G.R. No.
L-13484 May 20, 1960 one offense, namely, that of sedition, defined in Article 139 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
DOMINADOR CAMERINO, MANUEL PAKINGAN, CRISANTO SARATAN, BIENVENIDO OSTERIA,
ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Actg. Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Eriberto D. Ignacio for appellant.
Avelino A. Velasco for appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Dominador Camerino and eighty-six others were accused before the Court of First Instance of Cavite of
the crime of sedition, said to have been committed on or about and during the period comprised by and
between the months of October, 1953, to November 15, 1953 and for sometime prior thereto; under an
information charging conspiracy among the said accused in having allegedly perpetrated for political
and social ends, insistent, repeated and continuous acts of hate, terrorism and revenge against private
persons, leaders, members and sympathizers of the Nacionalista Party in the town of Bacoor, Cavite,
and frustrating by force, threats and violence, and intimidation the free expression of the popular will in
the election held on November 10, 1953. The information described in detail the manner in which the
alleged seditious acts were performed, specifying the dates and the places where they were committed
and the persons who were victims thereof, under fourteen different overt acts of sedition. Before
arraignment, forty-eight of the
eighty-seven accused, headed by Dominador Camerino, filed a motion to quash the information on the
ground of double jeopardy, claiming in support thereof that they had been previously convicted or been
in jeopardy of being convicted and/or acquitted of the offense charged in other cases of the same
nature before the court.
The Assistant Provincial Fiscal filed written opposition to the motion, saying that although it was alleged
in the information that the accused had been charged with various crimes under different and separate
informations, that would not place them in double jeopardy, because those previous charges were
being specified in the information only as a bill of particulars for the purpose of describing in detail the
offense of sedition, but not to hold the defendants liable for punishment under said separate and
different specifications; in other words, the specifications describing separate crimes were alleged in the
information merely to complete the narration of facts which constitute the crime of sedition.
Later, all the accused filed a supplemental motion to quash, raising as additional grounds that more
than one offense was charged, and that the criminal action or liability of said defendants had been
extinguished.
On March 14, 1956, the trial court issued an order sustaining the reasons of the motion to quash and
dismissing the information on the grounds:(1) that the information charged more than one offense, (2)
that it was vague, ambiguous and uncertain, (3) that it described crimes for which some of the accused
had either been convicted or acquitted, and (4) some violation of the election law described in the
specification had already prescribed. A motion for reconsideration filed by the Fiscal was denied. The
Government is appealing from that order of dismissal, as well as the order denying the motion for
reconsideration.
In determining the present appeal, we deem it necessary to discuss only the first ground of the
dismissal of the information by the trial court, namely, multiplicity of offenses, that is to say, that the
information allegedly charged more than one offense. We agree with the Provincial Fiscal and the
Solicitor General representing the Government that the accused herein were being charged only with
Commonwealth Act No. 202, and penalized under Article 140 of the same code. the fourteen different
acts or specifications charging some or all of the accused with having committed the offenses charged
therein, were included in the information merely to describe and to narrate the different and specific
acts the sum total of which constitutes the crime of sedition. Different and separate acts constituting
different and separate offenses may serve as a basis for prosecuting the accused to hold them
criminally liable for said different offenses. Yet, those different acts of offenses may serve merely as a
basis for the prosecution of one single offense like that of sedition. For instance, one may be accused
of sedition, and at the same time be prosecuted under another information for murder or homicide as
the case may be, if the killing was done in pursuance of and to carry out the acts constituting sedition.
In case of the People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil., 64, this Tribunal said:
The nearest analogy to the two crimes of murder and sedition growing out of practically the
same facts, which can be found in the American authorities, relate to the crimes of assault
and riot or unlawful assembly. A majority of the American courts have held that the offense of
unlawful assembly and riot and the offense of assault and battery are distinct offense; and
that conviction or an acquittal for either does not bar a prosecution for other offense, even
though based on the same acts. (Freeland vs. People (1855), 16 Ill., 380; U.S. vs. Peaco
(1835), 27 Fed. Cas., 477; People vs. Vasquez (1905), 9 Puerto Rico, 488; contra, State vs.
Lindsay (18868), 61 N.C., 458.)
It is merely stating the obvious to say that sedition is not the same offense as murder.
Sedition is a crime against public order; murder is a crime against persons. Sedition is a
crime directed against the existence of the State, the authority of the government, and the
general public tranquility; murder is a crime directed against the lives of individuals. (U.S. vs.
Abad [1902], 1 Phil., 437.) Sedition in its more general sense is the raising of commotions or
disturbances in the state; murder at common law is where a person of sound mind and
discretion unlawfully kills any human being, in the peace of the sovereign, with malice
aforethought, express or implied.
The offenses charged in the two informations for sedition and murder are perfectly distinct in
point of law however nearly they may be connected in point of fact. Not alone are the
offenses eonomine different, but the allegations in the body of the informations are different.
The gist of the information for sedition is the public and tumultuous uprising of the
constabulary in order to attain by force and outside of legal methods the object of inflicting an
act of hate and revenge upon the persons of the police force of the city of Manila by firing at
them in several places in the city of Manila; the gist of the information in the murder case is
that the Constabulary, conspiring together, illegally and criminally killed eight persons and
gravely wounded three others. The crimes of the murder and serious physical injuries were
not necessarily included in the information for sedition; and the defendants could not have
been convicted of these crimes under the first information.
In the case of U.S. vs. Cernias, 10 Phil., 682, this Court held that while it is true that each of those acts
charged against the conspirators was itself a crime, the prosecutor in setting them out in the information
did no more than to furnish the defendants with a bill of particulars of the facts which it intended to
prove at the trial, not only as a basis upon which to be found an inference of guilt of the crime of
conspiracy but also as evidence of the extremely dangerous and wicked nature of that conspiracy.
The charge is not defective for duplicity when one single crime is set forth in different modes
prescribed by law for its commission, or the felony is set forth under different counts
specifying the way of its perpetuation, or the acts resulted from a single criminal impulse.
Neither is there duplicity when the other offense described is but an ingredient or an essential
element of the real offense charged nor when several acts are related in describing the
offense. (Padilla: Criminal Procedure Annotated, 1959 ed., p. 101).
In the case of People vs. Bacolod, 89 Phil., 621, the defendant therein was convicted on a plea of guilty The facts are briefly restated as follows:
of physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Based on the same facts, he was also accused of
having caused public disturbance. The plea of double jeopardy interposed by the accused was rejected
Private offended parties Elpidio Simon, Moises de la Cruz, Wenefredo Maniscan, Renato
on the ground that the two offenses were not the same, although they arose from the same act.
Militante and Crisanto Pelias are members of the Regional Special Operations Group
(RSOG) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Tacloban City. On
Following the reasoning of the trial court that more than one offense was charged, the trial court should September 1, 1997, they, together with SPO3 Andres B. Cinco, Jr. and SPO1 Rufo
have ordered that the information be amended, or if that was not possible, that a new information be Capoquian of the Philippine National Police Regional Intelligence Group, were sent to the
filed. Island of Daram, Western Samar to conduct intelligence operations on possible illegal
logging activities. At around 4:30-5:00 p.m., the team found two boats measuring 18
Under section 2 of this Rule, the Court may deny or sustain the motion to quash but may not meters in length and 5 meters in breadth being constructed at Barangay Locob-Locob.
defer it till the trial of the case on the merits. In sustaining the motion, the court may order the There they met petitioner Benito Astorga, the Mayor of Daram, who turned out to be the
filing of a new information or may dismiss the case. In the new information, the defects of the owner of the boats. A heated altercation ensued between petitioner and the DENR team.
previous information may be cured. For instance, if the motion to quash is sustained on the Petitioner called for reinforcements and, moments later, a boat bearing ten armed men,
ground that more than one offense is charged in the information, the court may order that some wearing fatigues, arrived at the scene. The DENR team was then brought to
another information be filed charging only one offense. But the court may or may not issue petitioner's house in Daram, where they had dinner and drinks. The team left at 2:00 a.m.
such order in the exercise of its discretion. The order may be made if the defects found in the
first information may be cured in a new information. If the order is made, the accused, if he is
On the basis of the foregoing facts, petitioner was charged with and convicted of Arbitrary
in custody, should not be discharged, unless otherwise, admitted to bail. But if no such order
Detention by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986. On Petition for Review , we
is made, or, having been made, the prosecuting attorney fails to file another information
rendered judgment as follows:
within the time specified by the court, the accused, if in custody must be discharged, unless
he is also in custody for another charge, or if is out on bail, the bail must be exonerated. In
such event, however, the fiscal is free to institute another criminal proceeding since such
ground of objection is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense. (Moran, WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1957 ed., Vol. II, pp. 778-779).
the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No., dated July 5, 2001 finding petitioner BENITO
In conclusion, we hold that the information filed in this case did not charged more than one offense but
ASTORGA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and
only that of sedition; that in specifying the separate and different criminal acts attributed to the
defendants, it was not the purpose or intention of the Government to hold them criminally liable in the
sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) months of arresto
present proceedings, but merely to complete the narration of facts, though specifying different offenses
which as a whole, supposedly constitute the crime of sedition. Consequently, we believe that the
mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as
information is valid.
maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.
We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other points raised in the appeal.

In view of the foregoing, the appealed orders are hereby set aside and the case is hereby remanded to Costs de oficio.
the trial court of further proceedings, without pronouncement as to costs.

SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 154130 : August 20, 2004] Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied with finality on January 12,
2004.1 Petitioner then filed an "Urgent Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for
Reconsideration"2 with attached "Motion for Reconsideration,"3 wherein he makes the
BENITO ASTORGA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. following submissions:

RESOLUTION
1. THE ARMED MEN WERE NOT SUMMONED BY PETITIONER FOR THE PURPOSE OF
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
DETAINING THE PRIVATE OFFENDED PARTIES;
On October 1, 2003, we rendered a Decision in this case affirming petitioner's conviction
by the Sandiganbayan of the crime of Arbitrary Detention. Petitioner now seeks a
reconsideration of our Decision.
2. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE SUPPOSED VICTIMS INSISTED ON LEAVING THE 3. That the detention is without legal grounds.8

PLACE WHERE THEY WERE SUPPOSED TO BE DETAINED;
3. THE SUPPOSED VICTIMS THEMSELVES HAVE DECLARED THE INNOCENCE OF THE
PETITIONER;
4. CRIMINAL INTENT ON THE PART OF THE ACCUSED IS CLEARLY WANTING IN THE
The determinative factor in Arbitrary Detention, in the absence of actual physical restraint,
is fear. After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no proof that petitioner
instilled fear in the minds of the private offended parties.
Indeed, we fail to discern any element of fear from the narration of SPO1 Rufo Capoquian,
the police officer who escorted the DENR Team during their mission. On the contrary,
what appears is that petitioner, being then a municipal mayor, merely extended his
hospitality and entertained the DENR Team in his house. SPO1 Capoquian testified thus:

INSTANT CASE.4
ATTY. JUMAMIL:

Subsequently, petitioner filed a Supplement to the Second Motion for Reconsideration.5

q After Bagacay you arrived in what barangay in Daram?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The prosecution was required to comment on petitioner's second Motion for
Reconsideration and the Supplement thereto.
a We were on our way to Barangay Sta. Rita in Daram but on our way we saw a boat
We find the grounds raised by the second Motion for Reconsideration well-taken.6
being constructed there so we proceeded to Barangay Lucodlucod (sic).
While a second motion for reconsideration is, as a general rule, a prohibited pleading, it is
within the sound discretion of the Court to admit the same, provided it is filed with prior
leave whenever substantive justice may be better served thereby. q And you arrived at 5:00 o'clock?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. a Yes sir.

They were conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the court in the dispensation of
q And you left at 2:00 o'clock in the morning of September
justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In
2?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by

the norm that on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights,
a Yes sir.
and not the other way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate

rather than promote justice, it is always within our power to suspend the rules, or except q And you ate dinner between 5:00 o'clock to 2:00 o'clock in the morning of

a particular case from its operation.7 September 2, is that correct?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The elements of the crime of Arbitrary Detention are:

a Yes sir. Mayor Astorga told us let us have dinner.

1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.

q And Mayor Astorga brought you to a house where you had

dinner?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
2. That he detains a person.
a Yes sir. ATTY. JUMAMIL:

q And of course you also partook of wine?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary q It was raining at that time, is that correct?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

a I know they had wine but with respect to us we had no wine sir. a Yes sir it was raining.

xxx xxx xxx q And the weather was not good for motorized travel at that particular time that you

were in Lucoblucob, Daram?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

AJ NARIO:

a I know it is raining but I could not say that you could not travel.
q While you were taking your dinner from 7 to 8:00 o'clock Mayor Astorga was with

you having dinner?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary q What was the condition of the sea at that time when you were in

Lucoblucob?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
a Yes Your Honor.

a The sea was good in fact we did not get wet and there were no waves at that time.
q You did not hear the conversation between the Mayor and the foresters, the

complainants here?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary q But it was raining the whole day?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

a I could not hear anything important because they were just laughing. a It was not raining at the day but after we ate in the evening it rained.

xxx xxx xxx q It was raining hard in fact after 8:00 p.m. up to 1:00 o'clock in the morning is that

correct?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AJ PALATTAO:

a A little bit hard I don't know when the rain stopped, sir.
q And then according to you there was laughter what was the cause of this

laughter?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary q It is possible that it rain.. the rain stopped at 1:00 o'clock in the morning of

September 2?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
a Probably they were talking of something humorous.9

The testimonial evidence likewise shows that there was no actual restraint imposed on the a I don't remember sir.
private offended parties. SPO1 Capoquian in fact testified that they were free to leave the
house and roam around the barangay. Furthermore, he admitted that it was raining at
that time. Hence, it is possible that petitioner prevented the team from leaving the island xxx xxx xxx
because it was unsafe for them to travel by boat.
AJ PALATTAO: q On your part according to you you can go places if you want although in your

impression you cannot leave the barangay. How about the other companions like Mr.
q Were you told not to go away from the place?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Simon, Cruz and Maniscan, can they leave the place?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

a No Your Honor.
a No Your Honor.

q Up to what point did you reach when you were allegedly prevented to go
q Why are you very positive that in your case you can leave but in the case of those I
somewhere?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
have enumerated they cannot, why?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

a They did not say anything sir.

a If only in that barangay we can leave, Your Honor.10

q Where did you go after that?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Mr. Elpidio Simon, one of the private offended parties, took the witness stand on August

16, 2000 but did not complete his testimony-in-chief due to lack of material time. His
a Just down until it rained.
testimony only covered preliminary matters and did not touch on the circumstances of the

q If you want to go, let us say, you want to leave that place, on your part, was there alleged detention.11

somebody prevented you to go to another place?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

On August 23, 2000, all the private offended parties, namely, Elpidio E. Simon, Moises de
la Cruz, Renato Militante, Crisanto Pelias and Wenefredo Maniscan, executed a Joint
Affidavit of Desistance stating, in pertinent part:
a I don't know Your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx;

q But on your part can you just leave that place or somebody will prevent you to go

somewhere else?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
6. That what transpired may have been caused by human limitation aggravated by the

exhaustion of the team in scouring the shores of the small islands of Samar for several
a What I felt I will not be able to leave because we were already told not to leave the
days. Mayor Benito Astorga may have also been confronted with the same predicament,
barangay.
hence our confrontation resulted to a heated argument and the eventual

q In other words, you can go places in that barangay but you are not supposed to misunderstanding;

leave that barangay, is this Barangay Daram?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

7. Considering that he is the local Chief Executive of the Municipality of Daram, Samar our

a Barangay Lucoblucob, Your Honor. respect for him prevailed when he ordered us to take dinner with him and other local

residents thereat, so we capitulated whose invitation was misinterpreted by us;


8. That thereafter, a natural and spontaneous conversation between the team and the
group of Mayor Astorga during the dinner and we were eventually allowed to leave Daram,
Samar;
9. That upon our return to our respective official stations we reported the incident to our
supervisors who required us to submit our affidavit;
10. That at present our differences had already been reconciled and both parties had
already express apologies and are personally no longer interested to pursue the case
against the Mayor, hence, this affidavit of desistance;
xxx xxx xxx.12
Thereafter, the private offended parties did not appear anymore in court to testify. This
notwithstanding, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner of the crime of Arbitrary
Detention on the basis of the testimonies of SPO1 Capoquian and SPO3 Cinco, the police
escorts of the DENR Team.
The quoted portions of SPO1 Capoquian's testimony negate the element of detention.
More importantly, fear is a state of mind and is necessarily subjective.13 Addressed to the
mind of the victim, its presence cannot be tested by any hard-and-fast rule but must
instead be viewed in the light of the perception and judgment of the victim at the time of
the crime.14 As such, SPO1 Capoquian and SPO3 Cinco, not being victims, were not
competent to testify on whether or not fear existed in the minds of the private offended
parties herein. It was thus error for the Sandiganbayan to have relied on their testimonies
in convicting petitioner.
Verily, the circumstances brought out by SPO1 Capoquian created a reasonable doubt as
to whether petitioner detained the DENR Team against their consent. The events that
transpired are, to be sure, capable to two interpretations. While it may support the
proposition that the private offended parties were taken to petitioner's house and
prevented from leaving until 2:00 a.m. the next morning, it is equally plausible, if not
more so, that petitioner extended his hospitality and served dinner and drinks to the team
at his house. He could have advised them to stay on the island inasmuch as sea travel
was rendered unsafe by the heavy rains. He ate together with the private offended parties
and even laughed with them while conversing over dinner. This scenario is inconsistent
with a hostile confrontation between the parties. Moreover, considering that the Mayor
also served alcoholic drinks, it is not at all unusual that his guests left the house at 2:00
a.m. the following morning.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved.15 He is entitled to an acquittal unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding
possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that
degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.16
As held in several cases, when the guilt of the accused has not been proven with moral
certainty, the presumption of innocence of the accused must be sustained and his
exoneration be granted as a matter of right. For the prosecution's evidence must stand or
fall on its own merit and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence for the defense.17 Furthermore, where the evidence for the prosecution is
concededly weak, even if the evidence for defense is also weak, the accused must be duly
accorded the benefit of the doubt in view of the constitutional presumption of innocence
that an accused enjoys. When the circumstances are capable of two or more inferences,
as in this case, one of which is consistent with the presumption of innocence while the
other is compatible with guilt, the presumption of innocence must prevail and the court
must acquit. It is better to acquit a guilty man than to convict an innocent man.18
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated October 1, 2003
is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The appealed judgment of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 24986 is REVERSED. Petitioner Benito Astorga is ACQUITTED of the
crime of Arbitrary Detention on the ground of reasonable doubt.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 70748 October 21, 1985
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF LAURENTE C. ILAGAN,
ANTONIO B. ARELLANO, and MARCOS D. RISONAR, JR., Integrated Bar of the Philippines
[IBP]; Free Legal Assistance Group [FLAG] and Movement of Attorneys For Brotherhood,
Integrity and Nationalism, Inc., [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Minister of National Defense; LT. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, Acting
Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines; BRIG. GEN. DIONISIO TAN-GATUE, PC-INP
Regional Commander for Region XI, Camp Catitipan, Davao City, respondents.
Roberto Concepcion, Jose B.L. Reyes, Raul S. Goco, Joker Arroyo, Haydee Yorac, Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Francisco I. Chavez , Lorenzo M. Tañada, Wigberto Tañada and Martiniano Vivo for
petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This is a petition for Habeas Corpus filed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), the Free Legal
Assistance Group (FLAG); and the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism
(MABINI) on behalf of Attorneys Laurente C. Ilagan, Antonio B. Arellano, and Marcos Risonar, Jr.
The facts follow:
On May 10, 1985, Attorney Laurente C. Ilagan was arrested in Davao City by elements of the PC-INP
and detained at Camp Catitipan on the basis of a Mission Order allegedly issued by the Ministry of
National Defense. On that same day, fifteen lawyers from the IBP Davao Chapter visited Atty. Ilagan.
One of the visiting lawyers, Atty. Antonio Arellano, was also arrested and detained on the basis of an
unsigned Mission Order. On May 13, 1985, the military sent word to the IBP Davao Chapter that
Attorney Marcos Risonar would likewise be arrested. The latter went to Camp Catitipan to verify his
arrest papers and was detained on the basis of a Mission Order signed by General Echavarria,
Regional Unified Commander.
This petition for habeas corpus was then filed by and on behalf of the three arrested lawyers hereinafter
referred to as the detained attorneys on the ground that their arrests were illegal and violative of the
Constitution, since arrests cannot be made on the basis of Mission Orders. and that there appears to be
a military campaign to harass lawyers involved in national security cases.
On May 16, 1985, the Court issued the Writ, required a Return, and set the petition for hearing on May
23, 1985.
In their Return, respondents contended that the detained attorneys were arrested on the basis of a PDA
issued by the President on January 25, 1985; that the Writ of habeas corpus is suspended as to them
by virtue of Proclamation No. 2045-A; and that pursuant to the ruling in Garcia-Padilla vs. Ponce Enrile,
et al, 1 Courts lack the authority to inquire into the cause and validity of detention of persons held
pursuant to the suspension. Respondents further expounded on the state of rebellion in Davao City on
the basis of seized subversive documents, implying that the detained attorneys played active roles in
organizing mass actions of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front.
Respondents then prayed for the denial of the petition.
During the hearing on May 23, 1985, the detained attorneys narrated to the Court the circumstances of
their arrest and detention. Counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, presented evidence of
subversive activities in Davao, but due to lack of evidence linking the detained attorneys with the
alleged subversive activities, the Court, on the same day resolved to order the temporary release of the
detained attorneys on the recognizance of the principal counsel of petitioner's, namely, retired Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion and retired Associate Justice J.B.L. Reyes. The Court further resolved to
give petitioners ten days within which to file a traverse to the Return of the Writ and the respondents ten
days to file a Reply thereto.
The next day, or on May 24, 1985, petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion stating that the detained
attorneys had not yet been released and praying that they be released to the custody of the principal
counsel of petioners at the Supreme Court.
On May 27, 1985, respondents filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's Order of
Release reiterating that the suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus has the effect of ousting the Court
of its jurisdiction to hear the case, and attached thereto classified documents consisting of the Report of
respondent Brig. Gen. Tan-Gatue stating that the detained attorneys "were arrested not on the basis of
their 'lawyering' but for specific acts of rebellion and economic sabotage as well as for their leadership
in the CPP" ... "even to the extent of attending CPP and NPA rites and using their profession as lawyers
as cover-up for their activities in furtherance of CPP goals and objectives;" and that the detained
attorneys were involved in the Welgang Bayan in Davao City, a mass action "with demands for the
armed overthrow of the government." Sworn statements of several persons also implicated the detained
attorneys in alleged subversive activities. Respondents added that, while there is a Court Order
directing release, they, too, are under orders, pursuant to the PDA, to hold in custody the detained
attorneys until ordered released by the President or by his duly authorized representative, and that the
PDA, when issued, constitutes authority to preventively detain them for a period not exceeding one
year.
On May 28, 1985, respondents filed an Urgent Manifestation/Motion stating that an Information for
Rebellion was filed on May 27, 1985 against the detained attorneys before the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City, Branch X, docketed as Criminal Case No. 12,349; that a Warrant of Arrest had been issued
against them; and praying that this Petition be dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic.
On May 30, 1985, petitioners filed an Opposition to respondents' Urgent Motion/Manifestation
contending that since the detained attorneys were not given the benefit of preliminary investigation,
they were denied their constitutional right to due process; consequently, the Information for Rebellion
filed against them is void. Respondents, on the other hand, filed on the same day a Comment to
petitioners' Manifestation and Motion reiterating their prayer for the dismissal of the petition on the
ground of mootness by virtue of the proceedings before the Regional Trial Court of Davao.
On June 3, 1985, petitioners filed a consolidated Comment and Traverse contending that the "Welgang
Bayans" were in legitimate exercise of the constitutional right of expression and assembly to petition the
government for redress of grievances; that the detained attorneys' participation was limited to serving in
the legal panel and the negotiating panels; that Proclamation No. 2045 is unconstitutional because
there exists no factual or legal basis for the suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus as provided for in
the Constitution; that the evidence presented by respondents against the detained attorneys are of a
doubtful and flimsy nature; and that the PDA is unconstitutional because it violates Section 3, Article IV,
of the Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures.
On July 1, 1985, petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion praying that the Court immediately resolve
the issues raised as the case affects not only the detained attorneys but the entire legal profession and
the administration of justice as well.
Finally, after two extensions granted by the Court, on July 8, 1985, respondents filed a Consolidated
Reply, reiterating first, the validity of Proclamation No. 2045, as amended by Proclamation No. 2045-A
and of the PDA issued against petitioners as an incident to the suspension of the privilege of the Writ
of habeas corpus: secondly, the ruling in Garcia-Padilla vs. Ponce Enrile, et al.; 2 and thirdly, its prayer
for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of mootness by virtue of the filing of an Information for
Rebellion against the detained attorneys before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City .
As contended by respondents, the petition herein has been rendered moot and academic by virtue of
the filing of an Information against them for Rebellion, a capital offense, before the Regional Trial Court
of Davao City and the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against them. 3 The function of the special
proceeding of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's detention. Now that the detained
attorneys' incarceration is by virtue of a judicial order in relation to criminal cases subsequently filed
against them before the Regional Trial Couravao City, the remedy of habeas corpus no longer lies. The
Writ had served its purpose.4
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.-If it appears the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process
issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment, or order of a court of record,
and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the
judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction
appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of
any informality or defect in the process, judgment or order. Nor shall anything in
this rule be held to authorize to discharge of a person charged with or convicted of
an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment. (Rule 102)
If the detained attorneys question their detention because of improper arrest, or that no preliminary
investigati•n has been conducted, the remedy is not a petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus but a
Motion before the trial court to quash the Warrant of Arrest, and /or the Information on grounds provided
by the Rules or to ask for an investigation / reinvestigation of the case. 5 Habeas corpus would not lie
after the Warrant of commitment was issued by the Court on the basis of the Information filed against
the accused. 6 So is it explicitly provided for by Section. 14, Rule of 102 of the Rules of Court, reading:
SEC. 14. When person lawfully imprisoned recommitted and when let to bail.- If it
appears that the prisoner was lawfully committed, and is plainly and specifically
charged in the warrant of commitment with an offense punishable by death, he
shall not be released, discharged, or bailed. If he is lawfully imprisoned or
restrained on a charge of having committed an offense not so punishable, he may
be recommitted to imprisonment or admitted to bail in the discretion of the court or
judge. . . .
But petitioners submit that because of the absence of a preliminary investigation, the Information for
Rebellion filed against the detained attorneys is void and the Court below could not have acquired
jurisdiction over them, and consequently, they are entitled to release.
On the other hand, respondents contend that a preliminary investigation was unnecessary since the
detained attorneys were lawfully arrested without a warrant.
Pursuant to the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, no Information for an offense cognizable by the
Regional Trial Court shall be filed without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted,
except as provided for in Section 7 of Rule 112. 7 The Information filed by the City Fiscal before the
Regional Trial Court of the City of Davao fell within the exception. Thus, the Verification reads:
VERIFICATION
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am filing this Information in pursuance with Rule 112,
Section 7 of the 1985 Rules on criminal Procedure, wherein after examining the
affidavits of the government witnesses and other documents attached to the
records, I found sufficient ground to hold respondents for trial.
(SGD.) EMMANUEL E. GALICIA
City Fiscal
Section 7, Rule 112, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure above referred to provides:
SEC. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant.- When a person is
lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court the complaint or information may be filed by the offended party, peace officer
or fiscal without preliminary investigation having been first conducted on the basis
of the affidavit of the offended party or arrested officer or person.
However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested
may ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this
Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-
availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his choice. Notwithstanding such
waiver, he may apply for bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the
investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been
first conducted, the accused may within five (5) days from the time he learns of the
filing of the information, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to
adduce evidence in his favor in the manner prescribed in this Rule.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the same Rules enumerates the instances when an arrest without warrant is
lawful.
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs [al and [b] hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall
be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. (Rule 113)
Paragraphs (a) and (b) refer to cases when a suspect is caught in flagrante delicto or immediately
thereafter, while paragraph (c) refers to escaping prisoners. As to whether the detained attorneys fall
under either of the first two instances enumerated is a question of fact, which will need the presentation
of evidence and is more properly within the province of the trial Court.
The question of absence of a proper preliminary investigation is also better inquired into by the Court
below. When so raised, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, has held that the
trial Court is called upon "not to dismiss the information but hold the case in abeyance and conduct its
own investigation or require the fiscal to hold a reinvestigation. 8 As stressed in People vs. Casiano, 1
SCRA 478 [1961], this is the proper procedure since the "absence of such investigation did not impair
the validity of the Information or otherwise render it defective. Much less did it affect the jurisdiction of
the Court of First Instance". 9 The right to a preliminary investigation, being waivable, does not argue
against the validity of the proceedings, the most that could have been done being to remand the case in
order that such investigation could be conducted. 10
... The proper forum before which absence of preliminary investigation should be
ventilated is the Court of First Instance, not this Court. Reason is not wanting for
this view. Absence of preliminary investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the
court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings. It could even be waived.
Indeed, it is frequently waived. These are matters to be inquired into by the trial
court, not an appellate Court. 11
The Nolasco case, which petitioners invoke, 12 wherein this Court ordered the release of two of the
accused, is not on all fours with the case at bar as, in that case, the accused were charged only with
Illegal Possession of Subversive documents under Presidential Decree No. 33, which is punishable
by prision correccional in its minimum period, and the trial Court had granted bail; whereas in this case,
petitioners are charged with the capital offense of Rebellion, and the trial Court has not allowed bail.
WHEREFORE, this petition for Habeas Corpus is hereby dismissed for having become moot and
academic. Petitioners are now detained by virtue of a Warrant of Arrest issued by the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City in relation to the criminal case for Rebellion filed against them before said Court.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, C.J., Plana, Escolin Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., concur in the result
Separate Opinions
I wish to express my views on other aspects of this case with which the majority does not concur.
It is to be noted that in the Warrant of Arrest issued by the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Davao City "no bail" has been indicated. Neither was bail recommended by the City Fiscal. However,
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1834, even as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1974 (May 2,
1985), the crime of Rebellion is still punishable by "reclusion perpetua to death." Presidential Decree
No. 1974 did not reduce the penalty for Rebellion under Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1834, but merely "tempered" the penalties for "conspiracy or
proposal or inciting to commit such crimes," limiting the amended provisions to Articles 136, 138, 141,
142, 142-B, 143, 144, 146, and 147, but not to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code.
Considering, therefore, that the detained attorneys are not entitled to bail as a matter of right before the
prosecution is heard on its evidence, and observing fealty to the Constitutional mandate that "all
persons, except those charged with capital offenses, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties" (Section 18, Article IV, 1973 Constitution), the Regional
Trial Court of Davao City, Branch X, should be directed in Criminal Case No. 12,349, to determine
whether the evidence of guilt against the detained attorneys is strong, and considering the gravity of the
offense charged, it should likewise be required to hear the case to completion with deliberate speed so
that their guilt or innocence may be determined without delay.
Furthermore, pending resolution by this Court of the crucial issues raised in Garcia-Padilla and
in Integrated Bar of the Philippines, et al vs. Min. Juan Ponce Enrile, et al. (G.R. No. 66610)
consolidated with National Bar Association of the Philippines, et all vs. Min. Juan Ponce Enrile, et
al. (G.R. No. 66706), it is my view that individuals against whom PDA's have been issued should be
furnished with the original, or the duplicate original, or a certified true copy issued by the official having
official custody of the PDA, at the time of apprehension. Pursuant to the Rules and Regulations
Implementing Presidential Decree No. 1877, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1877-A, the
PDA's should also be enforced within 24 hours in the Metro Manila area or within 48 hours outside
Metro Manila, upon receipt by the unit concerned. In this case, although the record does not show such
date of receipt, the fact is that the PDA was issued on January 25, 1985 but the detained attorneys
were arrested only on May 10 and 13, 1985, respectively. The four-month gap can give room for doubt
as to its authenticity and whether, in fact, the detained attorneys posed "any appreciable danger to
national security and public order. "
The paramount consideration should be that the Constitutional "right of the people to be secure in their
persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
not be violated" (Section 3, Article IV, 1973 Constitution). Until the issue of the validity of the PDA is
finally resolved, PDA's applied for on the basis of militancy alone in national security cases, of
insufficient surveillance, or unsupported deductions and inferences, contravene the Constitutional
mandate that "no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
Judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce" (ibid.). Adherence to Constitutional
mandates could ease the current discontent and growing insurgency gripping the nation today. The
objective should be to fight for the hearts and minds of the people by observing the rule of law.
Lastly I venture to invite attention, particularized for this case, that the Constitution provides for the
vesting of judicial power not only in this Court but also in inferior Courts established by law. While this
Court can reverse and modify, on appeal or certiorari, actuations of inferior Courts, the latter, as
wielders of judicial power, can not only invoke, but also be entitled to, "procedural due process".
Without a hearing, howsoever formal, the involved Regional Trial Court branch in Davao City should not
be deprived of jurisdiction, substantial or even initial, over persons it has ordered, or confirmed as,
arrested.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting
More than four (4) agonizing months * after this Court issued its near-unanimous Resolution 1 of May
23, 1985, after hearing the parties in oral argument in the morning, ordering the immediate release of
the three petitioners-detainees, Attys. Laurente C. Ilagan, Antonio B. Arellano and Marcos D. Risonar,
Jr., on the recognizance of their principal counsel, retired Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, Chairman,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines national legal aid committee, and retired Justice Jose B. L. Reyes,
President Emeritus of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as the president and officers of their
own IBP Davao chapter, which release it had expressly ordered to be "immediately executory", this
Court has now refused to enforce its own release order. Repeated motions for enforcement of this
Court's "immediately executory" order of release as against respondents' "brazen disrespect and
contemptous disregard" 2 thereof were filed in vain. It has instead dismissed the petition for habeas
corpus for having become "moot and academic, " because of the arbitrary filing of precipitate, vindictive
and oppressive charges against them for the capital crime of rebellion without hearing or preliminary
investigation and in gross violation of their constitutional right and rudimentary requirements of due
process and fair play.
I. Antecedent Facts.—The three lawyers, Attys. Ilagan, Arellano and Risonar, Jr., FLAG (Free Legal
Assistance Group) human rights lawyers of Davao City, were illegally arrested and brought to the
military stockade at Camp Catitipan, Davao City one after the other on May 10, 11 and 13, 1985, upon
mission orders issued by the prime mover and initiator of the operations, respondent General Dionisio
S. Tan-Guate, Jr. (hereinafter referred to as respondent general). The mission orders (which are
military orders for carrying out a specific mission or military operations) are not warrants of arrest, much
less Preventive Detention Actions (PDA's). The orders did not state what were the offenses allegedly
committed, although indicating that they were being issued pursuant to a PDA, which was never
shown nor produced by respondent general until a xerox copy thereof dated as early as January 25,
1985 was submitted with the respondents' return to the writ. No copy thereof was given the petitioners
nor were they given any reason for which the three lawyers were taken into military custody.
The first lawyer, Atty. Ilagan, was picked up at 10:45 a.m. on May 10th while taking a snack with some
friends at a place in front of his office at C.M. Recto St. His military arrestors denied his request to be
allowed to go to his office "a few meters away" so he could give instructions to his associates about a
case scheduled for hearing that afternoon.3 The second lawyer, Atty, Arellano, a law professor at the
Ateneo de Davao law school, was one of fifteen IBP Davao Chapter lawyers who insisted on visiting
Atty. Ilagan at the military camp on May 11th despite the military custodians' initial refusals that no
visitors could be allowed "unless first cleared by R-2 (intelligence) or Gen. Tan-Guates aide." After the
visit, he was told that he was under arrest under the mission order which was merely shown to him and
he was no longer all owed to leave the camp. As he told the Court: "I just (went) to visit my colleague, a
member of the IBP, to render legal assistance as I'm supposed to do as an officer of the Court. I came
to visit, I came to render legal assistance. I was arrested and detained." 4 On May 13th, the third lawyer,
Atty. Risonar, Jr.. having received word from the military that he was wanted, presented himself at
Camp Catitipan. He was not shown even the mission order, much less a PDA or warrant of arrest. He
was so shaken up by the traumatic experience of being himself wanted and arrested by the military (not
having been given even a traffic violation ticket in his whole life) instead of his accustomed role of
helping hapless persons who have come across their path and assisting as a member of the Human
Rights Committee "not only political detainees, but workers, students, teachers and urban community"
that he almost broke down at the hearing and had to be asked to take firm hold of himself. 5
After the filing of the petition at bar and the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus to produce in court the
persons of the three lawyers at the scheduled May 23rd hearing, they were transferred at 10 p.m. of the
night of May 20th to the Metro-Discom stockade in Davao City and herded with a fourth person in a
cramped cell, "a very small cell good only for 2 people. " The next day, they were picked up by "2 PC
jeeps loaded with fully armed men" and in the words of Atty. Arellano, "in the presence of the detainees
in the stockade, ... many of whom are my clients and in the presence of their visitors, ... and in the
presence of our wives, ... we were handcuffed like ordinary criminals, and we were transported from
that stockade up to the airport and from the airport we were brought to Manila and then we were
brought to Camp Bicutan." 6 They have been since detained there, their lives shattered, uprooted from
their homes and families, and deprived of their livelihood and their families left to fend for themselves.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other petitioners complain in their verified petition that
"(B)eyond the harassment and the illegal arrest and detention of these three advocates, are grave
implications for the craft. Their arrest appears to be a prelude to a campaign to ultimately deprive the
accused in national security cases of the services of counsel in violation of the Constitution," citing "a
readily discernible pattern from events in the recent past" including the killings of FLAG Atty. Zorro C.
Aguilar and newsman Jacobo Amatong who gave an antemortem statement "that it was the military that
shot them" in Dipolog City on September 23, 1984 and the killing of Atty. Romraflo R. Taojo in his own
home in Tagum, Davao del Norte on April 2, 1985, who had been allegedly warned by the military about
the nature of the cases he was handling. The petition further cited the case of petitioner MABINI trustee
and co-founder Atty. Jojo Binay who was successful in having several criminal cases against his client
Dr. Nemesio Prudente dropped, but in April this year "found himself a co-respondent with his client Dr.
Prudente in a new subversion charge filed by the military with the provincial fiscal of Rizal. " Also cited
were the cases of Attys. Romeo Astudillo and Alberto Benesa both former IBP Abra chapter presidents
and Abra FLAG chairman and member, respectively, who in the same month of April this year "were
arrested by the military, charged with subversion, and presently confined at the Constabulary stockade
in Bangued, Abra, Since 1979, they were the only human rights lawyers in Bangued, Abra. Since their
arrest, there are no lawyers anymore handling such cases." 7 Between the two of them, they reportedly
handled a total of about 120 subversion cases and "not one of their clients was even convicted due to
'lack of evidence.' " 8
The petition quoted respondent general's press statement issued on May 10th that ... the arrest of
Ilagan, 'who had lately been engaged in human rights lawyering for suspected persons detained for
subversion, rebellion and other charges' was 'long overdue' (Business Day, May 13, 1985, p. 11)"9 and
the exertion of pressure upon other Davao human rights lawyers in this wise:
The tension mounted when another lawyer Silvestre Bello III, BAYAN national
organizing committee member, got word from Jesus Dureza President of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Davao del Sur chapter, that Estares was 'inviting'
Bello to Camp Catitipan. Bello, in an earlier interview, said they were assured by
Estares that in case they would be slapped with a PDA, they would not be picked
up like what happened to Ilagan but instead just 'be invited' to Camp Catitipan as in
Arellano case.
Estares, on the other hard, told Business Day they were just 'inviting' Bello to 'visit
his friends,' PC-INP regional commander, Dionisio Tan- Gatue also told newsmen
in a phone interview that he was just inviting Bello to visit him. Tan-Gatue however,
declined to comment on whether or not there will be more arrests in the next few
days. 'Just wait and see,' he said. (Business Day, May 13, 1985)
10
"The aforesaid report has been confirmed by the IBP Davao Chapter."
The petition, noting that "(T)hese trends are ominous for members of the Bar especially those who are
engaged in pro bono publico work who have incurred the ire of the military," 11 invoked the writ of
habeas corpus as the great writ of liberty on behalf of the three lawyers. IBP President Emeritus J.B.L.
Reyes made this eloquent plea against this Damocles' sword wielded by the military in that its value is
not that it falls but that it hangs, and it hangs over every lawyer at the present time, engaged or not in
the defense of anybody":
That is why, if Your Honors please, we have here all the representatives of the Bar
organizations because they are all threatened under this method that is being
adopted by the military, that anybody who thus ran against their Ideas of what a
citizen should do, becomes ipso facto suspect and ipso facto rebel or a subversive.
And that is the reason why we've come to this Court, because with all this publicity.
Even if only 3 or 5 lawyers are arrested all the others will be afraid. If Your Honors
will recall that we are arguing the constitutionality of this PDA, we happened to
quote from the United States Supreme Court, that the value of the Sword of
Damocles is not that it falls but that it hangs, and it hangs over every lawyer at the
present time, engaged or not in the defense of anybody How do we know how
many more lawyers will be in the future arrested. 12
Or as then Associate (now Chief) Justice Makasiar in 1980 stressed before the Philconsa against the
proposal then to return the administrative supervision of inferior courts from the Supreme Court to the
Ministry of Justice: "The warning has been issued that a tyrant, who wants complete and absolute
control over the people, will first seduce and eliminate the lawyers and thereafter destroy the courts.
This tragedy must be averted." 12-a
Respondents' return made the startling charge that the three lawyers (all practitioners of long good
standing since 1971, 1977 and 1976, family men and without any derogatory record) "have been
arrested and detained because of evidence that they are members of the Communist Party of the
Philippines or its partner, the National Democratic Front, and have been active in organizing mass
actions intended to further the communist cause," and "(I)n truth, the PDA against the three lawyers
was issued as early as January 25, 1985, shortly after the series of welgas conducted late in 1984. But,
with the President's knowledge and concurrence, the military in Region 11 tried to withhold its
implementation precisely in the hope that the need for such action would pass, forestalling a possible
misinterpretation of the government's motive in making the arrest. The situation in Southern Mindanao
has, however, deteriorated compelling the government to act swiftly, arrest the communist leaders
behind the welga and stem the tide of mass disturbance sweeping the area." 13 Ironically, while the
state attorneys specifically pleaded that there is evidence that the three lawyers are communists, yet
they invoke the Garcia Padilla ruling that "the Court may not inquire into it" 14 and that "because of the Q From whom did they come from, if you know.
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the Courts have no authority to look into this
evidence" 15 which led then Chief Justice Fernando to ask in exasperation:
ASST. SOLGEN:

CHIEF JUSTICE
A I was shown that by these Military Officers.

Q But what is the connection between them? You can always,

JUSTICE CUEVAS:
your pleading is quite extensive, but until now according to you
there is evidence but you are not at liberty to reveal that
evidence. What good will it do to the Court then? What is Q Newly prepared also or long existing?
their [the lawyers] connection with the acts that
are rebellious in character or subversive? That perhaps will
give the possibility [for] their continued detention? 16 ASST. SOLGEN:

Still, at the hearing of May 23rd, it was clearly stressed that notwithstanding that the PDA had been A Your Honor please, I . . . .
secured since January 25, 1985 by respondent general, supposedly "on the basis of evidence and
verified reports," when questioned why no information had been filed against them "considering that as JUSTICE CUEVAS:
early as January 25, 1985 there had been [allegedly] evidence that they had committed subversion, "
respondents assured the Court that the detained lawyers would be "entitled to a hearing ... when the
time comes that we file charges [which] will be decided by the prosecuting officer of the Q You answer positively because I'll ask them, when they were
government" (upon interpellation of Mr. Justice Relova and reply of Assistant Solicitor General Eduardo turned over to you were they newly prepared also? When were
G. Montenegro). 17 Respondents' counsel had at the hearing claimed that "these three lawyers they prepared?
companeros of mine are active members of the Communist Party of the Philippines, [as] witnesses we
have captured NPA's." He said that these statements given by former NPA's were shown him by ASST. SOLGEN:
military officers, but when questioned as to whether these states were "newly prepared also or long
existing, " he was specifically warned against swallowing hook, line and sinker" the assertions of
such professional witnesses and of the imperative necessity of conducting an independent A I do not remember the date now but I was reading it.
investigation, thus: Anyway, Your Honor, the reason why we did not attach this to
our return is this, that most of those . . . .

JUSTICE CUEVAS:
JUSTICE CUEVAS:

Q What (did) your evidence consist of ?

Q That is very very material, simply because there is rebellion
in the count I do not think it warrants the picking up of
ASST. SOLGEN: anybody?

A Statements given by former members of the New People ASST. SOLGEN:

Army in Davao Your Honor, there are NPA's who surrendered
and then subsequently . . .
A Yes, Your honor.

JUSTICE CUEVAS:
JUSTICE CUEVAS:

Q And these evidences were in your possession long prior to

the arrest and detention of these 3 lawyers? Q That is following up under your theory?

ASST. SOLGEN: ASST. SOLGEN.

A In our possession, Your Honor no, sir, because I saw them
only when we were preparing the return, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
A Yes, Your Honor, because the surrendered NPA's who gave
those statements, at least 3 of them, have not yet been
surfaced by the Government. Their Identity are still not to be
divulged because the Military is not through yet in its
investigation with respect to these people. So they are not to say on such and such a date Attorney Ilagan was in the
be mentioned. mountains; you have to check that out, you can't
just swallow on its own. There are so many of these
professional witnesses?
JUSTICE CUEVAS:

ASST. SOLGEN:
Q My theory because I had been a Fiscal also, Mr. Assistant
Solicitor General as you know, there are people who are, who
had the appetite of giving any kind of affidavit. In fact, I had A That may be true, Your Honor, there are professional
prosecuted an accused who is even willing to testify that he witnesses, Your Honor.
witnessed the shooting of Rizal in Luneta?
JUSTICE TEEHANKEE:
ASST. SOLGEN:
Q There are, you know that and we all know that.
A That may be true, Your Honor.
ASST. SOLGEN:
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
A Yes there are. Now, may I continue, Your Honor.
Q You should not swallow 'hook, line, and sinker,' that is our
apprehension in particular?
CHIEF JUSTICE FERNANDO:

ASST. SOLGEN:
A Yes, but please you must go directly. 18

A Yes, Your Honor. May I continue, Your Honor. Now, Atty.

CHIEF JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Ilagan, in particular

Q We've heard that before but again [what is] the connection
JUSTICE TEEHANKEE:
of these people?

Q This is an appropriate time I believe, what Justice Cuevas

SOLICITOR ABAD:
has mentioned was that, in other words, you brought these
affidavits?
A Well, the position of the Military is that ....
ASST. SOLGEN:
CHIEF JUSTICE FERNANDO:
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q They are human rights lawyers, they have
been defending several persons accused of crimes of . . . . and
JUSTICE TEEHANKEE:
they had been doing as members of the Bar. Now they are
picked up and apprehended, at least justify that.
Q But you have to check them out?
SOLICITOR ABAD:
ASST. SOLGEN:
A Well, I appreciate that, Your Honor please,
A Yes, Your Honor. anyone belonging to the middle forces who campaign in the
open to organize the populace for support to the revolution
must really have some front, because when it comes to a
JUSTICE TEEHANKEE:
revolution .

Q Check the background of these people and check out their

CHIEF JUSTICE FERNANDO:
assertions as against an independent investigation. As if they
 Q But again you say they are the front of these people,
where is the evidence to substantiate this conclusion? They
are all naked assertions thus far?
JUSTICE TEEHANKEE:
Q Mr. Counsel, your theory seems that anybody who joins in a
protest or a demonstration against grievances and abuses as
perceived by them is a . . . . joining this middle force is
a communist already?
SOLICITOR ABAD:
A That is certainly not our theory, Your Honor, that is not the
theory of the Government.19
After the hearing, and as already indicated, the Court ordered the immediate release of the three
lawyers-detainees on recognizance of their principal counsel per its Resolution of May 23rd, which it
expressly ordered to be "immediately executory. " But the camp commander at Camp Bagong Diwa did
not honor the Court's release order, saying that "it had to be verified from higher authorities." So,
petitioners filed their manifestation and motion on May 24th, reporting the non-release and praying that
the immediate release of the three lawyers on recognizance of their principal counsel be effected in the
premises of the Supreme Court, as had been done in previous past cases.
On the next day thereafter, May 25th, respondents filed an urgent motion for reconsideration, invoking
anew the Garcia-Padilla ruling 20 that the courts could not entertain petitions for habeas corpus of
persons detained under Presidential Commitment Orders (now supplanted by PDA's),
Without awaiting this Court's action on their aforesaid motion for reconsideration, respondents,
particularly respondent general, somehow got th City Fiscal of Davao City to precipitately file on May
27, 1985, without any preliminary investigation, an information against the three petitioners' lawyers for
the capital crime of rebellion with the Regional Trial Court of Davao, Branch X. 21 The said trial
court grossly disregarding the deference that all inferior courts should accord this Court as the highest
court of the land (since the military's equally gross disregard of this Court's May 23rd order for the
release of petitioners-lawyers was a matter of public notice, having been prominently reported in all
national and local newspapers) just as precipitately issued a warrant of arrest with no bail against said
petitioners-lawyers. Respondents then filed on May 28th their Urgent Manifestation/Motion, annexing
copies of the information and warrant of arrest, praying for the dismissal of the habeas corpus petition
at bar on the ground that it has become moot and academic.
In their required comment on the state's action, petitioners' lawyers stated that the fiscal misinvoked
section 7, Rule 112 which allows the filing of an information without preliminary investigation "when the
person is lawfully arrested without a warrant," i.e. in flagrante delicto (which is not the case here). They
asserted petitioners' constitutional right to due process and the right to a preliminary investigation as
granted by statute and expressly assured to them in open court at the May 23rd hearing. They
denounced the "cabal among military authorities and the prosecution arm of the government" with the
contumacious cooperation of the trial court to deprive them of due process and to circumvent this
Court's release order, as follows:
3.1. Preliminary investigation is instituted to secure the innocent against hasty,
malicious and oppressive prosecution and to protect him from an open and public
accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of public trial, and also
to protect the state from useless and expensive trials. The right to preliminary
investigation is a statutory grant and to withhold it would be to transgress
constitutional due process. Salonga v. Hon. Ernani Cruz Paño, G.R. No. 59254,
February 18, 1985, citing Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA 241; Hashim v. Boncam, 71
Phil. 216; People v. Oandasa, 25 SCRA 277.
3.2. Petitioners having been deprived of their constitutional right to due process by
the Fiscal of Davao, therefore, the information for rebellion filed against them is
void.
3.3. The information filed by the Fiscal of Davao being void, the Regional Trial
Court of Davao has acquired no jurisdiction over the case of rebellion filed against
petitioner. Therefore, all orders, warrants, processes, and issuances of the Court
relative to the case, including the warrant for their arrest, are issued without
authority and therefore null and void.
3.4. What becomes evident in the face of these developments is a cabal among
military authorities and the prosecution arm of the government to bend and short
circuit rules in order to deprive petitioners of their right to due process guaranteed
by the Constitution, and to circumvent the order of this Court for their release. It is
deplorable that the Regional Trial Court of Davao has lent itself to this conspiracy
to undermine the Constitution and the authority of this Court.
3.5. All proceedings and orders in connection with the case of rebellion against
petitioners being of no legal effect these cannot have the consequence of
rendering the case moot and academic. 22
II. The merits of the petition.—I have gone to great lengths to restate hereinabove the antecedent facts
as established by the pleadings and annexes of record and the hearing held by the Court on May 23rd.
I submit that on the basis of these established facts, the "sacred constitutional rights [and] also the right
to 'due process' which is fundamental fairness " as imperatively stressed by the majority decision in the
recent case of Galman vs. Hon. P.J. Pamaran 23 have been grossly denied the three lawyers detainees.
This Court's "immediately executory" release order of May 23rd (issued over four months ago) should
be forthwith honored and complied with. Far from having rendered the petition as moot and academic,
all the railroaded proceedings and orders charging the three petitioners-lawyers with instant
rebellion in gross disregard of the pendency of this case and of the assurance given in open court that
the petitioners-lawyers would be entitled to a hearing and a preliminary investigation in obedience to
the constitutional mandate that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law" and "no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of
law, " 24 should be declared null and void. They were patently void, having been issued without
jurisdiction under the well-settled rule that "a violation of a constitutional right divests the court of
jurisdiction; and as a consequence its judgment [or order] is null and void and confers no rights. " 25 At
the very least, all proceedings in the instant rebellion case before the Davao trial court should be
suspended and enjoined until the petitioners-lawyers are granted their right to a preliminary
investigation and the opportunity to confront their accusers and disprove the charges; meanwhile, it is
but part of due process that they be set free as ordered by the Court and be enabled to prepare their
defense. The petition under the great writ of habeas corpus to set them at liberty should accordingly be
granted for the following fundamental reasons and considerations:
1. Basic Right to Due Process.—The Bill of Rights expressly mandates that ... no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized ." 26 This plainly means that generally no person may be held to
answer for a criminal offense without a preliminary investigation. The right to a preliminary investigation
is statutorily granted for serious offenses and to deny it violates the right to due process guaranteed by
the Constitution. 27 Preliminary investigation has been instituted precisely to secure the innocent against
hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution. Moreover, the instant rebellion case filed against the
petitioners manifestly falls under three recognized exceptions to the general rule that criminal
prosecution may not be blocked by court prohibition or injunction, namely, "l. for the orderly
administration of justice; 2. to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and
vindictive manner; ...; and 4. to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights. .... 28
2. Petitioners-lawyers denied due process.—The blitzkrieg filing of precipitate, vindictive and oppressive
charges against petitioners-lawyers for the capital crime of rebellion without hearing and preliminary
investigation deprived them their right to due process and the rudimentary requirements of fair play. As
the majority, quoting former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, emphasized in the recent case of
Galman vs. Pamaran, supra, 29 "due process ... is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason,
obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To
satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds
of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by
lack of reasonableness. Correctly, it has been Identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the
embodiment of the sporting Idea of fair play ... It exacts fealty 'to those strivings for justice' and judges
the act of officialdom of whatever branch 'in the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness
that reflect (democratic) traditions of legal and political thought.' ... It is not a narrow or 'technical
conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances,' ... decisions based on such a
clause requiring a 'close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society.' ... Questions
of due process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases. .... " 29-a
3. Right to preliminary investigation.-The May 23rd hearing brought out the importance of preliminary
investigation to prevent hasty and baseless prosecution, since respondents could not cite concrete
evidence of specific criminal acts committed by respondents. Respondent general secured the PDA on
January 25, 1985 on the basis of affidavits of surrendered NPA's supposedly incriminating the
petitioners, which was issued "on the basis of evidence and verified reports that the (petitioners-
lawyers) have committed subversion and/or acts inimical to public safety, national security and public
order." 30 Respondents would cavalierly tag the petitioners-lawyers as having gone "beyond purview of
lawyering, but even to the extent of attending CPP and NPA rites, and using their profession as lawyers
as cover-up for their activities in furtherance of CPP goals and objectives, "as per the affidavit executed
under date of January 22, 1985 by the Davao intelligence chief Lt. Col. Nelson J. Estares. 31 As pointed
out by petitioners in their verified traverse, this affidavit has no probative value. It is not based on the
affiant's direct knowledge but offers hearsay, on his alleged interviews with surrendered NPA's and "to
the best of [this] knowledge and ability." It would have been a simple matter for the alleged witnesses to
have executed their own affidavits. In turn, petitioners have categorically denied that they are members
of the CCP or NDF. Attys. Ilagan and Arellano said in open court that they are chairman and secretary-
general, respectively, of BAYAN-Mindanao, affiliated with the national organization of BAYAN (Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan) with former Senators Lorenzo M. Tañada and Ambrosio Padilla as chairman
and vice-chairman, respectively, and among whose national leaders is former Manila Times publisher
Joaquin "Chino" P. Roces. But strangely enough, while the aforesaid documents were executed in
January, 1985 to secure the PDA for subversion against petitioners, the instant charge filed without
hearing by the fiscal apparently based on the same affidavits is now for rebellion which would involve
the petitioners rising in arms. The whole point is that petitioners' lawyers have squarely presented to
this case the undeniable and undisputed facts that they have been denied their right to preliminary
investigation and to show the utter falsity of the charge of instant rebellion against them. Such right was
assured them in open court by the State's attorneys. It is this Court which must grant petitioners this
right, and uphold their right to due process. The obiter dictum cited by the majority decision from the
case of Medina vs. Orozco 32 that "the proper forum before which absence of preliminary investigation
should be ventilated is the Court of First Instance, not this Court" has no application. There, this Court
found that not only was a preliminary investigation made, but also a subsequent reinvestigation upon
his motion, after which the case against the accused proceeded to trial.
4. Professional witnesses of military not checked out.-As shown above, supra, 33 as admitted by the
State attorneys, there are so many professional witnesses presented by the military in such cases,
whose statements should not be "swallowed hook, line and sinker." The ex-parte affidavits of the
alleged surrendered NPAs could be checked out as against their background and an independent
investigation only in a preliminary investigation. Such affidavits and statements have been found to be
completely worthless in other cases. In the habeas corpus case of Aristedes Sarmiento, he and his wife
were charged with subversion on March 31, 1983, as ranking leaders of the NPA, after they had been
"invited" and detained at the military camp in Gumaca, Quezon on October 9, 1982. After the
prosecution rested its case, the trial court granted the defense' motion for dismissal of the charges for
utter "worthlessness of evidence." The trial court ruled that "(I)ndeed, there is nothing that the Armed
Forces of the Philippines or any of the law enforcement agencies of the Government could offer to
prove any connection of the Sarmiento couple with any subversive organization, even with the New
People's Army, if ever it is to be considered such, and much more as leaders thereof." This led to an
apparently unheeded call from the now Chief Justice that "The military establishment should inquire into
whether the President was deceived into issuing the PCO and who initiated the arrest of the couple
without supporting evidence." In petitioners' verified traverse, they point out that respondents' "star
witness" against petitioners is one Calixto Alegado III, an alleged former NPA who is now a member of
the Philippine Constabulary. They state that Calixto Alegado Ill is precisely one of those professional
witnesses unworthy of credence who has testified in a number of national security cases and who
should be checked out in an independent investigation as assured by the State attorneys at the May
23rd hearing, thus: "In Criminal Case No. 9198 before the Regional Trial Court of Davao entitled People
of the Philippines v. Carlito Gaspar, Alegado testified that he witnessed the accused therein giving
lectures for the CPP/NPA at dates when the accused Carlito Gaspar was either in Manila or out of the
country, more specifically in Australia and Latin America. On the basis of this affiant's testimony
together with other supposed former CPP/NPA members, the Regional Trial Court found Alegado not
worthy of belief and acquitted Gaspar. It is significant to point out here that the counsel of Carlito
Gaspar in that case is petitioner Atty. Laurente Ilagan." 34
5. Protective mantle of this Court.—The unlawful arrest and detention of the petitioners-lawyers has
completely uprooted their lives. This Court must extend them its protective mantle as officers of the
courts, because of the strong indications, supra, 35 of "ominous trends" for lawyers "who are engaged in
pro bono publico work who have incurred the ire of the military," such as in the case of Abra, where
there are no more lawyers handling subversion cases because the only two human rights lawyers
handling such cases have been charged with subversion and locked up in the stockade. As formulated
by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in response to a question of Mr. Justice Gutierrez why the lawyers were picked
out for criminal charges (when there were non-lawyers who also led the welga), "(Y)es, precisely they
pick the lawyers because I suppose they figure out that in fact the lawyers are actually social leaders in
their respective communities. That is why, if Your Honors please, we are pleading this Court for the
prosecution because after all the lawyers are officers of the Court and if the Court will not protect them,
who will? Certainly not the military. We certainly hope that a lawyer will not, in the long run, will not be
asking the NPA for protection, because nobody else wants to protect them." 36
6. People's right of assembly.-The people's right to freedom of expression and to peaceably assemble
and petition the government for redress of grievances are fundamental constitutional rights. Mass
demonstrations popularly termed as welgang bayan constitute a legitimate exercise of these basic
constitutional rights. Indeed, as the Court stressed in Jose B. L. Reyes vs. Ramon Bagatsing 37 "The
sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of
democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public
safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest." The Court therein reminded
the police (and the military for that matter) of their duty to extend protection to the
demonstrators/participants "staying at a discreet distance, but ever ready and alert to perform their
duty." It further admonished that should any disorderly conduct or incidents occur, whether provoked or
otherwise, such incidents of disorderly conduct by individual members of a crowd should not be seized infractions of the guarantees of liberty contained in our Constitution. Each
"as an excuse to characterize the assembly as seditious and tumultuous rising against the authorities" surrender of liberty to the demands of the moment makes easier another larger
and render illusory the right of peaceable assembly. 38 surrender. The battle over the Bill of Rights is a never ending one.

