Batch 1 Evidence Digests

EH 402 (2020) BATCH 1 DIGESTS
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EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS

1. Atienza v. Board of Medicine, 09 Feb 2011 (ACBAY)
KEYWORD: KIDNEY
DOCTRINE:
1. Rules of evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings before administrative bodies
such as the Board of Medicine.
2. The rules of evidence provide for some facts which are established and need not be
proved, such as those covered by judicial notice, both mandatory and discretionary.
FACTS:
A. Editha Sioson went to Rizal Medical Center (RMC) for a check-up due to her lumbar
pains.
B. The doctor ordered several diagnostic laboratory tests.
C. It was ascertained that her left kidney is non-functioning and non-visualizing. Thus, she
underwent kidney operation.
D. Her husband filed a complaint for gross negligence and/or incompetence before the
Board of Medicine against the doctors who allegedly participated in the fateful kidney
operation.
E. It was alleged in the complaint that the doctors removed the fully functional right
kidney, instead of the left.
F. The complaint was heard by the BOM. Editha Sioson filed her formal offer of
documentary evidence. Attached to it are her exhibits labeled “A” to “D” which she
offered for the purpose of proving that her kidneys were both in their proper anatomical
locations at the time she was operated on.
G. Petitioners’ contention: said exhibits are inadmissible because the same are mere
photocopies, not properly identified and authenticated, and intended to establish
matters which are hearsay. He added that the exhibits are incompetent to prove the
purpose for which they are offered.
H. Board of Medicine: admitted the evidence of Editha Sioson. It concluded that it should
first admit the evidence being offered so that it can determine its probative value when
it decides the case.
ISSUES: WON the evidence was admissible.
RULING: Yes, the evidence was admissible.

● It is well-settled that the rules of evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings before
administrative bodies such as the Board of Medicine.
Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the rules of evidence,
is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting
them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection places
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them beyond the consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant or competent; on
the other hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be
remedied by completely discarding them or ignoring them.
From the foregoing, the Court emphasized the distinction between the admissibility of
evidence and the probative weight to be accorded the same pieces of evidence. Admissibility of
evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to be
considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the question of
whether or not it proves an issue.
● Moreover, petitioner mistakenly relies on Section 20, Article I of the Professional
Regulation Commission Rules of Procedure, which reads:
Section 20. Administrative investigation shall be conducted in accordance

with these Rules. The Rules of Court shall only apply in these proceedings by
analogy or on a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.
Technical errors in the admission of evidence which do not prejudice the
substantive rights of either party shall not vitiate the proceedings.
The admission of the exhibits did not prejudice the substantive rights of petitioner because,
at any rate, the fact sought to be proved thereby, that the two kidneys of Editha were in their
proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated on, is presumed under Section 3, Rule
131 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. – The following presumptions are
satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other
evidence:...That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature
and the ordinary habits of life.
The fact sought to be established by the admission of Editha’s exhibits, that her "kidneys
were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time" of her operation, need not be proved
as it is covered by mandatory judicial notice. Laws of nature involving the physical sciences,
specifically biology, include the structural make-up and composition of living things such as
human beings. In this case, we may take judicial notice that Editha’s kidneys before, and at the
time of, her operation, as with most human beings, were in their proper anatomical locations.
(Other matters: Best evidence rule is inapplicable; exhibits are not hearsay, the anatomical
position may be established through other means such as ultrasound or x-ray)
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2. Dr. Dela Llana v. Rebecca Biong, GR 182356, 04 Dec 2013 (ALICANTE)
KEYWORD: WHIPLASH INJURY
DOCTRINE: In questions of fact, the court can only draw conclusion from the facts or evidence
adduced. When the facts are lacking because of the deficiency of presented evidence, then the
court can only draw one conclusion: that the cause must fail for lack of evidentiary support.
FACTS:
Around 11:00 PM, Juan dela Llana was driving a 1997 Toyota Corolla car along North Avenue,
Quezon City. His sister, Dra. dela Llana, was seated at the front passenger seat while a certain
Calimlim was at the backseat. Juan stopped the car when the signal light turned red. A few
seconds after, a dump truck containing gravel and sand suddenly rammed the car’s rear end,
violently pushing the car forward. The car’s rear end collapsed and its rear windshield was
shattered. Dra. dela Llana was punctured by glass splinters but did not appear to have suffered
from any other visible physical injuries.
According to the traffic investigation report, Joel Primero, the truck driver, was recklessly
imprudent in driving the truck. His employer, Rebecca Biong, doing business under the name and
style of "Pongkay Trading" was engaged in a gravel and sand business.
Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild to moderate pain on the left side of her neck and shoulder. It
became more severe and her health deteriorated to the extent that she could no longer move her
left arm. She consulted with Dr. Rosalinda Milla, a rehabilitation medicine specialist and was told
that she suffered from a whiplash injury, an injury caused by the compression of the nerve running
to her left arm and hand. She underwent extensive physical therapy for 3 months but her condition
did not improve. She underwent cervical spine surgery to release the compression of her nerve.
The operation released the impingement of the nerve but incapacitated Dra. dela Llana from the
practice of her profession despite the surgery.
Dra. dela Llana demanded from Rebecca compensation for her injuries, but Rebecca refused to
pay. Thus, she sued Rebecca for damages before the RTC of Quezon City. At the trial, Dra. dela
Llana presented herself as an ordinary witness and Joel as a hostile witness. To prove her claim,
she identified and authenticated a medical certificate issued by Dr. Milla stating that she suffered
from a whiplash injury. Joel testified that his truck hit the car because the truck’s brakes got stuck.
In defense, Rebecca maintained that Dra. dela Llana had no cause of action as no reasonable
relation existed between the vehicular accident and Dra. dela Llana’s injury. Dra. dela Llana’s
illness became manifest 1 month and 1 week from the date of the vehicular accident. She testified
that Dra. dela Llana was physically fit and strong when they met several days after the vehicular
accident. She observed the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of Joel. She required Joel to submit a certification of good moral character as well as barangay,
police, and NBI clearances prior to his employment. Joel successfully passed the driving skills
test conducted by Alberto Marcelo, a licensed driver-mechanic. Alberto also took the witness
stand. He testified that he checked the truck in the morning and it was in good condition prior to
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the vehicular accident. He opined that the cause of the vehicular accident was a damaged
compressor, the absence of air inside the tank damaged the compressor.
RTC Ruling
The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana and held that the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llana’s
whiplash injury to be Joel’s reckless driving. It pointed out that the massive damage the car
suffered only meant that the truck was over-speeding. It also concluded that Joel was probably
sleeping when the collision occurred as Joel had been driving for 15 hours on that fateful day.
Rebecca did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in Joel's selection and
supervision of Joel.
CA Ruling
CA reversed the RTC ruling. It held that Dra. dela Llana failed to establish a reasonable
connection between the vehicular accident and her whiplash injury by preponderance of evidence.
It cited Nutrimix Feeds Corp. v. CA, it declared that courts will not hesitate to rule in favor of the
other party if there is no evidence or the evidence is too slight to warrant an inference establishing
the fact in issue.
ISSUE:
WON it was established by preponderance of evidence that Joel’s reckless driving is the
proximate cause of Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury.
RULING:
No. The issue presented is a question of fact and the Court is not a trier of facts but SC may
review questions of fact when the findings of fact by the lower courts are conflicting
Dra. dela Llana failed to establish her case by preponderance of evidence. Article 2176 of the
Civil Code provides that "whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is a quasi-delict." The elements to establish a
quasi-delict case are:
(1) damages to the plaintiff;
(2) negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant or by some person for whose acts the
defendant must respond, was guilty; and
(3) the connection of cause and effect between such negligence and the damages.
Dra. dela Llana must first establish by preponderance of evidence the 3 elements of quasi-delict
before we determine Rebecca’s liability as Joel’s employer. It is essentially the wrongful or
negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris in extra-contractual obligations.
In civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving his allegation by preponderance
of evidence or greater weight of credible evidence.
In the present case, Dra. dela Llana anchors her claim mainly on three pieces of evidence:
(1) the pictures of her damaged car,
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(2) the medical certificate dated November 20, 2000, and
(3) her testimonial evidence.
However, none of these pieces of evidence show the causal relation between the vehicular
accident and the whiplash injury. In other words, Dra. dela Llana, during trial, did not adduce the
factum probans or the evidentiary facts by which the factum probandum or the ultimate fact can
be established.
A. The pictures of the damaged car only demonstrate the impact of the collision but it is a
far-fetched assumption that the whiplash injury can also be inferred from these pictures.
B. The medical certificate cannot be considered because it was not admitted in evidence
by the RTC. It is a basic rule that evidence which has not been admitted cannot be validly
considered by the courts in arriving at their judgments. However, even if we consider the medical
certificate in the disposition of this case, it has no probative value for being hearsay. Evidence,
whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal
knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of another person who is not on the witness stand.
Admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of
evidence depends on its relevance and competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to
evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade. Thus, a particular item of
evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the
guidelines provided by the Rules of Court.
Here, it was Dr. Milla who had personal knowledge of the contents of the medical certificate.
However, she was not presented to testify in court and was not even able to identify and affirm
the contents of the medical certificate. Furthermore, Rebecca was deprived of the opportunity to
cross-examine Dr. Milla on the accuracy and veracity of her findings. The medical certificate did
not explain the chain of causation in fact between Joel’s reckless driving and Dra. dela Llana’s
whiplash injury. It did not categorically state that the whiplash injury was a result of the vehicular
accident. The medical certificate only chronicled her medical history and physical examinations.
C. Dra. dela Llana’s opinion that Joel’s negligence caused her whiplash injury has no
probative value. Dra. dela Llana was the lone physician-witness during trial. She merely testified
as an ordinary witness and claimed in her testimony that Joel’s reckless driving caused her
whiplash injury. Despite the fact that Dra. dela Llana is a physician and even assuming that she
is an expert in neurology, we cannot give weight to her opinion that Joel’s reckless driving caused
her whiplash injury without violating the rules on evidence. Under the Rules of Court, there is a
substantial difference between an ordinary witness and an expert witness. The opinion of an
ordinary witness may be received in evidence regarding:
(a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
(b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and
(c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted. Furthermore, the
witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or
appearance of a person.
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On the other hand, the opinion of an expert witness may be received in evidence on a matter
requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he shown to possess. The
probative value of an expert testimony lies in the assistance that the expert witness may afford
the courts by demonstrating the facts which serve as a basis for his opinion and the reasons on
which the logic of his conclusions is founded.
Here, Dra. dela Llana’s medical opinion cannot be given probative value for the reason that she
was not presented as an expert witness. As an ordinary witness, she was not competent to testify
on the nature, and the cause and effects of whiplash injury.
The Supreme Court cannot take judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries.
Dra. Dela Llana did not present any testimonial or documentary evidence that directly shows the
causal relation between the vehicular accident and Dra. Dela Llana’s injury. She failed to establish
her cause by preponderance of evidence.
WHEREFORE, decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED and the petition is DENIED
for lack of merit.
3. State of Missouri v. William Arthur Ball 339 S.W. 2d 783 Mo. 1960, 14 Nov 1960
(BALIONG)
KEYWORD: robbery, possession of money, admissibility of evidence
DOCTRINE: MERE POSSESSION OF A QUANTITY OF MONEY IS IN ITSELF NO

INDICATION THAT THE POSSESSOR WAS THE TAKER OF MONEY CHARGED AS
TAKEN, BECAUSE IN GENERAL ALL MONEY OF THE SAME DENOMINATION AND
MATERIAL IS ALIKE
FACTS:
1) On the afternoon of 15 October 1958, two colored men, one short, the other tall,
entered Krekeler Jewelry Store.
2) The taller man spent ten or fifteen minutes selecting and buying a cigarette lighter,
he also talked about buying and looked at watches and rings.
3) Meanwhile, the shorter man looked in the cases and moved about the store.
4) Later in the day, as the owner, John Krekeler was placing rings and watches in the
safe preparatory to closing the store two men entered, one of them tall and the other
short, and Krekeler immediately recognized them as the two men who had been in the
store at 2:30
5) The shorter man started to walk behind the counter and as Krekeler intercepted
him he "drew a long barreled blue .38 and stuck it in my fact."
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6) Both men followed Krekeler, the shorter man with the gun in "his back," directing
him to the watch repair department and finally into the rest room in the rear of the store.
He was told not to turn around and stood facing the wall.
· He could hear jewelry being dumped into a bag and the "jingle" of the
cash register.
7) The two men left Krekeler in the rest room and after hearing the door slam he
called the police.
8) The two men had taken watches and rings of the stipulated value of $4,455.21 and
$140 in cash from the register.
9) Krekler identified Ball from pictures as the taller of the two men.
10) Three weeks after the robbery, police officers in a squad car saw Ball walking on
Easton Avenue.
· The officers stopped him, told him that they were officers and that he
was under arrest.
· As officer Powell faced and searched Ball officer Ballard "holstered" his
gun and attempted "to cuff" him.
· Ball shoved Powell over and ran down Easton Avenue, the officers ran
after him.
· Powell yelled, "halt Ball, you're under arrest," and fired one shot high in
the air but Ball continued running and Powell fired four more shots, two at
his legs, one at his buttocks, and he finally fell from a bullet in his back.
11) When Ball was subdued, the officers took from his person: A brown felt hat, "a
brownish" windbreaker type jacket, trousers, gray shirt and shoes - these were exhibits
one and two
· In identifying Ball, Krekeler was impressed with and remembered the

brown ensemble, particularly the "tall brown hat."
12) Ball’s Defense:
· there was no direct evidence of an injury or any evidence to show that

Krekeler was put "in fear of some immediate injury to his person” which is
one of the essential elements or robbery in the first degree
· His fleeing and eluding of the police officers was not material or relevant
because it was too remote from the date of the robbery to indicate a
consciousness of guilt
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· Objects to the fact that a police officer was permitted to testify that
$258.02 in currency and two pennies were taken from his person.
o It is said that the introduction of these exhibits was "immaterial and

irrelevant, neither tended to prove nor disprove any of the issues
involved in this case;
o that said money as seized at the time of the arrest was neither
identified by Mr. Krekeler nor by any other person as the money
which was allegedly stolen from the A. L. Krekeler & Sons Jewelry
Company
ISSUES: Is the mere possession of money, an indication that the possessor was the
taker of the money charged as taken?
RULING: NO!
MERE POSSESSION OF A QUANTITY OF MONEY IS IN ITSELF NO INDICATION

THAT THE POSSESSOR WAS THE TAKER OF MONEY CHARGED AS TAKEN,
BECAUSE IN GENERAL ALL MONEY OF THE SAME DENOMINATION AND
MATERIAL IS ALIKE
· The testimony of the $258.02 was not offered in proof of the substantive fact of the
crime.
· The proof of the money here was evidently on the theory that Ball did not have or was
not likely to have such a sum of money on his person prior to the commission of the
offense.
· he had been out of the penitentiary about eight months and the inference the state
would draw is that he had no visible means of support and no employment and could not
possible have $258.02 except from robberies.
· nineteen days had elapsed, there was no proof that Ball had suddenly come into
possession of the $258.02
· in general all money of the same denomination and material is alike, and the
hypothesis that the money found is the same as the money taken is too forced and
extraordinary to be receivable."
· In the absence of proof or of a fair inference from the record that the money in Ball's
possession at the time of his arrest came from or had some connection with the robbery
and in the absence of a plain showing of his impecuniousness before the robbery and his
sudden affluence, the evidence was not in fact relevant and in the circumstances was
obviously prejudicial for if it did not tend to prove the offense for which the appellant was
on trial the jury may have inferred that he was guilty of another robbery.
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OTHER RULES OF EVIDENCE DISCUSSED:
· ELEMENT OF FEAR IS A REASONABLE INFERENCE FROM EVIDENCE
○ the facts and circumstances support and warrant the finding of robbery in
the first degree
· REMOTENESS OF THE FLIGHT GOES TO THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE

