
evasion. So help me God.

In all, Atty. Pangalangan displayed deplorable arrogance by making a mockery out of the institution of marriage, and
taking advantage of his legal skills by attacking the Petition through technicalities and refusing to participate in the
proceedings. His actions showed that he lacked the degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar, thus
warranting the penalty of disbarment.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, the Court resolves to ADOPT the resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors approving and adopting, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner. Accordingly, respondent Atty. Ian Raymond A. Pangalangan is found GUILTY of gross immorality
and of violating Section 2 of A1iicle XV of the 1987 Constitution, Canon 1 and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03,
and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer's Oath and is hereby
DISBARRED from the practice of law.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the personal records of Atty. Ian Raymond A. Pangalangan with the
Office of the Bar Confidant and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Likewise, let copies
of this Decision be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated by the Cou1i
Administrator to all the cou1is in the country for their information and guidance.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.
 MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On leave)
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
BIENVENIDO L. REYES*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

EN BANC

A.C. No. 9226 (Formerly CBD 06-1749), June 14, 2016

MA. CECILIA CLARISSA C, ADVINCULA, Complainant, v. ATTY. LEONARDO C. ADVINCULA, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

This administrative case stemmed from the complaint for disbarment dated June 16, 2006 brought to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Leonardo C. Advincula (Atty. Advincula) by no less than his wife, Dr. Ma.
Cecilia Clarissa C. Advincula (Dr. Advincula).

In her complaint,1 Dr. Advincula has averred that Atty. Advincula committed unlawful and immoral acts;2 that while
Atty. Advincula was still married to her, he had extra-marital sexual relations with Ma. Judith Ortiz Gonzaga (Ms.
Gonzaga);3 that the extra-marital relations bore a child in the name of Ma. Alexandria Gonzaga Advincula
(Alexandria);4 that Atty. Advincula failed to give financial support to their own children, namely: Ma. Samantha
Paulina, Ma. Andrea Lana, and Jose Leandro, despite his having sufficient financial resources;5 that he admitted in
the affidavit of late registration of birth of Alexandria that he had contracted another marriage with Ms.
Gonzaga;6 that even should Atty. Advincula prove that his declaration in the affidavit of late registration of birth was
motivated by some reason other than the fact that he truly entered into a subsequent marriage with Ms. Gonzaga,
then making such a declaration was in itself still unlawful;7 that siring a child with a woman other than his lawful wife
was conduct way below the standards of morality required of every lawyer;8 that contracting a subsequent marriage
while the first marriage had not been dissolved was also an unlawful conduct;9 that making a false declaration
before a notary public was an unlawful conduct punishable under the Revised Penal Code;10 and that the failure of
Atty. Advincula to provide proper support to his children showed his moral character to be below the standards set
by law for every lawyer.11 Dr. Advincula prayed that Atty. Advincula be disbarred.12chanrobleslaw

In his answer,13 Atty. Advincula denied the accusations. He asserted that during the subsistence of his marriage
with Dr. Advincula but prior to the birth of their youngest Jose Leandro, their marital relationship had deteriorated;
that they could not agree on various matters concerning their family, religion, friends, and respective careers; that
Dr. Advincula abandoned the rented family home with the two children to live with her parents; that despite their
separation, he regularly gave financial support to Dr. Advincula and their children; that during their separation, he
got into a brief relationship with Ms. Gonzaga; and that he did not contract a second marriage with Ms.
Gonzaga.14chanrobleslaw

Atty. Advincula further acknowledged that as a result of the relationship with Ms. Gonzaga, a child was bom and
named Alexandra;15 that in consideration of his moral obligation as a father, he gave support to Alexandra;16 that he
only learned that the birth of Alexandra had been subsequently registered after the child was already enrolled in
school;17 that it was Ms. Gonzaga who informed him that she had the birth certificate of Alexandria altered by a fixer
in order to enroll the child;18 that he strived to reunite his legitimate family, resulting in a reconciliation that begot
their third child, Jose Leandro; that Dr. Advincula once again decided to live with her parents, bringing all of their
children along; that nevertheless, he continued to provide financial support to his family and visited the children
regularly; that Dr. Advincula intimated to him that she had planned to take up nursing in order to work as a nurse
abroad because her medical practice here was not lucrative; that he supported his wife's nursing school
expenses;19 that Dr. Advincula left for the United States of America (USA) to work as a nurse;20 that the custody of
their children was not entrusted to him but he agreed to such arrangement to avoid further division of the
family;21 that during the same period he was also busy with his law studies;22 that Dr. Advincula proposed that he
and their children migrate to the USA but he opposed the proposal because he would not be able to practice his
profession there;23 that Dr. Advincula stated that if he did not want to join her, then she would just get the children to
live with her;24 that when Dr. Advincula came home for a vacation he was not able to accompany her due to his
extremely busy schedule as Chief Legal Staff of the General Prosecution Division of the National Bureau of
Investigation;25cralawred and that when they finally met arguments flared out, during which she threatened to file a
disbarment suit against him in order to force him to allow her to bring their children to the USA.26 Atty. Advincula
prayed that the disbarment case be dismissed for utter lack of merit.27chanrobleslaw

Findings and Recommendations of the IBP-CBD

After exhaustive hearings, Commissioner Angelito C. Inocencio of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)
rendered the following findings and observations, and recommended the following sanctions, to
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Based on Rule 1.01, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers comes this provisions (sic): "A
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

This means that members of the bar ought to possess good moral character. Remember we must (sic) that the
practice of law is a mere privilege. The moment that a lawyer no longer has the required qualifications foremost of
which is the presence of that character earlier mentioned, the Honorable Supreme Court may revoke the said
practice.

