THIRD DIVISION In his Answer with Counterclaim,3 petitioner admitted only the personal
circumstances of the parties as averred in the complaint and denied the rest of the
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review
and set aside the Decision1 of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
24256 which affirmed in toto the 16 October 1939 Decision of Branch 38 (Lingayen)
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 16503. Presented
is the issue of whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to
marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The antecedents of this case are not complicated:
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed
with the aforesaid trial court a complaint2 for damages against the petitioner for the
alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint
that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good
moral character and reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner, on the
other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan
City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum
Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the latter courted
and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they would
get married; they therefore agreed to get married after the end of the school
semester, which was in October of that year; petitioner then visited the private
respondent's parents in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to
the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with
him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with him; a
week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to
change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment,
she sustained injuries; during a confrontation with a representative of the barangay
captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their
marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner
is already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private respondent then
prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of
not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to
P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies
as may be just and equitable. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.
allegations either for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as
to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those alleged as his Special and
Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he never proposed marriage to or
agreed to be married with the private respondent; he neither sought the consent
and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment; he did not
maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered
that she had deceived him by stealing his money and passport; and finally, no
confrontation took place with a representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in
his Counterclaim, that the complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a result
thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to incur expenses,
and has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation, he prayed for an
award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.
After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial
Order4 embodying the stipulated facts which the parties had agreed upon, to wit:
1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Bañaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan, while the defendant is single, Iranian citizen
and resident (sic) of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since
September 1, 1987 up to the present;
2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum
Northwestern, Dagupan City, College of Medicine, second year
medicine proper;
3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette
, Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City since July, 1986 up to the
present and a (sic) high school graduate;
4. That the parties happened to know each other when the
manager of the Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino introduced
the defendant to the plaintiff on August 3, 1986.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code,
rendered on 16 October 1989 a decision5 favoring the private respondent. The
petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney's fees; the
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of
twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as moral damages.
2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum
of three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos as atty's fees and two
thousand (P2,000.00) pesos at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay
the costs.
 3. All other claims are denied.6 by the barangay captain went to talk to defendant to still convince
him to marry plaintiff, but defendant insisted that he could not do
so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City,
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a)
although the truth, as stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial, is
petitioner and private respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a
that defendant is still single.
woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual
advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false pretenses,
promised to marry private respondent, d) because of his persuasive promise to Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after
marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that defendant had informed them of his desire to marry Marilou, he
deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents — in accordance with Filipino already looked for sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for
customs and traditions — made some preparations for the wedding that was to be the reception by looking for pigs and chickens, and even already
held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends invited many relatives and friends to the forthcoming wedding. 8
and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise to
marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals
abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of morality, good customs,
which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief,9 he contended that
culture and traditions. The trial court gave full credit to the private respondent's
the trial court erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal basis
testimony because, inter alia, she would not have had the temerity and courage to
and (b) in ordering him to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses
come to court and expose her honor and reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if
and costs.
her claim was false.7

On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged

The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of the
decision 10 affirming in toto the trial court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining
evidence for the private respondent in the foregoing decision, digested by the
the trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court made the following analysis:
respondent Court as follows:

First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met
According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the
defendant who was already 29 years old at the time, does not
time and that she never had a boyfriend before, defendant started
appear to be a girl of loose morals. It is uncontradicted that she
courting her just a few days after they first met. He later proposed
was a virgin prior to her unfortunate experience with defendant
marriage to her several times and she accepted his love as well as
and never had boyfriend. She is, as described by the lower court,
his proposal of marriage on August 20, 1987, on which same day
a barrio lass "not used and accustomed to trend of modern urban
he went with her to her hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon,
life", and certainly would (sic) not have allowed
Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet her parents and inform them of
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no
their relationship and their intention to get married. The
persuasive promise made by the defendant to marry her." In fact,
photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their submarkings) of
we agree with the lower court that plaintiff and defendant must
defendant with members of plaintiff's family or with plaintiff, were
have been sweethearts or so the plaintiff must have thought
taken that day. Also on that occasion, defendant told plaintiffs
because of the deception of defendant, for otherwise, she would
parents and brothers and sisters that he intended to marry her
not have allowed herself to be photographed with defendant in
during the semestral break in October, 1987, and because
public in so (sic) loving and tender poses as those depicted in the
plaintiff's parents thought he was good and trusted him, they
pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot believe, therefore,
agreed to his proposal for him to marry their daughter, and they
defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to him except a
likewise allowed him to stay in their house and sleep with plaintiff
waitress at the restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in fact
during the few days that they were in Bugallon. When plaintiff and
admitted that he went to plaintiff's hometown of Bañaga,
defendant later returned to Dagupan City, they continued to live
Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) the town fiesta on
together in defendant's apartment. However, in the early days of
February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic) a beach
October, 1987, defendant would tie plaintiff's hands and feet while
party together with the manager and employees of the Mabuhay
he went to school, and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in
Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on April 1,
the morning that made her sleep the whole day and night until the
1987 when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who told him
following day. As a result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff
to marry her daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have
became pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine to abort
left Dagupan City where he was involved in the serious study of
the fetus. Still plaintiff continued to live with defendant and kept
medicine to go to plaintiff's hometown in Bañaga, Bugallon, unless
reminding him of his promise to marry her until he told her that
there was (sic) some kind of special relationship between them?
he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in
And this special relationship must indeed have led to defendant's
Bacolod City. That was the time plaintiff left defendant, went
insincere proposal of marriage to plaintiff, communicated not only
home to her parents, and thereafter consulted a lawyer who
to her but also to her parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner
accompanied her to the barangay captain in Dagupan City.
of the restaurant where plaintiff was working and where defendant
Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother, and a barangay tanod sent
 first proposed marriage to her, also knew of this love affair and
defendant's proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she declared
was the reason why plaintiff resigned from her job at the
restaurant after she had accepted defendant's proposal (pp. 6-7,
tsn March 7, 1988).
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of
good moral character and must think so low and have so little
respect and regard for Filipino women that he openly admitted
that when he studied in Bacolod City for several years where he
finished his B.S. Biology before he came to Dagupan City to study
medicine, he had a common-law wife in Bacolod City. In other
words, he also lived with another woman in Bacolod City but did
not marry that woman, just like what he did to plaintiff. It is not
surprising, then, that he felt so little compunction or remorse in
pretending to love and promising to marry plaintiff, a young,
innocent, trustful country girl, in order to satisfy his lust on her. 11
and then concluded:
In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was
defendant-appellant's fraudulent and deceptive protestations of
love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender
her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the
honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it
was likewise these (sic) fraud and deception on appellant's part
that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in
with him preparatory to their supposed marriage. And as these
acts of appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against morals,
good customs, and public policy, and are even gravely and deeply
derogatory and insulting to our women, coming as they do from a
foreigner who has been enjoying the hospitality of our people and
taking advantage of the opportunity to study in one of our
institutions of learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be
made, under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to
compensate for the moral damages and injury that he had caused
plaintiff, as the lower court ordered him to do in its decision in this
case. 12
concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not
posses good moral character. Moreover, his controversial "common law life" is now
his legal wife as their marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the
Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful cohabitation with the private respondent,
petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be pinned on him for the live-in
relationship, the private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit
arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be
assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private respondent and had
also promised to marry her, such acts would not be actionable in view of the special
circumstances of the case. The mere breach of promise is not actionable. 14
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the
petition and the petitioner had filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave due course to
the petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda, which
they subsequently complied with.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in
support of his thesis, it is clear that questions of fact, which boil down to the issue
of the credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule in this jurisdiction that
appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings as to the credibility of
witnesses, the latter court having heard the witnesses and having had the
opportunity to observe closely their deportment and manner of testifying, unless the
trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which, if considered,
might affect the result of the case. 15
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial
courts had overlooked any fact of substance or values which could alter the result of
the case.
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the function of this
Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence introduced by the parties
before the lower court. There are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule.
Thus, in Medina vs.Asistio, Jr., 16 this Court took the time, again, to enumerate
these exceptions:
xxx xxx xxx

Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March 1991; (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
he raises therein the single issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code speculation, surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil.
applies to the case at bar. 13 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurb or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15
[1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v.
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not
People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on
committed any moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public policy;
a misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing,
he has not professed love or proposed marriage to the private respondent; and he
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are
has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino
conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6)
customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he
When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond
is not conversant with such Filipino customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian
the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions
Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that even if
of both appellate and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and
he had made a promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is
Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);
excusable or tolerable because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of
Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to take four (4) wives and
 the trial court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970];
Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The
finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record
(Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).
Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the above
quoted exceptions in this case. Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and
appellate courts must be respected.
And now to the legal issue.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong. 17 Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the
provisions that would have made it so. The reason therefor is set forth in the report
of the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote:
The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of
promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely decided in
the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. 18 The history of breach of
promise suits in the United States and in England has shown that
no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing
women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led
to the abolition of rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits
in many of the American states. . . . 19
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is
designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by
granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute
books. 20
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of
wrongs defined or determined by positive law. Fully sensible that
there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many
victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually
suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed it
necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed
Civil Code the following rule:
Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A"
seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of
marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl
becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as
the girl is above nineteen years of age. Neither can any civil action
for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the
grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl
and family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her
parents cannot bring action for damages. But under the proposed
article, she and her parents would have such a right of action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved,
would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of
moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide
for specifically in the statutes. 21
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of
willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa
aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or
common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because
it includes not only negligence, but international criminal acts as well such
as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general
scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission
responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts,
with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code
while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the
Civil Code. 22 In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts
which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus,
Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles
19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of
the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable
than the Anglo-American law on torts. 23
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and
so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the
acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise
thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a
sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that
the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her
to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because
of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation
which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have
been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent
and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her
surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and
sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and
deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's
living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private
respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single
Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by
the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be
held liable for criminal seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of
the Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was above eighteen (18)
years of age at the time of the seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a
breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction. Thus,
in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,25 this Court denied recovery of damages to the
woman because:
. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner
is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is
approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant —
who was around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly
enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance
agent are supposed to be — when she became intimate with
petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because the
court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered
herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him,
she "wanted to bind" him by having a fruit of their engagement
even before they had the benefit of clergy.
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at possible
recovery if there had been moral seduction, recovery was eventually denied
because We were not convinced that such seduction existed. The following
enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made in the said case:
The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example
set forth in the Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort
upon a minor who had been seduced. The essential feature is
seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a
breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea
of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on
the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs.
Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —
To constitute seduction there must in all cases
be some sufficient promise or inducement and
the woman must yield because of the promise or
other inducement. If she consents merely from
carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual
desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit.
Seduction, par. 56) She must be induced to
depart from the path of virtue by the use of
some species of arts, persuasions and wiles,
which are calculated to have and do have that
effect, and which result in her person to
ultimately submitting her person to the sexual
embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the woman,
the enticement, persuasion or deception is the
essence of the injury; and a mere proof of
intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recovery.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the
willingness arises out of sexual desire of
curiosity of the female, and the defendant
merely affords her the needed opportunity for
the commission of the act. It has been
emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such
cases would tend to the demoralization of the
female sex, and would be a reward for
unchastity by which a class of adventuresses
would be swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662)
xxx xxx xxx
Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that
for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a
woman of adult age, maintain intimate sexual relations with
appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is
incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here
voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been
deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit,
artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have
again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without
exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and
would have cut short all sexual relations upon finding that
defendant did not intend to fulfill his defendant did not intend to
fulfill his promise. Hence, we conclude that no case is made under
article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being
alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in
dismissing the complaint. 27
In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who
recently retired from this Court, opined that in a breach of promise to marry where
there had been carnal knowledge, moral damages may be recovered:
. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the
intercourse was due to mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs. Court of
Appeals,
 L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. accept a proposition that may have been offered by the
30, 1960; Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs. petitioner. 34
Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words,
if the CAUSE be the promise to marry, and the EFFECT be the
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear
carnal knowledge, there is a chance that there was criminal or
that he harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent
moral seduction, hence recovery of moral damages will prosper. If
on account of the latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty
it be the other way around, there can be no recovery of moral
and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment. Obviously then, from the very
damages, because here mutual lust has intervened). . . .
beginning, he was not at all moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying
with a woman so circumstances could not have even remotely occurred to him.
together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly
expenses for the wedding presentations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing
471). that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life's partner. His was
nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed
that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29
is also of the same persuasion:
enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of
morality and brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women.
It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still subsists, It can even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant
notwithstanding the incorporation of the present article31 in the disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with
Code. The example given by the Code Commission is correct, if justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of
there was seduction, not necessarily in the legal sense, but in the his rights and in the performance of his obligations.
vulgar sense of deception. But when the sexual act is
accomplished without any deceit or qualifying circumstance of
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and
abuse of authority or influence, but the woman, already of age,
traditions.
has knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot be said that there
is an injury which can be the basis for indemnity.
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private
respondent may not have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually
But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness
submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but because of moral
(sic), the action lies. The court, however, must weigh the degree
seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire
of fraud, if it is sufficient to deceive the woman under the
episode for as soon as she found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her
circumstances, because an act which would deceive a girl sixteen
after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari
years of age may not constitute deceit as to an experienced
delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal
woman thirty years of age. But so long as there is a wrongful act
fault." 35At most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.
and a resulting injury, there should be civil liability, even if the act
is not punishable under the criminal law and there should have
been an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for that reason. Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the
parties, where his transgression has been brought about by the
imposition of undue influence of the party on whom the burden of
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect
the original wrong principally rests, or where his consent to the
that granting, for argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the private
transaction was itself procured by
respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both parties
fraud. 36
are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code and the
doctrine laid down in Batarra vs. Marcos, 32 the private respondent cannot recover
damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes as far as stating that if the In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37
We declared:
private respondent had "sustained any injury or damage in their relationship, it is
primarily because of her own doing, 33 for:
Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there
should be no action by one against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil
. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will Code). This rule, however, has been interpreted as applicable only
become a doctor sooner or later. Take notice that she is a plain where the fault on both sides is, more or less, equivalent. It does
high school graduate and a mere employee . . . (Annex "C") or a not apply where one party is literate or intelligent and the other
waitress (TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988) in a luncheonette and one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209).
without doubt, is in need of a man who can give her economic
security. Her family is in dire need of financial assistance. (TSN,
We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not
pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988). And this predicament prompted her to
be said that this Court condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting
her and the petitioner stay together in the same room in their house after giving
approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect the honor of
their daughters and infuse upon them the higher values of morality and dignity.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant

petition is hereby DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.

 On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and
proceedings and motion for new trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike
it cut. But the court, on August 2, 1955, ordered the parties and their attorneys to
EN BANC
appear before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this stage of the proceedings the
possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement." It added that should any of them
G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964 fail to appear "the petition for relief and the opposition thereto will be deemed
submitted for resolution."
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court. Instead, on the
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant. following day his counsel filed a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on
defendants petition for relief. The counsel stated that he would confer with
Jalandoni & Jamir for defendant-appellant. defendant in Cagayan de Oro City — the latter's residence — on the possibility of an
Samson S. Alcantara for plaintiff-appellee. amicable element. The court granted two weeks counted from August 25, 1955.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:
The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed by
appropriate planning and serious endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what
is worse, complete public humiliation.
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love,
decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2,
1954 Velez left this note for his bride-to-be:
Dear Bet —
Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it. Am
leaving on the Convair today.
Please do not ask too many people about the reason why — That
would only create a scandal.
Paquing
But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:
NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON
APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE .
PAKING
Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default.
Plaintiff adduced evidence before the clerk of court as commissioner, and on April
29, 1955, judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as
actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as
attorney's fees; and the costs.
Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by the court had
expired on September 8, 1955 but that defendant and his counsel had failed to
appear.
Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its order of July 6,
1956 calling the parties and their attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956. This time.
however, defendant's counsel informed the court that chances of settling the case
amicably were nil.
On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's aforesaid petition.
Defendant has appealed to this Court. In his petition of June 21, 1955 in the court a
quo defendant alleged excusable negligence as ground to set aside the judgment by
default. Specifically, it was stated that defendant filed no answer in the belief that
an amicable settlement was being negotiated.
A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence, must be duly supported by an affidavit of merits stating facts
constituting a valid defense. (Sec. 3, Rule 38, Rules of Court.) Defendant's affidavit
of merits attached to his petition of June 21, 1955 stated: "That he has a good and
valid defense against plaintiff's cause of action, his failure to marry the plaintiff as
scheduled having been due to fortuitous event and/or circumstances beyond his
control." An affidavit of merits like this stating mere conclusions or opinions
instead of facts is not valid. (Cortes vs. Co Bun Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951;
Vaswani vs. P. Tarrachand Bros., L-15800, December 29, 1960.)
Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in fact
unnecessary, or a mere surplusage, because the judgment sought to be set aside
was null and void, it having been based on evidence adduced before the clerk of
court. In Province of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519, October 30, 1962, this Court
pointed out that the procedure of designating the clerk of court as commissioner to
receive evidence is sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule 33) of the Rules of Court. Now
as to defendant's consent to said procedure, the same did not have to be obtained
for he was declared in default and thus had no standing in court (Velez vs. Ramas,
40 Phil. 787; Alano vs. Court of First Instance, L-14557, October 30, 1959).
In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts that
the judgment is contrary to law. The reason given is that "there is no provision of
the Civil Code authorizing" an action for breach of promise to marry. Indeed, our
ruling in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960), as reiterated Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala,
in Estopa vs. Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere breach of a promise Makalintal, and Zaldivar, JJ.,concur.
to marry" is not an actionable wrong. We pointed out that Congress deliberately
eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code the provisions that would have it so.