RATHER THAN ITS ADMISSIBILITY
○ unexplained flight and resisting arrest even thirty days after the supposed
commission of a crime is a relevant circumstance
Admission of the evidence in the circumstances infringed the right to a fair trial and for
that reason, judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
4. Lopez v. Heesen, 69 NM 206, 365 P. 2d 448 NM 1961, 22 Aug 1961(BERINGUEL)
KEYWORD: HIGGINS MODEL 51 HUNTING RIFLE, SAFE OR NOT
DOCTRINE: Any evidence which throws light on the question in issue should be admitted,
leaving it to the trial court to hold the hearing within reasonable bounds.
FACTS: Facts:
● Sears Roebuck was engaged in designing, manufacturing and selling of hunting fire
arms. Sears sold the Higgins Model 51 Hunting Rifle in 1958. The thing about his model
is its design has a defect. This model is deemed negligently designed. In fact, its safety
device was considered unsafe and dangerous among gun enthusiasts.
● The case started when appellant Jesse Lopez filed a suit against appellee Robert
Heesen alleging that one fateful day of October of 1958, Heesen assaulted and shot
appellant Lopez with a shotgun thereby inflicting dangerous and painful wounds and
injuries to appellant all to his damage in the total sum of $80.000.
● Heesen denied the allegation of the complaint and demanded for a jury trial. And in this
trial the gun company Sears Roebuck who sold the defected gun to Heesen was joined
as party-defendant.The amended complaint alleged that on October 14, 1958 Sears sold
to Heesen one of said Higgins Model 51 Hunting Rifles, the one that was negligently
designed or manufactured by Sears, and that appellee Sears negligently failed to warn
appellee Heesen of the dangerous and defective condition of the rifle.
● The appellant introduced evidence tending to prove that the safety device on the Higgins
Model 51 rifle is easy to knock off safety, making the rifle dangerous. Frank Doyle, his
witness, said that the safety device, without telescopic sight, is not a safe piece, in that
the projection is too long and it is too prone to be knocked from “safe” to “fire” position.
● The witness of the appellee, La Violette, on the other hand, testified that safety device
on the Higgins Model 51 is supplied to High Standard Manufacturing Company by
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Fabrique Nationale of Belgium. He also testified extensively as to the advantages of the
safety device of the Higgins Model 51 rifle. The witness, Thomas Raymond Robison, Jr.,
testified that the Higgins Model 51 is good and practical in the filed for a prudent hunter
and is suitable for hunting. Ira L. Kessler, an expert witness called by defendant testified
that the Marlin Firearms Company has a fair reputation, and that the Colt Firearms
Company has an excellent reputation.
● Now, the appellant contends that: 1) the trial court committed error in permitting
testimony as to the general reputation of other firearms companies who use the same
modified leaf safety device as the Higgins Model 51 in which the witness for appellee,
Paul A. La Violette, Jr., that such companies had an excellent reputation in the small
arms field. Objection was made to this testimony on the ground that it was wholly
immaterial and irrelevant to any issue in the case; 2) trial court erred in permitting
evidence to be introduced as to the poundage pressure required to move the safety
levers of various rifles from “safe” to “fire” position.
ISSUES: Whether or not the testimonies of other firearms companies who use the same device
are admissible as evidence in court.
RULING:
1) Under Rule 21-1-1(43) (a) the rule which favors the reception of the evidence governs, the
basis being that any evidence which throws light on the question in issue should be admitted,
leaving it to the trial court to hold the hearing within reasonable bounds. We hold that the
testimony as to the reputation of Fabrique Nationale, who manufacture the safety device on the
Higgins Model 51 and the reputation of Marlin Firearms Company, Weatherby Corporation, Colt
Firearms Company and Jefferson Corporation, who manufacture rifles which have the same
modified leaf safety device as the Higgins Model 51, was relevant to the issue whether the
safety device on the Higgins Model 51 was unsafe or safe, and that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in admitting this testimony.
2) Under this circumstances, it was proper for the appellee to show that poundage pressure
required to move the safety lever on Higgins Model 51 from “safe” to “fire” measured two-and-
one-half pounds, and also to show the poundage pressure required in rifles with identical safety
devices because the Doyle’s testimony was introduced under appellant’s contention that the
Higgins Model 51 rifle was unsafe and thus the issue arose as to the pressure required to move
the safety lever from “safe” to “fire” position.
The thing about opinion evidence is its admissibility in court depends on the facts of the
case at hand. In other words, there is no clear cut basis that expert opinions adduced as
evidence in ultimate issues of facts can outright determine the outcome of the case. In fact it
does not attempt or have the power to usurp the functions of such in this case, the jury.
As stated in the case, the jury may still reject these expert opinions and accept some
other view. Its admissibility all depends on the jury’s assessment on how expert the expert
opinion is. Besides, opinion evidence offered by both parties in this case was not binding upon
the jury and they were so instructed.The opinion evidence in this case were admitted on the
basis that it aided the jury to understand the problem and led them to the truth on the ultimate
facts.
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5. People v. Marti 193 SCRA 57 (CAIMBRE)
Exclusionary Rules under the 1987 Constitution – Sections 2 and 3, Art. III
GIFT PACKAGES FOR ZURICH FRIEND
DOCTRINE: An act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's

constitutional rights, cannot be invoked against the State. Hence, in the absence of
governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked
against the State.
FACTS:
● On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., Andre Marti and his common-
law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export
Forwarders" in Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift wrapped packages.
● Anita Reyes, the proprietress, attended to them. Anita asked if she could examine
and inspect the packages but Marti refused, assuring her that the packages simply
contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich,
Switzerland. Hence, Anita no longer insisted on inspecting the packages.
● Before delivery of the box to the Bureau of Customs, Mr. Job Reyes, (proprietor
and husband of Anita), opened the boxes for final inspection as per SOP. When
he opened Marti's box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. Mr. Reyes took several
grams of the contents (dried leaves) thereof and informed the NBI of the shipment.
● 3 NBI agents and a photographer went to the Reyes' office and in their presence,
Mr. Reyes brought out and opened the box. Dried marijuana leaves were found
which turned out to be marijuana flowering tops as certified by the forensic chemist.
● An Information was filed against Marti for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act. RTC convicted him of violation of Section 21 (b),
Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1 of
Republic Act 6425.
ISSUE 1: WON the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in
violation of the constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy
of communication and therefore inadmissible in evidence
HELD: NO.
● In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule. However,
in all those cases adverted to, the evidence so obtained were invariably procured
by the State acting through the medium of its law enforcers or other authorized
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government agencies. An act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of
appellant's constitutional rights, cannot be invoked against the State. The
constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a
restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law. Hence, in the absence of governmental interference, the
liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
● The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government
without the latter transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable search and
seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted
against him in the prosecution of the offense charged.
● First, it was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made
search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard
operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes. Second, the mere presence of the
NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a
warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Where the
contraband articles are identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting
officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution.
● If the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private

establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without
the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and
seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law
enforcers, is involved.
ISSUE 2: WON the lower court erred in convicting him despite the undisputed fact that
his rights under the constitution while under custodial investigation were not observed
HELD: NO.
● The law enforcers testified that accused/appellant was informed of his

constitutional rights. It is presumed that they have regularly performed their duties
(See. 5(m), Rule 131) and their testimonies should be given full faith and credence,
there being no evidence to the contrary. What is clear from the records, on the
other hand, is that appellant refused to give any written statement while under
investigation.
6. Waterous Drug Corp v. NLRC, 280 SCRA 735 (DULANAS)
KEYWORDS: PHARMACIST/ OVERPRICED
DOCTRINES:
Hearsay evidence carries no probative value.
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A private entity opening an envelope addressed to another person does not constitute a
constitutional violation of unreasonable search and seizure. Thus, any evidence obtained can be
admissible.
FACTS:
Respondent Antonia Catolico was a pharmacist of petitioner, Waterous Drug Corp.
An irregularity was reported (by petitioner’s control clerk) in a transaction involving Catolico and
Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals (YSP). In one purchase order, a purchase of 10 bottles of Voren
tablets was made at 384 pesos per unit while previous purchase orders show that the price for
each tablet was at 320 pesos, showing a difference of 64 pesos per bottle. Thus, each tablet
purchased by petitioner was overpriced. It was also found that a check was given by YSP to the
name of Catolico, representing the amount of 640 pesos. Petitioner argues that this amount
represents the “overprice refund” which Catolico allegedly pocketed.
Petitioner issued a memorandum asking Catolico to explain within twenty-four hours, which was
later extended for a further 48 hours. She was also placed in preventive suspension. Catolico
replied through a letter, explaining that the check was a “christmas gift” and not an “overprice
refund.”
Less than a month after her letter, Petitioner issued a memorandum terminating Catolico so she
filed before the Office of the Labor Arbiter a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal
and illegal suspension.
Labor Arbiter: Decided in favor of Catolico because:

1) Petitioner failed to prove dishonesty
2) Petitioner failed to show that there was any investigation conducted and
3) Dismissal was without just cause and due process.
NLRC: Affirmed Labor Arbiter on the ground that petitioners were not able to prove a just cause
for Catolico's dismissal from her employment. It found that petitioner's evidence consisted only of
the check of P640.00 drawn by YSP in favor of complainant, which her co-employee saw when
the latter opened the envelope. But, it DECLARED THE CHECK WAS INADMISSIBLE in
evidence pursuant to Sections 2 and 3(1 and 2) of Article III of the Constitution.
*In re: allegation of Constitutional violation, the OSG submitted an argument that no violation of
the right of privacy of communication in this case. According to OSG, petitioner WATEROUS was
justified in opening an envelope from one of its regular suppliers as it could assume that the letter
was a business communication in which it had an interest.
ISSUES:
MAIN ISSUE
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Whether or not NLRC committed an error in applying Section 3, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
OTHERS
Whether or not due process was duly accorded to Catolico
Whether or not Catolico was unjustly dismissed
RULING: PETITION FALLS. NLRC DECISION AFFIRMED EXCEPT AS TO ITS REASON THAT
EVIDENCE (CHECK) IS INADMISSIBLE FOR HAVING BEEN OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF
HER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES.
1. As regards the constitutional violation upon which the NLRC anchored its decision, we
find no reason to revise the doctrine laid down in People vs. Marti that the Bill of Rights
does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private
individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse
against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion
gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities.
2. Catolico was denied due process.

Procedural due process requires that an employee be apprised of the charge against
him, given reasonable time to answer the charge, allowed ample opportunity to be
heard and defend himself, and assisted by a representative if the employee so
desires.Ample opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that management must
accord the employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense, including legal
representation.
In the case at bar, although Catolico was given an opportunity to explain her side, she was
dismissed from the service in the memorandum of 5 March 1990 issued by her Supervisor
after receipt of her letter and that of her counsel. No hearing was ever conducted after
the issues were joined through said letters. The Supervisor's memorandum spoke of
"evidences [sic] in [WATEROUS] possession," which were not, however, submitted. What
the "evidences" [sic] other than the sales invoice and the check were, only the Supervisor
knew.
3. Catolico was unjustly dismissed.

The burden is on the employer to prove just and valid cause for dismissing an employee,
and its failure to discharge that burden would result in a finding that the dismissal is
unjustified.
It is evident from the Supervisor's memorandum that Catolico was dismissed because of
an alleged anomalous transaction with YSP. Unfortunately for petitioners, their evidence
does not establish that there was an overcharge.
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Their evidence was an affidavit executed by petitioner’s control clerk who stated that he
verified with the Accounting Department of YPS Philippines through Miss Estelita Reyes
and learned from her that there really was an overprice and the difference was refunded
through a check whose payee is Catolico.
This evidence is merely hearsay. Estelita Reyes never testified nor executed an affidavit
relative to this case; thus, we have to reject the statements attributed to her by Valdez.
Hearsay evidence carries no probative value.
Besides, it was never shown that petitioners paid for the Voren tablets. While Valdez
informed Co, through the former's memorandum of 29 January 1990, that WATEROUS
paid YSP P3,840.00 "thru MBTC Check No. 222832," the said check was never presented
in evidence, nor was any receipt from YSP offered by petitioners.
Moreover, the two purchase orders for Voren tablets presented by petitioners do not
indicate an overcharge. The purchase order dated 16 August 198929 stated that the
Voren tablets cost P320.00 per box, while the purchase order dated 5 October 198930
priced the Voren tablets at P384.00 per bottle. The difference in price may then be
attributed to the different packaging used in each purchase order.
Assuming that there was an overcharge, the two purchase orders for the Voren tablets
were recommended by Director-MMG Mario R. Panuncio, verified by AVP-MNG Noli M.
Lopez and approved by Vice President-General Manager Emma R. Co. The purchase
orders were silent as to Catolico's participation in the purchase. If the price increase
was objectionable to petitioners, they or their officers should have disapproved the
transaction. Consequently, petitioners had no one to blame for their predicament but
themselves. This set of facts emphasizes the exceedingly incredible situation proposed
by petitioners. Despite the memorandum warning Catolico not to negotiate with
suppliers of medicine, there was no proof that she ever transacted, or that she had
the opportunity to transact, with the said suppliers. Again, as the purchase orders
indicate, Catolico was not at all involved in the sale of the Voren tablets. There was no
occasion for Catolico to initiate, much less benefit from, what Valdez called an "under the
table deal" with YSP.
Catolico's dismissal then was obviously grounded on mere suspicion, which in no

case can justify an employee's dismissal. Suspicion is not among the valid causes
provided by the Labor Code for the termination of employment.
7. People v. Eric Guillermo GR 147786 20 Jan 2004 (ESTRELLA)
Topic: Admissibility of confession in violation of Miranda principles.

