ART. VI – LEGISLATIVE II.
Issues on Delegation of Legislative Power
Sec. 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of
the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by
the provision on initiative and referendum.
I. General Rule: Non-delegability of legislative power;
Exceptions
A. Delegation to local governments and administrative bodies;
Grant of Quasi-legislative Power; In General; LGU and
Administrative Bodies
CHAVEZ v. JBC
 JBC – intended to be an innovative solution to the public
clamor in favor of eliminating politics in the appointment of
members of the judiciary
 Doctrine of Operative Fact – a statute prior to a
determination of constitutionality is an operative fact;
actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are
legally recognized
RUBI v. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO (LGU)
 An exception to the general rule sanctioned by immemorial
practice permits the central legislative body to delegate
legislative powers to local authorities.
ANTIPOLO REALTY CORP v. NHA (administrative)
 Many administrative agencies exercise and perform
adjudicatory powers and function, though to a limited extent
only. The need for special competence and experience has
been recognized as an essential in the resolution of
questions of complex or specialized character and because
the dockets of our regular courts are remain crowded and
clogged.
PITC v. ANGELES (administrative)
 The grant of quasi-legislative powers in administrative
bodies is not unconstitutional. It has become necessary to
create more administrative bodies to help in the regulation
of its activities, and because they specialize in the field
assigned to them, they can deal and dispatch problems with
more expertise than the legislative or the courts of justice.
ATITIW v. ZAMORA (repealing power)
 The PH Gov’t, through Congress, can unilaterality amend
and repeal Executive Orders. Since the ratification of the
1987 Constitution, the power to make, amend, or repeal
laws has been lodged exclusively with Congress, except to
the extent reserved to the people through initiative and
referendum. There is no such thing as an irrepealable law.
SEC v. INTERPORT (absence of IRR)
 To rule that the absence of implementing rules can render
ineffective an act of Congress would empower
administrative bodies to defeat the legislative will by
delaying the implementing rules. Where the statute
contains sufficient standards and an unmistakable intent,
there should be no impediment to its implementation.
A. Requisites of a valid delegation
AGUSTIN v. EDU (test of delegability)
 The LOI in question herein was issued in the exercise of the
State’s police power intended to promote public safety and
there has been no undue delegation power as a standard
has been set; the country cannot repudiate its commitment
to international bodies and the accepted principles of
international law.
 To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a
standard which implies that legislature itself determines
matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. A
standard defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps
out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply
it.
 Thereafter, the executive or administrative once designated
may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate
supplemental rules and regulations.
FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS v. MINISTRY OF LABOR
(assumption of jurisdiction in labor disputes)
 To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation
of legislative power, the inquiry must be directed to the
scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The
legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes
what job must be done, who is to do it, and what the scope
of his authority is.
 Delegation of power to make laws – involves a discretion
as to what it shall be, unconstitutional
 Delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution
– to be exercised under and in pursuance of law, no valid
objection can be made
GUINGONA v. CARAGUE (automatic debt service)
 The hands of Congress are not hamstrung as to deprive it
the power to respond to the imperatives of the national
interest for the attainment of other state policies or
objectives.
 Congress is not without any power to provide an
appropriation that can reasonably service our enormous
debt, even with the appropriation for which would be bigger
than the allocation for education.
TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEV’T CORP v. CSC (rule making
is not law making)
 The rules that CSC formulates must not override, but must
be in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement.
Administrative regulations must be in harmony with the
provisions of the law, and in a conflict between the basic
law and an IRR, the former must prevail.
1. Complete in itself
ARANETA v. GATMAITAN (details for implementation only)
 The Fisheries Act herein is complete in itself, leaving to the
Sec. of Agriculture and Natural Resources the promulgation
of rules and regulations to carry into effect the legislative
intent.
MARCOS v. CA (Monetary Board authority)
 Administrative bodies have the authority to issue
administrative regulations which are penal in nature where
the law itself makes the violation of the administrative
regulation punishable and provides for its penalty.
GEROCHI v. DOE (imposition of universal charge)
 The laws principal agencies execute must pass 2 tests:
 Completeness Test – complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it
reaches the delegate, the only thing to do is to enforce it
 Sufficient Standard Test – provides adequate guidelines
or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the
delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY v. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD
(drug testing)
 RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless
drug testing of students are constitutional. The provision in
question is not so extensively drawn as to give unbridled
options to schools and employers to determine the manner
of drug testing.
PACIFIC STEAM v. LLDA (LLDA’s power)
 The LDDA was granted the powers and functions to
effectively perform its role and enlarge its prerogatives of
monitoring, licensing, and enforcement, which includes
issuance of orders or decisions to compel compliance with
their standards. LLDA has the power to impose fines even
though they are penal in nature.
DISINI v. SEC. OF JUSTICE
 Certain provisions of the cybercrime law were questioned.
 Those that establish the Cybercrime Investigation and
Coordinating Center, defines its powers and functions, and
articles of the RPC that penalizes libel as well as sections
that penalize online libel were held constitutional and valid
with respect to original authors of such post, while
unconstitutional and void with respect to others who simply
receive and react to such posts.
2. Fixes a Standard
PEOPLE v. ROSENTHAL (standard of “public interest”)
 The intention of the Blue Sky Law – to protect the public
against “speculative schemes which have no more basis
than so many feet of blue sky” and against the “sale of
exploitations” is a sufficient standard to guide the Insular
Treasurer in reaching a decision on a matter pertaining to
the issuance or cancellation of certificates or permits.
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES v. POEA (discretion as to
substantive contents)
 The “power of the subordinate legislation” or the authority
to issue rules (supplementary regulations) to carry out the
general provisions of the statute given to administrative
bodies is necessary.
TABLARIN v. GUTIERREZ (establishment of medical
educational requirements)
 The requirement by the Board of Medical Education of
NMAT is constitutional as the standards set for subordinate
legislation in the exercise of the rule making authority of the
Board is necessarily high and abstract, and the NMAT was
justified by the completeness and sufficiency of the 1959
Medical Act.
CONFERENCE v. POEA (promulgation of rules and
regulations)
 What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how
the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The
ascertainment of the latter is a prerogative of the legislature,
and such cannot be abdicated nor surrendered to the
delegate.
OSMEÑA v. ORBOS (power of ERB to add amounts)
 The authority conferred upon ERB to impose additional
amounts on petroleum provides a sufficient standard by
which the authority must be exercised. What is here
involved is not so much the power of taxation as police
power.
 Constant fluctuation of the various factors involved in the
determination of the price of oil and petroleum products do
not conveniently permit the setting of fixed or rigid
parameters in the law.
 The stabilization and subsidy of domestic prices of
petroleum products is regarded as a public purpose.
VIOLA v. ALUNAN (power to create positions)
 The creation of the additional positions in the National Liga
ng mga Barangay was made in the Constitution. The
provision on Organization of the Liga in the LGC requires
the BOD to create such other positions as it may deem
necessary for the management of the chapter.
 The Congress can delegate the power to create positions
such as these were supported by the decisions upholding
the validity of reorganization statutes.
ABAKADA v. ERMITA (ascertainment of facts)
 The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating
are those which are strictly and inherently legislative.
Exceptions to this are delegation of
 tariff powers to the President under Constitution
 emergency power to the President under Constitution
 people at large
 local governments
 administrative bodies
 A delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which
enforcement and administration of the increased rate under
the law is contingent. Congress just granted the Sec. of
Finance the authority to ascertain the existence of a fact.
He is merely acting as the agent of the legislative
department.
BELTRAN v. SEC. OF HEALTH (promotion of public health
sufficient guideline)
 The National Blood Services Act of 1994 is complete in itself
and has sufficiently provided a definite standard for the
guidance of Sec. of Health, which is the promotion of public
health by providing a safe and adequate supply of blood
through voluntary blood donation.
BAYAN v. ERMITA (issuance of permits for rally)
 BP 880 is not an absolute ban on public assemblies but a
restriction that simply regulates the time, place, and manner
of the assemblies. Issuance of permits can only be denied
on the ground of clear and present danger to the public.
 The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally
permits is valid because it is subject to the constitutionally-
sound “clear and present danger” standard.
ABAKADA v. PURISIMA (system of rewards)
 Equality guaranteed under the equal protection clause is
equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of
persons who are classified based on substantial differences
in relation to the object to be accomplished. Things or
persons different in fact or circumstance may be treated by
law differently. Such classification must be reasonable –
 that it must be germane to the purpose of the law, not be
limited to existing conditions only; and must apply to each
member of the class.
