USES OF EVIDENCE

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD

GOVERNMENT), petitioner, vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, BIENVENIDO R. TANTOCO, JR. and DOMINADOR R. SANTIAGO, respondents.
G.R. No. 90478 November 21, 1991

FACTS: The case was commenced on July 21, 1987 by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. The complaint which initiated the action was denominated one "for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages," and was avowedly filed pursuant to Executive Order
No. 14 of President Corazon C. Aquino.

After having been served with summons, Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago, instead of filing their answer, jointly filed a
"Motion to Strike Out Some Portions of the Complaint and For Bill of Particulars of Other Portions."

The PCGG filed an opposition thereto, and the movants, a reply to the opposition.

Tantoco and Santiago then presented a "motion for leave to file interrogatories under Rule 25 of the Rules of Court"
of which the PCGG responded by filing a motion.

On March 18, 1988, in compliance with the Order of January 29, 1988, the PCGG filed an Expanded Complaint of which
the Sandiganbayan denied with a Resolution.

RESPONDENTS then filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim. On July 27, 1989 Tantoco and Santiago filed with
the Sandiganbayan a pleading denominated "Interrogatories to Plaintiff," and on August 2, 1989, an "Amended
Interrogatories to Plaintiff"' as well as a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents.

The Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Interrogatories and granted the motion for production and inspection of
documents respectively. PCGG filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of August 25, 1989, it also filed an
opposition to the Amended Interrogatories.

Tantoco and Santiago filed a reply and opposition. After hearing, the Sandiganbayan promulgated two (2) Resolutions.
Hence, this present petition.

ISSUES:
1. WON PETITIONER CAN OBJECT TO THE INTERROGATORIES SERVED ON IT IN ACCORDANCE WITH RULE 25 OF
THE RULES OF COURT.
2. WON SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN ORDERING FOR THE PRODUCTION AND INSPECTION OF SPECIFIED
DOCUMENTS AND THINGS ALLEGEDLY IN THE POSSESSION OF PCGG.

HELD:
1. No. The State is, of course, immune from suit in the sense that it cannot, as a rule, be sued without its consent.
But it is axiomatic that in filing an action, it divests itself of its sovereign character and sheds its immunity from
suit, descending to the level of an ordinary litigant. The PCGG cannot claim a superior or preferred status to
the State, even while assuming to represent or act for the State.

2. No. The Court gives short shrift to the argument that some documents sought to be produced and inspected
had already been presented in Court and marked preliminarily as PCGG's exhibits, the movants having in fact
viewed, scrutinized and even offered objections thereto and made comments thereon. Obviously, there is
nothing secret or confidential about these documents. No serious objection can therefore be presented to the
desire of the private respondents to have copies of those documents in order to study them some more or
otherwise use them during the trial for any purpose allowed by law.
 Dr. DELA LLANA vs. BIONG
2013-12-04 | G.R. No. 182356

FACTS:
On March 30, 2000, Juan dela Llana was driving and his sister, Dra. dela Llana, was seated at the front
passenger seat while a certain Calimlim was at the backseat. Juan stopped the car across the Veterans
Memorial Hospital when the signal light turned red. A few seconds after the car halted, a dump truck rammed
the car’s rear end, violently pushing the car forward.
Dra. Dela Llana suffered minor wounds. The traffic investigation report dated March 30, 2000
identified the truck driver as Joel Primero who is an employee of respondent Rebecca Biong.
In the first week of May 2000, Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild to moderate
pain on the left side of hernneck and shoulder. The pain became more intense as days passed by. Her injury
became more severe. On June 9, 2000, she to suffer from a whiplash injury, an injury caused by the
compression of the nerve running to her left arm and is required to undergo serious medication to alleviate her
condition. Thus she demanded from Biong compensation for her injuries, but Rebecca refused to pay. This made
her sued Biong for damages before the Regional Trial Court.
The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana but was reversed by the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether Joel’s reckless driving is the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury and consider
her medical certificate as an admissible evidence.

RULING:
The SC said that “the basic rule that evidence which has not been admitted cannot be validly
considered by the courts in arriving at their judgments. However, even
if we consider the medical certificate in the disposition of this case, the medical certificate has no probative
value for being hearsay. It is a basic rule that evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its
probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of another
person who is not on the witness stand. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be given
credence except in very unusual circumstance that is not found in the present case. Furthermore,
admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence depends
on its relevance and competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its
tendency to convince and persuade. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary
weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the Rules of Court.”
In sum, Dra. dela Liana miserably failed to establish her case by preponderance of evidence. While we
commiserate with her, our solemn duty to independently and impartially assess the merits of the case
binds us to rule against Dra. dela Liana's favor. Her claim, unsupported by preponderance of evidence,
is merely a bare assertion and has no leg to stand on.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals are hereby
AFFIRMED and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

DELA LLANA VS BIONG

FACTS:

On March 30, 2000, Juan dela Llana was driving a car along North Avenue, Quezon City. His sister, Dra. dela Llana, was
seated at the front passenger seat while a certain Calimlim was at the backseat. Juan stopped the when the signal light
turned red. A few seconds after the car halted, a dump truck owned by Rebecca Biong and driven by Joel Primero
containing gravel and sand suddenly rammed the car’s rear end, violently pushing the car forward. Due to the impact,
the car’s rear end collapsed and its rear windshield was shattered. Glass splinters flew, puncturing Dra. dela Llana.
Apart from these minor wounds, Dra. dela Llana did not appear to have suffered from any other visible physical injuries.
In the first week of May 2000, Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild to moderate pain on the left side of her neck and
shoulder. The pain became more intense as days passed by. Her injury became more severe. Her health deteriorated to
the extent that she could no longer move her left arm. On June 9, 2000, she consulted with Dr. Rosalinda Milla, a
rehabilitation medicine specialist, to examine her condition. Dr. Milla told her that she suffered from a whiplash injury,
an injury caused by the compression of the nerve running to her left arm and hand. Dr. Milla required her to undergo
physical therapy to alleviate her condition.

Dra. dela Llana’s condition did not improve despite three months of extensive physical therapy. She then consulted
other doctors in search for a cure. Dr. Flores, a neuro-surgeon, finally suggested that she undergo a cervical spine
surgery to release the compression of her nerve. On October 19, 2000, Dr. Flores operated on her spine and neck,
between the C5 and the C6 vertebrae. The operation released the impingement of the nerve, but incapacitated Dra.
dela Llana from the practice of her profession since June 2000 despite the surgery.

Dra. dela Llana, on October 16, 2000, demanded from Rebecca compensation for her injuries, but Rebecca refused to
pay. Thus, on May 8, 2001, Dra. dela Llana sued Rebecca for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
(RTC). She alleged that she lost the mobility of her arm as a result of the vehicular accident and claimed P150,000.00 for
her medical expenses (as of the filing of the complaint) and an average monthly income of P30,000.00 since June 2000.
She further prayed for actual, moral, and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees.

At the trial, Dra. dela Llana presented herself as an ordinary witness and Joel as a hostile witness. Dra. Dela Llana
reiterated that she lost the mobility of her arm because of the vehicular accident. To prove her claim, she identified and
authenticated a medical certificate dated November 20, 2000 issued by Dr. Milla. The medical certificate stated that
Dra. dela Llana suffered from a whiplash injury. It also chronicled her clinical history and physical examinations.
Meanwhile, Joel testified that his truck hit the car because the truck’s brakes got stuck.

In defense, Rebecca testified that Dra. dela Llana was physically fit and strong when they met several days after the
vehicular accident. She also asserted that she observed the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of Joel.

The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana and held that the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury to be
Joel’s reckless driving.

The CA reversed the RTC ruling.

ISSUES:

1. Who has the burden of proving the proximate causation between Joel’s negligence and Dra. dela Llana’s
whiplash injury?
2. WON the medical certificate has no probative value for being hearsay.
3. WON Dra. dela Llana’s medical opinion cannot be given probative value for the reason that she was not
presented as an expert witness.
4. WON the Supreme Court cannot take judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries.

HELD:

1. In civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. He who alleges has the burden of proving
his allegation by preponderance of evidence or greater weight of credible evidence. The reason for this rule is that bare
allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof. In short, mere allegations are not evidence.

In the present case, the burden of proving the proximate causation between Joel’s negligence and Dra. dela Llana’s
whiplash injury rests on Dra. dela Llana. She must establish by preponderance of evidence that Joel’s negligence, in its
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produced her whiplash injury, and
without which her whiplash injury would not have occurred.
2. The medical certificate has no probative value for being hearsay. It is a basic rule that evidence, whether oral
or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the
knowledge of another person who is not on the witness stand. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot
be given credence except in very unusual circumstance that is not found in the present case. Furthermore, admissibility
of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and
competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and
persuade. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial
evaluation within the guidelines provided by the Rules of Court.
3. Under the Rules of Court, there is a substantial difference between an ordinary witness and an expert witness.
The opinion of an ordinary witness may be received in evidence regarding: (a) the identity of a person about whom he
has adequate knowledge; (b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and (c) the mental sanity of a
person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted. Furthermore, the witness may also testify on his impressions of the
emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a person.43 On the other hand, the opinion of an expert witness may be
received in evidence on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he shown to possess.
However, courts do not immediately accord probative value to an admitted expert testimony, much less to an
unobjected ordinary testimony respecting special knowledge. The reason is that the probative value of an expert
testimony does not lie in a simple exposition of the expert’s opinion. Rather, its weight lies in the assistance that the
expert witness may afford the courts by demonstrating the facts which serve as a basis for his opinion and the reasons
on which the logic of his conclusions is founded.

In the present case, Dra. dela Llana’s medical opinion cannot be given probative value for the reason that she was not
presented as an expert witness. As an ordinary witness, she was not competent to testify on the nature, and the cause
and effects of whiplash injury. Furthermore, we emphasize that Dra. dela Llana, during trial, nonetheless did not
provide a medical explanation on the nature as well as the cause and effects of whiplash injury in her testimony.

4. Indeed, a perusal of the pieces of evidence presented by the parties before the trial court shows that Dra. dela
Llana did not present any testimonial or documentary evidence that directly shows the causal relation between the
vehicular accident and Dra. dela Llana’s injury. Her claim that Joel’s negligence caused her whiplash injury was not
established because of the deficiency of the presented evidence during trial. We point out in this respect that courts
cannot take judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries. This proposition is not public knowledge, or
is capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. We
have no expertise in the field of medicine. Justices and judges are only tasked to apply and interpret the law on the
basis of the parties’ pieces of evidence and their corresponding legal arguments.

In sum, Dra. dela Llana miserably failed to establish her case by preponderance of evidence. While we commiserate
with her, our solemn duty to independently and impartially assess the merits of the case binds us to rule against Dra.
dela Llana’s favor. Her claim, unsupported by preponderance of evidence, is merely a bare assertion and has no leg to
stand on.
Concept of relevance and conditional admissibility
Admissibility and weight or credibility of evidence

Prats & Company vs. Phoenix Insurance Company

FACTS: Prats & Co., a mercantile partnership instituted an action in the RTC of the City of Manila for recovery from the
Phoenix Insurance Co. the sum of P117,800.60 with interest, by reason of a loss alleged to have been sustained by the
plaintiff from a fire for said loss was covered by insurance issued by the defendant company. Phoenix Insurance
admitted the insurance of the insurance but by way of special defense, alleged that the fire in question had been set by
the plaintiff, or with its connivance, and the plaintiff had submitted under oath to the defendant a fraudulent claim of
loss in contravention of the express terms of the policy. The trial court absolved the defendant from the complaint with
respect to the obligation created by the policy but ordered the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P11, 731.93
with interest from the filing of the complaint, upon account of moneys received from salvage sales, conducted by the
defendant, of remnants of the insured stock.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner caused the fire to be set or connived therein and submitted fraudulent proof as

the trial judge found.

RULING: YES. The proof submitted by the defendant tends to show that obscure manipulations were used by the
plaintiff in the storing of merchandise at 95 Plaza Gardenia and in the removal of part of the contents of the bodega
before the fire. It appears that cases of old stock were shipped to Manila before the fire but instead of being taken
directly to the bodega they were housed for a time in the back part of the lower floor where the petitioner had office.
Also, the manipulation of one of their people to attend to the alarm box not to allow others to touch it and reasoned
out that he already have done it, when in fact the fire chief noticed that it was never touched and he himself turned on
the alarm. The finding of the trial court in the effect that plaintiff had submitted false proof in the support of his claim
is also well founded. First, the plaintiff had submitted a claim for jewelry lost in the fire as of a value of P 12,800 when
the true value of the said jewelry was about P 600; and secondly, that the plaintiff had sought to recover from the
insurance company the value of the goods which had been surreptitiously withdrawn by it from the bodega prior to the
fire. As a conclusion, not only that the plaintiff caused the fire to be set, or connive therein, but also that it submitted
fraudulent proof.

Concept of relevance and conditional admissibility

PRATS & COMPANY vs. PHOENIX INSURANCE COMPANY

G.R. No. L-28607 February 21, 1929

DOCTRINE: LOSS by WILLFUL ACT or CONNIVANCE by INSURED

FACTS: Plaintiff sued defendant for the purpose of recovering the sum of P117,800.60, with interest, by reason of a
loss alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff, on August 21, 1924, from a fire, it being alleged that said loss was
covered by policy for the sum of P200,000, issued by the defendant company to the plaintiff. For answer, the
defendant, Phoenix Insurance Co., admitted the insurance of the policy of insurance but, by way of special defense,
alleged, among other things, that the fire in question had been set by the plaintiff, or with its connivance, and that the
plaintiff had submitted under oath to the defendant a fraudulent claim of loss, in contravention of the express terms of
the policy.

With respect to the insurance upon this stock at the time of the fire, the following facts appear: In the month of June
preceeding the fire, nine policies aggregating P160,000 were taken out by Prats in the name of Hanna, Bejar & Co. on
merchandise stored at 95 Plaza Gardenia. At the time these policies were taken out the valuation of the goods then in
said store could not have been more than P68,753. Total insurance of P410,000 were on the contents of the store at 95
Plaza Gardenia. At the time, according to Prats himself, the evaluation of the merchandise then in the place was not in
excess of P230,000. Furthermore, Prats, about this time, caused the first nine policies which had been taken out in the
name of Hanna, Bejar & Co. to be indorsed to Prats & Co., thereby making this firm the sole insured firm with respect to
this stock of merchandise. This fact was offered in evidence by the defendant, as tending to reveal a scheme by which,
if a destructive fire should occur, the plaintiff would be able to mislead the defendant as to the quantity of goods stored
in the bodega. This item of proof, though circumstantial in its nature, was undoubtedly competent and should have
been admitted by the trial court.

ISSUE: Is the policy avoided by fraud on part of the plaintiff?

RULING: Yes. The proof submitted by the defendant tends to show that obscure manipulations were used by the
plaintiff in the storing of merchandise at 95 Plaza Gardenia and in the removal of part of the contents of the bodega
before the fire. If overinsurance and the assemblage of goods at inflated values in the bodega at 95 Plaza Gardenia,
together with the surreptitious abstraction of goods therefrom by the insured, have suggested a possible intention on
the part of its manager to realize improperly on its insurance policies, this inference is, in our opinion, but beyond reach
of reasonable doubt by facts relative to the destruction of the place. After the fire that a special investigation was made
by the police department with the result that Deputy Chief Lorenzo came to the conclusion that the fire had originated
from an intentional act. Reflection upon the proof before the court engenders in us the same belief and conducts us to
the further conclusion that Prats & Co. was not alien to the deed.
Decision AFFIRMED.

(DIRECT ASSAULT)

Nature of the Case:

Petition for Review (Appeal )

People of the Philippines Plaintiff – Appellee Vs. Tiburcio Abalos Accused-appellant G. R. No. 88189 July 9, 1996
REGALADO, J:

BRIEF:

In this case accused-appellant Tiburcio Abalos seeks absolution from the judgment of conviction rendered by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 27, of Catbalogan, Samar which pronounced him guilty of the complex
crime of direct assault with murder iin Criminal case No. 2302.
FACTS:

The Incident transpired during the barangay fiesta near the house of appellant at the said barangay. On that
night while accused Tiburcio Abalos and his father, Police Major Cecilio Abalos, were having heated
argument a woman shouted for help. The victim Police Officer Sofronio Labine then appeared at the scene
and asks Major Abalos about what happen. The victim saluted Abalos when the latter turned around to face
him. As Major Abalos leveled his carbine ar Labine, accused harriedly left and procured a piece of wood,
about two inches thick, three inches wide, and three feet long from a nearby ford Fiera Vehicle. He then
swiftlt returned and unceremoniously swung with that wooded piece at Labine from behind, hitting the
policeman at the back of the right side of his head. Labine collapsed unconciously in a heap and he later
expired from the severe skull fracture he sustained from the blow. The trial court found the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Direct Assault with Murder.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
complex crime of direct assault with murder

Held:

No.

There are two modes of committing atendados contra la autoridad o sus agentes under art. 148 of the RPC.
The first is not true atendado as it is tantamount to rebellion or sedition, except that there is no public
uprising. On the other hand, the second mode is the more common way of committing assault and is
aggravated when there is a weapon employed in the attack or the offender is a public officer , or the
offender lays hand upon a person in authority .

Appellant committed the second form of assault, the elements of which are that there must be an attack,
use of force, or serious intimadation or resistance upon a person in authority or his Agent., that is, that the
accused has the attention to offend, injure or assault the offended party as a person in authority or an agent
of a person in authority.

Labine is a Police officer in Catbalogan Samar, an thus was an agent of a person in authority pursuant to
article 152 of the RPC. There is no dispute that he was in the actual performance of his duties when he was
assaulted by the appellant that is he was maintaining the peace and order during the fiesta in Barangay
Canlapwas. Appellant Himself testified that he personally knew that Labine as a policeman, and in Fact
Labine was then wearing his police uniform. These facts should have sufficiently deterred appellant from
attacking him, and his defiant conduct clearly demonstrates that he really had the criminal intent to assault
and injure an agent of the Law.

When the assault results in the killing of that agent or of a person in authority for that matter, there arises
the complex crime of direct assault with homicide or murder. The killing in the instant case constituted the
felony of murder qualified by alevosia throught treacherous means deliberately adopted by the vistim struck
from behind while he was confronted at the same time by appellant’s father. The evidence shows that
appellant deliberately went behind the victim whom he then hit with a piece of wood which he deliberately
got for the purpose.

G.R. No. 88189 July 9, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
TIBURCIO ABALOS, accused-appellant.

Criminal Law; Murder; Evidence; Witnesses; A doctrine of long standing in this jurisdiction is that the testimony of a lone
eyewitness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict an accused.—From the evidence in the case at bar, the
prosecution has convincingly proved, through the clear and positive testimony of Basal, the manner in which the victim
was killed by herein appellant. The record is bereft of any showing that said prosecution witness was actuated by any
evil motivation or dubious intent in testifying against appellant. Moreover, a doctrine of long standing in this
jurisdiction is that the testimony of a lone eyewitness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict an accused.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Corroborative Evidence; The presentation of corroborative evidence in court would only be
warranted when there are compelling reasons to suspect that the eyewitness is prevaricating or that his observations
were inaccurate.—There was no need, as appellant would want the prosecution to do, to present in court the woman
who shouted for assistance since her testimony would only be corroborative in nature. The presentation of such
species of evidence in court would only be warranted when there are compelling reasons to suspect that the
eyewitness is prevaricating or that his observations were inaccurate. Besides, it is up to the People to determine who
should be presented as prosecution witness on the basis of its own assessment of the necessity for such testimony.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Evidence, to be believed, must have been given not only by a credible witness but that the
same must also be reasonably acceptable in itself.—Curiously enough, appellant’s assertion that there was poor
visibility is ironically contradicted by his testimony which is detailed on facts that one could readily recall after
witnessing an event in broad daylight. While appellant considers unbelievable Basal’s identification of him supposedly
because of inadequate lighting, he himself, under the same conditions, could clearly see his father’s assailant wearing a
fatigue uniform which was different from that worn by policemen. He even asserts that he saw his father clutching the
carbine with his hands holding the butt while his purported assailant held on tightly to the rifle. What these facts
establish is that the lights in the area at the time of the incident were enough to afford Basal an excellent view of the
incident, contrary to appellant’s pretense. Appellant’s testimony is thus negated by the rule that evidence, to be
believed, must have been given not only by a credible witness, but that the same must also be reasonably acceptable in
itself.

Same; Same; Same; Flight; Flight right after the assault on the victim is corrosive of the accused’s testimony.—
Appellant’s flight right after he had assaulted the victim is also corrosive of his testimony. For, if it were true that he had
merely labored under the wrong notion that his father was being attacked by a member of the NPA, and that it was an
innocent case of error in personae, he could have readily surrendered to his father right then and there. After all, Cecilio
Abalos was a police major and was the Station Commander of the Integrated National Police (INP) in Wright, Samar.
Further, there was no necessity at all for him to flee from the crime scene for fear of retaliation considering that he was
in the company of his own father who, aside from his position, was then armed with a carbine. Appellant’s explanation
is, therefore, absurd and should be considered as self-serving evidence with no weight in law.

Same; Same; Direct Assault with Murder; Two modes of committing atentados contra la autoridad o sus agentes.—On
the offense committed by appellant, the trial court correctly concluded that he should be held accountable for the
complex crime of direct assault with murder. There are two modes of committing atentados contra la autoridad o sus
agentes under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code. The first is not a true atentado as it is tantamount to rebellion or
sedition, except that there is no public uprising. On the other hand, the second mode is the more common way of
committing assault and is aggravated when there is a weapon employed in the attack, or the offender is a public officer,
or the offender lays hands upon a person in authority.

Same; Same; Same; Elements of the second form of assault.—Appellant committed the second form of assault, the
elements of which are that there must be an attack, use of force, or serious intimidation or resistance upon a person in
authority or his agent; the assault was made when the said person was performing his duties or on the occasion of such
performance; and the accused knew that the victim is a person in authority or his agent, that is, that the accused must
have the intention to offend, injure or assault the offended party as a person in authority or an agent of a person in
authority.
Same; Same; Same; When the assault results in the killing of that agent or of a person in authority for that matter, there
arises the complex crime of direct assault with murder or homicide.—When the assault results in the killing of that agent
or of a person in authority for that matter, there arises the complex crime of direct assault with murder or homicide.
The killing in the instant case constituted the felony of murder qualified by alevosia through treacherous means
deliberately adopted. Pfc. Labine was struck from behind while he was being confronted at the same time by
appellant’s father. The evidence shows that appellant deliberately went behind the victim whom he then hit with a
piece of wood which he deliberately got for that purpose.

Same; Same; Same; Penalties; Mitigating Circumstances; A mitigating circumstance is unavailing and inapplicable where
the penalty imposed by law is indivisible.—The offense is a complex crime, the penalty for which is that for the graver
offense, to be imposed in the maximum period. Considering that the more serious crime of murder then carried the
penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, the imposable penalty should have been death. The
mitigating circumstance, in that context, would have been unavailing and inapplicable since the penalty thus imposed
by the law is indivisible. At all events, the punishment of death could not be imposed as it would have to be reduced
to reclusion perpetua due to the then existing proscription against the imposition of the death penalty.

APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar, Br. 27.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Esnesto P. Miel for accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J.:p

In this appeal, accused-appellant Tiburcio Abalos seeks absolution from the judgment of conviction rendered by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, of Catbalogan, Samar which pronounced him guilty of the complex crime of direct
assault with murder in Criminal Case No. 2302. His arguments in the present appeal turn on the central question of
unwarranted credence allegedly extended by the trial court to the version of the criminal incident narrated by the sole
prosecution witness. The totality of the evidence adduced, however, indubitably confirms appellant's guilt of the
offense charged. Accordingly, we affirm.

An information filed in the trial court, dated April 21, 1983, imputed the crime of direct assault with murder to herein
appellant Tiburcio Abalos, alias "Ewet," with the allegations —

That on or about the 20th day of March, 1983, at nighttime, in the Municipality of Catbalogan, Province of Samar,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill,
with treachery and evident premeditation and knowing fully well that one Sofronio Labine was an agent of a person in
authority being a member of the Integrated National Police with station at Catbalogan, Samar, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and strike said Sofronio Labine with a piece of wood, which said
accused ha(d) conveniently provided himself for the purpose while said P/Pfc. Sofronio Labine, a duly appointed and
qualified member of the said INP, was engaged in the performance of his official duties or on the occasion of such
performance, that is, maintaining peace and order during the barangay fiesta of Canlapwas, of said municipality,
thereby inflicting upon him "Lacerated wound 2 inches parietal area right. Blood oozing from both ears and nose"
which wound directly caused his death.

That in the commission of the crime, the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity was present. 1

At his arraignment on June 7, 1983, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.2 The trial
conducted thereafter culminated in the decision3 of the trial court on February 3, 1989 finding appellant guilty as
charged and meting out to him the penalty of "life imprisonment, with the accessories of the law." Appellant was
likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P30,000.00; actual and compensatory damages in
the amount of P2,633.00, with P15,000.00 as moral damages; and to pay the costs. 4

As recounted by prosecution witness Felipe Basal, a farmer residing in Barangay Pupua, Catbalogan, Samar, appellant
assaulted the victim, Pfc. Sofronio Labine, at around 8:00 P.M. of March 20, 1983, which was then the day of
the barangay fiesta celebrations in Barangay Canlapwas, Catbalogan, Samar. The incident transpired near the house of
appellant at the said barangay. Felipe Basal was then having a drinking session in front of the shanty of one Rodulfo
Figueroa, Jr. which was situated just a few meters from the residence of appellant.

