6. Manalo v.
Ateneo De Naga University Arbiter Quiñones and of the National Labor Relations Commission and
Facts:
Manalo was a regular and permanent full-time faculty member of the
Accountancy Department of Ateneo de Naga University's College of
Commerce and was granted permanent status in 1996. , Manalo
similarly acknowledged that in 1994, she taught subjects in Ateneo de
Naga University's Economics Department (i.e., International Trade
and Philippine Economic Development), albeit insisting that she did
not have the required aptitude and competence.[11]
Manalo was also a part-time Manager of the Ateneo de Naga Multi-
Purpose Cooperative (Cooperative). She came into conflict with
Bernal, Dean of Ateneo de Naga University's College of Commerce.
Bernal supposedly charged Manalo with various offenses. Bernal
wrote to Fr. Tabora, Ateneo de Naga University President,
recommending the termination of her employment on the grounds of
serious business malpractice, palpable dishonesty, and questionable
integrity. . The Grievance Committee later found Manalo guilty and
recommended her dismissal. ] Fr. Tabora instead opted to transfer
Manalo to teach Economics in the Department of Social Sciences.
Alleging that her transfer constituted constructive dismissal, Manalo
filed a Complaint. Labor Arbiter Quiñones rendered the
Decision[20] finding that Manalo was constructively dismissed. He
similarly faulted a Manalo's transfer to teach Economics—a subject
that she was supposedly not qualified to teach—as unduly
burdensome, inconvenient, and even embarrassing, and construed it
as a badge of constructive dismissal. Court of Appeals rendered the
assailed Decision.[29] It reversed and set aside the rulings of Labor
ordered Manalo's Complaint dismissed.
Issues:
First, whether the Court of Appeals was in error for entertaining
alternative findings to those made by Labor Arbiter Quiñones and the
National Labor Relations Commission; and
Second, whether the shift in petitioner Jovita S. Manalo's teaching
load from mainly Accountancy subjects to Economics subjects
constituted constructive dismissal.
Held:
1. No, it is a clear error for petitioner to insist that the figurative
hands of the Court of Appeals were tied just because the findings of
the Labor Arbiter and of the National Labor Relations coincided with
each other. Precisely because it was confronted with a Rule 65
Petition, it was the Court of Appeals' business to determine whether
there had been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. When the Court of Appeals was going about its task of
arriving at a resolution, petitioner should not fault the Court of
Appeals both for examining the records and evidence at its disposal
and for embarking on its own analysis of whether Labor Arbiter
Quiñones and the National Labor Relations Commission properly
performed their duties and were circumspect in concluding that
petitioner was constructively dismissed.
The Court of Appeals concluded that Labor Arbiter Quiñones' and the
National Labor Relations Commission's disposition of the case were
attended with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. We sustain the conclusion of the Court of Appeals.
2. Constructive dismissal in such a way that the impossibility,
unreasonableness, or unlikelihood of continued employment leaves
an employee with no other viable recourse but to terminate his or her
employment. Not every inconvenience, disruption, difficulty, or
disadvantage that an employee must endure results in a finding of
constructive dismissal. Jurisprudence has long recognized that
transferring employees, to the extent that it is done fairly and in good
faith, is a valid exercise of management prerogative.
Jurisprudence has long recognized that transferring employees, to the
extent that it is done fairly and in good faith, is a valid exercise of
management prerogative
When his transfer is not unreasonable, nor inconvenient, nor
prejudicial to him, and it does not involve a demotion in rank or a
diminution of his salaries, benefits, and other privileges, the
employee may not complain that it amounts to a constructive
dismissal, she argues that her supposed offenses are not work-related
and cannot be the bases of any prospective termination or of any
other action taken on her employment as a faculty member.
Respondents aptly note that the offenses petitioner committed show
"clear transgressions of the Code of Ethics of Accountants, which
rendered petitioner disqualified to teach Accounting.
3. Being a professional is, thus, a matter of credibility and
trustworthiness. Accordingly, ethics and values are as inherent to
professions as are training and technical competence
It is precisely with the public interest in mind that professional
regulation—whether by the state or by members of the professions
themselves, i.e., self-regulation—is an accepted norm. In legal
parlance and where the state apparatus is employed, professional
regulation is a matter of police power.
Regulation of a profession is a specific response to the need for
certain standards to be met by the members of that profession[;]
[albeit] [t]he need for and nature of such regulation is dependent on
the specific profession and the market conditions in which it
operates. Professionals who concurrently take on the role of
educators act as gatekeepers to the esteemed ranks of a profession
or as channels of skills and knowledge.