It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to
law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code
provides that "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage."

The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a
license to contract marriage, which was subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their
wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and distributed to
relatives, friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-to-be's trousseau,
party drsrses and other apparel for the important occasion were purchased (Tsn., 7-
8). Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial
bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received
(Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then, with but two days before the wedding, defendant, who
was then 28 years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to
postpone wedding — My mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home city in
Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired plaintiff:
"Nothing changed rest assured returning soon." But he never returned and was
never heard from again.

Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere
breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a
wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to
walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This
is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be
held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.

Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages awarded were
excessive. No question is raised as to the award of actual damages. What defendant
would really assert hereunder is that the award of moral and exemplary damages,
in the amount of P25,000.00, should be totally eliminated.

Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are
recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary
damages, defendant contends that the same could not be adjudged against him
because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the condition precedent is that
"the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner." The argument is devoid of merit as under the above-narrated
circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton ... , reckless [and]
oppressive manner." This Court's opinion, however, is that considering the
particular circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages
is deemed to be a reasonable award.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the lower court's

judgment is hereby affirmed, with costs.
 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of
Agapito Elcano, deceased, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian
of said minor, defendants-appellees.
Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.
Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January
29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al.
dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for
recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of
the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living
and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs,
named Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was
acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to
kill, coupled with mistake."
Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:
1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section
1, Rule 107, which is now Rule III, of the Revised Rules of Court;
2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and
or in res-adjudicata;
3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin
Hill, because he was relieved as guardian of the other defendant
through emancipation by marriage.
(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])
was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of
the defendants of such denial, reiterating the above grounds that the following
order was issued:
Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants
on January 14, 1965 and after thoroughly examining the
arguments therein contained, the Court finds the same to be
meritorious and well-founded.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is
hereby reconsidered by ordering the dismissal of the above
entitled case.
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21,
Record on Appeal.)
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are presenting
for Our resolution the following assignment of errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY
UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT -
I
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A
VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111, OF THE
REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE
111, RULES OF COURT IS APPLICABLE;
II
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW
FINAL OR RES-ADJUDICTA;
III
THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF
THE CIVIL CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE; and
IV
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST
DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS
GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER DEFENDANT THROUGH EMANCIPATION
BY MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.)
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant-
appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City. After due trial, he was acquitted on the
ground that his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with
mistake." Parenthetically, none of the parties has favored Us with a copy of the
decision of acquittal, presumably because appellants do not dispute that such
indeed was the basis stated in the court's decision. And so, when appellants filed
their complaint against appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on
account of the death of their son, the appellees filed the motion to dismiss above-
referred to.
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues
presented for Our resolution are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the
criminal case wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied against
Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence
complained of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting subsistenee from
his father, was already legally married?
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and further
clarification of the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a
source of obligation which was firmly established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs.
Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court postulated, on the basis of a scholarly
dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa
criminal or delito and mere culpa or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain, the works of recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence
of our own, that the same given act can result in civil liability not only under the
Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus, the opinion holds:
The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act
machinist. come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In
that case, the action of the agent killeth unjustified and fraudulent
and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action.
And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action
under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it
was the employer and not the employee who was being sued. (pp.
615-616, 73 Phil.). 1
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have
been prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence causing
the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is
therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a
proper subject matter either of a criminal action with its
consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely
separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under
article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the
separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under
the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with
regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been
prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after
such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability
arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court
specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that
although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for
reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also
made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence, nevertheless
this Court awarded damages in an independent civil action for
fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. (p. 618,
73 Phil.) 3
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should
ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we
are announcing doctrines that have been little understood, in the
past, it might not he inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only
reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to hold that
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or
negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the literal import of
article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa
aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual
life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property- through
any degree of negligence - even the slightest - would have to be
Idemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a
crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain
for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the
lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and
anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed
to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth
life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and
render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such
full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is
conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Spanish Civil Code.
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case,
preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay
in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence
which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be
proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the
defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action
under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise. there
would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus
Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the
Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has given
rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already
discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and
efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a
common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil
responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another
remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
Although this habitual method is allowed by, our laws, it has
nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more
expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or
 culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help
perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we
pointed out to the harms done by such practice and to restore the
principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles
1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we
caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its
own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted
into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed,
make for the better safeguarding or private rights because it
realtor, an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further
reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the
issues, limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and
entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more
likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73
Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the foregoing
excerpts from the opinion in Garcia that the concurrence of the Penal Code and the
Civil Code therein referred to contemplate only acts of negligence and not
intentional voluntary acts - deeper reflection would reveal that the thrust of the
pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in fact it actually extends to fault
or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made therein to the Sentence of the
Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud
or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in
force here at the time of Garcia, provided textually that obligations "which are
derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not punishable by law,
intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book (which refers to
quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely the underline qualification, "not punishable by
law", that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an ultimo construction or
interpretation of the letter of the law that "killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth
lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law to
smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-
grown development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved and made
enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code." And so, because
Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the original text
of the new Civil Code, it is to be noted that the said Code, which was enacted after
the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11 not punishable by law," thereby
making it clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal
in character or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the
corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code, which is Article 1162,
simply says, "Obligations derived from quasi-delicto shall be governed by the
provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special
laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of the new code provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the
preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through
at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact
nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law,
while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always
had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such
distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-
delito" has been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and
maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish
jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of
criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a
subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for
damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a
double recovery.", (Report of the Code) Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of
negligence, the same argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that upholds
"the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of
the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And considering that the
preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes
the separability and independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in
character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility arising from crime
fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court,
under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability, it is
"more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony
with modern progress"- to borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs.
Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176,
where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by law"
but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided
that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to
recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to
the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In
other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule
111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only
and not as a crime is not estinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case
that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the
accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa
aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.4
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not
extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the
instant action against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation by
marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our
considered opinion that the conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is already free
from responsibility cannot be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child
(Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the
marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article
399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus
"(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental
authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his
property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or
encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He
can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or
guardian."

Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable
not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one
is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their
company." In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although
married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of
the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to
and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.

It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint
and solidary liability of presuncion with their offending child under Article 2180 is
that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to
prevent them from causing damage to third persons. 5 On the other hand, the clear
implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may
not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such
emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act
that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.)
And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the
marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that
the child, while still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of money
and alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor
married child without their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)

Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill

notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it
is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill
has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to
proceed in accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs against appellees.

Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, and Martin, JJ., concur.

Concepcion Jr., J, is on leave.

Martin, J, was designated to sit in the Second Division.

 FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-29993 October 23, 1978
LAUDENCIO TORIO, GUILLERMO EVANGELISTA, MANUEL DE GUZMAN,
ALFONSO R. MAGSANOC, JESUS MACARANAS, MAXIMO MANANGAN, FIDEL
MONTEMAYOR, MELCHOR VIRAY, RAMON TULAGAN, all Members of the
Municipal Council of Malasiqui in 1959, Malasiqui, Pangasinan, petitioners,
vs.
ROSALINA, ANGELINA, LEONARDO, EDUARDO, ARTEMIO, ANGELITA,
ANITA, ERNESTO, NORMA, VIRGINIA, REMEDIOS and ROBERTO, all
surnamed FONTANILLA, and THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-30183 October 23, 1978
MUNICIPALITY OF MALASIQUI, petitioner,
vs.
ROSALINA, ANGELINA, LEONARDO, EDUARDO, ARTEMIO, ANGELITA,
ANITA, ERNESTO, NORMA, VIRGINIA, REMEDIOS and ROBERTO, all
surnamed FONTANILLA, and the Honorable COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Julian M. Armas, Assistant Provincial Fiscal for petitioners.
Isidro L. Padilla for respondents.
MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:
These Petitions for review present the issue of whether or not the celebration of a
town fiesta authorized by a municipal council under Sec. 2282 of the Municipal Law
as embodied in the Revised Administrative Code is a governmental or a corporate or
proprietary function of the municipality.
A resolution of that issue will lead to another, viz the civil liability for damages of
the Municipality of Malasiqui, and the members of the Municipal Council of
Malasiqui, province of Pangasinan, for a death which occurred during the celebration
of the town fiesta on January 22, 1959, and which was attributed to the negligence
of the municipality and its council members.
The following facts are not in dispute:
On October 21, 1958, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, passed
Resolution No. 159 whereby "it resolved to manage the 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta
celebration on January 21, 22, and 23, 1959." Resolution No. 182 was also passed
creating the "1959 Malasiqui 'Town Fiesta Executive Committee" which in turn
organized a sub-committee on entertainment and stage, with Jose Macaraeg as
Chairman. the council appropriated the amount of P100.00 for the construction of 2
stages, one for the "zarzuela" and another for the cancionan Jose Macaraeg
supervised the construction of the stage and as constructed the stage for the
"zarzuela" was "5-½ meters by 8 meters in size, had a wooden floor high at the rear
and was supported by 24 bamboo posts — 4 in a row in front, 4 in the rear and 5 on
each side — with bamboo braces." 1
The "zarzuela" entitled "Midas Extravaganza" was donated by an association of
Malasiqui employees of the Manila Railroad Company in Caloocan, Rizal. The troupe
arrived in the evening of January 22 for the performance and one of the members
of the group was Vicente Fontanilla. The program started at about 10:15 o'clock
that evening with some speeches, and many persons went up the stage. The
"zarzuela" then began but before the dramatic part of the play was reached, the
stage collapsed and Vicente Fontanilla who was at the rear of the stage was pinned
underneath. Fontanilia was taken to tile San Carlos General Hospital where he died
in the afternoon of the following day.
The heirs of Vicente Fontanilia filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of
Manila on September 11, 1959 to recover damages. Named party-defendants were
the Municipality of Malasiqui, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui and all the individual
members of the Municipal Council in 1959.
Answering the complaint defendant municipality invoked inter alia the principal
defense that as a legally and duly organized public corporation it performs sovereign
functions and the holding of a town fiesta was an exercise of its governmental
functions from which no liability can arise to answer for the negligence of any of its
agents.
The defendant councilors inturn maintained that they merely acted as agents of the
municipality in carrying out the municipal ordinance providing for the management
of the town fiesta celebration and as such they are likewise not liable for damages
as the undertaking was not one for profit; furthermore, they had exercised due care
and diligence in implementing the municipal ordinance. 2
After trial, the Presiding Judge, Hon. Gregorio T. Lantin narrowed the issue to
whether or not the defendants exercised due diligence 'm the construction of the
stage. From his findings he arrived at the conclusion that the Executive Committee
appointed by the municipal council had exercised due diligence and care like a good
father of the family in selecting a competent man to construct a stage strong
enough for the occasion and that if it collapsed that was due to forces beyond the
control of the committee on entertainment, consequently, the defendants were not
liable for damages for the death of Vicente Fontanilla. The complaint was
accordingly dismissed in a decision dated July 10, 1962. 3
The Fontanillas appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a decision Promulgated on
October 31, 1968, the Court of Appeals through its Fourth Division composed at the
