LEUNG BEN vs. PJ. O’BRIEN, JAMES A. OSTRAND and GEO. R.

HARVEY,
Judges of First Instance of the City of Manila. April 6, 1918

FACTS:

On December 12, 1917, an action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila
by P.J. O’Brien to recover of Leung Ben the sum of P15,000, all alleged to have been
lost by the plaintiff to the defendant in a series of gambling, banking, and percentage
games conducted during the two or three months prior to the institution of the suit. The
plaintiff asked for an attachment against the property of the defendant, on the ground
that the latter was about to depart from the Philippines with intent to defraud his
creditors. This attachment was issued. The provision of law under which this
attachment was issued requires that there should be a cause of action arising upon
contract, express or implied. The contention of the petitioner is that the statutory action
to recover money lost at gaming is not such an action as is contemplated in this
provision, and he insists that the original complaint shows on its face that the remedy
of attachment is not available in aid thereof; that the Court of First Instance acted in
excess of its jurisdiction in granting the writ of attachment; that the petitioner has no
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise; and that consequently
the writ of certiorari supplies the appropriate remedy for this relief.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the statutory obligation to restore money won at gaming is an obligation
arising from contract, express or implied.

RULING:

Yes. In permitting the recovery money lost at play, Act No. 1757 has introduced
modifications in the application of Articles 1798, 1801, and 1305 of the Civil Code.

The first two of these articles relate to gambling contracts, while article 1305 treats of
the nullity of contracts proceeding from a vicious or illicit consideration. Taking all these
provisions together, it must be apparent that the obligation to return money lost at play
has a decided affinity to contractual obligation; and the Court believes that it could,
without violence to the doctrines of the civil law, be held that such obligations is an
innominate quasi-contract.

It is however, unnecessary to place the decision on this ground. In the opinion of the
Court, the cause of action stated in the complaint in the court below is based on a
contract, express or implied, and is therefore of such nature that the court had authority
to issue the writ of attachment. The application for the writ of certiorari must therefore
be denied and the proceedings dismissed.
ARTURO PELAYO vs MARCELO LAURON, ET AL. GR No. L-4089, January 12,
1909

FACTS:

Pelayo, herein petitioner, was a doctor who filed a complaint on November 1906,
stating that herein defendant Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abella requested medical
assistance from him for their daughter-in-law who was about to give birth. By
consultation, it was agreed upon to remove the fetus as well as the afterbirth through
operation. He estimated his services cost around P500 which the defendants refuse
to pay.

Defendants on the other hand denied everything and alleged as a special defense that
the daughter’s -in-law died because of the childbirth, that said daughter-in-law was
living apart from them together with her husband, and that her stay in their house on
the day of childbirth was merely accidental.

The lower court held for the defendants on account of lack of sufficient evidence to
establish a right of action. Hence, this case before the SC.

ISSUES: WON the defendants are bound to pay the bills.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. According to Article 1089 of the Civil Code,
obligations are created by law, by contracts by quasi-contracts, and by illicit acts and
omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs. Obligations
arising from law are not presumed. Those expressly determined in the code or in
special laws, etc. are the only demandable ones. Obligations arising from contracts
have legal force between the contracting parties and must be fulfilled in accordance
with their stipulations (Articles 1090 and 1091).

Therefore, the plaintiff must direct his action against the husband who is under
obligation to furnish medical assistance to his lawful wife in such emergency.

OPTION: The Court laid down the sequence of its reasoning. First, the court cited the general law on
obligations under Article 1158 stating that “Obligations arising from law are not presumed. Only those
expressly determined in this Code or in special laws are demandable. By the express provision of law,
the rendering of medical assistance, in case of illness is one of the mutual obligations of the spouses
who are bound by way of mutual support. In this case therefore, if the dead daughter-in-law could not
pay for her childbirth expenses, then the burden will fall on the husband. The party bound to furnish
support is therfore liable for all expenses, including the fees of the medical expert for his professional
services. It is only the husband, and not his parents who are bound to give support. The fact that it
wasn’t the husband who asked for help from Mr Pelayo is of no moment. Since there was no contract
agreed upon that the defendants will pay for the expenses, then they were not liable. Within the meaning
of the law, the father and mother-in-law are strangers with respect to the obligation that falls upon the
husband to give support.
Bautista vs. Federico O. Borromeo, Inc.

Petitioners: Abelardo Bautista and Roberto Tan Ting

Respondent: Federico O. Borromeo, Inc.

Ponente: Sanchez

Respondents seek to overturn the decision of CFI of Rizal on Jan 6, 1966 granting
petitioners petition for relief from judgment of Municipal Court on July 23, 1965.

FACTS:

On SEPTEMBER 15, 1964, Ford truck of Petitioner (Tan Ting) driven by Abelardo
Bautista and Volkswagen delivery panel truck owned by Respondent (Borromeo) were
involved in a traffic accident along EDSA which caused the death of Quintin Delgado,
a helper in Borromeo’s Delivery truck.

Borromeo had to pay Delgado’s widow P 4,444.00 representing compensation

(death benefit) and funeral expenses due under Workmen’s Compensation Act
(source of the obligation).

On JUNE 17, 1965, upon the confirmation that the said vehicular accident was
caused by the Petitioners’ negligence, Respondent started a suit in the Municipal
Court of Mandaluyong to recover from petitioners the compensation and funeral
expenses it paid to the widow.