It is the ethical behavior of the professional accountant that is the
ultimate guarantee of good service and quality. Accountancy
profession is regulated by Republic Act No. 9298, otherwise known as
the Philippine Accountancy Act of 2004.
We fail to see how petitioner can avoid the conclusion that these
indiscretions do not reflect her fitness as an educator for the
accountancy profession and her employment with respondent Ateneo
de Naga University. The totality of the indiscretions imputed to
petitioner reflects negatively on the accountancy profession and
indicates anything but professional behavior, she failed to educate in
respect of the values that are integral to the training that she was
supposed to impart to future professional accountants. They are as
much a matter of ethics
If at all, petitioner should be grateful to her employer that she was
only transferred and her employment was not completely
terminated. At the heart of the issue of constructive dismissal is the
matter of whether the employer's actions are warranted. Here, we
find ample basis not only for the precautionary measures actually
taken on petitioner, but even for other heavier penalties that could
have been imposed on her
 7. Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College
Facts: Respondent SSC is the owner of four (4) parcels of land in
Marikina Heights.The property is enclosed by a tall concrete
perimeter fence built some thirty (30) years ago. The petitioners are
the officials of the City Government of Marikina. the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Marikina City enacted Ordinance No. 192,[4] entitled
“Regulating the Construction of Fences and Walls in the Municipality
of Marikina.” Ordinance regulates the construction of all fences, walls
and gates on lots classified or used for residential, commercial,
industrial, or special purposes.
Section 3. The standard height of fences or walls allowed under this
ordinance are as follows:
(1) Fences on the front yard – shall be no more than one (1) meter in
height. Fences in excess of one (1) meter shall be of an open
fence type, at least eighty percent (80%) see-thru; and
Section 5. In no case shall walls and fences be built within the five
(5) meter parking area allowance located between the front
monument line and the building line of commercial and industrial
establishments and educational and religious institutions
the City Government of Marikina sent a letter to the respondents
ordering them to demolish and replace the fence of their Marikina
property to make it 80% see-thru, and, at the same time, to move it
back about six (6) meters to provide parking space for vehicles to
park. the respondents requested for an extension of time to comply
with the directive insisted on the enforcement of the subject
ordinance. the respondents filed a petition for prohibition with an
application for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order.
Issue: Whether or not Sections 3.1 and 5 Ordinance 192 are a valid
exercise of police power
Held: No. “Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature
to make statutes and ordinances to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the
people.”[21] The State, through the legislature, has delegated the
exercise of police power to local government units, as agencies of the
State.
The Court first turns its attention to Section 5 which requires the five-
meter setback of the fence to provide for a parking area. the
petitioners admitted that Section 5 was, in fact, invalid for being
repugnant to the Constitution.[31] The Court agrees with the latter
position. Section 9 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution, a provision
on eminent domain, provides that private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation.
The petitioners cannot justify the setback by arguing that the
ownership of the property will continue to remain with the
respondents. It is a settled rule that neither the acquisition of title nor
the total destruction of value is essential to taking. Section 5 of
Ordinance No. 192 is invalid.
The petitioners, however, argue that the invalidity of Section 5 was
properly cured by Zoning Ordinance No. 303. The petitioners are
mistaken. Ordinance No. 303, Series of 2000, has no bearing to the
case at hand.
Ordinance No. 192 aims to regulate the construction of fences, while
Ordinance No. 303 is a zoning ordinance which classifies the city into
specific land uses.
The principal purpose of Section 3.1 is "to discourage, suppress or
prevent the concealment of prohibited or unlawful acts." The
ultimate goal of this objective is clearly the prevention of crime to
ensure public safety and security.
The petitioners have not adequately shown, and it does not appear
obvious to this Court, that an 80% see-thru fence would provide
better protection and a higher level of security, or serve as a more
satisfactory criminal deterrent, than a tall solid concrete wall.
Compelling the respondents to construct their fence in accordance
with the assailed ordinance is, thus, a clear encroachment on their
right to property, which necessarily includes their right to decide how
best to protect their property.
It also appears that requiring the exposure of their property via a see-
thru fence is violative of their right to privacy, considering that the
residence of the Benedictine nuns is also located within the property
Section 3.1 of Ordinance No. 192 is, thus, also invalid and cannot be
enforced against the respondents.
