SWE KS-Concept 1.0

SWEDISH ARMED FORCES
Headquarters
Joint Concepts, Development & Experimentation Centre
KNOWLEDGE SUPPORT (KS)
Analytical Concept Paper

Analytical Concept Paper - Knowledge Support
Title Subject Date

Swedish Knowledge Support Analytical Concept Paper 02/06/2008
Concept
Project/working group Authorised by Pages Revision
Ag KS 1.0
39
Lead Concept Developer
Capt. Alexandra Larsson (alx@dof.se),
Abstract
This is an analytical concept paper outlining the challenges and solutions to understand the
operational environment and to handle all the information needed to conduct operations in an
operational level HQ
The aim is to integrate the development of joint intelligence new multi-disciplinary methods
for analysis of operational areas in order to better understand the complex nature of modern
conflict. Mixed analysis teams with people from various professional and personal back-
grounds will further enhance the ability to have a wider understanding of the operational en-
vironment. An analysis method based on systems thinking is introduced as a complement and
will provide a more holistic view than most existing methods do today. All this will in return
provide better support to conduct multi-functional comprehensive operations.
Resources for collection, processing and dissemination will most likely always be to few and
this concept addresses this issue through a command, coordination and optimization process
called Knowledge Request Management. This process needs to be integrated in the overall
operational command process in order to take part in coordination efforts directed at the
component level and be able to both plan and support execution of collection and processing
of non-friendly information.
A number of enabling functions to support information and knowledge management is intro-

duced in this concept. They span from exposing personal knowledge and skills to developing
guidelines and rules for information management that will support staff work and facilitate
collaboration in all elements of the HQ. A knowledge integration function will provide im-
plementation support for these guidelines and rules and in essence become an operational
digital librarian.
Finally this concept will address how information is communicated to the end user in various
situations in order achieve the intended effect on the decision-making process.
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Table of Contents
1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE CONCEPT ..................................................................................... 6

1.1 CHALLENGES ........................................................................................................................................ 6
1.2 INTEGRATION OF INTELLIGENCE WITH COMPLEMENTARY METHODS..................................................... 6
1.3 FRAMING THE PROBLEM ....................................................................................................................... 6
1.4 DIVERSITY IN THE ANALYTICAL PROCESS ............................................................................................. 7
1.5 SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AND SYSTEMS THINKING ....................................................................................... 7
1.6 COMPONENTS OF THE KNOWLEDGE SUPPORT CONCEPT ........................................................................ 8
2 PROJECT DESCRIPTION ...................................................................................................................... 11
2.1 PURPOSE ............................................................................................................................................. 11
2.2 AIM..................................................................................................................................................... 11
2.3 PROBLEM DEFINITION AND CHALLENGES ............................................................................................ 12
2.3.1 Improve Information management ................................................................................................ 12
2.3.2 Lack of understanding concerning the conflict characteristics ..................................................... 12
2.3.3 Broaden Intelligence Analysis and processing.............................................................................. 13
2.3.4 Improve the Process integration within the HQ ............................................................................ 13
2.3.5 Some additional challenges/problem areas................................................................................... 13
2.4 DELIMITATIONS .................................................................................................................................. 14
2.5 ASSUMPTIONS ..................................................................................................................................... 14
2.6 PROJECT TIMELINE .............................................................................................................................. 14
2.7 PROJECT DELIVERABLES ..................................................................................................................... 15
2.8 EXPECTED GAIN ................................................................................................................................. 16
2.8.1 Increased ability to retrieve already gathered data, information and knowledge ........................ 16
2.8.2 Improved understanding of the operational environment ............................................................. 16
2.8.3 Improved Quality of Operations.................................................................................................... 16
3 DEFINITIONS........................................................................................................................................... 17
3.1 ABOUT DATA, INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE ................................................................................. 17
3.2 IMPLICIT, EXPLICIT & TACIT KNOWLEDGE .......................................................................................... 17
3.3 METADATA ......................................................................................................................................... 17
3.4 KNOWLEDGE BASE ............................................................................................................................. 18
3.5 REPOSITORY ....................................................................................................................................... 18
3.6 DATABASE .......................................................................................................................................... 18
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE CONCEPT .............................................................................. 19
4.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT ........................................................................................................ 19
4.2 UNDERSTANDING NEW ENVIRONMENTS AND HANDLING THEIR CONSEQUENCES................................. 21
4.2.1 Key aspects of Manoeuvre warfare and Mission command .......................................................... 22
4.2.2 Intelligence and manoeuvre warfare ............................................................................................. 23
4.3 EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH TO OPERATIONS (EBAO) ........................................................................ 23
4.4 KNOWLEDGE, SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AND SYSTEMS THINKING ............................................................... 25
4.5 HANDLING UNCERTAINTY ................................................................................................................... 31
4.5.1 Balancing the need to specialize with the needs to integrate ........................................................ 32
4.5.2 Balancing the need for prediction with an insight about its limits ................................................ 33
4.5.3 Balancing the capacity of technology with the one of humans...................................................... 35
4.5.4 Balancing the benefits of simplification with the insight of complexity ........................................ 37
4.6 A SYSTEMIC VIEW OF KNOWLEDGE ..................................................................................................... 44
4.7 METHOD: SYSTEMS OF DISTRIBUTED ABDUCTION ............................................................................... 45
4.8 CRITICAL COMPETENCES AND CAPACITIES .......................................................................................... 46
5 THE HUMAN RESOURCES CHALLENGE ........................................................................................ 48
5.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................... 48
5.2 DESCRIBING THE COMPETENCE NEEDS ............................................................................................... 48
SOME ....................................................................................................................................................... 50
5.3 KS ASPECTS OF THE FUTURE SWEDISH HR SYSTEM .......................................................................... 50
5.4 FINDING AND RECRUITING THE RIGHT PEOPLE ................................................................................... 50
5.4.1 Full-time Military Staff.................................................................................................................. 51
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5.4.2 Civilians Working within the Armed Forces ................................................................................. 51

5.4.3 Reserve Officers ............................................................................................................................ 52
5.4.4 Other Reservists, e.g. Former Conscripts. .................................................................................... 52
5.4.5 Persons Without Previous Military Experience ............................................................................ 52
5.5 A WIDENED SCOPE FOR HR IN OPERATIONS ...................................................................................... 53
6 COMPONENTS OF THE KNOWLEDGE SUPPORT CONCEPT ..................................................... 54
6.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................... 54
6.1.1 The importance of context ............................................................................................................. 54
6.1.2 Lower levels of command .............................................................................................................. 55
6.1.3 Need for change in reporting culture ............................................................................................ 55
6.1.4 Collaboration and the power of many ........................................................................................... 55
6.1.5 Vertical and horizontal dissemination .......................................................................................... 56
6.2 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT (KM) .................................................................................................... 56
6.2.1 Summary........................................................................................................................................ 56
6.2.2 An introduction to Knowledge Management ................................................................................. 57
6.2.3 KM System..................................................................................................................................... 58
6.2.4 KM in a military context................................................................................................................ 62
6.2.5 IT System Management ................................................................................................................. 63
6.2.6 Information Management .............................................................................................................. 63
6.2.7 The need for an Information architecture ..................................................................................... 64
6.2.8 Taxonomies / Ontologies Management ......................................................................................... 65
6.2.9 Metadata model management ....................................................................................................... 66
6.2.10 Human Resource Management ................................................................................................. 66
6.2.11 Plans and Policy ....................................................................................................................... 66
6.2.12 How KM efforts contribute to the (in)ability to find information ............................................. 67
6.2.13 Knowledge Support Liaison Officer (KSLO) ............................................................................ 68
6.2.14 Security ..................................................................................................................................... 68
6.2.15 Roles for different parts of the KM/KI processes ..................................................................... 69
6.3 KNOWLEDGE INTEGRATION (KI) ........................................................................................................ 70
6.3.1 Assumption .................................................................................................................................... 70
6.3.2 The role of KI ................................................................................................................................ 70
6.3.3 Format adaptation ........................................................................................................................ 70
6.3.4 Classification................................................................................................................................. 71
6.3.5 Content splitting ............................................................................................................................ 71
6.3.6 Objectifying ................................................................................................................................... 71
6.3.7 Relationships between information objects ................................................................................... 72
6.3.8 Information disparity detection ..................................................................................................... 73
6.3.9 Visualization.................................................................................................................................. 73
6.3.10 The KI Pipeline ......................................................................................................................... 74
6.3.11 Technology requirements ......................................................................................................... 75
6.4 KNOWLEDGE REQUEST MANAGEMENT (KRM) .................................................................................. 76
6.4.1 Background ................................................................................................................................... 76
6.4.2 Purpose and aim ........................................................................................................................... 76
6.4.3 Input and guidance to KRM .......................................................................................................... 76
6.4.4 The Knowledge Request ................................................................................................................ 77
6.4.5 Steps in the KRM process .............................................................................................................. 77
6.4.6 KR Breakdown .............................................................................................................................. 78
6.4.7 Collection Management ................................................................................................................ 80
6.4.8 KR Monitoring .............................................................................................................................. 81
6.4.9 KRM process ................................................................................................................................. 81
6.4.10 Examples of roles in the KRM-process..................................................................................... 81
6.4.11 Technical requirements from the KRM-process ....................................................................... 82
6.5 KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION (KA) ....................................................................................................... 83
6.6 KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION (KP) ........................................................................................................ 84
6.6.1 Analytical methods: steps of knowledge production ..................................................................... 84
6.6.2 Analytical processes ...................................................................................................................... 91
6.7 ANALYTICAL METHODS IN KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION ....................................................................... 91
6.7.1 Qualitative methods ...................................................................................................................... 92
6.7.2 Analysis based on systems thinking ............................................................................................... 93
6.7.3 Statistics, data mining and forecasting ....................................................................................... 106
6.7.4 Pattern-link analysis ................................................................................................................... 107
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6.7.5 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) ...................................................................... 107

6.8 KNOWLEDGE VISUALIZATION (KV) ................................................................................................. 114
6.8.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 114
6.8.2 Presentation methods during briefings ....................................................................................... 114
6.8.3 Written reports in document form ............................................................................................... 119
6.8.4 Consumption of information from the software platform ............................................................ 119
7 APPLICATION OF KNOWLEDGE SUPPORT IN AN OPERATIONAL HQ ............................... 121
7.1 KS AND ISR...................................................................................................................................... 121
7.2 KS AND TARGETING ......................................................................................................................... 121
7.2.1 The Targeting process ................................................................................................................. 122
7.3 THE TARGETING PROCESS ................................................................................................................. 122
7.3.1 Overview ..................................................................................................................................... 123
7.3.2 Objectives & Guidance ............................................................................................................... 124
7.3.3 Target Development and Prioritization; ..................................................................................... 125
7.4 KS IN TARGETING ............................................................................................................................. 127
7.5 KS AND INTELLIGENCE ..................................................................................................................... 128
7.6 KS AND JIPB / JIPOE (JOINT INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLE SPACE / ..OPERATIONAL
ENVIRONMENT)............................................................................................................................................... 128
7.7 KS AND CCIRM & RFI PROCESSES .................................................................................................. 128
8 TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS USED ............................................................................................. 129
9 APPENDIX .............................................................................................................................................. 130

9.1 APPENDIX 1 - CHRONOLOGICAL BACKGROUND TO THE CONCEPT..................................................... 130
10 REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................................ 132
10.1 NON-PUBLISHED SOURCES ................................................................................................................ 132
PUBLISHED SOURCES ............................................................................................................................. 132
10.2 ................................................................................................................................................................. 132
11 INDEX ...................................................................................................................................................... 136
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1 Executive summary of the concept
1.1 Challenges
Military forces are facing a number of challenges based on both changed conflict characteris-
tics and a changing role for military forces. Most conflicts are internal with a wide variety of
actors operating within states that often have a weak foundation in terms of infrastructure,
government and law and order. There is therefore a need for a much more comprehensive
approach to peace-support operations where all aspects of national power need to be utilized.
This multifunctional approach will create new challenges for national intelligence resources to
be able to support the decision-making process not only to be able to accomplish what is de-
sired but also to do that with acceptable risks for own assets. This Knowledge Support con-
cept intends to meet a desire to develop capabilities to provide that critical support to the deci-
sion-making process on the operational level.
1.2 Integration of intelligence with complementary methods

Building on many years of experiences from joint intelligence this concept seeks to integrate
that knowledge with a set of complementary methods and procedures which will prove both
the analytical capability as well as the ability to store, find and reuse the information assets
that the analysis rests on. That means there is also a need to improve the integration of these
procedures in the overall operational level processes both in terms of how information is han-
dled but also how the available resources for collection, processing and dissemination are
utilized over time. The ability to plan and manage this according to the evolvement of both
short- and long-term planning will be critical to establish a foundation to provide the decision-
making process with adequate and timely information and intelligence.
Since military intelligence has been around for some time it also means that some procedures
that have been established within the function have a close linkage to current way of military
thinking and operational art. Currently that means that the concepts of manoeuvre warfare
have a strong influence on military intelligence and that means supporting commanders with
decision-support to be able identify critical vulnerabilities of the adversary and be able to util-
ize moments of opportunity in battle. Since the goal of manoeuvre warfare is to achieve sys-
tem collapse that also influences the way of thinking in the intelligence staff. However, it can
be argued that achieving system collapse is not that applicable today when the goal of opera-
tions rather is about rebuilding states that often is considered failed in one respect or another.
The concept of effects-based approach to operations based on a comprehensive approach sets
out to complement the idea of manoeuvre warfare and that means that intelligence analysis
need to be adopted to that wider perspective as well. This concept seeks to do just that.
1.3 Framing the problem

A view of the term knowledge is introduced which not only restricts knowledge to something
found in people’s heads but lies in the interaction between individuals and between individu-
als and the supporting technology. This idea that knowledge is found in the interaction opens
for a way to understand how technology can support our apprehension of a situation. Informa-
tion technology will only present certain information to the individual which provides a vital
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part of how this individual frames the problem. People discuss this with each other which
continue to frame the problem and set the level and focus of our attention. This highlights the
need for an information technology which is highly configurable and thus being able to
change the perspective on how things are being framed by human beings. This concepts rests
on advanced technology for enterprise content management, collaboration and search tech-
nologies which together with procedures for knowledge management and knowledge integra-
tion will provide the necessary support to be able to find alternative ways of framing a situa-
tion. That also means that is the line between enabling services such as information manage-
ment and the analytical process is not a distinct as one might expect. The analytical process
starts when we sort and structure information which again is part of the framing that informa-
tion technology will provide either we like it or not.
1.4 Diversity in the analytical process

As noted before both the changed role of the military and the nature of modern conflicts have
created challenges to how we understand the operational environment. This concept argues
that this will be address through diversity in the analytical process.
Firstly, the foundation of diversity lies on access to a wide variety of sources which provide
multiple ways of understanding the situation. Having information only from one or a few
sources available will most likely lead to a very narrow and streamline framing of the situa-
tion. However, this means that the amount of information will be quite large and being able to
access all of this in an effective way is another challenge to provide a wide perspective. If that
can’t be done there is a risk that only a small (and possibly random) part of the available in-
formation will be considered in the analytical processes.
Secondly, there is a need for a very conscious manning policy which sets out to recruit people
of a variety of backgrounds that not only provide different skills to the analysis team but also
provide different viewpoints based on their professional and personal background. It is also
vital that an environment is created that supports establishment of personal mastery and a
team learning process. This will make the sum bigger than each of the components put to-
gether.
Thirdly, there is a need for multiplicity in analytical methods which will provide tools to ap-
proach the problems from different perspectives. By having this toolset of methods available
in the analysis team it will also be more capable of handling different kind of information
coming from a wide variety of sources. That will include highly classified HUMINT reports,
information from various technical platforms, statistical data from government sources, news
reports and expert advice from scholars in the field. All these different sources require differ-
ent kind of skills and analytical methods in order to utilize them the best way possible. The
approach is to embrace different kind of useful methods instead of trying to create a single
best one.
1.5 Systems analysis and systems thinking

This concept suggests the introduction of analysis based on systems thinking as a complement
to existing intelligence procedures. The main reason for this is a need provide a different more
holistic perspective on the situation. By departing from the traditional reductionist approach
to science in general and analysis in particular it will be possible to see things from an overall
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systems perspective. Having the word systems in the term may make it sound technical and
mechanistic but it is far from it.
System thinking challenges the reductionist approach which entered the world during the
Enlightenment era which was well suited for physics and natural sciences. Reductionism con-
veys a closed systems view and breaking down everything to the tiniest part for instance the
atom and bases the explanations of the whole from the cumulative properties of all the parts
That is the way the US Air Force initially introduced systems-of-systems analysis where the
total effect of say an air defence system could be calculated from each individual strike on
components of it. Systems thinking have another approach where the holistic view is more
important than the sum of all its components. Systems thinking allows for a way to handle
complexity without a need to first represent all the tiny details before understanding the big-
ger picture. That focus means that understanding the interrelationships, strengths and vulner-
abilities between different parts of the systems is much more relevant. The centre of this proc-
ess is not to create a model of the real world but rather to depict our perception of it. That
means that we claim to provide a useful representation of the world rather than one which is
necessarily a true representation of it. The usefulness lies whether or not it is of any use in the
decision-making process end that is also they way to validate the model.
Just as systems thinking will inspire to new ways of analyzing the problem it will also intro-
duce new set of analytical products to support the commander. Instead of relying only on
written summaries and presentations with bullets, graphical representations such as influence
diagrams will be introduced. Even though these diagrams easily can be converted to a written
narrative the graphical nature of them can provide new insights and inspire to a discussion on
how to apprehend the mechanisms of the operational environment.
1.6 Components of the knowledge support concept

In order to make the concept more concrete procedures and processes have been divided into
six basic components which each has their own inspirations and its own part on making the
aim of this concept happen. All these components have the word knowledge in their name and
it is merely a way to link them with the overall name of the concept rather than arguing that it
is actually knowledge (with some of the definitions available) that will be handled. The image
below provides an overview of the components of the concept and what has been used to cre-
ate that particular component.
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The Knowledge Request Management (KRM) component establishes a mechanism to access

and generate new information and knowledge, which does not currently exist in the Knowledge
Base.
KRM will do that by providing two main functions. The first is is to handle the operational
level management and optimization of all available assets for collection, processing and dis-
semination. This needs to be closely linked to the operational command and control processes
that include planning, execution and assessment. Commander’s Critical Information Re-
quirements (CCIR) provides an important mechanism to iron out what is the most important
in any given phase of the operation. A dialogue with lower levels of command provides in-
formation about their intelligence requirements as well as the status of resources for collec-
tion, processing and dissemination over time. Maintaining an overall database of this informa-
tion is critical in being able to meet CCIRs over time. Finally the KRM component provides
internal management of the KS organisation and provides internal coordination between proc-
esses and elements/cells in the organisation.
Knowledge Production (KP), is a term for all different analytical activities that create or add
new knowledge about non-friendly phenomena 1 . It includes activities and processes to produce
Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battle space, Joint Intelligence Estimates, INTSUM as well
as systems thinking, statistics/data mining and other usable analytical methods often coming from
1
In the current Swedish Military Intelligence Handbook the term “icke-egen” is used.
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the social sciences domain. The idea is to create a diverse mix of people and methods to be able to
provide support to decision-making in a true comprehensive approach.
Knowledge Management (KM) is an enabling process that facilitates collaboration and governs
structure but does not alter content. KM deals with both people and technology. The human re-
sources available to the staff represent a huge amount of knowledge which together with all the
information systems creates what we call the knowledge base. The KM process need to be closely
connected to the HR (J1) function with the staff to be able utilize the knowledge available as good
as possible. The HR-dimension need to be a factor in the operational aspect of the daily work in
the HQ since the experience of individual staff members can be critical to certain phases of the
operation. KM will also be a resource for the Chief of Staff to create working information flows
with the HQ and to facilitate collaboration within and between these processes. The procedures
and guidelines developed by the KM function need then to be implemented in the different SOPs
that guide the work in the HQ. That will facilitate both effective information flows and rapid ac-
cess to information.
To execute these rules and provide concrete governance of the information systems KM also con-
sists of an information management process which will be the link to the IT-support department.
This link will translate requirements, business rules and process definitions into a working con-
figuration of the technology platform. The ability to quickly change and adapt these configuration
to changing needs from processes and SOPs in the HQ will be a key factor in providing support to
each staff member in her/his daily work.
Knowledge Integration (KI) aims to provide pre-processing of data and information when it is
imported or created in the repository. The goal of this pre-processing is the make the information
available to analysts as well as other staff members for further utilization. KI deals differently
with each piece of content but will mainly provide a way to implement the structure that the
Knowledge Management (KM) function have decided on.
Knowledge Acquistiton (KI) is an activity in charge of executing standardized and ad-hoc re-
quirements of external information. It will covering everything from subscriptions of government
database updates, open source information as well as formalized access to experts throughout the
government and the society in general. The approach is to coordinate these formal (cost-driven)
external resources based on directions from the KRM process which will provide guidance for
current and future prioritizations.
Knowledge Visualisation (KV) deals with how we communicate our knowledge to the recipi-
ent or consumer. Thus it matters not only what we try to communicate but also how we are
doing it. That means paying attention to form and design not only from an aesthetic perspec-
tive but also from pedagogic/psychological perspective. Of course these are recommendations
there is always a need to adapt to the situation at hand. KV will initially try to address these
different contexts:
• Presentation methods during briefings

• Written reports in document form
• Consumption of information from the software platform
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2 Project Description
2.1 Purpose
The purpose of this project is to integrate the development of joint intelligence with multina-
tional methods for analysis of operational areas as well as national and multinational methods
for knowledge management.
The purpose is to develop and implement knowledge and methods for the operational level of
the national command chain about these four areas:
• Create basis of decision about foreign nations, actors and other elements in areas of
actual or potential operations in support of an operational commander and his/her HQ.
• Command, coordination and optimization of resources for collection, analysis and dis-
semination of information. This method needs to be integrated in the operational level
command process in order to serve as guidance for prioritization issues concerning
how different assets shall be used over time in the operation.
• Knowledge and information management in order to better use the available knowl-
edge of the staff in the military HQ as well as the information existing in the available
information systems.
• Effective and efficient communication of information and knowledge between pro-
ducer and consumer in various situations such as briefings, written products and use of
information systems.
2.2 Aim
The aim is that operational units will be able to utilize a handbook for Knowledge Support in
an operational level HQ as a part of a new operational command concept. Training has been
conducted according to handbooks and standard operating procedures in order to support units
designated for higher readiness (i.e. a Battle Group) in 2011. The KS concept will support the
operational level need for products about foreign phenomena but also enabling processes that
facilitates an effective utilization of all available information in the military HQ. It also in-
cludes working command processes to manage and coordinate collection, processing and dis-
semination of information in the military HQ.
Initially the aim is to produce an Analytical Concept Paper to be delivered in June 2008 fol-
lowed by a refined concept in 2009 which will be used in experimentation and coordination
with other relevant national concepts. The Concept Paper will also be used as national inputs
in various multinational projects such as the multinational experimentation (MNE) series.
The aim of this concept is to present the methods, processes and functionalities of Knowledge
Support (KS) and how they contribute to military operations at the operational level within
the Comprehensive approach. This concept will provide a holistic framework for a number of
new and existing processes focusing on giving the commander products and services in sup-
port of the decision-making process. In addition to existing analytical processes this concept
also includes analysis based on systems thinking which is well suited to support an effects-
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based approach to operations. This integrated KS-process will enable dynamic planning and
decision-making with higher quality.
2.3 Problem definition and challenges
2.3.1 Improve Information management

The lessons identified over the last ten or more years of multinational operations is alarmingly
similar. Due to a combination of inadequate training and insufficiently supporting technology,
a lot of the already available data and information in the operation is not actually utilized in
the analytical processes. This has led to severe limitations in information management. Units
lack software and other tools which can store, manage and access information in an effective
way and existing standard operating procedures is mainly characterized by inefficient work-
around to compensate for lack of suitable information systems.
The result is an inability to find and utilize already existing information which is maybe most
apparent in the intelligence function but is also applicable to other functions within the HQ.
From the intelligence point of view this lead to unnecessary force utilization to collect the
information that has already been collected one or many times before. One example is a vil-
lage elder in an Area of Responsibility receiving up to ten visits from Swedish representatives
every six months or so. This clearly affects the perception of the professionalism of a multina-
tional operation. The inability to utilize existing information also decreases the quality of as-
sessments and other products for decision-making which can lead to severe consequences and
possibly even loss of life.
The challenge is both to define the technical requirements of a sound information architecture
and necessary software as well as developing methods and procedures to facilitate and govern
knowledge and information. The aim is create a bridge between the staff processes and IT
support staff to create suitable configuration and adaptation of a technical platform.
Another challenge is to be able to support work in a distributed environment where either dif-
ferent elements are located on two different physical location in the operational area or having
support from so called reach-back functions back home in Sweden. The increased importance
of a capability to conduct expeditionary operations highlights this issue even further. These
operations puts increased demand on us being able to quickly deploy forces over extended
lines of communications which of course both means a need for good information manage-
ment but also increased difficulties in making it happen.
2.3.2 Lack of understanding concerning the conflict characteristics
The current operations are of significantly different types that the ones just one or two dec-
ades ago, and since the evolution of methods are slow, it is of outmost importance to stress
the awareness that the prerequisite have changed dramatically.
Today and in the future we face:

• Insurgency/Low Intensity Conflict/Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)
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• An operational environment that has evolved into a highly complex, dynamic, volatile,
and adaptive system.
• New actors (both governmental and non governmental) are often involved without a clear
characteristic whether they should be regarded as opposed, neutral or allied and without
definition of their interests, motivations, and capabilities.
• New risks of military as well as non-military nature arises.
• Almost zero-casualty political requirements.
• Being able to quickly support expeditionary operations with intelligence products.
2.3.3 Broaden Intelligence Analysis and processing

This changed nature of modern conflicts as well as the multifunctional and comprehensive
approaches in recent development of operational command puts new requirements of the ana-
lytical process. The products must cover a very broad spectrum of the operational environ-
ment outside the traditional military domain. This creates challenges to adapt recruitment,
training and procedures for intelligence analysts on the operational level.
Currently there is a also need to establish a transparent and commonly agreed methods to cre-
ated analytical products in support of operational level decision-making. Initially it means
establishing some of the existing methods found in the NATO domain such as Joint Intelli-
gence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB) as well as Collection Coordination and Intelli-
gence Requirement Management (CCIRM). That need to be followed by introducing a multi-
disciplinary approach to the analysis of the operational environment.
2.3.4 Improve the Process integration within the HQ

Another challenge is to further increase the effectiveness of the processes in the military HQ
by establishing a mutual understanding of how the intelligence function can be directed based
on requirements from operations and plans staff. With the necessary supporting technology
the process integration between intelligence and their “customers” can be made more effec-
tive and thus support the understanding of the operational environment which is needed in
complex conflict situations.
2.3.5 Some additional challenges/problem areas
• We often feel we come into the command process to late and do not have enough
time to produce the desired products
• There is not enough guidance on where to focus from the command level
• Difficult to provide value over commercial news sources and the internet, especially
in time critical situations.
• Inability to change thematic focus quickly and introduce new competencies as re-
quired to provide outputs to the decision-making process. Takes to much time to con-
nect new people to the organization.
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2.4 Delimitations
This concept is focused on the operational command level but will when necessary include
interfaces and interaction with both lower and higher level of command. The concept follows
the development done in the EBAO project which will set the framework for operational level
command concept and its processes. The finished concept will serve as a foundation to im-
plement processes and create suitable organizational units within an operational level military
HQ.
This concept will closely follow the overall development of the Swedish military intelligence
function at all levels and will when necessary suggest changes in order to implement the KS
concept. However, the main focus of the concept is the operational level. One of the conse-
quences of this focus is that the possibility to implement KS at lower levels is not covered in
this paper. Another consequence is that knowledge base is described as being limited to the
sum of the competences of the persons in a staff, while in reality the knowledge base is of
course much wider. C.f. Chapter 4.4. for a more detailed description of this issue. This rea-
soning has wider implications e.g. regarding some important definitions.
2.5 Assumptions
The development of this concept is based on a number of assumptions that is critical to under-
stand the reasoning and the choices made in this paper.
• The evolution of information technology has led to a need to re-evaluate various es-
tablished methods for information flows within and between different levels of com-
mand.
• Technology is an enabler together with properly trained people working together in an
organisation using a set of methods. This creates a capability.
• We need to handle a large amount of information which can’t be done with help of
technology. Proper use of technology will help to reduce the number of people needed
for manual work.
• Technology and methods/processes must evolve together iteratively and thus avoiding
traditional sequential development methods..
• The main element of the HQ will be located in the same geographical location with
access to an office-like environment with no significant limitations in transmission ca-
pacity.
• Some elements of the HQ as well as reach-back functions will be located on different
geographical locations thus creating a need for distributed collaborative information
environment.
2.6 Project timeline
Analysis and concept development phase - from Jan 2008 to June 2008.
• Compile earlier concept development work(2005 -2007).
• Explore and investigate context, terms, possibilities and limitations
• Create a theoretical foundation with regard to our view on knowledge, system thinking
and military theory.
• Identify requirements on the technical platform for the experiment in autumn 2008
• Write KS Analytical Concept Paper (juni 2008)
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Realisation phase from - from June 2008 to Nov 2008.

• Write CONOPS or SOP for System Thinking, Knowledge Management, Knowledge
Integration och Knowledge Request Management (sept 2008, Viking)
• Implementation of methods and procedures from Analytical Concept Paper, CONPS
and SOP into the experiment platform based on previously defined requirements.
Experiment phase - from Oct 2008 to Nov 2008

• Follow work done in Effects-Based Execution/Joint Action. (okt 2008)
• Conduct a KS experiment in support of Effects-Based Planning during Viking 08
Concept development phase - from December 2008 to June 2009

• Identify technical requirements to conduct experiment during Combine Joint Staff Ex-
cerise 09 (CJSE 09)
• Conduct smaller technical experiment primarily in support of KI, KRM and KAl
• Genomförande av mindre tekniska experiment främst inriktat mot KI; KRM och KA
• Conduct a KS experiment in support of Effects-Based Excecution during CJSE 09
• Skriva KS Interim Concept Paper (June 2009)
Experiment phase - from June 2008 to Nov 2009

• Identify technical requirements to conduct experiment during Development Exercise
09 (Utvövn 09H)
• Write KS CONOPS (Sept 2009)
• Conduct a KS experiment in support of EBAO och Joint Action during Development
Exercise 09 (Utvövn 09H)
Evaluation and assessment phase - from Dec 2009 to Feb 2010

• Write KS Approved Concept Paper (Jan 2010).
• Complete handbook/SOP Knowledge Support.
• Document technical design and configurations in the experiment platform in order to
make them a part of the deliverables from the concept development work
• Write final project report KS (Feb 2010)
2.7 Project deliverables
This project will deliver outcomes in various forms during the project life time. This outcome
will influence doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities
and interoperability (DOTMPLFI) in the Swedish Armed Forces. Some examples of deliver-
ables are
• Concept papers
• Project Reports
• Handbooks and Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)
• Seminars and workshops to involve members of operational units
• Requirements of new and changed courses at military schools
• Requirements on information architecture and technology platforms
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• Technical configurations and lessons learned from experiments

• Support to adjoining concept developments?
2.8 Expected Gain

The conceptual approach to KS will provide significant advantages in gaining and maintain-
ing products of higher quality for planning and decision making, compared to currently exis-
tent methods and processes. The integrated approach will provide a framework for non-
analytic enabling processes as well as integrating establish intelligence analysis methods to-
gether with analytical methods based on Systems Thinking. The result will be both a more
effective processes with better use of existing knowledge as well as analytical products that
are tailored for the decision-maker and support the overall approach to operations.
2.8.1 Increased ability to retrieve already gathered data, information and

knowledge
KS includes some internal activities, which are put in place to ensure the overarching quality
ensurance on the overall use of the available information and knowledge. They include KI
(Knowledge Integration) and KA (Knowledge Acquisition) which are described later.
The main goal of these activities is to increase the coherence and access ability of the reposi-
tory and people in the KB. That is done via a conscious and continuous monitoring of the
changes & additions to the repository, and by keeping track of how they relate to the already
available knowledge. This includes locating duplicates, similarities and contradictory content.
2.8.2 Improved understanding of the operational environment

The multi-disciplinary approach of KS facilitates a broader understanding of the operational
environment which is necessary to conduct multifunctional and comprehensive operations. In
order to utilize all instruments of national power an understanding of all aspects of societal
life in the operational is necessary. By combining different methods such as JIPB, statistics,
case studies, and systems thinking using people with various backgrounds the risk for linear,
narrow-minded products based on western reasoning is hopefully mitigated.
2.8.3 Improved Quality of Operations

In a complex environment only comprehensive understanding of the operational environment
provides a broad foundation to support of decisions on all echelons of command and across
the whole spectrum of operations. KS supports the development of a wider range of options
for the military commander and various access points for him/her to influence the situation
using various means of power. This provides a foundation for effective force utilization in
order to achieve the goals set by the political level.
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3 Definitions
3.1 About data, information and knowledge
[Fleming, 1996] has stated the following on Data, information & knowledge:
– A collection of data is not information

– A collection of information is not knowledge
– A collection of knowledge is not wisdom
– A collection of wisdom is not truth
Given these statements one might conclude that information, knowledge and wisdom are not
simply collections. For example, the sum of all parts in a collection of data elements is less
than the result of looking at the collection from an information perspective. Data is a context-
less point in space and time without any relations what so ever, for example a simple letter,
word or number. Data becomes information when supplied with relations that yield meaning
of the data. However, the perception of a collection of data elements as information depends
largely on the understanding and context of an observer [KM]. Information does not include
the constructs to resolve why the data is what it is, or dynamic aspects such as change of data
over time. Knowledge extends the concept of information by introduction of intentionality.
This means that knowledge is information that has a purpose or use [Wiki]. In essence, infor-
mation relates to description, definition, or perspective, thus capable of answering the ques-
tions what?, who?, when? and where?, whereas knowledge comprises strategy, practice,
method or approach, thus answers the question how?.
3.2 Implicit, explicit & tacit knowledge

Michael Polany [Polany, 1966] made a distinction between different kinds of knowledge, a
distinction that has been heavily used in the KM community since then. Explicit knowledge is
stated in detail. Being recordable (codified), it is sometimes called formal knowledge. Tacit
knowledge is well understood without the ability to be recorded. It exists within the minds of
individuals. Thus, this knowledge can not be expressed formally. Implicit knowledge is re-
cordable knowledge that has not been codified.
3.3 Metadata
One way of describing what metadata encompasses is the following statement; ”metadata is
the total sum of what one can say about any information object” [Gill, 1998]. In this context
an information object is a digital item or group of items, which can be referenced and manipu-
lated as a single object by a computer. Each information object is usually associated with
three aspects, which can be represented in the metadata [Gill, 1998]:
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• Content: relates to what the object contains