According to Basal, at about that time he noticed the father of appellant, Police Major Cecilio Abalos, scolding his
employees in his transportation business for turning in only two hundred pesos in earnings for that day. While Major
Abalos was thus berating his employees, appellant arrived and asked his father not to scold them and to just let them
take part in the barangay festivities. This infuriated the elder Abalos and set off a heated argument between father and
son.5

While the two were thus quarreling, a woman shouted "Justicia, boligue kumi! Adi in mag-a-aringasa." meaning,
"Police officer, help us! Somebody's making trouble here." The victim, Pfc. Sofronio Labine, then appeared on the scene
and asked Major Abalos, "What is it, sir?" The victim saluted Abalos when the latter turned around to face him. As
Major Abalos leveled his carbine at Labine, appellant hurriedly left and procured a piece of wood, about two inches
thick, three inches wide and three feet long, from a nearby Ford Fiera vehicle.

He then swiftly returned and unceremoniously swung with that wooden piece at Labine from behind, hitting the
policeman at the back of the right side of his head. Labine collapsed unconscious in a heap, and he later expired from
the severe skull fracture he sustained from that blow. Felipe Basal and his wife took flight right after appellant struck
the victim, fearful that they might be hit by possible stray bullets 6 should a gunfight ensue.

Appellant's testimony, on the other hand, is of a different tenor. He admits having struck Labine with a piece of wood
during the incident in question but claims that he did so in the erroneous belief that his father was being attacked by a
member of the New People's Army (NPA). According to appellant, he was then seated inside their family-owned Sarao
jeepney parked beside the store of Rodulfo Figueroa, Jr. near their home in Barangay Canlapwas when he noticed a
man in fatigue uniform suddenly accost his father. At that time, appellant's father had just arrived from a trip from
Wright, Samar and had just alighted from his service vehicle, a Ford Fiera.

The man tried to disarm Major Abalos of his firearm but the latter resisted and while the two were grappling for
possession of the gun, appellant instinctively went to the rescue of his father. He got a piece of wood from Figueroa's
store with which he then clubbed Labine whom he did not recognize at that point. When Labine fell to the ground from
the blow, appellant immediately fled to Barangay Mercedes nearby, fearing that the man had companions who might
retaliate. When he came to know of the identity of his victim the following morning, he forthwith surrendered to the
authorities.7

As mentioned at the outset, the foregoing version of the factual antecedents as presented by appellant was roundly
rejected by the lower court which found the same unworthy of belief. Appellant ascribes reversible errors to the trial
court (a) in not giving credence to the evidence adduced by the defense; (b) in believing the evidence presented by the
prosecution; (c) in relying on the prosecution's evidence which falls short of the required quantum of evidence that
would warrant a conviction; (d) in finding that treachery attended the commission of the crime and failing to credit in
appellant's favor his voluntary surrender; and (e) in finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged.8

In the main, appellant insists that the trial court should not have given credence to the story of the lone eyewitness for
the prosecution. He also contends that since the testimony of that witness bore clear traces of incredibility, particularly
the fact that he could not have had a clear view of the incident due to poor visibility, the prosecution should have
presented as well the woman who had called for help at the height of the incident if only to corroborate Basal's
narration of the events. Appellant also assails as inherently incredible the fact that it took quite a time for witness
Felipe Basal to come forward and divulge what he knew to the authorities. All these, unfortunately, are flawed
arguments.

From the evidence in the case at bar, the prosecution has convincingly proved, through the clear and positive testimony
of Basal, the manner in which the victim was killed by herein appellant. The record is bereft of any showing that said
prosecution witness was actuated by any evil motivation or dubious intent in testifying against appellant. Moreover, a
doctrine of long standing in this jurisdiction is that the testimony of a lone eyewitness, if credible and positive, is
sufficient to convict an accused.9 There was thus no need, as appellant would want the prosecution to do, to present in
court the woman who shouted for assistance since her testimony would only be corroborative in nature.

The presentation of such species of evidence in court would only be warranted when there are compelling reasons to
suspect that the eyewitness is prevaricating or that his observations were inaccurate. 10 Besides, it is up to the People
to determine who should be presented as prosecution witness on the basis of its own assessment of the necessity for
such testimony. 11 Also, no unreasonable delay could even be attributed to Felipe Basal considering that during the
wake for Pfc. Labine, Basal came and intimated to the widow of the victim that he was going to testify regarding her
husband's slaying. 12

Appellant's contention that the deceased had attacked and attempted to divest his father of his firearm is rather
preposterous considering that no reason was advanced as to why the deceased patrolman would assault a police officer
of superior rank. Parenthetically, the condition of visibility at the time of the incident was conducive not only to the
clear and positive identification of appellant as the victim's assailant but likewise to an actual and unobstructed view of
the events that led to the victim's violent death.

Basal was seated just a few meters away from the protagonists whom he all knew, he being also a long-time resident of
that municipality. There was a twelve-foot high fluorescent lamppost located along the road and which, by appellant's
own reckoning, was just seventeen meters away from them. 13 Notwithstanding the fact that a couple of trees partly
obstructed the post, the illumination cast by the fluorescent lamp and the nearby houses provided sufficient brightness
for the identification of the combatants.

Curiously enough, appellant's assertion that there was poor visibility is ironically contradicted by his testimony which is
detailed on facts that one could readily recall after witnessing an event in broad daylight. While appellant considers
unbelievable Basal's identification of him supposedly because of inadequate lighting, he himself, under the same
conditions, could clearly see his father's assailant wearing a fatigue uniform which was different from that worn by
policemen. He even asserts that he saw his father clutching the carbine with his hands holding the butt while his
purported assailant held on tightly to the rifle. 14 What these facts establish is that the lights in the area at the time of
the incident were enough to afford Basal an excellent view of the incident, contrary to appellant's pretense. Appellant's
testimony is thus negated by the rule that evidence, to be believed, must have been given not only by a credible
witness, but that the same must also be reasonably acceptable in itself.

Appellant's flight right after he had assaulted the victim is also corrosive of his testimony. For, if it were true that he had
merely labored under the wrong notion that his father was being attacked by a member of the NPA, and that it was an
innocent case of error in personae, he could have readily surrendered to his father right then and there. After all, Cecilio
Abalos was a police major and was the Station Commander of the Integrated National Police (INP) in Wright, Samar.
Further, there was no necessity at all for him to flee from the crime scene for fear of retaliation considering that he was
in the company of his own father who, aside from his position, was then armed with a carbine. Appellant's explanation
is, therefore, absurd and should be considered as self-serving evidence with no weight in law.

On the offense committed by appellant, the trial court correctly concluded that he should be held accountable for the
complex crime of direct assault with murder. There are two modes of committing atentados contra la autoridad o sus
agentes under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code. The first is not a true atentado as it is tantamount to rebellion or
sedition, except that there is no public uprising. On the other hand, the second mode is the more common way of
committing assault and is aggravated when there is a weapon employed in the attack, or the offender is a public officer,
or the offender lays hands upon a person in authority. 15

Appellant committed the second form of assault, the elements of which are that there must be an attack, use of force,
or serious intimidation or resistance upon a person in authority or his agent; the assault was made when the said
person was performing his duties or on the occasion of such performance; and the accused knew that the victim is a
person in authority or his agent, that is, that the accused must have the intention to offend, injure or assault the
offended party as a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority. 16

Here, Labine was a duly appointed member of the then INP in Catbalogan, Samar and, thus, was an agent of a person in
authority pursuant to Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. There is also no dispute that he was in the
actual performance of his duties when assaulted by appellant, that is, he was maintaining peace and order during the
fiesta in Barangay Canlap was. Appellant himself testified that he personally knew Labine to be a policeman 17 and, in
fact, Labine was then wearing his uniform. These facts should have sufficiently deterred appellant from attacking him,
and his defiant conduct clearly demonstrates that he really had the criminal intent to assault and injure an agent of the
law.

When the assault results in the killing of that agent or of a person in authority for that matter, there arises the complex
crime of direct assault with murder or homicide. 18 The killing in the instant case constituted the felony of murder
qualified by alevosia through treacherous means deliberately adopted Pfc. Labine was struck from behind while he was
being confronted at the same time by appellant's father. The evidence shows that appellant deliberately went behind
the victim whom he then hit with a piece of wood which he deliberately got for that purpose.

Obviously, appellant resorted to such means to avoid any risk to himself, knowing fully well that his quarry was a
policeman who could readily mount a defense. The aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and nocturnity,
however, were not duly proven, as correctly ruled by the court below. On the other hand, appellant's voluntary
surrender even if duly taken into account by the trial court would have been inconsequential.

The offense is a complex crime, the penalty for which is that for the graver offense, to be imposed in the maximum
period. Considering that the more serious crime of murder then carried the penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death, the imposable penalty should have been death. The mitigating circumstance, in that
context, would have been unavailing and inapplicable since the penalty thus imposed by the law is indivisible. 19 At all
events, the punishment of death could not be imposed as it would have to be reduced to reclusion perpetua due to the
then existing proscription against the imposition of the death penalty. 20

However, the designation by the trial court of the imposable penalty as "life imprisonment" is erroneous, as the same
should properly be denominated as reclusion perpetua. 21 Also, the death indemnity payable to the heirs of the victim,
under the present jurisprudential policy, is P50,000.00.

ACCORDINGLY, with the MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed upon accused-appellant Tiburcio Abalos should
be reclusion perpetua, and that the death indemnity is hereby increased to P50,000.00, the judgment of the court a
quo in Criminal Case No. 2302 is AFFIRMED in all other respects, with costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.
 REYES V CA
G.R. No. 96492 | November 26, 1992 | J. Nocon

Facts:

Petitioners Romeo Reyes, Angel Parayao and Emilio Mananghaya question the respondent Court’s
decision, which affirmed with modification the agrarian court’s decision, which ordered them and the other defendants
therein to, among others, restore possession of the disputed landholding to private respondent, Eufrocina Vda. dela
Cruz.

Juan Mendoza, father of defendant Olympio, is the owner of farm lots in Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga.
Devoted to the production of palay, the lots were tenanted and cultivated by now deceased Julian dela Cruz, husband
of plaintiff Eufrocina dela Cruz.

Eufrocina alleged that her husband’s death, she succeeded him as bona fide tenant of the subject lots; that
Olympio, in conspiracy with the other defendants, prevented her daughter Violeta and her workers through force,
intimidation, strategy and stealth, from entering and working on the subject premises; and that until the filing of the
instant case, defendants had refused to vacate and surrender the lots, thus violating her tenancy rights. Plaintiff
therefore prayed for judgment for the recovery of possession and damages with a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction in the meantime.

Defendant barangay officials denied interference in the tenancy relationship existing between plaintiff and
defendant Mendoza, particularly in the cultivation of the latter’s farm lots and asked for the dismissal of the case,
moral damages and attorney’s fees.

Mendoza raised abandonment, sublease and mortgage of the farm lots without his consent and approval, and
non-payment of rentals, irrigation fees and other taxes due the government, as his defenses.

Petitioners now bring the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issue: W/N the court erred in holding petitioners liable

Held:

No. The evidence presented before the trial court and CA served as basis in arriving at their findings of fact. The
Supreme Court will not analyze such evidence all over again because settled is the rule that only questions of law may
be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court absent the exceptions which do not
obtain in the instant case.

In agrarian cases, the quantum of evidence is no more than substantial evidence. Substantial evidence does not
necessarily import preponderant evidence, as is required in an ordinarily civil case. It has been defined to be such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion and its absence is not shown
by stressing that there is contrary evidence on record, direct or circumstantial, for the appellate court cannot substitute
its own judgment or criteria for that of the trial court in determining wherein lies the weight of evidence or what
evidence is entitled to belief.
 PEOPLE V TURCO

G.R. No. 137757 | August 14, 2000 | J. Melo

Facts:

Accused-appellant Rodegelio Turco, Jr. (aka “Totong”) was charged with the rape of his neighbor 13-year-old
Escelea Tabada. Escelea was about to sleep when she heard a familiar voice calling her from outside her house. She
recognized appellant Turco immediately as she had known him for 4 years and he is her second cousin. Unaware of the
danger that was about to befall her, Escelea opened the door. Turco, with the use of towel, covered Escelea’s face,
placed his right hand on the latter’s neck and bid her to walk. When they reached a grassy part, near the pig pen which
was about 12 meters away from the victim’s house, appellant lost no time in laying the victim on the grass, laid on top
of the victim and took off her short pants and panty and succeeded in pursuing his evil design-by forcibly inserting his
penis inside Escelea’s private part despite Escelea’s resistance. Appellant then threatened her that he will kill her if she
reports the incident to anybody.

For almost 10 days, she just kept the incident to herself until she was able to muster enough courage to tell
her brother-in-law, Orlando Pioquinto, who in turn informed Alejandro, the victim’s father, about the rape of his
daughter. Alejandro did not waste time and immediately asked Escelea to see a doctor for medical examination and
eventually file a complaint after the issuance of the medical certificate. Turco, meanwhile, alleged that he and Escelea
were sweethearts.

The trial court found Turco guilty of the charge.

In his appeal, Turco argues, among others, that no actual proof was presented that the rape of the complainant actually
happened considering that although a medical certificate was presented, the medico-legal officer who prepared the
same was not presented in court to explain the same.

Issue:
1. W/N the lower court erred in finding the appellant guilty of rape
2. W/N the appellant’s contention that the medical certificate may not be considered is with merit

Held:

1. No. The Supreme Court agrees with the lower court’s finding of credibility in the testimony and evidence presented
by the victim, and finds the appellant guilty of rape beyond reasonable doubt.

2. Yes. With regards to appellant’s argument on the proof of medical certificate, while the certificate could be admitted
as an exception to the hearsay rule since entries in official records constitute exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule,
since it involved an opinion of one who must first be established as an expert witness, it could not be given weight or
credit unless the doctor who issued it is presented in court to show his qualifications. Emphasis must be placed on the
distinction between admissibility of evidence and the probative value thereof. Evidence is admissible when it is relevant
to the issue and is not excluded by the law or the rules or is competent. Since admissibility of evidence is determined by
its relevance and competence, admissibility is, therefore, an affair of logic and law. On the other hand, the weight to be
given to such evidence, once admitted, depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided in Rule 133 and
the jurisprudence laid down by the Court. Thus, while evidence may be admissible, it may be entitled to little or no
weight at all. Conversely, evidence which may have evidentiary weight may be inadmissible because a special rule
forbids its reception.

Withal, although the medical certificate is an exception to the hearsay rule, hence admissible as evidence, it has very
little probative value due to the absence of the examining physician. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the
 prosecution relied solely on the medical certificate. In fact, reliance was made on the testimony of the victim herself
which, standing alone even without medical examination, is sufficient to convict. It is well-settled that a medical
examination is not indispensable in the prosecution of rape. The absence of medical findings by a medico-legal officer
does not disprove the occurrence of rape. It is enough that the evidence on hand convinces the court that conviction is
proper. In the instant case, the victim’s testimony alone is credible and sufficient to convict.

PEOPLE v. TURCO
MELO, J. | Aug. 14, 2000 | Appeal
APPELLANT: Rodegelio “Totong” Turco, Jr.
APPELLEE: People of the Philippines

SUMMARY: Turco was convicted of rape. He appealed and argued that court erred in finding him guilty based only on testimony.
Although medical certificate was presented, medico-legal officer was not present at the trial. Court held that, in cases of rape, due to its
intimate nature, primary consideration is credibility of complainant’s testimony, which standing alone, even without medical
examination, is sufficient to convict.

DOCTRINE: 1. The primordial consideration in a determination concerning the crime of rape is the credibility of complainant’s testimony.
2. Court places significance on distinction between admissibility of evidence and its probative value. Since

admissibility is determined by relevance and competence, admissibility is therefore an affair of logic and law. Probative value

or weight given to evidence, once admitted, depends on judicial evaluation guided by R133 and jurisprudence.

FACTS

Rodegelio Turco was charged by RTC Basilan with the crime of rape. The victim was his 12 year old second
cousin, Escalea Tabada.
Upon reaching home, Escalea heard a call from outside. She recognized the voice and when she asked who it
was, the party introduced himself as Turco. When she opened the door, Turco covered her face with a
towel and placed his right hand on her neck. He led her to her father’s pig pen where he forced her to lie
down and mounted her. After consummating the act, Turco kissed her and held her breasts. He threatened
her that he will kill her if she reports the incident. She reported the incident after 10 days and a complaint
was immediately filed.

At the trial, Turco pleaded not guilty and presented the “sweetheart defense”. Trial court found him guilty
and sentenced him to suffer penalty of reclusion perpetua + Php 50,000 moral damages.

Turco appealed arguing that Court erred in ruling that prosecution, based only on affidavits and oral
testimonies, was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he committed the crime. Aside from written
statement of complainant before the police station and her testimony during direct examination, no other
evidence was presented.
Although medical certificate was presented, medico-legal officer was not present at the trial.

ISSUE

I. Whether or not court can find accused guilty of rape based only on the testimonies of the complainant and
witnesses – YES
II. Whether or not medical certificate is admissible despite absence of medico-legal officer - YES
RATIO

3 guiding principles in review of rape cases:

1. Accusation of rape can be made with facility; difficult to prove on the part of complainant, more difficult
to disprove for accused
2. In view of intrinsic nature of rape where only 2 persons are usually involved, testimony of complainant is
given importance and scrutinized with extreme caution
3. Evidence of prosecution stands or fails on its own merits

The primordial consideration in a determination concerning the crime of rape is the credibility of complainant’s

testimony. Court held that testimony of complainant Escalea Tabada must be given credence:

1. Declarations on the witness stand of rape victims who are young and immature deserve full credence.
2. Court also took cognizance of the fact that complainant was poor and illiterate. Court believes that “these
people” value their virginity which like a “mirror, once dropped and broken… can no longer be pieced
together… not ever.” (OMG!)
3. The victim’s relatively low intelligence explains the lapses in her testimony. Lapses should be expected when a
person recounts details of an experience so humiliating and painful as rape.
4. Victim had no motive to falsely testify against accused. No woman, especially one at a tender age, would
concoct a story of defloration.

Sweetheart theory not true, merely concocted by accused to escape criminal liability. He failed to

introduce independent proof such as love letters, photos, tokens, mementos, gifts, etc etc etc.

People v Bernaldez

While the medical certificate could be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule since entries in official
records constitute exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule (R130 S4), since it involved an opinion of one
who must first be established as an expert witness, it could not be given weight or credit unless doctor
who issued it is presented in court to show his qualifications.

Court places significance on distinction between admissibility of evidence and its probative value. Since
admissibility is determined by relevance and competence, admissibility is therefore an affair of logic and
law. Probative value or weight given to evidence, once admitted, depends on judicial evaluation guided by
R133 and jurisprudence.
Although medical certificate is an exception to hearsay rule, thus admissible as evidence, it has very little
probative value due to absence of examining physician in this case. Nevertheless, prosecution did not rely
solely on medical report. Reliance was made on testimony of victim which standing alone even without
medical examination is sufficient to convict.
 Knapp v. State

Citation. Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 2014 Ind. LEXIS 485, 2014 WL 2617279 (Ind. June 12, 2014)

Brief Fact Summary. Knapp is the (D). He claims self defense and had been told the victim actually killed a different person. In
this case the prosecution was allowed to prove that the victim did not cause the other person’s death.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Relevancy is determined on a specific item of evidence by proof of the relevancy could reasonably help
to resolve the main issue at trial

Facts. Knapp (D) killed a deputy sheriff in Hagerstown who attempted to arrest him and D claimed that he murdered in self-
defense. People around the town had told D that the deputy killed the old man. The prosecutor then showed that the deputy
did not kill the old man, that the old man died of natural causes. D was convicted of murder and he then appealed, claiming that
the real issue was whether D had heard that the deputy had killed the old man.

Issue. Is evidence relevant of a particular item if it tends to support whether proof of that evidence would assist to resolve the to
a central issue of a case?

Held. Yes, the judgment is affirmed.

D was correct in asserting that the real issue was whether or not D had heard that the deputy had killed the old man. Yet their
may be some evidence that does not have a direct connection to the trial. In this case D claimed that he had heard that the
deputy killed the old man. If in fact the deputy had not killed the old man, it is less likely that someone would have told D such a
story. People have a tendency to tell the truth.

The problem for the prosecutor was that he could not show what D had, or had not, heard. Obviously, there are multiple ways
prosecution could handle the case. He attacked the problem by showing that the deputy had not killed the old man, which in
turn meant that somewhere between the truth and D’s testi-mony there was a person who was not telling the truth. This,
coupled with D’s being unable to identify the informant, was his claim of what he heard was less probable. No error having been
shown, therefore conviction is affirmed.

Discussion. The court shows that admissibility of evidence in this case indicates that if even a slight inference can be made, then
the court should admit the evidence of a collateral fact. In actual practice, the courts tend to weigh the value of the evidence
against the amount of time that will be consumed by its introduction. The more there is a direct connection to the case; the
court will be more liberal.

Knapp v. State, 168 Ind. 153 - 79 N.E. 1076 (1907)

RULE:

In order to predicate error upon the refusal of an instruction, it must be couched in such terms as to be sound to the full extent.
It is not error to refuse an instruction, unless it ought to be given precisely in the terms prayed.

FACTS:

Knapp (defendant) stood convicted of murder in the first degree. He claimed self-defense, testifying that he had heard that the
deceased had clubbed and seriously injured an old man in arresting him, and that he died a short time afterwards. He contended
that it was error to admit rebuttal testimony that the old man died of senility and alcoholism, and that there were no bruises nor
marks on his person; that the question was whether he had, in fact, heard the story, and not as to its truth or falsity. The trial
court convicted Knapp of murder. Knapp appealed.

ISSUE: Could the falsity of a story that a witness testifies be admitted as evidence?

ANSWER: Yes.
CONCLUSION: The Court affirmed Knapp’s conviction. To show that there was no basis in fact for the statement Knapp claimed
to have heard had a tendency to make it less probable that his testimony on this point was true. With respect to jury
instructions, the Court had the right to choose its own mode of expression.

TATING vs. MARCELLA, TATING and COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 155208 | 2007-03-27

FACTS:

On October 14, 1969, Daniela sold the subject property to her granddaughter, herein petitioner Nena
Lazalita Tating. The contract of sale was embodied in a duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in
favor of Nena. Subsequently, title over the subject property was transferred in the name of Nena. She declared the
property in her name for tax purposes and paid the real estate taxes due thereon for the years 1972, 1973, 1975 to 1986
and 1988.However, the land remained in possession Daniela.

On December 28, 1977, Daniela executed a sworn statement claiming that she had actually no intention of
selling the property; the true agreement between her and
Nena was simply to transfer title over the subject property in favor of the latter to enable her to obtain a loan by
mortgaging the subject property for the purpose of helping her defray her business expenses; she later discovered that
Nena did not secure any loan nor mortgage the property; she wants the title in the name of Nena cancelled and the subject
property reconveyed to her.

Daniela died on July 29, 1988 leaving her children as her heirs. In a letter dated March 1, 1989, Carlos informed Nena that
when Daniela died they discovered the sworn statement she executed on December 28, 1977 and, as a consequence,
they are demanding from Nena the return of their rightful shares over the subject property as heirs of Daniela. Nena
did not reply.

Efforts to settle the case amicably proved futile.

Hence, her son filed a complaint with the RTC praying for the nullification of the

Deed of Absolute Sale. RTC decide in favour or the plaintiff and was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether the Sworn Statement should have been rejected outright by the lower courts.

RULING:
The Court finds that both the trial court and the CA committed error in giving the sworn statement probative
weight. Since Daniela is no longer available to take the witness stand as she is already dead, the RTC and the CA should
not have given probative value on Daniela's sworn statement for purposes of proving that the contract of sale between
her and petitioner was simulated and that, as a consequence, a trust relationship was created between them.

Considering that the Court finds the subject contract of sale between petitioner and Daniela to be valid and
not fictitious or simulated, there is no more necessity to discuss the issue as to whether or not a trust relationship was
created between them.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, affirming the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The complaint of the private respondents is DISMISSED.
B. RELEVANCE (SECTIONS 3, RULE 128)

RULE 128

General Provisions

Section 1. Evidence defined. — Evidence is the means, sanctioned by these rules, of ascertaining in a judicial
proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact. (1)

Section 2. Scope. — The rules of evidence shall be the same in all courts and in all trials and hearings, except
as otherwise provided by law or these rules. (2a)

Section 3. Admissibility of evidence. — Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not
excluded by the law of these rules. (3a)

Section 4. Relevancy; collateral matters. — Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce
belief in its existence or non-existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends
in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue. (4a)

The proper rule is that industry standards are not conclusive as to ordinary care in design, but rather are admissible evidence.
Lopez v. Heesen, 69 N.M. 206, 365 P.2d 448 (1961)

Jesse G. LOPEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert HEESEN and Sears, Roebuck and Company, a corporation, Defendants-Appellees.
NO. 6760. 365 P.2d 448 (1961) 69 N.M. 206
Supreme Court of New Mexico.
August 22, 1961. Rehearing Denied October 31, 1961.

Facts: Jesse G. Lopez, originally filed suit against Robert Heesen, alleging that on October 15, 1958, Heesen unlawfully, violently,
maliciously and feloniously assaulted and shot him with a shotgun, thereby inflicting dangerous and painful wounds and injuries,
causing him great bodily and mental pain and anguish. Heesen answered denying the allegations of the complaint and thereafter
Lopez filed a demand for jury trial. Sears, Roebuck and Company was joined as a party-defendant. “Sears”, was engaged in the
design and manufacture of hunting firearms and was also engaged in the selling of firearms in Albuquerque.

It was also alleged that on October 14, 1958, Sears, sold to Heesen, one Higgins Model 51 hunting rifles; that said rifle was
negligently designed or manufactured by Sears, in that the safety mechanism moved readily and in a dangerous manner from a
"safe" to a "fire" position. In addition, it was alleged that the rifle in this dangerous condition known to Sears, was sold to
Heesen, and that Sears, negligently failed to warn Heesen, of the dangerous and defective condition of the rifle.

The complaint further alleged that on the afternoon of October 15, 1958, in Colfax County, New Mexico, Heesen, negligently
permitted the rifle to discharge while hunting and that as a proximate result of the joint and concurrent negligence of both
Heesen and “Sears”, Lopez sustained a severe and disabling wound and injury to his chest, requiring hospital and surgical care.
Appellant demanded damages against both appellees, jointly and severally. Both appellees denied the allegations.

