Dominador Bustos vs.
Lucero to establish the fact in dispute in judicial proceedings" — is identified with and forms part of
G.R. No. L-2068, October 20,1948
FACTS:
The petitioner in the case appeared at the preliminary investigation before the Justice of
Peace of Masantol, Pampanga, and after being informed of the criminal charges against him
and asked if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which he entered the plea of not guilty.
"Then his counsel moved that the complainant present her evidence so that she and her
witnesses could be examined and cross-examined in the manner and form provided by law."
The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected, invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the
objection was sustained. "In view thereof, the accused's counsel announced his intention to
renounce his right to present evidence," and the justice of the peace forwarded the case to the
court of first instance.
The counsel for the accused petitioner filed a motion with the CFI praying that the record of
the case be remanded to the justice of peace of Masantol, on order that the petitioner might
cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection with their testimony. The
motion was denied and for that reason the present special civil action of mandamus was
instituted. Petitioner squarely attacks the validity of the provision of section 11 or Rule 108, on
the ground that it deprives him of the right to be confronted with and cross-examine the
witnesses for the prosecution, contrary to the provision of section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 11, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is an infringement to the provision
of section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution hence the decision of the majority is judicial
legislation that diminishes the right of the accused.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that section 11 of Rule 108, like its predecessors is an adjective
law and not a substantive law or substantive right. Substantive law creates substantive rights
and the two terms in this respect may be said to be synonymous. Substantive rights are a
term which includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the
disturbance of normal relations. Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines
and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of
action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective
or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their
invasion. As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what acts are
crimes and prescribes the punishment for committing them, as distinguished from the
procedural law which provides or regulates the steps by which one who commits a crime is to
be punished Preliminary investigation is eminently and essentially remedial; it is the first step
taken in a criminal prosecution.
As a rule of evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural. Evidence — which is the "the
mode and manner of proving the competent facts and circumstances on which a party relies
the method by which, in private law, rights are enforced and redress obtained, and, in criminal
law, a law transgressor is punished. Criminal procedure refers to pleading, evidence and
practice. The entire rules of evidence have been incorporated into the Rules of Court. We
cannot tear down section 11 of Rule 108 on constitutional grounds without throwing out the
whole code of evidence embodied in these Rules. We do not believe that the curtailment of
the right of an accused in a preliminary investigation to cross-examine the witnesses who had
given evidence for his arrest is of such importance as to offend against the constitutional
inhibition. As we have said in the beginning, preliminary investigation is not an essential part
of due process of law. It may be suppressed entirely, and if this may be done, mere restriction
of the privilege formerly enjoyed thereunder cannot be held to fall within the constitutional
prohibition.
While section 11 of Rule 108 denies to the defendant the right to cross-examine witnesses in
a preliminary investigation, his right to present his witnesses remains unaffected, and his
constitutional right to be informed of the charges against him both at such investigation and at
the trial is unchanged. In the latter stage of the proceedings, the only stage where the
guaranty of due process comes into play, he still enjoys to the full extent the right to be
confronted by and to cross-examine the witnesses against him. The degree of importance of a
preliminary investigation to an accused may be gauged by the fact that this formality is
frequently waived. It is inevitable that the Supreme Court in making rules should step on
substantive rights, and the Constitution must be presumed to tolerate if not to expect such
incursion as does not affect the accused in a harsh and arbitrary manner or deprive him of a
defense, but operates only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage. For the
Court's power is not merely to compile, revise or codify the rules of procedure existing at the
time of the Constitution's approval. This power is "to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts," which is a power to adopt a general, complete and
comprehensive system of procedure, adding new and different rules without regard to their
source.
1
People vs. Romy Lim (2018)
Plaintiff-appellee: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Accused-appellants: ROMY LIM Y MIRANDA
Ponente: Peralta (En Banc)
Topic: Criminal Law
SUMMARY: The SC acquitted Romy Lim of violation of R.A. 9165 for non-compliance with the
chain of custody rule.
DOCTRINE: It must be alleged and proved that the presence of the three witnesses to the
physical inventory and photograph of the illegal drug seized was not obtained due to reason/s
such as:
(1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area;
(2) their safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was
threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s acting for and in
his/her behalf;
(3) the elected official themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be
apprehended;
(4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media representative and an
elected public official within the period required under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code
prove futile through no fault of the arresting officers, who face the threat of being charged with
arbitrary detention; or
(5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations, which often rely on tips
of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from obtaining the presence of the required
witnesses even before the offenders could escape.
Earnest effort to secure the attendance of the necessary witnesses must be proven.
---
Judicial notice is taken of the fact that arrests and seizures related to illegal drugs
are typically made without a warrant; hence, subject to inquest proceedings. Relative thereto,
Sections 1 (A.1.10) of the Chain of Custody Implementing Rules and Regulations directs:
A.1.10. Any justification or explanation in cases of noncompliance with the
requirements of Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, shall be clearly stated in the
sworn statements/affidavits of the apprehending/seizing officers, as well as the steps taken to
preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized/confiscated items. Certification or
record of coordination for operating units other than the PDEA pursuant to Section 86 (a) and
(b), Article IX of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 shall be presented.
While the above-quoted provision has been the rule, it appears that it has not been
practiced in most cases elevated before Us. Thus, in order to weed out early on from the
courts' already congested docket any orchestrated or poorly built up drug-related cases, the
following should henceforth be enforced as a mandatory policy:
1. In the sworn statements/affidavits, the apprehending/seizing officers must state
their compliance with the requirements of Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, and
its IRR.
2. In case of non-observance of the provision, the apprehending/seizing officers
must state the justification or explanation therefor as well as the steps they have taken in
order to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized/confiscated items.
3. If there is no justification or explanation expressly declared in the sworn
statements or affidavits, the investigating fiscal must not immediately file the case before the
court. Instead, he or she must refer the case for further preliminary investigation in order to
determine the (non) existence of probable cause.
4. If the investigating fiscal filed the case despite such absence, the court may
exercise its discretion to either refuse to issue a commitment order (or warrant of arrest) or
dismiss the case outright for lack of probable cause in accordance with Section 5, Rule 112,
Rules of Court.
FACTS:
Around 8:00 p.m. on October 19, 2010, IO1 Orellan and his teammates were at
Regional Office X of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). Based on a report of a
confidential informant (CI) that a certain "Romy" has been engaged in the sale of prohibited
drugs in Zone 7, Cabina, Bonbon, Cagayan de Oro City, they were directed by their Regional
Director, Lt. Col. Edwin Layese, to gather for a buy-bust operation. During the briefing, IO2
Orcales, IO1 Orellan, and IO1 Carin were assigned as the team leader, the arresting
officer/back-up/evidence custodian, and the poseur-buyer, respectively. The team prepared a
P500.00 bill as buy-bust money (with its serial number entered in the PDEA blotter), the
Coordination Form for the nearest police station, and other related documents.
Using their service vehicle, the team left the regional office about 15 minutes before
10:00 p.m. and arrived in the target area at 10:00 p.m., more or less. IO1 Carin and the CI
alighted from the vehicle near the comer leading to the house of "Romy," while IO1 Orellan
and the other team members disembarked a few meters after and positioned themselves in
the area to observe. IO1 Carin and the CI turned at the comer and stopped in front of a house.
The CI knocked at the door and uttered, "ayo, nang Romy. " Gorres came out and invited
them to enter. Inside, Lim was sitting on the sofa while watching the television. When the CI
introduced IO1 Carin as a shabu buyer, Lim nodded and told Gorres to get one inside the
bedroom. Gorres stood up and did as instructed. After he came out, he handed a small
medicine box to Lim, who then took one piece of heat-sealed transparent plastic of shabu and
gave it to IO1 Carin. In turn, IO1 Carin paid him with the buy-bust money.
After examining the plastic sachet, IO1 Carin executed a missed call to IO1 Orellan,
which was the pre-arranged signal. The latter, with the rest of the team members, immediately
rushed to Lim's house. When they arrived, IO1 Carin and the CI were standing near the door.
They then entered the house because the gate was opened. IO1 Orellan declared that they
were PDEA agents and informed Lim and Gorres, who were visibly surprised, of their arrest
for selling dangerous drug. They were ordered to put their hands on their heads and to squat
on the floor. IO1 Orellan recited the Miranda rights to them. Thereafter, IO1 Orellan conducted
a body search on both.
When he frisked Lim, no deadly weapon was found, but something was bulging in
his pocket. IO1 Orellan ordered him to pull it out. Inside the pocket were the buy-bust money
and a transparent rectangular plastic box about 3x4 inches in size. They could see that it
contained a plastic sachet of a white substance. As for Gorres, no weapon or illegal drug was
seized.
IO1 Orellan took into custody the P500.00 bill, the plastic box with the plastic sachet
of white substance, and a disposable lighter. IO1 Carin turned over to him the plastic sachet
2
that she bought from Lim. While in the house, IO1 Orellan marked the two plastic sachets. o Evident, however, is the absence of an elected public official and representatives of
Despite exerting efforts to secure the attendance of the representative from the media and the DOJ and the media to witness the physical inventory and photograph of the seized items.
barangay officials, nobody arrived to witness the inventory-taking. In fact, their signatures do not appear in the Inventory Receipt.
The buy-bust team brought Lim and Gorres to the PDEA Regional Office, with IO1 o In this case, IO1 Orellan testified that no members of the media and barangay
Orellan in possession of the seized items. Upon arrival, they "booked" the two accused and officials arrived at the crime scene because it was late at night and it was raining, making it
prepared the letters requesting for the laboratory examination on the drug evidence and for unsafe for them to wait at Lim's house. IO2 Orcales similarly declared that the inventory was
the drug test on the arrested suspects as well as the documents for the filing of the case. made in the PDEA office considering that it was late in the evening and there were no
Likewise, IO1 Orellan made the Inventory Receipt of the confiscated items. It was not signed available media representative and barangay officials despite their effort to contact them. He
by Lim and Gorres. Also, there was no signature of an elected public official and the admitted that there are times when they do not inform the barangay officials prior to their
representatives of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the media as witnesses. Pictures of operation as they. might leak the confidential information. We are of the view that these
both accused and the evidence seized were taken. justifications are unacceptable as there was no genuine and sufficient attempt to comply with
The day after, IO1 Orellan and IO1 Carin delivered both accused and the drug the law.
specimens to Regional Crime Laboratory Office 10. IO1 Orellan was in possession of the o The prosecution likewise failed to explain why they did not secure the presence of a
sachets of shabu from the regional office to the crime lab. PSI Caceres, who was a Forensic representative from the Department the arresting officer, IO1 Orellan, stated in his Affidavit
Chemist, and Police Officer 2 (PO2) Bajas personally received the letter- requests and the two that they only tried to coordinate with the barangay officials and the media, the testimonies of
pieces of heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. PSI the prosecution witnesses failed to show that they tried to contact a DOJ representative.
Caceres got urine samples from Lim and Gorres and conducted screening and confirmatory o The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses also failed to establish the details of
tests on them. Based on her examination, only Lim was found positive for the presence of an earnest effort to coordinate with and secure presence of the required witnesses. They also
shabu. The result was shown in Chemistry Report No. DTCRIM-196 and 197-2010. With failed to explain why the buy-bust team felt "unsafe" in waiting for the representatives in Lim's
respect to the two sachets of white crystalline substance, both were found to be positive of house, considering that the team is composed of at least ten (10) members, and the two
shabu after a chromatographic examination was conducted by PSI Caceres. Her findings accused were the only persons in the house.
were reflected in Chemistry Report No. D-228-2010. PSI Caceres, likewise, put her own NOTES: Lim ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt
marking on the cellophane containing the two sachets of shabu. After that, she gave them to
the evidence custodian. As to the buy-bust money, the arresting team turned it over to the
fiscal's office during the inquest.
Lim was charged with illegal possession of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride
(shabu). Lim, together with Gorres, was also indicted for illegal sale of shabu. RTC handed a
guilty verdict on Lim for illegal possession and sale of shabu and acquitted Gorres for lack of
sufficient evidence linking him as a conspirator. CA affirmed.
ISSUES:
• WoN the chain of custody rule was complied with
o NO. We have held that the immediate physical inventory and photograph of the
confiscated items at the place of arrest may be excused in instances when the safety and
security of the apprehending officers and the witnesses required by law or of the items seized
are threatened by immediate or extreme danger such as retaliatory action of those who have
the resources and capability to mount a counter-assault. The present case is not one of those.
o Here, IO1 Orellan took into custody the P500.00 bill, the plastic box with the plastic
sachet of white substance, and a disposable lighter. IO1 Carin also turned over to him the
plastic sachet that she bought from Lim. While in the house, IO1 Orellan marked the two
plastic sachets. IO1 Orellan testified that he immediately conducted the marking and physical
inventory of the two sachets of shabu. To ensure that they were not interchanged, he
separately marked the item sold by Lim to IO1 Carin and the one that he recovered from his
possession upon body search as BB AEO 10-19-10 and AEO-RI 10-19-10, respectively, with
both bearing his initial/signature.