• Context: indicates the 5Ws 2 related to the creation of an object
• Structure: relates to the formal set of associations among a set of objects
3.4 Knowledge Base

The word knowledge is a problematic one since there are many suggestions of what actually
constitutes knowledge. Knowledge Base (KB) is even more problematic since it assumes that
knowledge can be stored easily especially if it is translated into being a database (DB) or
some other software tool. However, the term KB is important for this concept since it pro-
vides a mean to include human resources and the experiences that they bring into EBAO.
A knowledge base is NOT to be understood as a database of any kind, rather it is an abstract

concept which represent the sum of all people in the operational level staff together with all
information stored in digital and analogue ways. That includes everything from advanced en-
terprise content management repositories and databases to the shelves in the HQ’s library or
physical archive.
This concept is intended for a multinational context where all contributing nations will con-
tribute both people and their experiences as well as information stored digitally and on paper.
Therefore the term multi-national knowledge base (MNKB) will be the one used.
MN KB = physical archive +digital content + human resources
3.5 Repository
The term repository represent an advanced platform for storage of digital content. A reposi-
tory exposes various technical services for server-to-server communication as well as clients
where users interact with the content in the repository.
3.6 Database
In this concept the term database is primarily mean structured data that is stored using a SQL-
based database management system (DBMS) that allows large amount of data to be stored
and queried.
2
5Ws – Who, What, When, Where, Why
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4 Theoretical foundations of the concept
4.1 Introduction to the concept
The Swedish KS Concept has been developed in the context of the new Effects-Based Ap-
proach to Operations (EBAO) and the ambition to meet the challenges of the new character of
conflicts with a multifunctional approach, through collaboration between different military as
well as non-military organizations and their different tools for obtaining strategic goals.
This KS concept4 is based on a set of building blocks (see Figure 1), representing vital elements
and necessary functions to be performed in order to reach the envisioned objectives:
• Knowledge Production (KP), which is a term for all different analytical activities that create or
add new knowledge about non-friendly phenomena 3 .
• Knowledge Management (KM), which is an enabling process that facilitates collaboration and
governs structure but does not alter content.
3
In the current Swedish Military Intelligence Handbook the term “icke-egen” is used.
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• Knowledge Request Management (KRM), establishes a mechanism to access and generate new
information and knowledge, which does not currently exist in the Knowledge Base.
o KRM meets knowledge gaps and shortfalls of all EBAO staff personnel and must there-
fore include any kind of aggregation level independent if it is data, information or
knowledge.
o KRM has the mandate to prioritize in the total available knowledge production capabili-
ties and to be able to respond to the highest prioritized KRs.
o KRM has a coordinating role in the overall KS process.
• Knowledge Integration (KI), which aims to provide pre-processing of data and information
when it is imported or created in the repository. The goal of this pre-processing is the make
the information available to analysts as well as other staff members for further utilization.
KI deals differently with each piece of content but will mainly provide a way to implement
the structure that the Knowledge Management (KM) function have decided on.
• Knowledge Visualisation (KV), which encompasses techniques for visualisation of knowledge

products;
• Knowledge Base (KB), which is a virtual construction of the knowledge available to the staff, in
terms of digital content or individual knowledge residing in people, created and maintained
through the KS process and;
• Knowledge Acquisition (KA) which encompasses the continuous input to the KB, in response to
the knowledge requests and the needs of the analysis, planning, execution and assessment
processes in the military staff, identifying and connecting possible new sources to match
knowledge shortfalls or gaps.
The concept also builds on the Swedish tradition of manoeuvre warfare and mission com-
mand as guiding principles for operations. In this concept, systems analysis has been intro-
duced based on recent concept development within EBAO. However, EBAO does not stand
for itself or replaces earlier doctrines based on manoeuvre warfare. Manoeuvre warfare relied
primarily on the intelligence function in order to support the decision-making process with
information about the adversary. Central to this paper is to relate the Swedish KS-concepts
approach to systems analysis to established practices of intelligence and enabling processes
such as knowledge management. EBAO is seen as a complement to the manoeuverist ap-
proach, rather than something replacing it. However, there is a need to revise the traditional
focus of manoeuvre warfare to create systems chocks on easily identifiable adversaries by
attacking infrastructure and logistics. In modern conflicts, the situation may be to create con-
ditions to rebuild infrastructure rather than destroying it. Therefore the effects-based approach
with its broader focus on all parts of the environment and the multifunctional approach where
all instruments of power are coordinated seem to provide promising tools to handle modern
conflicts.
Intelligence has long been an important support function in warfare but in a manoeuvre war-
fare context it seems to focus more on military issues. The strength of this focus is different in
different countries depending on tradition. There is however nothing that prevents intelligence
in the military to have a broader perspective. However, in order to support effects-based op-
erations the current intelligence function must be adaptive to the requirements from conduct-
ing coordinated multi-functional operations in an effects-based context. Although frequently
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debated, the more recent theoretical underpinnings of what is called system thinking have
many ‘soft’ approaches which seem highly relevant in analyzing modern conflicts, suitable to
support the focus on articulating effects in defined systems in an effects-based approach. The
multi-disciplinary approach assures that different perspectives are brought to the staff and the
PMESII approach ensures that analysis is not only focused on military phenomena. However,
systems analysis must not be seen as the holy grail of analysis, instead the combination of the
approach with established intelligence procedures and methods from all academic areas is
highly desirable.
The Swedish Knowledge Support concept has set out to create a framework to integrate intel-
ligence, systems analysis and enabling processes developed in multi-national experiments.
That looks very promising since integrating intelligence together with systems analysis can be
seen as a sub-process of integrating manoeuvre warfare with effects-based approach to opera-
tions. They are both designed to support their respective approach and integrating them will
most likely create synergy effects. When it comes to the enabling services found in the KS
concept such as Knowledge Management (KM), Knowledge Integration (KI), Knowledge
Request Management (KRM), Knowledge Acquisition (KV) and Knowledge Visualization
(KV) they seem needed irrespective of the analytical methods is based on Joint Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlefield or systems analysis. In fact those supporting services are likely
to support the overall staff work in a much needed way.
4.2 Understanding new environments and handling their conse-

quences
Over the years from 1946 the nature of warfare has changed significantly from the World War
II style of warfare (Clark, 2001:3). One major factor of this change is naturally the nature of
the conflicts around the world. Most of the conflicts since World War II have been fought
within states while around 20% of these have an international component where outside states
took active part in the conflict (Harbom & Wallensten, 2005:623). As seen in Figure one there
has been a significant increase in both the number of conflicts and the share of them classified
as internal since the 1950-ies and 1960-ies.
Figure 2. Number of Armed Conflicts by Type, 1946-2004 (Harbom, Wallensteen 2005:625)
Another aspect of modern day conflicts is the urban component. Starting from the conflicts in
Palestine and Cyprus in the 1940-ies and 1950-ies up to modern examples as Freetown,
Grozny, Kabul and Baghdad shows that the urban environment can not be avoided when con-
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ducting operations today (Hills 2004:4). In many of the conflicts where the international
community have been engaged during the last decades they have been characterized by states
that have failed or are fragile where political structures have collapsed (Derblom et al, 2007
p.11). They often also have a low-intensity character which means situations where the crite-
ria for war are not met (Försvarsmakten 2002, p.108). For the military, that means conducting
operations like humanitarian assistance, peace-support activities or evacuations in a situation
with varying degrees of threats.
4.2.1 Key aspects of Manoeuvre warfare and Mission command

Manoeuvre warfare is a departure from the linear attribution warfare of WW1 where all units
are on-line with small operational reserves with a desire to create and hold long, continuous
fronts supported by obstacles in the terrain (van Creveld, Canby and Brower 2001, 8pp).
Boyd’s observe-orient-decide-act loop (OODA-loop) offered a definition of manoeuvre as to
gain an advantage by being faster in repeated OODA-loop cycles until the enemy’s ability to
fight as an organized force is lost (Lind, 2006 p.17). According to Lind, decentralization of
the decision-making process allows for getting inside the enemy’s decision cycle, while de-
centralized creativity and avoidance of templates and formulas are crucial in order to mini-
mize the enemy’s capability to predict our own actions. Hence, manoeuvre warfare requires
an acceptance of disorder and confusion, which it also creates. However, manoeuvre warfare
demands that commanders understand both their own and the enemy’s strengths and critical
vulnerabilities, to continuously assess the options available and be able to create new ones
(Lind, 2006 p.18).
From an operational standpoint manoeuvre warfare means the ability to exploit tactical
events; decide when and where tactical battles should be fought in order to create a strategic
result by striking directly against the enemy’s centre of gravity. Only then can smaller forces
win over a bigger force. Closely linked to manoeuvre warfare is the idea of mission command
tactics which is an overall approach where higher command put trust in their subordinates’
thinking and their power of action: their ability to decide how a task is solved based on tasks
and directives. The original German concept was founded on the belief in a long-term view of
military education to prepare the officer for this kind of creative thinking in the face of uncer-
tainty. A key component in the training was many applied exercises during peace-time to train
officers’ ability to take the responsibility to solve tasks given from above (Mattson, 2003:53).
Also William Lind argues that studies in military history, war gaming and field exercises are
required to each officer’s military education. He also stressed the importance of judging the
different character of each situation when it comes to location, timing and the enemy at hand.
Everything must be adapted and adjusted to each new situation (Lind 2006:25). Hence, ma-
noeuvre warfare through mission command has relied heavily on the acceptance of uncer-
tainty and the individual’s creative capability gained through training and self-confidence
though trust from superiors.
Although manoeuvre warfare has shown to be efficient in the past, we may ask to what extent
it still is relevant to the conflicts we face today. Hills argued that whether or not manoeuver-
ism is relevant to situations when covert or clandestine war is fought against non-state actors
remains unclear, as these actors could be difficult to coerce especially if they do not share a
Western sense of rationality. Also, their ways of organizing typically offers no single point of
contact and the nature of urban environment provides several obstacles to conduct manoeuvre
that previously depended on open spaces well clear of cities. (Hills, 2004 p.36f). However,
she also pointed out that during the Second Gulf-war the American forces successfully man-
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aged to employ manoeuvre to draw the republican guard out of their positions in the city and
engage them using Joint Warfare tactics (Hills, 2004 p.10f).
The current Swedish military-strategic doctrine states that the principles of manoeuvre war-
fare are valid during the whole scale of warfare and conflict level. However, the logic of cre-
ating a system chock, in line with regular warfare where the enemy is easy to identify and
there are vulnerability in infrastructure and supply lines to strike (Försvarsmakten 2002:81) is
fundamentally challenged by the very character of modern day’s conflicts.
The flexibility of the manoeuvrist approach is balanced by a coordination of efforts, thus im-
plying more detailed control from higher command. The Swedish doctrine mentions this
problem and uses the way Rules of Engagement (ROE) are used to direct the level of force
that is authorized as an example. However, this is seen as an exception and that there in gen-
eral are few benefits of detailed guidance from higher command (Försvarsmakten 2002:90).
In the present situation, where typically the state and its infrastructure has already have failed,
where the enemy is not easily identified and it is hard to achieve a system chock, it may be
asked whether manoeuvre warfare and mission tactics alone are sufficient to handle present-
day conflicts and whether there are additional perspectives improving the chances of achiev-
ing strategic goals.
4.2.2 Intelligence and manoeuvre warfare

Military intelligence on the operational level has been one of the main support functions for
manoeuvre warfare. One historical example of the importance of intelligence could perhaps
be drawn from the Israelis during the war that started in 1967. General Yashayahu Gavish
then commanded his forces using a small support team in helicopters consisting of only his
intelligence chief, some operational officers and a signals officer (van Creveld, 2006 p.155).
The Swedish Military-Strategic doctrine states that intelligence aims to bring the best possible
decision-support to our actions and that is mainly supposed to cover the adversary, the opera-
tional area but also factors about the environment and the civilian situation (Försvarsmakten,
2003 p.76ff). Intelligence is also seen as a key component in order to get inside the adver-
sary’s decision-cycle (Försvarsmakten, 2003 p.132).The Swedish Intelligence Handbook re-
fers to the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield as a support process which includes
information about critical vulnerabilities, capacities, limitations, centre of gravity and course
of actions (Försvarsmakten, 2006 p.25).
In some countries the intelligence function found in the Armed Forces deals with only mili-
tary issues but in a country like Sweden where the military intelligence agency is supporting
the government there is tradition of having both civilian and military experts in the staff
(Försvarsmakten 2007:5). Not all current intelligence doctrines adhere to the principles of
manoeuvre warfare. In Allied Joint Intelligence , Counter intelligence and Security Doctrine
one of the eight principles of intelligence is centralized control which is needed in order to
avoid duplication or work and to provide and efficient use of all available resources (NATO
2003:1-3-1).
4.3 Effects-based approach to operations (EBAO)

Effects-based operations initially came from thinking within the USAF during the early 1990-
ies based on experiences from the first Gulf War. It had initially a focus on viewing the en-
emy as a system where it was desirable to find linkages between cause and effect in military
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actions. Later the US Joint Forces Command was given a task to formulate a concept to sup-
port the transformation of the US Armed Forces. A few years later they formed something
called the Multinational Experimentation (MNE) series to support the process of developing
the concept and Sweden joined the project together with Finland (Wikström 2005:9pp). To-
day there are several versions of the concept available. The concept developed in the MNE-
community was handed over to NATO Allied Command Transformation (NATO, 2007) and
the US JFCOM have issued a national concept handbook (JFCOM, 2006). The JFCOM hand-
book outlines the operational environment where EBAO is needed the following way in a
broader way than the originally target-oriented approach of the USAF heritage:
“Joint operations against contemporary adversaries require unity of effort

in planning and execution with interagency and multinational partners
who are not under military command authority” (JFCOM 2006, I-2)
Sweden have decided to put the military EBAO concept in a bigger framework and regards it
as the military component of a bigger strategic context based on the ‘whole of government’
approach outlined in the European Union’s Comprehensive Approach which was adopted in
2005. (Derblom et al, 2007 p.7; p.20) A key concept in EBAO is the word ‘effect’ which un-
fortunately also has led to many misunderstandings. The term effect does not mean simply the
outcome of an action by someone but is by JFCOM seen as:
“the physical and/or behavioural state of a system that results from and
action, a set of actions, or another effect” (JFCOM 2006,I-3).
This distinction is important because it means that these effects which are used only on the
operational level represent a set of objectives which all should contribute to achieving a so
called End State which is the criteria of an overall successful operation (HKV 2006:5) . The
use of these effects is a way to change the mindset from thinking about what to do next to
thinking about what is the desired goal or outcome of the whole campaign. NATO uses a
slightly different interpretation of the word effect and focuses on that it is:
“the cumulative consequence of one or more actions across the engage-

ment space that leads to a change in the situation in one or more do-
main...”
Note that the words ‘system’ or ‘domain’ are used in both of these definitions which means
that thinking about the adversary and the operational environment in terms of systems is a
vital component in effects-based operations. The idea is to use systems analysis as a way to
develop knowledge about the environment which has been sliced into multiple domains or
systems 4 in order not only focus on the military domains (JFCOM 2007:2-7). The effect then
defines the desired state of a particular system and a set of actions are developed in order to
achieve that particular state. This way of seeing the operational environment in terms of a
system is one of the contested principles of EBAO which is a bit unfortunate since that it
draws attention from the so much needed multifunctional and ‘whole of government’ ap-
4 4 A common set of slices are the PMESII construct which means Political, Military, Economic, social, infrastructural and informational (JFCOM 2007: p 2-7)
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proach. Nonetheless, systems analysis is a vital component of the EBAO heritage and it is
worth exploring what it really brings to the table.
4.4 Knowledge, systems analysis and systems thinking
Systems Systems
Analysis Thinking
Knowing
within the
unknowable
Figure 1. A paradoxical fusion of perspectives
The Swedish KS Concept relies upon a view of knowledge as a complex and multifaceted
phenomenon: as embodied, embedded, embrained, encultured and encoded. Hence, knowl-
edge is an intrinsic part of our culturally conditioned practices of doing and being. Despite its
different manifestations in data, signs, symbols, pictures, text and other human artefacts,
knowledge is fundamentally seen as mediated, situated, provisional, pragmatic 5 and contested
(c.f. Blackler, 1995). In other words, knowledge is not seen as an objective opposite of mere
beliefs, but rather the beliefs that are culturally accepted as justified within a specific context,
thus holding a specific perspective on the world.
Unlike information, knowledge is about beliefs and commitment, thus embracing a particular
stance, perspective or intention in relation to an intended action to some end. Further, knowl-
edge is about context-specific and relational meaning. Hence, knowledge is understood as a
dynamic human process of justifying personal belief toward the truth (Nonaka and Takeuchi,
1995). Although even this very view on knowledge is an expression of a perspective itself,
(Nonaka et al, 2006) suggested openness to multiple epistemologies, which is expresses
through an acceptance of multiple methodologies and associated perspectives within the KS-
Concept. Consequently, methods usually known as quantitative or positivistic are here sug-
gested as complementary to methods known as qualitative or hermeneutic, regardless of the
5
The term ‘pragmatic’ here refers to what is also termed ’new pragmatism’ (c.f. Czarniawska, 2004; Rorty,
1991; Wicks & Freeman, 1998)
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different claims of different traditions: truth is in the practical use of knowledge, regardless of
its origin.
Organizations operating in changing and complex environments are specifically vulnerable to

systems that promote excessive stability and routine (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001). Not only the
way of using information systems, but also their design affect collective mindfulness (Butler
and Gray, 2006). To obtain desired effects, military and civil organizations need to match the
complexity of the environment, not least through their ways of adapting through a succes-
sively enhanced understanding of the situation.
Through the distributed character of modern military affairs, no single actor must be cogni-
zant of the environment as a whole, but rather contributes through his or her specific perspec-
tive (Gorman et al, 2006). Allowing for multiple analytical approaches as well as multiple
voices further encourages critical thinking and exploration of the environment. This convic-
tion goes against the grain with many writings on “shared understanding” or “shared situation
awareness”, which assumes all actors to have the same view on the world. The Swedish KS-
Concept emphasizes the differences in perspectives that go along with professional specializa-
tion. However, to facilitate communication and knowledge-creation between different com-
munities of practice, boundary objects and technology supporting rich communication
(Boland and Tenkasi, 1995) (document sharing, search engines, cause maps, models, elec-
tronic whiteboards, web-cams) are crucial enabling components of the KS-concept and efforts
to carry out dispersed tactical action to attain strategic goals.
The character of the processes generating collaborative structures between networked actors
needed to maintain and develop situation awareness is perhaps best described through the
notion of autopoiesis 6 : to match external complexity, the system needs to produce its own
organization (c.f. Principia Cybernetica Web). Hence, rather than being fully defined in ad-
vance, operations as well as KS-processes should be expected to alternate, mutate and evolve
in a conscious and controlled manner, depending on situational demands and the complexity
of the issue. To support the conscious development of the knowledge repository, its structures
and contents, as well as the tendencies of knowledge requests, should continuously be ana-
lyzed and pro-actively acted upon. Powerful and flexible search-engines and statistical tools
allow for such self-reflection of the system. A core idea of the Swedish KS-concept is there-
fore an active and ongoing human reconfiguration of tools and structures to allow for adapta-
tion.
The need for adaptability not only concerns KS-processes but also the result of these proc-
esses in terms of human as well as electronic knowledge repositories. As knowledge and ig-
norance grow together (Weick, 1993), such repositories may become burdens as much as
blessings in a changing world. The possibility of significant change in understandings should
as far as possible be supported also technically in terms of flexible ontologies or taxonomies
allowing for a reframing of the content, thus producing new knowledge out of the same data.
Understanding of the world is not an end point, but “a moving dialectic process of dialogue
that always takes place anew at the horizon of our prejudice” (Boland et al, 1994, p. 460).
6
Autopoiesis literally means "auto (self)-creation" (from the Greek: auto - αυτό for self- and poiesis - ποίησις
for creation or production) and expresses a fundamental dialectic between structure and function. The term was
originally introduced by Chilean biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela in 1973:
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autopoiesis)
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Systems thinking is an analytical cornerstone of the Swedish KS-concept. However, systems

thinking can be thought of and applied in a number of different ways ranging from formal
modelling (c.f. Schön, 1983) of System Dynamics to Cognitive Maps (Eden and Ackermann,
1998) or mental models (Senge, 1990), thus in the latter cases suggesting pragmatic rather
than positivistic notions of knowing. The role and character of models in the process of creat-
ing new knowledge has been under debate for decades. Fundamentally, a model is involved in
a triadic relation: a person takes something as a model of something else. Thus building a
model of the operational environment means characterizing it by something that it is not. Evi-
dently, a society is not a collection of nodes and arrows. Instead, the idea is to grasp some of a
society’s characteristics in a model. In science, analogue models are frequently used for un-
derstanding a phenomena: billiard balls are used as analogy to understand the interaction of
molecules of gas, mice are used as models of humans in testing drugs and the more abstract
mathematical models are used to represent a wide variety of real objects and situations
(Lloyd, 1998). However, the model is never identical with the real object – or – it isn’t a
model.
As mentioned, there is a broad range of different understandings of the relation between the
model and the real world as to which extent the model really represents the world. The prag-
matic argument is that the point of a model and its knowledge is not the model or knowledge
itself, but its usefulness for coping with the real world. Consequent, while a true model would
be useful, truthfulness is not a necessary prerequisite for the usefulness of models. If the mod-
els guide our thought and action to better cope with the practical challenges we meet, they are
good enough, at least for the moment. The most important discussion is therefore not whether
a model impeccably represents the world or not, but whether the selection of aspects of the
real object are good ones for understanding it. Given that the operational environment – a
society – is too complex to understand in detail in one single model, the question is rather
what we chose to highlight and what we chose to put aside. Although a model never is the
world itself, it can be argued that a model that shows useful in practice probably has at lest
some structural similarity with the object it claims to represent.
The systems thinking promoted in the Swedish KS-Concept can be seen as a commitment for
a mode of non-linear logical reasoning resisting the temptation of linear, short-term thinking
and instead embracing complexity with a pro-active attitude. In essence, this really means a
departure from the traditional great model of an objective, constant, external universe based
on Newtonian mechanics (Vargish, 1998). Hence, while keeping the question of true repre-
sentation of the world open, systems thinking rather suggests a model by which we under-
stand the world (and make sense of our data) out of a model with “interactive complexity”
(Tradoc pamphlet), suggesting more complex, non-linear modes of analysis. This logic is also
applied in the ideas of the knowledge-generating system itself. In sum, the fundamental prin-
ciple of the Swedish KS-Concept is that of the dynamics of a non-equilibrium system, which
is never in a stable optimum as it is always in development and transition through its inherent
tensions, pro-active reflection upon the environment and itself – with the knowledge reposi-
tory and exchange of views as its vital elements. Hence, the Swedish KS-Concept is an at-
tempt to “Know within the unknowable” (Flood, 1999), using systems thinking to understand
the characteristics of the operational environments, analyzing it by systemic models while not
ignoring the debated relation between such models and the real world.
Systems analysis is not new in the military domain. In the 1960s an Office of Systems Analy-
sis was established was established at the Pentagon in order to support the decision-making
process. The methods mainly focused on creating detail definitions of each problem as parts
of a bigger system and create chains of interconnections that linked everything from the low-
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est level to the overall goal of the Armed Forces. This was mainly done by using language
and formats from the natural sciences which also rendered a lot of critique of being too quan-
titative (van Creveld, 2006 p.187 ff.). In the light of this it is easy to understand those voicing
critics towards applying systems analysis as a foundation to develop effects on the operational
level. In the current concept systems analysis is described as an analytical process which in-
tends to provide a holistic understanding of the adversary. The intention is to be broad in the
ways information are gathered but also to focus on “more than just an adversary’s military
capabilities, order of battle, and tactics” (JFCOM 2006, II-2). Not only the sources and the
analytical focus areas must be broad but also the analyst’s must have expertise from many
different domains and academic fields (NATO 2007:3-3). Systems analysis is then conducted
by seeing the operational environment in sets of systems which have connections to each
other. The analysts identify elements and how they are related with links and interrelation-
ships but also explore strengths, weaknesses, vulnerabilities and dependencies (NATO
2007:3-2).
The present German approach to systems analysis is called Continuous Systemic Approach
(CSA) and the different outputs from this process consists of the following: (KS LOE 2007)
• Definition of the boundaries of the operational environment
• A system model that describes actors, elements and their interrelations
• Free form graphical cognitive depictions outlining how certain actors relate to certain
topics
• Casual diagrams with formal notation rules
• Influence diagrams with variables and underlying equations
The interesting thing to note from the German example is that only the last product actually
has a quantitative approach. The rest of them are simply varying methods of creating graphi-
cal outputs from the analysis of the operational environment. The outputs look different than
the traditional intelligence reports which have caused some initial problems in experiments
(HKV 2006:21). Sources as well the scope is not limited to military phenomena in order to
support the multi-functional approach that EBAO have. Critics of systems analysis in the mili-
tary domain have argued that it is a mathematical or at least a scientific way of looking at the
world without acknowledging the complexity and dynamics of the real world (Vego, 2006
p.54). However, such arguments like that seem to miss the point of utilizing systems thinking
in the analytical process. On the contrary, systems thinking offer a language where the use of
constructs like system archetypes helps people to come to grip with dynamic complexity
(Flood, 1999 p.25). The intent is not to disregard complexity but to acquire methods of deal-
ing with them soundly.
System thinking challenges the reductionist approach which entered the world during the
Enlightenment era which was well suited for physics and natural sciences. Reductionism con-
veys a closed systems view and breaking down everything to the tiniest part for instance the
atom and bases the explanations of the whole from the cumulative properties of all the parts.
A holistic approach, seeing systems as a whole, yields different results (Flood, 1999 p.79f).
Senge mentioned two different situations where complexity is too much. Either detail com-
plexity where there are too many factors to keep in the mind to appreciate the whole and dy-
namic complexity where interrelations are subtle and the result of actions are not obvious
(Ibid. p.13). There are also many people contributing to systems thinking that can broaden
the perspective further. Checkland’s action research mentions that it is a collaborative process
aimed at critical inquiry with focus on social practice and reflective learning (Ibid. p.54).
Churchman’s operational research focuses on the importance of an inter-disciplinary approach
with mixed teams to create team learning which also mentioned by Senge (Ibid. p.62). The
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aim of systems thinking is too better understand the world and our mental models of it and not
just try to draw complicated systems diagrams of it (Ibid. p.23).
That leads us to conclude that the critics of systems thinking in EBOA seem largely exagger-
ated or even unfounded. What determines its contribution to military operations is how it is
implemented and as we have shown that it can be done in a way that counters these threats.
However, recent experiences from multinational experiments show that there is a tendency in
NATO to rely too much on quantitative approaches for campaign assessment. The risk is that
the analysis is focused on areas where it is possible to measure rather than areas that need to
analyzed (HKV, 2006 p.27ff). Quantitative approaches are sometimes useful but just as im-
plementations of assessment need to be aware of desires to measure everything. User’s of
system thinking methods need to be that too.
The term "system" is derived from the ancient Greek word systema. The meaning of the word
implies the organized relationship between an interrelated set of functioning components. As
such, a system can be defined as a combination of entities working together to achieve a cer-
tain aim, i.e. a system "absorbs" inputs, process them in some way and produce outputs.
Systems thinking is a perspective based on the belief that the component parts of a system
will act differently when the system’s relationships are removed and it is viewed in isolation.
The only way to fully understand why a problem or phenomena occurs and persists is to un-
derstand the part in relation to the whole. Systems thinking has been around since the 1960s
and has generated different techniques, such as influence diagrams and knowledge acquisition
sessions with expertise from different backgrounds. The systemic perspective can be seen in
contrast to non-interacting separate phenomena but also in contrast to a holistic view (focus
on the system as one whole entity).
Separate phenomena Systemic Holistic
Figure 1: The systemic perspective
Systems thinking view the world as a complex system of interconnected entities - “everything
affects everything”. The system components are interrelated and interdependent and can not
exist independently. However, neither in practice nor in theory is it possible to take all these
entities into consideration when a problem or phenomena is analyzed or described. Instead the
“most” relevant interactions and entities are defined as being inside the system boundary. En-
tities outside the system boundary are still recognized as having the potential of influencing
the system but are viewed as a part of the environment of the system. Consequently, aspects
of the world are described as simplified representations or models of the actual system.
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Consequently, the basic logic of a model is analogy in terms of patterns of similarity and dif-
ferences between the model and the modeling subject. 7 By reducing the complexity of reality
but still containing relevant information, the model might be used as a tool, a schema or a
procedure to predict the consequences of an event. The properties of a model will be formally
defined as a set of elements or conceptual terms, a set of rules for relations between the ele-
ments, a set of empirical elements and relations corresponding to the conceptual terms and
relations, and finally, a set of rules for interpretation.
Planning and executing operations with a wider scope implies the involvement of additional
experts to the command and control process besides the military staff. The alternative, to train
and educate available military personnel to master all relevant areas of expertise is hardly an
efficient and realistic option. In this context, systems analysis has been considered as a meth-
odological approach to involve external expertise and knowledge into the military knowledge
management process in an efficient way. The advantages of a system thinking and systems
analysis approach are well proven in practice. In the development of complex systems there
are hardly any alternative to a systems analysis approach, besides letting systems emerge
naturally without intervention which is hardly an alternative in most cases where a structured
and goal oriented process is necessary.
However, there is an abundance of systems analysis methods and techniques, all based on
different assumptions and preconditions. For the practitioner, using system analysis for a spe-
cific purpose, it might then be hard to have an overview of available means and thus choose a
relevant technique. From a practical perspective, a systems analysis by itself has limited
value. No matter how relevant a systems analysis may seem, it does not implement itself. The
result often implies interventions and actions in routines, systems, organizational structures,
working patterns and conditions for example. If systems analysis should be part of a decision
process, organizational acceptation is of central importance.
In addition, systems analysis does not automatically provide correct system description even
if all relevant expertise is engaged in the analysis. It is worth remembering the basic notion of
systems thinking that a system cannot be described as the sum of the behavior of its sub-
components. The result of a systems analysis should instead be viewed as a “qualified guess”
of the systems properties and characteristics. C. West Churchman exemplifies: “Airports are
designed to get people on and off planes; the result might be a very uncomfortable experience
for the traveler.” 8 Consequently, a systems analysis must include a structured process of suc-
cessively testing and validating whether the system model per se passes the test of reality.
Finally, some problems are in practice beyond the scope of systems analysis techniques. A
systems analysis requires that the preconditions, criteria of behavior and system boundaries
for the system are specified. When it is reasonable to assume that input to the systems analy-
sis is invalid or limited measures of control must be implemented alternatively some other
approach could be used. There might for example be political, economical or personal interest
to distort the data used in the analysis. In other cases, communication is not even possible.
7
Harré, 2002, p. 54
8
Churchman, 1979
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4.5 Handling uncertainty

A tension can be traced between the more rationalistic analytical stance of EBAO and the
ambition to orchestrate a broad range of actors to obtain strategic goals and the tendency of
manoeuvre warfare and mission command to accept the abundant uncertainties of war, per-
haps most clearly expressed in von Moltke’s principle to plan only to the first contact with the
enemy. However, this tension should be understood as different ways of handling uncertainty
by different and specialized units within the military organization. There are three fundamen-
tal attitudes towards uncertainty: to strive to control and thereby eliminate uncertainty, to dis-
solve uncertainty through prediction and to accept unlimited uncertainty (FOI, 1994). In their
pure form, each of these attitudes is absurd. It would be too costly, if even possible to invest
in security so heavily that uncertainty would be fully eliminated through control. Likewise, it
would be too costly, if even possible to predict every relevant aspect of the environment as to
dissolve uncertainty through prediction. Finally, as at least some uncertainty can be rather
easily be eliminated or dissolved through investment in knowledge, it would seem unneces-
sary to take the fatalist attitude to fully accept unlimited uncertainty. Hence, uncertainty needs
to be handled through a combination of these three attitudes, i.e. to play over the whole sur-
face of the triangle (ibid.).
Control
Predict Accept
Figure 1.Three fundamentally different attitudes towards uncertainty (FOI, 1994)
The very act of establishing military forces can be seen as an expression of the attempts to
control uncertainty: both as prevention and as an investment to be used in case of war. How-
ever, the tricky question of ‘how much is enough’ reveals its problematic character: how
should we know whether we’ve made the right investments? If nothing else is certain about
the answer to this question, we can know for sure that an adversary would not plan his in-
vestments regardless of what capabilities that we’ve chosen to prioritize. In consequence,
some uncertainty will still persist. By building up knowledge about the adversary, his re-
sources, intents and present possibilities of prioritizing, we can better predict what resources
and actions will be needed to make efficient use of our capabilities. However, no matter how
much we invest in knowledge, some uncertainty will still persist. Hence, whatever our spon-
taneous attitude towards uncertainty might be, we will have to accept a certain degree of un-
certainty in military operations.
The remaining part is best handled pro-actively: through a combination of attempts to succes-
sively predict as time dissolves more uncertainty, with re-active measures as we fail to foresee
everything. Within the present Swedish doctrine, the remaining uncertainties are handled not
least by means of mission command, which rather than eliminating uncertainty rather creates
it on the tactical level to ensure tactical success that can be exploited for operational, and ul-
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timately strategic, purposes. On higher levels of command, uncertainty is also absorbed by

flexible planning and revision processes. The Swedish KS-concept should be understood in
this context where its specialized function in the operative staff is to try to predict as far as
possible, while counting on the flexibility and innovativeness generated through mission
command to absorb remaining uncertainty at the local level. Consequently, attempts to control
environments and to predict its changes should be seen as complementary to the acceptance of
uncertainties in military operations.
The uncertainties and character of modern conflict and operational environments and re-
sponses to them cause challenges on practical and intellectual as well as on emotional levels
(c.f. FOI, 1994). Complex conflicts and the multiple aspects of the environment they address
put pressure on military organizations to broaden their scope in terms of tasks, collaboration
and understanding. On a practical level, this means alternative ways of organizing for a
broader range of tasks, embracing uncertainty through a broadening of repertoires. On an in-
tellectual level the challenge is not least to understand an adversary that is almost ‘perfectly
asymmetrical’ in action and motivation: extremely adaptable to counter-measures, maintain-
ing motivation through ideology, not dependent on large infrastructures or permanent institu-
tion, not fearing what we fear and operating as networks without fixed lines of command
(Rekkedal, 2006 p. 284f). On an emotional level, surprise leading to disintegration of organ-
ized roles and thereby breakdown of sense making sets senseless fear free, leaving an “endan-
gered person in a world where it is every man for himself … at the worst possible moment”
(Weick, 1993 p. 637).
As uncertainty has increased, so have the strategic demands to obtain political goals at low
costs in a world with almost real-time reporting of diverse media sources from the field. Also,
technological development has increased the possibility of rapid gathering, storing, manipula-
tion, retrieval and distribution of data and information, promising better tools for communica-
tion and analysis. Just as with the practical tasks of military organizations, attempts to use
modern ICT in support of the decision-making process provide challenges on practical, intel-
lectual as well as on emotional levels. Revolutions in military affairs have rarely relied on
technology alone, but rather on its uses (c.f. Gray, 2006). On the intellectual level, the practi-
cal need to predict outcomes for the sake of optimization of resources and minimization of
casualties raises fundamental questions about the possibilities and limits of such analysis on
complex phenomena as human organizations and societies. Furthermore, these questions are
typically not neutral, neither intellectually nor emotionally, as these themes touches upon
deep convictions about what the world is like and how we gain knowledge about it, which is
not isolated from identities which are easily threatened by opponents’ arguments (c.f. Parsons,
2003; Hacking, 1999).
The challenge of the Swedish KS-concept can be stated as one of actively balancing the need
to specialize with the need to integrate, the need for prediction with an insight about its limits,
the capacity of technology with the one of humans, as well as the benefits of simplification
with the insight of complexity.
4.5.1 Balancing the need to specialize with the needs to integrate