The jury returned its verdict finding the issues for both Heesen and Sears and against Lopez. Judgment was entered for appellees
and this appeal followed. Lopez abandoned any contention that the verdict in favor of Heesen was erroneous and this appeal
concerns only appellee Sears.

During the trial, the jury (composed of 6 men and 6 ladies, requires specialized knowledge or experience and cannot be
determined independently merely from deductions made and inferences drawn on the basis of ordinary knowledge) was
instructed that expert testimony is intended only to assist them in coming to a correct conclusion upon facts which are of a
technical nature, but that the opinion of experts was not binding upon them and the jury must determine the weight to be given
to such testimony.

Lopez introduced evidence tending to prove that the safety device on the Higgins Model 51 rifle is easy to knock off safety,
making the rifle dangerous. Lopez’s witness, Frank Doyle, expressed the opinion that the safety device, without the telescopic
sight, is not a safe piece, in that the projection is too long and it is too prone to be knocked from "safe" to "fire" position. There
is also testimony of certain tests made with the Higgins Model 51 and the witness, Ira Kessler, expressed the opinion that the
Higgins Model 51 was unsafe without the telescopic sight. Another witness, Robert Allen, testified as to the manner in which the
safety lever of the Higgins Model 51 moved from "safe" to "fire" position without his knowledge.

Sears, introduced testimony of witnesses who were either experts in the small arms field or experts in gun designing. The
witness, Paul A. La Violette, Jr., testified that he is a gun designer employed by High Standard Manufacturing Company who
manufacture the Higgins Model 51 for Sears. He qualified as an expert gun designer with many years' experience with other rifle
manufacturers and in factories designing and building weapons of the small arms design. La Violette testified that the safety
device on the Higgins Model 51 is supplied to High Standard Manufacturing Company by Fabrique Nationale of Belgium. He also
testified extensively as to the advantages of the safety device of the Higgins Model 51 and stated that six different makes of
guns have the same modified leaf safety device as does the Higgins Model 51. The manufacturers of these guns are F.N. Mauser,
Colt, Marlin, Nato and Weatherby. The evidence also shows that since 1951, 75,572 Higgins Model 51 rifles with the modified
leaf safety device have been sold by High Standard Manufacturing Company to Sears. High Standard Manufacturing Company
has never been sued by reason of the design of the Higgins Model 51 rifle. There is also opinion evidence that the Higgins Model
51 rifle is safe by all commercial sporting goods standards.

Sears appears to concede that the number of rifles manufactured with the modified leaf safety device, and the fact that other
companies manufacture guns with the same design, is relevant as tending to show that the design is proper. Lopez also seems to
concede that the reputation of Fabrique Nationale of Belgium may be relevant to the issue.

Subsequent to the testimony as to the reputation of the various firearms companies who use a similar safety device as the
Higgins Model 51, the witness, Paul A. La Violette, Jr., testified without objection that the Higgins Model 51 rifle is safe by all
commercial sporting goods standards, and that the design of the safety device of the Higgins
Model 51 was not negligent or defective. The witness, Thomas Raymond Robinson, Jr., testified that in his opinion the Higgins
Model 51 is good and practical in the field for a prudent hunter, and is suitable for hunting. Ira L. Kessler, an expert witness
called by defendant, Heesen, testified that the Marlin Firearms Company has a fair reputation, and that the Colt Firearms
Company has an excellent reputation

Issue: Whether or not the trial court committed error in permitting testimony as to the general reputation of other firearms
companies who use the same modified leaf safety device as the Higgins Model 51.

Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the experts to express their opinion.

Under New Mexico Rule, which is the same as the Federal Rule, the rule which favors the reception of the evidence governs, the
basis being that any evidence which throws light on the question in issue should be admitted, leaving it to the trial court to hold
the hearing within reasonable bounds.

Circuit Judge Bratton, in stating the rule, quoted from United States Smelting Co. v. Parry, 8 Cir., 166 F. 407, as follows:
"It is true that in trials by jury it is their province to determine the ultimate facts, and that the general rule is that witnesses are
permitted to testify to the primary facts within their knowledge, but not to their opinions. And it is also true that this has at
times led to the statement that witnesses may not give their opinions upon the ultimate facts which the jury are to decide,
because that would supplant their judgment and usurp their province. But such a statement is not to be taken literally. It but
reflects the general rule, which is subject to important qualifications, and never was intended to close any reasonable avenue to
the truth in the investigation of questions of fact. Besides, the tendency of modern decisions is not only to give as wide a scope
as is reasonably possible to the investigation of such questions, but also to accord to the trial judge a certain discretion in
determining what testimony has a tendency to establish the ultimate facts, and to disturb his decision admitting testimony of
that character only when it plainly appears that the testimony had no legitimate bearing upon the questions at issue and was
calculated to prejudice the minds of the jurors. * * *"

Applying the above principles we hold that the testimony as to the reputation of Fabrique Nationale, who manufacture the
safety device on the Higgins Model 51, and the reputation of Marlin Firearms Company, Weatherby Corporation, Colt Firearms
Company and Jefferson Corporation, who manufacture rifles which have the same modified leaf safety device as the Higgins
Model 51, was relevant to the issue of whether the safety device on the Higgins Model 51 was unsafe or safe, and
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this testimony.
 STATE V. BALL
339 S.W.2d 783 (1960)

STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. William Arthur BALL, Appellant.

No. 47575.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.

November 14, 1960.

Dewey S. Godfrey, St. Louis, for appellant.

*784 John M. Dalton, Atty. Gen., Richard R. Nacy, Jr., Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

BARRETT, Commissioner.

A jury has found William Arthur Ball guilty of robbery in the first degree; the jury also found prior felony convictions and,
therefore, a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment was imposed. V.A.M.S. §§ 560.120, 560.135, 556.280.

The facts, briefly, as the jury could find them were that about 2:30 in the afternoon of October 15, 1958, two colored men, one
of them tall and the other short, entered the Krekeler Jewelry Store at 1651 South 39th Street. The taller man spent ten or
fifteen minutes selecting and buying a cigarette lighter, he also talked about buying and looked at watches and rings. As the
taller man looked at jewelry and made his purchase the shorter man looked in the cases and moved about in the store. Later in
the day, about 5:50, as John Krekeler was placing rings and watches in the safe preparatory to closing the store two men
entered, one of them tall and the other short, and Krekeler immediately recognized them as the two men who had been in the
store at 2:30, especially the taller man. He recognized the taller man's narrow-brimmed, tall hat, brown jacket, gray stirt and
particularly a scar on his face. The shorter man started to walk behind the counter and as Krekeler intercepted him he "drew a
long barreled blue .38 and stuck it in my face." Both men followed Krekeler, the shorter man with the gun in "his back," directing
him to the watch repair department and finally into the rest room in the rear of the store. He was told not to turn around and
stood facing the wall. He could hear jewelry being dumped into a bag and the "jingle" of the cash register. The two men left
Krekeler in the rest room and after hearing the door slam he called the police. The two men had taken watches and rings of the
stipulated value of $4,455.21 and $140 in cash from the register. Krekeler identified the appellant from pictures, and three
weeks later, after his capture, in a hospital and upon the trial positively identified him as the taller of the two holdup men.

In his motion for a new trial one of the claims is that there was no direct evidence of an injury or any evidence to show that
Krekeler was put "in fear of some immediate injury to his person," one of the essential elements of robbery in the first degree.
V.A.M.S. § 560.120. Krekeler did not affirmatively testify that he was in fear but he could well apprehend injury if he did not
comply with their requests and in the circumstances the jury could reasonably find "the fear" contemplated in the statute. 77
C.J.S. Robbery § 16, p. 459; State v. Thompson, Mo., 299 S.W.2d 468, 474. The element of fear being a reasonable inference
from the evidence, the facts and circumstances support and warrant the finding of robbery in the first degree. State v. Eckenfels,
Mo., 316 S.W.2d 532.

Another of the appellant's sufficiently preserved claims in his motion for a new trial (V.A.M.S. § 547.030; Supreme Court Rule
27.20, V.A.M.R.) has to do with his arrest and the testimony of the two arresting officers. On November 4, 1958, about three
weeks after the robbery, police officers in a squad car saw Ball walking on Easton Avenue. The officers stopped him, told him
that they were officers and that he was under arrest. As officer Powell faced and searched Ball officer Ballard "holstered" his gun
and attempted "to cuff" him. Ball shoved Powell over and ran down Easton Avenue, the officers ran after him, Powell being
closest. Powell yelled, "Halt Ball, you're under arrest," and fired one shot high in the air but Ball continued running and Powell
fired four more shots, two at his legs, one at his buttocks, and he finally fell from a bullet in his back. It is claimed that this
evidence was not material or relevant, that it was too remote from the date of the robbery to indicate a consciousness of guilt
and since it was of course prejuducial *785 that he is entitled to a new trial. But unexplained flight and resisting arrest even
thirty days after the supposed commission of a crime is a relevant circumstance (State v. Duncan, 336 Mo. 600, 611, 80 S.W.2d
147, 153), the remoteness of the flight goes to the weight of the evidence rather than to its admissibility. 20 Am.Jur., Sec. 293, p.
274.

When Ball was finally subdued and arrested the officers took from his person and impounded a brown felt hat, "a brownish"
windbreaker type jacket, trousers, gray shirt and shoesthese were exhibits one and two, Ball admitted that they belonged to him
although his evidence tended to show that he had purchased the jacket after October 15. In identifying Ball, in addition to the
scar on his face, Krekeler was impressed with and remembered the brown ensemble, particularly the "tall brown hat." These
items were of course relevant and admissible in evidence and there is no objection to them. State v. Johnson, Mo., 286 S.W.2d
787, 792. The appellant objects, however, in his motion for a new trial that a police officer was permitted to testify that $258.02
in currency and two pennies were taken from his person. It is said that the introduction of these exhibits was "immaterial and
irrelevant, neither tended to prove nor disprove any of the issues involved in this case; that said money as seized at the time of
the arrest was neither identified by Mr. Krekeler nor by any other person as the money which was allegedly stolen from the A. L.
Krekeler & Sons Jewelry Company on the 15th day of October, 1958; that said evidence was considered by this jury to the
prejudice of this defendant convincingly."

The circumstances in which this evidence was introduced were these: After the clothes were identified and introduced as
exhibits one and two the prosecuting attorney inquired of officer Powell, "Did you also seize his personal effects?" Defense
counsel immediately objected to any testimony relating to personal effects found on the defendant "at the time." The court
overruled the objection and state's counsel inquired, "Well Officer, what personal effects were seized?" Defense counsel,
evidently knowing and anticipating, objected "to any testimony relevant (sic) to any personal effects seized upon this Defendant
at the time he was arrested by reason of the fact it is immaterial and irrelevant and tends to neither prove nor disprove any facts
involved and ask that the jury be discharged and a mistrial be declared." The court overruled the objection and the officer said,
"Ball's personal effects consisted of two hundred and fifty eight dollars and two cents in cash, with the denominations of th e
bill(s), two one hundred dollar bills, a twentytwo twenties, a ten, a five, three ones and two pennies. He had a ladies ring and a
man's wristwatch. He had a crusifixion along with a small pen knife and a black leather wallet. Maybe one or two other personal
articles." All of these items were then marked as exhibits, from three to nine, offered in evidence and described by the officer,
exhibit three being the bills and pennies comprising the $258.02. According to the officer Mr. Krekeler was unable to identify
any of these articles or the money as having come from the jewelry store robbery and there is no objection in the motion to any
of the items other than the money and some of them were obviously not prejudicial, for example the keys, a small penknife and
wallet.

Unlike the roll of dimes in State v. Hampton, Mo., 275 S.W.2d 356, the testimony as to the $258.02 was not offered in proof of
the substantive fact of the crime. In that case the five-dollar roll of dimes wrapped in a roll of green paper was found on the
defendant the same day of the burglary and while the fact was a circumstance admissible in evidence it was held to not
constitute substantive evidence inconsistent with the hypothesis of the defendant's innocence of burglary. In State v.
Gerberding, Mo., 272 S.W.2d 230, there was no timely or proper objection to the proof but $4,000 was taken in a robbery and
*786 the appellant had $920 in currency in his topcoat pocket when captured the day of the robbery. The proof of the money
here was evidently on the theory that Ball did not have or was not likely to have such a sum of money on his person prior to the
commission of the offense. 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence, Sec. 204, p. 410. As to this the facts were that he had been out of the
penitentiary about eight months and the inference the state would draw is that he had no visible means of support and no
employment and could not possibly have $258.02 except from robberies. Of course, there was no such proof and Ball claimed
that he had worked intermittently for a custodian or janitor of an apartment house and that he had won the $258.02 in a series
of crap games at a named place. Not only was Krekeler unable to identify the money or any of the items on Ball's person as
having come from the jewelry store so that in fact they were not admissible in evidence (annotation 3 A.L.R. 1213), the charge
here was that Ball and his accomplice took jewelry of the value of $4,455.21 and $140 in cash from the cash register. There was
no proof as to the denomination of the money in the cash register, it was simply a total of $140. Here nineteen days had
elapsed, there was no proof that Ball had suddenly come into possession of the $258.02 (annotation 123 A.L.R. 119) and in all
these circumstances "The mere possession of a quantity of money is in itself no indication that the possessor was the taker of
money charged as taken, because in general all money of the same denomination and material is alike, and the hypothesis that
the money found is the same as the money taken is too forced and extraordinary to be receivable." 1 Wigmore, Evidence, Sec.
154, p. 601. In the absence of proof or of a fair inference from the record that the money in Ball's possession at the time of his
arrest came from or had some connection with the robbery and in the absence of a plain showing of his impecuniousness before
the robbery and his sudden affluence (State v. Garrett, 285 Mo. 279, 226 S.W. 4), the evidence was not in fact relevant and in
the circumstances was obviously prejudicial for if it did not tend to prove the offense for which the appellant was on trial the
jury may have inferred that he was guilty of another robbery. State v. Bray, Mo. App., 278 S.W.2d 49; People v. Orloff, 65 Cal.
App. 2d 614, 620-621, 151 P.2d 288; annotation 123 A.L.R. loc. cit. 132-134 and compare the facts and circumstances in State v.
Garrett, supra. The admission of the evidence in the circumstances of this record infringed the right to a fair trial and for that
reason the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion by BARRETT, C., is adopted as the opinion of the Court en banc.

WESTHUES, EAGER, STORCKMAN and HOLLINGSWORTH, JJ., concur.

HYDE, C. J., and LEEDY and DALTON, JJ., dissent.

G.R. No. 123546 July 2, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOERAL GALLENO, accused-appellant.

Accused-appellant Joeral Galleno was charged and convicted with the crime of rape of a 5-year old child. He
seeks reversal of the judgment of the trial court alleging that he was deprived of a fair and impartial trial since
the judge discounted the accused testimony and actively participated in the cross examination of the accused-
appellant.

Issue: W/N, the trial judge is guilty of undue interference.

Held:

Rule 3.06 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides:

While a judge may, to promote justice, prevent waste of time or clear up some obscurity, properly intervene in
the presentation of evidence during the trial, it should always be borne in mind that undue interference may
prevent the proper presentation of the cause or the ascertainment of truth.

The court held that there is undue interference if the judge extensively propounds questions to the witnesses
which will have the effect of or will tend to build or bolster the case for one of the parties.

In the instant case, the court found that the trial court judge, the Honorable Salvador S. Gubaton, did
propound questions but this was done only for clarification purposes and not to build the case for one of the
parties. The line of questioning referred to hardly shows bias on the part of the trial court, but a pure
clarification.

PEOPLE V. CALUMPANG 454 SCRA 719

Topic: Alibi

Facts: Rico Calumpang and Jovenal Omatang were charged with two counts of murder, committed
against the spouses Alicia Catipay and Santiago Catipay. The trial court dismissed the defense of alibi
interposed by the defendants because it was weak and then convicted the defendants, relying on
the testimony of Magno Gomez who allegedly eye witnessed the killing of the two victims. The
defendants appealed, contending that the testimony of Magno is unreliable and inconsistent, and
that the trial court erred in dismissing their defense of alibi.

Issue: Whether or not the defense of alibi is sufficient to cast doubt as to the guilt of the accused.

Ruling: Yes. Appellants’ defense of alibi was indeed weak, since their alibis were corroborated only
by their relatives and friends, and it was not shown that it was impossible for them to be at the place
of the incident. However, the rule that an accused must satisfactorily prove his alibi was never
intended to change or shift the burden of proof in criminal cases. It is basic that the prosecution
evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the
defense. Unless the prosecution overturns the constitutional presumption of innocence of an
accused by competent and credible evidence proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the
presumption remains. There being no sufficient evidence beyond reasonable doubt pointing to
appellants as the perpetrators of the crime, appellants’ presumed innocence stands.
The Supreme Court found that the testimony of the lone witness Magno is full of inconsistencies. While Magno
claimed to have witnessed the gruesome killings, the records show that serious discrepancies attended
Magno’s testimony in court and his sworn statement executed during the preliminary examination. Well
settled is the rule that evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness,
but must be credible in itself—such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstances stand. Magno’s testimony failed to satisfy such rule, hence, the presumed
innocence of the accused must be upheld.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RICO CALUMPANG and JOVENAL OMATANG

G.R. No. 158203. March 31, 2005

FACTS:
APPELLEE VERSION
Magno Gomez testified that around 6:30 p.m. of July 14, 1991, he was at Talay, Pamplona, Negros
Oriental, walking home to Sitio Makapa, Mangoto, Pamplona. He was with his neighbors, the spouses
Santiago and Alicia Catipay. On their way, they stopped at the store of Ana Andagan, located near the
Pamplona Coconut Plantation, and decided to have some beer. Magno added that Santiago saw appellants
drinking tuba inside Anas store, and offered them a glass of beer, but appellants refused. Santiago just drank
the glass of beer he was offering. After that, Magno and the spouses left the store and took a shortcut through
the coconut plantation.
Magno saw appellants follow them. He suspected that appellants were planning something sinister
because they followed too closely and were concealing something at their backs. Magno cautioned Santiago,
but the latter just told him not to worry about appellants. Magno and the spouses simply continued walking
for another half-kilometer until they reached the narrow waterway that let water from the river into the
plantation. Magno removed his slippers and started to cross ahead of the spouses. Santiago and Alicia stayed
slightly behind because Santiago had to remove his shoes.
When Magno had crossed five feet of the waterway, Magno turned around to wait for his companions
and saw appellants attacking the spouses. With a bolo, appellant Calumpang hacked Santiago on the head and
stabbed his abdomen. At the same time, appellant Omatang attacked Alicia.
Scared that appellants would also attack him, Magno ran away. After 50 meters, he reached Alexander
Ebiass house. He asked Alexander for a torch then continued walking towards Sitio Makapa, Mangoto,
Pamplona. After a kilometer, however, he saw the house of his cousin Rolando Retada. He decided to spend
the night there.
Rolando confirmed that Magno spent the night at his house on July 14, 1991, and left very early the next
morning without drinking coffee. Visitacion Rabor, on the other hand, testified that she overheard Santiago
berating Magno when they passed her store around 6:30 p.m. on July 14, 1991. Santiago was mad at Magno
because Magno did not want to help Santiago clean the dam at Mangoto, Pamplona, as Magno was supposed
to. She added that Santiago continued calling Magno useless at Anas store until Alicia prevailed upon Santiago
to go home. When Santiago and Alicia left, Magno followed them.

APPELLANT VERSION
Analyn Andagan testified that on July 14, 1991, she was tending the store of her mother, Ana Andagan, at
Talay, Pamplona, Negros Oriental. Around 3:00 p.m. appellants Calumpang and Omatang arrived with one
Conchito Nilas. The three ordered a gallon of tuba and started drinking. Around 6:30 p.m., Magno and the
spouses arrived. They each had one bottle of beer and immediately left after finishing their beers. Analyn
further testified that appellants did not follow Magno, Santiago and Alicia when the three left her mothers
store. Appellant Omatang stayed until 7:00 p.m. and continued talking with his two companions, appellant
Calumpang and Conchito Nilas. He left when his 12-year-old nephew, defense witness Joseph Rabor, came to
fetch him for supper. Appellant Calumpang, for his part, stayed until 8:00 p.m. and helped her close the store.
He walked home with her and Conchito Nilas.
Joseph Rabor corroborated Analyns testimony that he fetched his uncle, appellant Omatang, from the
store around 7:00 p.m. upon the order of his mother. He added that he and appellant Omatang slept in the
same room that night.
Appellant Omatang likewise corroborated Analyns testimony that he left around 7:00 p.m. with
Joseph. He also claimed he had nothing to do with the killing of the spouses and averred that he was at home
in the same room with Joseph, sleeping, when the spouses were murdered. He claimed that he learned of the
murders only upon his arrest the next day.
Appellant Calumpang vehemently denied killing the spouses. He declared that Santiago and Alicia had no
known enemies and were good people. He corroborated all of Analyns testimony, and added that Magno and
Santiago were arguing when the two came into the store. Appellant Calumpang likewise averred that after
helping Analyn close the store, he went home, ate supper, and went to bed.
The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Magno Gomez and accepted his account of the
murders.

ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence for the prosecution proves that petitioner committed the crime
charged of double murder beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:
No. The decision in the Regional Trial Court is reversed. Appellants Rico Calumpang and Jovenal
Omatang are acquitted on reasonable doubt. No convincing proof could show that appellants had any reason
to kill Santiago and Alicia in cold blood. As the OSG points out, the supposed grudge, which Magno claimed
could have motivated appellants to kill the spouses, is too flimsy to be believed. It is highly improbable that
appellants would murder the spouses because Santiago had offered appellants a glass of beer and they
refused him. If anybody should harbor a grudge from such an incident, it should have been Santiago whose
offer appellants refused. But there is no evidence of any grudge between Santiago and the appellants, and as
Magno testified, Santiago simply drank the glass of beer himself.
Appellants defense of alibi was indeed weak, since their alibis were corroborated only by their relatives
and friends, and it was not shown that it was impossible for them to be at the place of the incident. However,
the rule that an accused must satisfactorily prove his alibi was never intended to change or shift the burden of
proof in criminal cases. It is basic that the prosecution evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and
cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense. Unless the prosecution overturns the constitutional
presumption of innocence of an accused by competent and credible evidence proving his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, the presumption remains. There being no sufficient evidence beyond reasonable doubt
pointing to appellants as the perpetrators of the crime, appellants presumed innocence stands.

C. RELEVANCE (SECTIONS 3, RULE 128)

Section 3. Admissibility of evidence. — Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue

and is not excluded by the law of these rules. (3a)

1. EXCLUSIONART RULES UNDER THE 1987 CONSTI

a. SECTIONS 2 AND 3, ART. III
b. SECTIONS 12, ART. III
c. SECTIONS 17, ART. III

ARTICLE III
BILL OF RIGHTS

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
<="" p="">

Section 3.

1. The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by
law.
2. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.

Section 12.

1. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
2. No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free
will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other
similar forms of detention are prohibited.
3. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
4. The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this Section as well as
compensation to the rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their
families.

Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

Kastigar v. United States

Citation. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 92 S. Ct. 1653, 32 L. Ed. 2d 212, 1972 U.S. LEXIS 57 (U.S. 1972)

Brief Fact Summary. Petitioners refuse to testify at a grand jury hearing on Fifth Amendment grounds despite
their having been granted immunity.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The government may compel testimony even though subpoenaed persons have
invoked their privilege versus self-incrimination if they have conferred immunity from use on their compelled
testimony.

Facts. Subpoenaed to appear before a federal grand jury, the petitioners refused to answer questions in
asserting the Fifth Amendment, despite the government having granted them immunity. The immunity was
based on a part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 stating that neither the testimony nor any other
information from the testimony could be used against the witnesses. Petitioners argued that the scope of the
immunity they were given was not as broad as the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination, and were
unsuccessful in the District Court. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the order, and the petitioners
were granted certiorari.

Issue. Can the government compel immunized testimony even if the subpoenaed persons have invoked the
privilege versus self-incrimination?
Held. Yes. Affirm the lower court’s decision allowing the compulsion of testimony.
The total proscription on use found in this federal statute, that is, from both use and derivative use, provides
enough of a safeguard against Fifth Amendment rights being infringed on by barring the testimony from even
being used as an investigatory lead.

The petitioners’ concern that the bar against derivative use could not be enforced effectively is overcome by
subsequent prosecuting authorities having the burden of showing that their evidence comes from an
independent source.

Dissent. Justice William O. Douglas dissented because he believed that if transactional immunity was absent,
the grant of immunity was not sufficient under the constitution to compel witness’ testimony. An immunity
grant is only adequate if it operates as a complete pardon for the offense.
Justice Thurgood Marshall also dissented, expressing the view that enforcement of the bar on use or derivative
use of compelled testimony would be “futile.”

Discussion. The majority in this case foresees enforcement of the grants of immunity through “taint hearings”
in which the prosecution has an affirmative duty to show an independent source. Since this case and Zicarelli v.
New Jersey State Comm. Of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472 (1972) were decided, many states have moved to
use/derivative use immunity from transactional immunity.

GALMAN V. PAMARAN

Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. No. L-69809 | October 16, 1986 | J. Gutierrez Jr.

Facts:

Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of complainant’s
residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the
Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed conditions,
complainant made a telephone call to Laconico. That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a
lawyer, to come to his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular
lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip.

When complainant called, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation
through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement. Twenty
minutes later, complainant called again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico
answered ‘Yes’. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the money.

Complainant called again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office of the then
Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal
Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself should receive the
money. When he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the
Philippine Constabulary.

Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for
the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant
for robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since appellant listened to the telephone
conversation without complainant’s consent, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of
the Anti-Wiretapping Act.

