Evidence Digests

EVIDENCE - 3S
CASE DIGEST
EVIDENCE AND
TRIAL TECHNIQUES
SECTION 3S (2019-
2020)
Under: Atty.
Francesca Lourdes
M. Senga
Agapalo | Aliping | Aquilizan | Aruta | Asuncion | Baguio | Balisi | Canja | Cunanan | Dalidig | De Leon | Dela Cruz | Diloy | Escanilla | Fabella | Francisco |
Hernandez | Lamado | Limpot | Maranon | Oliveros | Orcullo | Pepito | Rubio | Somera | Taduran | Tio
EVIDENCE - 3S
Case #1 TOPIC: Section 1, Evidence Defined, Quantum of
Evidence, Burden of Proof, Burden of Evidence
CASE TITLE: Vitarich Corporation vs Chona Losin
G.R. NO: 181560 DATE: November 15, 2010
PONENTE: Mendoza, J
DOCTRINE:
As a general rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. In Jimenez v. NLRC, the Court ruled that the
burden rests on the debtor to prove payment, rather than on the creditor to prove non-payment. The debtor has the
burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged by payment.
FACTS:
Respondent Chona Losin (Losin) was in the fastfood and catering services business named Glamours Chicken
House, with address at Parang Road, Cotabato City. Vitarich, had been her supplier of poultry meat.
In the months of July to November 1996, Losin’s orders of dressed chicken and other meat products allegedly
amounted to ₱921,083.10. During this said period, Losin’s poultry meat needs were serviced by Rodrigo Directo
(Directo) and Allan Rosa (Rosa), both salesmen and authorized collectors of Vitarich, and Arnold Baybay (Baybay),
a supervisor of said corporation.
On August 24, 1996, Directo’s services were terminated by Vitarich without Losin’s knowledge. He left without turning
over some supporting invoices covering the orders of Losin. Rosa and Baybay resigned on November 30, 1996 and
December 30, 1996, respectively and also did not also turn over pertinent invoices covering Losin’s account.
On February 12, 1997, demand letters were sent to Losin covering her alleged unpaid account amounting to
₱921,083.10. Because of said demands, she checked her records and discovered that she had an overpayment to
Vitarich in the amount of ₱500,000.00. She relayed this fact to Vitarich and further informed the latter that checks
were issued and the same were collected by Directo.
It appears that Losin had issued three (3) checks amounting to ₱288,463.30 which were dishonored either for reasons
- Drawn Against Insufficient Funds (DAIF) or Stop Payment.
On March 2, 1998, Vitarich filed a complaint for Sum of Money against Losin, Directo, Rosa, and Baybay before the
RTC.
On August 9, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of Vitarich.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of Losin
ISSUE: Whether Vitarich has the burden of proof.
RULING:
No.
Vitarich presented several charge sales invoices and statement of account to support Losin’s accountability for the
products delivered to her. A total of ₱921,083.10 was initially charged to her. Losin, on the other hand, presented a
copy of the list of checks allegedly issued to Vitarich through its agent Directo, and a Statement of Payments Made
to Vitarich to support her allegation of payment.
As a general rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. In Jimenez v. NLRC, the Court ruled that the
burden rests on the debtor to prove payment, rather than on the creditor to prove non-payment. The debtor has the
burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged by payment.
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True, the law requires in civil cases that the party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. Section 1, Rule 131
of the Rules of Court provides that the burden of proof is the duty of a party to prove the truth of his claim or defense,
or any fact in issue by the amount of evidence required by law. In this case, however, the burden of proof is on Losin
because she alleges an affirmative defense, namely, payment. Losin failed to discharge that burden.
After examination of the evidence presented, this Court is of the opinion that Losin failed to present a single official
receipt to prove payment. This is contrary to the well-settled rule that a receipt, which is a written and signed
acknowledgment that money and goods have been delivered, is the best evidence of the fact of payment although
not exclusive.All she presented were copies of the list of checks allegedly issued to Vitarich through its agent Directo,
a Statement of Payments Made to Vitarich, and apparently copies of the pertinent history of her checking account with
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC). At best, these may only serve as documentary records of her
business dealings with Vitarich to keep track of the payments made but these are not enough to prove payment.
Article 1249, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code provides:

The delivery of promissory notes payable to order, or bills of exchange or other mercantile documents shall produce
the effect of payment only when they have been cashed, or when through the fault of the creditor they have been
impaired.
In the case at bar, no cash payment was proved. It was neither confirmed that the checks issued by Losin were
actually encashed by Vitarich. Thus, the Court cannot consider that payment, much less overpayment, made by Losin.
DISPOSITIVE RULING:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering Chona Losin to pay Vitarich Corporation the following:
(1) ₱222,434.96 representing the two checks, with Check Nos. CX 046324 dated August 27, 1996 and CX 046325
dated August 30, 1996 which had been stopped payment and the amount as appearing in Charge Sales Invoice
marked as Exhibit ‘L’ subject to an interest rate of 6% per annum from February 12, 1997, the date when Vitarich
demanded payment of the sum amounting to ₱921,083.10 from Losin until finality of the Decision. The rate of interest
shall increase to 12% per annum only from such finality until its satisfaction, the interim period being deemed to be
equivalent to a forbearance of credit;
(2) ₱10,000.00 representing attorney’s fees; and
(3) Cost of suit.
The complaint against Allan Rosa and Arnold Baybay is dismissed. The complaint against Rodrigo Directo (at large)
is ordered archived until he could be served with summons.
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Case # 2 TOPIC: Section 1, Evidence Defined, Quantum of

Evidence, Burden of Proof and Burden of Evidence
CASE TITLE: TOMAS P. TAN Jr. vs. JOSE G. HOSANA
G.R. NO 190846: FEB. 3, 2016
BRION, J.
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
Spouses Jose G. Hosana and Milagros C. Hosana bought a house and lot located at Tinago, Naga City. On January
13, 1998, Milagros sold to the petitioner Tomas P. Tan, Jr. the subject property, as evidenced by a deed of sale
executed by Milagros herself and as attorney-in-fact of Jose, by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed
by Jose in her favor. The Deed of Sale stated that the purchase price for the lot was P200,000.00.
On October 19, 2001, Jose filed before the RTC a Complaint for Annulment of Sale/Cancellation of
Title/Reconveyance and Damages against Milagros, Tomas, and the Register of Deeds of Naga City. Jose averred
that while he was working in Japan, Milagros, without his consent and knowledge, conspired with Tomas to execute
the SPA by forging Jose's signature making it appear that Jose had authorized Milagros to sell the subject property
to Tomas. Tomas claimed that he was a buyer in good faith and for value and that the SPA authorizing Milagros to
sell the property was annotated at the back of the title.
With the assurance that all the documents were in order, Tomas made a partial payment of P350,000.00 and another
P350,000.00 upon the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale. Tomas noticed that the consideration written by
Milagros on the Deed of Sale was only P200,000.00; he inquired why the written consideration was lower than the
actual consideration paid. Milagros explained that it was done to save on taxes. Tomas also learned from Milagros
that she needed money badly and had to sell the house because Jose had stopped sending her money.
The RTC decided in favor of Jose and nullified the sale of the subject property to Tomas. The RTC held that the SPA
dated June 10, 1996, wherein Jose supposedly appointed Milagros as his attorney-in-fact, was actually null and void.
The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC that the deed of sale and the SPA were void. However, the CA modified the
judgment by directing Jose and Milagros to reimburse Tomas the purchase price of P200,000.00, with interest, under
the principle of unjust enrichment. Despite Tomas' allegation that he paid P700,000.00 for the subject lot, the CA
found that there was no convincing evidence that established this claim. Tomas’ motion for reconsideration was
denied. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari. Tomas argues that the CA erred in relying on the
consideration stated in the deed of sale as basis for the reimbursable amount because a null and void document
cannot be used as evidence.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the deed of sale can be used as the basis for the amount of consideration paid; and
2. W/N the testimony of Tomas is sufficient to establish the actual purchase price of the sale.
RULING:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the ruling of the CA.
1. YES. A void document is admissible as evidence because the purpose of introducing it as evidence is to ascertain
the truth respecting a matter of fact, not to enforce the terms of the document itself.
While the terms and provisions of a void contract cannot be enforced since it is deemed inexistent, it does not preclude
the admissibility of the contract as evidence to prove matters that occurred in the course of executing the contract,
i.e., what each party has given in the execution of the contract. The deed of sale as documentary evidence may be
used as a means to ascertain the truthfulness of the consideration stated and its actual payment. The deed of sale is
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used as a means to determine matters that occurred in the execution of such contract, i.e., the determination of what
each party has given under the void contract to allow restitution and prevent unjust enrichment. Moreover, there is no
provision in the Rules of Evidence which excludes the admissibility of a void document.
In the present case, the deed of sale was declared null and void by positive provision of the law prohibiting the sale
of conjugal property without the spouse's consent. It does not, however, preclude the possibility that Tomas paid the
consideration stated therein. The admission of the deed of sale as evidence is consistent with the liberal policy of the
court to admit the evidence which appears to be relevant in resolving an issue before the courts.
2. NO. In civil cases, the basic rule is that the party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a
preponderance of evidence. Moreover, the parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence, not upon the
weakness of the defense offered by their opponent.
Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually
considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible
evidence." Preponderance of evidence is a phrase that, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is
evidence that is more convincing to the court as it is worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
No documentary or testimonial evidence to prove payment of the higher amount was presented, apart from Tomas'
sole testimony. Tomas' sole testimony of payment is self-serving and insufficient to unequivocally prove that
Milagros received P700,000.00 for the subject property. In the present case, the consideration stated in the deed of
sale constitutes prima facie evidence of the amount paid by Tomas for the transfer of the property to his name.
Tomas failed to adduce satisfactory evidence to rebut or contradict the consideration stated as the actual
consideration and amount paid to Milagros and Jose. The notarized deed of sale is a public document and is prima
facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated therein. Hence, the consideration stated in the deed of sale remains
sufficient evidence of the actual amount the petitioner paid and the same amount which should be returned under
the principle of unjust enrichment.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for review on certiorari. The decision dated
August 28, 2009 and the resolution dated November 17, 2009, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88645 is
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
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Case # 3 TOPIC: Quantum of Evidence, Burden of Proof and
Burden of Evidence
CASE TITLE: Pedro G. Tolentino, Romeo M. Laygo, Solomon M. Lulalang, Sr., Meliton D. Evangelista, Sr.,
Complainants, VS Atty. Norberto M. Mendoza, Respondent.
G.R. NO: AC NO. 5151 DATE: October 19, 2004
PONENTE: Austria-Martines, J.:
DOCTRINE: The evidence presented by complainants reach the quantum of evidence required in administrative
proceedings which is only substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conviction.
FACTS: Complainants allege that Atty. Mendoza, a former MTC Judge, abandoned his legal wife, Felicitas V.
Valderia in favor of his paramour Marily dela Fuente. The two have been cohabiting openly and publicly as husband
and wife in Brgy. Estrella, Naujan, Oriental Mindoro. They bore two children and declared in the birth certificates that
they were married on May 12, 1986 making it appear that the children were legitimate. However, in respondent;s
CoC filed with the COMELEC in 1995, he declared Felicitas as his legal wife while in 1998, he declared his civil
status as separated. Such false declarations constitute falsification of public documents and respondent’s acts
betray his lack of good moral character and constitute grounds for his removal as member of the bar.
Respondent filed his comment stating that the complainants who are his political opponents are merely filing the
case to exact revenge on him for his filing of criminal charges against them. He further commented that the
complainants illegally procured copies of the birth certificates of his children in violation of A.O. No. 1, s. 1993, thus,
such documents are inadmissible in evidence.
The case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. Thereafter, the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the IBP conducted hearings.
Witnesses for complainants Nelson Melgar (former Mayor) and Romeo Laygo (Municipal Councilor) submitted their
affidavits as their direct testimony and were subjected to cross-examination by respondent’s counsel. Both the
affidavits contained that the respondent is known as a practicing lawyer and a former MTC Judge. That he has been
cohabiting openly and publicly with Marilyn representing themselves as husband and wife and from that they bore
two children. Sometime in 1995, the witnesses received a letter from a concerned citizen informing them that
respondent was married to one Felicitas. Attached to the letter was a photocopy of a Certification issued by the Civil
Register attesting to the marriage between respondent and Felicitas and also that Marilyn was married to one Ramon
Marcos.
On cross-examination, witness Laygo testified that he was not the one who procured the certified true copies of the
birth certificates of the two children Mara and Myrra, as somebody just gave said documents to witness Melgar.
Complainants then formally offered documentary evidence consisting of photocopies which were admitted by
respondent’s counsel to be faithful reproductions of the originals or certified true copies thereof: (1) The letter; (2)
The birth certificates; (3) marriage certificate of respondent and Felicitas; (4) the CoC filed with the COMELEC in
1998; (5) marriage certificate of Marilyn and Ramon; and (6) an editorial page of the Naujanews wherein it is stated
that respondent has two daughters with his wife Marilyn.
Respondent opted not to present any evidence and merely submitted a memorandum expounding on his arguments
that the testimonies of complainants’ witnesses are mere hearsay, thus, said testimonies and their documentary
evidence have no probative weight.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimonies of the witnesses and documentary evidence of the complainants have
probative weight.
RULING: The affidavits of the witnesses are categorical statements made under oath by complainants are not
hearsay and remain un-rebutted. Respondent chose not to rebut them. With respect to the documentary evidence,
the Court believes that they are competent and relevant evidence admissible in this proceedings. The exclusionary
rule which bars admission of illegally obtained evidence applies more appropriately to evidence obtained as a result
of illegal searches and seizures. This instant case cannot be analogous to an illegal search or seizure. A person
who violates Rule 24 of A.O. No. 1, s. 1993 as cited by respondent risks the penalty of imprisonment of payment of
fine but it does not make the document so issued inadmissible as evidence specially in proceedings like the present
case.
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By and large the evidence of complainants consisting of the testimonies of witnesses Melgar and Laygo, and
corroborated by the documentary exhibits will show that indeed respondent has been cohabiting publicly with Marilyn
who is not his wife and that out of said cohabitation respondent sired two children. These facts we repeat have not
been denied by respondent under oath since he chose to just argue on the basis of the improper motivations and
the inadmissibility, hearsay and self-serving nature of the documents presented. Complainants have presented
evidence sufficient enough to convince us that indeed respondent has been cohabiting publicly with a person not
his wife. The evidence taken together will support the fact that respondent is not of good moral character. The direct
and forthright testimonies and statements of Melgar and Laygo is not hearsay. The witnesses may have admitted
that respondent did not tell them that a certain Marilyn was his paramour but the witnesses did state clearly in their
affidavits under oath that respondent was cohabiting with Marilyn who is not his wife.
The evidence presented by complainants reach the quantum of evidence required in administrative proceedings
which is only substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conviction.
Furthermore, Sec.3, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that “evidence is admissible when it is
relevant to the issue and is not excluded by law or these rules.” There could be no dispute that the subject birth
certificates who is said to be produced in violation of AO 1, s. 1993, are relevant to the issue. Note that Rule 24 of
AO 1 only provides for sanctions for violating the rule on confidentiality of birth records but nowhere does it state
that procurement of birth records in violation of said rule render said records inadmissible in evidence. Also, the rule
on inadmissibility of evidence does not apply in this case.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: Wherefore, respondent Atty. Norberto M. Mendoza is hereby found GUILTY of
immorality, in violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR. He is SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the practice of law until
he submits satisfactorily proof that he has abandoned his immoral course of conduct.
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Case No. 4 Section 1. Evidence Defined; Quantum of Evidence,
Burden of Proof and Burden of Evidence
People v. Caranguian
G.R. No. 124514 July 6, 2000
QUISUMBING J.:
DOCTRINE:
QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE
The quantum of evidence required in criminal cases is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable
doubt does not mean absolute certainty. It is only moral certainty that is required or that degree of proof that
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
The rationale for requiring the same is the almost unlimited resources at the State’s command with prior inculpatory
finding in its hands. These inequalities of position the law strives to meet by the rule that there is to be no conviction
when there is a reasonable doubt of guilt.
BURDEN OF PROOF AND BURDEN OF EVIDENCE

There is a constitutional presumption of innocence. Thus, because of this presumption, it is the State that has the
burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt to overturn or rebut the presumption of innocence protected by the
Constitution.
FACTS: In August 1, 1991 in the morning, Civilian Volunteer Organization (CVO) members Lumboy and Capiili
informed PO3 Birung that they sighted two former Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) agents at a
barangay in Cagayan.
Birung formed a team to track the two CAFGUs. The team proceeded to the barangay in single file with in the lead.
Suddenly, they came under gunfire. The team returned fire. The exchange lasted for 30 minutes. The gunmen
withdrew to another barangay. PO3 Birung ordered his men to rescue Lumboy and Capili. Lumboy died while Capili
was rushed to the hospital.
The next day, an informer named the two former CAFGUs sighted as Caranguian and Garcia, the appelant and co-
accused in this case. Both were charged with Murder for the killing of Lumboy and Frustrated Murder for the
wounding of Capili. They were convicted of murder but acquitted of the Frustrated Murder charge.
As a defense, Canranguian (his co-accused still at large) invokes the defense of denial and alibi. He claims that at
the time he was 15 kilometers away. Sol Gen contends that the sole eye witness testified in clear and unequivocal
terms as to the identity of the assailants.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there has been a sufficient identification of the appelant as the perpetrator of the offense.
RULING:
No. The prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that it was Caranguian who perpetrated the
killing.
Quantum of evidence required in criminal cases is proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Section 2 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that "[p]roof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such
degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or
that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind."
Two fold task of the prosecution,

First, To prove that a crime was committed, and second, that accused is the person responsible. The prosecution
must be able to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence beyond reasonable doubt to justify
the conviction of the accused.
Rationale for requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt

The State is arrayed against the subject; it enters the contest with a prior inculpatory finding in its hands; with
unlimited command of means; with counsel usually of authority and capacity, who are regarded as public officers,
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and therefore speaking semi-judicially, and with an attitude of tranquil majesty often in striking contrast to that of
defendant engaged in a perturbed and distracting struggle for liberty if not for life. These inequalities of position
the law strives to meet by the rule that there is to be no conviction when there is a reasonable doubt of guilt.
The information therefore, given by Lumboy or Palos (the Informant) as to the identity of appelant is
hearsay.
- The hearsay rule bars the testimony of a witness who merely recites what someone else has told him,
whether orally or in writing. Section 36 of Rule 130 provides that a witness can testify only to those facts
which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as
otherwise provided in the rules. In fact, PO3 Birung's testimony is even double or multiple hearsay, since it
is based upon "third-hand" information related to the witness by someone who heard it from others. Multiple
hearsay is no more competent than single hearsay. PO3 Birung heard it from an informant who also
heard it from another. The informant did not even witness the shooting nor did not event appear during trial
and executed only an affidavit.
Testimony of a sole eyewitness is sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction but it must be positive and
credible
- Such testimony must be clear, positive, and credible. Hence, an identification of the appellant as the
gunman based on hearsay does not suffice for conviction.
The decision of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant BERNARDINO Y PINAPIN
CARANGUIAN is ACQUITTED for lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt that he committed the crime of murder.
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Case #5 TOPIC: Sec. 1 Evidence Defined, Quantum of Evidence
CASE TITLE: Ladaga v Magapu
G.R. NO: 189689, 189690, 189691 DATE: November 13, 2012
PONENTE: Perlas-Bernabe, J
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
On June 16, 2009, petitioners separately filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with
Application for a Production Order. On June 22, 2009, the RTC issued separate Writs of Amparo in each of the three
(3) cases, directing respondents to file a verified written return within seventy-two (72) hours and setting the case for
summary hearing on June 29, 2009.
Petitioners in these separate cases are Atty. Lilibeth Ladaga, Atty. Angela Librado-Trinidad, and Atty. Carlos Isagani.
Their names were included in the Order of Battle (OB) contained in a PowerPoint Presentation marked “Secret” and
Captioned “JCICC AGUILA” under the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the 10th ID of the Philippine
Army. The presentation revealed the names of organization and personalities in Southern Mindanao connected to the
CPP and the NPA. It was made public by Rep. Satur Ocampo which was said to be leaked by a “conscientious soldier”.
They also allege that suspicious-looking men and members of the military falsely claiming to be their clients have been
visiting them.
In their Returns, respondents denied authorship of the document and claimed that petitioners miserably failed to show,
by substantial evidence, that they were responsible for the alleged threats perceived by petitioners. Instead, they
asserted that petitioners' allegations are based solely on hearsay, speculation, beliefs, impression and feelings, which
are insufficient to warrant the issuance of the writ and, ultimately, the grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo.
In her Reply, Atty. Librado-Trinidad averred that the present petition substantially conformed with the requirements of
the Amparo Rule, as it alleged ultimate facts on the participation of respondents in the preparation of the OB List, which
naturally requires utmost secrecy. The petition likewise alleged how the inclusion of their names in the said OB List
substantiates the threat of becoming easy targets of unexplained disappearances and extrajudicial killings. On the
other hand, Attys. Zarate and Ladaga commonly asserted that the totality of the events, which consists of respondents'
virtual admission to the media of the existence of the OB List, as well as, the fact that known victims of past extrajudicial
killings have been likewise labeled as communist fronts in similar orders of battle, more than satisfies the standard
required to prove that petitioners' life, liberty and security are at risk.
ISSUE: Whether the totality of evidence satisfies the degree of proof required under the Amparo Rule?
RULING:
Sections 17 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provide as follows:
SEC. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. The parties shall establish their claims by substantial
evidence.
Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion. It is more than a mere imputation of wrongdoing or violation that would warrant a finding of liability against
the person charged. The summary nature of amparo proceedings, as well as, the use of substantial evidence as
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standard of proof shows the intent of the framers of the rule to address situations of enforced disappearance and
extrajudicial killings, or threats thereof, with what is akin to administrative proceedings.
Suitable to, and consistent with this incipiently unique and informal treatment of amparo cases, the Court in Razon, Jr.
v. Tagitis, laid down a new standard of relaxed admissibility of evidence to enable amparo petitioners to meet the
required amount of proof showing the State's direct or indirect involvement in the purported violations and found it a fair
and proper rule in amparo cases "to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality" and "to consider any
evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence
adduced. Put simply, evidence is not to be rejected outright because it is inadmissible under the rules for as long as it
satisfies "the most basic test of reason i.e., relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all
other pieces of adduced evidence."
This measure of flexibility in the admissibility of evidence, however, does not do away with the requirement of substantial
evidence in showing the State's involvement in the enforced disappearance, extrajudicial killing or threats thereof. It
merely permits, in the absence of hard-to-produce direct evidence, a closer look at the relevance and significance of
every available evidence, including those that are, strictly speaking, hearsay where the circumstances of the case so
require, and allows the consideration of the evidence adduced in terms of their consistency with the totality of the
evidence.
The statement of Representative Ocampo that the respondents are the real source of the OB List is unquestionably
hearsay evidence because, except for the fact that he himself received the OB List from an unnamed source merely
described as "a conscientious soldier," he had no personal knowledge concerning its preparation. But even if the Court
were to apply the appropriate measure of flexibility in the instant cases by admitting the hearsay testimony of
Representative Ocampo, a consideration of this piece of evidence to the totality of those adduced, namely, the Press
Releases issued by the 10th ID admitting the existence of a military-prepared Order of Battle, the affidavits of petitioners
attesting to the threatening visits and tailing of their vehicles by menacing strangers, as well as the violent deaths of
alleged militant personalities, leads to the conclusion that the threat to petitioners' security has not be adequately
proven.
Petitioners sought to prove that the inclusion of their names in the OB List presented a real threat to their security by
attributing the violent deaths of known activists to the inclusion of the latter's names or the names of their militant
organizations in the subject OB List. The RTC, however, correctly dismissed both arguments, holding that the existence
of the OB List could not be directly associated with the menacing behavior of suspicious men or the violent deaths of
certain personalities.
Petitioners would insist that respondents be investigated and directed to produce the Order of Battle that they have
admitted to be in their safekeeping and justify the inclusion of petitioners' names therein. However, without substantial
evidence of an actual threat to petitioners' rights to life, liberty and security that consists more than just the inclusion of
their names in an OB List, an order for further investigation into, or production of, the military's Order of Battle, would
have no concrete basis.
DISPOSITIVE RULING:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are hereby DENIED. The assailed Orders dated August 14, 2009
and September 22, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 10, are AFFIRMED.
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Case # 6 Sec. 2. Scope
PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (PDIC), Petitioner, v. HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, IN

