Art.

36 B

BELTRAN vs. PEOPLE

FACTS:

Meynardo Beltran (petitioner) and his wife Charmaine Felix were married on June 16, 1973. After four
years of marriage, Meynardo filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Charmaine alleged that Meynardo was the one who abandoned their home and cohabited
with another woman. She then filed a criminal suit for concubinage against Meynardo. Petitioner
Meynardo filed a motion to deter the proceedings on the ground that the pending civil case for the
declaration of the nullity of marriage raises a prejudicial question. He further argued that he should be
acquitted of the crime of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void.

ISSUE:

W/N the pendency of the petition for the declaration for nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is a prejudicial question to the case of concubinage.

RULING:

No, it is not a prejudicial question. The elements of prejudicial question are as follows: (a) the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent
criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed. The pendency of the declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question to the case
of concubinage because for the civil case to be considered prejudicial to the criminal action as to cause
the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear that the
said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based and the
resolution is determinative of the innocence or guilt of the accused. In his contention that he could be
acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void is not a defense. If
a man cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of the nullity of marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage. The court, therefore, has not erred in ruling that
the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in the criminal
case of concubinage.
Art. 36 C

PHILIPPINE AGILA SATELLITE, INC. vs. LICHAUCO.

FACTS:

On June 6, 1994 , a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was entered into by a group of private
telecommunications carriers and the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) . The
private telecom carriers formed a corporation and adopted a corporate name Philippine Agila Satellite,
Inc. (PASI). By letter dated June 28, 1996, the president of PASI, Rodrigo Silverio, requested the
Secretary of the DOTC, Amado Lagdameo, for official government confirmation of the assignment of
Philippine orbital slots 161E and 153E to PASI for its AGILA satellites.

By letter dated July 3, 1996, Lagdameo confirmed the assignment of the orbital slots to PASI, who
thereafter undertook preparations for the launching and operations of its satellites. On December 3,
1996, PASI president and CEO Michael de Guzman , informed Jesli Lapuz , president and CEO of
Landbank of the Philippines, of the government’s assignment to PASI of the orbital slots. He requested
the bank’s confirmation of its participation in a club loan amounting to $11 million, the proceeds of
which would be applied to PASI’s interim satellite.

Lapuz sent a copy of De Guzman’s letter to the DOTC Undersecretary, Josefina Lichauco , who wrote to
Lapuz stating that: 1. There is no basis for De Guzman to allege that the DOTC assigned two (2) slots to
PASI. Slot 153E was to be used for the migration of the Russian satellite in time for the APEC Leader’s
Summit, thus it could no longer be assigned to PASI. 2. PASI is interested in pursuing their “interim
satellite project” and are applying for a loan with Landbank. The DOTC supports this venture but they
will be getting only one orbital slot for both the Interim Satellite Project and for the Launch
Project. 3. As regards the use of the name “Agila”, Mr. de Guzman’s allegation that PASI has
registered “Agila” as a corporate alias/trademark, is FALSE. There is no such thing as registration of a
“corporate alias.”

However, on December 1997, Lichauco subsequently issued a Notice of Offer for several orbital slots
including 153E. Another company, whose identity had not been disclosed, had submitted a bid and won
the award for slot 153E. PASI, claiming that the offer was without its knowledge, filed on January 23,
1998 before the RTC a complaint against Lichauco and the “unknown awardee” for injunction to enjoin
the award of 153E, declare its nullity, and for damages. On February 23, 1998, PASI also filed a
complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against Lichauco, for gross violation of Sec.3(e) of RA
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which states: (e) Causing any
undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply
to officers and employees of officers or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions. The Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) of the Office
of the Ombudsman, by evaluation report dated April 15, 1998, found the existence of a prejudicial
question , saying that the civil case filed in the Ombudsman is premature since the issues involved
herein are now subject of litigation in the case filed with the RTC.
ISSUES:

1.W/N there exists a prejudicial question in the civil case filed with the Ombudsman, in relation to the
criminal case filed with the RTC.

2. If so, W/N the dismissal of the complaint in the Ombudsman is correct.

RULING:

1. Yes, there exists a prejudicial question because if the award to the undisclosed bidder of the orbital
slot 153E is declared valid for being within Lichauco’s scope of authority to thus free her from liability
for damages, there would be no prohibited act to speak of nor would there be basis for undue injury
claimed to have been suffered by petitioner. Thus, whether or not the criminal case can proceed is
dependent upon the judgment of the civil case. This constitutes a prejudicial question.