. The military must overcome their allergy if not aversion to such welgas. Acting AFP Chief of Staff Lt. ... The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of us.
Gen. Fidel V. Ramos recently, correctly urged those involved in law enforcement and criminal justice
system to "keep themselves up-to-date on the [changing] law and jurisprudence and the intricacies of 43
... In short, the liberties of none are safe unless the liberties of all are protected.
implementation" adding that "as law enforcers they must be convinced by heart that they enforce the
law and never violate it. 39
The record of the May 23rd hearing highlights the imperative importance of the injunction that no matter
how worthy the motive may be, the authorities, civilian or military, should not suppress the people's
Petitioners candidly state in their verified traverse that "(T)he possibility that the Communist Party of the
liberties, and push the aggrieved citizen in despair towards the NPA or the communists; and respect
Philippines and the National Democratic Front may have participated in or used the events for their own
their constitutional rights as otherwise there would be no difference as against the outlaws or rebels.
purposes may be assumed for purposes of argument. It is not fair inference from this assumption that
For as Brandeis called it, "Crime is contagious. If the government becomes the lawbreaker it breeds
all those who participated in any significant degree in the strikes and the activities held in connection
contempt for the law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy." The record
therewith are members of the Communist Party of the Philippines or the National Democratic
again underscores the utter lack of evidence to support the unlawful arrest and detention of the three
Front," 40 but they rightfully submit that "(T)o conclude that persons who participate in such mass
petitioners-lawyers, thus:
activities are communists or subversives and to restrain them in their freedom as a consequence is
the worst form of witch-hunting violative of all principles of fair play and due process." 41
JUSTICE TEEHANKEE:
42
In the Philippine Blooming Mills case this Court set aside the industrial court's decision dismissing
from employment the workers' labor union's eight officers for having led and carried out a "temporary Q All right, I will ask one more question on that. Since it was
stoppage of work" to hold a mass demonstration at Malacañang of all the workers on March 4, 1969 in organized, this Mindanao Chapter, in April you already had a
protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police. It held that such dismissal was violative of the PDA in January. Did you not or the Military exercise strict
workers' legitimate exercise of their constitutional rights of free expression, peaceable assembly and surveillance daily over the activities of these people? So that
petition for redress of grievance, thus: you can catch them with the goods?

... Recognition and protection of such freedoms are imperative on all public officers SOLICITOR ABAD
including the courts (as well as private citizens and corporations ... when even a
law enacted by Congress must yield to the untrammelled enjoyment of these
human rights. There is no time limit to the exercise of these freedoms. The right to A Well, it is not that simple, if Your Honor please, because
enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of one speech, the printing of one rebellion is not a crime committed (with) not exactly with
article or the staging of one demonstration. It is a continuing immunity, to be bouncing checks or similar crimes.
invoked and exercised when exigent and expedient whenever there are errors to
be rectified, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be condemned. Otherwise, JUSTICE TEEHANKEE
these guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be vitiated by a rule on procedure
prescribing the period for appeal. The battle then would be reduced to a race for
time. Q True, that's very true, but ...?

7. Preservation of liberties and motives.—Good faith must be presumed as well on the part of SOLICITOR ABAD
respondents as of petitioners-lawyers. The good motive but misplaced overzealousness of the military,
particularly as headed by respondent general in the Davao area, may be noted, obsessed as they are A So precisely a good rebel is one who is not caught, he was
with keeping peace and order. But it seems appropriate and timely to cite the pointed reminder of the able to lose himself in the populace. How can we expect let's
late Mr. Justice William Douglas as reproduced in the PBM case, as follows: say a member of a front organization of the NPA will carry an
Id, if Your Honor please.
The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not from those who consciously
seek to destroy our system of government, but from men of goodwill-good men JUSTICE TEEHANKEE
who allow their proper concerns to blind them to the fact that what they propose to
accomplish involves an impairment of liberty.
Q But you have to look into the record of the individual.

... The Motives of these men are often commendable. What we must remember,
however, is that preservation of liberties does not depend on motives. A SOLICITOR ABAD
suppression of liberty has the same effect whether the suppressor be a reformer or
an outlaw. The only protection against misguided zeal is constant alertness of the A I think they have, Your Honor.
JUSTICE TEEHANKEE SOLICITOR ABAD

Q You have to look into the record of these individuals here, A Well, I read from a very authoritative document of the
lawyers, members of the Bar of good standing, without any Communist Party of the Philippines
derogatory record, is it within the ordinary course of human
conduct that they would prostitute their profession, pervert it
JUSTICE TEEHANKEE
and serve as fronts?

Q That's begging the question?

SOLICITOR ABAD

A Horacio Morales, Your Honor, was a Government Executive,
in the same manner as Atty. Ocampo was a good journalist,
but they admitted they have turned to the communist side. We
cannot say that a background of a man is sufficient guarantee
that he is not going to join the rebellion.
JUSTICE TEEHANKEE
Q As far as Morales is concerned he gave up on reforms, he
was desperate; that is why he says there is no other way...
SOLICITOR ABAD
JUSTICE MAKASIAR
Q And they deny? The communist party they accept
membership... the Alyansa?
SOLICITOR ABAD
A Financial support, telling over the populace into supporting
the rebellion; driving them away from the Government: giving
financial support; harboring them in their homes. While these
are not armed assistance given to the rebel, if Your Honor
please, but its the duty also of the government to ...

JUSTICE MAKASIAR
A Well, that's what I mean, if Your Honor please, an individual
supplace (sic) society, the old society ...
Q ... the various dates of harboring them in their homes; the
financial contributions made by them on such and such a date,
JUSTICE TEEHANKEE
how much? Those are the particulars to support the conclusion
that they had contributed, they were harboring them?
Q Society (should) not push the aggrieved citizen towards the
NPA or the communist party as a last resort. And therefore, we
SOLICITOR ABAD
must observe their Constitutional rights. Otherwise, there is no
difference?
A Well, as I said we have the evidence, the only problem is we
are not prepared to produce now the evidence. 43-a
SOLICITOR ABAD

A There were 3 million people who were unable to use the
streets of Davao, if Your Honor please, its their constitutional
rights to travel to bring their sick to the hospitals and were
violated by these ...
JUSTICE MAKASIAR
Q Compañero, your position is that history is replete with
examples of traitors and quislings from high society or high
Government circles. But the question is, while you affirm the
fact that the communist is not necessarily open or overt, he is
usually engaged in covert activities. Now what are the
examples of these covert activities of these people? What is
your evidence?
Indeed, in their Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's May 23rd release order, respondents,
"having obtained clearance for the declassification of the needed materials" submitted their "evidence, "
consisting of hearsay military reports (rather than the direct affidavits of credible witnesses) and
the affidavit of a discredited and perjured professional witness, an alleged NPA, now a member of the
Philippine Constabulary, supra. 43-b No concrete evidence whatever has been submitted therein against
petitioners-lawyers, other than to recklessly red brush their legitimate organization (BAYAN-Mindanao)
as communist-led or infiltrated front organizations and to characterize the series of welgas or strikes in
Mindanao as implementation of the NDF program of activities to organize and mobilize the "middle
forces" of society, supra. 43-c
8. Basic concepts and principles of freedom-The PBM case, citing numerous precedents, restated basic
concepts and principles which, to my mind, underlie and are determinative of the issues at bar, as
follows:
(1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of
the human personality is the central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of
our civilization. The inviolable character of man as an individual must
be 'protected to the largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the
citadel of his person. 44
(2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the Ideals of liberty, equality and
security 'against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour,
the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have
no patience with general principles. 45
In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose of the Bill of
Rights is to withdraw 'certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy,
to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and to establish them as
legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's rights to life, liberty and property,
to free speech, or free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other
fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of
no elections. 46 Laski proclaimed that 'the happiness of the individual not the well-
being of the State, was the criterion on by which its behaviour was to be judged.
His interests, not its power, set the limits to the authority it was entitled to
exercise. 47
(3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are
included among the immunities reserved by the sovereign people, in the rhetorical
aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the Ideas that we abhor or hate more than
the Ideas we cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the minority
who want to talk, but also to benefit the majority who refuse to listen. 48 And as
Justice Douglas cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are the liberties of all; and
the liberties of one are not safe unless the liberties of all are protected. 49
(4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights
but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness
and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can
participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the government through their
suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of
abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal
to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and protection as
well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and
employees.
(5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human
rights over property rights is recognized. 50 Because these freedoms are 'delicate
and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society' and the 'threat of
sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of
sanctions,' they 'need breathing space to survive,' permitting government regulation
only 'with narrow specificity. 51
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are
imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the
Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to
be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the
influential and powerful and of oligarchs political economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly
occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of
our civil and political institutions;52 and such priority 'gives these liberties a sanctity
and a sanction not permitting dubious intrusions. 53
xxx xxx xxx
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression as well as their right of
assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the
employees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for their
very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them, by the Constitution-the
untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. ... Material loss can be
repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being-broken
in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms.
The wounds fester and the scars remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as
he cries in anguish for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on bruised
tissues. 54
9. The express teaching of the Salonga case.—The express teaching on freedom of expression, based
on numerous precedents, of this Court's unanimous decision (11 members with 3 abstentions) in the
case of Salonga vs. Paño 55 should dispel the apparent misconception on the part of the military, us well
as certain government prosecutors, that militant protests and demonstrations are seditious and
subversive of the government. This Court set forth therein guiding and controlling constitutional
principles and precepts governing constitutionally protected spheres and areas reserved by the Bill of
Rights for the individual "where even the awesome powers of government may not enter at will," as
follows: "... if there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than
any other, it is the principle of free thought-not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for
the thought that we hate;" that "freedom of expression is a 'preferred' right and therefore stands on a
higher level than substantive economic or other liberties;" that "this must be so because the lessons of
history, both political and legal, illustrate that freedom of thought and speech is the indispensable
condition of nearly every other form of freedom. Protection is especially mandated for political
discussions. This Court is particularly concerned when allegations are made that restraints have been
imposed upon mere criticisms of government and public officials. Political discussion is essential to the
ascertainment of political truth. It cannot be the basis of criminal indictments;" that there must be
tolerance of political hyperbole since "debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide
open and it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
government and public officials;" that "the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do
not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action;" that "political discussion even among those opposed to the present
administration is within the protective clause of freedom of speech and expression. The same cannot
be construed as subversive activities per se or as evidence of membership in a subversive
organization" in the absence of proof that "such discussion was in furtherance of any plan to overthrow
the government through illegal means, " and that "the judge or fiscal, therefore, should not go on with
the prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence might later turn up during trial for this would be
a flagrant violation of a basic right which the courts are created to uphold. It bears repeating that the
judiciary lives up to its mission by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights. So it has been
before. It should continue to be so."
10. Peaceful and violent welgas.—The military and the police but adhere to the aforecited basic
democratic concepts and principles and recognize the people's constitutional right of assembly, protest
and petition for redress of grievances and accordingly exercise forbearance and understanding, then
the welgas will not and cannot erupt in violence. As emphasized in the PBM case, there is no time limit
in the exercise of these basic freedoms of free expression, peaceable assembly and petition for redress
of grievances. The right to enjoy them is not exhausted "by . . . . the staging of one demonstration." It is
a continuing immunity, to be exercised whenever there are errors to be rectified, abuses to be
denounced, inhumanities to be condemned. This is borne out by the numerous demonstrations, rallies
and welgas in Manila, Bataan and many other provinces. The Welgang bayan in Bataan against, the
nuclear plant which paralyzed the whole of the province for three days last June were carried out
peacefully without any violence, despite certain critical moments when the provincial commander
ordered his forces to advance thru a blockade manned by some 4,000 people. He later withdrew his
orders after a dialogue with the protestors. The behaviour of both the military and the demonstrators
merited commendations from all sectors. The President himself was quoted as saying that "the official
policy of maximum tolerance in dealing with mass demonstrations paid off during the welgang Bayan in
Bataan." 56
In this case, the May 2-3, 1985 welgang bayan which incurred the ire and displeasure of the military
was carried out without any ugly incidents. But the aggressiveness and intolerance of the military and
CHDF forces in Escalante, Negros Occidental turned the welgang bayan there into a bloodbath
last September 20th. Some thirty demonstrators, including women, were reported killed when
government troops who were supposed to keep order during the rally opened fire at the massed crowd
when some troublemakers reportedly tried to snatch their firearms. As observed in one editorial, "once
government soldiers or police open fire on a rally crowd, the result would be a virtual massacre for the
enforcers are better armed." 57 "Indeed, the use of combat-ready and trigger-happy troops trained only
to shoot-to-kill without any training in crowd control of demonstrators or rallyists should be restudied. As
stated in my separate opinion in Hildawa vs. Minister of Defense. 58 "The Supreme Court stands as the
guarantor of the constitutional and human rights of all persons within its jurisdiction and cannot abdicate
its basic role under the Constitution that these rights be respected and enforced. The spirit and letter of
the Constitution negates as contrary to the basic precepts of human rights and freedom that a person's
life be snuffed on out without due process in a split second even if he is caught in flagrante delicto-
unless it was called for as an act of self-defense by the law agents using reasonable means to prevent
or repel an unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased."
11. The Stale PDA.-Iwill not deal here with the serious question raised by petitioners as to the validity of
the PDA issued by the President under date of January 25, 1985 for the arrest and detention of the
three petitioners-lawyers for having "committed subversion and/or acts inimical to public safety, national
security and public order." This question is better resolved in the separate case filed by the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for the declaration of unconstitutionality of the Presidential Decrees authorizing,
among others, the issuance by the President of PDA's without the constitutional requirement that any
officer issuing a warrant of arrest must personally examine the complainant and the witnesses he may
present. 59 Suffice it to state that the PDA against petitioners was already inoperative and stale. It
was issued on January 25, 1985. As respondent general himself states in the return, the military did not
see any need to enforce it until after almost four months later on May 10 to 13 of this year. What is
incomprehensible is that no copy certified or plain of the PDA could be shown to the petitioners upon
their arrest, contrary to existing rules and instructions. A xerox copy of the PDA was first seen by them
only with the filing of the respondents' return, in this case on last May 23rd.
Be that as it may, the PDA should be held to be inoperative and ineffectual. The facts and records as
hereinabove stated patently show that the President was misled into precipitately issuing the same:
A. By the President's own statement, he had declared that "he would issue the controversial Preventive
Detention Action (PDA) orders only when national security would require it and that there is no present
need for him to do it." 60 The PDA was issued on January 25, 1985. Under the implementing rules, it
should have been served within forty-eight (48) hours since it covered persons outside Metro Manila (in
Metro Manila, the prescribed period of service is twenty-four [24] hours). The respondent general's own
admission that there was no need to serve it until after almost four months later shows that there
was no necessity for the peremptory issuance of the PDA last January 25th.
B. The issuance of the PDA against the three petitioners lawyers clearly do not fall within the two
exceptions to the general rule provided in section I of P.D. 1877, as amended, that all cases involving
national security offenses "shall be referred to the provincial or city fiscal or to the proper court for
preliminary examination or investigation in accordance with existing laws. " The two exceptions
provided in section 2 of the said P.D. are as follows:
SEC. 2. Only upon proper warrant issued by the Court or other responsible officer
as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and his witnesses, shall the person or persons charged with the
above-mentioned crimes be arrested and detained; Provided, however, that should
a military commander or the head of a law enforcement agency ascertain that the
person or persons to be arrested has/have committed, is/are actually committing,
or is/are about to commit the above-mentioned crimes, or would probably escape
or commit further acts which would endanger public order and safety as well as the
stability of the state before proper warrant could be obtained, the said military
commander or the head of law enforcement agency may apply to the President of
the Philippines for a preventive detention action against the person or persons
ascertained to be participants in the commission of the crimes referred to in
Section I hereof, under the following circumstances:
(a) When resort to judicial processes is not possible or expedient without
endangering public order and safety;
(b) When in the judgement of the President of the Philippines to apply for a judicial
warrant may prejudice peace and order and the safety of the state like when it may
jeopardize the continued covert intelligence counter insurgency operations of the
Government, or endanger the lives of intelligence and undercover agents whose
Identities would be revealed by the evidence against the person or persons
covered by a preventive detention action.
There is no question here of judicial process not being possible or expedient. It is obvious from the facts
of record that it would be absurd to say that the. PDA could fall under the second exception that to
apply for a judicial warrant would prejudice public order and the safety of the state. The mere gap of
almost four months between its issuance on January 25th and its actual service on May 10-12 this year
speaks for itself Furthermore, as succinctly stated by petitioners in their verified traverse, "(A)s
members of this Court pointed out in the hearing of May 23, 1985, the alleged PDA was issued as early
as January 25, 1985. Petitioners were not hiding. They were regularly discharging their functions as
lawyers, including visiting their clients in military camps. There was more than ample time from the
issuance of the alleged PDA up to the time when petitioners were actually arrested and detained for
respondents to place them under close surveillance so that concrete, credible evidence of their
supposed criminal activities and connection might be established 'to catch them with the goods' so to
speak. With the manpower and the resources at the command of respondents, they have failed to
produce that evidence." 61
Indeed, as the ponente, Mme. Justice Herrera, notes in her additional opinion, which failed to gain the
majority's concurrence, "it is my view that individuals against whom PDAs have been issued should be
furnished with the original or the duplicate original or a certified true copy issued by the official having
official custody of the PDA, at the time of apprehension. Pursuant to the Rules and Regulations
Implementing Presidential Decree No. 1877, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1877-A, the PDAs
should also be enforced within 24 hours in the Metro Manila area or within 48 hours outside Metro
Manila, upon receipt by the unit concerned. In this case, although the record does not show such date
of receipt, the fact is that the PDA was issued on January 25, 1985 but the detained attorneys were
arrested only on May 10 and 13, 1985, respectively. The four-month gap can give room for doubt as to
its authenticity and whether, in fact, the detained attorneys posed 'any appreciable danger to national
security and public order.' " (Italics supplied)
12. Civilian Supremacy.—Art II, section 8 of our Constitution's Declaration of Principles and State
Policies states that "Civilian authority is at all times supreme over the military. " But the military here
dragged its feet and refused to honor this Court's "immediately executory" release order of May 23rd.
Without waiting for the resolution of its motion for reconsideration of the Court's release order,
respondent general, who had secured the PDA, then filed the new charge of rebellion against
petitioners and with the deplorable acquiescence of the city fiscal and the trial judge, the former filed the
instant information for the capital crime of rebellion and the latter in tum issued the warrant of arrest
without bail. Respondent general was quoted as saying that "The Supreme Court won in only one point.
And that is, we had to file the the charges much sooner"62 as if this Court were an adverse protagonist
instead of the final arbiter and the third department of government vested by the Constitution with the
judicial power to determine and adjudicate all justiciable disputes. The same general is quoted as
replying in a letter of April 1, 1985 to Atty. Jesus G. Dureza, IBP Davao chapter (who was asking why
detainees continue to languish in jail despite court decisions either releasing or acquitting them) that
"To begin with, I believe it may be necessary to review our position on these cases (human rights
cases). I express this need because, despite recent court decisions otherwise, I am morally convinced
that some released suspected communist subversives are guilty."63 This Court's decisions and orders
form part of the law of the land It is a sad day for civilian supremacy when the military do not feel bound
by the verdict of the courts and would place themselves above the courts and require as a condition for
executing its judgment that they be "morally convinced" by the judgment rendered.
To allow such usurpation and denigration of the Court's power of judicial review is to subvert, if not
destroy, the Constitution and the Rule of Law. The survival of a democratic society rests on the Rule of
Law, which depends on the existence of an independent judiciary.
In endorse and reproduce herein the impassioned appeal made by then Justice Makasiar in his address
in 1980 before the Philconsa against the proposed return of the supervision of lower courts from the
Supreme Court to the Ministry of Justice, supra, 64 as follows:
On the rule of law rests the survival of a democratic state. But the rule of law
depends on the existence of an independent judiciary. 'Those who (make the
proposal), I hope, realize that the ill-effects of such a proposal will reach them and
their children. Even at this late stage in our lives when we are about to fade from
the scene, we cannot evade the tragic consequences of such a proposal; but those
who will suffer more would be the succeeding generations-including the children of
those proposing the subtle destruction of the foundations of the judicial system.
In the evening of our lives, let us not emasculate one branch of the government
that is the last sanctuary of our lives and our liberties-the judiciary. As an enduring
legacy to the generations that will come after us, let us all continue to strengthen
the Supreme Court and the entire judicial system.
The contemporary scene demonstrates once again that injustice breeds dissidence
which seethes and finally explodes into a violent and bloody revolution. To all
human beings, the denial of justice is a mortal assault on life itself. Where the
human spirit is brutalized by abuses and inequities, the ultimate hope for liberation
lies in the force of arms unless the courts can effectively enforce the rule of law.
Our historical experience delineated the varied seeds of armed rebellion or
insurrection with which all of you are familiar. The ruthless exploitation of peasants
and laborers, the lust for and arrogance of power, unabated corruption, unequal
application of the law. the prostitution of elections, despoliation of the national
patrimony by a a favored few, as well as the monopoly and manipulation of the
supply and distribution of economic goods essential to man's existence-all
constitute the many facets of injustice that provide the dynamics of open defiance
of the status quo.
The warning has been issued that a tyrant, who wants complete and absolute
control over the people, will first seduce and eliminate the lawyers and thereafter
destroy the courts. This tragedy must be averted.
To support any proposal that erodes the independence of the courts, abets
subversion of the rule of law, undermines the stability of our democratic institutions,
imperils the liberties of the individual, or gives aid and comfort to the enemies of
the people-is akin to committing treason against the nation. " (Italics supplied)
13. The Supreme Court as guardian and final arbiter of the Constitution.—The judiciary, as headed by
the Supreme Court has neither the power of the sword nor the purse. Yet as the third great department
of government, it is entrusted by the Constitution with the judicial power-the awesome power and task
of determining disputes between litigants involving life, liberty and fortune and protecting the citizen
against arbitrary or oppressive action of the State. The Supreme Court and all inferior courts are called
upon by the Constitution "to protect the citizen against violation of his constitutional or legal rights or
misuse or abuse of power by the State or its officers. The judiciary [assisted by the bar] stands between
the citizen and the State as a bulwark against executive excesses and misuse or abuse of power by the
executive as also transgression of its constitutional limitations by the legislature." 65
The Constitution is basically a charter of limitations of governmental power and enshrines a system of
separation of powers and checks and balances under which no man is the law nor above the law. It
ordains the weakest department, the Supreme Court, as the guardian and final arbiter of the
Constitution. It postulates and requires a free and independent judiciary, sworn to defend and enforce
the Constitution and the law without fear or favor. It mandates that civilian authority is at all times
supreme over the military. Like His Holiness, the Pope, the Supreme Court has no battalions, tanks or
guns to enforce its decisions. Its strength lies in that its verdicts would be obeyed by the sheer moral
force and truth of its judgments for as long as the Court kept the faith and confidence reposed in it by
the people through the Constitution to render justice and sustained their moral conviction that through
the Supreme Court, justice and the voice of reason and truth would prevail in the end. Under the Rule
of Law, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system of the Philippines " (Art. 8, Civil Code) and the Excutive and all its offices and agencies.
and particularly the military, are called upon to execute the laws as so interpreted and adjudged by the
courts and enforce obedience thereto.65-a
As restated by the late Justice Jose P. Laurel in the 1936 landmark case of Angara us. Electoral
Commission, 66 "The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations
upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would
be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of
government along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage,
the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political
apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they
should be in any living Constitution." Justice Laurel pointed out that in contrast to the United States
Constitution, the Philippine Constitution as "a definition of the powers of government" placed upon the
judiciary the great burden of "determining the nature, scope and extent of such powers" and stressed
that "when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority
over the other department ...but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation entrusted to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the
parties in an actual controversy the rights which the instrument secures and guarantees to them."
Let all bear ever in mind that " (I)n a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled
if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent, omnipresent teacher. For good
or ill, it teaches the whole people by example. Crime is contagious If the Government becomes the
lawbreaker it breeds contempt for the law it invites every man to become a law unto himself, it invites
anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means ... would
bring terrible retribution. 67
14. Erroneous premises of the majority decision.
A. The majority decision holds that under section 4, Rule 102 the writ of habeas corpus has served its
purpose because of the judicial warrant of arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court. This is based on
an erroneous premise that the trial court had such jurisdiction to issue the warrant of arrest, and that the
denial of a preliminary investigation of petitioners-lawyers was a mere informality or defect.—As already
emphasized hereinabove, the trial court was totally devoid and ousted of jurisdiction to issue a warrant
of arrest because of the gross denial to petitioners-lawyers of their constitutional right to due process.
B. The majority decision holds that the filing of the information without preliminary investigation falls
within the exceptions of Rule 112, sec. 7 and Rule 113, sec. 5 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure.68 Again, this is erroneous premise. The fiscal misinvoked and misapplied the cited
rules. The petitioners are not persons "lawfully arrested without a warrant. " The fiscal could not rely on
the stale and inoperative PDA of January 25, 1985. Otherwise, the rules would be rendered nugatory, if
all that was needed was to get a PDA and then serve it at one's whim and caprice when the very
issuance of the PDA is premised on its imperative urgency and necessity as declared by the President
himself. The majority decision then relies on Rule 113, sec. 5 which authorizes arrests without warrant
by a citizen or by a police officer who witnessed the arrestee in flagrante delicto, viz, in the act of
committing the offense. Quite obviously, the arrest was not a citizen's arrest nor were they caught in
flagrante delicto violating the law. In fact, this Court in promulgating the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure have tightened and made the rules more strict. Thus, the Rule now requires that an offense "
has in fact just been committed. " This connotes immediacy in point of time and excludes cases under
the old rule where an offense "has in fact been committed" no matter how long ago. Similarly, the
arrestor must have "personal knowledge of facts indicating that the arrestee has committed it" (instead
of just "reasonable ground to believe that the arrestee has committed it" under the old rule). Clearly,
then, an information could not just be filed against the petitioners without due process and preliminary
investigation.
C. The majority decision's rationale that the Nolasco case invoked by petitioners is not applicable here
since the trial court had granted bail to Nolasco for a number of non-capital offenses, whereas in this
case petitioners are charged with the capital offense of rebellion and the trial court has not allowed bail.
This is erroneously premised. As already emphasized above, the instant information for rebellion
against petitioners is null and void for denial of due process. What remains is the PDA, just like in
the Nolasco case. There, the trial court granted bail. Here, it is this Court that has granted bail in the
form of its May 23rd "immediately executory" release order. It certainly would be judicial anathema that
this Court ordered compliance with the bail order of the trial court in the Nolasco case and yet feel
impotent to enforce its own "immediately executory" release order of the petitioners-lawyers upon their
counsel's recognizance. More so, when the petitioners are members of the Philippine Bar and officers
of this Court.
The irony of the situation can be thus depicted. Had this Court simply ordered the immediate
enforcement without delay of its May 23rd order, by May 24th, the petitioners would have not been
under detention. There would be no basis to claim that they were "lawfully arrested without warrant" and
therefore could be instantly charged for the most heinous crimes without preliminary investigation.
D. As stressed by the writer in German vs. Barangan, 69 "to require the citizen at every step to assert his
rights and to go to court is to render illusory his rights. " Here, the flaunting and disregard of the Court's
immediately executory May 23rd release order by not releasing the petitioners-lawyers so that it could
be claimed that they fell under Rule 112, section 7 and considered as "lawfully arrested without warrant"
wherein "the information may be filed by the ... fiscal without preliminary investigation having been first
conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person" (which
affidavit had long been executed since January, 1985 while the unlawful arrests were made on May 10-
13 and in no way could be termed as in flagrante delicto would render illusory petitioners' right to due
process and preliminary investigation. The majority decision should properly apply the case
of Abejuela cited by it 70 that the trial court is called upon "not to dismiss the information but hold the
case in abeyance and conduct its own investigation or require the fiscal to hold a reinvestigation.
" Meanwhile, this Court's release order should be complied with without one moment's delay.
Respondents' filing two days later on May 25th of an "urgent motion for reconsideration" could in no
way cause or justify suspension or non-compliance with this Court's release order.
15. Same standard in Galman case of not jeopardizing accused's constitutional rights should be
applied. In the recent case of Galman vs. Pamaran, the majority held that "the only way to cure the law
of its unconstitutional effects is to construe it in the manner as if IMMUNITY had in 'fact been offered [by
the prosecution] ... (hence) the testimonies compelled thereby are deemed immunized under Section 5
of the same law. The applicability of the immunity granted by P.D. 1886 cannot be made to depend on
a claim of the privilege against self- incrimination which the same law practically strips away from the
witness." The same standard and concern of not placing the accused "in jeopardy of their constitutional
rights" through denial of due process and their right to preliminary investigation should be applied here.
The only way is to construe it in the manner as if this Court's release order had in fact been immediately
complied with and petitioners could in no way be deemed as "lawfully arrested without warrant."
Otherwise, the Rule on preliminary investigation would not be "cured of its unconstitutional effects" by
allowing the railroading on May 27th of the instant information for rebellion without preliminary
investigation thru respondent general's contumacious and unlawful act of disobeying the Court's May
23rd release order. This was the same standard that would have been applied in the Court's aborted
decision in Eastern Broadcasting Corp. (DYRE) vs. Hon. Dans, Jr.71 There, this Court brushed aside
respondents' procedural arguments to dismiss the petition as "moot and academic" because of the non-
renewal of the petitioner's radio broadcasting station's license from the time of its summary closure in
1980 up to the time of the Court's determination in July this year. Instead, as noted in the writer's
separate opinion therein, this Court "serve(d) notice that in the exercise of the judicial power vested in it
by the Constitution, it will issue the equitable writs of certiorari and mandamus to do substantial justice
and restore the status quo. In this case, the summary closure of petitioner's radio station in 1980 having
been declared null and void and no valid ground for non-renewal of its license having been shown, it is
as if the said license has been duly extended up to the end of the current term or year. It is expected
that respondents will forthwith return the crystal of the transmitter and place no further obstacle to the
prompt reopening of the radio station so that petitioner may pick up the broken pieces and rightfully
resume its operations (after almost five years of closure) in accordance with the judgment at bar."
Applying this standard to the case at bar, would simply mean that the clock would simply be turned
back to the day of this Court's immediately executory release order of May 23rd this year, as if the
same order had been faithfully and lawfully complied with. Only thus could substantial and not paper
justice be done and the petitioners be not deprived of their constitutional right to due process and be
secured by preliminary investigation against hasty, oppressive and vindictive prosecution.
16. "The preservation of freedom, like its perfection is a never ending struggle."—This was the
exhortation of President Ferdinand Edralin Marcos at the observance at Fort Bonifacio last May 27th of
American Memorial Day. He admonished the people that "democracy is a condition requiring constant
vigilance. Neither totalitarianism nor authoritarianism can by themselves triumph over the democratic
Ideal. But when free men shirk from their duties to society, as well as to themselves, they imperil their
own liberty. When the citizens of a democracy allow themselves to be lulled into indifference, they seal
their own doom. ... If we are to remain free at all, we must show ourselves to be capable and willing to
fight in defense of our way of life. " 72
17. Former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, who with IBP President Emeritus J.B.L. Reyes, has
shunned their well-earned rest and in their eighties continue at the forefront of upholding the cause of
freedom and human rights and rendering free legal aid to the poor, disadvantaged and oppressed,
made this plea for the cause of the independence of the judiciary at the hall of the Court which he once
presided with honor, dignity and integrity. "During the 85 years of this century, there has never been a
case as transcendental as this one. We have tried and bolstered to be a democratic society which is
based and predicated upon freedom of speech. But to bolster up the freedom of speech, we've
established the right of every person accused and even detained to counsel. Now, any (act) tending to
impair the disposition of lawyers to represent the accused, is derogatory to the democratic system, and
therefore, derogatory to human rights. It is significant that at first only, I would say, only persons
suspected of being subversives were being arrested and later on salvaged. I don't know how the word
salvage happened to be used, because salvage from what ...Then even the priests, ... we have started
from the North to the Southernmost part of the Philippines, from Abra to Davao, with lawyers. The only
In the words of Justice Jugo Black
step higher than that echelon is the Judiciary. So it's not only the lawyers that are being involved in this
case, it is the Judiciary, the independence of the Judiciary."73
His Holiness Pope John Paul II in his address of February 17, 1981 to the President and the Nation
during his Philippine visit stressed that " Even in exceptional situations that may at times arise, one can
never justify any violation of the fundamental dignity of the human person or of the basic rights that
safeguard this dignity Legitimate concern for the security of a nation, as demanded by the common
good, could lead to the temptation of subjugating to the State the human being and his or her dignity
and rights. Any apparent conflict between the exigencies of security and of the citizens' basic rights
must be resolved according to the fundamental principle upheld always by the Church that social
organization exists only for the service of man and for the protection of his dignity, and that it cannot
claim to serve the common good when human rights are not safeguarded."
17. Petitioners'appeal for liberty should be heeded.-Petitioner Ilagan concisely stated at the May 23rd
hearing that his objective as BAYAN s chairman is To achieve reforms in the government by voicing our
grievances. " 74 In an open letter to his colleagues of the Integrated Bar, after expressing , 'grateful
appreciation for the generous assistance, both financial and moral, which I and my family received . . . .
(and) welcomed . . . . for reasons of necessity" (which hardliners would consider as a criminal act of the
sympathizers and "assisting and aiding the enemy"), petitioner Ilagan makes this poignant appeal:
... What we are here for may not be your concern, but that we are here without due
process of law should interest you all if you are true to your calling. We lawyers are
adept at defending persons and interests in all the courts and forums of the land.
We, particularly should be the first concerned at defending our own. But, by all
means, we deserve that sacred right to do so on legitimate, fair and equitable
terms. Never mind that our families have to subsist on the meager earnings of our
working wines, but foremost in our welfare is the right to be free, not only to
prepare for our defense adequately but to give essence to that constitutional tenet
that 'every person is presumed innocent until proven otherwise.' We cannot lay
claim of a democratic society if we, lawyers, not only tolerate a lopsided view of the
rule of law but ourselves fall prey to it.
That we are 'preventively detained' is pure euphemism. Deprived of liberty and
entirely curtailed in the exercise of our basic rights, we are, in every sense,
prisoners of the state. It is in this context that 1, on behalf of your three colleagues
here, ask your whole-hearted support in demanding justice for our cause. 75
Petitioners' eminent counsel make this stirring plea on their behalf:
Constitutional history in republican democratic states is the story of the progressive
triumph and expansion of human liberty as against the assertion of unrestrained
power by monarchs, tyrants and other instrumentalities in the political community.
Civilization under law has been marked by the departure from lese
majeste, the strengthening of legal institutions, especially the independent courts,
and the adoption of rules, substantive and procedural, so that freedom is the
general and normal state of the people. Although in exceptional cases, their
individual freedom could be restrained but only on serious grounds compatible with
the Constitution and always upon due process. This, at any rate, is a fundamental
principle of English and American constitutional law whence our own constitutional
system has been derived.
. . . . From the popular hatred and abhorrence of illegal confinement, torture and
extortion of confessions of violations of 'the law of the land' evolved the
fundamental Idea that no man's life liberty or property be forfeited as criminal
punishment for violation of that law until there had been a charge fairly made and
fairly tried in public tribunal free of prejudice, passion excitement and tyrannical
power. Thus, as an assurance against ancient evils, our country, in order to
preserve 'the blessings of liberty,' wrote into its basic law the requirement, among
others, that the forfeiture of life, liberty or property of people accused of crime can
only follow if procedural safeguards of due process have been obeyed.
The determination to preserve the accused's right to procedural due
process sprang in large part from knowledge of historical truth that the rights and
liberties of the people accused of crime could not safely be entrusted to secret
inquisitorial processes. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227.
In this jurisdiction, these rules are enshrined in the Bill of Rights in the Constitution
and reenforced by statutes and the Rules of Court.
xxx xxx xxx
If a person is unlawfully deprived of his liberty, he can avail himself of the great writ
of liberty, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for the purpose of regaining
freedom in the shortest time possible.
In its early years of practice, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was a puny
and unavailing remedy as against the king. For judges were under the influence of
the crown and refused to issue the writ for people who were detained on suspicion
of disloyalty to the former but against whom there was no concrete evidence, and
the people continued "to languish in extended detention. To remedy this evil, the
Habeas Corpus Act was adopted in 1679. Ex Parte Watkins, 7 L. Ed. 193, 201; Ex
Parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 85: MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
ENGLAND 314-315.
Since then, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has become the fundamental
instrument against arbitrary and lawless state action. .
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus carries with it the
derogation of the people's freedoms and liberties. Therefore, the provisions must
 be strictly construed and cannot be allowed to extend to situations not explicitly
allowed by the Constitution.
Obliquely and subliminally respondents suggest to this Court to go back in history
and to dismantle the intricate system of reenforcing rules, principles and
procedures that have developed through centuries of struggle for the more
efficacious protection of individual liberty. They seek a return to the lese
majeste when the voice of the King was the voice of God so that those who are
touched by his absolute powers could only pray that the King acted prudently and
wisely. Similarly respondents would have this Court and the people accept the
proposition that the State's designation of persons as rebels and subversives
without more is adequate basis for their immediate and indefinite detention. And
that regardless of the quality or absence of evidence, the courts are powerless to
intervene in behalf of the persons so designated.
The Rule of Law and constitutionalism mean precisely the existence and the
efficacy of legal institutions to protect and defend the rights and liberties of the
people so they no longer have to depend upon prayers for the purpose.
Petitioners invoke the power of this Court to uphold the Constitution and to protect
the rights of the people and to reject the basically undemocratic
proposition suggested by respondents. 76
I submit that the Court should heed petitioners' appeal for liberty. An editorial after the Court's stillborn
May 23rd Resolution graphically articulates the compelling reasons for granting their plea for liberty:
The government is not only the Chief Executive and the Batasang Pambansa. It
necessarily includes the Supreme Court and the other courts. And time and again it
has been shown that the performance of the judiciary affects the complexion of the
two other branches.
The en banc resolution of the Supreme Court ordering the release from
confinement of the three Davao lawyers who have acted as defense counsel in
national security cases illustrates the point.
The resolution shows the power of the judicial review and affirms the supremacy of
the Constitution.
It shows the independence of the judiciary and allays the fear of the opposition
that, the judiciary is an instrument of the Chief Executive.
xxx xxx xxx
Where the Constitution of the democracy is not supreme, the Supreme Court
weakens as the Chief Executive becomes stronger. Where that situation obtains,
the people no longer trust the courts nor the Constitution.
In the democracies, the judiciary is usually the 'weakest' of the branches. But here
and at this time, the exclusion of the judiciary from an analysis of the kind of
government that obtains would make a big difference.
A government without an independent Supreme Court would be like an automobile
without brakes. 77
I vote to grant the petition for habeas corpus and to set the petitioners immediately at liberty. Petitioners
must be granted their constitutional right to due process and the right to preliminary investigation, as
granted by statute and expressly assured to them by respondents in open court at the May 23rd
hearing. The railroaded ex-parte proceedings and orders in the instant rebellion case should be
declared null and void for lack of jurisdiction in having deprived petitioners of their sacred constitutional
right to due process.
CONCEPCION, JR., J., dissenting:
1. I dissent. The petition is not moot and academic.
2. Petitioners should be set free immediately because they were arrested unlawfully, and the
information filed against them dismissed for being null and void. However, the authorities may, if they
choose to do so, file a case against petitioners in the Fiscal's Office of Davao. The fiscal should conduct
a preliminary investigation as required by law. If he finds the existence of a prima facie case, then he
should file the necessary information in court. After the court issues a warrant of arrest against
petitioners, only then may they be placed in custody.
3. Petitioners have a right to a preliminary investigation, and infringement of this right is a denial of due
process.
4. The instances when a person may be arrested without a warrant are clearly laid down by Rule 113 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as follows:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant when lawful.-A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall
be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 1 1 2, Section 7. (6a, 17a). "
5. From the facts brought out by the pleadings and at the hearing, petitioners' arrest does not fall under
any of the instances enumerated above. Their arrest without a warrant is therefore patently and
undeniably illegal and contrary to law.
6. Just as a spring polluted at its source cannot produce a flow of clean water, the unlawful arrest of
petitioners cannot give rise to a valid information. The information filed in court against them necessarily
is and must remain null and void.
7. In Morales,1 this Court cautioned against arrests without warrant in this wise:
14. Care should be exercised in making an arrest without a warrant. Where there is
no justification for the arrest, the public officer could be criminally liable for arbitrary
detention or unlawful arrest or for some other offense."
8. It is the responsibility of the judiciary to define and maintain the delicate balance between individual
freedom and the security of the State. In the fulfillment of this mission, the active participation and
assistance of dedicated human rights lawyers are indispensable. They sacrifice time and effort, and
take grave risks to defend the rights of their clients. I salute them and say, "May their tribe increase."
9. At a time when the Armed Forces of the Philippines has to play a salient role in our affairs of
government in view of the existence of a rebellion in our midst, there is all the more a greater need for
lawyers to defend the rights of individuals against actual or possible abuses of agents of the State.
10. We must strengthen and solidify the Rule of Law. It is the only way to the survival of democracy in
our land.
Patajo J., concur
ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting :
It was Holmes who said that the life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience. Thus the
early Roman law was ritualistic and highly formal. Gradually, however, it evolved and form was
replaced by substance. The development of the law did not stop there. The Roman praetorian law
enlarged, supplemented and over-rode law which became narrow and rigid in scope. Finally, common
law produced equity jurisprudence. It is a formal set of legal and procedural rules and doctrines to aid
and even override common and statute law in order to protect rights and enforce duties fixed by
substantive law.
The majority opinion appeals to the mind for it appears to be logically constructed. It leans heavily on
the letter of the law. Upon the other hand the dissenting opinion of Justice Teehankee which is his
article of faith appeals both to the mind and the heart for it is based not only on law but on equity also.
I believe that Justice Teehankee's opinion better serves the ends of justice and I gladly subscribe to it. I
also subscribe to Justice Concepcion's separate opinion
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring
I wish to express my views on other aspects of this case with which the majority does not concur.
It is to be noted that in the Warrant of Arrest issued by the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Davao City "no bail" has been indicated. Neither was bail recommended by the City Fiscal. However,
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1834, even as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1974 (May 2,
1985), the crime of Rebellion is still punishable by "reclusion perpetua to death." Presidential Decree
No. 1974 did not reduce the penalty for Rebellion under Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1834, but merely "tempered" the penalties for "conspiracy or
proposal or inciting to commit such crimes," limiting the amended provisions to Articles 136, 138, 141,
142, 142-B, 143, 144, 146, and 147, but not to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code.
Considering, therefore, that the detained attorneys are not entitled to bail as a matter of right before the
prosecution is heard on its evidence, and observing fealty to the Constitutional mandate that "all
persons, except those charged with capital offenses, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties" (Section 18, Article IV, 1973 Constitution), the Regional
Trial Court of Davao City, Branch X, should be directed in Criminal Case No. 12,349, to determine
whether the evidence of guilt against the detained attorneys is strong, and considering the gravity of the
offense charged, it should likewise be required to hear the case to completion with deliberate speed so
that their guilt or innocence may be determined without delay.
Furthermore, pending resolution by this Court of the crucial issues raised in Garcia-Padilla and
in Integrated Bar of the Philippines, et al vs. Min. Juan Ponce Enrile, et al. (G.R. No. 66610)
consolidated with National Bar Association of the Philippines, et all vs. Min. Juan Ponce Enrile, et
al. (G.R. No. 66706), it is my view that individuals against whom PDA's have been issued should be
furnished with the original, or the duplicate original, or a certified true copy issued by the official having
official custody of the PDA, at the time of apprehension. Pursuant to the Rules and Regulations
Implementing Presidential Decree No. 1877, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1877-A, the
PDA's should also be enforced within 24 hours in the Metro Manila area or within 48 hours outside
Metro Manila, upon receipt by the unit concerned. In this case, although the record does not show such
date of receipt, the fact is that the PDA was issued on January 25, 1985 but the detained attorneys
were arrested only on May 10 and 13, 1985, respectively. The four-month gap can give room for doubt
as to its authenticity and whether, in fact, the detained attorneys posed "any appreciable danger to
national security and public order. "
The paramount consideration should be that the Constitutional "right of the people to be secure in their
persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
not be violated" (Section 3, Article IV, 1973 Constitution). Until the issue of the validity of the PDA is
finally resolved, PDA's applied for on the basis of militancy alone in national security cases, of
insufficient surveillance, or unsupported deductions and inferences, contravene the Constitutional
mandate that "no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
Judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce" (ibid.). Adherence to Constitutional
mandates could ease the current discontent and growing insurgency gripping the nation today. The
objective should be to fight for the hearts and minds of the people by observing the rule of law.
Lastly I venture to invite attention, particularized for this case, that the Constitution provides for the
vesting of judicial power not only in this Court but also in inferior Courts established by law. While this
Court can reverse and modify, on appeal or certiorari, actuations of inferior Courts, the latter, as
wielders of judicial power, can not only invoke, but also be entitled to, "procedural due process".
Without a hearing, howsoever formal, the involved Regional Trial Court branch in Davao City should not
be deprived of jurisdiction, substantial or even initial, over persons it has ordered, or confirmed as,
arrested.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting
More than four (4) agonizing months * after this Court issued its near-unanimous Resolution 1 of May
23, 1985, after hearing the parties in oral argument in the morning, ordering the immediate release of
the three petitioners-detainees, Attys. Laurente C. Ilagan, Antonio B. Arellano and Marcos D. Risonar,
Jr., on the recognizance of their principal counsel, retired Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, Chairman,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines national legal aid committee, and retired Justice Jose B. L. Reyes,
President Emeritus of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as the president and officers of their
own IBP Davao chapter, which release it had expressly ordered to be "immediately executory", this
Court has now refused to enforce its own release order. Repeated motions for enforcement of this
Court's "immediately executory" order of release as against respondents' "brazen disrespect and
contemptous disregard" 2 thereof were filed in vain. It has instead dismissed the petition for habeas
corpus for having become "moot and academic, " because of the arbitrary filing of precipitate, vindictive
and oppressive charges against them for the capital crime of rebellion without hearing or preliminary
investigation and in gross violation of their constitutional right and rudimentary requirements of due
process and fair play.
I. Antecedent Facts.—The three lawyers, Attys. Ilagan, Arellano and Risonar, Jr., FLAG (Free Legal
Assistance Group) human rights lawyers of Davao City, were illegally arrested and brought to the
military stockade at Camp Catitipan, Davao City one after the other on May 10, 11 and 13, 1985, upon
mission orders issued by the prime mover and initiator of the operations, respondent General Dionisio
S. Tan-Guate, Jr. (hereinafter referred to as respondent general). The mission orders (which are
military orders for carrying out a specific mission or military operations) are not warrants of arrest, much
less Preventive Detention Actions (PDA's). The orders did not state what were the offenses allegedly
committed, although indicating that they were being issued pursuant to a PDA, which was never
shown nor produced by respondent general until a xerox copy thereof dated as early as January 25,
1985 was submitted with the respondents' return to the writ. No copy thereof was given the petitioners
nor were they given any reason for which the three lawyers were taken into military custody.
The first lawyer, Atty. Ilagan, was picked up at 10:45 a.m. on May 10th while taking a snack with some
friends at a place in front of his office at C.M. Recto St. His military arrestors denied his request to be
allowed to go to his office "a few meters away" so he could give instructions to his associates about a
case scheduled for hearing that afternoon.3 The second lawyer, Atty, Arellano, a law professor at the
Ateneo de Davao law school, was one of fifteen IBP Davao Chapter lawyers who insisted on visiting
Atty. Ilagan at the military camp on May 11th despite the military custodians' initial refusals that no
visitors could be allowed "unless first cleared by R-2 (intelligence) or Gen. Tan-Guates aide." After the
visit, he was told that he was under arrest under the mission order which was merely shown to him and
he was no longer all owed to leave the camp. As he told the Court: "I just (went) to visit my colleague, a
member of the IBP, to render legal assistance as I'm supposed to do as an officer of the Court. I came
to visit, I came to render legal assistance. I was arrested and detained." 4 On May 13th, the third lawyer,
Atty. Risonar, Jr.. having received word from the military that he was wanted, presented himself at
Camp Catitipan. He was not shown even the mission order, much less a PDA or warrant of arrest. He
was so shaken up by the traumatic experience of being himself wanted and arrested by the military (not
having been given even a traffic violation ticket in his whole life) instead of his accustomed role of
helping hapless persons who have come across their path and assisting as a member of the Human
Rights Committee "not only political detainees, but workers, students, teachers and urban community"
that he almost broke down at the hearing and had to be asked to take firm hold of himself. 5
After the filing of the petition at bar and the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus to produce in court the
persons of the three lawyers at the scheduled May 23rd hearing, they were transferred at 10 p.m. of the
night of May 20th to the Metro-Discom stockade in Davao City and herded with a fourth person in a
cramped cell, "a very small cell good only for 2 people. " The next day, they were picked up by "2 PC
jeeps loaded with fully armed men" and in the words of Atty. Arellano, "in the presence of the detainees
in the stockade, ... many of whom are my clients and in the presence of their visitors, ... and in the
presence of our wives, ... we were handcuffed like ordinary criminals, and we were transported from
that stockade up to the airport and from the airport we were brought to Manila and then we were
brought to Camp Bicutan." 6 They have been since detained there, their lives shattered, uprooted from
their homes and families, and deprived of their livelihood and their families left to fend for themselves.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other petitioners complain in their verified petition that
"(B)eyond the harassment and the illegal arrest and detention of these three advocates, are grave
implications for the craft. Their arrest appears to be a prelude to a campaign to ultimately deprive the
accused in national security cases of the services of counsel in violation of the Constitution," citing "a
readily discernible pattern from events in the recent past" including the killings of FLAG Atty. Zorro C.
Aguilar and newsman Jacobo Amatong who gave an antemortem statement "that it was the military that
shot them" in Dipolog City on September 23, 1984 and the killing of Atty. Romraflo R. Taojo in his own
home in Tagum, Davao del Norte on April 2, 1985, who had been allegedly warned by the military about
the nature of the cases he was handling. The petition further cited the case of petitioner MABINI trustee
and co-founder Atty. Jojo Binay who was successful in having several criminal cases against his client
Dr. Nemesio Prudente dropped, but in April this year "found himself a co-respondent with his client Dr.
Prudente in a new subversion charge filed by the military with the provincial fiscal of Rizal. " Also cited
were the cases of Attys. Romeo Astudillo and Alberto Benesa both former IBP Abra chapter presidents
and Abra FLAG chairman and member, respectively, who in the same month of April this year "were
arrested by the military, charged with subversion, and presently confined at the Constabulary stockade
in Bangued, Abra, Since 1979, they were the only human rights lawyers in Bangued, Abra. Since their
arrest, there are no lawyers anymore handling such cases." 7 Between the two of them, they reportedly
handled a total of about 120 subversion cases and "not one of their clients was even convicted due to
'lack of evidence.' " 8
The petition quoted respondent general's press statement issued on May 10th that ... the arrest of
Ilagan, 'who had lately been engaged in human rights lawyering for suspected persons detained for
subversion, rebellion and other charges' was 'long overdue' (Business Day, May 13, 1985, p. 11)"9 and
the exertion of pressure upon other Davao human rights lawyers in this wise:
The tension mounted when another lawyer Silvestre Bello III, BAYAN national
organizing committee member, got word from Jesus Dureza President of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Davao del Sur chapter, that Estares was 'inviting'
Bello to Camp Catitipan. Bello, in an earlier interview, said they were assured by
Estares that in case they would be slapped with a PDA, they would not be picked
up like what happened to Ilagan but instead just 'be invited' to Camp Catitipan as in
Arellano case.
Estares, on the other hard, told Business Day they were just 'inviting' Bello to 'visit
his friends,' PC-INP regional commander, Dionisio Tan- Gatue also told newsmen
in a phone interview that he was just inviting Bello to visit him. Tan-Gatue however,
declined to comment on whether or not there will be more arrests in the next few
days. 'Just wait and see,' he said. (Business Day, May 13, 1985)
10
"The aforesaid report has been confirmed by the IBP Davao Chapter."
The petition, noting that "(T)hese trends are ominous for members of the Bar especially those who are
engaged in pro bono publico work who have incurred the ire of the military," 11 invoked the writ of
habeas corpus as the great writ of liberty on behalf of the three lawyers. IBP President Emeritus J.B.L.
Reyes made this eloquent plea against this Damocles' sword wielded by the military in that its value is
not that it falls but that it hangs, and it hangs over every lawyer at the present time, engaged or not in
the defense of anybody":
 That is why, if Your Honors please, we have here all the representatives of the Bar have captured NPA's." He said that these statements given by former NPA's were shown him by
organizations because they are all threatened under this method that is being military officers, but when questioned as to whether these states were "newly prepared also or long
adopted by the military, that anybody who thus ran against their Ideas of what a existing, " he was specifically warned against swallowing hook, line and sinker" the assertions of
citizen should do, becomes ipso facto suspect and ipso facto rebel or a subversive. such professional witnesses and of the imperative necessity of conducting an independent
And that is the reason why we've come to this Court, because with all this publicity. investigation, thus:
Even if only 3 or 5 lawyers are arrested all the others will be afraid. If Your Honors
will recall that we are arguing the constitutionality of this PDA, we happened to
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
quote from the United States Supreme Court, that the value of the Sword of
Damocles is not that it falls but that it hangs, and it hangs over every lawyer at the
present time, engaged or not in the defense of anybody How do we know how Q What (did) your evidence consist of ?
many more lawyers will be in the future arrested. 12
ASST. SOLGEN:
Or as then Associate (now Chief) Justice Makasiar in 1980 stressed before the Philconsa against the
proposal then to return the administrative supervision of inferior courts from the Supreme Court to the
Ministry of Justice: "The warning has been issued that a tyrant, who wants complete and absolute A Statements given by former members of the New People
control over the people, will first seduce and eliminate the lawyers and thereafter destroy the courts. Army in Davao Your Honor, there are NPA's who surrendered
and then subsequently . . .
This tragedy must be
averted." 12-a
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
Respondents' return made the startling charge that the three lawyers (all practitioners of long good
standing since 1971, 1977 and 1976, family men and without any derogatory record) "have been Q And these evidences were in your possession long prior to
arrested and detained because of evidence that they are members of the Communist Party of the the arrest and detention of these 3 lawyers?
Philippines or its partner, the National Democratic Front, and have been active in organizing mass
actions intended to further the communist cause," and "(I)n truth, the PDA against the three lawyers
was issued as early as January 25, 1985, shortly after the series of welgas conducted late in 1984. But, ASST. SOLGEN:
with the President's knowledge and concurrence, the military in Region 11 tried to withhold its
implementation precisely in the hope that the need for such action would pass, forestalling a possible A In our possession, Your Honor no, sir, because I saw them
misinterpretation of the government's motive in making the arrest. The situation in Southern Mindanao only when we were preparing the return, Your Honor.
has, however, deteriorated compelling the government to act swiftly, arrest the communist leaders
behind the welga and stem the tide of mass disturbance sweeping the area." 13 Ironically, while the
state attorneys specifically pleaded that there is evidence that the three lawyers are communists, yet JUSTICE CUEVAS:
they invoke the Garcia Padilla ruling that "the Court may not inquire into it" 14 and that "because of the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the Courts have no authority to look into this Q From whom did they come from, if you know.
evidence" 15 which led then Chief Justice Fernando to ask in exasperation:
ASST. SOLGEN:
CHIEF JUSTICE
A I was shown that by these Military Officers.
Q But what is the connection between them? You can always,
your pleading is quite extensive, but until now according to you
there is evidence but you are not at liberty to reveal that JUSTICE CUEVAS:
evidence. What good will it do to the Court then? What is
their [the lawyers] connection with the acts that Q Newly prepared also or long existing?
are rebellious in character or subversive? That perhaps will
give the possibility [for] their continued detention? 16
ASST. SOLGEN:

Still, at the hearing of May 23rd, it was clearly stressed that notwithstanding that the PDA had been
secured since January 25, 1985 by respondent general, supposedly "on the basis of evidence and A Your Honor please, I . . . .
verified reports," when questioned why no information had been filed against them "considering that as
early as January 25, 1985 there had been [allegedly] evidence that they had committed subversion, " JUSTICE CUEVAS:
respondents assured the Court that the detained lawyers would be "entitled to a hearing ... when the
time comes that we file charges [which] will be decided by the prosecuting officer of the
government" (upon interpellation of Mr. Justice Relova and reply of Assistant Solicitor General Eduardo Q You answer positively because I'll ask them, when they were
G. Montenegro). 17 Respondents' counsel had at the hearing claimed that "these three lawyers turned over to you were they newly prepared also? When were
companeros of mine are active members of the Communist Party of the Philippines, [as] witnesses we they prepared?
ASST. SOLGEN: A Yes, Your Honor. May I continue, Your Honor. Now, Atty.
Ilagan, in particular
A I do not remember the date now but I was reading it.
Anyway, Your Honor, the reason why we did not attach this to JUSTICE TEEHANKEE:
our return is this, that most of those . . . .
Q This is an appropriate time I believe, what Justice Cuevas
JUSTICE CUEVAS: has mentioned was that, in other words, you brought these
affidavits?
Q That is very very material, simply because there is rebellion
in the count I do not think it warrants the picking up of ASST. SOLGEN:
anybody?
A Yes, Your Honor.
ASST. SOLGEN:
JUSTICE TEEHANKEE:
A Yes, Your honor.
Q But you have to check them out?
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
ASST. SOLGEN:
Q That is following up under your theory?
A Yes, Your Honor.
ASST. SOLGEN.
JUSTICE TEEHANKEE:
A Yes, Your Honor, because the surrendered NPA's who gave
those statements, at least 3 of them, have not yet been
Q Check the background of these people and check out their
surfaced by the Government. Their Identity are still not to be
assertions as against an independent investigation. As if they
divulged because the Military is not through yet in its
say on such and such a date Attorney Ilagan was in the
investigation with respect to these people. So they are not to
mountains; you have to check that out, you can't
be mentioned.
just swallow on its own. There are so many of these
professional witnesses?
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
ASST. SOLGEN:
Q My theory because I had been a Fiscal also, Mr. Assistant
Solicitor General as you know, there are people who are, who
A That may be true, Your Honor, there are professional
had the appetite of giving any kind of affidavit. In fact, I had
witnesses, Your Honor.
prosecuted an accused who is even willing to testify that he
witnessed the shooting of Rizal in Luneta?
JUSTICE TEEHANKEE:
ASST. SOLGEN:
Q There are, you know that and we all know that.
A That may be true, Your Honor.
ASST. SOLGEN:
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
A Yes there are. Now, may I continue, Your Honor.
Q You should not swallow 'hook, line, and sinker,' that is our
apprehension in particular? CHIEF JUSTICE FERNANDO:

ASST. SOLGEN: A Yes, but please you must go directly. 18

 CHIEF JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Q We've heard that before but again [what is] the connection
of these people?
SOLICITOR ABAD:
A Well, the position of the Military is that ....
CHIEF JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Q They are human rights lawyers, they have
been defending several persons accused of crimes of . . . . and
they had been doing as members of the Bar. Now they are
picked up and apprehended, at least justify that.
SOLICITOR ABAD:
A Well, I appreciate that, Your Honor please,
anyone belonging to the middle forces who campaign in the
open to organize the populace for support to the revolution
must really have some front, because when it comes to a
revolution .
CHIEF JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Q But again you say they are the front of these people,
where is the evidence to substantiate this conclusion? They
are all naked assertions thus far?
JUSTICE TEEHANKEE:
Q Mr. Counsel, your theory seems that anybody who joins in a
protest or a demonstration against grievances and abuses as
perceived by them is a . . . . joining this middle force is
a communist already?
SOLICITOR ABAD:
A That is certainly not our theory, Your Honor, that is not the
theory of the
Government.19
After the hearing, and as already indicated, the Court ordered the immediate release of the three
lawyers-detainees on recognizance of their principal counsel per its Resolution of May 23rd, which it
expressly ordered to be "immediately executory. " But the camp commander at Camp Bagong Diwa did
not honor the Court's release order, saying that "it had to be verified from higher authorities." So,
petitioners filed their manifestation and motion on May 24th, reporting the non-release and praying that
the immediate release of the three lawyers on recognizance of their principal counsel be effected in the
premises of the Supreme Court, as had been done in previous past cases.
On the next day thereafter, May 25th, respondents filed an urgent motion for reconsideration, invoking
anew the Garcia-Padilla ruling 20 that the courts could not entertain petitions for habeas corpus of
persons detained under Presidential Commitment Orders (now supplanted by PDA's),
Without awaiting this Court's action on their aforesaid motion for reconsideration, respondents,
particularly respondent general, somehow got th City Fiscal of Davao City to precipitately file on May
27, 1985, without any preliminary investigation, an information against the three petitioners' lawyers for
the capital crime of rebellion with the Regional Trial Court of Davao, Branch X. 21 The said trial
court grossly disregarding the deference that all inferior courts should accord this Court as the highest
court of the land (since the military's equally gross disregard of this Court's May 23rd order for the
release of petitioners-lawyers was a matter of public notice, having been prominently reported in all
national and local newspapers) just as precipitately issued a warrant of arrest with no bail against said
petitioners-lawyers. Respondents then filed on May 28th their Urgent Manifestation/Motion, annexing
copies of the information and warrant of arrest, praying for the dismissal of the habeas corpus petition
at bar on the ground that it has become moot and academic.
In their required comment on the state's action, petitioners' lawyers stated that the fiscal misinvoked
section 7, Rule 112 which allows the filing of an information without preliminary investigation "when the
person is lawfully arrested without a warrant," i.e. in flagrante delicto (which is not the case here). They
asserted petitioners' constitutional right to due process and the right to a preliminary investigation as
granted by statute and expressly assured to them in open court at the May 23rd hearing. They
denounced the "cabal among military authorities and the prosecution arm of the government" with the
contumacious cooperation of the trial court to deprive them of due process and to circumvent this
Court's release order, as follows:
3.1. Preliminary investigation is instituted to secure the innocent against hasty,
malicious and oppressive prosecution and to protect him from an open and public
accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of public trial, and also
to protect the state from useless and expensive trials. The right to preliminary
investigation is a statutory grant and to withhold it would be to transgress
constitutional due process. Salonga v. Hon. Ernani Cruz Paño, G.R. No. 59254,
February 18, 1985, citing Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA 241; Hashim v. Boncam, 71
Phil. 216; People v. Oandasa, 25 SCRA 277.
3.2. Petitioners having been deprived of their constitutional right to due process by
the Fiscal of Davao, therefore, the information for rebellion filed against them is
void.
3.3. The information filed by the Fiscal of Davao being void, the Regional Trial
Court of Davao has acquired no jurisdiction over the case of rebellion filed against
petitioner. Therefore, all orders, warrants, processes, and issuances of the Court
relative to the case, including the warrant for their arrest, are issued without
authority and therefore null and void.
3.4. What becomes evident in the face of these developments is a cabal among
military authorities and the prosecution arm of the government to bend and short
circuit rules in order to deprive petitioners of their right to due process guaranteed
by the Constitution, and to circumvent the order of this Court for their release. It is
deplorable that the Regional Trial Court of Davao has lent itself to this conspiracy
to undermine the Constitution and the authority of this Court.
 3.5. All proceedings and orders in connection with the case of rebellion against
petitioners being of no legal effect these cannot have the consequence of
rendering the case moot and academic. 22
II. The merits of the petition.—I have gone to great lengths to restate hereinabove the antecedent facts
as established by the pleadings and annexes of record and the hearing held by the Court on May 23rd.
I submit that on the basis of these established facts, the "sacred constitutional rights [and] also the right
to 'due process' which is fundamental fairness " as imperatively stressed by the majority decision in the
recent case of Galman vs. Hon. P.J. Pamaran 23 have been grossly denied the three lawyers detainees.
This Court's "immediately executory" release order of May 23rd (issued over four months ago) should
be forthwith honored and complied with. Far from having rendered the petition as moot and academic,
all the railroaded proceedings and orders charging the three petitioners-lawyers with instant
rebellion in gross disregard of the pendency of this case and of the assurance given in open court that
the petitioners-lawyers would be entitled to a hearing and a preliminary investigation in obedience to
the constitutional mandate that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law" and "no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of
law, " 24 should be declared null and void. They were patently void, having been issued without
jurisdiction under the well-settled rule that "a violation of a constitutional right divests the court of
jurisdiction; and as a consequence its judgment [or order] is null and void and confers no rights. " 25 At
the very least, all proceedings in the instant rebellion case before the Davao trial court should be
suspended and enjoined until the petitioners-lawyers are granted their right to a preliminary
investigation and the opportunity to confront their accusers and disprove the charges; meanwhile, it is
but part of due process that they be set free as ordered by the Court and be enabled to prepare their
defense. The petition under the great writ of habeas corpus to set them at liberty should accordingly be
granted for the following fundamental reasons and considerations:
1. Basic Right to Due Process.—The Bill of Rights expressly mandates that ... no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized ." 26 This plainly means that generally no person may be held to
answer for a criminal offense without a preliminary investigation. The right to a preliminary investigation
is statutorily granted for serious offenses and to deny it violates the right to due process guaranteed by
the Constitution. 27 Preliminary investigation has been instituted precisely to secure the innocent against
hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution. Moreover, the instant rebellion case filed against the
petitioners manifestly falls under three recognized exceptions to the general rule that criminal
prosecution may not be blocked by court prohibition or injunction, namely, "l. for the orderly
administration of justice; 2. to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and
vindictive manner; ...; and 4. to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights. .... 28
2. Petitioners-lawyers denied due process.—The blitzkrieg filing of precipitate, vindictive and oppressive
charges against petitioners-lawyers for the capital crime of rebellion without hearing and preliminary
investigation deprived them their right to due process and the rudimentary requirements of fair play. As
the majority, quoting former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, emphasized in the recent case of
Galman vs. Pamaran, supra, 29 "due process ... is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason,
obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To
satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds
of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by
lack of reasonableness. Correctly, it has been Identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the
embodiment of the sporting Idea of fair play ... It exacts fealty 'to those strivings for justice' and judges
the act of officialdom of whatever branch 'in the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness
that reflect (democratic) traditions of legal and political thought.' ... It is not a narrow or 'technical
conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances,' ... decisions based on such a
clause requiring a 'close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society.' ... Questions
of due process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases. .... " 29-a
3. Right to preliminary investigation.-The May 23rd hearing brought out the importance of preliminary
investigation to prevent hasty and baseless prosecution, since respondents could not cite concrete
evidence of specific criminal acts committed by respondents. Respondent general secured the PDA on
January 25, 1985 on the basis of affidavits of surrendered NPA's supposedly incriminating the
petitioners, which was issued "on the basis of evidence and verified reports that the (petitioners-
lawyers) have committed subversion and/or acts inimical to public safety, national security and public
order." 30 Respondents would cavalierly tag the petitioners-lawyers as having gone "beyond purview of
lawyering, but even to the extent of attending CPP and NPA rites, and using their profession as lawyers
as cover-up for their activities in furtherance of CPP goals and objectives, "as per the affidavit executed
under date of January 22, 1985 by the Davao intelligence chief Lt. Col. Nelson J. Estares. 31 As pointed
out by petitioners in their verified traverse, this affidavit has no probative value. It is not based on the
affiant's direct knowledge but offers hearsay, on his alleged interviews with surrendered NPA's and "to
the best of [this] knowledge and ability." It would have been a simple matter for the alleged witnesses to
have executed their own affidavits. In turn, petitioners have categorically denied that they are members
of the CCP or NDF. Attys. Ilagan and Arellano said in open court that they are chairman and secretary-
general, respectively, of BAYAN-Mindanao, affiliated with the national organization of BAYAN (Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan) with former Senators Lorenzo M. Tañada and Ambrosio Padilla as chairman
and vice-chairman, respectively, and among whose national leaders is former Manila Times publisher
Joaquin "Chino" P. Roces. But strangely enough, while the aforesaid documents were executed in
January, 1985 to secure the PDA for subversion against petitioners, the instant charge filed without
hearing by the fiscal apparently based on the same affidavits is now for rebellion which would involve
the petitioners rising in arms. The whole point is that petitioners' lawyers have squarely presented to
this case the undeniable and undisputed facts that they have been denied their right to preliminary
investigation and to show the utter falsity of the charge of instant rebellion against them. Such right was
assured them in open court by the State's attorneys. It is this Court which must grant petitioners this
right, and uphold their right to due process. The obiter dictum cited by the majority decision from the
case of Medina vs. Orozco 32 that "the proper forum before which absence of preliminary investigation
should be ventilated is the Court of First Instance, not this Court" has no application. There, this Court
found that not only was a preliminary investigation made, but also a subsequent reinvestigation upon
his motion, after which the case against the accused proceeded to trial.
4. Professional witnesses of military not checked out.-As shown above,
supra, 33 as admitted by the State attorneys, there are so many professional witnesses presented by the
military in such cases, whose statements should not be "swallowed hook, line and sinker." The ex-parte
affidavits of the alleged surrendered NPAs could be checked out as against their background and an
independent investigation only in a preliminary investigation. Such affidavits and statements have been
found to be completely worthless in other cases. In the habeas corpus case of Aristedes Sarmiento, he
and his wife were charged with subversion on March 31, 1983, as ranking leaders of the NPA, after
they had been "invited" and detained at the military camp in Gumaca, Quezon on October 9, 1982. After
the prosecution rested its case, the trial court granted the defense' motion for dismissal of the charges
for utter "worthlessness of evidence." The trial court ruled that "(I)ndeed, there is nothing that the Armed
Forces of the Philippines or any of the law enforcement agencies of the Government could offer to
prove any connection of the Sarmiento couple with any subversive organization, even with the New
People's Army, if ever it is to be considered such, and much more as leaders thereof." This led to an
apparently unheeded call from the now Chief Justice that "The military establishment should inquire into
whether the President was deceived into issuing the PCO and who initiated the arrest of the couple
without supporting evidence." In petitioners' verified traverse, they point out that respondents' "star
witness" against petitioners is one Calixto Alegado III, an alleged former NPA who is now a member of
the Philippine Constabulary. They state that Calixto Alegado Ill is precisely one of those professional
witnesses unworthy of credence who has testified in a number of national security cases and who
should be checked out in an independent investigation as assured by the State attorneys at the May
23rd hearing, thus: "In Criminal Case No. 9198 before the Regional Trial Court of Davao entitled People
of the Philippines v. Carlito Gaspar, Alegado testified that he witnessed the accused therein giving
lectures for the CPP/NPA at dates when the accused Carlito Gaspar was either in Manila or out of the
country, more specifically in Australia and Latin America. On the basis of this affiant's testimony
together with other supposed former CPP/NPA members, the Regional Trial Court found Alegado not
worthy of belief and acquitted Gaspar. It is significant to point out here that the counsel of Carlito
Gaspar in that case is petitioner Atty. Laurente Ilagan." 34
5. Protective mantle of this Court.—The unlawful arrest and detention of the petitioners-lawyers has
completely uprooted their lives. This Court must extend them its protective mantle as officers of the
courts, because of the strong indications, supra, 35 of "ominous trends" for lawyers "who are engaged in
pro bono publico work who have incurred the ire of the military," such as in the case of Abra, where
there are no more lawyers handling subversion cases because the only two human rights lawyers
handling such cases have been charged with subversion and locked up in the stockade. As formulated
by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in response to a question of Mr. Justice Gutierrez why the lawyers were picked
out for criminal charges (when there were non-lawyers who also led the welga), "(Y)es, precisely they
pick the lawyers because I suppose they figure out that in fact the lawyers are actually social leaders in
their respective communities. That is why, if Your Honors please, we are pleading this Court for the
prosecution because after all the lawyers are officers of the Court and if the Court will not protect them,
who will? Certainly not the military. We certainly hope that a lawyer will not, in the long run, will not be
asking the NPA for protection, because nobody else wants to protect them." 36
6. People's right of assembly.-The people's right to freedom of expression and to peaceably assemble
and petition the government for redress of grievances are fundamental constitutional rights. Mass
demonstrations popularly termed as welgang bayan constitute a legitimate exercise of these basic
constitutional rights. Indeed, as the Court stressed in Jose B. L. Reyes vs. Ramon Bagatsing 37 "The
sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of
democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public
safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest." The Court therein reminded
the police (and the military for that matter) of their duty to extend protection to the
demonstrators/participants "staying at a discreet distance, but ever ready and alert to perform their
duty." It further admonished that should any disorderly conduct or incidents occur, whether provoked or
otherwise, such incidents of disorderly conduct by individual members of a crowd should not be seized
"as an excuse to characterize the assembly as seditious and tumultuous rising against the authorities"
and render illusory the right of peaceable assembly. 38
. The military must overcome their allergy if not aversion to such welgas. Acting AFP Chief of Staff Lt.
Gen. Fidel V. Ramos recently, correctly urged those involved in law enforcement and criminal justice
system to "keep themselves up-to-date on the [changing] law and jurisprudence and the intricacies of
implementation" adding that "as law enforcers they must be convinced by heart that they enforce the
law and never violate it. 39
Petitioners candidly state in their verified traverse that "(T)he possibility that the Communist Party of the
Philippines and the National Democratic Front may have participated in or used the events for their own
purposes may be assumed for purposes of argument. It is not fair inference from this assumption that
all those who participated in any significant degree in the strikes and the activities held in connection
therewith are members of the Communist Party of the Philippines or the National Democratic
Front," 40 but they rightfully submit that "(T)o conclude that persons who participate in such mass
activities are communists or subversives and to restrain them in their freedom as a consequence is
the worst form of witch-hunting violative of all principles of fair play and due
process." 41
In the Philippine Blooming Mills case 42 this Court set aside the industrial court's decision dismissing
from employment the workers' labor union's eight officers for having led and carried out a "temporary
stoppage of work" to hold a mass demonstration at Malacañang of all the workers on March 4, 1969 in
protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police. It held that such dismissal was violative of the
workers' legitimate exercise of their constitutional rights of free expression, peaceable assembly and
petition for redress of grievance, thus:
... Recognition and protection of such freedoms are imperative on all public officers
including the courts (as well as private citizens and corporations ... when even a
law enacted by Congress must yield to the untrammelled enjoyment of these
human rights. There is no time limit to the exercise of these freedoms. The right to
enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of one speech, the printing of one
article or the staging of one demonstration. It is a continuing immunity, to be
invoked and exercised when exigent and expedient whenever there are errors to
be rectified, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be condemned. Otherwise,
these guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be vitiated by a rule on procedure
prescribing the period for appeal. The battle then would be reduced to a race for
time.
7. Preservation of liberties and motives.—Good faith must be presumed as well on the part of
respondents as of petitioners-lawyers. The good motive but misplaced overzealousness of the military,
particularly as headed by respondent general in the Davao area, may be noted, obsessed as they are
with keeping peace and order. But it seems appropriate and timely to cite the pointed reminder of the
late Mr. Justice William Douglas as reproduced in the PBM case, as follows:
The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not from those who consciously
seek to destroy our system of government, but from men of goodwill-good men
who allow their proper concerns to blind them to the fact that what they propose to
accomplish involves an impairment of liberty.
... The Motives of these men are often commendable. What we must remember,
however, is that preservation of liberties does not depend on motives. A
suppression of liberty has the same effect whether the suppressor be a reformer or
an outlaw. The only protection against misguided zeal is constant alertness of the
infractions of the guarantees of liberty contained in our Constitution. Each
surrender of liberty to the demands of the moment makes easier another larger
surrender. The battle over the Bill of Rights is a never ending one.
... The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of us.
43
... In short, the liberties of none are safe unless the liberties of all are protected.
The record of the May 23rd hearing highlights the imperative importance of the injunction that no matter
how worthy the motive may be, the authorities, civilian or military, should not suppress the people's
liberties, and push the aggrieved citizen in despair towards the NPA or the communists; and respect
their constitutional rights as otherwise there would be no difference as against the outlaws or rebels.
For as Brandeis called it, "Crime is contagious. If the government becomes the lawbreaker it breeds
contempt for the law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy." The record
again underscores the utter lack of evidence to support the unlawful arrest and detention of the three
petitioners-lawyers, thus:
JUSTICE TEEHANKEE:
Q All right, I will ask one more question on that. Since it was
organized, this Mindanao Chapter, in April you already had a
PDA in January. Did you not or the Military exercise strict
surveillance daily over the activities of these people? So that
you can catch them with the goods?
SOLICITOR ABAD
A Well, it is not that simple, if Your Honor please, because
rebellion is not a crime committed (with) not exactly with
bouncing checks or similar crimes.
JUSTICE TEEHANKEE
Q True, that's very true, but ...?
SOLICITOR ABAD
A So precisely a good rebel is one who is not caught, he was
able to lose himself in the populace. How can we expect let's
say a member of a front organization of the NPA will carry an
Id, if Your Honor please.
JUSTICE TEEHANKEE
Q But you have to look into the record of the individual.
SOLICITOR ABAD
A I think they have, Your Honor.
JUSTICE TEEHANKEE
Q You have to look into the record of these individuals here,
lawyers, members of the Bar of good standing, without any
derogatory record, is it within the ordinary course of human
conduct that they would prostitute their profession, pervert it
and serve as fronts?
SOLICITOR ABAD
A Horacio Morales, Your Honor, was a Government Executive,
in the same manner as Atty. Ocampo was a good journalist,
but they admitted they have turned to the communist side. We
cannot say that a background of a man is sufficient guarantee
that he is not going to join the rebellion.
JUSTICE TEEHANKEE
Q As far as Morales is concerned he gave up on reforms, he
was desperate; that is why he says there is no other way...
SOLICITOR ABAD
A Well, that's what I mean, if Your Honor please, an individual
supplace (sic) society, the old society ...
JUSTICE TEEHANKEE
Q Society (should) not push the aggrieved citizen towards the
NPA or the communist party as a last resort. And therefore, we
must observe their Constitutional rights. Otherwise, there is no
difference?
SOLICITOR ABAD
A There were 3 million people who were unable to use the
streets of Davao, if Your Honor please, its their constitutional
rights to travel to bring their sick to the hospitals and were
violated by these ...
JUSTICE MAKASIAR
Q Compañero, your position is that history is replete with
examples of traitors and quislings from high society or high
Government circles. But the question is, while you affirm the
fact that the communist is not necessarily open or overt, he is
usually engaged in covert activities. Now what are the
examples of these covert activities of these people? What is
your evidence?
SOLICITOR ABAD
A Well, I read from a very authoritative document of the
Communist Party of the Philippines
JUSTICE TEEHANKEE
Q That's begging the question?
JUSTICE MAKASIAR
Q And they deny• The communist party they accept
membership... the Alyansa?
SOLICITOR ABAD
A Financial support, telling over the populace into supporting
the rebellion; driving them away from the Government: giving
financial support; harboring them in their homes. While these
are not armed assistance given to the rebel, if Your Honor
please, but its the duty also of the government to ...
 JUSTICE MAKASIAR
Q ... the various dates of harboring them in their homes; the
financial contributions made by them on such and such a date,
how much? Those are the particulars to support the conclusion
that they had contributed, they were harboring them?
SOLICITOR ABAD
A Well, as I said we have the evidence, the only problem is we
are not prepared to produce now the evidence. 43-a
Indeed, in their Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's May 23rd release order, respondents,
"having obtained clearance for the declassification of the needed materials" submitted their "evidence, "
consisting of hearsay military reports (rather than the direct affidavits of credible witnesses) and
the affidavit of a discredited and perjured professional witness, an alleged NPA, now a member of the
Philippine Constabulary, supra. 43-b No concrete evidence whatever has been submitted therein against
petitioners-lawyers, other than to recklessly red brush their legitimate organization (BAYAN-Mindanao)
as communist-led or infiltrated front organizations and to characterize the series of welgas or strikes in
Mindanao as implementation of the NDF program of activities to organize and mobilize the "middle
forces" of society, supra. 43-c
8. Basic concepts and principles of freedom-The PBM case, citing numerous precedents, restated basic
concepts and principles which, to my mind, underlie and are determinative of the issues at bar, as
follows:
(1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of
the human personality is the central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of
our civilization. The inviolable character of man as an individual must
be 'protected to the largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the
citadel of his person. 44
(2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the Ideals of liberty, equality and
security 'against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour,
the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have
no patience with general principles. 45
In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose of the Bill of
Rights is to withdraw 'certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy,
to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and to establish them as
legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's rights to life, liberty and property,
to free speech, or free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other
fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of
no elections. 46 Laski proclaimed that 'the happiness of the individual not the well-
being of the State, was the criterion on by which its behaviour was to be judged.
His interests, not its power, set the limits to the authority it was entitled to
exercise. 47
(3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are
included among the immunities reserved by the sovereign people, in the rhetorical
aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the Ideas that we abhor or hate more than
the Ideas we cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the minority
who want to talk, but also to benefit the majority who refuse to listen. 48 And as
Justice Douglas cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are the liberties of all; and
the liberties of one are not safe unless the liberties of all are protected. 49
(4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights
but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness
and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can
participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the government through their
suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of
abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal
to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and protection as
well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and
employees.
(5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human
rights over property rights is recognized. 50 Because these freedoms are 'delicate
and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society' and the 'threat of
sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of
sanctions,' they 'need breathing space to survive,' permitting government regulation
only 'with narrow specificity. 51
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are
imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the
Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to
be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the
influential and powerful and of oligarchs political economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly
occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of
our civil and political institutions;52 and such priority 'gives these liberties a sanctity
and a sanction not permitting dubious intrusions. 53
xxx xxx xxx
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression as well as their right of
assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the
employees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for their
very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them, by the Constitution-the
untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. ... Material loss can be
repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being-broken
in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms.
The wounds fester and the scars remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as
he cries in anguish for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on bruised
tissues. 54
9. The express teaching of the Salonga case.—The express teaching on freedom of expression, based
on numerous precedents, of this Court's unanimous decision (11 members with 3 abstentions) in the
case of Salonga vs. Paño 55 should dispel the apparent misconception on the part of the military, us well
as certain government prosecutors, that militant protests and demonstrations are seditious and
subversive of the government. This Court set forth therein guiding and controlling constitutional
principles and precepts governing constitutionally protected spheres and areas reserved by the Bill of
Rights for the individual "where even the awesome powers of government may not enter at will," as
follows: "... if there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than
any other, it is the principle of free thought-not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for
the thought that we hate;" that "freedom of expression is a 'preferred' right and therefore stands on a
higher level than substantive economic or other liberties;" that "this must be so because the lessons of
history, both political and legal, illustrate that freedom of thought and speech is the indispensable
condition of nearly every other form of freedom. Protection is especially mandated for political
discussions. This Court is particularly concerned when allegations are made that restraints have been
imposed upon mere criticisms of government and public officials. Political discussion is essential to the
ascertainment of political truth. It cannot be the basis of criminal indictments;" that there must be
tolerance of political hyperbole since "debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide
open and it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
government and public officials;" that "the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do
not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action;" that "political discussion even among those opposed to the present
administration is within the protective clause of freedom of speech and expression. The same cannot
be construed as subversive activities per se or as evidence of membership in a subversive
organization" in the absence of proof that "such discussion was in furtherance of any plan to overthrow
the government through illegal means, " and that "the judge or fiscal, therefore, should not go on with
the prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence might later turn up during trial for this would be
a flagrant violation of a basic right which the courts are created to uphold. It bears repeating that the
judiciary lives up to its mission by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights. So it has been
before. It should continue to be so."
10. Peaceful and violent welgas.—The military and the police but adhere to the aforecited basic
democratic concepts and principles and recognize the people's constitutional right of assembly, protest
and petition for redress of grievances and accordingly exercise forbearance and understanding, then
the welgas will not and cannot erupt in violence. As emphasized in the PBM case, there is no time limit
in the exercise of these basic freedoms of free expression, peaceable assembly and petition for redress
of grievances. The right to enjoy them is not exhausted "by . . . . the staging of one demonstration." It is
a continuing immunity, to be exercised whenever there are errors to be rectified, abuses to be
denounced, inhumanities to be condemned. This is borne out by the numerous demonstrations, rallies
and welgas in Manila, Bataan and many other provinces. The Welgang bayan in Bataan against, the
nuclear plant which paralyzed the whole of the province for three days last June were carried out
peacefully without any violence, despite certain critical moments when the provincial commander
ordered his forces to advance thru a blockade manned by some 4,000 people. He later withdrew his
orders after a dialogue with the protestors. The behaviour of both the military and the demonstrators
merited commendations from all sectors. The President himself was quoted as saying that "the official
policy of maximum tolerance in dealing with mass demonstrations paid off during the welgang Bayan in
Bataan." 56
In this case, the May 2-3, 1985 welgang bayan which incurred the ire and displeasure of the military
was carried out without any ugly incidents. But the aggressiveness and intolerance of the military and
CHDF forces in Escalante, Negros Occidental turned the welgang bayan there into a bloodbath
last September 20th. Some thirty demonstrators, including women, were reported killed when
government troops who were supposed to keep order during the rally opened fire at the massed crowd
when some troublemakers reportedly tried to snatch their firearms. As observed in one editorial, "once
government soldiers or police open fire on a rally crowd, the result would be a virtual massacre for the
enforcers are better armed." 57 "Indeed, the use of combat-ready and trigger-happy troops trained only
to shoot-to-kill without any training in crowd control of demonstrators or rallyists should be restudied. As
stated in my separate opinion in Hildawa vs. Minister of Defense. 58 "The Supreme Court stands as the
guarantor of the constitutional and human rights of all persons within its jurisdiction and cannot abdicate
its basic role under the Constitution that these rights be respected and enforced. The spirit and letter of
the Constitution negates as contrary to the basic precepts of human rights and freedom that a person's
life be snuffed on out without due process in a split second even if he is caught in flagrante delicto-
unless it was called for as an act of self-defense by the law agents using reasonable means to prevent
or repel an unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased."
11. The Stale PDA.-Iwill not deal here with the serious question raised by petitioners as to the validity of
the PDA issued by the President under date of January 25, 1985 for the arrest and detention of the
three petitioners-lawyers for having "committed subversion and/or acts inimical to public safety, national
security and public order." This question is better resolved in the separate case filed by the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for the declaration of unconstitutionality of the Presidential Decrees authorizing,
among others, the issuance by the President of PDA's without the constitutional requirement that any
officer issuing a warrant of arrest must personally examine the complainant and the witnesses he may
present. 59 Suffice it to state that the PDA against petitioners was already inoperative and stale. It
was issued on January 25, 1985. As respondent general himself states in the return, the military did not
see any need to enforce it until after almost four months later on May 10 to 13 of this year. What is
incomprehensible is that no copy certified or plain of the PDA could be shown to the petitioners upon
their arrest, contrary to existing rules and instructions. A xerox copy of the PDA was first seen by them
only with the filing of the respondents' return, in this case on last May 23rd.
Be that as it may, the PDA should be held to be inoperative and ineffectual. The facts and records as
hereinabove stated patently show that the President was misled into precipitately issuing the same:
A. By the President's own statement, he had declared that "he would issue the controversial Preventive
Detention Action (PDA) orders only when national security would require it and that there is no present
need for him to do it." 60 The PDA was issued on January 25, 1985. Under the implementing rules, it
should have been served within forty-eight (48) hours since it covered persons outside Metro Manila (in
Metro Manila, the prescribed period of service is twenty-four [24] hours). The respondent general's own
admission that there was no need to serve it until after almost four months later shows that there
was no necessity for the peremptory issuance of the PDA last January 25th.
B. The issuance of the PDA against the three petitioners lawyers clearly do not fall within the two
exceptions to the general rule provided in section I of P.D. 1877, as amended, that all cases involving
national security offenses "shall be referred to the provincial or city fiscal or to the proper court for
preliminary examination or investigation in accordance with existing laws. " The two exceptions
provided in section 2 of the said P.D. are as follows:
SEC. 2. Only upon proper warrant issued by the Court or other responsible officer
as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and his witnesses, shall the person or persons charged with the
above-mentioned crimes be arrested and detained; Provided, however, that should
a military commander or the head of a law enforcement agency ascertain that the
person or persons to be arrested has/have committed, is/are actually committing,
or is/are about to commit the above-mentioned crimes, or would probably escape
or commit further acts which would endanger public order and safety as well as the
stability of the state before proper warrant could be obtained, the said military
commander or the head of law enforcement agency may apply to the President of
the Philippines for a preventive detention action against the person or persons
ascertained to be participants in the commission of the crimes referred to in
Section I hereof, under the following circumstances:
(a) When resort to judicial processes is not possible or expedient without
endangering public order and safety;
(b) When in the judgement of the President of the Philippines to apply for a judicial
warrant may prejudice peace and order and the safety of the state like when it may
 jeopardize the continued covert intelligence counter insurgency operations of the
Government, or endanger the lives of intelligence and undercover agents whose
Identities would be revealed by the evidence against the person or persons
covered by a preventive detention action.
There is no question here of judicial process not being possible or expedient. It is obvious from the facts
of record that it would be absurd to say that the. PDA could fall under the second exception that to
apply for a judicial warrant would prejudice public order and the safety of the state. The mere gap of
almost four months between its issuance on January 25th and its actual service on May 10-12 this year
speaks for itself Furthermore, as succinctly stated by petitioners in their verified traverse, "(A)s
members of this Court pointed out in the hearing of May 23, 1985, the alleged PDA was issued as early
as January 25, 1985. Petitioners were not hiding. They were regularly discharging their functions as
lawyers, including visiting their clients in military camps. There was more than ample time from the
issuance of the alleged PDA up to the time when petitioners were actually arrested and detained for
respondents to place them under close surveillance so that concrete, credible evidence of their
supposed criminal activities and connection might be established 'to catch them with the goods' so to
speak. With the manpower and the resources at the command of respondents, they have failed to
produce that evidence." 61
Indeed, as the ponente, Mme. Justice Herrera, notes in her additional opinion, which failed to gain the
majority's concurrence, "it is my view that individuals against whom PDAs have been issued should be
furnished with the original or the duplicate original or a certified true copy issued by the official having
official custody of the PDA, at the time of apprehension. Pursuant to the Rules and Regulations
Implementing Presidential Decree No. 1877, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1877-A, the PDAs
should also be enforced within 24 hours in the Metro Manila area or within 48 hours outside Metro
Manila, upon receipt by the unit concerned. In this case, although the record does not show such date
of receipt, the fact is that the PDA was issued on January 25, 1985 but the detained attorneys were
arrested only on May 10 and 13, 1985, respectively. The four-month gap can give room for doubt as to
its authenticity and whether, in fact, the detained attorneys posed 'any appreciable danger to national
security and public order.' " (Italics supplied)
12. Civilian Supremacy.—Art II, section 8 of our Constitution's Declaration of Principles and State
Policies states that "Civilian authority is at all times supreme over the military. " But the military here
dragged its feet and refused to honor this Court's "immediately executory" release order of May 23rd.
Without waiting for the resolution of its motion for reconsideration of the Court's release order,
respondent general, who had secured the PDA, then filed the new charge of rebellion against
petitioners and with the deplorable acquiescence of the city fiscal and the trial judge, the former filed the
instant information for the capital crime of rebellion and the latter in tum issued the warrant of arrest
without bail. Respondent general was quoted as saying that "The Supreme Court won in only one point.
And that is, we had to file the the charges much sooner"62 as if this Court were an adverse protagonist
instead of the final arbiter and the third department of government vested by the Constitution with the
judicial power to determine and adjudicate all justiciable disputes. The same general is quoted as
replying in a letter of April 1, 1985 to Atty. Jesus G. Dureza, IBP Davao chapter (who was asking why
detainees continue to languish in jail despite court decisions either releasing or acquitting them) that
"To begin with, I believe it may be necessary to review our position on these cases (human rights
cases). I express this need because, despite recent court decisions otherwise, I am morally convinced
that some released suspected communist subversives are guilty." 63 This Court's decisions and orders
form part of the law of the land It is a sad day for civilian supremacy when the military do not feel bound
by the verdict of the courts and would place themselves above the courts and require as a condition for
executing its judgment that they be "morally convinced" by the judgment rendered.
To allow such usurpation and denigration of the Court's power of judicial review is to subvert, if not
destroy, the Constitution and the Rule of Law. The survival of a democratic society rests on the Rule of
Law, which depends on the existence of an independent judiciary.
In endorse and reproduce herein the impassioned appeal made by then Justice Makasiar in his address
in 1980 before the Philconsa against the proposed return of the supervision of lower courts from the
Supreme Court to the Ministry of Justice, supra, 64 as follows:
On the rule of law rests the survival of a democratic state. But the rule of law
depends on the existence of an independent judiciary. 'Those who (make the
proposal), I hope, realize that the ill-effects of such a proposal will reach them and
their children. Even at this late stage in our lives when we are about to fade from
the scene, we cannot evade the tragic consequences of such a proposal; but those
who will suffer more would be the succeeding generations-including the children of
those proposing the subtle destruction of the foundations of the judicial system.
In the evening of our lives, let us not emasculate one branch of the government
that is the last sanctuary of our lives and our liberties-the judiciary. As an enduring
legacy to the generations that will come after us, let us all continue to strengthen
the Supreme Court and the entire judicial system.
The contemporary scene demonstrates once again that injustice breeds dissidence
which seethes and finally explodes into a violent and bloody revolution. To all
human beings, the denial of justice is a mortal assault on life itself. Where the
human spirit is brutalized by abuses and inequities, the ultimate hope for liberation
lies in the force of arms unless the courts can effectively enforce the rule of law.
Our historical experience delineated the varied seeds of armed rebellion or
insurrection with which all of you are familiar. The ruthless exploitation of peasants
and laborers, the lust for and arrogance of power, unabated corruption, unequal
application of the law. the prostitution of elections, despoliation of the national
patrimony by a a favored few, as well as the monopoly and manipulation of the
supply and distribution of economic goods essential to man's existence-all
constitute the many facets of injustice that provide the dynamics of open defiance
of the status quo.
The warning has been issued that a tyrant, who wants complete and absolute
control over the people, will first seduce and eliminate the lawyers and thereafter
destroy the courts. This tragedy must be averted.
To support any proposal that erodes the independence of the courts, abets
subversion of the rule of law, undermines the stability of our democratic institutions,
imperils the liberties of the individual, or gives aid and comfort to the enemies of
the people-is akin to committing treason against the nation. " (Italics supplied)
13. The Supreme Court as guardian and final arbiter of the Constitution.—The judiciary, as headed by
the Supreme Court has neither the power of the sword nor the purse. Yet as the third great department
of government, it is entrusted by the Constitution with the judicial power-the awesome power and task
of determining disputes between litigants involving life, liberty and fortune and protecting the citizen
against arbitrary or oppressive action of the State. The Supreme Court and all inferior courts are called
upon by the Constitution "to protect the citizen against violation of his constitutional or legal rights or
misuse or abuse of power by the State or its officers. The judiciary [assisted by the bar] stands between
the citizen and the State as a bulwark against executive excesses and misuse or abuse of power by the
executive as also transgression of its constitutional limitations by the legislature." 65
The Constitution is basically a charter of limitations of governmental power and enshrines a system of
separation of powers and checks and balances under which no man is the law nor above the law. It
ordains the weakest department, the Supreme Court, as the guardian and final arbiter of the
Constitution. It postulates and requires a free and independent judiciary, sworn to defend and enforce
the Constitution and the law without fear or favor. It mandates that civilian authority is at all times
supreme over the military. Like His Holiness, the Pope, the Supreme Court has no battalions, tanks or
guns to enforce its decisions. Its strength lies in that its verdicts would be obeyed by the sheer moral
force and truth of its judgments for as long as the Court kept the faith and confidence reposed in it by
the people through the Constitution to render justice and sustained their moral conviction that through
the Supreme Court, justice and the voice of reason and truth would prevail in the end. Under the Rule
of Law, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system of the Philippines " (Art. 8, Civil Code) and the Excutive and all its offices and agencies.
and particularly the military, are called upon to execute the laws as so interpreted and adjudged by the
courts and enforce obedience thereto.65-a
As restated by the late Justice Jose P. Laurel in the 1936 landmark case of Angara us. Electoral
Commission, 66 "The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations
upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would
be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of
government along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage,
the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political
apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they
should be in any living Constitution." Justice Laurel pointed out that in contrast to the United States
Constitution, the Philippine Constitution as "a definition of the powers of government" placed upon the
judiciary the great burden of "determining the nature, scope and extent of such powers" and stressed
that "when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority
over the other department ...but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation entrusted to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the
parties in an actual controversy the rights which the instrument secures and guarantees to them."
Let all bear ever in mind that " (I)n a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled
if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent, omnipresent teacher. For good
or ill, it teaches the whole people by example. Crime is contagious If the Government becomes the
lawbreaker it breeds contempt for the law it invites every man to become a law unto himself, it invites
anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means ... would
bring terrible retribution. 67
14. Erroneous premises of the majority decision.
A. The majority decision holds that under section 4, Rule 102 the writ of habeas corpus has served its
purpose because of the judicial warrant of arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court. This is based on
an erroneous premise that the trial court had such jurisdiction to issue the warrant of arrest, and that the
denial of a preliminary investigation of petitioners-lawyers was a mere informality or defect.—As already
emphasized hereinabove, the trial court was totally devoid and ousted of jurisdiction to issue a warrant
of arrest because of the gross denial to petitioners-lawyers of their constitutional right to due process.
B. The majority decision holds that the filing of the information without preliminary investigation falls
within the exceptions of Rule 112, sec. 7 and Rule 113, sec. 5 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure.68 Again, this is erroneous premise. The fiscal misinvoked and misapplied the cited
rules. The petitioners are not persons "lawfully arrested without a warrant. " The fiscal could not rely on
the stale and inoperative PDA of January 25, 1985. Otherwise, the rules would be rendered nugatory, if
all that was needed was to get a PDA and then serve it at one's whim and caprice when the very
issuance of the PDA is premised on its imperative urgency and necessity as declared by the President
himself. The majority decision then relies on Rule 113, sec. 5 which authorizes arrests without warrant
by a citizen or by a police officer who witnessed the arrestee in flagrante delicto, viz, in the act of
committing the offense. Quite obviously, the arrest was not a citizen's arrest nor were they caught in
flagrante delicto violating the law. In fact, this Court in promulgating the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure have tightened and made the rules more strict. Thus, the Rule now requires that an offense "
has in fact just been committed. " This connotes immediacy in point of time and excludes cases under
the old rule where an offense "has in fact been committed" no matter how long ago. Similarly, the
arrestor must have "personal knowledge of facts indicating that the arrestee has committed it" (instead
of just "reasonable ground to believe that the arrestee has committed it" under the old rule). Clearly,
then, an information could not just be filed against the petitioners without due process and preliminary
investigation.
C. The majority decision's rationale that the Nolasco case invoked by petitioners is not applicable here
since the trial court had granted bail to Nolasco for a number of non-capital offenses, whereas in this
case petitioners are charged with the capital offense of rebellion and the trial court has not allowed bail.
This is erroneously premised. As already emphasized above, the instant information for rebellion
against petitioners is null and void for denial of due process. What remains is the PDA, just like in
the Nolasco case. There, the trial court granted bail. Here, it is this Court that has granted bail in the
form of its May 23rd "immediately executory" release order. It certainly would be judicial anathema that
this Court ordered compliance with the bail order of the trial court in the Nolasco case and yet feel
impotent to enforce its own "immediately executory" release order of the petitioners-lawyers upon their
counsel's recognizance. More so, when the petitioners are members of the Philippine Bar and officers
of this Court.
The irony of the situation can be thus depicted. Had this Court simply ordered the immediate
enforcement without delay of its May 23rd order, by May 24th, the petitioners would have not been
under detention. There would be no basis to claim that they were "lawfully arrested without warrant" and
therefore could be instantly charged for the most heinous crimes without preliminary investigation.
D. As stressed by the writer in German vs. Barangan, 69 "to require the citizen at every step to assert his
rights and to go to court is to render illusory his rights. " Here, the flaunting and disregard of the Court's
immediately executory May 23rd release order by not releasing the petitioners-lawyers so that it could
be claimed that they fell under Rule 112, section 7 and considered as "lawfully arrested without warrant"
wherein "the information may be filed by the ... fiscal without preliminary investigation having been first
conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person" (which
affidavit had long been executed since January, 1985 while the unlawful arrests were made on May 10-
13 and in no way could be termed as in flagrante delicto would render illusory petitioners' right to due
process and preliminary investigation. The majority decision should properly apply the case
of Abejuela cited by
it 70 that the trial court is called upon "not to dismiss the information but hold the case in abeyance and
conduct its own investigation or require the fiscal to hold a reinvestigation. " Meanwhile, this Court's
release order should be complied with without one moment's delay. Respondents' filing two days later
on May 25th of an "urgent motion for reconsideration" could in no way cause or justify suspension or
non-compliance with this Court's release order.
15. Same standard in Galman case of not jeopardizing accused's constitutional rights should be
applied. In the recent case of Galman vs. Pamaran, the majority held that "the only way to cure the law
of its unconstitutional effects is to construe it in the manner as if IMMUNITY had in 'fact been offered [by
the prosecution] ... (hence) the testimonies compelled thereby are deemed immunized under Section 5
of the same law. The applicability of the immunity granted by P.D. 1886 cannot be made to depend on
a claim of the privilege against self- incrimination which the same law practically strips away from the
witness." The same standard and concern of not placing the accused "in jeopardy of their constitutional
rights" through denial of due process and their right to preliminary investigation should be applied here.
The only way is to construe it in the manner as if this Court's release order had in fact been immediately
complied with and petitioners could in no way be deemed as "lawfully arrested without warrant."
Otherwise, the Rule on preliminary investigation would not be "cured of its unconstitutional effects" by
allowing the railroading on May 27th of the instant information for rebellion without preliminary
investigation thru respondent general's contumacious and unlawful act of disobeying the Court's May
23rd release order. This was the same standard that would have been applied in the Court's aborted
decision in Eastern Broadcasting Corp. (DYRE) vs. Hon. Dans, Jr.71 There, this Court brushed aside
respondents' procedural arguments to dismiss the petition as "moot and academic" because of the non-
renewal of the petitioner's radio broadcasting station's license from the time of its summary closure in
1980 up to the time of the Court's determination in July this year. Instead, as noted in the writer's
separate opinion therein, this Court "serve(d) notice that in the exercise of the judicial power vested in it
by the Constitution, it will issue the equitable writs of certiorari and mandamus to do substantial justice
and restore the status quo. In this case, the summary closure of petitioner's radio station in 1980 having
been declared null and void and no valid ground for non-renewal of its license having been shown, it is
as if the said license has been duly extended up to the end of the current term or year. It is expected
that respondents will forthwith return the crystal of the transmitter and place no further obstacle to the
prompt reopening of the radio station so that petitioner may pick up the broken pieces and rightfully
resume its operations (after almost five years of closure) in accordance with the judgment at bar."
Applying this standard to the case at bar, would simply mean that the clock would simply be turned
back to the day of this Court's immediately executory release order of May 23rd this year, as if the
same order had been faithfully and lawfully complied with. Only thus could substantial and not paper
justice be done and the petitioners be not deprived of their constitutional right to due process and be
secured by preliminary investigation against hasty, oppressive and vindictive prosecution.
16. "The preservation of freedom, like its perfection is a never ending struggle."—This was the
exhortation of President Ferdinand Edralin Marcos at the observance at Fort Bonifacio last May 27th of
American Memorial Day. He admonished the people that "democracy is a condition requiring constant
vigilance. Neither totalitarianism nor authoritarianism can by themselves triumph over the democratic
Ideal. But when free men shirk from their duties to society, as well as to themselves, they imperil their
own liberty. When the citizens of a democracy allow themselves to be lulled into indifference, they seal
their own doom. ... If we are to remain free at all, we must show ourselves to be capable and willing to
fight in defense of our way of life. " 72
17. Former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, who with IBP President Emeritus J.B.L. Reyes, has
shunned their well-earned rest and in their eighties continue at the forefront of upholding the cause of
freedom and human rights and rendering free legal aid to the poor, disadvantaged and oppressed,
made this plea for the cause of the independence of the judiciary at the hall of the Court which he once
presided with honor, dignity and integrity. "During the 85 years of this century, there has never been a
case as transcendental as this one. We have tried and bolstered to be a democratic society which is
based and predicated upon freedom of speech. But to bolster up the freedom of speech, we've
established the right of every person accused and even detained to counsel. Now, any (act) tending to
impair the disposition of lawyers to represent the accused, is derogatory to the democratic system, and
therefore, derogatory to human rights. It is significant that at first only, I would say, only persons
suspected of being subversives were being arrested and later on salvaged. I don't know how the word
salvage happened to be used, because salvage from what ...Then even the priests, ... we have started
from the North to the Southernmost part of the Philippines, from Abra to Davao, with lawyers. The only
step higher than that echelon is the Judiciary. So it's not only the lawyers that are being involved in this
case, it is the Judiciary, the independence of the
Judiciary."73
His Holiness Pope John Paul II in his address of February 17, 1981 to the President and the Nation
during his Philippine visit stressed that " Even in exceptional situations that may at times arise, one can
never justify any violation of the fundamental dignity of the human person or of the basic rights that
safeguard this dignity Legitimate concern for the security of a nation, as demanded by the common
good, could lead to the temptation of subjugating to the State the human being and his or her dignity
and rights. Any apparent conflict between the exigencies of security and of the citizens' basic rights
must be resolved according to the fundamental principle upheld always by the Church that social
organization exists only for the service of man and for the protection of his dignity, and that it cannot
claim to serve the common good when human rights are not safeguarded."
17. Petitioners'appeal for liberty should be heeded.-Petitioner Ilagan concisely stated at the May 23rd
hearing that his objective as BAYAN s chairman is To achieve reforms in the government by voicing our
grievances. " 74 In an open letter to his colleagues of the Integrated Bar, after expressing , 'grateful
appreciation for the generous assistance, both financial and moral, which I and my family received . . . .
(and) welcomed . . . . for reasons of necessity" (which hardliners would c•nsider as a criminal act of the
sympathizers and "assisting and aiding the enemy"), petitioner Ilagan makes this poignant appeal:
... What we are here for may not be your concern, but that we are here without due
process of law should interest you all if you are true to your calling. We lawyers are
adept at defending persons and interests in all the courts and forums of the land.
We, particularly should be the first concerned at defending our own. But, by all
means, we deserve that sacred right to do so on legitimate, fair and equitable
terms. Never mind that our families have to subsist on the meager earnings of our
working wines, but foremost in our welfare is the right to be free, not only to
prepare for our defense adequately but to give essence to that constitutional tenet
that 'every person is presumed innocent until proven otherwise.' We cannot lay
claim of a democratic society if we, lawyers, not only tolerate a lopsided view of the
rule of law but ourselves fall prey to it.
That we are 'preventively detained' is pure euphemism. Deprived of liberty and
entirely curtailed in the exercise of our basic rights, we are, in every sense,
prisoners of the state. It is in this context that 1, on behalf of your three colleagues
here, ask your whole-hearted support in demanding justice for our cause. 75
Petitioners' eminent counsel make this stirring plea on their behalf:
Constitutional history in republican democratic states is the story of the progressive
triumph and expansion of human liberty as against the assertion of unrestrained
power by monarchs, tyrants and other instrumentalities in the political community.
Civilization under law has been marked by the departure from lese
majeste, the strengthening of legal institutions, especially the independent courts,
and the adoption of rules, substantive and procedural, so that freedom is the
general and normal state of the people. Although in exceptional cases, their
individual freedom could be restrained but only on serious grounds compatible with
the Constitution and always upon due process. This, at any rate, is a fundamental
principle of English and American constitutional law whence our own constitutional
system has been derived.
In the words of Justice Jugo Black
. . . . From the popular hatred and abhorrence of illegal confinement, torture and
extortion of confessions of violations of 'the law of the land' evolved the
fundamental Idea that no man's life liberty or property be forfeited as criminal
punishment for violation of that law until there had been a charge fairly made and
fairly tried in public tribunal free of prejudice, passion excitement and tyrannical
power. Thus, as an assurance against ancient evils, our country, in order to
preserve 'the blessings of liberty,' wrote into its basic law the requirement, among
others, that the forfeiture of life, liberty or property of people accused of crime can
only follow if procedural safeguards of due process have been obeyed.
The determination to preserve the accused's right to procedural due
process sprang in large part from knowledge of historical truth that the rights and
liberties of the people accused of crime could not safely be entrusted to secret
inquisitorial processes. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227.
In this jurisdiction, these rules are enshrined in the Bill of Rights in the Constitution
and reenforced by statutes and the Rules of Court.
I submit that the Court should heed petitioners' appeal for liberty. An editorial after the Court's stillborn
May 23rd Resolution graphically articulates the compelling reasons for granting their plea for liberty:
The government is not only the Chief Executive and the Batasang Pambansa. It
necessarily includes the Supreme Court and the other courts. And time and again it
has been shown that the performance of the judiciary affects the complexion of the
two other branches.

xxx xxx xxx The en banc resolution of the Supreme Court ordering the release from
confinement of the three Davao lawyers who have acted as defense counsel in
national security cases illustrates the point.
If a person is unlawfully deprived of his liberty, he can avail himself of the great writ
of liberty, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for the purpose of regaining
freedom in the shortest time possible. The resolution shows the power of the judicial review and affirms the supremacy of
the Constitution.
In its early years of practice, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was a puny
and unavailing remedy as against the king. For judges were under the influence of It shows the independence of the judiciary and allays the fear of the opposition
the crown and refused to issue the writ for people who were detained on suspicion that, the judiciary is an instrument of the Chief Executive.
of disloyalty to the former but against whom there was no concrete evidence, and
the people continued "to languish in extended detention. To remedy this evil, the
xxx xxx xxx
Habeas Corpus Act was adopted in 1679. Ex Parte Watkins, 7 L. Ed. 193, 201; Ex
Parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 85: MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
ENGLAND 314-315. Where the Constitution of the democracy is not supreme, the Supreme Court
weakens as the Chief Executive becomes stronger. Where that situation obtains,
the people no longer trust the courts nor the Constitution.
Since then, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has become the fundamental
instrument against arbitrary and lawless state action. .
In the democracies, the judiciary is usually the 'weakest' of the branches. But here
and at this time, the exclusion of the judiciary from an analysis of the kind of
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus carries with it the
government that obtains would make a big difference.
derogation of the people's freedoms and liberties. Therefore, the provisions must
be strictly construed and cannot be allowed to extend to situations not explicitly
allowed by the Constitution. A government without an independent Supreme Court would be like an automobile
without brakes. 77
Obliquely and subliminally respondents suggest to this Court to go back in history
and to dismantle the intricate system of reenforcing rules, principles and I vote to grant the petition for habeas corpus and to set the petitioners immediately at liberty. Petitioners
procedures that have developed through centuries of struggle for the more must be granted their constitutional right to due process and the right to preliminary investigation, as
efficacious protection of individual liberty. They seek a return to the lese granted by statute and expressly assured to them by respondents in open court at the May 23rd
majeste when the voice of the King was the voice of God so that those who are hearing. The railroaded ex-parte proceedings and orders in the instant rebellion case should be
touched by his absolute powers could only pray that the King acted prudently and declared null and void for lack of jurisdiction in having deprived petitioners of their sacred constitutional
wisely. Similarly respondents would have this Court and the people accept the right to due process.
proposition that the State's designation of persons as rebels and subversives
without more is adequate basis for their immediate and indefinite detention. And
G.R. No. 121917 March 12, 1997
that regardless of the quality or absence of evidence, the courts are powerless to
intervene in behalf of the persons so designated.
ROBIN CARIÑO PADILLA @ ROBINHOOD PADILLA, petitioner,
The Rule of Law and constitutionalism mean precisely the existence and the vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES, respondents.
efficacy of legal institutions to protect and defend the rights and liberties of the
people so they no longer have to depend upon prayers for the purpose.

Petitioners invoke the power of this Court to uphold the Constitution and to protect
the rights of the people and to reject the basically undemocratic FRANCISCO, J.:
proposition suggested by respondents. 76
On October 26, 1992, high-powered firearms with live ammunitions were found in the possession of
petitioner Robin Padilla @ Robinhood Padilla, i.e.:
(1) One .357 Caliber revolver, Smith and Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6) live
ammunitions;
(2) One M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long and one (1)
short magazine with ammunitions;
(3) One .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A 35723 Y with clip and eight (8) ammunitions; and
(4) Six additional live double action ammunitions of .38 caliber revolver.1
Petitioner was correspondingly charged on December 3, 1992, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Angeles City with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions under P.D. 18662 thru the following
Information:3
That on or about the 26th day of October, 1992, in the City of Angeles, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and
under his custody and control one (1) M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with
four (4) long and one (1) short magazines with ammunitions, one (1) .357 caliber
revolver Smith and Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6) live ammunitions and one (1)
.380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A35723Y with clip and eight (8) ammunitions, without
having the necessary authority and permit to carry and possess the same.
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
The lower court then ordered the arrest of petitioner,5 but granted his application for
bail. 6 During the arraignment on January 20, 1993, a plea of not guilty was entered for
petitioner after he refused, 7 upon advice of counsel, 8 to make any plea. 9 Petitioner waived
in writing his right to be present in any and all stages of the case. 10
After trial, Angeles City RTC Judge David Rosete rendered judgment dated April 25, 1994 convicting
petitioner of the crime charged and sentenced him to an "indeterminate penalty from 17 years, 4
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 21 years of reclusion perpetua, as
maximum". 11 Petitioner filed his notice of appeal on April 28, 1994. 12 Pending the appeal in the
respondent Court of Appeals, 13 the Solicitor-General, convinced that
the conviction shows strong evidence of guilt, filed on December 2, 1994 a motion to cancel petitioner's
bail bond. The resolution of this motion was incorporated in the now assailed respondent court's
decision sustaining petitioner's conviction 14 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing circumstances considered, the appealed decision is
hereby AFFIRMED, and furthermore, the P200,000.00 bailbond posted by
accused-appellant for his provisional liberty, FGU Insurance Corporation Bond No.
JCR (2) 6523, is hereby cancelled. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Angeles
City, is directed to issue the Order of Arrest of accused-appellant and thereafter his
transmittal to the National Bureau of Prisons thru the Philippine National Police
where the said accused-appellant shall remain under confinement pending
resolution of his appeal, should he appeal to the Supreme Court. This shall be
immediately executory. The Regional Trial Court is further directed to submit a
report of compliance herewith.
SO ORDERED. 15
Petitioner received a copy of this decision on July 26, 1995. 16 On August 9, 1995 he filed a
"motion for reconsideration (and to recall the warrant of arrest)" 17 but the same was denied
by respondent court in its September 20, 1995 Resolution 18 copy of which was received by
petitioner on September 27, 1995. The next day, September 28, petitioner filed the instant
petition for review on certiorari with application for bail 19 followed by two "supplemental
petitions" filed by different counsels, 20 a "second supplemental petition" 21 and an urgent
motion for the separate resolution of his application for bail. Again, the Solicitor-
General 22 sought the denial of the application for bail, to which the Court agreed in a
Resolution promulgated on July 31, 1996. 23 The Court also granted the Solicitor-General's
motion to file a consolidated comment on the petitions and thereafter required the petitioner
to file his reply. 24 However, after his vigorous resistance and success on the intramural of
bail (both in the respondent court and this Court) and thorough exposition of petitioner's guilt
in his 55-page Brief in the respondent court, the Solicitor-General now makes a complete
turnabout by filing a "Manifestation In Lieu Of Comment" praying for petitioner's acquittal. 25
The People's detailed narration of facts, well-supported by evidence on record and given credence by
respondent court, is as follows: 26
At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of October 26, 1992, Enrique Manarang and
his compadre Danny Perez were inside the Manukan sa Highway Restaurant in
Sto. Kristo, Angeles City where they took shelter from the heavy downpour (pp. 5-
6, TSN, February 15, 1993) that had interrupted their ride on motorcycles (pp 5-
6, ibid.) along McArthur Highway (ibid). While inside the restaurant, Manarang
noticed a vehicle, a Mitsubishi Pajero, running fast down the highway prompting
him to remark that the vehicle might get into an accident considering the inclement
weather. (p. 7, Ibid) In the local vernacular, he said thus: "Ka bilis na, mumuran pa
naman pota makaaksidente ya." (p. 7, ibid). True enough, immediately after the
vehicle had passed the restaurant, Manarang and Perez heard a screeching sound
produced by the sudden and hard braking of a vehicle running very fast (pp. 7-
8, ibid) followed by a sickening sound of the vehicle hitting something (p. 8, ibid).
Danny Cruz, quite sure of what had happened, remarked "oy ta na" signifying that
Manarang had been right in his observation (pp. 8-9, ibid).
Manarang and Cruz went out to investigate and immediately saw the vehicle
occupying the edge or shoulder of the highway giving it a slight tilt to its side (pp. 9-
10, ibid). Manarang, being a member of both the Spectrum, a civic group and the
Barangay Disaster Coordinating Council, decided to report the incident to the
Philippine National Police of Angeles City (p. 10, ibid). He took out his radio and
called the Viper, the radio controller of the Philippine National Police of Angeles
City (p. 10, ibid). By the time Manarang completed the call, the vehicle had started
to leave the place of the accident taking the general direction to the north (p.
11, ibid).
Manarang went to the location of the accident and found out that the vehicle had hit
somebody (p. 11, ibid).
He asked Cruz to look after the victim while he went back to the restaurant, rode on
his motorcycle and chased the vehicle (p. 11 ibid). During the chase he was able to
make out the plate number of the vehicle as PMA 777 (p. 33, TSN, February 15,
1193). He called the Viper through the radio once again (p. 34, ibid) reporting that a
vehicle heading north with plate number PMA 777 was involved in a hit and run
accident (p. 20, TSN, June 8, 1993). The Viper, in the person of SP02 Ruby Buan,
upon receipt of the second radio call flashed the message to all units of PNP
Angeles City with the order to apprehend the vehicle (p. 20, ibid). One of the units
of the PNP Angeles City reached by the alarm was its Patrol Division at Jake
Gonzales Street near the Traffic Division (pp. 5-7, TSN, February 23, 1993). SPO2
Juan C. Borja III and SPO2 Emerlito Miranda immediately borded a mobile patrol
vehicle (Mobile No. 3) and positioned themselves near the south approach of
Abacan bridge since it was the only passable way going to the north (pp. 8-9, ibid).
It took them about ten (10) seconds to cover the distance between their office and
the Abacan bridge (p. 9, ibid).
Another PNP mobile patrol vehicle that responded to the flash message from
SPO2 Buan was Mobile No. 7 of the Pulongmaragal Detachment which was then
conducting patrol along Don Juico Avenue (pp. 8-9, TSN, March 8, 1993). On
board were SPO Ruben Mercado and SPO3 Tan and SPO2 Odejar (p. 8, ibid).
SPO Ruben Mercado immediately told SPO3 Tan to proceed to the MacArthur
Highway to intercept the vehicle with plate number PMA 777 (p. 10, ibid).
In the meantime, Manarang continued to chase the vehicle which figured in the hit
and run incident, even passing through a flooded portion of the MacArthur Highway
two (2) feet deep in front of the Iglesia ni Kristo church but he could not catch up
with the same vehicle (pp. 11-12, February 15, 1993). When he saw that the car he
was chasing went towards Magalang, he proceeded to Abacan bridge because he
knew Pulongmaragal was not passable (pp. 12-14, ibid). When he reached the
Abacan bridge, he found Mobile No. 3 and SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda
watching all vehicles coming their way (p. 10, TSN, February 23, 1993). He
approached them and informed them that there was a hit and run incident (p.
10, ibid). Upon learning that the two police officers already knew about the incident,
Manarang went back to where he came from (pp. 10-11; ibid). When Manarang
was in front of Tina's Restaurant, he saw the vehicle that had figured in the hit and
run incident emerging from the corner adjoining Tina's Restaurant (p. 15, TSN,
February 15, 1993). He saw that the license plate hanging in front of the vehicle
bore the identifying number PMA 777 and he followed it (p. 15, ibid) towards the
Abacan bridge.
Soon the vehicle was within sight of SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda of Mobile No.
3 (p. 10, TSN, February 23, 1993). When the vehicle was about twelve (12) meters
away from their position, the two police officers boarded their Mobile car, switched
on the engine, operated the siren and strobe light and drove out to intercept the
vehicle (p. 11, ibid). They cut into the path of the vehicle forcing it to stop (p.
11, ibid).
SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda alighted from Mobile No. 3 (P. 12, TSN, February
23, 1993). SPO2 Miranda went to the vehicle with plate number PMA 777 and
instructed its driver to alight (p. 12, ibid). The driver rolled down the window and put
his head out while raising both his hands. They recognized the driver as Robin C.
Padilla, appellant in this case (p. 13, ibid). There was no one else with him inside
the vehicle (p. 24). At that moment, Borja noticed that Manarang arrived and
stopped his motorcycle behind the vehicle of appellant (p. 14, ibid). SPO2 Miranda
told appellant to alight to which appellant complied. Appellant was wearing a short
leather jacket (p. 16, TSN, March 8, 1993) such that when he alighted with both his
hands raised, a gun (Exhibit "C") tucked on the left side of his waist was revealed
(p. 15, TSN, February 23, 1993), its butt protruding (p. 15, ibid). SPO2 Borja made
the move to confiscate the gun but appellant held the former's hand alleging that
the gun was covered by legal papers (p. 16, ibid). SPO2 Borja, however, insisted
that if the gun really was covered by legal papers, it would have to be shown in the
office (p. 16, ibid). After disarming appellant, SPO2 Borja told him about the hit and
run incident which was angrily denied by appellant (p. 17, ibid). By that time, a
crowd had formed at the place (p. 19, ibid). SPO2 Borja checked the cylinder of the
gun and find six (6) live bullets inside (p. 20, ibid).
While SPO2 Borja and appellant were arguing, Mobile No. 7 with SPO Ruben
Mercado, SPO3 Tan and SPO2 Odejar on board arrived (pp. 11-12, TSN, March 8,
1993). As the most senior police officer in the group, SPO Mercado took over the
matter and informed appellant that he was being arrested for the hit and run
incident (p. 13, ibid). He pointed out to appellant the fact that the plate number of
his vehicle was dangling and the railing and the hood were dented (p. 12, ibid).
Appellant, however, arrogantly denied his misdeed and, instead, played with the
crowd by holding their hands with one hand and pointing to SPO3 Borja with his
right hand saying "iyan, kinuha ang baril ko" (pp. 13-15, ibid). Because appellant's
jacket was short, his gesture exposed a long magazine of an armalite rifle tucked in
appellant 's back right, pocket (p. 16, ibid). SPO Mercado saw this and so when
appellant turned around as he was talking and proceeding to his vehicle, Mercado
confiscated the magazine from appellant (pp. 16-17, ibid). Suspecting that
appellant could also be carrying a rifle inside the vehicle since he had a magazine,
SPO2 Mercado prevented appellant from going back to his vehicle by opening
himself the door of appellant's vehicle (16-17, ibid). He saw a baby armalite rifle
(Exhibit D) lying horizontally at the front by the driver 's seat. It had a long
magazine filled with live bullets in a semi-automatic mode (pp. 17-21, ibid). He
asked appellant for the papers covering the rifle and appellant answered angrily
that they were at his home (pp. 26-27, ibid). SPO Mercado modified the arrest of
appellant by including as its ground illegal possession of firearms (p. 28, ibid). SPO
Mercado then read to appellant his constitutional rights (pp. 28-29, ibid).
The police officers brought appellant to the Traffic Division at Jake Gonzales
Boulevard (pp. 31-32, ibid) where appellant voluntarily surrendered a third firearm,
a pietro berreta pistol (Exhibit "L") with a single round in its chamber and a
magazine (pp. 33-35, ibid) loaded with seven (7) other live bullets. Appellant also
voluntarily surrendered a black bag containing two additional long magazines and
one short magazine (Exhibits M, N, and O, pp. 36-37, ibid). After appellant had
been interrogated by the Chief of the Traffic Division, he was transferred to the
Police Investigation Division at Sto. Rosario Street beside the City Hall Building
where he and the firearms and ammunitions were turned over to SPO2 Rene
Jesus Gregorio (pp. 5-10, TSN, July 13, 1993). During the investigation, appellant
admitted possession of the firearms stating that he used them for shooting (p.
14, ibid). He was not able to produce any permit to carry or memorandum receipt to
cover the three firearms (pp. 16-18, TSN, January 25, 1994).
On November 28, 1992, a certification (Exhibit "F") was issued by Captain, Senior
Inspector Mario Espino, PNP, Chief, Record Branch of the Firearms and
Explosives Office (pp. 7-8, TSN, March 4, 1993). The Certification stated that the
three firearms confiscated from appellant, an M-16 Baby armalite rifle SN-RP
131280, a .357 caliber revolver Smith and Wesson SN 32919 and a .380 Pietro
Beretta SN-A35720, were not registered in the name of Robin C. Padilla (p. 6, ibid).
A second Certification dated December 11, 1992 issued by Captain Espino stated
 that the three firearms were not also registered in the name of Robinhood C.
Padilla (p. 10, ibid).
Petitioner's defenses are as follows: (1) that his arrest was illegal and consequently, the firearms and
ammunitions taken in the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule; (2)
that he is a confidential agent authorized, under a Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, to carry
the subject firearms; and (3) that the penalty for simple illegal possession constitutes excessive and
cruel punishment proscribed by the 1987 Constitution.
After a careful review of the records 27 of this case, the Court is convinced that petitioner's guilt of the
crime charged stands on terra firma, notwithstanding the Solicitor-General's change of heart.
Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality of his arrest. There is no dispute that no warrant
was issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se did not make his apprehension at the Abacan
bridge illegal.
Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following instances: 28
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed or while he is
actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the
arresting officer or private person. 29 Both elements concurred here, as it has been
established that petitioner's vehicle figured in a hit and run — an offense committed in the
"presence" of Manarang, a private person, who then sought to arrest petitioner. It must be
stressed at this point that "presence" does not only require that the arresting person sees the
offense, but also when he "hears the disturbance created thereby AND proceeds at once to
the scene." 30 As testified to by Manarang, he heard the screeching of tires followed by a
thud, saw the sideswiped victim (balut vendor), reported the incident to the police and
thereafter gave chase to the erring Pajero vehicle using his motorcycle in order to apprehend
its driver. After having sent a radio report to the PNP for assistance, Manarang proceeded to
the Abacan bridge where he found responding policemen SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda
already positioned near the bridge who effected the actual arrest of petitioner. 31
Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that the policemen who
actually arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and run. 32 We beg to disagree. That Manarang
decided to seek the aid of the policemen (who admittedly were nowhere in the vicinity of the hit and run)
in effecting petitioner's arrest, did not in any way affect the propriety of the apprehension. It was in fact
the most prudent action Manarang could have taken rather than collaring petitioner by himself,
inasmuch as policemen are unquestionably better trained and well-equipped in effecting an arrest of a
suspect (like herein petitioner) who, in all probability, could have put up a degree of resistance which an
untrained civilian may not be able to contain without endangering his own life. Moreover, it is a reality
that curbing lawlessness gains more success when law enforcers function in collaboration with private
citizens. It is precisely through this cooperation, that the offense herein involved fortunately did not
become an additional entry to the long list of unreported and unsolved crimes.
It is appropriate to state at this juncture that a suspect, like petitioner herein, cannot defeat the arrest
which has been set in motion in a public place for want of a warrant as the police was confronted by an
urgent need to render aid or take action. 33 The exigent circumstances of — hot pursuit, 34 a fleeing
suspect, a moving vehicle, the public place and the raining nighttime — all created a situation in which
speed is essential and delay improvident. 35 The Court acknowledges police authority to make the
forcible stop since they had more than mere "reasonable and articulable" suspicion that the occupant of
the vehicle has been engaged in criminal activity. 36 Moreover, when caught in flagrante delicto with
possession of an unlicensed firearm (Smith & Wesson) and ammunition (M-16 magazine), petitioner's
warrantless arrest was proper as he was again actually committing another offense (illegal possession
of firearm and ammunitions) and this time in the presence of a peace officer. 37
Besides, the policemen's warrantless arrest of petitioner could likewise be justified under paragraph (b)
as he had in fact just committed an offense. There was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of
time between the hit and run and the actual apprehension. Moreover, after having stationed themselves
at the Abacan bridge in response to Manarang's report, the policemen saw for themselves the fast
approaching Pajero of petitioner, 38 its dangling plate number (PMA 777 as reported by Manarang), and
the dented hood and railings thereof. 39 These formed part of the arresting police officer's personal
knowledge of the facts indicating that petitioner's Pajero was indeed the vehicle involved in the hit and
run incident. Verily then, the arresting police officers acted upon verified personal knowledge and not on
unreliable hearsay information. 40
Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or irregularity attending an
arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea. 41 Petitioner's belated challenge thereto aside
from his failure to quash the information, his participation in the trial and by presenting his evidence,
placed him in estoppel to assail the legality of his arrest. 42 Likewise, by applying for bail, petitioner
patently waived such irregularities and defects. 43
We now go to the firearms and ammunitions seized from petitioner without a search warrant, the
admissibility in evidence of which, we uphold.
44
The five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless search and seizure of property is valid, are as
follows:
1. warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court 45 and by prevailing jurisprudence 46,
47
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view", the elements of which are:
(a). a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest
in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties;
(b). the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police
who had the right to be where they are;
 (c). the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d). "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without
further search. 48
3. search of a moving vehicle. 49 Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's
inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable
cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity. 50
4. consented warrantless search, and
5. customs search.
In conformity with respondent court's observation, it indeed appears that the authorities stumbled upon
petitioner's firearms and ammunitions without even undertaking any active search which, as it is
commonly understood, is a prying into hidden places for that which is concealed. 51 The seizure of the
Smith & Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was justified for they came within "plain view" of
the policemen who inadvertently discovered the revolver and magazine tucked in petitioner's waist and
back pocket respectively, when he raised his hands after alighting from his Pajero. The same
justification applies to the confiscation of the M-16 armalite rifle which was immediately apparent to the
policemen as they took a casual glance at the Pajero and saw said rifle lying horizontally near the
driver's seat. 52 Thus it has been held that:
(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense, the .
. . police officers should happen to discover a criminal offense being committed by
any person, they are not precluded from performing their duties as police officers
for the apprehension of the guilty person and the taking of the, corpus delicti. 53
Objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertently found in plain view
are subject to seizure even without a warrant. 54
With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag containing assorted magazines, petitioner
voluntarily surrendered them to the police. 55 This latter gesture of petitioner indicated a
waiver of his right against the alleged search and seizure 56, and that his failure to quash the
information estopped him from assailing any purported defect. 57
Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions were products of an active search done by the
authorities on the person and vehicle of petitioner, their seizure without a search warrant nonetheless
can still be justified under a search incidental to a lawful arrest (first instance). Once the lawful arrest
was effected, the police may undertake a protective search 58 of the passenger compartment and
containers in the vehicle 59 which are within petitioner's grabbing distance regardless of the nature of
the offense. 60 This satisfied the two-tiered test of an incidental search: (i) the item to be searched
(vehicle) was within the arrestee's custody or area of immediate control 61 and (ii) the search was
contemporaneous with the arrest. 62 The products of that search are admissible evidence not excluded
by the exclusionary rule. Another justification is a search of a moving vehicle (third instance). In
connection therewith, a warrantless search is constitutionally permissible when, as in this case, the
officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that
either the motorist is a law-offender (like herein petitioner with respect to the hit and run) or the contents
or cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some
criminal offense. 63
Anent his second defense, petitioner contends that he could not be convicted of violating P.D. 1866
because he is an appointed civilian agent authorized to possess and carry the subject firearms and
ammunition as evidenced by a Mission Order 64 and Memorandum Receipt duly issued by PNP Supt.
Rodialo Gumtang, the deputy commander of Task Force Aguila, Lianga, Surigao del Sur. The
contention lacks merit.
In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites must be established, viz.: (1) the
existence of the subject firearm and, (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm
does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess. 65 The first element is beyond dispute as
the subject firearms and ammunitions 66 were seized from petitioner's possession via a valid
warrantless search, identified and offered in evidence during trial. As to the second element, the same
was convincingly proven by the prosecution. Indeed, petitioner's purported Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt are inferior in the face of the more formidable evidence for the prosecution as
our meticulous review of the records reveals that the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were
mere afterthoughts contrived and issued under suspicious circumstances. On this score, we lift from
respondent court's incisive observation. Thus:
Appellant's contention is predicated on the assumption that the Memorandum
Receipts and Mission Order were issued before the subject firearms were seized
and confiscated from him by the police officers in Angeles City. That is not so. The
evidence adduced indicate that the Memorandum Receipts and Mission Order
were prepared and executed long after appellant had been apprehended on
October 26, 1992.
Appellant, when apprehended, could not show any document as proof of his
authority to possess and carry the subject firearms. During the preliminary
investigation of the charge against him for illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions he could not, despite the ample time given him, present any proper
document showing his authority. If he had, in actuality, the Memorandum Receipts
and Missions Order, he could have produced those documents easily, if not at the
time of apprehension, at least during the preliminary investigation. But neither
appellant nor his counsel inform the prosecutor that appellant is authorized to
possess and carry the subject firearms under Memorandum Receipt and Mission
Order. At the initial presentation of his evidence in court, appellant could have
produced these documents to belie the charged against him. Appellant did not. He
did not even take the witness stand to explain his possession of the subject
firearms.
Even in appellant's Demurrer to Evidence filed after the prosecution rested contain
no allegation of a Memorandum Receipts and Mission Order authorizing appellant
to possess and carry the subject firearms.
At the initial presentation of appellant's evidence, the witness cited was one James
Neneng to whom a subpoena was issued. Superintendent Gumtang was not even
mentioned. James Neneng appeared in court but was not presented by the
defense. Subsequent hearings were reset until the defense found Superintendent
Gumtang who appeared in court without subpoena on January 13, 1994. 67
The Court is baffled why petitioner failed to produce and present the Mission Order and Memorandum
Receipt if they were really issued and existing before his apprehension. Petitioner's alternative excuses
that the subject firearms were intended for theatrical purposes, or that they were owned by the
Presidential Security Group, or that his Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were left at home,
further compound their irregularity. As to be reasonably expected, an accused claiming innocence, like
herein petitioner, would grab the earliest opportunity to present the Mission Order and Memorandum to insure its accomplishment and that the project is duly approved at the PC
Receipt in question and save himself from the long and agonizing public trial and spare him from Regional Command level or its equivalent level in other major services of the AFP,
proffering inconsistent excuses. In fact, the Mission Order itself, as well as the Letter-Directive of the INP and NBI, or at higher levels of command. 75 Circular No. 1, dated January 6,
AFP Chief of Staff, is explicit in providing that: 1986, of the then Ministry of Justice likewise provides as follows:

VIII. c. When a Mission Order is requested for verification by enforcement If mission orders are issued to civilians (not members of the uniformed service),
units/personnels such as PNP, Military Brigade and other Military Police Units of they must be civilian agents included in the regular plantilla of the government
AFP, the Mission Order should be shown without resentment to avoid agency involved in law enforcement and are receiving regular compensation for the
embarrassment and/or misunderstanding. service they are rendering.

IX. d. Implicit to this Mission Order is the injunction that the confidential instruction That petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were fabricated pieces of evidence
will be carried out through all legal means and do not cover an actuation in violation is accentuated all the more by the testimony and certification of the Chief of the Records
of laws. In the latter event, this Mission Order is rendered inoperative in respect to Branch of the firearms and Explosives Office of the PNP declaring that petitioner's
such violation. 68 confiscated firearms are not licensed or registered in the name of the petitioner. 76 Thus:

which directive petitioner failed to heed without cogent explanation. Q. In all these files that you have just mentioned Mr. Witness,
what did you find, if any?
The authenticity and validity of the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, moreover, were ably
controverted. Witness for the prosecution Police Supt. Durendes denied under oath his signature on the A. I found that a certain Robin C. Padilla is a licensed
dorsal side of the Mission Order and declared further that he did not authorize anyone to sign in his registered owner of one 9 mm pistol, Smith and Wesson with
behalf. 69 His surname thereon, we note, was glaringly misspelled as Serial No. TCT 8214 and the following firearms being asked
"Durembes." 70 In addition, only Unit Commanders and Chief of Offices have the authority to issue whether it is registered or not, I did not find any records, the M-
Mission Orders and Memorandum Receipts under the Guidelines on the Issuance of MOs, MRs, & 16 and the caliber .357 and the caliber .380 but there is a
PCFORs. 71 PNP Supt. Rodialo Gumtang who issued petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum firearm with the same serial number which is the same as that
Receipt is neither a Unit Commander nor the Chief of Office, but a mere deputy commander. Having licensed and/or registered in the name of one Albert Villanueva
emanated from an unauthorized source, petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt are infirm Fallorina.
and lacking in force and effect. Besides, the Mission Order covers "Recom 1-12-Baguio City," 72 areas
outside Supt. Gumtang's area of responsibility thereby needing prior approval "by next higher
Q. So in short, the only licensed firearms in the name of
Headquarters" 73 which is absent in this case. The Memorandum Receipt is also unsupported by a
accused Robin C. Padilla is a pistol, Smith and Wesson,
certification as required by the March 5, 1988 Memorandum of the Secretary of Defense which
caliber 9 mm with Serial No. TCT 8214?
pertinently provides that:

A. Yes, sir.
No memorandum receipt shall be issued for a CCS firearms without corresponding
certification from the corresponding Responsible Supply Officer of the appropriate
AFP unit that such firearm has been officially taken up in that units property book, Q. And the firearms that were the subject of this case are not
and that report of such action has been reported to higher AFP authority. listed in the names of the accused in this case?

Had petitioner's Memorandum Receipt been authentic, we see no reason why he cannot A. Yes, sir. 77
present the corresponding certification as well.
xxx xxx xxx
What is even more peculiar is that petitioner's name, as certified to by the Director for Personnel of the
PNP, does not even appear in the Plantilla of Non-Uniform Personnel or in the list of Civilian Agents or
And the certification which provides as follows:
Employees of the PNP which could justify the issuance of a Mission Order, a fact admitted by
petitioner's counsel. 74 The implementing rules of P.D. 1866 issued by the then PC-INP Chief and
Director-General Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos are clear and unambiguous, thus: Republic of the Philippines
Department of the Interior and Local Government
No Mission Order shall be issued to any civilian agent authorizing the same to GENERAL HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
carry firearms outside residence unless he/she is included in the regular plantilla of FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES OFFICE
Camp Crame, Quezon City
the government agency involved in law enforcement and is receiving regular
compensation for the services he/she is rendering in the agency. Further, the
civilian agent must be included in a specific law enforcement/police/intelligence PNFEO5 28 November 1992
project proposal or special project which specifically required the use of firearms(s)
 CERTIFICATION

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that Robin C. Padilla of 59 Labo St., Quezon City is a

licensed/registered holder of Pistol Smith and Wesson Cal 9mm with serial number
TCT8214 covered by License No. RL M76C4476687.

Further certify that the following firearms are not registered with this Office per
verification from available records on file this Office as of this date:

M16 Baby Armalite SN-RP131120

Revolver Cal 357 SN-3219

Pistol Cal 380 Pietro Beretta SN-35723

However, we have on file one Pistol Cal 380, Beretta with serial number 35723Y,
licensed/registered to one Albert Villanueva Fallorina of 29 San Juan St., Capitol
Pasig, MM under Re-Registered License.

This certification is issued pursuant to Subpoena from City of Angeles.

FOR THE CHIEF, FEO:

(
S
g
d
.
)

In several occasions, the Court J has ruled that either the testimony of a representative of, or a
certification from, the PNP Firearms
O and Explosives Office (FEO) attesting that a person is not a
licensee of any firearm wouldSsuffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of illegal
possession of firearm. 79 In People
E vs. Tobias, 80 we reiterated that such certification is sufficient to
show that a person has in fact M no license. From the foregoing discussion, the fact that petitioner does
not have the license or permitA to possess was overwhelmingly proven by the prosecution. The
certification may even be dispensed
R with in the light of the evidences 81 that an M-16 rifle and any short
firearm higher than a .38 caliber
I pistol, akin to the confiscated firearms, cannot be licensed to a
civilian, 82 as in the case of petitioner.
O The Court, therefore, entertains no doubt in affirming petitioner's
conviction especially as we findM no plausible reason, and none was presented, to depart from the
factual findings of both the trial
. court and respondent court which, as a rule, are accorded by the Court
with respect and finality. 83 E
S
P
Anent his third defense, petitioner faults respondent court "in applying P.D. 1866 in a democratic
I
ambience (sic) and a non-subversive context" and adds that respondent court should have applied
instead the previous laws on Nillegal possession of firearms since the reason for the penalty imposed
O
under P.D. 1866 no longer exists. 84
He stresses that the penalty of 17 years and 4 months to 21 years
for simple illegal possession S of firearm is cruel and excessive in contravention of the Constitution. 85
r
The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The trial court and the respondent court are bound
to apply the governing law at the time of appellant's commission of the offense for it is a rule that laws
are repealed only by subsequent ones. 86 Indeed, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply
the law as it stands. 87 And until its repeal, respondent court can not be faulted for applying P.D. 1866
which abrogated the previous statutes adverted to by petitioner.
Equally lacking in merit is appellant's allegation that the penalty for simple illegal possession is
unconstitutional. The penalty for simple possession of firearm, it should be stressed, ranges
from reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua contrary to appellant's erroneous averment.
The severity of a penalty does not ipso facto make the same cruel and excessive.
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a
penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. "The fact that the punishment
authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual." (24 C.J.S.,
1187-1188). Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come under the
ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive", "wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the
community" 88
It is well-settled that as far as the constitutional prohibition goes, it is not so much the extent
as the nature of the punishment that determines whether it is, or is not, cruel and unusual and
that sentences of imprisonment, though perceived to be harsh, are not cruel or unusual
if within statutory limits. 89
Moreover, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The burden of proving the
invalidity of the statute in question lies with the appellant which burden, we note, was not convincingly
discharged. To justify nullification of the law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication, 90 as in this case. In fact, the constitutionality
of P.D. 1866 has been upheld twice by this Court. 91 Just recently, the Court declared that "the pertinent
laws on illegal possession of firearms [are not] contrary to any provision of the Constitution. . .
" 92 Appellant's grievances on the wisdom of the prescribed penalty should not be addressed to us.
Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws. That question falls exclusively
within the province of Congress which enacts them and the Chief Executive who approves or vetoes
them. The only function of the courts, we reiterate, is to interpret and apply the laws.
With respect to the penalty imposed by the trial court as affirmed by respondent court (17 years 4
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 21 years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum),
we reduce the same in line with the fairly recent case of People v. Lian 93 where the Court en
banc provided that the indeterminate penalty imposable for simple illegal possession of firearm, without
any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, should be within the range of ten (10) years and one (1)
day to twelve years (12) of prision mayor, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day to twenty (20) of reclusion temporal, as maximum. This is discernible from the following
explanation by the Court:
In the case at bar, no mitigating or aggravating circumstances have been alleged
or proved, In accordance with the doctrine regarding special laws explained
in People v. Simon, 94 although Presidential Decree No. 1866 is a special law, the
penalties therein were taken from the Revised Penal Code, hence the rules in said
Code for graduating by degrees or determining the proper period should be
applied. Consequently, the penalty for the offense of simple illegal possession of
firearm is the medium period of the complex penalty in said Section 1, that is, 18
years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years.
This penalty, being that which is to be actually imposed in accordance with the
rules therefor and not merely imposable as a general prescription under the law,
shall be the maximum of the range of the indeterminate sentence. The minimum
thereof shall be taken, as aforesaid, from any period of the penalty next lower in
degree, which is, prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its
medium
period. 95
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining petitioner's
conviction by the lower court of the crime of simple illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions is
AFFIRMED EXCEPT that petitioner's indeterminate penalty is MODIFIED to "ten (10) years and one (1)
day, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 12779 September 10, 1917
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DIONISIO SANTOS, defendant-appellant.
Juan Median Cue for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Feria for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
The sole facts of controlling in the present case are these:
Dionisio Santos, a policeman of Pateros, Province of Rizal, acting under the orders of his chief who
desired to put a stop to pilfering in a certain locality, patrolled this district, and about midnight, seeing
two persons in front of an uninhabited house and then entering an uninhabited camarin, arrested when
without warrant, although no crime had been committed, and took them to the
municipal presidencia whereby they were detained in the jail for six or seven hours when they were
released. Was the accused guilty of coercion as found by the trial court? Or was he guilty of the lesser
offense of arbitrary detention as suggested by the Attorney-General? Or was he innocent as argued by
his counsel?
The powers of peace officers in the Philippines, generally stated, are the same as those conferred upon
constables under the Anglo-American Common Law. The extent of their authority to make arrests
without warrant and the limitations thereon, as held by the Supreme Court, are as stated in the
language of the Legislature in the Charter of the city of Manila. (U. S. vs. Fortaleza [1909], 12 Phil. Rep.
472.) The Administrative Code (sec. 2204, edition of 1916; sec. 2258, edition of 1917) enjoins municipal
policemen to "exercise vigilance in the prevention of public offenses."
The accused herein cannot justify the arrest by reason of acting in obedience to legal process which it
was his duty to obey. He must justify if at all, under the rule that peace officers may pursue and arrest
without warrant any person found in suspicious places or under suspicious circumstances reasonably
tending to show that such person has committed, or is about to commit any crime or breach of the
peace. Probable cause for an arrest without warrant is such a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves a to warrant a reasonable man in
believing the accused to be guilty. Besides reasonable ground of suspicion, action in good faith is
another protective bulwark for the officer. Under such conditions, even if the suspected person is later
found to be innocent, the peace officer is not liable.
One should however not expect too much of an ordinary policeman. He is not presumed to exercise the
subtle reasoning of a judicial officer. Often he has no opportunity to make proper investigation but must
act in haste on his own belief to prevent the escape of the criminal. To err is human. Even the most
conscientious officer must at times be mislead. If, therefore, under trying circumstances and in a
zealous effort to obey the orders of his superior officer and to enforce the law, a peace officer makes a
mere mistake in good faith, he should be exculpated. Otherwise, the courts will put a premium on crime
and will terrorize peace officers through a fear of themselves violating the law. (See generally Voorhees
on Arrest; 5 Corpus Juris, pp. 399, 416; 2 R. C. L. p. 450.)
The Common Law rule as to the arrest without warrant of suspicious night-walkers is of particular
interest. Blackstone says, "Watchmen, either those appointed by the statute of Winchester (13 Edw. I,
c. 4) to keep watch and ward in all towns from sun-setting to sun-rising, or such as are mere assistants
to be constable, may virtute offici (by virtue of their office) arrest all offenders, and particularly night-
walkers, and commit them to custody till the morning." (II Cooley's Blackstone, p. 1445.) The cases hold
that a peace officer might arrest and detain in prison for examination persons walking in the street at
night whom there is reasonable ground to suspect of felony, although there is no proof of a felony
having been committed: but the arrest would be illegal if the person so arrested was innocent and there
were no reasonable grounds of suspicion to mislead the officer. (Miles vs. Weston [1871], 60 Ill., 361,
citing English decisions.) The reason of the rule is apparent. Good people do not ordinarily lurk about
streets and uninhabited premises at midnight. Citizens must be protected from annoyance and crime.
Prevention of crimes is just as commendatory as the capture of criminals. Surely the officers must not
be forced to await the commission of robbery or other felony. The rule is supported by the necessities of
life.
The foregoing are the applicable principles of the American and English Common Law as to the powers
of peace officers. The principles of the Spanish law are not essentially different. (See. U.
S. vs. Sanchez [1914], 27 Phil. Rep., 442.) Both rest upon the same foundation of reason and common
sense.
Judgment is reversed and the defendant and appellant acquitted, with the costs de officio. So ordered.
[G.R. No. 84873. November 16, 1990.]
ERLE PENDON, for himself and as Managing Partner of KENER TRADING
COMPANY, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ENRIQUE T. JOCSON in
his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court of Negros
Occidental, FISCAL ALEXANDER N. MIRANO, in his capacity as City Fiscal of
Bacolod City and THE PROVINCIAL COMMANDER OF THE 331st PC COMPANY,
BACOLOD CITY, Respondents.
Ledesma, Guinez, Causing, Espino & Serfino Law Office for Petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCH WARRANT; PROBABLE CAUSE;
DEFINITION AND REQUISITES THEREOF. — The right against unreasonable searches and
seizures is guaranteed under Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution
of the Philippines. Under this provision, the issuance of a search warrant is justified only
upon a finding of probable cause. Probable cause for a search has been defined as such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with
the offense are in the place sought to be searched (Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, G.R. No.
64261, Dec. 26, 1984, 133 SCRA 800). In determining the existence of probable cause, it
is required that: 1) the judge (or) officer must examine the . . witnesses personally; 2)
the examination must be under oath; and (3) the examination must be reduced to writing
in the form of searching questions and answers (Marinas v. Sioco, 104 SCRA 403, Ponsica
v. Ignalaga, G.R. No. 72301, July 31, 1987, 152 SCRA 647). These requirements are
provided under Section 4, Rule 126 of the New Rules of Criminal Procedure.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FINDING OR OPINION THEREOF BY THE EXAMINING JUDGE, MUST
BE SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD; NOT OBSERVED IN THE CASE AT BAR. — It has been
ruled that the existence of probable cause depends to a large degree upon the finding or
opinion of the judge conducting the examination (Luna v. Plaza, G.R. No. L-27511, Nov.
29, 1968), however, the opinion or finding of probable cause must, to a certain degree, be
substantiated or supported by the record. In this case, We find that the requirement
mandated by the law and the rules that the judge must personally examine the applicant
and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers before issuing the
warrant, was not sufficiently complied with. The applicant himself was not asked any
searching question by Judge Magallanes. The records disclose that the only part played by
the applicant, Lieutenant Rojas was to subscribe the application before Judge Magallanes.
The application contained pre-typed questions, none of which stated that applicant had
personal knowledge of a robbery or a theft and that the proceeds thereof are in the
possession and control of the person against whom the search warrant was sought to be
issued. In the case of Roan v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 71410, Nov. 25, 1986, 145 SCRA 687,
citing the case of Mata v. Bayona, G.R. No. 50720, March 26, 1984, 128 SCRA 388, where
the applicant himself was not subjected to an interrogation but was questioned only "to
ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood (his affidavit) and only because the
application was not yet subscribed and sworn to," We held that: "It is axiomatic that the
examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro forma, if the
claimed probable cause is to be established. The examining magistrate must not simply
rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and
justification of the application."cralaw virtua1aw library
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ARTICLES SOUGHT TO BE SEIZED, MUST BE DESCRIBED WITH
PARTICULARITY. — Another infirmity of Search Warrant No. 181 is its generality. The law
requires that the articles sought to be seized must be described with particularity. The
items listed in the warrant, to wit: "NAPOCOR Galvanized bolts, grounding motor drive
assembly, aluminum wires and other NAPOCOR Towers parts and line accessories" are so
general that the searching team can practically take half of the business of Kener Trading,
the premises searched. Kener Trading, as alleged in petitioner’s petition before respondent
Court of Appeals and which has not been denied by respondent, is engaged in the
business of buying and selling scrap metals, second hand spare parts and accessories and
empty bottles. Far more important is that the items described in the application do not fall
under the list of personal property which may be seized under Section 2, Rule 126 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure because neither the application nor the joint deposition
alleged that the item/s sought to be seized were: a) the subject of an offense; b) stolen or
embezzled property and other proceeds or fruits of an offense; and c) used or intended to
be used as a means of committing an offense.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.;SEIZURE OF INCRIMINATING ARTICLES, CANNOT VALIDATE AN INVALID
WARRANT. — No matter how incriminating the articles taken from the petitioner may be,
their seizure cannot validate an invalid warrant. Again, in the case of Mata v. Bayona, G.R.
No. 50720, March 26, 1984, 128 SCRA 388: ". . . that nothing can justify the issuance of
the search warrant but the fulfillment of the legal requisites. It might be well to point out
what has been said in Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. Herrera: ‘It has been said that
of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace
and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his
private affairs, books and papers from inspection and scrutiny of others. While the power
to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the
law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic
principles of government." "Thus, in issuing a search warrant the Judge must strictly
comply with the requirements of the Constitution and the statutory provisions. A liberal
construction should be given in favor of the individual to prevent stealthy encroachment
upon, or gradual depreciation of the rights secured by the Constitution. No presumption of
regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify it."
DECISION
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the decision (pp. 38-42, Rollo) of
respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the orders dated August 24, 1987 (p. 43,
Record) and October 14, 1987, (pp. 53-54, Record) of the Regional Trial Court of Negros
Occidental in Criminal Case No. 5657.
On February 4, 1987, First Lieutenant Felipe L. Rojas, Officer-in-Charge of the Philippine
Constabulary-Criminal Investigation Service (PC-CIS), Bacolod City, filed an application for
a search warrant, alleging:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"x x x.
"That he was informed and verily believes that KENNETH SIAO who may be found at
KENER TRADING located at Rizal Street corner Lacson Street, Bacolod City has/have in
her/his/their possession and control the following property/ies, to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"NAPOCOR Galvanized bolts, grounding motor drive assembly; aluminum wires and other
NAPOCOR Tower parts and line accessories.
which he/she/they is/are concealing in the premises above mentioned.
"The undersigned has verified the report and found it to be the fact and has therefore
reasons to believe that a SEARCH WARRANT should be issued to enable the undersigned
or any agent of the law to take possession and bring the following described property/ies,
to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"NAPOCOR Galvanized bolts; grounding motor drive assembly; aluminum wires and other
NAPOCOR Tower parts and line accessories.
"WHEREFORE, the undersigned prays this Honorable Court to issue a SEARCH WARRANT
commanding any peace officer to search the premises/house described in this application
and to seize and bring to this Honorable Court the person/property/ies above-mentioned
to be dealt with as the law may direct.
Bacolod City, Philippines
Feb. 4, 1987 —.
SGD. FELIPE L. ROJAS, JR.
ILT, PC
OIC, PFOCIS, Bacolod City"
(p. 18, Records)
The application was subscribed before Judge Demosthenes D. Magallanes of the Municipal
Trial Court of Bacolod City and supported by the joint deposition of two (2) witnesses,
Ignacio L. Reyes, an employee of NAPOCOR (National Power Corporation) and IAI Eduardo
Abaja of the CIS of Bacolod City, quoted as follows:chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
"We, Ignacio L. Reyes and IAI Eduardo Abaja, CIS after having been duly sworn to, testify
as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. QUESTION: What are your names and other personal circumstances?
"ANSWER: IGNACIO L. REYES, 34 years old, married, an employee of NAPOCOR and
presently residing at Eroreco Subdivision, Bacolod City and AIA EDUARDO ABAJA, CIS,
regular member of the CO/INP CIS Command, Bacolod City.
"2. QUESTION: Do you know the premises/house of KENNETH SIAO located at Rizal
Street, near cor. Lacson St., Bacolod City?
"ANSWER: Yes, Sir.
"3. QUESTION: Do you have personal knowledge that said KENNETH SIAO who may be
found in the said premises/house has/have in his/her/their possession and control the
following property, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"NAPOCOR Galvanized bolts, grounding motor drive assembly, aluminum wires and other
NAPOCOR Tower parts and line accessories?
"ANSWER: Yes, sir.
"4. QUESTION: How do you know that above-described property/ies is/are being kept in
said premises/house?
"ANSWER: We conducted surveillance and we were able to purchase some of these items.
"IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we hereunto set our hands and affixed our signature this 4th day
of Feb. 1987 at Bacolod City, Philippines.
"SGD. IGNACIO L. REYES SGD. EDUARDO J. ABAJA Affiant Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to, before me this 4th day of Feb. 1987 at Bacolod City,
Philippines.
SGD. DEMOSTHENES L. MAGALLANES
Judge
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT
BACOLOD CITY"
(p. 19, Record)
On the basis of the foregoing application and joint deposition, Judge Magallanes issued
Search Warrant No. 181, commanding the search of the property described in the
warrant.
Subsequently, constabulary officers stationed in Bacolod City conducted a search of the
premises described in the search warrant and seized the following articles, to wit: 1) 272
kilos of galvanized bolts, V chuckle and U-bolts; and 2) 3 and 1/2 feet angular bar. The
receipt was signed by Digno Mamaril, PC Sergeant and marked "from Kenneth Siao" (p.
21, Record).
A complaint for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law (P.D. 1612) was filed against Kenneth
Siao with the office of the City Fiscal by the National Power Corporation. Thereafter, Siao
filed a counter-affidavit alleging that he had previously relinquished all his rights and
ownership over the Kener Trading to herein petitioner Erle Pendon. In a resolution (pp.
22-23, Record) dated May 18, 1987, the office of the City Fiscal recommended the
dismissal of the complaint against Siao and the filing of a complaint for the same violation
against petitioner. On the same day, a complaint (p. 24, Record) for Violation of the Anti-
Fencing Law was filed against petitioner and docketed as Criminal Case No. 5657 of the
Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental. The case was raffled to Branch 47 of the same
court presided over by respondent Judge Enrique T. Jocson.
Before his arraignment, petitioner filed on July 9, 1987, an application for the return of the
articles seized by virtue of Search Warrant No. 181 (pp. 26-29, Record) on the ground
that the said search warrant was illegally issued. The prosecuting fiscal filed an opposition
to the application (pp. 31-32, Record). The application was subsequently amended to an
application for quashal of the illegally-issued search warrant and for the return of the
articles seized by virtue thereof (pp. 33-38, Records).
On August 24, 1987, respondent Judge Jocson issued an order impliedly denying the
application for the quashal of the search warrant without ruling on the issue of the validity
of the issuance thereof. The order states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Counsel for accused having admitted in the hearing in open court that at least one of the
seized items bears the identifying mark of the complainant National Power Corporation,
and there being no statement that the seized items were acquired in usual course of
business for value, this court is constrained to have the case tried without resolving
whether or not the questioned search warrant was issued validly." (p. 43, Records)
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but it was denied on October 14, 1987
(p. 11, Rollo).
On October 20, 1987, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for a restraining order, assailing the legality of
search warrant No. 181 and praying for the permanent prohibition against the use in
evidence of the articles and properties seized and the return thereof to petitioner. On April
4, 1988, respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The appellate court found
the existence of a probable cause to justify the issuance of the search warrant. The
respondent court held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"x x x
"For reasons indicated, We hold that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the validity of
the issuance of the Search Warrant No. 181 and to sustain further the ruling of the
respondent trial court in denying the petition for the return of the articles and personal
properties seized thereunder.
"WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, with costs against petitioner. The
previous order to maintain the status quo is hereby withdrawn and set aside.
"SO ORDERED." (p. 41, Rollo)
The motion for reconsideration of the above decision filed by petitioner on May 2, 1988
was denied in a resolution (p. 49, Rollo) dated July 21, 1988.
The basic issue raised in this petition is the legality of the issuance of Search Warrant No.
181. It is the contention of petitioner that the application for the search warrant and the
joint deposition of the witnesses miserably failed to fulfill the requirements prescribed by
the Constitution and the rules.
The petitioner argues that the application of 1st Lt. Rojas and the joint deposition of Abaja
and Reyes failed to comply with the requisites of searching questions and answers. The
joint deposition of the witnesses showed that the questions therein were pretyped,
mimeographed and the answers of the witnesses were merely filled-in. No examination of
the applicant and of the joint deponents was personally conducted by Judge Magallanes as
required by law and the rules.
Additionally, petitioner also contends that both the application of Rojas and the joint
deposition of Abaya and Reyes show that neither of the affiants had personal knowledge
that any specific offense was committed by petitioner or that the articles sought to be
seized were stolen or that being so, they were brought to Kenneth Siao.chanrobles
virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
Lastly, the petitioner contends that, even assuming for the sake of polemics, that the
articles belong to the latter, his Constitutional right prevails over that of NAPOCOR.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed under Article III (Bill
of Rights), Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines which
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge alter examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Under the above provision, the issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon a
finding of probable cause. Probable cause for a search has been defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense
are in the place sought to be searched (Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, G.R. No. 64261, Dec.
26, 1984, 133 SCRA 800). In determining the existence of probable cause, it is required
that: 1) the judge (or) officer must examine the . . witnesses personally; 2) the
examination must be under oath; and (3) the examination must be reduced to writing in
the form of searching questions and answers (Marinas v. Sioco, 104 SCRA 403, Ponsica v.
Ignalaga, G.R. No. 72301, July 31, 1987, 152 SCRA 647). These requirements are
provided under Section 4, Rule 126 of the New Rules of Criminal Procedure which states:
"Sec. 4. Examination of complainant; record. — The judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing
and under oath the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally
known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any
affidavits submitted."cralaw virtua1aw library
It has been ruled that the existence of probable cause depends to a large degree upon the
finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination (Luna v. Plaza, G.R. No. L-
27511, Nov. 29, 1968), however, the opinion or finding of probable cause must, to a
certain degree, be substantiated or supported by the record.
In this case, We find that the requirement mandated by the law and the rules that the
judge must personally examine the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching
questions and answers before issuing the warrant, was not sufficiently complied with. The
applicant himself was not asked any searching question by Judge Magallanes. The records
disclose that the only part played by the applicant, Lieutenant Rojas was to subscribe the
application before Judge Magallanes. The application contained pre-typed questions, none
of which stated that applicant had personal knowledge of a robbery or a theft and that the
proceeds thereof are in the possession and control of the person against whom the search
warrant was sought to be issued. In the case of Roan v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 71410, Nov.
25, 1986, 145 SCRA 687, citing the case of Mata v. Bayona, G.R. No. 50720, March 26,
1984, 128 SCRA 388, where the applicant himself was not subjected to an interrogation
but was questioned only "to ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood (his
affidavit) and only because the application was not yet subscribed and sworn to," We held
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The
examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce and attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in
order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of
the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later
that his declarations are false.’
"x x x
"It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely
routinary or pro forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The examining
magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own
inquiry on the intent and justification of the application." (Emphasis supplied; p. 695)
Likewise, the joint deposition made by the two (2) witnesses presented by the applicant
can hardly satisfy the same requirement. The public respondent prosecutor admitted in his
memorandum that the questions propounded were pre-typed.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual
law library
The offense which petitioner was sought to be charged was violation of the anti-fencing
law which punishes the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for
another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy
or sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which
he knows, or should have known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft (Sec. 2a, P.D. 1612). The four (4) questions propounded could
hardly support a finding of probable cause. The first question was on the personal
circumstances of the deponents. The second and third were leading questions answerable
by yes or no. The fourth question was on how the deponents knew about their answers in
the second and third questions. The judge could have exploited this last question to
convince himself of the existence of a probable cause but he did not. There was also no
statement in the joint deposition that the articles sought to be seized were derived from
the proceeds of the crime of robbery or a theft or that applicants have any knowledge that
a robbery or theft was committed and the articles sought to be seized were the proceeds
thereof. It was not even shown what connection Kenneth Siao has with Kener Trading or
with the premises sought to be searched. By and large, neither the application nor the
joint deposition provided facts or circumstance which could lead a prudent man to believe
that an offense had been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense, if any, are in the possession of the person named in the application.
". . . [T]he searching questions propounded to the applicants of the search warrant and
his witnesses must depend to a large extent upon the discretion of the Judge just as long
as the answers establish a reasonable ground to believe the commission of a specific
offense and that the applicant is one authorized by law, and said answers particularly
describe with certainty the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The examination or investigation which must be under oath may not be in public. It may
even be held in the secrecy of his chambers. Far more important is that the examination
or investigation is not merely routinary but one that is thorough and elicit the required
information. To repeat, it must be under oath and must be in writing. (Mata v. Bayona,
50720, March 26, 1984, 128 SCRA 388) (Emphasis supplied)
And, in Quintero v. NBI, G.R. No. L-35149, June 23, 1988, 162 SCRA 467,
483:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"As held in Nolasco v. Paño No. 69803, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 163), the questions
propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicant’s witness are not sufficiently
searching to establish probable cause. Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an
application for search warrant, and conducting of examination in a general manner, would
not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search warrant."cralaw virtua1aw
library
Another infirmity of Search Warrant No. 181 is its generality. The law requires that the
articles sought to be seized must be described with particularity. The items listed in the
warrant, to wit: "NAPOCOR Galvanized bolts, grounding motor drive assembly, aluminum
wires and other NAPOCOR Towers parts and line accessories" are so general that the
searching team can practically take half of the business of Kener Trading, the premises
searched. Kener Trading, as alleged in petitioner’s petition before respondent Court of
Appeals and which has not been denied by respondent, is engaged in the business of
buying and selling scrap metals, second hand spare parts and accessories and empty
bottles.
Far more important is that the items described in the application do not fall under the list
of personal property which may be seized under Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure because neither the application nor the joint deposition alleged that
the item/s sought to be seized were: a) the subject of an offense; b) stolen or embezzled
property and other proceeds or fruits of an offense; and c) used or intended to be used as
a means of committing an offense.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
It is noted that respondent Judge Jocson himself had doubts about the existence of
probable cause in the issuance of the search warrant. In denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration of the denial of his motion to quash and application for articles seized by
virtue of search warrant No. 181, he stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The seeming lack of probable cause during the application for search warrant in the lower
court is cured by the admission for the accused of counsel that at least one of the items
seized bore the identifying mark of complainant National Power Corporation and the failure
to aver in the quashal motion and in the open hearing that the seized items themselves
were acquired in the usual course of business for value in good faith. However, this order
is without prejudice to the right of the accused to pursue against the administrative
liability of MTCC Judge Demosthenes Magallanes." (p. 54, Rollo)
In his memorandum, City Fiscal Mirano stated that the articles seized by virtue of search
warrant No. 181 was taken from the possession of petitioner who signed the receipt in
behalf of Kener Trading, which possession is punishable under Section 5, P.D. 1612, which
states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 5. Presumption of Fencing. — Mere possession of any goods, article, item, object or
anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie
evidence of fencing."cralaw virtua1aw library
No matter how incriminating the articles taken from the petitioner may be, their seizure
cannot validate an invalid warrant. Again, in the case of Mata v. Bayona, G.R. No. 50720,
March 26, 1984, 128 SCRA 388:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . that nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant but the fulfillment of the
legal requisites. It might be well to point out what has been said in Asian Surety &
Insurance Co., Inc. v. Herrera:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘It has been said that of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more
essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves
the exemption of his private affairs, books and papers from inspection and scrutiny of
others. While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must
be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the
citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference
to the basic principles of government."cralaw virtua1aw library
"Thus, in issuing a search warrant the Judge must strictly comply with the requirements of
the Constitution and the statutory provisions. A liberal construction should be given in
favor of the individual to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of
the rights secured by the Constitution. No presumption of regularity are to be invoked in
aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify it."cralaw virtua1aw library
Finally, the seized articles were described in the receipt issued by PC Sergeant Mamaril as
galvanized bolts, V-chuckle, U-bolts and 3 1/2 feet angular bar (p. 21, Record). There is
no showing that the possession thereof is prohibited by law hence, the return thereof to
petitioner is proper. Also, the use in evidence of the articles seized pursuant to an invalid
search warrant is enjoined by Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. Judgment is hereby rendered: 1) declaring
Search Warrant No. 181 issued by Judge Demosthenes Magallanes NULL and VOID; 2)
ordering the return of the items seized by virtue of the said warrant to herein petitioner;
and 3) permanently enjoining respondents from using in evidence the articles seized by
virtue of Search Warrant No. 181 in Criminal Case No. 5657.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 82870 December 14, 1989
DR. NEMESIO E. PRUDENTE, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. EXECUTIVE JUDGE ABELARDO M. DAYRIT, RTC Manila, Branch 33 and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Francisco SB Acejas III, Oscar S. Atencio, Rodolfo M. Capocyan, Ernesto P. Fernandez, Romulo B.
Macalintal, Rodrigo H. Melchor, Rudegelio D. Tacorda Virgilio L. Valle and Luciano D. Valencia for
petitioner.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge dated 9 March 1988
which denied the petitioner's motion to quash Search Warrant No. 87-14, as well as his order dated 20
April 1988 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the earlier order.
It appears that on 31 October 1987, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw, Chief of the Intelligence Special
Action Division (ISAD) of the Western Police District (WPD) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 33, presided over by respondent Judge Abelardo Dayrit, now Associate Justice of the
Court of Appeals. an application 1 for the issuance of a search warrant, docketed therein as SEARCH
WARRANT NO. 87-14, for VIOLATION OF PD NO. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.) entitled
"People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus Nemesis E. Prudente, Defendant." In his application for
search warrant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw alleged, among others, as follows:
1. That he has been informed and has good and sufficient reasons to believe that
NEMESIO PRUDENTE who may be found at the Polytechnic University of the
Philippines, Anonas St. Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, has in his control or
possession firearms, explosives handgrenades and ammunition which are illegally
 possessed or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense which c. explosives and handgrenades; and d. Assorted weapons with ammunitions?
the said NEMESIO PRUDENTE is keeping and concealing at the following
premises of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, to wit:
A: Yes sir.

a. Offices of the Department of Military Science and Tactics at

Q: Do you know who is or who are the person or persons who
the ground floor and other rooms at the ground floor;
has or have control of the above-described premises?

b. Office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente at PUP,

A: Yes sir, it is Dr. Nemesio Prudente, President of the
Second Floor and other rooms at the second floor;
Polytechnic University of the Philippines.

2. That the undersigned has verified the report and found it to be a fact, and
Q: How do you know that said property is subject of the
therefore, believes that a Search Warrant should be issued to enable the
offense of violation of Pres. Decree No. 1866 or intended to be
undersigned or any agent of the law to take possession and bring to this Honorable
used as the means of committing an offense?
Court the following described properties:

A: Sir, as a result of our continuous surveillance conducted for

a. M 16 Armalites with ammunitions;
several days, we gathered information from verified sources
that the holder of said firearms and explosives as well as
b. .38 and .45 Caliber handguns and pistols; ammunitions aren't licensed to possess said firearms and
ammunition. Further, the premises is a school and the holders
of these firearms are not students who were not supposed to
c. explosives and handgrenades; and,
possess firearms, explosives and ammunition.

d. assorted weapons with ammunitions.

On the same day, 31 October 1987, respondent Judge issued Search Warrant No. 87-14, 3 the
pertinent portions of which read as follows:
In support of the application for issuance of search warrant, P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles, OIC of the
Intelligence Section of (ISAD) executed a "Deposition of Witness" dated 31 October 1987, subscribed
and sworn to before respondent Judge. In his deposition, P/Lt. Florenio Angeles declared, inter alia, as
follows:
Q: Do you know P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw, the applicant for
a Search Warrant?
A: Yes, sir, he is the Chief, Intelligence and Special Action
Division, Western Police District.
Q: Do you know the premises of Polytechnic University of the
Philippines at Anonas St., Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila
A: Yes, sir, the said place has been the subject of our
surveillance and observation during the past few days.
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under oath
applicant ALLADIN M. DIMAGMALIW and his witness FLORENIO C. ANGELES
that there are good and sufficient reasons to believe (probable cause) that
NEMESIO PRUDENTE has in his control in the premises of Polytechnic University
of the Philippines, Anonas St., Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, properties which are
subject of the above offense or intended to be used as the means of committing
the said offense.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time in the day
or night of the premises of Polytechnic University of the Philippines, more
particularly (a) offices of the Department of Military Science and Tactics at the
ground floor and other rooms at the ground floor; (b) office of the President, Dr.
Nemesio Prudente at PUP, Second Floor and other rooms at the second floor, and
forthwith seize and take possession of the following personal properties, to wit:
a. M 16 Armalites with ammunition;

Q: Do you have personal knowledge that in the said premises

b. .38 and .45 Caliber handguns and pistols;
is kept the following properties subject of the offense of
violation of PD No. 1866 or intended to be used as a means of
committing an offense: c. explosives and hand grenades; and

a. M 16 Armalites with ammunitions; d. assorted weapons with ammunitions.

b. .38 and 45 Caliber handguns and pistols; and bring the above described properties to the undersigned to be dealt with as the
law directs.
On 1 November 1987, a Sunday and All Saints Day, the search warrant was enforced by some 200
WPD operatives led by P/Col. Edgar Dula Torre, Deputy Superintendent, WPD, and P/Major Romeo
Maganto, Precinct 8 Commander.
In his affidavit, 4 dated 2 November 1987, Ricardo Abando y Yusay, a member of the searching team,
alleged that he found in the drawer of a cabinet inside the wash room of Dr. Prudente's office a bulging
brown envelope with three (3) live fragmentation hand grenades separately wrapped with old
newspapers, classified by P/Sgt. J.L. Cruz as follows (a) one (1) pc.—M33 Fragmentation hand
grenade (live); (b) one (11) pc.—M26 Fragmentation hand grenade (live); and (c) one (1) pc.—PRB—
423 Fragmentation hand grenade (live).
On 6 November 1987, petitioner moved to quash the search warrant. He claimed that (1) the
complainant's lone witness, Lt. Florenio C. Angeles, had no personal knowledge of the facts which
formed the basis for the issuance of the search warrant; (2) the examination of the said witness was not
in the form of searching questions and answers; (3) the search warrant was a general warrant, for the
reason that it did not particularly describe the place to be searched and that it failed to charge one
specific offense; and (4) the search warrant was issued in violation of Circular No. 19 of the Supreme
Court in that the complainant failed to allege under oath that the issuance of the search warrant on a
Saturday was urgent. 5
The applicant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw thru the Chief, Inspectorate and Legal Affairs Division,
WPD, opposed the motion. 6 After petitioner had filed his reply 7 to the opposition, he filed a
supplemental motion to quash. 8
Thereafter, on 9 March 1988, respondent Judge issued an order, 9denying the petitioner's motion and
supplemental motion to quash. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration 10 was likewise denied in the
order 11 dated 20 April 1988.
Hence, the present recourse, petitioner alleging that respondent Judge has decided a question of
substance in a manner not in accord with law or applicable decisions of the Supreme Court, or that the
respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion tantamount to excess of jurisdiction, in issuing the
disputed orders.
For a valid search warrant to issue, there must be probable cause, which is to be determined personally
by the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.12 The probable cause must be in connection with one specific offense 13 and the judge must,
before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in
writing and under oath, the complainant and any witness he may produce, on facts personally known to
them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted. 14
The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant, has been defined "as such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet arid prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and that objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched." 15 This probable cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the
complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay. 16
Petitioner assails the validity of Search Warrant No. 87-14 on the ground that it was issued on the basis
of facts and circumstances which were not within the personal knowledge of the applicant and his
witness but based on hearsay evidence. In his application for search warrant, P/Major Alladin
Dimagmaliw stated that "he has been informed" that Nemesio Prudente "has in his control and
possession" the firearms and explosives described therein, and that he "has verified the report and
found it to be a fact." On the other hand, in his supporting deposition, P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles
declared that, as a result of their continuous surveillance for several days, they "gathered informations
from verified sources" that the holders of the said fire arms and explosives are not licensed to possess
them. In other words, the applicant and his witness had no personal knowledge of the facts and
circumstances which became the basis for issuing the questioned search warrant, but acquired
knowledge thereof only through information from other sources or persons.
While it is true that in his application for search warrant, applicant P/Major Dimagmaliw stated that he
verified the information he had earlier received that petitioner had in his possession and custody the t
there is nothing in the record to show or indicate how and when said applicant verified the earlier
information acquired by him as to justify his conclusion that he found such information to be a fact. He
might have clarified this point if there had been searching questions and answers, but there were none.
In fact, the records yield no questions and answers, whether searching or not, vis-a-vis the said
applicant.
What the records show is the deposition of witness, P/Lt. Angeles, as the only support to P/Major
Dimagmaliw's application, and the said deposition is based on hearsay. For, it avers that they
(presumably, the police authorities) had conducted continuous surveillance for several days of the
suspected premises and, as a result thereof, they "gathered information from verified sources" that the
holders of the subject firearms and explosives are not licensed to possess them.
In Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance, 17 this Court laid the following test in determining whether the
allegations in an application for search warrant or in a supporting deposition, are based on personal
knowledge or not—
The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to warrant issuance of a
search warrant is whether it has been drawn in a manner that perjury could be
charged thereon and the affiant be held liable for damage caused. The oath
required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the
applicant for search warrant, and/or his witnesses, not of the facts merely reported
by a person whom one considers to be reliable.
Tested by the above standard, the allegations of the witness, P/Lt. Angeles, in his deposition, do not
come up to the level of facts of his personal knowledge so much so that he cannot be held liable
for perjury for such allegations in causing the issuance of the questioned search warrant.
In the same Alvarez case, 18 the applicant stated that his purpose for applying for a search warrant was
that: "It had been reported to me by a person whom I consider to be reliable that there are being kept in
said premises books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with
his activities as a money lender, challenging usurious rate of interests, in violation of law." The Court
held that this was insufficient for the purpose of issuing a search warrant.
In People vs. Sy Juco, 19 where the affidavit contained an allegation that there had been a report to the
affiant by a person whom lie considered reliable that in said premises were "fraudulent books,
correspondence and records," this was likewise held as not sufficient for the purpose of issuing a
search warrant. Evidently, the allegations contained in the application of P/ Major Alladin Dimagmaliw
and the declaration of P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles in his deposition were insufficient basis for the issuance
of a valid search warrant. As held in the Alvarez case:
The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge
of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the
 committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the
issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause.
Besides, respondent Judge did not take the deposition of the applicant as required by the Rules of
Court. As held in Roan v. Gonzales, 20 "(m)ere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus
not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce and attach them to the record."
Moreover, a perusal of the deposition of P/Lt. Florenio Angeles shows that it was too brief and short.
Respondent Judge did not examine him "in the form of searching questions and answers." On the
contrary, the questions asked were leading as they called for a simple "yes" or "no" answer. As held
in Quintero vs. NBI," 21 the questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's
witness are not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. Asking of leading questions to the
deponent in an application for search warrant, and conducting of examination in a general manner,
would not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search warrant."
Manifestly, in the case at bar, the evidence failed to show the existence of probable cause to justify the
issuance of the search warrant. The Court also notes post facto that the search in question yielded, no
armalites, handguns, pistols, assorted weapons or ammunitions as stated in the application for search
warrant, the supporting deposition, and the search warrant the supporting hand grenades were itself
Only three (3) live fragmentation found in the searched premises of the PUP, according to the affidavit
of an alleged member of the searching party.
The Court avails of this decision to reiterate the strict requirements for determination of "probable
cause" in the valid issuance of a search warrant, as enunciated in earlier cases. True, these
requirements are stringent but the purpose is to assure that the constitutional right of the individual
against unreasonable search and seizure shall remain both meaningful and effective.
Petitioner also assails the validity of the search warrant on the ground that it failed to particularly
describe the place to be searched, contending that there were several rooms at the ground floor and
the second floor of the PUP.
The rule is, that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can,
with reasonable effort, ascertain and Identify the place intended . 22 In the case at bar, the application for
search warrant and the search warrant itself described the place to be searched as the premises of the
Polytechnic University of the Philippines, located at Anonas St., Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila more
particularly, the offices of the Department of Military Science and Tactics at the ground floor, and the
Office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente, at PUP, Second Floor and other rooms at the second
floor. The designation of the places to be searched sufficiently complied with the constitutional
injunction that a search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched, even if there were
several rooms at the ground floor and second floor of the PUP.
Petitioner next attacks the validity of the questioned warrant, on the ground that it was issued in
violation of the rule that a search warrant can be issued only in connection with one specific offense.
The search warrant issued by respondent judge, according to petitioner, was issued without any
reference to any particular provision of PD No. 1866 that was violated when allegedly P.D. No. 1866
punishes several offenses.
In Stonehill vs. Diokno, 23 Where the warrants involved were issued upon applications stating that the
natural and juridical persons therein named had committed a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code and Revised Penal Code," the Court held that no specific
offense had been alleged in the applications for a search warrant, and that it would be a legal hearsay
of the highest order to convict anybody of a "Violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue Code and Revised Penal Code" without reference to any determinate provision of
said laws and codes.
In the present case, however, the application for search warrant was captioned: "For Violation of PD
No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.) While the said decree punishes several offenses, the
alleged violation in this case was, qualified by the phrase "illegal possession of firearms, etc." As
explained by respondent Judge, the term "etc." referred to ammunitions and explosives. In other words,
the search warrant was issued for the specific offense of illegal possession of firearms and explosives.
Hence, the failure of the search warrant to mention the particular provision of PD No. 1-866 that was
violated is not of such a gravity as to call for its invalidation on this score. Besides, while illegal
possession of firearms is penalized under Section 1 of PD No. 1866 and illegal possession of
explosives is penalized under Section 3 thereof, it cannot be overlooked that said decree is a
codification of the various laws on illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives; such
illegal possession of items destructive of life and property are related offenses or belong to the same
species, as to be subsumed within the category of illegal possession of firearms, etc. under P.D. No.
1866. As observed by respondent Judge: 24
The grammatical syntax of the phraseology comparative with the title of PD 1866
can only mean that illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives,
have been codified under Section 1 of said Presidential Decree so much so that
the second and third are forthrightly species of illegal possession of firearms under
Section (1) thereof It has long been a practice in the investigative and prosecution
arm of the government, to designate the crime of illegal possession of firearms,
ammunitions and explosives as 'illegal possession of firearms, etc.' The
Constitution as well as the Rules of Criminal Procedure does not recognize the
issuance of one search warrant for illegal possession of firearms, one warrant for
illegal possession of ammunitions, and another for illegal possession of explosives.
Neither is the filing of three different informations for each of the above offenses
sanctioned by the Rules of Court. The usual practice adopted by the courts is to file
a single information for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. This
practice is considered to be in accordance with Section 13, Rule 110 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides that: 'A complaint or information must
charge but one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe
a single punishment for various offenses. Describably, the servers did not search
for articles other than firearms, ammunitions and explosives. The issuance of
Search Warrant No. 87-14 is deemed profoundly consistent with said rule and is
therefore valid and enforceable. (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, in connection with the petitioner's contention that the failure of the applicant to state, under oath,
the urgent need for the issuance of the search warrant, his application having been filed on a Saturday,
rendered the questioned warrant invalid for being violative of this Court's Circular No. 19, dated 14
August 1987, which reads:
3. Applications filed after office hours, during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays
shall likewise be taken cognizance of and acted upon by any judge of the court
having jurisdiction of the place to be searched, but in such cases the applicant shall
certify and state the facts under oath, to the satisfaction of the judge, that the
issuance is urgent.
it would suffice to state that the above section of the circular merely provides for a guideline, departure
from which would not necessarily affect the validity of an otherwise valid search warrant.
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned orders dated 9
March 1988 and 20 April 1988 as well as Search Warrant No. 87-14 are hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE.
The three (3) live fragmentation hand grenades which, according to Ricardo Y. Abando, a member of
the searching team, were seized in the washroom of petitioner's office at the PUP, are ordered
delivered to the Chief, Philippine Constabulary for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-45344 November 29, 1938
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. VICENTE P. ANCHETA, ET
AL., defendants.
VICENTE P. ANCHETA, ISIDORO DEL ROSARIO, and BENITO GASPI, appellants.
Alejo Mabanag for appellants.
Solicitor-General Tuason for appellee.
ABAD SANTOS, J.: chanrobles virtual law library
This case grew out of an affray which took place in a small and isolated community, the
municipal district of Balabac, Province of Palawan. Appellants, with twelve others, all
members of the constabular, were charge in the Court of First Instance of Palawan with
having murdered Guillermo Salazar who was at the time the justice of the peace of the
said municipal district. Upon motion of the prosecution, one of the accused, Isaac de
Guzman, was excluded from the information and used as a state witness. After due trial,
the court found the appellants Isidoro del Rosario and Benito Gaspi guilty of the crime
charged, as principals, and the appellant Vicente P. Ancheta, as accomplice, and
sentenced each of the first two to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and the last the
penalty of not less than six years and one day of prision mayor and not more than twelve
years and one day of reclusion temporal. The three appellants were further sentenced to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Guillermo Salazar in the sum of P1,000, pro rata, to
suffer the other accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay the costs. The eleven
remaining accused were acquitted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
While the information alleged that the fifteen accused conspired to kill Salazar, the trial
court held that there was no proof of such conspiracy. According to the findings of the
court, Salazar was shot and killed by Gaspi while the former was being assaulted by Del
Rosario; and although there was no expressed finding of conspiracy between these two
appellants, they were both found guilty of the alleged crime, as principals. The appellant
Ancheta was found guilty, as accomplice, for having failed to restrain his co-appellants
from the commission of the alleged criminal act.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
This appeal seeks to reverse the judgment of the court below, and to have the appellants
acquired. On the other hand, the Solicitor-General maintains that the appellant Ancheta,
like his two co-appellants, is guilty of murder, as principal. The Solicitor-General takes the
view that the appellants were engaged in the commission of an unlawful act when Salazar
was shot and killed by Gaspi.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is undisputed that, at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, all the fifteen
persons originally included as accused in this case, were members of a constabulary
detachment in the municipal district of Balabac, Province of Palawan. The appellant
Ancheta, with the rank of third lieutenant, was their commander. The appellant Del
Rosario was a sergeant, while the appellant Gaspi was a private. Ancheta became engaged
who belonged to one of the most prominent families in that municipal district. Bibiana had
two brothers named Cirilo and Rufo. About six months, prior to the occurence of the
events which gave rise to this case, the engagement of Ancheta to Bibiana was broken.
Whether because of this rupture or some other reason, the relations between Ancheta and
the Sanson brothers appeared to be quite strained. The Sanson family was running a store
located on the ground floor of their house facing the main street. On that fateful Sunday
morning, January 13, 1935, Bibiana, her two brothers, and the deceased Salazar were
gathered in the store. After the mass and while passing in front of the store, Ancheta was
assaulted and beaten by the Sanson brother and and received multiple bruises and cuts
about the face. In the course of the scuffle Ancheta fell down, and while Cirilo grappled
with him, Rufo continued to box him. Ancheta carried a pistol on his waist, and while he
was thus being attacked by the Sanson brothers, the deceased Salazar took the pistol and
kept it. The evidence is irreconcilably in conflict as to what transpired afterwards. It is
likewise in conflict as to what motivated the assault perpetrated on Ancheta by the Sanson
brothers.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
According to the evidence for the prosecution, Bibiana approached Ancheta, as he was
walking in front of the store, in order to demand from him an explanation about certain
statements alleged to have been made by Ancheta, which were derogatory to the dignity
of Bibiana; that Ancheta, out of spite, slapped Bibiana on the face and thereupon Bibiana's
brothers, Rufo and Cirilo, came out of the store and engaged Ancheta in a fight giving him
a bad beating; that in the course of the fight Salazar pulled out Ancheta's pistol from his
waist and kept it, presumably to forestall more serious consequences; that after the
combatants had been separated, six soldiers arrived and tried to strike Salazar and the
two brothers; that, at this juncture, Ancheta ran to the barracks and had a bugle call to
arms sounded; that in response to the call, all the soldiers composing the garrison, except
one who remained on guard duty, with loaded guns and fixed bayonets, marched to the
town, firing in the air as they went; that they arrested the two brothers and Salazar; that
while Salazar was under the custody of the soldiers, appellant Del Rosario gave him a
blow on the stomach with his left fist, while with his right hand he struck him with his
pistol; that Salazar became groggy, and as he was falling down, appellant Gaspi shot
him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On the part of the defense, Ancheta testified than on the morning in question, while on his
way to the forest station, he saw Bibiana standing in the store; that she came out to meet
him and said that she wanted to ask him something; that, smiling, she pointed to his right
shoulder and asked what he had on it; that he looked at his shoulder and, as he did so,
Bibiana embraced him tightly; that Bibiana's brothers, Rufo and Cirilo, and Salazar came
out of the store and attacked him; that Rufo struck him on the back of the head and his
sight became dim; that he was thrown down and Rufo and Cirrilo mounted on him and
beat him on the face with stones; that he scratched Cirilo with his left fingers; that the
sergeant of police came and separated the Sanson brothers from him; that when he stood
up he noticed that his pistol was missing from its holster; that he inquired who took it,
and Salazar answered: "I have your pistol but I will not give it"; that he left and went to
the store of Wy Dian Lo to see his face, which was bleeding, in the mirror; that from that
store, he proceeded to the barracks; that he did not reach the barracks because he met
appellant Del Rosario that he had been assaulted by the Sanson brothers, their sister
Bibiana, and Salazar; that he further told Del Rosario that his pistol was with Salazar, and sent out to arrest the Sanson brothers and Salazar, preserved their self-control, and did
ordered him to make the necessary investigation to effect the arrest; that after talking not run amuck, as some of the witnesses for the prosecution would have us believe. That
with Del Rosario, he went to his residence and lay down; that while thus living down in his Gaspi shot Salazar in defense of Del Rosario's life is, we believe, established by a
house, he heard shots from the direction of the town; that although he felt weak, he made preponderance of evidence. Gaspi, is, therefore, except from criminal liability. (Revised
an effort to go down to find out the cause of the shooting suspecting that the shots had Penal Code, article 11, clause 3.) It follows that Ancheta and Del Rosario must also be
been fired by his soldiers, and fearing that they might have done harm; that when he acquitted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
reached the intersection of two roads near the Catholic church, he saw soldiers coming out
of the house of the Sanson family, and he stopped and waited for them; that when the
Upon a careful scrutiny of the evidence in this case, we are inclined to believe that, in
soldiers came near him, he asked corporal Sapad, who came ahead of the rest of the
convicting the appellants, the trial court was unduly influenced, unconsciously no doubt,
soldiers and who accompanied the Sanson brothers, about the shooting; that Sapad
by the local atmosphere which seems to have been strongly unfavorable to the appellants.
answered that they had been fired in the air to effect the arrest of the Sanson brothers
This is indicated by the facts that the appellants and their codefendants in the court below
who closed themselves in their house and did not want to surrender; that he and the
were even prosecuted and convicted for the crime of sedition, which action the Solicitor-
soldiers walked towards the barracks; that when they came in front of the church, he
General, upon a more calm and careful review of the evidence, later admitted to have
heard two shots coming from behind; that he immediately went back and saw Salazar
been unwarranted, when he asked for a reversal of the judgment of conviction for the said
lying on the ground; that the first shot he heard was a pistol shot and the second must
crime of sedition. ( See People vs. Ancheta, G.R. Nos. 46250 and 46251, Nov. 29, 1938.)
have been fired from a rifle; that upon reaching the place where Salazar lay dead, he
While it may appear to the mind of the average person that there was an altogether
asked who killed him, and the appellant Gaspi answered: "I did, sir. I shot him because he
excessive show of force on the part of the members of the constabulary involved in this
wanted to shot against the sergeant once more"; that he then ordered Del Rosario to
case when they effected the arrest of the Sanson brothers and Salazar, we must bear in
watch the corpse, and left for his house with private De Guzman to have his wounds
mind that we are dealing here with men who were trained to take no chances in an
treated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
emergency and to uphold their authority by force of arms. And while we may not
approved of their conduct in this particular instance, we must not allow such consideration
Gaspi testified that he was among the soldiers who wee sent out to arrest the Sanson to affect our judgment as to their guilt o innocence of the particular crime now imputed to
brothers and Salazar; that after arresting them they started to take them to the barracks; them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
that the three persons arrested did not come out of the house of the Sanson family at the
same time; that the Sanson brothers came out fist, and were guarded by Del Rosario,
The judgment appealed from must be reversed, and the appellants acquitted, with
Sapad and three other soldiers; that Salazar was under the custody of corporal Baquiao
costs de oficio. So ordered.chanroblesvirtua
and himself; that they were not able to take Salazar to the barracks because upon nearing
an acacia tree, Del Rosario and private Aguilar approached them and the former required
Salazar to surrender Ancheta's pistol; that Salazar told Del Rosario he did not have the USliUS v SANCHEZ
pistol, whereupon the latter told the former that he would search his person; that as Del
Rosario was about to approach Salazar to search him, the latter stepped back and at the No. 90-1974.
same time dew a pistol out of the left pocket of his trousers and fired at Del Rosario; that
the latter could parry Salazar's left hand, and thus avoided the shot; that Salazar again
stepped back and was about to fire again at Del Rosario when he shot and killed Salazar Heard March 4, 1991.
to save Del Rosario's life.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Decided August 27, 1991.
The theory of the defense is that the Sanson brothers, their sister Bibiana and Salazar had
conspired to assault Ancheta. While there are some circumstances which seem to lend Russell M. Sollitto with whom Joseph A. Bevilacqua, Jr., Providence, R.I., was on brief, for defendant, appellant.
plausibility to this theory, we are unable to accept it. A conspiracy to commit a crime must
be established by positive evidence, and such evidence does not obtain here. Neither is Margaret E. Curran, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Lincoln C. Almond, U.S. Atty., and Charles A. Tamuleviz, Asst.
there enough evidence to support the theory of the prosecution that the purpose of the U.S. Atty., Providence, R.I., were on `brief, for appellee.
soldiers in marching to the town was not merely to arrest the Sanson brothers and
Salazar, but mainly to avenge the assault committed against Ancheta by the Sanson
brothers. If such were the case, if the soldiers were really determined to take the law into Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island.
their hands and punish those who assaulted and wounded their superior officer, Ancheta,
the first object of their revenge would have been the Sanson brothers, and not Salazar. Before CAMPBELL and CYR, Circuit Judges, and COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge.
And yet the former suffered no serious bodily harm at the hands of the soldiers. The
evidence fails to show that there was even an attempt on the part of any of the soldiers to
shoot anyone of the Sanson brothers. What the evidence for the prosecution tends to COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge.
show is that upon seeing the Sanson brothers, Ancheta wanted to shoot them, but was
prevented by Del Rosario and Baquiao. Granting this to be true, it reveals that Del Rosario
and Baquiao who, as sergeant and corporal, respectively, were in charge of the expedition Defendant Erwin Sanchez appeals his conviction for possessing cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). He asserts two grounds for reversal: first, that the district court wrongly
refused to suppress a quantity of cocaine seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, and, second, that the
court erred in denying his motion for acquittal because the evidence was insufficient to prove knowing possession
of the cocaine. We affirm.
I. Background
In reviewing a district court's denial of a suppression motion, we must uphold its findings of fact unless they are
clearly erroneous, United States v. Cruz Jimenez, 894 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1990). The court's ultimate conclusion,
however, is subject to plenary review, United States v. Curzi, 867 F.2d 36, 42 (1st Cir. 1989). Denial of a
suppression motion should be upheld "if any reasonable view of the evidence supports the trial court's
decision," United States v. Veillette, 778 F.2d 899, 902 (1st Cir. 1985). Applying these principles here, we are
unable to disturb the trial court's decision.