3
4
5
6
7
8
Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, 16 September 1998
[REGALADO, J.]
FACTS: Petitioner Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT
Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) which participated in the bidding for
government construction projects including those under the First Manila Engineering District
(FMED), and private respondent Nestor V. Agustin, incumbent District Engineer, reportedly
taking advantage of his official position, inveigled petitioner into an amorous relationship. After
misunderstandings and unpleasant incidents, Fabian eventually filed the aforementioned
administrative case against Agustin in a letter-complaint. The Graft Investigator of the
Ombudsman issued a resolution finding private respondent guilty of grave misconduct and
ordering his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits under the law. On a
motion for reconsideration, Agustin was exonerated of the administrative charges.
In the present appeal, petitioner argues that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989) pertinently provides that —
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten
(10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the
motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Emphasis
supplied)
ISSUE#1: Can the Court resolve the constitutionality of Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
not raised in the trial?
HELD#1: YES.
Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are
ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is
involved in which case it may be raised at any time or on the court’s own motion. The Court
ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where that
fact is developed. The court has a clearly recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction in
any proceeding.
ISSUE#2: Is Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 unconstitutional?
HELD#2: YES.
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently
violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which
increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been
cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which, as correctly
explained in First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et al. was intended to
give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction.
Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would
unnecessarily burden the Court.
As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be
struck down as unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals
from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken
to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43.
DOMINGO NEYPES, ET AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 141524 (September 14, 2005)
FACTS:
Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance
and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC against the private respondents.
Later, in an order, the trial court dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground that the action
had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on
March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for
reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for
reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998,
petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight
days late. This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998. Via a petition
for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of
appeal before the CA. In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably
filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started
to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of the trial
court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July
27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for
appeal. On September 16, 1999, the CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period
to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the
February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court, the order
was the “final order” appealable under the Rules.
9
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not receipt of a final order triggers the start of the 15-day reglmentary period to
appeal, the February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order
dismissing the Motion for Reconsideration.
(2) Whether or not petitioners file their notice of appeal on time.
HELD:
(1) The July 1, 1998 order dismissing the motion for reconsideration should be deemed as
the final order. In the case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., the trial court declared
petitioner non-suited and accordingly dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of the order of
dismissal, he filed an omnibus motion to set it aside. When the omnibus motion was filed, 12
days of the 15-day period to appeal the order had lapsed. He later on received another order,
this time dismissing his omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was
likewise dismissed ― for having been filed out of time. The court a quo ruled that petitioner
should have appealed within 15 days after the dismissal of his complaint since this was the
final order that was appealable under the Rules. The SC reversed the trial court and declared
that it was the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint
which constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised there. This
pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al. where
the SC again considered the order denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration as the final
order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case. Based on the aforementioned
cases, the SC sustained petitioners’ view that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their
motion for reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.
(2) YES. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15
days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this “fresh period
rule” shall also apply to Rule 40, Rule 42, Rule 43 and Rule 45. The new rule aims to regiment
or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion
for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
from notice of the “final order,” which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order
denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.
Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened
the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original
period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict
compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party
opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court
which rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity to review the case and, in
the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with
dispatch and to have judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we likewise
aspire to deliver justice fairly.
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt
of the RTC’s decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the “final order”)
denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day
period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final
and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.
Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the
order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal
was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed.
NOTE:
The “FRESH PERIOD RULE” do not apply to Rule 64 (Review of Judgments and Final Orders
or Resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit) because Rule
64 is derived from the Constitution. It is likewise doubtful whether it will apply to criminal
cases.