 The distinction for BIR and BOC for the system of rewards
under RA 9335 is germane and related to the purpose of
the law, hence it fully satisfies the demands of equal
protection.
3. Filling in the details
FERNANDEZ v. STO. TOMAS (authority to reorganize)
 Legislative authority was validly delegated to CSC by the
Revised Admin Code and the reorganization of office under
such is moved by legitimate considerations of
administrative efficiency and convenience.
CHIONGBIAN v. ORBOS (authority to reorganize)
 While the power to merge administrative regions is not
expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power
which has been traditionally lodged with the President to
facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision
over local governments.
RODRIGO v. SANDIGANBAYAN (power to classify)
 The Congress shall provide for the standardization of
compensation of officials and employees, including those in
GOCCs with original charters. On officials, salary is
determined by the Grade accorded to his position, and
ultimately by the nature of his position with respect to the
level of difficulty and responsibilities and level of
qualification requirements of the work.
TONDO MEDICAL v. CA (authority to reorganize)
 The power of the president to reorganize the executive
department is recognized in general appropriation laws.
MALARIA EMPLOYEES v. ROMULO (authority to reorganize)
 The President has the authority to carry out a
reorganization of the DOH under the Constitution.
Reorganization involves the reduction of personnel,
consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of
economy or redundancy of functions.
ANAK v. EXEC. SECRETARY (authority to PCUP/NCIP)
 PCUP and NCIP were formed as agencies under the office
of the President, and such refer to those placed under his
chairmanship and supervision. The President may transfer
any agency under the OP to any other department or
agency, subject to the policy of the Exec Office and in order
to achieve simplicity, economy, and efficiency (main
guideline of President’s power to reorganize).
PICHAY v. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXEC SEC (authority to
reorganize and appropriate funds)
 The Chief Executive is vested with the power to recommend
the budget necessary for the operation of the Government;
he has the necessary authority to evaluate and determine
the structure that each agency in the executive department
would need to operate in the most economical and efficient
manner.
 The General Appropriation Act recognizes the President’s
power to modify and realign appropriations in line with his
power to reorganize.
ARROYO v. DOJ (collaboration of two committees)
 The creation of the joint committee is not an abdication of
the COMELEC’s independence, as it agreed with DOJ to
exercise their concurrent jurisdiction jointly. There is no
reason to disallow the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction
especially with the magnitude of crimes, and this serves to
maximize the resources and manpower of both for the
prompt disposition of cases.
B. Undue Delegation
PEOPLE v. VERA (discretion in implementation)
 Probation Law is unconstitutional as it constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power to the provincial board
because it does not provide sufficient cause or reason for
such delegation. There is no guide nor standard for the
discretionary powers granted. Also, it denies equal
protection of the laws because it specifies the salary of a
probation office, to which if not complied with, the act will
not be enforceable. This is a manifestation of discrimination
and inequality.
US v. BARRIAS (delegated power to fix penalties)
 The fixing of penalties for criminal offenses is the exercise
of a legislative power which cannot be delegated to a
subordinate authority.
US v. PANLILIO (delegated power to criminalize)
 The orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they may
possibly be said to have the force of law, are statutes and
particularly not penal statutes, and a violation of such
orders is not a penal offense unless the statute itself
somewhere makes a violation thereof unlawful and
penalizes it.
PEOPLE v. MACEREN (delegation of power to declare what
acts constitute a crime; moved from ‘valid delegation’)
 The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive
official the power to declare what acts should constitute an
offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the
imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself, but it
cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory
requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the
statute.
PEOPLE v. DACUYCUY
 It is an undue delegation of power to vest in the court the
responsibility of imposing a duration on the punishment of
imprisonment. It is not for the courts to fix the term thereof
where no points of reference has been provided by the
legislature.
CEBU OXYGEN v. DRILON (implementing rule void,
anniversary wages)
 Implementing rules cannot add or detract from the
provisions of law it is designed to implement.
YNOT v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (disposition of
confiscated property, ban of transportation of carabao/carebeef)
 To warrant a valid exercise of power, the following must be
present:
a. the interests of the public, generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require such interference; and
b. the means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose.
 The protection of the general welfare is the particular
function of the police power which restraints and is
restrained by due process. The police power is simply
defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate
liberty and property for the promotion of the general
welfare.
PHARMACEUTICAL v. DOH (WHO guidelines, Milk Code)
 No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least 2/3 of all members
of the Senate.
 Transformation – an international law must be
transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional
mechanism such as local legislation
 Incorporation – by mere constitutional declaration,
international law is deemed to have the force of law
ABAKADA v. PURISIMA (encroachment of judicial power)
 Congressional oversight is not unconstitutional as it neither
necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive
power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional
separation of powers. It is integral to the checks and
balances inherent in our democratic system and prevents
the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.
 However, it may not vest itself with either executive or
judicial power. In exercising discretion to approve or
disapprove an IRR based on whether they conform to
provisions of an Act is an act of arrogation by the Congress
of judicial power unto itself and hence was held invalid.
COCOFED v. REPUBLIC (distribution of UCPB shares by PCA)
 The PCA assumed, due to lack of adequate guidelines set
by PD 755, that it had complete authority to define who the
coconut farmers are and to decide as to who among them
shall be given the gift of bank shares. PCA also did not take
note of the public purpose for which the coconut levy funds
were imposed under said PD. It disregarded national policy
for which the funds were created.
BELGICA v. OCHOA (PDAF)
 The power to appropriate is lodged in the Congress ad must
be exercised only through legislation. The 2013 PDAF has
conferred unto legislators the power of appropriation by
giving them personal, discretionary funds from which they
are able to fund specific projects which they themselves
determine.
 PDAF does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately
determine the limits of the President’s authority with respect
to the purpose of Malampaya Funds, and hence allows him
to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview
of the law.
C. Executive Misapplication
TATAD v. DOE
 The choice in crafting the standard to guide the exercise of
delegated power is part of the lawmaking process and is
exclusively in the Congress. Said standard cannot be
altered in any way by the Executive for he cannot modify
the will of the Legislature.
D. Mere Directive
DAGAN v. PRC (requisite of a valid administrative issuance)
 The validity of an administrative issuance hinges on
compliance with the following requisites:
a. promulgation must be authorized by the legislature
b. in accordance with the prescribed procedure
c. within the scope of the authority given by legislature
d. must be reasonable
Sec. 2. The Senate shall be composed of 24 senators who shall
be elected at large by the qualified voters of the Philippines, as
may be provided by law.
Sec. 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at
least 35 years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter,
and a resident of the Philippines for not less than 2 years
immediately preceding the day of the election.
Sec. 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and
shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on
the 30th day of June next following their election. No Senator
shall serve for more than 2 consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term of which he was elected.
Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of
not more than 250 members , unless otherwise fixed by law, who
shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and
on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who,
as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system
of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute 20% of the total
number of representatives including those under the party list.
For 3 consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution,
1/2 of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be
filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women,
youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except
the religious sector.
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a
population of at least 250,000 or each province shall have 1
representative.
(4) Within 3 years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reappointment of legislative districts
based on the standards provided in this section.
I. Party-list Representation (par. 2)
ANG BAGONG BAYANI v. COMELEC
 Political parties, even major ones, may participate in the
party-list elections.
 The intent of the Constitution is to give genuine power to
the people, not only by giving more law to those who have
less in life, but more so by enabling them to become
veritable lawmakers themselves.
VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY v. COMELEC
 The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is not
mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for part-list seats.
 The 2% threshold vote to qualify a party-list to
congressional seats is constitutional as Congress wants to
ensure than only those parties, organizations, and
coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents
deserving of representation are actually in Congress.
PHIL. GUARDIANS v. COMELEC
 The COMELEC may, upon verified complaint of any
interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and
hearing, the registration of any national, regional, or
sectoral party, organization, or coalition, if it:
(1) fails to participate in the last 2 preceding elections; or
 (2) fails to obtain at least 2% of the votes under party-list
system in the 2 preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered.
ANG LADLAD v. COMELEC
 The enumeration of marginalized and under-represented
sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is whether a
particular organization complies with the Requirements of
the Constitution and RA 7941 (Party-List System Act)
 Ang Ladlad, representing the LGBT sector, should be
granted accreditation for its party-list application.
LAYUG v. COMELEC
 The SC and the COMELEC have jurisdiction to question
declaration of party-list nominees who have not been
elected.