On the afternoon of March 20, 1990, defendant Sanchez was stopped for speeding as he drove a black Camaro
Because Fourth Amendment rights are personal and may not be asserted vicariously, the first inquiry in examining
along Interstate Route 95 in Rhode Island. State Trooper Underhill approached the car on the driver's side while
a fourth amendment claim is whether the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched or
Detective Denniston went to the passenger's side. In response to Underhill's request, defendant produced his valid
the item seized. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138-48, 99 S.Ct. 421, 427-33,
New York driver's license and retrieved the vehicle registration from inside the center armrest. The car was
registered in Massachusetts to Rafaela Penta.
58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978); United States v. McHugh, 769 F.2d 860, 864 (1st Cir. 1985). A defendant who fails to
demonstrate a sufficiently close connection to the relevant places or objects will not have "standing" to claim that
Trooper Underhill then questioned Sanchez about the car. The defendant reported that the car was owned by
they were searched or seized illegally. Thus, in this case, Sanchez would be entitled to challenge the legality of the
"Penta," but he did not know her full name, address or telephone number. He claimed that a friend in New York
search of the Camaro only if he met his burden of showing that he reasonably anticipated privacy in the car. See
named "Nana" lent him the car, but he did not know Nana's full name, address or phone number either. Underhill
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130-31 n. 1, 99 S.Ct. at 424 n. 1 (burden of proving a reasonable expectation of privacy is on
testified that Sanchez appeared extremely nervous throughout the questioning and, with his suspicions aroused by
the proponent of a motion to suppress); United States v. Garcia-Rosa, 876 F.2d 209, 219 (1st Cir. 1989), vacated
the exchange, the trooper asked Sanchez to get out of the car.
on other grounds, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 377, 112 L.Ed.2d 391 (1990), aff'd, 930 F.2d 951 (1st Cir. 1991)
(same). The district court found that Sanchez did not sustain this burden.
The defendant then was questioned again by Underhill and Denniston together. Sanchez repeated that the car was
loaned to him in New York by a friend named Nana, and that it belonged to Nana's girlfriend, Penta. He told the
Technically, the concept of "standing" has not had a place in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence for more than a
officers that he was driving to the Dartmouth, Massachusetts area to meet a friend named Robin, with whom he
decade, since the Supreme Court in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978),
planned to stay for three days. Although he did not know Robin's last name, address or telephone number, he
indicated that matters of standing in the context of searches and seizures actually involved substantive Fourth
claimed to know how to find his house. Sanchez had no extra clothes with him, and told the officers he planned to
Amendment law. The Court thus dispensed with standing as "a discrete analytic element apart from the merits" in
borrow some from Robin. The only "luggage" in the car was a bag in the back containing old cheese, a bottle of
such cases, United States v. Bouffard, 917 F.2d 673, 675 (1st Cir. 1990), instead requiring a defendant to prove a
liquor and photographs.
legitimate expectation of privacy as a prerequisite to challenging assertedly unlawful police conduct. We therefore
use the term "standing" somewhat imprecisely to refer to this threshold substantive determination.
At some point, the officers retrieved a slip of paper with a phone number from the front seat of the Camaro, and
arranged for someone at the state police barracks to call the number. The call was answered by someone who
The government conceded at oral argument that the officers had no probable cause to detain Sanchez or the car.
identified himself only as "Eduardo," and who hung up when asked about Sanchez and the Camaro. Computer
His own illegal seizure does not help his effort to suppress the cocaine, however, because the evidence resulted
checks on Sanchez's license and the car registration revealed nothing suspicious.
from the seizure and search of the car and not from his personal detention.

With Sanchez's consent, Denniston did a cursory search of the car, which turned up nothing unusual. The officers
nevertheless decided to bring the car to the police barracks for further investigation. Sanchez drove the Camaro
with Denniston in the passenger seat, and Underhill followed in the cruiser. Shortly after their arrival at the
barracks, Sanchez signed a form consenting to another search of the car. Underhill's drug detection canine alerted
near the car, and a subsequent search led to discovery of a kilogram of cocaine hidden behind a rear panel.
Sanchez then was arrested.
Sanchez sought to suppress the cocaine on the ground that it was obtained in violation of his fourth amendment
rights. He argued that the officers lacked probable cause to bring either him or the car back to the police barracks
and, consequently, that the drugs should have been excluded from evidence as the fruit of his unlawful arrest and
the car's unlawful seizure.
The district court denied the suppression motion, concluding that Sanchez had failed to establish a reasonable
expectation of privacy in either the Camaro or the cocaine and thus lacked standing to challenge the search of the
car. Sanchez appeals that ruling and also seeks reversal of his conviction based on a paucity of evidence showing
that he knowingly possessed the concealed cocaine.
II. Suppression of the Cocaine
We have in the past listed various factors that are relevant to the standing determination:
ownership, possession, and/or control; historical use of the property searched or the thing seized; ability to
regulate access; the totality of the surrounding circumstances; the existence or nonexistence of a subjective
anticipation of privacy; and the objective reasonableness of such an expectancy under the facts of a given case.
United States v. Aguirre, 839 F.2d 854, 856-57 (1st Cir. 1988).
In rejecting defendant's claim, the district court relied heavily on Sanchez's failure to show that he had the owner's
permission to use the car. The court accepted defendant's repeated assertion that he had been given the car by
Nana, whose girlfriend, Penta, was the owner. The court thus found that "at best the defendant was operating the
vehicle with the authority of a person who himself had been given the authority to operate the vehicle by
somebody else." The court further noted the lack of evidence showing that Sanchez had used the car previously or
had control or responsibility for the vehicle "other than the fact he was driving it when he was stopped."
Detective Denniston testified at the suppression hearing that after his arrest, in conversation in Spanish with an
immigration officer, Sanchez stated that he had permission from Penta to use the car. The district court apparently
gave little weight to this alternative version of how Sanchez got the car and we find no clear error in its decision to
do so. We note, moreover, that at oral argument, defendant's counsel stated that Sanchez had obtained the car from
Nana.
We consider this to be a close case. In his favor, Sanchez appropriately emphasizes his possession of the car, his
ability as the sole occupant to control or exclude others' use of the vehicle, and the fact that he was driving alone
on a long trip at a great distance from the vehicle's owner. The fact that he was alone distinguishes this case
from United States v. Lochan, 674 F.2d 960 (1st Cir. 1982), in which we found no legitimate expectation of
privacy on the part of the driver of a car whose owner was a passenger. We noted in Lochan that the owner's
presence "diluted" evidence of the defendant's control of the vehicle. Id. at 965. That distinction obviously
strengthens defendant's claim here.
Despite this difference from Lochan, we believe the circumstances, on balance, tip slightly in favor of the same
result. As in Lochan, Sanchez had only a casual possession of the car. He did not own it, nor, as the district court
observed, was there evidence that he had used the car on other occasions. He gained possession from a friend
about whom he knew very little — not even his last name. Although Sanchez's control of the vehicle presumably
was greater than Lochan's because Sanchez was driving unaccompanied by the car's owner, this factor is offset by
the fact that Sanchez did not have direct authority from the owner to use the vehicle. In addition, Sanchez claimed
no interest in the drugs contained within the car. Nor did he exhibit an expectation of privacy in the bag of items
stored in the hatchback area, which he displayed to the officers on his own initiative.
Michael's Credit Union, 880 F.2d 579, 584 (1st Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. McNatt, 813 F.2d 499,
502 (1st Cir. 1987)). Accordingly, we must determine whether, viewing all of the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government, including all reasonable inferences to be drawn from such evidence, a rational trier
of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Mena, 933 F.2d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 1991).
We need not dwell on this issue because the evidence clearly was ample. Sanchez was both alone and driving the
car in which the cocaine was hidden, permitting an inference that he knew about and possessed the drug. See
United States v. Barnes, 890 F.2d 545, 549 (1st Cir. 1989); Lochan, 674 F.2d at 966. He appeared nervous when
speaking to law enforcement officers, and claimed to be enroute to visit a friend whose last name he did not know.
In addition, he brought no clothing or toiletries with him for what was supposed to be a three-day visit, "a
suspicious circumstance that could give rise to an inference of guilty knowledge," Lochan, 674 F.2d at 966.
It is settled law "that a prosecutor may simultaneously maintain that a defendant criminally possessed the seized
good, but was not subject to a Fourth Amendment deprivation, without legal contradiction," United States v.
Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 90, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 2552, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980). Therefore,

[t]he seeming contradiction between finding that control over a motor vehicle by a nonowner driver gives rise to
Sanchez could have testified at the suppression hearing that he had some interest in the cocaine without concern
an inference of knowledge of the vehicle's contents and finding that the driver does not have an expectation of
that that testimony would be used as direct evidence against him at trial. United States v. Garcia-Rosa, 876 F.2d
privacy in the vehicle or its contents is irrelevant.
209, 219 (1st Cir. 1989), vacated on other grounds, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 377, 112 L.Ed.2d 391
(1990), aff'd, 930 F.2d 951 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Lochan, 674 F.2d 960, 965 n. 6 (1st Cir. 1982).
Lochan, 674 F.2d at 966 n. 7.
Had Sanchez demonstrated a more intimate relationship with the car's owner or a history of regular use of the Although a finding of guilt in these circumstances was not inevitable, we conclude that the evidence was
Camaro — from which a presumption of permission could be drawn — we would have been likely to conclude sufficient to support the jury's finding that Sanchez knowingly possessed the cocaine.
that the totality of the circumstances established a legitimate expectation of privacy. A pattern of permission,
together with his sole control on a long trip, would have minimized the informal and temporary nature of this
specific acquisition of the car. On the present record, however, the factors fall short, leaving Sanchez unable to Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
meet his burden of proof. See United States v. Arango, 912 F.2d 441, 445 (10th Cir. 1990) (no reasonable
expectation of privacy where defendant failed to introduce evidence that truck lawfully possessed); United States
G.R. No. L-2128 May 12, 1948
v. Obregon, 748 F.2d 1371, 1374-75 (10th Cir. 1984) (defendant driver of rental car had no reasonable
expectation of privacy where car had been rented by unrelated third party and no evidence presented of any
agreement with rental company allowing defendant lawfully to drive car). Cf. United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d MELENCIO SAYO and JOAQUIN MOSTERO, petitioners,
546, 548-49 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing cases) (finding reasonable expectation of privacy where defendant was sole vs.
occupant of car driven with permission of owner); United States v. Martinez, 808 F.2d 1050, 1056 (5th Cir. 1987) THE CHIEF OF POLICE and THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF MUNICIPAL JAIL, BOTH OF CITY OF
(finding reasonable expectation of privacy where defendant's boyfriend, owner of the car, testified that she used it MANILA, respondents.
with his permission); United States v. Rose, 731 F.2d 1337, 1343 (8th Cir. 1984) (defendant had permission of his
sister, the owner, and drove the car "as much as two or three times a week").
Enrique Q. Jabile for petitioners.
Acting City Fiscal A. P. Montesa, Assistant City Fiscal Arsenio Nañawa and D. Guinto Lazaro for
For example, in United States v. Williams, 714 F.2d 777, 779 n. 1 (8th Cir. 1983), the car at issue was owned by respondents.
an individual who lived with the defendant's nephew. The district court found that the nephew, with the owner's
knowledge, occasionally permitted the defendant to use the car and that such permission was given on the day in
FERIA, J.:
question. The court further found that this approval provided the defendant with a sufficient expectation of privacy
in the vehicle to have standing. In this case, however, Sanchez did not meet his burden of showing acquiescence
by Penta in his use of the car. Upon complaint of Bernardino Malinao, charging the petitioners with having committed the crime of
robbery, Benjamin Dumlao, a policeman of the City of Manila, arrested the petitioners on April 2, 1948,
and presented a complaint against them with the fiscal's office of Manila. Until April 7, 1948, when the
We therefore conclude that the district court correctly found that Sanchez lacked a sufficient expectation of
petition for habeas corpus filed with this Court was heard, the petitioners were still detained or under
privacy in the car to entitle him to challenge its seizure and search.
arrest, and the city fiscal had not yet released or filed against them an information with the proper
courts justice.
III. Judgment of Acquittal
This case has not been decided before this time because there was not a sufficient number of Justices
Defendant moved for judgment of acquittal claiming that the government's evidence was insufficient to prove that to form a quorum in Manila, And it had to be transferred to the Supreme Court acting in division here in
he knowingly possessed the cocaine found in the car. We review the district court's denial of the motion using the Baguio for deliberation and decision. We have not until now an official information as to the action taken
identical standard employed to measure the sufficiency of evidence supporting a guilty verdict. United States v. St. by the office of the city fiscal on the complaint filed by the Dumlao against the petitioners. But whatever
night have been the action taken by said office, if there was any, we have to decide this case in order to
lay down a ruling on the question involved herein for the information and guidance in the future of the
officers concerned.
The principal question to be determined in the present case in order to decide whether or not the
petitioners are being illegally restrained of their liberty, is the following: Is the city fiscal of manila
a judicial authority within the meaning of the provisions of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code?
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the penalties provided in the next proceeding
article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal
ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of six
hours."
Taking into consideration the history of the provisions of the above quoted article, the precept of our
Constitution guaranteeing individual liberty, and the provisions of Rules of Court regarding arrest
and habeas corpus, we are of the opinion that the words "judicial authority", as used in said article,
mean the courts of justices or judges of said courts vested with judicial power to order the temporary
detention or confinement of a person charged with having committed a public offense, that is, "the
Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law". (Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution.)
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was substantially taken from article 202 of the old Penal Code
formerly in force of these Islands, which penalized a public officer other than a judicial officer who,
without warrant, "shall arrest a person upon a charge of crime and shall fail to deliver such person to
the judicial authority within twenty four hours after his arrest." There was no doubt that a judicial
authority therein referred to was the judge of a court of justice empowered by law, after a proper
investigation, to order the temporary commitment or detention of the person arrested; and not the city
fiscals or any other officers, who are not authorized by law to do so. Because article 204, which
complements said section 202, of the same Code provided that "the penalty of suspension in its
minimum and medium degrees shall be imposed upon the following persons: 1. Any judicial officer who,
within the period prescribed by the provisions of the law of criminal procedure in force, shall fail to
release any prisoner under arrest or to commit such prisoner formally by written order containing a
statement of the grounds upon which the same is based."
Although the above quoted provision of article 204 of the old Penal Code has not been incorporated in
the Revised Penal Code the import of said words judicial authority or officer can not be construed as
having been modified by the mere omission of said provision in the Revised Penal Code.
Besides, section 1 (3), Article III, of our Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be secure in
their persons...against unreasonable seizure shall not be violated, and no warrant [of arrest, detention
or confinement] shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after the
examination under oath or affirmation of the complaint and the witness he may produce." Under this
constitutional precept no person may be deprived of his liberty, except by warrant of arrest or
commitment issued upon probable cause by a judge after examination of the complainant and his
witness. And the judicial authority to whom the person arrested by a public officers must be surrendered
can not be any other but court or judge who alone is authorized to issue a warrant of commitment or
provisional detention of the person arrested pending the trial of the case against the latter. Without such
warrant of commitment, the detention of the person arrested for than six hours would be illegal and in
violation of our Constitution.
Our conclusion is confirmed by section 17, Rule 109 of the Rules of court, which, referring to the duty of
an officer after arrest without warrant, provides that "a person making arrest for legal ground shall,
without unnecessary delay, and within the time prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, take the person
arrested to the proper court or judge for such action for they may deem proper to take;" and by section
11 of Rule 108, which reads that "after the arrest by the defendant and his delivery to the Court, he
shall be informed of the complaint or information filed against him. He shall also informed of the
substance of the testimony and evidence presented against him, and, if he desires to testify or to
present witnesses or evidence in his favor, he may be allowed to do so. The testimony of the witnesses
need not be reduced to writing but that of the defendant shall be taken in writing and subscribed by him.
And it is further corroborated by the provisions of section 1 and 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.
According to the provision of said section, "a writ of habeas corpus shall extend any person to all cases
of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is illegally deprived of his liberty"; and "if it
appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge, or by virtue of a judgement or order of a court of record, and that
the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render judgment, or make the order, the writ
shall not be allowed. "Which a contrario sensu means that, otherwise, the writ shall be allowed and the
person detained shall be released.
The judicial authority mentioned in section 125 of the Revised Penal Code can not be construed to
include the fiscal of the City of Manila or any other city, because they cannot issue a warrant of arrest or
of commitment or temporary confinement of a person surrendered to legalize the detention of a person
arrested without warrant. (Section 7, Rule 108; Hashim vs. Boncan, 40 Off. Gaz. 13th Supp., p.13;
Lino vs. Fugoso, L-1159, promulgated on January 30, 1947, 43 Off. Gaz., 1214). The investigation
which the city of fiscal of Manila makes is not the preliminary investigation proper provided for in section
11, Rule 108, above quoted, to which all person charged with offenses cognizable by the Court of First
Instance in provinces are entitled, but it is a mere investigation made by the city fiscal for the purpose of
filing the corresponding information against the defendant with the proper municipal court or Court of
First Instance of Manila if the result of the investigation so warrants, in order to obtain or secure from
the court a warrant of arrest of the defendant. It is provided by a law as a substitute, in a certain sense,
of the preliminary investigation proper to avoid or prevent a hasty or malicious prosecution, since
defendant charged with offenses triable by the courts in the City of Manila are not entitled to a proper
preliminary investigation.
The only executive officers authorized by law to make a proper preliminary investigation in case of
temporary absence of both the justice of the peace and the auxiliary justice of the peace from the
municipality, town or place, are the municipal mayors who are empowered in such case to issue a
warrant of arrest of the caused. (Section 3, Rule 108, in connection with section 6, Rule 108, and
section 2 of Rule 109.) The preliminary investigation which a city fiscal may conduct under section 2,
Rule 108, is the investigation referred to in the proceeding paragraph.
Under the law, a complaint charging a person with the commission of an offense cognizable by the
courts of Manila is not filed with municipal court or the Court of First Instance of Manila, because as
above stated, the latter do not make or conduct a preliminary investigation proper. The complaint must
be made or filed with the city fiscal of Manila who, personally or through one of his assistants, makes
the investigation, not for the purpose of ordering the arrest of the accused, but of filing with the proper
court the necessary information against the accused if the result of the investigation so warrants, and
obtaining from the court a warrant of arrest or commitment of the accused.
When a person is arrested without warrant in cases permitted bylaw, the officer or person making the
arrest should, as abovestated, without unnecessary delay take or surrender the person arrested, within
the period of time prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, to the court or judge having jurisdiction to try
or make a preliminary investigation of the offense (section 17, Rule 109); and the court or judge shall try
and decide the case if the court has original jurisdiction over the offense charged, or make the
preliminary investigation if it is a justice of the peace court having no original jurisdiction, and then
transfer the case to the proper Court of First Instance in accordance with the provisions of section 13,
Rule 108.
In the City of Manila, where complaints are not filed directly with the municipal court or the Court of First
Instance, the officer or person making the arrest without warrant shall surrender or take the person
arrested to the city fiscal, and the latter shall make the investigation above mentioned and file, if proper,
the corresponding information within the time prescribed by section 125 of the Revised Penal Code, so
that the court may issue a warrant of commitment for the temporary detention of the accused. And the
city fiscal or his assistants shall make the investigation forthwith, unless it is materially impossible for
them to do so, because the testimony of the person or officer making the arrest without warrant is in
such cases ready and available, and shall, immediately after the investigation, either release the person
arrested or file the corresponding information. If the city fiscal has any doubt as to the probability of the
defendant having committed the offense charged, or is not ready to file the information on the strength
of the testimony or evidence presented, he should release and not detain the person arrested for a
longer period than that prescribed in the Penal Code, without prejudice to making or continuing the
investigation and filing afterwards the proper information against him with the court, in order to obtain or
secure a warrant of his arrest. Of course, for the purpose of determining the criminal liability of an
officer detaining a person for more than six hours prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, the means of
communication as well as the hour of arrested and other circumstances, such as the time of surrender
and the material possibility for the fiscal to make the investigation and file in time the necessary
information, must be taken into consideration.
To consider the city fiscal as the judicial authority referred to in article 125 of the Revised Penal Code,
would be to authorize the detention of a person arrested without warrant for a period longer than that
permitted by law without any process issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. The city fiscal, may
not, after due investigation, find sufficient ground for filing an information or prosecuting the person
arrested and release him, after the latter had been illegally detained for days or weeks without any
process issued by a court or judge.
A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person without a warrant upon complaint of the
offended party or any other person, except in those cases expressly authorized by law. What he or the
complainant may do in such case is to file a complaint with the city fiscal of Manila, or directly with the
justice of the peace courts in municipalities and other political subdivisions. If the City Fiscal has no
authority, and he has not, to order the arrest even if he finds, after due investigation, that there is a
probability that a crime has been committed and the accused is guilty thereof, a fortiori a police officer
has no authority to arrest and detain a person charged with an offense upon complaint of the offended
party or other persons even though, after investigation, he becomes convinced that the accused is
guilty of the offense charged.
In view of all the foregoing, without making any pronouncement as to the responsibility of the officers
who intervened in the detention of the petitioners, for the policeman Dumlao may have acted in good
faith, in the absence of a clear cut ruling on the matter in believing that he had complied with the
mandate of article 125 by delivering the petitioners within six hours to the office of the city fiscal, and
the latter might have ignored the fact that the petitioners were being actually detained when the said
policeman filed a complaint against them with the city fiscal, we hold that the petitioners are being
illegally restrained of their liberty, and their release is hereby ordered unless they are now detained by
virtue of a process issued by a competent court of justice. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-28519 February 17, 1968
RICARDO PARULAN, petitioner,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.
Ricardo Parulan for and in his own behalf as petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
RESOLUTION
ANGELES, J.:
On petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed by Ricardo Parulan, directed to the Director of the
Bureau of Prisons, praying that the latter be ordered "to release immediately and without delay the body
of the petitioner from unlawful and illegal confinement", anchoring the relief prayed for on certain
allegations in the petition, to the effect that petitioner's confinement in the state penitentiary at
Muntinglupa, Rizal, under the administrative and supervisory control of the respondent Director of
Prisons, is illegal, for the reason that the sentence of conviction imposed upon said petitioner for the
crime of evasion of service of sentence, penalized under Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, was
rendered by a court without jurisdiction over his person and of the offense with which he was charged.
It appears that the petitioner, as alleged in the petition, was confined in the state penitentiary at
Muntinglupa, Rizal, serving a sentence of life imprisonment which, however, was commuted to twenty
(20) years by the President of the Philippines. In October, 1964, he was transferred to the military
barracks of Fort Bonifacio (formerly Fort Wm. McKinley) situated at Makati, Rizal, under the custody of
the Stockade Officer of the said military barracks. In that month of October, 1964, while still serving his
prison term as aforesaid, he effected his escape from his confinement. Petitioner was recaptured in the
City of Manila. Prosecuted for the crime of evasion of service of sentence, penalized under Article 157
of the Revised Penal Code, before the Court of First Instance of Manila, after due trial, petitioner was
found guilty of the offense charged and sentenced accordingly with the imposable penalty prescribed by
law, on August 3, 1966.
Assuming the correctness of the facts as alleged in the petition, and on the basis thereof, we
shall proceed to discuss the merits of the case regarding the validity and legality of the decision
sentencing the petitioner to a prison term for the crime of evasion of sentence.
Settled is the rule that for deprivation of any fundamental or constitutional rights, lack of
jurisdiction of the court to impose the sentence, or excessive penalty affords grounds for relief
by habeas corpus.
The issue, therefore, as posed in the petition is: Was the Court of First Instance of Manila with
jurisdiction to try and decide the case and to impose the sentence upon the petitioner, for the offense
with which he was charged — evasion of service of sentence?
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Place where action is to be instituted. — (a) In all criminal prosecutions the action shall
be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality of province where the offense was
committed or any of the essential ingredients thereof took place.
There are crimes which are called transitory or continuing offenses because some acts material
and essential to the crime occur in one province and some in another, in which case, the rule is settled
that the court of either province where any of the essential ingredients of the crime took place has —
jurisdiction to try the case.1 As Gomez Orbaneja opines —
Que habiendo en el delito continuado tantos resultados como hechos independientes
en sentido natural, el principio del resultado no basta para fijar el forum delicti commisi, y ha
de aceptarse que el delito se comete en cualquiera de los lugares donde se produzca uno de
pesos plurales resultados.2
 There are, however, crimes which although all the elements thereof for its consummation may
have occurred in a single place, yet by reason of the very nature of the offense committed, the violation
of the law is deemed to be continuing. Of the first class, the crime of estafa or malversation 3 and
abduction 4 may be mentioned; and as belonging to the second class are the crimes of kidnapping and
illegal detention where the deprivation of liberty is persistent and continuing from one place to
another 5 and libel where the libelous matter is published or circulated from one province to another. 6 To
this latter class may also be included the crime of evasion of service of sentence, when the prisoner in
his attempt to evade the service of the sentence imposed upon him by the courts and thus defeat the
purpose of the law, moves from one place to another; for, in this case, the act of the escaped prisoner
is a continuous or series of acts, set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent
force, however long it may be. It may not be validly said that after the convict shall have escaped from
the place of his confinement the crime is fully consummated, for, as long as he continues to evade the
service of his sentence, he is deemed to continue committing the crime, and may be arrested without
warrant, at any place where he may be found. Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court may be invoked
in support of this conclusion, for, under section 6[c] thereof, one of the instances when a person may be
arrested without warrant is where he has escaped from confinement. 7 Undoubtedly, this right of arrest
without a warrant is founded on the principle that at the time of the arrest, the escapee is in the
continuous act of committing a crime — evading the service of his sentence.
WHEREFORE, the writ is denied. Without costs.
[G.R. No. L-1159. January 30, 1947.]
CECILIO M. LINO, Petitioner, v. VALERIANO E. FUGOSO, LAMBERTO JAVALERA,
and JOHN DOE, in their capacity as Mayor, Chief of Police and Officer in charge of
municipal jail, all of the City of Manila, respectively, Respondents.
Emanuel Peldez, Francisco A. Rodrigo, Enrique M. Fernando, Manuel M. Crudo,
Claudio Teehankee and Jose W. Diokno Fiscal Jose P. Bengzon, for Respondent.
City Fiscal Jose P. Bengzon, for Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. HABEAS CORPUS; ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT; DETENTION AFTER SIX HOURS
WITHOUT DELIVERY TO JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES; ILLEGALITY OF, NOT CURED BY FILING
OF INFORMATION; CASE AT BAR. — Assuming that P. D. and P. M. were legally arrested
without warrant, their continued detention became illegal upon the expiration of six hours
without their having been delivered to the corresponding judicial authorities. The illegality
of their detention was not cured by the filing of informations against them, since no
warrants of arrest or orders of commitment have been issued by the municipal court up to
the hearing of this case before this Court.
2. ID.; ARREST WHEN INFORMATION IS FOR LIGHT OFFENSE; ARREST WITHOUT
WARRANT; DETENTION THEREUNDER. — The general rule is that when the offense
charged is light the accused should not be arrested except in particular instances when the
court expressly so orders in the exercise of its discretion. While an arrest may be made
without warrant when there are reasonable grounds therefor (Rule 109 section 6 Rules of
Court), the prisoner cannot be retained beyond the period provided by law unless a
warrant is procured from a competent court.
3. ID.; ARREST; CITY FISCAL AUTHORITY OF, TO ISSUE WARRANT OF. — The City Fiscal
has no authority to issue warrants of arrest, and is powerless to validate an illegal
detention by merely filing informations or by any order of his own either express or
implied.
4. ID.; CITY FISCAL; POWER OF, TO ORDER COMMITMENT OR RELEASE ON BAIL OF
ACCUSED. — The City Fiscal has no power to order either the commitment or the release
on bail of persons charged with penal offenses.
Per PERFECTO, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
5. EXPEDITING HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDING. — Cases of habeas corpus, by their very
nature if the remedy is to be effective and there is an earnest desire to avoid a failure of
justice should be disposed of without any delay, as was done in Tañada v. Quirino (42 Off.
Gaz., 934).
6. RESPONDENTS’ ACTIONS NEED BE COUNTERACTED. — Speedy action is necessary to
squelch the tactics of respondents who are bent on exerting all the power and ability that
they command to mock at the action of the courts as exemplified by the case of
Villavicencio v. Lukban (39 Phil. 778-812).
7. OFFICIAL DISREGARD FOR FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS. — Twelve humble peaceful
and law-abiding citizens while in the peaceful exercise of their constitutional rights of
freedom of expression and to peaceably assemble, the right to enlist public support in the
pursuit of their right to a decent living wage, and the right to petition their own
government for the redress of their grievances are abruptly interrupted in the exercise of
their rights and violently hauled into prison as dangerous criminals.
8. IGNORANCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS. — Ignorance of the
constitutional Bill of Rights by the erring officials is no justification. It only aggravates the
situation. It shows unpardonable dereliction of duty and recklessness of responsible high
authorities.
9. PEACE OFFICERS. — Peace officers are duty bound to know the law. They are also
known as law officers, because it is their essential function to enforce the laws. At least,
they ought to know the Constitution and learn by heart the Bill of Rights.
10. OFFER OF PROVISIONAL RELEASE OF BAIL. — That the twelve detainees were offered
provisional release if they should post a bail of P12,000 each, does not make legal their
illegal detention. The required bail only tends to show respondents stubbornness in the
exercise of an illegal power, and the fact that the amount of P12,000 was required of
persons who were not receiving even the miserable pittance, to secure the increase of
which they went into strike, appears to be an unbearable sarcasm.
11. SEDITION. — The allegation that the arresting officers believe that the detainees, are
guilty of sedition holds no water when respondents themselves confess that no such crime
was committed. Sedition is the crime usually resorted to by tyrants as a pretext to silence
or suppress those persons who have the firmness of character to oppose them and expose
their abuses.
12. ONE-FOURTH OF A CENTURY PRONOUNCEMENTS. — The pronouncements made by
the Supreme Court one-fourth of a century ago on fundamental civil rights are quoted in
the opinion.
13. VIRUS OF THE JAPANESE FEUDALISTIC IDEOLOGY. — The wanton disregard by those
 responsible for the arrest of the twelve detainees of their fundamental rights as
guaranteed by the Constitution, shows that the Japanese feudalistic ideology, as
propagated during enemy occupation, has left its pernicious virus in our soil.
14. ARBITRARINESS AND ILLEGAL DETENTION. — These Government officers who are
responsible for the detention and confinement of the twelve detainees are liable for
prosecution under articles 124 and 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
15. POOR FACE-SAVING DEVICE. — The filing of information for insignificant
misdemeanors against P. M. and P. D. appears to us as a poor face-saving device to
justify, in some way, their further detention and should not be countenanced as a means
to defeat the release of said two detainees.
16. PERILOUS PATH. — Those who under the pretext of subduing allegedly seditious
persons, committed the arbitrariness complained of in the petition, trod a perilous path
that, as shown by the experience of other countries, usually leads to the implantation of a
dictatorship, whose whole philosophy is built upon the hateful slogan that everything,
including the most cherished possessions and the most blessed ideals of the people,
should be sacrificed for the sake of state supremacy.
17. PRICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS. — Eternal vigilance and constant willingness and readiness
to fight for them are the price of human rights. The existence of liberal elements, always
watchful and ready to defend victims of violations of the Bill of Rights, is necessary to
vitalize democracy and to give tangible reality to the guarantees of the Constitution.
18. CONDITIONS AND QUALITIES REQUIRED. — The attainment of great ideals needs
faith, passionate adherence to them, the militant attitude manifested in the inflicting
readiness to fight and face hardships and sacrifices, unconquerable steadfastness and
unbreakable perseverance in the face of obstacles and setbacks. These are the conditions
and qualities needed by all liberal and progressive spirits to keep lighted the torch of
liberty, to squelch the hydra of reaction, to conserve the moral heritage of advancement
and conquests in the emporium of human rights bequeathed by the champions and
martyrs who waged the heroic battles for real spiritual values and for the dignity if man as
the image of God.
DECISION
MORAN, C.J. :
This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed in behalf of twelve persons alleged to be
unlawfully detained by respondents Valeriano E. Fugoso, Lamberto Javalera and John Doe
in their capacity as mayor, chief of police and officer in charge of the municipal jail of the
City of Manila, respectively. It is alleged in respondents’ return that ten of the petitioners
had already been released, no sufficient evidence having been found to warrant their
prosecution for inciting to sedition, but that the remaining two, Pascual Montaniel and
Facifico Deoduco, are being held in custody because of charges filed against them in the
municipal court unjust vexation and disobedience to police orders, respectively.
After hearing, by minute resolution we dismissed the case with respect to the petitioners
already released and we ordered the release of the remaining two, Montaniel and
Deoduco, without prejudice to a reasoned decision which we now proceed to render.
The case of the ten petitioners has become academic by their release. The purpose of a
writ of habeas corpus is only to set them free. After they are freed, the writ is
purposeless. If they have been the victims of illegal arrest or detention, they can have
recourse to criminal actions in the proper courts.
As regards the remaining two petitioners, the pertinent facts as admitted at the hearing
by respondents, are as follows: Pascual Montaniel was arrested without warrant by the
police officers of Manila on November 8, 1946, for inciting to sedition, and Pacifico
Deoduco, on November 7, 1946, for resisting arrest and disobedience to police orders. On
November 11 when this petition for habeas corpus was filed, these two petitioners were
still under arrest. They were thus held in confinement for three and four days,
respectively, without warrants and without charges formally filed in court. The papers of
their cases were not transmitted to the City Fiscal’s office until late in the afternoon of
November 11. Upon investigation by that office, no sufficient evidence was found to
warrant the prosecution of Pascual Montaniel for inciting to sedition and of Pacifico
Deoduco for resisting arrest, but both remained under custody because of informations
filed with minuet charging Montaniel with unjust vexation and Deoduco with disobedience
to an agent of a person in authority under the second paragraph of article 151 of Revised
Penal Code. These informations were filed on the same day when this case was heard
before this Court, that is, on November 12, 1946. And so far, no warrants of arrest or
orders of commitment are shown to have been issued by the municipal court pursuant to
the informations thus filed.
Under these facts, the detention of Pacifico Deoduco and Pascual Montaniel is illegal. Even
assuming that they were legally arrested without warrant on November 7 and 8, 1946,
respectively, their continued detention became illegal upon the exploration of six hours
without their having been delivered to the corresponding judicial authorities. (Article 125,
Rev. Pen Code, as amended by Act No. 3940.) Their cases were referred to the City Fiscal
late in the afternoon of November 11, 1946, that is, four and three days, respectively,
after they were arrested. The illegally of their detention was not cured by the filing of
information against them, since no warrants of arrest or orders of commitment have been
issued by the municipal court to the hearing of this case before this Court.
It must be observed, in this connection, that in said informatons, the two petitioners are
charged with light offenses punishable by law with arresto mayor or an fine ranging from
5 to 200 pesos or both, according to the second paragraphs of articles 151 and 287,
respectively, of the Revised Penal Code. Under Rule 108, section 10, when the offense
charged is of that character, "the judge with whom the complaint or information is filled,
shall not issue any warrant for order for the arrest of the defendant, but shall order the
letter to appear on the day and hour fixed in the order to answer to the complaint of
information," although in particular instances he may also "order that a defendant charged
with such offense be arrested and not released except upon furnishing bail." The general
rule, therefore, is that when the offense charged is light the accused should not be
arrested, except in particular instances when the court expressly so orders in the
experience of its discretion. In the instant case, the municipal court has not yet acted on
the informations nor exercised its discretion the arrest of the two petitioners and,
therefore, they are still detained not because of the informations filed against them but as
a continuance of their illegal detention by the police officers, While an arrest may be made
without warrant there are reasonable grounds therefor (Rule 109, section 6 Rules of
Court), the prisoner cannot be retained beyond the period provided by law, unless a
warrant is procured from a competent court. (4 Am. Jur., p. 49; Diers v. Mallon, 46 Neb.,
121; 50 Am. St. Rep., 598; Burk v. Howley, 179 Penn., 539; 57 Am. St. Rep., 607;
Karner v. Stump, 12 Tex. Civ. App., 460; 34 S. W., 656; Johnson v. Americus, 46 Ga., 80;
Leger v. Warren, L. R. A., 216-281 [Bk. 51. ] It is obvious in the instant case that the City
Fiscal had no authority to issue warrants of arrest (vide authorities cited above, and
Hashim v. Boncan and City of Manila, 71 Phil., 216) and was powerless to validate such
illegal detention by merely filing informations or by any order of his own, either express or
implied
It is not necessary now to determine whether the City Fiscal is a judicial authority within
the purview of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 3940, for
even if he were, the petitioners’ case was referred to him long after the expiration of the
six hours provided by law. And since the City Fiscal, unlike a judicial authority, has no
power to order either the commitment or the release on bail of persons charged with
penal offenses (Adm. Code, section 2460), the petitioners’ further their confinement after
their case had been referred to the City Fiscal was but a mere continuation of their illegal
detention by the police officers. In the eyes of the law, therefore, these prisoners should
have been out of prison long before the informations were filed with the municipal court,
and they should not be retained therein merely because of the filing of such informations
it appearing particularly that the offenses charged are light and are not, as a general rule,
grounds for arrest, under Rule 108, section 10. Under such circumstances, only an order
of commitment could legalize the prisoner’s continued confinement, and no such order has
ever been issued. Indeed, the municipal court could acquire jurisdiction over said
prisoners only by the issuance of a warrant of arrest, an order of commitment or a writ of
summons as provided in the aforementioned rule.
We reiterate the minute-resolution above mentioned.
G.R. No. 126351. February 18, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAUL ACOSTA y
LAYGO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision1 dated August 25, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court of
Kalookan City, Branch 127, convicting accused-appellant of the crime of Arson, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify private
complainant the amount of P100,000.00 as actual damages without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
Appellant Raul Acosta y Laygo was a 38-year old mason, married, and a resident of Barrio
Makatipo, Kalookan City, at the time of the offense charged. He used to be a good friend
of Almanzor "Elmer" Montesclaros, the grandson of private complainant, Filomena M.
Marigomen.2 On February 27, 1996, a few hours before the fire, Montesclaros, in the belief
that appellant and his wife were the ones hiding his live-in partner from him, stormed the
house of appellant and burned their clothes, furniture, and appliances.3 Montesclaros lived
in the house owned by said complainant and located at Banahaw St., Mountain Heights
Subdivision, Barrio Makatipo, Kalookan City. It was this house allegedly set on fire by
appellant.
The pertinent facts in this case, as summarized by the Solicitor General, which we find
supported by the records, are as follows:
"At about 4:00 to 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of February 27, 1996, the nephew of
prosecution witness Mona Aquino called the latter, simultaneously shouting that appellant
Raul Acosta, their neighbor, was carrying a stove and a kitchen knife (TSN, May 22, 1996,
pp. 3-4, 7). She went out of her house and approached appellant who, when asked why
he was carrying a stove and a knife, replied that he would burn the house of complainant
Filomena M. Marigomen. (Ibid., pp. 3-4)
Complainants house is situated at Banahaw Street, Mountain Heights Subdivision,
Kalookan City and adjacent to the house of prosecution witness Aquino. (Ibid., pp. 2, 18).
Only a wall fence divides her property from that of the complainant. (Ibid., p. 18).
Owing to the fearsome answer of appellant to witness Aquinos query, she returned
immediately to her house (Ibid., p. 7). A few minutes after closing the door, she heard the
sound of broken bottles and the throwing of chair inside the house of complainant (Ibid.,
p. 8). When she peeped through her kitchen door, she saw appellant inside complainants
house, which was unoccupied at that time. (Ibid., p. 8). Thereafter, appellant poured
kerosene on the bed (papag) and lighted it with cigarette lighter (Ibid., p. 10). The fire
was easily put off by appellants wife who arrived at the place. (Ibid., p. 10)
At around 1:00 oclock in the morning of February 28, 1996, prosecution witness Lina
Videa, likewise a resident of Mountain Heights Subdivision, was roused from her sleep by
the barking of their dogs at the back portion of her house. (TSN, May 20, 1996, pp. 3-4).
When she went out of her house, she saw complainants house situated at the adjacent lot
near the back portion of her garage burning. (Ibid., p. 4). When she peeped through the
holes of the GI sheets separating her lot from the adjacent lot, she noticed the presence
of appellant standing alone in front of the burning house. (Ibid., p. 5) Appellant was just
watching the blaze and not doing anything to contain it. (Ibid.)
Witness Videa immediately rushed back to her house and informed her husband about the
fire at the nearby lot. (Ibid., p. 5). They called up the police detachment and alerted other
members of her family to be ready for any contingency. (Ibid., p. 6). The fire truck arrived
at around 2:00 oclock in the morning, when the house was already razed to the ground.
(TSN, May 20, 1996, p. 6; TSN, May 22, 1996, p. 11).
An on-the-spot investigation was conducted by Fire Investigator Raymundo Savare of the
Kalookan Fire Department (TSN, May 27, 1996, p. 2). After the conduct of the
investigation, the investigator did not find any incendiary device; hence, the cause of fire
remained undetermined. (TSN, May 27, 1996, p. 5). In his Report, the investigator did not
rule out the possibility of intentional burning, since there is no other source of ignition,
unless otherwise somebody lighted an illuminating object and left it unattended. (TSN,
May 17, 1996, p. 8).
x x x"4cräläwvirtualibräry
On March 11, 1996, appellant was charged with the crime of Arson under the following
Information:
"That on or about the 28th day of February, 1996 in Kal. City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any justifiable
cause, did then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously burn the house of one,
FILOMENA MONTESCLAROS VDA. DE MARIGOMEN, located at Banahaw St., Mountain
Heights Subdivision., Bo. Makatipo, this city, said accused knowing the same to be
prohibited, by then and there setting fire to the said house thereby causing the same to
be totally burned, to the damage and prejudice of herein complainant in the estimated
amount of P100,000.00.
Contrary to Law."5cräläwvirtualibräry
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO THE DEFENSE OF DENIAL AND
ALIBI OF THE ACCUSED.
Appellant centers his appeal on the insufficiency of the circumstantial evidence against
him. He maintains that the fact that Montesclaros lived in the house which was razed to
the ground was not duly proved by the Prosecutor, and that even the Fire Investigator
could not determine the true cause of the fire. Appellant further assails the credibility of
the prosecution witnesses Mona Aquino and Lina Videa since their respective testimonies
as to his presence in the locus criminis before and after the incident remain
uncorroborated, and therefore, wholly unreliable and insufficient to sustain his conviction.

On April 22, 1996, appellant, duly assisted by counsel de oficio Atty. Juanito Crisostomo, For the State, the Solicitor General rebutted the factual submissions of appellant. First,
was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty. appellant himself testified that he knew that Elmer Montesclaros lived in the house of
private complainant.11 Second, the testimony of prosecution witness Mona Aquino though
uncorroborated does not impair her credibility since no ill-motive was ascribed to her to
During trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses (1) Mrs. Lina Videa, (2)
testify falsely against appellant. Third, any inconsistency in Lina Videas testimony that she
Mrs. Mona Aquino, both neighbors of appellant; and (3) Fire Investigator Raymundo
did not see appellant at the locus criminis could be explained by a reading of her entire
Savare. When the defense agreed to the proposed stipulation that the value of the burned
testimony. She saw appellant inside the yard of the burning house during the fire, not
property was P100,000.00, the State Prosecutor dispensed with the testimony of private
after the fire. Further, the Solicitor General stressed that the determination of credibility of
complainant,6 the owner of the house.
witnesses remains within the province of the trial court, whose finding is accorded due
respect on appeal, absent any substantial circumstance which could have been overlooked
The defense presented the appellant himself, Ernesto Riolloraza and Marieta Acosta as in the decision.
witnesses. Appellant claimed that at the time of the alleged arson he was sleeping at his
mothers home, some five houses away from the burned house.7 Ernesto Riolloraza
Arson is defined as the malicious destruction of property by fire.12 In this case, the alleged
testified he lived in the house behind the home of appellants mother; that at around 9:00
crime was committed on February 28, 1996, after R.A. 7659 already took effect. The trial
in the evening, he saw appellant and his family transferring their belongings to the house
court found appellant herein liable under Article 320, No. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as
of appellants mother; that at around 11:00 in the evening, he saw appellant watching TV;
amended by Section 10 of R.A. No. 7659, which provides as follows:
and that at around 1:00 AM, he was awakened by the sound of fire sirens; and that he
and appellant stood by the roadside and watched the fire.8 Marieta Acosta, common-law
wife of appellant, corroborated appellants testimony that they were sleeping in the home "Art. 320. Destructive Arson. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be
of appellants mother at the time of the incident.9cräläwvirtualibräry imposed upon any person who shall burn:

On August 25, 1996, the trial court rendered its decision,10 disposing as follows: 1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning, or as a
result of simultaneous burnings, or committed on several or different occasions.
"WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established the guilt of the accused with moral
certainty, this Court hereby sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of imprisonment x x x"
of Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify the offended party the amount of P100,000.00 as
actual damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
Appellants conviction rests on circumstantial evidence. Pertinently, Section 4 of Rule 133
costs.
of the Rules of Court provides:

The period of the Accuseds preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of his
"Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient.- Circumstantial evidence is sufficient
sentence if qualified under Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
for conviction if:

SO ORDERED."
(a) There is more than one circumstance;

Appellant seasonably interposed the present appeal assigning the following errors:
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;

1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BASED

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
MERELY ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
reasonable doubt."
In order to justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of "x x x
circumstances must be such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the
criminal responsibility of the accused.13 But no greater degree of certainty is required
"x x x Where a person is charged with the commission of a specific crime, testimony may
when the evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct.14cräläwvirtualibräry
be received of other similar acts, committed about the same time, for the purpose only of
establishing the criminal intent of the accused."
In this case, we find the trial court correctly held that the following circumstances taken
together constitute an unbroken chain of events pointing to one fair and logical conclusion,
Shortly thereafter, at around 9:00 in the evening, defense witness Ernesto Riolloraza who
that accused started the fire which gutted the house of private complainant. Although
lived behind the house of appellants mother, saw appellant and his family transferring
there is no direct evidence linking appellant to the arson, we agree with the trial court in
their belongings to said house of appellants mother.20cräläwvirtualibräry
holding him guilty thereof in the light of the following circumstances duly proved and on
record:
Third, appellant was not only present at the locus criminis before the incident, he was
seen inside the yard of the burning house during the height of the fire. At around 1:00 in
First, appellant had the motive to commit the arson. It is not absolutely necessary, and it
the morning of February 28, 1996, prosecution witness Lina Videa was awakened by the
is frequently impossible for the prosecution to prove the motive of the accused for the
barking of their dog, so she went to the back of their house to investigate.21 Through the
commission of the crime charged, nevertheless in a case of arson like the present, the
holes of the GI sheets, she saw appellant standing alone inside private complainants yard
existence or non-existence of a sufficient motive is a fact affecting the credibility of the
watching the house burning.22 Appellant even looked happy with a canine smile and crazy-
witnesses.15 It was duly proved that at around 4:30 in the afternoon of February 27, 1996,
looking expression. ("Siya para bang ang mukha niya ay natutuwa na hindi naman
private complainants grandson, Elmer Montesclaros, stormed the house of appellant and
humahalakhak, x x x para bang ngiting aso at mukhang nakakaluko, your
his wife and burned their clothes, household furniture and appliances, like TV and
honor").23cräläwvirtualibräry
karaoke.16 When appellant arrived home at around 5:00 in the afternoon and was
informed of the incident, he got mad, and as his common-law wife testified, appellant
threw a tantrum ("nagdadabog").17 Appellant had every reason to feel aggrieved about the Fourth, appellants actions subsequent to the incident further point to his culpability. At
incident and to retaliate in kind against Montesclaros and his grandmother. around 12:00 noon of the same day, private complainant went with prosecution witness
Lina Videa to the place of Kagawad Tecson. They were about to leave when appellant
arrived. Private complainant asked him why he burned her house and appellant answered,
Second, appellants intent to commit the arson was established by his previous attempt to
"So what if I burned your house?" Then appellant stared meanly at private complainant,
set on fire a bed ("papag") inside the same house (private complainants) which was
who got nervous and had to take medications.24 The following day, appellant threatened
burned later in the night. Prosecution witness Mona Aquino testified that at around 5:00 in
prosecution witness Mona Aquino, saying that if she would testify against him, he would
the afternoon of the same day, she saw appellant carrying a gas stove and knife. When
also burn her house.25cräläwvirtualibräry
she asked him what he was going to do with the stove, he answered that he was going to
burn the house of private complainant.18 Later, she heard the sound of somebody
throwing a chair and breaking bottles next door. When she peeped in the kitchen, she saw All the foregoing circumstances were duly established by the evidence on record.
that appellant entered the house of private complainant and started pouring gas on a bed Inseparably linked with one another, they point to no other conclusion than appellants
("papag") and then lighted a fire with a disposable lighter. Appellants wife rushed in and guilt beyond reasonable doubt. While nobody actually saw appellant light the match which
extinguished the fire with a broomstick. The two later left the house at around 6:00 in the set the house on fire, the facts and circumstances proved make a complete chain strongly
evening.19cräläwvirtualibräry leading to the conclusion that it was the appellant who perpetrated the
crime.26cräläwvirtualibräry
While it is true that "evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not
admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at another time," it In prosecutions for arson, proof of the crime charged is complete where the evidence
may be received "to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan system, scheme, establishes (1) the corpus delicti, that is, a fire because of criminal agency; and (2) the
habit, custom or usage, and the like." In People v. Dadles, 278 SCRA 393 (1997), we held identity of the defendants as the one responsible for the crime.27 Corpus delicti means the
that: substance of the crime, it is the fact that a crime has actually been committed. In arson,
the corpus delicti rule is generally satisfied by proof of the bare occurrence of the fire and
of its having been intentionally caused. Even the uncorroborated testimony of a single
"In the early case of United States v. Evangelista, [24 Phil. 453 (1913)] the accused was
witness, if credible, may be enough to prove the corpus delicti and to warrant
convicted of arson after the trial court admitted evidence that he had earlier attempted to
conviction.28cräläwvirtualibräry
set fire to the same premises. Ruling on the admissibility of the said evidence, we said
that:
Appellant interposes the defense of alibi in his bid for acquittal. For the defense of alibi to
prosper, it is axiomatic that the appellant must prove not only that he was at some other
"x x x While it was not the fire charged in the information, and does not by any means
place at the time the crime was committed, but that it was likewise physically impossible
amount to direct evidence against the accused, it was competent to prove the intent of
for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the alleged crime.29 In this case,
the accused in setting the fire which was charged in the information.
appellant himself testified that the house of his mother where he was staying on that
fateful night was merely five (5) houses away from the locus criminis, hence considering
the distance, it was not physically impossible for him to have perpetrated the crime and
then gone home to his mothers home, appearing as innocent as a lamb.
Lastly, it would not be amiss here to point out that "[i]n the crime of arson, the enormity
of the offense is not measured by the value of the property that may be destroyed but
rather by the human lives exposed to destruction."30 It is indeed a heinous crime that the
law wisely seeks to suppress with the most serious penalty because of its grave anti-social
character.
WHEREFORE , the decision of the Regional Trial Court finding appellant Raul Acosta y
Laygo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Arson and sentencing him
to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify private complainant, Filomena M. Marigomen, in
the amount of P100,000.00 as actual damages, without subsidiary imprisonment, is
AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919
ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.
Alfonso Mendoza for petitioners.
City Fiscal Diaz for respondents.
MALCOLM, J.:
The annals of juridical history fail to reveal a case quite as remarkable as the one which this application
for habeas corpus submits for decision. While hardly to be expected to be met with in this modern
epoch of triumphant democracy, yet, after all, the cause presents no great difficulty if there is kept in the
forefront of our minds the basic principles of popular government, and if we give expression to the
paramount purpose for which the courts, as an independent power of such a government, were
constituted. The primary question is — Shall the judiciary permit a government of the men instead of a
government of laws to be set up in the Philippine Islands?
Omitting much extraneous matter, of no moment to these proceedings, but which might prove profitable
reading for other departments of the government, the facts are these: The Mayor of the city of Manila,
Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for women
of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed. Between
October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept confined to their houses in the district by the
police. Presumably, during this period, the city authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the
Bureau of Labor for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with some government office
for the use of the coastguard cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary for a guard of
soldiers. At any rate, about midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief
of police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the
houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that
awaited their arrival. The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently
were under the impression that they were being taken to a police station for an investigation. They had
no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if they wished to
depart from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their consent to the deportation. The
involuntary guests were received on board the steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor and
a detachment of Constabulary soldiers. The two steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for
Davao during the night of October 25.
The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were landed and receipted
for as laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by Feliciano Yñigo and Rafael
Castillo. The governor and the hacendero Yñigo, who appear as parties in the case, had no previous
notification that the women were prostitutes who had been expelled from the city of Manila. The further
happenings to these women and the serious charges growing out of alleged ill-treatment are of public
interest, but are not essential to the disposition of this case. Suffice it to say, generally, that some of the
women married, others assumed more or less clandestine relations with men, others went to work in
different capacities, others assumed a life unknown and disappeared, and a goodly portion found
means to return to Manila.
To turn back in our narrative, just about the time the Corregidor and the Negros were putting in to
Davao, the attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of the deportees presented
an application for habeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court. Subsequently, the application,
through stipulation of the parties, was made to include all of the women who were sent away from
Manila to Davao and, as the same questions concerned them all, the application will be considered as
including them. The application set forth the salient facts, which need not be repeated, and alleged that
the women were illegally restrained of their liberty by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton
Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, and by certain unknown parties. The writ was made
returnable before the full court. The city fiscal appeared for the respondents, Lukban and Hohmann,
admitted certain facts relative to sequestration and deportation, and prayed that the writ should not be
granted because the petitioners were not proper parties, because the action should have been begun in
the Court of First Instance for Davao, Department of Mindanao and Sulu, because the respondents did
not have any of the women under their custody or control, and because their jurisdiction did not extend
beyond the boundaries of the city of Manila. According to an exhibit attached to the answer of the fiscal,
the 170 women were destined to be laborers, at good salaries, on the haciendas of Yñigo and Governor
Sales. In open court, the fiscal admitted, in answer to question of a member of the court, that these
women had been sent out of Manila without their consent. The court awarded the writ, in an order of
November 4, that directed Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of
the city of Manila, Francisco Sales, governor of the province of Davao, and Feliciano Yñigo,
an hacendero of Davao, to bring before the court the persons therein named, alleged to be deprived of
their liberty, on December 2, 1918.
Before the date mentioned, seven of the women had returned to Manila at their own expense. On
motion of counsel for petitioners, their testimony was taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court
sitting as commissioners. On the day named in the order, December 2nd, 1918, none of the persons in
whose behalf the writ was issued were produced in court by the respondents. It has been shown that
three of those who had been able to come back to Manila through their own efforts, were notified by the
police and the secret service to appear before the court. The fiscal appeared, repeated the facts more
comprehensively, reiterated the stand taken by him when pleading to the original petition copied a
telegram from the Mayor of the city of Manila to the provincial governor of Davao and the answer
thereto, and telegrams that had passed between the Director of Labor and the attorney for that Bureau
then in Davao, and offered certain affidavits showing that the women were contained with their life in
Mindanao and did not wish to return to Manila. Respondents Sales answered alleging that it was not
possible to fulfill the order of the Supreme Court because the women had never been under his control,
because they were at liberty in the Province of Davao, and because they had married or signed
contracts as laborers. Respondent Yñigo answered alleging that he did not have any of the women
under his control and that therefore it was impossible for him to obey the mandate. The court, after due
deliberation, on December 10, 1918, promulgated a second order, which related that the respondents
had not complied with the original order to the satisfaction of the court nor explained their failure to do
so, and therefore directed that those of the women not in Manila be brought before the court by
respondents Lukban, Hohmann, Sales, and Yñigo on January 13, 1919, unless the women should, in
written statements voluntarily made before the judge of first instance of Davao or the clerk of that court,
renounce the right, or unless the respondents should demonstrate some other legal motives that made
compliance impossible. It was further stated that the question of whether the respondents were in
contempt of court would later be decided and the reasons for the order announced in the final decision.
Before January 13, 1919, further testimony including that of a number of the women, of certain
detectives and policemen, and of the provincial governor of Davao, was taken before the clerk of the
Supreme Court sitting as commissioner and the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Davao acting in
the same capacity. On January 13, 1919, the respondents technically presented before the Court the
women who had returned to the city through their own efforts and eight others who had been brought to
Manila by the respondents. Attorneys for the respondents, by their returns, once again recounted the
facts and further endeavored to account for all of the persons involved in the habeas corpus. In
substance, it was stated that the respondents, through their representatives and agents, had
succeeded in bringing from Davao with their consent eight women; that eighty-one women were found
in Davao who, on notice that if they desired they could return to Manila, transportation fee, renounced
the right through sworn statements; that fifty-nine had already returned to Manila by other means, and
that despite all efforts to find them twenty-six could not be located. Both counsel for petitioners and the
city fiscal were permitted to submit memoranda. The first formally asked the court to find Justo Lukban,
Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez and
Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila, Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of
Davao, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor, and Anacleto Diaz, fiscal of the city of
Manila, in contempt of court. The city fiscal requested that the replica al memorandum de los
recurridos, (reply to respondents' memorandum) dated January 25, 1919, be struck from the record.
In the second order, the court promised to give the reasons for granting the writ of habeas corpus in the
final decision. We will now proceed to do so.
One fact, and one fact only, need be recalled — these one hundred and seventy women were isolated
from society, and then at night, without their consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends
or to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation to regions unknown.
Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the women left voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the
case is shown by the mere fact that the presence of the police and the constabulary was deemed
necessary and that these officers of the law chose the shades of night to cloak their secret and stealthy
acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to refute and practically admitted by the respondents.
locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal law specifically punishes any public officer who, not being
expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any person to change his residence.
In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of domicile is deemed so important as to be
found in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. Under the American constitutional system, liberty of abode
is a principle so deeply imbedded in jurisprudence and considered so elementary in nature as not even
to require a constitutional sanction. Even the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, even the
President of the United States, who has often been said to exercise more power than any king or
potentate, has no such arbitrary prerogative, either inherent or express. Much less, therefore, has the
executive of a municipality, who acts within a sphere of delegated powers. If the mayor and the chief of
police could, at their mere behest or even for the most praiseworthy of motives, render the liberty of the
citizen so insecure, then the presidents and chiefs of police of one thousand other municipalities of the
Philippines have the same privilege. If these officials can take to themselves such power, then any
other official can do the same. And if any official can exercise the power, then all persons would have
just as much right to do so. And if a prostitute could be sent against her wishes and under no law from
one locality to another within the country, then officialdom can hold the same club over the head of any
citizen.
Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that — "No freeman shall be taken, or
imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or
any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his
peers or by the law of the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either
justice or right." (Magna Charta, 9 Hen., 111, 1225, Cap. 29; 1 eng. stat. at Large, 7.) No official, no
matter how high, is above the law. The courts are the forum which functionate to safeguard individual
liberty and to punish official transgressors. "The law," said Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the
Supreme Court of the United States, "is the only supreme power in our system of government, and
every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit
to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority
which it gives." (U.S. vs. Lee [1882], 106 U.S., 196, 220.) "The very idea," said Justice Matthews of the
same high tribunal in another case, "that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of
living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be
intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself." (Yick
Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356, 370.) All this explains the motive in issuing the writ of habeas
corpus, and makes clear why we said in the very beginning that the primary question was whether the
courts should permit a government of men or a government of laws to be established in the Philippine
Islands.