Division of labour is the cornerstone of modern society’s productivity. Through specializa-
tion, humans are allowed to focus and develop their activities and reach levels of perfection
that would hardly be obtainable without it. Although discussed since Plato, Adam Smith’s
pin-making example may be the most famous one: specialized workers develop professional
knowledge and skills outmatching the performance of amateurs. This principle also creates
mutual dependencies. Nobody’s specialized knowledge is enough to cover all the needs of
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any single individual: pins must be traded for bread, bread for teaching and teaching for
safety. The history of modern society can be told in terms of this ongoing movement of spe-
cialization as a means for advancement of knowledge and skills rendering specific perspec-
tives on the world.
The backside of the story is that ongoing specialization creates ever new needs to integrate
different activities: i.e. to organize and coordinate. This is true for all kinds of activities, even
the production of knowledge. However, the popular view to create a common view of any
specific situation among a broad range of specialist becomes somewhat contradictory: at the
moment they all see the same thing; their professional perspective is changed into an amateur
one. This amateur perspective may bring different specialists closer to one another; however,
also amateur views differ depending of peoples’ social contexts, habits, ideologies etc.
The specific perspective on the world heavily influence individuals’ and groups’ focus and
understanding of any specific situation. As human attention is limited, we always have to se-
lect some stimuli or strains of thought at the cost of others. This selection also delimits the
human capability of rational thought and action. The sphere of human rationality is closely
related to the sphere of attention (Simon, 1947) and in an information-rich world, attention
becomes the scarce resource (Simon, 1971). As some things are seen only at the cost of oth-
ers, the selectivity of attention makes us see only certain aspects of any situation (Ocasio,
1997) implying certain views of the world, which do not necessarily sum up to one big syn-
thesis without contradictions.
Nevertheless, synthesis is needed to economize on scarce attention and analytical efforts may
nuance the “ruthless generalizations” (Argyris, 1977) of everyday life. In other words, a way
of seeing is a way of not seeing, and different domains of the real world require different
models of thought to cope with their specific challenges. This poses delicate problems of bal-
ancing the ongoing specialization with adequate coordination that doesn’t hamper the ability
of specialists of being efficient in the performance of their specialized task. However, the
weak spot of any specialist will be the tendency to always try to frame and cut the practice
situation to fit professional knowledge. This may lead to doing things right without consider-
ing whether one is doing the right thing at all. Hence, the professional perspective needs to be
balanced with a negotiation with the practice situation about to what extent a specific model
of thought or body of knowledge is relevant and applicable (c.f. Schön, 1983).
4.5.2 Balancing the need for prediction with an insight about its limits
In a highly lawful world, scientific method can replace redundant masses of brute data with
tidy statements by which small fractions of data can be used to predict the rest (Simon, 1971).
Also, in such a world extensive historical experience would provide all knowledge needed for
the future, which would not be the case in a changeable one. Since Plato, command-and-
control has been an endless quest for certainty (van Creveld, 2006, p.205). Irrefutably, today’s
technology allows for ‘lifting the fogs of war’, at lest in terms of data transfer and accessibil-
ity of information. This allows for unprecedented possibilities to ‘bring knowledge to the war-
fighter’ in terms of various types of data, symbols, pictures, views, documents and spoken
language. Although this radically changes the potential of informed action, it does not elimi-
nate the inherent uncertainties when engaging against equally intelligent, albeit different, ad-
versaries. Purely reactive ways of handling uncertainty puts an emphasis on the speed of deci-
sion-cycles. However, not only speed but also preparedness matter. In a world of open-ended
innovation, the search for new and unexpected ways of acting will hardly cease. Hence, at-
tempts at prediction will still be an important way to shorten reaction time, if not to anticipate
hostile intent.
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If nothing else, social logics as opposed to purely rational logics of behaviour together with
the general scarcity of attention form more stable, habitual 9 patterns of action. Where people
do the same thing again and again, or where social frictions and lacking reflection holds back
the creative power of the human mind, “The Wisdom of Crowds” (Ayres, 2007) allows us to
apply statistical methods to assess and predict future behaviour. However, statistical evidence
is never enough (ibid.) and raw data doesn’t tell the story unless we can map them against
some frame of interpretation, i.e. a theory, model or metaphor for understanding the phenom-
ena of the real world (Lloyd, 1998). In consequence, all facts are theory-laden i.e. no data are
useful until we put them into the context of our fundamental assumptions about the world or
specific theories by which we explain the data (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2008). Hence, there
are two fundamental objections to the idea that we would get a superior situation awareness
and valid predictions only by turning on all sensors and fusion all data. First, although people
may be predictable when acting in habitual ways, humans are also capable of rethinking what
is happening, reframing both situations and identities and thus generating abrupt changes in
behaviour. Second, analysts and other people need some frame of reference to make sense of
data and theory or understanding is never made only out of condensed data. In consequence,
theories or hypotheses are never validated against “pure facts” (Lloyd, 1998; Alvesson and
Sköldberg, 2008). Rather, facts are hybrid entities (Rorty, 1991) made out of both data and
interpretation thorough models (Lloyd, 1998) or metaphors (Lackoff and Johson, 1980).
While statistical and scientific methods may be very helpful for practical decision-making,
there is also a danger of misusing these attributes only to reproduce the model of thought al-
ready established: “Some researchers have so comprehensively tortured the data that their
datasets become like prisoners who will tell you anything you want to know. Statistical analy-
sis casts a patina of scientific integrity over a study that can obscure the misuse of mistaken
assumptions.” (Ayres, 2007 p. 187)
Although it is costly to learn from experience, it is frequently more costly and less reliable to
try to predict future events (Simon, 1971). Specifically in social sciences, stable and therefore
predictable patterns have shown hard to find. As well as it can be seen as a general failure, it
may also be seen as one of the most important contributions social science: to illuminate the
intelligibility of human action (Czarniawska, 2004). A classical dispute within social sciences
is that between proponents of qualitative and quantitative research traditions respectively con-
cerning both the possibility and the role of science in social or societal matters. While re-
searchers in the positivistic traditions have argued that prediction and understanding are two
sides of the same coin (Hollis, 1994 p. 49), those from the interpretive strand of research have
argued that understanding is something else. Understanding is often seen as a qualitative as-
pect of knowing something: not just to repeat what was rehearsed, but to grasp it having made
the knowledge a more integral part of one’s thoughts and habits. Understanding is embracing
a perspective, having detected the ‘code’ of something; the logics behind and not directly
added up from phenomena themselves. To really understand is to understand something from
within, rather than explaining it from the outside (c.f. Asplund, 1970; Senge et al, 2005).
Although heavily associated with command and control, measurement and prediction must
not be a prerequisite for efficiently managing with uncertain knowledge in a changeable
9
Habitual = formed by habits
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world. Unlike science, managing is about guiding action rather creating models of the world.
Rather, as suggested within civil management control, economizing on scarce attention may
be the most important aspect of this endeavour (Simons, 1995) and rather than relying on
truthful representation of reality through measurement, information may serve as a way of
directing attention generating diversified professional knowledge throughout the organization
(Bjurström, 2007).
4.5.3 Balancing the capacity of technology with the one of humans

The capacity of modern technology of using sensors and logical machines to compute data
offers unprecedented possibilities of generating dynamic, real time information flows, updat-
ing people and automated control-systems with the latest news and instant analysis. In a
highly lawful world, this provides powerful decision-support to such an extent that decisions
practically become the execution of the evident, i.e. decisions become automated. The only
thing needed to be added would be intent, as will or taste. In practice, decisions of the more
interesting kind are seldom about optimization in one dimension as much as they are about
comparing apples and pears. Consequently, as all alternatives of action cannot be ordered
upon one scale, but only as comparisons between different dimensions without an evident
optimum (Simon, 1955), preferences will be given from other kinds of rationalities. And
spheres of the good or bad, the right or wrong, the beautiful or ugly, the splendid or dull are
spheres of alternative human logics, as much deduced from feelings as from the mind.
The true quality of the human mind is perhaps best illustrated through the metaphor of the
dreaming brain, prioritizing association over correctness, checking for new possibilities of
establishing meaningful patterns, as much driven by feeling as by memory and although
clearly irrational capable of revolutionary innovation. Notwithstanding the importance of cor-
rect data, its proper aggregation, its sophistication through computation, the logic of the
dreaming brain is what makes humans superior to, albeit slower than, computers. Functional
or not, this logic governs human action as much as rational analysis of sensory experience
does. Out of a cognitive perspective, knowledge can be described as the relation between con-
cepts. A more extensive set of concepts and more elaborated relations between them could
therefore indicate the level of knowledge about an area (c.f. Naess, 1959/1995). Not least, the
dynamism of knowledge could be distinguished by emphasizing the importance of the con-
nections between concepts over the number of concepts per se: an atomistic approach to
learning doesn’t generate the same results in terms of understanding as a holistic one (Marton
et al, 1977 p.57).
The term tacit knowledge indicates that not all knowledge is directly accessible to the mind,
but is rather integrated into people’s personality or ways of doing things, as sub-conscious
patterns of behaviour, formed by experience. This underlines the view that knowledge resides
not in words and symbols, but in human minds, or even rather in their specific way of doing
and being. This has implications both for the expectations on the use of new technology for
gaining better knowledge, as well as it has methodological ones. Method is usually thought of
as making mediocrity wise: if we apply well designed methods, we need not to understand the
insights behind it to obtain higher levels of performance. The opposite view suggests that
tools such as computers and methods cannot fully substitute for professional skill. Instead, the
work performed should be seen as an art which to a large part is tacitly integrated into the
way of doing and being of individuals and groups. Consequently, people matter as does their
behaviour beyond what is described in manuals.
In terms of doing analysis, or create knowledge out of data, artistry lies not least in the way
analysis is performed, which is closely related to the issue of understanding: to understand
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something, one has to interpret it to see its meaningful aspect motivating action to grasp the
intelligibility of human action (Asplund, 1970). Understanding phenomena in this sense can
also be seen as a way of explaining them, but without pretentions to predict what is going to
happen next in any objective, deterministic sense, but rather as an informed guess or judge-
ment (c.f. Czarniawska, 2004). The greatest challenge for the Swedish KS-Concept is to bring
logical machines and humans together to realize this kind of balance. This will also be the
case for “number-crunchers”:
“The best data miners will sit back and use their intuitions and experiential exper-
tise to query whether their statistical analysis makes sense. … While there is now a
great conflict between dyed-in-the-wool intuitivists and the new breed of number
crunchers, the future is likely to show that these tools are complements more than
substitutes. Each form of decision making can pragmatically counterbalance the
greatest weaknesses of the other.” (Ayres, 2007).
The Swedish KS-concept searches to exploit new technologies, but out of a human centred
perspective. Individuals make a difference even though tools and processes play an important
role in the concept. Experienced people have greater possibilities to recognize patterns and
people able to cooperate have the potential to reach radically higher levels of collective intel-
ligence. Extensive knowledge and intense engagement in a subject matter is also an important
ingredient in analytical work, as Louis Pascal noted: “In the field of observation, chance fa-
vours only the prepared mind”. Hence, what is often called intuition can be related to the in-
tensity of attention (Marton et al. 1977, p. 70), which combined with heuristics 10 of creative,
lateral thinking 11 (De Bono, 1970) makes analysis something more than just the sum of the
facts. Not least in academic research, this logic of serendipity 12 – innovation through heuristic
insights while focusing intensely on a slightly different problem – is known as an important
source of new knowledge (Roberts, 1989; Van Adel, 1994). Finding the formula and building
the machine for production of new knowledge would be the ultimate dream of the Enlighten-
ment. Without doubt, that machine is human.
An important source of inspiration for the Swedish KS-concept’s attempt to establish a learn-
ing organization has been Peter Senge’s book The Fifth Discipline, where the five mentioned
disciplines are:
• Building shared vision

• Mental models
• Team learning
• Personal mastery
• Systems thinking
The four first of these disciplines are rather intuitive: the importance of having a common
goal or interest, the critical role of how we think about phenomena, the need to bring people
of different competence together and the decisive importance of developing professional, spe-
10
Learning through experimental and especially trial-and-error methods.
11
Methods of thinking concerned with changing concepts and perception. Reasoning that is not immediately
obvious and ideas that may not be obtainable by using only traditional step-by-step logic. Lateral thinking in-
volves leaps in understanding of a phenomena.
12
The accidental discovery of something fortunate, especially when looking for something else.
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cialized skills in specific areas. On the contrary, the fifth discipline which is found in the very
title of the book has caused some controversy, not least through different understandings of
systems theory, its scope and character.
It may seem contradictory that systems theory as an attempt to get away from the reduction-
ism of Newtonian physics as a role model in science, has evoked exactly the same kind of
critique from other strands of social research: the accusation of reducing society to what it is
not, i.e. a mechanical and predictable machine. There are several challenges in understanding
the very character of this conflict between perspectives, which complexity is caused by e.g.
the all-embracing ambition of systems theory, the interpretation and application of systems
theory with a positivistic stance, the long tradition of Methodenstreits 13 in science, the limited
insight of different parties into each others’ perspectives as well as the proximity between
theories, worldviews, identities and thereby also feelings among researchers and other profes-
sionals. Two of the major issues in such debates about how, by what theories and methods,
society should be understood are:
• whether humans and societal developments are subject to predictive explanation

• whether theory at all can help understanding society or if it only leads to a reduction of
complexity that rather obscures the very character society: what it really is
Both these issues are central to how we think about the possibilities of analyzing, understand-
ing, explaining and ultimately automate decision-making according to the rules established by
theory. Therefore, the next section develops the Swedish KS-concept’s attitude towards theo-
retical analysis and the possibilities of prediction, which both mirror fundamental assumptions
about human behaviour and the level of complexity of real-world societies.
4.5.4 Balancing the benefits of simplification with the insight of complexity

It would be somewhat self-contradictory to assume that it would be possible to analyze the
behaviour of other humans without assuming them to have an equally innovative capacity as
the one demonstrated in our own analysis. If it were that adversaries per definition were less
innovative than us, war and conflict wouldn’t be much of a challenge. Even though the
amount of accessible information makes a difference, it doesn’t change this fundamental in-
sight. This has also consequences for the possibility of simplification about organizational,
societal and thereby also human behaviour. Formal organizing through establishment of roles,
taxonomies and routines aims at lowering the degree of internal uncertainty by reducing the
complexity of human interaction, however at the cost of external adaptability. The stronger
the formalization of organized behaviour, the more humans will act in programmed ways, like
ants. On the contrary, the less formalized interaction, the greater the level of complexity and
the potential for innovative behaviour of relatively autonomous groups and the more organiz-
ing becomes loosely coupled systems (Weick, 1979).
This also includes our own ways of organizing. Specialization through division of labour, will
result in a multitude of perspectives on any situation. As attention is limited, knowledge
means selection, meaning that ‘knowledge and ignorance grow together’ (Weick, 1993
13
The actual Methodenstreit raged between German historicists and Austrian economists in the late 19th cen-
tury. The same kind of tensions have been repeated since then, lately in the “Science Wars” of the 1990’s (c.f.
Parsons, 2003).
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p.641). Perspectives not only differ in terms of conclusions, but also in terms of axiomatic
starting points in different practices, languages and worldviews. Summing up the different
perspectives doesn’t result in one, big coherent picture of the situation. Rather, the kind of
intelligence that emerges through interaction between different actors lies in the raised aware-
ness that everyone holds a perspective which is not the ultimate truth (Seidl, 1997). Conse-
quently, transparent analytical method is applied not so much for obtaining truth, as for allow-
ing own reasoning to be scrutinized.
In the Swedish KS-concept systems thinking is seen as one of the five disciplines (Senge,
1990) needed to build a learning organization, able to cope with changeable environments. It
should be noted, that the systemic thinking envisaged in the Swedish KS-concept is contrary
to reductionist approaches, which see the whole as cumulative properties of the parts: as sys-
tems and subsystems which trivializes the idea of wholeness as to the point of stripping it of
all essential meaning (Flood, 1999 p.82). A systemic appreciation of knowledge and the ef-
forts of the Swedish KS-concept rather problematizes taken-for-granted assumptions of sepa-
ration between humanity and nature, body and mind as well as self and other (c.f. Nonaka and
Takeuchi, 1995 p. 27ff). The practical consequence of such a systemic view is the emphasis
on the knowledge-creating processes rather than on their outcomes in terms of truth. This atti-
tude also adheres to the pragmatic tradition, seeing truth as manifested in the usefulness of
beliefs, rather than obtained through the application of any specific method of analysis (Mur-
phy, 1990). Systems thinking should not be understood as a dedication to any specific method
of analysis, but as an emphasis on the need to relate different phenomena to each other, rather
than analyzing them as isolated. Hence, systems thinking is rather a way of structuring data
for analysis, than a dogmatic adherence to any specific theory or method.
As systems theory has strong connotations with earlier sociological theory and reductionist
analysis (Gouldner, 1970), underestimating complexity (Hofstede,1978) and denying the crea-
tive capacity of humans, the term system has often been controversial. Ironically, the ambi-
tions of systems theory as a reaction to scientific reductionism of physics, emphasizing the
whole rather than the isolated properties of the parts (Flood, 1999 p.29ff) has resulted in accu-
sations for reductionism in another dimension. This accusation has more to do with applica-
tions of systems theory (with a positivistic interpretation) than with its founding ideas: the
complexity of living systems allowing for dynamism and synergetic effects. A main distinc-
tion can be made between closed cybernetic systems, striving for internal balance without any
capacity for external adaptation or innovative behaviour and open, living systems which are
unstable and therefore evolve as they adapt to the environment. Systems theory has often been
used as a “meta-theory” to classify other social or organizational theories, e.g. as closed or
open systems of different levels of complexity (Scott, 1981). The different levels of complex-
ity of different systems have been presented on a 9-level scale:
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9. Transcendental
8. Human organization
7. Man
6. Animal
5. Living plant
4. Biological cell
3. Closed-loop control or cy-
bernetic systems
2. Dynamic systems with pre-
determined motions
1. Static frameworks
Figure 3. Hierarchy of complexity of systems (Von Bertalanffy in Hofstede, 1978 p. 460)
While systems analysis frequently is associated with analyses on level 2-3 concerning as-
sumptions of complexity, the object of modelling (human organization in its largest sense: i.e.
human society) is just about the most complex thing we know of. Is then this kind of dramatic
simplification helpful or dangerous? The answer is perhaps a truism, but needs to be stated if
we consider frequent criticisms of simplification: a map with a 1:1 granularity wouldn’t be
very useful. Instead, we accept the loss of detail and even distortion of perspective in order to
have a handy device to help us reason about where we are and what is demanded of us. In
similar vein, we must admit that the ordinary organization chart – as a static framework –
doesn’t reveal very much of what is actually making the organization work. It just describes
the names of different groupings and their internal hierarchical order. Nevertheless, the chart
as well as the map is generally accepted because of its usefulness despite its lacking realism.
The real danger is perhaps not the map or the chart in themselves, but how we under-
stand them and thereby use them, especially when experience doesn’t fit into the descrip-
tion. Needless to say that the ones preferring the map are in danger, while the wise owner of a
map uses it as a tool for reducing uncertainty without fully eliminating it. Instead of applying
the general and simplified, the sketchy version of the world is used only as an orientation and
a reference point in complement to what is seen and heard in real life. In similar vein, since
facts are of necessity only historical, a theory without any simplification at all isn’t very use-
ful for prediction. Evidently, unless we assume a world of permanent logical necessities, hy-
potheses gained through deductive reasoning aren’t better off than empirically founded theo-
ries. Hence, drawing on the general and simplified must always be done with care and obser-
vant comparison with what experience tells us about local reality. And as we carefully build
our local theory of the specific case (Schön, 1978), we’ll still be using simplifications to sin-
gle out the most important things at the cost of other. Hence, even though static frameworks
or sketchy explanations will not be waterproof evidence, they will still be helpful out in the
unknown terrains or streets.
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In similar vein, attempts to understand such a complex thing as human organizations and so-
cieties must with necessity be only partial sketches which do not pretend to tell everything in
detail, but only the most critical things to understand what is important. Social science has
also generated a multitude of theories and research traditions which all could be helpful to
highlight some aspects, but only at the cost of others. Hence, any explanation of such a com-
plex thing as a society will only be partial and hardly predictive of the single case in any abso-
lute and deterministic sense. While a complete understanding of society would necessitate an
analysis on the correct level of complexity, partial explanations can be made also with lower-
levels models. However, even a rather technical aspect of a society, such as logistics, can
hardly be fully explained without any consideration of high-level problems such as national
culture. Hence, a description of a society or organization on the lowest levels of complexity
would rather only serve as a starting point for further investigation.
Regardless of what approaches and analytical methods that may be applied, or what theories
that could better serve our understanding, they should always rely on some kind of evidence,
i.e. data that needs to be collected, structured and presented before performing the purely ana-
lytical work. As we move up the ladder of analysis, more theory, more artisanal skills and
more interpretive power will be needed to make sense of our materiel. Although the scope of
the Swedish KS-concept is to move all the way up and allow for optimization of the employ-
ment of forces, already the use of tools, models and technology to gather and structure infor-
mation is an important contribution. As attention is the scarcest resource, efficient tools and
methods are needed – if nothing else – only to make use of data and earlier experience to keep
track of what is happening. As we pass from ‘Access and reporting’ into ‘Analytics’ (see fig-
ure below), it should be remarked that it is far from evident what theories that should be ap-
plied to answer the “why-question”. As different theories highlight different aspects of a phe-
nomenon, the choice of problem-setting and theoretical framing is a non-technical one (c.f.
Schön, 1993).
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Business intelligence and analytics
Optimization What’s the best that can happen?
Predictive modeling What will happen next?
Analytics
Forecasting/extrapolation What if these trends continue?
Competitive advantage
Statistical analysis Why is this happening?
Alerts What actions are needed?
Query/drill down Where exactly is the problem?

Access
and
Ad hoc reports How many, how often, where? reporting
Standard reports
What happened?
Degree of intelligence
Figure 4. “Competing on analytics” (Davenport & Harris, 2007)
A basic assumption of the Swedish KS Concept is that analysis is useful for understanding
environments and to a certain extent also for prediction. However, as humans are self-
reflecting and potentially innovative beings, they are inherently unpredictable. At the same
time, although humans and societies are unpredictable in principle, they are nevertheless often
predictable in practice. The difference can be stated as one between subjective and objective
probabilities. Objective probabilities and predictions with a stated percentage of confidence
are necessarily related to assumptions about the human behaviour. To the extent that we ex-
clude the hypothetical possibility that people suddenly change behaviour, we may say that we
have a certain confidence in predicting future action. However, the fact that people have be-
haved in one way until now is no guarantee that they will continue to do so. That is a mere
assumption, which makes such predictions subjective in character. Hence, predictions are
subjective in the sense that for predictions to be valid, we need to assume the kind of histori-
cal behaviour that caused the continuity or trends to continue also in the future. Such an as-
sumption contradicts the insight that humans have the potential of self-awareness and reflec-
tive behaviour, thus being able of changing course of action, if nothing else just because we
assumed them not to do so.
The aspect of systems thinking emphasized in the Swedish KS-concept is the ambition to see
phenomena not as isolated, but in their context. Hence, different aspects of society such as
economy, logistics, political movements, constellations of influential people, critical events
etc should not be analyzed separately, but with a holistic approach. In cases of using influence
diagrams to map how different aspects of a situation interact to produce an outcome, arrows
signify causal relations between different factors. The critical issue then, is how these arrows
are related to social theory and to the world. This is not a trivial issue. In fact, the understand-
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ing and use of the concepts and arrows makes the entire difference. There are several aspects
of this problem:
• the way and the extent the arrows of the influence diagram represent actual causality
• the way and the extent to which the objects of the influence diagram (i.e. concepts and
language) relates to the real world
In analogy with the above discussion about the subjectivity of prediction of social events, the
arrows of the influence diagram should clearly represent our expectations of future action,
based on historical evidence, social theory or mere deductive reasoning. Such expectations
rely on basic assumptions about the characteristics and capacity of humans, especially con-
cerning the capacity for self-reflection and rational thought. If human action is characterized
by rule-following behaviour, action can be seen as programmed and the arrows of the influ-
ence diagram should also be predictive of future action. If these assumptions are not realistic,
the arrows instead signify more or less informed guesses about future behaviour. If we as-
sume ourselves to be capable of rational analysis and innovative behaviour, which is not pri-
marily a consequence of the volume of gathered information, but rather a consequence of the
capacity for the human brain of lateral thinking, then we have to ask ourselves why we as-
sume an adversary not being capable of such innovative thinking. The answer to that question
should decide how we look at the arrows of an influence diagram: as a depiction of the rules
of the world out there, or rather as a depiction of our subjective expectations.
The second question is of similar character, but doesn’t concern only how we look at the cau-
sation of influence diagrams, but also how we look at the concepts or nodes of any representa-
tion: does our classification and naming of the concepts of any scheme really represent the
world out there? This debate is closer to latter days’ “science wars” than to the original 19th
century Methodenstreit between historicists’ and economists. Notwithstanding the differences
of the debates, the alternative conclusions are similar. Either we see our representations as
more or less correct classifications and naming of things, or we assume language not to be
representations of the world, but rather a set of social rules among others. This understanding
of human language led Wittgenstein to the recommendation: “Don’t think, look!” (in Tsoukas
and Chia, 2002 p. 571). Brandom (1976) clarified this point by suggesting that instead of ask-
ing ‘What are the facts?’ the proper question should be ‘What am I entitled to say?’ (in any
specific situation) (p. 138). Hence, with the later days scepticism against the positivistic
method’s claims of true representation of both the world and its rules, both the nodes and the
relations of an influence diagram should be understood as human tools for coping with the
world, rather than correct representations of it.
It should be noted that different strands of social theory take different positions in regard to
these two central questions and hence don’t agree on the very character of theory or its rela-
tion to the world. Although the scope of the Swedish KS-concept is not to bring clarity to
these philosophical disputes, it can be foreseen that they may become issues concerning any
analysis performed. In the practical interest to try to dissolve as much uncertainty as possible
at a reasonable effort, the Swedish KS-concept sees human knowledge as imperfect and to a
certain extent contradictory and encourages the diversity of perspectives in the strive for un-
derstanding a complex world. As any relation between concepts or events – regardless of
whether these are stated verbally, graphically or mathematically – will correspond to one or
more available theories of with different approaches, methods and worldviews, clashes can be
foreseen. Therefore, these differences and how they are handled need to be addressed in the
concept.
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The most fundamental aspect of different perspectives is their ontology, answering the ques-
tion of the basic character of the world itself. Plato’s idea of a distinction between the con-
crete world we can experience and the world of ideas runs like the main thread throughout the
history of western thought (Lovejoy, 1936). According to this view, the world we experience
is only a shadow of the real world, the world of ideas. Until the 18th century, intellectuals and
scientists broadly agreed on the existence of a ‘Great chain of being’, i.e. an unbroken conti-
nuity of things of the world, ordered since the creation into a complete and rational universe.
In the 19th century, this ontology was challenged by the Darwinian evolutionism and the need
to explain change. In consequence, the ‘Great chain of being’, derived out of the idea of an
ultimate idea – an eternal, complete and self-sufficient God – was turned upside down, and
God as well as the world of ideas was turned into a mere sphere of becoming. With this new
emphasis on the world of experiences, the romantic taste for the unique, local and changeable
came to push back the pursuit of the Enlightenment for the abstract, general and eternal for-
mulas by which the specific can be explained (ibid.).
Morgan (1986) classified different organizational theories in terms of different metaphors: as

machines, organisms, brains, cultures, political systems, psychic prisons, instruments of
domination and as flux and transformation. Although applied to organizations, these meta-
phors may also be applied more generally to society at large. Of interest in relation to the
above discussion is primarily the latter metaphor: organizations or societies as “Flux and
transformation”. The essence of this metaphor is its assumptions of the essential character not
only of organizations or societies, but of the entire world: with reference to Heraclitus “you
cannot step twice into the same river, for other waters are continually flowing on”. Hence,
change is not seen as a transition from one stable state to another, but as exactly that which
happens in between them and this is what really happens all the time: if we perceive stability,
we have only lost the nuances that would tell us about ongoing change in micro-events (c.f.
Tsoukas and Chia, 2002). This worldview makes analysis problematic, as in complex systems
the degree of differentiation is high and the mapping of loops cannot be done with the degree
of certainty and completeness one may desire. Nevertheless, the way of thinking – systems
thinking 14 - provides a new epistemology, i.e. a new way of getting knowledge of the world:
“[T]he mode of thinking involved in this kind of analysis can itself be of consider-
able benefit. We have here a new epistemology for the management of complex
systems that shows how we can grasp a better understanding of the processes shap-
ing organizational life. Even though its understanding is neither complete nor per-
fect, it provides a powerful tool for guiding decisions and interventions.” (Morgan,
1986 p. 252f.)
Although such a scheme is evidently a simplification, that simplification is about the details,
rather than in terms of reducing the complex and interacting characteristics of the events. In
comparison with a long list of every specific detail that reveals the structural complexity of
events, i.e. the number of independent parts of the system, the influence diagram emphasizes
the interactive complexity i.e. the complex interactions among the parts (c.f. TRADOC Pam-
plet 535-5-500). Hence, in the trade-off between the need to simplify and the complexity of
the real world, the relation between factors is given priority over the number of factors per se.
14
As promoted by the Swedish KS-concept
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Actor influences
A C Political influence
Military influence
Economical influence
D
B
Figure 5. A systemic analytical modelling of influences between different dimensions
4.6 A systemic view of knowledge

It would seem natural that the Swedish KS-concept would prefer theories that emphasize the
complexity of human action as well as the contextual nature of social events, e.g. Bourdieu’s
analysis of “fields of practice”, Latourian “Actor-Network-Theory” or Giddens’ “structuration
theory”. However, given the attitude and conviction that all theories are partial and imperfect,
emphasizing some aspects at the cost of others, it can also be assumed that many theories will
be needed in order to cope with the multiple aspects of any situation. Although it is important
to be aware of different theories’ underlying assumptions as to take notice of the inconsisten-
cies of any general synthesis, the Swedish KS-concept promotes a relativistic attitude towards
different theories: they are mainly tools for coping with the world, not true depictions of it.
Hence, the ultimate trial of truth of theories or conclusions does not stem from the application
of any specific method, but is made continuously in practice. With the pragmatic test of truth,
if something works, it is as true as anything can be (c.f. Wicks and Freeman, 1998; Rorty,
1991).
The primary scope of the Swedish KS-concept is not to apply method and theories to reach
truth, but to help decision-makers frame situations in non-simplistic ways. Experience tells us
that purely intuitive decision-making is weak in correctly weighing different aspects against
each other (Ayres, 2007). Whatever kind of analysis that is made, its quality will be depend-
ent upon a well structured material of data. No matter what assumptions that are made about
the existence and character of relations between factors and events, there will be different
theories to underpin them. And almost certainly, no matter what set of theories that are ap-
plied to grasp the practice situation, there will be a certain tension between them in terms of
their underlying assumptions. In face of the need to simplify, however, the preference will be
to maintain a holistic approach to any problem. The most important thing will be to establish
a conscious distance to prejudices and theories, their assumptions and the approach of any
analysis and to conduct an open dialog about the results as well as about the remaining uncer-
tainty.
While formal theories are often seen as a purer kind of knowledge than the everyday coping
with the world, this is not a self-evident view (Schön, 1983). However, this conception is
traceable to the long tradition in western thought to look at the world of ideas as more real
than the more mundane world of experience. Quite contrary to this assumption, there is a
closeness between systems thinking’s holistic perspective on the world and the questioning of
the Cartesian split between mind and body, human and nature as well as between self and
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others, which is often made to with reference to eastern traditions of thought (c.f. Nonaka and
Takeuchi, 1995; Flood, 1999). This leads to a preference for direct observation beyond the
classifications of language (Senge et al, 2005). All languages contain a limited set of available
words and concepts which simplifies communication but restricts perception since all nuances
can’t be expressed. It is evident that simplification means loss of nuances and it is an open
question whether they matter or not. However, if we with Bateson see information as “a dif-
ference that makes a difference” and add the possibility that exactly the missing information
may be the most important one, i.e. the weak signal or the meaningful nuance that may rede-
fine people’s perception of an event, it is clear that different kinds of knowledge are needed to
complement each other.
As the pragmatist William James argued, if we care most about is “the vision of the far and
the gathering of the scattered alike” – which we typically do in higher levels of command –
the conceptual method of gathering information in classes and categories, often through
measurement, is the proper one (Tsoukas and Chia, 2002). The important thing to keep in
mind is that the interaction with the gathered information is not the same thing as being there.
This is not to say that either is better or worse, only that these are different interactions with
different contexts, rendering specialized and thereby different knowledge. If we take a sys-
temic look at knowledge, the memory of the brain and the tacit part integrated in behaviour is
only a part of the story. The rest resides in the context in which we act and interact, in the
artefacts of displays and reports as well as in the communication with colleagues: the flow of
stimuli and interaction becomes more important than memory alone and knowledge becomes
the specific selection of such flows between an actor and the environment. As such, any
knowledge will have its “dark side” in what was not selected: i.e. its non-knowledge (Seidl,
1997). Hence, a systemic view on knowledge would push our interest away from theory and
methodology alone, in favour for the role of heedful interaction between different kinds of
knowledge, not least to become aware of what we miss because of our specific configuration
of such flows.
With such a systemic focus on the KS-concept, rather than on expertise in isolated ivory tow-
ers, the social networking potential of new technologies becomes as important as the impres-
sive capacity of smart search engines. While much of the enabling factors are purely techni-
cal, their aim is ultimately social: to bring together people in meaningful interaction trying to
make sense of the world out of different perspectives. Hence, the belief in the development of
intelligence through human interaction (Seidl, 1997) is at heart of the Swedish KS-concept.
4.7 Method: systems of distributed abduction