No doubt, Respondent Leanardo (sic) C. Advincula, probably due to the weakness of the flesh, had a romance
outside of marriage (sic) with Ma. Judith Ortiz Gonzaga. This he admitted.

From such affair came a child named Ma. Alexandria. He supported her as a moral obligation.

How, then, must we categorize his acts? It cannot be denied that he had committed an adulterous and immoral act.

Was his conduct grossly immoral?

Before answering that, let us recall what the highest Court of the Land defined as immoral conduct: "that conduct
which is willful, flagrant or shameless and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community."28chanrobleslaw

xxxx

It is the Commissioner's view that what he did pales when compared to Respondent Leo Palma's case earlier cited.

In that case, the Honorable Supreme Court stressed that Atty. Palma had made a mockery of marriage, a sacred
institution demanding respect and dignity.

The highest Court of the Land intoned in the same case: "But what respondent forgot is that he has also duties to
his wife. As a husband, he is obliged to live with her; observe mutual love, respect and fidelity: and render help and
support."

Deemed favorable to Respondent's cause were the various exhibits he presented evidencing the fact that he
supported their children financially. Such conduct could not illustrate him as having championed a grossly immoral
conduct.

Another factor to consider is this: Complainant should share part of the blame why their marriage soured. Their
constant quarrels while together would indicate that harmony between them was out of the question.

The possibility appears great that she might have displayed a temper that ignited the flame of discord between
them.

Just the same, however, while this Commissioner would not recommend the supreme penalty of disbarment for to
deprive him of such honored station in life would result in irreparable injury and must require proof of the highest
degree pursuant to the Honorable Supreme Court's ruling in Angeles vs. Figueroa, 470 SCRA 186 (2005), he must
be sanctioned.

And the proof adduced is not of the highest degree.

VI. RECOMMENDATION

In the light of the foregoing disquisition, having, in effect, Respondent's own admission of having committed an
extra-marital affair and fathering a child, it is respectfully recommended that he be suspended from the practice of
law for at least one month with the additional admonition that should he repeat the same, a more severe penalty
would be imposed.

It would be unjust to impose upon him the extreme penalty of disbarment. What he did was not grossly
immoral.29chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted the findings and recommendations of the Investigating
Commissioner with slight modification of the penalty, thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A" and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence
on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering respondent's admission of engaging in a simple
immorality and also taking into account the condonation of his extra-marital affair by his wife, Atty. Leonardo C.
Advincula is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) months.30chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Advincula accepted the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors as final and executory, and manifested in his
compliance dated February 26, 2013, as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

1. That on 28 November 2011 this Honorable Court issued a resolution suspending the undersigned
Attorney from the practice of law for two (2) months under "A.C. No. 9226 (formerly CBD Case No.
06-1749) (Ma. Cecilia Clarissa C. Advincula vs. Atty. Leonardo C. Advincula) x x x

2. That on 30 October 2012 in faithful compliance with the above order, the undersigned attorney
applied for Leave for two (2) months starting November up to December thereby refraining himself
from the practice of law as Legal Officer on the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) x x x

3. That the undersigned Attorney would like to notify this Honorable Court of his compliance with the
above resolution/order so that he may be able to practice his law profession again.31

Ruling of the Court

The good moral conduct or character must be possessed by lawyers at the time of their application for admission to
the Bar, and must be maintained until retirement from the practice of law. In this regard, the Code of Professional
Responsibility states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

xxxx

CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the
activities of the Integrated Bar.

xxxx

Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Accordingly, it is expected that every lawyer, being an officer of the Court, must not only be in fact of good moral
character, but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest
moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the Court is required not
only to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping mistresses but also to conduct himself as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. If the practice of law is to
remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, whoever is enrolled in its ranks should not only master its
tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral
character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal
learning.32chanrobleslaw

Immoral conduct has been described as conduct that is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to
the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. To be the basis of disciplinary action, such conduct
must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral, that is, it must be so corrupt as to virtually constitute a criminal act or
so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.33chanrobleslaw

On different occasions, we have disbarred or suspended lawyers for immorality based on the surrounding
circumstances of each case. In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro,34 the extreme penalty of disbarment was
imposed on the respondent who had abandoned his wife and maintained an illicit affair with another woman.
Likewise, disbarment was the penalty for a lawyer who carried on an extra-marital affair with a married woman prior
to the judicial declaration that her marriage was null and void, while he himself was also married.35 In another case
we have suspended for two years, a married attorney who had sired a child with a former client.36 In Samaniego v.
Ferrer,37 suspension of six months from the practice of law was meted on the philandering lawyer.

