I.
MARRIAGE
The concept of and nature of marriage
1. Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda 35 Phil 252
FACTS:
Luisa Goitia, petitioner, and Jose Campos, respondent,
were married on January 7, 1915 and had a residence at
115 Calle San Marcelino Manila. They stayed together for
a month before petitioner returned to her parent’s
home. Goitia filed a complaint against respondent for
support outside the conjugal home. It was alleged that
respondent demanded her to perform unchaste and
lascivious acts on his genital organs. Petitioner refused to
perform such acts and since Goitia kept on refusing,
respondent maltreated her inflicting injuries upon her
different body parts. The trial court ruled in favor of
respondent and stated that Goitia could not compel her
husband to support her except in the conjugal home.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to
support her outside the conjugal home.
HELD:
YES.
The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to
support the wife, may fulfil the obligation either by paying
her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home
at his option. However the law will not permit the
husband to evade or terminate his obligation to support
his wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal home
because of his wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the wife
was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the
lewd designs and physical assault of the husband, she
can therefore claim support from the husband for
separate maintenance even outside the conjugal
home.
2. Silverio v. Republic October 22, 2007 (GR. No. 174689)
FACTS:
On November 26, 2002, Silverio filed a petition for the
change of his first name “Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely” and
his sex from male to female in his birth certificate in the
RTC of Manila for reason of his sex reassignment. He
alleged that he is a male transsexual, he is anatomically
male but thinks and acts like a female. The RTC ruled in
favor of him, explaining that it is consonance with the
principle of justice and equality.
ISSUE:
WON change in name and sex in birth certificate are
allowed by reason of sex reassignment.
HELD: NO.
A change of name is a privilege and not a right. It may
be allowed in cases where the name is ridiculous, tainted
with dishonor, or difficult to pronounce or write; a
nickname is habitually used; or if the change will avoid
confusion. The petitioner’s basis of the change of his
name is that he intends his first name compatible with the
sex he thought he transformed himself into thru surgery.
The Court says that his true name does not prejudice him
at all, and no law allows the change of entry in the birth
certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment.
The Court denied the petition.
1 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
4. De Santis v.Intestate Estate Jalandoni
GR No. 178221, December 1, 2010
FACTS:
Rodolfo Jalandoni died intestate. His brother, Bernardino
filed with RTC a petition for issuance of letters of
administration. Anonuevo et al intervened and claimed
that their mother Sylvia De Santis was daughter of Isabel
and John. They alleged that at the time of Rodolfo’s
death, their grandmother Isabel was the lawful wife of
Rodolfo based on a marriage certificate. Rodolfo’s
brother opposed asserting that the birth certificate of
Sylvia states that Isabel and John were married, hence,
Isabel and Rodolfo’s marriage was null and void.
Petitioners argued that the entries in the birth certificate
of Sylvia could not be used as proof that Isabel and John
were indeed married.
ISSUE:
W/N the marriage of Isabel and Rodolfo was valid
HELD:
No. The birth certificate of Sylvia which indicates that
Isabel and John were married is sufficient proof that
indeed they were married. Therefore Isabel’s marriage to
Rodolfo is void because at that time, she was still married
to John. Consequently, her descendants have no share in
the estate of Rodolfo. While a marriage certificate is
considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is
not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of
marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of
marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other
than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s
birth certificate may be recognized as competent
evidence of the marriage between his parents.
5. [A.C. No. 9081. October 12, 2011.]
RODOLFO A. ESPINOSA and MAXIMO A.
GLINDO, complainants, vs. ATTY. JULIETA A.
OMAÑA, respondent.
FACTS:
Complainants Espinosa and Glindo filed a complaint for
disbarment against Omana. They alleged that on 17
November 1997, Espinosa and his wife Elena Marantal
(Marantal) sought Omaña's legal advice on whether they
could legally live separately and dissolve their marriage.
Omaña then prepared a document entitled "Kasunduan
Ng Paghihiwalay." That they were fully convinced of the
validity of the contract dissolving their marriage then
started implementing its terms and conditions.
ISSUE:
WON the Kasunduan ng Paghihiwalay validly dissolved
the marriage of the spouses?
RULING:
No.
Extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership
without judicial approval is void. 2 The Court has also
ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the
disintegration of a marriage and the family by
encouraging the separation of the spouses and
extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership, 3 which
is exactly what Omaña did in this case.
B. Requisites of a valid marriage
2. G.R. No. 187417, February 24, 2016 not affect the validity of marriage but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally
CHRISTINE JOY CAPIN-CADIZ, Petitioner, v. BRENT and administratively liable.
HOSPITAL AND COLLEGES, INC., Respondent.
E. Marriage License
FACTS:
Cadiz was the Human Resource Officer of respondent
2. Alcantara v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 167746, Aug. 28, 2007
Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc. (Brent) at the time of her
indefinite suspension from employment in 2006. The cause
FACTS:
of suspension was Cadiz's Unprofessionalism and
Unethical Behavior Resulting to Unwed Pregnancy. It
On 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without
appears that Cadiz became pregnant out of wedlock,
securing the required marriage license, went to the
and Brent imposed the suspension until such time that she
Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person
marries her boyfriend in accordance with law.
who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a
person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding. They got
married on the same day. Another marriage was held in
ISSUE:
a church in Tondo. The marriage was likewise celebrated
without the parties securing a marriage license. The
Whether or not Cadiz’ premarital relations with her
alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite,
boyfriend and the resulting pregnancy out of wedlock
appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as
constitute immorality, hence a valid ground for dismissal?
neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never
went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil
RULING:
registrar of the said place. A petition for annulment of
marriage was filed by petitioner against respondent.
No. Jurisprudence has already set the standard of
Rosita however asserts the validity of their marriage and
morality with which an act should be gauged - it is public
maintains that there was a marriage license issued.
and secular, not religious. Whether a conduct is
considered disgraceful or immoral should be made in
ISSUE:
accordance with the prevailing norms of conduct. The
fact that a particular act does not conform to the
Whether or not their marriage is valid.
traditional moral views of a certain sectarian institution is
not sufficient reason to qualify such act as immoral unless
RULING:
it, likewise, does not conform to public and secular
standards.
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under
Art 53 of NCC. Their marriage contract reflects a
2. Navarro v. Domagtoy S.C. A.M. MTJ-96-1088, July 19,
marriage license number. A certification was also issued
1996
by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The
certification is precise since it specifically identified the
FACTS:
parties to whom the marriage license was issued.
Issuance of a marriage license where none of the parties
A complaint was filed against respondent Judge
is resident, is just an irregularity. Marriage is still valid even
Hernando Domagtoy on two specific acts on the grounds
if the marriage license is issued in a place not the
of gross misconduct, inefficiency in office and ignorance
domicile of the parties.
of the law. The first allegation, Domagtoy solemnized
marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja despite the
knowledge that the groom has a subsisting marriage. It
was told that the wife of Gaspar left their conjugal home
4. G.R. No. 160172, February 13, 2008
and has not returned and been heard for almost seven
years.
REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, petitioner, vs. ANNABELLE
ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, respondent.
The second allegation was that the said judge likewise
solemnized marriage of Floriano Dadoy Sumaylo and
Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court’s jurisdiction.
FACTS: Petitioner and respondent met and became
sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married, thus
ISSUES:
they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the
Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994.
1. Whether or not the marriage solemnized by the
defendant Judge Domagtoy were void;
When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil
Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus,
2. Whether or not the acts of Judge Domagtoy exhibits
in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a
gross misconduct, inefficiency in office and ignorance of
marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13
the law?
March 1995 stating that they had been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got
RULING:
married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe,
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig
The court held that the marriage between Tagadan and
City, administering the civil rites
Borja was void and bigamous there being a subsisting
marriage between Tagadan and his wife,
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between petitioner
notwithstanding, the latter was gone for seven years.
and respondent is valid.
Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding as
provided in the Civil Code for the declaration of
RULING: No. Under the Family Code, the absence of any
presumptive death of the absentee. With regard to the
of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario, the said marriage
marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the
was solidified as valid as article 4 par 3 of the Family
essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable. In
Code of the Philippines states that formal requisites shall
2 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented
that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage
license when they contracted their marriage. Instead,
they presented an affidavit stating that they had been
living together for more than five years..
The psychological make-up of private respondent was
evaluated by a psychologist, who found that the
psychological incapacity of both husband and wife to
perform their marital obligations is grave, incorrigible and
incurable.

The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a
mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. They
were not exempt from the marriage license requirement
and their failure to obtain and present a marriage license
renders their marriage void ab initio.
Petitioner anchors his petition on the premise that the
allegations contained in respondent’s petition are
insufficient to support a declaration of nullity of marriage
based on psychological incapacity.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition for declaration of the nullity of

ISIDRO ABLAZA, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
marriage are sufficient for the court to declare the nullity
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
of the marriage between Vida and Danilo.

FACTS:
RULING:

On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional

YES. The Court finds that the root cause of psychological
Trial Court (RTC) in Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the
incapacity was stated and alleged in the complaint. The
declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage
manifestation of respondent that the family backgrounds
contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late
of both petitioner and respondent were discussed in the
brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. The
complaint as the root causes of their psychological
petitioner alleged that the marriage between
incapacity. Moreover, a competent and expert
Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated without a
psychologist clinically identified the same as the root
marriage license, due to such license being issued only
causes.
on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void
ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage
license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of
Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him
to one-half of the real properties acquired by
Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real
party in interest; and that any person, himself included,
could impugn the validity of the marriage between
Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the
death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void
ab initio.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is a real party in interest in

the action to seek the declaration of nullity of the
marriage of his deceased brother.

RULING:

YES. The petitioner alleged himself to be the late

Cresenciano’s brother and surviving heir. Assuming that
the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he
has a material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that
will be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit.
Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a
compulsory heir under the laws of succession, has the
right to succeed to the estate of a deceased brother.

4. G.R. No. 175367 June 6, 2011

DANILO A. AURELIO, Petitioner, vs. VIDA MA. CORAZON P.

AURELIO, Respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma.

Corazon Aurelio were married on March 23, 1988. On
May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 94, a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.4 In her petition,
respondent alleged that both she and petitioner were
psychologically incapacitated of performing and
complying with their respective essential marital
obligations.