The SC thus held that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period
of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for
reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules
which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final
order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word “or” signifies disassociation and
independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in
which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of “or” in the above provision supposes that the
notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days

10
ALMA JOSE vs. JAVELLANA G.R. No. 158239 January 25, 2012 Appeal, Final Order v.
Interlocutory Order
MAY 10, 2019
FACTS:
Margarita Alma Jose (Margarita) sold to respondent Ramon Javellana by deed of conditional
sale two parcels of land. They agreed that the registration shall be undertaken by Margarita
within a reasonable period of time, and that should Margarita become incapacitated, her son
and attorney-in-fact, Juvenal and her daughter, petitioner Priscilla M. Alma Jose, would
receive the payment of the balance and proceed with the application for registration.
Juvenal predeceased Margarita, and Margarita died, making Priscilla Margarita’s sole
surviving heir. However, Priscilla did not comply with the undertaking to cause the registration
of the properties under the Torrens System, and, instead, began to improve the properties by
dumping filling materials therein with the intention of converting the parcels of land into a
residential or industrial subdivision.
Thus, Javellana commenced an action for specific performance, injunction, and damages
against her with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain Priscilla from dumping filling materials in the parcels of land; and that
Priscilla be ordered to institute registration proceedings and then to execute a final deed of
sale in his favor.
Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss.
The RTC initially denied Priscilla’s motion to dismiss. However, upon her motion for
reconsideration, the RTC reversed itself and granted the motion to dismiss.
Javellana moved for reconsideration, however, it was denied by the RTC in its Order dated
June 21, 2000.
Hence, Javellana filed an appeal to the CA.
The CA reversed and set aside the dismissal of the case against Jose.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC order denying Javellana’s motion for reconsideration was appealable.
RULING:
The petition has no merit.
Denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal was a final order, hence,
appealable.
Priscilla submits that the order of the RTC was not the proper subject of an appeal considering
that Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that no appeal may be taken from an
order denying a motion for reconsideration.
Priscilla’s submission is erroneous and cannot be sustained.
First of all, the denial of Javellana’s motion for reconsideration left nothing more to be done by
the RTC because it confirmed the dismissal of the case against Jose. It was clearly a final
order, not an interlocutory one.
The Court has distinguished between final and interlocutory orders in Pahila-Garrido v.
Tortogo:
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first
disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action,
leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has
determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else
to be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the
merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered.
The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: does the
order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of
the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.
And, secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory determines whether appeal is the
correct remedy or not.
A final order is appealable, but the remedy from an interlocutory one is not an appeal but a
special civil action for certiorari.
Indeed, the Court has held that an appeal from an order denying a motion for reconsideration
of a final order or judgment is effectively an appeal from the final order or judgment itself; and
has expressly clarified that the prohibition against appealing an order denying a motion for
reconsideration referred only to a denial of a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory
order.
*The denial of a motion for reconsideration of an order granting the defending party’s motion
to dismiss is not an interlocutory but a final order because it puts an end to the particular
matter involved, or settles definitely the matter therein disposed of, as to leave nothing for the
trial court to do other than to execute the order.
11
Floresca v. Philex G.R. No. L-30642 (1985)
upxateneo Uncategorized September 22, 20183 Minutes
Topic. Purpose of Construction: Limitation on the power of courts to construe
Case. Petition to review lower court decision dismissing a civil complaint lodged against Philex
Facts. It is alleged that prior to the accident, Philex failed to address safety concerns in the
mining site. Much water accumulated in an open pit area which caused pressure in the
working shafts below. As a result, said area collapsed. Out of 48, 5 escaped, 22 rescued
within the week. But 21 were left to die due to Philex’s order to stop rescue mission.
Heirs of the 21 filed a civil complaint in CFI. Philex filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the
accident falls under the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) and thus outside of CFI
jurisdiction. WCA provides that (1) such work-connected deaths are within the jurisdiction of
Workmen’s Compensation Commission (WCC) and (2) if the employer is negligent, employer
shall pay the compensation plus 50% of same compensation. But in essence, the respondents
invoke Section 5 of the WCA which states: “Exclusive right to compensation — The rights and
remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to
compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his
personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil
Code and other laws because of said injury.” Because the heirs have already received
compensation, they are no longer entitled to a damage suit.
Doctrine: The topic, limitation on the power of courts to construe, can be found within court’s
discussion of the second issue. The two dissenting opinions posit that a careful reading of
Section 5 of WCA would demonstrate that when a complainant has already availed of
compensation via WCA, his/her right to sue in civil or other courts are understood to have
been extinguished. After passage of WCA, legislature had plenty of occasion to modify
relevant provision but did not do so. This, according to dissent, is manifest of legislative’s
continuing intent to retain the exclusivity provided therein. In the majority opinion’s decision to
allow petitioners to file case despite having received their WCA compensation, dissent argues
that the court has exercised a power outside of its capacities, i.e. that it has legislated.
To this, the majority opinion enunciates that it has not legislated. What it did was a mere
implementation of the Constitution and relevant statutes. Secs. 6, 7, and 9 of Art. II of 1973
Constitution guarantees social justice, establishes adequate services in employment, and
protects labor. With these provisions, the present court only gave effect to the rights
petitioners are entitled to. No legislation occurred, because the principles are already present
and need only be applied.

The heirs of the deceased filed the present petition.

Issue. (1) Does CFI has jurisdiction? -Yes

(2) Whether the petitioners can only avail of WCA action or have a choice between WCA
action and civil damage in regular court or can avail of both WCA and civil damage? –Choose
either one but not both.

Ratio. To answer the two issues, (2) should be addressed before (1). (2) Generally, petitioners
must choose between a WCA action and civil suit. This is what the Section 5 of WCA provides
and what has been applied in various court decisions. But the court decided to render leeway
to the petitioners given the peculiarity of the instances. Petitioners have already received
compensation under the WCA. Afterwards, they learned of the true cause of the accident
which was Philex’s negligence. And then they filed a civil suit. The court reasoned that had the
petitioners learned of the cause much sooner, petitioners would have filed for a civil suit
instead. Petitioners’ initial resort to WCA action, the court said, is based on ignorance or
mistake of fact. Because petitioners were not informed of the true cause, they had not the
choice between a WCA and a civil suit. This then creates an exception to Section 5 of WCA.
Hence, court remanded the case to lower court for proper judgment. (1) CFI now has
jurisdiction because of the court’s making an exception of the case.

