G.R. No.

128966
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDWIN DE VERA, appellant.
August 18, 1999

PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS:
Edwin de Vera y Garcia, together with Roderick Garcia, Kenneth Florendo and Elmer Castro, was
charged with Murder before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in connection with the killing
of one Frederick Capulong. De Vera and Garcia pleaded not guilty during arraignment. The other
two accused, Florendo and Castro, were at large. During trial, the prosecution presented as witness
one Bernardino Cacao who testified that he saw De Vera in the car, where an altercation later
occurred. Thereafter, he saw Florendo drag out of the vehicle an apparently disabled Capulong
and shot him in the head moments later. Aside from Cacao’s testimony, the prosecution also
presented De Vera’s extrajudicial statement which established that he knew that Florendo intended
to kill the victim and that the three co-accused were carrying weapons and that he acted as a lookout
to watch for passersby. Thereafter, the trial court convicted De Vera and his co-accused Garcia of
the crime charged and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to
indemnify the heirs of the victim.

The trial court found that it was indeed Florendo who actually shot the victim. However, it
convicted De Vera as a principal because the scientific and forensic findings on the criminal
incident directly and substantially confirmed the existence of conspiracy among the four accused.

Aggrieved, de Vera appealed his conviction before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting De Vera as principal

HELD:
Yes. The testimony of the prosecution eyewitness contained nothing that could inculpate De Vera.
Aside from the fact that he was inside the car, no other act was imputed to him. Mere presence
does not amount to conspiracy. Indeed, the trial court based its finding of conspiracy on mere
presumptions, and not on solid facts indubitably indicating a common design to commit murder.
Such suppositions do not constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. The fact that De Vera was at
the locus criminis in order to aid and abet the commission of the crime did not make him a
conspirator; at most, he was only an accomplice. Moreover, the prosecution evidence has not
established that De Vera was part of the conspiracy to kill Capulong. De Vera’s participation, as
culled from his own statement, was made after the decision to kill was already a fait accompli.
The appeal is hereby partially granted. Appellant De Vera is convicted as an accomplice, not as a
principal, in the crime of murder.