3 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK


1. G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MARELYN
TANEDO MANALO, Respondent.
FACTS:
Respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a
petition for cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil
Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a
judgment of divorce rendered by the Japanese court.
Manalo was allowed to testify. Among the documents
that were offered and admitted were: (1) Court Order
finding the petition and its attachments to be sufficient in
form and in substance; (2) Affidavit of Publication; (3)
Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former
Japanese husband; (4) Divorce Decree of the Japanese
court; (5) Authentication/Certificate issued by the
Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the
Notification of Divorce; and (6) Acceptance of
Certificate of Divorce.
The Office of the Solicitor’s General, as it appeared for
the petitioner Republic of the Philippines, did not present
any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of
Manalo.
The trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. It
opined that, based on Article of Article 15 of the New
Civil Code, the Philippine law “does not afford Filipinos
the right to file for a divorce, whether they are in the
country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or
to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the
Philippines or in another country.
On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held
that Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines is
applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce
against her Japanese husband because the decree they
obtained makes the latter no longer married to the
former capacitating him to remarry.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between a foreigner and a
Filipino was dissolved through a divorce filed abroad by
the latter?
RULING:
Yes. Article 26 of the Family Code which reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
4 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As
amended by Executive Order 227)
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on the
Philippine Courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce
decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. It
authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign
divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does
not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case
on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a divorce
case. Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction
recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of
foreign nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on
custody, care, and support of the children or property
relations of the spouses, must still be determined by our
court.
The Court state the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;
and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitation him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at
the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
Moreover, invoking the nationality principle is erroneous.
Such principle, found under Article 15of the Civil Code, is
not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the mere
existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that
the State may provide for an exception thereto. Also,
blind adherence to the nationality principle must be
disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and
oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights
are equally protected by law.
The Court, however, asserts that it cannot yet write finis to
this controversy by granting Manalo’s petition to
recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered by
the Japanese Court. Before a foreign divorce decree
can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further
proceedings and reception of evidence as to the
relevant Japanese law on divorce.
2. Tenchavez v. Escaño
G.R. No. L-19671, 29 November 1965
FACTS:
Vicenta Escaño, 27, exchanged marriage vows with
Pastor Tenchavez, 32, on February 24, 1948, before a
Catholic chaplain. The marriage was duly registered with
the local civil registrar. However, the two were unable to
live together after the marriage and as of June 1948, they
were already estranged. Vicenta left for the United
Stated in 1950. On the same year she filed a verified
complaint for divorce against Tenchavez in the State of
Nevada on the ground of “Extreme cruelty, entirely
mental in character.” A decree of divorce, “final and
absolute” was issued in open court by the said tribunal.
She married an American, lived with him in California,
had several children with him and, on 1958, acquired
American Citizenship.
On 30 July 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint in the Court
of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956,
against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and
Mena Escaño whom he charged with having dissuaded
and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and
alienating her affections, and against the Roman
Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan
Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and
asked for legal separation and one million pesos in
damages. Vicenta’s parents denied that they had in any
way influenced their daughter’s acts, and
counterclaimed for moral damages.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the divorce sought by Vicenta Escaño is
valid and binding upon courts of the Philippines.
2. Whether or not the parents of Vicenta alienated the
affections of their daughter and influenced her conduct
toward her husband.
RULING:
1. No. Vicenta Escaño and Pastor Tenchavez’ marriage
remain existent and undissolved under the Philippine Law.
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Civil Code, laws relating to
family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad.
Escaño’s divorce and second marriage cannot be
deemed valid under the Philippine Law to which Escaño
was bound since in the time the divorce decree was
issued, Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen.
The acts of the wife in not complying with her wifely
duties, deserting her husband without any justifiable
cause, leaving for the United States in order to secure a
decree of absolute divorce, and finally getting married
again are acts which constitute a willful infliction of injury
upon the husband’s feelings in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy, thus entitling
Tenchavez to a decree of legal separation under our law
on the basis of adultery.
2. No. There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta,
out of improper motives, aided and abetted her original
suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce.
A portion of Section 529 reads: The law distinguishes
between the right of a parent to interest himself in the
marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a
tranger to intermeddle in such affairs. …A parent is liable
for alienation of affections resulting from his own
malicious conduct, as where he wrongfully entices his son
or daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable
unless he acts maliciously, without justification and from
unworthy motives.
Therefore, her parents, in respecting Vicenta’s
independent decisions, certainly cannot be charged
with alienation of affections in the absence of malice or
unworthy motives.
3. ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, vs. HON. MANUEL
V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX,
5 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay
City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the
Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a
citizen of the United States. They were married in
Hongkong in 1972 and established their residence in the
Philippines. They begot two children born on April 4, 1973
and December 18, 1975, respectively. But the parties
were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982 and the
petitioner had remarried also in Nevada, this time to
Theodore Van Dorn.
On July 8, 1983, Richard Upton filed a suit against
petitioner, asking that Alice Van Dorn be ordered to
render an accounting of her business in Ermita, Manila
and be declared with right to manage the conjugal
property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the foreign divorce between the
petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is binding in
the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.
RULING:
As to Richard Upton, the divorce is binding on him as an
American Citizen. Owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law. The divorce is likewise valid as to the
petitioner.
As such, pursuant to his national law, private respondent
Richard Upton is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue Alice Van Dorn to
exercise control over conjugal assets. He was bound by
the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly
exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he
did not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property.
4. G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs. HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the
City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD
GEILING, respondents.
FACTS:
On September 7, 1979, Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a
Filipina and the respondent to the case, and Erich
Geiling, a German national, were married at
Friedenweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. After
about three and a half years of marriage, Geiling
initiated a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germany
in January 1983 while Pilapil filed an action for legal
separation, support and separation of property before
RTC of Manila in January 23, 1983 where it is still pending
as a civil case. On January 15, 1986, the local Court of
Germany promulgated a divorce decree on the ground
of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the
child,Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was granted to petitioner.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed two
complaints for adultery alleging that, while still married to
respondent, petitioner had an affair with a certain William
Chia and Jesus Chua sometime in 1982 and 1983
respectively. The respondent city fiscal approved a
resolution directing the filing of two complaints for
adultery against petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner filed a
motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment
and to suspend further proceedings thereon. Respondent
judge merely reset the date of the arraignment but
before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the
suspension of proceedings. On September 8, 1987,
respondent judge denied the motion to quash and also
directed the arraignment of both accused. Petitioner
refused to be arraigned and thus charged with direct
contempt and fined.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondent’s adultery charges
against the petitioner is still valid given the fact that both
had been divorced prior to the filing of charges.
RULING:
The law provides that in prosecutions for adultery and
concubinage the person who can legally file the
complaint should only be the offended spouse. The fact
that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his
country in 1983, is admitted. According to Article 15 of
the Civil Code, with relation to the status of Filipino
citizens both here and abroad, since the legal separation
of the petitioner and respondent has been finalized
through the courts in Germany and the RTC in Manila, the
marriage of the couple were already finished, thus giving
no merit to the charges the respondent filed against the
petitioner. Private respondent, being no longer married to
petitioner holds no legal merit to commence the adultery
case as the offended spouse at the time he filed suit in
1986. The temporary restraining order issued in this case
was made permanent.
5. FE D. QUITA v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 124862.
December 22, 1998
FACTS:
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were
married in the Philippines on 18 May 1941. They were not
however blessed with children. Somewhere along the
way their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo
for divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She
submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing
dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their agreement to live
separately from each other and a settlement of their
conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final
judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she
married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their
relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she
married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. Respondent
Blandina Dandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan),
claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and
Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda,
all surnamed Padlan, named in the petition as surviving
6 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
children of Arturo Padlan, opposed the petition. On 30
April 1973 the oppositors (Blandina and the Padlan
children) submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July
1950 private writing and the final judgment of divorce
between petitioner and Arturo.
ISSUE:
W/N private respondent be declared an heir pursuant to
the subsequent marriage contracted with Arturo?
RULING:
NO. Private respondent was not declared an heir.
Although it was stated in the aforementioned records of
birth that she and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947,
their marriage was clearly void since it was celebrated
during the existence of his previous marriage to
petitioner.
The provision relied upon by respondent court is clear: If
there is a controversy before the court as to who are the
lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under
the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in
ordinary cases.
We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to
the right of the six (6) Padlan children to inherit from the
decedent.
We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion
private respondent raised, among others, the issue as to
whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the
decedent considering that she had secured a divorce in
the U.S.A. and in fact had twice remarried. She also
invoked the above quoted procedural rule.11 To this,
petitioner replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such
remained legally married to her in spite of the divorce
they obtained.12 Reading between the lines, the
implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino
citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. This should
have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to
establish her citizenship.
In the present proceeding, petitioner's citizenship is
brought anew to the fore by private respondent. She
even furnishes the Court with the transcript of
stenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995 during the
hearing for the reconstitution of the original of a certain
transfer certificate title as well as the issuance of new
owner's duplicate copy thereof before another trial court.
When asked whether she was an American citizen
petitioner answered that she was since 1954.19
Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner and
Arturo was obtained in the same year.
We emphasize however that the question to be
determined by the trial court should be limited only to the
right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving
spouse. Private respondent's claim to heirship was
already resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo were
married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of
petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a
bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning
under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently,
she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as
this status presupposes a legitimate relationship.
The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering the
remand of the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings and declaring null and void its decision
holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as
intestate heirs is AFFIRMED.
6. Llorente vs CA GR 124371 November 23, 2000
FACTS:
Alicia( 2nd wife), Lorenzo N. Llorente,`Paula (1ST wife),
Ceferino Llorente (brother), Crisologo Llorente(son)
Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the
United States Navy from March 10, 1927 to September 30,
1957.
February 22, 1937: Lorenzo and Paula Llorente were
married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in
Nabua, Camarines Sur
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed
for the United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal
home
November 30, 1943: Lorenzo was admitted to United
States citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization
1945: When Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave to
visit his wife and he visited the Philippines, He discovered
that his wife Paula was pregnant and was “living in” and
having an adulterous relationship with his brother,
Ceferino Llorente
December 4, 1945: Paula gave birth to a boy registered
in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as Crisologo
Llorente with the certificate stating that the child was not
legitimate and the line for the father’s name was left
blank
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her
February 2, 1946: the couple drew and signed a written
agreement which was witnessed by Paula’s father and
stepmother to the effect that
1. all the family allowances allotted by the United States
Navy as part of Lorenzo’s salary and all other obligations
for Paula’s daily maintenance and support would be
suspended
2. they would dissolve their marital union in accordance
with judicial proceedings
3. they would make a separate agreement regarding
their conjugal property acquired during their marital life;
and
4. Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous
act since she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed
to separate from Lorenzo peacefully.
November 16, 1951: Lorenzo returned and filed for
divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California
in and for the County of San Diego
December 4, 1952: the divorce decree became final. On
January 16, 1958: Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in
Manila and lived together as husband and wife and bore
3 children: Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.
7 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
March 13, 1981: Lorenzo executed a Last Will and
Testament where he bequeathed all his property to Alicia
and their three children.
December 14, 1983: Lorenzo filed with the RTC, Iriga,
Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and allowance
of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that
Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate.
January 18, 1984: RTC denied the motion for the reason
that the Lorenzo was still alive
January 24, 1984: RTC admitted finding that the will was
duly executedthe will to probate
June 11, 1985: before the proceedings could be
terminated, Lorenzo died
RTC on the petition for letters of administration filed by
Paula over Lorenzo’s estate contending that she was the
surviving spouse and WITHOUT terminating the testate
proceedings filed by Alicia, gave due course to Paula’s
petition divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo
Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines,
therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia
Fortunato at Manila is void.
Paula T. Llorente: 1/3 estate and ½ conjugal estate
illegitimate children: Raul, Luz and Beverly: 1/3 estate
RTC denied Alicia’s motion for reconsideration but
modified that Raul and Luz Llorente are not children
“legitimate or otherwise” of Lorenzo since they were not
legally adopted by him thus, Beverly Llorente as the only
illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitles her to 1/3 of the
estate and one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the estate
CA: Affirmed with modification
ISSUE:
W/N the divorce is valid and proven
RULING:
YES. Petition is GRANTED. REVERSES the decision of the
Regional Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as VALID the
decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased
Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of
California in and for the County of San Diego, made final
on December 4, 1952. REMANDS the cases to the court of
origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo
N. Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’
successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with
instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all
deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased
within the framework of the Rules of Court.
Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.: nationality principle in Article 15
of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered
by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality.
Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
provided they are valid according to their national law.
Quita v. Court of Appeals: once proven that NO longer a
Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce, the ruling in
Van Dorn would become applicable
Divorce of Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was
valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of
comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the
succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters
best left to the determination of the trial court.
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his
second wife and children by her is glaringly shown in the
will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes,
since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on
“family rights and duties, status, condition and legal
capacity.
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit
from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which
must be pleaded and proved.
Whether the will was executed in accordance with the
formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine
law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
7. GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO [G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001.]
DOCTRINE:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be
recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is
valid according to the national law of the foreigner.
However, the divorce decree and the governing
personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the
divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial
notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any
other facts, both the divorce decree and the national
law of the alien must be alleged and proven according
to our law on evidence.
FACTS:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha
Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March
1, 1987. 4 They lived together as husband and wife in
Australia. On May 18, 1989, 5 a decree of divorce,
purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an
Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian
citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of Australian
Citizenship" issued by the Australian government. 6
Petitioner — a Filipina — and respondent were married on
January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in
Cabanatuan City. 7 In their application for a marriage
license, respondent was declared as "single" and
"Filipino." 8
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent
lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their
marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their
conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in
accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in
Australia. 9
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage 10 in the court a quo,
on the ground of bigamy — respondent allegedly had a
prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on
January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of
respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in
November, 1997. TDCaSE
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as
1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and
8 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
its subsequent dissolution. 11 He contended that his first
marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly
dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in
1989; 12 thus, he was legally capacitated to marry
petitioner in 1994.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the
ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and
recognized in the Philippines.
ISSUES:
(1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha
Samson was proven, and
(2) whether respondent was proven to be legally
capacitated to marry petitioner.
Proving the Divorce Between
Respondent and Editha Samson
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha
Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an
Australian family court. 35 However, appearance is not
sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on
evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce
decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence,
counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but
only to the fact that it had not been registered in the
Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. 36 The trial court
ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner's
qualification. 37 Hence, it was admitted in evidence and
accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's
failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree
admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney,
Australia. 38
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of
the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no
longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he
acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. 39 Naturalization is
the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with
the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. 40
Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of
their former states, don the attires of their adoptive
countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent
severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the
vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal
laws. aSDCIE
Burden of Proving Australian Law
The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the
existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution
or defense of an action." 41 In civil cases, plaintiffs have
the burden of proving the material allegations of the
complaint when those are denied by the answer; and
defendants have the burden of proving the material
allegations in their answer when they introduce new
matters. 42 Since the divorce was a defense raised by
respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent
Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot
take judicial notice of foreign laws. 43 Like any other
facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian
marital laws are not among those matters that judges are
supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. 44
The power of judicial notice must be exercised with
caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject
should be resolved in the negative.
Second Issue: Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry
In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution
of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But
divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1)
absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited
divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the
marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the
bond in full force. 45 There is no showing in the case at
bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains
a restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this
decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has
died) commits the offense of bigamy." 48
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce
obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did
not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry
according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for
the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed
that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored
respondent's capacity to remarry despite the paucity of
evidence on this matter.
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that
respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian
citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on
January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioner's contention
that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce
decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal
capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce
sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law
governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal
capacity to contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her
marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of
bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian
law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a
direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe
that the most judicious course is to remand this case to
the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show
respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in
that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the
parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being
already in evidence two existing marriage certificates,
which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in
Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the
other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and
substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the court a
quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which
conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to marry
petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties'
marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above
discussed.
8. Republic v Orbecido, GR No. 154380, October 5, 2005
FACTS:
The petition herein filed is a petition for authority to
remarry filed before the RTC, a declaratory relief
9 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
governed by Rule 63, ROC. The antecedent facts are as
follows.
Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros M. Villanueva, both
Filipinos got married on May 24, 1981 at the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines, Ozamis City. The
marriage was blessed with two children. In 1986, Lady
Myros went to the United States with her son and there,
after few years, was declared a naturalized American
citizen. In 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife
had already obtained a divorce decree and married a