2. No, according to Yap v. Paras, Section 6, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court directs that “the proceedings
may only be suspended, not dismissed , and that it may be made only upon petition, and not at the
instance of the judge alone or the investigating officer.” A complaint at the evaluation stage may be
dismissed outright only for lack of palpable merit, which means that there is no basis for the charges.
However, if the complaint has prima facie merit, the investigating officer shall recommend the
adoption of any of the actions enumerated in Rule II, Section 2 of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman.
Art. 36 D

YAP vs. CABALES

FACTS:

Jesse Yap and his spouse Bessie Yap are engaged in the real estate business through their company
Primetown Property Group. In 1996, they purchased several real properties from Evelyn Te. In
consideration of the said purchases, Jesse issued several BPI postdated checks to Evelyn. Thereafter,
spouses Orlando and Mergyl Mirabueno and spouses Charlie and Jovit Dimalanta, rediscounted the
checks from Evelyn. In the beginning, the first few checks were honored by the bank, but in the early
part of 1997, when the remaining checks were deposited with the drawee bank, they were dishonored
because the account was closed. Demands were made by spouses Mirabueno and spouses Dimalanta to
the petitioner to make good of the checks. Despite this, Yap failed to pay the amounts represented by
the said checks. Spouses Mirabueno filed a civil action for collection of sum of money, damages and
attorney's fees with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against Yap before the
trial court. Spouses Dimalanta followed suit and instituted a similar action. Subsequently, the Office of
the City Prosecutor filed several information for violation of BP 22 against Yap. In the criminal cases,
petitioner filed separate motions to suspend proceedings an account of the existence of a prejudicial
question and motion to exclude the private prosecutor from participating in the proceedings. Yap
prayed that the proceedings in the criminal cases be suspended until the civil cases pending before RTC
were finally resolved.

ISSUE:

W/N there exists a prejudicial question that necessitates the suspension of the criminal proceedings.

RULING:

No prejudicial question exists. A prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil action
and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue that must be
preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed and the resolution will be determinative of the
guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. This is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has 2
essential elements: a. The civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the criminal action; and b. The resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed.

