Masterson Demurrer PDF

1 ANDREW B. BRETTLER (BAR NO.
262928)
MARTIN F. HIRSHLAND (BAR NO. 322629)
2 LAVELY & SINGER
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
3 2049 Century Park East, Suite 2400
Los Angeles, California 90067-2906
4 Telephone: (310) 556-3501
Facsimile: (310) 556-3615
5 Email: abrettler@lavelysinger.com
mhirshland@lavelysinger.com
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Attorneys for Defendant DANIEL MASTERSON
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8 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
9 FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES — CENTRAL DISTRICT
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11 CHRISSIE CARNELL BIXLER; CEDRIC CASE NO. 19STCV29458

BIXLER-ZAVALA; JANE DOE #1; MARIE
12 BOBETTE RIALES; and JANE DOE #2, [Hon. Steven J. Kleifield — Dept. 57]
13 Plaintiffs, DEFENDANT DANIEL MASTERSON'S

NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND
14 v. DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS'
COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF
15 CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
INTERNATIONAL; RELIGIOUS
16 TECHNOLOGY CENTER; CHURCH OF (Declaration Of Andrew B. Brettler;
SCIENTOLOGY CELEBRITY CENTRE [Proposed] Order Filed Concurrently
17 INTERNATIONAL; DAVID MISCAVIGE; Herewith)
DANIEL MASTERSON; and DOES 1 — 25,
18 Date: March 20, 2020
Defendants. Time: 8:30 a.m.
19 Dept: 57
20 RESERVATION ID: 378634715965
21 Complaint Filed: August 22, 2019

Trial Date: None Set
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3697-9 DANIEL MASTERSON'S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT
1 TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on March 20, 2020, at 8:30 a.m., or as soon thereafter as
3 this matter may be heard, in Department 57 of the above-entitled Court, located at 111 North Hill
4 Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012, Defendant Daniel Masterson ("Masterson") will, and hereby does,
5 demur to Plaintiffs Chrissie Camel! Bixler, Cedric Bixler-Zavala, Jane Doe #1, Marie Bobette
6 Riales, and Jane Doe #2's (collectively, "Plaintiffs") Complaint in its entirety, including causes of
7 action One through Five.
8 As set forth in the concurrently-filed Declaration of Andrew B. Brettler, Plaintiffs' counsel
9 failed to meet and confer as required by California Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41(a)(1)-(3)
10 regarding the Demurrer before the original response deadline of January 2, 2020. On December 27,
11 2019, Andrew B. Brettler filed a declaration regarding the meet and confer obligations, thereby
12 extending, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41(a)(2), Masterson's
13 deadline to respond to the Complaint to Monday, February 3, 2020.
14 On January 9, 2020, as also set forth in the Brettler Declaration, counsel for the parties met
15 and conferred as required by the Code. Plaintiffs' counsel failed and refused to correct the pleading
16 deficiencies as set forth in this Demurrer, thereby necessitating this filing.
17 This Demurrer is made pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure sections 430.10(b),
18 430.10(d) and 430.10(e), upon the grounds that (1) Plaintiffs Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 lack
19 legal capacity to bring their causes of action as anonymous "Jane Doe" parties, (2) there is a defect,
20 or misjoinder, of parties and claims, causing prejudice to Masterson, and (3) all Plaintiffs' claims
21 fail to state facts sufficient to constitute any cause of action against Masterson.
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DANIEL MASTERSON'S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT
1 The Demurrer is based on this Notice of Demurrer and Demurrer, the attached Memorandum
2 of Points and Authorities, the concurrently-filed Brettler Declaration, all pleadings and papers on
3 file in this action, and any further evidence or argument that may be presented to the Court at the
4 hearing.
6 Dated: February 3, 2020 LAV Y & G RP FESSIONAL CORPORATION

AN W B. B TTL
7 MA TIN F. HI S
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By
9 AND' T LER
Att neys fo efen -D,A EL M STERSON
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1 DEMURRER1
2 Defendant Daniel Masterson ("Masterson") demurs generally to Plaintiffs Chrissie Carnell
3 Bixler, Cedric Bixler-Zavala, Jane Doe #1, Marie Bobette Riales, and Jane Doe #2's (collectively,
4 "Plaintiffs") Complaint in its entirety, including causes of action One through Five, on the following
5 grounds:
6 Demurrer to First Cause of Action
7 1. The First Cause of Action for Stalking in Violation of Civil Code section 1708.7
8 misjoins parties and is therefore subject to demurrer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section
9 430.10(d).
10 2. The First Cause of Action for Stalking in Violation of Civil Code section 1708.7 fails
11 to state a cause of action against Masterson and is therefore subject to demurrer pursuant to Code of
12 Civil Procedure section 430.10(e).
13 Demurrer to Second Cause of Action
14 3. The Second Cause of Action for Physical Invasion of Privacy in Violation of Civil
15 Code section 1708.8 misjoins parties and is therefore subject to demurrer pursuant to Code of Civil
16 Procedure section 430.10(d).
17 4. The Second Cause of Action for Physical Invasion of Privacy in Violation of Civil
18 Code section 1708.8 fails to state a cause of action against Masterson and is therefore subject to
19 demurrer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10(e).
20 Demurrer to Third Cause of Action
21 5. The Third Cause of Action for Constructive Invasion of Privacy in Violation of Civil
22 Code section 1708.8 misjoins parties and is therefore subject to demurrer pursuant to Code of Civil
23 Procedure section 430.10(d).
24 6. The Third Cause of Action for Constructive Invasion of Privacy in Violation of Civil
25 Code section 1708.8 fails to state a cause of action against Masterson and is therefore subject to
26 demurrer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10(e).
27 1 To the extent applicable, Masterson joins in the Demurrer filed by Defendants Church of Scientology International and
Church of Scientology Celebrity Centre on January 6, 2020, which is scheduled to be heard concurrently with this
28 Demurrer.
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1 Demurrer to Fourth Cause of Action
2 7. The Fourth Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress misjoins
3 parties and is therefore subject to demurrer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10(d).
4 8. The Fourth Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress fails to
5 state a cause of action against Masterson and is therefore subject to demurrer pursuant to Code of
6 Civil Procedure section 430.10(e).
7 Demurrer to Fifth Cause of Action
8 9. The Fifth Cause of Action for Loss of Consortium misjoins parties and is therefore
9 subject to demurrer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10(d).
10 10. The Fifth Cause of Action for Loss of Consortium fails to state a cause of action
11 against Masterson and is therefore subject to demurrer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section
12 430.10(e).
13 Special Demurrer to All Causes of Action
14 There are no circumstances justifying plaintiffs Jane Doe #1 and/or Jane Doe #2's use of a
15 fictitious name, and therefore those individuals lack legal capacity to bring their causes of action as
16 "Jane Doe" parties. Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10(b); Doe v. Lincoln Unified Sch. Dist., 188 Cal. App.
17 4th 758, 767 (2010).
18 WHEREFORE, Masterson respectfully requests that the Demurrer to the Complaint be
19 sustained as follows:
20 1. The demurrer to all causes of action be sustained without leave to amend;
21 2. The Complaint be dismissed, with prejudice;
22 3. Judgment be entered in favor of Masterson;
23 4. Fees and costs be awarded to Masterson; and
24 5. For such other and further relief as the Court ma eem to be just and appropriate.
25 Dated: February 3, 2020 LAVEL & S G P ESSIONAL CORPORATION