certain Innocent Stanley. Cipriano upon hearing the
same, filed before the RTC a petition for authority to
remarry invoking Paragraph 2, Art 26, FC. The RTC
granted the petition of Cipriano, the OSG filed a motion
for reconsideration but was denied and so it subsequently
filed before the Court the present case raising a pure
question of law. It was contended by the OSG that the
said law contemplates only mixed marriages, that is
between a foreigner and a Filipino but not for both
Filipinos ab initio. The proper remedy according to the
OSG was to file for annulment or legal separation.
ISSUE:
W/N Cipriano can remarry under Par. 2, Art 26, FC.
RULING:
Yes. The Court had the occasion to present a historical
background of the law now in question. Accordingly, the
original draft of the FC signed into law in July 6, 1987 lacks
the portion now being assailed by Cipriano. On July 17,
1987, few days after the signing of the FC, EO 227 was
issued amending Art. 26 among others. It was in this EO
where Par 2 of the present Art 26 was inserted. Records
of the proceedings of the FC deliberations showed that
the intent of Par 2, Art 26 according to Judge Alicia
Sempio - Diy was to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who,
after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse. As to jurisprudence, it was only in the 1998
case of Quita v CA where the Court hinted via obiter
dictum that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign
spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and thus
can remarry.
After all the foregoing, the Court now declares in the
present petition that Par 2, Art 26 should be interpreted to
include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
declaration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them becomes naturalized as foreign
citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse
should be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a
foreigner at the time of the solemnization of marriage.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at
the time of the celebration of marriage, but their
citizenship at the time the valid divorce is obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry. The twin elements to validly apply this law are as
follows: 1) There is a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;
and 2) A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
However, the contention of Cipriano was denied for not
being able to prove by presentation of evidence that his
wife was already a naturalized American citizen and that
a foreign divorce decree was already granted by a court
abroad.
9. Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas Case Digest G.R. No. 186571,
August 11, 2010
FACTS:
Gerbert Corpuz, a former Filipino citizen but now a
naturalized Canadian, married Daisylyn Sto. Tomas, a
Filipina. He soon left to Canada after their wedding due
to work commitments. He returned to Philippines on April
2005 only to find out Daisylyn has an affair with another
man. Gerbert returned to Canada to file a divorce that
took effect on January 2006.
Two years later, he found another Filipina and wanted to
marry her in the Philippines. He went to Pasig City
Registrar's Office to register his Canadian divorce decree
but was denied considering that his marriage with
Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law, that the foregin
divorce must be recognized judicially by the Philippine
court.
Gerbert subsequently filed at the Regional Trial Court a
judicial recognition of foreign divorce but was
subsequently denied since he is not the proper party and
according to Article 26 of the Civil Code, only a Filipino
spouse can avail the remedy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 26 can also be applied to Corpuz'
petition of recognition of the foreign divorce decree.
RULING:
The Court held that alien spouses cannot claim the right
as it is only in favor of Filipino spouses. The legislative intent
of Article 26 is for the benefit of the clarification of the
marital status of the Filipino spouse.
However, aliens are not strip to petition to the RTC for his
foreign divorce decree as it is a conclusive presumption
of evidence of the authenticity of foreign divorce decree
with confirmity to the alien's national law.
The Pasig City Registrar's Office acted out of line when it
registered the foreign divorce decree without judicial
order recognition. Therefore, the registration is still
deemed to be void.
10. G.R. No. 169766 March 30, 2011
ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO and ADIB
AHMAD A. TAMANO,Respondents.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision
dated August 17, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution
dated September 13, 2005, which affirmed the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch
89 declaring petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llave s (Estrellita)
marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as
void ab initio.
FACTS:
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamanomarried
Estrellita twice – initially under the Islamic laws and
tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and,
subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an
RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993.
In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano s civil status was
10 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
indicated as “divorced”. Since then, Estrellita has been
representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano s
wife, and upon his death, his widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri
Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad
A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of
the rest of Sen. Tamano s legitimate children with
Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City
for the declaration of nullity of marriage between
Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The
complaint alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on
May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage
remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993.
ISSUE:
Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late
Sen. Tamano was bigamous.
RULING:
Yes. The civil code governs the marriage of Zorayda and
late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was never invalidated
by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano’s subsequent marriage to
Estrellita is void ab initio.
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and
Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil
and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing
marriage relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims
alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of
which only one marriage can exist at any given time.
Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is
not recognized except during the effectivity of Republic
Act No. 394 which was not availed of during its effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano s prior
marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way of
divorce under PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim
personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita.
Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies
to “marriage and divorce wherein both parties are
Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and
the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim
law or this Code in any part of the Philippines.” But Article
13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the
parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites.”
11. G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER, vs. MARIA PAZ GALELA
MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR
OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL
REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS
OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.
FACTS:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who
married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay)
in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did
not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not
bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they
lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi
Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being
dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May
2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought
Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered
physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and
started to contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to
reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay
obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which
declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara
void on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki
filed a petition in the RTC entitled: “Judicial Recognition
of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage).”
The decision of the lower courts (RTC): dismissed the
petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment ·(or
Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on
improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner,
Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
2. Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file
a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a
foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
3. Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the
foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court.
RULING:
1. No. Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize
a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held
that the rule in A.M. No. 02- 11-10-SC that only the
husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage “does not apply if the reason
behind the petition is bigamy.” While the Philippines has
no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is
fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous
marriages are declared void from the beginning under
Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can
prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court
judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and
25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court.
2. Yes, the recognition of the foreign divorce decree may
be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of
special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a
party or a particular fact.”
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in
any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil
status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or
correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional
Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
11 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal
and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the
marriage he contracted and the property relations arising
from it.
3. Yes, there is neither circumvention of the substantive
and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine
law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No.
8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action
to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to
recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which
presupposes a case which was already tried and
decided under foreign law.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts
are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a
case was decided under foreign law. They cannot
decide on the “family rights and duties, or on the status,
condition and legal capacity” of the foreign citizen who
is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts
are limited to the question of whether to extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts
only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino
party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article
15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1)
whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an
overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether
any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to
repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want
of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public
policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment,
Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign
judgment as part of the comity of nations.
ARTICLE 34
1. Leonila Santiago v. People of the PH GR 200233 July
15, 2015
FACTS:
4 months after solemnization of marriage, Leonila
(petitioner) and Nicanor Santiago were served an
information for Bigamy for the prosecution adduced that
Nicaonor was still married to Estela when he entered into
the 2nd marriage; he was able to escape while petitioner
pleaded ‘not guilty’ relying on the fact that when she
married him, she thought he was single. She soon averred
that their marriage was void due to lack of marriage
license, wherein she should not then be charged with
bigamy. 11 years after inception if criminal case, Estela
Galang, the first wife, testified for the prosecution. She
alleged that she had met petitioner and introduced
herself as the legal wife. Petitioner denied allegation and
stated that she met Estela only after she had already
married Nicanor.
ISSUE:
1. W/N petitioner is co-accused in the instant case of
Bigamy.
2. W/N marriage between Leonila and Nicanor is valid
RULING:
Lower courts consistently found that petitioner indeed
knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality of the
following circumstances: (1) when Nicanor was courting
and visiting petitioner in the house of her in-laws, they
openly showed their disapproval of him (2) it was
incredible for a learned person like petitioner to not know
of his true civil status (3) Estela, who was the more
credible witness, compared to petitioner who had various
inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly testified that
she had already told petitioner on two occasions that the
former was the legal wife of Nicanor. In People v. Archilla,
knowledge of the second wife of the fact of her spouse’s
existing prior marriage, constitutes an indispensable
cooperation in the commission of Bigamy, which makes
her responsible as an accomplice. She is not co-accused.
She is guilty of Bigamy as an accomplice thereby
sentenced to 6m arresto mayor to 4y prision
correccional.
2. Office of the Court Administrator v Necessario
A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691, April 2, 2013
FACTS:
This is an administrative case that stemmed from the 6
July 2007 Memorandum of the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA).2 The judicial audit team created by
the OCA reported alleged irregularities in the
solemnization of marriages in several branches of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) and Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Cebu City.3 Certain package fees were
offered to interested parties by "fixers" or "facilitators" for
instant marriages.4
On 24 August 2007, the OCA through Senior Deputy Court
Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño submitted its
Memorandum dated 29 August 20079 and Supplemental
Report.10 Six hundred forty-three (643) marriage
certificates were examined by the judicial audit team.11
The team reported that out of the 643 marriage
certificates examined, 280 marriages were solemnized
under Article 3412 of the Family Code.13 The logbooks of
the MTCC Branches indicate a higher number of
solemnized marriages than the number of marriage
certificates in the courts’ custody.14 There is also an
unusual number of marriage licenses obtained from the
local civil registrars of the towns of Barili and Liloan,
Cebu.15 There were even marriages solemnized at 9 a.m.
with marriage licenses obtained on the same day.16 The
town of Barili, Cebu is more than sixty (60) kilometers
away from Cebu City and entails a travel time of almost
two (2) hours.17 Liloan, Cebu, on the other hand, is more
than ten (10) kilometers away from Cebu City.1
On 27 November 2007, the Court En Banc issued a
resolution: a) requiring Judges Anatalio S. Necessario, Gil
R. Acosta, Rosabella M. Tormis, and Edgemelo C. Rosales
of the MTCC, Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8, respectively, of
Cebu City, to comment on the findings of the 14 August
2007 Supplemental Report of the OCA, within fifteen (15)
days from notice; b) directing the Process Servicing Unit
to furnish the judges with a copy of the Supplemental
Report; c) requiring the court personnel listed below to
show cause within fifteen (15) days from notice why no
disciplinary action should be taken against them for their
alleged grave misconduct and dishonesty and
impleading them in this administrative matter:
The Court in the same resolution also: a) ordered the
referral to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the
Visayas for appropriate action on the ad.
12 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
On 12 November 2007, Judges Tormis and Rosales filed a
Memorandum of Law with Plea for Early Resolution, Lifting
of Suspension and Dismissal of Case.59 This Court in a
Resolution dated 11 December 2007 lifted the suspension
of the respondent judges but prohibited them from
solemnizing marriages until further ordered.60
In its Memorandum dated 15 June 2010,63 the OCA
recommended the dismissal of the respondent judges
and some court employees, and the suspension or
admonition of others.
The OCA summarized the liabilities of the respondents, to
wit:
JUDGE ANATALIO S. NECESSARIO is guilty of gross
inefficiency or neglect of duty for solemnizing marriages
with questionable documents and wherein one of the
contracting parties is a foreigner who submitted a mere
affidavit of his capacity to marry in lieu of the required
certificate from his embassy. He is also guilty of gross
ignorance of the law for solemnizing marriages under
Article 34 of the Family Code wherein one or both of the
contracting parties were minors during the cohabitation.
xxx
JUDGE GIL R. ACOSTA is guilty of gross inefficiency or
neglect of duty for failure to make sure that the
solemnization fee has been paid. He is also guilty of gross
ignorance of the law for solemnizing marriages under
Article 34 of the Family Code wherein one or both of the
contracting parties were minors during the cohabitation.
JUDGE EDGEMELO C. ROSALES is guilty of gross
inefficiency or neglect of duty for solemnizing marriages
with questionable documents, for failure to make sure
that the solemnization fee has been paid and for
solemnizing marriages wherein one of the contracting
parties is a foreigner who submitted a mere affidavit of his
capacity to marry in lieu of the required certificate from
his embassy. He is also guilty of gross ignorance of the law
for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage
license.
JUDGE ROSEBELLA M. TORMIS is guilty of gross inefficiency
or neglect of duty for solemnizing marriages with
questionable documents, for failure to make sure that the
solemnization fee has been paid, for solemnizing
marriages wherein one of the contracting parties is a
foreigner who submitted a mere affidavit of his capacity
to marry in lieu of the required certificate from the
embassy and for solemnizing a marriage with an expired
license.
xxx
HELEN MONGGAYA is guilty of grave misconduct for
violating Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel that prohibits court personnel from
soliciting or accepting any gift, favor or benefit based on
any or explicit or implicit understanding that such gift,
favor or benefit shall influence their official actions and
for giving false information for the purpose of
perpetrating an irregular marriage.
RHONA RODRIGUEZ is guilty of gross misconduct for
violating Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel and for inducing Maricel Albater to falsify
the application for marriage license by instructing her to
indicate her residence as Barili, Cebu.
DESIDERIO ARANAS and REBECCA ALESNA are guilty of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for
providing couples who are to be married under Article 34
of the Family Code with the required affidavit of
cohabitation.
CELESTE RETUYA, EMMA VALENCIA and REBECCA ALESNA
are guilty of violating Section 2(b), Canon III of the Code
of Conduct for Court Personnel which prohibits court
personnel from receiving tips or other remuneration for
assisting or attending to parties engaged in transactions
or involved in actions or proceedings with the Judiciary.64
The OCA, however, recommended the DISMISSAL of the
complaints against Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg,
Corazon P. Retuya, and Marilou Cabañez, for lack of
merit.
ISSUE:
The issue now before this Court is whether the judges and
personnel of the MTCC and RTC in Cebu City are guilty of
gross ignorance of the law, gross neglect of duty or gross
inefficiency and gross misconduct, and in turn, warrant
the most severe penalty of dismissal from service.
RULING:
The findings in the 2010 Memorandum of the Office of the
Court Administrator are supported by the evidence on
record and applicable law and jurisprudence.
This Court has long held that court officials and
employees are placed with a heavy burden and
responsibility of keeping the faith of the public.
65 In Obañana, Jr. v. Ricafort, we said that:
Any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in
the performance of official functions must be avoided.
This Court shall not countenance any conduct, act or
omission on the part of all those involved in the
administration of justice which would violate the norm of
public accountability and diminish the faith of the people
in the Judiciary.6
Liability of Judge Anatalio S. Necessario
The OCA reported that Judge Necessario solemnized a
total of one thousand one hundred twenty-three (1,123)
marriages from 2005 to 2007.67 However, only one
hundred eighty-four (184) marriage certificates were
actually examined by the judicial audit team.68 Out of
the 184 marriages, only seventy-nine (79) were
solemnized with a marriage license while one hundred
five (105) were solemnized under Article 34 of the Family
Code. Out of the 79 marriages with license, forty-seven
(47) of these licenses were issued by the Local Civil
Registrar of Liloan, Cebu. This translates to 42.93% of the
marriages he solemnized with marriage license coming
from Liloan for over a period of years.69 There were also
twenty-two (22) marriages solemnized by the judge with
incomplete documents such missing as marriage license,
certificate of legal capacity to marry, and the joint
affidavit of cohabitation.70
Judge Necessario solemnized nine (9) marriages that had
questionable supporting documents such as marriage
licenses.71 The OCA found that the place of residence of
the contracting parties appearing in the supporting
documents differ from the place where they obtained
their marriage license.72 The documents invited suspicion
13 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
because of erasures and superimpositions in the entries of
residence.73 Likewise, in lieu of the required certificate of
legal capacity to marry, a mere affidavit was submitted
by the parties.74 Variations in the signatures of the
contracting parties were also apparent in the
documents.75
To summarize, the liabilities of the judges are the
following:
First, Judges Necessario, Tormis and Rosales solemnized
marriages even if the requirements submitted by the
couples were incomplete and of questionable character.
Most of these documents showed visible signs of
tampering, erasures, corrections or superimpositions of
entries related to the parties’ place of residence.111 These
included indistinguishable features such as the font, font
size, and ink of the computer-printed entries in the
marriage certificate and marriage license.
Second, the judges were also found guilty of neglect of
duty regarding the payment of solemnization fees. The
Court, in Rodrigo-Ebron v. Adolfo,114 defined neglect of
duty as the failure to give one’s attention to a task
expected of him and it is gross when, from the gravity of
the offense or the frequency of instances, the offense is
so serious in its character as to endanger or threaten
public welfare. The marriage documents examined by
the audit team show that corresponding official receipts
for the solemnization fee were missing115 or payment by
batches was made for marriages performed on different
dates.116 The OCA emphasizes that the payment of the
solemnization fee starts off the whole marriage
application process and even puts a "stamp of regularity"
on the process.
Third, Judges Necessario, Tormis, and Rosales also
solemnized marriages where a contracting party is a
foreigner who did not submit a certificate of legal
capacity to marry from his or her embassy. What the
foreigners submitted were mere affidavits stating their
capacity to marry. The irregularity in the certificates of
legal capacity that are required under Article 21 of the
Family Code117 displayed the gross neglect of duty of the
judges. They should have been diligent in scrutinizing the
documents required for the marriage license issuance.
Any irregularities would have been prevented in the
qualifications of parties to contract marriage.118
Fourth, Judges Necessario, Acosta, and Tormis are
likewise guilty of gross ignorance of the law under Article
34 of the Family Code119 with respect to the marriages
they solemnized where legal impediments existed during
cohabitation such as the minority status of one party.120
The judges’ gross ignorance of the law is also evident
when they solemnized marriages under Article 34 of the
Family Code without the required qualifications and with
the existence of legal impediments such as minority of a
party. Marriages of exceptional character such as those
made under Article 34 are, doubtless, the exceptions to
the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a
marriage license.126 Under the rules of statutory
construction, exceptions as a general rule should be
strictly but reasonably construed.127 The affidavits of
cohabitation should not be issued and accepted pro
forma particularly in view of the settled rulings of the
Court on this matter. The five-year period of cohabitation
should be one of a perfect union valid under the law but
rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage
contract.128 The parties should have been capacitated to
marry each other during the entire period and not only at
the time of the marriage.129
To elaborate further on the gravity of the acts and
omissions of the respondents, the Family Code provides
the requisites for a valid marriage:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided
for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the
appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that
they take each other as husband and wife in the
presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
(53a, 55a)
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except
as stated in Article 35 (2). A defect in any of the essential
requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but
the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be
civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n)
The absence of a marriage license will clearly render a
marriage void ab initio.130 The actions of the judges have
raised a very alarming issue regarding the validity of the
marriages they solemnized since they did not follow the
proper procedure or check the required documents and
qualifications. In Aranes v. Judge Salvador Occiano,131
the Court said that a marriage solemnized without a
marriage license is void and the subsequent issuance of
the license cannot render valid or add even an iota of
validity to the marriage. It is the marriage license that
gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a
marriage and the act of solemnizing the marriage
without a license constitutes gross ignorance of the law.4)
Montañez vs Cipriano
ARTICLE 35
1. MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAÑES v. LOURDES TAJOLOSA
CIPRIANO. G.R. No. 181089; October 22, 2012.
FACTS:
On April 8, 1976, Lourdes Cipriano (Lourdes) married
Socrates Flores (Socrates). On January 24, 1983, during
the subsistence of the said marriage, Lourdes married
Silverio V. Cipriano (Silverio). In 2001, Lourdes filed with the
RTC of Muntinlupa a Petition for the Annulment of her
marriage with Socrates on the ground of the latter’s
psychological incapacity. The RTC rendered its decision
declaring the marriage of Lourdes with Socrates null and
void. Said decision became final and executory on
October 13, 2003.
On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Montañez, Silverio’s
daughter from the first marriage, filed a complaint for
bigamy against Lourdes alleging that Lourdes failed to
reveal to Silverio that she was still married to Socrates.
Lourdes moved to quash the information alleging that her
first marriage to Socrates had already been declared
void ab initio in 2003, thus, there was no more marriage to
speak of prior to her marriage to Silverio on January 24,
1983. She also averred that she had contracted her
second marriage before the effectivity of the Family
Code; hence, the existing law at that time did not require
a judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a condition
14 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
precedent to contracting a subsequent marriage.
Hence, the RTC granted the motion to quash.
ISSUE:
Was the RTC correct in quashing the information for
bigamy?
HELD:
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender
has been legally married; (b) the marriage has not been
legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a
second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or
subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of
the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is
essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged
second marriage, having all the essential requirements,
would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first
marriage.
In this case, it appears that when respondent contracted
a second marriage with Silverio in 1983, her first marriage
with Socrates celebrated in 1976 was still subsisting as the
same had not yet been annulled or declared void by a
competent authority. Clearly, the annulment of
respondent's first marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity was declared only in 2003.
In Mercado v. Tan, we ruled that the subsequent judicial
declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial, because prior to the declaration of nullity, the
crime of bigamy had already been consummated.
As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., the Court
already made the declaration that Article 40, which is a
rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively
because Article 256 of the Family Code itself provides
that said "Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it
does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights."
The Court went on to explain, thus: “The fact that
procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants'
rights may not preclude their retroactive application to
pending actions. The retroactive application of
procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person
who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is
that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor
arise from, procedural laws.” GRANTED.
2. G.R. No. 189607 April 18, 2016
RENATO A. CASTILLO, Petitioner, vs. LEA P. DE LEON
CASTILLO, Respondent.
SERENO, CJ:
DOCTRINE:
The requirement of a judicial decree of nullity (to avoid
being charged with Bigamy) does not apply to marriages
that were celebrated before the effectivity of the Family
Code, particularly if the children of the parties were born
while the Civil Code was in force. (Apiag v. Cantero and
Ty v. Court of Appeals)
FACTS:
On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo
(Lea) married Benjamin Bautista (Bautista). On 6 January
1979, respondent married herein petitioner Renato A.
Castillo (Renato).
On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, praying that his
marriage to Lea be declared void due to her subsisting
marriage to Bautista and her psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code
Respondent opposed the Petition and contended that
her marriage to Bautista was null and void as they had
not secured any license therefor, and neither of them
was a member of the denomination to which the
solemnizing officer belonged.
On 2002, Lea filed an action to declare her first marriage
to Baustista void. On 2003, the RTC of Parañaque City,
declared Lea's first marriage to Bautista null and void ab
initio.
On 23 March 2007, the RTC declared the marriage
between Lea and Renato null and void ab initio on the
ground that it was a bigamous marriage under Article 41
of the Family Code.
The RTC said that the fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista
was subsisting when she married Renato on 6 January
1979, makes her marriage to Renato bigamous, thus
rendering it void ab initio. The lower court dismissed Lea's
argument that she need not obtain a judicial decree of
nullity and could presume the nullity of a prior subsisting
marriage. The RTC stressed that so long as no judicial
declaration exists, the prior marriage is valid and existing.
Lastly, it also said that even if respondent eventually had
her first marriage judicially declared void, the fact
remains that the first and second marriage were
subsisting before the first marriage was annulled, since
Lea failed to obtain a judicial decree of nullity for her first
marriage to Bautista before contracting her second
marriage with Renato.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration insofar as the
distribution of their properties were concerned. His
motion, however, was denied by the RTC. Thereafter,
both petitioner and Respondent filed their respective
Notices of Appeal.
The CA reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision and
Order and upheld the validity of the parties' marriage. In
reversing the RTC, the CA said that since Lea's marriages
were solemnized in 1972 and in 1979, or prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code on 3 August 1988, the Civil
Code is the applicable law since it is the law in effect at
the time the marriages were celebrated, and not the
Family Code. Furthermore, the CA ruled that the Civil
Code does not state that a judicial decree is necessary in
order to establish the nullity of a marriage.
Petitioner's MR was denied. Hence, this Petition for Review
on Certiorar under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
WON the CA was correct in reversing the RTC’s
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage.
RULING:
YES. SC denied the petition. The CA decision was
affirmed.
15 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
The CA did not err in upholding the validity of marriage
between Lea and Renato. Hence, we find no reason to
disturb it.
The subsequent marriage of Lea and Renato is valid in
view of the invalidity of her first marriage with Bautista
because of the absence of a marriage license. That there
was no judicial declaration that the first marriage was
void ab initio before the second marriage was
contracted is immaterial as this is not a requirement
under the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the subsequent
Decision of the RTC declaring Lea’s marriage to Bautista
null, only serves to strengthen the conclusion that her
subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.
The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be
determined in accordance with the law in effect at the
time of its celebration. In this case, the law in force at the
time Lea contracted both marriages was the Civil Code.
The children of the parties were also born while the Civil
Code was in effect.
Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a
voidable marriage in the following ways: (1) a void
marriage is nonexistent - i.e., there was no marriage from
the beginning - while in a voidable marriage, the
marriage is valid until annulled by a competent court; (2)
a void marriage cannot be ratified, while a voidable
marriage can be ratified by cohabitation; (3) being
nonexistent, a void marriage can be collaterally
attacked, while a voidable marriage cannot be
collaterally attacked; (4) in a void marriage, there is no
conjugal partnership and the offspring are natural
children by legal fiction, while in voidable marriage there
is conjugal partnership and the children conceived
before the decree of annulment are considered
legitimate; and (5) "in a void marriage no judicial decree
to establish the invalidity is necessary," while in a voidable
marriage there must be a judicial decree.
This Court clarified in Apiag v. Cantero and Ty v. Court of
Appeals, the requirement of a judicial decree of nullity
does not apply to marriages that were celebrated before
the effectivity of the Family Code, particularly if the
children of the parties were born while the Civil Code was
in force. In Ty, this Court clarified that those cases
continue to be governed by Odayat v Amante, People v
Mendoza, and People v Aragon.
Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code
cannot be retroactively applied to the present case, for
to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner
and of her children.
3. G.R. No. 191566 July 17, 2013
PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. EDGARDO V.
ODTUHAN, Respondent.
PERALTA, J.:
DOCTRINE:
The Family Code has settled once and for all the
conflicting jurisprudence. A declaration of the absolute
nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a
cause of action or a ground for defense. A judicial
declaration of nullity is required before a valid
subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what
transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and
immoral.
FACTS:
On 1980 respondent Edgardo married Jasmin Modina. On
1993, Edgardo married Eleanor A. Alagon. On 1994, he
filed a petition for annulment for his marriage with
Modina. RTC granted this on 1999, declaring his marriage
with Modina void ab ignition for lack of a valid marriage
license. On 2003, Alagon died. Private complainant,
Evelyn Abesamis Alagon found out about the previous
marriage. She filed a Complaint-Affidavit charging
Edgardo with Bigamy.
Edgardo filed an Omnibus Motion praying to be allowed
to present evidence with Motion to Quash. He asserts that
the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy and the
criminal action or liability has been extinguished.
The RTC denied the Omnibus Motion. A petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 was also filed before the CA. CA
rendered the herein assailed decision, granting the
petition and ordering the RTC to give due course to
Edgardo’s motion. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
WON the subsequent court judgment declaring
Edgardo’s first marriage void ab initio did not extinguish
his criminal liability which already attached prior to said
judgment.
RULING:
YES. The petition is meritorious. SC granted the petition.
The CA decision is set aside, and the case is remanded to
the RTC for further proceedings.
The CA erred in granting the petition for certiorari filed by
respondent. The RTC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in denying his motion to quash and to allow
him to present evidence to support his omnibus motion.
The Family Code has settled once and for all the
conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of
the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required
either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. It has
been held in a number of cases that a judicial
declaration of nullity is required before a valid
subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what
transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and
immoral.
What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when
he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during
the subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves
its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment
of competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so
long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is
that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a
second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity
of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted
for bigamy. If we allow respondent’s line of defense and
the CA’s ratiocination, a person who commits bigamy
can simply evade prosecution by immediately filing a
petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage
and hope that a favorable decision is rendered therein
before anyone institutes a complaint against him.
Respondent, likewise, claims that there are more reasons
to quash the information against him, because he
16 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
obtained the declaration of nullity of marriage before the
filing of the complaint for bigamy against him. Again, we
cannot sustain such contention. Settled is the rule that
criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the
commission of the offense and from that instant, liability
appends to him until extinguished as provided by law
and that the time of filing of the criminal complaint or
information is material only for determining prescription.
G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013
4. AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and
MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners, vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES
ELISE QUIAZON, Respondent.
PEREZ, J.:
DOCTRINE:
In a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it
cannot be the source of rights, such that any interested
party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally
without prescription, which may be filed even beyond
the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.
FACTS:
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration
of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein
respondents who are Eliseo’s common-law wife and
daughter. The petition was opposed by herein petitioners
Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was
married. Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth
Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).
Eliseo Quiazon died intestate on December 12, 1992. His
natural daughter, Maria Lourdes Quiazon (Elise), then
minor represented by her mother Ma. Lourdes Belen, filed
a petition for letters of administration before the RTC of
Las Piñas City. Elise claims that she is the natural daughter
of decedent, having been conceived and born at the
time when her parents were both capacitated to marry
each other. Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s
marriage to Amelia. Amelia was previously married to
Filipito Sandico. Eliseo left real properties worth
P2,020,000.00 and personal properties worth
P2,100,000.00.
Amelia attacked the venue, raising Eliseo’s death
certificate where it reflects Capas, Tarlac as the
residence at the time of death. (This was not given
credence by the RTC and CA)
In 2005, RTC issued Letters of Administration in favor of
Elise. Elise attained the legal age, at this time.
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in
toto. CA held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and
Lourdes lived together as husband and wife and
established a common residence in Las Piñas City, the
venue was properly laid. Petitioner’s MR was denied.
Thus, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
WON the court erred in declaring that Amelia was not
legally married to Eliseo due to her pre-existing marriage?
No.
WON Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia was void for being
bigamous? Yes.
RULING:
NO. The petition is denied for lack of merit. The CA
decision was affirmed in toto.
Unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the Court of
Appeals erred in declaring Amelia’s marriage to Eliseo as
void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though no
marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source
of rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage
directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be
questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the
marriage. It must be pointed out that at the time of the
celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law
in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code,
making the ruling in Niñal v. Bayadog applicable four-
square to the case at hand. In Niñal, the Court, in no
uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a
petition for the declaration of nullity of their father’s
marriage to therein respondent after the death of their
father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable
marriages, to wit:
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even
after the death of either party but voidable marriages
can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and
not after death of either, in which case the parties and
their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been
perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity
is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the
action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage
can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a
void marriage.
It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void marriage, no
marriage has taken place and it cannot be the source of
rights, such that any interested party may attack the
marriage directly or collaterally without prescription,
which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the
parties to the marriage.
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise,
whose successional rights would be prejudiced by her
father’s marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence
of such marriage even after the death of her father. The
said marriage may be questioned directly by filing an
action attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by
raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case
at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir, has a
cause of action for the declaration of the absolute nullity
of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death
of either party to the said marriage does not extinguish
such cause of action.
Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseo’s
marriage to Amelia, we now proceed to determine
whether or not the decedent’s marriage to Amelia is void
for being bigamous.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the
existence of a previous marriage between Amelia and
Filipito was sufficiently established by no less than the
Certificate of Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac
and signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of San
Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage
certificate is a competent evidence of marriage and the
certification from the National Archive that no
information relative to the said marriage exists does not
diminish the probative value of the entries therein. We
17 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
take judicial notice of the fact that the first marriage was
celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus, the possibility
that a record of marriage can no longer be found in the
National Archive, given the interval of time, is not
completely remote. Consequently, in the absence of any
showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the
time Amelia and Eliseo’s marriage was solemnized, the
inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is
bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.
DIRECT AND COLLATERAL ATTACK FOR THE VALIDITY OF
MARRIAGE
G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993
ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA
represented by her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R. AVERA,
respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
DOCTRINE:
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the
Constitution as an "inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall be protected
by the State." In more explicit terms, the Family Code
characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal,
and family life." So crucial are marriage and the family to
the stability and peace of the nation that their "nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and
not subject to stipulation . . ." As a matter of policy,
therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose
of contracting another cannot be accomplished merely
on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one
that their union is so defective with respect to the
essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render
it void ipso jure and with no legal effect — and nothing
more.
A declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is now
explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground
of defense.
FACTS:
On 1991, Delia Soledad Domingo filed for a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of
property against Roberto Domingo. Delia only knew of
Roberto’s previous marriage with Emerlinda dela Paz
when the latter sued the for bigamy in 1983.
From 1979 to the time of filing of the case, Delia worked in
Saudi Arabia, and would only go back to the Philippines
during her annual one-month vacation. Roberto was
completely dependent upon her for support. She
purchased real and personal properties worth P350,000
which were under the possession and administration of
Roberto.
On 1989, during her annual vacation, Delia discovered
that Roberto was cohabiting with another woman. And
that he had been disposing of her properties without her
knowledge and consent. She appointed her brother,
Moises Avera as her atty-in-fact. But Roberto refused to
turn over possession and administration of the properties.
The petition prayed for the declaration of nullity of
marriage, and issuance of a TRO or writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining Roberto from exercising any act of
administration over the properties. Delia sought to be
declared the sole owner of the properties.
Roberto filed a motion to dismiss, claiming since his
marriage with Delia was void-ab-initio, there was no need
to file declaration of nullity. The action was superfluous
and stated no cause of action.
RTC denied the motion to dismiss. A MR was also denied.
A special civil action of certiorari and mandamus on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion for denying the
motion to dismiss was filed. CA dismissed the petition.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage
was necessary?
WON the same should only be filed for purposes of
remarriage?
RULING:
The petition was denied. The CA ruling was affirmed.
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and
private respondent celebrated during the former’s
marriage with Emerlinda dela Paz was still subsisting, is
bigamous. As such, it is from the beginning void. But there
is still a need for judicial declaration of such nullity. (Vda.
De Consuegra vs GSIS and Wiegel vs Sempio-Diy)
The Family Code settled all conflicting jurisprudence. A
declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is now
explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground
of defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law for said projected marriage be free
from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void.
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the
Constitution as an "inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall be protected
by the State." In more explicit terms, the Family Code
characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal,
and family life." So crucial are marriage and the family to
the stability and peace of the nation that their "nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and
not subject to stipulation . . ." As a matter of policy,
therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose
of contracting another cannot be accomplished merely
on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one
that their union is so defective with respect to the
essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render
it void ipso jure and with no legal effect — and nothing
more. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would
be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky
foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying
marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as human
ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For such a social
significant institution, an official state pronouncement
through the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the
exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open
and public declaration by the courts definitively confirm
the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the same
would be easily verifiable through records accessible to
everyone.
18 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
ARTICLE 36
1. AURELIO V. AURELIO
G.R. No. 175367, [June 06, 2011]
DOCTRINE: The following are the guidelines to aid the
courts in the disposition of cases involving psychological
incapacity: (1) Burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff; (2) The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in
the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven to be
existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage;
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically
or clinically permanent or incurable; (5) Such illness must
be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage; (6)
The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included
in the text of the decision; (7) Interpretations given by the
National AppellateMatrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts; (8) The trial
court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition.
FACTS: Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida
Ma. Corazon Aurelio were married on March 23, 1988.
They have two sons, namely: Danilo Miguel and Danilo
Gabriel.
On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 94, a Petition
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. In her petition,
respondent alleged that both she and petitioner were
psychologically incapacitated of performing and
complying with their respective essential marital
obligations. In addition, respondent alleged that such
state of psychological incapacity was present prior and
even during the time of the marriage ceremony. Hence,
respondent prays that her marriage be declared null and
void under Article 36 of the Family Code. It alleged
among others that said psychological incapacity was
manifested by lack of financial support from the
husband; his lack of drive and incapacity to discern the
plight of his working wife. The husband exhibited
consistent jealousy and distrust towards his wife. His
moods alternated between hostile defiance and
contrition. He refused to assist in the maintenance of the
family.
On the side of the wife on the other hand, is effusive and
displays her feelings openly and freely. Her feelings
change very quickly – from joy to fury to misery to
despair, depending on her day-to-day experiences. Her
tolerance for boredom was very low. She was
emotionally immature; she cannot stand frustration
or disappointment. She cannot delay to gratify her
needs. She gets upset when she cannot get what she
wants. Self-indulgence lifts her spirits immensely. Their
hostility towards each other distorted their relationship.
Their incapacity to accept and fulfill the essential
obligations of marital life led to the breakdown of their
marriage.
On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss
the petition. Petitioner principally argued that the petition
failed to state a cause of action and that it failed to meet
the standards set by the Court for the interpretation and
implementation of Article 36 of the Family Code.
RTC denied the petition. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage shall be declared null and
void?
HELD: Yes. The marriage is null and void.
RATIO: Petitioner anchors his petition on the premise that
the allegations contained in respondent's petition are
insufficient to support a declaration of nullity of marriage
based on psychological incapacity. Specifically,
petitioner contends that the petition failed to comply
with three of the Molina guidelines, namely: that the root
cause of the psychological incapacity must be alleged in
the complaint; that such illness must be grave enough to
bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage; and that the non-
complied marital obligation must be stated in the
petition.
First, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, this Court finds that
the root cause of psychological incapacity was stated
and alleged in the complaint. We agree with the
manifestation of respondent that the
family backgrounds of both petitioner and respondent
were discussed in the complaint as the root causes of
their psychological incapacity. Moreover, a competent
and expert psychologist clinically identified the same as
the root causes.
Second, the petition likewise alleged that the illness of
both parties was of such grave a nature as to bring about
a disability for them to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. The psychologist reported that respondent
suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic
Features. Petitioner, on the other hand, allegedly suffers
from Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorder.
The incapacity of both parties to perform their marital
obligations was alleged to be grave, incorrigible and
incurable.
Lastly, this Court also finds that the essential marital
obligations that were not complied with were alleged in
the petition. As can be easily gleaned from the totality of
the petition, respondent’s allegations fall under Article 68
of the Family Code which states that “the husband and
the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support.”
2. REPUBLIC V. GALANG
G.R. No. 168335, [June 6, 2011]
DOCTRINE:
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability.
The defect should refer to “no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage.”
FACTS:
19 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
In March 1994, Nestor and Juvy contracted marriage in
Pampanga and thereafter they resided in the house of
the Nestor’s father. Nestor worked as an artist-illustrator
while Juvy stayed at home. They had one child,
Christopher.
In August 1999, Nestor filed with the RTC a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Juvy, under
Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. He alleged
that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to exercise
the essential obligations of marriage, as she was a
kleptomaniac and a swindler; that Juvy suffers from
“mental deficiency, innate immaturity, distorted
discernment and total lack of care, love and affection
[towards him and their] child.” He posited that Juvy’s
incapacity was “extremely serious” and “appears to be
incurable.”
Having found no collusion between the parties, the case
was set for trial. In his testimony, Nestor alleged that he
was the one who prepared their breakfast because Juvy
did not want to wake up early; Juvy often left their child
to their neighbors’ care; and Christopher almost got lost
in the market when Juvy brought him there. He added
that Juvy stole his ATM card and falsified his signature to
encash the check representing Nestor’s father’s pension.
He, likewise, stated that he caught Juvy playing
“mahjong” and “kuwaho” three (3) times. Finally, he
testified that Juvy borrowed money from their relatives on
the pretense that their son was confined in a hospital.
Nestor presented Anna Liza Guiang, a psychologist, who
testified that she conducted a psychological test on
Nestor. In her Psychological Report, the psychologist
made the following findings:
Psychological Test conducted on client Nestor Galang
resembles an emotionally-matured individual. He is well-
adjusted to the problem he meets, and enable to throw-
off major irritations but manifest[s] a very low frustration
tolerance which means he has a little ability to endure
anxiety and the client manifests suppressed feelings and
emotions which resulted to unbearable emotional pain,
depression and lack of self-esteem and gained
emotional tensions caused by his wife’s behavior.
The incapacity of the defendant is manifested [in] such a
manner that the defendant-wife: (1) being very
irresponsible and very lazy and doesn’t manifest any
sense of responsibility; (2) her involvement in gambling
activities such as mahjong and kuwaho; (3) being an
estafador which exhibits her behavioral and personality
disorders; (4) her neglect and show no care attitude
towards her husband and child; (5) her immature and
rigid behavior; (6) her lack of initiative to change and
above all, the fact that she is unable to perform her
marital obligations as a loving, responsible and caring
wife to her family. There are just few reasons to believe
that the defendant is suffering from incapacitated mind
and such incapacity appears to be incorrigible.
The RTC nullified the parties’ marriage in its decision of
January 22, 2001. The RTC Judge, relying on the Santos
Case, stated in the decision that the psychological
incapacity of respondent to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage can be characterized by
(a) gravity because the subject cannot carry out the
normal and ordinary duties of marriage and family
shouldered by any average couple existing under
ordinary circumstances of life
and work; (b) antecedence, because the root cause of
the trouble can be traced to the history of the subject
before marriage although its overt manifestations appear
over after the wedding; and (c) incurability, if treatments
required exceed the ordinary means or subject, or
involve time and expense beyond the reach of the
subject – are all obtaining in this case.
ISSUE:
Whether there is basis to nullify the respondent’s marriage
to Juvy on the ground that at the time of the celebration
of the marriage, Juvy suffered from psychological
incapacity that prevented her from complying with her
essential marital obligations.
HELD:
None. The Supreme Court held that the totality of Nestor’s
evidence – his testimonies and the psychologist, and the
psychological report and evaluation – insufficient to
prove Juvy’s psychological incapacity pursuant to Article