KEYWORDS: Head inside a cement bag
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“Constitutional safeguards on custodial investigation (known, also as the Miranda
principles) do not apply to spontaneous statements, or those not elicited through
questioning by law enforcement authorities but given in an ordinary manner.”
FACTS:
● Guillermo was charged by the State Prosecutor of Murdering his employer. That
armed with piece of wood and a saw, Guillermo attacked, assaulted and hit with a
piece of wood and thereafter, cut into pieces using said saw his employer, Victor
Keyser, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal injuries which directly caused his
death. The victim, Victor Francisco Keyser, was the owner and manager of Keyser
Plastic Manufacturing Corp. Keyser Plastics shared its building with Greatmore
Corporation, a manufacturer of faucets. Separating the respective spaces being
utilized by the two firms in their operations was a wall, the lower portion of which
was made of concrete hollow blocks, while the upper portion was of lawanit boards.
The part of the wall made of lawanit
had two large holes, which could allow a person on one side of the wall to see what
was on the other side.
● A security guard, Campos, assigned to Greatmore was on duty. At around 8:00 a.m.,
he saw Guillermo enter the premises of Keyser Plastics. An hour later, he saw
Victor F. Keyser arrive. Campos was making some entries in his logbook, when he
heard some loud noises coming from the Keyser Plastics area. He stopped to listen,
but thinking that the noise was coming from the machines used to make plastics,
he did not pay much attention to the sound
● At around noontime, Campos was suddenly interrupted in his duties when he saw
Guillermo look through one of the holes in the dividing wall. Guillermo calmly told
him that he had killed Victor Keyser and needed Campos’ assistance to help him
carry the corpse to the garbage dump where he could burn it. Shocked by this
revelation, Campos immediately telephoned the police. The police told him to
immediately secure the premises and not let the suspect escape.
● The law enforcers tried to enter the premises of Keyser Plastics, but found the gates
securely locked. The officers then talked to Guillermo and after some minutes,
persuaded him to give them the keys. The police asked him where the body of the
victim was and Guillermo pointed to some cardboard boxes. On opening the boxes,
the police found the dismembered limbs and chopped torso of Victor F. Keyser. The
victim’s head was found stuffed inside a cement bag. The police asked how he did
it, according to the prosecution
witness, Guillermo said that he bashed the victim on the head with a piece of wood,
and after Keyser fell, he dismembered the body with a carpenter’s saw. He then
mopped up the blood on the floor with a plastic foam. Guillermo then turned over to
the police a bloodstained, two-foot long piece of coconut lumber and a carpenter’s
saw. Photographs were taken of the suspect, the dismembered corpse, and the
16
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implements used in committing the crime. When asked as to his motive for the killing,
Guillermo replied that Keyser had been maltreating him and his coemployees. He
expressed no regret whatsoever about his actions.
● Police then brought Guillermo to the Antipolo PNP Station for further investigation.
SPO1 Carlos conducted the investigation, without apprising the appellant about his
constitutional rights and without providing him with the services of counsel.
● The Antipolo police then turned over the bloodstained piece of wood and saw, a
medico-legal officer of the NBI, autopsied Keyser’s remains. He found that the
cadaver had been cut into seven (7) pieces. He further declared that it was possible
that the victim was dead when sawn into pieces, due to cyanosis or the presence
of stagnant blood in the body,25 but on cross-examination, he admitted that he
could not discount the possibility that the victim might still have been alive when
mutilated. The piece of coco lumber as well as the saw recovered from the crime
scene to a bio-chemical examination to determine if the bloodstains were of human
origin. Both tested positive for the presence of human blood. However, she could
not determine if the blood was of the same type as that of the victim owing to the
insufficient amount of bloodstains.
● Guillermo, who was then in police custody, was interviewed by the media (Kara
David- GMA & GUS ABELGAS- ABSCBN) on separate occasions wherein he
admitted that he committed the crime and disclosed details on it, he never gave it
second thought. When asked why he killed his employer, Guillermo stated that
Keyser had not paid him for years, did not feed him properly, and treated him "like
an animal”.
● Guillermo’s defense consisted of outright denial. He alleged he was a victim of
police "frame-up." He said he was then brought to the police station where he
was advised to admit having killed his employer since there was no other person
to be blamed. When he was made to face the media reporters, he said the police
instructed him what to say. He claimed that he could no longer recall what he told
the reporters.
● He contends that his conviction was based on inadmissible evidence. He points
out that there is no clear showing that he was informed of his constitutional rights
nor was he made to understand the same by the police investigators. In fact, he
says, he was only made to read said rights in printed form posed on the wall at the
police precinct. He was not provided with the services of counsel during the
custodial investigation, as admitted by SPO1 Reyes. In view of no showing on
record that he had waived his constitutional rights, he argues that any evidence
gathered from him, including his alleged confession, must be deemed
inadmissible.
● ((For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the
evidence clearly shows that the appellant admitted committing the crime in
several instances, not just during the custodial investigation. First, he admitted
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having killed his employer to the security guard, Campos, and even sought
Campos’ help in disposing of Keyser’s body. This admission may be treated as
part of the res gestae.))
ISSUE: WON Guillermo’s confession during the police investigation is inadmissible
RULING:
Not admissible.
Guillermo’s alleged confession at the police station lacks the safeguards required by the
Bill of Rights. The investigating officer made no serious effort to make him aware of his
basic rights under custodial investigation. While the investigating officer was aware of his
right to be represented by counsel, the officer exerted no effort to provide him with one on
the flimsy excuse that it was a Sunday. Despite the absence of counsel, the officer
proceeded with said investigation.
Moreover, the record is bare of any showing that appellant had waived his constitutional
rights in writing and in the presence of counsel. As well said in People v. Dano, even if the
admission or confession of an accused is gospel truth, if it was made without the
assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion
or even if it had been voluntarily given.
The right of a person under interrogation "to be informed" implies a correlative obligation
on the part of the police investigator to explain and contemplates an effective
communication that results in an understanding of what is conveyed. Absent that
understanding, there is a denial of the right "to be informed," as it cannot be said that the
person has been truly "informed" of his rights. Ceremonial shortcuts in the communication
of abstract constitutional principles ought not be allowed for it diminishes the liberty of
the person facing custodial investigation.
Be that as it may, however, the inadmissibility of the appellant’s confession to SPO1 Reyes
at the Antipolo PNP Station as evidence does not necessarily lead to his acquittal. For
constitutional safeguards on custodial investigation (known, also as the Miranda
principles) do not apply to spontaneous statements, or those not elicited through
questioning by law enforcement authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the
appellant verbally admits to having committed the offense. The rights enumerated in the
Constitution, Article III, Section 12, are meant to preclude the slightest use of the State’s
coercive power as would lead an accused to admit something false. But it is not intended
to prevent him from freely and voluntarily admitting the truth outside the sphere of such
power. The facts in this case clearly show that appellant admitted the commission of the
crime not just to the police but also to private
individuals.
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Under the Rules of Court, a declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in
evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur:
(1) the principal act, the res gestae is a startling occurrence;
(2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and
(3) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.
All these requisites are present in the instant case.
The TV news reporters’ testimonies on record show that they were acting as media
professionals when they interviewed appellant. They were not under the direction and
control of the police. There was no coercion for appellant to face the TV cameras. The
record also shows that the
interviews took place on several occasions, not just once. Each time, the appellant did not
protest or insist on his innocence. Instead, he repeatedly admitted what he had done. He
even supplied details of Keyser’s killing.
The prosecution has amply proven Guillermo’s guilt in the killing of Victor F. Keyser. The
bare
denial raised by him in open court pales in contrast to the spontaneous and vivid out-of-
court admissions he made to security guard Campos and the two media reporters, Abelgas
and David.
8. Villaflor v. Summers GR 16444, 8 Sept 1920 (FAJARDO)
Keyword: ADULTERY; BODY EXAMINATION (Preggy or not?)
Doctrines:
1. The constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory
testimonial self-incrimination.
2. On BODILY EXHIBITION — On a proper showing and under an order of the trial
court, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible.
Facts:
Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino Souingco are charged with the crime of
adultery. The court ordered the defendant Emeteria Villaflor (petitioner herein) to
submit her body to the examination of one or two competent doctors to determine
if she was pregnant or not. The accused refused to obey the order on the ground
that such examination of her person was a violation of the constitutional provision
in contempt of court and was ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until she
should permit the medical examination required by the court.
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Counsel for petitioner argues that such bodily exhibition is an infringement
of the constitutional provision; the representative of the city fiscal contends that it
is not an infringement of the constitutional provision.
The trial judge in the instant case has held with the fiscal; while it is brought to our
notice that a judge of the same court has held on an identical question as
contended for by the attorney for the accused and petitioner.
Issue:
WON the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be examined by
physicians to determine if she is pregnant, violates that portion of the Philippine
Bill of Rights that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself.
Ruling:
NO.
The constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against
compulsory testimonial self- incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is
that, on a proper showing and under an order of the trial court, an ocular inspection
of the body of the accused is permissible. The proviso is that torture or force shall
be avoided.
"The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness
against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may
be material." (Mr. Justice Holmes)
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, in two decisions, has seemed
to limit the protection to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-
incrimination. The constitutional limitation was said to be "simply a
prohibition against legal process to extract from the defendant's own lips,
against his will, an admission of his guilt."
9. Pascual v. Medical Board of Examiners GR L-25018, 26 May 1969 (FERNANDEZ)
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Keyword: Medical Malpractice
Doctrine: ”the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory
questions, but, also, to take the witness stand.”
Facts: Petitioner Arsenio Pascual, Jr. filed an action for prohibition against the Board of Medical
Examiners. It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case for alleged
immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he would present as his first witness the
petitioner. Thereupon, petitioner, through counsel, made of record his objection, relying on the
constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. Petitioner then alleged
that to compel him to take the witness stand, the Board of Examiners was guilty, at the very
least, of grave abuse of discretion for failure to respect the constitutional right against self-
incrimination. The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could
call petitioner to the witness stand and interrogate him, the right against self-incrimination being
available only when a question calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a witness. They
likewise alleged that the right against self-incrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative
hearing. Petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be compelled
to be the first witness of the complainants, he being the party proceeded against in an
administrative charge for malpractice. Hence, this appeal by respondent Board.
Issue: Whether or Not compelling petitioner to be the first witness of the complainants violates
the Self-Incrimination Clause.
Held: The Supreme Court held that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner
for alleged malpractice, respondentBoard of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the
self-incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand
without his consent. The Court found for the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled
principle that "the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory
questions, but, also, to take the witness stand." If petitioner would be compelled to testify
against himself, he could suffer not the forfeiture of property but the revocation of his license as
a medical practitioner. The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence: "The
accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of
his guilt." It is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses
to take the witness stand — with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will."
10. Cabal v. Kapunan GR L-19052 29 Dec 1962 (GORGONIO J)
Keywords: Forfeiture proceedings, penalty, criminal in nature; graft, corrupt practices
Doctrine: Forfeiture proceedings that partake of the nature of a penalty are deemed criminal,
hence, the exemption of defendants in criminal cases from the obligation to be witness against
themselves is applicable.
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Facts:
This is an original petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, to restrain the
Hon. Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, from further
proceeding in Criminal Case No. 60111 of said court, and to set aside an order of said respondent,
as well as the whole proceedings in said criminal case.
Col. Jose C. Maristela of the Philippine Army filed with the Secretary of Nation Defense a letter-
complaint charging petitioner Manuel Cabal, then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, with "graft, corrupt practices, unexplained wealth, conduct unbecoming of an officer
and gentleman dictatorial tendencies, giving false statements of his assets and liabilities in 1958
and other equally reprehensible acts". The following month, the President of the Philippines
created a committee of five (5) members to investigate the charge of unexplained wealth
contained in said letter-complaint and submit its report and recommendations as soon as
possible. During trial, petitioner (Cabal) refused to take the witness stand invoking his right against
self-incrimination. Hence, a charge for contempt was issued.
Petitioner (Cabal) then filed with respondent Judge a motion to quash the charge and/or order to
show cause, upon the ground:
(1) that the City Fiscal has neither authority nor personality to file said charge and the same is
null and void, for, if criminal, the charge has been filed without a preliminary investigation, and,
civil, the City Fiscal may not file it, his authority in respect of civil cases being limited to
representing the City of Manila; (2) that the facts charged constitute no offense for section 580 of
the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the charge is based, violates due process, in that
it is vague and uncertain as regards the offense therein defined and the fine imposable therefor
and that it fail to specify whether said offense shall be treated also contempt of an inferior court
or of a superior court (3) that more than one offense is charged, for the contempt imputed to
petitioner is sought to be punished as contempt of an inferior court, as contempt of a superior
court and as contempt under section 7 of Rule 64 of the Rules Court; (4) that the Committee had
no power to order and require petitioner to take the witness stand and be sworn to, upon the
request of Col. Maristela, as witness for the latter, inasmuch as said order violates petitioner's
constitutional right against self-incrimination.
Motion to quash denied. Petitioner began the present action. In their answer, respondents herein
allege, inter alia, that the investigation being conducted by the Committee is administrative, not
criminal, in nature; that the legal provision relied upon by petitioner in relation to preliminary
investigations is inapplicable to contempt proceedings.
ISSUE:
WON the proceeding before the aforementioned Committee is civil or criminal in character such
that if it is criminal, then the right against self-incrimination is applicable.
HELD:
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A forfeiture proceeding is criminal in character although technically a civil proceeding; defendant
may invoke right against self-incrimination.
It is not disputed that the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory
questions, but, also, to take the witness stand. Although said Committee was created to
investigate the administrative charge of unexplained wealth, there seems to be no question that
Col. Maristela does not seek the removal of petitioner herein as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines. As a matter of fact he no longer holds such office. The purpose of the charge
against petitioner is to apply the provisions of Republic Act No. 1379, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes the forfeiture to the State of property of a public
officer or employee which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or
employee and his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property. Such
forfeiture has been held, however, to partake of the nature of a penalty. As a consequence,
proceedings for forfeiture of property are deemed criminal or penal, and, hence, the exemption of
defendants in criminal case from the obligation to be witnesses against themselves is applicable
thereto.
Generally speaking, informations for the forfeiture of goods that seek no judgment of fine or
imprisonment against any person are deemed to be civil proceedings in rem. Such proceedings
are criminal in nature to the extent that where the person using the res illegally is the owner
or rightful possessor of it, the forfeiture proceeding is in the nature of a punishment. It has
frequently been held upon constitutional grounds under the various State Constitution, that a
witness or party called as witness cannot be made to testify against himself as to matters which
would subject his property to forfeiture.
Proceedings for forfeitures are generally considered to be civil and in the nature of proceedings
in rem. In some aspects, however, suits for penalties and forfeitures are of quasi-criminal
nature and within the reason of criminal proceedings for all the purposes of that portion
of the Fifth Amendment which declares that no person shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself. The rule protecting a person from being compelled
to furnish evidence which would incriminate him exists not only when he is liable
criminally to prosecution and punishment, but also when his answer would tend to expose
him to a forfeiture.
The privilege applies where the penalty or forfeiture recoverable, or is imposed in vindication of
the public justice the state as a statutory fine or penalty, or a fine or penalty for violation of a
municipal ordinance, even though the action or proceeding for its enforcement is not brought in a
criminal court but is prosecuted through the modes of procedure applicable to ordinary civil
remedy.
Thus, in Boyd vs. U.S., it was held that the information, in a proceeding to declaration a
forfeiture of certain property because of the evasion of a certain revenue law, "though
technically a civil proceeding is in substance and effect a criminal one", and that suits for
penalties and forfeitures are within the reason criminal proceedings for the purposes of that
23
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portion the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the U.S. which declares that no person shall
be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself.
Similarly, a proceeding for the removal of an officer was held, in Thurston vs. Clark, to be in
substance criminal, for said portion of the Fifth Amendment applies "to all cases in which the
action prosecution is not to establish, recover or redress private and civil rights, but to try and
punish persons charged with the commission of public offenses" and "a criminal case is an action,
suit or cause instituted to punish an infraction of criminal laws, and, with this object in view, it
matters not in what form a statute may clothe it; it is still a criminal case ...".
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted and respondent Judge hereby enjoined permanently
from proceeding further in Criminal Case No. 60111.
11. Beltran v. Samson GR 32025, 23 Sept 1929 (GORGONIO K)
KEYWORD: Handwriting as evidence
DOCTRINE:
"The privilege not to give self-incriminating evidence, while absolute when claimed, may be
waived by any one entitled to invoke it."As in the case of United States vs. Tan Teng (23 Phil.,
145), where the defendant did not oppose the extraction from his body of the substance later
used as evidence against him.
FACTS:
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition, wherein the petitioner complains that the respondent
judge ordered him to appear before the provincial fiscal to take dictation in his own handwriting
from the latter.
The order was given upon petition of said fiscal for the purpose of comparing the petitioner's
handwriting and determining whether or not it is he who wrote certain documents supposed to
be falsified.
But the respondents contend that the petitioner is not entitled to the remedy applied for,
inasmuch as the order prayed for by the provincial fiscal and later granted by the court below,
and against which the instance action was brought, is based on the provisions of section 1687
of the Administrative Code and on the doctrine laid down in the cases of People vs. Badilla;
United States vs. Tan Teng; United States vs. Ong Siu Hong, cited by counsel for the
respondents, and in the case of Villaflor vs. Summers cited by the judge in the order in question.
The fiscal under section 1687 of the Administrative Code, and the proper judge, upon motion of
the fiscal, may compel witnesses to be present at the investigation of any crime of
24
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misdemeanor. But this power must be exercised without prejudice to the constitutional rights of
persons cited to appear.
The petitioner, in refusing to perform what the fiscal demanded, seeks refuge in the
constitutional provision contained in the Jones Law and incorporated in General Orders, No. 58
Said provision is found in paragraph 3, section 3 of the Jones Law which (in Spanish) reads: "Ni
se le obligara a declarar en contra suya en ningun proceso criminal" and has been incorporated
in our Criminal Procedure (General Orders, No. 58) in section 15 (No. 4) and section 56.
As to the extent of this privilege, it should be noted first of all, that the English text of the Jones
Law, which is the original one, reads as follows: "Nor shall he be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself."
ISSUE:
WON the constitutional provision invoked by the petitioner prohibits compulsion to execute what
is enjoined upon him by the order of the court.
RULING:
Anent to the constitutional provision (par.3 sec.3 jones law)(cited above)
As to its scope, this privilege is not limited precisely to testimony, but extends to all giving or
furnishing of evidence.
"The rights intended to be protected by the constitutional provision that no man accused of
crime shall be compelled to be a witness against himself is so sacred, and the pressure toward
their relaxation so great when the suspicion of guilt is strong and the evidence obscure, that it is
the duty of courts liberally to construe the prohibition in favor of personal rights, and to refuse to
permit any steps tending toward their invasion. Hence, there is the well-established doctrine that
the constitutional inhibition is directed not merely to giving of oral testimony, but embraces as
well the furnishing of evidence by other means than by word of mouth, the divulging, in short, of
any fact which the accused has a right to hold secret.
But however the question is whether the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for
the purpose of comparing the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain
documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and
meaning of the constitutional provision under examination.
Thus, it must be considered that it has been settled that whenever a defendant, at the trial of his
case, testifying in his own behalf, denies that a certain writing or signature is in his own hand, he
may on cross-examination be compelled to write in open court in order that the jury may be able
to compare his handwriting with the one in question. It was so held in the case of Bradford vs.
People (43 Pacific Reporter, 1013) inasmuch as the defendant, in offering himself as witness in
his own behalf, waived his personal privileges.
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Similarly, in the case of Sprouse vs. Com., where the judge asked the defendant to write his
name during the hearing, and the latter did so voluntarily.
But however the cases (Bradford and sprouse) so resolved cannot be compared to the one now
before us. We are not concerned here with a defendant, for it does not appear that any
information was filed against the petitioner for the supposed falsification, and still less is it a
question of a defendant on trial testifying and under cross-examination. This is only an
investigation prior to the information and with a view to filing it. And let it further be noted that in
the case of Sprouse vs. Com., the defendant performed the act voluntarily.
Furthermore, in the case before us, writing is something more than moving the body, or the
hand, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical and attention; and in the case at bar
writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine or not he is the
falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, we
believe the present case is similar to that of producing documents of chattels in one's
possession. And as to such production of documents or chattels, which to our mind is not so
serious as the case now before us, the same eminent Professor Wigmore, in his work cited,
says (volume 4, page 864):
". . . 2264, Production or Inspection of Documents and Chattels. — 1. It follows that the
production of documents or chattels by a person (whether ordinary witness or party-witness) in
response to a subpoena, or to a motion to order production, or to other form of process treating
him as a witness (i. e. as a person appearing before the tribunal to furnish testimony on his
moral responsibility for truth- telling), may be refused under the protection of the privilege; and
this is universally conceded."
We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one
who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of
his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself.
And we say that the present case is more serious than that of compelling the production of
documents or chattels, because here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means of
the act of writing, evidence which does not exist, and which may identify him as the falsifier.
While it cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the
petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the
circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, according to Exhibit A, it should not be
a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtain genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even
supposing it is impossible to obtain a specimen or specimens without resorting to the means
complained of herein, that is not reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the
constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of
justice, but such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d'etre of the privilege.
This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons.
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With respect to the judgments rendered by this court and cited on behalf of the respondents, it
should be remembered that in the case of People vs. Badilla, it does not appear that the
defendants and other witnesses were questioned by the fiscal against their will, and if they did
not refuse to answer, they must be understood to have waived their constitutional privilege, as
they could certainly do.
"The privilege not to give self-incriminating evidence, while absolute when claimed, may be
waived by any one entitled to invoke it."As in the case of United States vs. Tan Teng (23 Phil.,
145), where the defendant did not oppose the extraction from his body of the substance later
used as evidence against him.
And in the case of Villaflor vs. Summers (41 Phil., 62), it was plainly stated that the court
preferred to rest its decision on the reason of the case rather than on blind adherence to
tradition. The said reason of the case there consisted in that it was a case of the examination of
the body by physicians, which could be and doubtless was interpreted by this court, as being no
compulsion of the petitioner therein to furnish evidence by means of a testimonial act. In reality
she was not compelled to execute any positive act, much less a testimonial act; she was only
enjoined from something, preventing the examination; all of which is very different from what is
required of the petitioner in the present case, where it is sought to compel him to perform a
positive, testimonial act, to write and give a specimen of his handwriting for the purpose of
comparison
Wherefore, we find the present action well taken, and it is ordered that the respondents and
those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely and forever from compelling the petitioner
to take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison.
12. US v. Tan Teng GR 7081, 7 Sept 1912 (GUANZON)
KEYWORD: Gonorrhea
DOCTRINE:
The prohibition contained in Sec. 5 of the Philippine Bill that a person shall not be compelled to
witness against himself is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the
defendant’s own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt.
FACTS:
Tan Teng was accused to have committed the crime of rape against the 7-year old, Olivia
Pacomio. The latter, was living together with her sister, wherein the Chinamen gambling near
their house, had the habit of visiting the house of her sister. It was during one of those nights that
Tan raped Olivia. It was only several days after that the sister of Olivia found out the commission
of the crime when she found that Olivia was suffering from gonorrhea. A number of Chinamen
were gathered, where Olivia immediately identified Tan.
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Tan was then arrested and taken to the police station and stripped of his clothing and examined.
The policemen who examined the defendant later testified that his body bore every sign that he
was suffering from gonorrhea. The policemen took a portion of the substance emitting from his
body and turned it to the Bureau of Science. The result of the examination showed that Tan Teng
was suffering from gonorrhea.
The trial court found him guilty of the crime of rape.
Tan Teng now appeals on the contention that the result of the examination made by the Bureau
of Science is not admissible in evidence as proof of the fact that he was suffering from gonorrhea.
It is of his opinion that to admit such evidence was to compel the defendant to testify against
himself.
ISSUE: Whether the result of the scientific examination of the Bureau of Science of the substance
taken from his body at or about the time Tan Teng was arrested is admissible in evidence?
RULING:
Yes. As a general rule, a person shall not be required to give testimony against himself. However,
in the long line of jurisprudence, it was held that the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal
court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to
extort communications from, not an exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material.
The court has the right to require an exhibit of the injured parts of the body.
The prohibition contained in Sec. 5 of the Philippine Bill that a person shall not be compelled to
witness against himself is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the
defendant’s own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt. The main purpose this provision
is to prohibit compulsory oral examination of prisoners before trial, or upon trial, for the purpose
of extorting unwilling confessions or declarations implication them in the commission of a crime.
In this case, the court held that the evidence clearly showed that Tan Teng was suffering from
gonorrhea and that through his brutal conduct the said disease was communicated to Oliva.
The court opined, that in cases like the present, it is always difficult to secure positive and direct
proof, as such, these kinds of crimes are generally proved by circumstantial evidence. In cases
of rape, the court requires corroborative proof, as this crime is generally committed in secret. In
this case, proof that Oliva contracted gonorrhea from Tan Teng is not necessary to show his guilt.
The results of the examination, and the testimonies of the medical experts is only corroborative
of the truth of Oliva’s declaration.
Wherefore, Tan Teng was found guilty of the crime of abusos deshonestos (rape).
13. People v. Salanguit, GR 133254-55, 19 April 2001 (HO)
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Keyword:
Marijuana bricks wrapped in newsprint. Pwede sad CANNED GOODS. Plain View
Doctrine:
Plain View Doctrine
The incriminating nature of the item must be immediately apparent. The container must clearly
betray its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or otherwise its
contents are obvious to an observer.
Facts:
Two criminal cases were filed against Salanguit, the first for possession/use of shabu, and the
second, for possession/use of marijuana. Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied in the RTC of Cavite a warrant
to search the premises of Robert Salanguit for shabu and shabu paraphernalias. He presented
as a witness Edmund Badua, an undercover officer, who transacted with Salanguit for the
purchase of shabu. Badua saw that the shabu was taken from the cabinet inside the room of
Salanguit where the sale took place.
The application was granted and the policemen proceeded to the premises of Salanguit in Quezon
City to serve the warrant. The police operatives knocked on accused-appellant's door, but
nobody opened it. They heard people inside the house, apparently panicking. The police
operatives then forced the door open and entered the house.
They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a white crystalline
substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried
leaves which appeared to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint. A receipt of the items seized was
prepared, but the accused-appellant refused to sign it.
Salanguit claimed that he was ordered to stay in one place of the house while the policemen
conducted a search, forcibly opening cabinets and taking his bag containing money, a licensed
.45 caliber firearm, jewelry, and canned goods. Salanguit’s mother-in law, Soledad Arcano,
corroborated his testimony. Arcano testifed that the policemen ransacked their house, ate their
food, and took away canned goods and other valuables.
RTC found Salanguit guilty of the crimes.
Issues:
1. Whether the search warrant was validly issued notwithstanding the failure to provide
evidence to seize drug paraphernalia; and
2. Whether the marijuana may be included as evidence in light of the “plain view doctrine?”
HELD:
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1. YES. The Court said the warrant authorized the seizure of "undetermined quantity of
shabu and drug paraphernalia." Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the
existence of shabu.
SPO1 Badua, who acted as a poseur-buyer, did not testify in the proceedings for the
issuance of a search warrant on anything about drug paraphernalia. However,
nothwithstanding the fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for
the seizure of drug paraphernalia, it does not warrant the conclusion that the search
warrant is void. This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized
by the police. The search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug
paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of shabu as to which evidence was presented
showing probable cause as to its existence. In sum, with respect to the seizure of shabu
from Salanguit's residence, the SW was properly issued, such warrant being founded on
probable cause personally determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the
deposing witness and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to
be seized.
2. NO. There was no apparent illegality to justify their seizure because the marijuana bricks
were wrapped in newsprint. Not being in a transparent container, the contents wrapped in
newsprint could not have been readily discernible as marijuana. Nor was there mention of the
time or manner these items were discovered.
Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution to prove that the seizure of the marijuana without
a warrant was conducted in accordance with the "plain view doctrine," we hold that the
marijuana is inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant. However, the
confiscation of the drug must be upheld.
14. People v. Damaso GR 93516, 12 August 1992 (JAILANI)
KEYWORD: M-14 rifle
DOCTRINE: while the testimonies may be hearsay, the same are admissible because of the
failure of counsel for appellant to object thereto. It is true that the lack of objection to a hearsay
testimony results in its being admitted as evidence. But, one should not be misled into thinking
that since these testimonies are admitted as evidence, they now have probative value. Hearsay
evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be given credence. The lack of objection may
make any incompetent evidence admissible. But admissibility of evidence should not be
equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not has no probative
value.
FACTS: The accused-appellant, Basilio Damaso, was originally charged in an information filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866
in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion, together with
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some other persons. But such information was later amended to exclude all the accused except
Basilio Damaso.
"That on or about the 19th day of June, 1988, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, Basilio
DAMASO, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, have in his possession, custody
and control one (1) M14 Rifle with magazine and Fifty-Seven (57) live ammunition, in
furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion
Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial on the
merits ensued. The prosecution rested its case and offered its exhibits for admission. The
counsel for accused-appellant interposed his objections to the admissibility of the prosecution’s
evidence on grounds of its being hearsay, immaterial or irrelevant and illegal for lack of a search
warrant.
The antecedent facts are set forth by the Solicitor General in his Brief, as follows:
"On June 18, 1988, Lt. Candido Quijardo, a Philippine Constabulary officer connected with the
152nd PC Company at Lingayen, Pangasinan, and some companions were sent to verify the
presence of CPP/NPA members in Barangay Catacdang, Arellano-Bani, Dagupan City. In said
place, the group apprehended Gregorio Flameniano, Berlina Aritumba, Revelina Gamboa and
Deogracias Mayaoa. When interrogated, the persons apprehended revealed that there was an
underground safehouse at Gracia Village in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. After coordinating with the
Station Commander of Urdaneta, the group proceeded to the house in Gracia Village. They
found subversive documents, a radio, a 1 x 7 caliber .45 firearm and other items.
"After the raid, the group proceeded to Bonuan, Dagupan City, and put under surveillance the
rented apartment of Rosemarie Aritumba, sister of Berlina Aritumba whom they earlier arrested.
They interviewed Luzviminda Morados, a visitor of Rosemarie Aritumba. She stated that she
worked with Bernie Mendoza, herein appellant. She guided the group to the house rented by
appellant. When they reached the house, the group found that it had already been vacated by
the occupants. Since Morados was hesitant to give the new address of Bernie Mendoza, the
group looked for the Barangay Captain of the place and requested him to point out the new
house rented by appellant. The group again required Morados to go with them. When they
reached the house, the group saw Luz Tanciangco outside. They told her that they already
knew that she was a member of the NPA in the area. At first, she denied it, but when she saw
Morados she requested the group to go inside the house.
Upon entering the house, the group, as well as the Barangay Captain, saw radio sets,
pamphlets entitled ‘Ang Bayan’, xerox copiers and a computer machine. They also found
persons who were companions of Luz Tanciangco (namely, Teresita Calosa, Ricardo Calosa,
Marites Calosa, Eric Tanciangco and Luzviminda Morados). The group requested the persons
in the house to allow them to look around. When Luz Tanciangco opened one of the rooms,
they saw books used for subversive orientation, one M-14 rifle, bullets and ammunitions,
Kenwood radio, artificial beard, maps of the Philippines, Zambales, Mindoro an(d) Laguna and
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other items. They confiscated the articles and brought them to their headquarters for final
inventory. They likewise brought the persons found in the house to the headquarters for
investigation. Said persons revealed that appellant was the lessee of the house and owned the
items confiscated therefrom.
The records of this case show that the accused-appellant was singled out as the sole violator of
P.D. No. 1866, in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion.
Yet, there is no substantial and credible evidence to establish the fact that the appellant is
allegedly the same person as the lessee of the house where the M-14 rifle and other subversive
items were found or the owner of the said items. ISSUE: Whether the evidence is admissible or
not on grounds of its being hearsay, immaterial, or irrelevant and illegal for lack for a search of
warrant.
ISSUE: Whether the evidence is admissible or not on grounds of its being hearsay, immaterial,
or irrelevant and illegal for lack of a search warrant.
RULING: No. The evidence is inadmissible.
It is true that the lack of objection to a hearsay testimony results in its being admitted as
evidence. But, one should not be misled into thinking that since these testimonies are admitted
as evidence, they now have probative value. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not,
cannot be given credence.
It is unfortunate that the prosecution failed to present as witnesses the persons who knew the
appellant as the lessee and owner of the M-14 rifle. In this way, the appellant could have
exercised his constitutional right to confront the witnesses and to cross-examine them for their
truthfulness. Likewise, the records do not show any other evidence which could have identified
the appellant as the lessee of the house and the owner of the subversive items. To give
probative value to these hearsay statements and convict the appellant on this basis alone would
be to render his constitutional rights useless and without meaning.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the appellant is the lessee of the house, the case
against him still will not prosper, the reason being that the law enforcers failed to comply with
the requirements of a valid search and seizure proceedings.
The Solicitor General argues otherwise. He claims, that the group of Lt. Quijardo entered the
appellant’s house upon invitation of Luz Tanciangco and Luzviminda Morados, helper of the
appellant and that since the evidence seized was in plain view of the authorities, the same may
be seized without a warrant.
We are not persuaded. The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures,
being a personal one cannot he waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded
or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf. In the case at bar, the records
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show that appellant was not in his house at that time Luz Tanciangco and Luz Morados, his
alleged helper, allowed the authorities to enter it. We find no evidence that would establish the
fact that Luz Morados was indeed the appellant’s helper ar if it was true that she was his helper,
that the appellant had given her authority to open his house in his absence. The prosecution
likewise failed to show if Luz Tanciangco has such an authority. Without this evidence, the
authorities’ intrusion into the appellant’s dwelling cannot be given any color of legality. While the
power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the
law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement
of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of
government
"The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the raid because it was in fact not urgent.
They knew where the petitioners were. They had every opportunity to get a search warrant
before making the raid. If they were worried that the weapons inside the compound would be
spirited away, they could have surrounded the premises in the meantime, as a preventive
measure.
Another factor which illustrates the weakness of the case against the accused-appellant is in the
identification of the gun which he was charged to have illegally possessed. In the amended
information (supra, pp. 1-2), the gun was described as an M-14 rifle with serial no. 1249935.
Yet, the gun presented at the trial bore a different serial number.
Hence, the evidence in hand is too weak to convict the accused-appellant of the charge of
illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of, or incident to or in connection with the crime of
subversion, We are therefore, left with no option, but to acquit the accused on reasonable
doubt. ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and the appellant is
ACQUITTED with costs de oficio.
15. Padilla v. CA, 269 SCRA 402 (1997) (JAVIER)
KEYWORD: Firearms
DOCTRINE: Valid Warrantless arrest and Warrantless Search and Seizure (Plain View)
FACTS:
Manarang and Cruz while at a restaurant seeking shelter from the heavy rainfall, saw a
pajero vehicle running fast down the highway and thought that it might get into an accident. Not
long enough, they heard a screeching sound by the sudden and hard braking of a vehicle with
a sickening sound of the vehicle hitting something.
Manarang and Cruz went out to check the place of accident and saw the vehicle at the edge of
the highway with a slight tilt to its side and found out that the vehicle hit somebody. Manarang
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being a member of a civic group, took out his radio and reported the matter to the PNP of
Angeles City.
By the time he completed his call, the vehicle had started to leave the place going to the north.
Manarang left the victim with Cruz and proceeded to chase the vehicle with his motorcycle.
During such pursuit, he was able to take note of the plate number (PMA 777) and again called
the viper through the radio and reported the plate number. The Viper in the person of SPO2
Buan upon receipt of the second radio call, flashed the message to all units of PNP Angeles
City with the order to apprehend the vehicle.
SPO2 Borja and Miranda was reached by the alarm and positioned themselves at the Abacan
bridge since it is the only way to the north. Also SPO2 Buan is SPO Ruben Mercado with SPO3
Tan and SPO2 Odejar responded.
In the meantime, Manarang continued to chase the vehicle and proceeded to Abacan Bridge
and saw SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda. He approached them and informed them of the hit
and run incident which the officers already knew.
Upon seeing the subject vehicle, the two police officers boarded their Mobile car and cut into the
path of the vehicle forcing it to stop. They then alighted from their Mobile car. SPO2 Miranda
went to the vehicle and instructed the driver to alight. The driver was recognized as Robin
Padilla.
Robin was wearing a short leather jacket such that when he alighted with both his hands raised,
a gun tucked on the left side of his waist was revealed. SPO2 Borja confiscated the gun and
disarmed him and told him about the hit and run incident which was angrily denied by Robin.
SPO2 Borja checked the cylinder of the gun and find six (6) live bullets inside.
The Senior police officers arrived. SPO Mercado took over the matter and informed him that he
was being arrested for the hit and run incident. He pointed out to Robin the fact that the plate
number of his vehicle was dangling and the railing and the hood were dented.
Since Robin’s jacket was short, it exposed a long magazine of an armalite rifle tucked in his
back right pocket. Mercado confiscated the magazine from him. Suspecting that he carrying a
rifle inside the vehicle since he had a magazine, SPO Mercado proceeded to open by himself
the door of Robin's vehicle. He saw a baby armalite rifle lying horizontally at the front by the
driver's seat. SPO Mercado modified the arrest of Robin by including as its ground illegal
possession of firearms and read to him his constitutional rights. Also, Robin voluntarily
surrendered a third firearm, a pietro berreta pistol and a black bag containing two long
magazines and one short magazine.
During the investigation, Robin admitted possession of the firearms stating that he used them
for shooting. He was also not able to produce any permit to carry or memorandum receipt to
cover the three firearms.
ISSUE:
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WON the arrest was illegal and the firearms and ammunitions confiscated pursuant to
the arrest are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule
RULING:
No. the warrantless arrest was legal, therefore, the firearms and ammunitions taken
were admissible in evidence.
(In Flagrante Delicto Arrest)
"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; (c) When the person to
be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested

(i) after he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least
attempting to commit an offense,
(ii) in the presence of the arresting officer or private person.
Both elements concurred. Petitioner's vehicle figured in a hit and run — an offense committed in
the "presence" of Manarang. In the ‘’PRESENCE’’ does not only require that the arresting
person sees the offense, but also when he ‘’hears the disturbance created thereby and
proceeds at once to the scene. As testified by Manarang he heard the screeching sound of tires
and saw the victim (balot vendor), reported the matter to the PNP and chase the vehicle. The
officer who came to know of such report positioned in Abacan bridge and caused the actual
arrest of Robin Padilla.
The subsequent confiscation of the firearms and ammunitions found in PLAIN VIEW of the
officers are proper as such constitutes another commission of an offense (Illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions). There was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of time
between the hit and run and the actual apprehension. Also, after having stationed themselves
in Abacan bridge in response to Manarang’s report, the officers saw themselves the fast
approaching pajero of Robin, its dangling plate number PMA 777 as reported and the dented
hood and railings. These formed part of the arresting police officer's personal knowledge of the
facts indicating that, petitioner' Pajero was indeed the vehicle involved in the hit and run
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accident. Verily their, the arresting police officers acted upon verified personal knowledge and
not on unreliable hearsay information.
Robin, cannot defeat the arrest which has been set in motion in a public place for want of a
warrant as the police was confronted by an urgent need to render aid or take action. (Hot
Pursuit)
(Valid Warrantless search and seizure)
The seizure of the Smith & Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was justified for they
came within "plain view" of the policemen who inadvertently discovered the revolver and
magazine tucked in petitioner's waist and back pocket respectively, when he raised his hands
after alighting from his Pajero. The same justification applies to the confiscation of the M-16
armalite rifle which was immediately apparent to the policemen as they took a casual glance at
the Pajero and saw said ri􀁇e lying horizontally near the driver's seat.
Even assuming that the items confiscated were products of an active search, the seizure
without a search warrant can still be justified under search incidental to a lawful arrest, once
lawful arrest was effected, officers may do a protective search which are within the petitioner’s
(robin) grabbing distance.
16. People v. Amminudin GR 74869, 6 July 1988 (KINAZO)
KEYWORD: Gangplank
DOCTRINE: : Evidence obtained through an illegal warrantless search is inadmissible.
FACTS:
The PC officers, two days before the arrest, received a tip from one of their informers
that the accused-appellant Amminudin (Amminudin) was on board a M/V Wilcon 9, bound for
Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. He was identified by name. The vessel and the time of its
arrival was also identified.
Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening and approached him as he
descended from the gangplank after the informer pointed at him. They detained him and
inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later
analyzed as marijuana leaves by the NBI forensic examiner. On the basis of the finding,
information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against Aminnudin.
Amminudin disclaimed the marijuana and claimed that all he had in his bag was his
clothing. He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was
confiscated w/o a search warrant and insisted that he did not even know what marijuana looked
like and that his business was selling watches and cigarettes. Thus w/o the arrest and search
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warrant, the marijuana allegedly found in his possession are inadmissible in evidence against
him.
ISSUES: WON the marijuanas obtained without an arrest and search warrant are admissible in
evidence against Amminudin.
RULING:
No. Evidence from a poisonous tree cannot be admitted.
The evidence cannot be admitted and should never have been considered by trial court
for the simple fact that the marijuana was seized illegally.
Amminudin was not caught in flagrante nor was the crime about to commited or had just
been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the RoC. He was
merely walking in a gangplank with no outward indication calling for his arrest.
This case also presented no urgency.The PC had at least two days within which they
could have obtained a warrant of arrest and search Amminudin.Yet they did nothing.
Furthermore, the search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because there was no
warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed by the
Rules of Court.
Therefore, the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence obtained thereby
was inadmissible.
17. People v. Zenaida Quebral GR 185379, 27 Nov. 2009 (PEREZ)
Keyword: Reverse; 15 Meters