AND W B. B E T
26 MARTEN F. H
27 By:
D B.
Attorneys or Defendant DA A ERSON
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1 TABLE OF CONTENTS
2 Page(s)
3 I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 1
4 II. LEGAL STANDARD 3
5 III. ARGUMENT 5
6 A. The Doe Plaintiffs Must Be Forced To Proceed Using Their Legal Names, if
7 They Want To Pursue Their Claims in This Court. 5
8 B. The Court Should Sustain the Demurrer Without Leave To Amend Because
9 Plaintiffs Fail To State a Viable Cause of Action Against Masterson
10 Personally. 6
11 1. All of the claims fail because Plaintiffs do not allege facts
12 demonstrating Masterson engaged in any conduct — let alone
13 misconduct. 6
14 2. Plaintiffs' first claim fails because Plaintiffs fail to allege facts
15 demonstrating the essential elements of stalking. 8
16 3. Plaintiffs do not allege facts demonstrating the essential elements of a
17 claim for phyQionl invasion of privacy 9
18 4. Plaintiffs fail to plead a cause of action for constructive invasion of
19 privacy. 11
20 5. Plaintiffs do not allege the nature or extent of the emotional distress
21 they allegedly suffered. 12
22 6. Bixler-Zavala's claim for loss of consortium fails because his wife has
23 not alleged a cause of action. 13
24 C. The Court Should Sustain the Demurrer, with Prejudice, Because Plaintiffs'
25 Claims Are Misjoined. 14
26 IV. CONCLUSION 15
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1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2 Page(s)
3 Cases
4 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Quackenbush,
5 64 Cal. App. 4th 135 (1998) 3
6 Angie M v. Superior Court,

37 Cal. App. 4th 1217 (1995) 12, 13
7
Blain v. Doctor 's Co.,
8 222 Cal. App. 3d 1048 (1990) 13
9 Blank v. Kirwan,
39 Cal.3d 311 (1985) 3
10
11 Bogard v. Employers Cas. Co.,

164 Cal. App. 3d 602 (1985) 13
12
C&H Foods Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co.,
13 163 Cal. App. 3d, 1055 (1984) 3
14 Coleman v. Twin Coast Newspapers, Inc.,

175 Cal. App. 2d 650 (1959) 4, 15
15
16 Connor v. Flake,
No. 16-cv-3542, 2017 WL 1908154 (C.D. Cal. May 5, 2017) 8
17
Doe v. City of Los Angeles,
18 41 Cal. 4th at 551, n.5 7, 8
19 Doe v. Saenz,
140 Cal. App. 4th 960 (2006) 5
20
Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,
21
192 Cal. App. 4th 1149 (2011) 7
22
Goodman v. Kennedy,
23 18 Cal. 3d 335 (1976) 3
24 Hahn v. Mirda,
147 Cal. App. 4th 740 (2007) 13
25
Hooper v. Deukmejian,
26 122 Cal. App. 3d 987 (1981) 5
27
Jane Doe 8015 v. Superior Court.,
28 148 Cal. App. 4th 489 (2007) 5
ii
1 Johnson v. Superior Court,
80 Cal. App. 4th 1050 (2000) 5
2
Moe v. Anderson,
3 207 Cal. App. 4th 826 (2012) 4, 15
4
Pitman v. City of Oakland,
5 197 Cal. App. 3d 1037 (1988) 12, 13
6 Rakestraw v. Cal. Physicians' Srvc.,

81 Cal. App. 4th 39 (2000) 6, 11, 12
7
Statutes
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Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.7 8
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Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8 12
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11 Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(a) 9, 10, 11
12 Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(b) 11, 12
13 Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(0(5) 12
14 Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10 3
15 Code Civ. Proc. § 430.30 et seq. 3