 HRET only has jurisdiction over those who have been
already elected.
MAGDALO v. COMELEC
 The COMELEC has a mandate to ascertain the eligibility of
parties and organizations to participate in electoral
contests.
 The Constitution states that parties, organizations, and
coalitions that seek to achieve their goals through violence
or unlawful means shall be denied registration.
ATONG PAGLAUM v. COMELEC
 The new parameters in the qualification of national,
regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list
system are as follows:
(1) 3 diff. groups may participate – (1) national, (2)
regional, (3) sectoral parties/organizations.
(2) National and regional parties/organizatiions do not
need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need
to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented”
sector.
(3) Political parties can participate provided they register
under the party-list system and do not field candidates
in legislative district elections. A political party, whether
major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district
elections can participate in the party-list elections only
through its sectoral wing that can separately register
under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by
itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a
political party through a coalition.
(4) Sectoral parties/organizations may either be
“marginalized and underrepresented” (labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers) or lacking in “well-defined political
constituencies” (professionals, elderly, women, and
the youth). It is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector.
(5) A majority of the members of sectoral parties/
organizations that represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented” and those that that lack “well-
defined political constituencies” must belong to the
sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral
parties of both characters either must belong to their
respective sectors, or must have a track record of
advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees
of national and regional parties/organizations must
be bona-fide members of such parties/organizations.
(6) National, regional, and sectoral parties/organizations
shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are
disqualified, provided that they have at least one
nominee who remains qualified.
ABANG LINGKOD v. COMELEC
 The guidelines and requirements for party-list registration
do not require track record proof, but rather only documents
in terms of their constitution, by-laws, platform, coalition
agreement, and other relevant information.
 Track records are not required with national and regional
organizations and there is no logic in treating sectoral
organizations differently.
 While the Court does not condone misrepresentation of
proof (photoshopping), since a track record is not required,
such misrepresentation is not a ground for cancellation.
LICO v. COMELEC (expulsion)
 It is the HRET who has jurisdiction over the expulsion of a
member of the HoR from his party-list organization.
 The HRET is endowed with jurisdiction to resolve questions
on the qualifications of members of congress. In the case
of party-list representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction
over a disqualification case upon proclamation of the
winning party-list group, oath of the nominee, and
assumption of office as a member of the HoR.
II. Rules on Appointment (pars. 1, 3, & 4)
MARIANO v. COMELEC (reapportionment of the special law)
 Addition of legislative districts in places is constitutional.
The Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing
membership by passing a law other than a general
reapportionment of the law.
SEMA v. COMELEC (ARMM RLA power)
 Representative districts are created by law. The ARMM
Regional Assembly may not create a representative district
nor may it create a province.
MONTEJO v. COMELEC (redistricting Leyte; mere minor
adjustments)
 The COMELEC does not have the power to transfer
municipalities from one legislative district to another. It is
only empowered to make minor adjustments of the
reapportionments made.
III. Population Size
HERRERA v. COMELEC
 The municipalities belong to each district are compact,
contiguous, and adjacent. The division of provinces into
districts and the corresponding apportionment by district, of
the number of elective members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, are provided for by law.
 Allotment of elective members to provinces and
municipalities must be made based on its classification as
a province and/or municipality.
(a) 1st and 2nd class provinces – 10 elective members
(b) 3rd and 4th class provinces – 8 elective members
(c) 5th and 6th class provinces – 6 elective members, to be
elected at large by the qualified voters therein
 A province with only 1 legislative district shall be divided into
2 for purposes of electing the members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan.
 A municipality shall belong to 1 district only.
AQUINO v. COMELEC
 The creation of a new legislative district is valid even if the
population of the new district is less than 250,000.
 Population is not the only factor in the composition of the
additional district.
BAGABUYO v. COMELEC (no need for plebisito in
appointment/ reappointment)
 The aim of legislative apportionment is “to equalize
population and voting power among districts.” The
emphasis is given to number of people represented; the
uniform and progressive ratio to be observed among the
representative districts; and accessibility and commonality
of interests in terms of each district being.
 The Constitution does not require mathematical exactitude
or rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of
representation.
 Legislative apportionment – determination of the number
of representatives which a State, country or other
subdivision may send to a legislative body. It is the
allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the
population, the drawing of voting district lines so as to
equalize population and voting power among the districts.
 Reappointment – the realignment or change in legislative
districts brought about by changes in population and
mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of
representation.
Sec. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and, on the day of the elections, is at least 25 years
of age, able to read and write, and except the party-list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall
be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than
one year immediately preceding the day of the election.
I. Citizenship
BENGZON v. CRUZ (recurring NBC status)
 A naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship but have been
restored through RA 2630 is deemed to have recovered his
original status as a natural-born citizen. This act of
repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original
status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
II. Domicile and Residence
AQUINO v. COMELEC
 The Constitution requires that a person seeking election to
the HoR should be a resident of the district in which he
seeks election for a period of not less than 1 year prior to
the elections.
 Residence – physical presence of a person in a given area,
synonymous with “domicile” for election purposes
 Domicile – the place where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home, where he, no
matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually
intends to return and remain.
 The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers
unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community
from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing
in that community for electoral gain.
IMELDA MARCOS v. COMELEC (abandonment of domicile)
 Marcos has lived in Tacloban by virtue of her father bringing
her there as a minor. Even though Marcos had left Tacloban
on several occasions, she still has property situated in the
area and still went back from time and time again. And even
after getting married, she chose Tacloban still as her
domicile, signifying her express intention of coming back.
DOMINO v. COMELEC (mere loan of house)
 The principal elements of domicile – physical presence in
the locality involved and intention to adopt it as a domicile,
must concur in order to establish a new domicile. Intention
to acquire a domicile without actual residence in the locality
does not result in the acquisition of domicile, nor does the
fact of physical presence without intention.
 Rules for establishment of domicile:
(1) A man must have a residence/domicile somewhere
(2) Once established, it remains until a new one is
acquired
(3) A man can have but one residence/domicile at one
time
PEREZ v. COMELEC
 The fact that a person is registered as a voter in one district
is not proof that he is not domiciled in another district. The
registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of
origin is not sufficient to consider him to have abandoned or
lost his residence.
FERNANDEZ v. HRET
 The Court has liberally and equitably construed the
electoral laws to give the fullest effect to the manifest will of
our people. In case of doubt, political laws must be
interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate
freely expressed through the ballot. Legal niceties and
technicalities cannot stand in the way of the sovereign will.
 The interpretation of HRET of the residency requirement
here is overly restrictive and unwarranted under the factual
circumstances of this case.
REYES v. COMELEC
 For a respondent to reacquire Filipino citizenship and
become eligible for public office, RA 9925 requires that he
must have accomplished the following:
(1) Take the oath of allegiance to the RP before the
consul-general of the PH consulate in the USA.
(2) Make a personal and sworn renunciation of her
American citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath.
III. Additional Qualifications
SJS v. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD (drug testing)
 It is unconstitutional that a candidate for senator should be
certified illegal-drug clean because if congress cannot
require a candidate for senator to meet such additional
qualifications, the COMELEC is also without such power.
 Art. 6, Sec. 3 only prescribes a maximum of 5 qualifications
for candidacy.
Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be
elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless
otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June
next following their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives hall service for
more than 3 consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.
DIMAPORO v. MITRA
 If a Batasan or a governor or a mayor who is mandated to
serve for 6 years be allowed to file for an office other than
the one he was elected to, that clearly shows that he did not
 intend to serve the mandate of the people which was placed
upon him and therefore he should be considered resigned.
 This provision is to ensure that such officials serve out their
entire term of office by discouraging them from running for
another public office position. The filing of a certificate shall
be considered as an overt act or abandoning/relinquishing
of mandate to the people.
Sec. 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election
of the Senators and the Members of the House of
Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May.
Sec. 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of
Representatives, a special election may be called to fill such
vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or
Member of the House of Representatives shall serve only for the
unexpired term.
LUCERO v. COMELEC (special elections)
 The COMELEC has the authority to order holdings of
special elections. The Omnibus Election Code provides 2
requisites for the holding of such:
(1) There is a failure of election
(2) Such failure would affect the results of the election
TOLENTINO v. COMELEC
 Failure of COMELEC to give notice as to the time of the
special election does not negate the calling of the said
election since the Constitution expressly provides for such.
 The test in determining the validity of a special election in
relation to the failure to give notice is whether the lack of
notice resulting in misleading a sufficient number of voters.