The issue in the criminal cases is whether Yap is guilty of violating BP 22, while in the civil cases, it is
whether the spouses Mirabueno and spouses Dimalanta are entitled to collect from the petitioner the
sum or the value of the checks that they have rediscounted from Evelyn Te. The resolution of the said
issue raised in the civil action is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case against him, and there is no necessity that the civil cases should be resolved first resulting
to the suspension if the criminal cases. In the aforementioned civil actions, even if the petitioner is
declared nit liable for the payment of the value of the checks and damages, he cannot be adjudged free
from criminal liability for violation of BP 22.
The mere issuance of worthless checks with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds to support the
checks is in itself an offense. It is clear that the determination of the issues involved in the criminal
action for collection of sum of money and damages is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of Yap in the
criminal cases for violation of BP 22. In addition, Yap's claim of lack of consideration may be raised as a
defense during the trial of the criminal cases against him. The validity and merits of a party's defense
and accusation, as well as the admissibility and weight of testimonies and evidence brought before the
court are better ventilated during the trial proper.
RAFAEL JOSE-CONSING, JR.,Petitioner,vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondent.G.R. No. 161075/
July 15, 2013Ponente: BERSAMIN,J.TOPIC: PERSONS; Effect and Application of Laws; Human
RelationsNature: Petition for Review on CertiorariDoctrine: An independent civil action based on fraud
initiated by the defrauded party does not raise a prejudicial question to stop the proceedings in a
pending criminal prosecution of the defendant for estafa through falsification. This is because the result
of the independent civil action is irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence of the accused.Facts:
Petitioner negotiated with and obtained for himself and his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz (de la Cruz)
various loans totalingP18,000,000.00 from Unicapital Inc. (Unicapital). The loans were secured by a real
estate mortgage constituted on a parcel of land registered under the name of de la Cruz.In accordance
with its option to purchase the mortgaged property, Unicapital agreed to purchase one-half of the
property for a total consideration ofP21,221,500.00. Payment was effected by off-setting the amounts
due to Unicapital under the promissory notes of de la Cruz and Consing in the amount ofP18,000,000.00
and paying an additional amount ofP3,145,946.50. The other half of the property was purchased by Plus
Builders, Inc. (Plus Builders), a joint venture partner of Unicapital. Before Unicapital and Plus Builders
could develop the property, they learned that the title to the property was really TCT No. 114708 in the
names of Po Willie Yu and Juanito Tan Teng, the parties from whom the property had been allegedly
acquired by de la Cruz. TCT No. 687599 held by De la Cruz appeared to be spurious. On its part,
Unicapital demanded the return of the total amount ofP41,377,851.48 as of April 19, 1999 that had been
paid to and received by de la Cruz and Consing, but the latter ignored the demands. Consing filed Civil
Case No. 1759 in the Pasig City RTC for injunctive relief, thereby seeking to enjoin Unicapital from
proceeding against him for the collection of theP41,377,851.48 on the ground that he had acted as a
mere agent of his mother. On the same date, Unicapital initiated a criminal complaint for estafa through
falsification of public document against Consing and de la Cruz in the Makati City Prosecutors Office.
Unicapital sued Consing in the RTC in Makati City (Civil Case No. 99-1418) for the recovery of a sum of
money and damages, with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment. The Office of the City
Prosecutor of Makati City filed against Consing and De la Cruz an information for estafa through
falsification of public document in the RTC in Makati City.Consing moved to defer his arraignment in the
Makati criminal case on the ground of existence of a prejudicial question due to the pendency of the
Pasig and Makati civil cases. On September 25, 2001, Consing reiterated his motion for deferment of his
arraignment, citing the additional ground of pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 in the CA. On November
19, 2001, the Prosecution opposed the motion. On November 26, 2001, the RTC issued an order
suspending the proceedings in the Makati criminal case on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial
question, and on March 18, 2001, the RTC denied the Prosecutions motion for reconsideration. The State
thus assailed in the CA the last two orders of the RTC in the Makati criminal case via petition for
certiorari (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 71252).On May 20, 2003, the CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No.
71252, dismissing the petition for certiorari and upholding the RTCs questioned orders. On August 18,
2003, the CA amended its decision, reversing itself. Consing filed a motion for reconsideration,but the CA
denied the motion through the second assailed resolution of December 11, 2003. Hence, this appeal by
petition for review on certiorari.Issue: Whether or not there is an existence of a prejudicial question that
warranted the suspension of the proceedings in the Makati criminal caseHeld: NORuling: Consing has
hereby deliberately chosen to ignore the firm holding in the ruling in G.R. No. 148193 to the effect that
the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 00-120 could not be suspended because the Makati civil case was
an independent civil action, while the Pasig civil case raised no prejudicial question. That was wrong for
him to do considering that the ruling fully applied to him due to the similarity between his case with
Plus Builders and his case with Unicapital.A perusal of Unicapitals complaint in the Makati civil case
reveals that the action was predicated on fraud. This was apparent from the allegations of Unicapital in
its complaint to the effect that Consing and de la Cruz had acted in a "wanton, fraudulent, oppressive, or
malevolent manner in offering as security and later object of sale, a property which they do not own, and
foisting to the public a spurious title."As such, the action was one that could proceed independently of
Criminal Case No. 00-120 pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code.It is well settled that a civil action
based on defamation, fraud and physical injuries may be independently instituted pursuant to Article 33
of the Civil Code, and does not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of a
criminal case.In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on account of the
alleged fraud committed by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an
independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial
question that will justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar. Contrary to Consings stance, it was
not improper for the CA to apply the ruling in G.R. No. 148193 to his case with Unicapital, for, although
the Manila and Makati civil cases involved different complainants (i.e., Plus Builders and Unicapital), the
civil actions Plus Builders and Unicapital had separately instituted against him were undeniably of
similar mold, i.e., they were both based on fraud, and were thus covered by Article 33 of the Civil Code.
Clearly, the Makati criminal case could not be suspended pending the resolution of the Makati civil case
that Unicapital had filed.As far as the Pasig civil case is concerned, the issue of Consings being a mere
agent of his mother who should not be criminally liable for having so acted due to the property involved
having belonged to his mother as principal has also been settled in G.R. No. 148193, to wit:In the case at
bar, we find no prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal
case (the Cavite criminal case). The issue in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 (the Pasig civil case) for Injunctive
Relief is whether or not respondent (Consing) merely acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz;
while in Civil Case No. 99-95381 (the Manila civil case), for Damages and Attachment, the question is
whether respondent and his mother are liable to pay damages and to return the amount paid by PBI for
the purchase of the disputed lot. Even if respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother in the
transaction involving the sale of the questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability.
An agent or any person may be held liable for conspiring to falsify public documents. Hence, the
determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the
guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for estafa through falsification of public
document.WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the amended decision promulgated on August 18, 2003;
and ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.</p>