HIS CAPACITY AS OVERALL DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN, FIDEL C. CU, CARMELITA B. ZATE, AND MARY LOU S.
APELO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 206866 September 02, 2015
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
DOCTRINE: Probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for
crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation
because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties.
FACTS:
Petitioner Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC), through its duly-authorized officers filed a joint affidavit
charging private respondents of the crimes of Direct Bribery and Corruption of Public Officials, as well as violation of
Section 3 (e) of R.A 3019. Specifically, private respondents were being sued in the following capacities: (a) Cu
(together with members of his family) as \ owner of Bicol Development Bank, Inc. (BDBI); (b) Zate as
Chairman/President of BDBI; and (c) Apelo as a former employee of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) who acted
as the Bank Officer-In-Charge that examined BDBI's books and records as of September 30, 2001, and as one of the
assistants of Bank Officer-In-Charge Evangeline C. Velasquez in connection with the Reports of Examination of
BDBI's books and records as of August 31, 2000 and October 31, 2002.
The Joint-Affidavit averred that on December 22, 2008, PDIC, acting as statutory receiver, took over the affairs of
BDBI after the BSP Monetary Board ordered its closure.
In the course of the receivership, Arsenia T. Gomez (Gomez) - a former Cashier, Service Officer, and Treasurer of
BDBI until its closure - went to the PDIC and submitted an Affidavit dated January 12, 2010 outlining the alleged
irregularities committed by private respondents when BDBI was still in operation.
Gomez's affidavit outlines such scheme as follows: (a) Apelo would provide Cu an "advance warning" of any
impending surprise bank examinations on BDBI by BSP; (b) upon receipt of the "advance warning," Cu would then
make the necessary steps to misrepresent BDBI's status, such as instructing BDBI employees on how to cover the
possible findings/exceptions of the BSP examiner on the books of BDBI, as well as infusing cash into BDBI's vault in
order to make it appear that the cash listed in the books reflect the actual cash in vault, and thereafter returning such
cash to the source; (c) in exchange for such "advance warnings," Cu and/or Zate gave Apelo as "professional fees"
the aggregate amount of P140,000.00 by depositing the same to the latter's bank account; and (d) to cover up such
amounts given to Apelo, Cu and/or Zate, instructed Gomez to initially cover the unofficial and unbooked cash
disbursements in favor of Apelo by placing such amounts in BDBI's books as "Other Cash Items," and thereafter,
regularize and remove from BDBI's books such disbursements by including them in the other accounts of BDBI until
they were completely covered. To support such statements, Gomez provided copies of deposit slips showing that
such amount was indeed deposited to Apelo's bank account. She likewise asserted that in the course of her
employment at BDBI, she does not know of any official or legitimate transactions that BDBI had with Apelo that would
warrant the disbursement of the aforesaid amount in the latter's favor.
The Ombudsman dismissed the criminal complaint for lack of probable cause. Ombudsman found Gomez's affidavit
showing Apelo as the source of the "advance warnings" received by Cu in connection with the BSP examinations to
be inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay.
ISSUE: Whether the dismissal was correct
RULING: No.
Preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not there is reasonable basis to
believe that a crime has been committed and that the person charged should be held responsible for it. Being merely
based on opinion and belief, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient
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evidence to secure a conviction.
[A preliminary investigation] is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of [the prosecution's] evidence. The
presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be
passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits." Hence, "the validity and merits of a party's defense or accusation,
as well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary
investigation level."
It was error on the part of the Ombudsman to simply discredit Gomez's affidavit as inadmissible in evidence for being
hearsay. It is noteworthy to point out that owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary investigations, the technical rules
of evidence should not be applied in the course of its proceedings. The Court declared that hearsay evidence is
admissible in determining probable cause in preliminary investigations because such investigation is merely
preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties.
In sum, the Court is convinced that there is probable cause to indict private respondents of the crimes charged
against them. Hence, the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it ordered the dismissal of the criminal complaint against private respondents.
DISPOSITIVE RULING:
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Case #7 TOPIC: Sec. 2. Scope
BUENAFLOR CAR SEVICES, INC. v. CEZAR DURUMPILI DAVID, JR.
G.R. No. 222730, November 07, 2016
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
Respondent was employed as Service Manager by petitioner, doing business under the trade name "Pronto! Auto
Services." He was in charge of the overall day-to-day operations of petitioner, including the authority to sign checks,
check vouchers, and purchase orders.
Petitioner implemented a company policy with respect to the purchase and delivery of automotive parts and products.
The process begins with the preparation of a purchase order by the Purchasing Officer which is submitted to respondent
for his review and approval. Once approved and signed, the duplicate copy of the said order is given to petitioner's
supplier who would deliver the goods/supplies. Once delivered and approved, the check voucher and corresponding
check are prepared to be signed by the respondent, the Chief Finance Officer, or the Vice-President for Operations. It
was company policy that all checks should be issued in the name of the specific supplier and not in "cash," and that the
said checks are to be picked up from Del Rosario at the company's office in Muntinlupa City.
On August 8, 2013, CFO Cristina S. David (David) of petitioner's affiliate company, Diamond IGB, Inc., received a call
from the branch manager of ChinaBank, SM City Bicutan Branch, informing her that the latter had cleared several
checks issued by petitioner bearing the words "OR CASH" indicated after the payee's name.
On August 22, 2013, petitioner company’s president Lampa and petitioner's Human Resource Manager, Helen Lee
(Lee), confronted Del Rosario on the questioned checks. Del Rosario readily confessed that upon respondent's
instruction, she inserted the words "OR CASH" after the name of the payees when the same had been signed by all
the authorized signatories. She also implicated De Guzman, who was under respondent's direct supervision, for
preparing spurious purchase orders that were used as basis in issuing the subject checks, as well as petitioner's
messenger/driver, Caranto, who was directed to encash some of the checks, with both persons also gaining from the
scheme. Her confession was put into writing in two (2) separate letters both of even date (extrajudicial confession).
Respondent, together with Del Rosario, De Guzman, and Caranto, were placed under preventive suspension for 30
days, and directed to submit their respective written explanations. Respondent and his co-workers were served their
respective notices of termination after having been found guilty of violating the company's Code of Conduct and
Behavior, particularly, serious misconduct and willful breach of trust. Aggrieved, respondent, De Guzman, and Caranto
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement and payment of damages and attorney's fees.
LA: ILLEGALLY DISMISSED. The petitioner failed to establish the existence of conspiracy among the respondent in
altering the checks and that the latter's extrajudicial confession was informally made and not supported by evidence.
NLRC: affirmed with modification the LA's Decision, finding De Guzman and Caranto to have been dismissed for
cause, but sustained the illegality of respondent's termination from work.
CA: ruled that Del Rosario's extrajudicial confession only bound her as the confessant but constitutes hearsay with
respect to respondent and the other co-accused under the res inter alios acta rule.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in upholding the NLRC's ruling that respondent was illegally
dismissed (ETO TALAGA YUNG ISSUE SA CASE)
YES. In the case at bar, respondent's termination was grounded on his violation of petitioner's Code of
Conduct and Behavior, which was supposedly tantamount to (a) serious misconduct and/or (b) willful breach of the
trust reposed in him by his employer. (Di ko na explain further kasi Labor aspect to)
2. Whether or not res inter alios acta rule applies in this case. (EVID)
RULING: NO
Respondent was directly implicated in the controversy through the extrajudicial confession of his co-employee, Del
Rosario, who had admitted to be the author of the checks' alterations, although mentioned that she did so only upon
respondent's imprimatur. The NLRC, as affirmed by the CA, however, deemed the same to be inadmissible in evidence
on account of the res inter alios acta rule, which, as per Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, provides that the
rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial
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confession is binding only on the confessant and is not admissible against his or her co-accused because it is
considered as hearsay against them.
However, the NLRC should not have bound itself by the technical rules of procedure as it is allowed to be liberal in the
application of its rules in deciding labor cases. The NLRC Rules of Procedure state that "[t]he rules of procedure and
evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling and the Commission shall use every and all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law
or procedure x x x."
In any case, even if it is assumed that the rule on res inter alios acta were to apply in this illegal dismissal case, the
treatment of the extrajudicial confession as hearsay is bound by the exception on independently relevant statements.
"Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, regardless of their truth or falsity, the fact that such
statements have been made is relevant. The hearsay rule does not apply, and the statements are admissible as
evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may
constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact."46 Verily, Del Rosario's
extrajudicial confession is independently relevant to prove the participation of respondent in the instant controversy
considering his vital role in petitioner's procurement process. The fact that such statement was made by Del Rosario,
who was the actual author of the alterations, should have been given consideration by the NLRC as it is directly, if not
circumstantially, relevant to the issue at hand.
Case law states that "labor suits require only substantial evidence to prove the validity of the dismissal." Based on the
foregoing, the Court is convinced that enough substantial evidence exists to support petitioner's claim that respondent
was involved in the afore-discussed scheme to defraud the company, and hence, guilty of serious misconduct and/or
willful breach of trust which are just causes for his termination. Substantial evidence is defined as such amount of
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion, which evidentiary threshold
petitioner successfully hurdled in this case. As such, the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in holding that respondent
was illegally dismissed. Perforce, the reversal of the CA's decision and the granting of the instant petition are in order.
Respondent is hereby declared to be validly dismissed and thus, is not entitled to backwages, separation pay, as well
as attorney's fees.
DISPOSITIVE RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 3, 2015 and the
Resolution dated February 9, 2016, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 139652 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.
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Case # 8 TOPIC: Sec. 3 Admissibility of evidence
CASE TITLE: BSB GROUP, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, MR. RICARDO BANGAYAN,
PETITIONER, VS. SALLY GO A.K.A. SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, RESPONDENT.
G.R. NO: G.R. No. 168644 DATE: February 16, 2010
PONENTE: PERALTA, J.:
DOCTRINE: The inquiry into bank deposits allowable under R.A. No. 1405 must be premised on the fact that the money
deposited in the account is itself the subject of the action.
FACTS: Petitioner, the BSB Group, Inc., through its president, Ricardo Bangayan, filed a complaint for qualified theft
against respondent Sally Go (Ricardo’s wife) who is employed in the company as a cashier. The complaint alleged that
several checks representing the amount of P1,534,135.50 issued by the company's customers in payment of their
obligation were, instead of being turned over to the company's coffers, indorsed by respondent who deposited the same
to her personal banking account maintained at Security Bank. Accordingly, respondent was charged with qualified theft
before the RTC, in an Information, the inculpatory portion of which reads:
That x x x the said accused x x x with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner
thereof, take, steal and carry away cash money in the total amount of P1,534,135.50 belonging to BSB GROUP
OF COMPANIES xxx.
On the premise that respondent had allegedly encashed the subject checks and deposited the corresponding amounts
thereof to her personal banking account, the prosecution moved for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum /ad
testificandum against the respective managers or records custodians of Security Bank and Metrobank. Respondent
filed a motion to quash, invoking the irrelevancy of the Metrobank account, as it was not mentioned in the complaint-
affidavit and the absolutely confidential nature of the Metrobank account under the provisions of R.A.1405 . The trial
court denied the motion to quash for lack of merit.
Meanwhile, the prosecution was able to present in court the testimony of the representative of Security Bank
(Marasigan). But before the testimony could be completed, respondent filed a Motion to Suppress, seeking the exclusion
of representative's testimony invoking, in addition to irrelevancy, the privilege of confidentiality under R.A. No. 1405.
The trial court, nevertheless, denied the motion. The CA reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the trial court.
ISSUE: (1) Whether the testimony of Marasigan and the accompanying documents are irrelevant to the case, and (2)
whether they are also violative of the absolutely confidential nature of bank deposits and, hence, excluded by operation
of R.A. No. 1405.
RULING: The testimony of Marasigan on the particulars of respondent’s supposed bank account with Security Bank
and the documentary evidence represented by the checks adduced in support thereof, are not only incompetent for
being excluded by operation of R.A. No. 1405. They are likewise irrelevant to the case, inasmuch as they do not appear
to have any logical and reasonable connection to the prosecution of respondent for qualified theft.
(1) NO. The fact in issue appears to be that respondent has taken away cash in the amount of ₱1,534,135.50 from the
coffers of petitioner. Petitioner seeks to establish the existence of the elemental act of taking by adducing evidence that
respondent deposited some of its checks to her personal account with Security Bank. Petitioner addresses the
incongruence between the allegation of theft of cash in the Information, on the one hand, and the evidence that
respondent had first stolen the checks and deposited the same in her banking account, on the other hand, by impressing
upon the Court that there obtains no difference between cash and check for purposes of prosecuting respondent for
theft of cash. Petitioner is mistaken.
The allegation of theft of money necessitates that evidence presented must have a tendency to prove that the offender
has unlawfully taken money belonging to another. Thus, as the Information in this case accuses respondent of having
stolen cash, proof tending to establish that respondent has actualized her criminal intent by indorsing the checks and
depositing the proceeds thereof in her personal account, becomes not only irrelevant but also immaterial and, on that
score, inadmissible in evidence.
(2) YES. Under Section 2 of R.A. No. 1405 (Bank Secrecy Act of 1955), “all deposits of whatever nature with banks or
banking institutions in the Philippines x x x are considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be
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examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except x x x in cases where the
money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.”
The inquiry into bank deposits allowable under R.A. No. 1405 must be premised on the fact that the money deposited
in the account is itself the subject of the action. Given this perspective, the subject matter of the action in this case is to
be determined from the indictment that charges respondent with the offense, and not from the evidence sought by the
prosecution to be admitted into the records. In the criminal Information, respondent, unqualifiedly and in plain language,
is charged with qualified theft by abusing petitioner's trust and confidence and stealing cash in the amount of
P1,534,135.50. The said Information makes no factual allegation that in some material way involves the checks subject
of the testimonial and documentary evidence sought to be suppressed. Neither do the allegations in said Information
make mention of the supposed bank account in which the funds represented by the checks have allegedly been kept.
In other words, it can hardly be inferred from the indictment itself that the Security Bank account is the ostensible subject
of the prosecution's inquiry. The subject matter of the action in this case is the money amounting to P1,534,135.50
alleged to have been stolen by respondent, and not the money equivalent of the checks which are sought to be admitted
in evidence. Thus, it is that, which the prosecution is bound to prove with its evidence, and no other. It comes clear that
the admission of testimonial and documentary evidence relative to respondent's Security Bank account serves no other
purpose than to establish the existence of such account, its nature and the amount kept in it. It constitutes an attempt
by the prosecution at an impermissible inquiry into a bank deposit account the privacy and confidentiality of which is
protected by law.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 87600 dated April 20, 2005, reversing the September 13, 2004 and November 5, 2004 Orders of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 36 in Criminal Case No. 02-202158, is AFFIRMED.
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Case #9 TOPIC: Sec 3. Admissibility of Evidence
CASE TITLE: DE JESUS vs. SANCHEZ-MALIT
A.C. No.: 6470 DATE: July 8, 2014
PONENTE: Sereno, C.J.
DOCTRINE: The Revised Rules of Evidence only provides for the exclusion of evidence if it is obtained as a result
of illegal searches and seizures. However, that rule against unreasonable searches and seizures is meant only to
protect a person from interference by the government or the state. Where a private individual obtains the subject
documents as evidence against respondent, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures does not
apply. Similarly, the 2004 Rules on Notarial Law contain no provision declaring the inadmissibility of documents
obtained in violation thereof.
FACTS:
- Mercedita De Jesus filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Juvy Sanchez-Malit.
- She alleged that Sanchez-Malit had drafted and notarized a REM of a public market stall that falsely named De
Jesus as its absolute and registered owner.
- As a result, the mortgagee sued De Jesus for perjury and for collection of sum of money.
- De Jesus claimed that Sanchez-Malit was a consultant of the local government unit of Bataan, and was therefore
aware that the market stall was government-owned.
- Prior thereto, Sanchez-Malit had also notarized
1) a lease agreement without the signature of the lessees; and
2) a sale agreement over a property without the former advising her that the property could not be alienated (because
it is covered by a Certificate of Land Ownership Award)
- An exchange of pleadings ensued after Sanchez-Malit submitted her Comment.
- De Jesus filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Submission of Additional Evidence.
- Attached thereto were copies of documents notarized by Sanchez-Malit without the signatures of the parties who
had purportedly appeared before her. (Note 1: the list specific docs are written below, in case asked by Ma’am)
- Report of IBP Investigating Commissioner: recommended the revocation of the Notarial Commission of Sanchez-
Malit and her disqualification as notary public for 2 years
- IBP Board of Governors: approved the Report, with the modification that she be suspended from the practice of law
for 1 year
- Sanchez-Malit filed her MR contending that the additional documents submitted were inadmissible, as they were
obtained without observing the procedural requisites under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. (Note 2: pertinent
law provided below for a better understanding of her contention BUT not provided in the case)
ISSUE: Whether or not the additional documents are admissible.
RULING: - A comparable argument was raised in Tolentino v. Mendoza, in which the respondent therein opposed
the admission of the birth certificates of his illegitimate children as evidence of his grossly immoral conduct, because
those documents were obtained in violation Rule 24, AO No. 1, Series of 1993.
- Rejecting his argument, the Court reasoned as follows: Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
provides that “evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules.”
- There could be no dispute that the subject birth certificates are relevant to the issue. The only question, therefore,
is whether the law or the rules provide for the inadmissibility of said birth certificates.
- Rule 24, AO No. 1, series of 1993 only provides for sanctions against persons violating the rule on confidentiality of
birth records, but nowhere does it state that procurement of birth records in violation of said rule would render said
records inadmissible in evidence.
- On the other hand, the Revised Rules of Evidence only provides for the exclusion of evidence if it is obtained as a
result of illegal searches and seizures. It should be emphasized, however, that said rule against unreasonable
searches and seizures is meant only to protect a person from interference by the government or the state. In a case
where complainants, as private individuals obtained the subject birth records as evidence against respondent, the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply.
- Similarly, the 2004 Rules on Notarial Law contain no provision declaring the inadmissibility of documents obtained
in violation thereof. Thus, the IBP correctly considered in evidence the other notarized documents submitted by De
Jesus as additional evidence.
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Note 1: List of the docs submitted as additional evidence
1) an Extra Judicial Deed of Partition which referred to the SPAs naming Limpioso as attorney-in-fact;
2) 5 SPAs that lacked the signatures of either the principal or the attorney-in-fact;
3) 2 deeds of sale with incomplete signatures of the parties thereto;
4) an unsigned Sworn Statement;
5) a lease contract that lacked the signature of the lessor;
6) 5 unsigned Affidavits;
7) an unsigned insurance claim form (Annual Declaration by the Heirs);
8) an unsigned Invitation Letter to a potential investor in Japan;
9) an unsigned Bank Certification; and
10) an unsigned Consent to Adoption.
Note 2:
The Law provides that for the Inspection, Copying and Disposal of an entry in the Notarial Register, it must be made
in the notary’s presence during regular business hours or may be examined by a law enforcement officer in the course
of an official investigation or by virtue of a court order. In the case at Bar, Atty Sanchez-Malit contends that these
procedures were not followed in obtaining the additional documents submitted.
DISPOSITIVE RULING:
Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit is found guilty of violating the CPR as well as her oath as notary public. She is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE YEAR. Her notarial commission, if still existing, is IMMEDIATELY
REVOKED and she is hereby PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public.
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Case #10 TOPIC: R128, S3- Admissibility of Evidence
CASE TITLE: People v. Samontañez
G.R. NO: 134530 DATE: December 4, 2000
PONENTE: De Leon, Jr., J:
FACTS:
Accused Roberto Samontañez was convicted of the crime of rape with homicide in the RTC of Nasugbu, Batangas.
The victim was 18-year old Lolita delas Alas who was seen lifeless and naked in the middle of a sugarcane plantation.
She was apparently raped and killed by the attacker. Nobody witnessed the actual commission of the crime. Police
investigation revealed that Samontañez was seen near the place where the crime was committed at approximately
during the time the crime was committed. Days after, Samontañez was arrested in his workplace in Mendez, Cavite.
During the interrogation. Samontañez admitted that he has the personal belongings of the victim. Seized from him
are the victim’s personal belongings (i.e. Omax wristwatch, gold ring, Joop cologne) inside Samontañez’ bag.
On the first arraignment, Samontañez pleaded not guilty to the crime charged but later on changed it to that of guilty.
Trial ensued. Samontañez’ conviction in the trial court hinged on: Samontañez’ plea of guilty, pieces of evidence
found in possession of Samontañez, and testimonies which seek to establish that Samontañez was seen near the
crime scene on or about the time the crime took place.
ISSUE: Whether or not the pieces of evidence (i.e., victim’s personal belongings) gathered is inadmissible in
evidence.
RULING: YES.
The mentioned pieces of evidence are inadmissible in evidence as they are considered “fruits of poisonous tree”.
It appeared from the records that the police authorities arrested Samontañez in his workplace in Cavite. It does not
appear from the record that the appellant was apprised of his constitutional rights during the police custodial
investigation nor was he assisted by counsel which are enshrined in Article III, Section 12(1) of the 1987 Constitution.
In the absence of a valid waiver, any confession obtained from Samontañez as well as any other evidence secured by
that confession is inadmissible in evidence even if the same was not objected to in the trial.
The libertarian exclusionary rule known as the “fruits of the poisonous tree” provides that once the primary source ( the
"tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is
also inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the illegal act,
whereas the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the same illegal act. The "fruit of the poisonous
tree" is at least once removed from the illegally seized evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the
principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the
originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained.
Thus, the personal belongings of the victim found inside the bag of Samontañez, having been gathered by virtue of an
illegally obtained confession, is inadmissible in evidence.
NOTE 1 (other bases of conviction of the trial court):
The only other evidence of the prosecution are the testimonies of Carlito Samontañez and Melecio Mendoza, both
of which merely seek to establish the presence of the appellant near the vicinity of the crime scene on or about the time
when the crime took place.
Ultimately, the conviction of the appellant for the crime charged in the case at bar rested primarily on his plea of guilty
which appeared to have been improvidently made and hence, contrary to the letter and spirit of Section 3, Rule 116
of the Revised Rules of Court.
Based on Section 3, Rule 116, three (3) things are enjoined of the trial court after a plea of guilty to a capital offense is
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entered by the accused:
1. The trial court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea;
2. The trial court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise
degree of his culpability through the requisite quantum of evidence; and,
3. The trial court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he
desires. It must be emphasized that the said procedure is mandatory and any judge who fails to observe it commits
grave abuse of discretion.
Why the plea was improvidently made: Lengthy transcript of inquiries of the trial court failed to dwell on a significant
development that transpired on the subsequent scheduled hearings when the appellant revealed in open court, through
counsel, that his subsequent plea of guilty was prompted by "pressure" from a certain policeman so that he (appellant)
agreed to admit the commission of the offense charged. The decision of the trial court is devoid of any actual finding
relative to the actual commission of the crime.
NOTE 2: RTC to SC -- This is automatic review of Decision of the RTC.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, of Nasugbu, Batangas
dated May 15, 1998 in Criminal Case No. 1032 convicting the appellant, Roberto V. Samontañez, of the crime of rape
with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE; and
the case is remanded to the court of origin for the proper arraignment and trial of the accused until terminated.
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Case #11 TOPIC: Rule 128, Section 3, Admissibility of Evidence
CASE TITLE: Navarro vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. NO: 121087 DATE: August 26, 1999
PONENTE: Mendoza, J
FACTS:
The deceased Enrique Lingan and Stanley Jabuena, both reporters of the radio station DWTI, went to the
Entertainment City following reports that it was showing nude dancers. A commotion followed when Jalbuena took a
picture of one of the dancers. Jalbuena and Lingan then rushed to the police station to report the matter.
At the police station, three policemen on duty, including herein petitioner Felipe Navarro, were having drinks in front
of the police station. Thereafter, a heated argument ensued between Navarro, who was acquainted with the owners
of the Entertainment City, and Lingan. The argument escalated to violence as Navarro hit Lingan’s head with the butt
of a gun and thereafter banged his head on the concrete pavement, causing the latter’s death. Jalbuena was able to
record on tape the exchange between petitioner and the deceased.
During trial, Jalbuena testified against Navarro and his testimony was confirmed by the voice recording submitted to
evidence. The trial court and CA found Navarro guilty of murder. Navarro, on appeal to the Supreme Court, alleges
that: 1) Jalbuena’s testimony should be held inadmissible on the ground that he is a biased witness, having a grudge
against him; and 2) the tape recording should be held inadmissible according to Republic Act No. 4200 which prohibits
wire tapping.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not Jalbuena’s testimony is admissible;
2) Whether or not the tape recording is admissible.
RULING:
1) Yes.
The testimony of a witness who has an interest in the conviction of the accused is not, for this reason alone, unreliable.
Trial courts, which have the opportunity observe the facial expressions, gestures, and tones of voice of a witness
while testifying, are competent to determine whether his or her testimony should be given credence. Here, petitioner
Navarro has not shown that the trial court erred in according weight to the testimony of Jalbuena.
2) Yes.
RA 4200 prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications. Here, since the exchange
between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited. Nor is there any question
that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording is authenticated by the testimony of a witness (1) that he personally
recorded the conversations; (2) that the tape played in the court was the one he recorded; and (3) that the voices on
the tape are those of the persons such are claimed to belong. In this case, Jalbuena testified as to these matters and
thus sufficient foundation was laid for the authentication of the tape presented by the prosecution.
DISPOSITIVE RULING:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the modification that petitioner Felipe Navarro
is hereby SENTENCED to suffer a prison terms of 18 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months
of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
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Case # 12 TOPIC: R128, S 3 - Admissibility of Evid
CASE TITLE: Reyes y Capistrano v. People
G.R. NO: 229380 DATE: June 6, 2018
PONENTE: Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS: The prosecution alleged that at around 8 pm of November 6, 2012, a group of police officers from Cardona,
Rizal, including PO1 Monteras, was patrolling the diversion road of Barangay Looc, Cardona, Rizal when 2 teenagers
approached and informed them that a woman with long hair and a dragon tattoo on her left arm had just bought shabu
in Barangay Mambog. After a few minutes, a woman, later identified to be Reyes, who matched the said description
and smelled like liquor passed by the police officers. The police asked if she bought shabu and ordered her to bring
it out. Reyes answered, "Di ba bawal kayong magkapkap ng babae?" and at that point, turned her back, pulled
something out from her breast area and held a small plastic sachet on her right hand. PO1 Monteras immediately
confiscated the sachet and brought it to the police station where he marked it with "LRC-1." Thereat, he prepared the
necessary documents, conducted the inventory and photography before Brgy Capt. Angeles. PO1 Monteras turned
over the seized item for examination to Police Senior Inspector Villaraza, who confirmed that the substance inside the
sachet tested positive for 0.04 gram of shabu.
For her defense, Reyes denied the charges, claiming that the incident happened on November 5, 2012 and not
November 6. On said date, she came from a drinking spree and was about to board a jeepney, when a man
approached and asked if she knew a certain person. After answering in the negative, she rode the jeepney until it was
blocked by 2civilian men in motorcycles whom she identified to be one PO1 Dimacali. The latter ordered her to alight
and bring out the shabu in her possession which she denied having. She was then brought to the police station where
the police officers extorted from her the amount of P35,000.00 in exchange for her freedom. But since she failed to
give the money, the police officers took her to Taytay for inquest proceedings. The RTC and the CA found her guilty
of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: WON the conviction should be upheld.
RULING: No, Reyes must be ACQUITTED.
To protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution
provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence
for any purpose in any proceeding. One of the recognized exceptions to the need of a warrant before a search may
be effected is a search incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful
arrest before a search can be made – the process cannot be reversed. A lawful warrantless arrest has to comply
with the parameters of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which identifies three (3)
instances when warrantless arrests may be lawfully effected. These are: (a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto;
(b) an arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that
said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; and (c) an arrest of a prisoner who has
escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (a), Rule 113, two (2) elements must concur, namely: (a) the person
to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. On the
other hand, Section 5 (b), Rule 113 requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just
been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed
it.
Essentially, the validity of this warrantless arrest requires compliance with the overt act test, showing that "the accused
x x x exhibit an overt act within the view of the police officers suggesting that [she] was in possession of illegal drugs
at the time [she] was apprehended." Absent any overt act showing the commission of a crime, the warrantless
arrest is rendered invalid.
The Court finds that no lawful arrest was made on Reyes. PO1 Monteras himself admitted that Reyes passed by them
without acting suspiciously or doing anything wrong, except that she smelled of liquor. As no other overt act could be
EVIDENCE - 3S
properly attributed to Reyes as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO1 Monteras that she had just committed, was
committing, or was about to commit a crime, the arrest is bereft of any legal basis. As case law demonstrates, the act
of walking while reeking of liquor per se cannot be considered a criminal act.
Neither has the prosecution established the conditions set forth in Section 5 (b), Rule 113 as records failed to show
that PO1 Monteras had any personal knowledge that a crime had been committed by Reyes, as in fact, he even
admitted that he merely relied on the two (2) teenagers' tip and that, everything happened by "chance." Moreover, the
Court finds the version of the prosecution regarding the seizure of the subject item as lacking in credence. It is rather
contrary to ordinary human experience for a person to willfully exhibit incriminating evidence which would result in his
or her conviction for a crime, absent any impelling circumstance which would prompt him or her to do so. Besides, the
Court finds the police officers to have committed unjustified deviations from the prescribed chain of custody rule under
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, through their admission that only the Barangay Captain was present during the
marking and inventory of the seized items.
In fine, there being no lawful warrantless arrest, the sachet of shabu purportedly seized from Reyes on
account of the search is rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous
tree. And since the shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, Reyes must necessarily be acquitted and
exonerated from criminal liability.
EVIDENCE - 3S
Case #13 TOPIC: Sec 3, Admissibility of evidence
CASE TITLE: PEOPLE V. GAJO Y BUENAFE
G.R. NO: 217026 DATE: January 22, 2018
PONENTE: Del Castillo, J.
DOCTRINE: Chain of custody refers to recorded authorized movements and custody of confiscated dangerous drugs,
or controlled substances. It involves testimony on every link in the chain - from the confiscation of the illegal drugs to
its receipt in the forensic laboratory up to its presentation in court. It is necessary that every person who touched the
seized item describe how and from whom he or she received it; where and what happened to it while in the witness'
possession; its condition when received and at the time it was delivered to the next link in the chain.
FACTS: On March 23, 2007, at about 11:05 p.m., PO3 Justo, PO1 Sangahin, and PO1 San Pedro planned to conduct
a buy-bust operation against Lawrence based on the details given by a civilian informant. PO3 Justo wrote his initials
"GMJ" into two ₱100.00 bills, and the police agreed that if PO1 Justo, as poseur buyer, successfully bought shabu
during the buy-bust, he would remove his cap. At about 11:20, he saw Lawrence standing near a lamp post and
approached him. P03 Justo told Lawrence, "pakuha ng dos," handing him ₱200.00. Lawrence took the money, and
replied, "sandali lang, asa bahay." After a while, Rico came out of Lawrence's house and handed PO3 Justo a small
plastic sachet containing suspected shabu. Consequently, PO3 Justo removed his cap, the police's pre-arranged
signal that PO3 Justo already bought shabu. PO3 Justo thereafter held Rico's arm and informed him of his
constitutional rights and directed Rico to bring out the contents of his pocket. Upon doing so, PO3 Justo saw from
Rico's pocket two plastic sachets suspected to contain shabu. Meanwhile POJ San Pedro and PO1 Sangahin entered
the house of Lawrence. There, PO1 San Pedro recovered the marked money and one plastic sachet of suspected
shabu from Lawrence.
In the Police Station, P03 Justo placed the markings GMJ, GMJ-1, and GMJ-2 on the three sachets he recovered
from Rico. He also marked and placed his initials, GMJ-3, on the plastic sachet that PO1 San Pedro recovered from
Lawrence. PO3 Justo marked all the seized items in the presence of PO1 San Pedro and PO1 Sangahin. According
to PO1 San Pedro, at the time of the marking, '"[the accused] was already inside the jail." In addition, PO3 Justo
testified that he marked the plastic sachet at the Police Station because there was already a commotion at the place
of the incident. However, PO1 San Pedro denied that there was any commotion immediately after the buy-bust.
In the Police Station, PO1 San Pedro made an inventory of the recovered items. PO3 Justo and PO1 San Pedro
confirmed that they brought the seized items to the Crime Laboratory. However, based on the Request for Laboratory
Examination, it was a certain PO2 Cruz who submitted them to the Crime Laboratory Service of Tikling, Taytay, Rizal.
Lawrence and Rico denied the allegations against them and narrated that during such operation, Rico was inside his
room at the house and his brother Lawrence was sleeping. Suddenly, they heard noises from outside and saw 5
Policemen. The police were looking for “Bubot,” their neighbor, and even after informing them that Bubot did not reside
there, the police continued their search.
The RTC and CA ruled that the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs had been established. According to the
CA, while there might be deficiency in compliance on the chain of custody of the seized items, the integrity of the
seized drugs had been preserved and the chain of its custody had been continuous and unbroken.
Lawrence and Rico contend that the prosecution failed to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt because of
non-observance of the chain of custody requirement under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 in the case.
ISSUE:WON the prosecution failed to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt because of non-observance of
the chain of custody requirement under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 in the case.
RULING: YES. To convict Lawrence and Rico, it is primordial that the corpus delicti or the confiscated illegal drugs
had been proved beyond reasonable doubt. This means that the same illegal drugs possessed and sold by the
accused must be the same ones offered in court. As such, the required unbroken chain of custody under Section 21,
Article II of RA 9165 above-quoted comes into play to ensure that no unnecessary doubt is created on the identity of
the seized illegal drugs. Chain of custody refers to recorded authorized movements and custody of confiscated
dangerous drugs, or controlled substances. It involves testimony on every link in the chain - from the confiscation of
the illegal drugs to its receipt in the forensic laboratory up to its presentation in court. It is necessary that every person
EVIDENCE - 3S
who touched the seized item describe how and from whom he or she received it; where and what happened to it while
in the witness' possession; its condition when received and at the time it was delivered to the next link in the chain.
Generally, there are four links in said chain of custody:
1. The seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug confiscated from the accused by the apprehending
officer;
2. The turnover of the seized drug by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer;
3. The turnover by the investigating officer of said item to the forensic chemist 'for examination; and
4. The turnover and submission thereof from forensic chemist to the court.
To stress, marking must be done immediately upon the seizure of the illegal drugs and in the presence of the
apprehended violator of law. Such prompt marking is important because the subsequent handlers of the seized items
will use the marking as reference. The marking also sets apart the seized item from other materials from the moment
it was confiscated until its disposal after the proceedings. In fine, marking is essential to preserve the integrity and
evidentiary value of the recovered dangerous drug. In this case, however, the apprehending officer did not make a
proper marking of the seized shabu.
PO3 Justo confirmed that he marked the seized items upon arrival at the Police Station. He attested that he did not
immediately mark the three sachets of shabu from Rico and the one sachet recovered by PO1 San Pedro from
Lawrence as there was already a commotion at the place of incident. Nonetheless, PO1 San Pedro refuted that there
was such commotion. Since there was no commotion that transpired after the seizure of shabu, there was nothing
that would prevent PO3 Justo from marking the shabu immediately after confiscation.
Moreover, PO3 Justo marked it without the presence of Lawrence and Rico. As testified by PO3 Justo himself he
marked the confiscated shabu in the presence of PO1 Sangahin and PO1 San Pedro. And, PO1 San Pedro declared
that "[the accused] was already inside the jail" when PO3 Justo marked the recovered items. The requirement that
the marking be done in the presence of the accused is not a mere technicality as it assures the preservation of the
identity and integrity of the illegal drugs. As such, the non-compliance with this requirement is fatal to this case against
Lawrence and Rico.
In addition, the second and third link was not complied with here. Here, PO3 Justo supposedly turned over the
confiscated shabu to Police Chief Inspector Anastacio B. Benzon, the investigating officer. Nevertheless, the
prosecution did not present PC/Insp. Benzon to testify on the matter. Such non-presentation undeniably constitutes
another gap in the chain of custody of the seized prohibited drugs. Similarly, the third link in the chain of custody was
also infirm. The Request for Laboratory Examination indicated a certain PO2 Cruz as the person who delivered the
specimens to the crime laboratory for examination. The prosecution did not present PO2 Cruz to testify on his receipt
of the seized shabu. Evidently, this non-presentation of a necessary witness constituted another gap in the chain of
custody.
DISPOSITIVE RULING:
EVIDENCE - 3S
Case # 14 TOPIC: Sec. 3, R. 128. Admissibility of Evidence
CASE TITLE: People v Acosta
G.R. NO: 238865 DATE: January 28, 2019
PONENTEPerlas-Bernabe, J.
DOCTRINE: Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable
searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. Evidence obtained and
confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded
for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. One of the recognized exceptions to the need of a warrant before a
search may be effected is when the "plain view" doctrine is applicable.
FACTS: An information was filed before the RTC accusing Acosta of the crime of Illegal Planting and Cultivation of
Marijuana Plant. The prosecution alleged that Salucana went to the Police Station to report a mauling incident where
Acosta purportedly hit him. He also reported that Acosta was illegally planting marijuana.
Salucana's reports prompted the police officers to proceed to Acosta's home. Thereat, the police officers arrested
Acosta before he entered his home. After the arrest, a police officer found thirteen (13) hills of suspected marijuana
plants planted beneath the "gabi" plants just outside Acosta's home.
Acosta argued that the seized marijuana plants are inadmissible in evidence as the "plain view" doctrine is not
applicable. Acosta argued that the discovery was not inadvertent because it was Salucana who pointed out the
marijuana plants to the police.
The RTC found Acosta guilty of the crime charged, ruling that the marijuana plants were inadvertently found in plain
view by the police officers. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the marijuana plants seized from Acosta constitute inadmissible evidence.
RULING: Yes. The seized marijuana plants constitute inadmissible evidence. One of the recognized exceptions to
the need of a warrant before a search may be effected is when the "plain view" doctrine is applicable.
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that view are subject to seizure
even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. The 'plain view' doctrine applies when the following
requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or
is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c)
it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise
subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from
which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece
of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.
Police officers proceeded with the arrest of Acosta for the mauling incident armed with prior knowledge that he was
also illegally planting marijuana.
The police team was dispatched to appellant's kaingin precisely to search for and uproot the prohibited flora. The
seizure of evidence in "plain view" applies only where the police officer is not searching for evidence against the
accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. We also note the testimony of SPO2 Tipay that upon
arriving at the area, they first had to "look around the area" before they could spot the illegal plants. Patently, the
seized marijuana plants were not "immediately apparent" and a "further search" was needed. In sum, the marijuana
plants in question were not in "plain view" or "open to eye and hand." The "plain view" doctrine, thus, cannot be made
to apply.
Thus, the second requisite (inadvertency) for the "plain view" doctrine is absent. The seized marijuana plants are
inadmissible in evidence against Acosta for being fruits of the poisonous tree.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 22, 2018 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01612-MIN is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-
appellant Billy Acosta is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
EVIDENCE - 3S
Case #15 TOPIC: Sec. 3- Admissibility of Evidence
CASE TITLE: Ladaga v. Mapagu
G.R. NO: 189689 DATE: November 13, 2012
PONENTE Perlas-Bernabe, J.
DOCTRINE: In Amparo cases, the requirement of admissibility is relaxed. An evidence otherwise