12
Primicias vs Ocampo, G.R. No. L-6120, June 30, 1953. Procedure and section 2477 of the old Charter of Manila are parts of
substantive law and as such are not embraced by the rule-making power of
Facts:
the Supreme Court. The aid may be invoked in the manner provided in the
Petitioner was charged before the Court of First Instance of Manila with two Code of Civil Procedure, and this right has been declared absolute and
statutory offenses, namely, (1) with a violation of Commonwealth Act No. substantial by this Court in several cases where the aid of assessors had
606, in that he knowingly chartered a vessel of Philippine registry to an alien been invoked. The intervention of the assessors is not an empty formality
without the approval of the President of the Philippines and (2) with a which may be disregarded without violating either the letter or the spirit of
violation of section 129 in relation to section 2713 of the Revised the law. It is another security given by the law to the litigants, and as such,
Administrative Code in that he failed to submit to the Collector of Customs it is a substantial right of which they cannot be deprived without vitiating all
the manifests and certain authenticated documents for the vessel the proceedings.
"Antarctic" and failed to obtain the necessary clearance from the Bureau of
The contention of respondents we reckon is predicated on the assumption
Customs prior to the departure of said vessel for a foreign port.
that the provisions on assessors of the Code of Civil Procedure had been
On April 23, 1952, before the trial of said criminal cases, petitioner filed a impliedly repealed. Such is not the case. We have already pointed out that
motion praying that assessors be appointed to assist the court in the basic provisions on the matter partake of the nature of substantive law
considering the questions of fact involved in said cases as authorized by and as such they were left intact by the Supreme Court.
section 49 of Republic Act No. 409 which provides that "the aid of assessors
It is therefore the opinion that the respondent Judge acted with abuse of
in the trial of any civil or criminal action in the Municipal Court, or the Court
discretion in denying petitioner his right to the aid of assessors in the trial of
of First Instance, within the City, may be invoked in the manner provided in
the two criminal cases now pending in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
the Code of Civil Procedure." This motion was opposed by the City Fiscal.
On April 28, 1952, the court issued an order denying the motion holding in
effect that with the promulgation of the Rules of Court by the Supreme
Court, which became effective on July 1, 1940, all rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts of the Philippines previously existing
were not only superseded but expressly repealed. The Supreme Court,
having been vested with the rule-making power, expressly omitted the
portions of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding assessors in said Rules of
Court. Believing that this order is erroneous, petitioner now comes to this
court imputing abuse of discretion to the respondent Judge.
Issues:
Whether or not the right of the petitioner to a trial with the aid of assessors
is an absolute substantive right, and the duty of the court to provide
assessors is mandatory.
Ruling:
Yes, a trial with the aid of assessors is an absolute substantive right. The trial
with the aid of assessors as granted by section 154 of the Code of Civil
13
Sarmiento v. Zaratan
Facts: Petitioner Gliceria Sarmiento filed an ejectment case against respondent Emerita
Zaratan, in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City. On 31 March 2003, the MeTC
rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. ( MeTC ordered the defendant to pay plaintiff
monthly rentals and to vacate the premises.) Respondent filed her notice of appeal.
Thereafter, the case was raffled to the RTC of Quezon City.
In the Notice of Appealed Case, the RTC directed respondent to submit her memorandum in
accordance with the provisions of Section 7(b) of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court and petitioner
to file a reply memorandum within 15 days from receipt.
Respondent’s counsel having received the notice on 19 May 2003, he had until 3 June 2003
within which to file the requisite memorandum. But on 3 June 2003, he filed a Motion for
Extension of Time of five days due to his failure to finish the draft of the said Memorandum.
He cited as reasons for the delay of filing his illness for one week, lack of staff to do the work
due to storm and flood compounded by the grounding of the computers because the wirings
got wet. But the motion remained unacted.
On 9 June 2003, respondent filed her Memorandum. On 19 June 2003, the RTC dismissed
the appeal as follows:
Record shows that defendant-appellant received the Notice of Appealed Case, through
counsel, on May 19, 2003 (Registry Return Receipt dated May 12, 2003, Record, back of p.
298). Thus, under Section 7(b), Rule 40 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, she had fifteen
(15) days or until June 3, 2003 within which to submit a memorandum on appeal. As further
appears on record, however, the required Memorandum was filed by defendant-appellant only
on June 9, 2003 (Record, p. 623), or six (6) days beyond the expiration of the aforesaid fifteen
day period.
Aggrieved, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals, which was
granted the petition of respondent. The appellate court nullified and set aside Orders of the
RTC and ordered the reinstatement of respondent’s appeal. Consequently, respondent’s
appeal memorandum was admitted and the case remanded to the RTC for further
proceedings.
Hence, this appeal by petitioner.
Issue: Whether the lack of notice of hearing in the Motion for Extension of Time to file
Memorandum on Appeal is fatal, such that the filing of the motion is a worthless piece of
paper.
Held: In this case, the answer is NO. Petitioner avers that, because of the failure of
respondent to include a Notice of Hearing in her Motion for
Extension of Time to file Memorandum on Appeal in the RTC, the latter’s motion is a
worthless piece of paper with no legal effect. It is not disputed that respondent perfected her
appeal on 4 April 2003 with the filing of her Notice of Appeal and payment of the required
docket fees. However, before the expiration of time to file the Memorandum, she filed a
Motion for Extension of Time seeking an additional period of five days within which to file her
Memorandum, which motion lacked the Notice of Hearing required by Section 4, Rule 15 of
the 1997 Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 4. Hearing of Motion. - Except for motions which the court may act upon without
prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the
applicant. Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall
be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days
before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.
As may be gleaned above and as held time and again, the notice requirement in a motion is
mandatory. As a rule, a motion without a Notice of Hearing is considered pro forma and does
not affect the reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading.
As a general rule, notice of motion is required where a party has a right to resist the relief
sought by the motion and principles of natural justice demand that his right be not affected
without an opportunity to be heard. The three-day notice required by law is intended not for
the benefit of the movant but to avoid surprises upon the adverse party and to give the latter
time to study and meet the arguments of the motion. Principles of natural justice demand that
the right of a party should not be affected without giving it an opportunity to be heard.
The test is the presence of the opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the
motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based.
Considering the circumstances of the present case, we believe that procedural due process
was substantially complied with.
There are, indeed, reasons which would warrant the suspension of the Rules: (a) the
existence of special or compelling circumstances, b) the merits of the case, (c) a cause not
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of rules,
(d) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the
other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. Elements or circumstances (c), (d) and (e)
exist in the present case.
The suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case. The motion in question does not affect
the substantive rights of petitioner as it merely seeks to extend the period to file
Memorandum. The required extension was due to respondent’s counsel’s illness, lack of staff
to do the work due to storm and flood, compounded by the grounding of the computers. There
is no claim likewise that said motion was interposed to delay the appeal. As it appears,
respondent sought extension prior to the expiration of the time to do so and the memorandum
was subsequently filed within the requested extended period. Under the circumstances,
substantial justice requires that we go into the merits of the case to resolve the issue of who is
entitled to the possession of the land in question.
14
Further, it has been held that a "motion for extension of time x x x is not a litigated motion
where notice to the adverse party is necessary to afford the latter an opportunity to resist the
application, but an ex parte motion made to the court in behalf of one or the other of the
parties to the action, in the absence and usually without the knowledge of the other party or
parties." As a general rule, notice of motion is required where a party has a right to resist the
relief sought by the motion and principles of natural justice demand that his rights be not
affected without an opportunity to be heard. It has been said that "ex parte motions are
frequently permissible in procedural matters, and also in situations and under circumstances
of emergency; and an exception to a rule requiring notice is sometimes made where notice or
the resulting delay might tend to defeat the objective of the motion.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision and the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby

AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

15
GR No. L-9527

United States v. Tamparong Spanish Period (1887) (Penal Code American Period (1900) (General
and Provisional Law of Crim. Pro.) Order No. 58)

Facts: Lowest court Gobernadorcillo Justice of the Peace

Next Level Courts of First Instance Courts of First Instance

 defendants were caught violating Baguio City Ordinance No. 35 prohibiting the Highest Court Audencia del Territorio
playing of a game of chance called “monte” Is the Supreme Rule 19: The judgment of the Court of
 Justice of the Peace of Baguio (gobernadorcillo/ city court) and Court of First Court required First Instance will be executory, and
Instance both convicted the defendants with the same charge by law to there will be no recourse from the
 Supreme Court tried the case because the validity of Ordinance No. 35 was put into examine the same except that of responsibility
question facts? before the Audencia del Territorio
 In tackling the question, the history of penal laws in the Philippines was looked into
Issues:
What happens? The Gobernadorcillo only had
responsibility over crimes whose
 Is Ordinance No. 35 valid? Affirmative, as in the case of United States v. Joson punishment are arresto and arresto
 Is the Supreme Court required by law to examine the evidence to determine guilt or menor. These cases may not reach
innocence of the defendants? No. To explain this, the history of penal laws and the Audiencia. As for cases which may
criminal procedure in the Philippines was looked into. be punished by arresto mayor, the
 In execution of the royal order dated December 17, 1887, the Penal Code and case is retried in its entirety by the
Provisional Law of Criminal Procedure used in Spain were applied to the Philippines Audiencia, and the facts are again
examined.
Supreme Court
Sec. 54: The decisions of the Courts
of First Instance shall be final and
conclusive, except in cases
involving the validity or
constitutionality of the statute,
wherein appeal may be made to the
Supreme Court (statutes include
ordinances)
The powers of the Justices of the
Peace were “extended to all offenses
which the Penal Code designates as
punishable by arresto mayor”. This
allowed the lower courts to have
decisions on higher offenses. Appeals
on all kinds of cases were allowed to
the Supreme Court, but only the
validity or constitutionality will be
questioned, and not the facts.

Held:
 The Supreme Court affirms the decision of the lower courts
 The Supreme Court will not examine the facts regarding any appeal, only the
constitutionality or validity of the decision
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE TAMPARONG, ET AL.,
defendantsappellants
No. 9527. August 23, 1915
Ponente: J. Trent
FACTS
Defendants were convicted for having played the game of chance called “Monte,” in violation
of Ordinance No. 35
Defendants appealed to the Court of First Instance, where they were again tried and
convicted upon the same charge
16
 Defendants raised their appeal to the Supreme Court which ONLY allowed to hear the case
on the grounds that the validity of Ordinance No. 35 was in question
ISSUE/s
1. Whether or not Ordinance No. 35 is valid
2. Whether or not the Supreme Court is required under the law to examine the evidence for
the purpose of determining the guilt or innocence of the defendants
HOLDING/s
1. Yes, Ordinance No. 35 is valid.
2. No. Although the SC wrote that Act No. 1627 does not explicitly limit their powers from
examining issues of facts, it likewise does not expressly authorize them to do so. The SC,
nevertheless, interpreted that the law was NOT framed to confer them the said power.
RATIO/s
1. For the issue at hand, the SC merely wrote, “The first question is answered in the
affirmative by this court in the case of the United States vs. Joson (26 Phil. 01). The cases are
on all fours, and a further discussion of this branch of the case is unnecessary.” Nothing more.
2.1 The SC has revisited prior laws to ascertain the intention of the „framers‟ of the amended
section of Act No. 1627; the latter being ambiguous in the sense that it did not explicitly allow
nor prohibit SC to examine issues of facts on appeals. The SC found, in light of former
practices and from further understanding the circumstances in which the framers of the
amended law were subject to, that the amendment was not meant to confer in them the
jurisdiction of reviewing questions of fact.
2.2 The SC further distinguished their holding from Loeb vs. Columbia Township Trustees,
and Boise Artesian Hot and Cold Water Co., Ltd. vs. Boise City. These two latter cases were
taken to the US SC directly from the circuit courts as writs of error, (not as appeals) where the
US SC does not only have jurisdiction to review constitutional questions but also every other
question properly arising.
2.3 In at least fourteen other cases, the SC has showed that the ruling for this issue in the last
10 years has remained uniform. And that the court, since its organization, never held that it
had the power to review facts touching guilt of an accused person, ONLY as to when the
appeal involved the validity or constitutionality of a statute or the constitutionality of a
municipal or township ordinance.
Digester‟s Notes:
SCRA was 14 pages long and about 12 pages were exhausted to explain holding for the 2nd
issue
The SCRA made no attempt to expound on Ordinance No. 35 and “monte” and therefore led
the
digester to believe that they were of little issue to the case‟s facts