With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve the question — By authority of what law did the
What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression? The remedies of the citizen are
Mayor and the Chief of Police presume to act in deporting by duress these persons from Manila to
three: (1) Civil action; (2) criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus.
another distant locality within the Philippine Islands? We turn to the statutes and we find —

The first is an optional but rather slow process by which the aggrieved party may recoup money
Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in conformity with an Act of congress. The
damages. It may still rest with the parties in interest to pursue such an action, but it was never intended
Governor-General can order the eviction of undesirable aliens after a hearing from the Islands. Act No.
effectively and promptly to meet any such situation as that now before us.
519 of the Philippine Commission and section 733 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila
provide for the conviction and punishment by a court of justice of any person who is a common
prostitute. Act No. 899 authorizes the return of any citizen of the United States, who may have been As to criminal responsibility, it is true that the Penal Code in force in these Islands provides:
convicted of vagrancy, to the homeland. New York and other States have statutes providing for the
commitment to the House of Refuge of women convicted of being common prostitutes. Always a law!
Any public officer not thereunto authorized by law or by regulations of a general character in
Even when the health authorities compel vaccination, or establish a quarantine, or place a leprous
force in the Philippines who shall banish any person to a place more than two hundred
person in the Culion leper colony, it is done pursuant to some law or order. But one can search in vain
kilometers distant from his domicile, except it be by virtue of the judgment of a court, shall be
for any law, order, or regulation, which even hints at the right of the Mayor of the city of Manila or the
punished by a fine of not less than three hundred and twenty-five and not more than three
chief of police of that city to force citizens of the Philippine Islands — and these women despite their
thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas.
being in a sense lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the
same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens — to change their domicile from Manila to another
 Any public officer not thereunto expressly authorized by law or by regulation of a general
character in force in the Philippines who shall compel any person to change his domicile or
residence shall suffer the penalty of destierro and a fine of not less than six hundred and
twenty-five and not more than six thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas. (Art. 211.)
We entertain no doubt but that, if, after due investigation, the proper prosecuting officers find that any
public officer has violated this provision of law, these prosecutors will institute and press a criminal
prosecution just as vigorously as they have defended the same official in this action. Nevertheless, that
the act may be a crime and that the persons guilty thereof can be proceeded against, is no bar to the
instant proceedings. To quote the words of Judge Cooley in a case which will later be referred to — "It
would be a monstrous anomaly in the law if to an application by one unlawfully confined, ta be restored
to his liberty, it could be a sufficient answer that the confinement was a crime, and therefore might be
continued indefinitely until the guilty party was tried and punished therefor by the slow process of
criminal procedure." (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416, 434.) The writ of habeas
corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. Any further rights of the
parties are left untouched by decision on the writ, whose principal purpose is to set the individual at
liberty.
Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, respondents have raised three specific objections to
its issuance in this instance. The fiscal has argued (l) that there is a defect in parties petitioners, (2) that
the Supreme Court should not a assume jurisdiction, and (3) that the person in question are not
restrained of their liberty by respondents. It was finally suggested that the jurisdiction of the Mayor and
the chief of police of the city of Manila only extends to the city limits and that perforce they could not
bring the women from Davao.
The first defense was not presented with any vigor by counsel. The petitioners were relatives and
friends of the deportees. The way the expulsion was conducted by the city officials made it impossible
for the women to sign a petition for habeas corpus. It was consequently proper for the writ to be
submitted by persons in their behalf. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 78; Code of Civil Procedure,
sec. 527.) The law, in its zealous regard for personal liberty, even makes it the duty of a court or judge
to grant a writ of habeas corpus if there is evidence that within the court's jurisdiction a person is
unjustly imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, though no application be made therefor. (Code of
Criminal Procedure, sec. 93.) Petitioners had standing in court.
The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been asked for in the Court of First Instance of
Davao or should have been made returnable before that court. It is a general rule of good practice that,
to avoid unnecessary expense and inconvenience, petitions for habeas corpus should be presented to
the nearest judge of the court of first instance. But this is not a hard and fast rule. The writ of habeas
corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the
Philippine Islands. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 79; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 526.) Whether
the writ shall be made returnable before the Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests in the
discretion of the Supreme Court and is dependent on the particular circumstances. In this instance it
was not shown that the Court of First Instance of Davao was in session, or that the women had any
means by which to advance their plea before that court. On the other hand, it was shown that the
petitioners with their attorneys, and the two original respondents with their attorney, were in Manila; it
was shown that the case involved parties situated in different parts of the Islands; it was shown that the
women might still be imprisoned or restrained of their liberty; and it was shown that if the writ was to
accomplish its purpose, it must be taken cognizance of and decided immediately by the appellate court.
The failure of the superior court to consider the application and then to grant the writ would have
amounted to a denial of the benefits of the writ.
The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more difficult to meet. When the writ was prayed
for, says counsel, the parties in whose behalf it was asked were under no restraint; the women, it is
claimed, were free in Davao, and the jurisdiction of the mayor and the chief of police did not extend
beyond the city limits. At first blush, this is a tenable position. On closer examination, acceptance of
such dictum is found to be perversive of the first principles of the writ of habeas corpus.
A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential
object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint
which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible taking of these women from Manila by
officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties, who deposited them in a distant region,
deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned.
Placed in Davao without either money or personal belongings, they were prevented from exercising the
liberty of going when and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued
until the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived his
right.
Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a defense would mean. The chief executive of
any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him
beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action,
could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official,
had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. We believe the true principle should be that, if the
respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court
and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to
whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for
the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no
authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must
necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the
reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change
her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright
of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.
It must be that some such question has heretofore been presented to the courts for decision.
Nevertheless, strange as it may seem, a close examination of the authorities fails to reveal any
analogous case. Certain decisions of respectable courts are however very persuasive in nature.
A question came before the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan at an early date as to whether or
not a writ of habeas corpus would issue from the Supreme Court to a person within the jurisdiction of
the State to bring into the State a minor child under guardianship in the State, who has been and
continues to be detained in another State. The membership of the Michigan Supreme Court at this time
was notable. It was composed of Martin, chief justice, and Cooley, Campbell, and Christiancy, justices.
On the question presented the court was equally divided. Campbell, J., with whom concurred Martin, C.
J., held that the writ should be quashed. Cooley, J., one of the most distinguished American judges and
law-writers, with whom concurred Christiancy, J., held that the writ should issue. Since the opinion of
Justice Campbell was predicated to a large extent on his conception of the English decisions, and
since, as will hereafter appear, the English courts have taken a contrary view, only the following
eloquent passages from the opinion of Justice Cooley are quoted:
I have not yet seen sufficient reason to doubt the power of this court to issue the present writ
on the petition which was laid before us. . . .
It would be strange indeed if, at this late day, after the eulogiums of six centuries and a half
have been expended upon the Magna Charta, and rivers of blood shed for its establishment;
after its many confirmations, until Coke could declare in his speech on the petition of right
that "Magna Charta was such a fellow that he will have no sovereign," and after the extension
 of its benefits and securities by the petition of right, bill of rights and habeas corpus acts, it
should now be discovered that evasion of that great clause for the protection of personal
liberty, which is the life and soul of the whole instrument, is so easy as is claimed here. If it is
so, it is important that it be determined without delay, that the legislature may apply the
proper remedy, as I can not doubt they would, on the subject being brought to their notice. . .
.
The second proposition — that the statutory provisions are confined to the case of
imprisonment within the state — seems to me to be based upon a misconception as to the
source of our jurisdiction. It was never the case in England that the court of king's bench
derived its jurisdiction to issue and enforce this writ from the statute. Statutes were not
passed to give the right, but to compel the observance of rights which existed. . . .
The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode of procedure upon this writ is, that it
is directed to and served upon, not the person confined, but his jailor. It does not reach the
former except through the latter. The officer or person who serves it does not unbar the
prison doors, and set the prisoner free, but the court relieves him by compelling the
oppressor to release his constraint. The whole force of the writ is spent upon the respondent,
and if he fails to obey it, the means to be resorted to for the purposes of compulsion are fine
and imprisonment. This is the ordinary mode of affording relief, and if any other means are
resorted to, they are only auxiliary to those which are usual. The place of confinement is,
therefore, not important to the relief, if the guilty party is within reach of process, so that by
the power of the court he can be compelled to release his grasp. The difficulty of affording
redress is not increased by the confinement being beyond the limits of the state, except as
greater distance may affect it. The important question is, where the power of control
exercised? And I am aware of no other remedy. (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich.,
416.)
The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as authoritative by other courts.
(Rivers vs. Mitchell [1881], 57 Iowa, 193; Breene vs. People [1911], Colo., 117 Pac. Rep., 1000; Ex
parte Young [1892], 50 Fed., 526.)
The English courts have given careful consideration to the subject. Thus, a child had been taken out of
English by the respondent. A writ of habeas corpus was issued by the Queen's Bench Division upon the
application of the mother and her husband directing the defendant to produce the child. The judge at
chambers gave defendant until a certain date to produce the child, but he did not do so. His return
stated that the child before the issuance of the writ had been handed over by him to another; that it was
no longer in his custody or control, and that it was impossible for him to obey the writ. He was found in
contempt of court. On appeal, the court, through Lord Esher, M. R., said:
A writ of habeas corpus was ordered to issue, and was issued on January 22. That writ
commanded the defendant to have the body of the child before a judge in chambers at the
Royal Courts of Justice immediately after the receipt of the writ, together with the cause of
her being taken and detained. That is a command to bring the child before the judge and
must be obeyed, unless some lawful reason can be shown to excuse the nonproduction of
the child. If it could be shown that by reason of his having lawfully parted with the possession
of the child before the issuing of the writ, the defendant had no longer power to produce the
child, that might be an answer; but in the absence of any lawful reason he is bound to
produce the child, and, if he does not, he is in contempt of the Court for not obeying the writ
without lawful excuse. Many efforts have been made in argument to shift the question of
contempt to some anterior period for the purpose of showing that what was done at some
time prior to the writ cannot be a contempt. But the question is not as to what was done
before the issue of the writ. The question is whether there has been a contempt in disobeying
the writ it was issued by not producing the child in obedience to its commands. (The
Queen vs. Bernardo [1889], 23 Q. B. D., 305. See also to the same effect the Irish case of In
re Matthews, 12 Ir. Com. Law Rep. [N. S.], 233; The Queen vs. Barnardo, Gossage's Case
[1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283.)
A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of interest. A habeas corpus was directed to the
defendant to have before the circuit court of the District of Columbia three colored persons, with the
cause of their detention. Davis, in his return to the writ, stated on oath that he had purchased the
negroes as slaves in the city of Washington; that, as he believed, they were removed beyond the
District of Columbia before the service of the writ of habeas corpus, and that they were then beyond his
control and out of his custody. The evidence tended to show that Davis had removed the negroes
because he suspected they would apply for a writ of habeas corpus. The court held the return to be
evasive and insufficient, and that Davis was bound to produce the negroes, and Davis being present in
court, and refusing to produce them, ordered that he be committed to the custody of the marshall until
he should produce the negroes, or be otherwise discharged in due course of law. The court afterwards
ordered that Davis be released upon the production of two of the negroes, for one of the negroes had
run away and been lodged in jail in Maryland. Davis produced the two negroes on the last day of the
term. (United States vs. Davis [1839], 5 Cranch C.C., 622, Fed. Cas. No. 14926. See also
Robb vs. Connolly [1883], 111 U.S., 624; Church on Habeas, 2nd ed., p. 170.)
We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no one of the defense offered by the respondents
constituted a legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of habeas corpus.
There remains to be considered whether the respondent complied with the two orders of the Supreme
Court awarding the writ of habeas corpus, and if it be found that they did not, whether the contempt
should be punished or be taken as purged.
The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Francisco Sales, and
Feliciano Yñigo to present the persons named in the writ before the court on December 2, 1918. The
order was dated November 4, 1918. The respondents were thus given ample time, practically one
month, to comply with the writ. As far as the record discloses, the Mayor of the city of Manila waited
until the 21st of November before sending a telegram to the provincial governor of Davao. According to
the response of the attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the telegram of his chief, there were then in
Davao women who desired to return to Manila, but who should not be permitted to do so because of
having contracted debts. The half-hearted effort naturally resulted in none of the parties in question
being brought before the court on the day named.
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could
have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have
shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought
before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their
attorney waived the right to be present. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 87.) They did not produce
the bodies of the persons in whose behalf the writ was granted; they did not show impossibility of
performance; and they did not present writings that waived the right to be present by those interested.
Instead a few stereotyped affidavits purporting to show that the women were contended with their life in
Davao, some of which have since been repudiated by the signers, were appended to the return. That
through ordinary diligence a considerable number of the women, at least sixty, could have been brought
back to Manila is demonstrated to be found in the municipality of Davao, and that about this number
either returned at their own expense or were produced at the second hearing by the respondents.
The court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would have been warranted summarily in
finding the respondents guilty of contempt of court, and in sending them to jail until they obeyed the
order. Their excuses for the non-production of the persons were far from sufficient. The, authorities
cited herein pertaining to somewhat similar facts all tend to indicate with what exactitude a habeas
corpus writ must be fulfilled. For example, in Gossage's case, supra, the Magistrate in referring to an was Justo Lukban, the Mayor of the city of Manila. His intention to suppress the social evil was
earlier decision of the Court, said: "We thought that, having brought about that state of things by his commendable. His methods were unlawful. His regard for the writ of habeas corpus issued by the court
own illegal act, he must take the consequences; and we said that he was bound to use every effort to was only tardily and reluctantly acknowledged.
get the child back; that he must do much more than write letters for the purpose; that he must advertise
in America, and even if necessary himself go after the child, and do everything that mortal man could
It would be possible to turn to the provisions of section 546 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which
do in the matter; and that the court would only accept clear proof of an absolute impossibility by way of
relates to the penalty for disobeying the writ, and in pursuance thereof to require respondent Lukban to
excuse." In other words, the return did not show that every possible effort to produce the women was
forfeit to the parties aggrieved as much as P400 each, which would reach to many thousands of pesos,
made by the respondents. That the court forebore at this time to take drastic action was because it did
and in addition to deal with him as for a contempt. Some members of the court are inclined to this stern
not wish to see presented to the public gaze the spectacle of a clash between executive officials and
view. It would also be possible to find that since respondent Lukban did comply substantially with the
the judiciary, and because it desired to give the respondents another chance to demonstrate their good
second order of the court, he has purged his contempt of the first order. Some members of the court
faith and to mitigate their wrong.
are inclined to this merciful view. Between the two extremes appears to lie the correct finding. The
failure of respondent Lukban to obey the first mandate of the court tended to belittle and embarrass the
In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have become more zealous administration of justice to such an extent that his later activity may be considered only as extenuating
and to have shown a better spirit. Agents were dispatched to Mindanao, placards were posted, the his conduct. A nominal fine will at once command such respect without being unduly
constabulary and the municipal police joined in rounding up the women, and a steamer with free oppressive — such an amount is P100.
transportation to Manila was provided. While charges and counter-charges in such a bitterly contested
case are to be expected, and while a critical reading of the record might reveal a failure of literal
In resume — as before stated, no further action on the writ of habeas corpus is necessary. The
fulfillment with our mandate, we come to conclude that there is a substantial compliance with it. Our
respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yñigo, and Diaz are found not to be in contempt of
finding to this effect may be influenced somewhat by our sincere desire to see this unhappy incident
court. Respondent Lukban is found in contempt of court and shall pay into the office of the clerk of the
finally closed. If any wrong is now being perpetrated in Davao, it should receive an executive
Supreme Court within five days the sum of one hundred pesos (P100). The motion of the fiscal of the
investigation. If any particular individual is still restrained of her liberty, it can be made the object of
city of Manila to strike from the record the Replica al Memorandum de los Recurridos of January 25,
separate habeas corpus proceedings.
1919, is granted. Costs shall be taxed against respondents. So ordered.

Since the writ has already been granted, and since we find a substantial compliance with it, nothing
In concluding this tedious and disagreeable task, may we not be permitted to express the hope that this
further in this connection remains to be done.
decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly government of laws and to protect
individual liberty from illegal encroachment.
The attorney for the petitioners asks that we find in contempt of court Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of
Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez, and Fernando Ordax,
Arellano, C.J., Avanceña and Moir, JJ., concur.
members of the police force of the city of Manila, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of
Johnson, and Street, JJ., concur in the result.
Labor, Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, and Anacleto Diaz, Fiscal of the city of Manila.

The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that
respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail. Nevertheless when one is
commanded to produce a certain person and does not do so, and does not offer a valid excuse, a court Separate Opinions
must, to vindicate its authority, adjudge the respondent to be guilty of contempt, and must order him
either imprisoned or fined. An officer's failure to produce the body of a person in obedience to a writ
TORRES, J., dissenting:
of habeas corpus when he has power to do so, is a contempt committed in the face of the court. (Ex
parte Sterns [1888], 77 Cal., 156; In re Patterson [1888], 99 N. C., 407.)
The undersigned does not entirely agree to the opinion of the majority in the decision of the habeas
With all the facts and circumstances in mind, and with judicial regard for human imperfections, we corpus proceeding against Justo Lukban, the mayor of this city.
cannot say that any of the respondents, with the possible exception of the first named, has flatly
disobeyed the court by acting in opposition to its authority. Respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, There is nothing in the record that shows the motive which impelled Mayor Lukban to oblige a great
and Joaquin only followed the orders of their chiefs, and while, under the law of public officers, this number of women of various ages, inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street,
does not exonerate them entirely, it is nevertheless a powerful mitigating circumstance. district of Sampaloc, to change their residence.
The hacendero Yñigo appears to have been drawn into the case through a misconstruction by counsel
of telegraphic communications. The city fiscal, Anacleto Diaz, would seem to have done no more than
to fulfill his duty as the legal representative of the city government. Finding him innocent of any We know no express law, regulation, or ordinance which clearly prohibits the opening of public houses
disrespect to the court, his counter-motion to strike from the record the memorandum of attorney for the of prostitution, as those in the said Gardenia Street, Sampaloc. For this reason, when more than one
petitioners, which brings him into this undesirable position, must be granted. When all is said and done, hundred and fifty women were assembled and placed aboard a steamer and transported to Davao,
as far as this record discloses, the official who was primarily responsible for the unlawful deportation, considering that the existence of the said houses of prostitution has been tolerated for so long a time, it
who ordered the police to accomplish the same, who made arrangements for the steamers and the is undeniable that the mayor of the city, in proceeding in the manner shown, acted without authority of
constabulary, who conducted the negotiations with the Bureau of Labor, and who later, as the head of any legal provision which constitutes an exception to the laws guaranteeing the liberty and the
the city government, had it within his power to facilitate the return of the unfortunate women to Manila, individual rights of the residents of the city of Manila.
We do not believe in the pomp and obstentation of force displayed by the police in complying with the
order of the mayor of the city; neither do we believe in the necessity of taking them to the distant district
of Davao. The said governmental authority, in carrying out his intention to suppress the segregated
district or the community formed by those women in Gardenia Street, could have obliged the said
women to return to their former residences in this city or in the provinces, without the necessity of
transporting them to Mindanao; hence the said official is obliged to bring back the women who are still
in Davao so that they may return to the places in which they lived prior to their becoming inmates of
certain houses in Gardenia Street.
As regards the manner whereby the mayor complied with the orders of this court, we do not find any
apparent disobedience and marked absence of respect in the steps taken by the mayor of the city and
his subordinates, if we take into account the difficulties encountered in bringing the said women who
were free at Davao and presenting them before this court within the time fixed, inasmuch as it does not
appear that the said women were living together in a given place. It was not because they were really
detained, but because on the first days there were no houses in which they could live with a relative
independent from one another, and as a proof that they were free a number of them returned to Manila
and the others succeeded in living separate from their companions who continued living together.
To determine whether or not the mayor acted with a good purpose and legal object and whether he has
acted in good or bad faith in proceeding to dissolve the said community of prostitutes and to oblige
them to change their domicile, it is necessary to consider not only the rights and interests of the said
women and especially of the patrons who have been directing and conducting such a reproachable
enterprise and shameful business in one of the suburbs of this city, but also the rights and interests of
the very numerous people of Manila where relatively a few transients accidentally and for some days
reside, the inhabitants thereof being more than three hundred thousand (300,000) who can not, with
indifference and without repugnance, live in the same place with so many unfortunate women dedicated
to prostitution.
If the material and moral interests of the community as well as the demands of social morality are to be
taken into account, it is not possible to sustain that it is legal and permissible to establish a house of
pandering or prostitution in the midst of an enlightened population, for, although there were no positive
laws prohibiting the existence of such houses within a district of Manila, the dictates of common sense
and dictates of conscience of its inhabitants are sufficient to warrant the public administration, acting
correctly, in exercising the inevitable duty of ordering the closing and abandonment of a house of
prostitution ostensibly open to the public, and of obliging the inmates thereof to leave it, although such a
house is inhabited by its true owner who invokes in his behalf the protection of the constitutional law
guaranteeing his liberty, his individual rights, and his right to property.
A cholera patient, a leper, or any other person affected by a known contagious disease cannot invoke in
his favor the constitutional law which guarantees his liberty and individual rights, should the
administrative authority order his hospitalization, reclusion, or concentration in a certain island or distant
point in order to free from contagious the great majority of the inhabitants of the country who fortunately
do not have such diseases. The same reasons exist or stand good with respect to the unfortunate
women dedicated to prostitution, and such reasons become stronger because the first persons named
have contracted their diseases without their knowledge and even against their will, whereas the
unfortunate prostitutes voluntarily adopted such manner of living and spontaneously accepted all its
consequences, knowing positively that their constant intercourse with men of all classes,
notwithstanding the cleanliness and precaution which they are wont to adopt, gives way to the spread
or multiplication of the disease known as syphilis, a venereal disease, which, although it constitutes a
secret disease among men and women, is still prejudicial to the human species in the same degree,
scope, and seriousness as cholera, tuberculosis, leprosy, pest, typhoid, and other contagious diseases
which produce great mortality and very serious prejudice to poor humanity.
If a young woman, instead of engaging in an occupation or works suitable to her sex, which can give
her sufficient remuneration for her subsistence, prefers to put herself under the will of another woman
who is usually older than she is and who is the manager or owner of a house of prostitution, or
spontaneously dedicates herself to this shameful profession, it is undeniable that she voluntarily and
with her own knowledge renounces her liberty and individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution,
because it is evident that she can not join the society of decent women nor can she expect to get the
same respect that is due to the latter, nor is it possible for her to live within the community or society
with the same liberty and rights enjoyed by every citizen. Considering her dishonorable conduct and
life, she should therefore be comprised within that class which is always subject to the police and
sanitary regulations conducive to the maintenance of public decency and morality and to the
conservation of public health, and for this reason it should not permitted that the unfortunate women
dedicated to prostitution evade the just orders and resolutions adopted by the administrative authorities.
It is regrettable that unnecessary rigor was employed against the said poor women, but those who have
been worrying so much about the prejudice resulting from a governmental measure, which being a very
drastic remedy may be considered arbitrary, have failed to consider with due reflection the interests of
the inhabitants of this city in general and particularly the duties and responsibilities weighing upon the
authorities which administer and govern it; they have forgotten that many of those who criticize and
censure the mayor are fathers of families and are in duty bound to take care of their children.
For the foregoing reasons, we reach the conclusion that when the petitioners, because of the abnormal
life they assumed, were obliged to change their residence not by a private citizen but by the mayor of
the city who is directly responsible for the conservation of public health and social morality, the latter
could take the step he had taken, availing himself of the services of the police in good faith and only
with the purpose of protecting the immense majority of the population from the social evils and diseases
which the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street have been producing, which houses have
been constituting for years a true center for the propagation of general diseases and other evils derived
therefrom. Hence, in ordering the dissolution and abandonment of the said houses of prostitution and
the change of the domicile of the inmates thereof, the mayor did not in bad faith violate the
constitutional laws which guarantees the liberty and the individual rights of every Filipino, inasmuch as
the women petitioners do not absolutely enjoy the said liberty and rights, the exercise of which they
have voluntarily renounced in exchange for the free practice of their shameful profession.
In very highly advanced and civilized countries, there have been adopted by the administrative
authorities similar measures, more or less rigorous, respecting prostitutes, considering them prejudicial
to the people, although it is true that in the execution of such measures more humane and less drastic
procedures, fortiter in re et suaviter in forma, have been adopted, but such procedures have always had
in view the ultimate object of the Government for the sake of the community, that is, putting an end to
the living together in a certain place of women dedicated to prostitution and changing their domicile,
with the problematical hope that they adopt another manner of living which is better and more useful to
themselves and to society.
In view of the foregoing remarks, we should hold, as we hereby hold, that Mayor Justo Lukban is
obliged to take back and restore the said women who are at present found in Davao, and who desire to
return to their former respective residences, not in Gardenia Street, Sampaloc District, with the
exception of the prostitutes who should expressly make known to the clerk of court their preference to
reside in Davao, which manifestation must be made under oath. This resolution must be transmitted to
the mayor within the shortest time possible for its due compliance. The costs shall be charged de
officio.
ARAULLO, J., dissenting in part:
I regret to dissent from the respectable opinion of the majority in the decision rendered in these
proceedings, with respect to the finding as to the importance of the contempt committed, according to
the same decision, by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, and the consequent imposition upon
him of a nominal fine of P100.
In the said decision, it is said:
The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Francisco Sales,
and Feliciano Yñigo to present the persons named in the writ before the court on December
2, 1918. The order was dated November 4, 1918. The respondents were thus given ample
time, practically one month, to comply with the writ. As far as the record disclosed, the mayor
of the city of Manila waited until the 21st of November before sending a telegram to the
provincial governor of Davao. According to the response of the Attorney for the Bureau of
Labor to the telegram of his chief, there were then in Davao women who desired to return to
Manila, but who should not be permitted to do so because of having contracted debts. The
half-hearted effort naturally resulted in none of the parties in question being brought before
the court on the day named.
In accordance with section 87 of General Orders No. 58, as said in the same decision, the respondents,
for the purpose of complying with the order of the court, could have, (1) produced the bodies of the
persons according to the command of the writ; (2) shown by affidavits that on account of sickness or
infirmity the said women could not safely be brought before this court; and (3) presented affidavits to
show that the parties in question or their lawyers waived their right to be present. According to the same
decision, the said respondents ". . . did not produce the bodies of the persons in whose behalf the writ
was granted; did not show impossibility of performance; and did not present writings, that waived the
right to be present by those interested. Instead, a few stereotyped affidavits purporting to show that the
women were contented with their life in Davao, some of which have since been repudiated by the
signers, were appended to the return. That through ordinary diligence a considerable number of the
women, at least sixty, could have been brought back to Manila is demonstrated by the fact that during
this time they were easily to be found in the municipality of Davao, and that about this number either
returned at their own expense or were produced at the second hearing by the respondents."
The majority opinion also recognized that, "That court, at the time the return to its first order was made,
would have been warranted summarily in finding the respondent guilty of contempt of court, and in
sending them to jail until they obeyed the order. Their excuses for the non production of the persons
were far from sufficient." To corroborate this, the majority decision cites the case of the
Queen vs. Barnardo, Gossage's Case ([1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283) and added "that the return did not
show that every possible effort to produce the women was made by the respondents."
When the said return by the respondents was made to this court in banc and the case discussed, my
opinion was that Mayor Lukban should have been immediately punished for contempt. Nevertheless, a
second order referred to in the decision was issued on December 10, 1918, requiring the respondents
to produce before the court, on January 13, 1919, the women who were not in Manila, unless they
could show that it was impossible to comply with the said order on the two grounds previously
mentioned. With respect to this second order, the same decision has the following to say:
In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have become more
zealous and to have shown a better spirit. Agents were dispatched to Mindanao, placards
were posted, the constabulary and the municipal police joined in rounding up the women, and
a steamer with free transportation to Manila was provided. While charges and
countercharges in such a bitterly contested case are to be expected, and while a critical
reading of the record might reveal a failure of literal fulfillment with our mandate, we come to
conclude that there is a substantial compliance with it.
I do not agree to this conclusion.
The respondent mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, let 17 days elapse from the date of the
issuance of the first order on November 4th till the 21st of the same month before taking the first step
for compliance with the mandate of the said order; he waited till the 21st of November, as the decision
says, before he sent a telegram to the provincial governor o f Davao and naturally this half-hearted
effort, as is so qualified in the decision, resulted in that none of the women appeared before this court
on December 2nd. Thus, the said order was not complied with, and in addition to this noncompliance
there was the circumstances that seven of the said women having returned to Manila at their own
expense before the said second day of December and being in the antechamber of the court room,
which fact was known to Chief of Police Hohmann, who was then present at the trial and to the attorney
for the respondents, were not produced before the court by the respondents nor did the latter show any
effort to present them, in spite of the fact that their attention was called to this particular by the
undersigned.
The result of the said second order was, as is said in the same decision, that the respondents, on
January 13th, the day fixed for the protection of the women before this court, presented technically the
seven (7) women above-mentioned who had returned to the city at their own expense and the other
eight (8) women whom the respondents themselves brought to Manila, alleging moreover that their
agents and subordinates succeeded in bringing them from Davao with their consent; that in Davao they
found eighty-one (81) women who, when asked if they desired to return to Manila with free
transportation, renounced such a right, as is shown in the affidavits presented by the respondents to
this effect; that, through other means, fifty-nine (59) women have already returned to Manila, but
notwithstanding the efforts made to find them it was not possible to locate the whereabouts of twenty-
six (26) of them. Thus, in short, out of the one hundred and eighty-one (181) women who, as has been
previously said, have been illegally detained by Mayor Lukban and Chief of Police Hohmann and
transported to Davao against their will, only eight (8) have been brought to Manila and presented before
this court by the respondents in compliance with the said two orders. Fifty-nine (59) of them have
returned to Manila through other means not furnished by the respondents, twenty-six of whom were
brought by the attorney for the petitioners, Mendoza, on his return from Davao. The said attorney paid
out of his own pocket the transportation of the said twenty-six women. Adding to these numbers the
other seven (7) women who returned to this city at their own expense before January 13 we have a
total of sixty-six (66), which evidently proves, on the one hand, the falsity of the allegation by the
respondents in their first answer at the trial of December 2, 1918, giving as one of the reasons for their
inability to present any of the said women that the latter were content with their life in Mindanao and did
not desire to return to Manila; and, on the other hand, that the respondents, especially the first named,
that is Mayor Justo Lukban, who acted as chief and principal in all that refers to the compliance with the
orders issued by this court, could bring before December 2nd, the date of the first hearing of the case,
as well as before January 13th, the date fixed for the compliance with the second order, if not the
seventy-four (74) women already indicated, at least a great number of them, or at least sixty (60) of
them, as is said in the majority decision, inasmuch as the said respondent could count upon the aid of
the Constabulary forces and the municipal police, and had transportation facilities for the purpose. But
the said respondent mayor brought only eight (8) of the women before this court on January 13th. This
fact can not, in my judgment, with due respect to the majority opinion, justify the conclusion that the
said respondent has substantially complied with the second order of this court, but on the other hand
demonstrates that he had not complied with the mandate of this court in its first and second orders; that
neither of the said orders has been complied with by the respondent Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of
Manila, who is, according to the majority decision, principally responsible for the contempt, to which
conclusion I agree. The conduct of the said respondent with respect to the second order confirms the
contempt committed by non-compliance with the first order and constitutes a new contempt because of
non-compliance with the second, because of the production of only eight (8) of the one hundred and
eighty-one (181) women who have been illegally detained by virtue of his order and transported to
Davao against their will, committing the twenty-six (26) women who could not be found in Davao,
demonstrates in my opinion that, notwithstanding the nature of the case which deals with the remedy
of habeas corpus, presented by the petitioners and involving the question whether they should or not be
granted their liberty, the respondent has not given due attention to the same nor has he made any effort
to comply with the second order. In other words, he has disobeyed the said two orders; has despised
the authority of this court; has failed to give the respect due to justice; and lastly, he has created and
placed obstacles to the administration of justice in the said habeas corpus proceeding, thus preventing,
because of his notorious disobedience, the resolution of the said proceeding with the promptness which
the nature of the same required.
Contempt of court has been defined as a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of the
court; and he is guilty of contempt whose conduct is such as tends to bring the authority and
administration of the law into disrespect or disregard. . . ." (Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 488.)
It is a general principle that a disobedience of any valid order of the court constitutes
contempt, unless the defendant is unable to comply therewith. (Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p.
502.)
It is contempt to employ a subterfuge to evade the judgment of the court, or to obstruct or
attempt to obstruct the service of legal process. If a person hinders or prevents the service of
process by deceiving the officer or circumventing him by any means, the result is the same
as though he had obstructed by some direct means. (Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 503.)
While it may seem somewhat incongruous to speak, as the courts often do, of enforcing
respect for the law and for the means it has provided in civilized communities for establishing
justice, since true respect never comes in that way, it is apparent nevertheless that the power
to enforce decorum in the courts and obedience to their orders and just measures is so
essentially a part of the life of the courts that it would be difficult to conceive of their
usefulness or efficiency as existing without it. Therefore it may be said generally that where
due respect for the courts as ministers of the law is wanting, a necessity arises for the use of
compulsion, not, however, so much to excite individual respect as to compel obedience or to
remove an unlawful or unwarranted interference with the administration of justice. (Ruling
Case Law, vol. 6, p. 487.)
The power to punish for contempt is as old as the law itself, and has been exercised from the
earliest times. In England it has been exerted when the contempt consisted of scandalizing
the sovereign or his ministers, the law-making power, or the courts. In the American states
the power to punish for contempt, so far as the executive department and the ministers of
state are concerned, and in some degree so far as the legislative department is concerned, is
obsolete, but it has been almost universally preserved so far as regards the judicial
department. The power which the courts have of vindicating their own authority is a
necessary incident to every court of justice, whether of record or not; and the authority for
issuing attachments in a proper case for contempts out of court, it has been declared, stands
upon the same immemorial usage as supports the whole fabric of the common law. . . .
(Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 489.)
The undisputed importance of the orders of this court which have been disobeyed; the loss of the
prestige of the authority of the court which issued the said orders, which loss might have been caused
by noncompliance with the same orders on the part of the respondent Justo Lukban; the damages
which might have been suffered by some of the women illegally detained, in view of the fact that they
were not brought to Manila by the respondents to be presented before the court and of the further fact
that some of them were obliged to come to this city at their own expense while still others were brought
to Manila by the attorney for the petitioners, who paid out of his own pocket the transportation of the
said women; and the delay which was necessarily incurred in the resolution of the petition interposed by
the said petitioners and which was due to the fact that the said orders were not opportunately and duly
obeyed and complied with, are circumstances which should be taken into account in imposing upon the
respondent Justo Lukban the penalty corresponding to the contempt committed by him, a penalty
which, according to section 236 of the Code of Civil Procedure, should consist of a fine not exceeding
P1,000 or imprisonment not exceeding months, or both such fine and imprisonment. In the imposition of
the penalty, there should also be taken into consideration the special circumstance that the contempt
was committed by a public authority, the mayor of the city of Manila, the first executive authority of the
city, and consequently, the person obliged to be the first in giving an example of obedience and respect
for the laws and the valid and just orders of the duly constituted authorities as well as for the orders
emanating from the courts of justice, and in giving help and aid to the said courts in order that justice
may be administered with promptness and rectitude.
I believe, therefore, that instead of the fine of one hundred pesos (P100), there should be imposed
upon the respondent Justo Lukban a fine of five hundred pesos (P500), and all the costs should be
charged against him. Lastly, I believe it to be my duty to state here that the records of this proceeding
should be transmitted to the Attorney-General in order that, after a study of the same and deduction
from the testimony which he may deem necessary, and the proper transmittal of the same to the fiscal
of the city of Manila and to the provincial fiscal of Davao, both the latter shall present the corresponding
informations for the prosecution and punishment of the crimes which have been committed on the
occasion when the illegal detention of the women was carried into effect by Mayor Justo Lukban of the
city of Manila and Chief of Police Anton Hohmann, and also of those crimes committed by reason of the
same detention and while the women were in Davao. This will be one of the means whereby the just
hope expressed in the majority decision will be realized, that is, that in the Philippine Islands there
should exist a government of laws and not a government of men and that this decision may serve to
bulwark the fortifications of an orderly Government of laws and to protect individual liberty from illegal
encroachments.
G.R. No. L-8995 November 6, 1913
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CHUA LUI, defendant-appellant.
Beaumont and Tenney, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee
MORELAND, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila convicting Chua Lui
and Koh Kieng Sien of the illegal possession of opium and sentencing the said Chua Lui to five years'
imprisonment and to pay one-fourth of the costs and Koh Kieng Sien to six months' imprisonment and
to pay one-fourth of the costs. The two other defendants who were jointly charged with Chua Lui and
Koh Kieng Sien were acquitted. Koh Kieng Sien did not appeal.
In the early part of March, 1913, Chua Lui, a resident of a city of Manila, became one of the parties to a
written lease in which he secured the possession, use and occupation of a house in Caloocan, a short
distance beyond the city limits of the city of Manila, for a period of five years. Soon after the execution
of the lease Chua Lui, Chua Tong and Chua Bee Cho moved into the house and occupied the same.
Two or three weeks later George W. Marshall, acting chief of secret service of Manila, in company with
three other American officers and one Filipino officer, went to the house. At the approach of the officers
Koh Kieng Sien jumped from the rear window of the house and ran across the fields. The officers gave
chase, overtook, and arrested the fleeing Chinaman. They testified that the fugitive had with him a
piece of bamboo containing an opium pipe and a can of opium and that when he saw himself hard
pressed he threw them away, evidently hoping of dispose of the incriminating evidence in such a way
as to deceive the officers. Having captured Koh Kieng Sien, the officers then arrested Chua Tong, and
Chua Bee Cho and preferred against them the following charge:
The undersigned accuses Chua Lui, alias Chua Lui Sane, alias Luis Sane, Chua Tong, Chua
Bee Cho, and Koh Kieng Sien of a violation of section 31 of Act No. 1761 of the Philippine
Commission, as amended by section 3 of Act No. 1910 of the Philippine Legislature,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 25th day of March, 1913, in the municipality of Caloocan, Province of
Rizal, Philippine Islands, within 2 ½ miles from the limits of the city of Manila, P. I., and within
the jurisdiction of this court, the said accused, conspiring among themselves and helping
each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have in their possession
and under their control and knowingly in their premises about 75 grams of opium. Contrary to
law.
It is admitted that after a very close and thorough search of the house and premises no opium was
found or anything which led to the suspicion that there had been opium on the premises at any time
except that found in the possession of Koh Kieng Sien. It is also conceded, as a necessary result, that
unless the fact that the accused Koh Kieng Sien had the opium in his possession is sufficient to convict
the other occupants of the house of the crime charged the prosecution must fail.
It is the undisputed evidence in the case, except by mere inference, that Koh Kieng Sien, the only
person who was found in the possession of opium, was a casual visitor at the house, having been there
but a few hours when the policemen arrived; that he was then under sentence following a conviction of
a violation of the Opium Law; that the reason of his presence at the house at that time was to borrow
money of the accused Chua Lui to pay the fine imposed upon him by such sentence.lawph!1.net
All of the accused, except Koh Kieng Sien, denied that they had possession of opium or that there was
opium in the house, and they denied all knowledge of the fact that Koh Kieng Sien had opium in his
possession at the time.
There is some claim on the part of the prosecution that Koh Kieng Sien was engaged in smoking opium
just prior to the arrival of the police officials, and that the other accused, being then in the house, must
have known that fact. It is asserted that there was an odor of opium fumes in the house when it was
entered by the police and that the pipe found in the possession of Koh Kieng Sien was still warm. There
is not entire agreement among the police officials relative to these facts. Some claimed to have noticed
the odor, others did not; some claimed to have observed the warmth of the pipe, others did not. We
doubt very much if there is evidence sufficient to establish clearly that Koh Kieng Sien was engaged in
smoking opium when the officers arrived. There are facts and circumstances, in addition to the absolute
denial of the accused, which go to show that such an allegation is not altogether well founded. It seems
that the same officers who made the arrests, or part of them, had visited and searched the house the
night before; that on the following morning the inmates thereof, in company with the teniente of the
barrio, went to a justice of the peace for the purpose of making a complaint against the officers for the
unlawful entry of their premises; that the justice of the peace requiring more evidence, the accused, in
company with the teniente at the barrio, returned to the house, arriving there but a few minutes before
the appearance of the police which resulted in their arrest. There was present, therefore, at the house
at the time it is claimed that Koh Kieng Sien was engaged in smoking opium, the teniente of the barrio,
who was an officer of the law and whose business it was to prevent the commission of crime. He
testified that there was no opium being smoked there at that time. It should be noticed also that Koh
Kieng Sien was at the house but temporarily; that he was there on a business matter; that in all
probability he brought the contraband articles with him and he certainly took them away with him when
he attempted to escape; that there was no lamp found in the house in such condition or in such a place
that it could have been used by Koh Kieng Sien. Moreover it should be noted that the house having
been searched or at least visited, the night before, by the police, the accused were fully aware that they
were under surveillance, and if they were engaged in the commission of crime, they had every reason
to believe that they were liable to be apprehended at any moment. But even if it be true that Koh Kieng
Sien was smoking opium, it has not been shown that any of the other accused were aware of it.
Certainly the teniente of the barrio knew nothing of it, and the accused and he were talking together at
the time.
In the case of United States vs. De los Reyes (20 Phil. Rep., 467), it appeared that a few days prior to
the 5th of November, 1910, one Gabriela Esguerra, who lived in San Miguel de Mayumo, being a friend
of De los Reyes and his wife, came to visit them at their home in the city of Manila. While Gabriela was
still there, certain revenue officials went to the house to search for opium. While some of the officers
were in the house prosecuting the search therein, others were on the outside watching to see that no
one left the house. During the progress of the search in the front part of the house one of the officers
outside saw the accused Gabriela throw a package from the window of the kitchen into the grass. Upon
recovering the package it was found to contain a considerable quantity of morphine. Upon these facts
together with his refusal to permit the officers to enter the house, the trial court convicted De los Reyes
of the crime of illegal possession of opium. Upon an appeal to this court, the judgment was reversed
upon the ground that the mere fact that a temporary visitor at the house of De los Reyes had in her
possession a quantity of morphine and that fearing discovery she threw it from the window of his
kitchen was not sufficient to charge him with knowledge of the fact that the opium was on his premises.
In the case of United States vs. Tan Tayco (12 Phil. Rep., 739), the court said at page 743:
Possession has been defined to be the detention or enjoyment of a thing which a manholds
or exercises by himself or by another who keeps or exercises it in his name. (Bouviers' Law
Dictionary, Rawles' Revision, Vol. II.) Clearly it involves' a state of mind on the part of the
possessor whereby he intends to exercise, and as a consequence of which, he does exercise
a right of possession, whether that right be legal or otherwise; and while the intention and the
will to possess may be, and usually are, inferred from the fact that the thing in question is
under the apparent power and control of the alleged possessor, nevertheless, the existence
of the animus possidendi is subject to contradiction, and may be rebutted by evidence which
tends to prove that the person under whose power and control the thing in question appears
to be does not in fact exercise such power of control and does not intend to do so. In order to
complete a possession two things are required, that there be an occupancy, apprehension or
taking; that the taking be with an intent to possess (animus possidendi). . . .
The statements of the witness Abila . . . furnish a full, satisfactory and sufficient explanation
of the presence of the utensils for smoking opium in his house at the time of their seizure,
which is entirely consistent with the allegations of the defendant that those utensils were not
at the time in their possession; and, therefore, entirely consistent with the innocence of the
defendants charged with a violation of the provisions of the Opium Act.
There is no evidence in the record showing or tending to show that the house occupied by the accused
was an "opium joint" or that it had been built or constructed for the purpose, or that it had been changed
and modified by the appellant Chua Lui so as to make it an "opium den," or that it had any of the
qualities, whatever they may be, of such a resort, or that he intended to use it for any illicit purpose.
There is no evidence in the record showing or tending to show that Chua Lui was acquainted with any
gang of opium smugglers or persons connected with such gang, or that he was himself connected
therewith or with such persons, or that he had ever been convicted of any violation of the Opium Law.
Even though all these things were true, it does not necessarily follow that he is guilty of the crime
charged. Persons may not be convicted on general principles, but only on evidence which establishes
the precise charge lodged against them.
We are satisfied from the whole case that the guilt of the appellant has not been shown beyond a
reasonable doubt. The judgment of conviction is reversed and the accused acquitted. The sureties on
his bond will be exonorated.
G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984
JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J. BURGOS MEDIA SERVICES,
INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND, THE
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET AL., respondents.
Lorenzo M. Tañada, Wigberto E. Tañada, Martiniano Vivo, Augusto Sanchez, Joker P. Arroyo, Jejomar
Binay and Rene Saguisag for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2] search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by
respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal
[Quezon City], under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784
Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan
Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines,
equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and
distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written
literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of
the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized.
Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the
return of the seized articles, and that respondents, "particularly the Chief Legal Officer, Presidential
Security Command, the Judge Advocate General, AFP, the City Fiscal of Quezon City, their
representatives, assistants, subalterns, subordinates, substitute or successors" be enjoined from using
the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and the other accused in
Criminal Case No. Q- 022782 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, entitled People v. Jose
Burgos, Jr. et al. 1
In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents were required to answer the petition. The plea for
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was set for hearing on June 28, 1983, later reset to
July 7, 1983, on motion of the Solicitor General in behalf of respondents.
At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while opposing petitioners' prayer for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, manifested that respondents "will not use the aforementioned articles
as evidence in the aforementioned case until final resolution of the legality of the seizure of the
aforementioned articles. ..." 2 With this manifestation, the prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction
was rendered moot and academic.
Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioners had come to this
Court without having previously sought the quashal of the search warrants before respondent judge.
Indeed, petitioners, before impugning the validity of the warrants before this Court, should have filed a
motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued them. 3 But this procedural flaw notwithstanding,
we take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues
raised not to mention the public interest generated by the search of the "We Forum" offices, which was
televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies. The existence of this special
circumstance justifies this Court to exercise its inherent power to suspend its rules. In the words of the
revered Mr. Justice Abad Santos in the case of C. Vda. de Ordoveza v. Raymundo, 4 "it is always in the
power of the court [Supreme Court] to suspend its rules or to except a particular case from its
operation, whenever the purposes of justice require it...".
Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of laches. Considerable stress is laid on
the fact that while said search warrants were issued on December 7, 1982, the instant petition
impugning the same was filed only on June 16, 1983 or after the lapse of a period of more than six [6]
months.
Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it. 5
Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply, explained the reason for the delay in the filing of the petition
thus:
Respondents should not find fault, as they now do [p. 1, Answer, p. 3,
Manifestation] with the fact that the Petition was filed on June 16, 1983, more than
half a year after the petitioners' premises had been raided.
The climate of the times has given petitioners no other choice. If they had waited
this long to bring their case to court, it was because they tried at first to exhaust
other remedies. The events of the past eleven fill years had taught them that
everything in this country, from release of public funds to release of detained
persons from custody, has become a matter of executive benevolence or largesse
Hence, as soon as they could, petitioners, upon suggestion of persons close to the
President, like Fiscal Flaminiano, sent a letter to President Marcos, through
counsel Antonio Coronet asking the return at least of the printing equipment and
vehicles. And after such a letter had been sent, through Col. Balbino V. Diego,
Chief Intelligence and Legal Officer of the Presidential Security Command, they
were further encouraged to hope that the latter would yield the desired results.
After waiting in vain for five [5] months, petitioners finally decided to come to Court.
[pp. 123-124, Rollo]
Although the reason given by petitioners may not be flattering to our judicial system, We find no ground
to punish or chastise them for an error in judgment. On the contrary, the extrajudicial efforts exerted by
petitioners quite evidently negate the presumption that they had abandoned their right to the
possession of the seized property, thereby refuting the charge of laches against them.
Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had used and marked as
evidence some of the seized documents in Criminal Case No. Q- 022872, he is now estopped from
challenging the validity of the search warrants. We do not follow the logic of respondents. These
documents lawfully belong to petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and he can do whatever he pleases with them,
within legal bounds. The fact that he has used them as evidence does not and cannot in any way affect
the validity or invalidity of the search warrants assailed in this petition.
Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners to nullify the search warrants in
question.
1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct an examination under oath or
affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional
provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court .6 This objection, however, may properly be
considered moot and academic, as petitioners themselves conceded during the hearing on August 9,
1983, that an examination had indeed been conducted by respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his
witnesses.
2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20- 82[b] were used to search two distinct places: No. 19,
Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City,
respectively. Objection is interposed to the execution of Search Warrant No. 20-82[b] at the latter
address on the ground that the two search warrants pinpointed only one place where petitioner Jose
Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3, Project
6, Quezon City. This assertion is based on that portion of Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] which states:
Which have been used, and are being used as instruments and means of
committing the crime of subversion penalized under P.D. 885 as amended and he
is keeping and concealing the same at 19 Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City.
The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search warrants were applied
for and issued because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct premises. It would be quite
absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two warrants intended for one and the same
place. Besides, the addresses of the places sought to be searched were specifically set forth in the
application, and since it was Col. Abadilla himself who headed the team which executed the search
warrants, the ambiguity that might have arisen by reason of the typographical error is more apparent
than real. The fact is that the place for which Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] was applied for was 728
Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, which address appeared in the opening
paragraph of the said warrant. 7 Obviously this is the same place that respondent judge had in mind
when he issued Warrant No. 20-82 [b].
In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with sufficient
particularity, it has been held "that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the place intended in
the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially true where the executing officer is the affiant
on whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows that the judge who issued the warrant
intended the building described in the affidavit, And it has also been said that the executing officer may
look to the affidavit in the official court file to resolve an ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be
searched." 8
3. Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants is the fact that although the warrants were
directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles b belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr.,
Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized.
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties that may be seized
under a search warrant, to wit:
Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. — A search warrant may be issued for the
search and seizure of the following personal property:
[a] Property subject of the offense;
[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits
of the offense; and
[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of
committing an offense.
The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person against
whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him. In fact, under subsection [b]
of the above-quoted Section 2, one of the properties that may be seized is stolen property. Necessarily,
stolen property must be owned by one other than the person in whose possession it may be at the time
of the search and seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the
person against whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the property sought to be
seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have in relation to the articles and property seized
under the warrants.
4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties were seized under the disputed
warrants. Under Article 415[5] of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery, receptables, instruments
or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on
in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or
works" are considered immovable property. In Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo9 where this legal provision
was invoked, this Court ruled that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when
placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant,
usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent
of the owner.
In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the
machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the
ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
5. The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge upon application of Col. Rolando
N. Abadilla Intelligence Officer of the P.C. Metrocom. 10 The application was accompanied by the Joint
Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, 11 members of the Metrocom Intelligence and
Security Group under Col. Abadilla which conducted a surveillance of the premises prior to the filing of
the application for the search warrants on December 7, 1982.
It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned documents could not have provided
sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may validly issue in
accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides:
SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as
may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
 complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought
to be searched. And when the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or
editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the application
and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged
subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice.
Thus, the broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in possession or has in his
control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were
used and are all continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion
punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as amended ..." 12 is a mere conclusion of law and does not
satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the
existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant
and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have done so.
Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement contained in the
joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that the evidence gathered and collated
by our unit clearly shows that the premises above- mentioned and the articles and things above-
described were used and are continuously being used for subversive activities in conspiracy with, and
to promote the objective of, illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement, Movement for Free
Philippines, and April 6 Movement." 13
In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, ...
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce; 14 the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his
witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. In Alvarez v. Court
of First Instance, 15 this Court ruled that "the oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the
personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the
committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant,
of the existence of probable cause." As couched, the quoted averment in said joint affidavit filed before
respondent judge hardly meets the test of sufficiency established by this Court in Alvarez case.
Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is
that they are in the nature of general warrants. The search warrants describe the articles sought to be
seized in this wise:
1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo (equipment, typewriters,
cabinets, tables, communications/recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone
and the like used and/or connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper
and any and all documents communication, letters and facsimile of prints related to
the "WE FORUM" newspaper.
2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publication to
promote the objectives and piurposes of the subversive organization known as
Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and,
3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and other
subversive materials and propaganda, more particularly,
1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;
2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969
3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 524;
4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP
665; and,
5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 427 with
marking "Bagong Silang."
In Stanford v. State of Texas 16 the search warrant which authorized the search for "books, records,
pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments
concerning the Communist Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too
general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connectionwith the violation of SDC 13-
3703 or otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of a search warrant which authorized
the seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut
General Statutes [the statute dealing with the crime of conspiracy]" was held to be a general warrant,
and therefore invalid. 17 The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants
in question cannot be characterized differently.
In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Courts calls to mind a notable chapter in English history: the
era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English Press, when "Officers of the Crown
were given roving commissions to search where they pleased in order to suppress and destroy the
literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan Reference herein to such historical episode would not be
relevant for it is not the policy of our government to suppress any newspaper or publication that speaks
with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to state security.
As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the "Metropolitan
Mail" and the "We Forum newspapers. As a consequence of the search and seizure, these premises
were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers
were discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press
guaranteed under the fundamental law, 18 and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to
express themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework
where a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the
citizenry.
Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the ground that they have
been sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended, which authorizes "the
sequestration of the property of any person, natural or artificial, engaged in subversive activities against
the government and its duly constituted authorities ... in accordance with implementing rules and
regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of National Defense." It is doubtful however, if
sequestration could validly be effected in view of the absence of any implementing rules and
regulations promulgated by the Minister of National Defense.
Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily Express, it was reported that no less than
President Marcos himself denied the request of the military authorities to sequester the property seized
from petitioners on December 7, 1982. Thus:
 The President denied a request flied by government prosecutors for sequestration intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away the following
of the WE FORUM newspaper and its printing presses, according to Information items, to wit:
Minister Gregorio S. Cendana.
* 13 sacks of dried coconuts (copra) valued at ₱7,537.00[;]
On the basis of court orders, government agents went to the We Forum offices in
Quezon City and took a detailed inventory of the equipment and all materials in the
* 2 pieces automatic watch (Seiko and citizen) valued at ₱6,796.00[:]
premises.