inadmissible under the usual rules is admissible if consistent with the admissible evidence adduced.
FACTS:These are 3 consolidated petitions for issuance of writ of Amparo. Representative Ocampo publicly
disclosed an Order of Battle by PowerPoint presentation during the International Solidarity Mission conducted by
various organizations. Petitioners have their names included in what is alleged to be an Order of Battle of the PH
Army’s 10th Infantry Division (10th ID), a list containing names of personalities in southern Mindanao supposedly
connected with the CPP and its military arm the NPA. They perceive that the inclusion of their names in the OB List
is a threat to their life, liberty, and security and they become easy targets of unexplained disappearances or
extralegal killings.
Atty. Ladaga claims that suspicious looking persons have been visiting her Davao City law office, posing as members
of the military or falsely claiming to be clients. The petitioners also cite press releases of respondents stating that the
“10th ID has its order of battle and it is not for public consumption.”
Petitioners separately filed in RTC a petition for issuance of writ of amparo. RTC found no substantial evidence of the
perceived threat to petitioners’ life, liberty, and security, dismissing the petitions. Hence these petitions.
ISSUE: Whether the totality of evidence satisfies the degree of proof required under the Amparo Rule- substantial
evidence.
RULING: NO.
Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. SC, recognizing the evidentiary difficulties of amparo petitioners due to the fact that the State,
that is supposedly tasked by law to investigate, is itself involved in the enforced disappearance/EJ killings, laid down
a new standard of relaxed admissibility of evidence. SC found it a proper rule in amparo cases to consider any
evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible
evidence adduced." Put simply, evidence is not to be rejected outright because it is inadmissible under the rules for
as long as it satisfies "the most basic test of reason — i.e., RELEVANCE of the evidence to the issue at hand and its
consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence." But this flexibility in admissibility of evidence does not
do away with the requirement of substantial evidence in showing state involvement in the enforced
disappearance/EJK.
Here, the statement of Rep. Ocampo that respondents are the real source of the OB List is hearsay since he had no
personal knowledge concerning its preparation and only received it from an unnamed source described as a
“conscientious soldier.” But even if the Court were to apply the appropriate measure of flexibility here by admitting the
hearsay testimony of Representative Ocampo, a consideration of this piece of evidence to the totality of those
adduced, namely, the Press Releases issued by the 10th ID admitting the existence of a military-prepared Order of
Battle, the affidavits of petitioners attesting to the threatening visits and tailing of their vehicles by menacing strangers,
as well as the violent deaths of alleged militant personalities, leads to the conclusion that the threat to petitioners'
security has not be adequately proven.
The existence of the OB List could not be directly associated with the menacing behavior of suspicious men
or the violent deaths of certain personalities. No substantial evidence of an actual threat to petitioners’ life, liberty,
or security was proven. For even if the existence of the OB List or the inclusion of petitioners’ names therein can be
inferred from the totality of evidence presented, still, no link was shown to related the OB List either to the
threatening visits received by petitioners from unknown men or to the violent deaths of the three mentioned
personalities (Pojas, Monzon, Peñera whom petitioners claim were killed since they were included in the OB List).
EVIDENCE - 3S
Case # 16 TOPIC: Rule 129 What Need Not Be Proved
CASE TITLE: FERNANDO U. JUAN, Petitioner, v. ROBERTO U. JUAN (SUBSTITUTED BY HIS SON JEFFREY
C. JUAN) AND LAUNDROMATIC CORPORATION, Respondents
G.R. NO: G.R. No. 221732 DATE: , August 23, 2017
PONENTE PERALTA, J Hint: Magkapatid, nag away sa “Lavandera Ko” /fakenews internet
DOCTRINE: The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial
notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every
reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.
FACTS: : Respondent claims that the started using the name and mark “Lavandera Ko” in his Laundry Business
since 1994. On 1977, the National Library issued him a certificate of copyright over the said name and mark. Over
the years, his business expanded with numerous franchise outlets. He then formed a corporation “Laundromatic
Corporation” which was incorporated in 1997, while “Lavandera Ko” was registered as a business name on 1998
with DTI. Respondent discovered that his brother, the petitioner, was able to register the same mark with the IPO
on 2001. It was also discovered that the petitioner has been selling his own franchise.
Thus, the respondent filed a petition for injunction, unfair competition, infringement of copyright, cancellation of
trademark and name with prayer for TRO and preliminary injunction with RTC Makati.
RTC: dismissed the petition: neither of the parties had a right to the exclusive use of the mark because the same
was the original mark and work of Santiago S. Suarez in 1942 in his musical composition called, "Lavandera Ko"
and both parties of the present case failed to prove that they were the originators of the same mark.
CA: Dismissed petitioner’s appeal based on technical grounds.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in taking judicial notice of the article found in the internet without need
of further authentication or verification.
1. RULING: Yes! The RTC, in dismissing the petition ruled in this wise:
The resolution of this Court - NO ONE OF THE HEREIN PARTIES HAS THE RIGHT TO USE AND ENJOY
"LAVANDERA KO"!
Based on the data taken from the internet - References: CCP encyclopedia of Philippine art, vol. 6
http://www.himig.coin.ph (http://kahimyang.info / kauswagan/articles/1420/today - in - philippine -history this
information was gathered: xxxthe "Lavandera ko" (1942) which is a composition of Santiago S. Suarez". Thus, the
herein parties had made misrepresentation before this court, xxx How can the herein parties have coined and
created the subject mark and work when these parties were not yet born; xxx
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take and act on without proof because
these facts are already known to them. Put differently, it is the assumption by a court of a fact without need of
further traditional evidentiary support. The principle is based on convenience and expediency in securing and
introducing evidence on matters which are not ordinarily capable of dispute and are not bona fide disputed.
The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial notice is
to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable
doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.
Generally speaking, judicial notice has three material requisites:
(1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain;
(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court.
The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it
can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.((because
the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed.))
EVIDENCE - 3S
But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge
of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known,
the basis of his action.
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge of men
generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by
mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally
known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed,
provided they are of such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as
forming part of the common knowledge of every person.
Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by
resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.
The article in the website cited by the RTC patently lacks a requisite for it to be of judicial notice to the court because
such article is not well and authoritatively settled and is doubtful or uncertain. It must be remembered that some
articles appearing in the internet or on websites are easily edited and their sources are unverifiable, thus,
sole reliance on those articles is greatly discouraged.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 is GRANTED. Consequently, the Decision
dated May 7, 2015 and Resolution dated December 4, 2015 of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. This Court, however, ORDERS the REMAND of this case to the RTC for its prompt disposition.
EVIDENCE - 3S
Case #17 TOPIC: Rule 129, Sec.1. Mandatory Judicial Notice
CASE TITLE: People v. Sevilleno y Villanueva
G.R. NO: 129058 DATE: March 29, 1999
PONENTE: J. Bellosillo
FACTS:
Appellant Paulino Sevilleno was charged for rape with homicide, committed against the 9 year old Virginia Baquia.
He pleaded guilty during the arraignment as assisted by PAO lawyers. The Stenographer’s notes states that “Accused
was arraigned in a Cebuano language duly known and understood by him, pleaded GUILTY.”
The hearing for the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution was reset several times. Accused was provided
a counsel de oficio (Atty. Pabalinas). Taking advantage of typhoon "Pepang" that struck the island of Negros, the
accused escaped from detention and the court directed that the accused be tried in absentia and counsel was relieved
from his responsibility to his client and the court.
The prosecution presented the examining physician as well as Maria Lariosa and Norma Baquia but were not cross-
examined because Atty. Pabalinas earlier excused himself from the case. Neither did the court appoint another
counsel for the accused. Thereafter, he was recaptured and provided with a new counsel de oficio (Atty. Saldavia).
On 17 July 1996 the prosecution presented Rogelio Baquia as its last witness. Atty. Saldavia cross-examined Rogelio
but his questions were only considered token, and even irrelevant. Then the prosecution rested.
The presentation of the evidence for the defense was likewise reset several times because of the counsel de oficio.
On 3 December 1996, when this case was called for the presentation of evidence for the accused, counsel manifested
that he had no evidence to present in favor of the accused except the plea of GUILT as a mitigating circumstance.
RTC convicted appellant.
ISSUE:
1.) WON the court followed the correct procedure in arraigning the accused considering he pleaded guilty
2.) WON the court erred in disregarding the testimony of Norma Baquia as it did not state that the crime happened
within its territorial jurisdiction
RULING:
1) NO. Under Sec. 3, Rule 116, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, when the accused pleads guilty
to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea. It must also require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of his
culpability. If the accused so desires he may also present evidence in his behalf. This procedure is mandatory and a
judge who fails to observe it commits grave abuse of discretion.
The questions propounded by the trial judge during arraignment hardly satisfied the requisite searching
inquiry. Regrettably, there were only two (2) questions propounded to the accused: First. Do you understand your
plea of guilt? Second. Do you know that your plea of guilt could bring death penalty? In every case where the accused
enters a plea of guilty to a capital offense, especially where he is an ignorant person with little or no education, the
proper and prudent course to follow is to take such evidence as are available and necessary in support of the material
allegations of the information, including the aggravating circumstances therein enumerated, not only to satisfy the trial
judge himself but also to aid the Supreme Court in determining whether the accused really and truly understood and
comprehended the meaning, full significance and consequences of his plea.
The trial court did not bother to explain the essential elements of the crime of rape with homicide with which
the accused was charged. The trial judge also failed to inform the accused the certainty by which the death penalty
would be imposed on him and the fact that he would also be made to indemnify the heirs of his victim. As a result, the
accused was not properly accorded his fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation
leveled against him.
Experience has shown that innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty. Only a clear, definite and
unconditional plea of guilty by the accused must be accepted by trial courts. There is no such rule which provides that
simply because the accused pleaded guilty to the charge that his conviction should automatically follow. A judge
should always be an embodiment of competence. As an administrator of justice, it is imperative that the trial judge
carry out his duties ably and competently so as not to erode public confidence in the judiciary.
It is quite unfortunate that Attys. Vic Agravante, Danilo Pabalinas and Florentino Saldavia, all of PAO, were
also remiss in their duties as defenders of the accused.
2) YES. The court below also erred in disregarding the testimony of Norma Baquia "for the reason that her
testimony failed to establish that the incident happened within the territorial jurisdiction of this court." The court did not
consider her testimony purportedly because she only testified that her sister Virginia went with the accused to
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Guindali-an without specifying as to what municipality or city it was part of. Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court
requires courts to take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and geographical
divisions of our country. There is only one Sitio Guindali-an, Brgy. Guadalupe, San Carlos City (Negros
Occidental).
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the 6 March 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court-Br. 57, San Carlos City (Negros Occidental),
in Crim. Case No. 129058, convicting the accused PAULINO SEVILLENO Y VILLANUEVA alias Tamayo of Rape
with Homicide and sentencing him to DEATH is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the case is REMANDED to the
court of origin for the proper arraignment and trial of the accused until terminated.
EVIDENCE - 3S
Case # 18 TOPIC: Sec. 1 Mandatory Judicial Notice
CASE TITLE: Peltan Development Inc vs CA
G.R. NO.: 117029 DATE: March 19, 1997
PONENTE: Panganiban, J.
DOCTRINE: Every court must take cognizance of decisions this Court has rendered because they are proper
subjects of mandatory judicial notice as provided by Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. The said
decisions, more importantly, form part of the legal system, and failure of any court to apply them shall constitute an
abdication of its duty to resolve a dispute in accordance with law, and shall be a ground for administrative action
against an inferior court magistrate.
FACTS: Herein private respondents filed against eleven (11) herein petitioners a complaint captioned for
Cancellation of Titles and Damages. The complaint was amended by including or impleading as the twelfth
defendant the City Townhouse
Development Corporation. Respondents are applicants for a free patent over a parcel of land comprising an area of
197,527 square meters, more or less, situated in Barrio Tindig na Manga, Las Pinas, Metro Manila. During the years
that respondents were occupying, cultivating, planting and staying on the aforestated parcel of land, neither one of
the petitioners was in possession thereof.
The processing and eventual approval of respondents’ free patent application or petition over the subject piece of
land have, however, been obstructed and/or held in abeyance, despite the absence of any opposition thereto,
because of the alleged existence of several supposed certificates of title thereon namely: Peltan Development, Inc -
TCT No. S-17992. They then filed an Action for Cancellation of Title as the aforesaid was found to be derived from
an OCT No. 4216, which was alleged herein to be fictitious and/or spurious.
Peltan filed a Motion For Preliminary Hearing on Affirmative Defenses mainly on the ground that the complaint
states no cause of action against defendant Peltan. It is alleged in the motion that plaintiffs are not the real parties in
interest in the action as they do not assert any present and subsisting title of ownership over the property in
question. Invoking the case of Gabila vs. Barriga, Peltan contends that the action being one for cancellation of the
certificates of title the Government, through the Solicitor General, not a private individual like plaintiff Gabila, was the
real party in interest.
RTC: Dismissed the complaint. Herein private respondents were not real parties-in-interest; hence, no cause of
action against the adverse party.
CA: Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the order of the Regional Trial Court. It further held that the RTC
should have treated the case as an accion publiciana to determine who as between the parties plaintiffs and
defendants have a better right of possession.
ISSUE: Whether or not to proceed on private respondent’s cause of action for the nullification of OCT No. 4216 on
the ground that it is fake/spurious when the Supreme Court had already ruled in G.R. No. 109490 and in G.R. No.
112038 that OCT No. 4216 is genuine and valid
RULING: It is axiomatic nonetheless that a court has a mandate to apply relevant statutes and jurisprudence in
determining whether the allegations in a complaint establish a cause of action. While it focuses on the complaint, a
court clearly cannot disregard decisions material to the proper appreciation of the questions before it. In resolving a
motion to dismiss, every court must take cognizance of decisions this Court has rendered because they are proper
subjects of mandatory judicial notice as provided by Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. The said
decisions, more importantly, form part of the legal system, and failure of any court to apply them shall constitute an
abdication of its duty to resolve a dispute in accordance with law, and shall be a ground for administrative action
against an inferior court magistrate.
In resolving the present complaint, therefore, the Court is well aware that a decision in Margolles vs. CA, rendered on
14 February 1994, upheld the validity of OCT No. 4216 (and the certificates of title derived therefrom), the same OCT
that the present complaint seeks to nullify for being fictitious and spurious. Respondent CA, in its assailed Decision
dated 29 June 1994, failed to consider Margolles vs. CA. Clearly, private respondents possession of the land, and
their pending application for a free patent thereon, did not not vest in them a right superior to the valid title of petitioner
originating from OCT No. 4216. Indeed, private respondents can invoke no right at all against the petitioners.
EVIDENCE - 3S
Accordingly, the first element of a cause of action, i.e., plaintiffs right, is not present in the instant case.
In this light, the CAs treatment of the present suit as an accion publiciana to determine which one among the parties
had a better right over the property is but an exercise in redundancy. As discussed above, the same issue has been
foreclosed by the Supreme Court in Margolles. The Supreme Court promulgated Margolles ahead of the assailed CA
decision. It was incumbent upon Respondent CA to take judicial notice thereof and apply it in resolving this case. That
the CA did not is clearly a reversible error.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The complaint of private respondents in Civil Case No. LP-8852-F is DISMISSED. The notice of lis pendens,
annotated in the titles of petitioners because of Civil Care No. LP-8852-P, is ordered CANCELED. No costs.
EVIDENCE - 3S
Case # 19 TOPIC:
Sec. 2. Discretionary Judicial Notice
CASE TITLE: Candelaria v. People
G.R. NO: 209386 DATE: December 8, 2014
PONENTE Perlas-Bernabe, J.
DOCTRINE: The trial court can only take judicial notice of the value of goods which are matters of public knowledge
or are capable of unquestionable demonstration. In this case, at the time of the commission of the crime, the value
of diesel fuel in this case may be readily gathered from price lists published by the Department of Energy. It may
then be considered as a matter of public knowledge.
FACTS: In the morning of August 23, 2006, Viron Transit Corp. (Viron) ordered 14,000 liters of diesel fuel allegedly
worth ₱497,000 from United Oil Petroleum Phils. (Unioil), a company owned by private complainant Lao. Petitioner
Candelaria is a truck driver, employed by Lao, who was dispatched to deliver the fuel. At 12:50 in the afternoon of
the same day, Candelaria left the premises of Unioil to deliver the fuel, accompanied by his helper Romano, also an
employee of Unioil. Around 5PM, Viron called Lao to say that it had not yet received its order. Lao called Candelaria
on his mobile phone but did not receive any response. Around 6PM, Romano returned alone to Unioil’s office and
reported that Candelaria poked a balisong at him, prompting Lao to report the incident to the authorities. After a few
days, the NBI found the truck in Calamba, Laguna, emptied of fuel. Lao filed a complaint for Qualified Theft against
Candelaria.
Lao’s allegations were corroborated on material points by Valera (Lao’s mother) and Claro (dispatcher and driver of
Unioil). The RTC convicted Candelaria, taking the following circumstances into consideration: (a) on August 23,
2006, Candelaria was the driver of the truck with plate number PTA-945, loaded with 14,000 liters of diesel fuel
valued at ₱497,000.00, for delivery to Viron in Laon Laan, Manila; (b) Viron did not receive the diesel fuel; (c) Lao
reported the incident to Camp Crame and the MPD; and (d) the following day, August 24, 2006, the same truck was
found abandoned and emptied of its load in Calamba, Laguna. However, Lao’s testimony as to the value of the
stolen diesel fuel being P497,000, was uncorroborated.
Still, the RTC sentenced Candelaria to suffer the indeterminate penalty of fourteen (14) years and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
and ordered him to indemnify Lao the amount of ₱497,000.00 as the value of the stolen diesel fuel, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the costs. CA affirmed the conviction as well as the prison
sentence, but modified the amount to which Candelaria was to indemnify Lao, fixing the same at ₱14,000 in the
absence of any supporting documents to prove that the diesel fuel was indeed ₱497,000.
ISSUE: Whether the CA was correct in modifying the amount to be indemnified.
RULING: NO. The imposable penalty for the crime of Qualified Theft depends upon the value of the thing stolen. To
prove the value of the stolen property for purposes of fixing the imposable penalty under the RPC, the prosecution
must present more than a mere uncorroborated "estimate." In the absence of independent and reliable
corroboration of such estimate, the courts may either: (1) apply the minimum penalty under Article 309; or (2) fix the
value of the property taken based on the attendant circumstances of the case.
In Merida v. People, the Court deemed it improper to take judicial notice of the selling price of narra at the time of
the commission of its theft, as such evidence would be "unreliable and inconclusive considering the lack of
independent and competent source of such information."
In Lozano v. People, the Court fixed the value of the stolen mag wheels at ₱12,000.00 as the "reasonable allowable
limit under the circumstances," because of the uncorroborated testimony of the private complainant therein. Lozano
cited the case of Francisco v. People: "the trial court can only take judicial notice of the value of goods which are
matters of public knowledge or are capable of unquestionable demonstration," further explaining that the value of
jewelry, the stolen items in the said case, is neither a matter of public knowledge nor is it capable of unquestionable
demonstration.
EVIDENCE - 3S
In this case, at the time of the commission of the crime, the value of diesel fuel in this case may be readily gathered
from price lists published by the Department of Energy (DOE). In this regard, the value of diesel fuel involved herein
may then be considered as a matter of public knowledge which falls within the purview of the rules on discretionary
judicial notice. Judicial notice, which is based on considerations of expediency and convenience, displaces evidence
since, being equivalent to proof, it fulfills the object which the evidence is intended to achieve."
Although the prosecution only presented the uncorroborated testimony of Lao, the Court takes judicial notice of the
fact that the pump price of diesel fuel in August 2006 (i.e., the time of the commission of the crime) is within the
range of ₱37.60 to 37.86 per liter. As the value of the goods may independently and competently be ascertained
from the DOE’s price publication, adding too that the defense had not presented any evidence to contradict said
finding nor cross examined Lao, the Court makes this determination following the second option set by case law –
and that is, to fix the value of the property taken based on the attendant circumstances of the case.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 31, 2013 and the
Resolution dated September 3, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 34470 are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS in that petitioner Mel Carpizo Candelaria is: (a) sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole; and (b) ordered to indemnify private complainant Jessielyn Valera Lao the
amount of ₱497,000.00 representing the value of the stolen property.
EVIDENCE - 3S
Case # 20 TOPIC: Sec. 2. Discretionary Judicial Notice
CASE TITLE: Habagat Grill v. DMC-Urban Property Developer Inc.,
G.R. NO: 155110 DATE: March 31, 2005
PONENTE: PANGANIBAN, J
DOCTRINE: Municipal courts may take judicial notice of the municipal ordinances in force in the municipality in
which they sit. Such notice, however, is limited to what the law is and what it states. The location of Habagat Grill
cannot be resolved by merely taking judicial notice of Presidential Proclamation No. 20; such location is precisely at
the core of the dispute in this case. Neither may the MTC take discretionary judicial notice under Section 2 of Rule
129 of the Rules of Court,because the exact boundaries of the lot covered by that law are not a matter of public
knowledge capable of unquestionable demonstration. Neither may these be known to judges because of their
judicial functions.
FACTS: On June 13, 1981, David M. Consunji, Inc. transferred a residential lot in Matina, Davao City to its sister
company respondent DMC Urban Property Developers, Inc. (DMC). On March 28, 1994, DMC filed a Complaint for
Forcible Entry against petitioner Habagat Grill and/or Louie Biraogo alleging that on December 1, 1993, Louie
Biraogo, by means of strategy and stealth, unlawfully entered into the lot in question and constructed the Habagat
Grill thereon. Louie Biraogo in his Answer denied illegally entering the lot in question. He averred that Habagat Grill
was built in 1992 inside Municipal Reservation No. 1050 (Presidential Proclamation No. 20) and so DMC has no
cause of action against him. A team composed of three members, one a Geodetic Engineer representing the DMC,
another representing Biraogo and the third from the DENR which was tasked with the duty of determining where
precisely was Habagat Grill located found out that Habagat Grill Restaurant was occupying 934 square meters of
the lot of respondent.
The lower court dismissed the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction holding that mere allegation of ownership
did not, by itself, show that respondent had prior possession of the property. Furthermore, by taking judicial notice of
Presidential Proclamation No. 20 which declared Times Beach a recreation center, the lower court made its own
estimate of the location of Times Beach and held that Habagat Grill Restaurant was located inside Times Beach,
which was owned by the City of Davao. Hence, it was City of Davao and not respondent who has a cause of action
against petitioner. This was affirmed by the RTC but was reversed by the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the MTCC correctly took discretionary judicial notice of Presidential Proclamation No. 20
and determined on its own the exact location of the metes and bounds of the Times Beach and Habagat Grill
RULING: No. "Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act on
without proof because they already know them." Its object is to save time, labor and expense in securing and
introducing evidence on matters that are not ordinarily capable of dispute or actually bona fide disputed, and the
tenor of which can safely be assumed from the tribunal's general knowledge or from a slight search on its part.
Indeed, municipal courts may take judicial notice of the municipal ordinances in force in the municipality in which
they sit. Such notice, however, is limited to what the law is and what it states.
The location of Habagat Grill cannot be resolved by merely taking judicial notice of Presidential Proclamation No.
20; such location is precisely at the core of the dispute in this case. Moreover, considering respondent's allegation
that the supposed lot covered by the Ordinance has been lost due to inundation by the sea, we cannot fathom how
the trial court could have known of the actual location of the metes and bounds of the subject lot. Neither may the
MTC take discretionary judicial notice under Section 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, because the exact
boundaries of the lot covered by that law are not a matter of public knowledge capable of unquestionable
demonstration. Neither may these be known to judges because of their judicial functions. The appellate court aptly
relied on the Report submitted by the survey team that had been constituted by the trial court, precisely for the
purpose of determining the location of Habagat Grill in relation to respondent's lot.
**Evid-related issue: Whether or not the respondent has adduced preponderance of evidence to prove that the case
was filed within the reglementary period by presenting the testimony of its former real property manager, Bienamer
Garcia, as he had personal knowledge of the facts
Ruling:
Yes. "Preponderance of evidence" means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has
greater weight than that of the other. Where the evidence presented by one side is insufficient to ascertain the
EVIDENCE - 3S
claim, there is no preponderance of evidence. Under Section 1 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, among the facts
and circumstances to be considered by the court in determining which of the presented evidence has superior
weight is the witnesses' means and opportunity to know the facts to which they testify.
The extent of such means and opportunity are determined by the following considerations:
"First, the 'Actor Rule.' This rule maintains that a person's recollection of his own acts and of the attendant
circumstances is more definite and trustworthy than another person's recollection of it, especially if it was an act
done in the performance of a duty, or if the other person's testimony is little more than an expression of opinion or
judgment.
"Second, the witness who had the greater interest in noticing and remembering the facts is to be believed in
preference to the one that had a slighter interest to observe or was wholly indifferent. Interest has effect on the
power of observation of witness.
"Third, the witness who gives reasons for the accuracy of his observations is preferred to him who merely states the
fact to be so, without adverting to any circumstances showing that his attention was particularly called to it.
“Fourth, the witness in a state of excitement, fear, or terror is generally incapable of observing accurately.
"Fifth, intoxication tends to impair accuracy both of observation and memory of a witness."
Based on the foregoing criteria, the testimony of Garcia must be given greater weight, considering that it was his
task -- as the real property manager of respondent -- to know about matters involving the latter's properties. The
lower courts dismissed the testimony of Garcia -- regardless of how clear, positive and straightforward it was --
solely on the ground that he was not a disinterested witness. True, he was an employee of respondent; relationship,
however, will not by itself determine the true worth of one's testimony. The essential test is whether such testimony
is disencumbered, credible, and in accord with human experience.
As to the issue of prior possession, possession can be acquired by juridical acts. "These are acts to which the law
gives the force of acts of possession. In the present case, prior possession of the lot by respondent's predecessor
was sufficiently proven by evidence of the execution and registration of public instruments and by the fact that the
lot was subject to its will from then until December 1, 1993, when petitioner unlawfully entered the premises and
deprived the former of possession thereof.
DISPOSITIVE RULING:
EVIDENCE - 3S
Case # 21 TOPIC: Sec. 3 Rule 129; Judicial Notice when hearing
necessary
CASE TITLE: Republic vs. Science Park of the Philippines, Inc.
G.R. NO: 237714 DATE: 12 November 2018
PONENTE: Perlas-Bernabe
DOCTRINE: In an application for land registration, it is elementary that the applicant has the burden of proving, by
clear, positive, and convincing evidence that its alleged possession and occupation were of the nature and duration
required by law.
FACTS: SPPI filed with the MCTC an Application for original registration of a 7,691-square meter (sq. m.) parcel of
land located in Barangay Luta Norte, Malvar, Batangas. SPPI claimed that: (a) the subject land formed part of the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain; (b) it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership prior to June
12, 1945;(c) the subject land is not mortgaged or encumbered, nor claimed or possessed by any person other than
itself; and (d) it bought the land from Cenen D. Torizo (Cenen) as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated October
17, 2013.
To prove its claim that the subject land formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, SPPI
presented a certification dated February 26, 2016 issued by the DENR - CENRO stating that the land is within the
alienable and disposable zone based on DENR Administrative Order No. 97-37 (DAO 97-37) issued by then DENR
Secretary Victor O. Ramos.
On the other hand, to support its claim of possession in the concept of owner prior to June 12, 1945, it presented
documentary and testimonial evidence that: (a) the subject land was previously owned by Gervacio Lat (Gervacio),
who held a 1955 tax declaration in his name; (b) Gervacio was assisted by his tenant in cultivating the land and
harvesting the crops thereon; (c) Gervacio was succeeded by his daughter, Ambrocia Lat, who sold the subject land
to Spouses Raymundo Linatoc and Maria Reyes (Sps. Linatoc) through a "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Patuluyan ng Lupa"
dated April 25, 1968; (d) after Sps. Linatoc's demise, their heirs executed an "Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with
Waiver and Renunciation of Rights" on June 4, 1995, waiving their rights, interests, and participation in the subject
land in favor of Ernesto Linatoc (Ernesto); (e) Ernesto subsequently sold the same land to Cenen on March 13, 2012
by virtue of a "Kasulatan ng Ganap na Bilihan;" and (f) the subject land is now owned by SPPI which purchased the
same from Cenen.
The MCTC granted SPPI's application for original registration. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was
denied.Hence, it appealed to the CA, arguing that the MCTC erred in granting SPPI's application for land registration
despite the latter's failure to prove that: (a) the subject land forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the
public domain since no DENR official had confirmed that DAO 97-37 was authentic and still in force at the time; and
(b) it and its predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous, and exclusive possession of the subject land under a
bona fide claim of ownership prior to June 12, 1945, since the earliest possession was shown to have started only in
1955, and it failed to identify its predecessors prior to that time.
CA affirmed MCTC. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA was correct in upholding the MCTC's grant of SPPI's application for land registration.
EVIDENCE - 3S
RULING: No. Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act on without
proof because they already know them.43 Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides:
Section 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. — During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of
a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
"As a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases, even
when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may
have been tried or are actually pending before the same judge. However, this rule is subject to the exception that in
the absence of objection and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the
original record of the case filed in its archives as read into the records of a case pending before it, when with the
knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it, by name and number or in some other manner by which it
is sufficiently designated. Thus, for said exception to apply, the party concerned must be given an opportunity to object
before the court could take judicial notice of any record pertaining to other cases pending before it."
As correctly ruled by the CA, the conditions necessary for the exception to be applicable were established in this case.
Notably, the handling Government Prosecutor (a) did not object to the dispensation of the testimony of the DENR
legal custodian of official records, Ms. Bautista, in view of the similar stipulation between him and the same counsel
of SPPI in LRC No. N-127 previously heard and decided by the MCTC, and (b) satisfied himself that the copy of DAO
97-37 presented was duly certified by Ms. Bautista. Only then was the photocopy of the certified copy duly marked as
exhibit.
However, notwithstanding the alienability and disposability of the subject land, the Court finds that SPPI failed to
present convincing evidence that its alleged possession and occupation were of the nature and duration required by
law.
For purposes of land registration under Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, proof of specific acts of ownership must be
presented to substantiate the claim of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
land subject of the application. Actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a
nature as a party would actually exercise over his own property. Possession is: (a) open when it is patent, visible,
apparent, notorious, and not clandestine; (b) continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken, and not intermittent or
occasional; (c) exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an
appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and (d) notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known
and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood.
Consequently, SPPI failed to satisfy the requisite exclusivity and notoriety of its claimed possession and occupation
of the subject land because exclusive dominion and conspicuous possession thereof were not established.
Furthermore, SPPFs evidence were insufficient to prove that its possession and occupation were for the duration
required by law. The earliest tax declaration in Gervacio's name presented by SPPI, i.e., Tax Declaration (TD) No.
6243, dates back to 1955 only, short of the requirement that possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of
ownership should be since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
In sum, the Court finds that SPPI's unsubstantiated and self-serving assertions of possession and occupation do not
constitute the well-nigh incontrovertible evidence of possession and occupation of the subject land of the nature and
duration required by Section 14 (1) of PD 1529. Accordingly, the CA erred in affirming the MCTC's grant of SPPI's
application for original registration of its imperfect title over the subject land.
DISPOSITIVE RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. A new judgment is hereby entered REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the
Decision dated October 12, 2017 and the Resolution dated February 9, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 108099, and accordingly, DENYING respondent Science Park of the Philippines, Inc.'s (SPPI) application for
original registration of the subject land.
EVIDENCE - 3S
Case # 22 TOPIC: Sec. 2. Discretionary Judicial Notice
CASE TITLE: Trinidad y Bersamin v. People
G.R. NO: 239957 February 18, 2019 DATE: February 18, 2019
PONENTE: PERLAS-BERNABE
DOCTRINE:
The general rule is that the courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other
cases. However, this rule admits of exceptions, such as when the other case has a close connection with the matter
in controversy in the case at hand.
FACTS:
The prosecution alleged that at around 8:30 in the evening of November 14, 2014, members from the Philippine
National Police (PNP)-Pasig Police Station conducted a buy-bust operation, to apprehend a certain "Jessie" who,
purportedly, was involved in illegal drug activities at Aurelia St., Barangay Bagong Hog, Pasig City. After the alleged
sale had been consummated, PO1 Nidoy arrested Trinidad, frisked him, and recovered from the latter a 0.38 caliber
revolver loaded with six (6) live ammunitions tucked at his back, as well as a 0.22 caliber rifle loaded with seven (7)
live ammunitions and two (2) magazines (subject firearms and ammunition) which were found beside the gate of his
house. When asked if he has any documentation for the same, Trinidad claimed that they were merely pawned to
him. After marking the seized items, they proceeded to the nearby barangay hall and conducted inventory and
photography thereof, and then went to the police station where the request for ballistic examination was made.
On December 12, 2014, an Information was filed before the RTC charging Trinidad with violation of RA 10591.
For his part, Trinidad denied the accusations against him, claiming, among others, that aside from the present case,
he was also charged with the crime of Illegal Sale and Possession of Dangerous Drugs, which arose from the same
incident, but was, however, acquitted therein for, inter alia, failure of the prosecution to prove that Trinidad was
validly arrested thru a legitimate buy-bust operation. He then formally offered in evidence the said acquittal ruling,
which was objected by the public prosecutor for being immaterial and irrelevant to the present case.The RTC
admitted said evidence only as part of Trinidad's testimony.
RTC found Trinidad guilty. The RTC found that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of the crime of
Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition. It likewise held that Trinidad's acquittal in the drugs charges is
immaterial to this case, opining that the ground for his acquittal is neither unlawful arrest nor unlawful search and
seizure, but the procedural flaw in the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs.Court of Appeals affirmed RTC
decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take judicial notice of the circumstances attendant to the buy bust operation
as found by the court which resolved the drugs cases.
EVIDENCE - 3S
RULING:
Yes.
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on
the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause, absent which, such search and
seizure becomes 'unreasonable’ within the meaning of said constitutional provision. To protect the people from
unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence
obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding "One of the recognized exceptions to the need for a warrant before a search may be affected is a search
incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can
be made – the process cannot be reversed.”
A lawful arrest may be affected with or without a warrant. With respect to the latter, a warrantless arrest may be
done when, inter alia, the accused is caught in flagrante delicto,such as in buy-bust operations in drugs cases.
However, if the existence of a valid buy-bust operation cannot be proven, and thus, the validity of the in flagrante
delicto warrantless arrest cannot be established, the arrest becomes illegal and the consequent search incidental
thereto becomes unreasonable. Resultantly, all the evidence seized by reason of the unlawful arrest is inadmissible
in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
A more circumspect review of the decision absolving Trinidad of criminal liability in the drugs cases reveals that he
was acquitted therein not only due to unjustified deviations from the chain of custody rule, but also on the ground
that the prosecution failed to prove the existence of a valid buy-bust operation, thereby rendering Trinidad's in
flagrante delicto warrantless arrest illegal and the subsequent search on him unreasonable. Thus, contrary to the
courts a quo's opinions, Trinidad's acquittal in the drugs cases, more particularly on the latter ground, is material to
this case because the subject firearms and ammunition were simultaneously recovered from him when he was
searched subsequent to his arrest on account of the buy-bust operation.
The Court is aware that the findings on the illegality of Trinidad's warrantless arrest were made in the drugs cases,
which are separate and distinct from the present illegal possession of firearms and ammunition case. Nevertheless,
the Court is not precluded from taking judicial notice of such findings as evidence, and apply them altogether for the
judicious resolution of the same issue which was duly raised herein. To be sure, the general rule is that the courts
are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases. However, this rule admits of
exceptions, such as when the other case has a close connection with the matter in controversy in the case at hand.
Here, an examination of the ruling in the drugs cases (which Trinidad offered as evidence and the RTC admitted as
part of his testimony confirms that the drugs cases and this case are so interwoven and interdependent of each
other since, as mentioned, the drugs, as well as the subject firearms and ammunition, were illegally seized in a
singular instance, i.e., the buy-bust operation. Hence, the Court may take judicial notice of the circumstances
attendant to the buy-bust operation as found by the court which resolved the drugs cases.
To recall, in the drugs cases, the finding of unreasonableness of search and seizure of the drugs was mainly based
on the failure of PO1 Sanoy's testimony to establish the legitimacy of the buy-bust operation against Trinidad as
said testimony was found to be highly doubtful and incredible. This circumstance similarly obtains here as in fact,
the testimonies of both PO1 Nidoy and PO1 Sanoy in this case essentially just mirror on all material points the latter's
implausible narration in the drugs cases. In view of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the subject firearms and
ammunition are also inadmissible in evidence for being recovered from the same unreasonable search and seizure
as in the drugs cases. Since the confiscated firearms and ammunition are the very corpus delicti of the crime charged
in this case, Trinidad's acquittal is in order.
DISPOSITIVE RULING:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 25, 2018 and the Resolution dated May
31, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 39598 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner
Jesus Trinidad y Bersamin is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections
is ordered to cause his immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held in custody for any other reason.
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Case #23 TOPIC: JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
CASE TITLE: ALFELOR V. HALASAN
G.R. NO: 165987 DATE: March 31, 2006
PONENTE: CELLEJO, SR., J.
DOCTRINE: A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge that fact as judicial admissions are
a waiver of proof; production of evidence is dispensed with.
FACTS: A complaint for partition was filed by Teresita as surviving heirs of Jose Aleflor. Josefina Halasan
filed a motion for intervention in the settlement of the estate of Jose Aleflor claiming to be the surviving
spouse of Jose Alfelor.
Teresita testified While she did not know Josefina personally, she knew that her husband had been
previously married to Josefina and revealed that Jose told her that he did not have his marriage to Josefina
annulled because he believed in good faith that he had the right to remarry, not having seen her for more
than seven years.
The motion was denied ruling that no witness was presented to identify the marriage contract as to the
existence of an original copy of the document or any public officer who had custody thereof.
ISSUE: Whether the first wife of a decedent, a fact admitted by the other party who claims to be the second
wife, should be allowed to intervene in an action for partition involving the share of the deceased "husband"
in the estate of his parents.
RULING: Intervention is allowed. Legal interest of Josefina has been judicially admitted by Teresita.
When called to testify, Teresita admitted several times that she knew that her late husband had been
previously married to another (Josefina). To the Court’s mind, this admission constitutes a "deliberate, clear
and unequivocal" statement; made as it was in the course of judicial proceedings, such statement qualifies