Considering that Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192 cannot be
enforced against the respondents, it is no longer necessary to rule on
the issue of retroactivity.
Considering the invalidity of Sections 3.1 and 5, it is clear that the
petitioners were acting in excess of their jurisdiction in enforcing
Ordinance No. 192 against the respondents. The CA was correct in
affirming the decision of the RTC in issuing the writ of prohibition.
8. Basco v. PAGCOR
Facts:
Petitioners filed the instant petition seeking to annul the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter - PD 1869,
because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and
because -
“A. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with
a right recognized by law. It waived the Manila City government's
right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law;
"B. For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding
paragraph, the law has intruded into the local government's right to
impose local taxes and license fees. This, in contravention of the
constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy;
“C. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it
legalizes PAGCOR - conducted gambling, while most other forms of
gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking
and other vices;
"C. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from
monopolistic and crony economy, and toward free enterprise and
privatization."
Issue and Ruling:
1. W/N the same is "null and void" for being "contrary to morals, public
policy and public order," monopolistic and tends toward "crony
economy", and is violative of the equal protection clause and local
autonomy as well as for running counter to the state policies enunciated in
Sections 11 (Personal Dignity and Human Rights), 12 (Family) and 13 (Role
of Youth) of Article II, Section 1 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2
(Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution.
Gambling in all its forms, unless allowed by law, is generally
prohibited. But the prohibition of gambling does not mean that the
Government cannot regulate it in the exercise of its police power.
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It
has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare." It consists of (1) an imposition or restraint upon
liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not
capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in
general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.
P.D. 1869 was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government to
"regulate and centralize thru an appropriate institution all games of
chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law" (1st
whereas clause, PD 1869). As was subsequently proved, regulating
and centralizing gambling operations in one corporate entity — the
PAGCOR, was beneficial not just to the Government but to society in
general. It is a reliable source of much needed revenue for the cash
strapped Government. It provided funds for social impact projects
and subjected gambling to "close scrutiny, regulation, supervision and
control of the Government" (4th Whereas Clause, PD 1869). With the
creation of PAGCOR and the direct intervention of the Government,
the evil practices and corruptions that go with gambling will be
minimized if not totally eradicated. Public welfare, then, lies at the
bottom of the enactment of PD 1896.
2. W/N P.D. 1869 is violative of the principle of local autonomy.
They must be referring to Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which
exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any "tax of any
kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of
whatever nature, whether National or Local."
Their contention stated hereinabove is without merit for the City of
Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been
revoked. As early as 1975, the power of local governments to regulate
gambling thru the grant of "franchise, licenses or permits" was
withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National
Government. Therefore, only the National Government has the
power to issue "licenses or permits" for the operation of gambling.
Necessarily, the power to demand or collect license fees which is a
consequence of the issuance of "licenses or permits" is no longer
vested in the City of Manila.
Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and
actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be
burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local
government.
3. W/N P.D. 1869 violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution, because "it legalized PAGCOR — conducted gambling,
while most gambling are outlawed together with prostitution, drug
trafficking and other vices
The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the Legislature from
establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different
rules shall operate (Laurel v. Misa, 43 O.G. 2847). The Constitution
does not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be
treated in law as though they were the same (Gomez v. Palomar, 25
SCRA 827).
4. W/N PD 1869 is contrary to the "avowed trend of the Cory
Government away from monopolies and crony economy and toward
free enterprise and privatization". If, indeed, PD 1869 runs counter
to the government's policies then it is for the Executive Department
to recommend to Congress its repeal or amendment.
Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when public
interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair
competition shall be allowed. (Art. XII, National Economy and
Patrimony)
It should be noted that, as the provision is worded, monopolies are
not necessarily prohibited by the Constitution. The state must still
decide whether public interest demands that monopolies be
regulated or prohibited. Again, this is a matter of policy for the
Legislature to decide.
9. City Govt. of QC vs Ericta
Facts: This is a petition for review which seeks the reversal of the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII declaring
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, of the Quezon City Council null
and void. For several years, the afore-quoted section of the Ordinance
was not enforced by city authorities but seven years after the
enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed the
following resolution:
RESOLVED by the council of Quezon assembled, to request, as it does
hereby request the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further
selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where
the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space
intended for paupers burial.
Pursuant to this petition, the Quezon City Engineer notified
respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of
Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 would be enforced.
Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with the Court of
First Instance of Rizal Branch XVIII at Quezon City, a petition for
declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
injunction (Sp. Proc. No. Q-16002) seeking to annul Section 9 of the
Ordinance in question The respondent alleged that the same is
contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local
Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code. There being no
issue of fact and the questions raised being purely legal both
petitioners and respondent agreed to the rendition of a judgment on
the pleadings. The respondent court, therefore, rendered the decision
declaring Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 null and void.
A motion for reconsideration having been denied, the City
Government and City Council filed the instant petition. Petitioners
argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and
reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a
public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They
further argue that the Quezon City Council is authorized under its
charter, in the exercise of local police power, " to make such further
ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to law as may be necessary
to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by
this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for
the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals,
peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the
inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein."
On the other hand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contends that
the taking or confiscation of property is obvious because the
questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property
such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives
the owner of all beneficial use of his property.
The respondent also stresses that the general welfare clause is not
available as a source of power for the taking of the property in this
case because it refers to "the power of promoting the public welfare
by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property." The
respondent points out that if an owner is deprived of his property
outright under the State's police power, the property is generally not
taken for public use but is urgently and summarily destroyed in order
to promote the general welfare. The respondent cites the case of a
nuisance per se or the destruction of a house to prevent the spread of
a conflagration.
Issue: Whether or not the ordinance made by Quezon City is a valid
taking of private property.
Ruling: No, the ordinance made by Quezon City is not a valid way of
taking private property. The ordinance is actually a taking without
compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit
paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of
building or maintaining a public cemeteries. State's exercise of the
power of expropriation requires payment of just compensation.
Passing the ordinance without benefiting the owner of the property
with just compensation or due process, would amount to unjust
taking of a real property. Since the property that is needed to be
taken will be used for the public's benefit, then the power of the state
to expropriate will come forward and not the police power of the
state.
10. Manila Memorial Park vs Sec. of DSWD
Facts: On April 23, 1992, RA 7432 was passed into law, granting senior
citizens the following privileges:
SECTION 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. – The senior citizens
shall be entitled to the following:
a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments
relative to utilization of transportation services, hotels and similar
lodging establishment[s], restaurants and recreation centers and
purchase of medicine anywhere in the country: Provided, That private
establishments may claim the cost as tax credit;
b) a minimum of twenty percent (20%) discount on admission fees
charged by theaters, cinema houses and concert halls, circuses,
carnivals and other similar places of culture, leisure, and amusement;
c) exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: Provided,
That their annual taxable income does not exceed the property level
as determined by the National Economic and Development Authority
(NEDA) for that year;
d) exemption from training fees for socioeconomic programs
undertaken by the OSCA as part of its work;
e) free medical and dental services in government establishment[s]
anywhere in the country, subject to guidelines to be issued by the
Department of Health, the Government Service Insurance System and
the Social Security System;
f) to the extent practicable and feasible, the continuance of the same
benefits and privileges given by the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS), Social Security System (SSS) and PAG-IBIG, as the case
may be, as are enjoyed by those in actual service.
SECTION 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. – The senior citizens
shall be entitled to the following:
(a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all
establishments relative to the utilization of services in hotels and
similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers,
and purchase of medicines in all establishments for the exclusive use
or enjoyment of senior citizens, including funeral and burial services
for the death of senior citizens;
The establishment may claim the discounts granted under (a), (f), (g)
and (h) as tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or
services rendered: Provided, That the cost of the discount shall be
allowed as deduction from gross income for the same taxable year
that the discount is granted. Provided, further, That the total amount
of the claimed tax deduction net of value added tax if applicable, shall
be included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall be
subject to proper documentation and to the provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code, as amended.
Feeling aggrieved by the tax deduction scheme, petitioners filed the
present recourse, praying that Section 4 of RA 7432, as amended by
RA 9257, and the implementing rules and regulations issued by the
DSWD and the DOF be declared unconstitutional insofar as these
allow business establishments to claim the 20% discount given to
senior citizens as a tax deduction; that the DSWD and the DOF be
prohibited from enforcing the same; and that the tax credit treatment
of the 20% discount under the former Section 4 (a) of RA 7432 be
reinstated.
Issue:
A. Whether the petition presents an actual case or controversy.
B. Whether section 4 of republic act no. 9257 and x x x its
implementing rules and regulations, insofar as they provide that the
twenty percent (20%) discount to senior citizens may be claimed as a
tax deduction by the private establishments, are invalid and
unconstitutional.