* 1 piece ([S]audi gold) valued at ₱4,731.00[;]

Cendaña said that because of the denial the newspaper and its equipment remain
at the disposal of the owners, subject to the discretion of the court. 19
* 1 [N]okia cellphone 3350 valued at ₱3,615.00[;]
That the property seized on December 7, 1982 had not been sequestered is further confirmed by the
reply of then Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo to the letter dated February 10, 1983 of U.S. * 1 unit Briggs and [Stratton] 16 horse power with propeller valued at ₱26,000.00[;]
Congressman Tony P. Hall addressed to President Marcos, expressing alarm over the "WE FORUM "
case. 20 In this reply dated February 11, 1983, Minister Romulo stated:
* cash money worth [₱] 1,000.00.

2. Contrary to reports, President Marcos turned down the recommendation of our

authorities to close the paper's printing facilities and confiscate the equipment and all in the amount of Forty Nine Thousand Six Hundred Seventy-Nine Pesos (₱49,679.00)to the damage
materials it uses. 21 and prejudice of the said owner.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by respondent CONTRARY TO LAW.3
judge on December 7, 1982 are hereby declared null and void and are accordingly set aside. The
prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles is hereby granted and all Appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. His co-accused, Romy Real (Romy), Danny Real
articles seized thereunder are hereby ordered released to petitioners. No costs. (Danny), and Onyong Reyes (Onyong), have not been an-ested and remain fugitives from justice.

SO ORDERED. Version of the Prosecution

G.R. No. 219581 On September 24, 2005; at around 1:00 a.m., Julita Nacoboan (Julita), her husband, Jose Nacoboan
(Jose), and their son, Marwin Nacoboan (Marwin) were about to board their pump boat loaded with 13
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee sacks of copra. These sacks of copra were supposed to be loaded and transferred to a bigger
vs. passenger boat that would ferry the copra to Catbalogan, Samar. Their barangay is situated along a
MAXIMO DELA PEÑA, Accused-Appellant river which opens to the sea. When the tide is low, the bigger passenger boat cannot dock along the
shore so a smaller pump boat has to be used to ferry the cargo to a bigger passenger boat.

DECISION
As the Nacoboan's pump boat was about to depart, a smaller boat suddenly blocked its path. For fear
of collision, Jose stopped the engine of their pump boat Three armed men then immediately ordered
DEL CASTILLO, J.: the pump boat. One of the armed men pointed a firearm at Jose arid ordered him to proceed to the aft
or the rear side of the boat. Julita identified him as the appellant. Jose's hands were tied and his head
covered.
Maximo De La Peña (appellant) filed this appeal assailing the December 16, 2014 Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC. No. 00834 which affirmed with modification the October 22,
2007 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calbiga, Samar, Branch 33, in Criminal Case No. Another armed person grabbed Julita’s bag and took the following items:
CC-2006- 1608 finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of piracy.
1) ₱1,000.00 Cash; 2) Earrings; 3) Cellular phone; and 4) Necklace.
Appellant was charged, with the crime of piracy defined under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 532
allegedly committed as follows:
Another person operated the pump boat and docked it on a small island after nearly two hours of travel.
During the trip, Marwin’s shirt was taken off and used to blindfold Julita. When they arrived at the small
That on or about the 24th day of September 2005, at about 1:00 o'clock in the morning, more or less, island, the appellant unloaded the 13 sacks of copra.
a1ong the river bank of Barangay San Roque, Municipality of Villareal, Province of Samar, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
The appellant and his armed companions then brought the pump boat to another island where its
confederating, and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent to gain, by means of force and
engine, prope1lertube, and tools were taken and loaded on appellant's boat. Consequently, the
Nacoboan’s boat was left without an engine and they had to paddle to safety. They discovered that they
were already in Equiran, Daram, Samar.
The following day, Julita went to the police authorities in Villareal, Samar to report the incident. She
reported that the value of the copra was then ₱15.00 per kilo and that the engine and other equipment
lost were valued at ₱30,000.00. She identified the appellant as one of the armed men who took control
of their boat and took away its engine, propeller tube, and tools since she had known him for 16 years
already arid she recognized him when he boarded their boat.
Version of the Defense
Appellant denied the accusa6on against him and testified that he was a resident of Brgy. San Roque,
Villareal, Samar for 15 years. He had been engaged in fishing for l0 years as a source of livelihood. He
claimed that from September ), 2005 up to December 5, 2005 he was fishing in Daram, Samar with
Edgar Pojas, Jose Dacletan (bacletan), Tope Dacletan, Nestor Bombay, and Esok Pojas. During the
said period, he smyed at the house of Barangay Kagawad Edgar Pojas and used the boat of Dacletan
to fish.
After their fishing activity, appellant went home to Brgy. San Roque, Villareal, Samar. On December 6,
2005, four soldiers arrested and beat him up. He was brought to the Municipal Hall thereafter and was
imprisoned. He declared that he knew the complainants who were also residents of Brgy. San Roque;
Villareal, Samar but did not knew his co-accused Romy, Onyong, and Danny.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On October 22, 2007, the RTC of Calbiga, Samar, Branch 33 rendered judgment finding appellant guilty
of piracy under PD 532. The RTC was convinced that the testimonies of Julita and Marwin positively
identifying the appellant as the one who boarded their boat and took away their cargo through violence
or intimidation were credible. The RTC ruled that appellant's denial and alibi could not prevail over the
positive identification made by the victims.
The dispositive portion of the RTC’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, AND IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the accused MAXIMO DE LA PEÑA is
sentenced to the penalty of imprisonment or RECLUSION PERPETUA, without [eligibility for] parole,
and to pay the victims the following:
1. ₱49,679.00, total amount lost;
2. ₱30,000.00 in exemplary damages;
3. ₱15,000.00 in moral damages;
4. ₱25,000.00 in nominal damages;
5. and to pay the costs.
Let the continued detention of the accused be transferred to the Leyte Regional Prison, as soon as
possible.
Issue an alias order for the arrest of Onyong Reyes, Romy Real and Danny Real, accordingly.
Furnish copies of this decision to [the] PNP station, PNP Regional Office and its Directorate for
operations.4
Aggrieved by the RTC's Decision, appellant filed an appeal to the CA.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On December 16, 2014, the CA affirmed appellant’s conviction for the crime of piracy under PD 532
and held as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated October 22, 2007, convicting
accused-appellant for the crime of piracy penalized under PD No. 532 and sentencing him accordingly
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without (eligibility for) parole is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION as follows:
a. [₱]30,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages;
b. the award of moral damages, nominal damages, and exemplary damages are deleted; and.
c. interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this
judgment until such amounts shall have been fully paid.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.5
Dissatisfied with the CA's Decision, and after denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, appellant filed a
Notice of Appeal.6
Issue
The issue in this case is whether appellant is guilty of piracy. According to appellant, the prosecution
failed to prove the elements of piracy under PD 532. Appellant insists that the RTC erroneously
convicted him since the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Our Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
Section 2(d) of PD 532 defines piracy as follows:
Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo,
equipment, or the personal belongings of its complement or pa5sengers, irrespective of the value
thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed by any
person, including a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel, in Philippine waters shall
be considered as piracy. x x x
In his Appellants Brief, appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove the elements of piracy
under PD 532. He posits that the Information failed to allege the elements of the crime of piracy.
Appellant maintains that the Information did not state that the vessel in question was in Philippine
waters and that its cargo, equipment, or personal belongings of the passengers or complement were
seized.
The Court disagrees.
The Information7 charged appellant of the crime of piracy to wit:
That on or about the 24th day of September 2005, at about 1:00 o'clock in the morning, more or less,
along the river bank of Barangay San Roque. Municipality of Villareal, Province of Samar, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable court; the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating,
and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent to gain, by means of force and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away the following items, to wit:
* 13 sacks of dried coconuts (copra) valued at ₱7.537.00[;]
* 2 pieces automatic watch (Seiko and citizen) valued at ₱6,796.00[;]
* 1 piece ([S]audi gold] valued at ₱4,731.00[;]
* 1 [N]okia cellphone 3350 valued at ₱3,615.00[;]
* 1 unit Briggs and [Stratton] 16 horse power with propeller valued at ₱26,000.00[;]
* Cash money worth [₱]1,000.00.
all in the amount of Forty Nine Thousand Six Hundred Seventy Nine Pesos (₱49,679.00) to the damage
and prejudice of the said owner.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The Information categorically alleged that the incident happened along the river bank of Brgy. San
Roque, Municipality of Villareal, Province of Samar. Under Section 2(a) of PD 532, "Philippine waters'''
is defined as follows:
[A]ll bodies of water, such as but not limited to, seas, gulfs, bays around, between and connecting each
of the Islands of the Philippine Archipelago, irrespective of its depth, breadth, length or dimension, and
all other waters belonging to the Philippines by historic or Iegal title, including territorial sea, the sea-
bed, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas over which the Philippines has sovereignty or
jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied)
From this definition, it is clear that a river is considered part of Philippine waters.
The Information also clearly alleged that the vessel's cargo, equipment, and personal belongings of the
passengers were taken by the appellant and his armed companions. It stated, in no uncertain terms,
that 13 sacks of copra were taken by the appellant through force and intimidation. Undoubtedly, these
sacks of copra were part of the vessel's cargo. The Information also stated that the vessel's equipment
which consisted of the engine, propeller tube, and tools were taken and carried away by the appellant.
Furthermore, the Information also stated that the personal belongings of the passengers consisting of
two watches, jewelry, cellphone, and cash money were taken by the appellant and his armed
companions. The appellant was able to seize these items when he, along with armed companions,
boarded the victims' pump boat and seized control of the same. Armed with firearms, appellant and his
companions tied Jose's hands, covered his head, and operated their pump boat. They travelled to an
island in Samar where they unloaded the sacks of copra. Thereafter, appellant and his armed
companions travelled to another island where the engine, propeller tube, and tools of the pump boat
were taken out and loaded on appellant's boat.
From the foregoing, the Court finds that the prosecution was able to establish that the victims' pump
boat was in Philippine waters when appellant and his armed companions boarded the same and seized
its cargo, equipment, and the personal belongings of the passengers.
The Court finds no merit in appellant's contention that he was not positively identified by the
prosecution's witnesses. Fron1 the testimony of Julita, she positively identified the appellant as follows:
Q: Among the three (3) accused, can you recall who particularly pointed and levelled at your husband
with his knife?
A: It was Maximo De la Peña, ma'am
xxxx
Q: Who [among the three (3) accused unloaded the 13 sacks of copra]?
A: The [ones] who unloaded our [copra] were Maximo De la Peña and the person who was guarding
me with a short [fire]arm [whom] I do not know x x x. [T]he other one who was carrying a long [fire]arm
[was] in charge of the engine.8
The Court finds no reason to doubt the testimony of Julita identifying appellant as one of the assailants
who boarded their vessel and seized its cargo, equipment, and the passengers' personal belongings.
Julita testified that she was able to identify appellant because of the moonlight that illuminated the area.
Further, she testified that she then had a flashlight that allowed her to see who boarded the vessel.
More importantly, Juljta had known the appellant for 16 years since they reside in the
same barangay.9 Appellant's bare denial and alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification made by
Julita. "Time and again, this Court has consistently ruled that positive identification prevails over alibi
since the latter can easily be fabricated and is inherently unreliable." 10 Since both the RTC and CA
found Julita's testimony to be credible and straightfo1ward, the Court thus finds no reason to disturb the
same.
Lastly, appellant argues that the proper penalty should be reclusion temporal in its medium and
maximum: periods and not reclusion perpetua as imposed by the RTC.
Appellant's contention is incorrect, Section 3 of PD 532, provides:
Section 3. Penalties. Any person who commits piracy or highway robbery/brigandage as herein defined,
shall, upon conviction by competent court be punished by:
a. Piracy. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium ai.1d maximum periods shall be
imposed.1âwphi1 If physical injuries or other crimes are committed as a result or on the occasion
thereof: the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. If rape murder or homicide is committed as
a result or on the occasion of piracy, or when the offenders abandoned the victims without means of
saving themselves or when the seizure is accomplished by firing upon or boarding a vessel, the
mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, it was established that the appellant and his armed companionsboarded the victims’ boat
and seized 13 sacks of copra, the boat's engine, propeller tube, and tools, as well as the contents of
Julita’s bag. Hence, from the provision above, the proper imposable penalty should be death. However,
due to Republic Act No. 9346, which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the Court thus finds.
that the penalty imposed by the RTC, which was reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole, was
correct since the seizure of the vessel and its cargo was accomplished by boarding the vessel.
Anent the award of damages, the Court sustains the modification made by the CA in deleting the
amount of ₱49,679.00 as actual damages and instead, awarding Julita temperate damages since she
failed to substantiate her losses with the necessary receipts. As we explained in Tan v. OMC Carriers.
Inc.:11
Actual damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be proved with
a reasonable degree of certainty. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in
determining the fact and amount of damages. To justify an award of actual damages there must be
competent proof of the actual amount of loss, credence can be given only to claims which are duly
supported by receipts.
The award of temperate damages is proper since under .Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperature
damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss had been suffered but its
amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty. Likewise, the Court finds the
deletion of nominal damages proper. The CA is correct in holding that temperate and nominal damages
arc incompatible and thus, cannot be granted concurrently. Under Article 2221 of the Civil Code,
nominal damages are given in order that a right of the plafr1tift: which has been violated or invaded by
the defendant, may he vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for
any loss suffered by him. Last1y, the deletion of the awards of moral and exemplary damages are also
proper for lack of factual and legal basis.
All told, based on the evidence on record, the Court finds no reason to disturb the findings of both the
RTC and the CA that appellant was guilty of piracy under PD 532.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The December 16, 2014 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-HC. No. 00834 finding appellant Maximo De La Peña GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of piracy defined and penalized under Presidential Decree No. 532 and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967
HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his
capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO
D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G.
REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal
Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City
Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City, respondents.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro,
Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor C. Padua for
respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 — hereinafter referred to as
Respondents-Prosecutors — several judges2 — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges —
issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein4 and/or the
corporations of which they were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons
above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and
take possession of the following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or
intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications
adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution
and the Rules of Court — because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents,
books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3)
the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases
filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the
documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to
be disposed of in accordance with law — on March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme
Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending
final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining Respondents-
Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned or
any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter,
decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void,
and commanding the respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in
accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash
moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and
have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by
petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against
herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition.
However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the
papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are
concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found and
seized in the residences of petitioners herein.7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question
may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the
aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality
of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that
said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of
herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said
corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the
legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby,9 and
that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third
parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of
the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to
above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in
proceedings against them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to
the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these papers were
unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they were
the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other defendants. Next, it is clear that a
question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose rights have been
invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights of
defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not been
disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment, when
its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United
States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the admissibility of
the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and seizure does not extend to the
personal defendants but embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . . . (A
Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the
aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by
this Court, 12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in
evidence against petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be settled,
namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the
authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative,
whether said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners
herein.1äwphï1.ñët
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants and
that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void. In this connection,
the Constitution 13 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said
provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were
issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a
"violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof
with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the
judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same
presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has
performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal
laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed
by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a
"violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code," — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate
provision of said laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the
privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace
officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted —
to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of
keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by
legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants,
that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court 14 by providing
in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court
added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific
offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was
compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and
loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The
warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations,
whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that the
things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the
elimination of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if
the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and
things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation,
however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be
abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law rule, that the criminal should not
be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has blundered," 16 upon the theory that the
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other than
the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages against
the searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and against
those assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without
liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted
the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has
been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the
constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official
may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution
which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will that
wrong be repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a
citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be
secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed
are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and
their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided
by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering
which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same Federal
Court. 20 After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of
privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are
led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official
lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific
guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible
in a State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by
the same sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government. Were it
otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal
searches and seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and underserving of mention in
a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from
state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual
nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to permit this
Court's high regard as a freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time that
the Court held in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States through the Due
Process Clause, the cases of this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to
federal officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized in
violation of its provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right to when
conceded operatively enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by
avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had always been deemed
dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the
substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches — state
or federal — it was logically and constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine — an
essential part of the right to privacy — be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the
right newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional
Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely,
the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the
unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege
and enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary
rule to "is to deter — to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively
available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it" . . . .
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of
constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that
the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States,
and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore
constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise.
Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured
by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any
police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment.
Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which
the Constitution guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to which honest law
enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true
administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a
search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime
by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not
comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such
competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and,
hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification)
for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing
expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant and/or
make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under
consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed By agents of the
party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they do
not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the minority usually — but, understandably — finds
itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and
moral effect of the possibility 21 of securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of
the party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June 29,
1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey
Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be
included among the premises considered in said Resolution as residences of herein petitioners, Harry
S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the
records, papers and other effects seized in the offices of the corporations above referred to include
personal belongings of said petitioners and other effects under their exclusive possession and control,
for the exclusion of which they have a standing under the latest rulings of the federal courts of federal
courts of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control over the
aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has Been
Advanced, not in their petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion for Reconsideration and
Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory would appear to be
readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach intimated in the Resolution sought to
be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits attached
to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain either inconsistent
allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for
reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in
support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in the cases
relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed, should we agree
thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being best to leave
the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned;
that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the
Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal;
that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and
other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the
writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the
aforementioned residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and
Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs
prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29)
places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement
as to costs.
It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:
From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and from the import of the
deliberations of the Court on this case, I gather the following distinct conclusions:
1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of Investigation in this case are
general warrants and are therefore proscribed by, and in violation of, paragraph 3 of section 1
of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution;
2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of the said search warrants
were consequently illegal;
3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs. People, 80 Phil. 1, should be, and is
declared, abandoned;
4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the petitioners
are expressly declared null and void the searches and seizures therein made
are expressly declared illegal; and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued against
the use of the documents, papers and effect seized in the said residences is made
permanent; and
5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings satisfactorily demonstrated that
they have legal standing to move for the suppression of the documents, papers and effects
seized in the places other than the three residences adverted to above, the opinion written by
the Chief Justice refrains from expressly declaring as null and void the such warrants served
at such other places and as illegal the searches and seizures made therein, and leaves "the
matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future."
It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized in the immediately preceding
paragraph (numbered 5) with which I am not in accord.
I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at this time, the nullity of the search
warrants served at places other than the three residences, and the illegibility of the searches and
seizures conducted under the authority thereof. In my view even the exacerbating passions and
prejudices inordinately generated by the environmental political and moral developments of this case
should not deter this Court from forthrightly laying down the law not only for this case but as well for
future cases and future generations. All the search warrants, without exception, in this case are
admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants and are therefore admittedly and indisputably outlawed
by the Constitution; and the searches and seizures made were therefore unlawful. That the petitioners,
let us assume in gratia argumente, have no legal standing to ask for the suppression of the papers,
things and effects seized from places other than their residences, to my mind, cannot in any manner
affect, alter or otherwise modify the intrinsic nullity of the search warrants and the intrinsic illegality of
the searches and seizures made thereunder. Whether or not the petitioners possess legal standing the
said warrants are void and remain void, and the searches and seizures were illegal and remain illegal.
No inference can be drawn from the words of the Constitution that "legal standing" or the lack of it is a
determinant of the nullity or validity of a search warrant or of the lawfulness or illegality of a search or
seizure.
On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon the pleadings submitted to this Court
the petitioners have the requisite legal standing to move for the suppression and return of the
documents, papers and effects that were seized from places other than their family residences.
Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived almost verbatim from the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. In the many years of judicial construction and
interpretation of the said constitutional provision, our courts have invariably regarded as doctrinal the
pronouncement made on the Fourth Amendment by federal courts, especially the Federal Supreme
Court and the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals.
The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the suppression or return of
documents, papers and effects which are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be
summarized as follows; (a) ownership of documents, papers and effects gives "standing;" (b) ownership
and/or control or possession — actual or constructive — of premises searched gives "standing"; and (c)
the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the search warrant and the sworn application for search warrant
are "primarily" directed solely and exclusively against the "aggrieved person," gives "standing."
An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that, excepting three, all were
directed against the petitioners personally. In some of them, the petitioners were named personally,
followed by the designation, "the President and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation. The
three warrants excepted named three corporate defendants. But the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the said three warrants were also the same
"office/house/warehouse/premises" declared to be owned by or under the control of the petitioners in all
the other search warrants directed against the petitioners and/or "the President and/or General
Manager" of the particular corporation. (see pages 5-24 of Petitioners' Reply of April 2, 1962). The
searches and seizures were to be made, and were actually made, in the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by or under the control of the petitioners.
Ownership of matters seized gives "standing."
Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a motion to return and
suppress, and gives them standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure regardless
of their location at the time of seizure. Jones vs. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960) (narcotics
stored in the apartment of a friend of the defendant); Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d. 650, 652-53
(5th Cir. 1961), (personal and corporate papers of corporation of which the defendant was
president), United States vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (narcotics seized in an apartment not
belonging to the defendant); Pielow vs. United States, 8 F. 2d 492, 493 (9th Cir. 1925) (books seized
from the defendant's sister but belonging to the defendant); Cf. Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680,
683 (10th Cir. 1962) (papers seized in desk neither owned by nor in exclusive possession of the
defendant).
In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on December 12, 1966), it was held that
under the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures, a person places himself or
his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or his
automobile:
Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the fundamental nature and scope of
Fourth Amendment protection. What the Fourth Amendment protects is the security a man
relies upon when he places himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be
it his home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile. There he is protected from
unwarranted governmental intrusion. And when he puts some thing in his filing cabinet, in his
desk drawer, or in his pocket, he has the right to know it will be secure from an unreasonable
search or an unreasonable seizure. So it was that the Fourth Amendment could not tolerate
the warrantless search of the hotel room in Jeffers, the purloining of the petitioner's private
papers in Gouled, or the surreptitious electronic surveilance in Silverman. Countless other
cases which have come to this Court over the years have involved a myriad of differing
factual contexts in which the protections of the Fourth Amendment have been appropriately
invoked. No doubt, the future will bring countless others. By nothing we say here do we either
foresee or foreclose factual situations to which the Fourth Amendment may be applicable.
(Hoffa vs. U.S., 87 S. Ct. 408 (December 12, 1966). See also U.S. vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48,
72 S. Ct. 93 (November 13, 1951). (Emphasis supplied).
Control of premises searched gives "standing."
Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records and documents seized, the
petitioners have standing to move for return and suppression by virtue of their proprietary or leasehold
interest in many of the premises searched. These proprietary and leasehold interests have been
sufficiently set forth in their motion for reconsideration and need not be recounted here, except to
emphasize that the petitioners paid rent, directly or indirectly, for practically all the premises searched
(Room 91, 84 Carmen Apts; Room 304, Army & Navy Club; Premises 2008, Dewey Boulevard; 1436
Colorado Street); maintained personal offices within the corporate offices (IBMC, USTC); had made
improvements or furnished such offices; or had paid for the filing cabinets in which the papers were
stored (Room 204, Army & Navy Club); and individually, or through their respective spouses, owned the
controlling stock of the corporations involved. The petitioners' proprietary interest in most, if not all, of
the premises searched therefore independently gives them standing to move for the return and
suppression of the books, papers and affects seized therefrom.
In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court delineated the nature and extent of the
interest in the searched premises necessary to maintain a motion to suppress. After reviewing what it
considered to be the unduly technical standard of the then prevailing circuit court decisions, the
Supreme Court said (362 U.S. 266):
We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the lower courts. We are persuaded,
however, that it is unnecessarily and ill-advised to import into the law surrounding the
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures subtle distinctions,
developed and refined by the common law in evolving the body of private property law which,
more than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by distinctions whose validity is
largely historical. Even in the area from which they derive, due consideration has led to the
discarding of those distinctions in the homeland of the common law. See Occupiers' Liability
Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, carrying out Law Reform Committee, Third Report, Cmd.
9305. Distinctions such as those between "lessee", "licensee," "invitee," "guest," often only of
gossamer strength, ought not be determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately referable
to constitutional safeguards. See also Chapman vs. United States, 354 U.S. 610, 616-17
(1961).
It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the premises searched must own the
property seized in order to have standing in a motion to return and suppress. In Alioto vs. United States,
216 F. Supp. 48 (1963), a Bookkeeper for several corporations from whose apartment the corporate
records were seized successfully moved for their return. In United States vs. Antonelli, Fireworks Co.,
53 F. Supp. 870, 873 (W D. N. Y. 1943), the corporation's president successfully moved for the return
and suppression is to him of both personal and corporate documents seized from his home during the
course of an illegal search:
The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and property, "either his own or the
corporation's was entitled to protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Under the
circumstances in the case at bar, the search and seizure were unreasonable and unlawful.
The motion for the return of seized article and the suppression of the evidence so obtained
should be granted. (Emphasis supplied).
Time was when only a person who had property in interest in either the place searched or the articles
seize had the necessary standing to invoke the protection of the exclusionary rule. But in MacDonald
vs. Unite States, 335 U.S. 461 (1948), Justice Robert Jackson joined by Justice Felix Frankfurter,
advanced the view that "even a guest may expect the shelter of the rooftree he is under against criminal
intrusion." This view finally became the official view of the U.S. Supreme Court and was articulated
in United States vs. Jeffers, 432 U.S 48 (1951). Nine years later, in 1960, in Jones vs. Unite States, 362
U.S. 257, 267, the U.S. Supreme Court went a step further. Jones was a mere guest in the apartment
unlawfully searched but the Court nonetheless declared that the exclusionary rule protected him as
well. The concept of "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure" was enlarged to include
"anyone legitimately on premise where the search occurs."
Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that the defendant organizer, sole stockholder and president of a corporation had standing in a
mail fraud prosecution against him to demand the return and suppression of corporate property. Henzel
vs. United States, 296 F 2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1961), supra. The court conclude that the defendant had committing a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1341, by the use of the mails
standing on two independent grounds: First — he had a sufficient interest in the property seized, by one Lowell M. Birrell, . . ." The second search warrant was captioned: "United States of
and second — he had an adequate interest in the premises searched (just like in the case at bar). A America vs. Lowell M. Birrell. (p. 198)
postal inspector had unlawfully searched the corporation' premises and had seized most of the
corporation's book and records. Looking to Jones, the court observed:
Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership, gives standing to move to
suppress. Such was the rule even before Jones. (p. 199)
Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required qualify one as a "person aggrieved by
an unlawful search and seizure." It tells us that appellant should not have been precluded
If, as thus indicated Birrell had at least constructive possession of the records stored with
from objecting to the Postal Inspector's search and seizure of the corporation's books and
Dunn, it matters not whether he had any interest in the premises searched. See also Jeffers
records merely because the appellant did not show ownership or possession of the books
v. United States, 88 U.S. Appl. D.C. 58, 187 F. 2d 498 (1950), affirmed 432 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct.
and records or a substantial possessory interest in the invade premises . . . (Henzel vs.
93, 96 L. Ed. 459 (1951).
United States, 296 F. 2d at 651). .

The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for reargument; the United States did not appeal
Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683, (10th Cir. 1962). In Villano,
from this decision. The factual situation in Birrell is strikingly similar to the case of the present
police officers seized two notebooks from a desk in the defendant's place of employment; the defendant
petitioners; as in Birrell, many personal and corporate papers were seized from premises not
did not claim ownership of either; he asserted that several employees (including himself) used the
petitioners' family residences; as in Birrell, the searches were "PRIMARILY DIRECTED SOLETY AND
notebooks. The Court held that the employee had a protected interest and that there also was an
EXCLUSIVELY" against the petitioners. Still both types of documents were suppressed
invasion of privacy. Both Henzel and Villano considered also the fact that the search and seizure were
in Birrell because of the illegal search. In the case at bar, the petitioners connection with the premises
"directed at" the moving defendant. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 682; Villano vs. United
raided is much closer than in Birrell.
States, 310 F. 2d at 683.

Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all the warrants regardless whether
In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed his files in storage and went to Puerto Rico,
these were directed against residences in the narrow sense of the word, as long as the documents
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized his standing to move to quash as unreasonable
were personal papers of the petitioners or (to the extent that they were corporate papers) were held by
search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution a grand jury subpoena duces
them in a personal capacity or under their personal control.
tecum directed to the custodian of his files. The Government contended that the petitioner had no
standing because the books and papers were physically in the possession of the custodian, and
because the subpoena was directed against the custodian. The court rejected the contention, holding Prescinding a from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should order the return to the petitioners
that all personal and private papers and effects seized, no matter where these were seized, whether from
their residences or corporate offices or any other place or places. The uncontradicted sworn statements
of the petitioners in their, various pleadings submitted to this Court indisputably show that amongst the
Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and unrelinquished personal rights in the
things seized from the corporate offices and other places were personal and private papers and effects
books and papers as not to enable the question of unreasonable search and seizure to be
belonging to the petitioners.
escaped through the mere procedural device of compelling a third-party naked possessor to
produce and deliver them. Schwimmer vs. United States, 232 F. 2d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 1956).
If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and things which where the objects of
the unlawful searches and seizures, I submit that the grouping should be: (a) personal or private papers
Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant s primarily directed against said person
of the petitioners were they were unlawfully seized, be it their family residences offices, warehouses
gives "standing."
and/or premises owned and/or possessed (actually or constructively) by them as shown in all the
search and in the sworn applications filed in securing the void search warrants and (b)
The latest United States decision squarely in point is United States vs. Birrell, 242 F. Supp. 191 (1965, purely corporate papers belonging to corporations. Under such categorization or grouping, the
U.S.D.C. S.D.N.Y.). The defendant had stored with an attorney certain files and papers, which attorney, determination of which unlawfully seized papers, documents and things are personal/private of the
by the name of Dunn, was not, at the time of the seizing of the records, Birrell's attorney. * Dunn, in petitioners or purely corporate papers will have to be left to the lower courts which issued the void
turn, had stored most of the records at his home in the country and on a farm which, according to search warrants in ultimately effecting the suppression and/or return of the said documents.
Dunn's affidavit, was under his (Dunn's) "control and management." The papers turned out to be
private, personal and business papers together with corporate books and records of certain unnamed
And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited, the petitioners likewise have clear legal
corporations in which Birrell did not even claim ownership. (All of these type records were seized in the
standing to move for the suppression of purely corporate papers as "President and/or General
case at bar). Nevertheless, the search in Birrell was held invalid by the court which held that even
Manager" of the corporations involved as specifically mentioned in the void search warrants.
though Birrell did not own the premises where the records were stored, he had "standing" to move for
the return of all the papers and properties seized. The court, relying on Jones vs. U.S., supra; U.S. vs.
Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, Aff'd 155 F. 2d 631: Henzel vs. U.S., supra; and Schwimmer Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases cited in my disquisition were criminal
vs. U.S., supra, pointed out that prosecutions, the great clauses of the constitutional proscription on illegal searches and seizures do not
withhold the mantle of their protection from cases not criminal in origin or nature.
It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in question were directed solely and
exclusively against Birrell. The only person suggested in the papers as having violated the G.R. No. L-27360 February 28, 1968
law was Birrell. The first search warrant described the records as having been used "in
HON. RICARDO G. PAPA, as Chief of Police of Manila; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, as
Commissioner of Customs; PEDRO PACIS, as Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila; and
MARTIN ALAGAO, as Patrolman of the Manila Police Department, petitioners,
vs.
REMEDIOS MAGO and HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge of Branch 23, Court of First
Instance of Manila, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioners.
Juan T. David for respondents.
ZALDIVAR, J.:
This is an original action for prohibition and certiorari, with preliminary injunction filed by Ricardo
Papa, Chief of Police of Manila; Juan once Enrile, Commissioner of Customs; Pedro Pacis, Collector of
Customs of the Port of Manila; and Martin Alagao, a patrolman of the Manila Police Department,
against Remedios Mago and Hon. Hilarion Jarencio, Presiding Judge of Branch 23 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, praying for the annulment of the order issued by respondent Judge in Civil Case No.
67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila under date of March 7, 1967, which authorized the
release under bond of certain goods which were seized and held by petitioners in connection with the
enforcement of the Tariff and Customs Code, but which were claimed by respondent Remedios Mago,
and to prohibit respondent Judge from further proceeding in any manner whatsoever in said Civil Case
No. 67496. Pending the determination of this case this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction
restraining the respondent Judge from executing, enforcing and/or implementing the questioned order
in Civil Case No. 67496 and from proceeding with said case.
Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department,
acting upon a reliable information received on November 3, 1966 to the effect that a certain shipment of
personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released the following day from the
customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and upon orders of petitioner Ricardo
Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs, conducted
surveillance at gate No. 1 of the customs zone. When the trucks left gate No. 1 at about 4:30 in the
afternoon of November 4, 1966, elements of the counter-intelligence unit went after the trucks and
intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load of the two trucks consisting of nine
bales of goods, and the two trucks, were seized on instructions of the Chief of Police. Upon
investigation, a person claimed ownership of the goods and showed to the policemen a "Statement and
Receipts of Duties Collected in Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the Bureau of Customs in the
name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit.
Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and detention of the two trucks and their cargo,
Remedios Mago and Valentin B. Lanopa filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition
"for mandamus with restraining order or preliminary injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 67496,
alleging, among others, that Remedios Mago was the owner of the goods seized, having purchased
them from the Sta. Monica Grocery in San Fernando, Pampanga; that she hired the trucks owned by
Valentin Lanopa to transport, the goods from said place to her residence at 1657 Laon Laan St.,
Sampaloc, Manila; that the goods were seized by members of the Manila Police Department without
search warrant issued by a competent court; that anila Chief of Police Ricardo Papa denied the request
of counsel for Remedios Mago that the bales be not opened and the goods contained therein be not
examined; that then Customs Commissioner Jacinto Gavino had illegally assigned appraisers to
examine the goods because the goods were no longer under the control and supervision of the
Commissioner of Customs; that the goods, even assuming them to have been misdeclared and,
undervalued, were not subject to seizure under Section 2531 of the Tariff and Customs Code because
Remedios Mago had bought them from another person without knowledge that they were imported
illegally; that the bales had not yet been opened, although Chief of Police Papa had arranged with the
Commissioner of Customs regarding the disposition of the goods, and that unless restrained their
constitutional rights would be violated and they would truly suffer irreparable injury. Hence, Remedios
Mago and Valentin Lanopa prayed for the issuance of a restraining order, ex parte, enjoining the above-
named police and customs authorities, or their agents, from opening the bales and examining the
goods, and a writ of mandamus for the return of the goods and the trucks, as well as a judgment for
actual, moral and exemplary damages in their favor.
On November 10, 1966, respondent Judge Hilarion Jarencio issued an order ex parte restraining
the respondents in Civil Case No. 67496 — now petitioners in the instant case before this Court — from
opening the nine bales in question, and at the same time set the hearing of the petition for preliminary
injunction on November 16, 1966. However, when the restraining order was received by herein
petitioners, some bales had already been opened by the examiners of the Bureau of Customs in the
presence of officials of the Manila Police Department, an assistant city fiscal and a representative of
herein respondent Remedios Mago.
Under date of November 15, 1966, Remedios Mago filed an amended petition in Civil Case No.
67496, including as party defendants Collector of Customs Pedro Pacis of the Port of Manila and Lt.
Martin Alagao of the Manila Police Department. Herein petitioners (defendants below) filed, on
November 24, 1966, their "Answer with Opposition to the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction",
denying the alleged illegality of the seizure and detention of the goods and the trucks and of their other
actuations, and alleging special and affirmative defenses, to wit: that the Court of First Instance of
Manila had no jurisdiction to try the case; that the case fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court
of Tax Appeals; that, assuming that the court had jurisdiction over the case, the petition stated no cause
of action in view of the failure of Remedios Mago to exhaust the administrative remedies provided for in
the Tariff and Customs Code; that the Bureau of Customs had not lost jurisdiction over the goods
because the full duties and charges thereon had not been paid; that the members of the Manila Police
Department had the power to make the seizure; that the seizure was not unreasonable; and the
persons deputized under Section 2203 (c) of the Tariff and Customs Code could effect search, seizures
and arrests in inland places in connection with the enforcement of the said Code. In opposing the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, herein petitioners averred in the court below that the writ
could not be granted for the reason that Remedios Mago was not entitled to the main reliefs she prayed
for; that the release of the goods, which were subject to seizure proceedings under the Tariff and
Customs Code, would deprive the Bureau of Customs of the authority to forfeit them; and that
Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa would not suffer irreparable injury. Herein petitioners prayed the
court below for the lifting of the restraining order, for the denial of the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction, and for the dismissal of the case.
At the hearing on December 9, 1966, the lower Court, with the conformity of the parties, ordered
that an inventory of the goods be made by its clerk of court in the presence of the representatives of the
claimant of the goods, the Bureau of Customs, and the Anti-Smuggling Center of the Manila Police
Department. On December 13, 1966, the above-named persons filed a "Compliance" itemizing the
contents of the nine bales.
Herein respondent Remedios Mago, on December 23, 1966, filed an ex parte motion to release
the goods, alleging that since the inventory of the goods seized did not show any article of prohibited
importation, the same should be released as per agreement of the patties upon her posting of the
appropriate bond that may be determined by the court. Herein petitioners filed their opposition to the
motion, alleging that the court had no jurisdiction to order the release of the goods in view of the fact
that the court had no jurisdiction over the case, and that most of the goods, as shown in the inventory,
were not declared and were, therefore, subject to forfeiture. A supplemental opposition was filed by
herein petitioners on January 19, 1967, alleging that on January 12, 1967 seizure proceedings against
the goods had been instituted by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila, and the determination
of all questions affecting the disposal of property proceeded against in seizure and forfeiture
proceedings should thereby be left to the Collector of Customs. On January 30, 1967, herein petitioners
filed a manifestation that the estimated duties, taxes and other charges due on the goods amounted to
P95,772.00. On February 2, 1967, herein respondent Remedios Mago filed an urgent manifestation and
reiteration of the motion for the release under bond of the goods.
On March 7, 1967, the respondent Judge issued an order releasing the goods to herein
respondent Remedios Mago upon her filing of a bond in the amount of P40,000.00, and on March 13,
1967, said respondent filed the corresponding bond.
On March 13, 1967, herein petitioner Ricardo Papa, on his own behalf, filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order of the court releasing the goods under bond, upon the ground that the
Manila Police Department had been directed by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila to hold
the goods pending termination of the seizure proceedings.
Without waiting for the court's action on the motion for reconsideration, and alleging that they had
no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, herein petitioners filed the present
action for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction before this Court. In their petition
petitioners alleged, among others, that the respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction in ordering the
release to respondent Remedios Mago of the disputed goods, for the following reasons: (1) the Court of
First Instance of Manila, presided by respondent Judge, had no jurisdiction over the case; (2)
respondent Remedios Mago had no cause of action in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila due to her failure to exhaust all administrative remedies before invoking judicial
intervention; (3) the Government was not estopped by the negligent and/or illegal acts of its agent in not
collecting the correct taxes; and (4) the bond fixed by respondent Judge for the release of the goods
was grossly insufficient.
In due time, the respondents filed their answer to the petition for prohibition and certiorari in this
case. In their answer, respondents alleged, among others: (1) that it was within the jurisdiction of the
lower court presided by respondent Judge to hear and decide Civil Case No. 67496 and to issue the
questioned order of March 7, 1967, because said Civil Case No. 67496 was instituted long before
seizure, and identification proceedings against the nine bales of goods in question were instituted by
the Collector of Customs; (2) that petitioners could no longer go after the goods in question after the
corresponding duties and taxes had been paid and said goods had left the customs premises and were
no longer within the control of the Bureau of Customs; (3) that respondent Remedios Mago was
purchaser in good faith of the goods in question so that those goods can not be the subject of seizure
and forfeiture proceedings; (4) that the seizure of the goods was affected by members of the Manila
Police Department at a place outside control of jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs and affected
without any search warrant or a warrant of seizure and detention; (5) that the warrant of seizure and
detention subsequently issued by the Collector of Customs is illegal and unconstitutional, it not being
issued by a judge; (6) that the seizing officers have no authority to seize the goods in question because
they are not articles of prohibited importation; (7) that petitioners are estopped to institute the present
action because they had agreed before the respondent Judge that they would not interpose any
objection to the release of the goods under bond to answer for whatever duties and taxes the said
goods may still be liable; and (8) that the bond for the release of the goods was sufficient.
The principal issue in the instant case is whether or not, the respondent Judge had acted with
jurisdiction in issuing the order of March 7, 1967 releasing the goods in question.
The Bureau of Customs has the duties, powers and jurisdiction, among others, (1) to assess and
collect all lawful revenues from imported articles, and all other dues, fees, charges, fines and penalties,
accruing under the tariff and customs laws; (2) to prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds
upon the customs; and (3) to enforce tariff and customs laws. 1 The goods in question were imported
from Hongkong, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry". 2 As
long as the importation has not been terminated the imported goods remain under the jurisdiction of the
Bureau of customs. Importation is deemed terminated only upon the payment of the duties, taxes and
other charges upon the articles, or secured to be paid, at the port of entry and the legal permit for
withdrawal shall have been granted. 3 The payment of the duties, taxes, fees and other charges must be
in full. 4
The record shows, by comparing the articles and duties stated in the aforesaid "Statement and
Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" with the manifestation of the Office of the Solicitor
General 5 wherein it is stated that the estimated duties, taxes and other charges on the goods subject of
this case amounted to P95,772.00 as evidenced by the report of the appraiser of the Bureau of
Customs, that the duties, taxes and other charges had not been paid in full. Furthermore, a comparison
of the goods on which duties had been assessed, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties
Collected on Informal Entry" and the "compliance" itemizing the articles found in the bales upon
examination and inventory, 6 shows that the quantity of the goods was underdeclared, presumably to
avoid the payment of duties thereon. For example, Annex B (the statement and receipts of duties
collected) states that there were 40 pieces of ladies' sweaters, whereas Annex H (the inventory
contained in the "compliance") states that in bale No. 1 alone there were 42 dozens and 1 piece of
ladies' sweaters of assorted colors; in Annex B, only 100 pieces of watch bands were assessed, but in
Annex H, there were in bale No. 2, 209 dozens and 5 pieces of men's metal watch bands (white) and
120 dozens of men's metal watch band (gold color), and in bale No. 7, 320 dozens of men's metal
watch bands (gold color); in Annex B, 20 dozens only of men's handkerchief were declared, but in
Annex H it appears that there were 224 dozens of said goods in bale No. 2, 120 dozens in bale No. 6,
380 dozens in bale No. 7, 220 dozens in bale No. 8, and another 200 dozens in bale No. 9. The articles
contained in the nine bales in question, were, therefore, subject to forfeiture under Section 2530, pars.
e and m, (1), (3), (4), and (5) of the Tariff and Customs Code. And this Court has held that
merchandise, the importation of which is effected contrary to law, is subject to forfeiture, 7 and that
goods released contrary to law are subject to seizure and forfeiture. 8
Even if it be granted, arguendo, that after the goods in question had been brought out of the
customs area the Bureau of Customs had lost jurisdiction over the same, nevertheless, when said
goods were intercepted at the Agrifina Circle on November 4, 1966 by members of the Manila Police
Department, acting under directions and orders of their Chief, Ricardo C. Papa, who had been formally
deputized by the Commissioner of Customs, 9 the Bureau of Customs had regained jurisdiction and
custody of the goods. Section 1206 of the Tariff and Customs Code imposes upon the Collector of
Customs the duty to hold possession of all imported articles upon which duties, taxes, and other
charges have not been paid or secured to be paid, and to dispose of the same according to law. The
goods in question, therefore, were under the custody and at the disposal of the Bureau of Customs at
the time the petition for mandamus, docketed as Civil Case No. 67496, was filed in the Court of First
Instance of Manila on November 9, 1966. The Court of First Instance of Manila, therefore, could not
exercise jurisdiction over said goods even if the warrant of seizure and detention of the goods for the
purposes of the seizure and forfeiture proceedings had not yet been issued by the Collector of
Customs.
The ruling in the case of "Alberto de Joya, et al. v. Hon. Gregorio Lantin, et al.," G.R. No. L-
24037, decided by this Court on April 27, 1967, is squarely applicable to the instant case. In the De
Joya case, it appears that Francindy Commercial of Manila bought from Ernerose Commercial of Cebu
City 90 bales of assorted textiles and rags, valued at P117,731.00, which had been imported and
entered thru the port of Cebu. Ernerose Commercial shipped the goods to Manila on board an inter-
island vessel. When the goods where about to leave the customs premises in Manila, on October 6,
1964, the customs authorities held them for further verification, and upon examination the goods were
found to be different from the declaration in the cargo manifest of the carrying vessel. Francindy
Commercial subsequently demanded from the customs authorities the release of the goods, asserting
that it is a purchaser in good faith of those goods; that a local purchaser was involved so the Bureau of
Customs had no right to examine the goods; and that the goods came from a coastwise port. On
October 26, 1964, Francindy Commercial filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition
for mandamus against the Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of Customs of the port of Manila
to compel said customs authorities to release the goods.
 Francindy Commercial alleged in its petition for mandamus that the Bureau of Customs had no
jurisdiction over the goods because the same were not imported to the port of Manila; that it was not
liable for duties and taxes because the transaction was not an original importation; that the goods were
not in the hands of the importer nor subject to importer's control, nor were the goods imported contrary
to law with its (Francindy Commercial's) knowledge; and that the importation had been terminated. On
November 12, 1964, the Collector of Customs of Manila issued a warrant of seizure and identification
against the goods. On December 3, 1964, the Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of Customs,
as respondents in the mandamus case, filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction, lack of cause of action, and in view of the pending seizure and forfeiture proceedings. The
Court of First Instance held resolution on the motion to dismiss in abeyance pending decision on the
merits. On December 14, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued a preventive and
mandatory injunction, on prayer by Francindy Commercial, upon a bond of P20,000.00. The
Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of Customs sought the lifting of the preliminary and
mandatory injunction, and the resolution of their motion to dismiss. The Court of First Instance of
Manila, however, on January 12, 1965, ordered them to comply with the preliminary and mandatory
injunction, upon the filing by Francindy Commercial of an additional bond of P50,000.00. Said customs
authorities thereupon filed with this Court, on January 14, 1965, a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction. In resolving the question raised in that case, this Court held:
This petition raises two related issues: first, has the Customs bureau jurisdiction to
seize the goods and institute forfeiture proceedings against them? and (2) has the Court of
First Instance jurisdiction to entertain the petition for mandamus to compel the Customs
authorities to release the goods?
Francindy Commercial contends that since the petition in the Court of first Instance
was filed (on October 26, 1964) ahead of the issuance of the Customs warrant of seizure and
forfeiture (on November 12, 1964),the Customs bureau should yield the jurisdiction of the
said court.
The record shows, however, that the goods in question were actually seized on
October 6, 1964, i.e., before Francindy Commercial sued in court. The purpose of the seizure
by the Customs bureau was to verify whether or not Custom duties and taxes were paid for
their importation. Hence, on December 23, 1964, Customs released 22 bales thereof, for the
same were found to have been released regularly from the Cebu Port (Petition Annex "L"). As
to goods imported illegally or released irregularly from Customs custody, these are subject to
seizure under Section 2530 m. of the Tariff and Customs Code (RA 1957).
The Bureau of Customs has jurisdiction and power, among others to collect revenues
from imported articles, fines and penalties and suppress smuggling and other frauds on
customs; and to enforce tariff and customs laws (Sec. 602, Republic Act 1957).
The goods in question are imported articles entered at the Port of Cebu. Should they
be found to have been released irregularly from Customs custody in Cebu City, they are
subject to seizure and forfeiture, the proceedings for which comes within the jurisdiction of
the Bureau of Customs pursuant to Republic Act 1937.
Said proceeding should be followed; the owner of the goods may set up defenses
therein (Pacis v. Averia, L-22526, Nov. 20, 1966.) From the decision of the Commissioner of
Customs appeal lies to the Court of Tax Appeals, as provided in Sec. 2402 of Republic Act
1937 and Sec. 11 of Republic Act, 1125. To permit recourse to the Court of First Instance in
cases of seizure of imported goods would in effect render ineffective the power of the
Customs authorities under the Tariff and Customs Code and deprive the Court of Tax
Appeals of one of its exclusive appellate jurisdictions. As this Court has ruled in Pacis v.
Averia, supra, Republic Acts 1937 and 1125 vest jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture
proceedings exclusively upon the Bureau of Customs and the Court of Tax Appeals. Such
law being special in nature, while the Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of Courts of First
Instance is a general legislation, not to mention that the former are later enactments, the
Court of First Instance should yield to the jurisdiction of the Customs authorities.
It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over
imported goods, for the purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods are
actually in its possession or control, even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously been
issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings. In the present
case, the Bureau of Customs actually seized the goods in question on November 4, 1966, and so from
that date the Bureau of Customs acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the
enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to the exclusion of the regular courts. Much less then would
the Court of First Instance of Manila have jurisdiction over the goods in question after the Collector of
Customs had issued the warrant of seizure and detention on January 12, 1967. 10 And so, it cannot be
said, as respondents contend, that the issuance of said warrant was only an attempt to divest the
respondent Judge of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The court presided by respondent
Judge did not acquire jurisdiction over the goods in question when the petition for mandamus was filed
before it, and so there was no need of divesting it of jurisdiction. Not having acquired jurisdiction over
the goods, it follows that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to issue the questioned
order of March 7, 1967 releasing said goods.
Respondents also aver that petitioner Martin Alagao, an officer of the Manila Police Department,
could not seize the goods in question without a search warrant. This contention cannot be sustained.
The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been deputized in writing by the
Commissioner of Customs, could, for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws,
effect searches, seizures, and arrests, 11 and it was his duty to make seizure, among others, of any
cargo, articles or other movable property when the same may be subject to forfeiture or liable for any
fine imposed under customs and tariff laws. 12 He could lawfully open and examine any box, trunk,
envelope or other container wherever found when he had reasonable cause to suspect the presence
therein of dutiable articles introduced into the Philippines contrary to law; and likewise to stop, search
and examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of holding or conveying such article as
aforesaid. 13 It cannot be doubted, therefore, that petitioner Ricardo G. Papa, Chief of Police of Manila,
could lawfully effect the search and seizure of the goods in question. The Tariff and Customs Code
authorizes him to demand assistance of any police officer to effect said search and seizure, and the
latter has the legal duty to render said assistance. 14 This was what happened precisely in the case of
Lt. Martin Alagao who, with his unit, made the search and seizure of the two trucks loaded with the nine
bales of goods in question at the Agrifina Circle. He was given authority by the Chief of Police to make
the interception of the cargo. 15
Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure without
any search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said
warrant in the instant case. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of
the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or
building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and
any trunk, package, or envelope or any person on board, or to stop and search and examine any
vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced
into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said
cases. 16 But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said "dwelling house may be
entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace. . . ." 17 It is our
considered view, therefor, that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising
police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the
enforcement of customs laws.
 Our conclusion finds support in the case of Carroll v. United States, 39 A.L.R., 790, 799, wherein
the court, considering a legal provision similar to Section 2211 of the Philippine Tariff and Customs
Code, said as follows:
Thus contemporaneously with the adoption of the 4th Amendment, we find in the first
Congress, and in the following second and fourth Congresses, a difference made as to the
necessity for a search warrant between goods subject to forfeiture, when concealed in a
dwelling house of similar place, and like goods in course of transportation and concealed in a
movable vessel, where readily they could be put out of reach of a search warrant. . . .
Again, by the 2d section of the Act of March 3, 1815 (3 Stat. at L.231, 232, chap. 94), it
was made lawful for customs officers not only to board and search vessels within their own
and adjoining districts, but also to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person on
which or whom they should suspect there was merchandise which was subject to duty, or
had been introduced into the United States in any manner contrary to law, whether by the
person in charge of the vehicle or beast or otherwise, and if they should find any goods,
wares, or merchandise thereon, which they had probably cause to believe had been so
unlawfully brought into the country, to seize and secure the same, and the vehicle or beast as
well, for trial and forfeiture. This Act was renewed April 27, 1816 (3 Sta. at L. 315, chap. 100),
for a year and expired. The Act of February 28, 1865, revived § 2 of the Act of 1815, above
described, chap. 67, 13 Stat. at L. 441. The substance of this section was re-enacted in the
3d section of the Act of July 18, 1866, chap. 201, 14 Stat. at L. 178, and was thereafter
embodied in the Revised Statutes as § 3061, Comp. Stat. § 5763, 2 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed.
p. 1161. Neither § 3061 nor any of its earlier counterparts has ever been attacked as
unconstitutional. Indeed, that section was referred to and treated as operative by this court in
Von Cotzhausen v. Nazro, 107 U.S. 215, 219, 27 L. ed. 540, 541, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 503. . . .
In the instant case, we note that petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen did not
have to make any search before they seized the two trucks and their cargo. In their original petition, and
amended petition, in the court below Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa did not even allege that
there was a search. 18 All that they complained of was,
That while the trucks were on their way, they were intercepted without any search
warrant near the Agrifina Circle and taken to the Manila Police Department, where they were
detained.
But even if there was a search, there is still authority to the effect that no search warrant would
be needed under the circumstances obtaining in the instant case. Thus, it has been held that:
The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is construed as
recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other structure
in respect of which a search warrant may readily be obtained and a search of a ship,
motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure
a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
the warrant must be sought. (47 Am. Jur., pp. 513-514, citing Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 69 L. ed., 543, 45 S. Ct., 280, 39 A.L.R., 790; People v. Case, 320 Mich., 379, 190
N.W., 389, 27 A.L.R., 686.)
In the case of People v. Case (320 Mich., 379, 190 N.W., 389, 27 A.L.R., 686), the question
raised by defendant's counsel was whether an automobile truck or an automobile could be searched
without search warrant or other process and the goods therein seized used afterwards as evidence in a
trial for violation of the prohibition laws of the State. Same counsel contended the negative, urging the
constitutional provision forbidding unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court said:
. . . Neither our state nor the Federal Constitution directly prohibits search and seizure
without a warrant, as is sometimes asserted. Only "unreasonable" search and seizure is
forbidden. . . .
. . . The question whether a seizure or a search is unreasonable in the language of the
Constitution is a judicial and not a legislative question; but in determining whether a seizure is
or is not unreasonable, all of the circumstances under which it is made must be looked to.
The automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle of recent development, which has
multiplied by quantity production and taken possession of our highways in battalions until the
slower, animal-drawn vehicles, with their easily noted individuality, are rare. Constructed as
covered vehicles to standard form in immense quantities, and with a capacity for speed
rivaling express trains, they furnish for successful commission of crime a disguising means of
silent approach and swift escape unknown in the history of the world before their advent. The
question of their police control and reasonable search on highways or other public places is a
serious question far deeper and broader than their use in so-called "bootleging" or "rum
running," which is itself is no small matter. While a possession in the sense of private
ownership, they are but a vehicle constructed for travel and transportation on highways. Their
active use is not in homes or on private premises, the privacy of which the law especially
guards from search and seizure without process. The baffling extent to which they are
successfully utilized to facilitate commission of crime of all degrees, from those against
morality, chastity, and decency, to robbery, rape, burglary, and murder, is a matter of
common knowledge. Upon that problem a condition, and not a theory, confronts proper
administration of our criminal laws. Whether search of and seizure from an automobile upon
a highway or other public place without a search warrant is unreasonable is in its final
analysis to be determined as a judicial question in view of all the circumstances under which
it is made.
Having declared that the seizure by the members of the Manila Police Department of the goods
in question was in accordance with law and by that seizure the Bureau of Customs had acquired
jurisdiction over the goods for the purpose of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, to the
exclusion of the Court of First Instance of Manila, We have thus resolved the principal and decisive
issue in the present case. We do not consider it necessary, for the purposes of this decision, to discuss
the incidental issues raised by the parties in their pleadings.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
(a) Granting the writ of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by petitioners;
(b) Declaring null and void, for having been issued without jurisdiction, the order of respondent
Judge Hilarion U. Jarencio, dated March 7, 1967, in Civil Code No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance
of Manila;
(c) Declaring permanent the preliminary injunction issued by this Court on March 31, 1967
restraining respondent Judge from executing, enforcing and/or implementing his order of March 7, 1967
in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and from proceeding in any manner in
said case;
(d) Ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila;
and1äwphï1.ñët
(e) Ordering the private respondent, Remedios Mago, to pay the costs.
 It is so ordered.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-6858. May 31, 1956.]
FERNANDO IGNACIO and SIMEON DE LA CRUZ, Petitioners-Appellants, vs. THE HONORABLE NORBERTO ELA,
Mayor of Sta. Cruz, Zambales, Respondent-Appellee.
DECISION
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Petitioners, in their behalf and for the benefit of other Jehovah’s Witnesses in the province of Zambales, brought
this action to compel Respondent to grant them a permit to hold a public meeting at the public plaza of Sta. Cruz,
Zambales, together with the kiosk, on such date and time as may be applied for by them.
Respondent in his answer stated that he had not refused the request of Petitioners to hold a religious meeting at
the public plaza as in fact he grave them permission to use the northwestern part of the plaza on July 27, 1952,
but they declined to avail of it. He prayed that the action be dismissed.
The questions of fact raised in the pleadings being not controverted, and Petitioners having submitted a motion
for judgment on the pleadings, which was concurred in by Respondent, the court rendered a decision dismissing
the case without pronouncement as to costs. Plaintiffs appealed from this decision.
It appears that Petitioners are members of the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society, commonly known as
Jehovah’s Witnesses, whose tenets and principles are derogatory to those professed by the Catholic organization.
In its publication “FACE THE FACTS”, that society branded the latter as a religious organization which is “a part of
the monstrosity now appearing in and claiming the right to rule the earth.” Desiring to hold a meeting in
furtherance of its objectives, Petitioners asked Respondent to give them permission to use the public plaza
together with the kiosk, but, instead of granting the permission, Respondent allowed them to hold their meeting
on the northwestern part corner of the plaza. He adopted as a policy not to allow the use of the kiosk for any
meeting by any religious denomination as it is his belief that said Kiosk should only be used “for legal purposes.”
And when their request for reconsideration was denied, Petitioners instituted the present action for mandamus.
It is now contended by Petitioners that the action taken by Respondent is unconstitutional being an abridgment of
the freedom of speech, assembly, and worship guaranteed by our Constitution. The issue raised involves a little
digression on the extent to which the right to peacefully assemble guaranteed by the Constitution may be invoked.
Fortunately, this issue has already been passed upon by this Court in Primicias vs. Fugoso, 45 Official Gazette,
3280, wherein this Court said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions of
democratic countries. But it is a settled principle growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the
exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal
enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to
regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign ‘police power’, which is the
power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general
welfare of the people. This sovereign police power is exercised by the government through its legislative branch
by the enactment of laws regulating those and other constitutional and civil rights, and it may be delegated to
political subdivisions, such as towns, municipalities and cities by authorizing their legislative bodies celled
municipal and city councils to enact ordinances for the purpose.”
It therefore appears that the right to freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble, though guaranteed by our
Constitution, is not absolute, for it may be regulated in order that it may not be “injurious to the equal enjoyment
of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society”, and this power may be
exercised under the “police power” of the state, which is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. It is true that there is no law
nor ordinance which expressly confers upon Respondents the power to regulate the use of the public plaza,
together with its kiosk, for the purposes for which it was established, but such power may be exercised under his
broad powers as chief executive in connection with his specific duty “to issue orders relating to the police or to
public safety” within the municipality (section 2194, paragraph c, Revised Administrative Code). And it may even
be said that the above regulation has been adopted as an implementation of the constitutional provision which
prohibits any public property to be used, directly or indirectly, by any religious denomination (paragraph 3, section
23, Article VI of the Constitution).
The power exercised by Respondent cannot be considered as capricious or arbitrary considering the peculiar
circumstances of this case. It appears that the public plaza, particularly the kiosk, is located at a short distance
from the Roman Catholic Church. The proximity of said church to the kiosk has caused some concern on the part
of the authorities that to avoid disturbance of peace and order, or the happening of untoward incidents, they
deemed it necessary to prohibit the use of that kiosk by any religious denomination as a place of meeting of its
members. This was the policy adopted by Respondent for sometime previous to the request made
by Petitioners. Respondent never denied such request but merely tried to enforce his policy by assigning them the
northwestern part of the public plaza. It cannot therefore be said that Petitioners were denied their constitutional
right to assemble for, as was said, such right is subject to regulation to maintain public order and public safety.
This is especially so considering that the tenets of Petitioners’ congregation are derogatory to those of the Roman
Catholic Church, a factor which Respondent must have considered in denying their request.
It is true that the foregoing conclusion is predicated on facts which do not appear in the pleadings nor are
supported by any evidence because none was presented for the reason that the case was submitted on a motion
for judgment on the pleadings, but those facts like the situation of the “kiosko” and the occurrence of religious
controversies which disturbed the peace and order in the municipality of Sta. Cruz are matters which may be
deemed to come within the judicial knowledge of the court as in fact they were so considered by the trial judge in
his decision. This is what he said on this point:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary “The presiding judge, through
information, personal experience and through the papers, has known of unfortunate events which caused the
disturbance of peace and order in the community. If the Petitioners should be allowed to use the ‘kiosko’ which is
within the hearing distance of the catholic church, this may give rise to disturbance of other religious ceremonies
performed in the church.” (Italics supplied.) This action of the judge may be justified under section 5, Rule 123, of
the Rules of Court, which is elaborated by this Court in the following wise:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
There are facts, indeed of which courts should take judicial cognizance. These facts refer to a variety of subjects
— legislative, political, historical, geographical, commercial, scientific, and artificial — in addition to a wide range
of matters, arising in the ordinary course of nature or the general current of human events. The matter of judicial
notice is ever expanding and will surely keep pace with the advance of the science and the arts. But, a matter to
be judicially cognizable must be well-established or authoritatively settled, or of common or general knowledge.
Obviously, courts should take notice of whatever is or should be generally known because judges should not be
more ignorant than the rest of mankind.’ (The Municipal Board of the City of Manila, et al. vs. Segundo Agustin,
65 Phil., 144.) (Italics supplied.)
The contention that the northwestern part of the plaza cannot be considered as part of said plaza but of the road
in the northwestern portion beyond the concrete fence is untenable, for it appears that portion is part of the plaza
and has a space capable of accommodating hundreds of people. In fact, during the past celebrations of the
traditional town fiesta of the municipality, said portion has been utilized by the authorities as a place for staging
dramas, zarzuelas, and cinematograph shows. Verily, the pretense of Petitioners cannot be attributed to the
unsuitability of that portion as a meeting place but rather to their obstinate desire to use the kiosk knowing it to
be contrary to the policy of the municipality. 1 The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs
against Petitioners.
G.R. No. 36453 September 28, 1932
CRISANTO EVANGELISTA, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. TOMAS EARNSHAW, Mayor of the
City of Manila, Defendant-Appellee.
Vicente Sotto for appellant.
City Fiscal Felix for appellee.
OSTRAND, J.:
This is an action of mandamus brought against the defendant mayor of the City of Manila.
The plaintiff alleges that he is the president of the Communist Party in the Philippine
Islands, a political group seeking the speedy granting of independence in these Islands
and the redemption of the proletariat, numbering over 300,000 men and woman in its
ranks; that on the 2d of March, 1931, by means of a letter to the defendant mayor of the
city, the plaintiff requested the necessary permission to hold a popular meeting at Plaza
Moriones in that city, on the afternoon of March 12, 1931, to be followed by a parade
through the streets of Juan Luna, Azcarraga, Avenida Rizal, Echague, and General Solano
in order to deliver to the Governor-General a message from the laboring class; that on the
3d of March, 1931, the mayor of the city denied the plaintiff's petition, instructing his
subaltern, the chief of police, to prohibit all kinds of meetings held by the Communist
Party throughout the city, because he had revoked their permits and licenses; that
consequently, the Communist Party has not been able to hold any private or public
meetings in the city since the 6th day of March, 1931; that in refusing the requested
permission and in prohibiting all meetings of the party within the city, the defendant
deprived the Communist Party of a constitutional right. The plaintiff further prays "that a
writ of mandamus be issued against the herein defendant compelling him to issue a
permit for the holding of meetings and parades by the Communist Party in
Manila."chanrobles virtual law library
The defendant in his answer and special defense stated that subsequent to the issuance of
the above-mentioned permit, it was discovered after an investigation conducted by the
office of the fiscal for the City of Manila, that said Communist Party of the Philippines is an
illegal association, or organization, which having for its principal object to incite the revolt
of the proletariat or laboring class, according to its constitution and by-laws, states as
follows:
The Philippines, as a subject nation, in order to establish an independent government, has
to revolt under the leadership of the laborers.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
. . . It is clear that the different political parties of the burgesses (Nacionalista-
Consolidado, Democrata, etc.) are no different from another. They have but one aim; to
rise into power and exploit, with independence or not; to enrich themselves and
strengthen the control of a government which is procapitalist and
proimperialist.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Because of these, we need a Communist Party, one that is not reformist but revolutionary.
Only by revolutionary means can we demolish the slavery of man by another and of one
nation by another nation. . .chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The principal ideal of the C. P. P. (Communist Party of the Philippines) in the desire to
head the Philippine Government is different from that of the burgees political parties. Its
aim is not to strengthen the capitalist government but to engender - as it cannot be
avoided - the war of the classes and to bring about its downfall. Therefore, the aims of the
C. P. P. are the following:chanrobles virtual law library
1. To lead the movement for the immediate and complete independence of the
Philippines.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
2. To fight and bring about the downfall of American imperialism which oppresses the
Philippines;chanrobles virtual law library
3. To stop the exploitation of the laborers and defend their rights and interests;chanrobles
virtual law library
4. To establish in the Philippines a Soviet Government under the
laborers.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
5. To bring about the downfall of capitalism.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
6. Under the dictatorship of the laborers, to emancipate and redeem the laborers and farm
hands, - to embrace communism.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
With these high ideals the Communist Party of the Philippines will be established. And
inasmuch as these ideals are the same as those of the C. I. (Communist International),
the C. P. P. will extend its full help for the redemption and welfare of the
laborers.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
. . . Here in the Philippines, American Imperialism is being fought also. The reluctance of
the Moros in paying taxes to the Government, the disorders in the large haciendas, the
farmers resisting the owners and the Constabulary, the strike of the high-school students,
the uprising of the Colorums, and the oppression of the imperialists and capitalists of the
laborers, are symptoms of a movement, which if carried on with unity, will perforce bring
about the downfall of American imperialism and the obtaining of Philippine
independence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Before achieving this ultimate ideal of the C. P. P. we will have you take other steps. First,
to overthrow American imperialism which oppresses the Philippines; second, to overthrow
capitalism and feudalism; third, to seize the power in the government; fourth, the
establishment of labor dictatorship; fifth, the bringing about of class consciousness and
class struggle and the prompt establishment of
communism.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Under this state of affairs, a struggle is indespensable. This struggle may be peaceful or
violent, but just the same it will be a bitter struggle, where life and death will be
staked.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
For the prompt overthrow of the institutions of capitalism and for the purpose of opening
the eyes of the people that the imperialists are not really in earnest about giving subject
peoples their independence - because independence is an enemy of oppression and
exploitation - unless their downfall is brought about, it is necessary to struggle, not only
during elections.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The difference of the revolutionary movement advocated by the C. P. P. is not found only
in its principal ideal but in the steps that it will take. While the reformists advocate
understanding and cooperation with the burgesses or capitalists, the movement of the
laborers is based on the principle of class struggle. Instead of cooperating with the enemy
we should master our own strength and fight our enemies. And in order to achieve this
union, strong and powerful, it is necessary that we should counteract every move that will
tend to prejudice the laborers.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In view of the revolutionary campaign of the C. P. P. for the sake of the laborers and farm
workers, the capitalists and imperialists will become more violent and antagonistic toward
them. And inasmuch as the capitalists and imperialists have control of the government, it
is not impossible that they will use their power to more violently oppress us; in such a
case they will make it clear that their ideals are inconsistent with those of the laborers.
When that day comes, the class struggle and the revolution will redouble their force, for
they will be forced to defend themselves by rising in revolt against the oppression they are
being subject to by means of the power of the state.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
For the obtaining of the partial demands to be made by the C. P. P., it is necessary that all
the laborers and farm hands, now divided by their different industrial organization, be
united. . . . If the factory laborers and farm hands organizations are already established
and ready for the struggle, and if their movement is already under the leadership of the
proletariat thru the C. P. P., it will endeavor to make the movement more vigorous for the
purpose of obtaining its partial demands until the time comes when the factory laborers
and farm hands are able to wrest the control of the Government from the capitalists and
imperialists and place it in the hands of the sons of the sweat;
By virtue of the original permits granted by the defendant mayor to the said Communist
Party of the Philippines, several public meetings were held under the auspices of the
aforesaid association in different parts of the City of Manila, in which seditious speeches
were made urging the laboring class to unite by affiliating to the Communist Party of the
Philippines in order to be able to overthrow the present government, and stirring up
enmity against the insular and local police forces by branding the members thereof as the
enemies of the laborers and as tools of the capitalists and imperialists for oppressing the
said laborers.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The communists further insisted that it was the duty of the laborers to bring the
government into their hands and to run it by themselves and for themselves, like the
laboring class in Russia; that when the laborers were united, neither the Constabulary nor
the United States Army nor the imperialist Governor-General could stop them when they
rose up as one body in order to free themselves from slavery by the capitalists; that
America was cunning and a coward, as evidenced by the fact that when she entered the
World War, her enemies were already weak; that the Constabulary and the police were
the ones who made trouble for the laborers because they were the agents of the American
imperialists in the Islands and they were used as instruments by the American Imperialist
Government; that united together, the laborers could down the American Imperialist
Government; and other terms and expression of similar tenor and
import.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It will be readily seen that the doctrines and principles advocated and urged in the
constitution and by-laws of the said Communist Party of the Philippines, and the speeches
uttered, delivered, and made by its members in the public meetings or gatherings, as
above stated, are highly seditious, in that they suggest and incite rebellious conspiracies
and disturb and obstruct the lawful authorities in their
duty.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Considering the actions of the so-called president of the Communist Party, it is evident
that he cannot expect that the defendant will permit the Communist Party to hold
meetings or parades in the manner herein described. Furthermore, it may be noted that
the complaint of the case is written merely in general terms and calls only for a judicial
declaration upon a question which is not at present an issue between the parties to this
case. But be that as it may, it must be considered that the respondent mayor, whose
sworn duty it is "to see that nothing should occur which would tend to provoke or excite
the people to disturb the peace of the community or the safety or order of the
Government," did only the right thing under the circumstances, that is, cancel and
withdraw, as was done, the permit previously issued by him to said Communist Party, in
accordance with the power granted him by law - "To grant and refuse municipal licenses
or permits of all classes and to revoke the same for violation of the conditions upon which
they were granted, or if acts prohibited by law or municipal ordinance are being
committed under the protection of such licenses or in the premises in which the business
for which the same have been granted is carried on, or for any other good reason of
general interest." (Act No. 2774, sec. 4, amending sec. 2434, par [ m], Administrative
Code.)chanrobles virtual law library
Instead of being condemned or criticised, the respondent mayor should be praised and
commended for having taken a prompt, courageous, and firm stand towards the said
Communist Party of the Philippines before the latter could do more damage by its
revolutionary propaganda, and by the seditious speeches and utterances of its members.
In the case of Gitlow vs. New York (268 U. S., 652), the Supreme Court of the United
States said:
Such utterances, by their very nature, involve danger to the public peace and to the
security of the state. They threaten breaches of the peace and ultimate revolution. And
the immediate danger is none the less real and substantial because the effect of the given
utterance cannot be accurately foreseen. The state cannot reasonably be required to
measure the danger from every such utterance in the nice balance of a jeweler's scale. A
single revolutionary spark may kindle a fire that, smoldering for a time, may burst into a
sweeping and destructive conflagration. It cannot be said that the state is acting
arbitrarily on unreasonably when, in the exercise of its judgment as to the measures
necessary to protect the public peace and safety, it seeks to extinguish the spark without
waiting until it has enkindled the flame or blazed into the conflagration. It cannot
reasonably be required to defer the adoption of measures for its own peace and safety
until the revolutionary utterances lead to actual disturbances of the public peace or
imminent and immediate danger of its own destruction; but it may, in the exercise of its
judgment, suppress the threatened danger in its incipiency. In People vs. Lloyd, supra, p.
35 (136 N. E., 505)., it was aptly said: "Manifestly, the legislature has authority to forbid
the advocacy of a doctrine designed and intended to overthrow the government without
waiting until there is a present and imminent danger of the success of the plan advocated.
If the state were compelled to wait until the apprehended danger became certain, then its
right to protect itself would come into being simultaneously with the overthrow of the
government, when there would be neither prosecuting officers nor courts for the
enforcement of the law."
At any rate, the right of peaceful assemblage is not an absolute one. In the case of People
vs. Perez (45 Phil., 599, 605), this court said:chanrobles virtual law library
. . . when the intention and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional guaranties of
freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive
measures designed to maintain the prestige of constituted authority, the supremacy of the
constitution and the laws, and the existence of the State. (Citing III Wharton's Criminal
Law, pp. 2127 et seq.; U. S. vs. Apurado [1907], 7 Phil., 422; People vs. Perfecto [1922],
43 Phil., 887.)chanrobles virtual law library
The judgment appealed from is affirmed with the costs against the appellant. So
ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
[G.R. No. L-31687. February 26, 1970.]
NAVARRO v. VILLEGAS.
GENTLEMEN:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court of even
date:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In Case G.R. No. L-31687 (Navarro v. Villegas), the Court, after considering the
pleadings and arguments of the parties, issued the following Resolution:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
Without prejudice to a more extended opinion and taking into account the following
considerations:chanrobles law library
That respondent Mayor has not denied nor absolutely refused the permit sought by
petitioner;
That as stated in Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 75, respondent Mayor possesses reasonable
discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the assembly
in order to secure convenient use thereof by others and provide adequate and proper
policing to minimize the risks of disorder and maintain public safety and order;
That respondent Mayor has expressly stated his willingness to grant permits for peaceful
assemblies at Plaza Miranda during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays when they would not
cause unnecessarily great disruption of the normal activities of the community and has
further offered Sunken Gardens as an alternative to Plaza Miranda as the site of the
demonstration sought to be held this afternoon;
That experiences in connection with present assemblies and demonstrations do not
warrant the Court’s disbelieving respondent Mayor’s appraisal that a public rally at Plaza
Miranda, as compared to one at the Sunken Gardens as he suggested, poses a clearer and
more imminent danger of public disorders, breaches of the peace, criminal acts, and even
bloodshed as an aftermath of such assemblies, and petitioner has manifested that it has
no means of preventing such disorders;
That, consequently, every time that such assemblies are announced, the community is
placed in such a state of fear and tension that offices are closed early and employees
dismissed, storefronts boarded up, classes suspended, and transportation disrupted, to
the general detriment of the public;
That civil rights and liberties can exist and be preserved only in an ordered society;
That petitioner has failed to show a clear specific legal duty on the part of respondent
Mayor to grant their application for permit unconditionally;
The Court resolved to DENY the writ prayed for and to dismiss the petition.chanrobles law
library : red
[G.R. No. L-18247. August 31, 1963.]
FLORENTINO GALLEGO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE
COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
K. V. Faylona for Petitioner.
Solicitor General for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHTS TO FREE SPEECH AND ASSEMBLY; POWER OF STATE
TO REGULATE UNDER THE POLICE POWER. — The rights to freedom of speech and to
peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances are
fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions
of democratic countries. But the exercise of these rights is not absolute for it may be so
regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal
rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society, and such power to regulate
is termed the sovereign "police power," which may in turn be delegated to political
subdivisions, like municipalities and cities, which may enact ordinances for the purpose.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES; JUDICIAL NOTICE BY COURT OF APPEALS. —
There is nothing in the law that prohibits a court, like the Court of Appeals, from taking
cognizance of a municipal ordinance. On the contrary, Section 5 of Rule 123 of the Rules
of Court enjoins courts to take judicial notice of matters which are capable of
unquestionable demonstration.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL NOTICE BY COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE. — Court of First
Instance should take judicial notice of municipal ordinances within their respective
jurisdictions.
4. CRIMINAL LAW; SLIGHT DISOBEDIENCE OF AN AGENT OF A PERSON IN AUTHORITY. —
Facts: In the morning of March 10, 1957, appellant and his companions were about to
hold a meeting of the Jehovah’s Witnesses in front of the public market of Lambunao,
Iloilo. The Chief of Police, Avelino Larrosa, approached appellant and inquired of him
whether he had permit to hold said meeting. As appellant could not produce any, the chief
of police enjoined him from so proceeding with the meeting but instead of desisting in
obedience to the chief of police’s intimation, appellant, in a challenging vein, addressed his
followers, "You must continue that, we will see what they (referring to the chief of police
and his policemen) can do for us." Whereupon, the chief of police warned appellant if he
continued with the meeting, he was to place him under arrest. However, appellant,
disregarding the warning, continued the meeting for at least 30 minutes more —
whereupon, he was arrested and charged accordingly. Held: Appellant is guilty of slight
disobedience of an agent of a person in authority.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISOBEDIENCE NOT JUSTIFIED UNLESS ILLEGALITY OF ORDER IS
CLEARLY MANIFEST. — Although petitioner may have legitimate reason to protest the
order of the chief of police, he was not justified in disobeying him and in assuming a
bellicose attitude by exhorting his followers to proceed with their meeting, as in fact the
latter did. As Justice Malcolm once said, "To authorize resistance (also disobedience) to
the agents of the authority, the illegality of the invasion must be manifested. Here, there
was possibly a proper case for protest. (But,) there was no case of excessive violence to
enforce defendant’s idea of a debatable legal question." (People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169).
DECISION
REGALA, J.:
Petitioner was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Iloilo to pay a fine of P10 and
the costs and, in case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment, following his
conviction of slight disobedience of an agent of a person in authority. He appealed to the
Court of Appeals which affirmed his sentence. He now appeals to this Court.
The Court of Appeals found the facts as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . That in the morning of March 10, 1957, appellant and his companions were about to
hold a meeting of the Jehovah’s Witnesses in front of the Public market of Lambunao,
Iloilo. The chief of police, Avelino Larrosa, approached appellant and inquired of him
whether he had a permit to hold said meeting. As appellant could not produce any, the
chief of police enjoined him from so proceeding with the meeting but instead of desisting
in obedience to the chief of police’s intimation, appellant, in a challenging vein, addressed
his followers, ‘You must continue that, we will see what they (referring to the chief of
police and his policeman) can do for us.’
"Whereupon the chief of police warned appellant if he continued with the meeting, he was
to place him under arrest. However, appellant, disregarding the warning, continued the
meeting for at least 30 minutes more — whereupon, he was arrested and charged
accordingly."cralaw virtua1aw library
In holding petitioner guilty of slight disobedience, the Court of Appeals
stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That there was disobedience on appellant’s part is self-evident from his immediate
reaction to the chief of police’ warning for him to discontinue the meeting — his exhorting
his followers ‘to continue the meeting as they were prepared to see what can the police do
for them.’ And these words were followed by the overt act of continuing the meeting for at
least 30 minutes as sufficiently established by the evidence. And it appears that, contrary
to appellant’s contention, there was an existing municipal ordinance at the time
(Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1957) providing for a previous permit for the holding of
religious meeting in public places."cralaw virtua1aw library
Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon
any person who not being included in the provisions of the preceding articles shall resist or
seriously disobey any person in authority or the agents of such person, while engaged in
the performance of official duties.
"When the disobedience to an agent of a person in authority is not of serious nature the
penalty of arresto menor or a fine ranging from 10 to 100 pesos shall be imposed."cralaw
virtua1aw library
There is no question here that petitioners, in defiance of the order of the chief of police,
held a meeting of his religious sect. He contends, however, that he cannot be convicted of
slight disobedience because, according to him, there is no proof of the existence of an
ordinance in force on March 10, 1957, requiring a permit for the holding of a meeting. For
this purpose, petitioner assails the Court of Appeals for taking judicial notice of Ordinance
No. 2, series of 1957 of Lambunao, Iloilo, when the trial court itself allegedly did not take
cognizance of the ordinance.
There is no merit in the defense. There is nothing in the law that prohibits a court, like the
Court of Appeals, from taking cognizance of a municipal ordinance. On the contrary,
Section 5 of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court enjoins courts to take judicial notice of matters
which are capable of unquestionable demonstration. This is exactly what the Court of
Appeals did in this case in holding that "contrary to appellant’s (petitioner’s) contention,
there was an existing municipal ordinance at the time (Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1957)
providing for a previous permit for the holding of religious meeting in public places."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Besides, it is not true, as claimed by petitioner, that the trial court did not take notice of
the ordinance in question. For the lower court mentioned petitioner’s "failure to secure the
necessary permit" with obvious reference to Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1957. In People v.
Gebune, 87 Phil. 727, We held that courts of first instance should take judicial notice of
municipal ordinances within their respective jurisdictions. It must be in compliance with
this ruling that the trial court took notice of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1957 of the
Municipality of Lambunao.
It is also contended that the order of the chief of police was illegal and, therefore, not
entitled to obedience because the ordinance applies only to meetings held in places where
the traffic is heavy. Here, it is claimed there is no proof that the traffic where the meeting
was held was heavy. Petitioner adds that he was given a permit by the mayor although at
the time he could not produce it because it was given orally.
It should not be lost of sight that this is a prosecution for slight disobedience, not for
violation of the ordinance. Although petitioner may have legitimate reason to protest the
order of the chief of people, he was not justified in disobeying him and in assuming a
bellicose attitude by exhorting his followers to proceed with their meeting, as in fact the
latter did. As Justice Malcolm once said, "To authorize resistance (also disobedience) to
the agents of the authority, the illegality of the invasion must be clearly manifested. Here,
there was possibly a proper case for protest. (But,) there was no case of excessive
violence to enforce defendant’s idea of a debatable legal question." (People v. Veloso, 48
Phil. 169)
Lastly, petitioner invokes the constitutional guaranty of free assembly to justify his act.
The rights to freedom of speech and to peaceably assemble and petition the government
for redress of grievances are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and
guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic countries. But it is a settled principle
growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of these rights is
not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal
enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or
society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is
termed the sovereign "police power," which is the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order of safety and the general
welfare of the people. This power is exercised by the government through its legislative
branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and other constitutional and civil rights
and it may be delegated to political subdivisions, such as municipalities and cities, by
authorizing their legislative bodies called municipal and city councils to enact ordinances
for the purpose. (Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71)
The ordinance in this case is a reasonable regulation of the use of public streets. There is
no claim that it gives the authorities arbitrary power to grant or deny permit; in fact there
is no claim that petitioner was arbitrarily denied a permit.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, costs against the petitioner.
G.R. No. L-36277 October 26, 1932
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. CRISANTO
EVANGELISTA and ABELARDO RAMOS, Defendants-Appellants.
Vicente Sotto for appellants.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
OSTRAND, J.:
In case No. 41830 (No. 36277 in the Supreme Court) the herein accused, Crisanto
Evangelista and Abelardo Ramos, were charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila
with a violation of section 8 of Act No. 292, as amended. Upon trial the court below found
the accused guilty and sentenced each of them to six month's imprisonment and to pay a
fine of P400 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and each of the accused
to pay one-half of the costs. Thereupon the defendants appealed to this
court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The acts which gave rise to this accusation were as follows: On the first day of May, 1931,
a parade was to be held by the communists in the municipality of Caloocan within two and
a half miles of the city limits of Manila, but as the permit for the parade had been revoked,
a Constabulary officer appeared with his soldiers at the place to prevent the holding of the
parade. The appellant, Crisanto Evangelista, who apparently was the leader of the people
therein assembled to take part in the parade, held a conversation with the Constabulary
officer about the permit and its revocation, after which Evangelista was allowed by the
Constabulary officer to say a few words to the people for the purpose of informing them
that the parade could not be held and that they should retire. But instead of telling the
people to retire, he raised his fist, which the people approved by shouting " mabuhay",
and then said: "Comrades or brethren, the municipal president, Mr. Aquino, has allowed
us to hold the parade, but for reason unknown to me, the permit has been revoked. This
shows that the big ones are persecuting and oppressing us, who are small, which they
have no right to do." Then shouts were heard from the audience saying, "Let us fight
them". The accused Abelardo Ramos, who was among the people, shouted "Let us fight
them until death". Evangelista proceeded saying, "My heart bleeds", but could not
continue because the officer stopped him and placed them both, Crisanto Evangelista and
Abelardo Ramos, under arrest. Thereupon the mass began to advance against the
Constabulary officer and soldiers, in an attempt to wrest Evangelista from the
constabulary and to continue the parade, but the soldiers made use of a water pump and
dispersed them. There were found on the body of Crisanto Evangelista the permit issued
by the municipal president and its revocation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The appellants testified denying having said the words above quoted and attributed to
them. They further claimed that the people were peaceful, but the trial court found the
facts as above stated, and the appellant's brief does not point out any data or reason why
the finding of the trial court should not be upheld.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Under the circumstances of the case, the statements made by the accused on the
occasion above related are clearly seditious. It must be noted that the disorder took place
on May 1, 1931, that is, several months after the inauguration of the Communist Party
and after the communists had already filled the minds of their followers with their
revolting ideas in several meetings. That the said utterances were really inciting the
people to revolt, is shown by the fact that the mass, not only shouted a protest against
the officers of the law, but did actually advance against them, and the latter had to use
force in order to enforce the law. The defense arguing upon the authority of United
States vs. Apurado (7 Phil., 422), maintains that there is no sedition here, because a mere
disorder is not sedition, but the comparison is inadmissible. In the Apurado case, the
people assembled at the chamber of the municipal council to ask for the removal of the
municipal treasurer on account of religious differences. This court did not find any disorder
in that case. It was a petition for redress of grievances made in more or less excited
language, but the affair on the whole was peaceful and orderly; whereas in the instant
case, there was an inducement to fight, an actual though unexpected fight and resistance
against the authorities. It was simply the practical expression and repetition of the
previous instigations to overthrow the government, made by the communist leaders
before.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
For these reasons and those given in cases G. R. Nos. 36275 1 and 36276, 2 the judgment
appealed from will be affirmed with the costs against the appellants. So
ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
G.R. No. L-18853 August 22, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EXEQUIEL ALIPIT and VICTORIO D. ALEMUS, defendants-appellants.
Pedro Guevara for appellants.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The information herein is as follows:
That on or about the 30th of May, 1920, in the municipality of Cabuyao, Province of Laguna,
Philippine Islands, the defendants Exequiel Alipit and Victorio D. Alemus, being the municipal
president and the chief of police respectively of the said municipality of Cabuyao, did willfully,
unlawfully, maliciously and acting under a previous agreement and conspiracy entered into
between themselves and assisting and cooperating with each other, after the accused
Exequiel Alipit had fired his revolver in the air, enter the session room of the municipality
building of Cabuyao wherein the municipal council of Cabuyao was holding a meeting
presided over by the vice-president, Manuel Basa, and once in said room, the aforesaid
accused Exequiel Alipit and Victorio D. Alemus, abusing their authority as municipal president
and chief of police respectively, the former with a revolver in his hand, and both using
violence and intimidation not only upon the person of said vice-president Manuel Basa, but
also upon those of the councilors present at the aforesaid meeting, and without any justifiable
motive or legal authority and by means of force, arrested said vice-president Manuel Basa
and compelled him to submit himself to the arrest against the latter's will and over his protest
and that of each and everyone of the councilors and took him to the jail of the municipal
building of Cabuyao, the accused Victorio D. Alemus taking at the same time possession of
all the papers concerning the meeting that was being held by the municipal council of
Cabuyao, by which acts the defendants succeeded in interrupting and dissolving the
aforesaid meeting.
After the usual proceedings, the trial court found the defendant guilty of coercion through illegal
detention and sentenced them, under articles 497, in connection with article 89, of the Penal Code, to
five months of arresto mayor and fine of 1,500 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, the accessory penalties and costs. From this judgment the defendants appealed, assigning
eleven errors which raise these points, to wit, the illegality of that meeting of the municipal council; the
fact of the vice-president presiding over it; the finding of the trial court that the act committed by the
accused constitutes coercion; and the conviction of the accused Victorio D. Alemus, who, according to
the defense, acted by virtue of an obedience due another; and from this defendants conclude that the
appellants should have been acquitted.
The Attorney-General asks for the affirmance of the judgment.
From the record the following antecedents appear:
The accused Exequiel Alipit had been elected municipal president of Cabuyao, Laguna. Agustin
Dedicatora and others petitioned the Executive Bureau not to confirm said election, because said
president-elect was a minor. The matter was referred by the Executive Bureau to the provincial board of
Laguna for investigation. The provincial board in turn transmitted the papers to the municipal council of
Cabuyao, which proceeded to make an investigation, three meetings having held for the purpose, which
were presided over by president Alipit, who left the chair to vice-president Manuel Basa as soon as the
aforesaid investigation came up for discussion.
On the 30th of May, 1920, the municipal council held an extraordinary meeting which was presided over
by vice-president Basa because the hour fixed had come without the president being present. While the
meeting was being held, the accused Victorio Alemus, then the chief of police of that municipality,
entered the room, saying that he had an order from the president to arrest vice-president Basa. Basa
answered that he had not committed any crime. Dominador Delfino, one of the councilors present,
succeeded in persuading the chief of police to wait until the meeting was over. A few minutes thereafter
president Alipit arrived at the municipal building and after taking one of the revolvers in the police office,
fired a shot in the air, entered immediately the room where the meeting was being held and said in a
loud voice to the chief of police who was there: "Arrest him, arrest him," pointing out the vice-president.
The chief of police obeyed the order, holding the vice-president by the arm and taking him to the jail,
president Alipit following them with the revolver in his hand.
Shortly afterwards, councilor Delfino asked president Alipit if they could continue the meeting to the
end, to which Alipit answered: "Whoever dare continue holding the meeting will be arrested." the
councilors then dispersed, leaving the premises. Alipit ordered the taking of the books and documents
used in the meeting and went to Calamba where he asked and obtained from the Constabulary three
armed soldiers to protect him against any possible attack from the vice-president Basa. By his order,
the three soldiers watched vice-president Basa and held him incommunicated in the jail until about two
o'clock in the evening, when he was released by the provincial governor who had come there.
One of the points whereupon great stress is laid by the appellants is that that meeting of May 30, 1920,
was unlawful. The evidence shows that that special meeting of the council was called at the instance of
two councilors and that notices had been prepared for all the members of the council, although those
addressed to the municipal president and some councilors were not delivered to the addresses.
There were five councilors present at the meeting in question, who constituted a quorum, with vice-
president Manuel Basa as chairman. The record shows that the president, as well as the other
councilors, was absent from the municipality when an attempt was made to deliver to them the notice of
that meeting, the notices to the councilors who were in Manila having been placed in the hands of
Agustin Dedicatora who was coming to Manila. In American jurisprudence it is a doctrine frequently
followed that where the members of a council are absent from the municipality, the necessity of notice
is dispensed with. (Russell vs. Wellington, 157 Mass., 100; Lord vs. City of Anoka, 36 Minn., 176.)
But it must be noted that the question here is not concerned with the legality of any resolution adopted
by the council at that special meeting. The question is whether or not that meeting of the council in
which there was a quorum of the absence or inability of the municipal president on account of the
absence or inability of the municipal president (or of both causes) was a meeting the disturbance and
interruption of which should be punished. This is, in our opinion, the point at issue in this case.
The legality of that meeting is attacked on the ground of lack of notice to some members of the council.
Nobody has the right to dissolve, through violence, the meeting of a council under the present of the
existence of such a legal defect which was not apparent, but required an investigation before it could be
determined. Any stranger, even if he be the municipal president himself or the chief of the municipal
police, must respect the meeting of the municipal council which for the time being, at least, raises the
presumption that no defect exists to render it illegal. That meeting of the municipal council was entitled
too this respect on the part of the defendants and the aforesaid presumption was effective as to them.
Let it not be said that the presumption of legality did not operate as to the accused Exequiel Alipit for
the reason that he did in fact receive no notice of said meeting. The law (sec. 2220, Administrative
Code) does not require personal services of the notice; it is sufficient if the same be left in the domicile
of the member of the council. Besides said president Alipit was personally interested in the matter to be
transacted in the meeting, and so the notice sent to him was, according to the witness, Dominador
Delfino, as if it were to a party respondent. Said accused Alipit could not take part in the determination
of the matter as a member of the council.
 It is universally recognized that it is improper and illegal for a member of a municipal council
to vote upon any question brought before the council in which he is personally interested. . . .
When the council is acting in a quasi judicial capacity, for a member to pass upon a question
in which he is interested renders the judgment void, even if his vote was not necessary to a
decision. Thus the action of the common council of a city in determining an election contest
according to the weight of conflicting evidence is judicial in its nature, and a contestant is
disqualified to sit as a member of the council in the determination of the contest. His
participation makes the proceedings invalid even if the decision reached did not depend upon
his vote. (19 R. C. L., 897 and cases cited.)
We find no valid excuse, exempting the defendants from the criminal responsibility arising from the acts
committed by them. With regard to the accused Victorio Alemus, it is no valid justification for him to
have acted by virtue of an order received from is coaccused, because said order was unlawful..
We find no error in the judgment appealed from, except as regards the denomination of the crime and
the imposition of the penalty.
The information charges the accused with the crime of coercion and the trial court found them guilty of
arbitrary detention as a means to commit coercion. We are of the opinion that the law violated by the
accused is Act No. 1755, which in its section 1, says:
Any person who willfully or by force or fraud prevent or attempts to prevent the meeting of the
Philippine Commission or the organizing or meeting of the Philippine Assembly or of any
Insular legislative body of the Philippine Islands hereafter established, or the meeting or
organizing of any provincial board or municipal or township council, and any person who
willfully disturbs the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Assembly, or in Insular
legislative body of the Philippine Islands hereafter established, or any provincial board or
municipal or township council, while in session, or who is guilty of any disorderly conduct in
the immediate view or presence of any such body tending to interrupt the proceedings of
such body or to impair the respect due to its authority, shall be punished by a fine of not more
than two thousand pesos or by imprisonment for not more than five years, or by both, in the
discretion of the court.
And in view of the allegations contained in the information herein, the accused may, and must, be
convicted of a violation of said section 1 of this Act and punished accordingly.
Regard being had of the gravity of the act committed, as well as the respective condition and position of
the accused, Exequiel Alipit is hereby sentenced to three years' imprisonment and Victorio Alemus to
one years' imprisonment, with the costs against them. The judgment appealed from being thus
modified, the defendants are found guilty of a violation of section 1 of Act No. 1755 and punishable with
the penalty thereby provided. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, and Johns, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-40577 August 23, 1934
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PROCOPIO REYES, POLICARPIO NACANA, FLORENTINO CLEMENTE, HERMOGENES
MALLARI, MARCELINO MALLARI, CASTOR ALIPIO, and RUFINO MATIAS, defendants-appellants.
Hilarion U. Jarencio for appellants.
Acting Solicitor-General Peña for appellee.
HULL, J.:
Appellants were convicted in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac of a violation of article 133 of the
Revised Penal Code, which reads:
ART. 133. Offending the religious feelings.—The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon anyone who, in a
place devoted to religious ceremony, shall perform acts notoriously offensive to the feelings
of the faithful.
In the barrio of Macalong, municipality of La Paz, Province of Tarlac, there is a chapel where it is
customary to hold what is known in local parlance as a pabasa. As stated by the lower court, "the
term pabasa is applied to the act of the people, professing the Roman Catholic faith," of assembling,
during Lent, "at a certain designated place, for the purpose of reading and the life, passion and death of
Jesus Christ. A book known as the 'Vida, Pasion y Muerte de Jesucristo', which contains a fun account
in verse of the life, passion and death of Jesus Christ, is used in this celebration." The pabasa in
Macalong used to begin on Palm Sunday and continue day and night, without any interruption
whatsoever, until Good Friday. As usual, refreshment and food were served in the yard adjoining the
chapel, and the expenses incidental thereto were defrayed by different persons.
While the pabasa was going on the evening of April 10, 1933, between 11 and 12 o'clock, the
defendants Procopio Reyes, Policarpio Nacana, Florentino Clemente, Hermogenes Mallari, Marcelino
Mallari, Castor Alipio, and Rufino Matias arrived at the place, carrying bolos and crowbars, and started
to construct a barbed wire fence in front of the chapel. Alfonso Castillo, who was chairman of the
committee in charge of the pabasa, tried to persuade them to refrain from carrying out their plan, by
reminding them of the fact that it was Holy Week and that it was highly improper to construct a fence at
that time of the evening. A verbal altercation ensued.
When the people attending the pabasa in the chapel and those who were eating in the yard thereof
noticed what was happening, they became excited and left the place hurriedly and in such confusion
that dishes and saucers were broken and benches toppled over. The pabasa was discontinued and it
was not resumed until after an investigation conducted by the chief of police on the following morning,
which investigation led to the filing of the complaint appearing on pages 1 and 2 of the record.
Many years ago the Clemente family by informal donation gave the land on which the old chapel was
erected. When it was destroyed, the present chapel was erected, and there is now a dispute as to
whether the new chapel is not now impinging on the land that belongs to the Clemente family. The
appellants are partisans of he Clemente family.
It is to be noted that article 133 of the Revises Penal Code punishes acts "notoriously offensive to the
feelings of the faithful." The construction of a fence, even though irritating and vexatious under the
circumstances to those present, is not such an act as can be designated as "notoriously offensive to the
faithful", as normally such an act would be a matter of complete indifference to those not present, no
matter how religious a turn of mind they might be.
The disturbance or interruption of any ceremony of a religious character under the old Penal Code was
denounced by article 571 and was punished by arrest from one to ten days and a fine of from 15 to
125 pesetas. But this article was omitted from the Revised Penal Code and the offense, if any was
committed by the appellants, is denounced in article 287 as an "unjust vexation" and punished
by arresto menor or a fine ranging from 5 to 200 pesos or both.
It is urged upon us that the act of building a fence was innocent and was simply to protect private
property rights. The fact that this argument is a pretense only is clearly shown by the circumstances
under which the fence was constructed, namely, late at night and in such a way as to vex and annoy
the parties who had gathered to celebrate the pabasa and is further shown by the fact that many of the
appellants saw fit to introduce as their defense a false alibi.
Appellants are therefore acquitted of a violation of article 133 of the Revised Penal Code but found
guilty of a violation of article 287 of the Revised Penal Code and are sentenced each to a fine of P75
with subsidiary confinement in case of insolvency, together with the costs in both instances. So
ordered.
G.R. No. 225624, October 03, 2018
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. MARIANITO ARCES, JR., Appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
On appeal is the 26 November 2015 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CEB-CR HC No. 01908, which affirmed the 3 June 2013 Decision2 of Branch 41 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bacolod City in Criminal Case No. 08-31346 finding appellant
Marianito Arces, Jr. (Arces) guilty of the crime of rape.
The Facts
On 19 April 2006, at around 5:30 a.m., AAA's father, mother, elder brother, and younger
brother left the house leaving AAA,3 who was nine (9) years old, alone in the house. While
sleeping, AAA was awakened by her uncle, Arces who appeared beside her and started to
undress her. Arces took off his clothes, positioned himself on top of AAA and inserted his
penis into her vagina. AAA complained that what he was doing was painful. Arces stopped,
dressed AAA, put on his clothes, and warned AAA not to tell anyone what had happened.
The following day, Arces returned to AAA's house where she was again left alone. Arces
took off his clothes, laid on top of AAA, and made pumping motions while AAA was fully
clothed. AAA never revealed these incidents with Arces with anyone.
On 4 January 2008, AAA's mother had an argument with her cousin Marites Moraña
(Marites), who is Arces' sister. Marites and AAA's mother were neighbors and the smoke
coming from the trash being burned by Marites caused the argument between the two.
They had an exchange of words where Marites' sister Maricel Lacuba (Maricel) commented
that AAA's mother was good at minding other people's business but was unaware of her
daughter's sexual activities. Angered by this accusation, AAA's mother confronted AAA
about the accusation. AAA did not say anything but upon the prodding of her mother, she
told what had happened. AAA stated that she did not tell her sooner because Arces had
threatened her. Together, AAA and AAA's mother reported the incident to the police
station. On 7 January 2008, AAA was examined by Dr. Jesus Medardo Buyco (Dr. Buyco)
of the City Health Office. Dr. Buyco observed that AAA’s hymen was intact, there were no
signs of hematoma or any vaginal deformities, and there were no signs of lacerations of
AAA’s vaginal wall. Dr. Buyco concluded that the findings were not consistent with penile
penetration.
Arces vehemently denied the allegations against him, arguing that on the day that he
allegedly raped AAA, he was already at sea catching crabs with his brother-in-law,
Jonathan Lacuba (Lacuba). Lacuba testified that on the day and time of the alleged
incident, he was working together with Arces at sea. Arces also asserted that he usually
leaves at around 4:30 to 5:30a.m. and would return only at 8:00 a.m.
Further, Arces argued that on the date of the alleged incident, 19 April 2006, AAA and her
family were not home as they attended a barangay fiesta in the town of Dueñas in Iloilo.
In fact, AAA's parents had invited him to go but he refused as he had no money for
transportation to Iloilo.
Finally, Arces alleged that on 20 August 2006, he had moved to Jaro, Iloilo and worked
there for two years.4 After the complaint for rape was filed against him, he was forced to
return from Iloilo to answer the accusation against him.
Arces' sisters Marites and Maricel testified that the charge against Arces was instigated by
the existing conflict and ill-feelings between them and AAA's mother.
Marites testified that she and AAA's mother had an argument where AAA’s mother accused
her and her sister Maricel as being whores, to which she replied that AAA’s mother should
watch her daughter instead. AAA’s mother replied that they better stand by what they
charge because there will come a time that they will cry tears of blood for what she will
do.5 Marites also stated that she knew AAA and her mother went to Iloilo on 15 April 2006
to attend a fiesta as AAA's mother borrowed money from her.
Likewise, Maricel testified that they used to have good relations with AAA's mother but
that their relationship turned sour. Maricel also stated that she saw AAA and her playmate
playing house while the playmate was only in his briefs.6
Due to the altercation between AAA's mother and the sisters of Arces, AAA's mother filed
a case against Marites and Maricel before the Punong Barangay. During their confrontation
at the barangay conciliation hearing, it was intimated that it was AAA's playmate who had
sexual activities with AAA. This was denied by AAA's playmate.
Arces was charged with the crime of Rape under Article 266-A, par. 1(d), in relation to
Article 266-B, of the Revised Penal Code. He entered a plea of not guilty.
The Ruling of the RTC
In a Decision dated 3 June 2013, the RTC found Arces guilty of the crime of rape, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the
defendant MARIANITO ARCES, JR., GUILTY of the offense charged and is hereby
sentenced to a penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
The defendant is ordered to pay the complainant [AAA], the sum of Seventy Five
Thousand Pesos (Php75,000.00) as moral damages and the sum of Twenty Five Thousand
Pesos (Php25,000.00) as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.7
The RTC found that the allegation of Arces that he was falsely charged because of the ill-
will and quarreling between AAA's mother and his sisters is far-fetched as to be
persuasive. It held that the defense of denial put up by Arces - being a negative and self-
serving defense - cannot prevail over the affirmative allegations of the victim. The RTC
found AAA’s testimony to be credible in its entirety, albeit not perfect in all details. It held
that the defense was too weak given the direct, positive, and straightforward testimony of
the child complainant.
The Ruling of the CA
In a Decision dated 26 November 2015, the CA affirmed, with modification as to the
penalty, the Decision of the RTC. The dispositive portion of the Decision of the CA reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated 3 June
2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 41, finding Marianito Arces, Jr.
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape in Criminal Case No. 08-31346 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Marianito Arces, Jr. is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole. Further, he is ORDERED to pay AAA the amount of
Ph100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages, plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6%
from the date of finality of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.8
The CA held that the feud between the Arces' sisters and AAA's mother was too trivial for
the latter to allow her daughter to admit having been defiled. The CA also found that the
RTC properly upheld the testimony of AAA, which served as the basis for Arces' conviction.
As to the finding of Dr. Buyco that there was no penile penetration, the CA held that this
does not negate the commission of rape as rape can be established even in the absence of
external signs or physical injuries or a medical finding relating to such fact.
The Issue
The issue to be resolved in this appeal is whether or not the CA gravely erred in finding
Arces guilty of the crime of rape.
The Ruling of the Court
We find the appeal to be meritorious.
There are three (3) guiding principles in reviewing rape cases: (1) an accusation of rape
can be made with facility, and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more
difficult for the person accused, although innocent, to disprove; (2) considering the
intrinsic nature of the crime, only two persons being usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.9 Based on the foregoing principles, we
find that Arces should be acquitted of the crime of rape.
Doubtful Testimony of AAA
We are not unmindful of the fact that as a general rule, the findings of the trial court,
when affirmed by the appellate court are binding on this Court.10 However, this principle
does not preclude a reevaluation of the evidence to determine whether material facts or
circumstances have been overlooked or misinterpreted by the lower courts.11 The Court
has not hesitated to reverse judgments of conviction when there were strong indications
pointing to a possibility that the rape charge was false.12 In this case, we find that the
evidence for the prosecution failed to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, that Arces is
guilty of the crime charged.
The RTC and CA relied heavily on the testimony of AAA to find Arces guilty of the crime of
rape. And while an accused may be convicted of rape solely on the basis of the testimony
of the complainant, such testimony should meet the test of credibility - it should be
straightforward; clear, positive, and convincing.13 In this case, we find that the testimony
of AAA did not meet these requirements. A review of AAA's testimony would show that she
is very indifferent and nonchalant about the events that had allegedly transpired. Her
answers to the questions addressed to her are almost devoid of any emotion:
Atty. Umahag:
Q: For how long did this Marianito pump, Madam Witness?
A: A few seconds.
Q: Does his penis penetrate your vagina?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: And you said you complained that it's painful, that's why he stopped, Madam Witness?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: And actually, he dressed up your shorts again, Madam Witness?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: And he also put on his shorts, Madam Witness?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: And for all those time, you did not say anything to him, Madam Witness?
A: No, only the accused said something.
Q: And you did not even cry, Madam Witness?
A: No, ma'am.
Q: And Marianito Arces told you not to tell your mother, Madam Witness?
A: Yes ma'am.
Q: Only to your mother, Madam Witness?
A: Not to tell my mother and not to tell anyone.
Q: And you said after that, you just went to sleep, Madam Witness?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: As if nothing happened, Madam Witness?
A: Yes, ma'am.14
In addition to the manner of her testimony, her attitude after the alleged incidents is also
very odd and not in accordance with ordinary human experience. AAA stated that she did
not speak or even cry and merely went to sleep after the alleged incidents as if nothing
happened. While it is true that victims of rape are not expected to act in a certain way,
her actions after the alleged incidents, together with the indifferent manner of her
testimony, raise doubts on her narration of the events.
Moreover, it is also curious that she remained entirely silent during the second alleged
incident, where Arces allegedly laid on top of her at around noontime while fully clothed.
She testified that her entire family was just outside of the house, although she did not
know exactly where. AAA testified:
Q: Let me clarify. You said the second incident also happened on April 20 or was it April
19, Madam Witness?
A: April 20.
Q: You mean to say the next day, Madam Witness?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: And you said that was around 12:00 o'clock noon, Madam Witness?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: After your lunch, Madam Witness, you said?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: At that time, Madam Witness, where were your mother, brother and father, Madam
Witness?
A: They were just outside of the house, I do not know where.15
If she knew that her family was just outside of the house, she could have easily called out
for help if Arces was truly doing the malicious deeds to her. However, similar to the first
alleged incident, she did not say or do anything. Again, while we recognize that victims of
rape are not expected to act in a certain way, her actions during this second alleged
incident are against ordinary human experience. To the mind of this Court, it creates
doubts and uncertainties as to her allegations against Arces.
Although the trend in procedural law is to give wide latitude to the questioning of a child
witness, the Court must not lose track of the basic tenet that the truth must be
ascertained.16 In this case, we find that the testimony of AAA raises too many questions
and doubts, and is insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt the allegations made
against Arces.
Delay in reporting the incident
We also take note of the fact that it took AAA almost two (2) years to tell her mother
about the alleged incidents. Generally; a delay in reporting an incident of rape is not an
indication of fabrication and does not necessarily cast doubt on the credibility of the
victim.17 However, if the delay in reporting such incident is unreasonable or unexplained,
this may discredit the victim.18
Time and again, this Court has held that a rape charge becomes doubtful only when the
delay in revealing its commission is unreasonable and unexplained.19 This is because the
long delay in reporting the incident creates doubt in the Court's mind as to the allegation
of rape.20 In People v. Relorcasa,21 the alleged victim therein reported the incident ten
(10) months after the said incident. The Court found this delay of ten (10) months to be
unreasonable and unexplained, despite the allegation that the accused threatened to kill
her, because there was no evidence that the alleged victim was under the watchful eye of
the accused. The accused and the alleged victim therein lived several kilometers apart and
she only saw the accused three or four times after the incident. Thus, the Court found that
there was no surveillance by the accused, and the alleged victim had all the opportunities
to report the incident. The delay created doubt in the mind of the Court that the alleged
victim was indeed raped by the accused.
However, this is not to say a delay of two (2) years or more in reporting a rape incident
automatically renders the credibility of a complainant doubtful. The delay must be
unreasonable and unexplained, and it must be determined whether such delay in the
reporting was justified. There have indeed been cases where the delay lasted for more
than two years but the Court still upheld the conviction of rape because the victims were
found to be credible.22
Unfortunately, in this case, the delay in reporting is unexplained and unjustified. Arces
moved to Jaro, Iloilo a few months after the alleged incidents. AAA had every opportunity
to report the matter to her family, but she chose not to. AAA opened up about the
incidents only after the prodding of her mother, which sprang from the argument between
the sisters of Arces and AAA's mother. There was no explanation as to why AAA chose not
to tell others of the alleged incidents and why it took her so long to report them. Again,
even if Arces allegedly told AAA not to tell anyone, he had already moved away, and thus
AAA was no longer under any threat. Failure of the alleged victim to report that she was
raped despite several opportunities to do so renders doubtful her rape charge.23
The doubt created by the unexplained delay in reporting the incidents, along with the
cloud on the credibility of AAA, compels this Court to acquit the accused. A conviction in a
criminal case must be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits. It is fundamental that the prosecution's
case cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense.24
Defense of Alibi and Medical Report
The lower courts found the defense of alibi to be weak and self-serving because the
testimonies were given by Arces and his relatives. While it is true that alibi is weak and
viewed with skepticism, it is not always undeserving of credit - there are times when the
accused has no other possible defense for what could really be the truth as to his
whereabouts.25 Moreover, the fact that the witness to the alibi is a relative of the accused
does not automatically affect the probative value of the testimony.26 Family relationship
does not by itself render a witness' testimony inadmissible or devoid of evidentiary
weight.27
In this case, Arces testified that he was at sea during the time AAA was allegedly raped by
him. This was corroborated by his brother-in-law, Lacuba, who also testified that on the
day and time of the alleged incident, he was working together with Arces at sea. If AAA's
testimony was clear, straightforward, and trustworthy, this defense of alibi would be
considered weak and undeserving. However, as already discussed, there are clouds of
doubt on AAA's testimony. Thus, the defense of Arces must be considered thoroughly by
this Court. Nonetheless, whether or not the defense of alibi of Arces is meritorious is
entirely irrelevant if the prosecution itself failed to discharge the burden of proof against
Arces. And in this case, we find that the evidence for the prosecution is insufficient to
sustain the conviction of Arces.
Lastly, we also note that the medical report strengthens the challenge against the
credibility of AAA. While a medical report is not indispensable to the prosecution of a rape
case, and is not at all controlling because its value is merely corroborative, the medico-
legal's findings can still raise serious doubt as to the credibility of the alleged rape
victim.28 In this case, the medical report found AAA's hymen intact with no signs of
hematoma or any vaginal deformities and no signs of lacerations of the vaginal wall. The
conclusion that the medical findings were inconsistent with penile penetration casts further
cloud on AAA's already doubtful narration of events.
Based on the foregoing, this Court reverses the rulings of the lower courts due to the
failure of the prosecution to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that Arces is guilty of the
crime charged.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The 26 November 2015 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR HC No. 01908, affirming with modification the 3 June 2013
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Bacolod City, Branch 41 in Criminal Case No. 08-
31346, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Appellant Marianito Arces, Jr. is ACQUITTED of the crime of rape on the ground of
reasonable doubt. His IMMEDIATE RELEASE from custody is hereby ordered unless he is
being held for other lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-34854 November 20, 1978
FORTUNATO R. PAMIL, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HONORABLE VICTORINO C. TELERON, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bohol, Branch
III, and REV. FR. MARGARITO R. GONZAGA, respondents-appellees.
Urbano H. Lagunay for petitioner.
Cristeto O. Cimagala for respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
The novel question raised in this certiorari proceeding concerns the eligibility of an ecclesiastic to an
elective municipal position. Private respondent, Father Margarito R. Gonzaga, was, in 1971, elected to
the position of municipal mayor of Alburquerque, Bohol. 1 Therefore, he was duly proclaimed. A suit
for quo warranto was then filed by petitioner, himself an aspirant for the office, for his
disqualification 2 based on this Administrative Code provision: "In no case shall there be elected or
appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or
compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for public works of the
municipality." 3 The suit did not prosper, respondent Judge sustaining the right of Father Gonzaga to the
office of municipal mayor. He ruled that such statutory ineligibility was impliedly repealed by the
Election Code of 1971. The matter was then elevated to this Tribunal by petitioner. It is his contention
that there was no such implied repeal, that it is still in full force and effect. Thus was the specific
question raised.
There is no clear-cut answer from this Tribunal. After a lengthy and protracted deliberation, the Court is
divided on the issue. Seven members of the Court are of the view that the judgment should be affirmed
as the challenged provision is no longer operative either because it was superseded by the 1935
Constitution or repealed. Outside of the writer of this opinion, six other Justices are of this mind They
are Justices Teehankee, Muñoz Palma Concepcion Jr., Santos, Fernandez, and Guerrero. For them,
the overriding principle of the supremacy of the Constitution or, at the very least, the repeal of such
provision bars a reversal. 4 The remaining five members of this Court, Chief Justice Castro, Justices
Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, and Aquino, on the other hand, hold the position that such a prohibition
against an ecclesiastic running for elective office is not tainted with any constitutional infirmity.
The vote is thus indecisive. While five members of the Court constitute a minority, the vote of the
remaining seven does not suffice to render the challenged provision ineffective. Section 2175 of the
Revised Administrative Code, as far as ecclesiastics are concerned, must be accorded respect. The
presumption of validity calls for its application. Under the circumstances, certiorari lies. That is the
conclusion arrived at by the writer of this opinion, joined by Justice Concepcion Jr., Santos, Fernandez,
and Guerrero. They have no choice then but to vote for the reversal of the lower court decision and
declare ineligible respondent Father Margarito R. Gonzaga for the office of municipal mayor. With the
aforesaid five other members, led by the Chief Justice, entertaining no doubt as to his lack of eligibility,
this petition for certiorari must be granted.
Except for the dispositive part announcing the judgment of the Court, the remainder of this opinion sets guaranteed by the Constitution. To so exclude them is to impose a religious test. Torcaso v.
forth the reasons why there are constitutional objections to the continuing force and effectivity of Watkins 18 an American Supreme Court decision, has persuasive weight. What was there involved was
Section 2175 as far as ecclesiastics are concerned. the validity of a provision in the Maryland Constitution prescribing that "no religious test ought ever to be
required as a disqualification for any office or profit or trust in this State, other than a declaration of
belief in the existence of God ..." Such a constitutional requirement was assailed as contrary to the First
1. The Revised Administrative Code was enacted in 1917. In the 1935 Constitution, as it is now under
Amendment of the United States Constitution by an appointee to the office of notary public in Maryland,
the present Charter, it is explicitly declared: "No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil
who was refused a commission as he would not declare a belief in God. He failed in the Maryland Court
or political rights." 5 The principle of the paramount character of the fundamental law 6 thus comes into
of Appeals but prevailed in the United States Supreme Court, which reversed the state court decision. It
play. There are previous rulings to that effect. 6 The ban imposed by the Administrative Code cannot
could not have been otherwise. As emphatically declared by Justice Black: "this Maryland religious test
survive. So the writer of this opinion would hold.
for public office unconstitutionally invades the appellant's freedom of belief and religion and therefore
cannot be enforced against him." 19
2. This is to conform to this provision of the 1935 Charter: "All laws of the Philippine Islands shall
continue in force until the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter, such laws
The analogy appears to be obvious. In that case, it was lack of belief in God that was a disqualification.
shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution, until amended, altered, modified, or
Here being an ecclesiastic and therefore professing a religious faith suffices to disqualify for a public
repealed by the Congress of the Philippines, and all references in such laws to the government or
office. There is thus an incompatibility between the Administrative Code provision relied upon by
officials of the Philippines shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and
petitioner and an express constitutional mandate. It is not a valid argument against this conclusion to
corresponding officials under this Constitution." 7 It was first applied in People v. Linsangan, 8 decided in
assert that under the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, there was such a prohibition against a religious
December, 1935, barely a month after that Constitution took effect. This Court held that Section 2718 of
test, and yet such a ban on holding a municipal position had not been nullified. It suffices to answer that
the Revised Administrative Code that would allow the prosecution of a person who remains delinquent
no question was raised as to its validity. In Vilar v. Paraiso, 20 decided under the 1935 Constitution, it
in the payment of cedula tax, 9 was no longer in force. As stated by the then Justice, later Chief Justice,
was assumed that there was no conflict with the fundamental law.
Abad Santos, after setting forth that the Constitution prohibits the imprisonment for debt or non-
payment of poll tax: 10 "It seems too clear to require demonstration that section 2718 of the Revised
Administrative Code is inconsistent with section 1, clause 12, of Article Ill of the Constitution in that, 4. This is the first case then where this Court has to face squarely such an issue. This excerpt from the
while the former authorizes imprisonment for non-payment of the poll or cedula tax, the latter forbids it. opinion of Justice Moreland in the leading case of McGirr v. Hamilton, 21 a 1915 decision, has a force
It follows that upon the inauguration of the Government of the Commonwealth, said section 2718 of the unimpaired by the passage of time: "Relative to the theory that Act No. 1627 has stood so long and
Revised Administrative Code became inoperative, and no judgment of conviction can be based been silently acquiesced in for so great a length of time that it should not be disturbed, it may be said
thereon." 11 that the fact that certain individuals have, by ignorance or neglect, failed to claim their fundamental
rights, furnishes no reason why another individual, alert to his rights and their proper enforcement,
should be prevented from asserting and sustaining those rights. The fact that Smith and Jones have
De los Santos v. Mallare 12 came next. The President, under the Revised Administrative Code, could
failed to demand their constitutional rights furnishes no basis for the refusal to consider and uphold the
remove at pleasure any of the appointive officials under the Charter of the City of Baguio. 13 Relying on
constitutional rights of Richard Roe In the case of Sadler v. Langham (34 Ala. 311), this same question
such a provision, the then President Quirino removed petitioner De los Santos, who was appointed City
was under consideration and the court in resolving it said: 'It may be urged, that these statutes have
Engineer of Baguio on July 16, 1946, and chose in his place respondent Gil R. Mallare. Why such a
stood, and been silently acquiesced in for so great a length of time, they should not now be disturbed.
power could not pass the test of validity under the 1935 Constitution was pointed out by Justice Tuason
We are sensible of the force of this argument. It will be observed, however, that in Tennessee, the
thus: "So, unlike legislation that is passed in defiance of the Constitution, assertive and menacing, the
decision which declared the private road law unconstitutional was pronounced forty years after the
questioned part of section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code does not need a positive
enact. judgment of the statute; and in New York, after seventy years had elapsed. It is, perhaps, never
declaration of nullity by the court to put it out of the way. To all intents and purposes, it is non-existent,
too late to re- establish constitutional rights, the observance of which had been silently neglected." 22 To
outlawed and eliminated from the statute book by the Constitution itself by express mandate before the
support such a conclusion, no less than the great Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for this Court
petitioner was appointed." 14
in United States v. More, in disposing of a contention by one of the parties as to appellate jurisdiction
having been previously exercised and therefore beyond dispute was likewise relied upon. Thus: "No
Martinez v. Morfe, 15 a 1972 decision, is likewise in point. In the light of the cited provision of the 1935 question was made in that case as to the jurisdiction petition. It passed sub silentio, and the court does
Constitution, as authoritatively construed, Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code was found to be not consider itself bound by that case. 23 So it should be in this litigation. As set forth at the outset, it is
inoperative. As therein provided, the penalty of prision correccional is imposed on any public officer or not even necessary to annul the challenged Administrative Code provision. It is merely declared
employee who, while the Congress was in regular or special session, would arrest or search a member inoperative by virtue of the mandate of the 1935 Constitution, similarly found in the present Charter.
thereof, except in case he had committed a crime punishable by a penalty higher than prision mayor.
This Court ruled that the Revised Penal Code extended unduly the legislative privilege of freedom from
5. Nonetheless, tie above view failed to obtain the necessary eight votes needed to give it binding force.
arrest as ordained in the Constitution. 16 Such a provision then was contrary to and in defiance of the
The attack on the continuing effectivity of Section 2175 having failed, it must be, as noted at the outset,
clear expression of the will of the Constitutional Convention of 1934 that such immunity was never
given full force and application.
intended to exempt members of a legislative body from an arrest for a criminal offense, the phrase
treason, felony and breach of the peace being all-inclusive. Reference was likewise made to the
prevailing American doctrine to that effect as enunciated by Williamson v. United States. 17 WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The judgment a quo is reversed and set aside.
Respondent Gonzaga is hereby ordered immediately to vacate the mayoralty of the municipality of
Albuquerque, Bohol, there being a failure to elect. No pronouncement as to costs.
3. It would be an unjustified departure from a settled principle of the applicable construction of the
provision on what laws remain operative after 1935 if the plea of petitioner in this case were to be
heeded. The challenged Administrative Code provision, certainly insofar as it declares ineligible
ecclesiastics to any elective or appointive office, is, on its face, inconsistent with the religious freedom