BIENVENIDO DIÑO and RENATO COMPARATIVO, vs.

PABLO OLIVAREZ,
G.R. No. 170447 June 23, 2009 CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
RESOLUTION

DOCTRINE: Once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case as to its dismissal, or conviction
or acquittal of the accused, rests on the sound discretion of the said court, as it is the best and sole judge of what to do with
the case before it.

EMERGENCY RECIT: Petitioners Diño and Comparativo instituted a complaint for vote buying against respondent Olivarez.
Two Informations were filed in the RTC charging Olivarez for violation of Section 261, paragraphs a, b and k of Article XXII
of the Omnibus Election Code. Olivarez filed before the Law Department of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) an
appeal of the Joint Resolution with Motion to Revoke Continuing Authority. He also filed a motion to quash on the two
informations charged against him pending before the RTC arguing that the pendency of the appeal of the Joint Resolution
before the COMELEC should prevent the filing of the Informations before the RTC as there could be no final finding of
probable cause until the COMELEC had resolved the appeal. The COMELEC Law Department wrote a letter directing the
city prosecutor to transmit the entire records of the case and to suspend further implementation of the Joint Resolution until
final resolution of the appeal before the COMELEC en banc. Meanwhile, Olivarez filed a Motion to Quash the two criminal
informations on the ground that more than one offense was charged therein. Prosecutor filed its Opposition to the Motion
to Quash and Motion to Admit Amended Informations. The RTC Judge admitted the Amended Informations. On the day of
arraignment, Olivarez failed to appear in court. The RTC judge ordered the arrest of Olivarez and the confiscation of the
cash bond.

PEOPLE v. MARCIAL AMA Y PEREZ

(G.R. No. L-14783, 29 April 1961, Regalado, J.)

FACTS: PER CURIAM: On October 16, 1958, Marcial Ama y Perez, Ernesto de Jesus and Alejandro Ramos were charged
with murder before the Court of First Instance of Rizal in an information the pertinent portions of which read:

"That on or about the 27th day of August, 1958, in the New Bilibid Prison, municipality of Muntinlupa, province of
Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, armed with deadly weapons to wit: sharp-pointed
instruments, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and stab one Almario Bautista, thereby inflicting upon the latter stab wounds on the
different parts of his body, and as a result of which, said Almario Bautista died instantaneously.

"That the accused are quasi-recidivist having committed the abovementioned felony while serving their respective
sentences after having been convicted of final judgment.

"That the crime was committed in the presence of public authorities who were then engaged in the discharge of their
duties.”

After the accused pleaded not guilty, upon arraignment, the trial court set the case for hearing on November 25, 1958. On the
same date, however, De Jesus and Ramos moved for postponement on the ground that they were asking the fiscal to
reinvestigate their case, which motion was granted. Marcial Ama y Perez, on the other hand, moved that he be permitted
to withdraw his former plea of not guilty and substitute it for that of guilty. Granting said motion, the court directed that the
information be read and explained again to him, after which Marcial Ama, with the assistance of his counsel de oficio,
spontaneously and voluntarily pleaded guilty as charged.

Then, counsel for the accused moved that the minimum penalty be imposed in view of his plea of guilty, which motion was
objected to by the prosecution, contending that since the special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism is
present which cannot be offset by the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty, the imposable penalty should be
the maximum or death. And after the fiscal had submitted proof relative to the presence of the aggravating circumstances
alleged in the information, the court rendered decision sentencing Marcial Ama y Perez to death penalty, to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased in the amount of P6,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs.

Whereupon, the case was elevated to this Court for review pursuant to Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in allowing appellant to change his plea of not guilty to that of guilty without
informing him that his plea cannot offset the aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism alleged in the information as to
obviate the imposition of death penalty RULING: NO. According to defense counsel, had the trial court informed appellant
that despite his plea of guilty he would still be sentenced to death, he would have chosen to go to trial no matter how slim
might be his chance of being acquitted. Counsel further avers that the attorney who assisted appellant in the lower court
committed an oversight in advising him to plead guilty overlooking the provisions of Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code
on quasi-recidivism, while the lower court erred in sentencing him to death relying merely on his plea of guilty.

There is no merit in this appeal. When an accused is arraigned in connection with a criminal charge the only duty of the
court is to inform him of its nature and cause so that he may be able to comprehend it, as well as the circumstances
attendant thereto.

And when the charge is of a serious nature it becomes the imperative duty of his counsel not only to assist him during the
reading of the information but also to explain to him the real import of the charge so "that he may fully realize the gravity
and consequences of his plea. But there is nothing in the law that
imposes upon the court the duty to apprise him of what the nature of the penalty to be meted out to him might be
if he would plead guilty to the charge, its duty being limited to have him informed of the nature and cause thereof.
In the instant case, the lower court did just that. In fact, it did even more. Considering the gravity of the charge it asked the
fiscal to produce the evidence in his possession relative to the aggravating circumstance alleged in the information so that
appellant's counsel may peruse it, and this was done without any objection on his part, and thereafter, the court rendered
its decision. The error that counsel now imputes to the lower court is, therefore, untenable. Indeed, if appellant expressed
his desire to plead guilty it is for no other reason than that his conscience persuaded him to do so, and so he has to suffer
its consequences.

With regard to counsel's contention that the lower court erred in convicting appellant merely on his plea of guilty without
requiring the fiscal to produce evidence in support of the charge, suffice it to quote hereunder what we said in a recent case:

"We are fully convinced that before the appellants entered their plea of guilty, they were apprised of the import and
consequences thereof. They did not plead, without the assistance of counsel. Counsel de oficio was all the time at hand.
The presumption of regularity and faithfulness in the performance of official functions, on the part of counsel de oficio, has
not been overcome. No evidence appear on record that he had failed in his duty to advice the appellants of what to do. It
would be creating a dangerous precedent to say now that the advice to plead guilty by the appointed counsel de oficio was
improvident. * * *

"The issues raised by counsel in his brief were already answered by us in a number of cases. In U.S. vs. Barba, 29 Phil.,
206, and U.S. vs. Santiago, 35 Phil., 20, it was held that a plea of guilty is an admission of all the material facts alleged in
the complaint or information. Tn subsequent cases, we ruled that a plea of goiilty when formally entered in arraignment, is
sufficient to sustain a conviction for any offense charged in the information, without the 'necessity of requiring1 additional
evidence, since by so pleading, the defendant himself has supplied the necessary proof (People vs. Valencia, 59 Phil., 42;
People vs. Palupe, fi9 Phil., 702.) It matters not even if the offense is capital, for the admission (plea of guilty), covers both
the crime as well as its attendant circumstances (People vs. Acosta, 98 Phil., 642, 52 Off. Gaz., 1930). The allegation that
the defendants did not get any practical benefit in pleading guilty to the crime charged, is not a plausible argument to dub
the plea of guilty, as improvidently made. As well observed by the Solicitor General, 'The matter of pleading guilty to a
charge is not a game. An accused pleads guilty because he believes that he is guilty. The advantages that he may get by
so pleading are mere secondary considerations. Using the very argument of appellants that their plea of guilty did not
improve their situation, we ask, what advantage would appellant achieve by undergoing a trial?'
* * * * * * * "Undoubtedly, * * * the trial judge must have been fully satisfied that the appellants entered the plea
of guilty, with full knowledge of the meaning and consequences of their act, more so when, as in this ease, the lives of the
appellants were involved. The record does not reveal that appellants or counsel ever complained or protested at the time
of arraignment that they did not understand the information and the effect of their plea of guilty." (People vs. Yamson and
Romero 109 Phil. 793).

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs. Bengzon, C.J., Bautista
Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.
RESTITUTO BINABAY v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HONORABLE HERMINIO C. MARIANO,
Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch X
(January 30, 1971) G.R. No. L-3100

● This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction, to restrain respondent
Honorable Herminio C. Mariano, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance, Rizal, Branch X, from
conducting further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 19503 of said court, entitled "People of the Philippines
v. Restituto Binabay."

● After the filing of the petition the Court issued the temporary restraining order prayed for.

Petitioner Restituto Binabay is charged therein with serious illegal detention for kidnapping and illegally
detaining one Georgie Malongat, a child one and a half years of age, (by then and there taking and carrying him
away from his parents against his will and consent,) depriving him of his liberty for about seven (7) hours.