as a judicial admission. A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge that fact as judicial
admissions are a waiver of proof; production of evidence is dispensed with. A judicial admission also
removes an admitted fact from the field of controversy. Consequently, an admission made in the pleadings
cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to such party, and all
proofs to the contrary or inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the
party or not. The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against
the pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a position contrary of or inconsistent with what was pleaded.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 74757 is AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Davao City, is ORDERED to admit
respondent Josefina Halasan’s Complaint- in-Intervention and forthwith conduct the proper proceedings
with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
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Case # 24 TOPIC: Judicial Admissions
CASE TITLE: People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee, VS Julian Castillo y Lumayro, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. NO: 131592-93 DATE: February 15, 2000
PONENTE: Puno, J.:
DOCTRINE:
FACTS: With the passage of RA 8294 on June 6, 1997, the use of an unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is
now considered, not as a separate crime, but merely a special aggravating circumstance.
Appellant Julian Castillo y Lumayro was charged with Murder and Illegal Possession of Firearms in 2 separate
Informations. The scene of the crime was the then on-going construction site of Gaisano Bldg in Lapaz, Iloilo City.
On Nov. 14, 1995 at about 8am, Roberto Lustica, a construction worker, was on the last rung of the stairs on the
third floor of the said bldg when he saw his co-worker Rogelio Abawag being closely pursued by accused Julian
Castillo, a lead man in the same construction site. During the chase, the accused pointed a gun at Abawag and shot
him. Abawag, then about a half meter away from the accused, fell on his knees beside a pile of hollow blocks.
Franklin Acaso, a mason working on the third floor of the bldg, heard the first shot. Initially, he did not pay attention
to it as he thought that the sound came from one of their construction equipment. Seconds later, he heard a second
shot and a person screaming: “Ouch that is enough!” When he looked towards the direction of the sound, he saw
the accused in front of Abawag, about a meter away, pointing a .38 caliber revolver at the latter. The accused shot
Abawag a third time. Then accused fled, leaving Abawag lifeless.
The police proceeded to Port San Pedro after inspecting the crime scene where they saw the accused on board a
vessel bound for Cebu. They were able to caught up with him but up inquiry, the accused denied complicity in the
killing of Abawag. The police found the gun in his possession with 3 empty shells and 3 live ammunitions. Further
inquiry revealed that the accused owned the gun but had no license to possess it. The police took him to custody
and charged him for the murder of Abawag and for Illegal possession of firearm.
The self-defense theory hoisted by the accused was not given credence by the trial court so he was convicted of
Homicide and of Illegal Possession of Firearm, aggravated by homicide. On automatic review, the appellant impugns
solely his conviction for illegal possession of firearm for which he was sentenced to the supreme penalty of death.
ISSUE: Whether it was proper for the trial court to convict the accused of two separate offenses in light of the
recent amendment.
RULING: Considering that the provisions of the amendatory law favorable to the appellant, the new law should be
retroactively applied in the case at bar. It was thus error for the trial court to convict the appellant of two separate
offenses and punish him separately for each crime.
The appellant anchors his appeal on the assertion that his conviction was unwarranted as no proof was adduced by
the prosecution that he was not licensed to possess the subject firearm. The Court agrees. 2 requisites are
necessary to establish illegal possession of firearms: (1) existence of subject firearm; (2) the fact that the accused
who owned or possessed the gun did not have the corresponding license or permit to carry it outside his residence.
The onus probandi of establishing these elements as alleged in the Information lies with the prosecution,.
No proof was adduced by the prosecution to establish the second element of the crime. This negative fact constitutes
an esential element of the crime as mere possession, by itself, is not an offense. Indeed, if the means of proving a
negative fact is equally within the control of each party, the burden of proof is on the party averring said negative
fact. The prosecution is duty-bound to prove the allegation. It is the prosecution who has the burden of establishing
beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime charged. Thus, if the non-existence of some fact is a
constituent element of the crime, the onus is upon the State to prove this negative allegation of non-existence.
Hence, in the case at bar, although the appellant himself admitted that he had no license for the gun recovered from
his possession, his admission will not relieve the prosecution of its duty to establish beyond reasonable doubt the
appellant’s lack of license or permit to possess the gun. By its very nature, an “admission is the mere
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acknowledgement of a fact or circumstances from which guilty may be inferred, tending to incriminate the speaker,
but not sufficient of itself to establish the guilt.” From the above principles, this Court can infer that an admission in
criminal cases is insufficient to prove beyond doubt the commission of the crime charged.
Moreover, said admission is extrajudicial in nature. As such, it does not fall under Sec.4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court which states: “An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the trial or other proceedings
in the same case does not require proof.”
Not being a judicial admission, said statement by accused-appellant does not prove beyond reasonable doubt the
second element of illegal possession of firearm. It does not even establish a prima facie case. It merely bolsters the
case for the prosecution but does not stand as proof of the fact of absence of lack of a license.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOINF, the assailed Decision is MODIFIED. Appellant Julian
Castillo y Lumayro is found guilty of Homicide.
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Case # 25 Sec. 4. Judicial Admissions
Constantino v. Heirs of Pedro Constantino Jr.
G.R. No. 181508, October 2, 2013
PEREZ, J.:
Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the admissions. Even if placed at a disadvantageous
position, a party may not be allowed to rescind them unilaterally, it must assume the consequences of the
disadvantage.
The general rule regarding conclusiveness of judicial admission upon the party making it and the dispensation of
proof admits of two exceptions:. First, when it is shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake, and
when it is shown that no such admission was in fact made.
FACTS:
Pedro Sr., ancestors of petitioners and respondents owned several parcels of land, one of which is an unregistered
parcel of land in Bulacan. Upon his death, he was survived by six children.
Asuncion and Josefina, great grandchildren of Pedro Sr. filed a complaint against Oscar Constantino et. a.,
grandchildren of Pedro Sr. for the nullification of a document “Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman”.
Asuncion and Josefina alleged that in 1998, Oscar asserted their claim of ownership over the entirety of the parcel
of land. The former, upon verification, learned that a tax declaration was unlawfully issued which in effect cancelled
the tax declaration in favor of Pedro Sr and that the cancellation was due to the “Pagmamana sa Labas ng
Hukuman. The land was then divided equally among Oscar and Maxima.
Respondents sought to annul the "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman" as well as the Tax Declarations that were
issued on the basis of such document.
Petitioners position was that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver which led to the issuance of Tax
Declaration No.9534 was acquiesced in by the other heirs of Pedro Sr., including the petitioners, on the
understanding that the respondent heirs of Pedro Jr. would no longer share and participate in the settlement and
partition of the remaining lot covered by the "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman”.
RTC rendered a Decision finding the parties in in pari delicto in which the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement
with Waiver and the “Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman” was executed to the exclusion of the other heirs. Thus,
both plaintiff and defendant acted equally at fault. CA ruled that it was erroneous for the RTC to declare the parties
in pari delicto.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA disregarded the stipulations and admissions during the pre-trial conference on which
the application of in pari delicto was based.
RULING:
Yes. The CA contradicted the admissions by the respondents themselves during the pre-trial conference. A portion
of it is as follows:
1. That the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 9534 previously owned by Pedro Constantino, Sr. was transferred
to Maria Constantino under Tax Declaration No. 9535; (highlighting ours)
1. The existence of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver per Doc. No.319, Page No. 44, Book No. 11, Series of 1968
by Notary Public Romerico Flores, Jr.
The admission against the interest of respondents fact of ownership by Pedro Sr of the property which was
transferred to respondents’ mother, the daughter of Pedro Jr. Such that in one of the issues to be resolved by the
court, this was included: “whether or not the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver” is enforceable against
plaintiffs. Thus curing the legal infirmities if any of the Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman.
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Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the admissions. Pre-trial admission in civil
cases is one of the instances of judicial admissions explicitly provided for under Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of
Court, which mandates that the contents of the pre-trial order shall control the subsequent course of the action,
thereby, defining and limiting the issues to be tried
Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and signed by the parties and their counsels, they become
binding on the parties who made them. They become judicial admissions of the fact or facts stipulated. Even if
placed at a disadvantageous position, a party may not be allowed to rescind them unilaterally, it must assume
the consequences of the disadvantage.
A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge the fact as judicial admissions are a waiver of
proof; Production of evidence is dispensed with.
A judicial admission also removes an admitted fact from the field of controversy. Consequently, an admission made
in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to such party,
and all proofs to the contrary or inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the
party or not. The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the
pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a position contrary of or inconsistent with what was pleaded.
Last paragraph of Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court serves as a caveat for the rule of conclusiveness
of judicial admissions
In the interest of justice, issues that may arise in the course of the proceedings but which may not have been taken
up in the pre-trial can still be taken up.
The general rule regarding conclusiveness of judicial admission upon the party making it and the
dispensation of proof admits of two exceptions:
1. When it is shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake, and
2. When it is shown that no such admission was in fact made.
- The latter exception allows one to contradict an admission by denying that he made such an
admission
- However, respondents failed to refute the earlier admission/stipulation before and during the trial.
While denying ownership by Pedro Sr. of the 192 sq m lot, respondent Asuncion Laquindanum,
when placed on the stand, offered a vague explanation as to how such parcel of land was acquired
by Pedro Jr
WHEREFORE, the 31 May 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81329 is hereby REVERSED.
The Pagmamana sa Lahas ng Hukuman and Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver are hereby declared void without
prejudice to the partition of the estate of Pedro Constantino Sr. with the full participation of all the latter's heirs.
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Case #26 TOPIC: Sec. 1 Object as Evidence
CASE TITLE: People v Rullepa
G.R. NO: 131516 DATE: March 5, 2003
PONENTE: Carpio-Morales, J
FACTS: Ronnie Rullepa y Guinto (Rullepa), a houseboy, was charged with Rape before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City for allegedly having carnal knowledge with “AAA”, three (3) years of age, a minor and against
her will and without her consent.
“AAA” described her abuse under the hands of Rullepa in a plain and matter-of-fact manner in her testimony.
The victim and her mother testified that she was only three years old at the time of the rape. However, the prosecution
did not offer the victim‘s certificate of live birth or similar authentic documents in evidence.
Finding for the prosecution, the RTC rendered judgment finding Rullepa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and
accordingly sentenced him to death. The case was placed for automatic review of the Supreme Court
ISSUE: Whether the RTC erred in sentencing the accused to death when the prosecution failed to offer the live birth
as evidence.
RULING: Yes. The Court in People v Pruna established a set of guidelines in appreciating age as an element of the
crime or as a qualifying circumstance, to wit:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live
birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school
records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable,
the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity
who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party
pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years
old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years
old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years
old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victims mother or relatives
concerning the victims age, the complainants testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted
by the accused.
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5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to
object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.
This does not mean, however, that the presentation of the certificate of birth is at all times necessary to prove minority.
The minority of a victim of tender age who may be below the age of ten is quite manifest and the court can take judicial
notice thereof. The crucial years pertain to the ages of fifteen to seventeen where minority may seem to be dubitable
due to ones physical appearance. In this situation, the prosecution has the burden of proving with certainty the fact
that the victim was under 18 years of age when the rape was committed in order to justify the imposition of the death
penalty under the above-cited provision.
A person‘s appearance, where relevant, is admissible as object evidence, the same being addressed to the senses
of the court. As to the weight to accord such appearance, especially in rape cases, the Court in People v. Pruna laid
down the guideline.
Under the guideline, the testimony of a relative with respect to the age of the victim is sufficient to constitute proof
beyond reasonable doubt in cases (a) and (b) above. In such cases, the disparity between the allegation and the proof
of age is so great that the court can easily determine from the appearance of the victim the veracity of the testimony.
The appearance corroborates the relative‘s testimony.
As the alleged age approaches the age sought to be proved, the person‘s appearance, as object evidence of her age,
loses probative value. Doubt as to her true age becomes greater and, following United States v. Agadas, such doubt
must be resolved in favor of the accused.
Because of the vast disparity between the alleged age (three years old) and the age sought to be proved (below
twelve years), the trial court would have had no difficulty ascertaining the victim‘s age from her appearance. No
reasonable doubt, therefore, exists that the second element of statutory rape is present.
Whether the victim was below seven years old, however, is another matter. Here, reasonable doubt exists. A mature
three and a half-year old can easily be mistaken for an underdeveloped seven-year old. The appearance of the victim,
as object evidence, cannot be accorded much weight and the testimony of the mother is, by itself, insufficient.
As it has not been established with moral certainty that “AAA” was below seven years old at the time of the commission
of the offense, Rullepa cannot be sentenced to suffer the death penalty. Only the penalty of reclusion perpetua can
be imposed upon him.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 96, is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Ronnie Rullepa y Guinto is found GUILTY of Statutory Rape,
defined and punished by Article 335 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay private complainant, Cyra May Buenafe y Francisco, the amount
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
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Case #27 Sec. 3. Original Document Must be Produced
CONSOLIDATED BANK AND TRUST CORPORATION (SOLIDBANK), Petitioners, vs.
DEL MONTE MOTOR WORKS, INC., NARCISO G. MORALES, AND SPOUSE, Respondents
DOCTRINE:The only actual rule that the ‘best evidence’ phrase denotes today is the rule requiring the
production of the original writing
G.R. No. 143338 July 29, 2005
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Petitioner, a domestic banking and trust corporation, alleges in a complaint for recovery of sum of money against
respondents, that on 23 April 1982, it extended a loan (in favour of the respondents) in the amount of One Million
Pesos (₱1,000,000.00) as evidenced by a promissory note executed by respondents on the same date. Under the
promissory note, respondents Del Monte Motor Works, Inc. (respondent corporation) and Morales bound
themselves jointly and severally to pay petitioner the full amount of the loan through twenty-five monthly
installments of with interest. The note was to be paid in full by 23 May 1984. As respondents defaulted on their
monthly installments, the full amount of the loan became due and demandable pursuant to the terms of the
promissory note. Petitioner likewise alleges that it made oral and written demands upon respondents to settle their
obligation but notwithstanding these demands, respondents still failed to pay their indebtedness.
Petitioner attached to its complaint a photocopy (Exhibit "A") of the promissory note supposedly executed by
respondents, a copy of the demand letter it sent respondents dated 20 January 1983, and statement of account
pertaining to respondents’ loan.
On 26 September 1985, petitioner made its formal offer of evidence. However, as the original copy of Exhibit "A"
could no longer be found, petitioner instead sought the admission of the duplicate original of the promissory note
which was identified and marked as Exhibit "E."
The trial court initially admitted into evidence Exhibit "E" and granted respondents’ motion that they be allowed to
amend their respective answers to conform with this new evidence.
On 30 September 1985, respondent corporation filed a manifestation and motion for reconsideration of the trial
court’s order admitting into evidence petitioner’s Exhibit "E." On 06 December 1985, the trial court granted
respondents’ motions for reconsideration. The case was eventually dismissed on the ground that petitioner no
longer possessed any proof of respondents’ alleged indebtedness.
Issue: Whether the best evidence rule applies in this case.
RULING: .The "best evidence rule" is encapsulated in Rule 130, Section 3, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
which provides:
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. – When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
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(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of
the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and
the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court
without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole;
and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
Bearing in mind that the risk of mistransmission of the contents of a writing is the justification for the "best evidence
rule," we declare that this rule finds no application to this case. It should be noted that respondents never disputed
the terms and conditions of the promissory note thus leaving us to conclude that as far as the parties herein are
concerned, the wording or content of said note is clear enough and leaves no room for disagreement. In their
responsive pleadings, respondents’ principal defense rests on the alleged lack of consideration of the promissory
note. In addition, respondent Morales also claims that he did not sign the note in his personal capacity. These
contentions clearly do not question the "precise wording" of the promissory note which should have paved the way
for the application of the "best evidence rule." It was, therefore, an error for the Court of Appeals to sustain the
decision of the trial court on this point.
Besides, the "best evidence rule" as stated in our Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is not absolute. As quoted
earlier, the rule accepts of exceptions one of which is when the original of the subject document is in the possession
of the adverse party. As pointed out by petitioner, had it been giv en the opportunity by the court a quo, it would
have sufficiently established that the original of Exhibit "A" was in the possession of respondents which would have
called into application one of the exceptions to the "best evidence rule."
Moreover, respondents failed to deny specifically the execution of the promissory note. This being the case, there
was no need for petitioner to present the original of the promissory note in question. Their judicial admission with
respect to the genuineness and execution of the promissory note sufficiently established their liability to petitioner
regardless of the fact that petitioner failed to present the original of said note.
Indeed, when the defendant fails to deny specifically and under oath the due execution and genuineness of a
document copied in a complaint, the plaintiff need not prove that fact as it is considered admitted by the defendant
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Case #28 TOPIC: Sec. 3 Original Document Must be
Produced
CASE TITLE: HEIRS OF MARGARITA PRODON, PETITIONERS, VS. HEIRS OF MAXIMO S. ALVAREZ AND
VALENTINA CLAVE, REPRESENTED BY REV. MAXIMO ALVAREZ, JR., RESPONDENTS.
G.R. NO: G.R. No. 170604 DATE: September 02, 2013
PONENTE BERSAMIN, J.:
DOCTRINE: The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a written document are the subject of the inquiry.
In an action for quieting of title based on the inexistence of a deed of sale with right to repurchase that purportedly
cast a cloud on the title of a property, therefore, the Best Evidence Rule does not apply, and the defendant is not
precluded from presenting evidence other than the original document.
FACTS: Respondents filed a complaint for quieting of title and damages against Margarita Prodon. They averred
that their parents were the registered owners of that parcel of land covered by TCT No. 84797 of the Register of
Deeds of Manila. They could not locate the owner’s duplicate copy, but the original copy of TCT No. 84797 on file
with the Register of Deeds was intact, but it contained an entry stating that the property had been sold to Prodon
subject to the right of repurchase. Respondents content that the entry had been maliciously done by Prodon
because the deed of sale with right to repurchase covering the property did not exist.
In her answer, Prodon claimed that the late Alvarez, Sr (respondents’ father) had executed on September 9, 1975 the
deed of sale with right to repurchase to her and that she had then become the absolute owner of the property due to
its non-repurchase within the given 6-month period.
During trial, the custodian of the records of the property attested that the copy of the deed of sale with right to
repurchase could not be found in the files of the Register of Deeds of Manila.
The RTC rendered judgment, finding untenable the respondents’ contention that the deed of sale with right to
repurchase did not exist. It opined that although the deed itself could not be presented as evidence in court, its
contents could nevertheless be proved by secondary evidence, upon proof of its execution or existence and of the
cause of its unavailability being without bad faith. It found that the defendant had established the execution and
existence of the deed.
The CA reversed the RTC. It held that before secondary evidence as to the contents of a document may be admitted
in evidence, the existence of the document must first be proved, likewise, its execution and its subsequent loss.
ISSUE: Whether the pre-requisites for the admission of secondary evidence had been complied with.
RULING: The CA and the RTC both misapplied the Best Evidence Rule to this case, and their misapplication
diverted the attention from the decisive issue in this action for quieting of title.
The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a writing are in issue. When the evidence sought to be
introduced concerns external facts, such as the existence, execution or delivery of the writing, without reference to its
terms, the Best Evidence Rule cannot be invoked. In such a case, secondary evidence may be admitted even without
accounting for the original.
This case involves an action for quieting of title. The action for quieting of title may be based on the fact that a deed
is invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable. The terms of the writing may or may not be material to an action for
quieting of title, depending on the ground alleged by the plaintiff. It is not denied that this action does not involve the
terms or contents of the deed of sale with right to repurchase. The principal issue raised by the respondents as the
plaintiffs, which Prodon challenged head on, was whether or not the deed of sale with right to repurchase, duly
executed by the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr., had really existed.
Considering that the Best Evidence Rule was not applicable because the terms of the deed of sale with right to
repurchase were not the issue, the CA did not have to address and determine whether the existence, execution, and
loss, as pre-requisites for the presentation of secondary evidence, had been established by Prodon’s evidence. It
should have simply addressed and determined whether or not the “existence” and “execution” of the deed as the facts
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in issue had been proved by preponderance of evidence.
The foregoing notwithstanding, good trial tactics still required Prodon to establish and explain the loss of the original
of the deed of sale with right to repurchase to establish the genuineness and due execution of the deed. This was
because the deed, although a collateral document, was the foundation of her defense in this action for quieting of title.
In this case, Prodon did not preponderantly establish the existence and due execution of the deed of sale with right
to repurchase.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on August
18, 2005 by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 58624 entitled Heirs of Maximo S.
Alvarez and Valentina Clave, represented by Rev. Maximo Alvarez, Jr. v. Margarita Prodon
and the Register of Deeds of the City Manila; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs
of suit.
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Case #29 TOPIC: Section 3, Original Document Must be
Presented
CASE TITLE: Anita U. Lorenzana vs. Rodolfo Lelina
G.R. NO: 187850 DATE: August 17, 2016
PONENTE: Jardeleza, J
DOCTRINE:
Mere photocopies of documents are inadmissible pursuant to the best evidence rule. Nevertheless, evidence not
objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment. Courts are
not precluded to accept in evidence a mere photocopy of a document when no objection was raised when it was
formally offered.
FACTS:
This case involves a dispute over the ownership of a parcel of land located at Tagudin, Ilocos Sur.
On April 1, 1975, Ambrosia Lelina (Ambrosia), married to Aquilino Lelina (Aquilino), executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
over one-half (1/2) of an undivided parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration (TD) No. 14324-C (property) in favor of
her son, Rodolfo Lelina, the respondent. Immediately after the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale, respondent
took possession of the property.
Around August 1996, respondent and his three tenants were invited at the Municipal Agrarian Office of Tagudin, Ilocos
Sur for a conference where they were informed that the property is already owned by petitioner by virtue of a Deed of
Final Conveyance and TD No. 11-21367-A both in the name of Anita U. Lorenzana, the petitioner. Alerted by the turn
of events, respondent filed a complaint for quieting of title and cancellation of documents on September 24, 1996,
with the RTC Branch 25, Tagudin, Ilocos Sur, claiming that there appears to be a cloud over his ownership and
possession of the property.
In her answer, petitioner averred that she acquired the land through a foreclosure sale. She alleged that she was a
judgment creditor in a final judgment against Aquilino. Thereafter, by virtue of a writ of execution to enforce the
decision in the collection case, the sheriff levied on a land with an area of 16,047 sq. m. covered by the TD No. 11-
05370-A (levied property) under the name of Ambrosia. Petitioner claimed to have emerged as the highest bidder
during the auction sale held on September 29, 1977.
The RTC upheld respondent's ownership over the half of the levied property. It ruled that the levied property is
exclusively owned by Ambrosia, and could not be held to answer for the obligations of her husband in the collection
case. On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings of the RTC and upheld respondent's ownership over the property.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner argues that respondent's sole basis for his claim of ownership over the property is the
Deed of Absolute Sale, the original of which was not presented in court. Since only the photocopy of the Deed of
Absolute Sale was presented, its contents are inadmissible for violating the best evidence rule. Thus, respondent's
claim of ownership should be denied.
ISSUE: Whether the Deed of Absolute Sale upon which respondent Lelina’s claim of ownership rests is
admissible in evidence.
RULING:
Yes. The deed is admissible in evidence.
Petitioner claims that the photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale should not have been admitted in evidence to prove
respondent's ownership over the property. We disagree.
The best evidence rule requires that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence is
admissible other than the original document itself except in the instances mentioned in Section 3, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules of Court. As such, mere photocopies of documents are inadmissible pursuant to the best evidence
rule. Nevertheless, evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly considered by the court in arriving
at its judgment. Courts are not precluded to accept in evidence a mere photocopy of a document when no objection
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was raised when it was formally offered.
In order to exclude evidence, the objection to admissibility of evidence must be made at the proper time, and the
grounds specified. Objection to evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered. In case of documentary
evidence, offer is made after all the witnesses of the party making the offer have testified, specifying the purpose for
which the evidence is being offered. It is only at this time, and not at any other, that objection to the documentary
evidence may be made. And when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were
offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived. This is true even if by its nature the evidence is
inadmissible and would have surely been rejected if it had been challenged at the proper time. Moreover, grounds for
objection must be specified in any case. Grounds for objections not raised at the proper time shall be considered
waived, even if the evidence was objected to on some other ground. Thus, even on appeal, the appellate court may
not consider any other ground of objection, except those that were raised at the proper time.
In this case, the objection to the Deed of Absolute Sale was belatedly raised. Respondent submitted his Formal Offer
of Evidence on February 12, 2003 which included the Deed of Absolute Sale as Exhibit A. While petitioner filed a
Comment and Objection on February 21, 2003, she only objected to the Deed of Absolute Sale for being self-serving.
In the Order dated February 27, 2003, the RTC admitted the Deed of Absolute Sale, rejecting the objection of
petitioner. Having failed to object on the ground of inadmissibility under the best evidence rule, petitioner is now
deemed to have waived her objection on this ground and cannot raise it for the first time on appeal.
Respondent acquired the property through the Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 1, 1975, while petitioner bought the
levied property at the public auction held on September 29, 1977. Obviously, respondent already owned the property
at the time petitioner bought the levied property, and thus cannot be levied and attached for the obligations of Aquilino
in the collection case.
DISPOSITIVE RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
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Case #30 TOPIC: Sec. 3 Original Doc must be Produced
CASE TITLE: FLORES Y DE LEON vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO: 222861 DATE: April 23, 2018
PONENTE: Gesmundo, J.
DOCTRINE: Where the issue is only as to whether or not such document was actually executed, or exists, or in the
circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial
evidence is admissible. In this case, the marked money was presented by the prosecution solely for the purpose of
establishing its existence and not its contents. Therefore, other substitute evidence, like a xerox copy thereof, is
admissible without the need of accounting for the original.
FACTS:
- Roderick France filed a complaint against PO2 Flores, a member of the Traffic Enforcement Group for robbery
- According to France, the taxi driven by him figured in an accident with a jeepney. PO2 Flores confiscated his Driver's
License then issued a Traffic Violation Receipt (TVR) indicating his alleged violations
- He was told to return to the Kamuning Police Station and prepare the amount of P2,000 so he can get back his driver's
license.
- France became suspicious as he recalled that on a previous occasion when his driver's license was confiscated due
to a traffic violation the same was claimed from the office of the MMDA or City Hall and not from the officer who
confiscated his license.
- France went to Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) in Camp Crame to file a complaint against
PO2 Flores.
- They planned for an entrapment operation. France was asked to provide 4pcs of 500-peso bills which were dusted
with ultraviolet fluorescent powder.
- France went to the police station. Flores opened a drawer and told France to drop the money inside. PO2 Flores then
counted the money using his left hand.
- As soon as France asked for his driver's license, the PAOCTF team arrested PO2 Flores and confiscated the things
inside his drawer including the marked money. The team subsequently proceeded to Camp Crame where PO2 Flores
was turned over for ultraviolet examination.
- Flores interposed the defense of denial and "frame-up". His own version of the incident is that he told France that he
could claim his driver's license from the QC Redemption Center upon payment of P2,000 and had no idea why France
returned to his office. France was persistent in giving him the TVR with the enclosed money. Flores refused to receive
them. While PO2 Flores was at the comfort room, France placed the money inside Flores' drawer. When Flores
returned, the operatives from the PAOCTF arrested him.
- RTC Decision: Flores is guilty of simple robbery (extortion).
- Petitioner appealed to the CA contending that RTC incorrectly convicted him of simple robbery by giving weight on
pieces of evidence in violation of the Best Evidence Rule.
- He argued that the prosecution's exhibits were mere photocopies and the original pieces of the marked money were
never even presented.
- OSG argues that the photocopies of the exhibits were sufficient and admissible since they were public records. It also
said in its brief that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were enough to prove the elements of the crime and
that the presentation of the original marked money was no longer necessary.
- CA: denied the appeal. It held that the best evidence rule admits of some exemptions which were present in this case.
It stated that the Complaint and Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by France were public records under
the custody of a public officer, hence, the presentation of the photocopies as evidence, was deemed sufficient.
- As to the marked money, the CA held that the non-presentation of the original marked money did not create a hiatus
in the evidence for the prosecution as the serial numbers were duly recorded in the memorandum prepared by the
PAOCTF requesting the ultraviolet fluorescent powder dusting after the entrapment operation.
ISSUE: Whether the non-presentation of the original pieces of the marked money is fatal to the cause of the prosecution.
RULING: NO.
- In People v. Tandoy, the Court held that the best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the document are
the subject of inquiry.
- Where the issue is only as to whether or not such document was actually executed, or exists, or in the circumstances
relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible.
- In this case, the marked money was presented by the prosecution solely for the purpose of establishing its existence
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and not its contents. Therefore, other substitute evidence, like a xerox copy thereof, is admissible without the need of
accounting for the original.
- The existence of the marked money in the case at bar was never questioned. It was not disputed that the 4 pieces of
P500 bills which were used as marked money, were produced and thereafter turned over to the police officer for dusting
of fluorescent powder.
- The serial numbers of these marked money were duly recorded in the memorandum prepared by the PAOCTF in
connection with the entrapment operation, and the same set of P500 bills bearing similar serial numbers was reflected
in the request for laboratory examination after the conduct of the entrapment operation.
- More importantly, these 4 pieces of P500 bills were positively identified by the prosecution witnesses during the trial.
- As such, the absence of the original pieces of the marked money did not militate against the cause of the prosecution.
Notes:
Where did the accident happen? corner of E. Rodriguez and Aurora Blvd., QC
What time? 6:00 PM
DISPOSITIVE RULING: Petition is DENIED. Resolution of the CA is AFFIRMED.
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Case # 31 TOPIC: Electronic Evidence
CASE TITLE: RCBC Bankard Services Corp. v. Oracion, Jr.
G.R. No. 223274 DATE: June 19, 2019
PONENTE: CAGUIOA, J.
DOCTRINE: For the Court to consider an electronic document as evidence, it must pass the test of admissibility. According to
Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, "[a]n electronic document is admissible in evidence if it complies with the
rules on admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by these
Rules."
FACTS: Respondents Moises Oracion, Jr. and Emily L. Oracion applied for and were granted by petitioner credit card
accommodations with the issuance of a Bankard PESO Mastercard Platinum.
Respondents used the credit card in purchasing different products but failed to pay petitioner the total amount of P117,157.98,
inclusive of charges and penalties or at least the minimum amount due under the credit card.
Petitioner sent a written demand letter to respondents but despite receipt thereof, respondents refused to comply with their
obligation to petitioner. Hence, petitioner filed a Complaint for Sum of Money before the MeTC under the Rule on Summary
Procedure.
Petitioner attached to its complaint against respondents "duplicate original" copies of the Statements of Account and the Credit
History Inquiry.
The MeTC, without delving into the merits of the case, dismissed it on the ground that petitioner, as the plaintiff, failed to
discharge the required burden of proof in a civil case, which is to establish its case by preponderance of evidence, ruling that
“the signature in the attachments in support of the [complaint] are mere photocopies, stamp mark in the instant case. The Best
Evidence Rule provides that the court shall not receive any evidence that is merely substitutionary in its nature, such as stamp
mark, as long as the original evidence can be had.”
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. Petitioner argued that what it attached to the complaint were the "duplicate original copies"
and not mere photocopies.
The RTC found petitioner's appeal to be without merit. A perusal of the said annexes would show that there is a stamp mark at
the bottom right portion of each page of the said annexes, with the words "DUPLICATE ORIGINAL (signature) CHARITO O. HAM,
Senior Manager, Collection Support Division Head, Collection Group, Bankard Inc." However, further inspection of the said
stamp marks would reveal that the signatures appearing at the top of the name CHARITO O. HAM in the respective annexes are
not original signatures but are part of the subject stamp marks.
Upon appeal to the SC via Rule 45, petitioner argues that since electronic documents, when directly printed out are
considered original reproductions of the same, they are admissible under the Best Evidence Rule.
ISSUE: W/N the attachments to the complaint are admissible.
RULING: No. In the Memorandum for Appellant which it filed before the RTC, petitioner did not raise the Rules on Electronic
Evidence to justify that the so-called "duplicate original copies" of the SOAs and Credit History Inquiry are electronic documents.
Rather, it insisted that they were duplicate original copies, being computer-generated reports, and not mere photocopies or
substitutionary evidence, as found by the MeTC. Because petitioner has not raised the electronic document argument before
the RTC, it may no longer be raised nor ruled upon on appeal.
Even assuming that the Court brushes aside the above-noted procedural obstacles, the Court cannot just concede that the
pieces of documentary evidence in question are indeed electronic documents.
For the Court to consider an electronic document as evidence, it must pass the test of admissibility.
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According to Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, "[a]n electronic document is admissible in evidence if it
complies with the rules on admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws and is authenticated in the manner
prescribed by these Rules."
Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence lays down the authentication process of electronic documents. Section 1 of Rule 5
imposes upon the party seeking to introduce an electronic document in any legal proceeding the burden of proving its
authenticity in the manner provided therein.
Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence provides for the method of proof.
Evidently, petitioner could not have complied with the Rules on Electronic Evidence because it failed to authenticate the
supposed electronic documents through the required affidavit of evidence. As earlier pointed out, what petitioner had in mind
at the inception (when it filed the complaint) was to have the annexes admitted as duplicate originals as the term is understood
in relation to paper-based documents. Thus, the annexes or attachments to the complaint of petitioner are inadmissible as
electronic documents, and they cannot be given any probative value.
Furthermore, the fact that a stamp with the markings was placed at the right bottom of each page of the SOAs and the Credit
History Inquiry did not make them "duplicate original copies" as described above. The necessary allegations to qualify them as
"duplicate original copies" must be stated in the complaint and duly supported by the pertinent affidavit of the qualified person.
If petitioner intended the annexes to the complaint as electronic documents, then the proper allegations should have been
made in the complaint and the required proof of authentication as "print-outs", "outputs" or "counterparts" should have been
complied with.
Note: Given that the action filed by petitioner is for payment of money where the value of the claim does not exceed
P100,000.00 (the jurisdictional amount when the complaint was filed in January 2013), exclusive of interest and costs, petitioner
could have opted to prosecute its cause under the Revised Rules of Procedure for Small Claims Cases (Revised Rules for Small
Claims).
If petitioner took this option, then it would have been incumbent upon it to attach to its Statement of Claim even the affidavits
of its witnesses. If that was the option that petitioner took, then maybe its complaint might not have been dismissed for lack of
preponderance of evidence.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated August 13, 2013 and
the Order dated March 1, 2016 of the RTC are AFFIRMED.
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Case #32 TOPIC: Rule on Electronic Evidence
CASE TITLE: National Power Corporation v. Codilla Jr.
G.R. NO: 17049 DATE: April 4, 2007
PONENTE: Chico-Nazario, J.
FACTS:
On April 26, 1996, petitioner National Power Corporation filed a complaint for damages against private respondent
Bangpai Shipping Co., the latter’s vessel M/V Dibena Win having bumped and damaged peittioner’s Power Barge
209.
Petitioner, after adducing evidence during the trial of the case, filed a formal offer of evidence. Public respondent
judge, however, found merit in the objections raised and the motion to strike out filed by respondents and issued the
assailed order denying the admission and excluding from the records certain exhibits which consisted of mere Xerox
or photocopies of the documents offered.
NAPOCOR justifies the admission of the photocopies by contending that photocopies are equivalent to the original of
the document on the basis of the Rules on Electronic Evidence. Specifically, petitioner maintains that an "electronic
document" can refer to other modes of written expression that is produced electronically, such as photocopies, as
included in the pertinent section’s catch-all proviso: "any print-out or output, readable by sight or other means."
ISSUE: Whether or not photocopies constitute electronic evidence.
RULING: NO.
Section 1 of Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence defines an "electronic document" as information or the
representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other models of written expression, described or however
represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and
affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includes
digitally signed documents and any printout, readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects the electronic
data message or electronic document.
The argument of petitioner that since herein paper printouts were produced through an electronic process, then these
photocopies are electronic documents is an erroneous, if not preposterous, interpretation of the law. What
differentiates an electronic document from a paper-based document is the manner by which the information is
processed. Clearly, the information contained in an electronic document must be received, recorded, transmitted,
stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.
Here, the photocopies submitted by petitioner show that not all of the contents therein, such as the signatures of the
persons who purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded or produced electronically. By no stretch of the
imagination can a person’s signature affixed manually be considered as information electronically received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced.
The offered photocopies not being tantamount to electronic documents, the same may not be considered as the
functional equivalent of their original as decreed in the law.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 00848, dated 9 November 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
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Case # 33 TOPIC: Evidence
CASE TITLE: Bartolome v Maranan
AM P-11-2979 DATE: November 18, 2014
DOCTRINE:
1. Ephemeral electronic communications are now admissible evidence, subject to certain