Note: This is not a situation of a search incident to a lawful arrest. This is a search
preceding an arrest. For purposes of arrest, tipped information is not enough but for purposes of
search, the same is enough, provided it coincides with the actual condition in the field as
witnessed by the arresting officer.
FACTS:
There was a tip that two men and a woman on board an owner type jeep with a
specific plate number would deliver shabu, a prohibited drug, on the following day to a drug pusher
on the list. Police officers went to the designated area as early as 7:45 AM to watch out for the
owner type jeepney mentioned. At around 4 PM such a jeep, bearing the reported plate number
and with two men and a woman on board, came out of the road as expected. They followed the
jeep until it entered a gas station. A man alighted from another vehicle, walked towards the jeep
and talked to the woman (Zenaida) who handed a white envelope to him. Upon seeing this 15-
meters away, police officers alighted from their vehicle and surrounded the jeep. PO3 Galvez (the
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witness here) opened the envelope and saw five plastic sachets containing white substance
believed to be shabu.
Accused-appellants denied having committed the crime and alleged that they were
framed.
ISSUE: WON there’s a valid search and arrest.
HELD:
1. Accused-appellants invoked the rule on warrantless arrest, that there was an illegal
arrest as the police officers could not tell that there was a crime per se, thus the
search was also illegal; but SC said it was more of a search preceding the arrest.
Probable cause was established through the confidential report of the police
informer corroborated with what the police witnessed before the search and arrest.
The police acted on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to
believe that a crime has been committed or is about to be committed. Since the
seized shabu resulted from a valid search, it is admissible in evidence against the
accused.
2. The case of People v. Aminnudin cannot apply to this case. In Aminnudin, the
informant gave the police the name and description of the person who would be
coming down from a ship the following day carrying a shipment of drugs. In such
a case, the Court held that the police had ample time to seek a search warrant
against the named person so they could validly search his luggage. In the present
case, all the information the police had about the persons in possession of the
prohibited drugs was that they were two men and a woman on board an owner
type jeep. A search warrant issued against such persons could be used by the
police to harass practically anyone.
18. Rosete v. Lim GR 136051, 8 June 2006 (RICALDE)
KEYWORD: Refusal to take Deposition
DOCTRINE:
Generally, only an accused in a criminal case can refuse to take the witness stand.
The exception is that when an administrative or civil proceeding partakes the nature of a
criminal proceeding or analogous thereto, an accused may also refuse to take the witness
stand. Therefore, petitioners cannot refuse to take deposition since a civil case for
Annulment, Specific Performance with Damages cannot be considered in the nature of a
criminal proceeding.
FACTS:
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Respondent Juliano and Lilia Lim (Lim) filed complaint for annulment, specific
performance with damages against the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-
RSBS), Espreme Realty and Dev’t Co., Alfredo Rosete, Maj. Oscar Mapalo, Chito Rosete, BPI,
and Register of Deeds of Mindoro Occidental. They pray for annulment of deed of sale, executed
by AFP-RSBS to Espreme Realty of parcels of land, and for the cancellation of the titles in
Espreme Realty’s name. They also ask for execution of docs to restore ownership and title of the
lands to the Lims.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss but was denied. Respondents filed a Notice to Take
Deposition Upon Oral Examination that they will cause the deposition of petitioners Mapalo and
Rosete. Petitioner objected saying that there are two pending criminal cases (BP 22 and Estafa)
involving the same set of facts; allowing their deposition would violate their right against self-
incrimination because the deposition would establish allegation of fact in the complaint-affidavits
in the criminal cases. Petitioners allege that while an ordinary witness may be compelled to take
the witness stand, and claim privilege against self-incrim. as each question requiring incriminating
answer is asked, accused may altogether refuse to answer any and all questions because right
against self-incrim. is the right to refuse to testify. They further allege that deposition may not be
taken without leave of court as no answer has yet been served and the issues have not yet been
joined since their Answer was filed ex abudanti cautela, pending resolution of the Petition for
Certiorari challenging the orders that denied their MTD.
LC and CA denied petitioners. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. WON the trial court erred in declaring that the right against self-incrim would not be
violated by the taking of their deposition in the civil case. - NO.
2. WON the trial court erred in declaring that the notice to take deposition need not be with
leave of court because an answer abudanti cautela has been filed. - NO
RULING:
1. NO. LCs are correct. The right against self-incrimination can only be claimed when a
specific question is actually put to the witness, and not at any other time. As for an accused
in a CRIMINAL CASE, he may altogether refuse to take the witness stand as a witness,
as held in Ayson where the court held an accused to occupy a different tier of protection.
Under the Rules of Court, in all criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled
among others (1) to be exempt from being a witness against himself, and (2) to testify as
a witness in his own behalf…his refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice
or be used against him. Clearly, only an ACCUSED in a CRIMINAL CASE can refuse to
take the witness stand. Or in cases which partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding
or analogous thereto. Or in civil actions which are criminal in nature. It is the nature of
the proceedings that controls, not the character of the suit involved.
In this case, what is involved is a civil case for Annulment, Specific Performance
with Damages. It cannot be considered in the nature of a criminal proceeding. They are
not facing criminal charges in the civil case. Hence they cannot refuse to take the
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deposition. The pending criminal cases do not give a right to refuse to testify in the civil
case. They may invoke their right against self-incrim only when the incriminating questions
are thrown their way.
2. NO. ROC provides that deposition may be taken without leave of court after an answer
has been served. Ex abudanti cautela means “out of abundant caution” or “to be on the
safe side”. An answer ex abudanti cautela does not make their answer less of an answer.
The answers of the petitioner contain their respective defenses, and an answer is a
pleading in which a defending party sets forth his defenses.
19. People v. Bokingo GR 187536, 10 August 2011 (RIEL)
KEYWORD: “Tara, patay na siya.” HAMMERING THE VICTIM’S HEAD
DOCTRINE: Under Sec. 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission of another. Res inter alios acta alteri nocere
non debet. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is
not admissible against his or her co-accused, and is considered as hearsay against them.
An EXCEPTION to the res inter alios acta rule is AN ADMISSION MADE BY A

CONSPIRATOR. Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that the act or declaration
of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in
evidence against the co-conspirator provided that the conspiracy is shown by evidence
other than by such act or declaration.
FACTS:
Noli Pasion and wife Elsa were owners of apartment units and one was leased to Dante
Vitalicio (Apartment No 5). Appellants Bokingo and Col occupied Apartment No. 3 since they were
employed as construction workers by Pasion.
Upon hearing a commotion from Apartment No 3, Vitalicio peeped through the screen
door and saw Bokingo hitting something on the floor. Upon seeing him, Bokingo allegedly pushed
open the screen door and attacked him with a hammer in his hand. Later on, Pasion was found
dead in the kitchen of Apartment No. 3.
Elsa testified that she heard the moaning of his husband and proceeded downstairs but
was blocked by Col and was sprayed with tear gas on her eyes and poked a sharp object under
her chin. He further instructed her to open the vault of the pawnshop but she informed him that
she does not know the combination lock. Elsa saw Bokingo and heard him tell Col: “Tara, patay
na siya.” Col immediately let her go and ran away with Bokingo.
During the preliminary investigation, Bokingo admitted that her conspired with Col to kill
Pasion and that they planned the killing several days before because they got “fed up” with
Pasion.
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BOKINGCO’s RECOLLECTION: Pasion appears to be intoxicated and wanted to

know where he was during the day. He replied that he just stayed at the apartment and Pasion
suddenly hit him in the head and prompted him to take a hammer and hit Pasion. They both
struggled and Bokingo repeatedly hit Pasion.
TRIAL COURT RULED that Bokingo and Col are guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED the decision.
ISSUES:
1) Whether the qualifying circumstances were properly appreciated to convict appellant

Bokingo of murder.
2) Whether appellant Col is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as a co-conspirator.
RULING:
1) THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT BOKINGO ATTACKED AND KILLED PASION based on

the 2 separate and dissimilar admissions: (1) in his extrajudicial confession taken during the
preliminary investigation where he admitted that he and Col planned the killing of Pasion, and
(2) when he testified in open court that he was only provoked in hitting Pasion back when the
latter hit him in the head.
ON THE APPRECIATION OF THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE: TREACHERY cannot

be appreciated to qualify the crime to murder in the absence of any proof of the manner in which
the aggression was commenced. The prosecution must prove that at the time of the attack, the
victim was not in a position to defend himself, and that the offender consciously adopted the
particular means, method or form of attack employed by him. Nobody witnessed the
commencement and the manner of the attack. While the witness Vitalicio managed to see
Bokingo hitting something on the floor, he failed to see the victim at that time.
The admitted manner of killing is inconsistent with EVIDENT PREMEDITATION. In order

for there to be evident premeditation the following must be present: (a) the time when the offender
was determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his
determination; and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution of
the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. No proof was shown as to
how and when the plan to kill was devised. Bokingo admitted in court that he only retaliated
when Pasion allegedly hit him in the head. Despite the fact that Bokingo admitted that he
was treated poorly by Pasion, the prosecution failed to establish that Bokingco planned
the attack.
During the preliminary investigation, Bokingco’s confession was admittedly taken

without the assistance of counsel in violation of Sec. 12, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution.
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“Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Sec. 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.” In the instant case, the extrajudicial confession is
INADMISSIBLE against Bokingco because he was not assisted at all by counsel during the time
his confession was taken before a judge.
NIGHTTIME. The court having ruled that evident premeditation has not been proved, the
aggravating circumstance of nighttime cannot be properly appreciated. There was no evidence
to show that Bokingco purposely sought nighttime to facilitate the commission of the
offense.
ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE could not also be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance

in this case. However, there was no showing that he took advantage of said trust to facilitate
the commission of the crime.
THE CONVICTION OF MURDER was DOWNGRADED to HOMICIDE for failure of the

prosecutuion to prove the presence of the qualifying circumstances.
2) COL’s ASSERTION: Applying Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of COurt, Bokingco’s
uncounselled testimony that appellants planned to kill Pasion bears no relevance
considering the fact that there was no other evidence which will prove conspiracy. He also
claims that Elsa’s statements during trial, such as the presence of Col inside her house
and his forcing her to open the vault of the pawnshop, as well as the alleged statement she
heard from Bokingco “Tara, patay na siya,” are not adequate to support the finding of
conspiracy.
Unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective are essential
to establish the existence of conspiracy.
As a rule, CONSPIRACY MUST BE ESTABLISHED WITH THE SAME QUANTUM OF

PROOF AS THE CRIME ITSELF AND MUST BE SHOWN AS CLEARLY AS THE
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME.
NOBODY WITNESSED THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE ATTACK, Col was not seen
at the apartment where Pasion was being attacked by Bokingco. In fact, he was at Elsa’s house
and allegedly ordering her to open the pawnshop vault. When Esla heard Bokingco called out to
Col that Pasion had been killed and that they had to leave the place, this does not prove that they
acted in concert towards the consummation of the crime. It only proves, at best, that there were
two crimes committed simultaneously and they were united in their efforts to escape from the
crimes they separately committed.
RULES ON EVIDENCE: Inasmuch as Bokingco’s extrajudicial confession is

inadmissible against him, it is likewise inadmissible against Col, specifically where he implicated
the latter as a cohort. Under Sec. 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the rights of a party
cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission of another. Res inter alios acta
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alteri nocere non debet. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the
confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused, and is considered as hearsay
against them.
An EXCEPTION to the res inter alios acta rule is AN ADMISSION MADE BY A

CONSPIRATOR. Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that the act or declaration
of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in
evidence against the co-conspirator provided that the conspiracy is shown by evidence
other than by such act or declaration.
In order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-
conspirators, it is necessary that (1) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than
the admission itself; (2) the admission relates to the common object; and (3) it has been
made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. We did not find any
sufficient evidence to establish the existence of conspiracy. Therefore, the extrajudicial
confession has no probative value and is inadmissible in evidence against Col.
Bonkingco’s judicial admission exculpated Col because Bokingco admitted that he

only attacked Pasion after the latter hit him in the head.
WHEREFORE, Appellant REYNANTE COL is ACQUITTED xxx Appellant MICHAEL

BOKINGCO is found GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
20. Jaime dela Cruz v. People, GR 20748, 23 July 2014 (SABERON)
KEYWORD: DRUG TEST
DOCTRINE: The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended or arrested
for any unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts listed under Article II of R.A. 9165.
FACTS:
· NBI received a complaint from Corazon Absin and Charito Escobido claiming that
Ariel Escobido (live-in partner of Corazon and son of Charito) was picked up by police
officers for allegedly selling drugs.
· An errand boy gave a number to the complainants. When they called the number,
they were instructed to go to the Gorordo Police Station.
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· In the said police station, they met “James” who demanded 100,000 (later on
lowered to 40,000) in exchange for the release of Ariel.
· After the said meeting, the complainants went directly to the NBI wherein the NBI
formed an entrapment operation.
· The officers were able to nab Jaime dela Cruz through the use of mark-money.
· Jaime dela Cruz was brought to the forensic laboratory of NBI where he was required
to submit his urine for drug testing. The test yielded positive for presence of dangerous
drugs.
· Based on dela Cruz’ testimony, he was contending that he refused to the drug
examination and requested to call his laywer but it was denied by the NBI.
· RTC – found dela Cruz guilty of violating Sec. 15 of RA9165; ruled that all the
elements were present: 1) accused was arrested 2) accused was subjected to drug test
3) confirmatory test shows that he used a dangerous drug
· CA – affirmed RTC ruling; ruled that extracting urine from one’s body is merely a
mechanical act, hence falling outside the concept of a custodial investigation.
ISSUE:
WON the drug test conducted upon Jaime dela Cruz was legal?
HELD:
NO. FIRST, the drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended or arrested
for any unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts listed under Article II of R.A. 9165. To make
the provision applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for any crime not listed
under Article II is tantamount to unduly expanding its meaning. Note that accused
appellant here was arrested in the alleged act of extortion.
SECOND, the drug test is not covered by allowable non-testimonial compulsion. We are
aware of the prohibition against testimonial compulsion and the allowable exceptions to
such proscription. Cases where non-testimonial compulsion has been allowed reveal,
however, that the pieces of evidence obtained were all material to the principal cause of
the arrest. In the instant case, we fail to see how a urine sample could be material to the
charge of extortion. The RTC and the CA, therefore, both erred when they held that the
extraction of petitioner’s urine for purposes of drug testing was “merely a mechanical act,
hence, falling outside the concept of a custodial investigation.”
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LASTLY, the drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to privacy and right against self-
incrimination. It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine extracted and
tested for drugs. He also asked for a lawyer prior to his urine test. He was adamant in
exercising his rights, but all of his efforts proved futile, because he was still compelled to
submit his urine for drug testing under those circumstances. Such acts were in violation
of Sec 2 and Sec 17 of the 1987 Constitution. In the face of these constitutional guarantees,
we cannot condone drug testing of all arrested persons regardless of the crime or offense
for which the arrest is being made.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated 22 June 2011 issued by
the Twentieth Division, and the Resolution dated 2 February 2012 issued by the former
Twentieth Division of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 00670 are SET ASIDE.
Petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED.
21. De Castro v. People, GR 171672, 2 Feb 2015 (ACBAY)
KEYWORD: BANK TELLER
DOCTRINE: The rights against self-incrimination and to counsel guaranteed under the
Constitution apply only during the custodial interrogation of a suspect.
FACTS:
A. Marieta de Castro is a bank teller of the BPI Family Savings Bank (BPI Family)
B. Matuguina and Cornejo left their passbook with de Castro.
C. Branch Manager discovered that Matuguina’s account had (3) three withdrawal slips
containing signatures radically different from the specimen signatures of the depositor
and Cornejo’s account had (1) one withdrawal slip.
D. It was apparent that the accused de Castro had intervened in the posting and
verification of the slips because her initials were affixed thereto.
E. After notifying Matuguina and Cornejo, both adamantly denied that it was their
signature affixed to the withdrawal slips.
F. The branch manager reported her findings to her superiors which ultimately led to De
Castro’s confession of guilt.
G. Since then, she executed three more statements in response to the investigation
conducted by the bank’s internal auditors. She also gave a list of the depositors’
accounts from which she drew cash and which were listed methodically in her diary.
H. The employment of the accused was ultimately terminated. The bank paid Matuguina
P65, 000, while Cornejo got her refund directly from the accused.
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I. RTC-Pasay found the petitioner guilty as charged. CA affirmed but with the modification
that the award of P2000 to BPI Family be deleted.
ISSUES:
1. WON her conviction should be set aside because the evidence presented against her had been
obtained in violation of her constitutional right against self-incrimination (main);
2. WON her rights to due process and to counsel had been infringed; and
3. WON the evidence against her should be inadmissible for being obtained by illegal or
unconstitutional means rendering the evidence as the fruit of the poisonous tree.
RULING:
1. There is no violation of petitioner’s constitutional rights against self- incrimination.