16 Other Authorities
17 A Sara
Judge luctly ‘Jaau Ronan
♦- ""
18 California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial Claims & Defenses
§2:906.2 (2019) (citing Civ. Code § 1708.8(b)). 11
19
Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac. Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group
20 2011), § 2:136.5 5
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1 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
2 I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
3 This lawsuit is nothing more than a publicity stunt orchestrated by Danny Masterson's ex-
4 girlfriends, some of whom seek to proceed anonymously while very publicly accusing Mr.
5 Masterson and other named defendants of wrongdoing. In particular, the Jane Doe plaintiffs want to
6 use fake names in this lawsuit to avoid public scrutiny of their claims and prevent others from
7 questioning their allegations and/or speaking out against them personally. These two women are not
8 permitted, under California law, to file a lawsuit without identifying themselves. Mr. Masterson and
9 the other defendants have a right to confront their accusers, and if these secret plaintiffs want to use
10 the public courts to try to get money from Mr. Masterson and the other defendants, they need to play
11 by the rules and sue in their real names.
12 Only after their wild and previously rejected allegations of sexual assault against Mr.
13 Masterson rightfully fell on deaf ears, several of Mr. Masterson's ex-girlfriends — some from nearly
14 twenty ago — participated in an anti-Scientology television series. At the time, they insisted this
15 "wasn't about money," yet after their criminal complaints went nowhere, they filed this fantastical
16 lawsuit against Mr. Masterson and the Church of Scientology hoping to recover many millions of
17 dollars. This lawsuit is not about justice, as Mr. Masterson's exes disingenuously claim. It is a
18 shameful money grab; plain and simple. The transparency of Plaintiffs' conduct is evident on the
19 face of the Complaint itself, which fails to allege a single instance of wrongdoing at the hands of Mr.
20 Masterson.
21 In what can only be characterized as paranoid delusions, Mr. Masterson's ex-girlfriends and
22 one of their jealous husbands banded together to concoct these preposterous and bigoted allegations
23 aimed largely against the Church of Scientology. They included Mr. Masterson as a defendant in this
24 discriminatory lawsuit to insure that the media would cover it. For that reason, Plaintiffs needlessly,
25 but intentionally and in salacious detail, rehash their decades-old false and defamatory allegations
26 against Mr. Masterson — none of which have anything to do with the claims asserted in this action.
27 Plaintiffs Chrissie Carnell Bixler, her husband Cedric Bixler-Zavala, Marie Bobette Riales, and two
28 of Mr. Masterson's ex-girlfriends, who now seek to hide behind a cloak of anonymity, have very
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1 publicly accused Mr. Masterson of unthinkable crimes despite that fact that their allegations were
2 thoroughly investigated and rejected years ago.
3 Their stories, however, have morphed into fairytales demonstrating their religious intolerance
4 and prejudice. Recognizing that their original claims arising out of their prior, consensual
5 relationships with Mr. Masterson are not only time-barred under the law but also entirely meritless,
6 they turned this case into one about alleged stalking and harassment. Giving these delusional
7 plaintiffs the benefit of the doubt, they have seemingly convinced themselves that every day
8 inconveniences that are commonplace in all large cities, such as having their trashcans go missing,
9 or finding their car doors unlocked, are part of a large conspiracy against them by the Church of
10 Scientology at the direction of one of their parishioners. Lawsuits do not get much more far-fetched,
11 or anti-religious than this one.
12 Other than Plaintiffs' own neurotic and self-serving contentions that these things supposedly
13 happened to them, they allege no facts in their lawsuit that point to Mr. Masterson being responsible
14 for them. Rather, Plaintiffs' Complaint is a desperate attempt to dredge-up previously disproven and
15 rejected claims against Mr. Masterson for sexual assault. Although the lawsuit is filled with patently
16 false allegations related to Mr. Masterson's alleged "crimes," it fails mention that the female Plain-
17 tiffs all had long-standing relationships with Mr. Masterson. In some cases, those relationships lasted
18 for years after these women now claim Mr. Masterson abused them. Indeed, Ms. Bixler, for one, sent
19 Mr. Masterson love letters begging him to get back together with her after he ended their relation-
20 ship due to her own instability and substance abuse issues. Plaintiffs have unnecessarily dragged Mr.
21 Masterson into this litigation to garner media interest in their suit—a shameless ploy for attention
22 which is amplified by the fact that Plaintiffs do not allege that Mr. Masterson personally committed
23 — or instructed others to commit — any of the allegedly wrongful conduct outlined in the Complaint.
24 In fact, the lawsuit contains no allegation, on personal knowledge, that any defendant
25 committed any act that forms the basis of a legal claim. Instead, in conclusory fashion, Plaintiffs
26 allege "upon information and belief' that the material acts set forth in the Complaint were performed
27 at the direction of Mr. Masterson, yet they fail to cite a single fact supporting this purported "belief."
28 Such bald allegations are insufficient to survive a demurrer. Further, even if the Court were to take,
2
1 on faith, Plaintiffs' unsupported argument that unidentified and unspecified agents of Mr. Masterson
2 supposedly engaged in the conduct described in their lawsuit, Plaintiffs' claims would still fail as a
3 matter of law because the essential elements of each of those causes of action are not met or even
4 properly pleaded.
5 But the Complaint's lack of supporting facts and law is not even its biggest defect. The
6 lawsuit is a mishmash of bigotry and allegations asserted by various individuals who have very little
7 in common with one another and do not belong in the same case together. The individual claims are
8 premised on entirely distinct and separate acts — allegedly occurring at different times and in
9 different locations. Because the claims do not arise from the same transaction or series of events,
10 they cannot be pleaded jointly. As a result of this improper joinder, the Complaint cannot be cured
11 by amendment and must be dismissed with prejudice.
12 For all of the foregoing reasons, as further explained herein, the Court should sustain Mr.
13 Masterson's Demurrer to the Complaint without leave to amend and award Mr. Masterson the relief
14 requested herein.
15 II. LEGAL STANDARD
16 The California Code of Civil Procedure requires that a demurrer be sustained where a
17 plaintiff lacks legal capacity to sue, where a complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a
18 cause of action, or where there is a defect or misjoinder of parties. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 430.10,
19 430.30. A demurrer may be used to challenge defects that appear on the face of the complaint, or for
20 matters outside the complaint that are judicially noticeable. Blank v. Kirwan, 39 Ca1.3d 311, 318
21 (1985); Cal. Civ. Proc. § 430.30(a). "[C]ontentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged
22 in the complaint are not considered in judging its sufficiency." C&H Foods Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co.,
23 163 Cal. App. 3d, 1055, 1062 (1984); see also 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Quackenbush, 64 Cal. App.
24 4th 135, 138 n.1 (1998) ("argumentative allegations, and conclusions of law, are not.. . presumed
25 true"). Moreover, unless the pleading party demonstrates how the complaint can be amended, leave
26 to amend is properly denied. See Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d 335, 349 (1976) (it is the
27 pleading party's burden to "show in what manner he can amend his complaint and how that
28 amendment will change the legal effect of his pleading").
3
1 Further, absent "exceptional circumstances," a plaintiff in California is not permitted to file a
2 complaint using a fictitious name. Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac. Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial
3 (The Rutter Group 2011), § 2:136.5. Such "exceptional circumstances" may exist where: (1)
4 matters of a highly sensitive and personal nature are at issue; (2) there is a real danger of physical or
5 mental harm to a plaintiff if her identity is revealed; or (3) the injuries sought to be avoided by a
6 plaintiff would be incurred by disclosure of her identity. Id.; Doe v. Lincoln Unified Sch. Dist., 188
7 Cal. App. 4th 758, 767 (2010). No such "exceptional circumstances" are present here, and therefore
8 the Doe Plaintiffs are not permitted to proceed anonymously. See, e.g. Cal. Rules of Court 2.550(c)
9 ("Unless confidentiality is required by law, court records are presumed to be open").
10 Lastly, a demurrer must be sustained where "[t]here is a defect or misjoinder of parties."
11 Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10(d). Plaintiffs are properly joined in one action only if their claims "aris[e]
12 out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question
13 of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action." Cal. Civ. Proc. § 378(a)(1)
14 (emphasis added). Separate and distinct acts occurring at separate and distinct times do not "arise
15 out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions," and therefore joinder is not
16 proper. Moe v. Anderson, 207 Cal. App. 4th 826, 833 (2012) (citing Coleman v. Twin Coast
17 Newspapers, Inc., 175 Cal. App. 2d 650, 653 (1959)). An allegation that defendants "conspired" to
18 commit acts against the plaintiffs is insufficient to demonstrate proper joinder where the allegations
19 consist of separate acts committed against different plaintiffs at different times and locations.
20 Coleman, 175 Cal. App. 2d at 654.2 Plaintiffs' misjoinder of claims and parties is highly prejudicial
21 to Masterson, as unfounded allegations that Masterson is the mastermind of an alleged coordinated
22 harassment campaign "evoke[s] an emotional bias against [him] as an individual . . . . which has
23 very little effect on the issues." People v. Gionis, 9 Cal. 4th 1196, 1214 (1995). This misjoinder is
24 especially prejudicial in light of the fact that nowhere in the Complaint do Plaintiffs allege
25 Masterson himself committed any wrongful act entitling Plaintiffs to relief. In short, Plaintiffs'
26 attempt to conflate conduct allegedly committed by different people at different times and different
27 2
In Coleman, the court explained that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate "a right to relief arising out the same transaction
or series of transactions" where, as here, multiple "separate and distinct plaintiffs are suing to recover damages for alle-
28 ged [misconduct] on separate and distinct premises" at separate and distinct times. Coleman, 175 Cal. App. 2d at 654.
4
1 places is improper and cannot withstand demurrer.
2 III. ARGUMENT
3 A. The Doe Plaintiffs Must Be Forced To Proceed Using Their Legal Names, if
4 They Want To Pursue Their Claims in This Court.
5 This case is about alleged harassment and stalking. It is not about sexual assault, as Plaintiffs
6 would like the Court and the media to believe. Absent "exceptional circumstances," a plaintiff in
7 California is not permitted to file a complaint under a fictitious name. Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac.
8 Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2011), § 2:136.5. Plaintiffs claim good
9 cause exists for the Doe Plaintiffs "to use a pseudonym due to the harmful effect of the public
10 disclosure of her identity and the harm inflicted by the Defendants." Compl. VII 4, 6. These are not
11 the "exceptional circumstances" required under the law to file a complaint anonymously. See, e.g.
12 Doe v. Saenz, 140 Cal. App. 4th 960, 977-980 (2006) (plaintiffs with prior criminal history at issue
13 in lawsuit allowed to sue under fictitious names); Hooper v. Deukmejian, 122 Cal. App. 3d 987, 993
14 (1981) (convicted narcotics seller allowed to sue under fictitious name in suit regarding marijuana
15 legislation); Jane Doe 8015 v. Superior Court., 148 Cal. App. 4th 489, 492 (2007) (HIV-infected
16 patient of a clinical laboratory allowed to sue the laboratory under fictitious name); Johnson v.
17 Superior Court, 80 Cal. App. 4th 1050, 1072 (2000) ("John Doe" designation appropriate to protect
18 an anonymous sperm donor's identity).
19 The two Doe Plaintiffs' claim that disclosure of their identities would lead to harm is belied
20 by the fact that there are other named Plaintiffs in the lawsuit already. For at least two reasons,
21 allowing the Doe Plaintiffs to assert their outrageous and bigoted allegations under the cloak of
22 anonymity actually prejudices Masterson. First, it is much more likely that the Doe Plaintiffs will
23 exaggerate their claims if they are not required to identify themselves in publicly filed pleadings.
24 Second, additional witnesses are more likely to come forward to testify about the alleged incident as
25 well as about the Doe Plaintiffs' credibility if their names become a matter of public record. Just
26 because the Doe Plaintiffs want to remain anonymous does not mean that they are entitled to do so at
27 the expense of and prejudice to Masterson. See Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.
28 3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000) ("a party may preserve his or her anonymity in judicial proceedings in
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1 special circumstances when the party's need for anonymity outweighs prejudice to the opposing
2 party and the public's interest in knowing the party's identity") (emphasis added).
3 Because there are no "exceptional circumstances" justifying the use of a fictitious name here,
4 Doe Plaintiffs lacks legal capacity to file their Complaint anonymously. The Court should therefore
5 sustain Masterson's special demurrer to all causes of action on this ground alone. So long as Doe
6 Plaintiffs continue to maintain that they will not reveal their identities, leave to amend is futile and
7 should be denied.
8 B. The Court Should Sustain the Demurrer Without Leave To Amend Because
9 Plaintiffs Fail To State a Viable Cause of Action Against Masterson Personally.
10 "Because a demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the plaintiff must show the
11 complaint alleges facts sufficient to establish every element of each cause of action." Rakestraw v.
12 Cal. Physicians' Srvc., 81 Cal. App. 4th 39, 42-43 (2000). Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden here.
13 1. All of the claims fail because Plaintiffs do not allege facts demonstrating
14 Masterson engaged in any conduct — let alone misconduct.
15 The gravamen of each of Plaintiffs' claims is the alleged acts of harassment and unlawful
16 surveillance supposedly perpetrated against each Plaintiff. Specifically:
17 • Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action for stalking is based on "Defendants" allegedly following
18 Plaintiffs "online" and in person "thus placing Plaintiffs under surveillance with the intent to
19 alarm, threaten, and harass Plaintiffs." (Compl. ¶ 224.)
20 • Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action for physical invasion of privacy is based on "Defendants"
21 allegedly "trespass[ing] on [Plaintiffs'] property to take photos, look[ing] in Plaintiffs'
22 windows, and electronically compromis[ing] their security systems, and/or phones, and/or
23 computers, and/or other digital devices." (Id. ¶ 236.)
24 • Plaintiffs' Third Cause of Action for constructive invasion of privacy is based on
25 "Defendants" allegedly "us[ing] devices to capture image and sound recordings or other
26 physical impressions which, because of such device's use, allowed Defendants to avoid
27 trespassing on Plaintiffs' land while still being able to capture such recordings and
28 impressions." (Id. ¶ 242.)
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1 • Plaintiffs' Fourth Cause of Action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is based on
2 "Defendants trespass[ing] on Plaintiffs' personal property, look[ing] in windows, follow[ing]
3 and stalk[ing], hack[ing] personal online accounts and emails, engag[ing] in surveillance of
4 and interference with Plaintiffs' daily lives, and/or call[ing], and/or text[ing], and/or
5 otherwise attempt[ing] to communicate repeatedly." (Id. ¶ 248.)
6 • Plaintiff Cedric Bixler-Zavala's Fifth Cause of Action for loss of consortium is based on his
7 claim that "[t]he losses suffered by Plaintiff Cedric Bixler-Zavala were proximately caused
8 by Defendants' tortious conduct, as described herein, through which his wife was tortuously
9 injured." (Id. ¶ 255.)