Yet, we cannot sanction Atty. Advincula with the same gravity. Although his siring the child with a woman other than
his legitimate wife constituted immorality, he committed the immoral conduct when he was not yet a lawyer. The
degree of his immoral conduct was not as grave than if he had committed the immorality when already a member of
the Philippine Bar. Even so, he cannot escape administrative liability. Taking all the circumstances of this case into
proper context, the Court considers suspension from the practice of law for three months to be condign and
appropriate.

As a last note, Atty. Advincula manifested in his compliance dated February 26, 2013 that he had immediately
accepted the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors suspending him from the practice of law for two months as
final and executory; that he had then gone on leave from work in the NBI for two months starting in November and
lasting until the end of December, 2012; and that such leave from work involved refraining from performing his
duties as a Legal Officer of the NBI.

The manifestation of compliance is unacceptable. A lawyer like him ought to know that it is only the Court that wields
the power to discipline lawyers. The IBP Board of Governors did not possess such power, rendering its
recommendation against him incapable of finality. It is the Court's final determination of his liability as a lawyer that
is the reckoning point for the service of sanctions and penalties. As such, his supposed compliance with the
recommended two-month suspension could not be satisfied by his going on leave from his work at the NBI.
Moreover, his being a government employee necessitates that his suspension from the practice of law should
include his suspension from office. A leave of absence will not suffice. This is so considering that his position
mandated him to be a member of the Philippine Bar in good standing. The suspension from the practice of law will
not be a penalty if it does not negate his continuance in office for the period of the suspension. If the rule is different,
this exercise of reprobation of an erring lawyer by the Court is rendered inutile and becomes a mockery because he
can continue to receive his salaries and other benefits by simply going on leave for the duration of his suspension
from the practice of law.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS AND DECLARES ATTY. LEONARDO C. ADVINCULA GUILTY of immorality;
and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a period of THREE MONTHS EFFECTIVE UPON NOTICE
HEREOF, with a STERN WARNING that a more severe penalty shall be imposed should he commit the same
offense or a similar offense; DIRECTS ATTY. ADVINCULA to report the date of his receipt of the Decision to this
Court; and ORDERS the Chief of the Personnel Division of the National Bureau of Investigation to implement the
suspension from office of ATTY. ADVINCULA and to report on his compliance in order to determine the date of
commencement of his suspension from the practice of law.

Let a copy of this Decision be made part of the records of the respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant; and
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Service Commission for their information and
guidance.

SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, and Caguioa,
JJ., concur.
Brion, Peralta, and Jardeleza, JJ., on official leave.
Del Castillo, J., on wellness leave.
Leonen, J., see separate concurring opinion.

CONCURRING OPINION

LEONEN, J.:

Before his admission to the bar, respondent Atty. Leonardo C. Advincula—who was married to complainant Dr. Ma.
Cecilia Clarissa C. Advincula—entered into a brief extra-marital relationship with Ma. Judith Gonzaga, with whom he
had a child.1chanrobleslaw

The standard of morality and the rules of conduct under the Code of Professional Responsibility are applicable only
to lawyers. These are not enforced against persons who have not taken the lawyer's oath.

A lawyer's commitment to the lawyer's oath or any standard of morality and conduct under the Code of Professional
Responsibility starts only upon taking that oath.

Oaths are not senseless utterances. Lawyers who take their oath consent to this Court's administrative jurisdiction
over their actions. The oath is essentially a promise to act consistently with the value-expectations of this Court.

The significance of the oath rests on many assumptions. Taking the oath implies notice to the person of the
standards he or she is expected to abide by. It not only implies consent to, but also assumes consciousness of
those standards. The person allowed to take the oath is assumed to have the capacity to consider and control his or
her actions accordingly.

For these reasons, violation of the oath or of the Code of Professional Responsibility is deemed to merit this Court's
imposition of a penalty.

When a lawyer takes the oath, any action inconsistent with the oath or with the Code of Professional Responsibility
may be interpreted as a willful disregard of the standards embodied in the oath or the Code of Professional
Responsibility. As expressed in our Rules of Evidence, a person is presumed to know and intend "the ordinary
consequences of his [or her] voluntary act."2 The oath places "penalty" under the great scope of "ordinary
consequence" of a lawyer's actions.

On the other hand, without the taking the oath, we cannot presume a person's conscious and careful consideration
of his or her acts in conforming with this Court's moral and behavioral standards. Without the taking the oath,
administrative penalties do not rise to the level of ordinary consequence of a person's actions.

This Court, as guardian of constitutional rights, should lead other institutions by exemplifying through its processes
the import of the principle of due process.3 A person cannot adjust his or her past actions now to conform to the
standards imposed by an oath he or she takes after. It is unreasonable to expect a person to abide by standards
that he or she cannot be presumed to know and apply to actions he or she can no longer control.

Respondent cannot be expected to abide by the standards imposed by the lawyer's oath or by the Code of
Professional Responsibility. At that time, this Court had no administrative jurisdiction over his actions. He was not
yet a lawyer when he entered into a relationship with Ma. Judith Gonzaga during his marriage with complainant.