In relation to knowledge, method is frequently understood as a way of discovering truth by
applying scientific principles of research. The products – the text, the formulae, the depictions
– are thereby frequently seen as valid knowledge about the world, or in case of doubt, they are
understood to be validated by testing them against objective data about the world.
Out of a pragmatic view of knowledge, this means confusing method as a pedagogical device
for telling a story about the world and a means for reaching truth (Rorty, 1991, p. 79). Rather,
truth should be assessed through the ability to practically cope with upcoming situations, than
be searched for in abstract language and depiction. Consequently, whatever methods or theo-
ries that are used to understand the situation, action and its outcome should be seen as the
ultimate proof of validity. This view emphasizes the view of the entire organization as knowl-
edge production through its continuous and ongoing process of reflecting over concrete ex-
perience and trying out new ideas in practice. Hence, the challenge to a knowledge-intensive
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organization in the modern world should be to make better guesses in an unknowable world
(Weick, 2006) and to learn within the unknowable (Flood, 1999).
The iterative process of believing, acting, reflecting and doubting can be referred to as abduc-
tion: the iteration between experience-based conclusions through induction and development
of new hypotheses through deductive reasoning. As this work is performed throughout the
learning organization, the process of abduction is also a distributed one: over levels of com-
mand, differentiated experts, individual- and situation-dependent experiences and over the
different flows of selected data, information and communication. Hence, in a learning organi-
zation, new experiences and conclusions are generated through a process of distributed ab-
duction (Weick, 2006 p. 1730) through the distribution of texts, sketches, formulae, graphics,
sounds and human communication. As the social context is important for towards what as-
pects of any situation attention is directed (Ocasio, 1997), not least the social side of these
interactions and how they are generated are at heart of the KS-koncept’s ambitions for knowl-
edge management. A second generation of web-based communities such as social-networking
sites, wikis and blogs facilitates the building of social bonds which in turn direct the informa-
tion flows facilitating creativity throughout the organization. Through the application of “so-
cial software”, people can quickly find others who have a common interest or other reasons to
connect (Eagle, 2004). Hence, the central method of distributed abduction relies heavily on
social bonds which in turn can be facilitated and leveraged by technological solutions.
When dealing with change, general models should not be expected to apply to all specific
situations. Rather each specific situation requires its specific model, which is only possible
through real time learning (FOA, 1996 p. 9; Tradoc pamphlet). Hence, reflective practitioners
must develop a theory of the specific case (Schön, 1983) and need to expand their repertoire
to improve their alertness to spot weak signals of change in order to handle issues before they
turn into serious problems (Weick, 2006). With these ambitions, commanders as well as sub-
ordinates are in need to continuous support but also challenges to the habitual ‘ruthless gener-
alizations’ which humans typically develop to cope with information flows that by far exceed
their capacity for attention. In other words, the flow of suggestions from analysis, concrete
experience and the different specialized perspectives on any situation is what warrants for
intelligence through the network (Seidl, 1997). Hence, interactivity throughout the network,
differences between expectations and outcomes, multitude of expertise perspectives and the
contact between the formal and informal sides of organizing should be seen as as important
sources of intelligence (ibid.).
4.8 Critical competences and capacities

Although diversity will still be the most characteristic feature of demanded skills, a few of
them will be of a most general character. First, to become a fast learning organization in un-
predictable environments, analysts, commanders and subordinates need to grasp the qualita-
tive difference between these new environments and the ones expected during the cold war.
As adversaries are harder to both identify and their ways of organizing and acting harder to
understand, the fundamental re-orientation in terms of mindset will be an ongoing accom-
plishment over a rather long period of time. In order to perform new tasks properly, the con-
text and its logic must first of all be understood on a deep, fundamental level. Second, as the
principle of distributed abduction relies on an intense interaction between differences of per-
spectives and competences, interpersonal skills will increase in importance.
While both understanding and interpersonal relations will remain ever-improvable in human
affairs, their importance for the Swedish KS-concept should not be underestimated: only tools
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and technology cannot do the work envisaged and needed to keep up with change through
organization-wide learning. The understanding and experience concerning irregular warfare is
still very limited among Swedish forces. This may also influence the work of KM-officers.
Commanders with higher levels of understanding will be more able to prioritize, while less
experienced commanders will want to know everything. Given the complexity of analysis and
the amount of expertise and generalist experience needed in the staff, both coordination and
HR-turnover are formidable challenges for the future. Although an extensive documentation
and advanced tools for structuring and primary analysis on data are envisaged by the Swedish
KS-concept, these will not eliminate the need for continuity and extensive experience of staff
personnel. Also, the ability to build trust, integrity, collaborative capacity and experience of
the KS-officer will be of decisive importance.
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5 The Human Resources Challenge
5.1 Introduction
As for many other concepts, a vital factor in KS is of course getting the right people to the
task. The scope of the KS Concept is rather wide, and it will depend on using both people
inside and outside of the existing military organization with skill sets suited for the new proc-
esses and tasks in KS. Because of this, it is important to be aware of both the current and fu-
ture military system when it comes to HR issues, as well as having a good knowledge of the
resources to be found outside the military sector.
Below, some of the aspects related to this issue are discussed, mainly based on the work hith-
erto conducted within the Swedish KS Concept.
5.2 Describing the Competence Needs

Depending on the different scope of the KS task likely to be at hand for any one mission, both
the KS organization and the resulting demands on the competencies of the staff will probably
differ over time to a greater or lesser extent. We probably need to look for different personal-
ity types and skill sets in order to match people to different roles. Defining these criteria is a
critical factor in order to make the recruiting process work.
The process of working out and describing this need for various competencies to be found
within the KS structure is likely to be a part of an iterative planning process resulting in both a
standing organization and a capacity for more or less rapid adaptation, e.g. to cover new re-
gions, countries and types of conflicts. Valuable real life experiences from such planning
processes, or similar processes, are probably to be found in e.g. USA and Germany, stemming
from these countries’ respective efforts to create more or less long-lived KS-related structures
for more or less ad hoc-related tasks. However, given the different cultures of Sweden and
other nations, it cannot be taken for granted that the experiences from other nations can be
adapted as is, but rather that these experiences can give some initial ideas in order to facilitate
and speed up Swedish similar efforts.
In general, the level of competence demanded from the staff involved in KS is likely to be
high. Overall, there will naturally be a need for expertise for all staff members in their respec-
tive disciplines. Also, it perhaps goes without saying that the staff involved in the analysis of
non-friendly phenomena, i.e. Knowledge Production, should be expected to, between them,
cover e.g. the full PMESII spectrum, as well as having access to a substantial network of con-
tacts useful for the KS work, It is, furthermore, probably uncontroversial to put forward the
idea that the staff involved in the services for enabling and management, e.g. Knowledge Re-
quest Management and Knowledge Management, must be experts in their respective disci-
plines, be it Collection Coordination or Human Resources.
However, for all staff members, their respective subject matter and/or special technical exper-
tise would preferably be coupled with a thorough understanding not only of the organizational
structure, tasks and culture of the supported staff element, but also a solid knowledge of the
political and other contexts of the mission at hand for this staff element. These two observa-
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tions are borne out e.g. by the experience from the Swedish Dial-a-Sensor project (Bäckström,
C. och Åsvärn, D. Dial-a-Sensor – Scientific Report. 2005. Saab Systems Report No. 365255
to The Swedish Defense Materiel Administration), where some experiment participants stated
their views on the ideal supporting KS staff competencies (in this case image interpretation
expertise) to encompass both e.g. the mindset and competence of the supported commanding
officer and the technical and other expertise inherent in the supporting KS role. Although
lacking in precision, one way of expressing this duality would be to say that it would be good
if KS staff could have a civilian-military background. This means that they should possess
both a military background (in the sense of understanding the traditional military way of do-
ing things) and a civilian background (while acknowledging the fact that many supposedly
“civilian” competencies should really today, in the world of the three-block war, be inter-
preted as necessary for a modern military general education, and therefore be labelled “mili-
tary”). For reasons of simplicity, in spite of the inadequateness of the expression, below the
expression “military-civilian background” will be used to denote this dual competence.
There will probably be many ways of being attached to the KS concept. It is perhaps not un-
reasonable to predict that much of the work will be led by a relatively small number of people
working with KS on a more or less permanent basis. Other KS staff members, e.g. subject
matter experts, might be connected to the KS work only insofar as they are being, from time
to time, asked to give advice on various subjects. It also seems probable that, depending on
the scope and subject of the work, more or less ad hoc combinations of people will be used,
supported by, or working within, more permanent structures. As discussed further below,
some of these forms of attachment might be planned and wanted, while some might be neces-
sitated e.g. by the difficulty to get more than limited access to some people’s time, or that
people do not want to leave their ordinary jobs.
Experiences from this and other experiments, in Sweden and abroad, aiming at describing
suitable forms and modalities for various forms of KS support, could well serve as food for
thought for the iterative process of describing KS staff competence needs.
In this context, it could be pointed out that it seems reasonable to believe that the level of
competence needed finally decided upon will have an effect on the possibility to find persons
who could fulfil the competence needs. If the sights are set high, the persons meeting the de-
mands will be fewer, and the risk of their already being gainfully employed elsewhere in-
creases. If so, it will be more difficult to engage them in KS activities, and the use of these
persons in KS might also increasingly be coupled with restrictions of various kinds, e.g. in
their willingness to travel abroad. If this is the case, and this seems highly probable, it goes
without saying that, in turn, this might have repercussions when it comes to e.g. the organiza-
tional framework and even the physical location of the KS structure. Another way of saying
this might be that persons with some competence profiles might be possible to recruit for
some kind of duty, while other competence profiles will lend themselves more readily to other
kinds of duty. One important division here is perhaps that between persons more actively in-
volved in KS work, e.g. away from their homes, and persons in a reachback role, supporting
with advice from their normal workplaces. To conclude this discussion, it seems likely that, in
many cases, it will not be possible to have immediate access to the kind of expertise needed.
It might well be that the best possible solution will turn out to be having access to someone
with a reasonable grasp of a subject enabling her or him to sift out information, discuss with
peers and consult subject authorities, in short, a kind of interpreter and guide to the subject in
question rather than an expert per se.
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Another aspect of staff competence is that of the individual suitability, and the usual security
safeguards must naturally be expected to apply to KS staff. This important discussion is not
followed up in more detail here.
Yet another aspect with introducing any new practice is the need to have KS-educated users
and decision-makers. Unless the new methods are understood and accepted at the supported
levels as well as by decision-makers at all levels, any new practice runs the risk of not being
fully utilized.
As a closing comment, it is probably wise to reiterate the need to judge experiences, others’ as
well as our own, in the light of the cultural and organizational conditions at hand when they
were made, and the subsequent need to adapt these experiences to our own requirements of
today.
5.3 Some KS Aspects of the Future Swedish HR System
Major changes are currently being made in the Swedish military HR system. One important
feature can be expected to be further moves away from the conscription system. If so this will
lead to fewer people will have first-hand experience from military activities. In turn, this can
be expected to lead to KS relying on the use of officers even more than today, when many
people, in all walks of life, have military experience.
In the future, officers will be recruited and trained in three categories:

- Officers with Tactical and Operational Focus;
- Specialist Officers; and
- Reserve Officers.
Finding the right mix between these three officer categories, as well as the right mix between
military and civilian staff, will be a task for further concept development and implementation.
It will also require the KS Concept to define what kind of skill set, training and basic compe-
tence that will be needed for different positions within those three and other staff categories.
Detta stycke bygger vi om beroende på vad vi får för material från persstaben – eller kanske
tar vi in det som en bilaga?.//Dag
5.4 Finding and Recruiting the Right People

Once the competence profiles and other demands on the KS staff are described and decided
upon, it will be possible to start to try to identify people who fit the descriptions. After this,
these persons will need to be attracted to the possibility of taking part in the KS work, and a
selection process put in place.
Regardless of the staff competence profiles chosen, in order to decrease the need for substan-
tial training and/or education to be undertaken it is reasonable to try to find persons able to fit
these descriptions with as little need for additional training and/or education as possible..
Given the probable demands on the staff as described above, i.e. the suggested preference for
subject matter and/or special technical expertise to be coupled with a military and political
understanding of the supported staff element as well as with the context of the mission, this
probably leads to the conclusion of trying to find persons that already have dual mili-
tary/civilian backgrounds. On the other hand, for some staff categories this might not be pos-
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sible, as it might be difficult to find persons combining some of the disciplines needed with
previous military experience. Also, it might well be that some specific competencies are
thought to be so valuable that the possession of these competencies alone would be seen as
meriting recruitment, and that these persons would instead be given the necessary training in
e.g. the needed military subjects.
However, if the sights should be set on persons with a military-civilian background, this
would lead us to trying to find KS staff members mainly among full-time military staff with
civilian competencies, civilians working within the military, reserve officers, and other re-
servists having military experience, e.g. former conscripts. (The term “Reservist” is not a
word often used in Sweden, but in many countries the term denotes a person belonging to the
armed forces, but presently not being on active duty. In Sweden, if someone talks about re-
servists, he is probably thinking of reserve officers, while other persons who could be called
up in the event of e.g. a national crisis are often not thought of as reservists. However, in
many other countries, the term “reservist” comprises both reserve officers as well as other
reservists. Sweden, unlike some other countries, does not at the moment have an active policy
towards reservists, i.e. also those other than reserve officers. It seems likely that, with the di-
minishing number of conscript soldiers, Sweden will also need to put more effort to organis-
ing and training reservists.)
The Headquarters is at present conducting work aiming at describing the competencies of all
full-time staff. This work can be expected to facilitate the search for staff with specific com-
petencies.
Below is found a discussion on the possibilities to find and recruit staff from these groups. In
addition, a brief discussion on the possibilities to find and recruit staff without previous mili-
tary experience is also found..
5.4.1 Full-time Military Staff

One of the advantages of using this staff group for KS work is that it they all have a military
background. Some also have dual competencies, e.g. by combining their military expertise
with civilian experience of different kinds. Also, another advantage is that this group is that it
is relatively readily available, since they are already in the system..
Among the problems connected with trying to engage full-time officers in KS work, however,
the present practice of frequent job rotation can be mentioned, as this is held by some (e.g.
Riksrevisionsverket (The Swedish National Audit Office, 1998, Officerarna i försvaret - ut-
bildning, utnyttjande och kompetens) to be detrimental to the creation of the necessary long-
term experience.
5.4.2 Civilians Working within the Armed Forces
One of the advantages of using civilians already working within the Armed Forces for KS
work is that they are relatively readily available. The problem connected with frequent job
rotation, mentioned above for full-time military staff, is also judged to be less marked for this
staff group. One of the disadvantages, however, might be that some civilian staff might have a
less thorough and far-reaching understanding of military matters than their military col-
leagues. Also, in order to be able to use these civilians in areas of conflict, thought would
need to be devoted to the legal forms for this use, i.e. regarding their formal status as combat-
ants or non-combatants.
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5.4.3 Reserve Officers

Reserve officers are a fairly disparate group, encompassing every variation between very ac-
tive reserve officers with excellent recent military, and civilian track records, full-time offi-
cers recently having left full time service to take up a civilian career and become reserve offi-
cers, and seventy year-old reserve officers who have not served for many years. In this con-
text, another group should also be mentioned, i.e. that of former full-time officers having left
the armed forces for other careers, but not having become reserve officers.
Regardless if they formally are reserve officers or not, one advantage with reserve officers
and former full-time officers alike from a KS standpoint is that they all combine military and
civilian backgrounds. Many of them have civilian skills and competencies making them suit-
able for KS work. In addition, the reserve officers share the advantage of the full-time officers
of being easy to employ from an administrative standpoint, as they are already in the system,
while some of the former full-time officers might have various forms of agreements with the
Armed Forces, making it difficult to use them from a contractual point of view.
One disadvantage with this group from a KS perspective is that, due to their often qualified
and high-salaried work positions, many of them are difficult to recruit for military service
other than service in Sweden in a national crisis. However, this is perhaps just another way of
saying that present recruitment methods and remuneration practices simply are not conducive
to recruitment of them. If their skills are wanted, thought should be devoted on how to attract
them. In order to facilitate this thought process, some reference material can be recom-
mended. Among recent publications can be mentioned a pilot study from the Headquarters
covering e.g. what could make reserve officers serve more and a White Paper issued by the
Swedish Reserve Officers’ Association (Hammarstrand, Lennart (Ed.) The Swedish Reserve
Officers’ Association (2007). Modern militär professionalism - försvaret och Sverige i värl-
den.) The White Paper i.a. describes the use of reservists in Sweden and in other countries,
giving suggestions as to the future use of reserve officers and examples from other countries
making good use of their reserve officers, e.g. the United Kingdom .
5.4.4 Other Reservists, e.g. Former Conscripts.

Reservists (apart from Reserve Officers, c.f. the discussion above) are also a disparate group,
consisting of former conscripts, but also, not to be overlooked, of persons from various volun-
tary organisations with both female and male members. Many of its members, like the reserve
officers, have civilian skills and competencies, making them interesting from a KS standpoint.
Some reservists also have recent military experience, while many would need training prior to
being used for KS work. For many of them, the same reasoning as for reserve officers would
probably apply as to the difficulty to recruit competent staff, mainly due to their sometimes
qualified and high-salaried work positions. As with the reserve officers, this is another way of
saying that if we want competent staff, we might need to think of new ways to recruit and
keep them.
5.4.5 Persons Without Previous Military Experience

Many persons without any previous connection with the military could also play important
roles in KS work. One obvious role is that of reachback, i.e. answering questions put from the
KS structure. Another important aspect of this group is that many persons possess background
and language knowledge from other parts of the world.
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Referring back to the previous discussion regarding the need for all KS staff to have some
degree of both military and political understanding, some of these persons would probably
need to undergo some training before starting to take part in the work.
Mechanisms also need to be put in place, both from a de-conflicting, security and remunera-
tive perspective, in order to make it possible to recruit persons without previous military ex-
perience Also, there would have to be a discussion regarding their legal status similar to that
described above for civilians employed by the military.
For many, the same reasoning as for reserve officers and former conscripts would probably
apply as to the difficulty to recruit competent staff.
5.5 A Widened Scope for HR in Operations

In operations, the HR role has traditionally focused on providing more long-term aspects sup-
port such as manning lists, role descriptions and recruitment to fit these roles. However, when
the manning list for a certain operation is fixed, often no analysis is made of the total avail-
ability of skills and knowledge over time, and vacancies are not always swiftly remedied by
e.g. providing replacements. For KS, there will be a need to keep the capacity at a certain
level over time, e.g. in order not to miss out on any one of the letters in PMESII just because
someone is on leave.
Another problem is that people who have finished a tour of duty are generally not kept track
of, something with makes it more difficult to find them in order to use their advice for the
new unit taking over the operation. It also makes it difficult to use former staff in reach back
functions. Instead, the KS concept argues the importance of making the knowledge and skills
dimension available for each and every one which are, or have been, involved in a certain
operation. This not only allows for an up-to-date situation picture of current knowledge to be
available to the commander, but also helps all involved to utilize past experience in a better
way, e.g. for reach back. This not only increases efficiency, it is also a way to build on the
emerging lessons learned process created within the Armed Forces.
For some of the staffing needs identified, for reasons of time, availability and cost efficiency,
recruiting in-house staff might not always be the best choice, or even possible. This is linked
an intention in this concept of making external specialists available to the HQ staff when re-
quired. To which extent that is suitable from a security perspective varies from situation to
situation since there might be a need to give these experts access to current knowledge. These
external resources can come from anywhere in the civilian society such as university institu-
tions and consultancy firms. Where formal agreement for this use of external specialists is
needed, it will be handled by the Knowledge Acquisition process. Having some degree of
control of this process reduces the risk of overutilization (everybody calling the same person)
of precious reach back human resources, and also makes it easier to handle quality and secu-
rity issues.
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6 Components of the Knowledge Support Concept
6.1 Introduction
The following text will present the different components of the KS concept on a rather con-
crete level in order to create an understanding of what all these K-terms really mean and what
is required to make them happen. Some of the terms used here can be found with a wide vari-
ety of meanings in various literature and business areas. However, here they are given a spe-
cific meaning which fits this particular context and that is also how they should be under-
stood.
6.1.1 The importance of context

One of the greatest challenges in handling contemporary conflict situations is not just to be
able to communicate information but also the relevant context that is needed to interpret it in a
certain way. Context provides a framing for all relevant parties which can lead to a better un-
derstanding of what is relevant and not in a certain situation. This concept intends to facilitate
mechanisms that ease the provision of that context both within a military HQ but also be-
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tween different levels of command. The assumption is that a combination of established prac-
tices and modern information technology can assist in doing that.
6.1.2 Lower levels of command

Although this concept is primarily scoped to the operational level it is vital that methods, in-
formation architecture and processes are seen in a wider perspective. After all, just as the op-
erational level intends to command the lower levels they are also dependent on them to pro-
vide a wide range of information about the world around us. In order to make this information
usable on many levels there need to look at all parts of the chain in terms of information man-
agement. That can initiate a need to capture and report information in certain formats to easy
further processing of it.
6.1.3 Need for change in reporting culture

Before the dawn of the internet era where computers were relatively scarce in a military HQ
information management were mainly focused on limiting the amount of information that
needed to be sent in order to match input terminals, transmission bandwidth and the recipients
ability to process vast amount of information. Today that has all changed due to advances in
information technology but old reporting patterns still remain. That means that information
from one level is normally summarized into a condensed report that is then sent to the higher
level of command but without any of the source information. In the end that leads to reports
which are based on summarizations which in turn are based on other summarization. If some-
body then wants to reassess the whole chain of events due to new information, that is gener-
ally not possible.
This concept then asserts this reporting culture needs to change in order to allow for all re-
ports to be stored and sent together with all their source material which today often can in-
clude both images and video. If bandwidth limitations still exist at least linkages to these in-
formation pieces need to be attached to be retrieved when needed. Further on it can lead to
requirements to digitize the input of information on the lowest level by introducing handheld
devices.
6.1.4 Collaboration and the power of many

Finally there is a need to change the culture from “need to know” to “need to share” which is
a way to harness the power of all people in the organization. This is something that has been
seen on the public internet where so called Web 2.0-services have radically changed the way
information is contributed an accessed. The main change has been in lowering the threshold
for all people to contribute content in various ways. Each contributor then has the opportunity
to add context to it by assigning keywords but even more important – everybody else can also
assign context to the content. That allows for a movement where information structure is cre-
ated by everybody which also eases the access of the information. This kind of tagging is
called folksonomies which are useful on their own but can also be monitored to constantly
update corporate taxonomies and thereby formalizing the structure into established proce-
dures. However, in the end this a cultural movement where people need to want to collabo-
rate, comment and contribute in order to harness these new possibilities.
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6.1.5 Vertical and horizontal dissemination

The question of horizontal versus vertical dissemination of finished intelligence is also a fac-
tor worth discussing. In a commander-centric approach all members of the staff serve to pro-
vide the commander with the best foundation for decision-making. This means that each level
focuses on providing information to their commander and his/her guidance is the most impor-
tant factor to guide work being done. However, all this information will also be disseminated
to lower command which in the “old days” was limited by lack of computers and communica-
tion capabilities. While some bandwidth limitations still remain the possibility of providing
distributed access to information has dramatically changes which allows for availability of
information rather than daily reports which are pushed downwards.
6.2 Knowledge Management (KM)
6.2.1 Summary
The core problem to be addressed is that contemporary operational commanders are faced
with data and information overload yet they lack the means to synthesize data and information
to provide the key actionable knowledge required for timely and effective operational deci-
sion-making. In the EBAO concept, the Knowledge Support process has the responsibility to
deliver this through a shared Multi National Repository which is a technical representation of
available knowledge. In order to achieve that there is a need for activities and processes on
several levels.
One of these is knowledge management which primarily is an approach relevant to all people
in the organization. By implementing a sound KM approach the idea is to facilitate collabora-
tion between people and full utilization of the knowledge embedded in the organization.
Knowledge is created when people apply data and information in different situational contexts
and the KM approach is designed to facilitate that through training, business rules and a sup-
porting technical platform. The primary goal of the technical platform is to facilitate collabo-
ration between people and capture, storage and accessibility to data and information created
inside or outside the organization. This means that KM applies to all processes and functions
within an organization.
KM is an enabling process that facilitates collaboration and governs structure but does
not alter content.
In these contexts, technology is not the sole factor to success. Not all knowledge can be codi-
fied and stored in a knowledge base. Some knowledge exists within the minds of individuals
(tacit knowledge), and thus, may be harder to use and disseminate. However, one of the aims
and purposes of KM is to establish methods and practices that support a deliberate capture of
the tacit knowledge as well.
To leverage the full potential of an organization’s knowledge-related assets, it is important to

keep track of different kinds of knowledge, implicit, explicit and tacit, and utilize this in the
best way possible to gain advantages over adversaries. It is of prime importance to know;
what we know, who knows what and what we do not know.
Knowledge Management (KM) consists of:
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- IT-system Management
- Information Management
- Taxonomies / Ontologies management
- Metadata model management
- Human Resource Management
- Plans and Policy
- Security
- Support Liaison Officer (KSLO)
This chapter will now provide a theoretical background to Knowledge Management [KM] and
the finally in more concrete way provide an outline of the different sub-components of KM.
6.2.2 An introduction to Knowledge Management

In any type of organization, whether civilian or military, know-how is the prime key to suc-
cess. A challenge to address is how to manage knowledge over time, i.e. how to reuse existing
knowledge, preserve knowledge within the organization, refine existing knowledge etc. These
difficulties are related to several factors. Within large organizations it is hard to keep track of
all knowledge assets in an efficient manner. Distances within the organization may hinder
transfer of knowledge since people simply do not have proper tools to identify where knowl-
edge can be acquired from. Further, as employees end their jobs, acquired knowledge may be
lost.
During recent decades, globalization has been a major driving force behind the evolution of
KM techniques and practices. Today’s complexity in global trade, partly induced by new pos-
sibilities brought forth by the rapid development of information technology, causes speed-up
of various business processes. Companies are forced to develop new products at a faster pace,
which are also distributed to a wider market more quickly than ever before [Wiig, 1999]. In
this competitive environment it is important to treat knowledge as a first-class resource, facili-
tating long-term survival of an organization and helps gaining advantages over adversaries.
The possibilities of an organization are linked to the competitive quality of its knowledge re-
lated assets. Further more, the proper application of these assets in various business activities
governs the successfulness of the enterprise.
All in all, this highlights the importance of [Prusak, 2001]:
1. knowing what we know

2. who knows what
3. what is not known that we should know
Piet Hein;
At veta. Too know

Vad man inte vet What you do not know
Är dock Is after all
ett slags allvetenhet a kind of omniscience.
Knowledge Management (KM) aims at providing support for this in terms of technical means,
but also in terms of guidelines and practices.
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KM builds on theories from the fields of economics, sociology, philosophy and psychology.
Also, more concrete fields such as information technology and library science influence and
contribute to the evolution of the area [McIntyre et al., 2003].
There are numerous definitions of knowledge management available from various authors.
The following definition by [Wiig, 1999] highlights some important notions of knowledge
management:
KM is the “systematic and explicit management of knowledge-related

activities, practices, programs, and policies within the enterprise”.
This definition pinpoints the fact the management of knowledge should follow pre-defined
methods (principles, guidelines) that are expressed in an unambiguous form. These methods
should govern the identification and mapping of knowledge-related assets, generation of new
knowledge in order to gain a better position compared with an organization’s competitors and
sharing of corporate information [Barclay & Murray]. To enable knowledge management at a
larger scale, technical means are important, however, fundamental changes in corporate cul-
tures are equally important.
6.2.3 KM System
In this section we describe the KM System 15 . The KM system comprises activities and influ-
encers, i.e. activities carried out to mange an organization’s knowledge assets and aspects that
influence these activities in various ways.
6.2.3.1 Knowledge transfer

Nonaka and Takeuchi described the process of transforming tacit knowledge into explicit
knowledge in the quest of creating organizational knowledge, see figure 2 [Nonaka and Ta-
keuchi, 1995]. This model illustrates how knowledge transfer is accomplished in the KM sys-
tem. The model comprises four main processes; socialization, externalization, combination
and internalization, which form a closed loop. Through-out the life-time of an organization,
organizational knowledge will evolve through successive iterations in this cycle.
15
Does not refer to an IT-system but rather system in a more abstract sense.
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Figure 2. Transformation of knowledge [reproduced from Nonaka and Takeuchi,

1995].
In the socialization process (tacit to tacit), tacit knowledge may be transferred between indi-
viduals by sharing of experiences, i.e. sharing of know-how. In the military domain a com-
mon way of exchanging tacit knowledge is by “storytelling”. Through classroom training,
simulation, observation and mentoring, experiences from past operations may be transferred
between individuals, which in the end facilitates build-up of collective knowledge, visions
and values [Waltz, 2003].
In the externalization process (tacit to explicit) tacit knowledge is codified into an explicit
form. This means that knowledge models are created that capture experiences and concepts in
a more formal way [Waltz, 2003]. At this stage, a highly structured and formalized knowl-
edge model is desirable, but the output from this process may also include text documents.
In the combination process (explicit to explicit) explicitly codified knowledge models is cate-
gorized, related and combined by either man or machine. E.g. an intelligence analyst studies
various reports on a common subject in order to produce a combined analysis. In other cases a
computer may be used to fuse information from multiple sensors, or others sources, to gain an
aggregate view [Waltz, 2003].
In the internalization process (explicit to tacit) explicit knowledge gained through the combi-
nation process results in tacit knowledge of the individuals of the organization. Applying the
combined knowledge may lead to new insight that in the end facilitates development of skills
and expertise [Waltz, 2003]. Knowledge (tacit) gained in the internalization process may then
be used in the socialization process, marking the beginning of a new iteration through the
knowledge transfer cycle.
A KM-system can be described in terms of a model originally created by the MITRE Corpo-
ration, but later modified in [USJFCOM Conops, 2004], see figure 3. In this model two main
aspects are represented; Influencers and Activities. Influencers are factors that have an impact
on the Activities carried out to support the knowledge-centric organization.
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Figure 3. Knowledge Management Model [reproduced after USJFCOM Conops,

2004].
6.2.3.2 Knowledge activities

In the KM model illustrated in figure 3, the following knowledge activities are present
[USJFCOM Collaboration, 2004]:
– Creation – this process aims at creating actionable knowledge by linking tacit knowl-
edge to other resources (other data or information).
– Organization – this activity is carried out when knowledge is transferred from an in-
dividual or group to the knowledge store of an organization (we want to store the
knowledge in a knowledge base). The activity requires application of business rules
that govern how knowledge is acquired and which format that is used for its storage.
– Formalization – this is an activity for validation of captured knowledge. This is cru-

cial in order to assure quality and relevance of knowledge.
– Distribution – this activity represents sharing of knowledge within an organization,

this includes both stored knowledge (explicit knowledge) as well as knowledge in the
minds of people (tacit knowledge). This activity requires what we mentioned earlier
being a fundament for knowledge management; “knowing what we know”. The
knowledge assets of an organization must be captured, categorized, and made avail-
able through a common environment.
– Application – this activity represents the actual use of knowledge in pursuit of an or-
ganization’s goals.
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– Evolution – in this activity the knowledge base and knowledge activities are reviewed
in order to adjust in response to changing requirements or the arrival of new technol-
ogy.
6.2.3.3 KM Influencers
There are several factors that influence the activities of knowledge management and/or how
knowledge management is realized within an organization. The following seven aspects are
important influencers of knowledge management according to [USJFCOM Collaboration,
2004]:
1. Technology is a true enabler of knowledge management. The last decade’s rapid de-
velopment of the ICT area has surely changed the way we are able to share and com-
municate knowledge in different forms. However, even though technology brings new
opportunities, it has to be applied with care to gain maximum output from an invest-
ment. The introduction of new systems and applications in an organization must be
accompanied by proper procedures (methodology).
2. Strategy defines an organization’s objectives, goals, and desired end state and influ-
ences the performance of knowledge activities.
3. Culture has a large impact on the successful application of KM. A basic condition is
that the users of the system are willing and are allowed to share their information.
Therefore, a culture must be promoted were sharing is rewarded. Also, users must be
open to reuse of other’s knowledge in order to build new products and try to avoid the
“not invented here” syndrome.
4. Policy dictates business rules to apply within the KM system and responsibilities of
different roles in creating, storing and reusing knowledge. Also, a policy should dic-
tate a model for management of access rights and responsibilities for validation of
knowledge assets.
5. Measurement provides means of profiling the KM system, i.e. evaluate the effective-
ness of knowledge activities, which in the end should motivate an analysis in order to
refine applied processes.
6. Process represents the main business activities of an organization and these enforce
requirements on the KM system. For instance, how is knowledge acquired, processed,
analyzed and disseminated throughout the organization.
7. Content refers to the data, information and knowledge contained within the KM sys-
tem. The nature of the content, or changes to it, may have an impact on knowledge ac-
tivities carried out within the KM system.
Apart from this it is important to acknowledge the importance of the leadership of an organi-
zation. The leadership must encourage and promote KM projects. Often, successful knowl-
edge management tools and processes are developed from the grass root level and not en-
forced in a top down manner. Thus, it is important to encourage bottom-up approaches in or-
der to facilitate development of an organization in a KM direction [Girard, 2005].
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6.2.4 KM in a military context

KM in the corporate business world operates in a more static and predictable world, compared
to the world that faces military KM approaches. In modern warfare, information from multi-
ple, potentially heterogeneous, sources must be used to ensure superiority over the adversary.
The information is vital in facilitating anticipation of potential enemy actions, sense-making
and decision-making [McIntyre, 2003]. KM in the military context has some additional re-
quirements compared with the corporate business world [McIntyre, 2003]:
1. Knowledge processes that are robust and reliable within operational contexts.
2. Knowledge content and intellectual assets that is focused, precise, reliable, with suit-
able recall levels.
3. Knowledge creation and conversation processes that match the pace of operations.
The nature of military organizations and its cultures may also hinder successful application of
KM. It is important to understand that successful realization of any knowledge management
system depends on the willingness of its users to contribute with their expertise and knowl-
edge. A culture must be nourished where sharing of knowledge is encouraged and rewarded.
This may not be an easy task to accomplish in certain parts of the military community where
traditionally, information and knowledge sharing have been kept at a minimum to assure in-
tegrity of sources etc. However, in order to explore the full potential of knowledge manage-
ment these requirements may have to be relaxed somehow, or realized in a different way.
Looking at the knowledge cycle, described in section 3.1, in a military context, e.g. the forma-
tion and work of a team responsible for analyzing the whereabouts of warlords in the
Bogaland scenario, some general activities of each phase could include the following, based
on [Waltz, 2003]:
- Socialization
In this phase, team members meet to exchange views, form subgroups, delegate re-
sponsibilities etc. This is important to establish trust and develop a shared vision
within the group. During the process a number of meetings are conducted where team
members share their tacit knowledge concerning irregular units and warlords of
Bogaland. This is done to exchange views of the potential threats that these units en-
force on BFOR (the contingent responsible for stabilization of the region) and how to
influence these groups in the best way possible to reach the desired end-state. As this
process continues, missing elements of information are identified and recorded. Fur-
ther, a preliminary roadmap is established that outline the activities needed to reach a
desired end-state.
- Externalization
In this phase the knowledge of the team (beliefs) and speculations are codified into
models that are disseminated through the system and refined in iterative steps. Given
the background story of our example these models might include; social networks of
irregular units and warlords, relations between different groupings, financial support
and so on. Causal chain of past operations of groups and potential lines of develop-
ment (or activities) that theses groups may take to pursuit their own goals.
- Combination
The codified knowledge represents current thinking of the team, e.g. the organization
of different groups (their internal and external relations), beliefs or motivations of
groups, resources and constraints etc. In the combination phase the team combines
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knowledge models to create higher level explanations. It is also important for the team
to structure knowledge that forms the basis of their hypothesis to gain evidence in
support of various assertions. In the end, the combination process should yield rec-
ommended courses of action for BFOR in order to avoid or suppress the threat im-
posed by warlords.
- Internalization
In this phase, models created by the group are refined through internal discussions, but
also as a result of team members discussing various matters with colleagues within
their own area of expertise. The activity results in models that are considered valid and
valuable enough for continued exploration and refinement. After this phase the team
once again enters the socialization phase. However, in this iteration the team discusses
how to improve models produced earlier, and how to incorporate or react to changes
in the real world.
This provided a theoretical background of KM and the following parts will examine the dif-
ferent sub-components.
6.2.5 IT System Management

In order to make the KS Concept work a set of requirements on the underlying IT-architecture
has been devised. Those requirements focus on the nature and flow of information objects in
the IT-platform and make sure that information is integrated between processes without any
“stove piping”. IT-system management is vital to enable or facilitate all the work being done
in the different processes of KS in particular but in other EBAO-processes in general.
In order to quickly be able to respond to changing requirements IT-system management

should be closely linked to the KM process. The KM process then becomes the translator be-
tween operational demands from the HQ and the IT-staff that will manage the day-to-day op-
erations of the systems.
The reason for this approach is because the bridge between business and IT generally is too
wide today and the IT-organisation has a tendency to be caught in their own processes with
little resources to innovate. Instead optimizations is focused on the daily maintenance of the
systems only-
6.2.6 Information Management

A key element of KM is Information Management (IM), which has an especially significant
role in the administrative functions of KS. IM is both a strategy, driven by customer needs,
and an infrastructure, shaped by technology, for handling and distributing information. IM
crosses disciplinary and administrative boundaries.
IM introduces the required consistent and systematic approach to managing all information
assets, regardless of the medium in which they are held, throughout their entire life cycle. The
vision is to have an integrated repository of information assets, including an integrated ap-
proach to metadata management within the experiment that encompasses the following sys-
tems:
• Web content management (CM)
• Document management (DM)
• Records management with retention policies (RM)
• Digital asset management of images, audio and video(DAM)
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• Learning management systems possibly implementing SCORM (LM)

• Collaboration in a wide sense integrated in the repository
• Enterprise-wide federated search which provides multiple representation of the same
content..
• Business Processing Management (human workflows) around content
• Transformation Services to combine and change format on content
The approaches above can be summarized as Enterprise Content Management (ECM).
6.2.7 The need for an Information architecture

KM has a unique facilitating role to enable all staff members to both use and reuse the avail-
able data and information. It is vital that representatives from IT-system management, Infor-
mation Management and people in charge of process development in various staff elements to
work interactively. Technology is no black-box which solves any problems; instead the criti-
cal factor will be to expose information flows, information objects and processes. That is
something that only representatives from the actual end users can do. Their input is vital to
configure the systems.
However, these problems can initially look like they are technical problems because a particu-
lar software platform highlights questions about the way the organization works. That means
that the information architecture and the configuration will in fact be some kind of formalized
digital rules or descriptions of how people are working today or how we want them to work.
Sometimes it is perceived that technology requires people to change the way the work but that
is sometimes just an effect of decisions (hopefully improvements) that have been done in the
design and configuration phases.
In the end the questions that need to be asked are the following:
• What kind of digital content do we have?