At the scheduled hearing of the case on JULY 23, 1965 neither petitioners nor their
counsel appeared. Borromeo was then allowed to present its evidence ex parte1. On
the same day, the municipal court rendered judgment in favor of Borromeo and against
the petitioners in the principal sum of P 4,444.00 and P 500.00 attorney’s fees, and
costs.

On AUGUST 6, 1965, petitioners received a copy of the municipal court’s decision

On AUGUST 13, 1965, petitioners moved to set aside the decision. On AUGUST
14, 1965, this motion was denied.

On AUGUST 16, 1965, copy of this order of denial was sent by registered mail to
counsel of petitioners. Said counsel did not receive this registered mail and the mail
matter was returned to the court unclaimed. However, said counsel learned of this
denial on SEPTEMBER 2, 1965 allegedly "in the course of his investigation."

Petitioners then filed a notice of appeal on SEPT. 2, 1965, but they only paid the
docket fee only on SEPTEMBER 28, 1965which was after the lapse of the
reglementary period

The Petitioners did nothing until OCTOBER 26, 1965 when they lodged a petition
for relief. They claimed excusable negligencefor their failure to appear in July 23rd’s
hearing that they had a good and substantial defense that they were not in contractual
relationshiop with the respondents. They also sought for preliminary injunction which
was later on denied to them.

ISSUE(S):

WHETHER OR NOT the petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 can be invoked
by the petitioners

WHETHER OR NOT the petitioners can be excused for their negligence to appear on
July 23rd hearing

WHETHER OR NOT the respondents have an obligation to pay their employee’s

widow death benefits.

HELD:

1) It is a basic precept that when another remedy at law is open to a party, he cannot
sue out a petition for releif under Rule 382. A petition for relief is not a substitute for
appeal. The petitioners somehow waived their right to appeal because when they were
informed that their motion to set aside, they could have appealed but they did not.
They also did not pay the docket fees on time it was eleven days late(it must have
been within 15 days of receipt of the denial of their motion to set aside).Also when they
filed a petition for relief, it was way beyond the 60-day period from August 6, 1965, the
time when they first learned of the judgment to be set aside. Thus the petitioners’
petition for relief must fail.

2) Their counsel, Atty. Leopoldo Repotente, Jr., explained that he failed to attend the
hearing on July 23 because he had another case before the City Court of Quezon City
and that he gave permission to his associate, Atty. Lucenito Tagle, to attend for him.
In Tagle’s sworn statement he said that he just transferred to his new office so the
record of this case was misplaced or lost by his helpers. He then only found it after a
few days of the said hearing in his former office.

Their negligence is INEXCUSABLE, there was no plausible reason for Repotente to

entrust the hearing to another lawyer. When Repotente agreed in open court to set the
trial of the case on July 23, it may be very well be presumed that his other case in QC
was not yet calendared for hearing otherwise he could have disagreed on the said
date. He also failed to notify his clients about the hearing set on July 23 so they also
failed to appear.

3) The obligation of Borromeo to pay the widow of its employee compensation and
funeral expenses arose from law – Sec. 23 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The
same law also provides that it shall be optional with such injured employee either to
claim compensation from his employer or sue another person for damages; “and in
case compensation is claimed and allowed in accordance with this Act, the employer
who paid such compensation or was found liable to pay the same, shall succeed the
injured employee to the right of recovering from such person what he paid”.
There is no need to establish any contractual relationship between Delgado and the
petitioners because in this case there is none. The cause of action of the respondent
corporation is one relief from judgments, orders or other proceedings.

SEC. 2. Grounds for compensation. - When an employee suffers personal injury from
any accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, or contracts
tuberculosis or other illness directly caused by such employment, or either aggravated
by or the result of the nature of such employment, his employer shall pay
compensation in the sums and to the person hereinafter specified…

which does not spring from a creditor-debtor relationship. It arises by virtue of its
subrogation4 to the right of Quintin Delgado to sue the guilty party. Such subrogation
is sanctioned by the Workmen's Compensation Law aforesaid.

CUI vs. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY G.R. No. L-15127

FACTS:

Emeterio Cui enrolled in the defendant university where plaintiff finished his law
studies up to the first semester of his fourth year. Plaintiff was awarded with
scholarship grants and his tuition fees were returned to him at the end of each
semester. Plaintiff left the defendant’s law school and enrolled for the last semester of
his fourth year at the College of Law of Abad Santos University where he graduated.

He applied to take the bar examination in with which he needed the transcript of
records from defendant Arellano University. The defendant demanded that he had
paid back the P1, 033.87, noting the contract that he signed stated that in
consideration of the scholarship granted to him by the University, he waives his right
to transfer to another school without having refunded to the defendant the equivalent
of the scholarship cash.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contract between Cui and the respondent university,
whereby the former waives his right to transfer to another school without having
refunded to the defendant the equivalent of the scholarship is valid or not.

HELD: The contract of waiver between the plaintiff and respondent on September 10,
1951, is a direct violation of Memorandum No. 38 and hence null and void. The
contract was contrary to sound policy and civic honesty. The policy enunciated in
Memorandum No.38, 1949 is sound policy.

When students are given full or partial scholarships it is understood that such
scholarships are merited and earned. The amount in tuition and other fees
corresponding to these scholarships should not be subsequently charged to the
recipient students when they decide to quit school or to transfer to another institution.