10 Nowhere in these allegations is Masterson's name even mentioned. Nor is it even suggested
11 that Masterson engaged in any such misconduct himself Indeed, the Complaint contains no
12 allegation that any Defendant committed any act in furtherance of a claim. Instead, Plaintiffs merely
13 allege "[u]pon information and belief, all the [purported] acts of harassment, surveillance, and/or
14 stalking were carried out by or at the direction of Defendants' employees, agents, and/or
15 representatives." (Compl. ¶¶ 84, 154,187, 212.) This self-serving statement is a conclusion—not an
16 allegation sufficient to withstand a demurrer.
17 "A plaintiff may allege on information and belief any matters that are not within [her]
18 personal knowledge, if [s]he has information leading [her] to believe that the allegations are true."
19 Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 4th 1149, 1158 (2011) (quoting Doe v. City
20 of Los Angeles, 42 Cal. 4th 531, 550 (2007)) (emphasis added). A pleading made on information
21 and belief is not sufficient if it "merely assert[s] the facts so alleged without alleging such
22 information that leads the plaintiff to believe that the allegations are true." Doe, 42 Cal. 4th at 551,
23 n.5. The Complaint alleges that the acts in question were committed by numerous individuals, most
24 of whom are unnamed and unidentified. (See, e.g., Compl. IN 85, 86, 88, 89, 92, 95, 100-103, 107,
25 109, 111, 113, 155, 158, 161, 164, 165, 167, 170, 172, 190-196, 198, 213, 215, 216, 219.) As to the
26 alleged acts of these unnamed and unidentified people, Plaintiffs fail to allege facts that support their
27 collective belief that these individuals were acting at the "direction of Defendants' employees,
28 agents, and/or representatives." These are no more than accusations of culpability without a shred of
7
1 support that is required at the initial pleading stage. (Compl. TT 84, 154,187, 212.)
2 The Complaint does identify six individuals by name who supposedly engaged in limited acts
3 of purported harassment: Steve Miller, Heather Seidler, Virginia Macgregor, Kathy Gold, Taryn
4 Rinder, and Michelle Miskovich. (Id. TT 96, 98, 99, 104, 156, 166, 197, 218.) None of these
5 individuals are even defendants in the case. The Complaint fails to allege sufficient information that
6 "leads the plaintiff[s] to believe" the individuals were acting at the direction of Masterson, or any
7 other Defendant for that matter. Doe, 42 Cal. 4th at 551, n.5. Plainly, that a person is a member of a
8 religion does not establish that all actions performed by that person were "at the direction" of the
9 religious institution or any of its parishioners such as Masterson. (Compl. 7 84, 154,187, 212.)
10 Because the Complaint merely asserts facts "on information and belief," without alleging the
11 information that leads the plaintiffs to believe that the allegations are true, it is insufficient. Doe, 42
12 Cal. 4th at 551, n.5. The Demurrer should be sustained as to all of Plaintiffs' causes of action.
13 2. Plaintiffs' first claim fails because Plaintiffs fail to allege facts
14 demonstrating the essential elements of stalking.
15 To allege a cause of action for stalking under California Civil Code section 1708.7, a plaintiff
16 must allege: (1) the defendant engaged in a pattern of conduct the intent of which was to follow,
17 alarm, place under surveillance, or harass the plaintiff; (2) as a result of that pattern of conduct,
18 either (A) the plaintiff reasonably feared for his or her safety or (B) the plaintiff suffered substantial
19 emotional distress; and (3) one of the following: (A) The defendant made a credible threat with
20 either (i) the intent to place the plaintiff in reasonable fear for his or her safety, or the safety of an
21 immediate family member, or (ii) reckless disregard for the safety of the plaintiff or that of an
22 immediate family member (if plaintiff demanded defendant cease and abate his or her pattern of
23 conduct and the defendant persisted) or (B) The defendant violated a restraining order. Cal. Civ.
24 Code § 1708.7. Here, Plaintiffs do not allege any of the requisite elements.
25 Specifically, Plaintiffs fail to allege that Masterson personally engaged in any conduct, much
26 less conduct with the intent "to follow, alarm, place under surveillance, or harass the plaintiff," or
27 that Masterson made a "credible threat" (or any threat at all) to Plaintiffs. Because Plaintiffs do not
28 assert these "most basic" allegations, their first cause of action fails as a matter of law. Connor v.
8
1 Flake, No. CV 16-3542 PA (JCX), 2017 WL 1908154, at *6 (C.D. Cal. May 5, 2017) (granting
2 motion to dismiss stalking claim because "Plaintiff does not even allege that Defendant is the person
3 who broke into her home or followed her").
4 Moreover, Bixler-Zavala, Riales, and Jane Doe #2 do not allege that they were threatened by
5 anyone. (Compare Compl. ¶ 197 (alleging that "Plaintiffs" but not "Plaintiff Riales" was
6 threatened), ¶ 218 (alleging that "Plaintiffs" but not "Plaintiff Jane Doe #2" were threatened), ¶ 99
7 (alleging that "Plaintiff Bixler" but not "Plaintiff Bixler-Zavala" was threatened) with Compl. 1199
8 (alleging that "Plaintiff Bixler" was threatened), ¶ 167 (alleging that "Plaintiff Jane Doe #1" was
9 threatened).) For this additional reason, Bixler-Zavala, Riales, and Jane Doe #2's claim for stalking
10 must be dismissed.3
11 3. Plaintiffs do not allege facts demonstrating the essential elements of a
12 claim for physical invasion of privacy.
13 Under the Civil Code "[a] person is liable for physical invasion of privacy when the person
14 knowingly enters onto the land or into the airspace above the land of another person without
15 permission or otherwise commits a trespass in order to capture any type of visual image, sound
16 recording, or other physical impression of the plaintiff engaging in a private, personal, or familial
17 activity and the invasion occurs in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable person." Civ. Code
18 § 1708.8(a). Accordingly, to allege physical invasion of privacy against Masterson, Plaintiffs must
19 allege facts showing, among other things: (1) he physically trespassed; (2) with the intent to record
20 or photograph Plaintiffs. Id. Plaintiffs have not done so — nor can they because it is simply untrue
21 that Masterson ever engaged in such behavior.
22 Jane Doe #2, for instance, never alleges any instances of being photographed or recorded, or
23 that any events occurred on her property, or near her home. (Compl. IN 213-221.) She alleges
24 "vandalism of her car," but does not indicate the location of her car, or that it was at the hands of
25 Masterson. (Compl. ¶ 215.)
26 Although the Bixler Plaintiffs seemingly allege facts detailing instances where they were
27
3 This discrepancy further demonstrates the issue with Plaintiffs' improper, joint pleading of their claims (as discussed
28 further below).
9
1 supposedly photographed or recorded, they admit instances occurred in public, and therefore, do not
2 satisfy the trespass requirement of section 1708.8(a). (Compl. ¶ 89 (alleging Ms. Bixler was filmed
3 while "driving on the street), ¶ 92 (alleging Ms. Bixler was photographed in a nail salon), ¶ 104
4 (alleging Ms. Bixler was filmed at a sexual violence prevention event).) The Bixler Plaintiffs also
5 allege that various events occurred near their home, but they do not allege that any of these events
6 occurred at their home or on their property — and therefore do not constitute a legal physical trespass.
7 (Compl. ¶ 86 (alleging individuals "loitering outside their home" and "vans parking outside their
8 home and filming their home and their family"), ¶ 96 (alleging a van was parked on the street
9 outside her home), ¶ 109 (alleging activity on "adjacent property"), ¶ 111 (alleging a man was
10 "loitering around their property and looking into windows").) Even if these vague allegations
11 constituted physical trespasses (they do not), the Bixler Plaintiffs fail to allege any recording or
12 photography efforts in connection with these ostensible trespass events. (Compl. ¶ 85 (alleging car
13 doors discovered open without alleging the location of the parked cars), ¶ 90 (alleging mail stolen
14 without alleging location of the mail), ¶ 100 (alleging front door lock was broken), ¶ 112 (alleging
15 trash stolen without alleging location of the trash).)
16 Jane Doe #1 similarly fails to allege any physical trespass on her property, with intent to
17 record or photograph her. Rather, Jane Doe #1 alleges she was supposedly surveilled in public.
18 (Compl. ¶ 156.) She also alleges that individuals stood near her property — but outside the property
19 line. (Compl. ¶ 158 (SUV sitting "outside of her home"), ¶ 165 (woman surveilling her from
20 "outside the curtilage"), ¶ 169 (alleging activity "from the neighboring property" and "at the
21 property line").) Like the Bixler Plaintiffs, Jane Doe #1 alleges certain events that might constitute
22 physical trespass, but fails to allege any recording activity in connection with these events. (Compl.
23 ¶ 160 (alleging trash stolen without alleging location of the trash), ¶ 161 (alleging car doors and
24 trunk discovered open without alleging location of the car).)
25 The same is true with respect to Riales, who allegedly lives and works in Indiana. (Compl.
26 ¶ 5). She alleges being photographed or surveilled but not by individuals on her property. (Compl.
27 Ifif 196, 198.) She also alleges instances that might constitute trespass, but without any alleged
28 recording activity. (Compl. ¶ 188 (alleging trash was stolen without alleging location of the trash),
10
1 ¶ 192 (alleging a window to her home was shattered).) Riales also alleges two instances of
2 individuals standing on her property and taking photographs; however, in neither instance does she
3 allege they were taking or attempting to take photographs of her "engaging in a private, personal, or
4 familial activity." Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(a). Instead, she alleges these individuals took pictures
5 "of her home" and of her "food truck, car, license plates, and home," and not of any activity or any
6 person in or around her home. (Compl. in 191, 193.) She does not allege that these events took
7 place in California, evidencing a jurisdictional defect in her claims as the law does not apply to any
8 alleged recording "taken or captured outside of California." Civ. Code § 1708.80(5).
9 Because no Plaintiff has alleged an instance of legal trespass on their property with the intent
10 to photograph or record a private, personal, or familial activity, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim against
11 Masterson for physical invasion of privacy in violation of section 1708.8(a). See Rakestraw, 81 Cal.
12 App. 4th at 43 (plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to establish every element of each cause of action).
13 4. Plaintiffs fail to plead a cause of action for constructive invasion of
14 privacy.