The information was amended on July 3, 1969 to allege that Binabay wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap,
with threats to kill, Georgie Malongat, a minor, for purpose of separating said child from his parents,
detaining said minor for a period of seven (7) hours.

When the case was called for hearing on August 27, 1969, counsel for the petitioner stated that he wished "to
make representations" to the Court; that he was "willing to plead guilty to a lesser offense" ; and that he
"invoked" or pleaded that a "lighter penalty" than that prescribed by law for the offense charged be imposed.

● The Court then went into a consideration of the imposable penalty, mentioning, in connection therewith, certain
details having a bearing on the circumstance surrounding the commission of said offense.

● Defense counsel and the private prosecutor, as well as the father of the kidnapped child and petitioner herein,
likewise, made some statements.

● Thereafter, petitioner’s counsel said:"At the arraignment of this case, the accused pleaded Not Guilty, to the crime
charged.

● After clarification of the facts of this case, the petitioner’s counsel entered a plea of Guilty after making the accused
realize and appreciate the consequences of such an act.

● They requested the Court for an appreciation of the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and the provisions
of the last paragraph of Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code.

● Petitioner was "rearraigned."

● The Branch Clerk of Court stated that the accused entered the plea of guilty to the lesser offense.

● Respondent Judge orally announced that he had found petitioner guilty of "the crime of serious illegal detention
described under Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to the third paragraph of Art. 268" of the same
Code

● The Judge, considering the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty, imposed upon him the penalty of indeterminate
sentence ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correcional to seven (7) years and
four (4) months of prision mayor, "to pay a fine of P500, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and
to pay the costs."

● When the judgment was being put in writing, respondent Judge noticed that petitioner had been "rearraigned
under the original information, to which he pleaded guilty, not under the amended information

● Respondent Judge issued an order setting aside the proceedings held that morning and declaring the same "null
and void," at the same time setting the case for rearraignment (presumably under the amended information) on
September 8, 1969 at 8:30 a.m.

● Petitioner’s counsel filed an "urgent motion" praying that the rearraignment be held at 10:00 a.m. instead of 8:30
a.m. Petitioner was actually rearraigned, under the amended information. He then entered a plea of not guilty,
and the case was set for trial on September 29, 1969.
 ● On September 24, 1969, petitioner commenced an action against the People of the Philippines and respondent
Judge to restrain the latter from conducting any further proceedings the case, alleging that it would place him twice
in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, upon the ground that the judgment orally given on August 27,
1969 had become final and executory, he having allegedly begun to serve his sentence immediately thereafter.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner would be put in double jeopardy

HELD

No. The petitioner did not set it up in the lower court. Besides, he was a detention prisoner since June 28, 1969. From the
court room, he was brought back to the provincial jail in Pasig, Rizal, on August 27, 1969, as such detention prisoner, not
to serve his sentence.He did not and could not have begun to serve the sentence, no order of commitment having been
issued, and no such order could have been issued for no written judgment had ever been rendered.

Pursuant to Rule 120, section 2, of the Rules of Court, "the judgment must be written . . . personally and directly prepared
by the judge and signed by him . . ."

Indeed, when respondent Judge was about to comply with this provision, he found out that petitioner had inadvertently been
rearraigned under the original information, despite the fact that, since July 3, 1969, it had been superseded by the amended
information, so that the original information was, on August 27, 1969, legally non-existent.

As a consequence, the rearraignment under such original information and petitioner’s plea to the charge were properly
declared null and void, and no valid judgment could have been rendered in the case, on August 27, 1969. The plea of
not guilty entered by the petitioner on September 9, 1968, upon arraignment under the amended information, amounted to
a waiver of "all objections which are grounds for a motion to quash," one of which is that of former jeopardy.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ISIDORO ESCALONA

(G.R. No. L-13294, March 29, 1961, PADILLA, J.)

DOCTRINE: The mere failure to present prosecution witnesses listed in the information does not warrant an inference that
the prosecution had suppressed their respective testimonies because they were false.

EMERGENCY RECIT: One evening, the offended party Protacio Eval was stabbed on the left forearm and at his back by
the respondent-accused Isidoro Escalona and Epifanio Escalona while he was tightly held. Protacio was brought to the
hospital, but four days after, he died. According to Dr. Vicente Ramo who attended to the victim, the cause of death was
severe hemorrhage and peritonitis due to two stab wounds. Isidoro claimed self-defense. Epifanio also denied complicity in
the commission of the crime. Epifanio testified that in an afternoon he passed by a house, and there saw group of men
including Isidro drinking; that in the evening of that day, he was with the group of men because they would not allow him to
leave; and that Epifanio, Isidoro and some other two men went home together. Their respective claims and defenses cannot
be believed in the face of the clear, direct and positive evidence for the prosecution. Felicidad Eval, mother of the victim,
testified that while she was barely a foot away from her son Protacio, Isidoro came from behind, embraced and stabbed
Protacio and while in that position Epifanio stabbed him (Protacio)in the back. The record does not disclose any motive why
Felicidad Eval would falsely testify against the appellants. The fact that Patricia Eval, a sister of the victim, who was with
him and his mother Felicidad when the incident took place and Mercedes Eval, another witness listed in the information,
were not presented as witnesses by the prosecution does not detract from the probative value of the evidence already at
hand and does not warrant an inference that the prosecution had suppressed their respective testimonies because they
were false. The record shows that Patricia's testimony was dispensed with because it was merely corroborative. As regards
to Mercedes, it appears that she was not with the victim and his mother at the time of the incident and could not have
testified on anything concerning it.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. PERFECTO PALACIO

(G.R. No. L-13933, 25 May 1960, Padilla, J)
Petition for certiorari and mandamus.

DOCTRINE: While the accused in a criminal prosecution is entitled to know the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, it does not mean that he is entitled to know in advance the names of all the witnesses for the prosecution. The success
of the prosecution might be endangered if such right be granted to an accused, for the known witnesses might be subjected
to pressure or coerced not to testify. The time for the accused to know all the witnesses against him is when they take the
witness stand.

EMERGENCY RECIT: During trial, counsel for the defense asked the Court to order the prosecution to furnish the
defendants with a list of all the names of the witnesses for the prosecution. However, when the court took no action, the
defendants then again filed a motion inviting the attention of the court to the fact that the prosecution had not complied with
its order to furnish them with a list of all the names of the witnesses for the prosecution and prayed that the prosecution be
limited to the presentation of witnesses whose names appear in the information. At the trial, the prosecution called people
whose names do not appear as witnesses in the information, to take the witness stand and testify. Counsel for the defense
objected. The SC held that the fact that some of the witnesses for the prosecution who are not listed in the information were
present in the courtroom and heard the testimony of the other witnesses does not disqualify them from being witnesses.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, v. MORO SABILUL, defendant-appellant

(G.R. No. L-5520, 31 July 1953, Paras, J.)
Appeal from a decision of CFI to SC

DOCTRINE: Where the accused enters a conditional plea of guilty in the sense that he admits his guilt provided that a
certain penalty be imposed upon him, he must be considered as having entered a plea of not guilty.

EMERGENCY RECIT: City Fiscal of Zamboanga filed an info for murder qualified by treachery and evident premeditation
in the CFI of Zamboanga for allegedly killing Moro Lario. Before the hearing, counsel for Moro Sabilul manifested to the
court that his client would plead guilty and prayed that he be sentenced to destierro because the murder was committed
while the deceased Moro Lario was in the act of committing sexual intercourse with Moro Sabilul’s wife Mora Mislayan.
Moro Sabilul was found guilty of murder by the CFI. On the first appeal, SC ordered the case to be returned to CFI for new
trial because of a probability of a misunderstanding as to the entry of the plea of guilty by Moro Sabilul. However, the CFI
sentenced Moro Sabilul to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from 6Y and 1D to 8Y of prision mayor, with the accessory
penalties prescribed by law to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Moro Lario. Moro Sabilul appealed this decision to SC.
On the issue of Moro Sabilul’s plea of guilt, the SC said it should be considered that Moro Sabilul had entered a plea of not
guilty.

PEOPLE v. STEPHEN DOUGLAS STRONG alias STEVE STRONG

(G.R. No. L-38626. March 14, 1975. Fernando, J.)