36 of the Family Code.
RATIO:
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c)
incurability. The defect should refer to “no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage.” It must be confined to “the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. [Louel Santos
vs. CA]
It is not absolutely necessary to introduce expert opinion
in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the
totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity
exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability can be duly established. [Brenda Marcos vs.
Marcos]
Instead of serving as a guideline, Molina Doctrine
unintentionally became a straightjacket; it forced all
cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and
be bound by it. [Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te] In Ting vs. Velez-Ting,
far from abandoning Molina, the Ngo Te case simply
suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements; the
Ngo Te case merely stands for a more flexible approach
in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriages based on psychological incapacity.
In the present case, the psychologist did not even identify
the types of psychological tests which she administered
on Nestor and the root cause of Juvy’s psychological
condition. There was no showing that any mental disorder
existed at the inception of the marriage. The report failed
to prove the gravity or severity of Juvy’s alleged
condition, specifically, why and to what extent the
disorder is serious, and how it incapacitated her
to comply with her marital duties; the report did not even
categorically state the particular type of personality
disorder found. The report failed to establish the
incurability of Juvy’s condition. The report’s
pronouncements that Juvy “lacks the initiative to
change” and that her mental incapacity “appears
incorrigible” are insufficient to prove that her mental
condition could not be treated, or if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond her means to undertake.
Petition was granted. Galang’s petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Juvy Salazar under
Article 36 of the Family Code was dismissed.
particular type of personality disorder found. The report
failed to establish the incurability of Juvy’s condition. The
report’s pronouncements that Juvy “lacks the initiative to
change” and that her mental incapacity “appears
incorrigible” are insufficient to prove that her mental
20 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
condition could not be treated, or if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond her means to undertake.
Petition was granted. Galang’s petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Juvy Salazar under
Article 36 of the Family Code was dismissed.
3. Republic of the Philippines, Petitioner vs. Cesar
Encelan, Respondent
G.R. No. 170022; January 09, 2013
DOCTRINE: To constitute psychological incapacity, it must
be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are
manifestations of a disordered personality that actually
prevented the erring spouse from discharging the
essential marital obligations.
Facts: Cesar Married Lolita, and they had two children.
To support the family, Cesar went abroad and worked as
an OFW in Saudi Arabia. After two years of working
abroad, Cesar learned that Lolita is having an illicit affair
with Alvin Perez, and thereafter, left the conjugal dwelling
together with the two children. But even with such
circumstances, Cesar never failed to send financial
support for the family. On June 1995, Cesar filed a
petition against Lolita for the declaration of the nullity of
his marriage based on Lolita’s psychological incapacity.
Cesar, during a hearing even presented a psychological
evaluation report on Lolita with the finding that “Lolita
was not suffering from any form of psychiatric illness, but
had been unable to provide the expectations expected
of her for a good and lasting marital relationship.... and
her transferring from one job to another depicts some
interpersonal problem with co-workers as well as her
impatience in attaining her ambitions .... and her refusal
to go with her husband abroad signifies her reluctance to
work out a good marital and family relationship...” Cesar
found ally in RTC as it gave him a favourable decision
which declared his marriage to Lolita null and void. The
court of Appeals also affirmed the decision of RTC, and
thereafter, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court,
thus, this case.
Issue: Whether or not psychological incapacity is
indeed present in the person of Lolita as to nullify a valid
marriage.
Ruling: No. Article 36 of the Family Code governs
psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of
nullity of marriage. It provides that “[a] marriage
contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.” In interpreting this
provision, we have repeatedly stressed that
psychological incapacity contemplates “downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume the basic marital obligations”; not merely the
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part
of the errant spouse. The plaintiff bears the burden of
proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence at
the time of the celebration of marriage), gravity and
incurability of the condition of the errant spouse.
In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the
conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily
constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply
grounds for legal separation. To constitute psychological
incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and
abandonment are manifestations of a disordered
personality that completely prevented the erring spouse
from discharging the essential marital obligations.
Aside from the time element involved, a wife’s
psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply be
equated with her professional/work relationship;
workplace obligations and responsibilities are poles apart
from their marital counterparts. While both spring from
human relationship, their relatedness and relevance to
one another should be fully established for them to be
compared or to serve as measures of comparison with
one another.
Once again, we stress that marriage is an inviolable
social institution protected by the State. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of its existence its existence
and continuation and against its dissolution and nullity. It
cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties nor by
transgressions made by one party to the other during the
marriage.
Marriage is an inviolable social institution protected by
the State and any doubt should be resolved in favour of
its existence and continuation against its dissolution and
nullity. In this case, sexual infidelity and abandonment of
the conjugal dwelling do not necessarily constitute
psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for
legal separation. To constitute psychological incapacity,
it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and
abandonment are manifestations of a disordered
personality that actually prevented the erring spouse
from discharging the essential marital obligations, which
the court found not present in the person of Lolita.
4. CAMACHO- REYES V. REYES
G.R. No. 185286, [August 18, 2010]
FACTS:
Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met
respondent Ramon Reyes at the University of the
Philippines (UP), Diliman, in 1972 when they were both
nineteen (19) years old. The casual acquaintanceship
quickly developed into a boyfriend-girlfriend relationship.
At that time, respondent held a job in the family business,
the Aristocrat Restaurant. Petitioner’s good impression of
the respondent was not diminished by the latter’s habit of
cutting classes, not even by her discovery that
respondent was taking marijuana.
Not surprisingly, only petitioner finished university studies,
obtaining a degree in AB Sociology from the UP. By 1974,
respondent had dropped out of school on his third year,
and just continued to work for the Aristocrat Restaurant.
In 1976, the year following petitioner’s graduation and her
father’s death, petitioner and respondent got married. At
that time, petitioner was already five (5) months pregnant
and employed at the Population Center
Foundation. Thereafter, the newlyweds lived with the
respondent’s family in Mandaluyong City. All
livingexpenses were shouldered by respondent’s parents,
and the couple’s respective salaries were spent solely for
their personal needs. Initially, respondent gave petitioner
a monthly allowance of P1,500.00 from his salary. When
their first child was born on March 22, 1977, financial
difficulties started. Rearing a child entailed expenses. A
year into their marriage, the monthly allowance of
P1,500.00 from respondent stopped. Further, respondent
no longer handed his salary to petitioner. When petitioner
mustered enough courage to ask the respondent about
this, the latter told her that he had resigned due to slow
advancement within the family business. Respondent’s
game plan was to venture into trading seafood in the
province, supplying hotels and restaurants, including
21 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
the Aristocrat Restaurant. However, this new business took
respondent away from his young family for days on
end without any communication. Petitioner simply
endured the set up, hoping that the situation will
change. To prod respondent into assuming more
responsibility, petitioner suggested that
they live separately from her in-laws. However, the new
living arrangement engendered further financial
difficulty. While petitioner struggled to make ends meet
as the single-income earner of the household,
respondent’s business floundered. Thereafter,
another attempt at business, a fishpond in Mindoro, was
similarly unsuccessful. Respondent gave money to
petitioner sporadically. Compounding the family’s
financial woes and further straining the parties’
relationship was the indifferent attitude of respondent
towards his family. That his business took him away from
his family did not seem to bother respondent; he did not
exert any effort to remain in touch with them while he
was away in Mindoro.
After two (2) years of struggling, the spouses transferred
residence and, this time, moved in with petitioner’s
mother. But the new set up did not end their marital
difficulties. In fact, the parties became more estranged.
Petitioner continued to carry the burden of supporting a
family not just financially, but in most aspects as well.
In 1985, petitioner, who had previously suffered a
miscarriage, gave birth to their third son. At that time,
respondent was in Mindoro and he did not even inquire
on the health of either the petitioner or the newborn. A
week later, respondent arrivedin Manila, acting
nonchalantly while playing with the baby, with nary
an attempt to find out how the hospital bills were settled.
In 1989, due to financial reverses, respondent’s fishpond
business stopped operations. Although without any
means to support his family, respondent refused to go
back to work for the family business. Not surprisingly, the
relationship of the parties deteriorated.
Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent
was having an extra-marital affair. Petitioner soon
realized that respondent was not only unable to provide
financially for their family, but he was, more importantly,
remiss in his obligation to remain faithful to her and their
family.
One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the
parties’ marriage was a surgical operation on petitioner
for the removal of a cyst. Although his wife was about to
be operated on, respondent remained unconcerned
and unattentive; and simply read the newspaper, and
played dumb when petitioner requested that he
accompany her as she was wheeled into the operating
room. After the operation, petitioner felt that she had
had enough of respondent’s lack of concern,
and asked her mother to order respondent to leave the
recovery room.
Adolfo Reyes, respondent’s elder brother, and his spouse,
Peregrina, members of a marriage encounter group,
invited and sponsored the parties to join the group. The
elder couple scheduled counseling sessions with
petitioner and respondent, but these did not improve the
parties’ relationship as respondent remained
uncooperative.
In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to Dr. Natividad A.
Dayan for a psychological assessment to “determine
benchmarks of current psychological functioning.” As
with all other attempts to help him, respondent resisted
and did not continue with the clinical psychologist’s
recommendation to undergo psychotherapy. At about
this time, petitioner, with the knowledge of respondent’s
siblings, told respondent to move out of their house.
Respondent acquiesced to give space to petitioner. With
the de facto separation, the relationship still did not
improve. Neither did respondent’s relationship with his
children.
Finally, in 2001,5 petitioner filed (before the RTC) a petition
for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with the
respondent, alleging the latter’s psychological incapacity
to fulfill the essential marital obligations under Article 36 of
the Family Code.
Traversing the petition, respondent denied petitioner’s
allegations that he was psychologically
incapacitated. After trial (where the testimonies of two
clinical psychologists, Dr. Dayan and Dr. Estrella Magno,
and a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas, were presented in
evidence), the RTC granted the petition and declared
the marriage between the parties null and void on the
ground of their psychological incapacity. The CA
reversed. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES:
Whether the respondent was suffering from psychological
incapacity. –YES.
Whether the marriage should be declared null and void
under Art. 36. –YES.
HELD:
Taking into consideration the explicit guidelines in the
determination of psychological incapacity in conjunction
to the totality of the evidence presented, with emphasis
on the pervasive pattern of behaviors of the respondent
and outcome of the assessment/diagnos[is] of expert
witnesses, Dra. Dayan, Dra. Mango and Dra. Villegas on
the psychological condition of the respondent, the Court
finds that the marriage between the parties from its
inception has a congenital infirmity termed
“psychological incapacity” which pertains to the inability
of the parties to effectively function emotionally,
intellectually and socially towards each other in relation
to their essential duties to mutually observe love, fidelity
and respect as well as to mutually render help and
support, (Art. 68 Family Code). In short, there was already
a fixed niche in the psychological constellation of
respondent which created the death of his marriage.
There is no reason to entertain any slightest doubt on the
truthfulness of the personality disorder of the respondent.
The three expert witnesses have spoken. They were
unanimous in their findings that respondent is suffering
from personality disorder which psychologically
incapacitated him to fulfill his basic duties to the
marriage.
This psychological incapacity of the respondent, in the
uniform words of said three (3) expert witnesses, is serious,
incurable and exists before his marriage and renders him
a helpless victim of his structural constellation. It is beyond
the respondent’s impulse control. In short, he is
weaponless or powerless to restrain himself from his
consistent behaviors simply because he did not consider
the same as wrongful. This is clearly manifested from his
assertion that nothing was wrong in his marriage with the
petitioner and considered their relationship as a normal
one. In fact, with this belief, he lent deaf ears to
counseling and efforts extended to them by his original
22 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
family members to save his marriage. In short, he was
blind and too insensitive to the reality of his marital
atmosphere. He totally disregarded the feelings of
petitioner who appeared to have been saturated
already that she finally revealed her misfortunes to her
sister-in-law and willingly submitted to counseling to save
their marriage. However, the hard position of the
respondent finally constrained her to ask respondent to
leave the conjugal dwelling. Even the siblings of the
respondent were unanimous that separation is the
remedy to the seriously ailing marriage of the parties.
Respondent confirmed this stand of his siblings. As
previously adverted to, the three experts were one in
diagnosing respondent with a personality disorder, to wit:
1. Dra. Cecilia C. Villegas
Based on the clinical data presented, it is the opinion of
the examiner, that [petitioner] manifested inadequacies
along her affective sphere, that made her less responsive
to the emotional needs of her husband, who needed a
great amount of it, rendering her relatively
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and
responsibilities of marriage. [Respondent], on the other
hand, has manifested strong clinical evidences (sic), that
he is suffering from a Personality Disorder, of the antisocial
type, associated with strong sense of Inadequacy along
masculine strivings and narcissistic features that renders
him psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties
and responsibilities of marriage. This is characterized by
his inability to conform to the social norms that ordinarily
govern many aspects of adolescent and adult behavior.
His being a “free spirit” associated with no remorse, no
guilt feelings and no anxiety, is distinctive of this clinical
condition. His prolonged drug intake [marijuana] and
maybe stronger drugs lately, are external factors to boost
his ego.
The root cause of the above clinical conditions is due to
his underlying defense mechanisms, or the unconscious
mental processes, that the ego uses to resolve conflicts.
His prolonged and closed attachments to his mother
encouraged cross identification and developed a severe
sense of inadequacy specifically along masculine
strivings. He therefore has to camouflage his weakness, in
terms of authority, assertiveness, unilateral and forceful
decision making, aloofness and indifference, even if it
resulted to antisocial acts. His narcissistic supplies
rendered by his mother was not resolved (sic).
It existed before marriage, but became manifest only
after the celebration, due to marital demands and
stresses. It is considered as permanent in nature because
it started early in his psychological development, and
therefore became so engrained into his personality
structures (sic). It is considered as severe in degree,
because it hampered, interrupted and interfered with his
normal functioning related to heterosexual adjustments.
(emphasis supplied)
2. Dr. Natividad A. Dayan
In his relationships with people, [respondent] is apt to
project a reserved, aloof and detached attitude.
[Respondent] exhibits withdrawal patterns. He has deep
feelings of inadequacy. Due to a low self-esteem, he
tends to feel inferior and to exclude himself from
association with others. He feels that he is “different” and
as a result is prone to anticipate rejections. Because of
the discomfort produced by these feelings, he is apt to
avoid personal and social involvement, which increases
his preoccupation with himself and accentuates his
tendency to withdraw from interpersonal contact.
[Respondent] is also apt to be the less dominant partner.
He feels better when he has to follow than when he has
to take the lead. A self-contained
person[,] he does not really need to interact with others in
order to enjoy life and to be able to move on. He has a
small need of companionship and is most comfortable
alone. He, too[,] feels uncomfortable in expressing his
more tender feelings for fear of being hurt. Likewise, he
maybe very angry within but he may choose to repress
this feeling. [Respondent’s] strong need for social
approval, which could have stemmed from some deep
seated insecurities makes him submissive and over
[compliant]. He tends to make extra effort to please
people. Although at times[, he] already feels victimized
and taken advantage of, he still tolerates abusive
behavior for fear of interpersonal conflicts. Despite his
[dis]illusion with people, he seeks to minimize dangers of
indifference and disapproval [of] others. Resentments are
suppressed. This is likely to result in anger and frustrations
which is likewise apt to be repressed.
There are indications that [respondent] is[,] at the
moment[,] experiencing considerable tension and
anxiety. He is prone to fits of apprehension and
nervousness. Likewise, he is also entertaining feelings of
hopelessness and is preoccupied with negative thought.
He feels that he is up in the air but with no sound
foundation. He is striving [for] goals which he knows he will
never be able to attain. Feeling discouraged and
distressed, he has difficulty concentrating and focusing
on things which he needs to prioritize. He has many plans
but he can’t accomplish anything because he is unable
to see which path to take. This feeling of hopelessness is
further aggravated by the lack of support from significant
others.
Diagnostic Impression
Axis I : Drug Dependence
Axis II : Mixed Personality Disorder
[Schizoid, Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder]
Axis III : None
Axis IV : Psychosocial and Environmental Problems:
Severe He seems to be very good at planning and
starting things but is unable to accomplish anything;
unable to give priority to the needs of his family; in social
relationships.
Axis V : Global Assessment of Functioning – Fair (Emphasis
supplied)
3. Dr. Estrella T. Tiongson-Magno
Diagnosis for [petitioner]: Axis I Partner Relational Problem
Axis II Obsessive Compulsive Personality Style with Self-
Defeating features
Axis III No diagnosis
Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord
(spouse’s immaturity, drug abuse, and infidelity)
Severity: 4-severe
23 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
Diagnosis for [respondent]
Axis I Partner Relational Problem
Axis II Antisocial Personality Disorder with marked
narcissistic, aggressive sadistic and dependent features
Axis III No diagnosis
Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord
(successful wife)
Severity: 4 (severe)
[Respondent], diagnosed with an antisocial personality
disorder with marked narcissistic features and aggressive
sadistic and dependent features, is psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill the essential obligations of
marriage: to love, respect and render support for his
spouse and children. A personality disorder is not curable
as it is permanent and stable over time.
From a psychological viewpoint, therefore, there is
evidence that the marriage of [petitioner] and
[respondent is] null and void from the very beginning.
(emphasis supplied)
The recent case of Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim, citing The
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,
Fourth Edition (DSM IV), instructs us on the general
diagnostic criteria for personality disorders:
A. An enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior
that deviates markedly from the expectations of the
individual’s culture. This pattern is manifested in two (2) or
more of the following areas:
(1) cognition (i.e., ways of perceiving and interpreting
self, other people, and events)
(2) affectivity (i.e., the range, intensity, liability, and
appropriateness of emotional response)
(3) interpersonal functioning
(4) impulse control
B. The enduring pattern is inflexible and pervasive across
a broad range of personal and social situations.
C. The enduring pattern leads to clinically significant
distress or impairment in social, occupational or other
important areas of functioning.
D. The pattern is stable and of long duration, and its onset
can be traced back at least to adolescence or early
adulthood.
E. The enduring pattern is not better accounted for as a
manifestation or a consequence of another mental
disorder.
F. The enduring pattern is not due to the direct
physiological effects of a substance (i.e., a drug of
abuse, a medication) or a general medical condition
(e.g., head trauma).
Within their acknowledged field of expertise, doctors can
diagnose the psychological make up of a person based
on a number of factors culled from various sources. A
person afflicted with a personality disorder will not
necessarily have personal knowledge thereof. In this
case, considering that a personality disorder is
manifested in a pattern of behavior, self-diagnosis by the
respondent consisting only in his bare denial of the
doctors’ separate diagnoses, does not necessarily evoke
credence and cannot trump the clinical findings of
experts.
In the case at bar, however, even without the experts’
conclusions, the factual antecedents (narrative of
events) alleged in the petition and established during
trial, all point to the inevitable conclusion that respondent
is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
marital obligations.
In the instant case, respondent’s pattern of behavior
manifests an inability, nay, a psychological incapacity to
perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his:
(1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3)
substance abuse; (4) failed business attempts; (5) unpaid
money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not
connected with the family businesses; and (7) criminal
charges of estafa.
In fine, given the factual milieu of the present case and in
light of the foregoing disquisition, we find ample basis to
conclude that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
marital obligations at the time of his marriage to the
petitioner.
5. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LAILA TANYAG-SAN
JOSE and MANOLITO SAN JOSE
517 SCRA 123 (2007)
Being jobless and a drug user is not a state or condition or
attitude shown to be a malady or disorder rooted on
some incapacitating or debilitating psychological
condition.
FACTS:
Repondents Manolito San Jose and Laila Tanyag-San
Jose got married. Thereafter Laila gave birth to two
children. Laila, then left Manolito for being jobless
and hooked into gambling and drugs.
Laila then filed a Petition for Declartion of Nullity on the
ground of psychological incapacity before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City.
Dr. Nedy Tayag found that Manolito was psychologically
incapacitated based on the testimony of Laila. Dr.
Tayag further said that he suffers from anti-social
personality disorder because of the following overt
manipulations: the presence of drug, the absence of
remourse, the constant incapacity in terms of maintaining
the marital relationship, the lack of concern to his family,
and his self-centeredness.
The RTC denied Laila‘s petition on the ground that it is not
enough to prove that one failed to perform his
marital duty, it is essential that it must be shown that the
other party is incapable of doing so due to psychological
incapacity not physical illness. Laila appealed to Court
of Appeals (CA). The CA held that Manolito was
psychologically incapacitated hence their marriage is
24 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
void ab Initio. The CA concluded that the deficiency of
Manolito was so grave and so permanent as to deprive
one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Manolito is psychologically incapacitated
HELD:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for nullity of
marriage, has been succinctly expounded in the recent
case of Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris v. Brix Ferraris(Ferraris),
the term “psychological incapacity” to be a ground for
the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a
party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a
malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
the awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
As the earlier-quoted Report of Dr. Tayag shows, her
conclusion about Manolito‘s psychological incapacity
was based on the information supplied by Laila which she
found to be ―factual.‖ Undoubtedly, the doctor‘s
conclusion is hearsay. It is ―unscientific and unreliable,‖ so
this Court declared in Choa v. Choa where
the assessment of the therein party sought to be
declared psychologically incapacitated was based
merely on the information communicated to the doctor
by the therein respondent-spouse. In this case, Dr.
Gauzon had no personal knowledge of the facts he
testified to, as these had merely been relayed to him by
respondent. The former was working on pure suppositions
and secondhand information fed to him by one
side. Consequently, his testimony can be dismissed as
unscientific and unreliable.
Parenthetically, Dr. Tayag’s Psychological Report does
not even show that the alleged anti-social
personality disorder of Manolito was already present at
the inception of the marriage or that it is incurable.
Neither does it explain the incapacitating nature of the
alleged disorder nor identify its rootcause. It merely states
that “such disorder is considered to be grave and is
deeply immersed within the system and continues to
influence the individual until the later stage of life.”
Manolito’s alleged psychological incapacity is thus
premised on his being jobless and a drug user, as well as
his inability to support his family and his refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Manolito’s state or condition or attitude has not
been shown, however, to be a malady or disorderrooted
on some incapacitating or debilitating psychological
condition.
ARTICLE 40:
BIGAMY
VINCENT MERCADO, petitioner vs.
MA.CONSUELO TAN, defendant
G.R. No. 137110. August 1, 2000
FACTS:
The accused, Vincent Mercado was in lawful wedlock
with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a marriage
ceremony solemnized on April 10, 1976. Despite the prior
marriage he got married to complainant
Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991. On October 5, 1992,
a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by complainant
through counsel with the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City,
which eventually resulted [in] the institution of the present
case before this Court against said accused, Dr. Vincent
G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an Information dated
January 22, 1993. On November 13, 1992, or more than a
month after the bigamy case was lodged in the
Prosecutor’s Office, accused filed an action
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma
V. Oliva in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City, and in a Decision dated
May 6, 1993 the marriage between Vincent G. Mercado
and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null and void.
Despite this, the Trial Court charged Vincent with bigamy
since his prior marriage was still subsisting at the time he
had contracted his second marriage. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The
petitioner then filed a case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Is the judicial declaration of nullity of a prior marriage
necessary for remarriage?
RULING:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the
assailed decision. Under Article 40 of the Family Code,
‘the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of
a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.’
But here, the final judgment declaring null and void