17

G.R. No. 114135 October 7, 1994 (Can’t find a digest)
LEON M. GARCIA, JR., petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, as
represented by Chairman MAGTANGGOL C. GUNIGUNDO, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
OF UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, represented by Chairman TIRSO D.
ANTIPORDA and CESAR SEVILLA, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The chief issue raised in this case is whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
special civil actions of prohibition, mandamus, and quo warranto.
The antecedent facts as summarized by the Sandiganbayan in its challenged decision are as
follows:
1. On June 26, 1990 petitioner Garcia was elected to the Board of Directors of the UCPB1 at a
regular meeting thereof to fill a vacancy therein as a PCGG2 nominee;
2. Almost three (3) years later, petitioner Garcia received a letter from PCGG Chairman
Gunigundo asking him to resign from the UCPB Board in order that a replacement might be
made in his stead;
3. Garcia refused to resign and instead asserted in his reply letter dated May 21, 1993 his
membership in the Davao City Chapter of the COCOFED and, therefore, his representation of
the coconut planters of Davao City;
4. By a letter dated July 6, 1993, PCGG Chairman Gunigundo informed Garcia (and two other
directors) that his membership in the Board of Directors of UCPB had been terminated upon
instruction by the Office of the President, copy of which letter was furnished to the Chairman
and the Corporate Secretary of the UCPB;
5. By a letter dated July 8, 1993, Garcia (together with two other directors whose services as
directors had also been terminated) wrote PCGG Chairman Gunigundo reiterating their refusal
to step down from the Board and announced that they would wait for the next regular
stockholders' meeting since, according to Garcia, he had a fixed term as a director;
6. In the same letter, Garcia further stated that since he and his fellow directors were not mere
agents of the PCGG, their removal would have to be done in the manner provided by the
Corporation Code, citing the case of Baseco v. PCGG (150 SCRA 181) that, at all events, the
PCGG cannot change the composition of the Board of Directors of sequestered corporations;
7. At a special meeting of the Board of Directors — which petitioner Garcia claims to have
been held on July 22, 1993 without notice to him — petitioner and another director were
deemed terminated as members of the UCPB Board and were duly replaced, petitioner Garcia
in particular by respondent Cesar A. Sevilla;
8. While he may have been elected to the Board through the action of the Board, petitioner
claims that he can be removed therefrom only by a vote of the stockholders representing 2/3
of the outstanding capital stock at a regular stockholders' meeting or at a special stockholders'
meeting called for that purpose.
The petitioner then filed with the Sandiganbayan on 20 August 1993 a petition for prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, damages and attorney's fees with preliminary injunction and a
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order4 (docketed as SB No. 0154) against
the PCGG, Cesar Sevilla, and others.5 The prayer of the petition reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully prayed that:
Before hearing:
A temporary restraining order be issued against respondent Cesar A. Sevilla from performing
the duties of a member of the Board of Directors and against the PCGG and Board Members
Cesar A. Sevilla, Tirso D. Antiporda, Jr., Juan J. Carlos, Gloria C. Carreon, Renato L.
Cayetano, Ma. Corazon K. Imperial, Eduardo K. Litonjua, Sr., Jesus N. Manalastas, Jose V.
Romero, Jr., Celso L. Samaniego, Daniel P. Santiago, Jr., and Oscar F. Santos from
recognizing Cesar A. Sevilla as a member of the Board of Directors.
After hearing:
(1) a writ of prohibition be issued (a) to prohibit respondent PCGG chairman and the members
of the Board of Directors from recognizing respondent Cesar A. Sevilla as a member of the
Board of Directors of the Bank, and (b) Cesar A. Sevilla from performing the duties of a
member of Board of Directors.
(2) to compel respondents to recognize petitioner as a director of UCPB.
(3) to declare respondent Cesar A. Sevilla not entitled to said office and ousting him
therefrom.
(4) to declare that the herein petitioner is entitled to said office and placing him in possession
thereof.
(5) to hold all the respondents solidarily liable to pay petitioner the costs of suit and expenses
of litigation and attorney's fees in the amount of P50,000.00 because the acts or omissions of
the respondents have compelled the petitioner to litigate and thus incur expenses to protect
his rights and interests.
(6) to hold all the respondents solidarily liable to pay nominal, temperate and exemplary
damages, by way of example or correction for the public good and for unlawful and illegal acts
committed and to be awarded at the discretion of this Honorable Court.
(7) to grant such and other remedies as may be just and equitable in the premises.
Perceiving that the issue raised was not just the propriety of the petitioner's separation or
removal as director of the UCPB but the court's own jurisdiction over the subject matter, the
Sandiganbayan set the petition "for hearing on 3 September 1993 on the issuance of a
restraining order with the issue of jurisdiction indicated as primordial." At the hearing on the
said date, it expressed its concern as to "its jurisdiction over the petition upon certain
premises, namely, whether or not the acts complained of by petitioner Garcia, which do not
appear to be factually disputed by the respondents herein, constitute merely acts of the Board,
which would make the conflict an intra-corporate problem cognizable only by the Securities
and Exchange Commission or, considering the peculiarity of the circumstances, particularly
the alleged totality of the dominance by the PCGG over the United Coconut Planters Bank,
the acts attributed to the Board of Directors by the petitioner are acts of the PCGG under the
mantle of its special functions under Executive Orders No. 1, No. 2, No. 14 and No. 14-A." It
then required the respondents to submit their "memoranda and/or oppositions and/or
answers" to the petition and the petitioner to submit his memorandum of authorities herein,
immediately after which the petition would be deemed submitted for decision.
18
After the parties had complied with the above requirements, the Sandiganbayan (First entered into by the New Riviera Hotel and Development Co., Inc., which was sequestered by
Division) promulgated on 1 October 1993 its decision9 dismissing the petition because "both the PCGG and where two-thirds of the Board of Directors were PCGG nominees. In a ruling
the allegations in the petition and the relevant supporting annexes demonstrate that the issues that was approved of by the Supreme Court, this Court said:
presented by the petitioner refer solely to the election or appointment of directors in a ". . . . This court is of the view that its jurisdiction refers to acts of the PCGG acting as such
corporation and, therefore, within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities and whether alone or with other persons, natural or juridical, and not generally where PCGG
Exchange Commission under Section 5(c) of P.D. 902-A, as amended." It found such issues representatives act as part of another juridical person or entity. A rule of thumb might be thus:
as having "nothing to do, except very peripherally, with the PCGG's functions of preserving if the PCGG can be properly impleaded on a cause of action asserted before this Court as a
property under sequestration or of determining the distinct entity, then this Court would generally exercise jurisdiction; otherwise, it would not,
ill-gotten character of propriety [sic] already under sequestration." because, then the "PCGG character" of the act of omission in question may, at best, be only
In view of its relevance to the proper disposition of this petition, it is well to quote the incidental.
Sandiganbayan's disquisition supporting its judgment: After all, the presence of PCGG representatives in sequestered companies does not
It is the view of this Court that the issue brought by the petitioner to the bar is one that automatically tear down the corporate veil that distinguishes the corporation from its officers,
concerns the acts of the Board of Directors of a corporation as such with respect to one of its directors or stockholders. Corporate officers whether nominated by the PCGG or not act,
members and, therefore, under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange insofar as third parties are concerned, are corporate officers. Contracts entered into by the
Commission. Pursuant to P.D. No. 902-A as amended, the Securities and Exchange San Miguel corporation, for example, in connection with its poultry operations and the
Commission ". . . shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases cancellations thereof, are not PCGG activities which would justify the invocation of this Court's
involving: jurisdiction, even if the contract or the suit were unanimously approved by its board of
xxx xxx xxx directors where PCGG representatives sit. (Resolution, Annex "O", p. 143, Rollo).
(c) Controversies in the election or appointments of directors, trustees, officers or managers of
such corporations, partnerships or associations." [Sec. 5(c)].
xxx xxx xxx
The fact that this Court for its part has exclusive original jurisdiction over cases — whether
civil or criminal — filed or prosecuted by the PCGG does not set it in conflict with the authority
of the Securities and Exchange Commission under its own Charter.
Undoubtedly, the Supreme Court has affirmed the exclusivity of this Court's jurisdiction over
cases filed by PCGG as well over the very acts of the PCGG therein, thus:
". . . Necessarily, those who wish to question or challenge the Commission's acts or orders in
such cases must seek recourse to the same court, the Sandiganbayan, which is vested with
exclusive and original jurisdiction ." (PCGG v. Peña, 159 SCRA 556, 564, emphasis supplied).
The point of this, of course, is the juridical abhorrence to split jurisdictions resulting in
multiplicity of suits (id., p. 565).
Indeed, even in proceedings on issues which appeared at first blush to have been peripheral
to the PCGG's exercise of its authority, the Supreme Court has withdrawn cases from the
Regional Trial courts and even from the Securities and Exchange Commission where it turned
out that the conflict among the parties was one ". . . arising from, incidental to, or related to
such cases . . ." i.e., the cases involving the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth ". . . such as
the dispute over the sale of shares, the propriety of the issuance of ancillary writs of
provisional remedies relative thereto, the sequestration thereof, which may not be made the
subject of separate actions or proceedings in another forum . . ." (Soriano III v. Yuzon, 164
SCRA 226, 242).
Having said all of the above, however, this Court itself has also drawn the limits of its authority
to hear matters when the PCGG would somehow be involved.
Thus, this Court was upheld by the Supreme Court in the case of Holiday Inn v.
Sandiganbayan (186 SCRA 447) when it refused to look into the propriety of a contract