 For special elections, there is no need for a separate
canvassing and documentation.
OCAMPO v. HRET
 In local government elections, when the winning candidate
for governor or mayor is subsequently disqualified, the vice
succeeds to the position by virtue of LGC.
 For representatives, voters are not afforded the opportunity
of electing a ‘substitute congressman’ in the eventuality that
their first choice dies, resigns, is disqualified, or in any other
way leaves the post vacant.
Sec. 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall be determined by law. No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full
term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives.
Sec. 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in
session. No. Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in
any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in
any committee thereof.
I. Privilege from Arrest.
PEOPLE v. JALOSJOS (convicted legislator)
 The rights and privileges from being elected as public
official may be restricted by law. Privilege must be granted
by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. The higher
the rank, the greater the requirement of obedience rather
than exemption.
 Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in
liberty of movement.
TRILLANES v. PIMENTEL
 Re-election to office does not obliterate a criminal charge.
 The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by
public officers has never been an excuse to free a person
validly in prison. Congress continues to function well in the
physical absence of one or a few of its members.
 Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from
imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion
of the authorities or upon court orders.
II. Parliamentary Freedom of Speech
JIMENEZ v. CABANGBANG
 Speech and debate made in the performance of official
function include speeches, statements, or votes cast
against Congress. They are duly authorized to do such in
the exercise and in the performance of their duties. But the
open letter in this case is not of that nature; it was done
when the Congress was not in session and not in the
performance of his duty, and hence, not privileged.
POBRE v. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO (violation of lawyer’s oath)
 The parliamentary immunity’s purpose is to enable and
encourage a representative of the public to discharge his
public trust with firmness and success, for it is indispensably
necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech
and that he should be protected from resentment of every
one, however powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty
may occasionally offense.”
Sec. 12. All Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives shall, upon assumption of office, make a full
disclosure of their financial and business interests. They shall
notify the House concerned of a potential conflict of interest that
may arise from the filing of a proposed legislation of which they
are authors.
Sec. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
may hold another office or employment in the Government, or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither
shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created
nor the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which
he was elected.
LIBAN v. GORDON (office of PNRC)
 The office of the Chairman of the PNRC is not a government
office or an office in a GOCC.
 Gordon did not forfeit his seat in the Senate when he
accepted chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors.
 The auxiliary status of the Red Cross Society means that it
is at one and the same time a private institution and a public
service organization. The Geneva Convention granted
PNRC this sui generis character.
 The PNRC Charter does not come within spirit of this
constitutional provision as it does not grant special
privileges to a particular individual, family, or group, but
creates an entity that strives to serve the common good.
Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or
before the Electoral Tribunals, or any court of justice or before
the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative
bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested
financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special
privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-
owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his
term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any
office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he
may be called upon to act on account of his office.
PUYAT v. DE GUZMAN
 Fernandez is a member of the interim Batasang Pambansa
who entered as counsel for respondent Acero Group in the
SEC.
 This is a case of an indirect “appearance as counsel before
any administrative body” and a clear circumvention of the
Constitutional prohibition using the small stock as a
rationale of being a director for the administrative body.
 The intervention would enable him to appear actively in
proceedings in some other capacities and if upheld would
render the constitutional prohibition ineffective. If all other
assemblymen would want to influence administrative
bodies, they would do so just by acquiring minimal
participation. The constitution prohibits such and may not
be rendered ineffective by indirection.
Sec. 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the 4th
Monday of July for its regular session, unless a different date is
fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number
of days as it may determine until 30 days before the opening of
its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and
legal holidays. The President may call a special session at any
time.
Sec. 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House
of Representatives, its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its
respective Members. Each House shall choose such other
officers as it may deem necessary.
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day
and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such
manner, and under such penalties, as such House may provide.
(3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings,
punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the
concurrence of 2/3 of all its Members, suspend or expel a
Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not
exceed 60 days.
(4) Each house shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from
time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in
its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on
any question shall, at the request of 1/5 of the Members present,
be entered in the Journal. Each House shall also keep a Record
of its proceedings.
(5) Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall,
without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than 3 days,
nor to any other place than that in which the 2 Houses shall be
sitting.
I. Officers of Congress
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO v. GUINGONA
 While the Constitution mandates that the Senate President
must be elected by a number constituting more than half of
all the members thereof, it does not provide that the
members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute
the “minority”, who could thereby elect the minority leader.
 The Constitution and the Rules of Senate do not provide for
the majority and minority leaders.
II. Meaning of a “quorum to do business” and compulsion to
attend
DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA v. SENATE
 RA 10153 (ARMM) fixed the date of “regular elections” and
provided interim officials appointed by the President to act
as officer for the meantime. It failed to comply with the twin
requirements of RA 9054 where (1) approval of 2/3 vote of
members of Senate and HoR separately, and (2)
submission of the voted bill to ARMM for plebiscite. There
was no plebiscite that happened nor was 2/3 vote reached.
 The synchronization of ARMM’s date of election is
constitutional but the extension of the office and
appointment officers while the election is pending is
unconstitutional. Though the appointment of ARMM
Governor under the supervision of the president is allowed
under present circumstances.
 The use of emergency powers of the President is subject to
judicial review of congress, which the Congress failed to
follow the required days and dispensing of copies to the
House.
 A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business. This means that the House can amend, repeal,
and create bills and resolutions upon the majority vote of a
quorum. While supermajority is not a total ban against a
repeal, it is a limitation in excess of what the Constitution
requires on the passage of bills and is constitutionally
obnoxious because it significantly constricts future
legislators’ room for action and flexibility.
III. Internal Rules and Discipline
ARROYO v. DE VENECIA (par. 3, determination of rules)
 Parliamentary rules are mere procedural and with their
observance, the courts have no concern. The rules are
subject to the whims of the House so they can change,
modify, or waive the rules entirely.
 Mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not
invalidate the action when the requisite number of members
have agreed to a particular measure.
OSMEÑA v. PENDATUN (disorderly behavior)
 For any speech or debate in Congress, the Senators or
Members of the HoR shall not be questioned in any other
place.
 The Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is
a fundamental privilege cherished In every legislative
assembly of the democratic world, but it does not protect
him from responsibility before the legislative body itself
whenever his words and conduct are considered by the
latter disorderly or unbecoming of a member thereof.
SANTIAGO v. SANDIGANBAYAN
 The Sandiganbayan has the authority to suspend a
Senator.
 Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings,
punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the
concurrence of 2/3 of all its Members, suspend or expel a
Member.
 The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order preventive
suspension of an incumbent public official charged with
violation of the provisions of RA 3019 has both legal and
jurisprudential support.
IV. Duty to Keep Journals and Records
US v. Pons
 The Courts in the Philippine Islands are bound, judicially, to
take notice of what the law is and, to enable them to
determine whether the legal requisites to the validity of a
statute has been complied with, it is their right, as well as
their duty, to take notice of the legislative journals.
CASCO PHIL. COMMERCIAL CO. v. GIMENEZ
 Individual statements by members of Congress on the floor
do not necessarily reflect the intent of the legislative. What
is printed in the enrolled bill would be conclusive upon the
courts.
 If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before
it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by
the Executive, the remedy is by amendment or curative
legislation, not by judicial decree.
MORALES v. SUBIDO
 The judiciary cannot assail the validity of an enrolled bill by
investigating the legislative process.
 Principle of the Enrolled Bill – the text of the act passed
and approved is deemed importing absolute verity and is
binding on the courts.
 However, it is not an absolute rule that enrolled bill prevails
over the legislative journal. There are certain matters which
the Constitution expressly requires that must be entered on
the journal of each house.
ASTORGA v. VILLEGAS
 If the attestation is absent and the same is not required for
the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals
and other records of Congress for proof of its due
enactment.
PHIL. JUDGES ASSOCIATION v. PRADO
 The judiciary is not allowed to inquire on the veracity of the
journals kept by Congress. Under the doctrine of separation
of powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the
certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding
officers of Congress.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall
each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief
Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate
or the House of Representative, as the case may be, who shall
be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registered under
the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in
the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
I. Jurisdiction of Electoral Tribunal
A. Nature and Power
ANGARA v. ELECTORAL COMMISION (nature and power)
 The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex
necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the
time with which protests entrusted to its cognizance should
be filed.
 The incidental power to promulgate rules necessary for the
proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by
necessary implication to have been lodged in it also.
LOCSIN v. HRET (sole judge)
 HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their members.