time of Justices Salvador V. Esguerra, Nicasio A. Yatco and Eulogio S. Serrano
reversed the trial court's decision and ordered all the defendants-appellees to pay
jointly and severally the heirs of Vicente Fontanilla the sums of P12,000.00 by way
of moral and actual damages: P1200.00 its attorney's fees; and the costs. 4
The case is now before Us on various assignments of errors all of which center on
the proposition stated at the sentence of this Opinion and which We repeat:
Is the celebration of a town fiesta an undertaking in the excercise of a municipality's
governmental or public function or is it or a private or proprietary character?
1. Under Philippine laws municipalities are political bodies corporate and as such ag
endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised by and through
their respective municipal governments in conformity with law, and in their proper
corporate name, they may inter alia sue and be sued, and contract and be
contracted with. 5
The powers of a municipality are twofold in character public, governmental or
political on the one hand, and corporate, private, or proprietary on the other.
Governmental powers are those exercised by the corporation in administering the
powers of the state and promoting the public welfare and they include the
legislative, judicial public, and political Municipal powers on the other hand are
exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the community and include those
which are ministerial private and corporate. 6
As to when a certain activity is governmental and when proprietary or private, that
is generally a difficult matter to determine. The evolution of the municipal law in
American Jurisprudence, for instance, has shown that; none of the tests which have
evolved and are stated in textbooks have set down a conclusive principle or rule, so
that each case will have to be determined on the basis of attending circumstances.
In McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, the rule is stated thus: "A municipal
corporation proper has ... a public character as regards the state at large insofar as
it is its agent in government, and private (so-called) insofar as it is to promote local
necessities and conveniences for its own community. 7
Another statement of the test is given in City of Kokomo v. Loy, decided by the
Supreme Court of Indiana in 1916, thus:
Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions
are two fold. In one they exercise the right springing from
sovereignty, and while in the performance of the duties pertaining
thereto, their acts are political and governmental Their officers
and agents in such capacity, though elected or appointed by the
are nevertheless public functionaries performing a public service,
and as such they are officers, agents, and servants of the state. In
the other capacity the municipalities exercise a private.
proprietary or corporate right, arising from their existence as legal
persons and not as public agencies. Their officers and agents in
the performance of such functions act in behalf of the
municipalities in their corporate or in. individual capacity, and not
for the state or sovereign power. (112 N. E 994-995)
In the early Philippine case of Mendoza v. de Leon 1916, the Supreme Court,
through Justice Grant T. Trent, relying mainly on American Jurisprudence classified
certain activities of the municipality as governmental, e.g.: regulations against fire,
disease, preservation of public peace, maintenance of municipal prisons,
establishment of schools, post-offices, etc. while the following are corporate or
proprietary in character, viz: municipal waterwork, slaughter houses, markets,
stables, bathing establishments, wharves, ferries, and fisheries. 8 Maintenance of
parks, golf courses, cemeteries and airports among others, are also recognized as
municipal or city activities of a proprietary character. 9
2. This distinction of powers becomes important for purposes of determining the
liability of the municipality for the acts of its agents which result in an injury to third
persons.
If the injury is caused in the course of the performance of a governmental function
or duty no recovery, as a rule, can be. had from the municipality unless there is an
existing statute on the matter,10 nor from its officers, so long as they performed
their duties honestly and in good faith or that they did not act wantonly and
maliciously. 11 In Palafox, et al., v. Province of Ilocos Norte, et al., 1958, a truck
driver employed by the provincial government of Ilocos Norte ran over Proceto
Palafox in the course of his work at the construction of a road. The Supreme Court
in affirming the trial court's dismissal of the complaint for damages held that the
province could not be made liable because its employee was in the performance of a
governmental function — the construction and maintenance of roads — and
however tragic and deplorable it may be, the death of Palafox imposed on the
province no duty to pay monetary consideration. 12
With respect to proprietary functions, the settled rule is that a municipal corporation
can be held liable to third persons ex contract 13 or ex delicto. 14
Municipal corporations are subject to be sued upon contracts and
in tort. ...
xxx xxx xxx
The rule of law is a general one, that the superior or employer
must answer civilly for the negligence or want of skill of its agent
or servant in the course or fine of his employment, by which
another, who is free from contributory fault, is injured. Municipal
corporations under the conditions herein stated, fall within the
operation of this rule of law, and are liable, accordingly, to civil
actions for damages when the requisite elements of liability co-
exist. ... (Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 5th ed. Sec.
1610,1647, cited in Mendoza v. de Leon, supra. 514)
3. Coming to the cam before Us, and applying the general tests given above, We
hold that the ho of the town fiesta in 1959 by the municipality of Malsiqui
Pangasinan was an exercise of a private or proprietary function of the municipality.
Section 2282 of the Chatter on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative Code
provides:
Section 2282. Celebration of fiesta. — fiesta may be held in each
municipality not oftener than once a year upon a date fixed by the
municipal council A fiesta s not be held upon any other date than
that lawfully fixed therefor, except when, for weighty reasons,
such as typhoons, foundations, earthquakes, epidemics, or other
public ties, the fiesta cannot be hold in the date fixed in which
 case it may be held at a later date in the same year, by resolution
of the council.
This provision simply gives authority to the municipality to accelebrate a yearly
fiesta but it does not impose upon it a duty to observe one. Holding a fiesta even if
the purpose is to commemorate a religious or historical event of the town is in