19
— Holiday Inn (Phils.),
Inc. vs. Sandiganbayan,
186 SCRA 447, 452
Going farther, the Supreme Court in that case ruled that the Sandiganbayan would not have
jurisdiction over issues which did not relate to the propriety of the sequestration nor to the "ill-
gotten" or "crony related" character of the subject of the PCGG's acts. (id. p. 453).
In the instant petition, petitioner Garcia protests the act of the Board of Directors of the UCPB
on July 22, 1993 which resulted in his ouster from the UCPB Board.
While it is not denied that the PCGG through its Chairman had asked petitioner Garcia to
resign, Garcia had refused to do so; while PCGG Chairman Gunigundo had written petitioner
Garcia on July 6, 1993 to tell him that his representation of the Government in the UCPB
Board had been terminated, petitioner did not there and then cease to be a member of the
UCPB Board of Directors. Instead, it was the Resolution (No. 66-93) of the Board of Directors
at its meeting on July 22, 1993 which replaced petitioner Garcia with respondent Cesar A.
Sevilla in the Board, albeit undoubtedly upon the request or, if petitioner pleases, upon
instigation of the PCGG Chairman.
Respondent members of the Board of Directors Tirso D. Antiporda, et al., have well pointed
out that while PCGG Chairman Gunigundo had also terminated the representation of Director
Manuel Concordia, as Gunigundo indeed had in his letter of July 6, 1993 (Annex "C", Petition),
the UCPB Board declined to follow that lead resulting thus in the termination only of petitioner
Garcia and Wencelito T. Andanar (Annex "F", Petition).
We then have a situation, both as a matter of law and as a matter
of fact, where an entity other than the PCGG — the UCPB Board of Directors — acting
independently although in acquiescence to or accommodation of the behest of the PCGG.
We, therefore, have clearly a simple case of a Board of Directors ousting two of its members
for reasons which it had deemed proper.
Whether the Board did act properly or not in this regard has nothing to do, except very
peripherally, with the PCGG's functions of preserving property under sequestration or of
determining the ill-gotten character of propriety [sic] already under sequestration. In fact, both
the allegations in the petition and the relevant supporting annexes demonstrate that the issues
presented by the petitioner refer solely to the election or appointment of directors in a
corporation and, therefor[e], within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities and
Exchange Commission under Sec. 5(c) of P.D. 902-A, as amended.
His motion for the reconsideration 10 of the decision having been denied in the resolution of
the Sandiganbayan of 9 February 1994,11 the petitioner then filed the instant petition. He asks
this Court to give due course to the petition and to order the Sandiganbayan "to exercise
jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, etc. in the case of Leon
M. Garcia, Jr. vs. PCGG, et al. in S.B. No. 0154." 12
He imputes upon the Sandiganbayan the commission of the following errors:
(1) . . . IN RULING THAT IT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITION FOR
PROHIBITION, MANDAMUS, QUO WARRANTO ENTITLED LEON M. GARCIA, JR. VS.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) PARTICULARLY IN
RESOLVING THE PROPRIETY OF PETITIONER'S SEPARATION OR REMOVAL FROM
HIS POSITION.
(2) . . . IN NOT RULING THAT THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF ARE DIRECT AND OVERT
ACTS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) IN
RELATION TO ITS POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF SEQUESTRATION HENCE WITHIN
THE JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN.
(3) . . . IN RULING THAT THE REMOVAL OF PETITIONER AS MEMBER OF THE BOARD
OF DIRECTORS BY THE PCGG AND HIS REPLACEMENT BY THE UCPB BOARD OF
DIRECTORS IS WITHIN THE ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION.
It is the contention of the petitioner that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over his petition
because (1) "the acts complained of are direct and overt acts of the respondent PCGG in
relation to its powers and functions of sequestration," (2) the petitioner's cause of action
against the PCGG "arose from its act of removing and directing the Board to elect his
replacement," and (3) the PCGG as the conservator of sequestered UCPB shares of stock,
directly exercised its power of sequestration of the UCPB shares of stock." Accordingly, citing
"PCGG vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, G.R. No. 82188, January [should be June]
30, 1988, p. 15," and "Holiday Inn vs. The Sandiganbayan, 186 SCRA 447," the petitioner
posits the view that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case. He further contends
that since the PCGG is the "real party in interest" and it was its "act . . . in abruptly removing
the petitioner from his position and its urgent importunings that prompted UCPB Board of
Directors to elect Cesar Sevilla in his place," then, following "PCGG vs. SEC," the SEC would
have no jurisdiction over his petition since the PCGG, "as co-equal body, is a co-equal entity
over which actions the SEC has no power of control."
This Court required the parties to Comment on the petition.
In their Comment filed on 14 June 1994, the private respondents maintain that the controversy
falls within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the SEC since it involves a protest against
a corporate act to replace a member of the Board of Directors. 13
In its Comment filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, respondent PCGG submits that:
THE SOLE ISSUE POSED FOR RESOLUTION IS WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT
SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITION FOR PROHIBITION,
MANDAMUS, QUO WARRANTO, ETC. FILED BY PETITIONER. 14
Its arguments to support the negative of the proposition are actually anchored not on the
Sandiganbayan's lack of jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs but on the fact that the
petition in SB No. 0154 "essentially assails the validity of Resolution No. 66-93 of the UCPB
Board which removed petitioner as a director thereat" and "the allegations therein have nary a
bearing on the question of whether or not the sequestered shares in UCPB are ill-gotten by
the specified defendants in Civil Case No. 0033 (Republic vs. Eduardo Cojuangco, et al.)
20
pending before respondent Sandiganbayan"; "it is thus evident that the subject matter of the
petition below refers to the corporate act of the UCPB Board and not that of PCGG's as a
public or government entity." Otherwise stated, "the petition below is not thus per se a PCGG
case," and in light of Holiday Inn (Phils.), Inc. vs. Sandiganbayan, 15 the Sandiganbayan has
no jurisdiction over it.
This Court resolved to give due course to this petition and decide it on the basis of the
pleadings already submitted which sufficiently expound the parties' respective views and
positions.
As this Court sees it, the larger and more crucial issue in this case is not just the separation or
removal of the petitioner as a director of the UCPB representing the PCGG, but, as stated in
the exordium of this ponencia, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the special civil
actions of prohibition, mandamus, and quo warranto.
Jurisdiction, which is the authority to hear and the right to act in a case, 16 is conferred by the
Constitution and by law. 17 Although the Sandiganbayan, a constitutionally-mandated court,
18 is a regular court, 19 it has, nevertheless, only a special or limited jurisdiction. As the
Sandiganbayan puts it in the challenged decision:
its jurisdiction encompasses only those enumerated under Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 as
amended and those provided in special laws such as R.A. No. 7080 on "Plunder" and the
enabling enactments of Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) particularly
Executive Order No. 14 as amended (May 7, 1986), especially Secs. 1 and 2 thereof which
read:
Sec. 1. Any provision of the law to the contrary notwithstanding, the Presidential Commission
on Good Government, with the assistance of the Office of the Solicitor General and other
government agencies, is hereby empowered to file and prosecute all cases investigated by it
under Executive Order No. 1, dated February 12, 1986, and Executive Order No. 2, dated
March 12, 1986, as may be warranted by its findings.
Sec. 2. The Presidential Commission on Good Government shall file all such cases, whether
civil or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan, which shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction
thereof.