accused’s previous marriage came not before the
celebration of the second marriage, but after, when the
case for bigamy against accused was already tried in
court. And what constitutes the crime of bigamy is the
act of any person who shall contract a second
subsequent marriage ‘before’ the former marriage has
been legally dissolved.
It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void
from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge.
As with a voidable marriage, there must be a
judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage before
contracting the second marriage.
ARTICLE 41
WELL-FOUNDED BELIEF OF DEATH
1. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
v. GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent.
G.R. No. 94053. March 17, 1993.
FACTS:
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed
before the Regional Trial Court a petition for
the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet
Monica Parker, involving Article 41 of the Family Code.
The petition prayed that respondent’s wife be declared
presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the
marriage be declared null and void.
The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition
through the Provincial Prosecutor of Antique who had
been deputized to assist the Solicitor-General in the
instant case. The Republic argued, first, that Nolasco did
not possess a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead; and second, Nolasco’s attempt to
have his marriage annulled in the same proceeding was
a cunning attempt to circumvent the law on marriage.
Respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and
that he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a British
subject, in a bar in England during one of his ship’s port
calls. From that chance meeting onwards, Janet Monica
Parker lived with respondent Nolasco on his ship for six
25 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
months until they returned to respondent’s hometown of
San Jose, Antique on 19 November 1980 after his
seaman’s contract expired. On 15 January 1982,
respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San
Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van
Tilborg in the Cathedral of San Jose.
He obtained another employment contract as a seaman
and left his wife with his parents in San Jose, Antique.
Sometime in January 1983, while working overseas,
respondent received a letter from his mother informing
him that Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The
same letter informed him that Janet Monica had
left Antique.
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her
himself whenever his ship docked in England proved
fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to
his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton,
Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where he and
Janet Monica first met, were all returned to him. He also
claimed that he inquired from among friends but they too
had no news of Janet Monica.
The trial court granted Nolasco’s petition hereby
declaring the presumptively death of Janet Monica
Parker Nolasco, without prejudice to her reappearance.
The Republic appealed to the Court
of Appeals contending that the trial court erred in
declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead
because respondent Nolasco had failed to show that
there existed a well founded belief for such declaration.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision,
holding that respondent had sufficiently established a
basis to form a belief that his absent spouse had already
died.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his
wife is already dead.
RULING:
No. The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed
to conduct a search for his missing wife with
such diligence as to give rise to a “well-founded belief”
that she is dead. Pursuant to Article 41 of the Family
Code, a marriage contracted by any person during the
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void,
unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present had a well
founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead. In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had
the well-founded belief required by law that his absent
wife was already dead that would sustain the issuance of
a court order declaring Janet Monica Parker
presumptively dead. Thus, the Decision of the Court
of Appeals affirming the trial court’s decision declaring
Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead is hereby
reversed and both Decisions are hereby nullified and set
aside.
2. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, v.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 159614. December 9, 2005.
FACTS:
On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a petition in the
Regional Trial Courtbfor the declaration of presumptive
death of his wife, Rosalia “Lea” A. Julaton.
At the hearing, Alan adduced evidence that he and Lea
were married on January 20, 1995 in Catbalogan, Samar.
He testified that, on February 6, 1995, Lea arrived home
late in the evening and he berated her for being always
out of their house. He told her that if she enjoyed the life
of a single person, it would be better for her to go back
to her parents. Lea did not reply. Alan narrated that,
when he reported for work the following day, Lea was still
in the house, but when he arrived home later in the day,
Lea was nowhere to be found. Alan thought that Lea
merely went to her parents’ house in Bliss, Sto. Niño,
Catbalogan, Samar. However, Lea did not return to their
house anymore.
Alan further testified that, he inquired Lea’s whereabouts
but to no avail.
Sometime in June 1995, he decided to go to Manila to
look for Lea, but his mother asked him to leave after the
town fiesta of Catbalogan, hoping that Lea may come
home for the fiesta. Alan agreed. However, Lea did
not show up. Alan then left for Manila on August 27, 1995.
He went to a house in Navotas where Janeth, Lea’s
friend, was staying. When asked where Lea was, Janeth
told him that she had not seen her. He failed to find out
Lea’s whereabouts despite his repeated talks with
Janeth. Alan decided to work as a part-time taxi driver.
On his free time, he would look for Lea in the malls but still
to no avail. He returned to Catbalogan in 1997 and again
looked for his wife but failed.
On June 20, 2001, Alan reported Lea’s disappearance to
the local police station. The police authorities issued an
Alarm Notice on July 4, 2001. Alan also reported Lea’s
disappearance to the National Bureau of Investigation on
July 9, 2001.
On January 8, 2002, the court rendered judgment
granting the petition.
The OSG appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals
which rendered judgment on August 4, 2003, affirming
the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the declaration of presumptive death of
the wife is valid
RULING:
No. In view of the summary nature of proceedings under
Article 41 of the Family Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of one’s spouse, the degree of
due diligence set by the Court in locating the
whereabouts of a missing spouse must be strictly
complied with. It is the policy of the State to protect and
strengthen the family as a basic social institution.
Marriage is the foundation of the family. Since marriage is
an inviolable social institution that the 1987 Constitution
seeks to protect from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. For respondent’s failure to prove that he had a
well-founded belief that his wife is already dead and that
he exerted the required amount of diligence in searching
for his missing wife, the petition for declaration of
presumptive death should have been denied by the trial
court and the Honorable Court of Appeals. For the
purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage, the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse. The spouse present
is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been
absent and that he has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse
may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not
define what is meant by a well-grounded belief. Cuello
Callon writes that “es menester que su creencia sea firme
se funde en motivos racionales.” The Court finds and so
holds that the respondent failed to prove that he had a
well-founded belief, before he filed his petition in the trial
court, that his spouse Rosalia “Lea” Julaton was already
26 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
dead. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed
and set aside.
WHEN THERE IS DELIVERY OF PRESUMPTIVE LEGITIMES
1. DIÑO V. DIÑO G.R. No. 178044, [January 19, 2011]
DOCTRINE:
Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages
which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the
Family Code, which should be declared void without
waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was
declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code and
not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the
liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner
and respondent are the rules on co-ownership.
FACTS:
Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L.
Diño(respondent) got married on 14 January 1998 before
Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas City.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent,
citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag) submitted a psychological
report establishing that respondent was suffering
from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was incurable
and deeply ingrained in her system since her early
formative years.
The trial court granted the petition on the ground that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations at the
time of the celebration of the marriage and declared
their marriage void ab initio. It ordered that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued
upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family
Code.
Trial court, upon motion for partial reconsideration of
petitioner, modified its decision holding that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued after
liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred when it ordered that
adecree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be
issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the
parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
HELD:
Yes. The trial court’s decision is affirmed with modification.
Decree of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be issued
upon finality of the trial court’s decision without waiting
for the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the
parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
RATIO:
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC that in a void
marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of
the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed
either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties
who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless void, such as petitioner and respondent in
the case before the Court.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following
elements must be present:
 1. The man and the woman must be capacitated
to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband
and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or
their marriage is void.
All these elements are present in this case and there is no
question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to
the property relations between petitioner and
respondent.
The trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute
nullity of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation,
partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis
because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to
cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family
Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. – (1) If the court renders a decision
granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the
decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall
be issued by the court only after compliance with Articles
50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the
Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of
Properties.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section
19(1) of the Rule appliesonly to marriages which are
declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment
under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short,
Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages
which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the
Family Code, which should be declared void without
waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages
are governed either by absolute community of property
or conjugal partnership of gains unless the parties agree
to a complete separation of property in a marriage
settlement entered into before the marriage. Since the
property relations of the parties is governed by absolute
community of property or conjugal partnership of gains,
there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the
properties before a decree of annulment could be
issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code because the
marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-
ownership.
In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was
declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code and
not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the
liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner
and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes,
the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a
void marriage during the period of cohabitation is
governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family
Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the
properties of the spouses should be liquidated in
accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-
ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, “[p]artition
may be made by agreement between the parties or by
judicial proceedings. x x x.” It is not necessary to liquidate
the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding
for declaration of nullity of marriage.
2. YU V. JUDGE REYES-CARPIO AND YU
G.R. No. 189207, [June 15, 2011]
DOCTRINE:
27 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
It is more proper to rule first on the declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of each party’s psychological
incapacity to perform their respective marital obligations.
If the Court eventually finds that the parties’ respective
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage is indeed
meritorious on the basis of either or both of the parties’
psychological incapacity, then the parties
shall proceed to comply with Articles 50 and 51 of the
Family Code before a final decree of absolute nullity of
marriage can be issued. Pending such ruling on
the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage, the
Court finds no legal ground, at this stage, to proceed with
the reception of evidence in regard the issues on custody
and property relations, since these are mere incidents of
the nullity of the parties’ marriage.
FACTS:
Eric Yu filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage against Caroline T. Yu with the RTC of Pasig.
Judge Suarez on May 30, 2006 issued an order stating
that Eric’s partial offer of evidence dated April 18, 2006
would be submitted for resolution after certain exhibits
have been remarked. But the exhibits were only relative
to the issue of the nullity of the marriage of Eric and
Caroline. On September 12, 2006, Caroline moved to
submit the case for resolution, considering that the
incidents on custody, support, and property relations
(incidental issues) were mere consequences of
the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage.
Eric opposed this motion saying that the incident
on declaration of nullity cannot be resolved without
presentation of evidence for the incidents on custody,
support, and property relations. Eric added that the
incidental issues and the issue on declaration of nullity
can both proceed and be simultaneously resolved. RTC
ruled in favour of Eric’s opposition.
Caroline caused the inhibition of Judge Suarez, so that
the case was re-raffled to another branch presided by
Judge Reyes-Carpio. While the case was being tried by
Judge Reyes-Carpio, Caroline filed an Omnibus Motion
seeking the strict observation by the said judge of the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriage
as codified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, and that the case on
the declaration on nullity be already submitted for
resolution ahead of the incidental issues, and not
simultaneously. Eric opposed this motion.
Judge Reyes-Carpio granted the Omnibus Motion, saying
that the main cause of action is the declaration of nullity
of the marriage and the incidental issues are
merely ancillary incidents thereto. Eric moved for
reconsideration, which was denied by Judge Reyes-
Carpio. Eric then filed for certiorari with the CA under Rule
65. CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
ISSUES/HELD:
Whether the main issue of nullity of marriage must be
submitted for resolution first before the reception of
evidence on custody, support, and property relations
(incidental issues) – NO.
RATIO:
It appears in the records that the Orders in question, or
what are alleged to have been exercised with grave
abuse of discretion, are interlocutory orders. An
interlocutory order is one which “does not
finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Court’s
task of adjudicating the parties’ contentions and
determining their rights and liabilities as regards each
other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to
be done by the Court. Eric Yu to prove that the assailed
orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion and
that those were patently erroneous. Considering that the
requisites that would justify certiorari as an appropriate
remedy to assail an interlocutory order have not been
complied with, the proper recourse for petitioner should
have been an appeal in due course of the judgment of
the trial court on the merits, incorporating the grounds for
assailing the interlocutory orders.
It must be noted that Judge Reyes-Carpio did not
disallow the presentation of evidence on the incidents on
custody, support, and property relations. It is clear in the
assailed orders that the trial court judge merely deferred
the reception of evidence relating to custody, support,
and property relations. And the trial judge’s decision was
not without basis. Judge Reyes-Carpio finds support in the
Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Particularly, Secs.
19 and 21 of the Rule clearly allow the reception of
evidence on custody, support, and property relations
after the trial court renders a decision granting the
petition, or upon entry of judgment granting the petition:
Section 19. Decision. – (1) If the court renders a decision
granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the
decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall
be issued by the court only after compliance with Articles
50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the
Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of
Properties.
Section 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody,
support of common children and delivery of their
presumptive legitimes. – Upon entry of the judgment
granting the petition, or, in case of appeal, upon receipt
of the entry of judgment of the appellate court granting
the petition, the Family Court, on motion of either party,
shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, including
custody, support of common children and delivery of
their presumptive legitimes pursuant to Articles 50 and 51
of the Family Code unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
Evidently, Judge Reyes-Carpio did not deny the
reception of evidence on custody, support, and property
relations but merely deferred it, based on the existing
rules issued by this Court, to a time when a decision
granting the petition is already at hand and before a final
decree is issued. Conversely, the trial court, or more
particularly the family court, shall proceed with the
liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of
common children, and delivery of their presumptive
legitimes upon entry of judgment granting the petition.
And following the pertinent provisions of the Court
En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, this act is
undoubtedly consistent with Articles 50 and 51 of the
Family Code, contrary to what petitioner asserts.
Particularly, Arts. 50 and 51 of the Family Code state:
Article 50. The final judgment in such cases shall provide
for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the
common children, and the delivery of their presumptive
legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in
the previous judicial proceedings.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive
legitimes of all common children, computed as of the
date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be
28 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless
the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved,
had already provided for such matters.
Also, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC clearly allows the deferment of
the reception of evidence on custody, support, and
property relations. Conversely, the trial court may receive
evidence on the subject incidents after a judgment
granting the petition but before the decree of nullity or
annulment of marriage is issued. And this is what Judge
Reyes-Carpio sought to comply with in issuing the assailed
orders. As correctly pointed out by the CA, Eric Yu’s
assertion that ruling the main issue without receiving
evidence on the subject incidents would result in
an ambiguous and fragmentary judgment is certainly
speculative and, hence, contravenes the legal
presumption that a trial judge can fairly weigh
and appraise the evidence submitted by the parties.
Therefore, it cannot be said at all that Judge Reyes-
Carpio acted in a capricious and whimsical manner,
much less in a way that is patently gross and erroneous,
when she issued the assailed orders deferring the
reception of evidence on custody, support, and property
relations. To reiterate, this decision is left to the trial court’s
wisdom and legal soundness. Consequently, therefore,
the CA cannot likewise be said to have committed grave
abuse of discretion in upholding the Orders of Judge
Reyes-Carpio and in ultimately finding an absence of
grave abuse of discretion on her part.
ARTICLE 41
1. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner vs. ROBERT P.
NARCEDA, respondent G.R. No. 182760 April 10, 2013
FACTS:
Robert and Marina Narceda contracted marriage on
July 22, 1987. Marina went to Singapore in 1994 and
never returned. Robert tried to look for her but he could
not find her. Several years later, Robert was informed by a
town mate in La Union who came home from Singapore
that his wife was already living with a Singaporean
husband.
In view of his wife’s absence and his desire to remarry,
Robert filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a petition
for a declaration of presumptive death and/or absence
of Marina.
The court then granted the petition in 2005. Petitioner
appealed and claimed that the respondent failed to
conduct a search for his missing wife with diligence
required by law and enough to give rise to a well-
founded belief that his wife was dead. The Court of
Appeals (CA) dismissed the appeal on the ground that
the judgment of the RTC in the summary proceeding is
immediately final and executory. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing
the petition.
HELD:
No. By express provision of the law, the judgment of the
court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final
and executory. It follows that no appeal can be
approved from trial court’s judgment in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of
an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code.
However, an aggrieved party may file a petition for
certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the
Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of
Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court’s original
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with
the RTC’s and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such
concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom
of choice of court forum.
From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing
party may then file a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme
Court. This is because the errors which the court may
commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of
judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.
2. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES , vs. JOSE B. SAREÑOGON,
JR. G.R. No. 199194 February 10, 2016
DOCTRINE:
The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded
belief." It depends upon the circumstances of each
particular case. Its determination, so to speak, remains on
a case-to-case basis. To be able to comply with this
requirement, the present spouse must prove that his/her
belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts
and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based
on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under
the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It
requires exertion of active effort (not a mere passive
one).
FACTS:
On November 4, 2008, respondent Jose B. Sareñogon, Jr.
(Jose) filed a Petition before the RTC of Ozamiz City for
the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Netchie
S. Sareñogon (Netchie).
The RTC set the Petition for initial hearing on April 16, 2009.
It likewise directed the publication of said Order in a
newspaper of general circulation in the cities of Tangub,
Ozamiz and Oroquieta, all in the province of Misamis
Occidental. Nobody opposed the Petition. Trial then
followed.
Jose testified that he first met Netchie in Clarin, Misamis
Occidental in 1991. They later became sweethearts and
on August 10, 1996, they got married in civil rites at the
Manila City Hall. However, they lived together as
husband and wife for a month only because he left to
work as a seaman while Netchie went to Hongkong as a
domestic helper. For three months, he did not receive
any communication from Netchie. He likewise had no
idea about her whereabouts. While still abroad, he tried
to contact Netchie’s parents, but failed, as the latter had
allegedly left Clarin, Misamis Occidental. He returned
home after his contract expired. He then inquired from
Netchie’s relatives and friends about her whereabouts,
but they also did not know where she was. Because of
these, he had to presume that his wife Netchie was
already dead. He filed the Petition before the RTC so he
could contract another marriage pursuant to Article 41 of
the Family Code.
Jose’s testimony was corroborated by his older brother
Joel Sareñogon, and by Netchie’s aunt, Consuelo Sande.
These two witnesses testified that Jose and Netchie lived
29 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
together as husband and wife only for one month prior to
their leaving the Philippines for separate destinations
abroad. These two added that they had no information
regarding Netchie’s location.
The RTC held that Jose had established by
preponderance of evidence that he is entitled to the
relief prayed for under Article 41 of the Family Code. The
RTC found that Netchie had disappeared for more than
four years, reason enough for Jose to conclude that his
wife was indeed already dead. On appeal, the CA
dismissed the petition. Hence, this action.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC properly granted Jose’s Petition
RULING:
NO.
In Republic v. Cantor, the Court has held that:
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can
be obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the present
spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse
was already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code,
there are four essential requisites for the declaration of
presumptive death:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four
consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death
under the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the
Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that
the absentee is dead; and,
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.
With respect to the third element (which seems to be the
element that in this case invites extended discussion), the
holding is that the – mere absence of the spouse (even
for such period required by the law), or lack of news that
such absentee is still alive, failure to communicate [by the
absentee spouse or invocation of the] general
presumption on absence under the Civil Code [would]
not suffice. This conclusion proceeds from the premise
that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the
present spouse the burden of proving the additional and
more stringent requirement of "well-founded belief" which
can only be discharged upon a due showing of proper
and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain
not only the absent spouse’s whereabouts but, more
importantly, that the absent spouse is [either] still alive or
is already dead.
In the case at bar, the RTC ruled that Jose has "well-
founded belief" that Netchie was already dead upon the
following grounds:
(1) Jose allegedly tried to contact Netchie’s parents while
he was still out of the country, but did not reach them as
they had allegedly left Clarin, Misamis Occidental;
(2) Jose believed/presumed that Netchie was already
dead because when he returned home, he was not able
to obtain any information that Netchie was still alive from
Netchie’s relatives and friends;
(3) Jose’s testimony to the effect that Netchie is no longer
alive, hence must be presumed dead, was corroborated
by Jose’s older brother, and by Netchie’s aunt, both of
whom testified that he (Jose) and Netchie lived together
as husband and wife only for one month and that after
this, there had been no information as to Netchie’s
whereabouts.
The application of this stricter standard becomes even
more imperative if we consider the State’s policy to
protect and strengthen the institution of marriage. Since
marriage serves as the family’s foundation and since it is
the state’s policy to protect and strengthen the family as
a basic social institution, marriage should not be
permitted to be dissolved at the whim of the parties.
x x x [I]t has not escaped this Court’s attention that the
strict standard required in petitions for declaration of
presumptive death has not been fully observed by the
lower courts. We need only to cite the instances when
this Court, on review, has consistently ruled on the
sanctity of marriage and reiterated that anything less
than the use of the strict standard necessitates a denial.
To rectify this situation, lower courts are now expressly put
on notice of the strict standard this Court requires in cases
under Article 41 of the Family Code."
Given the Court’s imposition of "strict standard" in a
petition for a declaration of presumptive death under