15 "A person is liable for constructive invasion of privacy when the person attempts to capture,
16 in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable person, any type of visual image, sound recording, or
17 other physical impression of the plaintiff engaging in a private, personal, familial activity, through
18 the use of any device, regardless of whether there is a physical trespass, if this image, sound
19 recording, or other physical impression could not have been achieved without a trespass unless the
20 device was used." Civ. Code § 1708.8(b). This statute is sometimes referred to as "technological
21 trespass" and applies when technology "enabled [a] defendant to secure an image or recording that —
22 but for the device — could not have been achieved without a trespass." Judge Kimberly A. Gaab &
23 Sara Church Reese, California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial Claims & Defenses
24 §2:906.2 (2019) (citing Civ. Code § 1708.8(b)). The treatise further explains that this provision
25 "might apply, for example, if a defendant used a powerful telephoto lens to capture an image from
26 the public street, because otherwise it would be impossible to capture the image without physically
27 trespassing onto plaintiff's property." Id. Here, Plaintiffs fail to allege facts showing any instance
28 of technological trespass, and certainly not one by Masterson at all.
11
1 For one thing, Jane Doe #2 alleges no instances of being photographed or recorded at all.
2 (Compl. IN 213-221.) The Bixler Plaintiffs allege they "observed vans parking outside their home
3 and filming their home and family." (Compl. ¶ 86.) Yet, they do not allege the purported device
4 somehow enhanced or enabled the unspecified transgressors to record of film the Bixlers, as required
5 by Civil Code Section 1708.8(b). (Compl. ¶ 86.)
6 Jane Doe #1 alleges a driver of an SUV sat outside her home and "photograph[ed] her with
7 his cell phone." (Compl. ¶ 158.) Yet, she does not allege the "image, sound recording, or other
8 physical impression could not have been achieved without a trespass unless the device was used."
9 Civ.Code § 1708.8(b).And while Jane Doe #1 also alleges that a woman supposedly stood "outside
10 the curtilage" of Jane Doe #1's home at night "surveilling her home," she does not allege this
11 woman recorded her. (Compl. ¶ 165.)
12 Riales too alleges being photographed from a "nearby balcony" while on vacation in
13 Rehoboth Beach, Delaware in July 2018 (Comp1.11196), but again California Civil Code section
14 1708.8 does not apply to any alleged recording "taken or captured outside of California." Civ. Code
15 § 1708.8(f)(5). Further, Riales does not allege the purported device used or that "image, sound
16 recording or other physical impression could not have been achieved without a trespass unless the
17 device was used." Because Plaintiffs fail to allege facts supporting the elements of a claim for
18 constructive invasion of privacy under Civil Code Section 1708.8(b), the Demurrer to their Third
19 Claim should be sustained. See Rakestraw, 81 Cal. App. 4th at 43.
20 5. Plaintiffs do not allege the nature or extent of the emotional distress they
21 allegedly suffered.
22 "Intentional infliction of emotional distress requires (1) 'outrageous' conduct by the
23 defendant, (2) that the defendant intended to cause (or recklessly disregarded the probability of
24 causing) emotional distress, (3) severe emotional distress, and (4) causation." Angie M v. Superior
25 Court, 37 Cal. App. 4th 1217, 1225-26 (1995). "[T]he mere allegation that the plaintiffs suffered
26 severe emotional distress, without facts indicating the nature or extent of any mental suffering
27 incurred as a result of defendant's alleged outrageous conduct, fail[s] to state a cause of action for
28 intentional infliction of emotional distress." Pitman v. City of Oakland, 197 Cal. App. 3d 1037,
12
1 1047 (1988) (citing Bogard v. Employers Cas. Co., 164 Cal. App. 3d 602, 617 (1985)).
2 Here, Plaintiffs allege only in conclusory fashion "[t]he aforesaid outrageous conduct caused
3 Plaintiffs severe emotional distress, suffering, anguish, anxiety, humiliation, and shame." (Compl.
4 ¶ 251.) Plaintiffs provide no facts "indicating the nature or extent of any mental suffering," and
5 therefore, have failed to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The
6 Demurrer to Plaintiffs' Fourth Claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress should be
7 sustained. Pitman, 197 Cal. App. 3d at 1047 (affirming sustaining demurrer on intentional infliction
8 of emotional distress claim because bare allegation that plaintiff "suffered shame, humiliation,
9 embarrassment, and loss of his employment" was insufficient to allege severe emotional distress);
10 Angie M, 37 Cal. App. 4th at 1227 (affirming sustaining of demurrer on intentional infliction of
11 emotional distress claim where plaintiff failed to allege "specific facts sufficient to show the severity
12 of [plaintiff s] alleged emotional distress"); Bogard, 164 Cal. App. 3d at 617-18 (affirming
13 sustaining of demurrer on intentional infliction of emotional distress claim where plaintiffs "failed to
14 set forth any facts which indicate the nature or extent of any mental suffering incurred as a result of
15 [defendant's] alleged outrageous conduct").
16 6. Bixler-Zavala's claim for loss of consortium fails because his wife has not
17 alleged a cause of action.
18 "A cause of action for loss of consortium is, by its nature, dependent on the existence of a
19 cause of action for tortious injury to a spouse." Hahn v. Mirda, 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 746 (2007).
20 A cause of action for loss of consortium "stands or falls based on whether the spouse of the party
21 alleging loss of consortium has suffered an actionable tortious injury." Id.
22 Here, Bixler fails to allege any tort claim against Masterson, and fails to allege any facts
23 which indicate that Masterson was personally responsible for any alleged harm to Bixler-Zavala
24 other than the bare-bones and legally insufficient assertion that Masterson was involved in a
25 "conspiracy." Therefore, Plaintiff Bixler-Zavala's Fifth Claim for loss of consortium based on
26 "Defendants' above-described tortious conduct" fails. (See Compl. ¶ 255); Blain v. Doctor 's Co.,
27 222 Cal. App. 3d 1048, 1067 (1990) (affirming sustaining of demurrer without leave to amend and
28 noting "[s]ince [plaintiff] has no cause of action in tort [,] his spouse has no cause of action for loss
13
1 of consortium").
2 C. The Court Should Sustain the Demurrer, with Prejudice, Because Plaintiffs'
3 Claims Are Misjoined.
4 The Complaint amounts to a recitation of discrete events that each Plaintiff experienced
5 separately at different times and at different places. There is not a single alleged act that all of the
6 Plaintiffs experienced or suffered together. By way of example and without limitation, the following
7 allegations only apply to Bixler:
8 • Compl. 1189 (alleging Plaintiff Bixler was filmed on a public street), ¶ 92 (alleging Plaintiff
9 Bixler was "harassed and photographed" at a nail salon), ¶ 107 (alleging Plaintiff Bixler was
10 "run off the road by a vehicle that was following her").
11 The following allegations only apply to Jane Doe#1:
12 • ¶ 156 (alleging Plaintiff Jane Doe #1 was followed in a Best Buy store), ¶ 165 (alleging
13 Plaintiff Jane Doe #1 was watched at a hair salon), ¶ 167 (alleging Plaintiff Jane Doe #1 was
14 "accosted" at an accountant's parking lot), ¶ 168 (alleging Plaintiff Jane Doe #1 was
15 "followed into a grocery store").
16 The following allegations only apply to Riales:
17 • ¶ 194 (alleging Plaintiff Riales was harassed in a restaurant), ¶ 196 (alleging Plaintiff Riales
18 was photographed on vacation in Delaware); and
19 ¶217 only applies to Jane Doe #2, alleging she was harassed at a grocery store. Most notably,
20 Plaintiffs claim that events occurred at their separate homes, which are not alleged to be in the same
21 neighborhood, let alone the same state. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 85-88, 94, 100, 109-110, 112
22 (allegations regarding events occurring at Plaintiff Bixler's home); id. ¶¶ 158, 160, 161, 162, 165,
23 170-172 (allegations regarding events occurring at Plaintiff Jane Doe #1's home); id. Ifir 191, 192,
24 193, 195, 198 (allegations regarding events occurring at Plaintiff Riales' home).) Further, none of
25 the allegations indicates Masterson was involved.
26 Each of Plaintiffs' allegations concerning the occurrence of distinct events at different places
27 and during different times requires unique evidence to prove their veracity. Each plaintiff must bear
28 their own burden of proof with respect to their claims, and cannot trade off one another's alleged
14
1 harm. For instance, Bixler showing that she was "harassed" at a hair salon does not absolve Jane
2 Doe #2 of her burden to show she was "harassed" at a grocery store. Yet these distinct and separate
3 acts form the basis of Plaintiffs' jointly-pleaded claims. Because Plaintiffs' claims are premised on
4 different acts that occurred at different times and in different locations, and have very little if no
5 overlap, they do not arise from the same transaction or series of transactions. See Moe, 207 Cal.
6 App. 4th at 834; Coleman, 175 Cal. App. 2d at 654.
7 Further, Plaintiffs' improper misjoinder of claims and parties is highly prejudicial to
8 Masterson. Without providing any factual basis for their claims, Plaintiffs allege that Masterson is
9 the mastermind of an alleged coordinated harassment campaign, a strategy which by design would
10 cause any jury to "evoke[s] an emotional bias against [Masterson] as an individual," an emotional
11 response "which has very little effect on the issues," especially given that Plaintiffs do not, and
12 cannot, allege any facts to support their claim that Masterson directly or indirectly participated in
13 any of the wrongful conduct complained of. People v. Gionis, at 1214 (1995). Plaintiffs' Complaint
14 is prejudicial on its face, since it attempts to implicate Masterson in the alleged wrongful conduct
15 complained of by association, without alleging any facts to support the claim that Masterson was
16 directly or indirectly involved. See People v. Sanchez, 63 Cal. 4th 411, 464 (2016) (In the criminal
17 context, Iplrejudicial association might exist if the characteristics or culpability of one or more
18 defendants is such that the jury will find the remaining defendants guilty simply because of their
19 association with a reprehensible person, rather than assessing each defendant's individual guilt of the
20 crimes at issue"). Therefore, joinder is not appropriate, and the demurrer should be sustained without
21 leave to amend. See Cal. Civ. Proc. §§ 378(a)(1), 430.10(d); Moe, 207 Cal. App. 4th at 834;
22 Coleman, 175 Cal. App. 2d at 654.
23 IV. CONCLUSION
24 For the foregoing reasons, Masterson respectfully re• uest e Court sustain the Demurrer
25 without leave to amend.
26 Dated: February 3, 2020 LAVE Y & SIN E PROF SSIONAL CORPORATION