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. Nos. 1860 and 1861, provides as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their
office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether
simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than
prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00; PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty
prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a
fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
(b) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction:
(1) On appeal, from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial courts in
cases originally decided by them in their respective territorial jurisdiction.
(2) By petition for review, from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial
Courts in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over cases originally decided by the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in their
respective jurisdiction.
It is settled that the authority to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus involves
the exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or
by law. In Garcia vs. De Jesus, 20 this Court stated:
In the Philippine setting, the authority to issue Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
involves the exercise of original jurisdiction. Thus, such authority has always been expressly
conferred, either by the Constitution or by law. As a matter of fact, the well-settled rule is that
jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law (Orosa, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
Nos. 76828-32, 28 January 1991; Bacalso v. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-22488, 26 October 1967,
21 SCRA 519). It is never derived by implication. Indeed, "(w)hile the power to issue the writ
of certiorari is in some instance conferred on all courts by constitutional or statutory
provisions, ordinarily, the particular courts which have such power are expressly designated"
(J. Aquino's Concurring Opinion in Pimentel, supra, citing 14 C.J.S. 202; Emphasis ours).
Thus, our Courts exercise the power to issue Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus by
virtue of express constitutional grant or legislative enactments. To enumerate:
(1) Section 5[1], Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution conferred upon this Court such
jurisdiction;
(2) Section 9[1] of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, to
the Court of Appeals (then Intermediate Appellate Court);
(3) Section 21[1] of the said Act, to Regional Trial Courts;
(4) Section 5[1] of Republic Act No. 6734, or the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao, to the newly created Shari'ah Appellate Court; and
(5) Article 143[e], Chapter I, Title I, Book IV of Presidential Decree No. 1083, or the Code of
Muslim Personal Law, to Shari'ah District Courts.
With respect to petitions for quo warranto and habeas corpus, original jurisdiction over them is
expressly conferred to this Court by Section 5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution and to the
Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts by Section 9(1) and Section 21(1),
respectively, of B.P. Blg. 129.
In the absence then of a specific statutory grant of jurisdiction to issue the said extraordinary
writs, the Sandiganbayan, as a court with only special and limited jurisdiction, cannot exercise
jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto filed by petitioner.
Having reached the foregoing conclusion, discussions on the other issues raised would no
longer be necessary.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. No pronouncements as to costs. SO
ORDERED.
21
RODOLFO M. CUENCA and CUENCA INVESTMENT CORP., petitioners,
- Versus -
THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, INDEPENDENT REALTY
CORP., and UNIVERSAL HOLDINGS CORP., respondents.
G.R. Nos. 159104-05, October 5, 2007
Justice Velasco, JR., Ponente
Facts: In 1978, petitioner Rodolfo M. Cuenca and his family’s holding company, petitioner
Cuenca Investment Corporation (CIC), negotiated and reached an agreement with
respondents Independent Realty Corporation (IRC) and Universal Holdings Corporation
(UHC), whereby petitioners Cuenca and CIC would purchase all the shares of stock and
subscription rights of IRC in UHC for PhP 10,000,000 and assume IRC’s unpaid subscription
of PhP 30,000,000. Petitioners Cuenca and CIC were then the controlling stockholders of the
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP), now the Philippine
National Construction Corporation (PNCC), Sta. Ines Melale Forest Products Corporation
(Sta. Ines), and Resort Hotels Corporation (Resort Hotels). In order to build up UHC as his
flagship company, petitioner Cuenca transferred to UHC the shares of stocks in CDCP, Sta.
Ines, and Resort Hotels worth PhP 67,233,405, with UHC assuming Cuenca’s various bank
obligations, some or all of which were secured by pledges or liens on the stocks.
On October 21, 1978, petitioner Cuenca was elected Chairperson and President of UHC at a
special stockholders’ meeting in accordance with the acquisition plan, and through UHC,
Cuenca continued to control and manage CDCP, Sta. Ines, and Resort Hotels. Pursuant to
the acquisition plan and agreement with IRC, Cuenca and CIC transferred their shares of
stock in CDCP, Sta. Ines, and Resort Hotels to UHC, which in turn paid PhP 10,000,000 to
IRC. In addition, petitioners assumed IRC’s unpaid subscription of PhP 30,000,000 in UHC.
The only remaining matter to be accomplished was the transfer of the stocks and subscription
rights of IRC in UHC to petitioners, but despite demand, IRC did not comply.
Issue: Whether or not respondent UHC may have been sequestered did not divest the
Regional Trial Court of its jurisdiction over the subject matter of petitioners’ complaint?
Ruling: No. The Court Ruled that a rigorous examination of the antecedent facts and existing
records at hand shows that Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over the instant case.
It must be borne in mind that the Sandiganbayan was created in 1978 pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1606. Thus, the executive issuances during such period before
the ratification of the 1987 Constitution had the force and effect of laws. Specifically, then
President Corazon C. Aquino issued the following Executive Orders which amended PD 1606
in so far as the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over civil and criminal cases instituted and
prosecuted by the PCGG is concerned, viz:
a) EO 1, entitled "Creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government," dated
February 28, 1986;
b) EO 2, entitled "Regarding the Funds, Moneys, Assets, and Properties Illegally Acquired or
Misappropriated by Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos,
Their Close Relatives, Subordinates, Business Associates, Dummies, Agents, or Nominees,"
dated March 12, 1986;
c) EO 14, entitled "Defining the Jurisdiction over Cases Involving the Ill-gotten Wealth of
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, Members of their Immediate
Family, Close Relatives, Subordinates, Close and/or Business Associates, Dummies, Agents
and Nominees," dated May 7, 1986; and
d) EO 14-A, entitled "Amending Executive Order No. 14," dated August 18, 1986.
Bearing on the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over cases of ill-gotten wealth, EO 14, Secs.
1 and 2 provide:
SECTION 1. Any provision of the law to the contrary notwithstanding, the Presidential
Commission on Good Government with the assistance of the Office of the Solicitor General
and other government agencies, is hereby empowered to file and prosecute all cases
investigated by it under Executive Order No. 1, dated February 28, 1986 and Executive Order
No. 2, dated March 12, 1986, as may be warranted by its findings.
SECTION 2. The Presidential Commission on Good Government shall file all such cases,
whether civil or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan, which shall have exclusive and original
jurisdiction thereof. (Emphasis supplied.)
Notably, these amendments had been duly recognized and reflected in subsequent
amendments to PD 1606, specifically Republic Act Nos. 7975 and 8249.
In the light of the foregoing provisions, it is clear that it is the Sandiganbayan and not the
Makati City RTC that has jurisdiction over the disputed UHC and PNCC shares, being the
alleged "ill-gotten wealth" of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and petitioner Cuenca
22
G.R. No. 75919 May 7, 1987
MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, STEPHEN ROXAS,
ANDREW LUISON, GRACE LUISON and JOSE DE MAISIP, respondents.