DOCTRINE: For a plea of guilty to be judicially acceptable there must be a showing of full understanding of what is at stake.
This is so even when an accused does clearly admit the commission of the culpable act.

EMERGENCY RECIT: Strong always answered in negative regarding the death of Cornelia Bartolaba even if he already
entered a plea of guilty. The trial court rendered judgment finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt based on a
plea of guilty, notwithstanding the fact that at the arraignment the accused repeatedly and categorically denied having
committed the crime. The Supreme Court set aside the lower court's decision and remanded it for trial holding that for a
plea of guilty to be judicially acceptable there must be a showing of full understanding of what is at stake.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AURELIO BALISACAN

(G.R. No. L-26376 August 31, 1966, BENGZON, J.P., J.:)

DOCTRINE: A plea of guilty is an unconditional admission of guilt with respect to the offense charged. It forecloses the
right to defend oneself from said charge and leaves the court with no alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by law
under the circumstances. After entering a plea of guilty, the assertion of self-defense had the effect of vacating the plea of
guilty.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte for the
stabbing of Leonicio Bulaoat in the Municipality of Nueva Era. Upon being arraigned, Balisacan entered a plea of guilty
with the assistance of counsel. He was allowed to present evidence to prove mitigating circumstance wherein he
testified that he stabbed the deceased in self defense because the latter was strangling him and that after the
incident he voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities. He was ACQUITTED by the Trial Court. The SC
remanded the case back to the trial court under another judge because a plea of guilty is an unconditional admission
of guilt with respect to the offense charged. In view of the assertion of self-defense in the testimony of the accused, the
proper course should have been for the court to take defendant's plea anew and then proceed with the trial of the case, in
the order set forth in Section 3 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDUARDO BANDOJO and MAMERTO ARTUZ

G. R. No. 66945; July 9, 1986 CRUZ, J.

DOCTRINE: : It is not always de rigueur or mandatory upon the trial court to receive evidence when a plea of guilty is
entered in capital cases. The court has discretion to dispense with the reception of evidence.

EMERGENCY RECIT: Eduardo Bandojo and Mamerto Artuz were charged with piracy in violation of P.D. 532. According
to the information, both of them in conspiracy with each other while on board a pumpboat on the seawaters of Bantayan,
Cebu, fatally shot Consolacion Alfar and then took money in the sum of P5,000, thereafter, threw the dead body into the
sea and forced the other passengers to jump overboard. They admitted the above charge in extrajudicial confessions taken
from them without observance of their rights under the Constitution but these were flatly rejected. Later, at their formal
arraignment, they entered separate pleas of guilty. The trial judge did not immediately impose sentence. The judge asked
both of them many searching questions to satisfy that they understood the nature and consequences of their confessions.
Not contented with the first examination, he conducted another hearing. After being assured that they know what they were
doing, he pronounced his judgment of death. The respondents asked to annul the judgment because the judge should have
received independent testimony to determine their liability because they were charged with a capital offense. The Supreme
Court held that it is not always mandatory upon the trial court to receive evidence when a plea of guilty is entered in capital
cases. The court has discretion to dispense with the reception of evidence. Here, the judge was able to satisfy himself with
his investigation.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROGER PERETE Y MANLAPAS, ET AL.

(G.R. No. L-15515, 29 April 1961)
DOCTRINE:
It is well-settled that a plea of guilt, when formally entered on arraignment, is sufficient to sustain a conviction even for a
capital offense without the introduction of further evidence, and that such plea admits all the material allegations of the
information, including the attendant circumstances qualifying and/or aggravating the crime. While it may be the better
practice in serious cases, as the one at bar, to receive such additional evidence as would sustain the conviction
independently of the plea of guilt, this depends on the sound discretion of the trial court, according to whether it was satisfied
that the plea of guilt was made with knowledge of its import.
EMERGENCY RECIT:
Roger Perete and Victor Sajorda were charged with murder for killing their co-prisoner. On the day of arraignment and with
the assistance of a counsel, Perete pleaded guilty. On the same day, Perete was convicted for murder and was sentenced
to death. Before the Supreme Court, it was argued that evidence should be presented and/or witnesses should be heard
first before a judgement should be rendered. The Supreme Court stated that a plea of guilt, when formally entered on
arraignment, is sufficient to sustain a conviction. The receipt of additional evidence depends on the sound discretion of the
court.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

BRUNO OCBINA Y DE LOS SANTOS (alias BRUNO OCVINA) and MANUEL PAMERO, defendants.
BRUNO OCBINA Y DE LOS SANTOS (alias BRUNO OCVINA), appellant.
G.R. No. 45178, September 30, 1936 ABAD SANTOS, J.

DOCTRINE:
The failure to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the accused of his right to have counsel is not sufficient
ground to reverse a judgment of conviction. The reason behind this doctrine is because the trial court must be presumed to
have complied with the procedure prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases. Such presumption can only be
overcome by an affirmative showing to the contrary.

EMERGENCY RECIT: Please refer to facts.

FACTS:
Appellant was prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the crime of theft. Upon his plea of guilty, he was
sentenced to suffer 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor, and an additional penalty of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor
for habitual delinquency.

In support of this appeal counsel de oficio for the appellant contends that the lower court erred in not advising the appellant
of his right to have counsel, as well as in sentencing him to suffer the penalty above indicated.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the lower court erred in not advising the appellant of his right to have counsel; (NO)
2. Whether or not the lower court erred in sentencing him to suffer an additional penalty of prision mayor for habitual
delinquency.(YES)

RULING:
1. There is no affirmative showing that the appellant was not advised of his right to have counsel.

As mentioned in the case of United States vs Escalante, the failure to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge
advised the accused of his right to have counsel is not sufficient ground to reverse a judgment of conviction. The
reason behind this doctrine is because the trial court must be presumed to have complied with the procedure
prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases; and that such a presumption can only be overcome by an
affirmative showing to the contrary.

2. There is no dispute with regard to the first assignment of penalty. The second assignment of penalty, however, is
sufficiently broad to raise the question of whether the penalty for habitual delinquency was properly imposed.

Based on the information, the only allegation for habitual delinquency is that Bruno Ocbina y De los Santos had
already been convicted 3 times of the crime of theft, by virtue of final judgments of a competent court, the date of
his last conviction being December 13, 1935. Jurisprudence had said that an allegation of this nature in an
information was too general and therefore insufficient to sustain a conviction for habitual delinquency upon a plea
of guilty.

Hence, the additional penalty for habitual delinquency must be eliminated.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. DEOGRACIAS CARIAGA, Defendant-Appellant.

G.R. No. L-45354, June 29, 1937 CONCEPTION, J.

DOCTRINE:
There is no difference if the court, after hearing the accused plead guilty upon arraignment, stated such facts in the judgment
rendered immediately, in open court and in the presence of said accused, or caused said arraignment and plea of the
accused to be stated in the minutes. What is important and essential is that the accused be arraigned and that he entered
his plea. It is immaterial how or in what manner such facts are stated. For legal purposes, it makes no difference whether
they appear in the minutes or in the judgment itself.

EMERGENCY RECIT:
The appealed judgement stated: "Upon arraignment, he entered a plea of guilty." The appellant, without denying the fact in
itself, contends that the record does not show when, where or how he was arraigned. According to him, neither does it
appear of record that he has waived the right to arraigned. However, this court is of the opinion that the statement in the
judgment the accused had been arraigned and that he pleaded guilty is sufficient compliance with the provisions of Sec. 16
and 25 of General Orders, No. 58, inasmuch as it may be presumed from said statement that the law has been obeyed
by causing the accused to appear before the court, and it is shown thereby that he has really been arraigned, his plea
entered personally being that of guilty.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROMUALDO CAPILLAS, ANTONIO CAPILLAS and JULIANITO CAPILLAS
(G.R. No. L-27177, October 23, 1981, FERNANDEZ, J)

DOCTRINE: The guilt of the accused must be proven beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. If the inculpatory facts
and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused
and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to
support a conviction.