AND' W B.
27 MAR IN F. H
28 By:
W B. T
Attorneys for Defendant DANIEL MASTERSON
15
1 PROOF OF SERVICE
1013A(3) C.C.P. Revised 5/1/88
2
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
3
I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18
4 and not a party to the within action. My business address is 2049 Century Park East, Suite 2400,
Los Angeles, California 90067-2906.
5
On the date set forth below, I served the foregoing document described as:
6
EFENDANT DANIEL MASTERSON'S NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO
7 PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
8 on the interested parties in this action as follows:
9
PLEASE SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST
10
11 [X] BY ELECTRONICALLY FILING with the Court and electronically serving true and
correct copies of the document on counsel of record listed below through ASAP Legal.
12
[X] BY MAIL: I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing
13 correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with U.S. postal
service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Los Angeles, California in the
14 ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is
presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after
15 date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.
16
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is
17 true and correct. Executed February 3, 2020, at Los Angeles, California.
18
19
20 isa Carpenter
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
PROOF OF SERVICE
1 SERVICE LIST
2 Attorneys for Plaintiffs Chrissie Camel! Bixler; Cedric Bixler-Zavala; Jane Doe #1; Marie
Bobette Riales; and Jane Doe #2:
3
Robert W. Thompson, Esq. (Pro Hac Vice Admissions Pending)
4 Kristen A. Vierhaus, Esq.
THOMPSON LAW OFFICES, P.C. Brian D. Kent, Esq.
700 Airport Boulevard, Suite 160 Gaetano D'Andrea, Esq.
5 Burlingame, CA 94010-1931 M. Stewart Ryan, Esq.
Tel: (650) 513-6111 / Fax: (650) 513-6071 Helen L. Fitzpatrick, Esq.
6 Emails: bobb@tlopc.com Lauren Stram, Esq.
kris@tlopc.com LAFFEY, BUCCI & KENT, LLP
7 1435 Walnut Street, Suite 700
Philadelphia, PA 19102
8 Tel: (215) 399-9255 / Fax: (215) 241-8700
9 Jeffrey P. Fritz, Esq.

