Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of
CRUZ VS MINA Attorneys for “stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues” to the IBP
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 154207, April 27, 2007 ]
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, PETITIONER,
VS.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F GUERRERO AND
HON. ZENAIDA LAGUILLES, RESPONDENTS
Facts:
Ferdinand A. Cruz filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of
Appearance, as private prosecutor, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is
the complaining witness.
The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies
his appearance as private prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule
138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc in
Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr. that a non-lawyer may appear before
the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The
petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior
conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano
Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said
criminal case.
However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied
permission for petitioner to appear as private prosecutor on the ground
that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in
conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student
Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid
down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial.
Issue:
whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior
court as an agent or friend of a party litigant
Ruling:
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an
inferior court, where the issues and procedure are relatively simple. In
inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity
without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the court of a justice of
the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of
an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of
an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or
friend of a party without the supervision of a member of the bar.
(Emphasis supplied)
In re: Atty. Marcial Edillon
A.C. No. 1928. August 3, 1978
FACTS:
The respondent Martial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney
in the Philippines. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of
Governors unanimously adopted Resolution recommending to the
since the latter’s constitution notwithstanding due notice. The Court
required the respondent to comment on the resolution; he submitted
his comment reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due
from him. The core of the respondent’s arguments is that the above
provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the
sense that he is being compelled, as a precondition to maintaining his
status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to
pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this
compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is
admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to
liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the
respondent concludes, the provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP
By- Laws are void and of no legal force and effect. The respondent
similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from
the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the
justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an “administrative
nature pertaining to an administrative body.”
ISSUES
Whether the Court is without power to compel him to become a
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Whether the
provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a membership fee is
void. Whether the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount
to a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes
on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the power of SC to strike
the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys is valid.
HELD:
1. To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not
violative of Edillon’s constitutional freedom to associate. Bar
integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is
free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter
or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues.
The Supreme Court, in order to further the State’s legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the
cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the
subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers.
But, assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a
lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is
justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. 2. Nothing in
the Constitution prohibits the Court, to promulgate rules concerning
the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the
Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — from
requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a
reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the
profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is
indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for
carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. 3. Whether the
practice of law is a property right, the respondent’s right to practice law
before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to
regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a
regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its
payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not
void as unreasonable or arbitrary. But it must be emphasized that the
practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such
must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact
compliance with the lawyer’s public responsibilities. 4. Relative to the
issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike
the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state
that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have
been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and
responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion.
DECISION
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the
Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby
disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys of the Court. Respondent disbarred.

Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo Case Digest
The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law,
the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme
Court. (Sec. 5, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution)
Facts:
Atty. Arevalo wrote a letter to the SC requesting for exemption from
payment of his IBP dues from 1977-2005 in the amount of P12,035.00.
He contends that after admission to the Bar he worked at the Civil
Service Commission then migrated to the US until his retirement.
His contention to be exempt is that his employment with the CSC
prohibits him to practice his law profession and he did not practice the
same while in the US. The compulsion that he pays his IBP annual
membership is oppressive since he has an inactive status as a lawyer.
His removal from the profession because of non-payment of the same
constitutes to the deprivation of his property rights bereft of due
process of the law.
Issues:
1. Is petitioner entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during
the time that he was inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was
in the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad from
1986-2003?
2. Does the enforcement of the penalty of removal amount to a
deprivation of property without due process?
Held:
1. No. A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for
regulation. If the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it
follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership
fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to put on an integrated
Bar program without means to defray the expenses. The doctrine of
implied powers necessarily carries with it the power to impose such
exaction.
The payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in
the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This means that the compulsory
nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as ones membership in
the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type
of practice, the member is engaged in.
2. No. Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its
being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession,
we do not here pause to consider at length, as it [is] clear that under
the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted
to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondents right
to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a
matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose
the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a penalty
designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided
altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property
right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent
regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyers
public responsibilities.
As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is
a privilege burdened with conditions, one of which is the payment of
membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of
such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move. (Letter
of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr., Requesting Exemption from Payment of IBP
Dues, B.M. No. 1370. May 9, 2005)
Santos vs Llamas Case Digest
Soliman M. Santos, Jr. v. Atty. Francisco R. Llamas
A.C. No. 4749. January 20, 2000
Facts: Complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar
membership dues. It appears that Atty. Llamas, who for a number of
years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP OR Nos. and
data in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicated “IBP Rizal 259060” but
he has been using this for at least 3 years already. On the other hand,
respondent, who is now of age, averred that he is only engaged in a
“limited” practice of law and under RA 7432, as a senior citizen, he is
exempted from payment of income taxes and included in this
exemption is the payment of membership dues.
Held: GUILTY. Rule 139-A requires that every member of the
Integrated Bar shall pay annual dues and default thereof for six months
shall warrant suspension of membership and if nonpayment covers a
period of 1-year, default shall be a ground for removal of the
delinquent’s name from the Roll of Attorneys. It does not matter
whether or not respondent is only engaged in “limited” practice of law.
Moreover, the exemption invoked by respondent does not include
exemption from payment of membership or association dues.
In addition, by indicating “IBP Rizal 259060” in his pleadings and
thereby misprepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid
his IBP dues to the Rizal Chpater, respondent is guilty of violating the
Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: Rule 1.01 – A
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. His act is also a violation of Rule 10.01 which provides that: A
lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; nor mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
Lawyer was suspended for 1 year or until he has paid his IBP dues,
whichever is later.
Constancia I. Valencia, Complainant, v. Atty. Dionisio C. Antiniw,
Respondent
A.C. No. 1302, A.C. No. 1391, A.C. No. 1543, 30 June 2008
Facts:
This is an appeal for reinstatement to the bar of the respondent who
was disbarred on 26 April 1991 for falsifying a deed of sale and
introduction the same as evidence for his client. From 1993 to 2002,
the respondent filed several motions and appeals for reinstatement to
the bar. His motions and appeals were accompanied by endorsements
of his good moral character by various organizations such as IBP-
Pangasinan Chapter; Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Courts of
Lingayen and Urdaneta, Pangasinan; Provincial Prosecutors’
Association of Pangasinan; Provincial Board of Pangasinan; Rotary
Club of Urdaneta; and past National President of the IBP.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent should be readmitted to the practice
of law.
Held:
Records show that the long period of respondent’s disbarment gave
him the chance to purge himself of his misconduct, to show his
remorse and repentance, and to demonstrate his willingness and
capacity to live up once again of conduct demanded of every member
of the bar. It is well-settled that the objective of disciplinary
proceedings is restorative justice, not retribution. Guided by their
doctrine and considering the evidence submitted by respondent
satisfactorily showing his contribution and his being again worthy of
membership in the legal profession, the Supreme Court find that it is
now time to lift respondent’s disbarment.