RECOMMENDED
Art. 36 E

DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC. vs. JANIOLA

FACTS:

On February 2, 2005, petitioner, through its President and VP, filed before the MTC, a criminal
information against Cleofe Janiola for violation of BP 22. On September 20, 2006, Janiola and her
husband filed before the RTC, a civil complaint against petitioner for the rescission of an alleged
construction agreement between the parties , as well as for damages. Notably, the checks, subject of
the criminal case before the MTC, were issued in consideration of the construction agreement.

On July 25, 2007, respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings of the criminal case, alleging that
the civil and criminal cases involved facts and issues similar or intimately related, and thereby claiming
that the civil case posed a prejudicial question against the criminal case.

The MTC granted the motion to suspend proceedings, reasoning that one of the elements of a
prejudicial question is that there must be a previously instituted civil action which raises issues against a
subsequent criminal action. In this case, the criminal case preceded the civil case.

ISSUE:

W/N the MTC erred when it ruled to suspend proceedings in the criminal case on the basis of
“prejudicial question.”

RULING: Yes, the MTC erred in its ruling since there is no prejudicial question.

1. The court ruled that the civil action must precede the filing of the criminal action, for a prejudicial
question to exist . The circumstances present in the instant case indicate that the filing of the civil action
and the subsequent move to suspend the criminal proceedings by reason of the presence of a
prejudicial question were a mere afterthought , and instituted to delay the criminal proceedings. The
civil case was filed 2 years after the institution of the criminal complaint and from the time that private
respondent allegedly withdrew its equipment from the job site. Also, it is worth noting that the civil case
was instituted more than 2 ½ years from the time that private respondent allegedly stopped
construction of the proposed building for no valid reason. More importantly, the civil case praying for
the rescission of the construction agreement for lack of consideration was filed more than 3 years from
the execution of the construction agreement.

2. The court also ruled that the resolution of the civil case is not determinative of the prosecution of
the criminal case. Even if the civil case here was instituted prior to the criminal action, there is still no
prejudicial question. The mere fact that there exists a valid contract or agreement to support the
issuance of the check/s, or that the checks were issued for valuable consideration , does not make up
the elements of the crime. The agreement surrounding the issuance of dishonoured checks is irrelevant
to the prosecution for the violation of BP 22. The law punishes the mere act of issuing a bouncing check,
not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. Thus, even
if the trial court in the civil case declares that the construction agreement between the parties is void,
this would not affect the prosecution of the respondent in the criminal case.
Art. 36 F

RAFAEL JOSE-CONSING, Jr. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Doctrine: An independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the defrauded party does not raise a
prejudicial question to stop the proceedings in a pending criminal prosecution of the defendant for estafa
through falsification. This is because the result of the independent civil action is irrelevant to the issue of
guilt or innocence of the accused.

FACTS:

Petitioner negotiated with and obtained for himself and his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz (de la Cruz) various
loans totalingP18,000,000.00 from Unicapital Inc. (Unicapital). The loans were secured by a real estate
mortgage constituted on a parcel of land registered under the name of de la Cruz.In accordance with its
option to purchase the mortgaged property, Unicapital agreed to purchase one-half of the property for a
total consideration ofP21,221,500.00. Payment was effected by off-setting the amounts due to Unicapital
under the promissory notes of de la Cruz and Consing in the amount ofP18,000,000.00 and paying an
additional amount ofP3,145,946.50. The other half of the property was purchased by Plus Builders, Inc.
(Plus Builders), a joint venture partner of Unicapital.