Article 41 of the Family Code, it must follow that there
was no basis at all for the RTC’s finding that Jose’s Petition
complied with the requisites of Article 41 of the Family
Code, in reference to the "well-founded belief" standard.
If anything, Jose’s pathetically anemic efforts to locate
the missing Netchie are notches below the required
degree of stringent diligence prescribed by
jurisprudence. For, aside from his bare claims that he had
inquired from alleged friends and relatives as to Netchie’s
whereabouts, Jose did not call to the witness stand
specific individuals or persons whom he allegedly saw or
met in the course of his search or quest for the allegedly
missing Netchie. Neither did he prove that he sought the
assistance of the pertinent government agencies as well
as the media. Nor did he show that he undertook a
thorough, determined and unflagging search for Netchie,
say for at least two years (and what those years were),
and naming the particular places, provinces, cities,
barangays or municipalities that he visited, or went to,
and identifying the specific persons he interviewed or
talked to in the course of his search.
3. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. NILDA B.
TAMPUS, Respondent. G.R. No. 214243, March 16, 2016
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent was married to Dante L. Del Mundo on
November 29, 1975 in Cordova, Cebu. The marriage
ceremony was solemnized by Municipal Judge Julian B.
Pogoy of Cordova, Cebu.5 Three days thereafter, or on
December 2, 1975, Dante, a member of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), left respondent, and went
to Jolo, Sulu where he was assigned. The couple had no
children. Since then, respondent heard no news from
Dante. She tried everything to locate him, but her efforts
proved futile. Thus, on April 14, 2009, she filed before the
30 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
RTC a petition8 to declare Dante as presumptively dead
for the purpose of remarriage, alleging that after the
lapse of thirty-three (33) years without any kind of
communication from him, she firmly believes that he is
already dead. Due to the absence of any oppositor,
respondent was allowed to present her evidence ex
parte. She testified on the allegations in her petition,
affirming that she exerted efforts to find Dante by
inquiring from his parents, relatives, and neighbors, who,
unfortunately, were also not aware of his whereabouts.
She averred that she intends to remarry and move on
with her life.10
The RTC granted the petition and declared Dante as
presumptively dead for all legal purposes, without
prejudice to the effect of his reappearance. The CA
affirmed the RTC Decision declaring Dante as
presumptively dead. The CA gave credence to the RTC's
findings that respondent had exerted efforts to find her
husband by inquiring from his parents, relatives, and
neighbors, who likewise had no knowledge of his
whereabouts. Further, the lapse of thirty-three (33) years,
coupled with the fact that Dante had been sent on a
combat mission to Jolo, Sulu, gave rise to respondent's
well-founded belief that her husband is already dead.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in upholding the RTC Decision
declaring Dante as presumptively dead.
RULING: YES
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can
be obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the present
spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse
was already dead.
Under Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines
(Family Code), there are four (4) essential requisites for
the declaration of presumptive death:
(a) that the absent spouse has been missing for four (4)
consecutive years, or two (2) consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death
under the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the
Civil Code;
(b) that the present spouse wishes to remarry;
(c) that the present spouse has a well-founded belief that
the absentee is dead; and
(d) that the present spouse files a summary proceeding
for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee.
The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show
that all the foregoing requisites under Article 41 of the
Family Code exist.
The "well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires
the present spouse to prove that his/her belief was the
result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the
absent spouse and that based on these efforts and
inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances,
the absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates
exertion of active effort, not a passive one. As such, the
mere absence of the spouse for such periods prescribed
under the law, lack of any news that such absentee
spouse is still alive, failure to communicate, or general
presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not
suffice.22 The premise is that Article 41 of the Family Code
places upon the present spouse the burden of complying
with the stringent requirement of "well-founded belief
which can only be discharged upon a showing of proper
and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain
not only the absent spouse's whereabouts, but more
importantly, whether the latter is still alive or is already
dead.
In this case, respondent testified that after Dante's
disappearance, she tried to locate him by making
inquiries with his parents, relatives, and neighbors as to his
whereabouts, but unfortunately, they also did not know
where to find him. Other than making said inquiries,
however, she made no further efforts to find her husband.
She could have called or proceeded to the AFP
headquarters to request information about her husband,
but failed to do so. She did not even seek the help of the
authorities or the AFP itself in finding him. Considering her
own pronouncement that Dante was sent by the AFP on
a combat mission to Jolo, Sulu at the time of his
disappearance, she could have inquired from the AFP on
the status of the said mission, or from the members of the
AFP who were assigned thereto. To the Court's mind,
therefore, Nilda failed to actively look for her missing
husband, and her purported earnest efforts to find him by
asking Dante's parents, relatives, and friends did not
satisfy the strict standard and degree of diligence
required to create a "well-founded belief of his death.
Furthermore, Nilda did not present Dante's family,
relatives, or neighbors as witnesses who could have
corroborated her asseverations that she earnestly looked
for Dante. These resource persons were not even named.
Finally, other than respondent's bare testimony, no other
corroborative evidence had been offered to support her
allegation that she exerted efforts to find him but was
unsuccessful. What appears from the facts as established
in this case was that respondnet simply allowed the
passage of time without actively and diligently searching
for her husband, which the Court cannot accept as
constituting a "well-founded belief that her husband is
dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a
well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse
depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great
many circumstances occurring before and after the
disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and
extent of the inquiries made by the present spouse.26
Having fallen short of the stringent standard and degree
of due diligence required by jurisprudence to support her
claim of a "well-founded belief that her husband Dante is
already dead, the instant petition must be granted.
4. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner, vs.
TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON, Respondent. G.R. No.
165545 March 24, 2006
CARPIO MORALES,J.:
FACTS:
On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon (Bailon) and Alice
P. Diaz (Alice) contracted marriage.6 More than 15 years
later or on October 9, 1970, Bailon filed before the then
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sorsogon a petition7 to
declare Alice presumptively dead. CFI granted the
petition. Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was
declared presumptively dead or on August 8, 1983,
Bailon contracted marriage with Teresita Jarque
(respondent). On January 30, 1998, Bailon, who was a
member of the Social Security System (SSS) since 1960
and a retiree pensioner thereof effective July 1994, died.
Respondent thereupon filed a claim for funeral benefits
and was granted.
Cecilia Bailon-Yap (Cecilia), who claimed to be a
daughter of Bailon and one Elisa Jayona (Elisa) contested
before the SSS the release to respondent of the death
and funeral benefits. She claimed that Bailon contracted
31 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
three marriages in his lifetime, the first with Alice, the
second with her mother Elisa, and the third with
respondent, all of whom are still alive; she, together with
her siblings, paid for Bailon’s medical and funeral
expenses; and all the documents submitted by
respondent to the SSS in support of her claims are
spurious.
Cecilia and her sister Norma Bailon Chavez (Norma), who
claimed to be daughters of Bailon and one Elisa Jayona
(Elisa), contested before the SSS the release to
respondent of the death and funeral benefits and
submitted an Affidavit averring that they are two of nine
children of Bailon and Elisa who cohabited as husband
and wife as early as 1958; and they were reserving their
right to file the necessary court action to contest the
marriage between Bailon and respondent as they
personally know that Alice is "still very much alive."
Hermes P. Diaz, claiming to be the brother and guardian
of "Aliz P. Diaz," filed before the SSS a claim for death
benefits accruing from Bailon’s death, he further attesting
in a sworn statement18 that it was Norma who defrayed
Bailon’s funeral expenses.
Elisa and seven of her children19 subsequently filed claims
for death benefits as Bailon’s beneficiaries before the
SSS.20
SSS advised respondent of the cancellation of her
monthly pension for death benefits in view of the opinion
rendered by its legal department that her marriage with
Bailon was void as it was contracted while the latter’s
marriage with Alice was still subsisting. Respondent
protested the cancellation of her monthly pension for
death benefits. The SSS, however, maintained the denial
of her claim for and the discontinuance of payment of
monthly pension. Respondent thus filed a
petition27 against the SSS before the SSC for the
restoration to her of her entitlement to monthly pension.
Respondent informed the SSS that she was returning,
under protest.
SSC found that the marriage of respondent to Bailon was
void and, therefore, she was "just a common-law-wife."
The CA reversed and set aside Resolution and Order of
the SSC and thus ordered the SSS to pay respondent all
the pension benefits due her. It held that nowhere does
the law contemplates the possibility that respondent SSS
may validly declare the second marriage null and void
on the basis alone of its own investigation and declare
that the decision of the RTC declaring one to be
presumptively dead is without basis. Respondent SSS
cannot arrogate upon itself the authority to review the
decision of the regular courts
ISSUE: 1. WON SSC has jurisdiction to make a finding with
respect to the validity of the marriage of Bailon and
respondent. NO
2. WON the 2nd marriage is valid. YES
3. WON the reappearance of the 1 st wife (ALICE) is
sufficient to terminate the 2nd marriage. NO
RULING: 1.) NO
That the SSC is empowered to settle any dispute with
respect to SSS coverage, benefits and contributions,
there is no doubt. In so exercising such power, however, it
cannot review, much less reverse, decisions rendered by
courts of law as it did in the case at bar when it declared
that the December 10, 1970 CFI Order was obtained
through fraud and subsequently disregarded the same,
making its own findings with respect to the validity of
Bailon and Alice’s marriage on the one hand and the
invalidity of Bailon and respondent’s marriage on the
other.
In interfering with and passing upon the CFI Order, the
SSC virtually acted as an appellate court. The law does
not give the SSC unfettered discretion to trifle with orders
of regular courts in the exercise of its authority to
determine the beneficiaries of the SSS.
2.) The two marriages involved herein having been
solemnized prior to the effectivity on August 3, 1988 of the
Family Code, the applicable law to determine their
validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at
the time of their celebration.42
Article 83 of the Civil Code43 provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any
person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such
person with any person other than such first spouse shall
be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of
the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though
he has been absent for less than seven years, is
generally considered as dead and believed to be so
by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed
dead according to Articles 390 and
391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any
of the three cases until declared null and void by a
competent court. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Under the foregoing provision of the Civil Code, a
subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of
the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior
marriage is first annulled or dissolved or contracted under
any of the three exceptional circumstances. It bears
noting that the marriage under any of these exceptional
cases is deemed valid "until declared null and void by a
competent court." It follows that the onus probandi in
these cases rests on the party assailing the second
marriage.44
In the case at bar, as found by the CFI, Alice had been
absent for 15 consecutive years45 when Bailon sought the
declaration of her presumptive death, which judicial
declaration was not even a requirement then for
purposes of remarriage.46
Eminent jurist Arturo M. Tolentino (now deceased)
commented: Where a person has entered into two
successive marriages, a presumption arises in favor of the
validity of the second marriage, and the burden is on the
party attacking the validity of the second marriage to
prove that the first marriage had not been dissolved; it is
not enough to prove the first marriage, for it must also be
shown that it had not ended when the second marriage
was contracted. The presumption in favor of the
innocence of the defendant from crime or wrong and of
the legality of his second marriage, will prevail over the
presumption of the continuance of life of the first spouse
or of the continuance of the marital relation with such first
spouse.47 (Underscoring supplied)
32 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
3.) Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being
voidable,48 it is terminated by final judgment of
annulment in a case instituted by the absent spouse who
reappears or by either of the spouses in the subsequent
marriage.
Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a
subsequent marriage is necessary. Thus Article 42 thereof
provides:
Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the
preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by
the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the
absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the
previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of
reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the
residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at
the instance of any interested person, with due notice to
the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without
prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially
determined in case such fact is disputed. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The termination of the subsequent marriage by affidavit
provided by the above-quoted provision of the Family
Code does not preclude the filing of an action in court to
prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a
declaration of dissolution or termination of the
subsequent marriage.49
If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to
terminate the subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or
by court action, such absentee’s mere reappearance,
even if made known to the spouses in the subsequent
marriage, will not terminate such marriage.50 Since the
second marriage has been contracted because of a
presumption that the former spouse is dead, such
presumption continues inspite of the spouse’s physical
reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still
be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent
marriage is terminated as provided by law.51
If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by
registration of an affidavit of reappearance or by judicial
declaration but by death of either spouse as in the case
at bar, Tolentino submits: x x x [G]enerally if a subsequent
marriage is dissolved by the death of either spouse, the
effects of dissolution of valid marriages shall arise. The
good or bad faith of either spouse can no longer be
raised, because, as in annullable or voidable marriages,
the marriage cannot be questioned except in a direct
action for annulment.52(Underscoring supplied)
In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in
accordance with law, Bailon’s and respondent’s
marriage prior to the former’s death in 1998, respondent is
rightfully the dependent spouse-beneficiary of Bailon.
LEGAL SEPARATION
Grounds for legal separation
1. VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner, vs. MA. ELENA
FERNANDEZ, Respondent.
G.R. No. 166357 September 19, 2011
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A finding of psychological incapacity must be supported
by well-established facts. It is the plaintiff’s burden to
convince the court of the existence of these facts.
Sexual infidelity per se is a ground for legal separation,
but it does not necessarily constitute psychological
incapacity.
FACTS: Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and
respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez (Malyn) were married
and they had four children. Shortly after the birth of their
youngest son, Tyrone had an extramarital affair with
Jocelyn Quejano (Jocelyn), who bore him three more
children. Malyn left the conjugal home and her four
children with Tyrone.
Tyrone went to the USA with Jocelyn and their children.
He left his four children from his marriage with Malyn in a
rented house in Valle Verde with only a househelp and a
driver. Also, in accordance with their custody agreement,
the children stayed with Malyn on weekends.9
Nine years since the de facto separation from his wife,
Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
based on Article 36 of the Family Code.12 He alleged that
Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform and
comply with the essential marital obligations at the time
of the celebration of their marriage. He further claimed
that her psychological incapacity was manifested by her
immaturity and irresponsibility towards Tyrone and their
children during their co-habitation, as shown by Malyn’s
following acts: she left the children without proper care
and attention as she played mahjong all day and all
night; she left the house to party with male friends and
returned in the early hours of the following day; and she
committed adultery on June 9, 1985, which act Tyrone
discovered in flagrante delicto.13
Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr.
Gates), and a Catholic canon law expert, Fr. Gerard
Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy), to testify on Malyn’s psychological
incapacity. Dr. Gates explained on the stand that the
factual allegations regarding Malyn’s behavior – her
sexual infidelity, habitual mahjong playing, and her
frequent nights-out with friends – may reflect a narcissistic
personality disorder (NPD).17 NPD is present when a
person is obsessed to meet her wants and needs in utter
disregard of her significant others.18 Malyn’s NPD is
manifest in her utter neglect of her duties as a mother.19
Dr. Gates reported that Malyn’s personality disorder "may
have been evident even prior to her marriage" because
it is rooted in her family background and upbringing,
which the psychologist gathered to be materially
deprived and without a proper maternal role model.20
Dr. Gates based her diagnosis on the facts revealed by
her interviews with Tyrone, Trinidad Kalaw (Tyrone’s sister-
in-law), and the son Miggy. She also read the transcript of
Tyrone’s court testimony.21 Fr. Healy corroborated Dr.
Gates’ assessment. He concluded that Malyn was
psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital
duties.22 He explained that her psychological incapacity
is rooted in her role as the breadwinner of her family. This
role allegedly inflated Malyn’s ego to the point that her
needs became priority, while her kids’ and husband’s
needs became secondary. Malyn is so self-absorbed that
she is incapable of prioritizing her family’s needs. Fr. Healy
clarified that playing mahjong and spending time with
friends are not disorders by themselves. They only
constitute psychological incapacity whenever inordinate
amounts of time are spent on these activities to the
detriment of one’s familial duties.23 Fr. Healy
characterized Malyn’s psychological incapacity as grave
and incurable.24 He based his opinion on his interview
33 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
with Tyrone, the trial transcripts, as well as the report of Dr.
Natividad Dayan (Dr. Dayan), Malyn’s expert
witness.25 He clarified that he did not verify the
truthfulness of the factual allegations regarding Malyn’s
"habits" because he believed it is the court’s duty to do
so.26 Instead, he formed his opinion on the assumption
that the factual allegations are indeed true.
The RTC concluded that both parties are psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations
under the Family Code. The trial court then declared the
parties’ marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of
the Family Code.55
The CA reversed the trial court’s ruling. Both parties’
allegations and incriminations against each other do not
support a finding of psychological incapacity. The
parties’ faults tend only to picture their immaturity and
irresponsibility in performing their marital and familial
obligations. At most, there may be sufficient grounds for a
legal separation.
ISSUE: WON petitioner has sufficiently proved that
respondent suffers from psychological incapacity
RULIING: NO.
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is
governed by Article 36 of the Family Code which
provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic
marital obligations.72 The burden of proving psychological
incapacity is on the plaintiff.73 The plaintiff must prove
that the incapacitated party, based on his or her actions
or behavior, suffers a serious psychological disorder that
completely disables him or her from understanding and
discharging the essential obligations of the marital state.
The psychological problem must be grave, must have
existed at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.74
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife
(respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity. He
presented the testimonies of two supposed expert
witnesses who concluded that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of
these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or
behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently
proven. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on petitioner’s
allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions,
visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery,
and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts opined
that respondent’s alleged habits, when performed
constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of
time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute
a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.
But petitioner’s allegations, which served as the bases or
underlying premises of the conclusions of his experts,
were not actually proven. In fact, respondent presented
contrary evidence refuting these allegations of the
petitioner.
For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent
constantly played mahjong and neglected their children
as a result. Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but
it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so
frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother and
a wife. Respondent refuted petitioner’s allegations that
she played four to five times a week. She maintained it
was only two to three times a week and always with the
permission of her husband and without abandoning her
children at home. The children corroborated this, saying
that they were with their mother when she played
mahjong in their relative’s home. Petitioner did not
present any proof, other than his own testimony, that the
mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent
neglected her family. While he intimated that two of his
sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link
this episode to respondent’s mahjong-playing. The least
that could have been done was to prove the frequency
of respondent’s mahjong-playing during the years when
these two children were in second grade. This was not
done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent
played mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency and
adverse effect on the children were not proven.
Also unproven was petitioner’s claim about respondent’s
alleged constant visits to the beauty parlor, going out
with friends, and obsessive need for attention from other
men. No proof whatsoever was presented to prove her
visits to beauty salons or her frequent partying with
friends. Petitioner presented Mario (an alleged
companion of respondent during these nights-out) in
order to prove that respondent had affairs with other
men, but Mario only testified that respondent appeared
to be dating other men. Even assuming arguendo that
petitioner was able to prove that respondent had an
extramarital affair with another man, that one instance of
sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated with
obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual
infidelity per se is a ground for legal separation, but it
does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.
Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent
actually engaged in the behaviors described as
constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for concluding that
she was indeed psychologically incapacitated. Indeed,
the totality of the evidence points to the opposite
conclusion. A fair assessment of the facts would show
that respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of
appreciating and performing her marital and parental
duties. Not once did the children state that they were
neglected by their mother. On the contrary, they
narrated that she took care of them, was around when
they were sick, and cooked the food they like. It appears
that respondent made real efforts to see and take care
of her children despite her estrangement from their
father. There was no testimony whatsoever that shows
abandonment and neglect of familial duties. While
petitioner cites the fact that his two sons, Rio and Miggy,
both failed the second elementary level despite having
tutors, there is nothing to link their academic
shortcomings to Malyn’s actions.
After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds
no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological
incapacity.
What transpired between the parties is acrimony and,
perhaps, infidelity, which may have constrained them
from dedicating the best of themselves to each other and
to their children. There may be grounds for legal
separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity
that voids a marriage.
2. G.R. No. 153206 October 23, 2006
ONG ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG, petitioner, vs.
LUCITA G. ONG, respondent.
34 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
FACTS:
William Ong and Lucita Ong have been married for more
than 20 years when Lucita filed a complaint for Legal
separation under Article 55 par. (1) of the Family Code.
Lucita alleged that since their third year of marriage, her
husband William subjected her to physical violence
like slapping, kicking and pulling her hair and bang her
head against the concrete wall.and been violent
towards their three children. He would scold them using
his belt buckle to beat them. One day after a violent
quarrel wherein William hit Lucita on several different
parts of her body, pointed a gun at her and asked her to
leave the house which she did.
Lucita’s statements about William’s abusive behavior
were corroborated by her sister Linda Lim. Dr. Vicente
Elinzan whom Lucita consulted the day after she left her
conjugal home also testified about her injuries.
The trial court granted Lucitas petition for legal separation
which the CA affirmed.
William then filed this petition for review on certiorari
-On the decision denying all of Lucita’s allegations and
that he never inflicted physical harm on her or their
children.
-He also argued that the real motive of Lucita and
her family in filing the complaint is to deprive him of his
control and ownership over his conjugal properties with
Lucita.
-That the CA overlooked some facts of the case which
warrant an exception to the general rule that questions
of fact cannot be the subject for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.
-The CA erred in relying on the testimonies of Lucita her
sister and their parents’ doctor Dr. ElinZano since their
testimonies are tainted with relationship and fraud
and since Lucita abandoned the family home she has
also given a ground for legal separation and therefore
should NOT- be granted one pursuant to Art. 56 par. 4 of
The family code – Where both parties have given ground
for legal separation
ISSUE: WON Lucita Ong should be granted a decree on
legal separation
HELD: The claim that the real motive of Lucita in filing the
case is for her family to take control of the
conjugal properties is absurd. Lucita left because of her
husband’s repeated physical violence and grossly
abusive conduct. That the physical violence and grossly
abusive conduct were brought to bear upon Lucita have
been duly established. He can derive no personal gain
from pushing for the financial interests of her family at the
expense of her marriage of 20 years and
the companionship of her husband and children.
The assessment of the trial court regarding the credibility
of witnesses is given great respect. Relationship alone is
not enough to discredit and label a witness’ testimony as
biased and unworthy of credence. Witnesses Linda Lim
and Dr. Elinzano gave detailed and straightforward
testimonies the court finds that their testimonies are not
tainted with bias.
The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is
abandonment without justifiable cause for more than
one year. Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct,
such does not constitute abandonment contemplated in
the said provision.
PETITION DENIED: Lucita should be granted a decree
of legal separation.