SOLOFF & ZERVANOS, P.C.
1525 Locust Street, 8th Floor
10 Philadelphia, PA 19102
Tel: (215) 732-2260 / Fax: (215) 732-2289
11
Marci Hamilton, Esq.
12 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
Fox-Fels Building
13 3814 Walnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
14 Tel: (215) 353-8984 / Fax: (215) 493-1094
15 Ricardo M. Martinez-Cid, Esq.

Lea P. Bucciero, Esq.
PODHURST ORSECK, P.A.
16 One S.E. 3rd Avenue, Suite 2300
Miami, FL 33131
17 Tel: (305) 358-2800 / Fax: (305) 358-2382
18 Attorneysfor Defendants Church of Attorneysfor Defendant Religious
Scientology International and Church of Technology Center:
19 Scientology Celebrity Centre International:
Robert E. Mangels, Esq.
20 William H. Foreman, Esq. Matthew D. Hinks, Esq.
David C. Scheper, Esq. Iman G. Wilson, Esq.
21 Margaret E. Dayton, Esq. JEFFER MANGELS BUTLER &
SCHEPER KIM & HARRIS LLP MITCHELL LLP
22 800 West Sixth Street, 18th Floor 1900 Avenue of the Stars, 7th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90017-2701 Los Angeles, CA 90067-4308
Tel: (213) 613-4655 / Fax: (213) 613-4656' Tel: (310) 203-8080 / Fax: (310) 203-0567
23 Emails: rmangels@jmbm.com
Emails: wforman@scheperkim.corn
dscheper@scheperkim.com mhinks jmbm.com
24 pdayton@scheperkim.com iwilson jmbm.com
25 Specially-Appearing Attorneysfor Defendant David Miscavige:
26 Jeffrey K. Riffer, Esq.