Before Unicapital and Plus Builders could develop the property, they learned that the title to the property
was really TCT No. 114708 in the names of Po Willie Yu and Juanito Tan Teng, the parties from whom the
property had been allegedly acquired by de la Cruz. TCT No. 687599 held by De la Cruz appeared to be
spurious. On its part, Unicapital demanded the return of the total amount ofP41,377,851.48 as of April
19, 1999 that had been paid to and received by de la Cruz and Consing, but the latter ignored the demands.
Consing filed Civil Case No. 1759 in the Pasig City RTC for injunctive relief, thereby seeking to enjoin
Unicapital from proceeding against him for the collection of theP41,377,851.48 on the ground that he had
acted as a mere agent of his mother.

On the same date, Unicapital initiated a criminal complaint for estafa through falsification of public
document against Consing and de la Cruz in the Makati City Prosecutors Office. Unicapital sued Consing
in the RTC in Makati City (Civil Case No. 99-1418) for the recovery of a sum of money and damages, with
an application for a writ of preliminary attachment.

The Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City filed against Consing and De la Cruz an information for
estafa through falsification of public document in the RTC in Makati City. Consing moved to defer his
arraignment in the Makati criminal case on the ground of existence of a prejudicial question due to the
pendency of the Pasig and Makati civil cases. On September 25, 2001, Consing reiterated his motion for
deferment of his arraignment, citing the additional ground of pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 in the
CA. On November 19, 2001, the Prosecution opposed the motion.

On November 26, 2001, the RTC issued an order suspending the proceedings in the Makati criminal case
on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question, and on March 18, 2001, the RTC denied the
Prosecutions motion for reconsideration. The State thus assailed in the CA the last two orders of the RTC
in the Makati criminal case via petition for certiorari (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 71252).
On May 20, 2003, the CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 71252, dismissing the petition for
certiorari and upholding the RTCs questioned orders. On August 18, 2003, the CA amended its decision,
reversing itself. Consing filed a motion for reconsideration,but the CA denied the motion through the
second assailed resolution of December 11, 2003. Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is an existence of a prejudicial question that warranted the suspension of the
proceedings in the Makati criminal case

RULING: NO. Consing has hereby deliberately chosen to ignore the firm holding in the ruling in G.R. No.
148193 to the effect that the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 00-120 could not be suspended because
the Makati civil case was an independent civil action, while the Pasig civil case raised no prejudicial
question. That was wrong for him to do considering that the ruling fully applied to him due to the similarity
between his case with Plus Builders and his case with Unicapital.

A perusal of Unicapitals complaint in the Makati civil case reveals that the action was predicated on fraud.
This was apparent from the allegations of Unicapital in its complaint to the effect that Consing and de la
Cruz had acted in a "wanton, fraudulent, oppressive, or malevolent manner in offering as security and
later object of sale, a property which they do not own, and foisting to the public a spurious title."As such,
the action was one that could proceed independently of Criminal Case No. 00-120 pursuant to Article 33
of the Civil Code.

It is well settled that a civil action based on defamation, fraud and physical injuries may be independently
instituted pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, and does not operate as a prejudicial question that will
justify the suspension of a criminal case.

In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on account of the alleged fraud
committed by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil action
under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the
suspension of the criminal case at bar. Contrary to Consings stance, it was not improper for the CA to
apply the ruling in G.R. No. 148193 to his case with Unicapital, for, although the Manila and Makati civil
cases involved different complainants (i.e., Plus Builders and Unicapital), the civil actions Plus Builders and
Unicapital had separately instituted against him were undeniably of similar mold, i.e., they were both
based on fraud, and were thus covered by Article 33 of the Civil Code. Clearly, the Makati criminal case
could not be suspended pending the resolution of the Makati civil case that Unicapital had filed.As far as
the Pasig civil case is concerned, the issue of Consings being a mere agent of his mother who should not
be criminally liable for having so acted due to the property involved having belonged to his mother as
principal has also been settled in G.R. No. 148193, to wit:In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question
that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case (the Cavite criminal case). The
issue in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 (the Pasig civil case) for Injunctive Relief is whether or not respondent
(Consing) merely acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in Civil Case No. 99-95381 (the
Manila civil case), for Damages and Attachment, the question is whether respondent and his mother are
liable to pay damages and to return the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the disputed lot. Even if
respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother in the transaction involving the sale of the
questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or any person may be held
liable for conspiring to falsify public documents. Hence, the determination of the issue involved in Civil
Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the
criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document.

Court AFFIRMS the amended decision promulgated on August 18, 2003; and ORDERS petitioner to pay the
costs of suit.