The lower court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200, which
prompted petitioner to appeal. The IAC affirmed with modification hence the present petition for certiorari.
Issue:
W/N an extension telephone is covered by the term “device or arrangement” under Rep. Act No. 4200

Held:

No. The law refers to a “tap” of a wire or cable or the use of a “device or arrangement” for the purpose of
secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical
interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear,
intercept, or record the spoken words.

An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other
devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as “tapping” the wire
or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just
happened to be there for ordinary office use.

STATUTORY RULES OF EXCLUSION

a. Section 201, Tax Reform Act of 1997

b. RA 1405 Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits

c. RA 4200 Wire Tapping Act (in re RA 9372)

d. RA 7438. Section 2(d)

Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

[GR L-69809, 16 October 1986]

FACTS:
Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were discussing the terms for the withdrawal
of the complaint for direct assault filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo
Laconico after demanding P 8,000.00 from him. This demand was heard by Atty. Gaanan through a
telephone extension as requested by Laconico so as to personally hear the proposed conditions for
the settlement. Atty. Pintor was subsequently arrested in an entrapment operation upon receipt of
the money. since Atty. Gaanan listened to the telephone conversation without complainant's
consent, complainant charged Gaanan and Laconico with violation of the Anti- Wiretapping Act (RA
4200).

ISSUE: Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Sec. 1 of RA 4200
such that its use to overheard a private conversation would constitute an unlawful interception of
communication between two parties using a telephone line.
HELD:
No. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone or
dictagraph, or other devvices enumerated in Sec. 1 of the law as the use thereof cannot be
considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. this section refers to instruments
whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard
because, by their very nature, they are of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping,
intercepting, or recording a telephone conversation. The telephone extension in this case was not
installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use.

Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the
accused. Thus in the case of doubt as in this case, on whether or not an extension telephone is
included in the phrase "device or arrangement" the penal statute must be construed as not including
an extension telephone.

A perusal of the Senate Congressional Record shows that our lawmakers intended to discourage,
through punishment, persons such as government authorities or representatives of organized
groups from installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail
or gain some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users. Consequently, the mere act of
listeneing , in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA
4200 or other similar nature.
RAMIREZ V CA

G.R. No. 93833 | September 28, 1995 | J. Katipunan

Facts:

A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the Quezon City RTC alleging that the private
respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her
in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality,” contrary to
morals, good customs and public policy.”

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought damages. The
transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by
petitioner.

As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Pasay RTC for violation of
Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of
private communication, and other purposes.”

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the RTC later on granted, on the ground that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200.

The CA declared the RTC’s decision null and void and denied the petitioner’s MR, hence the instant petition.

Issue: W/N the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of the parties in the conversation

Held: Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes,” provides:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication
or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone
or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the
parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The
law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party
other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all
persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier “any”. Consequently,
as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, “even a (person) privy to a communication who records
his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator” under this
provision of R.A. 4200.

A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court’s conclusion that in
enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of
private conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons.

The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not
be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing,
intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere
allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder
would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his
COMMENT before the respondent court: “Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be
regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be
professed.”

Petitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include
“private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word “communication” to a point of absurdity.
The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning “to share or to impart.” In its
ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication
connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the “process by which meanings or
thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or
gestures)”

These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of
“meanings or thoughts” which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988,
between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter’s office. Any doubts about the
legislative body’s meaning of the phrase “private communication” are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that
the terms “conversation” and “communication” were interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his
Explanatory Note to the Bill.

SOCORRO RAMIREZ VS. CA AND GARCIA [G.R. NO. 93833. SEPTEMBER 28, 1995]

Ponente: KAPUNAN, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner made a secret recording of the conversation that was part of a civil case filed in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, vexed,
insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s
dignity and personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.”. Private respondent
filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200,
entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private
communication, and other purposes.” Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information. The trial
court granted the said motion. The private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with
the Supreme Court, which referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution. Respondent
Court of Appeals promulgated its decision declaring the trial court’s order as null and void, after
subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration by the petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a

private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation.

HELD: NO. Petition denied. Costs against petitioner.

RATIO:

Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute.

The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted
deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the
respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private
communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.

[P]etitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not
include “private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word “communication” to a
point of absurdity.

MAMBA v. GARCIA

Facts: On August 23, 1996, a complaint for violation of Presidential Decree No.1866 (illegal possession of
firearms) was filed against a certain Renato Bulatao by the Cagayan Provincial Police Command before the sala
of respondent Judge Dominador L. Garcia of the Municipal Trial Court, Tuao, Cagayan.

Respondent set the preliminary investigation, but the same was subsequently postponed and reset as
respondent was not present, although the complaining officers appeared in court.

Later, the preliminary investigation was again reset. On the day before the new date of preliminary
investigation, the accused, Renato Bulatao, complained to the NBI that at the first scheduled preliminary
investigation, the arresting officer demanded P30,000.00 from him in consideration of the withdrawal of the
criminal case against him. According to Bulatao, the demand was reiterated by Salvador and respondent
judge. As Bulatao told them that he could not afford it, the amount was reduced to P6,000.00.

Based on Bulatao’s report, the NBI set out to entrap Salvador and respondent judge.

Bulatao was given a tape recorder to record his conversation with whoever will receive the money. After
handing the money to the police officers, Bulatao went out of respondent's chambers. Upon his signal, the
NBI operatives waiting outside respondent's court then rushed to the judge's chambers and arrested the two
police officers after recovering marked bills in their possession.

After the matter was referred by this Court to the Executive Judge for investigation, the latter scheduled
several hearings for the reception of evidence for the respondent. The records show that hearings were set on
different dates, but respondent did not appear despite due notice. Accordingly, he was deemed to have
waived the right to present evidence and the case was submitted for decision. Hence only his counter-affidavit
was considered, in which respondent claimed that it was Bulatao who asked permission to talk to the two
police officers.

Issue: Whether the investigating judge’s reliance on the taped conversation is proper?

Held: The Investigating Judge's reliance on the tape-recorded conversation between Bulatao and the two
police officers is erroneous. The recording of private conversations without the consent of the parties
contravenes the provisions of Rep. Act. No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wire Tapping Law, and renders
the same inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding.
In all other respects, however, the findings of the Investigating Judge are in accordance with the evidence. We
hold, however, that respondent judge is guilty not just of improper conduct but of serious misconduct. Serious
misconduct is such conduct which affects a public officer's performance of his duties as such officer and not
only that which affects his character as a private individual.

EJERCITO V. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. NO. 157294-95

G.R. NO. 157294-95

DATE: November 30, 2006

PONENTE: CARPIO-MORALES

FACTS:

The Special Prosecution Panel filed before the Sandiganbayan a Request for Issuance of Subpoena Duces
Tecum for the issuance of a subpoena directing the President of Export and Industry Bank (EIB, formerly Urban
Bank) or his/her authorized representative to produce documents relating to Trust Account No. 858 and
Savings Account of President Estrada. The SB granted the request.

Estrada filed a Motion to Quash the subpoenas claiming that his bank accounts are covered by R.A. No. 1405
(The Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) and do not fall under any of the exceptions stated therein. He further
claimed that the specific identification of documents in the questioned subpoenas, including details on dates
and amounts, could only have been made possible by an earlier illegal disclosure thereof by the EIB and the
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) in its capacity as receiver of the then Urban Bank. The
disclosure being illegal, petitioner concluded, the prosecution in the case may not be allowed to make use of
the information. The SB denied the motion.

ISSUE/S:

1. Is the Trust Account covered by the term “deposit”under the Bank Secrecy Law?

2. Are the Trust and Savings Accounts of Estrada excepted from the protection of the Bank Secrecy Law?

3. Does the fruit of poisonous tree principle apply?

RULING:

1. YES. The contention that trust accounts are not covered by the term “deposits,”as used in R.A.
1405, by the mere fact that they do not entail a creditor-debtor relationship between the trustor
and the bank, does not lie. An examination of the law shows that the term “deposits”used therein is
to be understood broadly and not limited only to accounts which give rise to a creditor-debtor
relationship between the depositor and the bank. If the money deposited under an account may be
used by banks for authorized loans to third persons, then such account, regardless of whether it
creates a creditor-debtor relationship between the depositor and the bank, falls under the category
of accounts which the law precisely seeks to protect for the purpose of boosting the economic
development of the country.

Trust Account No. 858 is, without doubt, one such account. The Trust Agreement between Estrada
and Urban Bank provides that the trust account covers “deposit, placement or investment of
funds”by Urban Bank for and in behalf of Estrada. The money deposited under Trust Account No.
858, was, therefore, intended not merely to remain with the bank but to be invested by it
elsewhere. To hold that this type of account is not protected by R.A. 1405 would encourage private
hoarding of funds that could otherwise be invested by banks in other ventures, contrary to the policy
behind the law.

The phrase “of whatever nature”proscribes any restrictive interpretation of “deposits.”Moreover, it

is clear from the immediately quoted provision that, generally, the law applies not only to money
which is deposited but also to those which are invested. This further shows that the law was not
intended to apply only to “deposits”in the strict sense of the word. Otherwise, there would have
been no need to add the phrase “or invested.” Clearly, therefore, R.A. 1405 is broad enough to cover
Trust Account No. 858.

2. YES. The protection afforded by the law is, however, not absolute, there being recognized
exceptions thereto, as abovequoted Section 2 provides. In the present case, two exceptions apply, to
wit: (1) the examination of bank accounts is upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or
dereliction of duty of public officials, and (2) the money deposited or invested is the subject matter
of the litigation.

Estrada contends that since plunder is neither bribery nor dereliction of duty, his accounts are not
excepted from the protection of R.A. 1405. He is wrong. Cases of unexplained wealth are similar to
cases of bribery or dereliction of duty and no reason is seen why these two classes of cases cannot
be excepted from the rule making bank deposits confidential. The policy as to one cannot be
different from the policy as to the other. This policy expresses the notion that a public office is a
public trust and any person who enters upon its discharge does so with the full knowledge that his
life, so far as relevant to his duty, is open to public scrutiny. An examination of the “overt or criminal
acts as described in Section 1(d)”of R.A. No. 7080 would make the similarity between plunder and
bribery even more pronounced since bribery is essentially included among these criminal acts.
Plunder being thus analogous to bribery, the exception to R.A. 1405 applicable in cases of bribery
must also apply to cases of plunder.

The plunder case now pending with the SB necessarily involves an inquiry into the whereabouts of
the amount purportedly acquired illegally by former President Joseph Estrada. In light then of this
Court’s pronouncement in Union Bank, the subject matter of the litigation cannot be limited to bank
accounts under the name of President Estrada alone, but must include those accounts to which the
money purportedly acquired illegally or a portion thereof was alleged to have been transferred.
Trust Account No. 858 and Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9 in the name of petitioner fall under
this description and must thus be part of the subject matter of the litigation.

In sum, exception (1) applies since the plunder case pending against former President Estrada is
analogous to bribery or dereliction of duty, while exception (2) applies because the money deposited
in petitioner’s bank accounts is said to form part of the subject matter of the same plunder case.

3. NO. The “fruit of the poisonous tree”principle, which states that once the primary source (the
“tree”) is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the “fruit”)
derived from it is also inadmissible, does not apply in this case. In the first place, R.A. 1405 does not
provide for the application of this rule. R.A. 1405, it bears noting, nowhere provides that an unlawful
examination of bank accounts shall render the evidence obtained therefrom inadmissible in
evidence. Moreover, there is no basis for applying the same in this case since the primary source for
the detailed information regarding petitioner’s bank accounts—the investigation previously
conducted by the Ombudsman—was lawful.
 EJERCITO V. SANDIGANBAYAN (G.R. NOS. 157294-95)

Facts:

In lieu of the Criminal Case “People v. Estrada” for plunder, the Special Prosecution Panel filed
before the Sandiganbayan a request for issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum directing the President
of Export and Industry Bank or his/her authorized representative to produce documents namely,
Trust Account and Savings Account belonging to petitioner and statement of accounts of one named
“Jose Velarde” and to testify thereon during the hearings. Sandiganbayan granted both requests and
subpoenas were accordingly issued. Sandiganbayan also granted and issued subpoenas prayed for
by the Prosecution Panel in another later date. Petitioner now assisted by his counsel filed two
separate motions to quash the two subpoenas issued. Sandiganbayan denied both motions and the
consequent motions for reconsideration of petitioner.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the trust accounts of petitioner are covered by the term “deposits” as used in
R.A. No. 1405
(2) Whether or not plunder is neither bribery nor dereliction of duty not exempted from protection
of R.A. No. 1405
(3) Whether or not the unlawful examination of bank accounts shall render the evidence obtained
therefrom inadmissible in evidence.

Ruling:

(1) YES. An examination of the law shows that the term “deposits” used therein is to be understood
broadly and not limited only to accounts which give rise to a creditor-debtor relationship between
the depositor and the bank.
The policy behind the law is laid down in Section 1. If the money deposited under an account may be
used by banks for authorized loans to third persons, then such account, regardless of whether it
creates a creditor-debtor relationship between the depositor and the bank, falls under the category
of accounts which the law precisely seeks to protect for the purpose of boosting the economic
development of the country.

Trust Account No. 858 is, without doubt, one such account. The Trust Agreement between petitioner
and Urban Bank provides that the trust account covers “deposit, placement or investment of funds”
by Urban Bank for and in behalf of petitioner. The money deposited under Trust Account No. 858,
was, therefore, intended not merely to remain with the bank but to be invested by it elsewhere. To
hold that this type of account is not protected by R.A. 1405 would encourage private hoarding of
funds that could otherwise be invested by banks in other ventures, contrary to the policy behind the
law.

Section 2 of the same law in fact even more clearly shows that the term “deposits” was intended to
be understood broadly. The phrase “of whatever nature” proscribes any restrictive interpretation of
“deposits.” Moreover, it is clear from the immediately quoted provision that, generally, the law
applies not only to money which is deposited but also to those which are invested. This further
shows that the law was not intended to apply only to “deposits” in the strict sense of the word.
Otherwise, there would have been no need to add the phrase “or invested.”
Clearly, therefore, R.A. 1405 is broad enough to cover Trust Account No. 858.

(2) NO. Cases of unexplained wealth are similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty and no
reason is seen why these two classes of cases cannot be excepted from the rule making bank
deposits confidential. The policy as to one cannot be different from the policy as to the other. This
policy expresses the notion that a public office is a public trust and any person who enters upon its
discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life, so far as relevant to his duty, is open to public
scrutiny.

The crime of bribery and the overt acts constitutive of plunder are crimes committed by public
officers, and in either case the noble idea that “a public office is a public trust and any person who
enters upon its discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life, so far as relevant to his duty,
is open to public scrutiny” applies with equal force.
Plunder being thus analogous to bribery, the exception to R.A. 1405 applicable in cases of bribery
must also apply to cases of plunder.

(3) NO. Petitioner’s attempt to make the exclusionary rule applicable to the instant case fails. R.A.
1405, it bears noting, nowhere provides that an unlawful examination of bank accounts shall render
the evidence obtained therefrom inadmissible in evidence. Section 5 of R.A. 1405 only states that
“[a]ny violation of this law will subject the offender upon conviction, to an imprisonment of not
more than five years or a fine of not more than twenty thousand pesos or both, in the discretion of
the court.”
Even assuming arguendo, however, that the exclusionary rule applies in principle to cases involving
R.A. 1405, the Court finds no reason to apply the same in this particular case. Clearly, the “fruit of
the poisonous tree” doctrine presupposes a violation of law. If there was no violation of R.A. 1405 in
the instant case, then there would be no “poisonous tree” to begin with, and, thus, no reason to
apply the doctrine.

Additional Note: (This case is to be contrasted with Marquez v. Desierto)

The Marquez ruling notwithstanding, the above-described examination by the Ombudsman of
petitioner’s bank accounts, conducted before a case was filed with a court of competent jurisdiction,
was lawful.

For the Ombudsman issued the subpoenas bearing on the bank accounts of petitioner about four
months before Marquez was promulgated on June 27, 2001.

When this Court construed the Ombudsman Act of 1989, in light of the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law
in Marquez, that “before an in camera inspection may be allowed there must be a pending case
before a court of competent jurisdiction”, it was, in fact, reversing an earlier doctrine found in Banco
Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Purisima.

Banco Filipino involved subpoenas duces tecum issued by the Office of the Ombudsman, then known
as the Tanodbayan, in the course of its preliminary investigation of a charge of violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. As the subpoenas subject of Banco Filipino were issued during a
preliminary investigation, in effect this Court upheld the power of the Tandobayan under P.D. 1630
to issue subpoenas duces tecum for bank documents prior to the filing of a case before a court of
competent jurisdiction.

Marquez, on the other hand, practically reversed this ruling in Banco Filipino despite the fact that
the subpoena power of the Ombudsman under R.A. 6770 was essentially the same as that under
P.D. 1630.
The Marquez ruling that there must be a pending case in order for the Ombudsman to validly inspect
bank records in camera thus reversed a prevailing doctrine. Hence, it may not be retroactively
applied. The Ombudsman’s inquiry into the subject bank accounts prior to the filing of any case
before a court of competent jurisdiction was therefore valid at the time it was conducted. In fine,
the subpoenas issued by the Ombudsman in this case were legal, hence, invocation of the “fruit of
the poisonous tree” doctrine is misplaced.

OTHER MATTERS

COMPETENCE AND CREDIBILITTY

SERRA V MUMAR

G.R. No. 193861. March 14, 2012

Topic: Introduction and Admissibility of Evidence

Facts:

 At around 6:30 in the evening of 3 April 2000, there was a vehicular accident along the National
Highway in Barangay Apopong, General Santos City, which resulted in the death of Armando Mumar,
husband of respondent.
 Based on the evidence presented, one Armando Tenerife was driving his Toyota Corolla sedan on the
National Highway heading in the direction of Polomolok, South Cotabato. Tenerife noticed the van
owned by petitioner Serra coming from the opposite direction, which was trying to overtake a
passenger jeep, and in the process encroached on his lane. The left side of the sedan was hit by the
van, causing the sedan to swerve to the left and end up on the other side of the road. The van collided
head on with the motorcycle, which was about 12 meters behind the sedan on the outer lane, causing
injuries to Mumar, which eventually led to his death.
 Petitioner denied that her van was overtaking the jeepney at the time of the incident. She claimed
that the left tire of Tenerife’s sedan burst, causing it to sideswipe her van. Consequently, the left front
tire of the van also burst and the van’s driver, Marciano de Castro, lost control of the vehicle. The van
swerved to the left towards Mumar’s motorcycle. The impact resulted in the death of Mumar.
 Respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for Damages by Reason of Reckless Imprudence
resulting to Homicide before the General Santos City RTC. The RTC, General Santos City promulgated
a judgment against defendant. Petitioner appealed the RTC ruling to the CA which denied the appeal
and affirmed with modification the RTC’s ruling.
 Hence, this petition. Petitioner prays that the assailed CA decision and resolution be reversed and set
aside. In the alternative, petitioner prays that, should the Court sustain the finding of negligence, that
the award of damages for loss of earning capacity in the sum of P1,224,000.00 be completely deleted
for lack of evidentiary basis.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in awarding to herein respondent “loss of earning
capacity” despite complete absence of documentary evidence that the deceased Mumar was self-
employed and earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws in force at the time of
his death
Held: YES. The Court holds that the CA erred in awarding damages for loss of earning capacity in the
absence of documentary evidence to support the claim.

Damages for loss of earning capacity is in the nature of actual damages, which as a rule must be
duly proven by documentary evidence, not merely by the self-serving testimony of the widow. By
way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of
documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is self-employed earning less than the minimum wage
under current labor laws, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased’s line of
work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker
earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.

Based solely on Nelfa’s testimony, the CA determined that the deceased falls within one of these
exceptions. Nelfa testified that her husband was in the business of contracting and manufacturing
grills, fences and gates, and his earnings “exceed P6,000.00” per month prior to his death. She
presented no documentary proof of her claims.

It was error for the CA to have awarded damages for loss of earning capacity based on Nelfa’s
testimony alone. First, while it is conceded that the deceased was self-employed, the Court cannot
accept that in his line of work there was no documentary proof available to prove his income from
such occupation. There would have been receipts, job orders, or some form of written contract or
agreement between the deceased and his clients when he is contracted for a job. Second, and more
importantly, decedent was not earning “less than the minimum wage” at the time of his death.
Respondent testified that her husband was earning not less than P6,000.00 per month. On the other
hand, the highest minimum wage rate at the time of the accident, based on Wage Order No. RTWPB-
XI-07, was P148.00. At that rate, the monthly minimum wage would be P3,256.00, clearly an amount
less than what respondent testified to as her husband’s monthly earnings. The deceased would not
fall within the recognized exceptions. There is therefore no basis for the CA’s computation for
Mumar’s supposed net earning capacity and the subsequent award of damages due to loss of
earning capacity.
The petition is partly granted. The Court affirms the decision of the CA, but modifies the award for
damages.

PEOPLE v SABADLAB
March 14, 2012|
Bersamin

Competence and Credibility

Doctrine: The task of assigning values to the testimonies of witnesses and of weighing their credibility is
best left to the trial judge by virtue of the first-hand impressions he derives while the witnesses testify
before him.

Summary: AAA was raped by Sabadlab and two other men. Although she did not know the names of the
3
men, She recognized one (Sabadlab) to be the man who had persistently greeted her every time she
bought pandesal. On the strength of AAA’s testimony and identification, Sabadlab was convicted of
forcible abduction with rape by the RTC which the CA affirmed. Sabadlab now questions the credibility
of AAA’s testimony. SC upheld its credibility but changed the crime to simple rape.
Facts:
March 12, 2002 (noon): AAA (16 y/o domestic helper) was on her way to pick up her employer’s
son from school. Suddenly, a man (Sabadlab) grabbed her and ordered her to go with him. She
refused but Sabadlab poked a gun at her throat.
She recognized him to be the man who had persistently greeted her every time she had
bought pandesal at 5 AM
Two other men joined Sabadlab at that point. They forced her into a car, and blindfolded her. After
20 min of travel, she was brought out of the car, still blindfolded, undressed, had her hands tied
and was raped.
 Although blindfolded, she knew that it was Sabadlab who raped her first because his cohorts
were calling out his name as he was kissing her body.
The others took their turns in raping her after Sabadlab. She could not remember how many times
they raped her.
Around 3PM: AAA was released after she was warned that they would kill her if she told anyone.
AAA lied about the incident but was forced (slapped and boxed) by her employer to disclose what
had happened.
Her employer took her to the police station and a medico-legal examination was conducted.
AAA and the police went to where AAA bought pandesal and Sabadlab was arrested. The City
Prosecutor filed an information charging Sabadlab and two John Does with forcible abduction
with rape.
RTC convicted Sabadlab based on AAA’s positive identification, observing that her physical
injuries and fresh hymenal lacerations were consistent with her account of the rapes.
CA sustained the conviction.

Issues:
WoN RTC and CA erred in giving Weight and Credence to AAA’s testimony – NO

The supposed inconsistencies dwelled on minor details or collateral matters that the CA precisely
held to be badges of veracity and manifestations of truthfulness due to their tendency of
demonstrating that the testimony had not been rehearsed or concocted.
It is also basic that inconsistencies bearing on minor details or collateral matters should not
adversely affect the substance of the witness declaration, veracity, or weight of testimony.
The only inconsistencies that might have discredited the victims credible testimony were those that
affected or related to the elements of the crime. Alas, that was not true herein
The supposed inconsistencies were inconsequential to the issue of guilt. For one, the matter of who
of the three rapists had blindfolded and undressed AAA was trifling, because her confusion did not
alter the fact that she had been really blindfolded and rendered naked. Nor did the failure to
produce any torn apparel of AAA disprove the crime charged, it being without dispute that the
tearing of the victims apparel was not necessary in the commission of the crime charged. In fact,
she did not even state that her clothes had been torn when Sabadlab had forcibly undressed her.
Verily, details and matters that did not detract from the commission of the crime did not diminish
her credibility.

We hardly need to remind that the task of assigning values to the testimonies of witnesses and
of weighing their credibility is best left to the trial judge by virtue of the first-hand impressions he
derives while the witnesses testify before him. The demeanor on the witness chair of persons sworn
to tell the truth in judicial proceedings is a significant element of judicial adjudication because it
can draw the line between fact and fancy. Their forthright answers or hesitant pauses, their
quivering voices or angry tones, their flustered looks or sincere gazes, their modest blushes or
guilty blanches - all these can reveal if the witnesses are telling the truth or lying in their teeth. As
the final appellate reviewer in this case, then, we bow to the age-old norm to accord the utmost
respect to the findings and conclusions on the credibility of witnesses reached by the trial judge
on account of his unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and on account of his
personal access to the various indicia available but not reflected in the record.

AAAs recollection of the principal occurrence and her positive identification of the rapists,
particularly Sabadlab, were firm. It is reassuring, too, that her trustworthiness in identifying Sabadlab
as one of the rapists rested on her recognition of him as the man who had frequently flirted with
her at the store where she had usually bought pandesal for her employers table.
AAAs failure to shout for help and her failure to escape were not factors that should diminish
credibility due to their being plausibly explained, the first by the fact that her mouth had been stuffed
by Sabadlab with crumpled newspaper, preventing her from making any outcry, and the second by
the fact that the culprits had blindfolded her and had also tied her hands behind her back.
Sabadlabs allegation that AAA did not sustain any bodily injuries (that she did not resist) was
actually contrary to the medical certification showing her several physical injuries and the
 penetration of her female organ. Also, her resistance to Sabadlabs order for her to go with him
was immediately stifled by his poking of the gun at her throat and by appearance of his two cohorts.

WoN the crime was Forcible Abduction with Rape –

NO
The principal objective of Sabadlab and his two cohorts in abducting AAA from Dapitan Street and
in bringing her to another place was to rape and ravish her.
Although forcible abduction was seemingly committed, we cannot hold him guilty of the complex
crime of forcible abduction with rape when the objective of the abduction was to commit the rape.
Under the circumstances, the rape absorbed the forcible abduction.