Imposing a penalty for respondent's actions before he took the lawyer's oath reduces the oath to nothing but a
frivolous ceremony. We undermine the significance of the oath if, on that basis, we penalize a person for his or her
actions, whether or not he or she subscribed to that oath.

While possession of good morals is required before and during one's membership to the bar,4 the bases and effects
of the finding that one meets or does not meet the standard of morality are different in these instances.

For admission to the bar, good morals are solely based on a person's actions before his or her admission. A person
found to be lacking of the required good morals is disqualified from membership in the bar. A person's actions, on
which the finding that a person has met the required good morals is based, are looked into for purposes of
admission—not penalty.

On the other hand, for retaining membership in the bar, the lawyer's actions while he or she is a member are looked
into. These acts may be the bases of administrative penalty.

However, this is not to say that a lawyer's actions before his or her admission cannot be the bases of his or her
removal from the bar. After all, a person who has not met the moral standards before admission should not even be
admitted to the bar. Thus, if for some reason, grossly immoral acts not considered by this Court during application
are later made known and proved to this Court, this Court may choose to remove him or her without disregarding
evidence of any possible moral transformation that could have taken place later.5chanrobleslaw

However, this Court should not be too quick to judge a person's actions as grossly immoral so as to constitute
unfitness to become a member of the bar.

In Reyes v. Wong,6 this Court has ruled that for an act to be administratively punishable for gross immorality, "it
must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree."7 Further:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
[T]he same must be established by clear and convincing proof, disclosing a case that is free from doubt as to
compel the exercise by the Court of its disciplinary power. . . . Likewise, the dubious character of the act done as
well as the motivation thereof must be clearly demonstrated.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
There are different aspects of morality. Morality may be religious or secular. In Perfecto v. Esidera:9
Morality refers to what is good or right conduct at a given circumstance. In Estrada v. Escritor, this court described
morality as "'how we ought to live' and why."

Morality may be religious, in which case what is good depends on the moral prescriptions of a high moral authority
or the beliefs of a particular religion. Religion, as this court defined in Aglipay v. Ruiz, is "a profession of faith to an
active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator." A conduct is religiously moral if it is consistent with and is
carried out in light of the divine set of beliefs and obligations imposed by the active power.

Morality may also be secular, in which case it is independent of any divine moral prescriptions. What is good or right
at a given circumstance does not derive its basis from any religious doctrine but from the independent moral sense
shared as humans.10 (Citations omitted)
In the same case, this Court stated that the rule against immorality should have a secular basis. Our jurisdiction to
determine what is moral or immoral should only be limited to conduct that affects public interest. Immoral conduct, if
made the basis for imposing administrative penalty, should refer to conduct as officers of the court. It must be of
such depravity as to reduce the public's confidence in our laws and in our judicial
system,11 thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The non-establishment clause bars the State from establishing, through laws and rules, moral standards according
to a specific religion. Prohibitions against immorality should be based on a purpose that is independent of religious
beliefs. When it forms part of our laws, rules, and policies, morality must be secular. Laws and rules of conduct must
be based on a secular purpose.

In the same way, this court, in resolving cases that touch on issues of morality, is bound to remain neutral and to
limit the bases of its judgment on secular moral standards. When laws or rules refer to morals or immorality, courts
should be careful not to overlook the distinction between secular and religious morality if it is to keep its part in
upholding constitutionally guaranteed rights.

There is the danger of "compelled religion" and, therefore, of negating the very idea of freedom of belief and non-
establishment of religion when religious morality is incorporated in government regulations and policies. As
explained in Estrada v. Escritor.
Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public policies and morals, the resulting policies
and morals would require conformity to what some might regard as religious programs or agenda. The non-believers
would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a
"compelled religion" anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious beliefs,
it would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious
views that would not support the policy. As a result, government will not provide full religious freedom for all its
citizens, or even make it appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens. Expansive
religious freedom therefore requires that government be neutral in matters of religion; governmental reliance upon
religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.
....

. . . . We have jurisdiction over matters of morality only insofar as it involves conduct that affects the public or its
interest.

Thus, for purposes of determining administrative liability of lawyers and judges, "immoral conduct" should relate to
their conduct as officers of the court. To be guilty of "immorality" under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a
lawyer's conduct must be so depraved as to reduce the public's confidence in the Rule of Law. Religious morality is
not binding whenever this court decides the administrative liability of lawyers and persons under this court's
supervision. At best, religious morality weighs only persuasively on us.12 (Citations omitted)
Respondent had a relationship with another woman during his marriage with complainant. Out of that extra-marital
relationship, a child was born. All these had happened before he became a lawyer.

Indeed, some may find respondent's actions before becoming a lawyer immoral. However, these do not constitute
grossly immoral conduct that is so corrupt and reprehensible for this Court to consider him unfit to be a member of
the bar.

The dubious character of respondent's actions and his ill-motive were not clearly demonstrated. Respondent's extra-
marital relationship happened during his and complainant's temporary separation. At the time of respondent's
application for bar admission, his relationship with his alleged mistress, whom he claimed he did not marry, had
already ended. He was already reunited with" complainant, his wife. As a result of their reconciliation, they even had
their third child, Jose Leandro.