EMERGENCY RECIT: on October 5, 1964, Pablo Amante, his wife, Consorcia Melendres, and their two children, one aged
5 years and the other, 3 years, were in the living room of their house situated atop a hill. Amante's wife was resting with
their 3 year old child, on a hammock tied in their living room, while Amante was teaching his 5 year old child to count. As it
was already dark, he tied their door with a rope. While in this condition, their door was forcibly broken down, prompting
Pablo Amante to stand up and get himself ready for any needed move. Through the broken door entered Romualdo, Antonio,
and Julianito, all surnamed Capillas, whom Amante has known for 27 years together with fourth masked man he could not
recognize. Upon entry, the group demanded money from Amante. Antonio, who was armed with a short bolo wrestled with
Amante but the latter was able to take possession of the bolo. Romualdo, who was armed with a revolver shot Amante’s
wife three times. Because of this, Amante used the bolo to stab Romualdo.
The group scampered away taking with them family's trunk containing money and clothings. Amante then immediately went
to the succor of his wife.
The victim was brought in the hospital, where the police officers got her statement. Shortly after affixing her thumbmark on
the instrument, the victim expired.
The accused Romualdo Capillas, Antonio Capillas, and Julianito Capillas were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of robbery with homicide and physical injuries and not robbery in band with homicide and physical injuries as there
was no evidence to show that there were more than three (3) armed malefactors who participated in the commission of the
crime. The SC found that the trial court did not err in imposing the death penalty upon the accused, however due to the lack
of necessary votes, the penalty next lower in degree was imposed. The penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NONCETO GRAVINO alias CETO alias NONOY
(G.R. Nos. L-31327-29, May 16, 1983, GUTIERREZ, JR., J)
Automatic review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur

DOCTRINE: It is a well established rule that a plea of guilty, besides being a mitigating circumstance, is a judicial confession
of guilty — an admission of all the material facts alleged in the information, including the aggravating circumstances. It is,
however, also an established rule that a plea of guilty cannot be held to include treachery and evident premeditation where
the evidence adduced does not adequately disclose the existence of these qualifying circumstances. The records do not
adequately support the existence of these qualifying circumstances.

EMERGENCY RECIT: The defendant was charged with originally charged with one crime of double murder with frustrated
murder for killing the parents of Zosima, his former sweetheart, because the they didn’t want him to marry their daughter.
The accused voluntarily surrendered and entered the plea of guilty, hence, the CFI of Davao del Sur found him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. However, in question is the fact that the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation being applied. According to the accused, the said qualifying circumstances were merely alleged but were not
proven. The SC held that it is a well established rule that a plea of guilty, besides being a mitigating circumstance, is a
judicial confession of guilty — an admission of all the material facts alleged in the information, including the aggravating
circumstances. It is, however, also an established rule that a plea of guilty cannot be held to include treachery and evident
premeditation where the evidence adduced does not adequately disclose the existence of these qualifying circumstances.
The records do not adequately support the existence of these qualifying circumstances.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, v ELIAS NANA alias Commander Delfin, et. al., defendants-
appellants.
G.R. No. L-9483 January 30, 1960 (Concepcion, J.)

DOCTRINE: The information is so drafted as to necessarily, to a person of average intelligence, the impression that the
accused were meant to be charged, and arte actually charged, with a series of acts constituting a single offense. Hence,
appellant's conviction for murder and multiple murder, as crimes independent of that of rebellion, violates their constitutional
right to b "informed of the nature and cause of the accusation" against them constitutes a denial of due process.

EMERGENCY RECIT: The only matter left for determination is the appeal taken by Briones and Bumanlag. The accused
were found guilty of the crime of rebellion. The appellants do not question the judgment against them for simple rebellion.
They merely impugn their additional conviction for multiple murder and murder, upon the theory that these offenses form
part of, and are absorbed by the crime of rebellion, as held in People vs. Hernandez.

PEOPLE v. ROMAGOSA alias DAVID

(G.R. No. L-8476 ,FEBRUARY 28, 1958, REYES J.B.L.,J)

DOCTRINE: The averment that said crime was perpetrated "in furtherance" of the rebellion being a mere conclusion
and not a bar to appellant's conviction and punishment for said offense, appellant having failed, at the arraignment,
to object to the information on the ground of multiplicity of crimes charged. Therefore, appellant must be held
guilty, and sentenced for the commission, of two separate offenses, simple rebellion and murder.

EMERGENCY RECIT: Appellant Abu Abundio Romagosa was accused in the CFI of Camarines Sur of the complex
crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings under 3 counts wherein he pleaded not guilty. Counsel for
the accused argued that the proper penalty imposable was only prision mayor (and not penalty of life imprisonment as
recommended by the prosecution) since there is no such complex crime as rebellion with murders, robberies, and
kidnappings. Counsel for the accused further averred that the crimes (murder, robbery, kidnapping) were perpetrated
in furtherance of rebellion and should bar the defendant’s conviction for the crime charged. SC held that lower court
erred in holding appellant Romagosa guilty of the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings,
and in imposing upon him the penalty for such crime. In Geronimo case, the Court held that where the crimes of murders,
robberies, and kidnappings are committed as a means to or in furtherance of the rebellion charged, they are absorbed
by, and form part and parcel of, the rebellion. The averment that said crime was perpetrated "in furtherance" of the
rebellion being a mere conclusion and not a bar to appellant's conviction and punishment for said offense, appellant
having failed, at the arraignment, to object to the information on the ground of multiplicity of crimes charged. Therefore,
appellant must be held guilty, and sentenced for the commission, of two separate offenses, simple rebellion and murder.

PEOPLE vs. HON. UNION KAYANAN and HON. ENRIQUE AGANA, Judges of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon, and PELAGIO ORGANO
[G.R. No. L-30355. May 31, 1978.]

Doctrines: A plea of guilty to a lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of
bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the accused. The rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does
not have sufficient evidence to establish guilt of the crime charged. When such an offer is made, the court is duty bound to
inquire carefully into the circumstances on which it is premised.
An accused can confess guilt at any time, even after arraignment and after trial has began, but the law is clear that he shall
not thereby be entitled to have such plea considered as a mitigating circumstance.

Facts: This is a petition for certiorari seeking the annulment and setting aside of a decision in the CFI in Quezon, regarding
the murder of Alfredo Puyal in which respondent Judge Union Kayanan is alleged to have allowed the accused, private
respondent Pelagio Organo to enter a plea of guilty to the lower offense of homicide even after the prosecution had already
rested and was not informed of the continuance of the trial and the prosecution team alleging they have presented ample
evidence of murder instead. While other respondent Judge Enrique Agana is being faulted for having denied the
prosecution's motion for reconsideration and for holding that to grant the same would place the accused in double jeopardy.

The Information was filed by Assistant Provincial Fiscal Eufemio Caparros, but the preliminary investigation was actually
conducted with the assistance of State prosecutor Lilia Lopez and Provincial Fiscal Juan Aquino. At the trial, the prosecution
was handled by Lopez and Aquino.

As the judge was to retire, the continuation of the trial was postponed indefinitely. Such was the status of the case on
February 13, 1968, but on the same day and without the notice to the prosecutors, and without the case being calendared
for continuation of trial, the following proceeding continued at the sala of respondent Judge Kayanan.The accused pleaded
guilty to the lighter offense of homicide, contrary to what the prosecution charged him for murder. The accused’s counsel,
Atty. Cerilla asked for the mitigating circumstances be considered in favor of the accused: voluntary surrender, plea of guilty,
and incomplete self-defense. Respondent Judge Kayanan considered this in his decision and accepted his plea of guilty to
a lighter offense of homicide than murder.
Upon being informed, the prosecution team filed an urgent motion of reconsideration, alleging that the crime actually
committed was murder from the ample evidence presented, such as the wounds inflicted were located at the back and that
policeman testified as the accused was actually arrested and not voluntarily submitted, and hence cannot be considered to
qualify for a mitigating circumstance and that the State Prosecutor was not informed of the continuance of the proceeding.
Furthermore, the circumstances to allow the accused to a lighter offense was not given proper evidence.
Other respondent Judge Enrique Agana took over the Branch III and denied the prosecution's motion for reconsideration
on the ground that the accused would be placed in double jeopardy.

Issues:
1) W/N Judge Kayanan’s decision to allow the accused to plead guilty to a lighter offense was correct?
2) W/N Judge Agana’s denial of motion for reconsideration is correct?