ELKINS KALT WEINTRAUB REUBEN GARTSIDE LLP
27 10345 West Olympic Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90064
28 Tel: (310) 746-4400 / Fax: (310) 746-4499
Email: jriffer@elkinskalt.com
2
PROOF OF SERVICE
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CHRISSIE CARNELL BIXLER, et al. vs CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY
INTERNATIONAL, et al.
Case Number: 19STCV29458 Case Type: Civil Unlimited Category: Other Non-Personal
Injury/Property Damage tort
Date Filed: 2019-08-22 Location: Stanley Mosk Courthouse - Department 57
Reservation
Case Name:
CHRISSIE CARNELL BIXLER, et al. vs CHURCH Case Number:
OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL, et al. 19STCV29458
Type: Status:
Demurrer - without Motion to Strike RESERVED
Filing Party: Location:

Daniel Masterson (Defendant) Stanley Mosk Courthouse - Department 57
Date/Time: Number of Motions:

I
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Sent: Tuesday, January 14, 2020 11:00 AM
To: Lisa Carpenter
Subject: Rescheduled: 19STCV29458 - 378634715965
The following reservation has been rescheduled by the COURT:
Event: Demurrer - without Motion to Strike Reservation ID: 378634715965

Status: RESCHEDULED
Case Number: 19STCV29458
Case Title: CHRISSIE CARNELL BIXLER, et al. vs CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL, et al.
Courthouse: Stanley Mosk Courthouse
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1 ANDREW B. BRETTLER (BAR NO.

8 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

9 FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES — CENTRAL DISTRICT

11 CHRISSIE CARNELL BIXLER; CEDRIC CASE NO. 19STCV29458

13 Plaintiffs, DEFENDANT DANIEL MASTERSON'S

20 RESERVATION ID: 378634715965

21 Complaint Filed: August 22, 2019

7 action One through Five.

8 As set forth in the concurrently-filed Declaration of Andrew B. Brettler, Plaintiffs' counsel

12 extending, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41(a)(2), Masterson's

13 deadline to respond to the Complaint to Monday, February 3, 2020.

16 deficiencies as set forth in this Demurrer, thereby necessitating this filing.

6 Dated: February 3, 2020 LAV Y & G RP FESSIONAL CORPORATION

2 Defendant Daniel Masterson ("Masterson") demurs generally to Plaintiffs Chrissie Carnell

6 Demurrer to First Cause of Action

12 Civil Procedure section 430.10(e).

13 Demurrer to Second Cause of Action

16 Procedure section 430.10(d).

19 demurrer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10(e).

20 Demurrer to Third Cause of Action

23 Procedure section 430.10(d).

26 demurrer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10(e).

6 Civil Procedure section 430.10(e).

7 Demurrer to Fifth Cause of Action

9 subject to demurrer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10(d).

13 Special Demurrer to All Causes of Action

17 4th 758, 767 (2010).

18 WHEREFORE, Masterson respectfully requests that the Demurrer to the Complaint be

20 1. The demurrer to all causes of action be sustained without leave to amend;

21 2. The Complaint be dismissed, with prejudice;

22 3. Judgment be entered in favor of Masterson;

23 4. Fees and costs be awarded to Masterson; and

25 Dated: February 3, 2020 LAVEL & S G P ESSIONAL CORPORATION

3697-9 DANIEL MASTERSON'S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT

4 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Quackenbush,

5 64 Cal. App. 4th 135 (1998) 3

6 Angie M v. Superior Court,

11 Bogard v. Employers Cas. Co.,

14 Coleman v. Twin Coast Newspapers, Inc.,

6 Rakestraw v. Cal. Physicians' Srvc.,

11 Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(a) 9, 10, 11

12 Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(b) 11, 12

13 Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(0(5) 12

14 Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10 3

15 Code Civ. Proc. § 430.30 et seq. 3

2 I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

11 by the rules and sue in their real names.

2 thoroughly investigated and rejected years ago.

11 or anti-religious than this one.

11 by amendment and must be dismissed with prejudice.

15 II. LEGAL STANDARD

28 amendment will change the legal effect of his pleading").

9 ("Unless confidentiality is required by law, court records are presumed to be open").

10 Lastly, a demurrer must be sustained where "[t]here is a defect or misjoinder of parties."

21 to Masterson, as unfounded allegations that Masterson is the mastermind of an alleged coordinated

4 They Want To Pursue Their Claims in This Court.

18 an anonymous sperm donor's identity).

9 Plaintiffs Fail To State a Viable Cause of Action Against Masterson Personally.

14 Masterson engaged in any conduct — let alone misconduct.

16 surveillance supposedly perpetrated against each Plaintiff. Specifically:

19 alarm, threaten, and harass Plaintiffs." (Compl. ¶ 224.)

21 allegedly "trespass[ing] on [Plaintiffs'] property to take photos, look[ing] in Plaintiffs'

23 computers, and/or other digital devices." (Id. ¶ 236.)