conditions. "Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone conversations, text
messages, chatroom sessions, streaming audio, streaming video, and other electronic forms of
communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained. It may be proven by the testimony
of a person who was a party to the communications or has personal knowledge thereof.
2. Section 1, Rule 11 of A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC, audio, photographic and video evidence of events, acts
or transactions shall be admissible provided it shall be shown, presented or displayed to the court
and shall be identified, explained or authenticated by the person who made the recording or by some
other person competent to testify on the accuracy thereof.
FACTS: Complainant Bartolome filed an administrative complaint against Maranan, charging her with
extortion, graft and corruption, gross misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a court employee. The
complainant alleged that the respondent asked P200,000 from her which was later reduced to P160,000.00,
to facilitate the filing of her case for annulment of marriage. She further alleged that the respondent
undertook to have the case decided in her favor without the need of court appearances during the
proceedings of the case. During the entrapment operation, the respondent was apprehended inside the
premises of the RTC, Branch 20, Imus, Cavite, in the act of receiving the money from the complainant.
In support of her allegations, the complainant attached to her affidavit-complaint the transcribed electronic
communications (text messages) between her and the respondent; a copy of an Electronic Psychiatric
History form given to her by the respondent for her to accomplish in filing the petition for annulment of
marriage;3 a copy of the Imus Police Station Blotter showing that the respondent was apprehended during
the entrapment operation conducted by police officers of Imus Police Station on November 11, 2009 at 2:40
p.m.; and a versatile compact disc (VCD) containing the video taken during the entrapment operation
conducted against the respondent.
ISSUE: Whether the text messages and the VCD are admissible
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RULING: YES.
As to the text messages, the SC held that Ephemeral electronic communications are now admissible
evidence, subject to certain conditions. "Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone
conversations, text messages, chatroom sessions, streaming audio, streaming video, and other electronic
forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained. It may be proven by the
testimony of a person who was a party to the communications or has personal knowledge thereof. In the
present case, we have no doubt regarding the probative value of the text messages as evidence in
considering the present case. The complainant, who was the recipient of the text messages and who
therefore has personal knowledge of these text messages, identified the respondent as the sender through
cellphone number 09175775982. The respondent herself admitted that her conversations with the
complainant had been thru SMS messaging and that the cellphone number reflected in the complainant’s
cellphone from which the text messages originated was hers. She confirmed that it was her cellphone
number during the entrapment operation the Imus Cavite Police conducted.
With regard to the VCD, the SC held that it was admissible. Under Section 1, Rule 11 of A.M. No. 01-7-01-
SC, audio, photographic and video evidence of events, acts or transactions shall be admissible provided it
shall be shown, presented or displayed to the court and shall be identified, explained or authenticated by
the person who made the recording or by some other person competent to testify on the accuracy thereof.
In this case, the complainant herself certified that the video and text messages are evidence of her complaint
against the respondent.
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Case #34 TOPIC: RULE ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
CASE TITLE: Maliksi v. COMELEC
G.R. NO: March 12, 2013 DATE: March 12, 2013
PONENTE BERSAMIN J.
DOCTRINE: The picture images of the ballots are electronic documents that are regarded as the equivalents of
the original official ballots themselves. But this juridical reality does not authorize the courts, the COMELEC, and
the Electoral Tribunals to quickly and unilaterally resort to the printouts of the picture images of the ballots in the
proceedings had before them without notice to the parties. Despite the equal probative weight accorded to the
official ballots and the printouts of their picture images, the rules for the revision of ballots adopted for their
respective proceedings still consider the official ballots to be the primary or best evidence of the voters’ will. In that
regard, the picture images of the ballots are to be used only when it is first shown that the official ballots are lost or
their integrity has been compromised
FACTS: During the 2010 Elections, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Saquilayan the winner for the
position of Mayor of Imus, Cavite. Maliksi, the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes,
brought an election protest in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite alleging that there were irregularities
in the counting of votes in 209 clustered precincts. Subsequently, the RTC held a revision of the votes, and, based
on the results of the revision, declared Maliksi as the duly elected Mayor of Imus commanding Saquilayan to
cease and desist from performing the functions of said office. Saquilayan appealed to the COMELEC. In the
meanwhile, the RTC granted Maliksi’s motion for execution pending appeal, and Maliksi was then installed as
Mayor.
COMELEC First Division then decided to conduct a recount of votes using the printout of ballot images from the CF
cards. After the recount, the COMELEC nullified the RTC ruling and reinstated Saquilayan as the winner. Maliksi
filed his MR, contending that he was denied due process as he had not been notified of the decryption proceedings;
and that the resort to the printouts of the ballot images, which were secondary evidence, had been unwarranted
because there was no proof that the integrity of the paper ballots had not been preserved. COMELEC En Banc
decided to deny the MR.
In a petition for certiorari with the SC, the Court likewise denied the same, pronouncing that the First Division did not
abuse its discretion in deciding to use the ballot images instead of the paper ballots, explaining that the printouts of
the ballot images were not secondary images, but considered original documents with the same evidentiary value
as the official ballots under the Rule on Electronic Evidence.
ISSUE: Did the Supreme Court err in upholding the COMELEC First Division’s ruling to dispense with the physical
ballots and resort to their digital images, in an alleged contravention to the best evidence rule?
RULING: YES. The picture images of the ballots are electronic documents that are regarded as the equivalents of
the original official ballots themselves. In Vinzons-Chato v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,7 the Court
held that "the picture images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are likewise ‘official ballots’
that faithfully capture in electronic form the votes cast by the voter, as defined by Section 2(3) of R.A. No. 9369. As
such, the printouts thereof are the functional equivalent of the paper ballots filled out by the voters and, thus, may
be used for purposes of revision of votes in an electoral protest.”
That the two documents—the official ballot and its picture image—are considered "original documents" simply
means that both of them are given equal probative weight. In short, when either is presented as evidence, one is
not considered as weightier than the other.
But this juridical reality does not authorize the courts, the COMELEC, and the Electoral Tribunals to quickly and
unilaterally resort to the printouts of the picture images of the ballots in the proceedings had before them without
notice to the parties. Despite the equal probative weight accorded to the official ballots and the printouts of their
picture images, the rules for the revision of ballots adopted for their respective proceedings still consider the official
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ballots to be the primary or best evidence of the voters’ will. In that regard, the picture images of the ballots are to
be used only when it is first shown that the official ballots are lost or their integrity has been compromised.
The printing of the picture images of the ballots may be resorted to only after the proper Revision/Recount Committee
has first determined that the integrity of the ballots and the ballot boxes was not preserved.
The decryption of the images stored in the CF cards and the printing of the decrypted images take place during the
revision or recount proceedings. There is a good reason for thus fixing where and by whom the decryption and the
printing should be conducted. It is during the revision or recount conducted by the Revision/Recount Committee
when the parties are allowed to be represented, with their representatives witnessing the proceedings and timely
raising their objections in the course of the proceedings. Moreover, whenever the Revision/Recount Committee
makes any determination that the ballots have been tampered and have become unreliable, the parties are
immediately made aware of such determination.
When, as in the present case, it was not the Revision/Recount Committee or the RTC exercising original jurisdiction
over the protest that made the finding that the ballots had been tampered, but the First Division in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction, the parties should have been given a formal notice thereof.
Maliksi was not immediately made aware of that crucial finding because the First Division did not even issue any
written resolution stating its reasons for ordering the printing of the picture images. The parties were formally notified
that the First Division had found that the ballots had been tampered only when they received the resolution, whereby
the First Division nullified the decision of the RTC and declared Saquilayan as the duly elected Mayor. Even so, the
resolution of the First Division to that effect was unusually mute about the factual bases for the finding of ballot box
tampering, and did not also particularize how and why the First Division was concluding that the integrity of the
ballots had been compromised. All that the First Division declared as justification was a simple generalization of the
same being apparent from the allegations of ballot and ballot box tampering and upon inspection of the ballot boxes.
The disregard of Maliksi’s right to be informed of the decision to print the picture images of the ballots and to conduct
the recount proceedings during the appellate stage cannot be brushed aside by the invocation of the fact that Maliksi
was able to file, after all, a motion for reconsideration. To be exact, the motion for reconsideration was actually
directed against the entire resolution of the First Division, while Maliksi’s claim of due process violation is directed
only against the First Division’s recount proceedings that resulted in the prejudicial result rendered against him.
Notably, the First Division did not issue any order directing the recount. Without the written order, Maliksi was
deprived of the chance to seek any reconsideration or even to assail the irregularly-held recount through a
seasonable petition for certiorari in this Court. In that context, he had no real opportunity to assail the conduct of the
recount proceedings.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the Extremely Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration of petitioner Emmanuel Maliksi; REVERSES the Court's decision promulgated on March 12,
2013; and DIRECTS the Commission on Elections En Banc to conduct proceedings for the decryption of the
picture images of the ballots involved in the protest after due authentication, and for the recount of ballots by using
the printouts of the ballot images, with notice to and in the presence of the parties or their representatives in
accordance with the procedure laid down by Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, as amended by
Resolution No. 9164.
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Case # 35 TOPIC: Electronic Evidence
CASE TITLE: MCC Industrial. vs. SSANGYONG CORP.
G.R. NO: 170633 DATE: October 17, 2007
PONENTE: Nachura, J
DOCTRINE: To be admissible in evidence or to be considered as the functional equivalent of an original document