Debunking the petitioner’s challenges, the CA stressed that the rights against self-incrimination
and to counsel guaranteed under the Constitution applied only during the custodial
interrogation of a suspect. In her case, she was not subjected to any investigation by the police
or other law enforcement agents. Instead, she underwent an administrative investigation as an
employee of the BPI Family Savings Bank, the investigation being conducted by her superiors.
She was not restrained of her freedom in any manner. She was free to stay or go. There was no
evidence that she was forced or pressured to say anything. It was an act of conscience that
compelled her to speak. In this setting, the invocation of the right to remain silent or to counsel is
simply irrelevant.
2. There is no infringement, for de Castro was not so poorly represented that it affected
her fundamental right to due process, even if her counsel was old and feeble and subsequently
died during the pendency of the case. Except for the several postponements incurred by her
counsel, there is really no showing that he committed any serious blunder during the trial. We
may take note that once, the trial court admonished the accused to replace her counsel due to
his absences, but she did not.
3. The evidence against de Castro are admissible. Considering that the foregoing
explanation by the CA was justly supported by the records, and that her investigation as a bank
employee by her employer did not come under the coverage of the Constitutionally-protected right
against self-incrimination, right to counsel and right to due process, we find no reversible error
committed by the CA in affirming the conviction of the petitioner by the RTC. The guilt of the
petitioner for four counts of estafa through falsification of a commercial document was established
beyond reasonable doubt. As a bank teller, she took advantage of the bank depositors who had
trusted in her enough to leave their passbooks with her upon her instruction. Without their
knowledge, however, she filled out withdrawal slips that she signed, and misrepresented to her
fellow bank employees that the signatures had been verified in due course. Her misrepresentation
to her co-employees enabled her to receive the amounts stated in the withdrawal slips.
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22. Homar v. People, GR 182534, 2 Sept 2015 (ALICANTE)
KEYWORD: JAYWALKING/SHABU
DOCTRINE:
The waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of
evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.
FACTS:
Ongcoma Hadji Homar was found to possess one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing 0.03 grams of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu. He
pleaded not guilty during arraignment.
PO1 Eric Tan (Tan) was the lone witness for the prosecution. He testified that he was ordered
together with civilian agent (C/A) Ronald Tangcoy (Tangcoy) by P/Chief Supt. Alfredo C. Valdez
to go to the South Wing, Roxas Boulevard where they saw the petitioner crossing a "No
Jaywalking" portion of Roxas Boulevard. They immediately accosted him and told him to cross at
the pedestrian crossing area. The petitioner picked up something from the ground, prompting
Tangcoy to frisk him resulting in the recovery of a knife. Thereafter, Tangcoy conducted a
thorough search on the petitioner’s body and found and confiscated a plastic sachet containing
what he suspected as shabu.
The petitioner was the sole witness for the defense. He testified that he was going home at around
6:30 PM after selling imitation sunglasses and other accessories at the BERMA Shopping Center.
After crossing the overpass, a policeman and a civilian stopped and frisked him despite his
refusal. They poked a gun at him, accused him of being a holdupper, and forced him to go with
them. They also confiscated the kitchen knife, which he carried to cut cords. He was likewise
investigated for alleged possession of shabu and detained for one day. He was criminally charged
before MTC of Parañaque City for the possession of the kitchen knife but he was eventually
acquitted.
RTC Ruling
The RTC convicted the petitioner. It ruled that PO1 Tan and C/A Tangcoy were presumed to have
performed their duties regularly in arresting and conducting a search on the petitioner. PO1 Eric
Tan was straightforward in giving his testimony and he did not show any ill motive in arresting the
petitioner.
CA ruling
The CA affirmed the RTC’s findings. Section 5, paragraph (a) of Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure enumerates the circumstances when a warrantless arrest is legal, valid,
and proper. One of these is when the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense in the presence of a peace officer or a private person.
Petitioner committed jaywalking in the presence of PO1 Tan and C/A Tangcoy; hence, his
warrantless arrest for jaywalking was lawful. The subsequent frisking and search done were
incident to a lawful arrest.
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The Petitioner’s Position

The petitioner argues that:
- First, the shabu is inadmissible as evidence because it was obtained as a result of his
unlawful arrest and in violation of his right against unreasonable search and seizure.
- Second, assuming there was a valid arrest, Section 13, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure permits a search that is directed only upon dangerous weapons or
"anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense
without a warrant." In the present case, the offense, for which the petitioner was allegedly
caught in flagrante delicto, is jaywalking. The alleged confiscated drug has nothing to do
with the offense of jaywalking.
- Finally, the non-presentation of Tangcoy renders the prosecution’s evidence weak and
uncorroborated. Consequently, the sole testimony of Tan cannot sustain the petitioner’s
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The Respondent’s Position

Respondent argues that:
- The guilt of the petitioner was conclusively established beyond reasonable doubt. The
warrantless frisking and search on the petitioner’s body was an incident to a lawful
warrantless arrest for jaywalking. The non-filing of a criminal charge of jaywalking against
the petitioner does not render his arrest invalid.
- The shabu is admissible as evidence. The petitioner can no longer question his arrest
after voluntarily submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court when he entered his
plea of not guilty and when he testified in court.
ISSUES:
1. Was there a valid warrantless arrest? NO
2. Were the seized drugs admissible in evidence? NO
RULING:
1. NO. The prosecution failed to prove that a lawful warrantless arrest preceded the search
conducted on the petitioner’s body.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Any evidence obtained in violation of
these rights shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
To determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, there must be a valid warrantless
search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, which must precede the
search. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the only
occasions when a person may be lawfully arrested without a warrant. To constitute a valid in
flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute
an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence of or within the view of the arresting
officer.
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Prosecution did not proffer any other proof to establish that the requirements for a valid in flagrante
delicto arrest were complied with. It failed to prove that the petitioner was committing a crime. It
failed to specifically identify the area where the petitioner allegedly crossed that was indeed a “no
jaywalking”, merely stating that the petitioner "crossed the street of Roxas Boulevard, in a place
not designated for crossing." Petitioner was also not charged of jaywalking.
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot save the prosecution’s
lack of evidence to prove the warrantless arrest and search. This presumption cannot overcome
the presumption of innocence or constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for
the commission of an offense. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body,
or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an
intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the
part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.
In the present case, Tan and Tangcoy did not intend to bring the petitioner under custody or to
restrain his liberty. This lack of intent to arrest him was bolstered by the fact that there was no
criminal charge that was filed against the petitioner for crossing a "no jaywalking" area. When Tan
and Tangcoy allegedly saw the petitioner jaywalking, they did not arrest him but accosted him
and pointed to him the right place for crossing. The intent to arrest only came after they allegedly
confiscated the shabu from the petitioner, for which they informed him of his constitutional rights
and brought him to the police station.
The intent to arrest is indispensible in Luz vs. People where it held that the shabu confiscated
from the accused in that case was inadmissible as evidence when the police officer who flagged
him for traffic violation had no intent to arrest him. According to the Court, due to the lack of intent
to arrest, the subsequent search was unlawful.
2. NO. The waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.
Petitioner did not timely object to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment as required
by the Rules. He actively participated in the trial of the case. As a result, the petitioner is deemed
to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest.
However, this waiver to question an illegal arrest only affects the jurisdiction of the court over his
person. It is well-settled that a waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it a
waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.
Since the shabu was seized during an illegal arrest, its inadmissibility as evidence precludes
conviction and justifies the acquittal of the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner ONGCOMA
HADJI HOMAR is ACQUITTED and ordered immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he
is confined for any other lawful cause.
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23. PDIC v. Casimiro GR 206866, 2 Sept 2015 (BALIONG)
KEYWORD: probable cause, hearsay evidence, Ombudsman
DOCTRINE: HEARSAY EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE IN DETERMINING PROBABLE CAUSE
FACTS:
1) Philippine Deposit Insurance (PDIC) (petitioner) through its officers, charged Cu, Zate,
and Apelo (respondents) of the crimes of Direct Bribery and Corruption of Public Officials under
ART 210 and 212 of the RPC and Sec. 3(e) RA 3019 “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.”
• PDIC acted as statutory receiver, taking over the affairs of BDBI after the Bangko
Sentral the Pilipinas (BSP) Monetary Board ordered its closure
• As receiver, it went on to gather, preserve, and administer the records
2) They were charged in the following capacities:

• Cu (together with members of his family) as the 85.99% owner of Bicol
Development Bank, Inc. (BDBI);
• Zate as Chairman/President of BDBI
• Apelo as a former employee of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) who acted
as the Bank Officer-In-Charge that examined BDBI's books and records as of September
30, 2001, and as one of the assistants of Bank Officer-InCharge Evangeline C.
Velasquez in connection with the Reports of Examination of BDBI's books and records
3) It was during the course of the receivership that Gomez (former Cashier of BDBI) went
to the PDIC and submitted an affidavit outlining the alleged irregularities committed by
respondents
4) According to Gomez:
• Cu instructed her to take money from the vault in the amount of P30,000.00 and
to deposit the same to Apelo's bank account in Philippine National Bank
• When Gomez asked for the reason, Cu replied "Professional Fee natin sa kanya
yan”
• On further orders/directives from Cu and Zate, additional deposits were made to
Apelo's bank account on two (2) separate dates, specifically April 20, 2007 and October
3, 2007, in the respective amounts of P60,000.00 and P50,000.00
• After the deposits were made, Gomez was initially instructed to cover the
unofficial and unbooked cash disbursements in favor of Apelo by placing such amounts
in BDBI's books as "Other Cash Items;" and thereafter, to regularize and remove from
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BDBI's books such disbursements by including them in the other accounts of BDBI until
they were completely covered.
• To bolster her allegations, Gomez attached copies of deposit slips and
official receipts to show that such deposits were indeed made to Apelo's bank accounts.
5) On the basis of Gomez’ affidavit PDIC filed the criminal complaint.
6) Cu’s defense: denied having ordered or instructed Gomez to make such deposits to
Apelo's bank account. He pointed to the lack of evidence to prove that Apelo was aware or
made aware of any alleged bank deposits made to her bank account, thus, negating the charge
of Direct Bribery against her and Corruption of Public Officials against him.
7) Zate’s defense: denied the allegations hurled against her, countering that Gomez's
statements should not be relied upon for being unfounded. Apelo did not file any counter-
affidavit despite the Ombudsman's orders.
8) OMBUDSMAN: DISMISSED the criminal complaint for lack of probable cause.

• while it may be said that certain amounts were indeed deposited to Apelo's bank
account, there is no proof that Apelo subsequently withdrew the same.
• unless it can be shown that Apelo made such withdrawals, it cannot be declared
with certainty that she received monetary consideration from Cu and Zate in exchange
for the advance information relative to impending BSP examinations
• Ombudsman found Gomez's affidavit showing Apelo as the source of the
"advance warnings" received by Cu in connection with the BSP examinations to be
inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay
ISSUES: Whether the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in finding no probable cause to
indict private respondents of the crimes charged?
RULING: YES!
THE COURT’S CONSISTENT POLICY IS TO MAINTAIN NON-INTERFERENCE IN THE

DETERMINATION OF THE OMBUDSMAN OF THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE
· Provided there is no grave abuse in the exercise of discretion.
· This is based not only on respect for the investigatory and prosecutor powers granted by
the Constitution to the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well.
· The conduct of preliminary investigation proceedings-whether by the Ombudsman or public

prosecutor—is geared only to determine whether or not probable cause exists to hold an accused-
respondent for trial for the supposed crime that the committed
NATURE OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
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· Merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not there is reasonable basis to
believe that a crime has been committed and that the person charged should be held responsible
for it.
· Being merely based on opinion and belief, a finding of probable cause does not require an
inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.
· Not the occasion for a full and exhaustive display of the prosecution’s evidence.
· Presence/absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of

defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.
· The validity and merits of a party’s defense or accusation, as well as the admissibility of
testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary
investigation level.
PROBABLE CAUSE, DEFINED
· Such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof.
· Does not mean “actual or positive cause,” nor “absolute certainty.”
· Merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.
· Does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction.
· Enough that it is believed that the act/omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged.
A FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE NEEDS ONLY TO REST ON EVIDENCE SHOWING

THAT…
· More likely than not, a crime has been committed by the suspects.
· Need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of
guilt.
IN DETERMINING PROBABLE CAUSE…
· The average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of
the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge.
· He relies on common sense.
· What is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief

that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be
held for trial.
· Does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.
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HEARSAY EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE IN DETERMINING PROBABLE CAUSE
· Because such an investigation is merely preliminary and does not finally adjudicate rights
and obligations of parties
· Probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence as long as there is substantial
basis for crediting the hearsay
· In the US Supreme Court:
o The determination of probable cause can rest partially, or even entirely, on

hearsay evidence, as long as the person making the hearsay statement is credible
o Thus, hearsay, may be the bases for issuance of a warrant, so long as there is
a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay
o An affidavit may be based on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct
personal observations of the affiant so long as the magistrate is informed of some
of the underlying circumstances supporting the affiant’s conclusions and his belief
that any informant involved whose identity need not be disclosed was credible or
his information reliable
IN THIS CASE…
· Court finds that the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the criminal
complaint against private respondents for lack of probable cause
o Apelo was accused of Direct Bribery
o Cu and Zate were accused of Corruption of Public Officials
o All respondents were accused of RA 3019
· After BDBI’s closure, PDIC started to perform its functions as statutory receiver, which
includes: control, management, administration of BDBI, investigating the causes of BDBI’s
closure.
· Gomez (former cashier) in an affidavit, reported the scheme of the respondents that
fraudulently concealed BDBI’s true condition as a banking entity:
o Apelo would provide Cu an advance warning of any impending surprise bank

examinations on BDBI by BSP
o Upon receipt of the advance warning, Cu would then make the necessary steps
to misrepresent BDBI’s status (instructing BDBI employees on how to cover the
possible findings/exceptions of the BSP examiner on the books of BDBI, infusing
cash into BDBI’s vault in order to make it appear that the cash listed in the books
reflect the actual cash in vault, returning such cash to the source
o In exchange for the warnings, Cu or Zate gave Apelo professional fees of Php
140,000.00 depositing the same to the latter’s bank account
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o To cover up such amounts, Gomez was instructed to place the amounts in
BDBI’s books as “other cash items,” and thereafter remove them from BDBI’s
books by including them in the other accounts of BDBI until they were completely
covered
· In support of his statements, Gomez provided copies of deposit slips showing that such
amount was indeed deposited to Apelo’s bank account
· Indubitably, the foregoing establishes probable cause.
· Error on the part of the Ombudsman to simply discredit Gomez’s affidavit as mere hearsay
o Even assuming that his statements were indeed hearsay, there is nevertheless
substantial basis to credit the same considering that she was a former Cashier,
Service Officer, and Treasurer of BDBI—privy to delivate transactions such as
those purported “under-the-table”
Wherefore, petition is GRANTED
24. People v. Adrian Guting, GR 205412, 9 Sept 2015 (BERINGUEL)
KEYWORDS: KILLED HIS FATHER
“The INVESTIGTION pertained in Section 12 (Bill of Rights) refer to custodial investigation. A

confession made before such investigation and was made in res gestae is admissible in
evidence ”
FACTS:
In an Information accused-appellant was charged before the RTC with Parricide killing his own
father while inside their residential house, and armed with a bladed weapon, suddenly and
unexpectedly stabbed several times the victim.
(PO1) Fidel Torre testified that on the rainy afternoon, Adrian all wet from the rain and with a
bladed weapon in his hand, suddenly approached them and told them that he had stabbed his
father. Hearing accused-appellant's statement, PO1 Torre immediately got the bladed weapon
from accused-appellant and turned it over to PO1 Macusi for proper disposition.
Thereafter, the police went to the residence of Jose Guting (Jose), father, to verify the reported
crime, while other police officers informed Flora Guting (Flora), Jose's wife (also accused-
appellant's mother), and Adrian’s brother. While waiting for them, PO1 Macusi, SPO2 Hermosado,
and SPO2 Felipe inquired from the neighbors if anybody had witnessed the crime, but no one did.
When Flora and Emerlito arrived, they entered the house and saw Jose's lifeless body with blood
still oozing from his wounds. Immediately, Flora and Emerlito brought Jose to the hospital where
he was pronounced dead on arrival.
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Doctor Valentin Theodore Lomibao (Dr. Lomibao) conducted the autopsy of Jose's body. Dr.
Lomibao reported that Jose suffered around 39 stab wounds on the head, neck, thorax, abdomen,
and extremities.
The RTC promulgated its Decision on June 24, 2010 finding Adrian guilty of Parricide based on
his verbal admission that he killed his father, Jose. Even assuming that accused-appellant's
admission was inadmissible in evidence, the RTC adjudged that the prosecution was still able to
establish sufficient circumstantial evidence. He appealed this decision.
Adrian argues that his oral confession to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi, without the assistance of
counsel, is inadmissible in evidence for having been made in blatant violation of his constitutional
right under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 12, paragraphs 1 and 3, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution mandate that:
SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right
to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
ISSUE: WON his his oral confession to the police is inadmissible in evidence.
RULING:
The investigation in Section 12, paragraph 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution pertains to
"custodial investigation."
He was not under custodial investigation when he admitted, without assistance of counsel, to PO1
Torre and PO1 Macusi that he stabbed his father to death. His confession was so spontaneously
and voluntarily given and was not elicited through questioning by the police authorities. It may be
true that PO1 Macusi asked accused-appellant who killed his father, but PO1 Macusi only did so
in response to accused-appellant's initial declaration that his father was already dead. At that
point, PO1 Macusi still had no idea who actually committed the crime and did not consider
accused-appellant as the suspect in his father's killing. Accused-appellant was also merely
standing before PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi in front of the Camiling Police Station and was not
yet in police custody.
His declaration is admissible for being part of the res gestae. A declaration is deemed part of the
res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when these three
requisites concur: (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements
were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements concern
the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. All the requisites are
present in this case. Accused-appellant had just been through a startling and gruesome
occurrence, that is, his father's death. Accused-appellant made the confession to PO1 Torre and
PO1 Macusi only a few minutes after and while he was still under the influence of said startling
occurrence, before he had the opportunity to concoct or contrive a story. In fact, accused-
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appellant seemed to still be in shock when he walked to the Police Station completely unmindful
of the rain and the knife in his hand, and headed directly to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi, who
were standing in front of the Police Station, to confess to stabbing his father to death. The police
officers who immediately went to the house of Jose, accused-appellant's father, found Jose's
lifeless body with blood still oozing from his stab wounds. As res gestae, accused-appellant's
spontaneous statement is admissible in evidence against him.
25. People v. Lauga, 15 March 2010 (CAIMBRE)
Exclusionary Rules under the 1987 Constitution – Section 12, Art. III
DOCTRINE: Extrajudicial confession to a "bantay-bayan" without the assistance of

counsel is inadmissible in evidence.
FACTS:
● In an Information dated 21 September 2000, Lauga was accused of the crime of