Held:
1) No. The Supreme Court held that the whole proceeding was void for being manifestly illegal and unjustified. Judge
Kayanan’s actuation was a grave abuse of discretion and legally erroneous. Under Sec. 2 of Rule 116, only at arraignment
and before trial and with the offended party and the prosecutor may the accused be able to plead guilty to a lower offense,
not when the prosecution has already rested during trial, or only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to
establish guilt of the crime charged. Indeed, when such an offer is made, the court is duty bound to inquire carefully into the
circumstances on which it is premised. The manifest indifference of respondent judge revealed in the record of the
proceedings aforequoted is an unpardonable betrayal of the administration of justice. There was a clear disregard of
overlooking the evidence. This was recklessness of the highest order devoid of any element of judicial
circumspection.However, a plea of guilty can still be made in the midst of trial. Surely, the accused can confess guilt at any
time even after arraignment and after trial has began, but the law is clear that he shall not thereby be entitled to have such
plea considered as a mitigating circumstance. Strangely, here, the accused Organo was not only irregularly credited with
the mitigating circumstance of a plea of guilty to a lesser offense than that already proven by the evidence on record, he
was also given credit for voluntary surrender and incomplete self-defense, as to which he did not even offer, much less
present an iota of evidence
2) No. The whole proceeding by Judge Kayanan was void, and hence, jeopardy could not have attached to it. Judge Agana
ought to have readily discerned such an obvious blunder in the judicial conduct of his colleague and immediately taken
steps to right the wrong done to the People, instead of straining himself to baselessly apply the principle of double jeopardy
in the premises.IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is granted and the impugned order of Judge Kayanan of
February 13, 1968 is hereby declared null and void, whereas the order of Judge Agana of January 21, 1969 is reversed.
The Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch III, is directed to proceed with the continuation of the trial of Criminal Case
No. 1692-G against herein private respondent Pelagio Organo and to thereafter decide the same as the evidence and the
law may warrant.

PEOPLE v. LUCIO AGUILAR, and TOMAS MENDEZ, alias BILLY BILLINGER

(G.R. No. L-30932, January 29, 1971, Makalintal, J.)
RESOLUTION

DOCTRINE:

Trial judges should be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty, he understands fully the meaning
of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction.

Aggravating circumstances is different from the reasonable doubt which shall be proved separate from each other.

EMERGENCY RECIT: Lucio Aguilar, Tomas Mendez, and Jesus Dugang were charged of the crime of attempted robbery
by a band with homicide for the death of Luis Gandalla. The information stated the aggravating circumstances of: 1) abuse
of superior strength; 2) with insult or utter disregard of the respect due to the offended party on account of the age of the
victim; 3) nighttime; 4) and recidivisim. Upon arraignment Aguilar and Mendez pleaded guilty and were sentenced to the
penalty of death. The Solgen submitted a manifestation and motion joining with counsel for the defendants in his prayer
that the case be remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. The Court granted the prayer on the ground that when
the defendants entered their plea, the accused had no lawyer and is presumed that they do not understand fully the crime
charged against them.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. REMEGIO ESTEBIA

(G.R. No. L-26868 July 29, 1971 Fernando, J.)
Doctrine: A mere formal plea of guilty‘ made under compulsion, or under any condition other than those just indicated will
not suffice. There must be a cleat and categorical showing, though, that such indeed was his intention. The plea of guilt
must be unequivocal. It must not give rise to contrary interpretations. Unfortunately, that is what happened in this case.

Emergency Recit: Estebia raped Buenabora. In the commission of the crime different aggravating circumstances were
raised by the prosecution. The counsel de oficio stated that the accused would want to enter a plea of guilty, the lower
court twice asked him whether such was the case, after informing him that the penalty imposed could be death, but he
still pleaded guilty. The Supreme Court held in favor of Estebia. According to SC, the lower court should not have
appreciated the aggravating circumstances raised by the prosecutor. It is the eeror of the lower court that it did not inform
Estebia of the consequences if he plead guilty. The essence of such a plea "is that the accused, on arraignment, admits
his guilt, freely, voluntarily, and with a full knowledge of the consequences and the meaning of his act. The effect of that
ruling is to make it clear that the doctrine just referred to is not applicable unless the plea of ‗guilty‘ is in truth and in fact
made under the conditions indicated, that is to say on arraignment, freely and voluntarily, as an express admission of the
guilt of the accused of the offense with which he is charged, and with full knowledge of the consequences and the meaning
of his act.

A mere formal plea of guilty‘ made under compulsion, or under any condition other than those just indicated will not suffice.
There must be a cleat and categorical showing, though, that such indeed was his intention. The plea of guilt must be
unequivocal. It must not give rise to contrary interpretations. Unfortunately, that is what happened in this case. The lower
court should not have been satisfied that the accused did in fact plead guilty. Thus, his judgment of conviction cannot
stand.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROLANDO CAMAY

G.R. NO. L-51306 | JULY 29, 1987
Ponente: Sarmiento, J.

Doctrine: When an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the
precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf.

Emergency recit: Rolando Camay was accused of the crime of Murder. He, with his counsel de oficio, pleaded guilty upon
the Regional Trial Court and he was sentenced to suffer a penalty of Death. Afterwards, the counsel de oficio and the
Solicitor General both filed manifestations recommending the affirmance of the Decision under review. The Supreme Court
ruled that the Trial Court’s decision is in accordance with law because the trial judge complied faithfully with the strict
procedure and more. The accused was aware of the nature of his plea of guilty. convinced that the guilt of the accused has
been proven beyond reasonable doubt in the light of overwhelming evidence presented by the prosecution, fully
corroborated and substantiated by the plea of guilty of the accused. Camay’s penalty was modified from Death to reclusion
perpetua.

PEOPLE V. MENDOZA, ET AL
(G.R. No. L-58678-80 July 20, 1982, Aquino, J.)

setting aside of a judgment of conviction based on a plea of guilty and allowing the accused to substitute it with a
plea of not guilty and have a trial on the merits

DOCTRINE: The exercise of that power should be justified by some compelling reason such as error, fraud, illegality or
manifest injustice. The trial court is not invested with unbridled discretion to set aside a judgment of conviction based on a
plea of guilty just because it has not yet become final. It is not the ministerial or routinary duty of the trial court, on a mere
request or petition of the accused, to allow him to substitute a plea of not guilty for his prior plea of guilty and to set aside
the judgment of conviction already rendered in the case.

EMERGENCY RECIT: This case is about the setting aside of a judgment of conviction based on a plea of guilty and allowing
the accused to substitute it with a plea of not guilty and have a trial on the merits. Andy de los Santos, Jr. was charged with
estafa in 3 informations for having issued postdated checks drawn against the Quezon City branch of the Pacific Banking
Corporation. The checks were dishonoured for lack of funds. In the three cases, De los Santos pleaded not guilty. At the
hearing, his counsel de oficio manifested that de los Santos was withdrawing his plea of not guilty and substituting it with a
plea of guilty. De los Santos was rearraigned. The trial court on the same day rendered three decisions imposing upon de
los Santos in each case an indeterminate penalty of 4mos & 21 days as min – 1yr 8mos & 21 days as max. Three days
later, his counsel filed a motion to set aside the judgments of conviction alleging that the accused wants to withdraw his
plea of guilty and substitute it with a plea of not guilty. The trial court, after noting that the judgments of conviction had not
yet become final, set them aside, granted the prayer of the accused that a plea of not guilty be entered for him and set the
three cases for trial. The Supreme Court held that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in setting aside the judgments
of conviction and later dismissing the three estafa cases. Section 6, Rule 118 of the Rules of Court empowers the trial court,
if the judgment has not become final, to allow a plea of guilty to be withdrawn, to set aside a judgment of conviction and to
allow a plea of not guilty. The exercise of that power should be justified by some compelling reason such as error, fraud,
illegality or manifest injustice.

FELILIBETH AGUINALDO and BENJAMIN PEREZ, vs. REYNALDO P. VENTUS and JOJO B. JOSON
( G.R. No. 176033, March 11, 2015, Peralta, J.)

DOCTRINE: If there is a pending petition for review before the DOJ, the court may suspend the proceedings upon motion
by the parties. However, the court should set the arraignment of the accused and direct the DOJ to submit the resolution
disposing of the petition on or before the period fixed by the Rules which, in no instance, could be more than sixty (60) days
from the filing of the Petition for Review before the DOJ, otherwise, the court will proceed with the arraignment as scheduled
and without further delay.