• How (in what format) do we want to store it?
• Where do we want to stored it?
• What do we want to do with it in our processes?
Applying that on an order makes us first define what an order actual is, what kind of orders
there are and what an order actually consists of. That will most likely render a lot of questions
about how these pieces of an order actually relates to other objects like for instance military
units that have received a task in the order.
When we have figured out what an order actually consists of we need to give some thought on
how we want to package this or represent it. Is it a freeform document in Word, several
documents where each represent a chapter, an special order application where each field is
stored in a database or maybe just a visual representation on a map. All these are options
which later on will dictate what we can do with the information.
The where part discusses whether we want to store stuff on a shared file server, a document
management system or in a database management system. Each has different advantages and
disadvantages that need a conscious decision. The where part also have a geographical aspect
in our distributed world. That means that advanced caching of information between different
locations is vital to ensure integrity in the system and also to avoid unnecessary long delays
for end users in accessing information.
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Finally, we must figure out what we want to do with it for instance how it is developed and
how we would like several people to be able to work with.
The information architecture therefore needs to represent the Standard Operating Procedures.
A sound information architecture will make it possible to do smart things with the information
we have in various systems. One thing is for sure and that we will not find one Silver Bullet –
one perfect system. Rather we will have to integrate the different systems we have with an
information architecture as our overall map. That way we will minimize creating stovepipes
with duplicate information for every single function in the HQ.
6.2.7.1 A collaborative vision that is possible today

It is also really important to stress the integration from a user or task perspective. The user
should be able to user the same username and password (better yet – just a smart card) in all
applications. Presence information (available, at lunch etc) should be integrated wherever the
user’s name is displayed. Search should be federated to include all existing storage of data
and the system must never force the user to manually create a new copy just to use it in a new
context. 16 The calendar containing meeting information should include references to the rele-
vant document (not a second copy), the meeting room should be able to be preloaded with the
documents from the event (not creating a third copy). The result from the meeting should be
saved as a new version back to the document management system and all recordings associ-
ated with it should be stored with links to the documents that was discussed in the meeting.
Integration IS the key to success in information management. All the pieces of technology are
out there, we just need to put some of them together now. 17 With an approach like this we
can truly create a Collaborative Information Environment (CIE).
6.2.8 Taxonomies / Ontologies 18 Management

One of the core requirements of the KS concept is that all data and information must be pos-
sible to relate to different structures, such as Taxonomies etc. Such structures, including Se-
mantic structures, are to be seen as different parallel structures, to which any information ob-
ject may be related. By relating it to the object it becomes part of each object’s set of meta-
data.
The management of these models is a KM task, even though most of the suggestions for
change will come from other processes, mainly KI and KP. The structures must be adapted to
the needs that are identified in the Coalition as the operation evolves.
There is a need for an interactive dialogue between KM and relevant staff elements to con-
tinuously capture new requirements to improve existing structures and establishment of new
main structures that provide even more perspectives on each object. These changes must be
synchronized with other guidance documents for the HQ such as Standard Operating Proce-
dures (SOP) and Tool, Techniques and Practices (TTP).
16
A formal review process using email between two people usually creates 8 different copies of a file for each
turn. Email is therefore usually not a good way to collaborate.
17
See 2.4.11 for further tech requirements from a KI perspective.
18
The word ontology refers here to structures expressed in the W3 standard Web Ontology Language (OWL)
which is one of the building blocks for the semantic web approach.
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KM has the overall responsibility for the change and lifecycle management of taxonomies and
ontologies.
6.2.9 Metadata model management

The Metadata model is a chosen set of ”Tags” that are available to set on each information
object (e.g. document). The utilisation of Metadata gives very powerful means to find & filter
information in the system, but the amount of metadata must be kept to a level where the users
still are able to fill it out. A preferred way it to implement a search-engine to come up with a
suggestion to metadata values from the actual content, giving the user the task to “just” mod-
ify the suggestion before saving. The amount of mandatory metadata must be kept to a mini-
mum.
In the same way as Taxonomies and other “soft” structures, the Metadata model must be
maintained and adapted to the current operational needs.
KM must have a method for developing, deciding and keeping track of the changes to the
changes in the different available “tags” in the model.
6.2.10 Human Resource Management

All people bring their skills and experiences to the MNKB and keeping track of the knowl-
edge that they represent is a key factor to ensure that the commander and his staff continu-
ously get the best advice in the decision-making process. The aim is not only to be able to
utilize the knowledge of all current members of the staff but also be able to plan ahead so that
key people with experiences and skills are available in the different phases of the operation.
Human Resource Management (HRM) within KM is the process responsible for continuously
keep track on people in the staff and make sure that their skill sets and experiences are docu-
mented.
HRM is also a key player in assisting the KA activity to connect Subject Matter Experts
(SME) and Centers of Excellence (COE) so that their knowledge can be used in the EBAO
processes. All SMEs and COEs that have a formal arrangement with the coalition HQ or have
been explicitly made available by contributing nations are considered a part of the MNKB and
need to be administered by HRM.
Human Resources = Staff members in HQ + SME and COE with formal agreements
It is impossible to represent all knowledge that people possess in IT-systems. However, it is

vital that staff members in need for knowledge have access to some kind of expert location
system. That system will contain a database of all staff members, SMEs, COEs and a repre-
sentation of their education, training, experiences and skill sets. The use of this kind of digital
CV makes it possible to continuously provide staff members’ recommendations about whom
to contact regarding various matters. These recommendations need to displayed with the dif-
ferent within different software applications that are in use in the HQ.
6.2.11 Plans and Policy

The KM Plans and Policy process is responsible for the KM Plan. The aim of a KM plan is to
establish the KM processes, responsibilities and interrelationships within the EBAO staff and
supporting organisations to provide and maintain a knowledge-enabled environment so as to
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achieve the Commanders operational objectives. The KM Plan is always specific to a certain
organisation, event (experiment or operation) and its context. The KM plan will identify the
functional requirements for applied technologies.
Plans and Policy is also responsible for the KM Business Rules (KM BRs), these rules are
detailed instructions to be followed by the EBAO staff in order to achieve the objectives out-
lined in the KM Plan. The KM BRs is to be implemented in the general Standing Operating
Procedures (SOP) for the EBAO Staff. The KM Staff have responsibility to monitor compli-
ance as well as continuously providing guidance and advice on how to implement them.
The standard set of business practices are organized into four categories that follow the in-
formation lifecycle of documents and records:
• Creation, Collection and Receipt
• Organization, Transmission, Use and Retrieval
• Storage and Protection
• Retention and Disposition.
The KS team will provide assistance or guidance as required to ensure these practices are un-
derstood and upheld.
This approach unites multiple types of information, the applications that gather and store it,
and the people both inside and outside the Coalition “walls” who must be linked to the infor-
mation and to each other.
6.2.12 How KM efforts contribute to the (in)ability to find information
Figure 2. Negative effects due to inability to find information and a balancing loop to illustrate
measures to improve the situation.
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Figure 2 illustrates how the ability to find needed information decreases the quality of the
products to the decision-makers because a lot of information that is already available is not
utilized in the analytical process. It will also decrease the overall satisfaction of the KS ena-
bling services which in turn will decrease the trust in the Knowledge Support process to actu-
ally deliver usable products to the decision-makers. Further on that will most likely decrease
the average staff members’ willingness to invest time in tools and knowledge management
procedures which will contribute to increasing the digital information chaos. By providing
structured and accessible information by implementing a relevant tech platform together with
dedicated staff they will contribute to increase the ability to find the needed information and
thereby closing the gap between the actual state of chaos and the desired state of having struc-
tured and accessible information.
On the other hand if users experience good “findability” it possibly the best incentive to sup-
port information management measures. Acceptance for the need of these measures will in-
crease the adherence to Business Rules in the information management domain which will
improve the way people tag, share and relate content. Everybody must be encouraged to do
their little part because they will have the best input of the context of a particular piece of con-
tent. Better tagging, relating and sharing of content improves the performance and effective-
ness of various automatic and semi-automatic measures to index, de-duplicate, classify and
cluster information. These measures support the activity being done by knowledge integration
staff because they will get more notifications and “feel” for the content if it both have struc-
ture from the end users and the results from the automatic and semi-automatic processing on
top of that. That will then support the evolution of advanced queries both to monitor the de-
velopment of the repository but also an ability to create queries that correspond to what dif-
ferent users need in their line of work. The availability of these queries and the structure in
itself supports the creation and development of smart and intuitive user interfaces where end
users can access the information “sliced” in they way that they want.
6.2.13 Knowledge Support Liaison Officer (KSLO)

The KS team will provide assistance or guidance by the Knowledge Support Liaison Officer
as required to ensure these practices are understood and upheld in the EBAO staff. These will
be a representative of the whole KS-process but their tasks will be focused on implementing
KM Business Rules, provide first level knowledge integration and assist users to initiate
Knowledge Requests.
Another vital role for the KS LO is to assist staff members to get access to analysts, Subject
Matter Experts and other people.
6.2.14 Security
There are several aspects of security that must be kept in mind.
Some of them are:
- Information security levels, criteria & methods for marking documents.
- Information sharing policy (i.e. to the outside of the Coalition) including the rules for in-
formation disclosure.
- Information assurance rules & methods.
All these aspects must be adapted to the fused set of format requirements that appears when
standing up the Coalition. They will mostly be pushed by different national legislations etc.
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6.2.15 Roles for different parts of the KM/KI processes
Each part in the KM process has different roles to bridge the gap between development of
staff processes and their implementation in information technology.
KM subprocess Output Responsibility

Knowledge Manage- Work process descriptions Coordinate development of
ment Functional requirements on human processes and monitor
IT compliance.
Information Manage- Detailed technical specifica- Coordinate the technical re-
ment tions quirements of the IT-platform.
Configuration descriptions Process-oriented configuration
(roles, workflows, groups)
IT Management Implementation of technical Installation, software devel-
specifications opment, technical –oriented
Technical level configuration configuration and mainte-
descriptions nance.
Information Integra- Metadata, transformations, Use KM/IM rules to work on
tion translations, relationships the actual content within the
and input to IM/KM IT-platform.
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6.3 Knowledge Integration (KI)
One of the components of the Swedish Knowledge Support (KS) Concept is Knowledge Inte-
gration (KI). This is a description of what KI is and how it fits together with the other compo-
nents of the KS Concept.
6.3.1 Assumption
A basic assumption for the Swedish KS concept is that the amount of information we need to
handle is increasing all the time and that we will need the support of Information Technology
to manage it. In order to achieve an effective use of all that content we also need specially
trained people and tailored methods to make sure that our content is handled in a way that
supports the analytical process in creating relevant products for the decision-maker.
6.3.2 The role of KI

The library has for long been a key component in scientific research and scientist has for long
relied on librarians to not only structure all content that arrives at the library but also provide
guidance on how to find it. However, books and reports usually exists in a limited number of
copies which limits our possibility of provide alternate and customized organisation of them.
However, modern technology allows us to do just that. Digital content can have lots of meta-
data associated with them to facilitate many different views or ways of organising the very
same content.
The concept of KI is created to make sure that someone have the responsibility of sound han-
dling or maintenance of the digital content available to a military headquarter. However, it is
important to stress that KI is foremost an enabling activity in support of the analytical proc-
esses within the Knowledge Production function. Just as the librarian needs to look at the con-
tent of a book to know where to put it, the Knowledge Integrator needs to examine the digital
content in order to know how it should be tagged, related and stored in the digital repository.
KI is not an analytical process; it is an enabling process that supports analysis.

It deals only with structure; it does not deal with content. The process adds and modifies
the structure, but does not add content.
The KI process aims to provide pre-processing of data and information when it is imported or
created in the repository. The goal of this pre-processing is the make the information available
to analysts as well as other staff members for further utilization. KI deals differently with each
piece of content but will mainly provide a way to implement the structure that the Knowledge
Management (KM) function have decided on. KI will however continuously provide input to
the KM function on how to make changes in the business rules which guides the flow and use
of information among the staff members.
6.3.3 Format adaptation

One of these pre-processing activities deals with format adaptation and transformation. That
means that KI staff needs to be a little bit more skilled than the average user when it comes to
understanding pros and cons of different file formats. These transformations can include
scanning a paper document to PDF, converting Word-documents to PDF as well as compress-
ing sound and video to formats suitable for viewing by the end users. The intention is that the
majority of these tasks can be handled but automated server-based services but their configu-
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ration need to be adapted to suit the actual work processes of the staff. The remaining conver-
sion tasks need to be handled manually by KI staff. This may sound as yet another IT-related
task but in reality a coordinated strategy for formats is vital to ensure that content created by
users can be reused in different contexts such as desktop applications, search engines or vir-
tual online meeting rooms in collaboration activities.
6.3.4 Classification
The classification requires decision on how to “tag” the information in different aspects.
Some are reliability of the facts, credibility of the source, functional & process-step connec-
tions etc. This classification results are stored as metadata on the information.
The last step of classification is to import the new information into the CIE or update new
info that is created on the inside. At the point the new information will be accessible by the
users at its current level of quality.
The first level of classification is to be done by the staff members but that effort will some-
times lead to a need to supplement this in a second review. The existence of correct metadata
is important to facilitate reuse of information. KI process has a vital task to continuously
monitor metadata on objects and if necessary add or change these. If needed these changes
and additions should be done in a dialogue with the staff member.
6.3.5 Content splitting

Today many documents that are in use contains hundreds or pages or slides and they are in a
sense compilations of different kind of subject areas and then packaged in a report or briefing
format. One vital aspect of KI is to implement guidelines from KM when it comes to content
splitting. That means actually breaking documents down into smaller pieces and thereby be
able to tag and relate each individual piece more accurately. To what degree this is possibly
varies a lot depending on various circumstances.
However, by splitting a large PowerPoint presentation such a Commander’s update into indi-
vidual objects based on subject opens up for individual version control and tagging on each
group of slides. These slides can than manually or semi-automatically be grouped together in
various products where one is the Commander’s update briefing.
The method for this is to create what is known as virtual documents for each different product
and when the deadline for contribution has arrived each contributing staff element will do a
check-in of their respective part of virtual document into the repository and the server-side
transformation engine will combine the individual pieces into a presentation. This will ensure
that each piece of the presentation is tracable back to the version of the individual staff ele-
ments contribution as well as open up for reuse of those pieces in other briefing formats.
The same method can be applied on PDF-reports and presentations that have been ingested
from the internet and other sources which improves reusability and traceability in the analyti-
cal process of KP.
6.3.6 Objectifying
Objectification in this context means to extract “information elements” at the lowest chosen
resolution. The “minimum size” of objects must be chosen based on the requirements of the
operation.
Usually, this is some of the typical objects:
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- Organization
- Person
- Facility
- Equipment
- Location
- Event
- State (object that transition btw different states, e.g. security, profit etc)
But others may me more appropriate to the specific implementation.
In the “pipeline” of KI, objectification is one step, where KI actually may create new objects
(relating them to the original document), for every relevant object that is found.
To keep the objects consistent, there is a need to continuously monitor the sum of objects of
different kind, avoiding creating parallel objects with e.g. different spelling of the name.
6.3.7 Relationships between information objects

Another important task for KI is identify and create relations between different pieces of data
and information. The idea behind that is to be able to provide another level of structure on top
of the pieces of data and information in the digital repository. Still, this is not a analytical
process with the intention of providing products to use in the decision-making process. It is
merely a way to relate different content such as reports, summaries, sensor data and multime-
dia to each other. These relations will indicate that different pieces likely to contain similar
information or even duplicates as well as highlighting contradictories. The creation of these
relations between pieces of content does not change that actual content itself, it is just provid-
ing a “map” with linkages within the digital repository. If it was an old library think of it as it
was thing red threads between books that have some kind of relationship between them. An-
other benefit of creating these relations it that it allows us to drive a visualisation tool to
automatically (by means of pre-defined queries) create the different thematic, temportal or
geographic views the information in the repository. Depending on the level of “zooming” the
user can look upon the overall structure of the repository as well as drilling down to individ-
ual pieces of content.
The main advantage to do the relations directly on the information objects is that they will
follow the information in its lifecycle in the CIE, independent of who is using the piece of
content or in what context it is used. One other advantage is that the KI process continuously
also updates the context (not the content itself) of relevant objects used as nodes in social
network analysis or influence diagrams.
There are some specific types of relations between objects or documents that the KI-functions
are tasked to locate & document.
- Duplicates, exactly the same content (preferably handled automatically)

- Different Format, same content, different format.
- Possible duplicate, deals with approx the same content, but requires further analysis.
- Different language, same content in different languages.
- Contradictory, the content has different opinions on the facts.
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The difference between tagging and relating.
6.3.8 Information disparity detection

The highest level of KI is to trace back from a newly related object to all other information
that it is related to. This will create an overall view of the description of the object. If the
newly related information contains discrepancies to the previous know information, an analy-
sis of the credibility of the different information objects must be done. In some cases it will be
possible to identify an update of the previous information, and that must be reflected by
changing the classification on the different objects. In the cases where the ambiguity remains,
and the information is part of a prioritised KR, a new KR is filed.
6.3.9 Visualization
It is important that the outputs from KI are not fixed and static products but rather query-
driven reports that represent virtual layers linking pieces in the multinational repository to-
gether. It is important to provide both text-based as well as graphical representations of the
content in the repository.
One example of such a layer is the information map (Info-map) which indicates the location
(virtual and physical) of different pieces of knowledge. Another layer is called information
index (Info-index) which indicates what is available in the repository. However, these are just
examples and it is very important to always be open to the need for new views based on dif-
ferent concept for organizing and categorizing information.
When combining the info-index with the information of all staff and external SMEs con-
nected to the operational HQ it will create a Knowledge Index (K-Index) that will provide
some basic representation of the sum of all knowledge available.
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Similarly the Knowledge Map K-Map will provide some representation on where (virtual and
physical) different pieces of content and knowledgeable people are located.
6.3.10 The KI Pipeline
This is an example of the “Pipeline” describing the steps (some of which are automatic) that
every new piece of information goes through in the KI process:
Notification Group-level “inbox” and reporting to be

able to monitor changes in the repository
Format identification Assign metadata attribute “file format”
Duplicate Detection Using either manual or automatic means
to identify exact duplicates as well as the
degree of similarity between content ob-
jects
Format Conversion Format change from one file format to
another. Manual or automatic measure
Language Identification Manual or automatic means to identify the
language used in text, images, sound or
video
Translation Manual or automatic translation between
different languages
Grammatical Analysis Identifications of the grammatical compo-
nents in sentences like nouns, verbs and
adjectives.
Stemming Normalising words by removing suffixes
(cars become car)
Lemmatization Normalising words which have non-
regular modifications (women becomes
woman)
Clustering Grouping content together based on simi-
larity.
Entity extraction Extracting definied entities such as peo-
ple, locations, events etc from text
Classification Classifying content to one or several cate-
gories.
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6.3.11 Technology requirements
Executing KI will create different kinds of technical requirements on both how data and in-
formation must be stored but also on different kind of advanced search and information dis-
covery tools that can be configured to assist KI.
One of these requirements is a configurable monitoring technology to be able to configure a

reasonable threshold when KI staff should be notified that there is a need for integration. This
needs to be done both as a push-based notification technology but also using advanced report-
ing services to “mine” the changes in the repository, and also the activity log from each user.
Since we most likely will only have a limited number of people available for KI tasks we will
have to rely on semi-automatic or automatic tools for duplicate detection, classification, clus-
tering, monitoring and searching.
These tools are neither magic black boxes nor silver bullets to solve the tasks in the KI proc-
ess. They are often based on advanced scientific research and we need to understand their
merits and their limitations in order to utilize them in a way that supports KI. In fact, the suc-
cess of KI will most likely be dependent on their ability to configure these systems and con-
tinuously apply changes to these configuration based on the current task or objective for the
overall headquarter.
The importance however, is that these integration tasks are possible today with commercial
enterprise applications. These applications or platforms enable an architecture where it is pos-
sible to store all these meta-data added by KI. The manual integration will most likely need to
be focused on areas and subjects in the repository which is most relevant for current and fu-
ture operations. Those priorities will be handled by the KRM process so that each sub-process
within the KS concept can contribute their specific piece in order to facilitate the analytical
process in KP. Remaining content in the repository can to varying degree be integrated by
using of automatic measures which will provide added value to users as they are and also
serve as a foundation for manual integration later on when priorities can have changed to
some other subject area. Keeping track of what part of the overall repository has been proc-
essed through integration is one indicator of the current status of the repository.
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6.4 Knowledge Request Management (KRM)
6.4.1 Background
The KRM process originates from the work done within the MNE-community but it is influ-
enced by established practices within the military intelligence domain. It is inspired from both
the NATO Collection Coordination Intelligence Request Management (CCIRM) process as
well as the national Swedish intelligence management process.
The basic purpose of this process is to handle planning and prioritizations between incoming
knowledge requests (KR) and limited resources for collection, analysis and dissemination.
The KRM-process is owned by managers who have a defined mandate on how they can
command their own processing resources (within their department) and how to participate in
the decision-making process on how to use military collection assets such as army units, navy
ships and air force aircraft. Since the number of collection assets always is finite there will
always be a need to prioritize on how to use each and every one of them over time.
This process is meant to be used in a operational level headquarters such as a Combined Joint
Task Force Headquarters (CJTF HQ) and applying to all lower echelons..
6.4.2 Purpose and aim

The KRM establishes a mechanism to access and generate new information and knowledge,
which does not currently exist in the Knowledge Base.
The KRM meets knowledge gaps and shortfalls of all EBAO staff personnel and must there-
fore include any kind of aggregation level independent if it is data, information or knowledge.
The KRM has the mandate to prioritize in the total available knowledge production capabili-
ties and to be able to respond to the highest prioritized KRs.
KRM has a management and coordinating role in the overall KS process.
6.4.3 Input and guidance to KRM

Since both the KS process and the KRM process is a supporting process the connection to
other processes in the HQ is vital. Since KRM is a coordination process for all KS activities
and processes there is a need to make sure that this coordination always done in way that sup-
port the current and future direction of the overall operation. Therefore the KRM process uses
several inputs to its own process:
• Commander´s intent
• Present and future CCIRs (Commander’s Criticial Information Requirement)
• Strategic guidance
• Other relevant outcomes from mission analysis, plans or orders.
That means that all prioritization efforts in the KRM process must have a link to the inputs
listed above. A common way will be to connect each prioritized KR to an active or projected
future CCIR (i.e. from a Plan).
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6.4.4 The Knowledge Request

A KR is a formal expression of a need for specific knowledge to be used within the opera-
tional level HQ. A KR is only created when both the staff member and the Knowledge Sup-
port Liaison Officer to the best of their abilities have decided that what they need is not cur-
rently available.
The KR needs to be expressed in specific format in order to be able to process it effectively

through the KRM process. That means that there is a requirement of a certain number of at-
tributes or fields which represent important pieces of information.
The KR must contain at least the following attributes to be considered valid:

- Name (User id etc) of the Requester
- Means of contacting the originator (Phone#, e-mail, etc)
- Description (specific) of the knowledge/info required
- Time the request vas posted
- LTIOV (Latest Time Information of Value)
It may also state:

- Requirements on the resulting product / answer (format)
- Highest classification level of the result (allowed)
In the end the most important field is of course the actual question (or hypothesis to be
tested). As stated before these questions/hypothesis can be formulated on all levels of aggre-
gation ranging from simple and concrete questions like “how many vehicles passes through
checkpoint A each day?” to very general ones like “Are the different factions upholding the
peace agreement?”.
6.4.5 Steps in the KRM process
• KR initiation
• Distribution (preferably through a workflow engine instead of email) of KR:s within
the KR organization
• Validate that incoming KR:s are written and expressed in a proper format. (Good
questions renders good answers)
• Compare KRs against existing information in the repository through advanced
search to make sure the information is not existing already
• Break valid KRs down into smaller answerable pieces that can be matched to col-
lection resources
• Merge similar KR into a fused one to be used in further work. Tracability from origi-
nating KR:s must be retained.
• Match KR:s to a collection source
• Prioritize KR based on Commander’s guidance
• Identify resource conflicts and nominate them to a higher decision-making process in
the EBP/EBE-process.
• Task collection, processing and dissemination assets.
• Monitor the progress in each subprocess
• Monitor that integration will be performed on both raw results from collection as
well as the finished products
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• Continuously keep a dialogue with the staff member in need for knowledge and close
the KR when staff member is satisfied with the outcome.
In order to do that the KRM process must be able to:

• Visualize and manage KRs and sub-KRs in relation to its own internal processing
staff over time (allocation of analysts to one or several KR:s)
• Visualize and manages KRs and sub-KRs in relation to available collection sources
over time.
• Visualize status of collection resources (type of collection available, general avail-
ability, geographical location) and analytical staff over time (occupied, off-duty and so
on)
• Measure the time each step in the process takes as a tool for optimization and internal
resource allocation
• Ensure that content objects (reports, images, videos) in the repository which is rele-
vant to each KR are connected to the KR object during the refinement process.
6.4.6 KR Breakdown
Just as it is important in scientific research to phrase the question carefully it is equally impor-
tant to phrase KRs in a consistent way. However, the time-sensitive nature of military opera-
tions and the varying backgrounds of staff members impractical to demand that from each and
every staff member. Instead the ambition is to create an open environment where users are
encouraged to document their needs to various knowledge producers.
The KSLO in each staff element provides the first level of assistance in phrasing good KRs.
After the KR has been initiated it needs to pass through a second level of scrutiny where
KRM staff examines each KR with regard for format and phrasing. If the question posed is
too generic the KRM staff will either on their own or in a dialogue with the closest KS LOE
perform a breakdown to facilitate further processing. The purpose of this is to make sure that
the purpose and perspective needed is documented in enough detail to enable good tasking
and relevant analytical products.
An example from the ficticious scenario Bogaland on of how KR:s are broken down into
more specialized requests:
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• Will MIDA Liberation Forces conduct an armed coup d´etat in Bogaland? (KR Level
1)
o Are there indications of political will to do a coup d’état? (KR Level 2)
o Is the force ratio between MIDA Liberation Forces and Bogaland suitable for a
coup d´etat? (KR Level 2)
o Are the number of weapon transports increasing in Bogaland? (KR Level 2)
Similar
KR:s to be
Are MIDA Liberation Forces planning to attack X-town? merged
o Establishment of weapon storage facilities in Bogaland? (KR Level 2)
o Observations of MIDA forces around X-town? (KR Level 2)
Observation of increased radio traffic around X-town? (KR Level 3)
Observations of increased number of ground forces around X-town (KR
Level 3)
Observations of increasing number of air movements around X-town air-
port?town? (KR Level 3)
The arrows in the right margin above indicates sub-KR:s which are similar in content and
will most likely be merged in the final step before tasking. Merging in this case means creat-
ing a new KR with references back to the original two KR:s. Those references can possibly be
made using relationships.
The merged KR would look something like this:
Are there observations of increased activity in supplying MIDA Liberation Forces with weap-
ons in Bogaland?
Or like this:
Are there observations on increased activity around weapon storage facilities in Bogaland?
After the originating KR is broken down as many levels as desired in order to meet the re-
quirments of the staff member the sum of all KR:s need to be compared to see if any of them
can be merged. The reason for that is to be able to optimize the continued process. The hy-
pothesis is that merging KR and a preliminary assignment to resources can be done interac-
tively to facitilate an optimal use of current and future resources. Here it is vital to stress that
the assignment is not only limited to collection resources but also analytical resources for
processing and dissemination resources. Often the amount of analyst’s is just as limited as the
availability of sources.
The process of splitting, merging and resource assignment can be illustrated like this:
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KR prel.
Breakdown Similar KRs assinged to
into sub-KRs are merged own resources
KR
KR KR Resource
KR
KR
KR
KR
KR
Resource
KR KR
KR KR
6.4.7 Collection Management

This activity with the KRM-process is responsible for keeping track of the current and pro-
jected status of currently available sources provided from the Knowledge Acquisition (KA)
activity. Based on the prioritizations coming out from other parts of this process the necessary
tasking to the sources will be carried out. This tasking includes everything from collection
orders (to military units) to requests directed to SME:s and COE:s which there is a formal
agreement with.
The aim of the activity is to keep track on the workload of available sources over time and be
able to plan collection in order to provide enough data to the Knowledge Production process
over time.
Another vital activity for the collection management is to continuously provide information to
the KRM lead when there is a lack of available resources and where there is a conflict be-
tween existing tasks given to the unit and the need for collection. These issues will continu-
ously be lifted for decision on a higher level outside the KS process for instance in a Joint
Coordination Board (JCB) or Daily Asseets Reconnaissance Board (DARB).
The CCIRM process from the Intel community must be either integrated into KRM or at least
a closely connected sub-process, sharing the same set of KR:s.
The responsibility ends when the result from each respective source has been delivered to the
analysts in the KP process.
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6.4.8 KR Monitoring
There needs to be a monitoring function that gives an overview of all KR:s in the CIE, with
the possibility to view at least:
- The total number of KRs, including information required, LTIOV and to whom it is as-
signed
- Status (initiated, in progress, finished, archived)
- Soon to be- and currently overdue KRs
6.4.9 KRM process
6.4.10 Examples of roles in the KRM-process

Based on the process diagram above a few roles and a brief description of their task can be
made:
Staff/End User
• Searches for information in the multinational repository or uses the expert location ser-
vices to find relevant staff members or SME:s.
• Sends questions to the KS LO.
• Searches for an existing KR and associated content.
• Register personal contacts which are potential sources or SME:s
KSLO
• Assists user in searching for information in the repository
• Assissts user in phrasing KR:s
• Initiates a new KR
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KI Staff
• Performs “supersearch” in databases
• Integrates finished product
KRM Staff
• Manages the KRM-process.
• Initiates a new KR if need arises
• Modifies existing KR.
• Merges similar KRs
• Reinitiates a finished KR to update the answer.
• Reprioritizes a KR.
• Manages available resources, between different levels.
KP Staff (Collection, processing or dissemination resource)