In light of respondent's reconciliation with complainant prior to becoming a lawyer, his actions cannot be described
as so depraved as to possibly reduce the public's confidence in our laws and judicial system.

ACCORDINGLY, I concur in the result.

 EN BANC

July 30, 1979

PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "SYCIP, SALAZAR, FELICIANO,
HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO." LUCIANO E. SALAZAR, FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, BENILDO G.
HERNANDEZ. GREGORIO R. CASTILLO. ALBERTO P. SAN JUAN, JUAN C. REYES. JR., ANDRES G.
GATMAITAN, JUSTINO H. CACANINDIN, NOEL A. LAMAN, ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ, ANGELITO C.
IMPERIO, EDUARDO R. CENIZA, TRISTAN A. CATINDIG, ANCHETA K. TAN, and ALICE V.
PESIGAN, petitioners.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "OZAETA,
ROMULO, DE LEON, MABANTA & REYES." RICARDO J. ROMULO, BENJAMIN M. DE LEON, ROMAN
MABANTA, JR., JOSE MA, REYES, JESUS S. J. SAYOC, EDUARDO DE LOS ANGELES, and JOSE F.
BUENAVENTURA, petitioners.

RESOLUTION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: ñé+.£ª wph!1

Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died
on May 5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying
that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of partners who had passed away. In
the Court's Resolution of September 2, 1976, both Petitions were ordered consolidated.

Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments:

1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business under a firm name which includes the
name of a deceased partner; in fact, Article 1840 of the Civil Code explicitly sanctions the practice when it provides
in the last paragraph that:têñ.£îhqwâ£
 The use by the person or partnership continuing the business of the partnership name, or the name
of a deceased partner as part thereof, shall not of itself make the individual property of the deceased
partner liable for any debts contracted by such person or partnership. 1

2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and engineering, the legislature has authorized the adoption
of firm names without any restriction as to the use, in such firm name, of the name of a deceased partner; 2 the
legislative authorization given to those engaged in the practice of accountancy — a profession requiring the same
degree of trust and confidence in respect of clients as that implicit in the relationship of attorney and client — to
acquire and use a trade name, strongly indicates that there is no fundamental policy that is offended by the
continued use by a firm of professionals of a firm name which includes the name of a deceased partner, at least
where such firm name has acquired the characteristics of a "trade name." 3

3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the continued use of the name of a deceased partner
in the firm name of a law partnership because Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the
American Bar Association declares that: têñ.£îhqw â£

... The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible by local
custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced
through this use. ... 4

4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of their respective deceased partners were
well-publicized in all newspapers of general circulation for several days; the stationeries now being used by them
carry new letterheads indicating the years when their respective deceased partners were connected with the firm;
petitioners will notify all leading national and international law directories of the fact of their respective deceased
partners' deaths. 5

5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner's name in a professional firm's name; 6 there is
no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the name of a
law firm necessarily Identifies the individual members of the firm. 7

6. The continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships has been consistently
allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted practice in the legal profession of most countries in the world.8

The question involved in these Petitions first came under consideration by this Court in 1953 when a law firm in
Cebu (the Deen case) continued its practice of including in its firm name that of a deceased partner, C.D. Johnston.
The matter was resolved with this Court advising the firm to desist from including in their firm designation the name
of C. D. Johnston, who has long been dead."

The same issue was raised before this Court in 1958 as an incident in G. R. No. L-11964, entitled Register of Deeds
of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation. The law firm of Perkins & Ponce Enrile moved to intervene as amicus
curiae. Before acting thereon, the Court, in a Resolution of April 15, 1957, stated that it "would like to be informed
why the name of Perkins is still being used although Atty. E. A. Perkins is already dead." In a Manifestation dated
May 21, 1957, the law firm of Perkins and Ponce Enrile, raising substantially the same arguments as those now
being raised by petitioners, prayed that the continued use of the firm name "Perkins & Ponce Enrile" be held proper.

On June 16, 1958, this Court resolved: têñ.£îhqw â£

After carefully considering the reasons given by Attorneys Alfonso Ponce Enrile and Associates for
their continued use of the name of the deceased E. G. Perkins, the Court found no reason to depart
from the policy it adopted in June 1953 when it required Attorneys Alfred P. Deen and Eddy A. Deen
of Cebu City to desist from including in their firm designation, the name of C. D. Johnston, deceased.
The Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations between
attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of professional ethics, no
practice should be allowed which even in a remote degree could give rise to the possibility of
deception. Said attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the name "PERKINS" from their firm
name.
Petitioners herein now seek a re-examination of the policy thus far enunciated by the Court.

The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from the rulings thus laid down.

A. Inasmuch as "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo" and "Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta and
Reyes" are partnerships, the use in their partnership names of the names of deceased partners will run counter to
Article 1815 of the Civil Code which provides: têñ.£îhqw â£

Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which may or may not include the
name of one or more of the partners.

Those who, not being members of the partnership, include their names in the firm name, shall be
subject to the liability, of a partner.