EMERGENCY RECIT: On December 2, 2002, private respondents Reynaldo P. Ventus and Jojo B. Joson filed a Complaint-
Affidavit for estafa against petitioners Aguinaldo and Perez before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Manila. On
July 16, 2003, an Information charging petitioners with the crime of estafa. On February 27, 2004, petitioners filed with the
Department of Justice (DOJ) a petition for review of the Information for estafa filed against them. On March 26, 2004,
petitioners filed an Urgent Motion to Cancel Arraignment and Suspend Further Proceedings, until their petition for review
before the DOJ is resolved with finality. On April 16, 2004, the public respondent granted petitioners' urgent motion to cancel
arraignment and suspend proceedings, and motion for reconsideration. On June 23, 2004, Levita De Castro filed a Motion
to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of Arrest. The public respondent issued an Order granting the Motion to Reinstate
Case and to Issue a Warrant of Arrest. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied because the Rules of
Court allows only a 60-day period of suspension of arraignment. The Supreme Court disagrees with petitioners' contention
that the provision of Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court limiting the suspension for arraignment to only sixty (60)
days is merely directory; thus, the estafa case against them cannot proceed until the DOJ resolves their petition for review
with finality. Arraignment was suspended pending the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration before the DOJ. However,
the lapse of almost 1 year and 7 months warranted the application of the limitation of the period for suspending arraignment.
While the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the
deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It
follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion
to defer arraignment.

MAYOR "JONG" AMADO CORPUS, JR. AND CARLITO SAMONTE v. HON. JUDGE RAMON D. PAMULAR OF
BRANCH 33, GUIMBA, NUEVA ECIJA, MRS. PRISCILLA ESPINOSA,* AND NUEVA ECIJA PROVINCIAL PUBLIC
PROSECUTOR FLORO FLORENDO
(G.R. No. 186403, September 05, 2018, Leonen, J.)

Arraignment and Plea

DOCTRINE: Court's rule merely requires a maximum 60-day period of suspension counted from the filing of a petition with
the reviewing office. Consequently, therefore, after the expiration of the 60-day period, "the trial court is bound to arraign
the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment."

FACTS:

Angelito Espinosa (Angelito) was shot by Samonte at Corpuz Street, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecjia on June 4, 2008, causing his
death.9 Samonte was caught in flagrante delicto and thereafter was arrested.10 After the inquest proceedings, an
Information11 for murder dated June 5, 2008 was filed against him, thus:12
Upon arraignment, Samonte admitted the killing but pleaded self-defense.

The wife of the deceased, Mrs. Priscilla Alcantara-Espinosa (Priscilla), filed a complaint-affidavit captioned as Reply-
Affidavit15 dated September 8, 2008 after the prosecution presented its second witness.16 She also filed an unsworn but
signed Reply to the Affidavit of Witnesses17 before First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor and Officer-in-Charge Floro F.
Florendo (Florendo).18

Based on the affidavit24 executed by Alexander Lozano (Lozano) on June 30, 2008, Corpuz was the one who instructed
Samonte to kill Angelito.25 In its October 7, 2008 Resolution,29 the Regional Trial Court dismissed Priscilla's complaint and
the attached affidavits of witnesses.30

Priscilla filed a Motion for Reconsideration,31 which was opposed by Corpus.32 Florendo reconsidered and set aside the
October 7, 2008 Resolution.33 He also instructed Assistant Public Prosecutor Edwin S. Bonifacio (Bonifacio) to conduct the
review.34

Bonifacio was not able to comply with the directive to personally submit his resolution by January 22, 2009, prompting
Florendo to order him to surrender the records of the case as the latter was taking over the resolution of the case based on
the evidence presented by the parties. This order was released on January 23, 2009 and was received by Bonifacio on the
same date.35
In his January 26, 2009 Resolution,36 Florendo found probable cause to indict Corpus for Angelito's murder. He directed the
filing of an amended information before the Regional Trial Court.37

Despite Florendo taking over the case, Bonifacio still issued a Review Resolution dated January 26, 2009, where he
reinstated the Regional Trial Court October 7, 2008 Resolution and affirmed the dismissal of the murder complaint against
Corpus.39
Meanwhile, Florendo filed an undated Motion to Amend Information, praying for the admission of the amended
information.41 Corpus and Samonte opposed this Motion by filing a Joint Urgent Manifestation/Opposition dated February
2, 2009.42
The prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration.43 Samonte and Corpus opposed this through a Vehement Opposition
and Omnibus Motion dated February 4, 2009.44 They averred that Judge Pamular's action was premature considering that
the Motion to Amend Information has yet to be scheduled for hearing.45 Moreover, Samonte was already
arraigned.46 Samonte and Corpus also claimed that the issuance of a warrant of arrest should be suspended because the
latter intended to appeal through a Petition for Review before the Department of Justice.47
Samonte and Corpus jointly filed a Petition for Review dated February 9, 2009 before the Department of Justice.48 They
also filed a Manifestation and Motion dated February 9, 2009 with the Regional Trial Court, asking it to desist from acting
further on the Amended Information in view of the Petition for Review filed with the Department of Justice.49
However, despite the manifestation, Judge Pamular of Branch 33, Regional Trial Court, Guimba, Nueva Ecija issued the
assailed February 26, 2009 Order, which granted the motion to amend the information and to admit the attached amended
information. The assailed Order also directed, among others, the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Corpus.50 The
dispositive portion of the Order read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court after personally examining the amended information and its
supporting documents finds probable cause and hereby orders to:

1. Grant the motion to amend the information;

2. Admit the attached amended information;
3. Issue the Warrant of Arrest for the immediate apprehension of the respondent-movant Amado Corpu[s],
Jr.; and
4. Deny the motion to defer/suspend arraignment and further proceedings of this case.

Hence, a direct recourse before this Court, through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with a prayer for an immediate
issuance of a temporary restraining order, was filed by Corpus and Samonte on March 3, 2009.52 This Petition seeks to
enjoin Judge Pamular from enforcing the February 26, 2009 Order and the warrant of arrest issued pursuant to the Order,
and from conducting further proceedings in the murder case.

Through its March 9, 2009 Resolution, this Court required respondents to comment on the Petition.53 It also granted
petitioners' prayer for a temporary restraining order. Judge Pamular, Florendo, Priscilla, and all other persons acting on the
assailed Regional Trial Court February 26, 2009 Order were enjoined from implementing it and the warrant of arrest issued
pursuant to it.54

Priscilla filed her comment on April 3, 2009.55 She cites Oaminal v. Castillo,56 which provided that in filing a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65, Section 1 there should be "no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law" available.57 Considering that there is still a remedy available for the accused apart from filing a petition, the
petition shall fail. She claims that petitioners should have first filed a motion for reconsideration with the Regional Trial Court
before resorting to a petition for certiorari before this Court.58

She insists that the Regional Trial Court is correct in granting the motion to admit the amended information because it has
no effect on Samonte's case and reasoned that:

[F]irst, because there would only be an addition of another accused with prior authority f[ro]m the Honorable Provincial
Prosecutor, second, the amendment will not cause any prejudice to the rights of the accused and more importantly, that
is what is provided for by the Rules[.]59

She claims that the alleged lack of determination of probable cause before the issuance of a warrant has no basis since
petitioners failed to present evidence or facts that would prove their claim.60

Judge Pamular filed his Comment on April 8, 2009.61 He asserts that he made a careful perusal of the case records in
issuing the assailed order. His independent judgment on the existence of probable cause was derived from his reading and
evaluation of pertinent documents and evidence. He states that he had set the case for hearing on February 13, 2009, when
both parties were heard and given the opportunity to argue.

On July 22, 2009, Priscilla filed a Manifestation64 before this Court. She asserts that this "present petition questioning the
alleged impropriety of the admission of the amended information as well as the issuance of a warrant of arrest against
Mayor Amado Corpu[s], Jr. has no more legal legs to stand on."65 She claims66 that Florendo's January 26, 2009 Resolution
was upheld by the Department of Justice in its June 26, 2009 Resolution.