• Performs the Collection, Analysis and Dissemination.
• A resource who requires additional information from another resource, for example a sub-
ject matter expert, can create a sub-KR and add it to an existing KR.
• Changes status and deadline for an assigned task.
• A resource unavailable to answer a specific KR can notify the level above to reschedule
the KR to another resource.
6.4.11 Technical requirements from the KRM-process
The IT-architecture must support complete traceability throughout these steps. It must also
support detailed monitoring of user actions within each step. The hypothesis is that this can be
realized using commercial Business Processing Management (BPM) software which focuses
of so-called human-oriented workflows.
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6.5 Knowledge Acquisition (KA)
While KRM primarily focuses on planning and monitoring the use of available resource the
purpose of Knowledge Acquisition (KA) activity is to perform the long term or steady state
input to the multinational repository. The KA sub activity will ensure that the identification
and connection of possible new sources match identified knowledge shortfalls or gaps.
KA has the overall responsibility of planning, acquiring and monitoring all standing require-
ments for data and information ingest from external (relative to the operational HQ) sources.
The aim is to make sure that we over time have access to the right kind of data and informa-
tion over time. All this planning is just as everything else based on the overall guidance given
by the Commander and the different tasks that are given to the HQ. Also, it is vital to create
an interactive dialogue with analysts in the KP-process as well as other end users to get the
detailed requirements for data and information.
Even though a main part of KA will be supplying the HQ with all the basic data and informa-
tion needed over time it will also have a crucial part in getting access to people with the right
knowledge. Therefore negotiations between key partners will be an important activity to fa-
cilitate the development of a sound relationship between the staff and key suppliers of data,
information and knowledge in the form of SME:s and COE:s.
In order to do this the KS-function need to have mandate to initiate these kind of contacts and
also have budget to work out payment deals. It could either be to acquire data from various
commercial data sources like news streams or or subscriptions to important websites. To-
gether with the HR department it will also include the establishments of formal contracts with
with key experts on various subjects.
Examples of KA-inflow:
• Subscriptions to newspapers, magazines and books
• Broadcast media (TV, satellite and radio)
• Digital capture of open source information on the internet (including subscriptions to
commercial services)
• Regular database updates of unclassified and classified information from Armed
Forces and other government agencies (geographic information, intelligence data,
weather etc.)
• SME:s from a university or organization.
Another important part to make this happen is to assist KM and end users in registering their
own personal contacts in order to ensure a reasonable use of that information. The reason for
that is to coordinate the utilization of available resources in a responsible manner. Otherwise
there is a risk that the operational staff could overuse a particular expert with the risk of losing
the cooperation of that individual or institution. The approach here is a lot like the one down
in Customer Relationship Management (KRM) where the ambition is to make sure that each
SME is neither forgotten nor overused.
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6.6 Knowledge Production (KP)

There are two fundamental dimensions of definitions of knowledge: one concerning the locus
of knowledge, and the second concerning the relation between the concepts of knowledge and
truth.
First, the distinction between data, information and knowledge emphasizes the use of infor-
mation to make it qualify as knowledge: i.e. a cognitive view of knowledge. Emphasizing the
role of the system for cognition may lead to a systemic view of knowledge: as the flow of in-
formation, action and interaction between parts of the system and the environment (c.f. Black-
ler, 1995; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Flood, 1999; Hutchins, 1995). However, it is perfectly
possible to think of the whole system as producing knowledge, while maintaining that only
humans come to know the results, in some completely ordinary (i.e. cognitive) sense of know-
ing (Giere and Moffat, 2003).
Second, the interest in knowledge is related to its usefulness. In a highly lawful world, this
usefulness is associated with the predictive power of beliefs. In an unpredictable world of
human innovativeness, it should rather be associated with a capacity for coping with the
world in real-time (c.f. Senge et al, 2005). Here, contradictory experience of human behaviour
amounts to a methodological paradox: while humans are potentially innovative and thus in-
herently unpredictable, human behaviour is often subjectively predictable in practice. How-
ever, although usually practical for planning in the face of uncertainty, predictions about hu-
mans are inherently uncertain. Consequently, in terms of theory of truth, the Swedish KS-
concept adheres to a pragmatic view, emphasizing the practical usefulness of beliefs for cop-
ing with the world, rather than the use of method to reach any abstract, eternal truth. Hence,
the KS-concept shows openness to multiple methods and epistemologies, all aiming at in-
forming troops for intelligent behaviour in the face of remaining uncertainties.
Concretely, KP here refers to the governing and facilitation of all different activities that cre-
ates or in any way adds new knowledge into the Knowledge Base, consisting of humans and
their artefacts (e.g. pictures and documents). A cognitive notion of knowledge emphasizes the
creation of beliefs situated in people’s body and minds, although also manifested in artefacts.
With a systemic notion of knowledge, KP rather refers to the establishment of relations and
flows of interaction between actors, artefacts and other environmental influences on the sys-
tem creating new knowledge, hence also related to the KM-process.
In either case, the issue of truth should be judged out of the usefulness of knowledge, rather
than by its means of production. Hence, out of a pragmatic perspective, rigorous method
should not be understood as a guarantee for truth, but as a means for allowing transparency
encouraging dialogue around assumptions, analysis and conclusions reached. While a cogni-
tive notion of knowledge focuses its interests on the end product, a systemic view of knowl-
edge rather emphasizes the dialogue around it. However, both views acknowledge the need
for KP-process to inform decision-making throughout the organization. In a world of continu-
ous change and innovation, any conclusion will have to be continuously revised in the light of
new observations and insights. In consequence, the overall methodological approach will be
one of establishing systems of distributed abduction (Weick, 2006).
6.6.1 Analytical methods: steps of knowledge production
6.6.1.1 Problem setting: the first and most critical phase

The very first phase preceding analysis is the most critical one: the non-technical task of
problem setting by which the very character of a situation is framed and problems are formu-
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lated (c.f. Schön, 1983). Setting the problem for analysis will benefit from the involvement of
many different kinds of expertise and different theoretical traditions to negotiate the very
character of the situation in order to secure multidimensional analysis, resisting single-
minded or reductionist approaches to multifaceted realities. The most important thing is to
become aware about what choices are made: what is included and not in the very definition of
the situation and the problems analyzed.
The matter of framing and problem setting is as critical in formalized staff analysis as it is for
any other member of the organization. By setting the problem, we frame the situation, thus
also setting the cognitive and practical filters for the – due to limited human capacity for at-
tention – inherently selective attention and hence defining the limits of rationality of deci-
sions. This is a main reason also for appreciating the role of diversity of professional exper-
tise, different foci of different levels of command, discrepancies between the formal and in-
formal organization and the usefulness of establishing communication between networked
actors throughout the organization. This appreciation will also feed the very essence of a
comprehensive approach (CA) and an effects-based approach to operations (EBAO): to
broaden the traditionally more narrow focus of ‘doing things right’ to also embrace the matter
of ‘doing the right thing’ with a broader understanding of the operational environment as well
as the strategic goals pursued. An open dialogue about the framing of the situation is the main
method for double-loop learning (Argyris and Schön, 1978), facilitating innovative thinking
in order to find new solutions. Hence, the role of collaborative efforts in the most critical
phase of problem setting should not be underestimated.
6.6.1.2 Choice of theoretical tradition and approach

In the military domain, there are already long traditions of established methods of informa-
tion-gathering and analysis. However, with the increased ambitions of EBAO to logically
trace action to strategic goals, and to consider a broader range of means than military force,
this basis of approaches needs to be broadened. Also, the new and more complex operational
environments demands revisions and supplementation both in military and civil theories. Not
least, military theory based on the assumption that the aim of military forces should be to de-
stabilize the system of an enemy by putting pressure on its organizing capacity should be
questioned in the light of new operational contexts with networked and ‘perfectly asymmet-
ric” (Rekkedal, 2006) adversaries.
This section discusses the relation between these established approaches and academic theo-
retical traditions and approaches. Because of their selectivity, academic theories should per-
haps best be seen as exaggerations highlighting some aspects of any situation at the cost of
others. In the process of negotiating the proper setting of the problem, the choice of theoreti-
cal tradition and thereby also methodological approach is set. Although the practical interest
to cover more aspects of a situation than typically covered by any single theory can be fore-
seen to provoke inconsistency of assumptions between different theories, relevance for the
identified problems should be given priority over conventional academic norms of theoretical
purity.
Theories within social sciences are typically generated in a historical context where frustra-
tions about at the time dominating theories are reacted against through the establishment of
new theories. In consequence, theoretical traditions not only cling to a specific way of telling
the story about society, but also typically carry with them a specific pathos or focus of interest
not always explicitly addressed. For instance, economic theory implicitly or explicitly prob-
lematize the issue of how to deal with scarce resources and typically assume rational actors,
optimizing their individual interests without regard to other aspects of social life. As a reac-
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tion to that assumed rationality, organizational theory and experimental psychology have of-
ten emphasized the bounded rationality and e.g. role of emotions in decision-making. In simi-
lar vein, early attempts to formulate general statements about human behaviour has been
countered with theories emphasizing the social character of human behaviour, emphasizing
the collective and more law-bound behaviour of logics of appropriateness. The following em-
phasis on macro-structure and the following ability to predict behaviour has lately also been
criticized by ‘practice-theory’, insisting on the active and creative character of human deci-
sion-making: people don’t obey general laws, but have the capacity to act rationally, however
restricted by what the situation allows for: they are capable to play the hand differently ac-
cording to the ‘flow of the game’ (Whittington, 2006 p. 615).
In contrast to the typically academic way of handling the diversity of scientific theories, in the
KP-process, such tensions should be accepted, but not ignored. Rather, contradictions should
be seen as a potential for creativity, unleashing value-creating dialogue around what we
should believe about the dynamics of the situation. Reducing the practice situation to only one
dimension or one single explanation of human behaviour will produce monolithic images,
typically resulting in unseen risks. As it is less dangerous to know that one believes, than to
believe that one knows (without warranty), theoretical tensions as well as informed dialogue
will increase the level of intelligence in the KP-process, however at the cost of confidence.
Although leading to contradiction or paradox out of a cognitive perspective, this benefit is
better highlighted with a systemic view of knowledge: the tensions between different theories
as well as between theories and observed evidence will create ‘zones of proximal develop-
ment’ (Vygotsky, 1978), allowing for the knowledge-creating system to change and thus ad-
vance.
Although the choice of theory of analysis chronologically should follow only after the gather-
ing of information by means of different methods, method in its broader sense is intertwined
with different theoretical traditions’ perspectives on the world and how to gain knowledge
about it. Many of these can be combined in new and creative ways. However, if we are to
understand the character of tensions between different kinds of analysis, the differences can-
not be ignored.
6.6.1.3 Choice and use of method

As noted above, although the gathering of information precedes and is not necessarily associ-
ated with a specific kind of theory, method should not be understood as only a way of gather-
ing information. Rather, the way of finding evidence for a story is closely associated with
convictions about the character of the world, the aspects critical for grasping human behav-
iour and how to get knowledge about it. Although there are many methodological approaches,
the most fundamental criteria for what is good research or a decent investigation are rather
similar, although with differences in understanding of what claims we make, even with a de-
cent study: what is the relation between the artefact (i.e. the text, the illustration) and the real
world and its logic?
Collection of data
Although knowledge-creation may well consist of pure reasoning or even fancy, we normally
expect some kind of empirical proof for the argumentation or to judge a belief true. With a
pragmatic as well as with a Popperian notion of knowledge, truth can in principle not be war-
ranted in advance: if the world has changed faster than my beliefs or if new phenomena fal-
sify old convictions, knowledge needs to be refined to become true. In practice, this should
ideally be done in real-time. Nevertheless, basing beliefs on empirical experience gives
greater credibility and more chances to scrutinize beliefs in advance. In research practice, any
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approach benefits from good data: be it through direct observation, questionnaires or sensor
information.
Regardless of approach, the discussion about the validity and reliability of data matters. Either
we doubt or believe in the true representation of the world through aggregated data, the re-
finement of accuracy – or – the political negotiation of the power to define the world is of
decisive value for the knowledge-creating process. This difference may as much be related to
the one of framing as the one of data alone: what is accepted and deemed as relevant and there
selected as ‘facts’ of the situation? Hence, although the term ‘source criticism’ is normally
associated with ideals of objectivity, it can also be understood as a process of negotiation
about the design of the systems of power/knowledge (c.f. Flood, 1999). Interestingly, whether
we believe (positivism) or doubt (new pragmatism and other anti-representationalisms) in the
possibility of correctly depict the world through language (and since we measure linguistic
concepts, thereby also through measurement), it is always relevant to check for whether fig-
ures and sentences are deemed true by several independent sources. In this interest for scruti-
nizing data and statements about the world, modern academic norms meets traditional ap-
proaches of military intelligence.
However, an important difference should noted. While the statistical method conveys beliefs
in the conceptual road to knowledge – using language and its classifications as the very tool
of creating new knowledge – this view is by no means self-evident. Especially when assum-
ing complexity and change as the normal state of the operational environment, and that
changes in people’s behaviour may stem from migrations in the understanding of the situation
and their part in it, mainly through the highlighting of new meaningful nuances in their ex-
perience – then, the conceptual method has shortcomings compared to direct observation and
interpretation (c.f. Tsoukas & Chia, 2002; Senge et al. 2005). However, from the perspective
of higher levels of command, the main interest is not in the concrete, present, local and spe-
cific, but in the general, scattered and future developments. Although it is acknowledged that
a better holistic understanding may well better emerge on lower levels of command (c.f.
TRADOC pamphlet; Senge et al, 2005), the aggregation and analysis of general data will re-
main the main tool for staff work.
Irrespective of the issues of truth and what perspectives the gathered data convey, the most
important aspect of collection of data is the transparency in descriptions of how the collection
was made. This will allow for further scrutinizing and comparison between different analyses
and their credibility.
How the amount of information affects the analytical process
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Figure 1. How more information both can be a positive and a negative thing.
Figure 1 illustrates how the current analytical process is affected by an increase or decrease in
the amount of information available. As the amount of information about the operational envi-
ronment increases it will either increase the detail resolution or the thematic coverage of the
subjects being analyzed. Increasing the thematic coverage means that new dimensions are
being added which gives a wider appreciation of the issue at hand. Both better details and new
dimensions usually means that analysts increase their understanding of the issue being stud-
ied. That will lead to an increase in demand for new information in order even better under-
stand and project the situation. That will result in a further increase in the amount of informa-
tion available.
However, in the balancing loop more information decreases the amount spent on analysis
since analysts have more text to read and process. This is amplified greatly since they nowa-
days don’t have access to advanced technology to tag and search information let alone set up
alerting rules. When less time can be spent on analysis and incoming information is not even
processed at all it will decrease the ability to pick up vital changes in the operational envi-
ronment. That leads to less quality of the analytical products given to decisions-makers and
will also decrease the amount of information about the operational environment.
Structuring of data
For smaller studies and spontaneous reports, direct interpretation of the material may be pos-
sible. However, for larger amounts of data, some kind of structuring will be necessary. Once
again, since we do not definitely know whether established classifications will persist forever,
the most important methodological aspect of the structuring of data is the transparency of
how it was made. Structuring necessarily means reductionism. However, reductionism in the
sense of classifying phenomena by means of the categories of the language is inevitable if we
are going to be able to communicate our experience. In assessing the degree of reductionism,
an important distinction should be made between structural complexity (or detail complexity)
and interactive complexity (or systemic complexity). An overall description trying to regard
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all relevant perspectives and aspects of a situation would exclude many details of the struc-
tural complexity while the analysis tries to highlight the systemic, interactive complexity of
the situation. A detailed description out of a specific perspective or applying one single theory
to explain everything would rather reduce the interactive complexity of the situation.
There are rather decisive differences both in conviction and in style between different re-
search traditions concerning the degree of linguistic reduction that is allowable. At the one
extreme, historicists insisting on the specificity and organic nature of society tend to empha-
size the role of historical and contextual detail for explaining the development, hence resisting
any form of premature and general analysis provided by theoretical models. At the other ex-
treme, economists will typically tend to map as much as possible of diverse phenomena into
established theoretical models to be able to simulate their relations and future development.
The main argument for not putting new phenomena into old theoretical models (or more gen-
erally: established language) is the loss of nuance, which tends to perpetuate old ways of rea-
soning and thinking, consequently inhibiting learning about an ever-changing world. The
Swedish KS-concept therefore generally strives to combine the practical need for classifying
information in forms and databases with the technical possibility to re-classifying or using
smart search-engines to allow for a dynamic clustering of frequently used linguistic concepts
in free text. It should be noted that already naming things means classifying them, assigning
value to them and providing a framing about the situation (Schön, 1983). Hence, allowing
actors to freely account for the situation provides more information about the relation between
the actor and the phenomena (i.e. the knowledge) than keeping close to general nomenclatures
or formal models fed with new data.
As language is local and contextually specific the full meaning of expressions cannot be
grasped without observing the actors using it together with the observation of phenomena and
the actions associated with them. Indeed, the active use of language as one of many expres-
sions of behaviours resulting in social distinction (Bourdieu, 1984) highlights the central role
of nuances in social behaviour defining unique tastes, ideals etc explaining human behavior in
specific fields of practice. This degree of nuance is hardly possible to handle for general
analysis, if not specifically focusing on it. Mere correlations will tend to tell more strict sto-
ries about such consequences rather than about their logic. However, keeping in mind the
fluid and contextual character of language will help preventing pre-mature conclusions about
the relation between general statements about the situation and the character of local realities.
Hence, structuring should be done with precaution that potentially valuable information gets
lost in the translation.
Assigning explicatory statements to relations between data

There is a world of difference between statistical correlation and statements about the causal
relation between phenomena in that the latter uses or produces a theory of human behaviour.
In other words, facts alone have never created theory. What is needed for an explanation is a
reasoning that links observations together with implicit or explicit assumptions of the nature
of the world, society, humans and their actions: excluding such assumptions doesn’t mean
being free of suppositions, only to be ignorant of them. The critical question is ‘why’ and ‘be-
cause they coincided in time and space’ is not much of an answer to that question.
The popular distinction between quantitative and qualitative research is often made with ref-
erence to the different methods of data collection. However, what really distinguishes a quan-
titative analysis from a qualitative one is not how data is collected, but how, and with what
assumptions about society and humans, they are used (c.f. Johannisson, 1988). Hence, me-
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chanical analysis, treating people as automata, based on interviews or participant observation

would be more quantitative than reasoning about people’s subjective and diverse motives,
based on statistical data. The difference, then, would be how the intelligibility of human ac-
tion is framed: as mechanical clockworks or as reflective and creative subjects.
In line with the power of framing and classification, it can be argued that analysis starts al-
ready with the naming of phenomena. However, the most explicit choice of perspective is
made by linking explanations to specific theories – and their respective assumptions. Al-
though both statistical analysis and pure historical descriptions may claim to be free of ex-
plicit theory, in this respect they are nevertheless opposites in the spectrum of reductionism
and theorization: the one risking to confuse statistical correlation with causal mechanisms,
typically ignoring assumptions behind such views on society and the other denying that kinds
of assumptions. Alvesson and Sköldberg (2008) argued that the most decisive aspect of good
social science research is not methodology per se, but a reflected attitude toward ontology
(i.e. what we believe that the world looks like) and epistemology (i.e. how we think we should
get knowledge about it).
Essentially, analyzing societal phenomena means going beyond data to assign explanatory
statements to their relations. This is done by logical reasoning. However, this reasoning is not
given by a single logic but will rely on assumptions about the deterministic or chaotic charac-
ter of society as well as about the character and capacity of human beings. This also addresses
the differences between understanding and explanation: explaining something in retrospective
does not warrant for being able to predict the next step in any objective sense. With a new
pragmatist view, it is not the form of evidence in terms of data collection which is decisive:
they are all stories about the world and none of them can have a privileged view. As social
scientists know that stories are fabricated, they want to know how they were fabricated.
Hence, the main interest in method should be to produce awareness of assumptions and trans-
parency allowing for scrutinizing results.
There are a number of different theoretical traditions that may be applied in analysis of em-
pirical evidence:
• War studies or strategic studies (“Krigsvetenskap” in Swedish) to grasp the character

of new operative environments and modern warfare.
• Historical sociology to underpin decision-making with rich descriptions of concrete
backgrounds of conflicts, identities and motives, thus pointing on different alternatives
of action for both own parties and actors involved in conflict.
• Political science case studies to put military concerns in the strategic framework of po-
litical relations.
• Economic studies, explaining rational actors’ reactions on changing economic condi-
tions.
• Structural functionalism, especially in later German re-interpretations (Luhmann,
Habermas), extending the role of the symbolic complexity of human interaction and
the French structural anthropology and linguistics emphasizing the structural aspects
of usage rules and language. Also, later understandings as provided by Giddens’ struc-
turation theory may help balancing the tensions between micro and macro explana-
tions of societal development.
• Phenomenology and ethnomethodology, shedding light on the life-worlds of actors in
the operative environment. In similar vein, symbolic interactionism, emphasizing em-
pathy as method for understanding the logic of other cultures (as in Red Teaming) in
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order to make informed guesses about how own actions are understood and acted
upon.
• Dialectic patterns of analysis in the Marxist tradition as well as Bourdieu’s analyses
on the specific logics of different fields of social practices.
• Sociology of knowledge, to understand how actors actively use e.g. rhetoric and build
power relations to influence and shape the perception of the situation to motivate and
legitimize hostile action (Latour, Foucault). Close to these approaches are also gender
and ethnical perspectives on power relations and oppression.
The art of knowledge production

Although method can be explicitly explained, the art of research is as tacit as any other arts.
The critical thing is not to do everything by-the-book, but to integrate insights of method into
the flow of everyday events as not to neither restrict creative possibilities nor abusing rules of
stringency and rigor. In research as in any other practice, serendipity and the heuristic side of
analytical work interacts with the intense engagement with the subject matter and extensive
experience growing tacit and deep understanding of the environment. Consequently, the com-
petence profile of analytic staff and other key actors, as well as their proper combination, will
remain crucial to the process and the quality of output. Finally, even with the fittest analytical
crew, some uncertainty will remain in a changeable world of human innovativeness. The ul-
timate production of truth will be warranted not by method but by proofs of practical useful-
ness in action.
6.6.2 Analytical processes

The above analytical methods may be applied in different specialized and parallel analytical
processes, all supporting the production of new knowledge about the operative environment
and the possible actions to support desired development. While some of these processes are
already in place, others need to be realized and all of them will ultimately need to be matched
in order to enrich each other and the dynamics between them. Hence, knowledge production
can be seen as a portal to many other areas of the Swedish KS-concept, addressing issues of
Knowledge Management, Knowledge Request, Knowledge Integration etc. With the systemic
view of knowledge, this matching and interaction between processes matters as much as do
the methods applied in the processes respectively. While the diversity of these processes is
appreciated as expressions of expertise and a source for creative tensions, systemic thinking is
a strong candidate for supporting logical reasoning based on the outcomes of these processes
in a systemic and holistic integration of analysis in line with different logics of human action;
e.g. motives of economic, ethnical, moral, practical or tactical character or driven by inertia
and social logics of appropriateness. Systems analysis and systems thinking should be seen as
complementary to these approaches: ignoring research traditions that have something to say
about any causal relation drawn as an arrow in the influence diagram must be deemed as at-
tempts to re-invent the wheel.
6.7 Analytical methods in Knowledge Production
Knowledge Production is a term used to designate all processes focusing on analysis of the
non-friendly aspect of the operational area. In these processes various analytical methods are
used to select data, perform the analysis and to create different kind of products. By using a
multi-disciplinary approach with several different methods several aspects of the problem at
hand will be covered resulting less group-think.
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The products created in the processes with different methods, will form the actual output
which is integrated in various part of the other processes within the operational level head-
quarters. The intention is to create a menu of different products based on the sum of the dif-
ferent needs from various processes in the HQ. This menu provides a baseline of what can be
expected as outputs from the Knowledge Production process. Based on changes in the opera-
tional environment and the tasks given to the HQ the format and content of these products can
be changed.
Having some kind of standardized set of analytical products will most likely make it easier for
decision-makers to include them in the decision-making process.
This section will describe all of these three views of Knowledge Production.
6.7.1 Qualitative methods

Qualitative method is typically focused on the deep-analysis of not only how phenomena cor-
relate, but exactly why they do so. It is thereby typically interested in the logics behind and
the very nature of social behaviour, as well as the nature of the social world and how we gain
knowledge about it. All these questions have generated different answers in different strands
of qualitative research, making any brief presentation of it somewhat distorting. However, a
common denominator of qualitative method is passion for non-standardized empirical evi-
dence, hence distinguishing it generally from quantitative methods searching to bring dis-
persed phenomena into pre-designed categories. This general tendency doesn’t deny that
some strands of qualitative research don’t reject typically quantitative methods such as survey
as a means of gathering evidence for further qualitative analysis. Fundamentally, qualitative
and qualitative method is not about how data are gathered, but rather how they are treated and
understood.
While there are many ways of categorizing this diversity of research, Alvesson and Sköldberg
(2008) suggested a distinction between traditions that keep close to empirical evidence (e.g.
grounded theory, etnomethodology and inductive ethnography), hermeneutics, critical re-
search and post-modernism. Although these traditions may be described separately in terms of
their traditions respectively, a more analytical way of presenting different streams of qualita-
tive research would be to present them along a number of common features which to various
extents are emphasized by different traditions (ibid):
I. Systematism and technique in method. While most literature on qualitative

method emphasizes this recipe-like character of how to handle empirical data, this
view on method is primarily emphasized by the grounded-theory approach to-
gether with ethnomethodology and some phenomenological strands of research.
However, all qualitative research endeavour should be done with a deliberate and
conscious approach to the interaction with the empirical materiel.
II. Explicity about the primacy of interpretation. Research as a primarily interpre-
tative endeavour should be distinguished by its awareness about the interpretive
process. Key to a qualified approach to method is the consciousness about the in-
terpretive act. Consequently, and as stressed not least by hermeneutical traditions,
with assumptions and concepts are decisive for how a study is designed and inter-
preted, method cannot be isolated from theory.
III. Consciousness about the policial-ideologial side of research and its relation to
power. Research is not made in a vacuum, but is a part of a political and ethical
context which forms both what is studied and how it is studied. As such, research
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is part of either supporting (reproducing) or challenging existing social conditions.

Interpretations and theoretical assumptions are not neutral, but credit or discredit
different social interests and contribute to the construction of political and social
arrangements. As emphasized by critical theory, feminism and researchers like
Foucault, knowledge and power are intertwined phenomena that cannot be under-
stood in isolation.
IV. Reflectivity in relation to the problem of representation and authority. Later
hermeneutics emphasized that any text in decisive aspects is decoupled from its
author, a point which post-modernists pushed further as to seeing the text as de-
coupled from any external reality as well. The conviction that there is nothing be-
hind the text, except references to other texts undermines the claims of authority of
both texts and researchers.
Alvesson and Sköldberg (2008) argued that almost no issues can be taken for granted, be eas-
ily handled, but needs to be problematized to fulfil the requirements of good research: the
research question, the interest in knowledge, vocabulary, modes of perception, representation,
judging and weighting different elements with claims of saying something about “reality”
(data), theory and metatheory, presentation, claims of authority etc. In other words, qualitative
research is not a way of choosing of being subjective instead of being objective. Rather, it
puts increased demands on the researcher to address fundamental problems of empirical re-
search such as the relation between language and reality and the political context of research.
Being aware of these problems might limit the risk of “damage” of research with claims of
conveying certainty and truth. Not least, the interpretive repertoire of the researcher is ac-
knowledged to set the limits for the range of possible analysis. In the work process, four lev-
els of interpretation with different foci can be distinguished.
Element/level of interpretation Focus

Interaction with empirical materiel Utterances, own observations etc
Interpretation Deeper meanings
Critical interpretation Ideology, politics, social reproduction
Self-criticism and reflection over language Own text, claims of authority, selectivity
(Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2008 p. 492)
Summing up, while qualitative method is commonly understood by its alternative means of
gathering information through interviews, direct observation or case studies, the decisive dis-
tinction between qualitative and quantitative methods rather lies in its ambition to scrutinize
the possibility of knowledge, the researcher’s active role in creating data, the social, political
and ethical context for the research endeavour as well as the interest for deep-analysis of non-
standardized empirical materiel. Many parallels on these issues can also be found in the vari-
ous approaches to systems analysis e.g. in the problematizing of definition of the system bor-
ders and concepts, the interests involved in such definitions and the moral aspects of perform-
ing research (c.f. Flood, 1999).
6.7.2 Analysis based on systems thinking

Although systems theory originally aimed at overcoming the reductionist and fragmented
stance of science (Flood, 1999), claims that systems analysis would exclude the need for other
theories are hardly credible in today’s society. Rather, systemic analysis should be understood
as attempts to partially integrate different aspects of any situation, each highlighted by differ-
ent theories of the social sciences. As systems analysis can be applied with respect to systems
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of structure, processes, meaning or power/knowledge (ibid), the contribution of systemic

analysis should be the attempt to synthesize fragmented academic theory, without ignoring
their respective traditions or pretending to be able to sum them up in non-problematic ways.
As in many cases systemic analysis can be combined with, or be used to underpin, different
kinds of analyses, systemic analysis should be seen as complementary rather than as opposed
to other research traditions. Hence, systemic analysis can in this respect be seen as an explicit
bricolage 19 , using whatever theoretical explanation deemed relevant, in order to grasp the
most essential aspects and holistic dynamics of a situation, guiding interventions.
Systemic Analysis results in a set of conceptual models complementing one another to cover
the whole spectrum of the operational environment. Seeing the whole of a system before get-
ting lost in details is most important. Hence, the result will be a reduction in detail rather than
a reduction in terms of the interacting complexities of different dimensions of the operational
environment. With the general scepticism of new pragmatism against claims of representation
of the real world through language and artefacts, models and conclusions should be subject to
ongoing, testing, revision and dialogue: do the models still seem relevant in relation to experi-
ences out in the fields?
6.7.2.1 Modelling Complex Systems

A basic thought in systems analysis is that reality can be analysed as a system where the in-
teraction between component parts of the system together shapes the behaviour of the system
as a whole. In the TRADOC pamphlet The U.S. Army Commander’s Appreciation and Cam-
paign Design 20 (CACD) this idea is expressed in the following way. “The entire earth is a
system, which like most systems is divisible into sub-components which are themselves sys-
tems. Each of these systems has a structure of independent parts that interact. Some of these
parts interact with parts of other systems. It is the number of parts and the ways in which they
interact that define the complexity of a given system.”
In systems analysis the analyses are focused on the interactions between these component
parts and the structures and patterns that they form. The analyses are therefore concentrated
on studying generic properties of the system. These properties depend more on the structure
and dynamic, than on the content of the system. A central idea in the analysis is thus the tru-
ism that “the whole is more than the sum of its parts” 21 which is known as the definition of
holism. 22
A central idea in systems analysis is about complexity and complex systems. The pamphlet
CACD distinguishes between two different types of complexity; structural complexity and
interactive complexity. “Structural complexity is based upon the number of parts in a system.
The larger the number of independent parts in a system, the greater its structural complexity.
Interactive complexity is based upon the behaviour of the parts and the resulting interactions
19
The construction or creation of a work from a diverse range of things which happen to be available
(http://www.wikipedia.oeg/wiki/bricolage)
20
The U.S. Army Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design (CACD), 2008, The U.S. Army Training
and Doctrine Command, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500, http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pamndx.htm
21
Quote from Aristotle in the Metaphysics
22
György Járos, 2002, Holism Revisited: Its Principles 75 Years On, World Futures, Volume 58, Issue 1 January
2002 , pages 13 - 32
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between them. The greater the freedom of action of each individual part and the more link-
ages among the components, the greater is the system’s interactive complexity.” 23
In systems analysis interactive complexity is especially important and difficult to deal with.
Systems composed of people are often interactively complex because people have great free-
dom of action and many links to other people in the society. In a system with a high degree of
interactive complexity the link between cause and effect is ambiguous. These systems are
often non-linear because they generally neither demonstrate proportionality, in the sense that
a small input leads to a small output, nor lead to demonstrability of cause and effect, meaning
that the system is not necessarily subject to replication. By replication we mean that under the
same conditions a system will respond the same way to a given input. Interactive complexity
makes a system more unpredictable and challenging than structural complexity does. When
analysing a system with a high degree of interactive complexity the component parts them-
selves can be highly complex, making it difficult to model the states of, and the interaction
between, the component parts.
An interactively complex system can often be seen as a system of systems where each com-
ponent part in itself is a sub-system. One way to deal with complexities in the component
parts is therefore to use systems analysis to analyse each sub-system of the larger system. A
reductionist approach can however encounter difficulties if the system has a high degree of
interactive complexity. Since interactively complex systems can be inherently unstable, ir-
regular and inconsistent, each system level being reduced is likely to increase the uncertainty
of the model as a whole making the behaviour of the top system highly unpredictable.
Another difficulty is related to the phenomenon called emergent patterns

as described by Steven Durlauf. A pattern that is the result of behaviours
and interactions at a lower system level than where it is seen is called
emergent. 24 Since the complexity itself originates from a particular system
level, if the analyses focus on a too low system level, the cause of the
emergent pattern will thus be missed. Modelling a complex system at a
lower system level than where the emergent patterns originates can there-
fore fail to spot some of the causes behind the complexity at the larger sys-
tem level. A concrete example of this is that even though a person can be
seen as a system of living cells, it is in most cases unfruitful to use bio-
chemical interactions to analyse societal phenomena originating in the so-
cial interaction between individuals. This is also related to the fact that Figure 4: System
even simple rules can generate complex outcomes, i.e. many simple interac- of systems
tions between relatively simple component parts can result in complex or
even chaotic system behaviour.
An important part of the analysis is therefore to define the system boundaries and choose the
right level of detail or depth in the system models. These choices depend on which system
that is being studied and what question the analysis tries to shed light upon. A systems ana-
lytical procedure can therefore be described as first determining the problem and then choos-
ing the proper system within which the problem can be analysed.
23
TRADOC Pam 525-5-500, p. 5
24
Steven N. Durlauf, David A. Lane, & W. Brian Arthur, 1997, The Economy as an Evolving Complex System
II, Santa Fe Institute Studies in the Sciences of Complexity Lecture Notes, Perseus Books
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A reductionist approach might fail to solve some of the problems of modelling complex sys-
tems where the component parts themselves are complex. But there are also other problems
associated with the possible complexity of the component parts. In every system where people
form an integral part, our knowledge and understanding of the system is likely to depend on
our choice of perspective and subjective interpretation. Also if the data which the systems
analytical models are built upon is unreliable, the analyses and systems models will have in-
herent uncertainties that can not easily be reduced. From a hermeneutical perspective, preju-
dices will be inevitable in all interpretations of observations. Depending on who we are and
the point of view that we take, we will see the world differently and therefore come to differ-
ent conclusions about the system we are about to analyse. This will specially be the case when
making a systems analysis of a society in a conflict area.
Since building a system model always requires us to make simplifications of the real system,
different forms of uncertainties and unconscious assumptions can make the conclusions we
draw from the models unreliable. This is particularly problematical if it is difficult or impos-
sible to validate the final system model.
When a model contains choices of perspectives and interpretations of events or observations it

is especially important to be explicit with the assumptions and choices that the model is based
upon. Using clear and distinctive definitions is also of crucial when the phenomena them-
selves are hard to grasp. An example can be the term political stability. Depending on what
we mean with this term and our underlying conceptions of the concept we will come to differ-
ent conclusions about its function and influences in the system model. Without an explicit
definition together with a theoretical or hermeneutical background, it can be difficult both to
validate and to convey the model.
6.7.2.2 Validating the Systems Analysis Models