QUALIFIED RAPE of his thirteen-year old daughter, AAA.
● Testimonies revealed that in one afternoon, AAA was left alone at home. Her
father, accused-appellant Lauga, was having a drinking spree at the neighbor’s
place. Her mother decided to leave because when appellant gets drunk, he has
the habit of mauling AAA’s mother. Her only brother BBB also went out in the
company of some neighbors.
● AAA recounted the harrowing experience to her brother, grandmother, and uncle.
They then sought the assistance of Moises Boy Banting, a "bantay-bayan" in the
barangay. Moises invited appellant to the police station, to which appellant obliged.
At the police outpost, he admitted to him that he raped AAA because he was
unable to control himself.
● On the other hand, only appellant testified for the defense. He believed that the
charge against him was ill-motivated because he sometimes physically abuses his
wife in front of their children after engaging in a heated argument, and beats the
children as a disciplinary measure.
● RTC convicted Lauga of qualified rape. CA affirmed with modifications on the

amount of damages. Before the SC, appellant argues that his extrajudicial
confession before Moises Boy Banting was without the assistance of a counsel, in
violation of his constitutional right.
ISSUE: WON the alleged confession with the “bantay-bayan” was without the assistance
of a counsel and therefore inadmissible in evidence
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HELD: Yes.
● In P. v. Buendia, the SC alluded to the nature of a “bantay-bayan” i.e. a group of

male residents living in [the] area organized for the purpose of keeping peace in
their community[,which is] an accredited auxiliary of the x x x PNP."
● This Court is, therefore, convinced that barangay-based volunteer organizations in

the nature of watch groups, as in the case of the "bantay bayan," are recognized
by the local government unit to perform functions relating to the preservation of
peace and order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the
actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and
responsibilities delegated to a "bantay bayan," particularly on the authority to
conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-
related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his
constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the
Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned.
● We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken
without a counsel, inadmissible in evidence.
● Be that as it may, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the conviction of the
appellant was not deduced solely from the assailed extrajudicial confession but
"from the confluence of evidence showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
26. Philippine Savings Bank v. Senate Impeachment Court GR 200238 9 Feb 2012
(DULANAS)
KEYWORDS: foreign currency deposit, PSBank, Chief Justice
DOCTRINE: Under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, all foreign currency deposits are
considered ABSOLUTELY CONFIDENTIAL.
Exception: Written permission of the depositor
FACTS:
A subpoena ad testificandum et duces tecum was issued by the Senate sitting as an Impeachment
Court against the Branch Manager of PSBank, Katipunan Branch, compelling him to give
information on the Chief Justice’s foreign currency deposits.
The petition seeks for a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction against such.
ISSUES: Whether or not the branch manager can be compelled to give information on foreign
currency deposits
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RULING: NO. TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER RELEASED.
There are two requisite conditions for the issuance of a preliminary injunction:
(1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and
(2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that the violation
sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable injustice.
A clear right to maintain the confidentiality of the foreign currency deposits of the Chief Justice is
provided under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency
Deposit Act of the Philippines (RA 6426). This law establishes the absolute confidentiality of
foreign currency deposits:
Section 8. Secrecy of foreign currency deposits. — All foreign currency deposits authorized under
this Act, as amended by PD No. 1035, as well as foreign currency deposits authorized under PD
No. 1034, are hereby declared as and considered of an absolutely confidential nature
and, except upon the written permission of the depositor, in no instance shall foreign currency
deposits be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or oKce
whether judicial or administrative or legislative, or any other entity whether public or private;
Provided, however, That said foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or
any administrative body whatsoever.
Under R.A. No. 6426 there is only a single exception to the secrecy of foreign currency deposits,
that is, disclosure is allowed only upon the written permission of the depositor.
In Intengan v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that where the accounts in question are U.S.
dollar deposits, the applicable law is not Republic Act No. 1405 but RA 6426. Similarly, in the
recent case of Government Service Insurance System v. 15th Division of the Court of Appeals,
the Court also held that RA 6426 is the applicable law for foreign currency deposits and not
Republic Act No. 1405.
The written consent under RA 6426 constitutes a waiver of the depositor's right to privacy in
relation to such deposit. In the present case, neither the prosecution nor the Impeachment Court
has presented any such written waiver by the alleged depositor, Chief Justice Renato C. Corona.
Also, while impeachment may be an exception to the secrecy of bank deposits under RA 1405, it
is not an exemption to the absolute confidentiality of foreign currency deposits under RA 6426.
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27. Gaanan v. IAC, 145 SCRA 112 (1986) (ESTRELLA)
Keyword: extension telephone
“The mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use of the
enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or others of similar nature. An extension telephone is not
among such devices or arrangements.”
FACTS:
● Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client were in the living room of complainant's
residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault
which they filed against Leonardo Laconico.
● That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant,Gaanan who is a lawyer, to come to
his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular
lawyer went on a business trip. According to the request, appellant went to the office of
Laconico where he was briefed about the problem.
● When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the
telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the
proposed conditions for the settlement (involves: Public apology to be made by Atty.
Laconico before the students of Don Bosco Technical High School; Pl,000.00 to be
given to the Don Bosco Faculty club; fees: 8K for withdrawal)
● Complainant called up again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions.
Laconico answered 'Yes'.
● Gaanan executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant
demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached
the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against
complainant. Since Gaanan listened to the telephone conversation without complainant's
consent, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-
Wiretapping Act.
● The lower court, in a found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of
Republic Act No. 4200. The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the
trial court. ((The issue here is not really with regards to admissibility of evidence but…))
ISSUE: WON an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act,
such that its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful interception of
communications between the two parties using a telephone line.
RULING:
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or
the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be
considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this
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case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is
a rule in statutory construction that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the
particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of
any of its parts.
Likewise, Article 1372 of the Civil Code stipulates that'however general the terms of a contract
may be, they shall not be understood to comprehend things that are distinct and cases that are
different from those upon which the parties intended to agree.' Similarly, Article 1374 of the
same Code provides that 'the various stipulations of a contract shall be
interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sensewhich may result from all of them
taken jointly.
Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive
to that enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or
similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line
of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the
party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage
and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone conversation.
An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the
extended unit does not have to be connected by wire to the main telephone but can be moved
from place ' to place within a radius of a kilometer or more. A person should safely presume
that the party he is calling at the other end of the line probably has an extension telephone and
he runs the risk of a third party listening as in the case of a party line or a telephone unit which
shares its line with another.
It can be readily seen that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons
such as government authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in
order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted
advantage over the telephone users.
Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use of
the enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or others of similar nature. An extension telephone is
not among such devices or arrangements.
Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 4200 provides:

Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken
word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described.
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28. Salcedo-Ortanez v. CA, 235 SCRA 111 (1994) (FAJARDO)
Keyword: Annulment; Cassette tapes; Wire tap
Doctrine: Evidence obtained in violation of Anti-Wire Tapping Act is inadmissible.
Facts:
Private respondent Rafael S. Ortanez filed with the RTC of Quezon City a
complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita
Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological
incapacity of the petitioner. Rafael, after presenting his evidence, orally formally
offered in evidence Exhibits “A” to “M.” Among the exhibits offered by private
respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between
petitioner and unidentified persons.
Petitioner submitted her Objection/Comment to private respondent's oral offer of
evidence; on the same day, the trial court admitted all of private respondent's offered
evidence. MR from petitioner was denied hence she filed a petition for certiorari in the
CA assailing the admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes. CA
dismissed the petition. Hence, the petitioner filed this petition for review.
Issue:
1. (Main Issue) WON the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was
properly availed of by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals.
2. (Issue Related to Evidence) WON the cassette tapes are admissible in evidence.
Ruling:
1. Yes. The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge an
interlocutory order of a trial court. The proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from
an adverse judgment, incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory
order. However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy
of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the court may allow certiorari as a
mode of redress.
2. NO. The trial court issued the assailed order admitting all of the evidence offered by
private respondent, including tape recordings of telephone conversations of petitioner with
unidentified persons. These tape recordings were made and obtained when private
respondent allowed his friends from the military to wire tap his home telephone.
Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes" expressly makes such
tape recordings inadmissible in evidence.
The relevant provisions of Rep. Act No. 4200 are as follows:
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"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties
to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using
any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone
or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape- recorder, or however
otherwise described. . . ."
"Section 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents,
substance, purport, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information
therein contained, obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding
sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial,
legislative or administrative hearing or investigation."
Clearly, respondents trial court and Court of Appeals failed to consider the afore-
quoted provisions of the law in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in question.
Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed to
recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep.
Act No. 4200.
29. Ramirez v. CA, 248 SCRA 590 (1995) (FERNANDEZ)
Keyword: Secret recording
Doctrine: “The right to the privacy of communication, among others, has expressly been assured by
our Constitution. Needless to state here, the framers of our Constitution must have recognized the
nature of conversations between individuals and the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his
feelings and of his intellect. They must have known that part of the pleasures and satisfactions of life
are to be found in the unaudited and free exchange of communication between individuals — free from
every unjustifiable intrusion by whatever means.”
Facts:
Socorro Ramirez filed a civil case for damages against Ester Garcia for allegedly
vexing, insulting, and humiliating her in a confrontation in the latter’s office which is in a matter
offensive the Ramirez’s dignity and personality. She supported her case by procuring a verbatim
transcript of their conversation which was secretly tape recorded.
Issue: WON the secretly tape recordings can be admitted as evidence?
Ruling:
No. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, “An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:
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Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the
parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or
by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record
such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized
by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape
recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute
ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. Thus, even
a person privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the
knowledge of the latter will qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200.
Free conversations are often characterized by exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable falsehoods,