Priscilla asserts further that the issue regarding the suspension of proceedings pending resolution by the Department of
Justice can now be considered moot and academic.69
On July 24, 2009, petitioners filed a Counter Manifestation.70 They claim that respondent Priscilla's prayer for the lifting of
the temporary restraining order is premature, thus:71
[Priscilla] should have been more candid. [She] should have informed the Honorable Court that a motion for reconsideration
with the Department of Justice was filed by the herein petitioner, and is still pending resolution. And in the event said motion
for reconsideration is denied, and as a part of petitioner/accused right to due process of law, it being clearly provided by the
rules, he would elevate said resolution to the Court of Appeals on certiorari – and, certainly, the aggrieved party would bring
the matter before this Honorable Court - during which interregnum, the appealed resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor . .
. would not have yet attained finality which is what jurisprudence underscores before the respondent court should have
proceeded with the amended information.

They further claim that lifting the temporary restraining order would be a relief "too harsh and preposterous" since Corpus
would be immediately imprisoned and constrained to face trial due to a flawed amended information.73 In case this Court
resolves to quash the amended information and nullify the warrant, Corpuz will have already "suffered grave and irreparable
injury—as he would not be able to discharge his constitutional mandate/duty to his constituents as their duly elected
mayor."74 As to Samonte, he will be allegedly "forced to face another set of defense—against the theory of conspiracy in
the amended information which, as we have heretofore stated, after his arraignment and trial half way, could no longer be
proper."75
On August 6, 2009, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment.76 It claims that petitioners should have made a
distinction on the propriety of respondent judge's acts in granting the admission of the amended information and in ordering
the issuance of a warrant. It posits that these acts are at par with the court's acquisition of jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the person of the accused. These acts have nothing to do with the suspension of arraignment provided for under
Rule 116, Section 11 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which ordinarily happens after a trial court has
acquired jurisdiction.77

The Office of the Solicitor General also adds that the insertion of the phrase "conspiring and confederating together" in the
amended information will not affect Samonte's substantial rights.78 Thus, the original charge against Samonte of murder
and his deliberate manner of shooting Angelita remain unaltered
Even if one or all of the elements of the crime of murder as alleged in the original information filed against petitioner Samonte
is not proven, the addition of conspiracy in the amended information, if duly proven, would not in any way result in his
conviction because conspiracy is not an essential or qualifying element of the crime of murder.80
The Office of the Solicitor General avers that respondent judge was well acquainted with the legal and factual circumstances
behind the filing of the original information against Samonte. The amended information merely added Corpus as a co-
conspirator. Thus, before respondent judge issued the assailed order, a prior hearing was held on February 13, 2009, when
all the parties were heard.81
The Office of the Solicitor General also asserts that while respondent judge committed error when he denied petitioners'
motion to suspend proceedings, what the law only requires under Rule 116, Section 11 is a maximum of 60-day suspension
of the arraignment. In this case, the 60-day period had already lapsed, rendering the issue raised by petitioners moot.
Hence, there is no longer any hindrance for respondent judge to continue with Corpus' arraignment.8
Petitioners filed their reply on August 7, 2009.83 They claim that respondent judge should have suspended action on the
issuance of a warrant considering the pendency of their Petition for Review before the Department of Justice.

Where the secretary of justice exercises his power of review only after an information has been filed, trial courts should
defer or suspend arraignment and further proceedings until the appeal is resolved. Such deferment or suspension, however,
does not signify that the trial court is ipso facto bound by the resolution of the secretary of justice. Jurisdiction, once acquired
by the trial court, is not lost despite a resolution by the secretary of justice to withdraw the information or to dismiss the
case.86
Petitioners also cite the dispositive portion of Tolentino v. Bonifacio,87 which directed the respondent judge in that case to
desist from proceeding with the trial until after the Department of Justice would have finally resolved a pending petition for
review.88 Thus:
While [w]e have noted from the expediente that the petitioner has utilized dilatory tactics to bring the case against her to
trial, still she is entitled to the remedy she seeks. The respondent judge should not be more anxious than the prosecution
in expediting the disposition of the case absent any indication of collusion between it and the defense. The Ministry of
Justice should not be deprived of its power to review the action of the City Fiscal by a precipitate trial of the case.

Petitioners claim that due to the theory of conspiracy in the amended information, Samonte will have an additional burden
of setting up a new defense particularly on any acts of his co-accused since "the act of one is the act of all."90
Petitioners also claim that respondent judge failed to comply with the mandate of making a prior determination of probable
cause before issuing the warrant. They insist that this mandate "is never excused nor dispensed with by the respondent
[judge]'s self-serving narration of the law (not the required facts) stated in [his] assailed order."91
On the issue of whether the arraignment of Corpus may proceed despite the lapse of the 60-day maximum period of
suspension under Rule 116, Section 11(c), petitioners aver that "[w]hat jurisprudence underscores is not the lapse of the
60-day period, but the issue of finality of the decision on appeal."92 The matter should not only cover the suspension of
arraignment but for respondent judge to defer from further proceedings on the amended information pending the final
resolution of the Department of Justice.93
This Court, through its August 26, 2009 Resolution, required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.94
Petitioners filed their memorandum on October 15, 2009.95 In their memorandum, they attached the Department of Justice
September 8, 2009 Resolution,96 which granted their motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners assert that Rule 116, Section 11(c) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that upon motion by
the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended

ISSUE: Whether the arraignment of petitioner Amado Corpus, Jr. may proceed after the lapse of the maximum 60-day
period suspension provided for under Rule 116, Section 11(c) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

RULING:

Rule 116, Section 11 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure pertains to a suspension of an arraignment in case of a
pending petition for review before the Department of Justice. It does not suspend the execution of a warrant of arrest for
the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction over the person of an accused.
In the assailed February 26, 2009 Order, Judge Pamular denied Corpus' motion to defer or suspend arraignment and further
proceedings.136 Petitioners claim that he should have suspended action on the issuance of a warrant considering the
pendency of their Petition for Review before the Department of Justice, citing Ledesma v. Court of Appeals137 and Tolentino
v. Bonifacio138 as their bases.139 Furthermore, they also assert that the assailed Order defies Rule 116, Section 11 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.140
Rule 116, Section 11 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for the grounds for suspension of arraignment.
Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in case of a pending petition for review of the
prosecutor's resolution filed before the Department of Justice.
Petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion141 dated February 9, 2009 before the Regional Trial Court, informing it about
their pending Petition for Review of the Prosecutor's January 26, 2009 Resolution before the Department of Justice.142 Thus,
respondent judge committed an error when he denied petitioners' motion to suspend the arraignment of Corpus because of
the pendency of their Petition for Review before the Department of Justice.
However, this Court's rule merely requires a maximum 60-day period of suspension counted from the filing of a petition with
the reviewing office.143 Consequently, therefore, after the expiration of the 60-day period, "the trial court is bound to arraign
the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment."144
 Petitioners jointly filed their Petition for Review145 before the Department of Justice on February 9, 2009.146 Thus, the 60-
day period has already lapsed since April 10, 2009. Hence, respondent judge can now continue with the arraignment and
further proceedings with regard to petitioner Corpus.

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. AMPARO M. CABOTAJE- TANG, HON.
SAMUEL R. MARTIRES, AND HON. ALEX L. QUIROZ OF THE THIRD DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015 BRION, J.