WoN exemplary damages should be awarded –

YES
Although the CA deleted the RTCs award of exemplary damages because of the absence of
aggravating circumstance (sic), we reinstate the award in view of the attendance of the aggravating
circumstance of use of a deadly weapon in the commission of the crime.
The Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed in a criminal case as part of the
civil liability when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. The Civil
Code allows such damages to be awarded by way of example or correction for the public good, in
addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
Present here was the need for exemplarity. Thus, the CA should have recognized the entitlement
to exemplary damages of AAA on account of the attendance of use of a deadly weapon. It was
of no moment that the use of a deadly weapon was not specifically alleged in the information.

Disposition: WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on April 26, 2006, with
the MODIFICATION that ERLAND SABADLAB BAYQUEL is: (a) DECLARED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT of SIMPLE RAPE

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. JESUSA P. REYES and CONRADO B.

REYES

[G.R. No. 157177, February 11, 2008]

FACTS:

On December 7, 1990, respondent Jesusa Reyes together with her daughter, went to BPI Zapote
Branch to open an ATM account.

Respondent informed one of petitioners employees, Mr. Capati, that they wanted to open an ATM
account for the amount of P200,000.00, P100,000.00 of which shall be withdrawn from her exiting
savings account with BPI bank which is account no. 0233-2433-88 and the other P100,000.00 will be
given by her in cash.

Capati allegedly made a mistake and prepared a withdrawal slip for P200,00.00 to be withdrawn
from her existing savings account with said bank and the respondent believing in good faith that
Capati prepared the papers with the correct amount signed the same unaware of the mistakes in
figures.

Minutes later after the slips were presented to the teller, Capati returned to where the respondent
was seating and informed the latter that the withdrawable balance could not accommodate
P200,000.00.

Respondent explained that she is withdrawing the amount of P100,000.00 only and then changed
and correct the figure two (2) into one (1) with her signature super-imposed thereto signifying the
change, afterwhich the amount of P100,000.00 in cash in two bundles containing 100 pieces of
P500.00 peso bill were given to Capati with her daughter Joan witnessing the same. Thereafter
Capati prepared a deposit slip for P200,000.00 in the name of resondent Jesusa Reyes with the new
account no. 0235-0767-48 and brought the same to the teller's booth.

After a while, he returned and handed to the respondent her duplicate copy of her deposit to
account no. 0235-0767-48 reflecting the amount of P200,000.00 with receipt stamp showing
December 7, as the date.

Later on, respondent would become aware that her ATM account only contained the amount of
P100,000.00 with interest. Hence, she filed an action before the RTC.

Petitioner claimed that there was actually no cash involved with the transactions which happened
on December 7, 1990 as contained in the bank’s teller tape.

On August 12, 1994, the RTC issued a Decision upholding the versions of respondents.

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA which affirmed the RTC decision with modification

ISSUE:

Whether the CA erred in sustaining the RTC's finding that respondent Jesusa made an initial deposit
of P200,000.00 in her newly opened Express Teller account on December 7, 1990.

HELD:

It is a basic rule in evidence that each party to a case must prove his own affirmative allegations by
the degree of evidence required by law. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must
establish his case by preponderance of evidence, or that evidence which is of greater weight or is
more convincing than that which is in opposition to it. It does not mean absolute truth; rather, it
means that the testimony of one side is more believable than that of the other side, and that the
probability of truth is on one side than on the other.

For a better perspective on the calibration of the evidence on hand, it must first be stressed that the
judge who had heard and seen the witnesses testify was not the same judge who penned the
decision. Thus, not having heard the testimonies himself, the trial judge or the appellate court would
not be in a better position than this Court to assess the credibility of witnesses on the basis of their
demeanor.

Hence, to arrive at the truth, we thoroughly reviewed the transcripts of the witnesses' testimonies
and examined the pieces of evidence on record.

After a careful and close examination of the records and evidence presented by the parties, we find
that respondents failed to successfully prove by preponderance of evidence that respondent Jesusa
made an initial deposit of P200,000.00 in her Express Teller account.
 BASTIAN v. CA

April 14, 2008 | Reyes, J. | Credible and Competent

SUMMARY: Bastian was convicted for homicide for killing John Ronquillo. This was witnessed by
Lorna Bandiola. The NPA then took responsibility for what happened. He claims that the RTC and CA
erred in convicting him because the evidence against him was circumstantial. The Court held that
evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only basis on which a court draws its finding of
guilt. Established facts that form a chain of circumstances can lead the mind intuitively or impel a
conscious process of reasoning towards a conviction. There was a combination of unbroken chain of
circumstances consistent with the hypothesis that Ricky Bastian was the assailant and inconsistent
with the hypothesis that he was not.

DOCTRINE: Resort to circumstantial evidence is sanctioned by Rule 133, Section 5 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence and to justify such conviction, the combination of circumstances must be
interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused. The
requisites are: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) facts from which the inferences are
derived have been proven; and 3) the combination of all the circumstances results in a moral
certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the one who has committed the crime.

FACTS:

 Lorna went to Solido Elementary school to fetch her children who went to a dance party when she
saw Ricky Bastian with his co-accused. On their way out of the campus, Lorna witnessed her son-in-
law, John Ronquillo get shot multiple times by Bastian.
 Bastian and his co-accused were all indicted for murder. The petitioner (Bastian) waived the conduct
of a pre-trial conference thus a trial on the merits ensued
 The evidence of the prosecution relied principally by witnesses—Lorna Bandiola, Dr. Gloria Boliver
(from the Health Office), and Jose Roo (PNP).
 The defense version was founded on denial: he presented 7 witnesses saying that on that evening, he
was in the house of the Brgy. Captain getting drunk until 12:30 am—he did not wake up until 8 am
and only learned at 2pm that John was shot.
 RTC: convicted petitioner for homicide instead of murder and acquitted his co-accused
 CA: Affirmed
 (Btw, sa discussion lang sa ruling nag-appear yung fact so I’m not sure where to put it
chronologically: The NPA has since taken credit for the killing of John Ronquillo. Apparently they
found Ronquillo liable for murder and rape so they executed him daw)
 Thus, this petition for certiorari

RULING: Decision AFFIRMED

Whether or not the courts gravely erred in convicting Bastian despite the fact that the NPA already
publicly claimed responsibility for the killing of John Ronquillo—NO

 Petitioner: testimony of the witnesses is circumstantial and unworthy of credence and belief. Also,
NPA took credit for the crime.
 Court: No reason to depart from the findings and conclusions reached by the trial court and the CA.
The Court puts great weight on the factual findings of the trial judge who conducted the trial of the
case and heard testimonies of the witnesses themselves.
 People v. Sanchez: “The matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and
most competently performed by the trial judge who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the
witnesses and to assess their credibility by the various indicia available but not reflected in the
record. The demeanor of the person on the stand can draw the line between fact and fancy. The
 forthright answer or the hesitant pause, the quivering voice or the angry tone, the flustered look or
the sincere gaze, the modest blush or the guilty blanch these can reveal if the witness is telling the
truth or lying in his teeth.”
 That the NPA allegedly publicly claimed responsibility is beside the point—such claims are not
binding upon the court and does not preclude it from determining the real killer in accordance with
the rule of evidence and settled jurisprudence.
 CJ Hilario Davide in People v. Quijada is quoted by the Court saying:
o “Settled is the rule that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility
of witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect. For, the trial court has the
advantage of observing the witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or
falsehood, such as the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a
discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a
ready reply; or the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the
sincere or the flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the
candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage
and mien.”
 Compared to appellate magistrates who merely deal and contend with the cold and inanimate pages
of the transcript of stenographic notes and the original records brought before them, the trial judge
confronts the victim or his heirs, the accused and their respective witnesses. He personally observes
their conduct, demeanor and deportment while responding to the questions propounded by both the
prosecutor and defense counsel. Moreover, it is also the trial judge who has the opportunity to pose
clarificatory questions to the parties
 Such findings have great weight and sometimes even conclusive on the appellate court.
 RULE: When findings of the trial courts have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are
generally binding upon this Court

TOPIC

 Petitioner insists that the inference upon which the conviction was premised was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt because the RTC and CA relied on circumstantial evidence.
 COURT: Circumstantial evidence is defined as that evidence that indirectly proves a fact in issue
through an inference which the fact-finder draws from the vidence established. Resort to it is
essential when the lack of direct testimony would result in setting a felon free.
 Evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only basis on which a court draws its finding of
guilt. Established facts that form a chain of circumstances can lead the mind intuitively or impel a
conscious process of reasoning towards a conviction
 Resort to circumstantial evidence is sanctioned by Rule 133, Section 5 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence
 The following are the requisites for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support conviction:
o there is more than one circumstance,
o the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven, and
o the combination of all the circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to
the exclusion of all others, is the one who has committed the crime.
 Thus, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances
must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.
 The trial court pointed to the following circumstantial evidence that sufficiently identified
petitioner as the author of the gruesome killing:
o Circumstance No. 1: The fact that Nemelyn heard gunshots and saw gun-flashes twenty
(20) meters away while she was on her way out of the school campus approaching the
main gate;
o Circumstance No. 2: The fact that after she heard gunshots, a short while thereafter, she
saw Ricky Bastian holding a gun running past behind her five (5) meters away coming
from the direction where the shots came from; and
o Circumstance No. 3: The fact that when she lighted with her flashlights the place where
she heard gunshots, she saw the victim lying dead on the ground.
 These are a combination of unbroken chain of circumstances consistent with the hypothesis that
Ricky Bastian was the assailant and inconsistent with the hypothesis that he was not.
  These unbroken chain of circumstances taken collectively engendered moral certainty for the
Court to believe that Ricky Bastian was the assailant. Nemelyns opportunity, however, of
identifying Ricky Bastian as the assailant was put to question by the accused through their
witnesses
 Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that the testimony of Nemelyn Tulio can be discarded,
petitioners conviction founded on the positive declarations of eyewitness Lorna Bandiola still
stands on terra firma.
 The rule is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that in determining the value and credibility
of evidence, witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered. The testimony of only one witness, if
credible and positive, is sufficient to convict
 People v. Toyco: “It is axiomatic that truth is established not by the number of witnesses but by the
quality of their testimonies. The testimony of a single witness if positive and credible is sufficient
to support a conviction even in a charge of murder.”

MULTIPLE ADMINISIBILITY
CONDITIONAL ADMINISIBILITY
CURATIVE ADMINISIBILITY
DIRECT AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

People v Matito

Direct and Circumstantial Evidence | Feb 24, 2004 | Panganiban

Nature of Case/Keywords: Appeal; Neighbors; Water supply; Fence

SUMMARY: RTC found Matito guilty for the murder of Raymundo on the strength of the following
circumstantial evidence: 1st: wife’s testimony narrating how her husband, before he died, had identified his
killer, 2nd: victim’s daughter narrated how appellant had spoken with her that fateful evening, 3 rd: a bitter
quarrel ensued between the victim and appellant when the latters water supply was cut off by the former, the
barangay tanod, and the secretary of the Homeowners Association, 4 th: when asked by his neighbors (including
the victim) to widen the right of way along his premises, appellant refused, 5th: there was a bitter quarrel
between their daughters, 6th: nitrate powder was conclusively proven to be present on the cast taken from the
right hand of appellant. SC convicted Matito of homicide and held that circumstantial evidence, when
demonstrated with clarity and forcefulness, may be the sole basis of a criminal conviction. It cannot be
overturned by bare denials or hackneyed alibis.

DOCTRINE: To warrant a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the following requisites must concur: (1)
there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3)
the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The
totality of the evidence must constitute an unbroken chain showing the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.

FACTS:

 Malolos, Bulacan RTC found Ferdinand Matito (Freddie) guilty of murder and sentenced him to reclusion
perpetua.

Prosecution Version: Oct 16, 1998, around 10:30PM, in San Roque, Hagonoy, Bulacan, Filomena Raymundo
heard gunshots just moments after her husband Mariano Raymundo, Jr. had stepped out of their house to go
to the backyard to attend to his quails. Filomena rushed to the kitchen door and, upon opening it, saw Mariano
who was about to come in. He was pressing his hands on his shoulder which was bloodied and bleeding. Once
inside the house, Filomena asked Mariano what happened and who did it to him. Mariano replied: Binaril ako
ni Pareng Freddie. Binaril ako ni Pareng Freddie. Mariano pushed Filomena away from the door when she tried
to look outside. Mariano was boarded on a tricycle and rushed to the Divine World Hospital where he was
pronounced dead.

 Dr. Manuel Aves conducted an autopsy examination on the victim at the Hagonoy District Hospital. It
revealed that the victim sustained 1 fatal wound on the right lateral neck at the area of the carotid
triangle; 2 other wounds on the left shoulder and right hand. Dr. Aves placed the cause of death to
hypovolemic shock due to GSW, neck.
 The following day, the police invited appellant and his father for questioning and conducted paraffin tests
on them. Filomena identified them as the last persons with whom Mariano had a quarrel prior to his
death.
 Oct 19, Teresita Lopez, Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory submitted her report that the right
hand cast of appellant was positive for powder nitrates.
 Mariano was a barangay tanod and the secretary of their neighborhood association. A month prior to his
death, he cut the supply of water to the house of appellant for his failure to pay his bills for 2 months. He
also had interceded for some neighbors who demanded that appellant move his fence away from their
walk path. Then, about 6:30PM of Oct 16, his daughter, met appellant along the road. After asking her
where her father was, appellant cursed: Putang ina iyang Tatay mo. Yari sa akin iyang Tatay mo. She
observed that appellant was drunk and his eyes were red
Defense Version:

 Witness CEFERINO GALVEZ, third cousin of victim who testified that while at victim’s wake, the widow told
him that her husband was already dead and was not able to say anything since blood was already coming
out through his nose and mouth. On cross-examination, he testified that the accused is a nephew of his
wife and during the time he went to the wake of the victim, the accused was outside the yard.
 Witness DR. MANUEL AVES, on direct examination, testified that the victim sustained 3 gunshot wounds
and the most fatal of which was the one that was inflicted in the neck of the deceased. The said injury was
a bloody one that it can block the air passage of the victim making him unable to talk. On cross-
examination, the doctor testified that the injury of the victim affected the larynx which was so severe that
it was not possible that he could talk as his injury was in the neck.
 The accused testified that he knew the victim because his wife is his sons godmother in his confirmation.
He is also a neighbor. On Oct 16, between the hours of 10 to 11PM he was at home with his wife and 4
children. On that night, at about past 8PM, after having dinner, his family went to bed. Between the hours
of 1 to 2 in the morning of the next day, they were awakened by 2 policemen who told him that they
needed to talk to him about the killing that happened that day.
 At about 2 in the morning, he was brought to the laboratory allegedly for examination but the
examination did not push through because the crime lab at that time had no wax so they asked them to
return on the Oct 17. Thereafter, he was told that the examination showed that the results gave a positive
result and thereafter he was incarcerated. On re-direct examination, he testified that he was incarcerated
on Oct 19. Between the dates of Oct 16 to 18 he was not yet incarcerated, he was attending the wake of
his kumpadre.
 The accused denied the allegations testified to by the victim’s daughter, that between the hours of 6PM of
Oct 16, he was already at home and the allegations as testified to by the widow of the victim and denied
having any misunderstanding with the victim when it cut-off the water supply. That they left a one meter
passage when they put a barbed wire fence around their house. The accused denied having any heated
argument or quarrel with the victim because ever since, they had good relationship as neighbors.

RTC: Debunking the defenses of denial and alibi, it accepted the testimony of the widow that her husband,
prior to his death, declared that it was appellant who had gunned him down. It based its conclusion on her
testimony and other pieces of circumstantial evidence, such as the presence of nitrate powder on the cast
taken from the right hand of appellant; the bitter quarrel that ensued between him and the victim after the
latter had cut off the formers water supply; the denial by appellant of the request of his neighbors (including
the victim) to widen the right of way along the premises of his house; and hours before the victim was killed,
the threatening remarks of appellant to the formers daughter.

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

WoN the prosecution evidence was sufficient - YES

 The hornbook doctrine is that the trial court, which has the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses on the stand, is in the best position to discern whether they are telling the truth. Thus, unless
tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of significance and influence, its
factual findings are accorded the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. In this
case, no sufficient reason was advanced by appellant to justify a deviation from this principle.

The RTC accepted Felomena’s story, because it cannot imagine the widow inventing such narrative against the
accused, if the victim did not really tell her that, and risking to let the real killer of her husband go scot free.

 The RTC deemed as incredulous the story proffered by the defense on the manner of the victims death.
Rosalina de Guzman, who was presented by the latter as eyewitness, narrated in her testimony how 3
armed men had grappled with the victim before he died. That one of these 3 men stabbed him on the
neck; when he fought back, he was shot by another one of them. This concoction was implausible,
because the autopsy shows that (1) the victim sustained 3 gunshot wounds, not just one such wound; and
(2) the fatal injury on his neck was a bullet, not a stab, wound.

Dying declaration
o A dying declaration, also known as a statement in articulo mortis, may be received in evidence
under Section 37 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which we quote: SEC. 37. Dying Declaration. The
declaration of a dying person, made under a consciousness of an impending death, may be received
in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding
circumstances of such death. To be admissible, the following requisites should be met: (a) the
declaration must concern the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarants death; (b)
at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of impending death; (c)
he or she is competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration is offered in a case in which the
declarants death is the subject of the inquiry.
o Even though Dr. Aves was accepted as an expert witness by both parties, he was not identified as a
speech therapist or as a neurologist who could authoritatively establish a causal connection
between carotid blood vessel injuries and functional damage to the voice box. Neither was he able
to relate those injuries to any of the nerves that controlled the speech mechanism of the victim.
Moreover, there was no evidence of injury to the tongue, the lips or the mouth of the victim-
organs responsible for audible and articulate speech - injury to which might have prevented him
from communicating audibly to his wife before he lost consciousness.

o In addition, the fact that he was still able to enter the house after being shot 3 times, and the
significant lapse of time before he died in the hospital, showed that he had ample time to
communicate to his wife the assailants identity. That there was no way the victim could have told
his wife before he died that it was appellant who had shot him cannot be accorded absolute
credence and faith, as such testimony was given by Dr. Aves who was not a speech therapist or a
neurologist.

 Circumstantial Evidence
o Circumstantial evidence is defined as that evidence that indirectly proves a fact in issue through an
inference which the factfinder draws from the evidence established. Resort thereto is essential
when the lack of direct testimony would result in setting a felon free. It is not a weaker form of
evidence vis-a-vis direct evidence. Cases have recognized that in its effect upon the courts, the
former may surpass the latter in weight and probative force.
 o To warrant a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the following requisites must concur: (1)
there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. The totality of the evidence must constitute an unbroken chain showing the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
o On the strength of the circumstantial evidence proven in the current case, we hold that the court a
quo did not err in convicting appellant of the crime charged. The combination of the circumstances
comprising such evidence forms an unbroken chain that points to appellant, to the exclusion of all
others, as the perpetrator of the crime.

1st: Wife’s testimony narrating how her husband, before he died, had identified his killer
2nd: Victim’s daughter narrated how appellant had spoken with her that fateful evening
3rd: A bitter quarrel ensued between the victim and appellant when the latters water supply was cut off by the
former, the barangay tanod, and the secretary of the Homeowners Association.
4th: When asked by his neighbors (including the victim) to widen the right of way along his premises, appellant
refused.
5th: There was a bitter quarrel between their daughters
6th: Nitrate powder was conclusively proven to be present on the cast taken from the right hand of appellant.

o Widow she explained that she had not mentioned the dying declaration at the wake, so that
appellant would not be forewarned that her husband had recognized him as the killler.
o Appellant assails this last piece of evidence, because the forensic chemist examined the cast on Oct
19 - 2 days after it had been taken by police authorities. According to appellant, it may be possible
that the gun nitrate was implanted by the police in their desire to accomplish something
 This argument does not persuade. Basic is the rule that police authorities enjoy the

presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duties

 Circumstantial evidence, when demonstrated with clarity and forcefulness, may be the sole basis of a
criminal conviction. It cannot be overturned by bare denials or hackneyed alibis.

Denial and Alibi

o Alibi and denial, when unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and
selfserving, undeserving of any weight in law. Alibi is an inherently weak defense, for it is easy to
fabricate and difficult to disprove. Appellant must prove that he was not only at some other place
when the crime was committed, but that it was impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the
time the crime was perpetrated. This he failed to do. He cannot be exculpated from the crime by his
contention that he was at home sleeping when the victim was killed. Their homes were only 50
meters apart; thus, it was not impossible for the former to be at the locus criminis when the crime
was committed.

WoN the penalty was proper- NO

 To justify a murder conviction, the qualifying circumstances invoked must be proven as

indubitably as the killing itself. A review of the assailed Decision reveals that the trial judge did
not discuss the presence of any qualifying circumstance that would elevate the killing to murder.
 Absent any qualifying circumstance, he can be convicted only of homicide. Under Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code, the penalty prescribed for such crime is reclusion temporal.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. Appellant is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
HOMICIDE and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 9 years and four (4) months of prision mayor as
minimum; to 16 years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum. He is likewise ordered to pay the
heirs of the victim P50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto and another P50,000 as moral damages. No costs.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARTURO LARA y ORBISTA
REYES, J p: [G.R. No. 199877. August 13, 2012.]

FACTS:
o Information charging Lara with robbery with homicide was filed with the RTC.
o Following Lara's plea of not guilty, trial ensued.
PROSECUTION: 3 witnesses: Enrique Sumulong, SPO1 Bernard Cruz and PO3 Efren Calix
SUMULONG:
 May 31, 2001, 9:00 AM, he withdrew the amount of P230,000.00 from the Metrobank-Mabini Branch, Pasig City to defray
the salaries of the employees of San Sebastian and while at around 10:30 AM, while the pickup he was riding was at the
intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig City, Lara suddenly appeared at the front passenger side of the pick-up
and pointed a gun at him stating, "Akin na ang pera, iyong bag, nasaan?";
 Bautista, one of those who accompanied him told him not to give the bag. He threw the bag in Bautista's direction and
Bautista alighted from the pick-up and ran. Seeing Bautista, Lara ran after him while firing his gun
 He then ran towards Mercedes Plaza and called up the office of San Sebastian to relay the incident and when he went back
to where the pick-up was parked, he went to the rear portion of the vehicle and saw blood on the ground;
 He was informed by one bystander that Bautista was shot and the bag was taken away from him;
 June 7, 2001: While on his way to Pasig City, he saw Lara walking along Dr. Pilapil Street, San Miguel, Pasig City and he
alerted the police and Lara was thereafter arrested. At the police station, he, Atie and Manacob (other companions at
pickup) identified Lara as the one who shot and robbed them of San Sebastian's money.
SPO1 CRUZ
 Around 7:55 PM on June 7, 2001, Sumulong went to the police station and informed him that he saw Lara walking along Dr.
Pilapil Street
 4 police officers and Sumulong went to Dr. Pilapil Street where they saw Lara, who Sumulong identified and they then
approached Lara and invited him for questioning.
 At the police station, Lara was placed in a line-up where he was positively identified by Sumulong, Manacob and Atie; and
after being identified, Lara was informed of his rights and subsequently detained.
PO3 CALIX
 May 31, 2001: he was informed of a robbery that took place and he, together with 3 other police officers, proceeded to the
crime scene wherein upon arriving one of the police officers who were able to respond ahead of them, handed to him 11
pieces of empty shells and 6 deformed slugs of a 9mm pistol;
 As part of his investigation, he interviewed Sumulong, Atie, Manacob at the police station; and before Bautista died, he was
able to interview Bautista at the hospital where the latter was brought after the incident.

DEFENSE:
LARA
o May 31, 2001: he was at his house, digging a sewer trench while his brother, Wilfredo, was constructing a comfort room
which was corroborated by his sister, Edjosa Manalo and neighbor, Simplicia Delos Reyes.
o June 7, 2001 and at around 7:00 in the evening, while he was at the house of one of his cousins, police officers arrived and
asked him if he was Arturo Lara and after confirming that he was Arturo Lara, the police officers asked him to go with them
to the Barangay Hall. He voluntarily went with them and while inside the patrol car, one of the policemen said, "You are
lucky, we were able to caught you in your house, if in another place we will kill you".
o He was brought to the police station and not the barangay hall as he was earlier told where he was investigated for robbery
with homicide and when he told the police that he was at home when the subject incident took place, the police challenged
him to produce witnesses but when his witnesses arrived at the station, one of the police officers told them to come back
the following day.
o While he was at the police line-up holding a name plate, a police officer told Sumulong and Atie, "Ituru nyo na yan at uuwi
na tayo"; and when his witnesses arrived the following day, they were told that he will be subjected to an inquest.

RTC: GUILTY of robbery with homicide sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, with all the
accessory penalties prescribed by law.
 Rejected Lara's defense of alibi as follows because Enrique Sumulong positively identified accused Arturo Lara as the
person who carted away the payroll money of San Sebastian Allied Services, and the one who shot Joselito Bautista
which caused his instantaneous death on the same day. Also, it is not impossible for him to be at the place
ARGUMENTS:
 On appeal, Lara pointed out several errors that supposedly attended his conviction. First, that he was arrested without a
warrant under circumstances that do not justify a warrantless arrest rendered void all proceedings including those that led
to his conviction.
 Second, he was not assisted by counsel when the police placed him in a line-up to be identified by the witnesses for the
prosecution in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. The police line-up is part of custodial investigation and
his right to counsel had already attached.
 Third, the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, the prosecution failed to present a
 witness who actually saw him commit the alleged acts. Sumulong merely presumed that he was the one who shot Bautista
and who took the bag of money from him. The physical description of Lara that Sumulong gave to the police was different
from the one he gave during the trial, indicating that he did not have a fair glimpse of the perpetrator. Moreover, this gives
rise to the possibility that it was his unidentified companion who shot Bautista and took possession of the money. Hence, it
cannot be reasonably claimed that his conviction was attended with moral certainty.
 Fourth, the trial court erred in discounting the testimony of his witnesses. Without any showing that they were impelled by
improper motives in testifying in his favor, their testimonies should have been given the credence they deserve. While his
two (2) witnesses were his sister and neighbor, this does not by itself suggest the existence of bias or impair their credibility.
CA: AFFIRMED conviction.
 AUTOMATIC APPEAL TO SC as the penalty imposed was reclusion perpetua

ISSUES:
1. Whether Lara's supposedly illegal arrest may be raised for the first time on appeal for the purpose of nullifying his
conviction? (YES)
2. Whether the identification made by Sumulong, Atie and Manacob in the police line-up is inadmissible because Lara stood
therein without the assistance of counsel? (NO, identification not custodial investigation)
3. Whether there is sufficient evidence to convict Lara? (YES)
4. Whether Lara's alibi can be given credence so as to exonerate him from the crime charged? (NO)

HELD: DENY appeal.