TAGOLINO v. HRET (sole judge)
 If an official candidate of a registered or accredited political
party dies, withdraws, or is disqualified for any cause, a
person belonging to and certified by the same political party
may file a CoC to replace the said candidate. But there must
be an “official candidate” before candidate substitution
proceeds.
B. Pre-proclamation controversies v. election contests; Scope of
inquiry; When proper
1. Election contest
VERA v. AVELINO (definition of election contest)
 Election contest – relates only to statutory contests in
which the contestant seeks not only to oust the intruder, but
also to have himself inducted into the office.
 When a member of the House raises a question as to the
qualifications of another, an “election contest” does not
ensue.
 The power to defer oath taking belongs to the House or
Senate.
ROCES v. HRET (standing to contest)
 One essential element of jurisdiction is that proper parties
must be present. HRET merely exercised exclusive
jurisdiction when it held that a person is a proper party to
contest the election.
LIMKAICHONG v. COMELEC (when HRET jurisdiction begins)
 Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his
oath, and assumed office as a Member of the HoR, the
COMELEC’s jurisdiction is over and the HRET’s own
jurisdiction begins.
BARBERS v. COMELEC (election contest)
 Election – conduct of the polls, including the list of voters,
the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and
the counting of the votes
 Returns – canvass of the returns and the proclamation of
the winners, including questions concerning the
composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity
of the election returns
 Qualifications – matters that could be raised in a quo
warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such
as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his COC
GUERRERO v. COMELEC (substitution)
 While the COMELEC is vested with the power to declare
valid or invalid a COC, its refusal to exercise that power
following the proclamation and assumption of the position
is a recognition of the jurisdictional boundaries separating
the COMELEC and the HRET.
VILLAROSA v. HRET (disallowing initials of husband)
 The nickname which Omnibus Election Code allows to be
included in the COC is that by which the candidate is
generally or popularly known.
ABAYON v. HRET (jurisdiction over party-list)
 The HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon
qualifications of party-list nominees since they are “elected
members” of the HoR.
GARCIA v. HRET
 The HRET has a judgment call and has the authority to
implement its rules. As long as the exercise of such
discretion is based on a well-founded factual and legal
basis, no abuse of discretion can be imputed to the
Tribunal.
2. Pre-proclamation controversy
CHAVEZ v. COMELEC (pre-proclamation)
 Pre-proclamation cases are not allowed in elections for
President, VP, Senators, and Members of the HoR on the
matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt,
custody, and appreciation of the election returns or the
certificate of canvass.
II. Composition
ABBAS v. SET (judicial and legislative participation)
 All contests shall be resolved by a panel or body in which
the Senators’ peers in that Chamber are represented.
 The Constitutional provision mandates the participation in
the same process of decision of a representative/s of the
Supreme Court.
PIMENTEL v. HRET (reconstitution of HRET and CA to include
pary-list)
 The composition of the HRET and CA is within the
prerogative of the HoR as defined within constitutional
limits; they may choose from among its district and party-
list representatives those who may occupy the seats
allotted.
III. Independence
BONDOC v. PINEDA (non-partisan)
 The HoR is not empowered to interfere with the disposition
of an election contest in the HRET on the representation in
the tribunal of the majority party.
 As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-
partisan; HRET is a non-political body.
IV. Action/Decision
ROBLES v. HRET (withdrawal of protest)
 The mere filing of the motion to withdraw protest, without
any action on the part of respondent tribunal, does not by
itself divest the tribunal of its jurisdiction over the case.
Once acquired, jurisdiction is not lost at the instance of the
parties but continues until the case is terminated.
ARROYO v. HRET (precinct-level documents)
 2 mandatory requisites for the annulment of election returns
based on fraud, irregularities, or terrorism:
(1) More than 50% of the total number of votes in the
precinct/s were involved
(2) Votes must be shown to have been affected or vitiated
by such fraud, irregularities, or terrorism
LERIAS v. HRET (election returns; best evidence)
 In an election contest, the best and most conclusive
evidence are the ballots themselves.
 Best evidence rule – there can be no evidence of a writing,
the contests of which are the subject of inquiry, other than
the original writing itself
SANDOVAL v. HRET (service of summons)
 Summons upon a respondent or defendant must be served
by handing a copy thereof to him in person or, if he refuses
to receive it, by tendering it to him.
 If however, efforts finding him would make prompt service
impossible, service may be completed by substituted
service. It is first necessary to establish the following:
(1) impossibility of service of summons within a
reasonable time
(2) efforts exerted to locate the receiver
(3) service upon a person of sufficient age and discretion
residing therein or some competent person in charge
his office or regular place of business
LOKIN v. COMELEC (substitution of party-list)
 3 instances in which the part-list organization can substitute
another person in place of the nominee whose name has
been submitted to the COMELEC:
(a) nominee dies
(b) nominee withdraws in writing his nomination
(c) nominee becomes incapacitated
SEMA v. HRET (election returns v. ballots)
 If what is being questioned is the correctness of the number
of votes for each candidate, the best and most conclusive
evidence is the ballot themselves.
 When the ballots are unavailable or cannot be produced,
then recourse can be made to untampered and unaltered
election returns or other election documents as evidence.
DUENAS v. HRET (revision of ballots)
 Since the HRET possessed the authority to motu propio
continue a revision of ballots, it also had the authority to
carry it out.
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments
consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman,
12 Senators, and 12 Members of the House of Representatives,
elected by each House on the basis of proportional
representation registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The chairman of the Commission shall not
vote, except in case of a ties. The Commission shall act on all
appointments submitted to it within 30 session days of the
Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by
a majority vote of all the Members.
DAZA v. SINGSON (political alignment)
 A registered parry obtaining the majority of the seats in the
House would still not be entitled to representation in the CA,
as long as it was organized recently and has not yet “aged.”
COSETENG v. MITRA (proportional representation)
 The composition of the House membership in the CA is
based on proportional representation of the political parties
in the House.
GUINGONA v. GONZALES (undue reduction of representation
of another party)
 To disturb the resulting fractional membership of the
political parties in the CA is a breach of the rule on
proportional representation.
 Sec. 18 assures representation in the CA of any political
party who succeeds in electing members to the Senate.
 Guidelines for CA Representation:
(1) In the Senate, political party or coalition must have at
least 2 duly elected senators for every seat in the CA
(2) Where there are more than 2 political parties
represented in the Senate, a political party/coalition
with a single senator in the Senate cannot
constitutionally claim seat in the CA
Sec. 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on
Appointments shall be constituted within 30 days after the
Senate and the House of Representatives shall have been
organized with the election of the President and the Speaker.
The Commission on Appointments shall meet only while the
Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority
of all its Members, to discharge such powers and functions as
are herein conferred upon it.
Sec. 20. The records and books of accounts of the Congress
shall be preserved and be open to the public in accordance with
law, and such books shall be audited by an itemized list of
amounts paid to and expenses incurred for each Member.
Sec. 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of
its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in, or affected by,
such inquiries shall be respected.
I. Power of Inquiry
GUDANI v. SENGA
 The President has constitutional authority to prevent a
member of the AFP from testifying before a legislative
inquiry, by virtue of his power as commander-in-chief, and
that as a consequence a military officer who defies such
injunction is liable under military justice.
 At the same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks
the appearance before it of a military officer against the
consent of the President has adequate remedies under law
to compel such attendance. The President may be
commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of
the military officer.
 Anyone except the President and Justices of the SC may
be summoned.
II. Nature and essence
NORECO v. SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD
 The inherent power to contempt along belongs to Congress
as a matter of self-preservation of one of the 3 independent
and coordinate branches of government.
 It is sui generis and may not be claimed by local legislative
bodies.
III. Requisites
BENGZON v. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE
 Requisites of the Exercise of Power of Inquiry:
(1) must be in aid of legislation
(2) in accordance with its duly published rules and
procedures
(3) rights of persons appearing must be respected
A. In aid of legislation
STANDARD v. SENATE (to prevent future fraudulent activities)
 It is erroneous to claim that just because a case was filed in
a court, the Congress loses its powers to conduct an
investigation in aid of legislation.
DE LA PAZ v. SENATE (Euro generals)
 Under Senate rules, all matters relating to relations of the
Philippines with other nations will be under the jurisdiction
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Rlations.
 The Senate Rules mandate the BRC to conduct
investigation on all matters relating to malfeasance,
misfeasance, and nonfeasance in office by officers of the
government.