It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm name of a partnership must either be those of living
partners and. in the case of non-partners, should be living persons who can be subjected to liability. In fact, Article
1825 of the Civil Code prohibits a third person from including his name in the firm name under pain of assuming the
liability of a partner. The heirs of a deceased partner in a law firm cannot be held liable as the old members to the
creditors of a firm particularly where they are non-lawyers. Thus, Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional Ethics
"prohibits an agreement for the payment to the widow and heirs of a deceased lawyer of a percentage, either gross
or net, of the fees received from the future business of the deceased lawyer's clients, both because the recipients of
such division are not lawyers and because such payments will not represent service or responsibility on the part of
the recipient. " Accordingly, neither the widow nor the heirs can be held liable for transactions entered into after the
death of their lawyer-predecessor. There being no benefits accruing, there ran be no corresponding liability.

Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to allowing the use by law firms of the names of deceased
partners. The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue advantages and
disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer without connections will have to make a name for
himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially ride on that old firm's
reputation established by deceased partners.

B. In regards to the last paragraph of Article 1840 of the Civil Code cited by petitioners, supra, the first factor to
consider is that it is within Chapter 3 of Title IX of the Code entitled "Dissolution and Winding Up." The Article
primarily deals with the exemption from liability in cases of a dissolved partnership, of the individual property of the
deceased partner for debts contracted by the person or partnership which continues the business using the
partnership name or the name of the deceased partner as part thereof. What the law contemplates therein is a hold-
over situation preparatory to formal reorganization.

Secondly, Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to protect rather than of
a professional partnership, with no saleable good will but whose reputation depends on the personal qualifications of
its individual members. Thus, it has been held that a saleable goodwill can exist only in a commercial partnership
and cannot arise in a professional partnership consisting of lawyers. 9 têñ.£îhqwâ£

As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a commercial partnership the succeeding partners or
parties have the right to carry on the business under the old name, in the absence of a stipulation
forbidding it, (s)ince the name of a commercial partnership is a partnership asset inseparable from
the good will of the firm. ... (60 Am Jur 2d, s 204, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, têñ.£îhqw â£

... a professional partnership the reputation of which depends or; the individual skill of the members,
such as partnerships of attorneys or physicians, has no good win to be distributed as a firm asset on
its dissolution, however intrinsically valuable such skill and reputation may be, especially where
there is no provision in the partnership agreement relating to good will as an asset. ... (ibid, s 203, p.
115) (Emphasis supplied)
C. A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other professionals or for
business. For one thing, the law on accountancy specifically allows the use of a trade name in connection with the
practice of accountancy.10 têñ.£îhqwâ£

A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or association for a
particular purpose. ... It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or business
or of holding property." 11 Thus, it has been stated that "the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade
name in law practice is improper. 12

The usual reason given for different standards of conduct being applicable to the practice of law from
those pertaining to business is that the law is a profession.

Dean Pound, in his recently published contribution to the Survey of the Legal Profession, (The
Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times, p. 5) defines a profession as "a group of men pursuing a
learned art as a common calling in the spirit of public service, — no less a public service because it
may incidentally be a means of livelihood."

xxx xxx xxx

Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from business are:

1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a byproduct, and in which one may attain the
highest eminence without making much money.

2. A relation as an "officer of court" to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity,

integrity, and reliability.

3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary.

4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to
current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with
their clients. 13

"The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or franchise. 14 It is
limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. 15 The right does
not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also the exercise of a special
privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature of a public trust." 16

D. Petitioners cited Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association" in support of
their petitions.

It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the name of a deceased or former
partner in the firm name of a law partnership when such a practice is permissible by local custom but the Canon
warns that care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use.

It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the continued use of a deceased or
former partner's name in the firm names of law partnerships. Firm names, under our custom, Identify the more
active and/or more senior members or partners of the law firm. A glimpse at the history of the firms of petitioners
and of other law firms in this country would show how their firm names have evolved and changed from time to time
as the composition of the partnership changed. têñ.£îhqwâ£

The continued use of a firm name after the death of one or more of the partners designated by it is
proper only where sustained by local custom and not where by custom this purports to Identify the
active members. ...
 There would seem to be a question, under the working of the Canon, as to the propriety of adding
the name of a new partner and at the same time retaining that of a deceased partner who was never
a partner with the new one. (H.S. Drinker, op. cit., supra, at pp. 207208) (Emphasis supplied).

The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the name of a deceased partner continues
to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in search of legal counsel might be guided by the familiar ring of a
distinguished name appearing in a firm title.

E. Petitioners argue that U.S. Courts have consistently allowed the continued use of a deceased partner's name in
the firm name of law partnerships. But that is so because it is sanctioned by custom.

