G.R. No.

L-18365 May 31, 1963

GEORGE DE BISSCHOP, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
EMILIO L. GALANG, in his capacity as Commissioner of Immigration, respondent-appellant.

Engracio Fabre for petitioner-appellee.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondent-appellant.

Fact: Petitioner-appellee, an American citizen, was allowed to stay in this country for three years,
expiring he applied for extension of stay with the Bureau of Immigration. In view, however, of
confidential and damaging reports of the Commissioner of Immigration, in a communication of
Customs of Iloilo demanded from petitioner, advised him that his application for extension of stay as a
prearranged employee has been denied by the Board of Commissioners, and that he should depart
within 5 days. Thereafter, counsel of de Bisschop requested for a copy of the adverse decision said
Board, but the legal officer of the Bureau of Immigration replied that, pursuant to immigration practice
and procedure and as is usual in such cases where the result is a vote for denial, for reason of
practicability and expediency, no formal decision, order resolution is promulgated by the Board.
Thereafter, Mr. Bisschop was simply advised of said denial. No request for reinvestigation was made
with the Bureau of Immigration. Instead, to forestall his arrest and the filing of the corresponding
deportation proceedings, de Bisschop filed the present case on 18 September
1959. adrianantazo.wordpress.com

Issue: Whether the Commissioners of Immigration are required by law to conduct formal hearings on
all applications for extension of stay of aliens, and in ruling that said Commissioners are enjoined to
promulgate written decisions in such cases?adrianantazo.wordpress.com

Held: The Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, is silent as to the procedure to be followed in these
cases, this would not violate the due process clause if it took into account that, in this particular case,
the letter of appellant-commissioner advising de Bisschop to depart in 5 days is a mere formality, a
preliminary step, and, therefore, far from final, because, as alleged in appellant’s answer to the
complaint, the “requirement to leave before the start of the deportation proceedings is only an advice
to the party that unless he departs voluntarily, the State will be compelled to take steps for his
expulsion”. It is already a settled rule in this jurisdiction that a day in court is not a matter of right in
administrative proceedings. That due process of law is not necessarily judicial process; much of the
process by means of which the Government is carried on, and the order of society maintained, is purely
executive or administrative, which is as much due process of law, as is judicial process. While a day in
court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, in administrative proceedings, it is otherwise since
they rest upon different principles. In certain proceedings, therefore, of all administrative character, it
may be stated, without fear of contradiction, that the right to a notice and hearing are not essential to
due process of law.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed. The petition for prohibition is dismissed, and the
writ of preliminary injunction issued by the court a quo is hereby dissolved, with costs against
petitioner-appellee George de Bisschop. So ordered.