ROMERO v. ESTRADA (sub judice rule)
 The Court has no authority to prohibit a Senate committee
from requiring persons to appear and testify before it in
connection with an inquiry in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure.
B. In accordance with duly published rules of procedure
GARCILLANO v. HOUSE (publication of rules)
 The requisite for publication of the rules is intended to
satisfy the basic requirements of due process.
 The organic law instructs that the Senate may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly
published rules of procedure, and does not make any
distinction whether or not these rules have undergone
amendments or revision.
C. Respect for the rights of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries
NERI v. SENATE (executive privilege)
 The right of Congress or any of its committees to obtain
information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the
people’s right to public information.
 Congress must not require the executive to state the
reasons for the claim of privilege with such particularity as
to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege
is meant to protect.
 The rights of the persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries must be respected.
IV. Power to Punish a Person under Investigation
ARNAULT v. NAZARENO (subject of inquiry)
 Since the Court has no power to determine what legislation
to approve or not to approve, it cannot say that the
information sought from a witness which is material to the
subject of legislative inquiry is immaterial to any proposed
or possible legislation. It is not within the province of the
Court to determine or imagine what legislative measures
Congress may take after the completion of the legislative
investigation.
SABIO v. GORDON (contempt and detention)
 Congress may keep a contumacious witness in detention
until the legislative body ceases to exist upon its final
judgment.
Sec. 22. The heads of departments may, upon their own
initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request
of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide,
appear before and be heard by such House on any matter
pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be
submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the
House of Representatives at least 3 days before their scheduled
appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written
questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the
security of the State or the public interest so requires and the
President so states in writing, the appearance shall be
conducted in executive session.
Sec. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of 2/3 of both Houses in
joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole
power to declare the existence of a state of war.
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress
may, by law, authorize the President for a limited period and
subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise
powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national
policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress,
such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
I. Delegation of Emergency Powers
SANLAKAS v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
 The President, when declaring a state of rebellion and in
calling out the AFP, is merely exercising her Chief
Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers.
AMPATUAN v. HON. DILG SEC. PUNO
 The President did not proclaim a national emergency but
only a state of emergency in the three places in this case.
 The calling out of the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
violence in such places is a power directly vested by the
Constitution to the President. There is no need for
congressional authority to exercise the same.
Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue, or tariff bills, bills authorizing
increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private
bills, shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives,
but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
Types of Bills
(1) Appropriation – money set aside from public
(2) Tariff/Revenue Bill – proposal to earn money for
government
(3) Increase of Public Debt – increase ceiling of borrowings to
be able to loan money
(4) Bills of local application – conversion of city, naming streets
(5) Private Bill – relate to private person (citizenship law, etc.)
I. Bills of Local Application – Origin
ALVAREZ v. GUINGONA (conversion of a municipality into a
city)
 The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of
its receipt of the bill from the HoR does not contravene the
constitutional requirement for origin of bills, for as long as
the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the
House bill.
SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT v. PHIL. CEMENT
 The required positive final determination of the Tariff
Commission exists as a properly enacted constitutional
limitation imposed on the delegation of the legislative power
to impose tariffs and imposts to the President.
 The authority delegated to the President may be exercised
by his alter egos such as department secretaries. For this
purpose, it is generally the Secretary of Finance.
II. Appropriation of Public Revenue for Public Purpose
PASCUAL v. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS (incidental
advantage)
 Legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue
for anything but a public purpose.
 It is the essential character of the direct object of the
expenditure which must determine its validity as justifying a
tax, and not the magnitude of the interest to be affected nor
the degree to which the general advantage of the
community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately
benefited by their promotion.
 Incidental to the public or to the state, which results from
the promotion of private interest and the prosperity of
private enterprises or business does not justify their aid by
the use of public money.
Sec. 25. (1) The Congress may not increase the appropriations
recommended by the President for the operation of the
Government as specified in the budget. The form, content, and
manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law.
(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general
appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular
appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be
limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.
(3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress
shall strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations
for other departments and agencies.
(4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for
which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually
available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raise by
a corresponding revenue proposal therein.
(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations; however, the President, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional
Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item
in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall
be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by
appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be
prescribed by law.
(7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have
failed to pass the general appropriations bill for the ensuing
fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the preceding
fiscal year shall be deemed reenacted and shall remain in force
and effect until the general appropriations bill is passed by
Congress.
I. Limits on Power to Appropriation
BRILLANTES v. COMELEC
 The power to augment from savings lies dormant until
authorized by law.
I. Prohibition of increase
III. Prohibition on “riders” in appropriation bills
GARCIA v. MATA (par. 2)
 Rider - provision not germane to the subject-matter of the
bill.
 An Appropriations Act for FY 1956-57 includes a provision
stating “after the approval of this Act, and when there is no
emergency, no reserve officer of thee AFP may be called to
a tour of active duty for more than 2 years during any period
of 5 consecutive years.
 If a provision in the body of an act is not fairly included in
the restricted subject, such provision is inoperative.
FARIÑAS v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
 The title herein is so broad it encompasses all the
processes involved in an election exercise.
IV. Special Purpose Fund
BELGICA v. OCHOA (PDAF)
 This violates the non-delegability of legislative power when
legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which
they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would
go to (b) a specific project/beneficiary that they themselves
also determine.
 The power to appropriate funds is solely lodged in both
Houses of Congress collectively and not lodged in the
individual members.
V. Transfer of Funds
DEMETRIA v. ALBA (par. 5, direct violation)
 Empowering the President to indiscriminately transfer funds
from one department, bureau, office, or agency of the
Executive Department to any program, project, or activity of
any included in the GAA or approved after its enactment is
unconstitutional.
LIGA v. COMELEC (par. 5, unused funds)
 It is alleged that COMELEC is re-allocating funds from the
executive and legislative functions to augment the
Barangay Poll Funds.
 Threat to pursue the scheme existed only in newspaper but
was not verified, hence petition dismissed.
 The heads may, by law, be authorized to augment any item
in the GAA for their respective offices from savings in other
items of their respective appropriations.
PHILCONSA v. ENRIQUEZ (par. 5, augmentation of pension
fund using savings)
 A special provision on use of savings for AFP pensions
allowing the Chief of Staff to augment pension funds
through the use of savings is not valid.
 No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer or
appropriations. While Sec. 25(5) allows an exception to the
realignment of savings to augment items in the GAA for the
exec. branch, only the President can exercise such right
pursuant to a specific law.
SANCHEZ v. COA (par. 5, DILG augmentation)
 3 requisites for transfer of appropriated funds:
(1) Only the President, the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the HoR, the CJ of the SC, and the heads
of Consti Commissions may transfer funds WITHIN
THEIR RESPECTIVE OFFICES;
(2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated form
the appropriations for their respective offices; and
(3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in
the GAA for their respective offices
VI. Discretionary Fund
ARAULLO v. AQUINO III (DAP)
 DAP failed to comply with all requirements.
 To be called a saving, it should be either:
(a) still available after the completion or final
discontinuance of abandonment of the work, activity, or
purpose the appropriation is authorized;
(b) from appropriations balances arising from unpaid
compensation and related costs pertaining to vacant
positions and LOAs without pay; or
(c) from appropriations balances realized from the
implementation of measures resulting in improved
systems and efficiencies and thus enabled agencies to
meet and deliver the required or planned targets,
programs, and services approved at a lesser cost.
Sec. 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it
has passed 3 readings on separate days, and printed copies
thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members
three days before its passage, except when the President
certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a
public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall
be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered
in the Journal.
PHILCONSA v. GIMENEZ (par. 1)
INSULAR LUMBER COMPANY v. CTA (par. 1)
 The purpose of this provision is to prohibit duplicity in
legislation. The title of which might completely fail to apprise
the legislators or the public of the nature, scope, and
consequences of the law or its operation.
TIO v. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD (par. 1)
 It is not necessary that the title express each and every end
that the stature wishes to accomplish. All parts of the
statutes just have to be related and germane to the subject
matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title.
BENJAMIN CAWALING v. COMELEC (par. 1)
 Same as above.
GIRON v. COMELEC
 An act having a single general subject indicated in the title
may contain any number of provisions, no matter how
diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent
with or foreign to the general subject.
REMMAN ENTERPRISES v. PRBRES and PRC
 Same as above.
Sec. 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it
becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves
the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return
the same with his objections to the House where it originated,
which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and
proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, 2/3 of all
the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall
be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by
which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approve by 2/3 of
all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such
cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas and
nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall
be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his
veto of any bill to the House where it originated within 30 days
after the receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if
he had signed it.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular
item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the
veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not
object.