under the Best Evidence Rule, the writing must foremost be an "electronic data message" or an "electronic
document." A facsimile transmission is not an "electronic data message" or an "electronic document."
FACTS: Petitioner MCC is engaged in the business of importing and wholesaling stainless steel products. One of its
suppliers is the Ssangyong Corporation, an international trading company with head office in Seoul, South Korea. The
two corporations conducted business through telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy transmissions. Ssangyong
would send the pro forma invoices to MCC.
Ssangyong Manila sent, by fax, a letter to MCC Manager to confirm the order of hot rolled stainless steel. Ssangyong
forwarded to MCC Pro Forma Invoice containing the terms and conditions of the transaction. MCC failed to open
letters of credit to facilitate the payment in breach of their contract. Ssangyong cancelled the sale and filed a civil
action for damages against MCC before the RTC. The print-out and photocopies of facsimile transmissions were
presented as evidence of the sale.
MCC filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging that Ssangyong failed to present the original copies of the pro forma
invoices on which the civil action was based. The court denied the demurrer, ruling that the admissibility finds support
in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are electronic evidence and therefore
RULING: No. The print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are not electronic evidence and not
To be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be considered as the functional equivalent of an

original document under the Best Evidence Rule, the writing must foremost be an "electronic data message" or an
"electronic document." R.A. No. 8792, considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the
functional equivalent of a written document for evidentiary purposes.
In an ordinary facsimile transmission, there exists an original paper-based information or data that is scanned, sent
through a phone line, and re-printed at the receiving end. The Congress intended virtual or paperless writings to be
the functional equivalent and to have the same legal function as paper-based documents. Further, in a virtual or
paperless environment, there is no original copy to speak of, as all direct printouts of the virtual reality are the same,
in all respects, and are considered as originals. Ineluctably, the law's definition of "electronic data message," which is
interchangeable with "electronic document," could not have included facsimile transmissions, which have an original
paper-based copy as sent and a paper-based facsimile copy as received.
The Congress excluded the early forms of technology, like telegraph, telex and telecopy when it defined the term
"electronic data message. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not
the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence. In
the present case, therefore, Pro Forma Invoices, which are mere photocopies of the original fax transmittals, are not
electronic evidence.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
EVIDENCE - 3S
Case #36 TOPIC: R130, S4- Original Document
CASE TITLE: BPI v. SMP, INC.
G.R. NO:175466 DATE: December 23, 2009
PONENTE: Nachura. J.
DOCTRINE: A receipt in triplicate copies the copies of which are executed at the same time as other copies
of the same receipt involving the same transaction is deemed an original copy.
FACTS: SMP, Inc. accepted the purchase order of Clothespak Manufacturing Phils. for 4000 bags of polystyrene
products. These were delivered. As payment, Clothespak issued postdated checks in favor of SMP but these were
dishonored. Meanwhile, Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC_ filed a case against Clothespak for recovery
of sum of money. SMP filed a third party claim on the 4000 bags taken at Clothespak factory worth P3M, claiming to
be the owner. The goods were not released upon FEBTC’s filing of indemnity bond. FEBTC obtained favorable
judgment against Clothespak. SMP thus filed this petition to recover from FEBTC (predecessor in interest of BPI,
petitioner) the value of the 4000 bags. SMP alleges that it was still the owner of the 4000 bags, anchoring this claim
on Provisional Receipt 4476 issued by Clothspak with the words “Materials belong to SMP until your checks clear.”
RTC ruled for SMP, ordering petitioner to pay SMP the value of the bags. CA affirmed. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the provisional receipt is an original document.
RULING: YES.
SC found that the contract between SMP and Clothespak was a contract to sell and thus ownership was retained by
SMP until after Clothespak’s checks cleared as evidenced by the provisional receipt issued by SMP to Clothespak.
1) Contention: The provisional receipt is inadmissible in evidence and is in contravention of the best evidence rule.
Held:
The best evidence rule requires the highest grade of evidence obtainable to prove a disputed fact. No evidence is
admissible other than the original document itself. Here, the receipt is deemed as an original considering that the
triplicate copy of the provisional receipt was executed at the same time as the other copies of the same receipt
involving the same transaction. (R130, S4[b]: “(b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the
same time, with identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded as originals”)
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
The Decision dated August 16, 2006 and the Resolution dated November 15, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 86055 are hereby AFFIRMED.
EVIDENCE - 3S
Case # 37 TOPIC: R130, S4 - Original of Document
CASE TITLE: Capital Shoes Factory, Ltd. v. Traveler Kids, Inc.,
G.R. NO: 200065 DATE: September 24, 2014
PONENTE: MENDOZA, J.
DOCTRINE: Duplicate originals are transmissible as evidence.
FACTS:
Sometime in 2000, petitioner Capital Shoes Factory Ltd., (CSFL) and respondent Traveller Kids, Inc. (TKI),a domestic
corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing, importing and distributing shoes, sandals and other footware
entered into an agreement, wherein they agreed that TKI would import the shoes and sandals made by CSFL from its
China factory. After TKI placed numerous purchase orders, CSFL began manufacturing the goods pursuant to the
special designs and specifications of TKI. CSFL then shipped the goods to TKI.
For the first three years, TKI was able to pay its purchase orders and the shipments made by CSFL.As of July 10, 2005,
the total unpaid accounts of TKI amounted to U.S. $325,451.39, exclusive of the interest accruing thereto.
CSFL filed a complaint for collection of sum of money and damages against TKI before the RTC. During the trial, CSFL,
through its witness, identified several sales invoices and order slips it issued as evidence of its transactions with TKI.
The latter objected to the identification pointing out that the documents being presented were mere photocopies.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the receipt presented is admissible.
RULING:
Yes. After a review of the RTC and the CA records, which were ordered elevated, the Court is ofthe considered view
that the CA erred in not admitting the invoices and order slips denominated as Exhibits "D" to "GG-1" and "HH" to "KK-
1," which were duplicate originals. Section 4(b), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 4 . Original of document. —