Validation of the result of a system analysis is about determining if the model corresponds to
reality and the question it is created to answer. In Lundqvist and Mattson a scheme, or check-
list, for analysing how well a model functions and serves the purposes for which it has been
designed: 25
• Practical validation (system design and scope of application). What is the system level?
Which parts of the overall system are included? Which mechanisms are endogenous and
which are exogenous? What kind of resources (data, money, computers, and competen-
cies) have been and will be available? What kind of decisions or policy issues are or
should be amended to analysis? Is the system designed in a way that minimises the risk of
unintentional misuse (data checks, self-documentation, transparency, user-friendliness)?
• Theoretical validation. What is the theoretical foundation? Does the system use equilib-
rium or a dynamic approach? How are different sub models coupled to each other? Are
the various causal relationships reasonably well modelled?
• Internal validation. How good are the models at reproducing the data on which they have
been estimated (goodness of fit)? Are parameters of right sign and statistically significant?
Is the responsiveness to changes in explanatory variables reasonable (sensitivity test)?
25
Lundqvist & Mattson, 2002
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• External validation. Can the model system reasonably well reproduce other independent
data not already used in the calibration? Are the conclusions being drawn from the model
in accordance with what can be found in the literature? How well can the model system
reproduce a future year (forecasting) or a previous year (backcasting)?
A problem when trying to validate a system model of an interactively complex system is that
it sometimes can be difficult to validate the model as a whole due to lack of data and large
uncertainties in the system. One approach can then be to instead of validating the system as a
whole trying to validate sub-systems of the model. This can be done with different tech-
niques; if data of a relationship is available this can be used in the verification; a link or sub-
system can also be verified or strengthened by an expert opinion from a SME; or by using
existing theories to support a causal mechanism in the system. By doing this the component
parts and sub-models of the system model are associated to existing knowledge traceability is
simplified.
The figure below comes from the KS LOE Experiment 2007 and serves as an example on
how a complex systems model can be verified.
Relationship
verified in
MNKB.
Influence
verified by
SME X.
Loop described in the-

ory A and B.
Figure 5: Validating a system model by different techniques.
Both hermeneutical and metatheoretical knowledge and methods can be used in the validation
of the system model, combining expert opinions, formal theories and empirical data to stay up
the system model making.
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6.7.2.3 A Multi-Model Approach to Systems Analysis

Creating a systems analysis of an open system operating in a dynamic environment is always
to some extent based on assumptions and judgements, regarding the entities and the bounda-
ries of the system entities as well as the connections between entities. There is a risk that the
assumptions are wrong and that the model fails to reflect reality. If an expected growth loop
in fact turns out to be a balancing loop the effect of a taken action may be the opposite of
what was desired. In order to minimize such mistakes, the analyst needs to be very careful and
systematic when defining the system and the connections between entities.
The KS database as well as other databases may give a rough view of the system in focus, the
subsystems and how they may be connected. However, this is only the first step. The further
data collection and analysis methods will differ depending on the scope of the task, the type
of product requested, how the model is going to be used, the level of detail required in the
model etc.
Since models with different levels of detail can answer different questions and also require
different sorts of data, a multiple model approach can be useful. The character of subsystems
may require different analysis methods. Also the result of an analysis may differ depending
on method or perspective. Thus, to obtain a sufficient validity, it is recommended that analy-
sis is conducted from several perspectives. It is important that the perspective chosen is taken
into account when validating and using the results. Also the analysis conducted by an expert
is made from a certain perspective.
In order to make the most sufficient analyses, the analysis team needs a wide variety of meth-
ods, a sort of methods toolbox. Methods can be quantitative or qualitative, based on heuristic,
systemic or metatheoretical perspectives. If time permits, analyses are made using different
perspectives which then are compared. Also, analyses of subsystems may require different
methods. Then these subsystem analyses are compared. The analyses may complement or
contradict each other. In the best of worlds, the analyses of subsystems point in the same di-
rection regarding the total question asked. In cases where they diverge, further analysis may
be necessary. Documentation and explanation of perspectives and motives to a certain rec-
ommendation is of certain importance when the model is based on diverging analyses.
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Complex system model
P M E S I I
Bla bla bla
bla bla bla
bla bla bla
bla bla bla
Figure 6: A multi-model approach to approximating a complex system model.
System analysis of complex systems is most likely a result of both method and model triangu-
lation where different models and a multi model approach are used to approximate a complex
system model.
By using a multi model approach it is also possible to compare the models against each other
and the different predictions they give of the likely consequence of alternative decisions.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 SME 1 SME 2 … … Conclusion

Alternative A + + - -
Alternative B - + - -
Alternative C -
…
By comparing the result from different models the robustness of different alternative deci-
sions can be evaluated. The comparison can also include expert judgments or other sources of
knowledge to illuminate different perspecives and aspects of the question.
6.7.2.4 Building System Models with Influence Diagrams

In the following section some basic components for building influence diagrams for analyzing
the interaction between different phenomena within a system is presented. The components
are combined into influence diagrams, containing two or more concepts, related by an influ-
ence arrow. While this is typical for any flowchart, specific to systems thinking is the creation
of causal loops, where a loop begins a new iteration not only as a consequence of time, but
also from the point of view that everything is related so that every effect, sooner or later, is
coming back to its roots.
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Concept
Phenomena or event Influence Delayed Growth Balance

(measurable) (causal link) influence (pos. or neg.)
+ + + -
Reinforcement loop Balancing loop
Figure 7: Some basic components for the interaction within a system
Typically, we start with isolated events that someone react to (“something is too small, big,
dangerous, problematic”). These isolated events need to be understood in terms of interaction,
hence we look for behaviors. From here the step is close to building system models where
consequences and influences of events and behaviors form a framework for analysis. Finally
we may need to confront deeper mental models that generate the behaviors and events, in or-
der to solve a problem.
In short the steps can be summarized as follows:

1. Identification of endogenous, exogenous and excluded component parts or elements of the
system model.
a) By using a theory
b) Unprejudiced
2. If relevant, arrange the set of system models to define. For example by time (current state
vs end state) or by perspective.
3. Define relations between components.
In the influence diagrams a systemic perspective is applied, that appropriate used, can be a
helpful tool for creating understanding of a system and solving problems as well as bringing
several experts together in a productive collaboration. The causal relationships in any com-
plex domain, such as economy or politics, could be clarified and potentially altered. There is
however a potential danger that “systemic thinking” competes with efforts to capture the es-
sence of each part of the system. A “shifting the burden” situation can appear if the attention
and responsibility for quality in key parts is transferred to its interactive environment. That is,
specialists with unique and genuine interests and power to invent may neither benefit from a
bird’s eye view nor create cutting edge products therefrom. The quality of the influence dia-
gram as a whole is no better than the quality of its component parts.
6.7.2.5 Towards a Systems Analysis Process for Knowledge Support

According to Karlqvist “[s]ystems analysis deals with integration of knowledge from different
areas in order to handle complex problems, often focusing on applications requiring actions
and decisions. Analytical tools, such as mathematical and statistical models, play a crucial
role. For utilising these tools, a good overview of theories and methods is required, and
knowledge about their applicability and limitations. Furthermore, combinatory skill and crea-
tivity is required in mobilising and integrating knowledge from different subject areas to-
gether with an understanding of the problems and the contexts in which the results are to be
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implemented, as well as an ability to communicate insights and results both in a cross disci-
plinary sense and to various stakeholders.” 26
Systems analysis is from the perspective above rather a work process and an art than a scien-
tific discipline. A system analytical approach can be a way of creating an iterative process for
analysing and collecting knowledge from different people and multiple perspectives. Based
on these assumptions, a generic systems analysis procedure which represents the common
features of any specific system analysis technique can be described as:
1. A KR enters the KS process, a decision is taken that SA is necessary to answer the ques-
tion. The KR is sent to SA.
2. Initial analysis of the task.
c) Dialogue with the problem owner in order to clarify the task, the purpose and the
underlying problem complex behind the KR.
d) Identify overarching system boundaries, focus areas and a couple of important en-
tities. Survey of available knowledge and SME within the problem area.
e) Design the systems analysis procedure, plan the information gathering for the KR,
and select the participants and experts to engage in the SA.
3. Initiate SA
f) Create a number of system models in collaboration with the SA-team, SME, staff
members and problem owners depending on the problem, time constraints and free
resources. KI support with data collection in the process.
g) Different system models can focus on different themes, subquestions, points of
view, methodological perspectives etc.
h) Validate the system models. Compare different parts of a model with known theo-
ries and SME judgements in order to examine the quality of the model and consis-
tency with prior knowledge.
4. Synthesize the system models and validate the results
i) Compare and synthesize the different system models into an overarching system
model for the question, check for consistency and knowledge gaps at the overarch-
ing system layer. The models do not necessarily need to converge completely for
the overarching system model to be functional. Perform robustness analysis of the
models by triangulating the system models against each other. Do they overlap or
diverge?
j) Find common themes relating to the KR, check for the presence of emergent be-
haviour, threshold effects and other unexpected phenomena.
5. Produce an answer to the KR
k) Use the overarching system model, the system models and other sources to pro-
duce an answer. Interpret the result.
l) Estimate the robustness of the answer by evaluating the KR, subquestions, hy-
potheses and potential decisions against each of the system models to triangulate
the answer. Do the sub models give the same result? Do the models give a satisfy-
ing answer to the KR?
m) Try to use the models to illuminate the problem complex further. Evaluate conse-
quences in long or short term, do different decision alternatives agree with the
commanders intent and ROE, etc.
26
Anders Karlqvist, 2000, definition given in an introduction to a doctoral course in systems analysis.
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6. Present the answer and the system models

n) Visualize and present the answer using different KV methods.
o) A member of the SA-team should participate in the hand over of the answer to ex-
plain the models and their underlying assumptions and limitations.
p) Return feedback from the hand over session to the SA-team.
7. Evaluate if the actions undertaken resulted in the kind of outcome predicted by the system
models. Adjust the system analysis model accordingly.
The process is not strictly linear. It is often required that the system analysis team returns to
earlier phases in order to successively adjust earlier judgments and decisions. It is also impor-
tant to stress that the method described above is not a method per se. Instead it should be
viewed as an attempt to generalize the more or less necessary steps of any system analysis
technique. Since SA is embedded within the KS process, the SA-process sketched above re-
quire a functional KS-process, including MNKB, KRM, KI, and KV as well as assigned con-
tracts with relevant SME’s and other sources of information.
6.7.2.6 Building System Models of an International Operation - An Illustra-

tive Example
In this section a short example of systems analysis is presented. The purpose of the example is
to illustrate how systems analytical models can be used to support multifunctional knowledge
support and decision making in accordance with the EBAO-concept.
In the figure below a system model of a number of actors is shown. The actors can for exam-
ple be an organisation, a government, a rebel group, a big man or a company.
Actor influences
Military influence
D
B
Figure 8: System model of actor influences.
The model depicts four actors and how they influence each other in a political, military and
economical way. We can see that actor A and B have economical connections with each other
and that actor A and D are in a military conflict situation. Since the models include the actors
and not just the studied phenomenon we call this model a micro model.
The influences at the actor level in the micro model can then be aggregated into an influence
diagram where we try to describe the causal relations between the observable phenomena.
Since the model describes relations on a level above the actors within the system we call this
a macro model.
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Aggregated
phenomena
Level of
security
Political
stability
Economic
growth
Figure 9: System model of aggregated phenomena.
Even though the two models cut the reality in different ways, there are close connections be-
tween them. The phenomenon “Level of security” in the macro model is for instance closely
related to the aggregated level of military influences in the micro model. Simultaneously do
the influences between the aggregated phenomena in the macro model describe the dynamics
of the different types of influences at the actor level and how they are related to each other.
The models do thus complement each other and can also be used to validate each other and
make the systems analysis more robust.
The models can also be used to evaluate possible consequences of a certain decision thus sup-
port the decision-making process. In previous work influence diagrams have been used for
identifying entry points a commander can use in order to achieve desired effects. The function
of the system model in the analysis is here threefold; to give a comprehensive understanding
of the modelled system; to identify possible entry points for an operation; and to evaluate the
comprehensive effects of a decision to influence the recognized entry points.
In the macro model an external influence by the commander can be modelled by adding an
exogenous factor or element to the model and drawing influence arrows from this factor to the
entry point.
Commander
Entry point
Level of
security
Political
Economic stability
growth
Figure 10: Modelling a decision to influence the system at the macro level.
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At the micro level the same operation is modelled by adding the actor “Commander” to the
system model as an endogenous element. At the micro level the commander is no longer an
exogenous entity outside of the system but an endogenous actor inside the system. By model-
ling oneself as being inside the system the comprehensive effect on the whole system can
more easily analysed. Not only does the decision to increase the level of security have mili-
tary effects on the other actors in the system. The presence of the forces will also have politi-
cal and economical influences on the system and the actors inside the system, and this is di-
rectly shown in the micro model at the actor level.
B-Force
Military influence
D
B
Figure 11: Modelling oneself as being inside the system.
By using complementary models more features of the modelled system can be included in the
system models and more consequences of a decision can be evaluated without necessarily
increasing the complexity of each sub-model.
It is also possible to add time to the system models to study how the influences are developed
as a function of time.
A’s influence over C
Time
Figure 12: Actor A’s influence over actor C as a function of time.
This diagram can be used for studying the dynamic behaviour of the influences between the
actors at the micro level, as well as at the aggregated behaviour at macro level. These types of
analyses can also be used for evaluating exit-strategies. A simple exit-strategy where the
commander’s forces just leave the area is at the macro level equal to stopping the external
influence on the entry point. At the micro level this can in a similar way be modelled as set-
ting the strength of every influence arrow connected to the own actor to zero.
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B-Force influence over C
A’s influence over C

Time Time
Figure 13: Actor A’s influence over actor C as a function of time
The system models at the actor level can thus be used for evaluating different exit-strategies,
analysing how the actors in the system is likely to respond to the removal of oneself and how
the exit can be modified to avoid undesired effects.
The method used in the example can be summarized in the following three points:
• Use multiple models loosely connected to each other to capture different aspects and per-
spectives of the system.
• Include oneself inside the system boundaries as an endogenous element.
• Include time to study the effect of different exit-strategies.
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6.7.3 Statistics, data mining and forecasting

Some of the data in the operational HQ consist of numerical data which have been gather
from various sources. Some data is gathered by lower echelons while other data is available
on the internet. Numerical data needs be analysed with appropriate methods in order to make
the most of out them but also to know when no assessment can be done at all. Descriptive
statistics, data mining and forecasting provide some tools to handle numerical data.
In relation to qualitative methods, statistics can be understood as analysis based on standard-

ized empirical evidence (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2008). Typically, where relevant data
doesn’t consist of already available numerical data, such as economic transactions or lists of
telephone calls, questionnaires are used for converting soft information from diverse contexts
into one single format. Answering questions by filling out a form makes opinions or experi-
ences numerical.
Before sending out the questionnaires or gathering other data, the relevant population must be
defined. Evidently, this is made on basis of some research question, which in turn is closely
related to an issue or theory which helps defining what and who is relevant or not (Körner and
Wahlgren, 1996) Theory plays an especially important role in excluding potential factors:
without theory or intuition there is a literal infinity of possible causes for any effect (Ayres,
2007). A considerable part of the work concerns how data should be gathered and formatted
to fit into the model: which questions should be asked and by which scale should the answers
be measured? Also, considerations must be made about the selection of cases or individuals
and what consequences this selection has on the results. Once the data are in place, the results
can be analyzed.
Some main arguments for statistical analysis is that decision-makers normally have trouble
updating beliefs in the face of disconfirming information, applying correct weights in assess-
ing what phenomena that influence an outcome and that experts make better decisions when
provided with results of statistical analysis and prediction (Ayres, 2007). Statistical prediction
relies on probabilities, which in turn requires the analyzed variable to be normally distributed,
i.e. variation is not intentional but variable by randomness over a large number of cases. A
statistical procedure cannot estimate the causal impact of rare events because there simply
aren’t enough data concerning them to make a credible estimate. (ibid.) The certitude of pre-
dictions are also based on these presuppositions: if the variable is normally distributed, there’s
a 95 percent chance that it will fall within two standard deviations (plus or minus) of its mean.
However, as soon as human intentionality comes into play, the outcome is not random and the
conditions for prediction changes.
Apart from traditional correlations, modern techniques holds potential for automating analy-
sis. With traditional regression, the analyst needs to specify the specific form for the equation.
However, computers can also be used to find out what equations that better fit the empirical
data, e.g. by neural networks analysis. By such techniques, the researcher just needs to feed in
the raw information, and the network, by searching over the massively interconnected set of
equations, will let the data pick out the best functional form. The capacity of matching formu-
lae to data and allow more fluid estimates of the nature of the impact also makes analysis co-
moplex. In many cases it becomes almost impossible to figure out how an individual input is
affecting the predicted outcome. Furthermore, exactly fitting the past doesn’t guarantee cor-
rect predictions of the future. In consequence, analysts often intentionally limit the number of
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parameters and the amount of time allowed not to overfit the matching of equations to empiri-
cal data (Ayres, 2007).
Although numerical analysis can become too much, it also risks saying too little of interest.
Finding correlations among data satisfies only the need for surface-analysis, while we nor-
mally also want to understand why things are related (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2008). Hence,
in order to be focused and become really interesting for practical decision-making, statistical
analysis is dependent on theory both as we set up the study and when we analyze the results.
6.7.4 Pattern-link analysis

Pattern-link analysis has for some time been a common method among law enforcement
agencies to analyse criminal networks and organised crime. Since the nature of conflict has
changed these methods have been introduced by the military in crisis response operations
around the world. In today’s conflicts characterised by irregular warfare and criminal activi-
ties rather than regular military units it is vital to keep track on these actors especially from a
force protection perspective.
Before advanced software applications were introduced pattern-link analysis was conducting
using paper-based methods. The aim was to create visual representations of actors and their
relationships to other actors, organisations, commodities and events. In order to do that the
information needs to be structured in a certain way to create these so called entities. These
entities are extracted into objects based on reports from lower echelons or other available in-
formation. In the KS-concept this is supported by the Knowledge Integration process which
means that most of this structuring work is already done when the analysis starts.
The introduction of software and database systems opened up for easier extraction of informa-
tion from the sources, more complex queries and much more advanced visual representations
of the networks. These representations gives the analyst’s a visual perspective of the relation-
ships between these entities and can through advanced queries uncover previously hidden
connections between the entities.
6.7.5 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB)
The IPB process is an established process among many countries around the world and pro-
vides a good process that integrates well with staff processes based on NATO’s Operational
Planning Process and Guidance for Operational Planning. The assumption is that this process
is highly relevant also in a concept based on an Effects-based Approach to operations but
need to be developed and complemented in order to match the characteristics of modern con-
flicts. The following text is based on the US Field Manual 34-130 from 1999 but is slightly
adapted to fit inside a KS context. It also important to note that depending on the development
being done in the EBAO Concept project the taxonomy and some of the processes described
here will likely need to be changed. However, the purpose is to illustrate activities and prod-
ucts that most likely will be needed for operational level decision-making.
IPB is a systematic continuous process to analyzing the weather, terrain, and threat in a spe-
cific geographic area for all types of operations. IPB integrates threat doctrine with the
weather and terrain as they relate to the mission within a specific battlefield environment.
This is done to determine and evaluate threat capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable
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courses of action (COAs). This analytical process builds an extensive database for each poten-
tial area in which a unit may be required to operate to determine the impact of the threat, envi-
ronment, and terrain on operations and ultimately presents it in a graphic format.
The IPB process consists of four steps:
• STEP 1: Define the battlefield environment.

• STEP 2: Describe the battlefield’s effects.
• STEP 3: Evaluate the threat.
• STEP 4: Determine threat COAs.
A particular battlefield may have unique boundaries but regardless of the operation the analy-
sis process is the same. The commander’s initial input into the IPB process is directly propor-
tional to success on the battlefield (Figure 1-2). By providing the commander’s intent and
guidance early on into the process, the KS cell directs the intelligence cycle allowing the staff
to focus on what’s important to the mission. Each staff element and each echelon conducts
IPB for its specific functional area. The IPB process helps the commander maximize the unit
is combat power at critical points in time, space, and resources to shape the battlefield by –
Determining the threat’s likely COA.
IPB MDMP
Cdr’s initia l guida nce
RECEIPT OF MISSION Wa rning orde r 1
Initial IPB
Completed Initial IPB produc ts
Re sta ted miss ion
Cdr’s Inte nt & G uida nc e
Mission Wa rning orde r 2
Brief to MISSION ANALYSIS Sta ff produc ts
Commander Battlef ield frame work
Pre limina ry move me nt
Update IPB
Products Completed COA stm ts and s ke tc hes
COA DEVELOPMENT
IPB Wa rgame re sults

Products COA ANALYSIS Ta sk orga niza tion
Brought to the (WARGAME) Miss ion to subordina te units
CCIR
Wargame
Dec is ion m atrix
COA COMPARISON
Refined IPB Approve d CO A

Re fined Cdr’s Intent
Completed COA APPROVAL Spe cified type of order
Spe cified type of rehea rsa l
HP TL
Continuous IPB OP LAN/OP O RD

ORDERS PRODUCTION
DENOT ES: CDR’s Input
Describing the environment your unit is operating within and the effects of the environment
on your unit.
Figure 1-2. IPB embedded into the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP).
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The IPB process is continuous. IPB is conducted prior to and during the command’s initial
planning for an operation. The analyst continues to perform and refine the IPB products
throughout the MDMP. This ensures that –
The products of IPB remain complete and valid and create the correct vision for the com-
mander. IPB is the primary means by which the commander develops that vision in mind of
how an operation will unfold and how the threat will be depicted throughout the operation.
The initial IPB process must be completed before the mission analysis brief to the commander
in the MDMP, prior to developing the friendly COA and the development of the staff esti-
mate. This ensures the effective visualization and communication tools necessary to inform
the commander.
A brief overview of each step of the IPB process follows:
STEP 1: DEFINE THE BATTLEFIELD ENVIRONMENT
Establishes the limits of the area of operation (AO).
Establishes the limits of the area of interest (AOI).
Identifies those characteristics of the battlefield that will influence friendly and threat opera-
tions.
Identifies gaps in current intelligence holdings and information.
To focus the remainder of the IPB process, the KS cell identifies those battlefield characteris-
tics requiring in-depth evaluation. This may include terrain, weather, logistical infrastructure,
demographics, and visualizing the operation in the integrated battlespace of an operation (See
Figure 1-3). Generally, the command’s AO is a geographical area assigned to the com-
mander’s responsibility whereas the AOI is usually larger. The AOI includes any threat or
characteristics of the battlefield environment that significantly influences the mission of the
command. This enables the KS cell to focus the IPB effort on a specific area within the op-
eration.
Battlespace encompasses the surface, subsurface, endoatmospheric, and exatmospheric

spheres of a particular geographic area. It also includes the electromagnetic spectrum, cyber-
space, and human psychological aspects of military operations. The dimension of the com-
mand’s battlespace is dictated by the mission and the capabilities of any potential threat
throughout the operation. Defining the significant characteristics of the battlefield environ-
ment also aids in identifying gaps in current intelligence holdings and the specific intelligence
required to fill them. Similarly, the KS cell identifies gaps in the command's knowledge of
the threat and analyzed current threat situation.
Once approved by the commander, the specific intelligence required to fill gaps in the com-
mand's knowledge of the battlefield environment and threat situation becomes the command's
initial intelligence requirements.
As the commander visualizes the operations, one develops the commander's critical intelli-
gence requirements (CCIR) by considering the following questions:
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What decisions do I need to make?

What information about the enemy, terrain, and friendly situation do I need to know to make
those decisions?
What friendly information must I conceal from the enemy?
When, during the operation, do I need this information to support my anticipated decisions?
This series of questions then generates the sub-elements of the CCIR: PIR, EEFI and FFRI
with related information requirements (IR). Eventually being combined into the information
collection requirements tasked out to assets available within the command.
STEP 2: DESCRIBE THE BATTLEFIELD’S EFFECTS
Step 2 evaluates the effects of weather and terrain for both the friendly and threat environ-
mental conditions. The KS cell identifies the limitations and opportunities the environment
offers to mission planning, equipment capabilities, and maneuver potential for ground assets.
This evaluation focuses on the general capabilities for each force until COAs are developed in
later steps of the IPB process.
This assessment of the environment always includes an analysis of the weather and terrain but
can include discussions of the characteristics of detailed geography, demographics, urban city
plans, or computer information infrastructure and their effects on friendly and threat opera-
tions.
Characteristics of geography include general characteristics of the terrain and weather, as well
as such factors as politics, civilian press, local population, and demographics. An area's infra-
structure consists of the facilities, equipment, and framework needed for the functioning of
systems, cities, or regions. Products developed in this step might include, but are not limited
to—
Population status overlays.
Overlays that depict the military aspects and effects of terrain.
Weather analysis matrices.
Integrated products such as modified combined obstacle overlays (MCOOs).
Information Infrastructure templates.
Regardless of the subject or means of presentation, the KS cell ensures the product’s focus on
the effects of the battlefield environment.
STEP 3: EVALUATE THE THREAT
In step 3, the KS cell must identify the threat by evaluating the command's intelligence hold-
ings (i.e., country studies, contingency plans, intelligence readiness files) to determine how
the threat normally organizes for combat and conducts operations under similar circum-
stances. Identifying the intelligence gaps in the available threat holdings allows the time to
develop requests for information (RFI) from higher headquarters to include the national agen-
cies.
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Identification of the threat’s capabilities becomes apparent and the analysis of the broad
COAs are discerned by understanding the environment, terrain, and then the patterns of be-
havior the threat may use as possible COAs to achieve their objectives and intent on the bat-
tlefield. KS cells’ evaluation is portrayed in the creation of threat models which are graphic
depictions and narratives that include doctrinal templates, the threat’s preferred tactics, op-
tions and peculiarities, and identification of HVTs as shown in Figure 1-5:
Figure 1-5. Portions of the threat model.
When facing a well-known threat, the KS cell relies on databases and threat models readily
available. The KS cell will use updated information to keep the databases current. It is also
entirely possible that one may have to create new threat models by combining doctrinal tem-
plates, threat tactics, and available options within the operation. The G2/S2 must take into
account the threat's many options by identifying all possible branches and sequels and peculi-
arities of a specific threat’s behavior into this IPB product termed the threat model. While
this detailed analysis is being developed, a direct outcome of this process is the identification
of the threat’s high value targets (HVTs). This enables the friendly to begin identifying their
assets to target the threat's vulnerabilities and HVTs along with building some broad COAs to
consider as threat plans of attack/defend alternatives.
There is also the realistic nature of the current threat dilemmas that the KS cell may know
very little regarding a certain threat. The motives, intentions and agenda may be unpredict-
able if analyzing a new terrorist faction or key leader whose profile is immature and has no
identifiable history of behavior characteristics. Another obstacle to threat determination are
the technological threats that are so diverse in options and sophistication. Assuming a data-
base will be available for all threat’s capabilities become inherently impossible when consid-
ering the asymmetric and asynchronous types of delivery means and diversification of the
threat agendas.
*Asymmetric Threat: A threat that uses dissimilar weapons or force (e.g. WMD, small-
scale attacks, information attack) to offset a superior military force and technological ad-
vantage.
*Asynchronous Threat: A threat that doesn’t require the orchestration of timing or si-
multaneous use of its capabilities to achieve a desired effect. Therefore causing hap-
hazard attacks that result more on circumstance and personality rather then by a well
designed operation. (e.g. A terrorist faction that is structured by separate cells branched
off for anonymity purposes acting independently of a primary leader of the faction.)
(*The above definitions are not yet approved as official doctrine until the final draft of FM
34-130)
STEP 4: DETERMINE THREAT COAs
Step 4 integrates the IPB products of the previous steps into conclusions that formulate possi-
ble COAs. The KS cell develops threat COA models depicting the threat's potential COAs.
(See Figure 1-6.) Additional IPB products during the final step involve the preparation of
event templates, situation templates, and specialized matrices that focus intelligence require-
ments and collection requirements on identifying the most likely COA the threat will use to
meet their objectives on the battlefield.
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Figure 1-6. Sequence of

determining threat.
The threat COA models developed in step 4 are the products taken into the MDMP of COA
analysis and the wargame process which help develop the planning phase of an operation for
the unit. Once the friendly COAs are war gamed separately against each possible threat
COA, the commander is briefed on the COAs which meet the requirements of the com-
mander’s guidance and intent of the operation that were successful in the wargame process.
(See Figure 1-7.)
STEP 1
PRODUCTS DEFINE THE BATTLEFIELD ENVIRONMENT
GEOGRAPHY
- Significant characteristics of the environment POPULATION
REQUIRED SOCIECONOMIC FACTORS
- Establish the limits of the AO and AOI
MAPS TRANSPORTATION
- Evaluate existing databases and identify
ROE
intelligence gaps TELECOMMUNICATIONS
- Collect required materials
STEP 2
OBSERVATION & FIELDS OF FIRE
DESCRIBE THE BATTLEFIELD EFFECTS COVER & CONCEALMENT
OBSTACLES
MCOO - Analyze the battlefield environment KEY TERRAIN
TERRAIN - Terrain analysis (OCOKA) AVENUES OF APPROACH
PRODUCTS - Weather Analysis (5 aspects)
- Describe the battlefield effects on the threat
VISIBILITY, WINDS
and friendly capabilities
PRECIPITATION
- Demographics, politics, legal issues …etc. CLOUD COVER, HUMIDITY
TEMPERATURE
STEP 3
MANEUVER RECON
EVALUATE THE THREAT
FIRES SECURITY
DOCTRINAL - Convert threat doctrine into doctrinal template NBC (WMD) LEADERSHIP
TEMPLATES M/S MORALE
- Describe the threat’s tactics, options
ADA AIR ASSAULT
and peculiarities AIR THREAT INFILTRATION
- Identify threat capabilities C2 REINFORCEMENT
- Identify high-value targets LOGISTICS UNCONVENTIONAL
EW TACTICS
STEP 4
DETERMINE THREAT COURSES OF ACTION
ENEMY COA CONSISTS OF:
SITEMPs
- Identify the threat’s likely objective SITEMP which portrays all enemy
EVENT
- Identify a full set of COAs available capabilities
TEMPLATE
- Evaluate and prioritize each COA DESCRIPTION OF TACTICS
INTEL
- Develop each COA in detail AND OPTIONS
REQMTS
- Identify collection requirements HIGH-VALUE TARGET LIST
HVT LIST
Figure 1-7. Key components of IPB.
The entire staff depends on the KS cell to use all the IPB products and analysis tools acquired
to portray the threat in the decision making and targeting processes. COAs are compared
until the commander approves the friendly COA to meet objectives versus the most likely
threat COA. The KS cell cannot produce these models, effectively predicting the threat
COAs, unless he has—
Adequately analyzed the friendly mission throughout the time duration of the operation; iden-
tified the physical limits of the AO and AOI; and identified every characteristic of the battle-
field environment that might affect the operation (step 1).
Identified the opportunities and constraints the battlefield environment offers to threat and
friendly forces (step 2).
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Thoroughly considered the threat capabilities and preferred COA in like situations if all con-
ditions best suited the threat in an unconstrained battlefield environment, using “reverse IPB”
to best understand the threat (step 3).
In short, the KS cell provides the commander with the best visualization of the threat’s capa-
bilities by developing threat COA models that drive the MDMP. These models are valid only
if the KS cell establishes a good foundation of analysis during the first three steps of the IPB
process.
6.7.5.1 Red Team (RT)

The Red team should describe a number of possible end states of the adversary at both the
strategic and operational levels in order to facilitate Blue desired effects development and
evaluation. While the real world adversary may not necessarily use effects-based terms such
as End State or Effects, the Red Team can productively use effects-based methodology and
terminology to describe the adversary intentions and activities. For each identified adversary
Potential End State, the Red team should develop and periodically review/refine a range of
the adversary potential desired and undesired Effects. This work enables the Red and Blue
planning teams to consider a wider range of activities that might be undertaken by the adver-
sary. A focus on adversary desired Effects, vice potential actions will help prevent Blue from
mirror imaging adversary and assuming that adversary intention and motivations match those
of Blue. This will assist in the development of a robust plan better able to accommodate the
unpredictable, competitive nature of conflict
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6.8 Knowledge Visualization (KV)
“Form is also a function”
6.8.1 Introduction
Many with a background in the military have all endured briefings with an endless series of
Powerpoint slides presented from behind a podium in a very traditional military manner. The
result is that there is a real risk that even the most brilliant analytical efforts will not reach the
decision-maker the way it was intended. This part of the concept can initially seem a little bit
too basic but the intention is to highlight that some of these basic skills and behaviour can be
taken for granted. Hopefully many will agree that this is an area that needs improvement after
all.
The Knowledge Visualization deals with how we communicate our knowledge to the recipi-
ent or consumer. Thus it matters not only what we try to communicate but also how we are
doing it. That means paying attention to form and design not only from an aesthetic perspec-
tive but also from pedagogic/psychologic perspective. Of course these are recommendations
there is always a need to adapt to the situation at hand. KV will initially try to address these
different contexts:
• Presentation methods during briefings

• Written reports in document form
• Consumption of information from the software platform
6.8.2 Presentation methods during briefings
6.8.2.1 Who is the audience?