2 Types of Veto
1. General Veto – if a provision in an ordinary bill was vetoed,
it is considered as if the whole bill was vetoed
2. Item Veto – only the specific provision is vetoed; the whole
bill continues to exist except for the vetoed item. This is only
for appropriation, revenue, and tariff bills.
Doctrine of Inappropriate Provision – a provision that is
constitutionally inappropriate for an appropriation bill may be
singled out for veto even if it is not an appropriation or revenue
(riders).
Executive Impoundment – refusal of the President to spend
funds already allocated by Congress for a specific purpose.
I. Passage of Bills
ARROYO v. DE VENECIA (supra, BCC)
 A legislative act will not be declared invalid for
noncompliance to the House’s own rules. Courts have no
power of legislative inquiry.
II. Presidential Veto
CIR v. CTA (item in a revenue bill)
 The President could not veto words or phrases in a bill but
only an entire item.
 Item – in a revenue bill, refers to the subject of the tax and
the tax rate
GONZALES v. MACARAIG (general provision)
 Any provision in the GAA shall relate specifically to some
particular appropriation therein and that any such provision
shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which
it relates.
 When it comes to veto, it is generally all or nothing.
However, in the case of the GAA, the President may veto a
provision in the therein without vetoing the whole bill.
BENGZON v. DRILON (effects of vetoing GAA)
 The item veto power of the president may not be effected
to disapprove a part of an item and approve the remaining
parts; he may only veto a whole item or none at all.
Sec. 28. (1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable.
The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix
within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts
within the framework of the national development program of the
Government.
(3) Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or
convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries,
and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly,
and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational
purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
(4) No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without
the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the
Congress.
Progressive Taxation – when the rate increases as the tax
base increases.
I. Scope and Purpose
PLANTERS v. FERTIPHIL (purpose of taxation)
 The power of taxation by the state is plenary.
 Police power and the power of taxation are inherent powers
of the State.
 Police Power – power to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote
the general welfare; regulation of behavior or conduct
 Power of Taxation – power to levy taxes to be used for
public purpose; revenue generation
 Public Purpose – broad concept; purposes designed to
promote social justice
II. Limitations on the Power: Uniform and Equitable
CIR v. LINGAYEN GULF
 The Legislature has the full power to exempt any person or
corporation or class of property from taxation. Its power to
exempt is as broad as its power to tax.
TAN v. DEL ROSARIO (rule of taxation)
 With the Legislature primarily lies discretion to determine
the nature (kind), object (purpose), extent (rate), coverage
(subjects), and situs (place) of taxation.
CIR v.CA (uniformity of taxation)
 Taxation must be uniform and equitable.
 Uniformity of Taxation – a tax is uniform when it operates
with the same force and effect in every place where the
subject of it is found. All property belonging to the same
class shall be taxed alike.
III. Progressive System
IV. Delegated Tax Legislation
SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT v. PHIL. CEMENT
 Delegation of taxation power by the legislative to the
executive is authorized by the Constitution.
 The Congress has the right to impose restrictions and
limitations on the taxation power delegated to the President.
 Congress could delegate to secretaries in their capacity as
alter ego of the President.
SPS. CONSTANTINO v. CUISIA
 The Constitution allows the President to contract and
guarantee foreign loans. There is also no prohibition on the
issuance of certain kinds of loans or distinctions as to which
kinds of debt instruments are more onerous than others.
V. Exemptions
ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE v. AQUINO (tax exemption)
 Exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the said
purposes.
REPUBLIC v. CITY OF KIDAPAWAN (tax exemption)
 Real property owned by the RP or any of its political
subdivisions are exempt from tax, except when the
beneficial use thereof has been granted to a taxable
person.
JOHN HAY PEOPLE’S ALTERNATIVE COALITION v. LIM
 Tax exemption cannot be implied, as it must be
categorically and unmistakably expressed.
LUNG CENTER v. QC
 Only such portion used exclusively for charitable purposes
shall be exempt from tax; those leased out to private entities
are not.
 Sec. 28(3) only covers property taxes, hence, the institution
itself is not exempted but only the land, buildings, and
improvements actually, directly, and exclusively used for
charitable purposes.
Sec. 29. (1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except
in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied,
paid, or employed directly or indirectly for the use, benefit, or
support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution,
or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other
religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest,
preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces,
or to any penal institution, or government orphanage
(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose
shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose
only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has
been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be
transferred to the general funds of the Government.
I. Fiscal Powers of Congress (par. 1)
PASCUAL v. SEC. OF PUBLIC WORKS (supra, Sec. 24)
 The property sought to be improved with public funds was
private in nature at the time the appropriation was made.
The appropriation in a private purpose is null and void.
MIAA v. MABUNAY (appropriation defined)
 Appropriation – an appropriations act is primarily a special
type of legislation whose content is limited to specified sums
of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate
fiscal unit.
 Administrative bodies are given discretion to the choice of
ways and means to accomplish the object of appropriation
that administrative discretion may not transcend the statute.
COMELEC v. HON. QUIJANO (inadequate fund for contract
with Photokina)
 In the execution of government contracts, the precise
import of the constitutional restriction that money shall only
be paid in pursuance to an appropriation is to require
various agencies to limit their expenditures to said
appropriation made by law for each fiscal year.
 The existence of appropriations and the availability of funds
are indispensable pre-requisites to or conditions for the
execution of government contracts.
II. Special Funds (par. 3)
GASTON v. REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK (tax levied for
special purpose)
 The fact that the State has taken possession of moneys in
pursuant to law is sufficient to constitute them as state
funds, even though they are held for a special purpose.
 Having been levied for a special purpose, the revenues
collected are to be treated as a “special fund” to be
“administered in trust” for the fund intended. Once the
purpose has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if
any, is to be transferred to the general funds of the
government.
Sec. 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution
without its advice and concurrence.
FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS v. CA (invalid increase in
appellate jurisdiction)
 The indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging the
SC’s appellate jurisdiction can burden the Court and
thereby undermine its essential function of expounding the
law in its most profound national aspects.
DIAZ v. CA (ERB to CA)
 An appeal taken to either the SC or the CA by the wrong or
inappropriate procedure shall be dismissed.
FABIAN v. DESIERTO (OMB to CA)
 The SC may not take cognizance of administrative
disciplinary cases, directives, or decisions of the Office of
the Ombusdman.
TIROL v. COA (OMB to CA)
 Sec. 27 or RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) is not valid
because it provides that “direct appeals are allowed in
administrative disciplinary cases from the OMB to the SC.
 This does not cover criminal cases.
CABRERA v. LAPID (OMB to CA)
 Same as above.
Sec. 31. No law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be
enacted.
Sec. 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a
system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions
therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact
laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed
by the Congress or local legislative body after the registration of
a petitioner therefor signed by at least 10% of the total number
of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least 3% of the registered voters thereof.
SBMA v. COMELEC (requisites)
 Initiative – power of the people to propose amendments to
the Constitution or to propose and enact legislations
through an election called for the purpose.
 Referendum – power of the electorate to approve or reject
a legislation through an election called for the purpose.
 In initiative and referendum, the COMELEC exercises
administration and supervision of the process itself akin to
its powers over the conduct of elections.
LAMBINO v. COMELEC
 The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon petition” is that the entire
proposal on its face is a petition by the people.
(1) The people must author and thus sign the entire
proposal; and
(2) As an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be
embodied in a petition.
 The full text of the proposed amendments must first be
shown to the people before asking for the signatures.
ART. VII – EXECUTIVE
Express Powers of the President
(1) To appoint
(2) To enter into treaties
(3) To grant pardon
(4) Commander-in-Chief powers
(5) Chief-of-State power (control over the Executive Dept.)
(6) To impose customs / tariff duties
(7) To execute / implement laws
(8) To submit the budget to Congress
Executive Privilege – power of the President to withhold certain
types of information from the courts, the Congress, and the
public
Immunity from Suit – there is no provision about this in the
Constitution; however, it is already understood from
jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his
tenure (RPC)
Sec. 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of
the Philippines.
MARCOS v. MANGLAPUS
 The powers of the President cannot be said to be limited
only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution.
 Whatever power inherent in the government that is neither
legislative nor judicial has to be executive.
 Residual power to protect the general welfare of the people.