FACTS:

• On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information3 for plunder against Enrile, Jessica Lucila Reyes, Janet Lim Napoles,
Ronald John Lim, and John Raymund de Asis before the Sandiganbayan.
• The Information reads: x x x x In 2004 to 2010 or thereabout, in the Philippines, and within this Honorable Court’s jurisdiction, above-
named accused JUAN PONCE ENRILE, then a Philippine Senator, JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES, then Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile’s
Office, both public officers, committing the offense in relation to their respective offices, conspiring with one another and with JANET LIM
NAPOLES, RONALD JOHN LIM, and JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally amass, accumulate,
and/or acquire ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (Php172,834,500.00) through a combination or series of overt criminal acts, as follows:
(a) by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or her representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and others, kickbacks or
commissions under the following circumstances: before, during and/or after the project identification, NAPOLES
gave, and ENRILE and/or REYES received, a percentage of the cost of a project to be funded from ENRILE’S Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), in consideration of ENRILE’S endorsement, directly or through REYES, to
the appropriate government agencies, of NAPOLES’ non-government organizations which became the recipients
and/or target implementors of ENRILE’S PDAF projects, which duly-funded projects turned out to be ghosts or
fictitious, thus enabling NAPOLES to misappropriate the PDAF proceeds for her personal gain; (b) by taking undue
advantage, on several occasions, of their official positions, authority, relationships, connections, and influence to
unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines. CONTRARY TO LAW.
• Enrile responded by filing before the Sandiganbayan (1) an urgent omnibus motion (motion to dismiss for lack of evidence on record
to establish probable cause and ad cautelam motion for bail), and (2) a supplemental opposition to issuance of warrant of arrest and for
dismissal of Information. Both motions were heard by Sandiganbayan.
• On June 24, 2014, the prosecution filed a consolidated opposition to both motions. On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan denied Enrile’s
motions and ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest on the plunder case against the accused.
• On July 8, 2014, Enrile received a notice of hearing informing him that his arraignment would be held before the Sandiganbayan’s
Third Division on July 11, 2014.
• On July 10, 2014, Enrile filed a motion for bill of particulars before the Sandiganbayan. On the same date, he filed a motion for
deferment of arraignment since he was to undergo medical examination at the Philippine General Hospital (PGH)
• On July 11, 2014, SB heard the parties (Atty. Medoza as counsel of Enrile) on oral arguments in relation accused Juan Ponce Enrile’s
Motion for Bill of Particulars. After a ten-minute recess to deliberate, Presiding Justice (PJ) Amparo Cabotaje-Tang (Cabotaje-Tang)
announced SB’s denial of Enrile’s bill of particulars on the grounds: (1) the details that Enrile desires are “substantial reiterations”
of the arguments he raised in his supplemental opposition to the issuance of warrant of arrest and for dismissal of information;
and (2) the details sought are evidentiary in nature and are best ventilated during trial.
• Counsel for accused Juan Ponce Enrile orally sought a reconsideration (MR) of the denial of his motion for bill of particulars which was
opposed by the prosecution. After deliberation thereon, the Court likewise resolved to deny the MR.
• ACCORDINGLY, the scheduled arraignment of accused Juan Ponce Enrile was to proceed as previously scheduled.
• Atty. Mendoza subsequently moved for the deferment of Enrile’s arraignment due to his health. However, after he was declared fit, the
Sandiganbayan proceeded with Enrile’s arraignment where he entered a “no plea,” prompting the Sandiganbayan to enter a “not guilty”
plea on his behalf.
• In his petition for certiorari, Enrile claims that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it denied his motion for bill of particulars despite the ambiguity and insufficiency of the Information filed against him.
Enrile maintains that the denial was a serious violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.
 • In its Comment, the People of the Philippines counters that the Sandiganbayan did not exercise its discretionary power in an arbitrary
or despotic manner and that the Information already contained the ultimate facts; matters of evidence do not need to be averred.
• In his Reply, Enrile essentially claims that the right to move for a bill of particulars is “ancillary to and in implementation” of an accused’s
rights to due process, to be heard, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. He maintains that the
Sandiganbayan’s denial of his motion for bill of particulars is not “a mere denial of a procedural right under the Rules of Court, but of
rights vested in an accused under the Constitution to ensure fairness in the trial of the offense charged.” Enrile also adds that there
could only be a fair trial if he could properly plead to the Information and prepare for trial.
• Enrile further argues that the People’s Comment did not dispute the relevance of the details sought in the motion for bill of particulars.
He likewise claims that the “desired details” could not be found in the bundle of documents marked by the prosecution during
the preliminary conference. Finally, Enrile maintains that his motion for bill of particulars was not dilatory.
• After due consideration, the SC resolve to partially GRANT the petition.

ISSUE: Whether Sandiganbayan’s denial of the Enrile’s motion for a bill of particulars, on the ground that the details sought to be itemized
or specified are all evidentiary – without any explanation supporting this conclusion – constitutes grave abuse of discretion. (YES)
RULING:

The purpose of a bill of particular is to clarify allegations in the Information that are indefinite, vague, or are conclusions of
law to enable the accused to properly plead and prepare for trial, not simply to inform him of the crime of which he stands
accused.

Enrile is entitled to a bill of particulars and such shall specifically contain the following:
1. The particular overt act/s alleged to constitute the “combination or series of overt criminal acts” charged in the Information. 2. A
breakdown of the amounts of the “kickbacks or commissions” allegedly received, stating how the amount of
P172,834,500.00 was arrived at. 3. A brief description of the ‘identified’ projects where kickbacks or commissions were received.
4. The approximate dates of receipt, “in 2004 to 2010 or thereabout,” of the alleged kickbacks and commissions from the identified
projects. At the very least, the prosecution should state the year when the kickbacks and transactions from the identified projects were
received. 5. The name of Napoles’ non-government organizations (NGOs) which were the alleged “recipients and/or target implementors
of Enrile’s PDAF projects.” 6. The government agencies to whom Enrile allegedly endorsed Napoles’ NGOs. The particular
person/s in each government
agency who facilitated the transactions need not be named as a particular.

As discussed above, some of the desired details are material facts that must be alleged to enable the petitioner to properly plead and
prepare his defense. The Sandiganbayan should have diligently sifted through each detail sought to be specified, and made the necessary
determination of whether each detail was an ultimate or evidentiary fact, particularly after Enrile stated in his Reply that the “desired details”
could not be found in the bundle of documents marked by the prosecution. We cannot insist or speculate that he is feigning ignorance of the
presence of these desired details; neither can we put on him the burden of unearthing from these voluminous documents what the desired
details are. The remedy of a bill of particulars is precisely made available by the Rules to enable an accused to positively respond
and make an intelligent defense.

Moreover, a resolution arising from a preliminary investigation does not amount to nor does it serve the purpose of a bill of particulars.

A bill of particulars guards against the taking of an accused by surprise by restricting the scope of the proof; it limits the evidence to be
presented by the parties to the matters alleged in the Information as supplemented by the bill. It is for this reason that the failure of
an accused to move for a bill of particulars deprives him of the right to object to evidence which could be lawfully introduced and admitted
under an information of more or less general terms which sufficiently charges the defendants with a definite crime.

The record on preliminary investigation, in comparison, serves as the written account of the inquisitorial process when the fiscal determined
the existence of prima facie evidence to indict a person for a particular crime. The record of the preliminary investigation, as a general rule,
does not even form part of the records of the case. These features of the record of investigation are significantly different from the bill of
particulars that serves as basis, together with the Information, in specifying the overt acts constituting the offense that the accused pleaded
to during arraignment.

Notably, plunder is a crime composed of several predicate criminal acts. To prove plunder, the prosecution must weave a web out
of the six ways of illegally amassing wealth and show how the various acts reveal a combination or series of means or schemes
that reveal a pattern of criminality. The interrelationship of the separate acts must be shown and be established as a scheme to
accumulate ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least P50 million.

Plunder thus involves intricate predicate criminal acts and numerous transactions and schemes that span a period of time. Naturally, in its
prosecution, the State possesses an “effective flexibility” of proving a predicate criminal act or transaction, not originally contemplated in
the Information, but is otherwise included in the broad statutory definition, in light of subsequently discovered evidence. The unwarranted
use of the flexibility is what the bill of particulars guards against.

ESTIPONA v. LOBRIGO
G.R. NO. 226679 | August 15, 2017 | Peralta, J

Doctrine
Section 23 is unconstitutional for being contrary to the rule-making authority of the Supreme court.
The rules on plea bargaining neither create a right nor take away a vested right. Instead, it operates as a means to implement
an existing right by regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly
administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment,
the pre-trial, or even up to the point when the prosecution already rested its case. As regards plea bargaining during the
pre-trial stage, the trial court's exercise of discretion should not amount to a grave abuse thereof.

Summary
Estopina was accused of illegal possession of dangerous drug. On arraignment he pleaded not guilty. Later on he filed a
motion to allow the accused to enter into a plea plea bargaining agreement in view of his being a first-time offender and the
minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession. He is also questioning the constitutionality of Sec 23 of
the law.

SEC 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. - Any person charged under any provision of this Act regardless of the imposable
penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on plea-bargaining.

The RTC denied his motion, on the ground that it cannot pass upon constitutional issues. His MR having been denied he
appealed to the SC. THE SC Held sec. 23 as unconstitutional for being contrary to the rule-making authority of the Supreme
court.