Facts:
Manchester contended that the filing fee must be assessed on the basis of the amended
complaint, citing the case of Magaspi v. Ramolete. The environmental facts of Magaspi as
compared to the current Manchester case were as follows:

Issue:
In relation to docket fees as applied in Manchester case:
a) Must it be based in original complaint or in the amended complaint?
b) In which part of the pleading must the amount of damages being prayed for stated?
c) Is the court devoid of jurisdiction for failure to pay the correct docket fees?
23
Held:

1.a) It must be based in the original complaint (as compared from Magaspic case where the
docket fee was based from amended complaint due to honest difference of opinion.
1.b) The amount of damages being prayed for must be stated in both the body of the pleading
and the prayer. Such amount will be the basis of the filing fees.
1.c) Yes

In Magaspi case, SC declared that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of docket fee
regardless of the actual date of filing in court. As such, in Manchester, the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case by payment of only P410 as docket fee. Neither the
amendment of complaint vested jurisdiction upon the court because in essence, there was no
such original complained that was duly filed which could be amended. The orders admitting
the amended complaint and all subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the RTC are
null and void.

CA was correct in ruling that the basis of assessment of docket fee should be the amount of
damages sought in the original complaint and not in the amended complaint.

SC frowns at the practice of counsel who filed the original complaint by omitting any
specification of the amount of damages in the prayer, although the real amount is alleged in
the body of the complaint. This is clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the
payment of correct filing fees or to mislead the docket clear in the assessment of filing fee.
Such fraudulent practice was compounded when Manchester, through another counsel, filed
an amended complaint, deleting all mention of the amount of damages being asked for in the
body of complaint. It was only when in obedience to the order of the SC that the amount of
damages be specified in the amended complaint, that Manchester wrote the damages in a
reduced amount in the body of the complaint but not in the prayer thereof. The design to avoid
payment of the required docket fee was obvious.

To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar
pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the
pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of
the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not be
accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.

The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket
fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the
Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended
pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi case in so far as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement
is overturned and reversed.

24
SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL. vs.MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO SIBONGHANOY
and LUCIA BAGUIO (CASE DIGEST) G.R. No. L-21450 - - April 15, 1968
FACTS:
The action at bar, which is a suit for collection of a sum of money in the sum of exactly P
1,908.00, exclusive of interest filed by Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog against Spouses
Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio, was originally instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948. A month prior to the filing of the complaint, the Judiciary
Act of 1948 (R.A. 296) took effect depriving the Court of First Instance of original jurisdiction
over cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, is not more than P 2,000.00 (Secs.
44[c] and 86[b], R.A. 296.)
The case has already been pending now for almost 15 years, and throughout the entire
proceeding the appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until the receipt of the Court
of Appeals' adverse decision.
Considering that the Supreme Court has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases in
which jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue, the Court of Appeals certified the case to the
Supreme Court along with the records of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant's motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance during the pendency of the appeal will prosper.
RULING:
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different
reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel
by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier;
it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which
requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of
limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or
unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief
against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question
that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by
way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had
jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such
cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of
the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can
not be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering
an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or
power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283;
St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo.
58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of
a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same
jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of the
Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra) — to the effect that we frown upon the "undesirable
practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if
favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse — as well as in Pindañgan
etc. vs. Dans, et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano, et al., vs. Bacolod-
Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of Industrial
Relation et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31,
1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved
which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of
inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a
quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain
affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after
an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the
question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be
declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on
July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The
inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.
Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after going over the entire record, We have become
persuaded that We can do nothing better than to quote in toto, with approval, the decision
rendered by the Court of Appeals x x x granting plaintiffs' motion for execution against the
surety x x x
25
UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs
against the appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc.
FIGUEROA V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 147406 / JULY 14, 2008 / NACHURA, J. / CIVPRO – Effect of estoppel on
objections to jurisdiction / MEEMARCILLA
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari
PETITIONERS Venancio Figueroa y Cervantes
RESPONDENTS People of the Philippines
SUMMARY. An information for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide was filed
against the petitioner before the RTC. Petitioner questioned the RTC’s jurisdiction on
appeal. CA affirmed the conviction saying that petitioner is already estopped by laches
from questioning the jurisdiction. SC granted the petition for certiorari because the issue of
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.
DOCTRINE. The general rule is that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of
the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. Such jurisdiction
is conferred by law and not by mere consent of the parties
FACTS.
 An information for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide was filed against the
petitioner before the RTC of Bulacan.
 Trial on the merits ensued and the trial court convicted the petitioner as charged. In his
appeal before the CA, the petitioner questioned for the first time the trial court’s jurisdiction.
 The appellate court considered the petitioner to have actively participated in the trial and to
have belatedly attacked the jurisdiction of the RTC; thus, he was already estopped by
laches from asserting the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction. CA affirmed the petitioner’s
conviction but modified the penalty imposed and the damages awarded.
 Petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari
ISSUES & RATIO.
1. WON the RTC of Bulacan has jurisdiction. – NO
The jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force
at the time of the institution of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive
application thereof.
In this case, at the time the criminal information for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
with violation of the Automobile Law (now Land Transportation and Traffic Code) was filed,
Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 had already been amended by Republic Act
No. 7691.1
As the imposable penalty for the crime charged herein is prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods or imprisonment for 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years, jurisdiction
to hear and try the same is conferred on the Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs). Therefore, the
RTC of Bulacan does not have jurisdiction over this case.
2. WON the principle of estoppel by laches has already precluded the petitioner from
questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC. – NO
The trial went on for 4 years with the petitioner actively participating therein and without him
ever raising the jurisdictional infirmity.
The general rule is that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel—estoppel by laches, to
bar a litigant from asserting the court’s absence or lack of jurisdiction, only supervenes in
exceptional cases similar to the factual milieu of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.
The fact that a person attempts to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not estop
him from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such jurisdiction
must be conferred by law and not by mere consent of the parties.
1 Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases.—Except in cases falling within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable
accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or
predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however,
That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.
26
No considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach. True, delay alone, though 10. Then the supreme court issue a decision on the petition for review filed by the petitioner
unreasonable, will not sustain the defense of “estoppel by laches” unless it further appears Velasquez affirming the decision of the IAC stating that the case had become moot and
that the party, knowing his rights, has not sought to enforce them until the condition of the academic with regards the claim of the petitioner against the DMC considering that the
party pleading laches has in good faith become so changed that he cannot be restored to his property had been foreclose by the PNB declaring however that the petitioner may redeem the
former state. In applying the principle of estoppel by laches in the exceptional case of property from the PNB and its transferee.
Sibonghanoy, it has already been more or less 15 years. The same, however, does not obtain 11. The record was remanded to the parad or the provincial agrarian adjudication for the
in the instant case. petitioner to exercise there right of redemption but since the case had become moot and
academic, the parad denied the action of the petitioner to recover the property against the
DMC since the land in question is now a residential land so the right of the petitioner as an
Moreover, a judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter is void. No agricultural lessee was terminated and the property was now in the possession of the remman
laches will even attach when the judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction. enterprise inc.
12. The petitioner filed a motion before the darab or the department of agrarian adjudication
board who reverses the decision of the parad stating that the land in question is an agricultural
DECISION. lan and uphold the right of the petitioner as an agricultural lessee to recover the said land.
13. The remman enterprise filed an appeal before the CA who reverses the decision of the
Petition granted. Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94 is dismissed without prejudice. darab because the land in question was already reclassified as residential land as early as
1981 converting it from agricultural land in to non-agricultural land.
14. The petitioner filed a motion to the supreme court.
VELASQUEZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ON CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE. DIGESTED BY C
Y THE GREAT Issue. Whether or not, the land was an agricultural land or a residential land.
VELASQUEZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS,
According to the supreme court, Agricoltural land was defined under RA. 6657 as those land
G.R. No. 111387 June 8, 2004 devoted to agricultural activities and not classified as forest,minerals,residential and industrial
JUSTINA ADVINCULA-VELASQUEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL. land.
FACTS. And one thing more, the property in question was converted in to a residential land in 1981
1. The petitioners here were the agricultural lessees of a Riceland located in Paranyake Metro under the ordinance issued by the city of Manila.
Manila.
2. In 1978,SPS. Nery and the Lorenzo’s sold the property to the Delta Motor’s corporation. So the supreme court set aside the petition of the petitioner.
3. Petitioner Velasquez in his capacity as leaseholder agricultural tenant filed an action for the
redemption of the said property before the court of agrarian relation.
4. The car dismiss the motion for lack on the part of the petitioner to redeem the property in its
acquisition price in the amount of 2,319,210 pesos but directing the defendant to maintain the
petitioner as agricultural lessee to the land in question.
5. Petitioner Velasquez and the defendants appealed the decision of the CAR to the
intermediate appellate court who affirmed the decision of the CAR.
6. Petitioner Velasquez filed a petition for review to the supreme court who issue a temporary
restraining order enjoining the car’s decision pending the outcome of the petition.
7In 1981, the land in question was reclassified as residential zone under the ordinance issued
by the city of Manila.
8. Later, the land in question was mortgage by the DMC to the PNB as security for its
obligation who later foreclose it because of the failure of the DMC to pay its account.
9. The PNB in 1986 executed a deed of sale with mortgage of 1186800 in favor of the
remman enterprise inc. who decided to develop it in to a residential subdivision.

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