PONTEJOS v. OMBUDSMAN
 The decision on whether to prosecute and whom to indict is
executive in character.
 Prosecutorial powers include discretion to granting
immunity to an accused in exchange for testimony against
another.
 The OMB is vested with the power to grant immunity from
prosecution.
BIRAOGO v. TRUTH COMMISSION
 The President is also granted the power to create ad hoc
committees.
ESTRADA v. DESIERTO
 The implied resignation of Estrada gave way to the rightful
vesting of Executive powers to then VP Arroyo.
 It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation
from liability for unlawful acts and omissions.
SOLIVEN v. MAKASIAR
 The rationale for the grant of the privilege of immunity from
suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and
functions is free from hindrance or distraction.
 The immunity from suit may only be invoked by the
President himself and not by any other person in the
President’s behalf.
 The choice of whether to exercise or waive the privilege is
solely the President’s prerogative.
AKBAYAN v. AQUINO
 The executive privilege includes those of diplomatic
negotiations between countries.
Sec. 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to
read and write, at least 40 years of age on the day of the
election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years
immediately preceding such election
TECSON v. COMELEC.
 The term “natural-born citizens” is defined to include those
who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having
to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship.
Sec. 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same
qualifications and term of office and be elected with, and in the
same manner, as the President. He may be removed from office
in the same manner as the President.
The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the
Cabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation.
Sec. 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected
by direct vote of the people for a term of 6 years which shall
begin at noon on the 30th day of June next following the day of
the election and shall end at noon of the same date, 6 years
thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any re-election.
No person who has succeeded as President and has served as
such for more than 4 years shall be qualified for election to the
same office at any time.
No Vice-President shall serve for more than 2 successive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the
service for the full term which he was elected.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for
President and Vice-President shall be held on the 2nd Monday
of May.
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President,
duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province or
city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the
President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of
canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than 30
days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the
presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in
joint public session, and in the Congress, upon determination of
the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner
provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be
proclaimed elected, but in case 2 or more shall have an equal
and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be
chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both
Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of
the certificates.
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules
for the purpose.
MACALINTAL v. COMELEC
 The canvassing of votes and proclamation of the winning
candidates for president and VP must remain in the hands
of Congress. It cannot enact a law giving the COMELEC
such power.
LOPEZ v. SENATE AND THE HOUSE
 The court has no power to review the internal proceedings
of Congress. It has no authority to restrict or limit the
exercise of congressional prerogatives granted by the
Constitution.
 The Congress may create a Joint Committee to canvass the
votes for President and Vice-President since it shall still be
subject to the approval of the joint session of both Houses
of Congress, voting separately.
MACALINTAL v. PET
 The SC, as a PET, is specifically and exclusively clothed
with jurisdiction by the Constitution to act responsibly as
“sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications” of the President and Vice-President.
Sec. 5. Before they enter on the execution of their office, the
President, the Vice-President, or the Acting President shall take
the following oath or affirmation:
“I do solemnly swear [or affirm] that I will faithfully and
conscientiously fulfill my duties as President [or Vice-President
or Acting President] of the Philippines, preserve and defend its
Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man, and
consecrate myself to the service of the Nation. So help me God.”
[In case of affirmation, last sentence will be omitted].
Sec. 6. The President shall have an official residence. The
salaries of the President and Vice-President shall be determined
by law and shall not be decreased during their tenure. No
increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the
expiration of the term of the incumbent during which such
increase was approved. They shall not receive during their
tenure any other emolument from the Government or any other
source.
Sec. 7. The President-elect and the Vice President-elect shall
assume office at the beginning of their terms.
If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice President-elect
shall act as President until the President-elect shall have
qualified.
If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice President-
elect shall act as President until a President shall have been
chosen and qualified.
If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-
elect shall have died or shall have become permanently
disabled, the Vice President-elect shall become President.
Where no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen
or shall have qualified, or where both shall have died or become
permanently disabled, the President of the Senate or, in case of
his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall
act as President until a President or a Vice-President shall have
been chosen and qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one
who is to act as President shall be selected until a President or
a Vice-President shall have qualified, in case of death,
permanent disability, or inability of the officials mentioned in the
next preceding paragraph.
Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from
office, or resignation of the President, the Vice-President shall
become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of
death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation
of both the President and Vice-President, the President of the
Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, shall then act as President until the President
or Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as
President in case of death, permanent disability, or resignation
of the Acting President. He shall serve until the President or the
Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified, and be
subject to the same restrictions of powers and disqualifications
as the Acting President.
Sec. 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-
President during the term for which he was elected, the
President shall nominate a Vice-President from among the
Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who
shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all
the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
Sec. 10. The Congress shall, at ten o’clock in the morning of the
third day after the vacancy in the offices of the President and
Vice-President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules
without need of a call and within seven days, enact a law calling
for a special election to elect a President and a Vice-President
to be held not earlier than forty-five days nor later than sixty days
from the time of such call. The bill calling such special election
shall be deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article
VI of this Constitution and shall become law upon its approval
on third reading by the Congress. Appropriations for the special
election shall be charged against any current appropriations and
shall be exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4, Section
25, Article VI of this Constitution. The convening of the Congress
cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed. No
special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within
eighteen months before the date of the next presidential
election.
Sec. 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives
his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written
declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be
discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit
to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives their written declaration that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-
President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of
the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the
Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives his
written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the
powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of
all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the
President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, their written declaration that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress
shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in
accordance with its rules and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written
declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is
required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both
Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President
shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue
exercising the powers and duties of his office.
Incapacity of the President – deals with the thorny issue of
whether or not the President is still able to perform his functions.
If the President is able to make the decision and is willing to
declare himself disabled, he has the power to declare so.
Sec. 12. In case of serious illness of the President, the public
shall be informed of the state of his health. The members of the
Cabinet in charge of national security and foreign relations and
the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, shall
not be denied access to the President during such illness.
Serious Illness of the President – one that is not incapacitating
because access to him is kept open for Cabinet members in
charge of national security and foreign relations. This is to allow
the President to make the important decisions in those areas of
government, which suggests a situation where the President is
still able.
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by
the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations
or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest
in the conduct of their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the
fourth civil degree of the President shall not, during his tenure,
be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or
the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries,
Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices,
including government-owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries.
DOROMAL v. SANDIGANBAYAN
 The constitutional ban to hold any other office is similar to
the prohibition in the CSL, and shall be a ground for
disciplinary action against any officer or employee.
BITONIO, JR. v. COA
 Take par. 1 verba legis
ESPIRITU v. LUTGARDA
 Any decision of a de facto officer of the President is
presumed to be valid, binding, and effective.
Sec. 14. Appointments extended by an Acting President shall
remain effective, unless revoked by the elected President, within
ninety days from his assumption or reassumption of office.
Sec. 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting
President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
Midnight Appointments – limitation on the President’s power
of appointment. There is no similar limitation on the power of
appointment of local executives.
IN RE APPOINTMENTS OF VALENZUELA
 The President is neither required to make appointments to
the courts nor allowed to do so during the period.
 Temporary vacancies can abide the period of the ban.
 The President is allowed to do appointments to important
positions which have to be made even after the
proclamation of a new President. Such appointments must
be “few and so spaced as to afford some assurances of
deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for
the appointment and the appointee’s qualifications.”

DE LA RAMA v. CA
 There is no law that prohibits local elective officials from
making appointments during the last days of his or her
tenure.

DE CASTRO v. JBC
 The prohibition does not apply to appointments to fill a
vacancy in the SC or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments
are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all
other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest
the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards.

The President shall have the power to make appointments

during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of the Congress.

Kinds of Presidential Appointments

Sec. 14. – Acting President
Sec. 15. – Midnight Appointments
Sec. 16. – Regular Presidential Appointments

Ad Interim – extended only during a recess of Congress, and

submitted to CoA.
Acting Capacity – extended anytime there is a vacancy, not
submitted to CoA, and is only a way of temporarily filling
vacancies.

GOVERNMENT v. SPRINGER
 The appointments in the Philippines is in the domain of the
Exec. branch and not the Legislative. The inclusion of the
Senate President and Speaker of the House in the voting
committee of the National Coal Company is an invasion of
the executive’s exclusive power of appointment.

BERMUDEZ v. EXEC. SEC.

 Appointment necessarily calls for an exercise of discretion
on the part of the appointing authority. The appointing
power has the right of choice which he may exercise freely
according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best
qualified among those who have the necessary
qualifications and eligibility.