and the expression of anti-social desires of views not intended to be taken seriously. The right to the
privacy of communication, among others, has expressly been assured by our Constitution. Needless to
state here, the framers of our Constitution must have recognized the nature of conversations between
individuals and the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They must
have known that part of the pleasures and satisfactions of life are to be found in the unaudited and free
exchange of communication between individuals — free from every unjustifiable intrusion by whatever
means.
For fairness’s sake, equity and justice demands that the people whose remarks and
observations are being made should know that the observations are being recorded. Otherwise,
there is a complete ban on tape recorded conversations taken without the authorization of all
the parties, and consequently mean that it cannot be used as evidence in the persecution of
offense even in civil or special proceedings.
30. People v. Navarro, GR 121087 (1999) (GORGONIO J)
Keywords: radio station reporters, police officer, fisticuffs, Anti-Wiretapping Act
Doctrine: The Anti-Wiretapping Act prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private
communications. Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its
tape recording is not prohibited.
Facts
Reporters of a radio station in Lucena City, Stanley Jalbuena and Enrique Lingan, went to the
police station to report alleged indecent show in one of the night establishment shows in the City.
At the station, a heated confrontation followed between victim Lingan and accused policeman
Navarro who was then having drinks outside the headquarters, which led to a fisticuffs. The victim
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was hit with the handle of the accused's gun below the left eyebrow, followed by a fist blow on the
forehead, where victim fell and died under treatment.
The exchange of words was recorded on tape, specifically the frantic exclamations made by
Navarro after the altercation that it was the victim who provoked the fight. During the trial,
Jalbuena, the other media man, testified. Presented in evidence to confirm his testimony was a
voice recording he had made of the heated discussion at the police station between the accused
police officer Navarro and the deceased Lingan, which was taken without the knowledge of the
two.
RTC found Navarro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. CA affirmed.
Issues
1. Whether or not the voice recording is admissible in evidence in view of RA 4200, which
prohibits wire-tapping.
2. Whether the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the
offended party and the lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong may be appreciated in favor
of the accused.
Held
1. Yes, the tape is admissible in view of RA 4200, which prohibits wire-tapping. Jalbuena's
testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he had made. The law provides:
SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie
or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described:
IIt shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in
the next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or
any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either
before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the
same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or
in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person:
Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this
prohibition.
SECTION 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport,
effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained
or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible
in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.
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The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications (Ramirez
v Court of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590 [1995]). Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro
and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.
Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording is authenticated by the
testimony of a witness (1) that he personally recorded the conversation; (2) that the tape played
in court was the one he recorded; and (3) that the voices on the tape are those of the persons
such are claimed to belong. In the instant case, Jalbuena testified that he personally made the
voice recording; that the tape played in court was the one he recorded; and that the speakers on
the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan.
The voice recording made by Jalbuena established: (1) that there was a heated exchange
between petitioner Navarro and Lingan on the placing in the police blotter of an entry against him
and Jalbuena; and (2) that some form of violence occurred involving petitioner Navarro and
Lingan, with the latter getting the worst of it.
Dr. Eva Yamamoto, who performed the autopsy on the body of Lingan, issued a medical certificate
containing the findings that Lingan suffered cerebral concussion and shock which directly caused
his death.
2. Yes. The remarks of Lingan, which immediately preceded the acts of the accused, constituted
sufficient provocation. Provocation is said to be any unjust or improper conduct of the offended
party capable of exciting, annoying or irritating someone. The provocation must be sufficient and
must immediately precede the act; and in order to be sufficient, it must be adequate to excite a
person to commit the wrong, which must be accordingly proportionate in gravity. It must
immediately precede the act so much so that there is no interval between the provocation by the
offended party and the commission of the crime by the accused. In the present case, the remarks
of Lingan, which immediately preceded the act of petitioner, constituted sufficient provocation.
This mitigating circumstance should be considered in favor of petitioner Navarro.
The mitigating circumstance that the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as
that committed should also be appreciated in favor of Navarro.. The exclamations made by
Navarro after the scuffle that it was Lingan who provoked him showed that he had no intent to kill
the latter. However, the aggravating circumstance of commission of a crime in a place where the
public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties should be appreciated against
Navarro.
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31. People v. Yatco, et al., 97 Phil 940 (28 Nov 1955) (GORGONIO K)
Keyword: Accused’s confession
Doctrine:
Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if an accused’s confession may
not be competent as against his co-accused, being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove
conspiracy between them without the conspiracy being established by other evidence, the
confession is nevertheless, admissible as evidence of the declarant’s own guilt.
Facts:
Juan Consunji, Alfonso Panganiban, and another whose identity is still unknown, were
charged with having conspired together in the murder of one Jose Ramos.
During the progress of the trial, counsel for the defendant Panganiban interposed a
general objection to any evidence on such confession made by defendant Consunji on the
ground that it was hearsay and therefore incompetent as against the other accused
Panganiban.
The lower court ordered the exclusion of the objected evidence but on a different ground
which is “the prosecution could not be permitted to introduce the confessions of defendants
Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban to prove conspiracy between them, without prior proof
of such conspiracy by a number of definite acts, conditions, and circumstances”.
OSG filed a petition for certiorari before the SC for the review and annulment of the
lower Court's order completely excluding any evidence on the extrajudicial confessions of the
accused Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban without prior proof of conspiracy.
Issues:
#1: WON the lower court is correct in excluding the prosecution’s evidence (extra-judicial
confession by Consunji)?
#2: WON section 12 of Rule 123 is applicable in the case at bar?
#3: WON the court has the power to disregard evidence? (Related to the topic Objections)
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Ruling:
Issue #1: WON the lower court is correct in excluding the prosecution’s evidence (extra-judicial
confession by Consunji)?
No. We believe that the lower Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
complete exclusion of the prosecution's evidence on the alleged confessions of the accused Juan
Consunji at the stage of the trial when the ruling was made.
Section 14, Rule 123, Rules of Court, is specific as to the admissibility of the extrajudicial
confession of an accused, freely and voluntarily made, as evidence against him.
SEC. 14. Confession. — The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging the truth of his
guilt as to the offense charged, may be given in evidence against him.
Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if Consunji's confession may not be
competent as against his co-accused Panganiban, being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove
conspiracy between them without the conspiracy being established by other evidence, the
confession of Consunji was, nevertheless, admissible as evidence of the declarant's own guilt
and should be admitted.
Rule on admissibility
The practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its materiality or technical objections
to the form of the questions should be avoided. In a case of any intricacy it is impossible for a
judge of first instance, in the early stages of the development of the proof, to know with any
certainty whether testimony is relevant or not; and where there is no indication of bad faith on the
part of the Attorney offering the evidence, the court may as a rule safely accept the testimony
upon the statement of the attorney that the proof offered will be connected later. At any rate, in
the final determination and consideration of the case, the trial Court should be able to distinguish
the admissible from the inadmissible, and reject what, under the rules of evidence, should be
excluded. There is greater reason to adhere to such policy in criminal cases where questions
arise as to admissibility of evidence for the prosecution, for the unjustified exclusion of evidence
may lead to the erroneous acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the charges, from which
the People can no longer appeal.
Issue #2: WON section 12 of Rule 123 is applicable in the case at bar?
No. The rule cited by the Court below in support of its exclusion of the proffered evidence is Sec.
12 of Rule 123, providing that the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and
during its existence may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. Manifestly, the rule refers to statements
made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful enterprises("during its existence")
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and in furtherance of its object, and not to a confession made, as in this case, long after the
conspiracy had been brought to an end.
Besides, the prosecution had not yet offered the confessions to prove conspiracy between the
two accused, nor as evidence against both of them. In fact, the alleged confessions (both in writing
and in tape recordings) had not yet even been identified, much less formally offered in evidence.
For all we know, the prosecution might still be able to adduce other proof of conspiracy between
Consunji and Panganiban before their confessions are formally offered in evidence. Assuming,
therefore, that section 12 of Rule 123 also applies to the confessions in question, it was premature
for the respondent Court to exclude them completely on the ground that there was no prior proof
of conspiracy.
Issue #3: WON the court has the power to disregard evidence? (Related to the topic Objections)
The court does not have the said power.
The exclusion of the proferred confessions was not made on the basis of the objection interposed
by Panganiban's counsel, but upon an altogether different ground, which the Court issued motu
proprio. Panganiban's counsel objected to Consunji's confession as evidence of the guilt of the
other accused Panganiban, on the ground that it was hearsay as to the latter. But the Court,
instead of ruling on this objection, put up its own objection to the confessions — that it could not
be admitted to prove conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban without prior evidence of
such conspiracy by a number of indefinite acts, conditions, circumstances, etc. and completely
excluded the confessions on that ground. By so doing, the Court overlooked that the right to object
is a mere privilege which the parties may waive; and if the ground for objection is known and not
reasonably made, the objection is deemed waived and the Court has no power, on its own motion,
to disregard the evidence.
32. People v. Pablito Andan, GR 116437 03 Mar 1997 (GUANZON)
KEYWORD: Confession to mayor and media
DOCTRINE: Exclusionary Rule is not applicable to the spontaneous statement made by the
accused which are not elicited through questioning by the authorities.
FACTS:
Pablito Andan, alias “Bobby”, was accused with the crime of rape with homicide against his 20-
year old cousin, Mariane Guevarra.
Marriane was walking along the subdivision, on her way to her school dormitory, when accused
invited her inside his house on the pretext that the blood pressure of his wife’s grandmother should
be taken. Upon entering, the accused punched here in the abdomen, brought her in the kitchen
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and raped her. During the night of the same day, accused dragged the then unconscious Marriane
to their backyard, where he lifted and draped her body over the fence of the pig pen to transfer it
to the vacant lot. He hit her with a concrete block, dragged her towards a shallow portion of the
lot and abandoned her body there.
The body of Marianne was discovered the following day. Her death drew public attention that
prompted the Mayor of Baliuag to from a crack team of police officers. The police included in their
investigation the house of Andan. The police interviewed the occupants of the house, where they
learned from the brother-in-law, that Andan and his family had lived there but later on left without
a word.
The accused was later traced to the house of his parents, where he was found and arrested.
Initially, the accused denied the accusations during the interrogation. However, he later confessed
that he was involved in the killing of Marriane, but merely acted as a look-out to Larin and Dizon,
his then neighbors, and that the latter individuals killed Marriane. He even confessed and was
able to retrieve the 2 bags of Marriane.
Larin, Dizon, and the accused was later on subjected to physical examination. The medical officer
found that the accused sustained multiple scratches on the right side of his neck, chest, and back.
When the results of the investigation were to be presented to the media, the accused ask the
mayor to talk to him in private. There the accused broke down and confessed his guilt. The mayor
opened the room to the public and media to witness the confession. The mayor first asked for a
lawyer to assist the accused but since there was no one available he ordered the proceedings to
be photographed and videotaped. In the next two days, the accused was interviewed by different
reporters wherein he affirmed his confession and re-enacted the crime.
Despite this, he later on pleaded not guilty in his arraignment.
The trial court convicted Pablito Andan and sentenced him to death. The court based its decision
on the testimonies of the 3 policemen of the investigating team, the mayor of Baliuagm and 4
news reporters. The photographs and video footages of his confession and re-enactment was
also taken into consideration.
In this automatic review, Pablito Andan now contend that the testimonies of the aforementioned
personalities should have not been admitted as evidence as they were made during custodial
investigation without the assistance of counsel.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimonies of the policemen, mayor, and news reporters be admitted
as evidence.
RULING:
Policemen – NO; Mayor and News Reporters – YES
As to the testimonies of the policemen:
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The same cannot be admitted as evidence. Sec. 12 pars. 1 and 3 of Article 3 of the Constitution
states that “a person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right…
to have competent and independent counsel…. These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel… Any confession or admission obtained in violation… hereof shall
be inadmissible in evidence against him.”
This exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an
unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police interrogation procedures where the
potentiality for compulsion, physical, and psychological, is forcefully apparent.
In this case, Pablito was already under custodial investigation when he confessed to the police.
As when he was arrested, the police were no longer engaged in a general inquiry but already
holds him as the primary suspect of Marriane’s death.
It was admitted that the police failed to inform the accused of his constitutional rights when he
was investigated. Wherefore, his confession is inadmissible as evidence. Corollarily, the bags of
Marriane were fruits of Pablito’s uncounseled confession, as such is also inadmissible as they are
tainted evidence.
As to the testimonies of the mayor and the news reporters:
The same was properly admitted as evidence. As a rule, constitutional procedures on custodial
investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the
authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed
the crime. The Constitution bars the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions
and NOT to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.
In this case, the mayor, although may arguably be deemed as a law enforcement officer for
purposes of applying the aforementioned constitutional provision, did not question Pablito at all.
It was the accused himself who spontaneously, freely, and voluntarily sought the mayo for a
private meeting. The mayor acted as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer. As such,
the uncounseled confession he made to the mayor did not violate his constitutional right.
Likewise, the confessions made to the media were made in response to the questions by news
reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. The media asked his permission
before interviewing him. And all his confessions were witnessed by his family and other relatives.
The court found that there was no coercive atmosphere in the interview of the accused by the
reporters.
Thus, the testimonies of the mayor and the news reporters were properly admitted as evidence.
Wherefore, the decision of the RTC is affirmed and the accused is found guilty of the special
complex crime of rape with homicide and is sentenced to the penalty of death.
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33. People v. Albert Abriol et al., GR 123137, 17 Oct 2001 (HO)
Keyword:
EXPERT OPINION ON BALLISTICS
Doctrine:
An expert witness is "one who belongs to the profession or calling to which the subject matter of
the inquiry relates and who possesses special knowledge on questions on which he proposes to
express an opinion." There is no definite standard of determining the degree of skill or knowledge
that a witness must possess in order to testify as an expert. It is sufficient that the following factors
be present: (1) training and education; (2) particular, first-hand familiarity with the facts of the
case; and (3) presentation of authorities or standards upon which his opinion is based. The
question of whether a witness is properly qualified to give an expert opinion on ballistics
rests with the discretion of the trial court.
FACTS:
Accused-appellants were charged of murder and illegal possession of firearms at the RTC of
Cebu City for killing one Alexander Flores aka “Alex”. Among the witnesses presented by the
prosecution were Romeo Sta. Cruz, Jr., a radio news reporter then aboard his jeep who heard a
couple of gunshots; PO3 Celso Seville, Jr., a homicide investigator of Police Station No. 3 who
found four (4) .45 caliber shells some four (4) feet away from the victim's body, and two (2)
deformed slugs where the victim had lain; Dr. Ladislao Diola, Jr., Chief of the PNP Region 7 Crime
Laboratory who had autopsied the victim's body; and SPO4 Lemuel Caser, a ballistician of the
PNP Crime Laboratory.
Accused appellant Abriol also testified that he surrendered his service firearm to the BBRC
Administrative Officer when he was served a warrant of arrest for murder in Criminal Case No.
CBU-28843. However, the handgun was defective and it was returned to him for repair by
Armscor. He presented a Memorandum Receipt authorizing him to carry the government-issued
.38 revolver. The defense also presented Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, medico-legal officer of the Cebu
City PNP Command, to testify on the caliber of the firearms which might have caused the gunshot
wounds of the victim. Relying on the Necropsy Report prepared by Dr. Diola, Dr. Cerna declared
that wound nos. 1 and 2, which each measured 0.6 cm. by 0.6 cm., may have been caused by a
.38 caliber firearm. As to wound nos. 3 and 4, which each measured 0.5 cm. by 0.5 cm., it was
possible that a .38 handgun was used, or one with a smaller bore. Dr. Cerna opined that a .45
pistol could not have inflicted all the foregoing wounds, as the entry points were too small for a
.45 caliber bullet. With respect to the grazing wounds found on the victim's body, Dr. Cerna
testified that it was impossible to determine the caliber of the firearm used.
The trial court found appellants' version of the incident neither convincing and credible and, as
earlier stated, it believed the prosecution's version. Petitioners' were convicted of the offenses
charged.
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Hence, this appeal. The defense stated that the lower court erred in convicting the accused-
appellants for the crime of murder and illegal possession of firearms when they received in
evidence the testimony of Dr. Diola and P/Inspector Lemuel Caser. They contend that both
findings were ambiguous and have no basis. On the other hand, appellants allege that the
testimony of P/Inspector Lemuel Caser, the prosecution's ballistics expert, clearly shows that: (1)
He is ignorant about such ballistics instruments such as the micrometer, goniometer, and
pressure barrel. (2) He is not conversant with "the required references concerning ballistics,"
particularly books on the subject by foreign authorities. (3) He could not "scientifically determine
the caliber of a bullet." Since P/Inspector Caser lacked adequate training and expertise in
ballistics, they claim that his opinion that the test bullets and cartridges matched the slugs and
cartridges recovered from the scene of the crime was not reliable. Appellants also assail Caser's
failure to take the necessary photographs to support his findings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the expert opinion of both the medical doctor and ballistic expert should be stricken
down.
HELD:
No. The Office of the Solicitor General points out that Dr. Diola's testimony is supported by Dr.
Pedro P. Solis, a medical expert, in his book entitled Legal Medicine. The factors which could
make the wound of entrance bigger than the caliber include: (1) shooting in contact or near fire;
(2) deformity of the bullet which entered; (3) a bullet which might have entered the skin sidewise;
and (4) an acute angular approach of the bullet. However, where the wound of entrance is smaller
than the firearm's caliber, the same may be attributed to the fragmentation of the bullet before
entering the skin or to a contraction of the elastic tissues of the skin. Dr. Diola testified that a .45
caliber pistol could have caused the grazing wounds on the victim's head and extremities. Dr.
Cerna corroborated Dr. Diola's findings in this regard. Such expert opinions disprove appellants'
theory that the .45 caliber handguns confiscated from them could not have been used in killing
the victim.
An expert witness is "one who belongs to the profession or calling to which the subject matter of
the inquiry relates and who possesses special knowledge on questions on which he proposes to
express an opinion." There is no definite standard of determining the degree of skill or knowledge
that a witness must possess in order to testify as an expert. It is sufficient that the following factors
be present: (1) training and education; (2) particular, first-hand familiarity with the facts of the
case; and (3) presentation of authorities or standards upon which his opinion is based. The
question of whether a witness is properly qualified to give an expert opinion on ballistics rests with
the discretion of the trial court.
In giving credence to Caser's expert testimony, the trial court explained:
The defense downgraded the capability of Caser in forensics ballistics and identifying
firearms. Much stress is given to the absence of photographs of his examination.
72
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Nonetheless, the Court is satisfied with Caser's examination, findings and conclusions
with the use of a microscope. Caser's conclusion based on his examination deserves
credit. He found the impressions on the primer of the fired cartridges that were test-fired
to have the same characteristics with those recovered at the scene of the crime. Whenever
a triggerman pumps a bullet (into) the body of his victim, he releases a chunk of concrete
evidence that binds him inseparably to his act. Every gun barrel deeply imprints on every
bullet its characteristic marking peculiar to that gun and that gun alone. These marking
might be microscopic but they are terribly vocal in announcing their origin. And they are
as infallible for purposes of identification, as the print left by the human finger. 41
We agree with the trial court that P/Inspector Caser qualifies as a ballistics expert. He is a licensed
criminologist, trained at the Ballistics Command and Laboratory Center in Fort Bonifacio, in the
PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, and in the National Bureau of Investigation. He had
previously testified as an expert witness in at least twenty-seven (27) murder and homicide cases
all over the country. An expert witness need not present comparative microphotographs of test
bullets and cartridges to support his findings. Examination under a comparison microscope
showing that the test bullet and the evidence bullet both came from the same gun is sufficient.
Moreover, the ballistician conclusively found similar characteristic markings in the evidence, test
cartridges and slugs.
34. Beltran v. Samson, GR 32025, 23 Sept 1929 (JAILANI)
KEYWORD: Handwriting specimen
DOCTRINES:
1. Constitutional inhibition is directed not merely to giving of oral testimony, but embraces as
well the furnishing of evidence by other means than by word of mouth, the divulging, in short, of
any fact which the accused has a right to hold secret.
2. The privilege not to give self-incriminating evidence, while absolute when claimed, maybe
waived by any one entitled to invoke it.
FACTS: This is a petition for a writ of prohibition, wherein the petitioner complains that the
respondent judge ordered him to appear before the provincial fiscal to take dictation in his own
handwriting from the latter.
The order was given upon petition of said fiscal for the purpose of comparing the petitioner's
handwriting and determining whether or not it is he who wrote certain documents supposed to
be falsified.
There is no question as to the facts alleged in the complaint filed in these proceedings; but the
respondents contend that the petitioner is not entitled to the remedy applied for, inasmuch as
the order prayed for by the provincial fiscal and later granted by the court below, and again
73
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which the instant action was brought, is based on the provisions of section 1687 of the
Administrative Code
ISSUE: whether the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of
comparing the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents
supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of
the constitutional provision under examination.
RULING: in the case before us, writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands,
or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of
intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to
furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent
fiscal clearly state.
It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the
petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the
circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, according to Exhibit A, it should not be
a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even
supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or specimens without resorting to the means
complained herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the
constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of
justice, but such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege.
This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons.
Wherefore, we find the present action well taken, and it is ordered that the respondents and
those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely and forever from compelling the petitioner
to take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison.
35. People v. Musa, GR 96177, 27 Jan 1993 (JAVIER)
KEYWORD: Buy-Bust/ Kitchen/ hanging plastic bag
DOCTRINE: Plain View Doctrine will not apply where the incriminating nature of the object is not
apparent from the ‘’plain view’’ of the object.
FACTS:
This involves a buy-bust operation
Gist: NARCOM team had conducted a surveillance and successfully test buy on appellant (Mari
Musa) pursuant to an information received that he is engaged in the sale of marijuana, a buy-
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bust operation was planned which resulted in appellant’s arrest. The team found a plastic bag
containing dried marijuana in the kitchen. (INADMISSIBLE)
The operation happened outside the house of Musa. When the poseur-buyer (Sgt. Ani)
negotiated with Mr. Musa, he handed to Musa the marked money, the consideration for the sale
of illegal drugs. But the accused did not bring with him the illegal drugs. He accepted the
money and went inside his house to get the drugs. When he came back he handed the two
newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana to the officer and that’s the time he was
arrested. When he was body searched, they could not find the marked money. When they
interrogated the accused, he told them he did not bring the money. They went inside the house
and turned the inside of the house upside down to locate the marked money and in the course
stumbled upon a plastic hanging at the kitchen. Curious of its contents, the police asked Mr.
Musa the contents of the plastic which he did not answered. It turned out the plastic contained
Marijuana leaves. It objected its admission but the state sought its admission to under evidence
in plain view.
ISSUE:
WON the seizure of a plastic bag containing marijuana is admissible as evidence
RULING:
NO. NOT ADMISSIBLE.
The NARCOM agents searched the person of the appellant after arresting him in his house but
found nothing. They then searched the entire house and, in the kitchen, found and seized a
plastic bag hanging in the corner. The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a
suspect’s lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the
premises or surroundings under his immediate control under Sec. 12 of Rule 126.
However, it DOES NOT fall under ‘’PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE’’. The agents found the plastic
bag inside the kitchen and upon asking about the contents of the bag, the accused did not
answer, making the agents open the bag and find marijuana leaves. Even if an object is
observed in ‘’’plain view’’ the ‘’plain view’’ doctrine will not justify the seizure of the object where
the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the ‘’plain view’’ of the object.
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36. US v. Ong Siu Hong GR L-12778, 03 August 1917 (KINAZO)
KEYWORD: Morphine
DOCTRINE: Forcing an accused to discharge morphine from his mouth is not compelling him to
be a witness against himself.
FACTS:
Counsel for appellant raises the constitutional question that the accused was compelled to be a
witness against himself as the result of forcing the accused to discharge the morphine from his
mouth.
ISSUES: WON forcing the accused to discharge morphine from his mouth compels him to be a
witness against himself
RULING:
NO.
Forcing an accused to discharge morphine from his mouth is not compelling him to be a
witness against himself.
To force a prohibited drug from the person of an accused is along the same line as
requiring him to exhibit himself before the court; or putting in evidence papers and other articles
taken from the room of an accused in his absence; or as in the Tan Teng case, taking a
substance from the body of the accused to be used in proving his guilt. It would be a forced
construction of the paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights in question to hold that any article,
substance, or thing taken from a person accused of a crime could not be given in evidence.
The main purpose of this constitutional provision is to prohibit testimonial compulsion by
oral examination in order to extort unwilling confessions from prisoners implicating them in the
commission of a crime.
76

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EH 402 (2020) BATCH 1 DIGESTS

EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS

ISSUES: WON the evidence was admissible.

RULING: Yes, the evidence was admissible.

Section 20. Administrative investigation shall be conducted in accordance

KEYWORD: WHIPLASH INJURY

KEYWORD: robbery, possession of money, admissibility of evidence

DOCTRINE: MERE POSSESSION OF A QUANTITY OF MONEY IS IN ITSELF NO

· In identifying Ball, Krekeler was impressed with and remembered the

12) Ball’s Defense:

· there was no direct evidence of an injury or any evidence to show that

o It is said that the introduction of these exhibits was "immaterial and

MERE POSSESSION OF A QUANTITY OF MONEY IS IN ITSELF NO INDICATION

· ELEMENT OF FEAR IS A REASONABLE INFERENCE FROM EVIDENCE

· REMOTENESS OF THE FLIGHT GOES TO THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE

4. Lopez v. Heesen, 69 NM 206, 365 P. 2d 448 NM 1961, 22 Aug 1961(BERINGUEL)

KEYWORD: HIGGINS MODEL 51 HUNTING RIFLE, SAFE OR NOT

5. People v. Marti 193 SCRA 57 (CAIMBRE)

DOCTRINE: An act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's

● If the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private

● The law enforcers testified that accused/appellant was informed of his

6. Waterous Drug Corp v. NLRC, 280 SCRA 735 (DULANAS)

KEYWORDS: PHARMACIST/ OVERPRICED

Hearsay evidence carries no probative value.

Labor Arbiter: Decided in favor of Catolico because:

2. Catolico was denied due process.

3. Catolico was unjustly dismissed.

Catolico's dismissal then was obviously grounded on mere suspicion, which in no

7. People v. Eric Guillermo GR 147786 20 Jan 2004 (ESTRELLA)

Topic: Admissibility of confession in violation of Miranda principles.

ISSUE: WON Guillermo’s confession during the police investigation is inadmissible

8. Villaflor v. Summers GR 16444, 8 Sept 1920 (FAJARDO)

Keyword: ADULTERY; BODY EXAMINATION (Preggy or not?)

9. Pascual v. Medical Board of Examiners GR L-25018, 26 May 1969 (FERNANDEZ)

Keyword: Medical Malpractice

10. Cabal v. Kapunan GR L-19052 29 Dec 1962 (GORGONIO J)

Keywords: Forfeiture proceedings, penalty, criminal in nature; graft, corrupt practices

11. Beltran v. Samson GR 32025, 23 Sept 1929 (GORGONIO K)

KEYWORD: Handwriting as evidence

12. US v. Tan Teng GR 7081, 7 Sept 1912 (GUANZON)

The trial court found him guilty of the crime of rape.

13. People v. Salanguit, GR 133254-55, 19 April 2001 (HO)

Plain View Doctrine

RTC found Salanguit guilty of the crimes.

14. People v. Damaso GR 93516, 12 August 1992 (JAILANI)

KEYWORD: M-14 rifle

RULING: No. The evidence is inadmissible.

15. Padilla v. CA, 269 SCRA 402 (1997) (JAVIER)

(In Flagrante Delicto Arrest)

Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested

(Valid Warrantless search and seizure)

16. People v. Amminudin GR 74869, 6 July 1988 (KINAZO)

DOCTRINE: : Evidence obtained through an illegal warrantless search is inadmissible.

No. Evidence from a poisonous tree cannot be admitted.

17. People v. Zenaida Quebral GR 185379, 27 Nov. 2009 (PEREZ)

Keyword: Reverse; 15 Meters

ISSUE: WON there’s a valid search and arrest.

18. Rosete v. Lim GR 136051, 8 June 2006 (RICALDE)

KEYWORD: Refusal to take Deposition

19. People v. Bokingo GR 187536, 10 August 2011 (RIEL)

KEYWORD: “Tara, patay na siya.” HAMMERING THE VICTIM’S HEAD

An EXCEPTION to the res inter alios acta rule is AN ADMISSION MADE BY A

BOKINGCO’s RECOLLECTION: Pasion appears to be intoxicated and wanted to