Defenses in actions for legal separation
1. G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972
CARMEN LAPUZ SY, represented by her substitute
MACARIO LAPUZ, petitioner-appellant, vs. EUFEMIO S.
EUFEMIO alias EUFEMIO SY UY, respondent-appellee.
FACTS:
Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation
against Eufemio Eufemio on August 1953. They were
married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically
after nine days. They had lived together as husband and
wife continuously without any children until 1943 when
her husband abandoned her. They acquired properties
during their marriage. Petitioner then discovered that her
husband cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go
Hiok on or about 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a
decree of legal separation, which among others, would
order that the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of
his share of the conjugal partnership profits.
Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of
his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the ground of his prior and
subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and
the parties adduced their respective
evidence. However, before the trial could be
completed, respondent already scheduled to present
surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular
accident on May 1969. Her counsel duly notified the
court of her death. Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition
for legal separation on June 1969 on the grounds that the
said petition was filed beyond the one-year period
provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the
death of Carmen abated the action for legal
separation. Petitioner’s counsel moved to substitute the
deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz.
ISSUE:
Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in
an action for legal separation, abate the action and will
it also apply if the action involved property rights.
HELD:
An action for legal separation is abated by the death of
the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved. These
rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their
source being the decree itself; without the decree such
rights do not come into existence, so that before the
finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in
expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of
the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death
producing a more radical and definitive separation; and
the expected consequential rights and claims would
necessarily remain unborn.
The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot
and academic and there could be no further interest in
continuing the same after her demise that automatically
dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights
acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and
determined in a proper action for partition by either the
appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.
2. G.R. No. L-11766 October 25, 1960
SOCORRO MATUBIS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ZOILO
PRAXEDES, defendant-appellee.
Facts: In 1943, Socorro Matubis and Zoilo Praxedes were
legally married. In 1948, they entered into a contract
35 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
wherein they agreed that they shall live separately and
that they should not prosecute each other for adultery or
concubinage or any other crime or suit arising from their
separation. In January 1955, Zoilo began cohabiting with
Asuncion, who later gave birth to their child. In April 1956,
Socorro filed a complaint for legal Separation on the
ground of abandonment and concubinage against Zoilo.
The lower court dismissed the complaint on the ground of
prescription and condonation/consent.
ISSUE:
1.) Did the action prescribe?
2.) Did Socorro consented to the commission of
concubinage by her husband?
RULING:
1.) Yes. Under Art. 102 of the Code Code, an action for
legal separation cannot be filed except within one year
from and after the date on which the plaintiff became
cognizant of the cause and within five years from after
the date when cause occurred (now 5 years under Art.
57, FC). The complaint was filed outside the periods
provided for by the above Article. By the very admission
of plaintiff, she came to know the ground (concubinage)
for the legal separation in January, 1955. She instituted
the complaint only on April 24, 1956.
2.) Yes. The very wording of the agreement gives no room
for interpretation other than that given by the trial judge.
Condonation and consent on the part of plaintiff are
necessarily the import of paragraph 6(b) of the
agreement. The condonation and consent here are not
only implied but expressed. The law specifically provides
that legal separation may be claimed only by the
innocent spouse, provided there has been no
condonation of or consent to the adultery or
concubinage. Having condoned and/or consented in
writing, the plaintiff is now undeserving of the court's
sympathy.
(1) Condonation
G.R. No. L-10033 December 28, 1956
BENJAMIN BUGAYONG, plaintiff-appellant, vs. LEONILA
GINEZ, defendant-appellee
FACTS:
Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States
Navy, was married to defendant Leonila Ginez on August
27, 1949, at Asingan, Pangasinan, while on furlough
leave. Immediately after their marriage, the couple lived
with their sisters who later moved to Sampaloc, Manila.
After some time, or about July, 1951, Leonila Ginez left the
dwelling of her sister-in-law and informed her husband by
letter that she had gone to reside with her mother in
Asingan, Pangasinan, from which place she later moved
to Dagupan City to study in a local college there.
As early as July, 1951, Benjamin Bugayong began
receiving letters from Valeriana Polangco (plaintiff's sister-
in-law) and some from anonymous writers(which were not
produced at the hearing) informing him of alleged acts
of infidelity of his wife which he did not even care to
mention. On cross-examination, plaintiff admitted that his
wife also informed him by letter, which she claims to have
destroyed, that a certain "Eliong" kissed her. All these
communications prompted him in October, 1951 to seek
the advice of the Navy Chaplain as to the propriety of a
legal separation between him and his wife on account of
the latter's alleged acts of infidelity, and he was directed
to consult instead the navy legal department.
In August, 1952, plaintiff went to Asingan, Pangasinan,
and sought for his wife whom he met in the house of one
Mrs. Malalang, defendant's godmother. She came along
with him and both proceeded to the house of Pedro
Bugayong, a cousin of the plaintiff-husband, where they
stayed and lived for 2 nights and 1 day as husband and
wife. Then they repaired to the plaintiff's house and again
passed the night therein as husband and wife. On the
second day, Benjamin Bugayong tried to verify from his
wife the truth of the information he received that she had
committed adultery but Leonila, instead of answering his
query, merely packed up and left, which he took as a
confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed on her. After
that and despite such belief, plaintiff exerted efforts to
locate her and failing to find her, he went to Bacarra,
Ilocos Norte, "to soothe his wounded feelings".
On November 18, 1952, Benjamin Bugayong filed in the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan a complaint for
legal separation against his wife, Leonila Ginez, who
timely filed an answer vehemently denying the
averments of the complaint and setting up affirmative
defenses. After the issues were joined and convinced
that a reconciliation was not possible, the court set the
case for hearing on June 9, 1953. Plaintiff's counsel
announced that he was to present 6 witnesses but after
plaintiff-husband finished testifying in his favor, counsel for
the defendant orally moved for the dismissal of the
complaint, but the Court ordered him to file a written
motion to that effect and gave plaintiff 10 days to answer
the same.
The motion to dismiss was predicted on the following
grounds: (1) Assuming arguendo the truth of the
allegations of the commission of "acts of rank infidelity
amounting to adultery", the cause of action, if any, is
barred by the statute of limitations; (2) That under the
same assumption, the act charged have been
condoned by the plaintiff-husband; and (3) That the
complaint failed to state a cause of action sufficient for
this court to render a valid judgment.
ISSUE:
Whether OR NOT there was condonation between
Bugayong and Ginez that may serve as a ground for
dismissal of the action.
RULING
YES.
ART. 100. The legal separation may be claimed only by
the innocent spouse, provided there has been no
condonation of or consent to the adultery or
concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal
separation cannot by either of them. Collusion between
the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the
dismissal of the petition.
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense
constituting a ground for legal separation or, as stated in I
Bouver's Law Dictionary, p. 585, condonation is the
"conditional forgiveness or remission, by a husband or
wife of a matrimonial offense which the latter has
committed".
A detailed examination of the testimony of the plaintiff-
husband, especially those portions quoted above, clearly
shows that there was a condonation on the part of the
36 | CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE DIGESTS – THIRD WEEK
husband for the supposed "acts of rank infidelity
amounting to adultery" committed by defendant-wife.
Admitting for the sake of argument that the infidelities
amounting to adultery were committed by the
defendant, a reconciliation was effected between her
and the plaintiff. The act of the latter in persuading her to
come along with him, and the fact that she went with
him and consented to be brought to the house of his
cousin Pedro Bugayong and together they slept there as
husband and wife for one day and one night, and the
further fact that in the second night they again slept
together in their house likewise as husband and wife — all
these facts have no other meaning in the opinion of this
court than that a reconciliation between them was
effected and that there was a condonation of the wife
by the husband. The reconciliation occurred almost ten
months after he came to know of the acts of infidelity
amounting to adultery.
Although no acts of infidelity might have been
committed by the wife, We agree with the trial judge that
the conduct of the plaintiff-husband above narrated
despite his belief that his wife was unfaithful, deprives him,
as alleged the offended spouse, of any action for legal
separation against the offending wife, because his said
conduct comes within the restriction of Article 100 of the
Civil Code.
(2) Recrimination
G.R. No. L-10699 October 18, 1957
WILLIAM H. BROWN, plaintiff-appellant, vs. JUANITA
YAMBAO, defendant-appellee.
FACTS:
On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed suit in the Court of
First Instance of Manila to obtain legal separation from his
lawful wife Juanita Yambao. He alleged under oath that
while interned by the Japanese invaders, from 1942 to
1945, at the University of Sto. Tomas internment camp, his
wife engaged in adulterous relations with one Carlos Field
of whom she begot a baby girl that Brown learned of his
wifes misconduct only in 1945, upon his release from
internment; that thereafter the spouse lived separately
and later executed a document liquidating their
conjugal partnership and assigning certain properties to
the erring wife as her share. The complaint prayed for
confirmation of the liquidation agreement; for custody of
the children issued of the marriage; that the defendant
be declared disqualified to succeed the plaintiff; and for
their remedy as might be just and equitable.
City Fiscal Rafael Jose appeared at the trial, and cross-
examined plaintiff Brown. His questions (strenuously
objected to by Brown's counsel) elicited the fact that
after liberation, Brown had lived maritally with another
woman and had begotten children by her. Thereafter,
the court rendered judgment denying the legal
separation asked, on the ground that, while the wife's
adultery was established, Brown had incurred in a
misconduct of similar nature that barred his right of action
under Article 100 of the new Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for legal separation should be
granted?
RULING:
NO.
Article 100 of the Civil Code provides that:“The legal
separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse,
provided there has been no condonation of or consent
to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are
offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed by
either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain
legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition.”
In the case at bar, it is pursuant to the second sentence
of the aforementioned law, wherein Brown and Yumbao
are both offenders, hence, a legal separation cannot be
granted.
Appellant Brown argues that in cross-examining him with
regard to his marital relation with Lilia Deito, who was not
his wife, the Assistant Fiscal acted as consel for the
defaulting wife, "when the power of the prosecuting
officer is limited to finding out whether or not there is
collusion, and if there is no collusion, which is the fact in
the case at bar, to intervene for the state which is not the
fact in the instant case, the truth of the matter being that
he intervened for Juanita Yambao, the defendant-
appellee, who is private citizen and who is far from being
the state.".
The argument is untenable. Collusion in matrimonial cases
being "the act of married persons in procuring a
divorce by mutual consent, whether by preconcerted
commission by one of a matrimonial offense, or by failure,
in pursuance of agreement to defend divorce
proceedings" (Cyclopedia Law Dictionary; Nelson,
Divorce and Separation, Section 500), it was legitimate
for the Fiscal to bring to light any circumstances that
could give rise to the inference that the wife's default was
calculated, or agreed upon, to enable appellant to
obtain the decree of legal separation that he sought
without regard to the legal merits of his case. One such
circumstance is obviously the fact of Brown's
cohabitation with a woman other than his wife, since it
bars him from claiming legal separation by express
provision of Article 100 of the new Civil Code. Wherefore,
such evidence of such misconduct, were proper subject
of inquiry as they may justifiably be considered
circumstantial evidence of collusion between the
spouses.
(3) Collusion/Mutual Consent
ARABELLE J. MENDOZA, Petitioner, vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and DOMINIC C.
MENDOZA, Respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner and Dominic met in 1989 upon his return to the
country from his employment in Papua New Guinea. They
had been next-door neighbors in the appartelle they
were renting while they were still in college she, at
Assumption College while he, at San Beda College taking
a business management course. After a month of
courtship, they became intimate and their intimacy
ultimately led to her pregnancy with their daughter
whom they named Allysa Bianca. They got married on
her eighth month of pregnancy in civil rites solemnized in
Pasay City on June 24, 1991, after which they moved to
her place, although remaining dependent on their
parents for support. It was petitioner who supported for
the family’s financial needs because Dominic’s job has
unstable salary. It was alleged in the evidence by the
petitioner that Dominic had an affair with his co-worker,
incurred debts and criminal charges which forced
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petitioner to end their relationship and move away from
Dominic. A petition for declaration of nullity was filed by
herein petitoner before the RTC on the ground of article
36, psychological incapacity presenting as evidence
Dr. Samson, a psychiatrist. OSG opposed the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of the psychiatrist is
sufficient to establish psychological incapacity.
RULING:
No. The guidelines incorporate the three basic
requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v.
Court of Appeals: “psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability.” The foregoing guidelines do not
require that a physician examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root
cause may be “medically or clinically identified.” What is
important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the party’s psychological condition.
For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity,
then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.
In light of the foregoing, even if the expert opinions of
psychologists are not conditions sine qua non in the
granting of petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage,
the actual medical examination of Dominic was to be
dispensed with only if the totality of evidence presented
was enough to support a finding of his psychological
incapacity. This did not mean that the presentation of
any form of medical or psychological evidence to show
the psychological incapacity would have automatically
ensured the granting of the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage. What was essential, we should
emphasize herein, was the “presence of evidence that
can adequately establish the partys psychological
condition.”
By the very nature of cases involving the application of
Article 36, it is logical and understandable to give weight
to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists
regarding the psychological temperament of parties in
order to determine the root cause, juridical
antecedence, gravity and incurability of the
psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while
highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in
granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. At
best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not
indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a
given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity,
then actual medical or psychological examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to. The trial
court, as in any other given case presented before it,
must always base its decision not solely on the expert
opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of
evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.
We have time and again held that psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental, not
physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that must
concomitantly be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage that, as so expressed by Article 68
of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to
live together, to observe love, respect and fidelity, and to
render help and support. We have also held that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning
of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage. To qualify as psychological incapacity as
a ground for nullification of marriage, a persons
psychological affliction must be grave and serious as to
indicate an utter incapacity to comprehend and comply
with the essential objects of marriage, including the rights
and obligations between husband and wife. The affliction
must be shown to exist at the time of marriage, and must
be incurable.

Accordingly, the RTCs findings that Dominic’s

psychological incapacity was characterized by gravity,
antecedence and incurability could not stand scrutiny.
The medical report failed to show that his actions
indicated a psychological affliction of such a grave or
serious nature that it was medically or clinically rooted. His
alleged immaturity, deceitfulness and lack of remorse for
his dishonesty and lack of affection did not necessarily
constitute psychological incapacity. His inability to share
or to take responsibility or to feel remorse over his
misbehavior or to share his earnings with family members,
albeit indicative of immaturity, was not necessarily a
medically rooted psychological affliction that was
incurable. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility did
not equate with psychological incapacity. Nor were his
supposed sexual infidelity and criminal offenses
manifestations of psychological incapacity. If at all, they
would constitute a ground only for an action for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.

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