In the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (33 N.Y.S. 2d 733) which petitioners Salazar, et al.
quoted in their memorandum, the New York Supreme Court sustained the use of the firm name Alexander & Green
even if none of the present ten partners of the firm bears either name because the practice was sanctioned by
custom and did not offend any statutory provision or legislative policy and was adopted by agreement of the parties.
The Court stated therein: têñ.£îhqwâ£

The practice sought to be proscribed has the sanction of custom and offends no statutory provision
or legislative policy. Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of both the American Bar
Association and the New York State Bar Association provides in part as follows: "The continued use
of the name of a deceased or former partner, when permissible by local custom is not unethical, but
care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use." There is no
question as to local custom. Many firms in the city use the names of deceased members with the
approval of other attorneys, bar associations and the courts. The Appellate Division of the First
Department has considered the matter and reached The conclusion that such practice should not be
prohibited. (Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

Neither the Partnership Law nor the Penal Law prohibits the practice in question. The use of the firm
name herein is also sustainable by reason of agreement between the partners. 18

Not so in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom that sanctions the practice. Custom has been defined as a
rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and
obligatory. 19 Courts take no judicial notice of custom. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of
evidence. 20 A local custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is
properly established by competent evidence like any other fact. 21 We find such proof of the existence of a local
custom, and of the elements requisite to constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as
a matter of practice does not mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a juridical
custom. Juridical custom must be differentiated from social custom. The former can supplement statutory law or be
applied in the absence of such statute. Not so with the latter.

Moreover, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws form part of the legal system. 22 When the Supreme
Court in the Deen and Perkins cases issued its Resolutions directing lawyers to desist from including the names of
deceased partners in their firm designation, it laid down a legal rule against which no custom or practice to the
contrary, even if proven, can prevail. This is not to speak of our civil law which clearly ordains that a partnership is
dissolved by the death of any partner. 23 Custom which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be
countenanced. 24

The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the administration of justice and should not be considered
like an ordinary "money-making trade." têñ.£îhqwâ£

... It is of the essence of a profession that it is practiced in a spirit of public service. A trade ... aims
primarily at personal gain; a profession at the exercise of powers beneficial to mankind. If, as in the
era of wide free opportunity, we think of free competitive self assertion as the highest good, lawyer
and grocer and farmer may seem to be freely competing with their fellows in their calling in order
each to acquire as much of the world's good as he may within the allowed him by law. But the
member of a profession does not regard himself as in competition with his professional brethren. He
 is not bartering his services as is the artisan nor exchanging the products of his skill and learning as
the farmer sells wheat or corn. There should be no such thing as a lawyers' or physicians' strike. The
best service of the professional man is often rendered for no equivalent or for a trifling equivalent
and it is his pride to do what he does in a way worthy of his profession even if done with no
expectation of reward, This spirit of public service in which the profession of law is and ought to be
exercised is a prerequisite of sound administration of justice according to law. The other two
elements of a profession, namely, organization and pursuit of a learned art have their justification in
that they secure and maintain that spirit. 25

In fine, petitioners' desire to preserve the Identity of their firms in the eyes of the public must bow to legal and ethical
impediment.

ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners advised to drop the names "SYCIP" and
"OZAETA" from their respective firm names. Those names may, however, be included in the listing of individuals
who have been partners in their firms indicating the years during which they served as such.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur

Fernando, C.J. and Abad Santos, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:

The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes for granting them, seven of the Justices being of the contrary
view, as explained in the plurality opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera. It is out of delicadeza that the
undersigned did not participate in the disposition of these petitions, as the law office of Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano,
Hernandez and Castillo started with the partnership of Quisumbing, Sycip, and Quisumbing, the senior partner, the
late Ramon Quisumbing, being the father-in-law of the undersigned, and the most junior partner then, Norberto J.
Quisumbing, being his brother- in-law. For the record, the undersigned wishes to invite the attention of all
concerned, and not only of petitioners, to the last sentence of the opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera:
'Those names [Sycip and Ozaeta] may, however, be included in the listing of individuals wtes

AQUINO, J., dissenting:

I dissent. The fourteen members of the law firm, Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo, in their petition of
June 10, 1975, prayed for authority to continue the use of that firm name, notwithstanding the death of Attorney
Alexander Sycip on May 5, 1975 (May he rest in peace). He was the founder of the firm which was originally known
as the Sycip Law Office.

On the other hand, the seven surviving partners of the law firm, Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta & Reyes, in
their petition of August 13, 1976, prayed that they be allowed to continue using the said firm name notwithstanding
the death of two partners, former Justice Roman Ozaeta and his son, Herminio, on May 1, 1972 and February 14,
1976, respectively.
They alleged that the said law firm was a continuation of the Ozaeta Law Office which was established in 1957 by
Justice Ozaeta and his son and that, as to the said law firm, the name Ozaeta has acquired an institutional and
secondary connotation.

Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of the use by the partnership of the name of a deceased partner as part
of the partnership name, is cited to justify the petitions. Also invoked is the canon that the continued use by a law
firm of the name of a deceased partner, "when permissible by local custom, is not unethical" as long as "no
imposition or deception is practised through this use" (Canon 33 of the Canons of Legal Ethics).

I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted with the condition that it be indicated in the letterheads of the
two firms (as the case may be) that Alexander Sycip, former Justice Ozaeta and Herminio Ozaeta are dead or the
period when they served as partners should be stated therein.

Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the names of their deceased founders is to retain
the clients who had customarily sought the legal services of Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta and to benefit from the
goodwill attached to the names of those respected and esteemed law practitioners. That is a legitimate motivation.