Even though the media sometimes is perceived as simplifying rather complex issues to much
there is much to be learned how to engage the audience. The first thing to consider is what the
target audience look like. There is no single format that is suitable for everybody and the
more time there is for customizing the message the success rate will increase. The key thing is
to capture the interest of people and in order to do that there are a few guidelines to keep in
mind.
6.8.2.2 What is the desired outcome?
A good thing to do is to ask yourself a few questions about the outcome of the presentation.
Without them you don’t know why you are talking…and probably, neither do they.
It is important to be specific and just not stay with too generic statements i.e “it is a briefing to
update the commander of the situation”. One help can be to focus on these three questions:
• What you want your audience to know
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• What you want them to feel after your presentation,

• Is there something you want them to do?
6.8.2.3 Getting the audience’s interest
What people in general ARE interested in: 27
1. Life / people
2. Environment
3. Society
4. Own organisation / routines
Pick a subject from the list to communicate your message via.Remember that the same mes-
sage can be communicated in different ways. Aim as high as possible in the list above.
Example: “Securing the area” can be communicated as:

“…how your organisation will handle the task…”
or
“…the people you protect and the lives you help saving…”
How someone receives and remembers these two messages is vastly different.
The first important step is the initial part where the audience needs to feel that this is some-
thing that concerns me. One way of doing that is to quickly get to the point without long
background explanations and introductions. Even if the people responsible for the product
think that is important to understand the bigger picture it is often more important to cut to the
chase and let them find out directly what some of the key findings are. Another useful trick is
to avoid to boring and generalizing headlines in the beginning like “Daily situation update
regarding the refugee camps”. Instead it is often more interesting to try a bolder statement that
reflects the overall finding like “Coalition forces helped saving lives yesterday”.
People usually also get more interested when it comes to issues dealing with people and emo-
tions. Therefore it is vital to capture the situation both from a top-down and a bottom-up per-
spective if the aim is to understand how the current situation affects the conflict area or indeed
our own forces. Many perspectives usually creates interest and important reflections.
Other factors that contributes to interest are:

• Recognition (I have been in that situation)
• Summary (easy to follow)
• Surprises
27
Said by Bertil Flodin, associate professor in journalism
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• Enthusiasm (from the presenter)

• Interaction with the audience (preferably from the very beginning to break the ice)
• Usefulness to the audience (What’s in it for me?)
6.8.2.4 Teasers
The idea is to create the interest and provide maybe 50 percent of the key findings at the be-
ginning so the audience immediately gets the interest and then try to continuously provide
them with “teasers” for the remaining part. If it takes to long to get to the point, most people
have not the energy to follow the line. Instead provide all the background information at the
end or present it in a printed form or where to find it on the intranet/portal/search engine.
6.8.2.5 Format
The format itself is also important to gain interest. Try combining many different formats in
order to create variation as well as multiple ways of illustrating the same thing. Pictures, au-
dio (even just background noise from a city) and video provide good ways of generating in-
terest. Remember that video productions are fairly easy to do today and do not necessarily
require specialized training and expensive equipment.
Using the studio interview format as an alternative form of presentation.

(From the Swedish KS LOE, November 2007)
Try to address your audience by several senses. Preferably let them see, hear and also feel,
touch or move. At least let them do something.
Go from abstract to concrete and try to give as many examples as possibles. Just as children
like examples, adults do to but are usually afraid of asking for it. Use comparisons and meta-
phors when possible.
Also remember that quotes can be used to connect some authority to the message.
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6.8.2.6 Limit the important messages

There are some rules in the media world which says that in a newspaper article you can de-
liver three (3) messages, in radio it only two (2) messages and on television there is only time
for one (1) message. This is of course based on time constraints for the various media but it is
very important to try to “boil” the overall result down the really important messages that we
want the audience to get. These messages can of course be repeated in order to make sure that
they have gone through.
6.8.2.7 Activate the audience

A simple task practising something you just said is one way of strengthening the new knowl-
edge conveyed. Let them execute your little task in pairs or triples. By urging them to take
part, actively, you increase their ability to take in and keep new knowledge.
The things that are outside the expected we tend to remember (like offering the commander a
peace of bauxite or letting people sit on sharp stones for a while, during a lesson about haem-
orrhoids.)
6.8.2.8 Avoid “cannibals”
Avoid anything competing with your message, “steeling your own thunder”.
Examples of known cannibals:
• No funny backgrounds
• no pink suits in business meetings in London,
• no crooked tie knots
• no dandruff on dark suite shoulders,
• no stains on glasses
• no wiggling whilst talking,
• no “humming and ah-ing”.
Do however underline your enthusiasm with your posture, hand movements etc.
If there is something in your appearance which can become a cannibal, point it out initially to
get rid of it. For example: if you have only one ear, explain why and let them take a good
look from the very start.
6.8.2.9 Designing the performance

Never regard the screen as your manuscript!
The whole point of having you there is that you tell, explain or describe something.
The audience don’t need you to read to them…
PowerPoint slides should complete your message, not compete with it. Symbolic pictures or
key words supporting your point are useful both for your audience and for you.Use cue-cards
if you need to remember something.
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Face/front to the audience. Let a colleague push the button for the next slide or use remote.
The distance between the presenter and the audience is important on how he/she is perceived.
Try to get closer to use the eye contact as a way of generating interest.
If the briefing is long, divide it into parts. Use a host, moderator or anchorman-/woman to
keep it together and to guide people trough the “show”.
It can be one spoken part (live), one film or clip/slide show and one interview/dialogue with
“the expert”.Again; let the audience take part, act, solve a problem or conduct a specific task
during a long presentation.
6.8.2.10 Variation keep the interest going
• Every time you change voices, faces, or simply just tempo or tone of voice something
happens. The audience “wakes up” and will endure another couple of minutes of facts
before their minds fly again.
• Read or explain in pairs, and change rather every 30 seconds than every two minutes.
If there is time try to do a faster “duet” where each person only delivers one sentence
each.
• Use images, still or moving. Drawings, diagrams and mind maps are also a kind of
image.
• If something is written, see to it that it is readable and short, use keywords rather than
sentences.
• Keep eye contact. Change focus every 20 sec rather than every 5 sec. Face/front to the
audience.
• Slow down and speak out. If they can’t hear you it is all a waste.
• If you run out of time, cut something out instead of speeding up.
6.8.2.11 Exploring new means of presentation

The activities in KV aim to create focused presentation on selected topics or in given perspec-
tives based on all the available knowledge. That means going a bit beyond the traditional
Powerpoint-approach which is the de-facto standard today. The evolution of modern technol-
ogy have made a lot of these “high-end” tools available today. However, it will most likely
demand a few new skill sets with people that have a professional background in graphics de-
sign, text writing, still/video photography and video editing.
An approach is to constantly re-package information that comes out from different staff proc-
esses into a more attractive format which improve the overall understanding of the situation
and present activities.
Just as technology is not just something for technicians it is also vital for military profession-
als to be involved in this process. Deciding how and in what form important information shall
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be communicated to the commander is not something we can hand over to KV-group of peo-
ple from the media sphere. The intention is to foster a climate where experiences and skill sets
can meet which have a possibility of create interesting synergy effects on knowledge support
to staff work in crisis management operations.
6.8.3 Written reports in document form
Sometimes it is important to be able to present a complete line of thought to the decision-

maker that s/he can read for themselves after the briefing. In order to keep the reader focused
and interested throughout the report there are a few things to consider here as well.
The introduction is important to get the immediate attention and remember that the eyes are
drawn to pictures the very first seconds of contact with the paper. After that there are a gen-
eral rule that you have two chances of exposing the “trigger words” that the gets the attention
of the user. It is on the cover and on the first page. Putting some extra effort there can mean a
lot for the overall apprehension.
One way is to get some inspiration from the newspapers, magazines and advertising on the
overall layout and how text and images are used to get the message through. Here are some of
the basic tools available:
6.8.4 Consumption of information from the software platform

The technology supporting the KS activities (and all knowledge activities in the organization)
needs to support some fundamental view of the available data and information. The users
need the capability to search for a set of “objects” based on some criteria, and the visualize
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these from several different perspectives, and in each perspective have the ability to continue
either narrowing or expanding the selection
These perspectives in among others:

- Geospatial, view things related to the three-dimensional space
- Temporal, view thins as functions over time, in timeframes and as sequences, including
“fast-forward” in time to visualize patterns. It also include the notion of “circular time”,
where you plot the timeline as a circle, with e.g. 24 hours as 360 degrees and seven circles
as the days of the week, visualizing patterns of the days of the week.
- Thematic, according to either meta data or taxonomically based sets of terms.
- By relation, where the relations between objects are visualized as link in networks.
- Facetted navigation, where the result of a search are automatically clustered into relevant
facets depending of the content, and these facets are user for further focusing if the results.
And of course as any combination of the above.
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7 Application of Knowledge Support in an operational HQ
To make KS as useful as possible, it is important that it is implemented on an enterprise scale.

That means that in the military context, it should be implemented on as many organisational
levels as possible, and most of the KM rules must apply to all in the structure. This section
should be seen as a food for thought for further work to integrate KS in operational command
and control processes.
7.1 KS and ISR
When executing ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance), it is vital that the KS
requirements for access to data, information and intelligence is implemented as close to the
sources and sensors as possible. With that you will gain some of the core effects of KS in re-
turn to the units on that level.
Special consideration must be made to established practices like the use of the Request For
Information 28 (RFI)-process. This must incorporated into as a sub-process of KRM (Knowl-
edge Request Management) and Planners must have access to all available intelligence assets.
This requires an integrated approach where sensor information are made available via service
contracts to be included in the repository on the operation level. Global business rules defined
by the KM function also need to be implemented on lower levels which. Instead of having a
lot separate stovepiped databases users can consume information based on their individual
access rights. All ISR-information (but not necessarily the source information) must pass
through Knowledge Integration.(see Knowledge Integration in chapter 2).
7.2 KS and Targeting

The targeting process is an important driver of current staff procedures such as those found in
the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) context. The targeting process is not a responsibility
of KS however KS support to targeting need to be extensive. Just as in many other areas the
new approaches to handling modern conflicts through comprehensive and effects-based op-
erations will need to change the way we work it will also affect the targeting process. Tradi-
tonally a process much devoted to hard targets with kinetic weapons there is a need to balance
this with a more comprehensive approach where soft targets are equally important. Maybe the
28
request for information — 1. Any specific time-sensitive ad hoc requirement for intelligence information or
products to support an ongoing crisis or operation not necessarily related to standing requirements or scheduled
intelligence production. A request for information can be initiated to respond to operational requirements and
will be validated in accordance with the theater command’s procedures. 2. The National Security
Agency/Central Security Service uses this term to state ad hoc signals intelligence requirements. (JP 1-02 De-
partment of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms)
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Joint Integrated Target List (JPTL) will need to change name to a Joint Integrated Influence
List in order to reflect this change of mindset.
The methods and procedures outline in this concept will most likely be very helpful in devel-
oping a new comprehensive targeting process since a lot of this deals with how to handle in-
formation and to be able to integrate the correct part in different decision-making processes.
By objectifying targets and the ability create relations between objects (target to target, as part
of a system, or target to document for descriptive purposes, linking tasks & reports etc) cre-
ates a good information infrastructure to manage this complex environment and being able to
some degrees estimate the effects of certain actions.
7.2.1 The Targeting process

•Standing Requirements
KS
KS in
in Targeting
Targeting •Non-Time critical/ ad Hoq Req
Knowledge Acquisition
ACO Dir SME COE IDB •Time critical planned and Ad Hoq req
•Target Dev. & BDA Req
LOAC Dir ISR
NAC O& G Knowledge KnowledgeRequest
Management Management
Geo-Spacial CTL
Products Knowledge Collection
Business Rules DARB
Integration RFI
Nat. CCIRM Task
Reach-Back List
Com
Obj& Weapon Force Combat assessment
Guid Plan. Systems Analysis
Knowledge Production
BDA 1 BDA 2 BDA 3
Target
JIPB/ Folders Force
JIOE Exec
Joint
Joint Target
OPCON
Target List
OPPLAN
List update
OPO
JCO FragO/
Draft Consolidated Draft Final Draft WO
Target Target Target
Nomination Nomination Nomination
List List List Approved Draft
Includes Target
Restricted List & Nomination
Prohibited List List
JTWG JTWG JTWG
JCB JCB JCB Knowledge

JCB WG
JCB WG JCB Visualization OHQ
WG
Knowledge Support AC Paper_7.2_v 0.81_080521_GH
7.3 The Targeting process

To give a comprehensive description of the Targeting process at the Operational level is a
complex task to perform, especially as Targeting is undergoing adjustments and development
both internal as well as towards new doctrines like Comprehensive Approach and Effect-
Based Approach to Operations.
The following part describes how the Knowledge Support Concept could interact with a theo-
retical design of a Targeting process. Thoughts and assumptions are mainly experience-based
from Combined Joint Staff Exercise in Enköping 2008 and the development within MNE 4
work, and should be seen as an example how Knowledge Support Concept could interact with
a defined staff process.
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The undergoing of a Swedish development of a national Effect-Based Approach to Operation

or Comprehensive Approach to Operation will probably demand a redefinition and some
changes in the design at the time when the concepts are further developed.
7.3.1 Overview
Joint targeting is a most central process involving several components and need to embrace
both hard and soft targets
The selection of targets are directly linked to the campaign- and JFC- objectives
To every target there are several considerations to be done e.g Operational requirements, po-
litical and legal limitations and Rules of Engagement. Targeting sometimes also requires deep
system analyses, discovering opponents Center of gravity, system impacts etc.
In performing such analyses a huge amount of data/ information need to be processed and
managed within all levels of military command from Strategic level to Unit level. The use of
non- lethal weapons or other methods than the use of force rendering personal or material
damage should be preferred, provided that given objectives are reachable. Other considera-
tions during this phase of Targeting are the risk of friendly fire, collateral damage and coordi-
nation with other than own actors within Area of Operation.
The Joint Targeting Cycle whether it is a mission led by EU or NATO are in the main parts
the same, starting with Directives & Guidelines from top Political/ Strategic level continuing
down through all the stages to Combat Assessment (CA) before starting again.
The foundation of witch the Targeting process lays is the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the
Battle-field/-space (JIPB).
The figure below is a common interpretation of how to divide the Targeting process in main
parts.
THE JOINT TARGETING CYCLE
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Commander´s
Objectives,
Guidance and
Intent
Target
Development,Validation
Combat Assessment Nomination and Prioriti-
sation
Capabilities
Mission Planning Analysis
and Execution (incl)
Weaponeering
Force Planning
and
Assignment
Figure X, Main Components of the Joint Targeting Cycle
7.3.2 Objectives & Guidance
O&G are the cornerstones of targeting. They identify what is required to be achieved, and
under what conditions and parameters. The process of providing O&G may well be a respon-
sive and continuous process that changes policies in response to political developments, mili-
tary strategy, the operational situation and the enemy stance.
Whatever the circumstances, in order to effectively conduct a target process the O&G must be
understandable, attainable, realistic, and measurable. The application of military force is an
instrument of political policy and as such, the political O&G must originate from, normally in
the form of a Political initiating directive. The JFC will receive strategic guidance in the form
of an Supreme Command initiating directive. This in turn, will be used to produce a Concept
of Operation (CONOPS) that contain the operational guidance; witch would be the JFC's
D&G. The CONOPS will be used to produce an Operational Plan (OPLAN) that contains the
specific O&G and desired end-state to be used for targeting policy and plans.
Component Commanders will further elaborate this guidance within their respective OPLAN
and/or SUPPLAN and the Supported Commander may issue O&G to Supporting Command-
ers (to include objectives, priorities, timings, desired effects and the overall concept of opera-
tion and intent). The guidance and objectives become progressively more specific and dy-
namic as they are passed down to each lower level of command. A thumb-rule for a specific
objective should be that it is
• Observable
• Measureable and
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• Realizable solution or alternative solutions fulfilling the objective
7.3.3 Target Development and Prioritization;
Under Strategic direction e.g. SHAPE, nations will provide/contribute to a Coalition

IDB that contains the Essential Elements of Information (EEI)
The IDB will provide an area specific subset database as the initial data to form a Joint Target
List (JTL) at the start of target development; this then serves as the basis for the next step in
the target development process.
There are several steps of approval before a JTL is constituted.

E.g In a NATO –led Campaign submitted target sets would be sent to ACO and are passed to
the NAC for prior approval. The JFC must pass any target sets and/or categories not originally
approved, but at a later stage deemed necessary for the campaign, to ACO in order to seek
approval from the NAC, or the NAC's delegated representative.
Each target should be analysed referring to critical points in order to chose appropriate choice
of weapon and bearer. One result of this analyse is performing, “Desired Mean
Point of Impact (DMPI), witch would point out preferable ways to engage the target.
From the JTL a Joint Prioritized Target List (JPTL) is formed, witch will frame actual Objec-
tives within the Area of Operation.
• Weaponeering
In this part of the Targeting process, considerations about weapons-effect, accuracy

and realibility has to be dealt with. The choice of weapon, lethal or non-lethal has to
be compared to what conditions there are, e.g availability, restrictions due to environ-
ment etc. This demands also access to extensive knowledge and information in coop-
eration with CC-level to get the optimal operational resource-status view.
• Force Planning
During this phase, the results from the previous stages are integrated with operational
planning considerations. This phase of the targeting cycle is primarily an Operations
responsibility with other staff elements in a substantial supporting role. The Joint Tar-
geting Working Group (JTWG) at this stage will assign targets from the JPTL to the
various components so that CC can allocate assets to the targets in accordance with the
apportionment and the objectives issued by the JFC.
During this planning “new” targets could be needed to insert in this process due to
current occurrences or insight of temporal opportunities. These new targets must un-
dergo a nomination process and be present in the Nomination Target List (NTL)
Analysis will result in the identification of information, tools and the team required to
complete the task. Additional Request for information (RFI) and support the build-up
a shared understanding of the situation and desired end-state in order to work together
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towards a common purpose. Information will be assessed, fused, transformed and pre-
sented during the planning process. Decisions will provide the trigger for subsequent
dissemination of direction and information for others to act upon.
• Force Execution
This phase deals specifically with the direct planning and preparation for, and the exe-
cution and supervision of, actions. The various components must translate the JFC’s
Orders, contained in the JCO or fragmentary orders (FRAGO), into execution instruc-
tions.
During the execution-phase could “windows of opportunity” occur witch would sig-
nificantly step towards the Operational End State or changes in the Politi-
cal/Operational Environment witch would hazard the operational objectives. In this
cases the staff have to consider a very fast approach to deal with this opportunity och
threat. The form to do this is by the use of Time Sensitive Target (TST). Specific re-
sources from the Joint and Component staff constitutes to form a Joint Action Task
Group (JAT). The nomination of a TST follows the same procedures as other nomina-
tions but in fast pace through the Chain of Command.
• Combat Assessment
The CA is used to assess current operations and guide the
future planning of the operation and is, therefore, vital to the targeting process. It
determines the effectiveness and performance of the campaign by examining the re-
sults of force execution. There are three main interrelated methods to support the CA
process
(1) Re-attack Recommendation – RR.
(2) Battle Damage assessment – BDA.
(3) Munitions Effects Assessment – MEA.
To support this process it is essential that units forward reports and imagery as soon as
possible in order to determine if there is need for re-attack, changes in weapon or con-
sidering alternative tactics etc. Normally there are dedicated resources for assessment,
organized in “cells” on each level. In the Joint operational staff all the reports regard-
ing the target engagement are fused in order to get a comprehensive picture and need
of changes in actions to come. The method to deal with this the Battle Damage As-
sessment (BDA), witch consists of three levels designated BDA1 to BDA3 .
BDA is a complementary activity to target development. The criteria developed to de-

termine the measures of effectiveness contribute to an efficient systematic
application of force, reducing risk and effort. If there are uncertainties of the result
complementary RFI would be sent to Daily Asset Reconnaissance Board (DARB) for
allocation of resources.
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7.4 KS in Targeting
From the constituent parts of the Targeting process, the following support from KS could be
identified as functions, services or products, described on a comprehensive level as follows;
Objectives & Guidance

CCDR´s End State and Strategic Objectives witch will be sent to the Force Commander,
firstly will be met by Knowledge Integration, where classification, format and tagging will be
done, so the subsequent administrative information management will be facilitated.
Business rules are formulated and monitored by the Knowledge Management in coordination
with the Information assurance- function. By Knowledge Integration do the input available
for further staff-work treatment
Target Development and Prioritization

The Production of JIPB concerning the AO are supported by Knowledge Production, Knowl-
edge Request Management, Knowledge Acquisition and Knowledge Visualization
Products or services from this could be e.g ; System Analyses, Decision support-products,
presentations for briefings. Other supporting services could be coordination of ISR in the pro-
duction of Collection Task List (CTL) in DARB-process, prioritizing and management of RFI
over time.
Weaponeering
Weaponeering are supported by knowledge Production by connecting data and information
according to related needs for target specifications. Knowledge Request Management coordi-
nate RFI intending on Weaponeering
Force Planning
Information needs will vary according to task, mission, own and coalition force composition,
opposition and neutral forces and JOA.
Framing these needs requires input from all elements of an organisation and, whilst
adaptive, the initial analysis must be comprehensive if information providers and the
information infrastructure are to deliver effectively. Throughout this process Knowledge Pro-
duction will support the whole staff. Compiling reference and environmental information for
a particular operation can take significant time and could impose a constraint unless providers
are identified and tasked early. This would be supported by Knowledge Acquisition and if
needed Knowledge Visualisation where there are demands for specific information products.
Force Execution
During this phase of the Operation the current and planned actions are supported, by integra-
tion and production of e.g. information, data, CoE, SME with the aim to reduce delay time
and improve Quality of the Operation and situational awareness of the operational environ-
ment.
This is supported by Knowledge Integration, Knowledge Production. Knowledge Acquisition
support the staff in coming, planned or ad hoc, needs of complementary information and intel-
ligence.
Combat Assessment
In the assessment of current operations and guidance to
future planning of the operation the overall KS will supply means to reduce time consuming
activities as e.g gathering Imagery, support complex system analyses in order to increase
speed and accuracy. KS or Knowledge Production spec. expand and complement the BDA
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process to a more holistic level, where both 2.nd and 3.rd level of influence could be de-
scribed or predicted.
7.5 KS and Intelligence
The possibilities for the intelligence function are perhaps the most pioneering. The KS con-
cept allows “multiple parallel perspectives” to be applied on the repository. This will create
the possibility to have virtually any standardized structure, like AIntP-3 (Stanag 2433) and
other structures, like ontologies, at the same time.
By objectifying, and partaking in the requirements of the KM & KI activities for setting the
rules for that process, the KS-concept supports both systemic analysis and any other type of
approach that the Intel community finds appropriate.
7.6 KS and JIPB / JIPOE (Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Bat-

tle space / ..Operational Environment)
JIPB/JPIOE is both a product and a process for the developing of the product. When perform-
ing IPB or similar analytical activities, the concept of utilizing objects in a governed reposi-
tory also enhances the outcome. By having a method for objectifying information into discrete
data objects, it will actually be possible to reuse parts of a particular product when the same
part is needed in another product with a slightly different scope.
Instead of creating static products like PowerPoint slides, the KS-approach enables grouping
of all parts of the analysis together. This can be done with two different approaches. Either
each individual object can be tagged with a product identifier in the metadata set or they can
be related to a “Product Object” (possibly a virtual document) or a specific object in a taxon-
omy or ontology. This creates a very flexible storage of information where new products rep-
resenting other perspectives easily can be made.
For each part of the total product, e.g. NAI, Situation Template, Event Matrix etc. a descrip-
tive document may be related, and the object itself way may of any kind, like a Geodata file
(vector or raster) or any other file that requires a special tool to visualize,
7.7 KS and CCIRM & RFI processes
To utilize the full potential of the available assets, it is of outmost importance that the KRM-
process encapsulates both the CCIRM and RFI.processes. This will ensure that all the re-
quirements on existing CCIRM- & RFI-processes has today are met, and at the same time
applying a holistic approach to “knowledge production”, increasing the transparency (for
those granted access) in the synchronised use of the coalition’s available assets.
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8 Terms and abbreviations used

CCIRM Collection Coordination Intelligence Re-
quirements Management
CJTF Combined Joint Task Force
COA Courses of Action
COE Centers of Excellence
CONOPS Concept of Operations
CSA Continous Systemic Approach, see KD
EBA Effects-Based Assessment
EBAO Effects-based Approach to Operations
EBE Effects-Based Execution
EBP Effects-Based Planning
HR Human Resources
HVT High-value Targets
IM Information Management
Intel Intelligence
JFCOM Joint Forces Command (US)
JIPB Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Bat-
tlespace
JPTL Joint Prioritized Target List
JTL Joint Target List
KA Knowledge Acquisition
KB Knowledge Base
KBD Knowledge Base Development, no longer
used, replaced by SA
KM Knowledge Management
KRM Knowledge Request Management
KS Knowledge Support
KV Knowledge Visualization
MNE Multinational Experimentation
MNKB Multi-national knowledge base
MOE Measurement of Effectiveness
MOP Measurement of Performance
NAI Named Area of Interest/Intelligence
ONA Operational Net Assessment, a concept in
support of analysis in effects-based opera-
tions, see SoSA
RFI Request for Information
SA Systemic Approach, probably no longer
used, replaced by CSA
SME Subject Matter Expert
SOP Standard Operating Procedure
SoSA Systems-of-Systems Analysis, mostly
used in the US now, replaced by SA in
MNE.
TST Time Sensitive Targeting
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9 Appendix
9.1 Appendix 1 - Chronological Background to the concept

During MNE 3 (Multinational Experimentation, managed mostly by US JFCOM, the third
iteration), the concept of ONA (Operational Net Assessment) was published by JFCOM. The
fundamental idea was to utilize Systems Theory to describe the operational environment in a
way that supported what was then called effects-based operations (EBO). ONA employed this
in the form of systems-of-systems analysis (SoSA) where a key part consist of identifying
nodes and their links which then creates systems. The links can describe different types of
interrelationships between the identified nodes. These nodes were usually kept on a tangible
level in order to be able to be able to employ different actions in order to change the state of
the system. However, a lot of confusion about the ONA-concept have arisen since the tool
supporting the concept is called the ONA Database (ONA-Db) which was used to manged the
objects and their links. Therefore a lot of people only associate ONA to the tool instead of the
method and process.
When MNE4 started, ONA was included in the new concept KBD (Knowledge Base Devel-
opment). KBD was supposed to be the one concept that supported all “knowledge processes”
in a CJTF. In reality, KBD under a German lead focused on developing the SoSA-part of
ONA by introducing influence diagrams with reinforcement loops in addition to just interrela-
tionships. These influence diagrams tries to depict the character of the systems being analyzed
on a more abstract level in order to gain understanding of the dynamics of the system. These
efforts was initially called Systemic Approach (SA) and then later on renamed to Continous
Systemic Approach (CSA) to further stress the fact that this kind of analysis is not a static
product but an ongoing effort.
Also, in the beginning of the MNE4 activities, Canada chaired a Knowledge Management-
concept, but during the process, it was canceled, with the rationale that KM should be in-
cluded in the KBD-concept.
The relationship between ONA/SoSA/CSA and the existing intelligence processes and or-
ganizations have never really been resolved. A complicating factor in this is the view of the
term intelligence. Sometimes intelligence is seen as just military intelligence with a narrow
focus on utilizing military assets to deliver products strictly related to military operations. In a
country like Sweden where the main intelligence agency is found within the Armed Forces,
the notion of intelligence involves not only military issues, but also any other relevant per-
spective, and the analysis is done by both military and civilian specialists working in the or-
ganization. The Intelligence service also supports many civilian customers in the Govern-
ment.
ONA/SoSA/CSA has always stressed the importance of utilizing a wide variety of skill sets
with people from various backgrounds to be able to grasp more aspects of the complex opera-
tional environment of present and future conflicts. The instantiation of these concepts into
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organizational units during various experiments have therefore focused on bringing these new
skill sets to the analysis in order to better support EBAO. Just as EBAO tries to bring tools 29
to the commander that has traditionally been reserved for the strategic level, ONA/SoSA/CSA
set out to bring analytical capabilities traditionally found on the strategic level down to the
operational level. Finally, ONA/SoSA/CSA can in some cases also be seen as a reaction to an
intelligence community that has previously not been able to give sufficient support to opera-
tional level commanders.
Therefore the organizational units that have been utilizing ONA/SoSA/CSA-methods have
been set up in parallel with the intelligence branch while there is no reason why the methods
themselves cannot be employed in the intelligence organization. In fact, the Swedish KS Con-
cept outlines a framework for both analytical processes based on Systems Theory as well as
established intelligence processes
Shortly before the MNE4 main event, the term KS was introduced, at that point referring to an
overarching object (process & organisation) that should consist of KM & KBD, and later even
KRM (Knowledge Request Management).Since there was no KS concept available for the
MNE 4 main event, the result was a lack of coordination between the analytical processes
CSA, Intel and Read Teaming. Further on the tech platform available at that time created sev-
eral stovepipes of information which posed serious challenges for the KM function to support
the staff.
After MNE4 Sweden choose to continue development of the KS concept, and used the initial
draft of an integrated KS concept in a national experiment called the Demo 06H EBAO ex-
periment. That experiment also included a prototype of a next-generation tech platform with
support for the whole range of KS-activities.
In the MNE5 the development of CSA was continued under a German lead but now under the
name Knowledge Development (KD).
29
Tools is here referring to the Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic (DIME) construct found in the
EBAO-concept.
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11 Index
A J
audience.................114, 115, 116, 117, 118 JIPB....................................................... 128
audio ......................................................116 Joint Coordination Board........................ 80
B JPIOE.................................................... 128
briefing ............................71, 114, 118, 119 K
business rules.........................56, 60, 61, 70 KBD...................................... 129, 130, 131
C KI .... 16, 65, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 82, 128
cannibal .................................................117 KM... 17, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 65,
cannibals................................................117 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 121, 128, 129,
CCIRM ......................................76, 80, 128 130, 131, 132
Cognitive .................................................27 KM Plan.................................................. 66
collaboration......................................56, 70 Knowledge Acquisition ...... 16, 80, 83, 129
Combination ..........................................62 Knowledge Base ............... 18, 76, 129, 130
Comprehensive approach ........................11 Knowledge Base Development..... 129, 130
Content .......................................18, 61, 71 Knowledge Integration ............. 16, 69, 121
Continous Systemic Approach ..............130 Knowledge Management56, 57, 60, 69, 70,
CSA .......................................129, 130, 131 129, 130, 132, 133, 134, 135
Culture....................................................61 Knowledge Production ..................... 70, 80
D Knowledge Request Management . 76, 121,
Daily Asseets Reconnaissance Board .....80 129, 131
database .............................................18, 66 Knowledge Visualization.............. 114, 129
E KRM .. 74, 76, 77, 78, 80, 81, 82, 121, 128,
EBAO ..........18, 56, 63, 66, 67, 68, 76, 131 129, 131
Enthusiasm ............................................116 L
Event Matrix..........................................128 Low Intensity Conflict............................ 12
Explicit knowledge..................................17 M
externalization ...................................58, 59 Measurement......................................... 61
Externalization ......................................62 metadata ............. 17, 63, 65, 66, 69, 70, 73
F Metadata ....................... 17, 57, 66, 69, 133
formal knowledge....................................17 MNE4 ........................................... 130, 131
I MNE5 ................................................... 131
images................................74, 78, 118, 119 N
influence ........................58, 61, 62, 72, 130 NAI ....................................................... 128
information ...10, 12, 16, 17, 18, 25, 26, 56, newspaper ............................................. 119
57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 65, 66, 67, 68, O
69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 77, 80, 81, 82, ONA...................................... 129, 130, 131
114, 116, 118, 119, 121, 131 P
Information Management............57, 63, 69 people..... 18, 56, 57, 60, 66, 67, 69, 73, 74,
information object .............................17, 65 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 130
information systems ................................26 Policy.................................... 57, 61, 66, 67
Intel................................................128, 131 PowerPoint...................................... 71, 117
intelligence ........59, 76, 121, 128, 130, 131 presentation............. 71, 114, 115, 116, 118
Intelligence service................................130 R
internalization....................................58, 59 Read Teaming....................................... 131
Internalization .......................................63 repository18, 63, 70, 71, 73, 74, 77, 78, 81,
ISR.........................................................121 128
Repository......................................... 18, 56
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RFI.................................................121, 128 Systemic Approach....................... 129, 130

S Systems Theory ............................ 130, 131
Situation Template ................................128 T
Situational Understanding .......................16 Tacit knowledge...................................... 17
socialization.................................58, 59, 63 Teasers .................................................. 116
Socialization ...........................................62 Technology................................. 61, 69, 74
SoSA......................................129, 130, 131 V,W
Standing Operating Procedures...............67 video ................................. 70, 74, 116, 118
storytelling...............................................59 wisdom.................................................... 17
System Dynamics....................................27 Written reports ........................ 10, 114, 119
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SWEDISH ARMED FORCES

KNOWLEDGE SUPPORT (KS)

Analytical Concept Paper

Title Subject Date

A number of enabling functions to support information and knowledge management is intro-

1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE CONCEPT ..................................................................................... 6

5.4.2 Civilians Working within the Armed Forces ................................................................................. 51

6.7.5 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) ...................................................................... 107

9 APPENDIX .............................................................................................................................................. 130

1 Executive summary of the concept

1.2 Integration of intelligence with complementary methods

1.3 Framing the problem

1.4 Diversity in the analytical process

1.5 Systems analysis and systems thinking

1.6 Components of the knowledge support concept

The Knowledge Request Management (KRM) component establishes a mechanism to access

• Presentation methods during briefings

2.3 Problem definition and challenges

2.3.1 Improve Information management

2.3.2 Lack of understanding concerning the conflict characteristics

Today and in the future we face:

2.3.3 Broaden Intelligence Analysis and processing

2.3.4 Improve the Process integration within the HQ

2.3.5 Some additional challenges/problem areas

2.6 Project timeline

Realisation phase from - from June 2008 to Nov 2008.

Experiment phase - from Oct 2008 to Nov 2008

Concept development phase - from December 2008 to June 2009

Experiment phase - from June 2008 to Nov 2009

Evaluation and assessment phase - from Dec 2009 to Feb 2010

2.7 Project deliverables

• Technical configurations and lessons learned from experiments

2.8 Expected Gain

2.8.1 Increased ability to retrieve already gathered data, information and

2.8.2 Improved understanding of the operational environment

2.8.3 Improved Quality of Operations

3.1 About data, information and knowledge

– A collection of data is not information

3.2 Implicit, explicit & tacit knowledge

• Content: relates to what the object contains

3.4 Knowledge Base

A knowledge base is NOT to be understood as a database of any kind, rather it is an abstract

MN KB = physical archive +digital content + human resources

4 Theoretical foundations of the concept

4.1 Introduction to the concept

o KRM has a coordinating role in the overall KS process.

• Knowledge Visualisation (KV), which encompasses techniques for visualisation of knowledge

4.2 Understanding new environments and handling their conse-

Figure 2. Number of Armed Conflicts by Type, 1946-2004 (Harbom, Wallensteen 2005:625)

4.2.1 Key aspects of Manoeuvre warfare and Mission command

4.2.2 Intelligence and manoeuvre warfare

4.3 Effects-based approach to operations (EBAO)

“Joint operations against contemporary adversaries require unity of effort

“the cumulative consequence of one or more actions across the engage-

4.4 Knowledge, systems analysis and systems thinking

Figure 1. A paradoxical fusion of perspectives

Organizations operating in changing and complex environments are specifically vulnerable to

Systems thinking is an analytical cornerstone of the Swedish KS-concept. However, systems

Separate phenomena Systemic Holistic

Figure 1: The systemic perspective

4.5 Handling uncertainty

timately strategic, purposes. On higher levels of command, uncertainty is also absorbed by

4.5.1 Balancing the need to specialize with the needs to integrate