1. YES. That Lara was supposedly arrested without a warrant may not serve as a ground to invalidate the proceedings leading
to his conviction considering its belated invocation. Any objections to the legality of the warrantless arrest should have been
raised in a motion to quash duly filed before the accused enters his plea; otherwise, it is deemed waived. Further, that the
accused was illegally arrested is not a ground to set aside conviction duly arrived at and based on evidence that sufficiently
establishes culpability:
 Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired through compulsory process such as a warrant of arrest or
through his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or to the court.
 Any objection to the arrest or acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his
plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. An accused submits to the jurisdiction of the trial court upon entering a
plea and participating actively in the trial and this precludes him invoking any irregularities that may have attended his
arrest. In voluntarily submitting himself to the court by entering a plea, instead of filing a motion to quash the information
for lack of jurisdiction over his person, accused-appellant is deemed to have waived his right to assail the legality of his
arrest.
 Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient ground to reverse and set aside a conviction that was arrived
upon a complaint duly filed and a trial conducted without error. The warrantless arrest, even if illegal, cannot render void all
other proceedings including those leading to the conviction of the appellants and his co-accused, nor can the state be
deprived of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to their culpability.
 As Section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: Sec. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any
ground therefor. — The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint
or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed
a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g) and (i) of Section 3 of
this Rule.

2. NO. There was no legal compulsion to afford him a counsel during a police line-up since the latter is not part of custodial
investigation and this does not constitute a violation of his right to counsel
 That he stood at the police line-up without the assistance of counsel did not render Sumulong's identification of Lara
inadmissible. The right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at the precise moment custodial investigation begins and
being made to stand in a police line-up is not the starting point or a part of custodial investigation.
 People v. Amestuzo: The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights,
may be invoked only by a person while he is under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation starts when the
police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect
taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit
incriminating statements.
 Police line-up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution
cannot yet be invoked at this stage.
 The right to be assisted by counsel attaches only during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed by the accused
during identification in a police line-up because it is not part of the custodial investigation process. This is because
during a police line-up, the process has not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory and it is usually the
witness or the complainant who is interrogated and who gives a statement in the course of the line-up.
 An exception to this rule is when the accused had been the focus of police attention at the start of the investigation.
In the case at bench, appellant was identified in a police line-up by prosecution witnesses from a group of persons
gathered for the purpose. However, there was no proof that appellant was interrogated at all or that a statement or
 confession was extracted from him. During the police line-up, the accusatory process had not yet commenced.
 Assuming there was interrogation, any allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant and
material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the
basis of their conviction. Here, appellant was convicted based on the testimony of a prosecution witness and not on his
alleged uncounseled confession or admission.

3. YES. Contrary to appellant's assertion, prosecution witness Sumulong actually saw him shoot Bautista, the victim. Also, it is
apparent from the assailed decision of the CA that the finding of guilt against Lara is based on circumstantial evidence.
 Not only direct evidence but also circumstantial evidence can overcome the presumption of innocence. Direct evidence
of the commission of the crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of
guilt. Even in the absence of direct evidence, conviction can be had if the established circumstances constitute an
unbroken chain, consistent with each other and to the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, to the exclusion of all
other hypothesis that he is not.
 REQUISITES OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE: Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,
circumstantial evidence sufficed to convict upon the concurrence of the following requisites: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
 It is not only by direct evidence that an accused may be convicted of the crime for which he is charged. Resort to
circumstantial evidence is essential since to insist on direct testimony would, in many cases, result in setting felons free
and denying proper protection to the community.
 Here, the following circumstantial evidence are tellingly sufficient to prove the guilt of appellant:
o While the vehicle was at the intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig City, appellant suddenly
emerged and pointed a gun at prosecution witness Sumulong, demanding from him to produce the bag
containing the money.
o Prosecution witness Sumulong threw the bag to the victim who was then seated at the backseat of the vehicle.
o The victim alighted from vehicle carrying the bag
o Appellant chased and fired several shots at the victim.
o The victim sustained several gunshot wounds.
o The police officers recovered from the scene of the crime six deformed empty shells.
 Indeed, in cases of robbery with homicide, the taking of personal property with intent to gain must itself be established
beyond reasonable doubt. The mere presence of the accused at the crime scene is not enough to implicate him. It is
essential to prove the intent to rob and the use of violence was necessary to realize such intent.
o In this case, Lara's intent to gain is proven by Sumulong's positive narration that it was Lara who pointed the
gun at him and demanded that the bag containing the money be turned over to him. That Lara resorted to
violence in order to actualize his intent to gain is proven by Sumulong's testimony that he saw Lara fire the gun
at the direction of Bautista, who was running away from the pick-up in order to prevent Lara from taking
possession of the money.
o Notably, the incident took place in broad daylight and in the middle of a street. Thus, where considerations of
visibility are favorable and the witness does not appear to be biased against the accused, his or her
assertions as to the identity of the malefactor should be normally accepted.
o Lara did not allege, much less, convincingly demonstrate that Sumulong was impelled by improper or malicious
motives to impute upon him, however perjurious, such a serious charge. Thus, his testimony, which the trial
court found to be forthright and credible, is worthy of full faith and credit and should not be disturbed. If an
accused had nothing to do with the crime, it is against the natural order of events and of human nature and
against the presumption of good faith that a prosecution witness would falsely testify against the former.
4. NO. In view of Sumulong's positive identification of Lara, the CA was correct in denying Lara's alibi outright. It is well-settled
that positive identification prevails over alibi, which is inherently a weak defense. Such is the rule, for as a defense, alibi is
easy to concoct, and difficult to disapprove.
 In order for the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be demonstrated that:
o that he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime
o he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the place of the crime or
its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.
 Physical impossibility "refers to the distance between the place where the accused was when the
crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the
two places.
 Proximity of Lara's house at the scene of the crime wholly negates his alibi. He himself admitted that his house was just
a stone's throw (about three minutes away) from the crime scene. Lara and his witnesses failed to prove that it is well-
nigh impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.
DISPOSITIVE: CA AFFIRMED

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs. ROLDAN A. OCHATE alias “Boy,” accused-appellant
Criminal Law; Rape with Homicide; Evidence; Requisites to sustain a conviction of an accused based on circumstantial evidence;
Basic guidelines in the appreciation of circumstantial evidence.—The requisites to sustain a conviction of an accused based on
circumstantial evidence are: (1) there must be more than one circumstance; (2) the inference must be based on proven facts;
and (3) the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. And in
the appreciation of circumstantial evidence, there are four basic guidelines: (1) it should be acted upon with caution; (2) all the
essential facts must be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt; (3) the facts must exclude every other theory but that of guilt;
and (4) the facts must establish such a certainty of guilt of the accused as to convince the judgment beyond a reasonable doubt
that the accused is the one who committed the offense.

Same; Same; Same; Quantum of Proof; Mere suspicion, no matter how strong it may be, is not sufficient to sustain conviction;
Enshrined in the Bill of Rights is the right of the accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and to overcome
the presumption nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt must be established by the
prosecution.—But then, mere suspicion, no matter how strong it may be, is not sufficient to sustain conviction. Law and
jurisprudence demand proof beyond reasonable doubt before any person may be deprived of his life, liberty, or even property.

Enshrined in the Bill of Rights is the right of the accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and to overcome
the presumption nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt must be established by the prosecution. The constitutional
presumption of innocence requires courts to take “a more than casual consideration” of every circumstances or doubt proving
the innocence of the accused.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the circumstances obtaining in a case are capable of two inferences, one of which is
consistent with the presumption of innocence while the other may be compatible with the finding of guilt, the court must
acquit the accused.—Jurisprudence instructs that where the circumstances obtaining in a case are capable of two inferences,
one of which is consistent with the presumption of innocence while the other may be compatible with the finding of guilt, the
court must acquit the accused because the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and, therefore, is insufficient to
support a judgment of conviction.

Same; Same; Same; Same; A finding of guilt must rest on the strength of the prosecution’s own evidence and not on the
weakness or absence of evidence for the defense.—Doubtless, accusedappellant’s
defenses of alibi and denial are weak. Nevertheless, it is a settled principle in criminal law that a finding of guilt must rest on the
strength of the prosecution’s own evidence and not on the weakness or absence of evidence for the defense. In the present
case, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is not sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.

Constitutional Law; Confessions; Accused-appellant confessed his guilt in the absence of a counsel and without being informed
of his constitutional rights; His confessions are inadmissible in evidence having been obtained in violation of the provisions of
Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.—Custodial investigation, as defined in Miranda vs. Arizona is any questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant way. Pantallano and Cawley are law enforcement officers, the former being a CAFGU member and the latter,
an NBI officer. With respect to Pantallano, accusedappellant’s confession was made when the former was pointing his gun at the
latter; thus, effectively depriving ac cused-appellant of his freedom of action. On the other hand, accused-appellant’s confession
to Dr. Cawley was made when the former is already under detention. Both Pantallano and Cawley elicited questions that
prompted accused-appellant to confess his guilt in the absence of a counsel and without being informed of his constitutional
rights. Hence, it is clear that his confessions are inadmissible in evidence having been obtained in violation of the provisions of
Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

Same; Same; The confession made by the accused-appellant to the barangay captain is inadmissible because it appeared that
the conversation between the two was part of the ongoing police investigation.—While it is true that the barangay captain is
not a police officer or a law enforcement agent, it is clear from the records that he asked his question in the course of police
interrogation without the accused-appellant being informed of his rights under the constitution. In People vs. Morada, this Court
held that the confession made by the accused-appellant to the barangay captain is inadmissible because it appeared that the
conversation between the two was part of the then ongoing police investigation.

AUTOMATIC REVIEW of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, Br. 11.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellant.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
On automatic review is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte (Branch 11) dated
September 20, 1996 in Criminal Case No. S-2504 finding accused Roldan A. Ochate guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with
homicide, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of the victim the amount of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).
:

COMULATIVE AND CORROBORATING EVIDENCE

DENNIS MANGANGEY, GABRIEL WANASON, and ANSELMO FORAYO v. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES
February 18, 2008 | Velasco, Jr., J. | Circumstantial Evidence

SUMMARY: Petitioners were charged with and convicted for estafa through falsification of public documents for a road-
widening and relocation project of Banilag-Minoli Road in Mountain Province. They certified that the project was completed,
thus, contractor was paid, even though the COA Engineer inspected and found that the project is not yet finished. Petitioners
insist that the circumstantial evidence presented in the Sandiganbayan were not enough to warrant their conviction. The Court
sustained the Sandiganbayan ruling. The Court held that Mangangey did not inspect the road project. He certified that the
subject project was completed exactly to the approximate volume of excavated earth without making any measurements of the
earthworks accomplished. Forayo and Wanason willfully signed the Certificate of Inspection and Acceptance, and certified that
they personally inspected the road when in fact they did not. The facts and the circumstances when strung together duly prove
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt

DOCTRINE: Under Sec. 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court on Revised Rules of Evidence, circumstantial evidence would be
sufficient to convict the offender if (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. A
judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken
chain that leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty
person, that is, the circumstances proven must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is
guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty.

FACTS

The Municipality of Paracelis, Mountain Province undertook the widening and partial relocation of the Banilag-Minoli Road. The
project was awarded to private contractor Leon Acapen.
The project was allegedly completed on December 8, 1986 as shown in the Certificate of Inspection and Acceptance dated
December 8, 1986. The certificate was prepared and signed by Construction and Maintenance Foreman Dennis Mangangey, who
attested that he personally inspected the project and that it was 100% completed in accordance with the agreed specifications.

In another Certificate of Inspection and Acceptance, with the same date, the signatories, namely: Municipal Planning and
Development Coordinator Gabriel Wanason, petitioner herein, as the Mayor’s representative; Municipal Revenue Clerk Anselmo
Forayo, petitioner herein, as the Treasurer’s representative; and Bernardo Acapen (now deceased), as the Engineer’s
representative, all attested that they personally inspected the work done by Leon and found the work in accordance with the
approved program of work. The Government subsequently issued a check for PhP 106,970 as payment for the project.

Subsequently, somebody complained to COA about the anomalies in the construction of the road. The COA Regional Director
directed Technical Audit Specialist Engr. Hospicio Angluben to conduct an actual site inspection. Part of his affidavit/report on
the inspection stated that out of the 4,010 cu.m. only 365 cu.m. was actually accomplished, but the contract was certified to be
completed and fully paid.
An Amended Information for Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents charged Paracelis Mayor Matthew Wandag,
Municipal Revenue Clerk Forayo, Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator Wanason, and Construction and
Maintenance Foreman of the Office of the Provincial Engineer Mangangey.
All pleaded not guilty. Wandag who took flight to the United States.

SANDIGANBAYAN: Convicted petitioners for the crime of estafa through falsification of public documents, with the exception of
Leon

In its Decision, the Sandiganbayan found that the signatories of the Certificate of Inspection and Acceptance, namely,
Mangangey, Wanason, Forayo, and the late Bernardo, in their own official functions, falsified a public document when they
attested that they personally inspected the work of Leon and reported that it was 100% completed in accordance with the plans,
specifications, and contract requirements notwithstanding that the work on the aforesaid project was not yet finished. The
Sandiganbayan found that petitioners conspired with the accused Wandag to defraud the Government
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. Hence, we have this petition for review
RULING: Petition DENIED.

Whether or not, under the facts alleged and proven, the accused may be held liable for the offense of estafa through
falsification of public document – YES

The Sandiganbayan found that Wandag masterminded the fraud and that the local government funded road project was neither
submitted to public bidding nor were the required documents on the road project in order when it was launched. Ostensibly,
Leon was merely pressured to sign the contract.
The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioners of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of a public document penalized
under Articles 315 and 171 in relation to Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
There is no question that petitioners were public officials and employees performing their official duty when they certified in a
public document that they inspected and found that the road project was 100% complete per contract specifications.

COA Examining Technical Audit Specialist Angluben testified on October 28, 1994 and stated in his affidavit that the facts in the
certificates of inspection and acceptance were false. His testimony was based on the specifications of the pakyaw contract as
evinced by the Individual Project Program for Roads and Bridges in the Mountain Province, the original Cross-Section of the
Program for Banilag-Minoli Road widening and partial relocation road project, and the earthwork computations. According to
Angluben, the earthworks dug were only 364.5 cu. m., short of the estimated 4,010 cu. m. He also found that no earthworks
were done on the estimated 1,800 cu. m. for removal of slides and overbreaks. The payment of the completed road project was
going to be based on the actual volume of the earthworks as clearly specified in the pakyaw contract, vis-à-vis the estimates of
the volume of earthworks in the project. The only conclusion that could be drawn is that the Banilag-Minoli Road was far from
finished at the time the certifications were signed by petitioners and when the government paid for the road project.

Based on the aforesaid documents and Angluben’s testimony, we agree with the Sandiganbayan that Mangangey lied in his
declarations.

First, his erroneous identification of the starting point of the project puts into doubt his claim that he personally inspected the
road project.

Second, we find it suspect that Mangangey, a foreman and a supposed technical expert of the Provincial Engineers Office, could
not specify the width and the extent of the work done on the road.

Third, Mangangeys report that the actual earthworks excavated were exactly the same as the approximated volume of
earthworks to be excavated is highly improbable. He also offered no proof to rebut the results of the technical audit of
Angluben.

As to the credibility of Angluben, it is a familiar and fundamental doctrine that the determination of the credibility of witnesses
is the domain of the trial court as it is in the best position to observe the witnesses demeanor. Angluben’s oral testimony is
supported by documentary evidence. Under the circumstances of this case, we are not inclined to depart from this principle.

Besides, Forayo and Wanason clearly admitted in their counter-affidavits that they did not personally inspect the project when
they affixed their signatures on the Certificate of Inspection and Acceptance. According to Forayo, he merely relied on the late
Bernardos signature. Wanason said he signed because he was threatened by Wandag.

Now, as to the requirement that the accused had a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated, suffice it to say
that a Certificate of Inspection and Acceptance is required in the processing of vouchers for the payment of government
projects. Patently, the falsification of this document by the petitioners caused the release of the payment for an unfinished road
at great cost to the Government.
Similarly, we find that the charge of estafa through falsification of public documents under Art. 315, par. 2(a) of the RPC was
likewise proven.

The first element, that the accused made false pretenses or fraudulent representations, need not be discussed all over. We have
sufficiently gone over this matter.

The same holds true with the requirement that these falsifications were made during the commission of the crime. The falsified
certificates of inspection and acceptance resulted in the government paying for the unfinished project to the disadvantage and
injury of the State. Altogether, the elements of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document are present.

Whether the petitioners conspired with Wandag to defraud the Government by making untruthful statements in the
certificates of inspection and acceptance – YES

There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. Conspiracy may be shown through
circumstantial evidence, deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of
the accused themselves when such lead to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest. must be
proven as convincingly as the criminal act itself like any element of the offense charged, conspiracy must be established by proof
beyond reasonable doubt.
For a co-conspirator to be liable for the acts of the others, there must be intentional participation in the conspiracy with a view
to further a common design

In this case, the ascertained facts abovementioned and the encashment of the contract payment check obtained through the
falsified certificate of inspection prove the commission of the crime. Wandag’s guilt has been proven with moral certainty. As co-
conspirators of Wandag, petitioners are equally guilty, for in a conspiracy, every act of one of the conspirators in furtherance of
a common design or purpose of such a conspiracy is the act of all

Recall that petitioners were convicted allegedly on circumstantial evidence. Under Sec. 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court on
Revised Rules of Evidence, circumstantial evidence would be sufficient to convict the offender if (1) there is more than one
circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be
upheld only if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain that leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing
to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, that is, the circumstances proven must be consistent with
each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other
hypothesis except that of guilty.

Based on our earlier discussion, the facts and the circumstances earlier mentioned when strung together duly prove guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Mangangey did not inspect the road project. He could not say where the starting point of the subject
project was when he was supposed to have inspected it. He certified that the subject project was completed exactly to the
approximate volume of excavated earth without making any measurements of the earthworks accomplished. Forayo and
Wanason willfully signed the Certificate of Inspection and Acceptance, and certified that they personally inspected the road
when in fact they did not as admitted in their counter-affidavits during the preliminary investigation. Wandag took flight a sign
of guilt.
In addition, it has not been shown that Forayo and Wanason were under duress when they signed the falsified documents nor
that any of their constitutional rights have been violated when they made their declarations in their counter-affidavits. Both
Forayo and Wanason did not dispute the finding that Mangangey did not inspect the road project. They instead only gave
separate excuses on why they signed the certificate. Also, the non-presentation of the investigating officer who conducted the
preliminary investigation to testify on the admissions is insignificant as this would only be corroborative. Although petitioners
vehemently deny receiving money from Wandag as their share in the loot, this information is of no moment. The concerted acts
of the co-conspirators resulted in the processing and release of the payment for an unfinished road to the disadvantage and
damage to the government. All these circumstances are based on facts proven by the prosecution, pointing to Wandag and
petitioners as conspiring to defraud the Government. Finally, we do not agree with petitioners that as lowly employees, they
were only prevailed upon by Wandag. As succinctly observed by the Sandiganbayan, if indeed there was duress, this duress is
not the exempting circumstance of irresistible force in Art. 12, par. 5 of the RPC sufficient to exculpate petitioners. A moral
choice was available to them.
Further, we have reviewed the records and we agree with the Sandiganbayan that the testimony of Angluben was credible,
consistent and categorical in contrast with the testimony of Mangangey, and there is no need to corroborate Angluben’s
testimony. Corroborative evidence is necessary only when there are reasons to suspect that the witness falsified the truth or
that his observations were inaccurate.

Petitioners are likewise mistaken that the interpretation of the provision in the pakyaw contract on the volume of the work
accomplished is not factual but merely a conclusion by the Sandiganbayan. Angluben testified that that there was only 364.5 cu.
m. of excavation work compared to the projected 5,810 cu. m. per program of work. The aggregate estimate of 5,810 cu. m. is
based on the cross-section of the project and the Individual Project Program. The Sandiganbayan observed that the contract
specifies the approximate volume of excavation as a basis for payment, and consequently, full payment was due only when the
actual work done had been measured and verified corresponding to the maximum approximate volume of work. That there was
only 364.5 cu. m. of excavation and there was actual payment for 5,810 cu. m. are not mere interpretations of the contract as
petitioners want us to believe. These are physical evidence of the amount of work done and evidence of the incompleteness of
the work on the road. All told, we rule that the guilt of petitioners has been proven beyond any iota of doubt.

NOTES:

Pefatorily, the Sandiganbayan acquitted Leon, the purported contractor of the project on ground of reasonable doubt. It noted
that during the preliminary investigation, Leon admitted that he was not the real contractor; that he did not do any work on the
road; that he signed the Letter of Acceptance printed below the Resolution of Award dated October 21, 1986 and the Municipal
Voucher; that he received the PhP 106,970 net contract payment; that he indorsed the PNB check payment for PhP 106,970 to
Wandag; and that it was Wandag who exchanged the said check with a demand draft in Wandag’s name, all because he was
being threatened and coerced by Wandag. Leon reported these matters as early as January 8, 1987 in an affidavit, shortly after
he signed the certificate to the Monitoring Committee of Paracelis, Department of Local Government. His affidavit was
appended to his counter-affidavit executed during the preliminary investigation. In our view, Wandag had coerced Leon and
used him as a dummy so he could himself get payment for the unfinished road.

ART. 315. Swindling (estafa).Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be
punished by x x x.
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission
of the fraud:
(a) By using a fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business
or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.

ART. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister.The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to
exceed P5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official
position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in any act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes.When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense
is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be
applied in its maximum period.
POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE EVIDENCE, ALIBI, FRAME UP, DELAY IN REPORTING

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANTONIO MENDOZA Y BUTONES

G.R. No. 152589 & 152758. January 31, 2005

Facts: Before us is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by herein accused-appellant of our Decision dated 24 October 2003 in
G.R. No. 152589 and No. 152758. In said decision, we modified the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Gumaca,
Quezon, in Crim. Case No. 6636-G finding accused-appellant guilty of rape under Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code and instead, we adjudged him guilty only of attempted rape. We, however, upheld the ruling of the court a quo with
regard to Crim. Case No. 6637-G finding accused-appellant guilty of incestuous rape of a minor under Art. 266-B of the Revised
Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 and for this, we sentenced accused-appellant to suffer the ultimate penalty of
death.

Issue: Whether or not the accused committed attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness.

Held: After a thorough review and evaluation of the records of this case, we find no sufficient basis to modify our earlier decision
convicting accused-appellant of attempted rape in Crim. Case No. 6636-G.There is an attempt to commit rape when the
offender commences its commission directly by overt acts but does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce
the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. Upon the other hand, Article 366 of
the Revised Penal Code states: “(a)ny person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon the other person of either sex,
under any of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished by prision correccional.” As explained by
an eminent author of criminal law, rape and acts of lasciviousness have the same nature. There is, however, a fundamental
difference between the two. In rape, there is the intent to lie with a woman whereas this element is absent in acts of
lasciviousness. In this case, the series of appalling events which took place on the night of 18 March 1998 inside the humble
home of private complainant and of accused-appellant, establish beyond doubt that the latter intended to ravish his very own
flesh and blood. As vividly narrated by private complainant before the trial court, accused-appellant, taking advantage of the
cover of darkness and of the absence of his wife, removed her (private complainant’s) clothing and thereafter placed himself on
top of her. Accused-appellant, who was similarly naked as private complainant, then proceeded to kiss the latter and he likewise
touched her breasts until finally, he rendered private complainant unconscious by boxing her in the stomach. These dastardly
acts of accused-appellant constitute “the first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the
offense after the preparations are made.” Far from being mere obscenity or lewdness, they are indisputably overt acts executed
in order to consummate the crime of rape against the person of private complainant.

Tan vs. Pacuribot, 540 SCRA 246 (2009)

CASE SUMMARY: Judge Pacuribot was charged with Sexual harassment by Sherlita O. Tan, Court Stenographer and by Johanna
M. Villafranca Clerk II, Gingoog City. The investigator found respondent judge guilty. Thus, Investigating Justice Dy-Liacco Flores
recommended: Inasmuch as what is imputed against respondent Judge connotes a misconduct so grave that, if proven, would
entail dismissal from the bench. The court agrees in the recommendation of the Investigating Justice. By having sexual
intercourse with Ms Tan and Ms. Villafranca, his subordinates, respondent violated the trust reposed on his high office and
completely failed to live up to the noble ideals and strict standards of morality required of members of the Judiciary.
WHEREFORE, Judge Rexel M. Pacuribot is hereby DISMISSED from the service for gross misconduct and immorality

FACTS: Three consolidated-complaints were filed against Executive Judge Rexel M. Pacuribot of the RTC of Gingoog charging him
with: 1. Sexual harassment- filed by Sherlita O. Tan, Court Stenographer and by Johanna M. Villafranca Clerk II, Gingoog City; 2.
terrorizing and harassing most of the employees, both casual and contractual, of the Hall of Justice of Gingoog City filed by a
“concerned citizens;

Tan’s story
When miss tan was attending a wedding in CDO, Judge Pacurot called her and offered to bring her to Agora Bus Terminal but she
politely refused. Aware that he has the tendency to humiliate anyone in public when he is angry, she decided to abruptly leave
the wedding reception and complied.
Unfortunately, instead of bringing her to the bus terminal, she was brought to a motel. Knowing the implications, she protested:
“Why did you bring me here, sir? Didn’t I tell you that I will just take a taxicab to the Agora Terminal?” He rudely told her: “Shut
up! As if you are still a virgin!” Respondent judge [Judge Pacuribot] then directed her to get down the car. Timorously, she
obeyed.
In the motel, [Judge Pacuribot] ordered Ms. Tan to undress. Frightened by the gun that the judge was carrying, Ms. Tan obeyed
everything the judge told her to the point of having sexual intercourse. After that, instead of bringing her to the bus terminal,
the judge brought and left her to another hotel. The judge went back to the conference he was attending. Meantime, through
his cell phone, he kept calling her that night and threatening her to watch out in the office if she would disobey.