The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That practice was followed before the war by the law firm of James
Ross. Notwithstanding the death of Judge Ross the founder of the law firm of Ross, Lawrence, Selph and
Carrascoso, his name was retained in the firm name with an indication of the year when he died. No one
complained that the retention of the name of Judge Ross in the firm name was illegal or unethical.

# Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:

The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes for granting them, seven of the Justices being of the contrary
view, as explained in the plurality opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera. It is out of delicadeza that the
undersigned did not participate in the disposition of these petitions, as the law office of Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano,
Hernandez and Castillo started with the partnership of Quisumbing, Sycip, and Quisumbing, the senior partner, the
late Ramon Quisumbing, being the father-in-law of the undersigned, and the most junior partner then, Norberto J.
Quisumbing, being his brother- in-law. For the record, the undersigned wishes to invite the attention of all
concerned, and not only of petitioners, to the last sentence of the opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera:
'Those names [Sycip and Ozaeta] may, however, be included in the listing of individuals wtes

AQUINO, J., dissenting:

I dissent. The fourteen members of the law firm, Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo, in their petition of
June 10, 1975, prayed for authority to continue the use of that firm name, notwithstanding the death of Attorney
Alexander Sycip on May 5, 1975 (May he rest in peace). He was the founder of the firm which was originally known
as the Sycip Law Office.

On the other hand, the seven surviving partners of the law firm, Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta & Reyes, in
their petition of August 13, 1976, prayed that they be allowed to continue using the said firm name notwithstanding
the death of two partners, former Justice Roman Ozaeta and his son, Herminio, on May 1, 1972 and February 14,
1976, respectively.

They alleged that the said law firm was a continuation of the Ozaeta Law Office which was established in 1957 by
Justice Ozaeta and his son and that, as to the said law firm, the name Ozaeta has acquired an institutional and
secondary connotation.

Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of the use by the partnership of the name of a deceased partner as part
of the partnership name, is cited to justify the petitions. Also invoked is the canon that the continued use by a law
firm of the name of a deceased partner, "when permissible by local custom, is not unethical" as long as "no
imposition or deception is practised through this use" (Canon 33 of the Canons of Legal Ethics).
I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted with the condition that it be indicated in the letterheads of the
two firms (as the case may be) that Alexander Sycip, former Justice Ozaeta and Herminio Ozaeta are dead or the
period when they served as partners should be stated therein.

Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the names of their deceased founders is to retain
the clients who had customarily sought the legal services of Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta and to benefit from the
goodwill attached to the names of those respected and esteemed law practitioners. That is a legitimate motivation.

The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That practice was followed before the war by the law firm of James
Ross. Notwithstanding the death of Judge Ross the founder of the law firm of Ross, Lawrence, Selph and
Carrascoso, his name was retained in the firm name with an indication of the year when he died. No one
complained that the retention of the name of Judge Ross in the firm name was illegal or unethical.

#Footnotes têñ.£îhq wâ£

1 See Memorandum of Salazar, et al., p. 5: see also Petition of Romulo, et al., p. 3.

2 Citing Sec, 16-A, Public Act No. 3105, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 342; Sec. 39,
Commonwealth Act No. 294; Sec. 23, Republic Act No. 318; Sec. 39, Republic Act No. 184.

3 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., pp. 7-8.

4 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., pp. 8-10; Petition of Romulo, et al., pp. 3- 4.

5 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., p. 13; Petition of Romulo, et al., p. 4.

6 Petition of Romulo, et al., p. 4.

7 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., p. 11.

8 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., pp. 6-7 and pp. 16-18; Petition of Romulo. et al., p, 5.

9 Seddal vs. Keating, 8 App. Div. 2d 44, 185 NYS 2d 630, affd 7 NY 2d 846, 196 NYS 2d 986, 164
NE 2d 860.

10 Section 16-A, Commonwealth Act No. 342.

11 In re Crawford's Estate, 184 NE 2d 779, 783.

12 H.S. Drinker, Legal Ethics (1953), p. 206; see also Canon 33, par. 2, Canons of Professional
Ethics.

13 H.S, Drinker, Legal Ethics (1953) pp. 4-5.

14 7 C.J.S. 708.

15 Am Jur 270.

16 In re Lavine, 41 P2d 161, all cited in Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, Fifth Ed., p. 8.

17 Canons 1 to 32 which were adopted by the American Bar Association in 1908 were also adopted
by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. The American Bar Association adopted Canons 33 to 45
in 1928, Canon 46 in 1933 and Canon 47 in 1937. On April 20, 1946, when Canons 33 to 47 where
already in effect, the Revised Constitution of the Philippine Bar Association was approved and it
provided that the Association "adopts and makes its own the Code of Ethics of the American Bar
Association." (Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, Fifth Ed. p, 341).
18 33 N.Y.S. 2d 733, 734.

19 JBL Reyes & RC Puno, Outline of Philippine Civil Law. Fourth Ed., Vol. I, p. 7

20 Article 12, Civil Code.

21 Patriarca vs. Orate, 7 Phil. 390, 395 (1907).

22 Art. 8, Civil Code

23 Art. 1830, Civil Code.

24 Art. 11, Civil Code.

25 Roscoe Pound, The Lawyer From Antiquity To Modern Times, (1953), pp. 9-10