essence an act for the special benefit of the community and not for the general
welfare of the public performed in pursuance of a policy of the state. The mere fact
that the celebration, as claimed was not to secure profit or gain but merely to
provide entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a conclusive test. For instance,
the maintenance of parks is not a source of income for the nonetheless it is private
undertaking as distinguished from the maintenance of public schools, jails, and the
like which are for public service.
As stated earlier, there can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of determining the
true nature of an undertaking or function of a municipality; the surrounding
circumstances of a particular case are to be considered and will be decisive. The
basic element, however beneficial to the public the undertaking may be, is that it is
governmental in essence, otherwise. the function becomes private or proprietary in
character. Easily, no overnmental or public policy of the state is involved in the
celebration of a town fiesta. 15
4. It follows that under the doctrine of respondent superior, petitioner-municipality
is to be held liable for damages for the death of Vicente Fontanilia if that was at-
tributable to the negligence of the municipality's officers, employees, or agents.
Art. 2176, Civil Code: Whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. . .
Art. 2180, Civil Code: The obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omission, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible. . .
On this point, the Court of Appeals found and held that there was negligence.
The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Angel Novado, a witness of the
defendants (now petitioners), that a member of the "extravaganza troupe removed
two principal braces located on the front portion of the stage and u them to hang
the screen or "telon", and that when many people went up the stage the latter
collapsed. This testimony was not believed however by respondent appellate court,
and rightly so. According to said defendants, those two braces were "mother" or
"principal" braces located semi-diagonally from the front ends of the stage to the
front posts of the ticket booth located at the rear of the stage and were fastened
with a bamboo twine. 16 That being the case, it becomes incredible that any person
in his right mind would remove those principal braces and leave the front portion of
the stage practically unsuported Moreover, if that did happen, there was indeed
negligence as there was lack of suspension over the use of the stage to prevent
such an occurrence.
At any rate, the guitarist who was pointed to by Novado as the person who removed
the two bamboo braces denied having done go. The Court of Appeals said "Amor by
himself alone could not have removed the two braces which must be about ten
meters long and fastened them on top of the stags for the curtain. The stage was
only five and a half meters wide. Surely, it, would be impractical and unwieldy to
use a ten meter bamboo pole, much more two poles for the stage curtain. 17
The appellate court also found that the stage was not strong enough considering
that only P100.00 was appropriate for the construction of two stages and while the
floor of the "zarzuela" stage was of wooden planks, the Post and braces used were
of bamboo material We likewise observe that although the stage was described by
the Petitioners as being supported by "24" posts, nevertheless there were only 4 in
front, 4 at the rear, and 5 on each side. Where were the rest?
The Court of Appeals thus concluded
The court a quo itself attributed the collapse of the stage to the
great number of onlookers who mounted the stage. The
municipality and/or its agents had the necessary means within its
command to prevent such an occurrence. Having filed to take the
necessary steps to maintain the safety of the stage for the use of
the participants in the stage presentation prepared in connection
with the celebration of the town fiesta, particularly, in preventing
non participants or spectators from mounting and accumulating on
the stage which was not constructed to meet the additional
weight- the defendant-appellees were negligent and are liable for
the death of Vicente Fontanilla . (pp. 30-31, rollo, L-29993)
The findings of the respondent appellate court that the facts as presented to it
establish negligence as a matter of law and that the Municipality failed to exercise
the due diligence of a good father of the family, will not disturbed by Us in the
absence of a clear showing of an abuse of discretion or a gross misapprehension of
facts." 18
Liability rests on negligence which is "the want of such care as a person of ordinary
prudence would exercise under the circumstances of the case." 19
Thus, private respondents argue that the "Midas Extravaganza" which was to be
performed during the town fiesta was a "donation" offered by an association of
Malasiqui employees of the Manila Railroad Co. in Caloocan, and that when the
Municipality of Malasiqui accepted the donation of services and constructed precisely
a "zarzuela stage" for the purpose, the participants in the stage show had the right
to expect that the Municipality through its "Committee on entertainment and stage"
would build or put up a stage or platform strong enough to sustain the weight or
burden of the performance and take the necessary measures to insure the personal
safety of the participants. 20 We agree.
Quite relevant to that argument is the American case of Sanders v. City of Long
Beach, 1942, which was an action against the city for injuries sustained from a fall
when plaintiff was descending the steps of the city auditorium. The city was
conducting a "Know your City Week" and one of the features was the showing of a
motion picture in the city auditorium to which the general public was invited and
plaintiff Sanders was one of those who attended. In sustaining the award for
Damages in favor of plaintiff, the District Court of Appeal, Second district, California,
held inter alia that the "Know your City Week" was a "proprietary activity" and not a non-performance by a public officer of his official duty; it does not apply to a case of
"governmental one" of the city, that defendant owed to plaintiff, an invitee the duty negligence or misfeasance in carrying out an official duty.
of exercising ordinary care for her safety, and plaintiff was entitled to assume that
she would not be exposed to a danger (which in this case consisted of lack of
If We are led to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as these
sufficient illumination of the premises) that would come to her through a violation of
petitioners are concerned, it is because of a plain error committed by respondent
defendant duty. 21
court which however is not invoked in petitioners' brief.