The harassment continued when she was back to work in his office. The judge even rented a room in her house and
when her husband is not around, she would find him knocking on her window and ordering her to go to his room.

Ms. Tan’s helplessness against the sexual abuses and advances of her judge was gnawing on her. She found it revolting. She
finally mustered enough courage to come out in the open to free herself. She filed criminal charges of rape, acts of
lasciviousness and sexual harassments against [Judge Pacuribot] but no lawyer in Gingoog City would even want to accept her
case. The criminal cases were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. She re-filed the case with the Prosecutor’s Office of Cagayan de
Oro City. They were also dismissed.
Villafranca’s Story
Ms. Villafranca first met respondent judge at the lobby near the Probation Office at the Hall of Justice of Gingoog City where she
holds office. She then received a call from [Judge Pacuribot]. After their talk, he asked her if he could call again for chitchat. She
answered “Ok lang. Later, she began to receive text messages from him, telling her how beautiful and sexy she is, how the mini
skirt suited her, etc. Then, he started inviting her for dinner. Knowing him to be married and the fact that she is married, she
declined these invitations citing an inoffensive excuse which is her evening teaching. But she found him persistent. One time, he
took offense at her refusal, saying “Why don’t you come with me? I AM A JUDGE! Why should you refuse me? Why do you go
with Dondi and not with me when I AM A JUDGE?”

In the last week of February 2005, Ms. Villafranca got a call from [Judge Pacuribot] who was fuming mad because she refused his
dinner invitations. Scared, she finally relented. She was fetched for the dinner and while she was talking to him, she saw him
brought out his clutch bag, took out his gun, cocked it and put it in between them.

Instead of going to the restaurant agreed upon, she was brought to a motel in Butuan City. In the motel, respondent judge
forced her to have sexual intercourse. Because respondent judge had a gun, she obeyed everything he said. She recalled that he
tried penetration more than three times, but was unsuccessful. Ms. Villafranca then got up, and put on her underwear and
pants. [Judge Pacuribot] also got up and took his cell phone and took photos of her half naked.

Back to work the next day, the judge called twice. When the phone rung again, she picked it up. It was [Judge Pacuribot]. After
recognizing her voice, he belittled her yelling: “Prostitute! Devil! Animal! Why don’t you pick up the phone?” Days passed as he
continued to threaten her with the publication of her half naked picture.

The judge even told her to file an annulment case against her husband. Later, he asked her to sign what Ms. Villa-franca calls a
“ridiculous document” he drafted wherein it purported to show that she and her husband agreed that each of them may freely
cohabit with a third person. She signed it in the face of his threats. Worse, he asked her to ask her husband to sign the same
document.

Indeed, when her husband found her with kiss marks, she suffered from her husband’s beating. Citing her husband’s beating
her, Ms. Villafranca pleaded to [Judge Pacuribot] to stop molesting her. He countered with an unusual suggestion—File a rape
case against him.

In his Comment,9 Judge Pacuribot denied the charges of Ms. Tan and Villafranca for “lack of factual and legal bases”; and
opposed the allegations on the ground that the same were motivated by revenge and were part of a comprehensive and sinister
plan to drive him out of service.

In particular, Judge Pacuribot denied the alleged rape incidents on 20-21 October 2004 in Cagayan de Oro City, and interposed
the defense of alibi. He contended that he was in faraway Gingoog City. He stated that on Mondays, he reports for his duties in
Gingoog City, and goes home to Cagayan de Oro City only on Fridays. He, thus, concluded that it was impossible for him to be
with Ms. Tan on 20 and 21 October 2004, a Wednesday and a Thursday, respectively. He argued that no proof existed to show
his physical presence in Cagayan de Oro City on those dates; hence, the presumption of his continuing physical presence in his
station during the inclusive period alluded to ran in his favor.

HELD: Ms. Villafranca’s story of rape and repeated sexual harassments is credible. [Judge Pacuribot’s] defense of denial and alibi
failed to overcome complainants’ evidence.
Investigator, thus, finds [Judge Pacuribot] guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges of rape committed on October 20 and
21, 2004 in Cagayan de Oro City, and guilty of sexual harassments committed in respondent judge’s chamber in RTC, Branch 27,
Hall of Justice, Gingoog City against Ms. Sherlita O. Tan.
One can see in these two cases a common strategy used by [Judge Pacuribot] in achieving his vile purposes. He used deceit on
Ms. Tan. He used deceit on Ms. Villafranca. He used intimidation on Ms. Tan and he used it on Ms. Villafranca. He makes use of a
substantial blackmail against both.

[Judge Pacuribot’s] theory that all these charges are part of the sinister plan to oust [Judge Pacuribot] from office at the
instigation of Ms. Waniwan is far fetched. But the court held “No married woman would subject herself to public scrutiny and
humiliation to foist a false charge of rape

In sum, [Judge Pacuribot] should be made administratively liable for the charges against him in A.M. Nos. RTJ-06-1982 and RTJ-
06-1983.

Black’s Law Dictionary defines integrity to mean “soundness or moral principle and character.” It is said to be synonymous with
“probity,” “honesty,” and “uprightness.” The evidence adduced indubitably show that [Judge Pacuribot] lacks the honesty in
dealing with his two subordinates herein. Not only did he fail to live up to the high moral standard expected of a member of the
Judiciary but he has transgressed the norms of morality expected of every person.

Indeed, [Judge Pacuribot’s] reprehensible acts amount to gross misconduct, and immorality the depravity of which is quite rare.
They undoubtedly violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. They are classified as severe charges under Section 8, Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court.

[Judge Pacuribot’s] acts indubitably went far beyond the bounds of decency and morality. He raped and repeatedly sexually
assaulted, not only one, but two female, married subordinates. He did not only violate his victims’ womanhood and their
dignities as persons but he aimed to weaken, then eventually destroy two families. By such act, [Judge Pacuribot] disgraced his
noble office, as well as the judiciary, in the eyes of the public. He has shown himself unworthy of the judicial robe.

Thus, Investigating Justice Dy-Liacco Flores recommended: Inasmuch as what is imputed against respondent Judge connotes a
misconduct so grave that, if proven, would entail dismissal from the bench, the quantum of proof required should be more than
substantial.

This court agrees in the recommendation of the Investigating Justice. With the avowed objective of promoting confidence in the
Judiciary, the Code of Judicial Conduct has the following provisions:
Canon I Rule 1.01: A Judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.
Canon II Rule 2.00: A Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. Rule 2.01: A judge
should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
We also stressed in Castillo v. Calanog, Jr. 15 that:
“The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of [even] a whiff of impropriety not only with
respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no
dichotomy of morality: a public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times.

In sum, we concur with the Investigating Justice in holding that complainants were able to muster the requisite quantum of
evidence to prove their charges against Judge Pacuribot. By having sexual intercourse with Ms Tan and Ms. Villafranca, his
subordinates, respondent violated the trust reposed on his high office and completely failed to live up to the noble ideals and
strict standards of morality required of members of the Judiciary.

WHEREFORE, Judge Rexel M. Pacuribot is hereby DISMISSED from the service for gross misconduct and immorality prejudicial to
the best interests of the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch of
the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations, except the money value of accrued earned leave
credits. Lastly, respondent judge is REQUIRED to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be disbarred as a member of the Philippine
Bar.
 SHERLITA O. TAN AND JOHANNA M. VILLAFRANCA VS. JUDGE PACURIBOT

Facts:

Judge Pacuribot was charged with rape and acts of lasciviousness by Ms. Tan and Ms. Villafranca.
Ms. Tan was deceived twice by Judge Pacuribot when he offered to take her to the bus terminal but instead brought her to a
motel where he ravished her. Not contented, he rented a room in the house of Ms. Tan wherein he would order Miss Tan to go
to his room when her husband was not around. Further, Judge Pacuribot during office hours would also request Miss Tan’s
presence in his chamber where respondent would sexually harass her even in the presence of another person.

Ms. Villafranca was also deceived by the said Judge when he made her believe that they were going to go out for dinner but
instead brought her in a motel in Butuan City where he ravished her and took a nude picture of her. The respondent used such
picture to blackmail Ms. Villafranca and would threaten her that in the event she would refuse to submit to his lustful desires, he
would send the picture to her family. After the incident, the respondent would order her to bring food at his rented room and
would subsequently rape her. Furthermore, the respondent ordered the complainant to send sweet text messages and write
love letters and greeting cards to him and even ordered her to file an annulment case against her husband.
Both charges were denied by Judge Pacuribot. Moreover, He claimed that delay in the filing of the charges against him casted
doubt to the truthfulness of their claim and that if they were truly raped by him why did they not refuse at all but instead
continued to submit themselves to him. He alleged that the charges imputed against him were complainants’ tool of revenge.

Issues:
1. Whether denial can prevail over positive testimony of the witness.
2. Whether the delay in the filing of the charges against him casted doubts to the truthfulness of their claim.
3. Whether the repeated sexual harassments and violence inside Judge Pacuribot’s chamber was improbable.
4. Whether inconsistencies of the witness’ testimony affects the credibility of the witness.
5. Whether absence of physical resistance from the victims negates the commission of the crime of rape.

Ruling:
1. Mere denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of a witness. A mere denial, like
alibi, is a self-serving negative evidence, which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. As between a categorical testimony that rings the truth on one hand, and bare
denial on the other, the former is generally held to prevail.

2. As held in People vs. Espino delay in the commission of rape is not an indication of
fabricated charge. Many victims of rape never complain or file criminal charges against the rapist, for they prefer to silently bear
the ignominy and pain, rather than reveal their shame to the world or risk the offender’s making good on his threats. This is
understandable, considering the inbred modesty of Filipinas and their aversion to the public disclosure of matters affecting their
honor.
Delay in the filing of charges does not necessarily undermine the credibility of witnesses. The Supreme Court has deemed delay
justified when there is fear of reprisal, social, humiliation, familial considerations and economic reasons.

3. Judge Pacuribot’s defense of improbability cannot be accepted. As held in People v. Lavador,

wherein the rapist argued that rape was impossible due to the presence of the victim’s son on her side, the Supreme Court said
that lust is no respecter of time and place and rape can be committed even in places where people congregate: in parks, along
the roadside, within the school premises, inside the house where there are several occupants and even in the same room where
other members of the family are sleeping.

4. Minor and trivial discrepancies which might have been caused by the natural fickleness of
memory, even tend to strengthen, rather than weaken the credibility of the witness, for they shake off the suspicion of a
rehearsed testimony. As held in Simbajon v. Esteban the Supreme Court said that No married woman would cry sexual assault,
subject herself and her family to public scrutiny and humiliation, and strain her marriage in order to perpetuate a falsehood.

5. In the case of People v. Fernandez the Supreme Court held that physical resistance need not
be established in rape when threats and intimidation are employed, and the victim submits herself to her attackers because of
fear. Besides, physical resistance is not the sole test to determine whether a woman involuntarily succumbed to the lust of an
accused. Rape victims show no uniform reaction. Some may offer strong resistance while others may be too intimidated to offer
any resistance at all. The use of a weapon, by itself, is strongly suggestive of force or at least intimidation, and threatening the
victim with a gun is sufficient to bring her into submission. Thus, the law does not impose upon the private complainant the
burden of proving resistance
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JESUS NUEVAS, et. al.
G.R. No. 170233 February 22, 2007
Facts: Police officer received information that a certain male person a man would make a delivery of marijuana dried leaves.
While stationed thereat, they saw a male person who fit the description, carrying a plastic bag, who was Nuevas. They
confronted the latter and ask. Later on, Nuevas voluntarily pointed to the police officers a plastic bag which, when opened,
contained marijuana dried leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. Nuevas disclosed where the two (2) other male persons
would make the delivery of marijuana weighing more or less five (5) kilos. The police officers together with Nuevas, then
proceeded the place where according to Nuevas was where his two (2) companions, Din and Inocencio, could be located. From
there, they saw and approached two (2) persons along the National Highway, introducing themselves as police officers. Din was
carrying a light blue plastic bag. When asked, Din disclosed that the bag belonged to Nuevas. Officers then took the bag and
upon inspection found inside it "marijuana packed in newspaper and wrapped therein." are violated.

All of the said materials are confiscated and the 3 are arrested. The trial court found them guilty with illegal possession
of marijuana in violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended. Nuevas, by manifestation, waived his right
of appeal. The appellate court found Fami and Cabling’s version of how appellants were apprehended to be categorical and
clear. However the other 2 filed there recourse in the Court of Appeals base on their allegations that they are not guilty and
their constitutional rights against warrantless arrest. However, the appellate court stated that the search in the instant case is
exempted from the requirement of a judicial warrant as appellants themselves waived their right against unreasonable searches
and seizures. According to the appellate court, both Cabling and Fami testified that Din voluntarily surrendered the bag.
Appellants never presented evidence to rebut the same. Thus, in the instant case, the exclusionary rule does not apply. Hence,
the petition.

Issue: Whether or not the arrest was valid?

Ruling: No.

The conviction or acquittal of appellants rests on the validity of the warrantless searches and seizure made by the
police officers and the admissibility of the evidence obtained by virture thereof.
Our Constitution states that a search and seizure must be carried through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and
seizure becomes "unreasonable" and any evidence obtained therefrom is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 35 The
constitutional proscription, however, is not absolute but admits of exceptions, namely:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and prevailing
jurisprudence);
2. Search of evidence in "plain view." The elements are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest
in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently
discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; (d)
"plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation
of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to
probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.

In the instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be
performed except without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial
question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the
presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched and
the character of the articles procured.
Arrest must preced the search. A search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can make the arrest as the
outset of the search. Reliable information alone is not a sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Sec. 5(a), Rule 113. A
peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a concent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for
the supremacy of the law. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of
evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.

In Nuevas’s case, the Court is convinced that he indeed voluntarily surrendered the incriminating bag to the police
officers. Thus, the Court would have affirmed Nuevas’s conviction had he not withdrawn his appeal.

However, with respect to the search conducted in the case of Din, the Court finds that no such consent had
actually been given. Thus, their arrest was indeed a violation of their rights. The arrest was an invalid warrantless arrest.
 PEOPLE v. BARO

June 5, 2002 | Panganiban, J. | Introduction and Admissibility of Evidence – Alibi

SUMMARY: Baro was charged with 3 counts of rape by Roda. He pleaded not guilty and interposed the alibi that he was in
Catubig, Northern Samar when the alleged rapes were committed. Based solely on the complainant’s testimony, RTC convicted
him of 3 counts of rape and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua for each count. SC reversed the RTC decision and acquitted
Baro. It held that complainant’s testimony was not credible, unable to prove accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The
accused’s defense of alibi is valid

DOCTRINE: An alibi is the plea of having been somewhere other than at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. To
prosper, it must be demonstrated that the person charged with the crime was not only somewhere else when the offense was
committed, but was so far away that it would have been physically impossible to have been at the place of the crime or its
immediate vicinity at the time of its commission

FACTS:

 December 17, 1997 Roda Ongotan filed a complaint for 3 counts of rape against Ernie Baro.
 It was alleged that he raped her on January 5, 1995, March 5, 1995 and April 16, 1996, in her bedroom (2 armslength wide
and 1½ armslength long). Roda, along with her parents, 8 other siblings and 1 uncle occupied the 2 nd floor of the house.
 Complainant described each rape as follows: the appellant enters her room, covers her mouth with a handkerchief,
threatens to kill her if she shouted, pulls down her underwear, pokes a balisong at her, and inserts his penis into her vagina
and she couldn’t remember how long the appellant’s penis was inside her.
 Medico-legal officer Dr. Freyra found lacerations in Roda’s hymen, opined that these lacerations could have been caused by
any hard blunt object like an erect male organ.
 Accused-appellant Baro pleaded not guilty to all three charges. His alibi: he was engaged in copra farming in Catubig,
Northern Samar prior to November 15, 1996, when he came to Manila with his wife and 3 kids to find work upon the
request and invitation of his niece (Roda’s mom). They stayed at Montessori, Manila before transferring to the house of his
niece where they stayed for about 1yr.
 RTC: Baro guilty of 3 counts of rape; reclusion perpetua for each count. Medico-legal report and testimony of Dr. Freyra
bolstered Roda’s claim that she had experienced violent sexual intercourse at a young age. Accused’s alibi and denial cannot
prevail over the positive testimony and identification of complainant.

RULING: Appeal granted. The guilt of the appellant was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. RTC decision

REVERSED and appellant ACQUITTED.

WoN the complainant’s testimony is credible – NO.

 While it is true that the complainant’s testimony may be the sole basis for convicting the accused in a rape case, the
complaining witness’ testimony must be credible.
 In reviewing rape cases, this Court has always been guided by the following principles: (a) an accusation of rape can be
made with facility – while it may be difficult for the prosecution to prove, it is usually more difficult for the person accused,
though innocent, to disprove; (b) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime in which only two persons are usually involved,
the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) the evidence for the prosecution must
stand or fall on its own merits – it cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.

 A review of the records of the case creates reasonable doubt as to accused’s guilt because of: (1) delay in filing the
complaint, (2) failure of the prosecution to prove accused’s moral ascendancy over complainant, (3) lack of support from
the records for the RTC’s finding of violent sexual intercourse, and (4) discrepancies in the complainant’s testimony.
o (1) The complaint was filed more than 2 years after the first rape and more than a year after the third one allegedly
occurred. Her explanation for the delay was the threat of the appellant to kill her, but she reported the incident while
he was still residing with her family because she no longer wanted to ruin her life.
o (2) He was not much older than her brothers. It was not shown whether he was her benefactor or whether he exercised
discipline over her. Presumptions of moral ascendancy cannot and should not prevail over the constitutional
presumption of innocence.
o (3) The report merely indicated healed lacerations were found. They were not proven to have been caused by the
alleged rapes.
 o (4) She reported the second rape first and even asked what he wanted from her. Considering the cramped space and
quietness of the night, the faintest cry from her would have been heard by one or more of her family members. Each
rape was described in a very uniform and even seemingly systematic manner which raises the suspicion that her
testimony had been coached, rehearsed or contrived.

WoN the accused’s alibi is a plausible excuse – YES.

 On each of the dates of the alleged rapes, Baro stated that he was in Catubig, Northern Samar. It would take 24 hours for a
bus to travel from Catubig to Manila. It would be highly unlikely for him to take the 24-hr bus ride to Manila, commit the act
and then return by Catubig by taking another 24-hr bus ride. No evidence was adduced by the prosecution to prove that
appellant was indeed in Manila when the alleged rapes were committed (no testimony from mom/siblings).
 An alibi is the plea of having been somewhere other than at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Contrary
to the common notion, alibi is not always a weak defense. But to be valid for purposes of exoneration from a criminal
charge, the defense of alibi must be so airtight that it would admit of no exception.
 In order for it to prosper, it must be demonstrated that the person charged with the crime was not only somewhere else
when the offense was committed, but was so far away that it would have been physically impossible to have been at the
place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. The reason is that no person can be in two places
at the same time.

WoN the accused’s guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt – NO.

 If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with
innocence and the other with guilt, then the evidence does not pass the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to
support a conviction. In order to convict the accused of a crime, the prosecution must produce evidence showing guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
The innocence of a defendant in a criminal case is always presumed until the contrary is proven.

PEOPLE V. BAUSTISTA
PEOPLE V. HONORATO NAVARRO
WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED

A. JUDICIAL NOTICE (SECS. 1 TO 3, RULE 129)

ULE 129

What Need Not Be Proved

Section 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of
evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols
of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political
constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of legislative, executive and judicial departments of the
Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions. (1a)

Section 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. — A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public
knowledge, or are capable to unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their
judicial functions. (1a)

Section 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. — During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on
request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be
heard thereon.

After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request of a party,
may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a
material issue in the case. (n)

Section 4. Judicial admissions. — An admission, verbal or written, made by the party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that
it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. (2a)

MANUFACTURES HANOVER TRUST V. GUERERO

February 19, 2003 | Carpio, J. | Petition for Review under Rule 45| Judicial Notice

PETITIONER: Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., and/or Chemical Bank

RESPONDENT: Rafael Ma. Guerrero

SUMMARY: Respondent Guerrero filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Bank regarding his bank account. The Bank
claimed that his account is governed by New York law which does not permit any claim except actual damages. The Bank moved
for a partial summary judgment which was supported by an affidavit by a NY Atty. claiming that the governing law is New York
law as stipulated by Guerrero’s bank account. SC ruled that there is a need for a trial as the Walden affidavit shows that the facts
and allegations were disputed. Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice and must be alleged and proven.

FACTS:
1. Respondent Guerrero filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Bank for allegedly: (a) illegally withheld taxes
charged against interests on his checking account with the Bank; (b) a returned check worth USS18,000.99 due to signature
verification problems; and (c) unauthorized conversion of his account.
2. The Bank claimed that by stipulation Guerrero’s account is governed by New York and this law does not permit any claim
except actual damages. The Bank filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeking to dismiss the claims for
consequential, nominal, temperate, moral and exemplary damages.

3. The affidavit of Alyssa Walden, a New York attorney, supported the Bank’s claim that Guerrero’s bank account stipulated
that the governing law is New York law and that this law bars all of the claims except actual damages. The Philippine
Consular Office in NY authenticated the Walden affidavit.
4. CA: Even if the Walden affidavit is used for purpose of summary judgment, the Bank must still comply with the procedure
 prescribed by the Rule 132, Sec. 241

ISSUE: WoN there are genuine issues of fact that necessitate formal trial—YES.

RULING: Petition DENIED. There being substanstial triable issues, motion for partial summary judgment is denied.

RATIO:
1. A genuine issue means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is
fictitious or contrived so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. Walden affidavit shows that the facts and material
allegations as pleaded by the parties are disputed and there are substantial triable issues necessitating a formal trial.
Resolution of whether a foreign law allows only the recovery of actual damages is a question of fact as far as the trial court
is concerned since foreign laws do not prove themselves in our courts.

Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proven. The conflicting
allegations as to whether New York law or Philippine law applies to Guerreros claims present a clear dispute on material
allegations which can be resolved only by a trial on the merits. The Walden affidavit cannot be considered as proof of New
York law on damages not only because it is self-serving but also because it does not state the specific New York law on
damages.

Guerrero cannot be said to have admitted the averments in the Banks motion for partial summary judgment and the
Walden affidavit just because he failed to file an opposing affidavit. The Bank still had the burden of proving New York law
and jurisprudence even if Guerrero did not present an opposing affidavit.

ADMISSIBILITY: Real/Object and Demonstrative Evidence

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RONNIE RULLEPA y GUINTO

398 SCRA 567, 5 March 2003, EN BANC

Evidence in Question Appearance of Cyra May (offended party who was allegedly 3
yrs. old when the offense was committed) as proof of her age

How was it raised to the SC? Automatic review

Trial Court Decision TC found Ronnie (accused) guilty beyond reasonable doubt and
sentenced him to death (considering the victim’s age/minority
as qualifying circumstance)

Supreme Court Decision Affirmed TC’s decision but modified the penalty to reclusion
perpetua (due to insufficiency of evidence as regards the
victim’s alleged age when the offense was committed)

RELEVANT FACTS

On complaint of Cyra May Francisco Buenafe, accused-appellant Ronnie Rullepa was charged with Rape before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City for allegedly having carnal knowledge with complainant who was then only three (3) years of age, a minor against
her will and without her consent. She described her abuse under the hands of Rullepa in a plain and matter-of-fact manner in her
testimony.
The victim and her mother testified that she was only three years old at the time of the rape. However, the prosecution did not offer
the victim‘s certificate of live birth or similar authentic documents in evidence.
Finding for the prosecution, the RTC rendered judgment finding Rullepa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and accordingly
sentenced him to death. The case was placed for automatic review of the Supreme Court

ISSUE/S

1
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible
for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody
of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has
the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
Whether or not a person’s appearance is admissible as object evidence- YES.
Whether or not the death penalty was rightfully imposed on Rullepa – NO.
RATIO DECIDENDI
Issue
Whether or not a person’s
appearance is admissible as object
evidence
Whether or not the death penalty
was rightfully imposed on Rullepa
RULING
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 96, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-
appellant Ronnie Rullepa y Guinto is found GUILTY of Statutory Rape, defined and punished by Article 335 (3) of the Revised
Ratio
YES.
1) A person‘s appearance, where relevant, is admissible as object evidence, the same being
addressed to the senses of the court. As to the weight to accord such appearance, especially in
rape cases, the Court in People v. Pruna laid down the guideline.
The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of
the certificate of live birth of such party.
In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal
certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove
age.
If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed
or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims mother or a
member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters
respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to
Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following
circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she
is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she
is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 18 years old.
In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the
victims mother or relatives concerning the victims age, the complainants testimony will suffice
provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure
of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against
him.
The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.
NO.
1) It has not been established with moral certainty that victim, Cyra May, was below
seven years old at the time of the commission of the offense. Thus, Rullepa cannot be
sentenced to suffer the death penalty. Only the penalty of reclusion perpetua can be
imposed upon him.
The testimony of a relative with respect to the age of the victim is sufficient to constitute
proof beyond reasonable doubt in cases (a) and (b) above. In such cases, the disparity
between the allegation and the proof of age is so great that the court can
easily determine from the appearance of the victim the veracity of the testimony. The
appearance corroborates the relative‘s testimony.
As the alleged age approaches the age sought to be proved, the person‘s appearance, as
object evidence of her age, loses probative value. Doubt as to her true
age becomes greater and, following United States v. Agadas, such doubt must be resolved
in favor of the accused.
Because of the vast disparity between the alleged age (three years old) and the age
sought to be proved (below twelve years), the trial court would have had no difficulty
ascertaining the victim‘s age from her appearance. No reasonable doubt, therefore, exists
that the second element of statutory rape is present.
Whether the victim was below seven years old, however, is another matter. Here,
reasonable doubt exists. A mature three and a half-year old can easily be mistaken for an
underdeveloped seven-year old. The appearance of the victim, as object evidence, cannot
be accorded much weight and the testimony of the mother is, by itself, insufficient.
Penal Code, as amended, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay private complainant,
Cyra May Buenafe, the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.