Ruling:
11. Reyes vs Almanzor
Facts:
Petitioners J.B.L. Reyes, Edmundo and Milagros Reyes are owners of
parcels of land situated in Tondo which are leased and entirely
occupied as dwelling sites by tenants. Said tenants were paying
monthly rentals not exceeding three hundred pesos (P300.00)
the National Legislature enacted Republic Act No. 6359 prohibiting for
one year from its effectivity, an increase in monthly rentals of
dwelling units or of lands on which another’s dwelling is located,
where such rentals do not exceed three hundred pesos (P300.00) a
month but allowing an increase in rent by not more than 10%
thereafter.
R.A. No. 6359 by making absolute the prohibition to increase monthly
rentals below P300.00 and by indefinitely suspending the
aforementioned provision of the Civil Code, excepting leases with a
definite period. The Reyeses, petitioners herein, were precluded from
raising the rentals and from ejecting the tenants.
The revision, as expected, entailed an increase in the corresponding
tax rates prompting petitioners to file a Memorandum of
Disagreement with the Board of Tax Assessment Appeals. They
averred that the reassessments made were "excessive, unwarranted,
inequitable, confiscatory and unconstitutional” considering that the
taxes imposed upon them greatly exceeded the annual income
derived from their properties
The Board of Tax Assessment Appeals, however, considered the
assessments valid
The Reyeses appealed to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.
the appealed Decision is modified by allowing a 20% reduction in their
respective market values and applying therein the assessment level of
30% to arrive at the corresponding assessed value. Petitioners'
subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, this
petition.
Issue: the honorable board erred in adopting the "comparable sales
approach" method in fixing the assessed value of appellants'
properties.
Held:
The crux of the controversy is in the method used in tax assessment
of the properties in question. Respondent Board of Tax Assessment
Appeals admits in its decision that the income approach is used in
determining land values in some vicinities, it maintains that when
income is affected by some sort of price control, the same is rejected
in the consideration and study of land values as in the case of
properties affected by the Rent Control Law for they do not project
the true market value in the open market.
Under Art. VIII, Sec. 17 (1) of the 1973 Constitution, then enforced,
the rule of taxation must not only be uniform, but must also be
equitable and progressive.
Taxation is said to be equitable when its burden falls on those better
able to pay. Taxation is progressive when its rate goes up depending
on the resources of the person affected .
The power to tax "is an attribute of sovereignty". In fact, it is the
strongest of all the powers of government. But for all its plenitude,
the power to tax is not unconfined as there are
restrictions. Adversely affecting as it does property rights, both the
due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution may
properly be invoked to invalidate in appropriate cases a revenue
measure.
The taxing power has the authority to make a reasonable and natural
classification for purposes of taxation but the government's act must
not be prompted by a spirit of hostility, or at the very least
discrimination that finds no support in reason
Ironically, in the case at bar, not even the factors determinant of the
assessed value of subject properties under the "comparable sales
approach" were presented by the public respondents, namely: (1)
that the sale must represent a bonafide arm's length transaction
between a willing seller and a willing buyer and (2) the property must
be comparable property (Rollo, p. 27). Nothing can justify or support
their view as it is of judicial notice that for properties covered by P.D.
20 especially during the time in question, there were hardly any
willing buyers. As a general rule, there were no takers so that there
can be no reasonable basis for the conclusion that these properties
were comparable with other residential properties not burdened by
P.D. 20. Neither can the given circumstances be nonchalantly
dismissed by public respondents as imposed under distressed
conditions clearly implying that the same were merely temporary in
character. At this point in time, the falsity of such premises cannot be
more convincingly demonstrated by the fact that the law has existed
for around twenty (20) years with no end to it in sight.
It is therefore necessary to reconcile the apparently conflicting
interests of the authorities and the taxpayers so that the real purpose
of taxations, which is the promotion of the common good, may be
achieved (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Algue, Inc., et al., 158
SCRA 9 [1988]). Consequently, it stands to reason that petitioners
who are burdened by the government by its Rental Freezing Laws
(then R.A. No. 6359 and P.D. 20) under the principle of social justice
should not now be penalized by the same government by the
imposition of excessive taxes petitioners can ill afford and eventually
result in the forfeiture of their properties.

The petition is GRANTED; (b) the assailed decisions of public

respondents are REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and (c) the respondent
Board of Assessment Appeals of Manila and the City Assessor of
Manila are ordered to make a new assessment by the income
approach method to guarantee a fairer and more realistic basis of
computation.