We can say that the deceased Vicente Fontanilla was similarly situated as Sander
In Miguel v. The Court of appeal. et al., the Court, through Justice, now Chief
The Municipality of Malasiqui resolved to celebrate the town fiesta in January of
Justice, Fred Ruiz Castro, held that the Supreme Court is vested with ample
1959; it created a committee in charge of the entertainment and stage; an
authority to review matters not assigned as errors in an appeal if it finds that their
association of Malasiqui residents responded to the call for the festivities and
consideration and resolution are indispensable or necessary in arriving at a just
volunteered to present a stage show; Vicente Fontanilla was one of the participants
decision in a given case, and that tills is author under Sec. 7, Rule 51 of the Rules of
who like Sanders had the right to expect that he would be exposed to danger on
Court. 25 We believe that this pronouncement can well be applied in the instant
that occasion.
case.

Lastly, petitioner or appellant Municipality cannot evade ability and/or liability under
The Court of Appeals in its decision now under review held that the celebration of a
the c that it was Jose Macaraeg who constructed the stage. The municipality acting
town fiesta by the Municipality of Malasiqui was not a governmental function. We
through its municipal council appointed Macaraeg as chairman of the sub-committee
upheld that ruling. The legal consequence thereof is that the Municipality stands on
on entertainment and in charge of the construction of the "zarzuela" stage.
the same footing as an ordinary private corporation with the municipal council
Macaraeg acted merely as an agent of the Municipality. Under the doctrine of
acting as its board of directors. It is an elementary principle that a corporation has a
respondent superior mentioned earlier, petitioner is responsible or liable for the
personality, separate and distinct from its officers, directors, or persons composing
negligence of its agent acting within his assigned tasks. 22
it 26 and the latter are not as a rule co-responsible in an action for damages for tort
or negligence culpa aquilla committed by the corporation's employees or agents
... when it is sought to render a municipal corporation liable for the act of servants unless there is a showing of bad faith or gross or wanton negligence on their part. 27
or agents, a cardinal inquiry is, whether they are the servants or agents of the
corporation. If the corporation appoints or elects them, can control them in the
xxx xxx xxx
discharge of their duties, can continue or remove the can hold them responsible for
the manner in which they discharge their trust, and if those duties relate to the
exercise of corporate powers, and are for the benefit of the corporation in its local The ordinary doctrine is that a director, merely by reason of his
or special interest, they may justly be regarded as its agents or servants, and the office, is not personally Stable for the torts of his corporation; he
maxim of respondent superior applies." ... (Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 5th Must be shown to have personally voted for or otherwise
Ed., Vol IV, p. 2879) participated in them ... Fletcher Encyclopedia Corporations, Vol 3A
Chapt 11, p. 207)
5. The remaining question to be resolved centers on the liability of the municipal
councilors who enacted the ordinance and created the fiesta committee. Officers of a corporation 'are not held liable for the negligence of
the corporation merely because of their official relation to it, but
because of some wrongful or negligent act by such officer
The Court of Appeals held the councilors jointly and solidarity liable with the
amounting to a breach of duty which resulted in an injury ... To
municipality for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code which provides that d
make an officer of a corporation liable for the negligence of the
any person suffering ing material or moral loss because a public servant or
corporation there must have been upon his part such a breach of
employee refuses or neglects, without just cause to perform his official duty may file
duty as contributed to, or helped to bring about, the injury; that is
an action for damages and other relief at the latter. 23
to say, he must be a participant in the wrongful act. ... (pp. 207-
208, Ibid.)
In their Petition for review the municipal councilors allege that the Court of Appeals
erred in ruling that the holding of a town fiesta is not a governmental function and
xxx xxx xxx
that there was negligence on their part for not maintaining and supervising the safe
use of the stage, in applying Article 27 of the Civil Code against them and in not
holding Jose Macaraeg liable for the collapse of the stage and the consequent death Directors who merely employ one to give a fireworks Ambition on
of Vicente Fontanilla. 24 the corporate are not personally liable for the negligent acts of the
exhibitor. (p. 211, Ibid.)
We agree with petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred in applying Article 27 of
the Civil Code against the for this particular article covers a case of nonfeasance or On these people We absolve Use municipal councilors from any liability for the death
of Vicente Fontanilla. The records do not show that said petitioners directly
participated in the defective construction of the "zarzuela" stage or that they
personally permitted spectators to go up the platform.

6. One last point We have to resolve is on the award of attorney's fees by

respondent court. Petitioner-municipality assails the award.

Under paragraph 11, Art. 2208 of the Civil Code attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation may be granted when the court deems it just and equitable. In this case of
Vicente Fontanilla, although respondent appellate court failed to state the grounds
for awarding attorney's fees, the records show however that attempts were made
by plaintiffs, now private respondents, to secure an extrajudicial compensation from
the municipality: that the latter gave prorases and assurances of assistance but
failed to comply; and it was only eight month after the incident that the bereaved
family of Vicente Fontanilla was compelled to seek relief from the courts to ventilate
what was believed to be a just cause. 28

We hold, therefore, that there is no error committed in the grant of attorney's fees
which after all is a matter of judicial discretion. The amount of P1,200.00 is fair and
reasonable.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, We AFFIRM in toto the decision of the Court of Appeals

insofar as the Municipality of Malasiqui is concerned (L-30183), and We absolve the
municipal councilors from liability and SET ASIDE the judgment against them (L-
9993).

Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED,

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, and Guerrero, JJ., concur.