NOTES
In such cases where the disparity between the allegation and the proof of age is so great, the court can easily determine from
the appearance of the victim the veracity of the testimony. The appearance corroborates the relative‘s testimony made
pursuant to Rule 130 Sec. 40.
As the alleged age approaches the age sought to be proved, the person‘s appearance, as object evidence of her
age, loses probative value. Doubt as to her true age becomes greater and, following United States v. Agadas, such doubt must be
resolved in favor of the accused

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RONNIE RULLEPA y GUINTO

Ronnie Rullepa y Guinto (Rullepa), a houseboy, was charged with Rape before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City for
allegedly having carnal knowledge with “AAA”, three (3) years of age, a minor and against her will and without her consent.
“AAA” described her abuse under the hands of Rullepa in a plain and matter-of-fact manner in her testimony. The victim and her
mother testified that she was only three years old at the time of the rape. However, the prosecution did not offer the victim‘s
certificate of live birth or similar authentic documents in evidence.

Finding for the prosecution, the RTC rendered judgment finding Rullepa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and accordingly
sentenced him to death. The case was placed for automatic review of the Supreme Court

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in imposing the supreme penalty of death upon Rullepa

HELD: A person‘s appearance, where relevant, is admissible as object evidence, the same being addressed to the senses of the
court. As to the weight to accord such appearance, especially in rape cases, the Court in People v. Pruna laid down the guideline.

Under the guideline, the testimony of a relative with respect to the age of the victim is sufficient to constitute proof beyond
reasonable doubt in cases (a) and (b) above. In such cases, the disparity between the allegation and the proof of age is so great
that the court can easily determine from the appearance of the victim the veracity of the testimony. The appearance
corroborates the relative‘s testimony.

As the alleged age approaches the age sought to be proved, the person‘s appearance, as object evidence of her age, loses
probative value. Doubt as to her true age becomes greater and, following United States v. Agadas, such doubt must be resolved
in favor of the accused.
Because of the vast disparity between the alleged age (three years old) and the age sought to be proved (below twelve years),
the trial court would have had no difficulty ascertaining the victim‘s age from her appearance. No reasonable doubt, therefore,
exists that the second element of statutory rape is present.

Whether the victim was below seven years old, however, is another matter. Here, reasonable doubt exists. A mature three and a
half-year old can easily be mistaken for an underdeveloped seven-year old. The appearance of the victim, as object evidence,
cannot be accorded much weight and the testimony of the mother is, by itself, insufficient.

As it has not been established with moral certainty that “AAA” was below seven years old at the time of the commission of the
offense, Rullepa cannot be sentenced to suffer the death penalty. Only the penalty of reclusion perpetua can be imposed upon
him.
 BPI FAMILY SAVINGS V. CTA
April 12, 2000 | Panganiban, J. | Judicial Notice (Sections 1 to 3, Rule 129)
PETITIONER: BPI Family Savings Bank
RESPONDENT: CTA

SUMMARY: The case involves a claim for tax refund on the amount of P112,491 representing BPI’s tax withheld for
1989. This was initially filed with the CIR alleging that the company did not apply the 1989 refundable amount to its
1990 Annual Income Tax Return or other tax liabilities due to the alleged business losses it incurred for the same
year. But, without waiting for CIR, it filed a petition for review with the CTA which dismissed the petition. Hence, this
petition.

DOCTRINE: As a rule, "courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases,
even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both
cases may have been heard or are actually pending before the same judge."

Be that as it may, Section 2, Rule 129 provides that courts may take judicial notice of matters ought to be known to
judges because of their judicial functions. In this case, the Court notes that a copy of the Decision in CTA Case No.
4897 was attached to the Petition for Review filed before this Court. Significantly, respondents do not claim at all
that the said Decision was fraudulent or nonexistent. Indeed, they do not even dispute the contents of the said
Decision, claiming merely that the Court cannot take judicial notice thereof

FACTS:
1. Case involves a claim for tax refund in the amount of P112,491.00 representing petitioners tax withheld for the year 1989.
2. Petitioner had a total refundable amount of P297,492 inclusive of the P112,491.00 being claimed as tax refund in the present
case. However, petitioner declared in its 1989 Income Tax Return that the said total refundable amount of P297,492.00 will be
applied as tax credit to the succeeding taxable year.
3. On October of 1990, petitioner filed written claim for refund in the amount of P112,491.00 w/ respondent Commissioner of
Internal Revenue (CIR) alleging that it did not apply the 1989 refundable amount of P297,492.00 (including P112,491.00) to its
1990 Annual Income Tax Return or other tax liabilities due to the alleged business losses it incurred for the same year.
4. Without waiting for respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue to act on the claim for refund, petitioner filed a petition
for review with respondent Court of Tax Appeals, seeking the refund of the amount of P112,491.00.
5. Court of Tax Appeals dismissed petitioners petition on the ground that petitioner failed to present as evidence its Corporate
Annual Income Tax Return for 1990 to establish the fact that petitioner had not yet credited the amount of P297,492.00
(inclusive of the amount P112,491.00 which is the subject of the present controversy) to its 1990 income tax liability.
6. CA affirmed decision of the CTA.

"It is incumbent upon the petitioner to show proof that it has not credited to its 1990 Annual income Tax Return, the amount of
P297,492.00 (including P112,491.00), so as to refute its previous declaration in the 1989 Income Tax Return that the said
amount will be applied as a tax credit in the succeeding year of 1990. Having failed to submit such requirement, there is no basis
to grant the claim for refund.”

7. Petitioner calls the attention of the Court, to a Decision rendered by the Tax Court in CTA Case No. 4897, involving its claim for
refund for the year 1990. In that case, the Tax Court held that "petitioner suffered a net loss for the taxable year 1990”
Respondent, however, urges this Court not to take judicial notice of the said case.

ISSUE/S:
1. WON Court can take judicial notice of such case?

RULING: Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

RATIO:
1. See Doctrine.

2. If respondents really believed that petitioner is not entitled to tax refund, they could have easily proved that it did not suffer
any loss in 1990. It is noteworthy that respondents opted not to assail the fact appearing therein -- that petitioner suffered a net
loss in 1990 in the same way that it refused to controvert the same fact established by petitioners other documentary exhibits.

3. Decision in CTA Case No. 4897 is not the sole basis of petitioners case. It is merely one more bit of information showing the
stark truth: petitioner did not use its 1989 refund to pay its taxes for 1990.
4. Respondents argue that tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions and are to be construed against the claimant.
However, petitioner has established its claim. Petitioner may have failed to strictly comply with the rules of procedure; it may
have even been negligent but these circumstances, should not compel the Court to disregard undisputed fact: that petitioner
suffered a net loss in 1990, and that it could not have applied the amount claimed as tax credits.

5. Technicalities and legalisms, however exalted, should not be misused by the government to keep money not belonging to it
and thereby enrich itself at the expense of its law-abiding citizens.

LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

SPOUSES VICENTE BANAL and LEONIDAS ARENAS-BANAL, respondents.

FACTS: Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal, respondents, are the registered owners of agricultural land situated in San Felipe,
Basud, Camarines Norte. A portion of the land was compulsorily acquired by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657,[1] as amended, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
Respondents rejected the valuation of petitioner hence a summary administrative proceeding was conducted before the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to determine the valuation of the land. Eventually, the PARAD rendered its
Decision affirming the Landbank’s valuation.

Dissatisfied with the Decision of the PARAD, respondents filed with the RTC a petition for determination of just compensation.

In determining the valuation of the land, the trial court based the same on the facts established in another case pending before
it.

ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of the average production figures in another case pending before it and
applying the same to the present case without conducting a hearing and without the knowledge or consent of the parties
HELD: Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases
even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge. They may only do so “in the
absence of objection” and “with the knowledge of the opposing party,” which are not obtaining here.
Furthermore, as earlier stated, the Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts. In this
regard, Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence is explicit on the necessity of a hearing before a court takes judicial
notice of a certain matter, thus:

“SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. – During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may
announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
“After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request of a party, may take
judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the
case.” (emphasis added)
The RTC failed to observe the above provisions.
 ESTRELLA PIGAO, et. al. vs.SAMUEL RABANILLO
G.R. No. 150712 May 2, 2006

FACTS: In 1947, the late Eusebio Pigao and his family, settled on a government lot owned by the People’s
Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC). A contract to sell was entered into by Eusebio and PHHC. In 1959,
Eusebio executed a deed of assignment of rights over one-half of the property in favor of respondent who
proceeded to occupy the front half portion. In 1970, Eusebio executed a deed of mortgage over the same half-
portion of the property in favor of respondent. In 1973, title was issued in Eusebio’s name over the entire
property. In 1978, respondent executed an affidavit of adverse claim over the front half portion of the lot
registered in Eusebio’s name. This affidavit was duly annotated on said title. On June 17, 1979, Eusebio
died.and was survived by his children, herein petitioners.

In 1988, after the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City was gutted by fire, petitioners were
issued a reconstituted title in the name of Eusebio which no longer carried the annotation of the adverse claim
of respondent. In 1992, the subject lot was included in the extrajudicial settlement of Eusebio’s estate and a
new title was issued for the entire lot in the name of petitioners. Respondent continued to occupy the front
half portion through his tenant, Gil Ymata. On January 29, 1996, petitioners filed a case in the RTC of Quezon
City against respondent and Ymata wherein they sought to quiet their title over the entire lot and to recover
possession of the front half portion. They averred that Eusebio’s deed of assignment and deed of mortgage
were clouds on their title which should be nullified. The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners: CA reversed the RTC
decision in favor of respondent.

Petitioners’ contend that when the final deed of sale was issued by PHHC in favor of Eusebio in 1973,
this deed contained a prohibition against the alienation of the lot that the applicant agree “(d) not to sell,
assign, encumber, mortgage, lease, sublet or in any other manner affect his right under this contract, at any
time, in any manner whatsoever, in whole or in part, without first obtaining the written consent of the
Corporation." To support their claim, they request this Court to take judicial notice of the fact that the pro-
forma conditional contracts-to- sell between PHHC and applicants. Petitioners failed to present during the trial
the conditional contract to sell between Eusebio and PHHC which they claimed that they did not have a copy
thereof. What they submitted to this Court was a copy of a conditional contract to sell between a certain
Armando Bernabe and the PHHC pertaining to a lot located at 94 K-5th St., Kamuning, Quezon City to prove
the existence of the aforementioned condition.

Respondent objects to this attempt of petitioners to seek admission of evidence which was presented
neither during trial nor on appeal.

ISSUES: WON the said conditional contract to sell between Armando Bernabe and PHHC may be given
judicial notice

HELD: NO. We cannot take cognizance of this document – the conditional contract to sell between Bernabe
and the PHHC alleged to be the pro-forma contract used by PHHC with its applicants - which petitioners are
presenting for the first time. This document is not among the matters the law mandatorily requires us to take
judicial notice of. Neither can we consider it of public knowledge nor capable of unquestionable
demonstration nor ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. We have held that:

Matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general
knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be
known to be within the limits of jurisdiction of the court. The power of taking judicial notice is to be exercised
by courts with caution. Care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists and every reasonable doubt on
the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative. (emphasis supplied)

Consequently, for this document to be properly considered by us, it should have been presented during trial
and formally offered as evidence. Otherwise, we would be denying due process of law to respondent.
A document, or any article for that matter, is not evidence when it is simply marked for identification; it must
be formally offered, and the opposing counsel given an opportunity to object to it or cross-examine the
witness called upon to prove or identify it. A formal offer is necessary since judges are required to base their
findings of fact and judgment only — and strictly — upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. To
allow a party to attach any document to his pleading and then expect the court to consider it as evidence may
draw unwarranted consequences. The opposing party will be deprived of his chance to examine the document
and object to its admissibility. The appellate court will have difficulty reviewing documents not previously
scrutinized by the court below. The pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules of Court on the inclusion on
appeal of documentary evidence or exhibits in the records cannot be stretched as to include such pleadings or
documents not offered at the hearing of the case.

Besides, this document does not even pertain to the lot and parties involved here. Accordingly, it is neither
relevant nor material evidence. But even assuming that it were, then it would substantially affect the outcome
of the case so respondent should have been given the chance to scrutinize the document and object to it
during the trial of the case. It is too late to present it now when nothing prevented petitioners from
introducing it before.

DEED OF ASSIGNMENT: NULL AND VOID for being contrary to public policy. Under PHHC rules, preference for
the purchase of residential lots from the PHHC was accorded to bona fide occupants of such lots.

Eusebio, as a bona fide occupant of the subject lot, had a vested right to buy the property. This did not,
however, give him the unbridled freedom to transfer his right to a third party, specially one who was
unqualified to avail of it. Undoubtedly, the PHHC was clothed with authority to determine if a person was
qualified to purchase a residential lot from it. The right to purchase was a personal right that the qualified
applicant, as determined by PHHC, must personally exercise. As a personal right, it could not be transferred to
just another person.

Any transfer of rights, to be valid, must be in line with the policy of PHHC which was to provide "decent
housing for those who may be found unable otherwise to provide themselves therewith." Thus, any transfer of
an applicant’s right to buy a lot was invalid if done without the consent of PHHC. The same policy was
enunciated by the terms of the deed of sale.25 There is no showing that the PHHC’s approval for the
assignment of half of the lot to respondent was ever obtained. Stated otherwise, there is no proof that
respondent would have been allowed to avail of the preferential rights exclusively granted to bona fide
occupants of PHHC-owned lots like Eusebio. Thus, the assignment of rights by Eusebio to respondent, who was
not a bona fide occupant of the lot, frustrated the public policy of the government. It should therefore be
struck down as null and void.
 G.R. NO. 152375, Dec. 13, 2011

Republic of the Phils. vs. Sandiganbayan, et. al.

FACTS:
A case was filed against the respondents for before the Sandiganbayan (SB) for reconveyance,
reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages in relation to the allegation that respondents
illegally manipulated the purchase of the major shareholdings of Cable and Wireless Limited in
Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI). This case docketed as Civil Case No.
0009 spawned numerous incidental cases, among them, Civil Case No. 0130, a petition instituted by
Victor Africa (Son of the late Jose Africa) which sought to nullify the orders of the PCGG directing him
to account for the alleged sequestered shares in ETPI and to cease and desist from exercising voting
rights. The present respondents were not made parties either in Civil Case No. 0130. In the former
case, Victor Africa (Africa) was not impleaded in and so is plainly not a party thereto.

In the proceedings for Civil Case No. 0130, testimony of Mr. Maurice V. Bane (former director and
treasurer-in-trust of ETPI) was taken by way of deposition upon oral examination (Bane deposition)
before Consul General Ernesto Castro of the Philippine Embassy in London, England. The purpose
was for Bane to identify and testify on the facts set forth in his affidavit so as to prove the ownership
issue in favor of the petitioner and/or establish the prima facie factual foundation for sequestration
of ETPI’s Class A stock.

As to Civil Case No. 009, the petitioner filed a motion (1st Motion) to adopt the testimonies of the
witnesses in Civil Case No. 0130, including the deposition of Mr. Maurice Bane which was denied by
SB in its April 1998 Resolution because he was not available for cross-examination. The petitioners
did not in any way question the 1998 resolution, and instead made its Formal Offer of Evidence on
December 14, 1999. Significantly, the Bane deposition was not included as part of its offered
exhibits. In rectifying this, they filed a second motion with prayer for re-opening of the case for the
purpose of introducing additional evidence and requested the court to take judicial notice of the
facts established by the Bane deposition. This was however denied by the SB in its November 6,
2000 resolution (2000 resolution). A third motion was filed by the petitioners on November 16, 2001
seeking once more to admit the Bane deposition which the SB denied for the reason that the 1998
resolution has become final in view of the petitioner’s failure to file a motion for reconsideration or
appeal within the 15-day reglementary period.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether the SB committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the 1998 resolution has already

attained finality and in refusing to re-open the case.

2. Whether the Bane deposition is admissible under the rules of court and under the principle of

judicial notice.

RULING:

1. The court ruled that the SB’s ruling on the finality of its 1998 resolution was legally erroneous but
did not constitute grave abuse of discretion due to the absence of a clear showing that its action
was a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment affecting its exercise of jurisdiction. The SB’s
ruling, although an erroneous legal conclusion was only an error of judgment, or, at best, an abuse
of discretion but not a grave one.

The 1998 resolution is an interlocutory decision, thus petition for certiorari is still premature since
the rules of court provides that certiorari should be availed in a situation where neither an appeal
nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is available to the
aggrieved party except if such remedy is inadequate or insufficient in relieving the aggrieved party of
the injurious effects of the order complained of. At the time of the 1st motion, the presentation of
evidence has not yet concluded. The remedy after the denial of the 1st motion should have been for
the petitioner to move for a reconsideration to assert and even clarify its position on the admission
of the Bane deposition. But upon denial of the 2nd motion, petitioners should have already
questioned it by way of certiorari since it effectively foreclosed all avenues available to it for the
consideration of the Bane deposition. Instead of doing so, however, the petitioner allowed the 60-
day reglementary period, under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to lapse, and proceeded to
file its 3rd motion.

However, the court ruled that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in ultimately
refusing to reopen the case for the purpose of introducing and admitting in evidence the Bane
deposition. The Rules of Court does not prohibit a party from requesting the court to allow it to
present additional evidence even after it has rested its case provided that the evidence is rebuttal in
character, whose necessity, for instance, arose from the shifting of the burden of evidence from one
party to the other; or where the evidence sought to be presented is in the nature of newly
discovered evidence. At the time the petitioner moved to re-open its case, the respondents had not
yet even presented their evidence in chief. The respondents, therefore, would not have been
prejudiced by allowing the petitioner’s introduction of the Bane deposition, which was concededly
omitted “through oversight.”

2. Despite the cases being closely related, admissibility of the Bane deposition still needs to comply
with the rules of court on the admissibility of testimonies or deposition taken in a different
proceeding. Depositions are not meant as substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a
party or witness. Generally, the deponent must be presented for oral examination in open court at
the trial or hearing otherwise, the adverse party may oppose it as mere hearsay. Cross-examination
will test the truthfulness of the statements of the witness; it is an essential safeguard of the accuracy
and completeness of a testimony. Depositions from the former trial may be introduced as evidence
provided that the parties to the first proceeding must be the same as the parties to the later
proceeding. In the present case, the petitioner failed to establish the identity of interest or privity
between the opponents of the two cases. While Victor Africa is the son of the late respondent Jose
Africa, the deposition is admissible only against him as an ETPI stockholder who filed Civil Case No.
0130.

Further, the rule of judicial notice is not applicable in this case as it would create confusion between
the two cases. It is the duty of the petitioner, as a party-litigant, to properly lay before the court the
evidence it relies upon in support of the relief it seeks, instead of imposing that same duty on the
court.

The petition was DISMISSED for lack of merit.

 STATE PROSECUTORS V. JUDGE MURO

A.M. No. RTJ-92-876 September 19, 1994

FACTS:

Judge Manuel T. Muro of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 54, was charged by
State Prosecutors Nilo C. Mariano, George C. Dee and Paterno V. Tac-an with ignorance of the law,
grave misconduct and violations of Rules 2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

The case at bar involves the prosecution of the 11 charges against Imelda Marcos in violation
of the Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restriction in the Central Bank Circular 960. The respondent
judge dismissed all 11 cases solely on the basis of the report published from the 2 newspapers, which
the judge believes to be reputable and of national circulation, that the President of the Philippines
lifted all foreign exchange restrictions.

The respondent’s decision was founded on his belief that the reported announcement of the
Executive Department in the newspaper in effect repealed the CB 960 and thereby divested the court
of its jurisdiction to further hear the pending case thus motu propio dismissed the case.

The petitioners stressed that this is not just a simple case of a misapplication or erroneous
interpretation of the law. The very act of respondent judge in altogether dismissing sua sponte the
eleven criminal cases without even a motion to quash having been filed by the accused, and without
at least giving the prosecution the basic opportunity to be heard on the matter by way of a written
comment or on oral argument, is not only a blatant denial of elementary due process to the
Government but is palpably indicative of bad faith and partiality.

Moreover, Petitioner’s alleged that the judge also exercised grave abuse of discretion by
taking judicial notice on the published statement of the President in the newspaper (Philippine Daily
Inquirer and the Daily Globe)which is a matter that has not yet been officially in force and effect of the
law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in taking judicial
notice on the statement of the president lifting the foreign exchange restriction published in the
newspaper as basis for dismissing the case?

HELD:

YES. A law which is not yet in force and hence, still inexistent, cannot be of common
knowledge capable of ready and unquestionable demonstration, which is one of the requirements
before a court can take judicial notice of a fact. Evidently, it was impossible for respondent judge, and
it was definitely not proper for him, to have taken cognizance of CB Circular No. 1353, when the same
was not yet in force at the time the improvident order of dismissal was issued.

When the President’s statement was published in the newspaper, the respondent judge
admitted of not having seen the official text of CB circular 1353 thus it was premature for him to take
judicial notice on this matter which is merely based on his personal knowledge and is not based on
the public knowledge that the law requires for the court to take judicial notice of.

For the court to take judicial notice, three material requisites should be present:
(1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain;
(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court.
 The fact that should be assumed as judicially known must be on such notoriety that such fact
cannot be disputed. Judicial notice is not judicial knowledge where the personal knowledge of the
judge does not amount to the judicial notice of the court. The common knowledge contemplated by
the law where the court can take judicial notice must come from the knowledge of men generally in
the course of ordinary experiences that are accepted as true and one that involves unquestioned
demonstration.

This is not a simple case of a misapplication or erroneous interpretation of the law. The very
act of respondent judge in altogether dismissing sua sponte the eleven criminal cases without even a
motion to quash having been filed by the accused, and without at least giving the prosecution the
basic opportunity to be heard on the matter by way of a written comment or on oral argument, is not
only a blatant denial of elementary due process to the Government but is palpably indicative of bad
faith and partiality.

The Court strongly feels that it has every right to assume and expect that respondent judge is
possessed with more than ordinary credentials and qualifications to merit his appointment as a
presiding judge in the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region, stationed in the City
of Manila itself. It is, accordingly, disheartening and regrettable to note the nature of the arguments
and the kind of logic that respondent judge would want to impose on this Court notwithstanding the
manifest lack of cogency thereof.

The SC cited several cases where judges were ordered dismissed from the government
service for gross incompetence and ignorance of the law and the Court after considering such
premises, it thus, finds respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro guilty of gross ignorance of the law. He is
hereby DISMISSED from the service, such dismissal to carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture
of leave credits and retirement benefits, and disqualification from reemployment in the government
service.
 VDA. DE CATALAN V. CATALAN-LEE

G. R. No. 183622, [February 08, 2012]

DOCTRINE:

Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which maybe recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid ac-
cording to their national law.

FACTS:

Orlando B. Catalan, a naturalized American citizen,allegedly obtained a divorce in the United States from his
first wife, Felicitas Amor. He then contracted a second marriage with petitioner.

When Orlando died intestate in the Philippines, petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for the issuance of
letters of administration for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate. While the case was
pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed a
similar petition with the RTC. The two cases were consolidated.

Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition filed by the respondent on the ground of litis pendentia.
Respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested person qualified to file the petition.
Respondent further alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against petitioner by Felicitas Amor
contending that petitioner contracted a second marriage to Orlando despite having been married to one
Eusebio Bristol.

However, the RTC acquitted petitioner of bigamy and ruled that since the deceased was a divorced American
citizen, and that divorce was not recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage between him and
petitioner was not valid. The RTC took note of the action for declaration of nullity then pending filed by
Felicitas Amor against the deceased and petitioner. It considered the pending action to be a prejudicial
question in determining the guilt of petition-er for the crime of bigamy. The RTC also found that petitioner had
never been married to Bristol.

The RTC subsequently dismissed the Petition for the issuance of letters of administration filed by petitioner
and granted that of private respondent. Contrary to its findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC held that the
marriage between petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsisting when she married Orlando. The RTC
held that petitioner was not an interested party who may file said petition. The CA affirmed the decision of the
lower court.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the acquittal of petitioner in the crim. case for bigamy meant that the marriage with Bristol was
still valid.

2. Whether the divorce obtained abroad by Orlando may be recognized under Philippine jurisdiction.

HELD:

It is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to ascertain the rightful party to
be issued the letters of administration over the estate of Orlando. Petition is partially granted. Case is
remanded to RTC.

1. No. The RTC in the special proceedings failed to appreciate the finding of the RTC in Crim. Case that
petitioner was never married to Eusebio Bristol. It concluded that, because petitioner was acquitted of bigamy,
it follows that the first marriage with Bristol still existed and was valid.
2. Yes. Under the principles of comity, Philippine jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of
for-eign nationality. Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national law. Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven by the
divorce decree itself. The best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule
132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an
official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the
record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

Moreover, the burden of proof lies with the “party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action.” In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material
allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving
the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. It is well-settled in our jurisdiction
that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and
proved.

It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of Orlando’s divorce under the
laws of the United States and the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there is a need to
remand the proceedings to the trial court for further reception of evidence to establish the fact of divorce.