xxxx
(b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time, with identical contents, all such
copies are equally regarded as originals.
xxxx
When carbon sheets are inserted between two or more sheets of writing paper so that the writing of a contract upon
the outside sheet, including the signature of the party to be charged thereby, produces a facsimile upon the sheets
beneath, such signature being thus reproduced by the same stroke of pen which made the surface or exposed
impression, all of the sheets so written on are regarded as duplicate originals and either of them may be introduced in
evidence as such without accounting for the nonproduction of the others.
Records reveal that Chiu, CSFL’s principal witness, was able to satisfactorily explain that Exhibits "D" to "GG-1" and
"HH" to "KK-1" were duplicate originals of invoicesand order slips, and not mere photocopies. She testified as follows:
Atty. Fernandez:
Q: The documents that you have brought today, to what records do they belong?
A: Those originals are from our company because one copy was sent to the customer and one we keep in our company,
Sir.
Q: When you prepare a particular invoice pertaining to a particular transaction Miss Witness, how many copies do you
prepare for that invoice? How many copies of the invoice will you prepare?
A: Two sets of invoice, one to the customer and one for our office sir.
EVIDENCE - 3S
Q: And the copies that you brought today, are those the ones that were retained to you inyour office, the copies you
brought to court?
A: Yes sir.
The transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) clearly show that Chiu convincingly explained that CSFL usually prepared
two (2) copies of invoices for a particular transaction, giving one copy to a client and retaining the other copy. The Court
combed through her testimony and found nothing that would indicate that the documents offered were mere
photocopies. She remained firm and consistent with her statement that the subject invoices were duplicate originals as
they were prepared at the same time. The Court sees no reason why Section 4(b), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
should not apply. At any rate, those exhibits can be admitted as part of the testimony of Chiu.
DISPOSITIVE RULING:
The trial court is directed to give priority to this case and act on it with dispatch.

Evidence Digests

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EVIDENCE - 3S

CASE TITLE: Vitarich Corporation vs Chona Losin

G.R. NO: 181560 DATE: November 15, 2010

On August 9, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of Vitarich.

ISSUE: Whether Vitarich has the burden of proof.

Article 1249, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code provides:

Case # 2 TOPIC: Section 1, Evidence Defined, Quantum of

CASE TITLE: TOMAS P. TAN Jr. vs. JOSE G. HOSANA

G.R. NO 190846: FEB. 3, 2016

G.R. NO: AC NO. 5151 DATE: October 19, 2004

PONENTE: Austria-Martines, J.:

G.R. No. 124514 July 6, 2000

BURDEN OF PROOF AND BURDEN OF EVIDENCE

Quantum of evidence required in criminal cases is proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Two fold task of the prosecution,

Rationale for requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt

Case #5 TOPIC: Sec. 1 Evidence Defined, Quantum of Evidence

CASE TITLE: Ladaga v Magapu

G.R. NO: 189689, 189690, 189691 DATE: November 13, 2012

Sections 17 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provide as follows:

PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (PDIC), Petitioner, v. HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, IN

G.R. No. 206866 September 02, 2015

ISSUE: Whether the dismissal was correct

BUENAFLOR CAR SEVICES, INC. v. CEZAR DURUMPILI DAVID, JR.

G.R. No. 222730, November 07, 2016

G.R. NO: G.R. No. 168644 DATE: February 16, 2010

PONENTE: PERALTA, J.:

Case #9 TOPIC: Sec 3. Admissibility of Evidence

CASE TITLE: DE JESUS vs. SANCHEZ-MALIT

A.C. No.: 6470 DATE: July 8, 2014

PONENTE: Sereno, C.J.

ISSUE: Whether or not the additional documents are admissible.

Case #10 TOPIC: R128, S3- Admissibility of Evidence

CASE TITLE: People v. Samontañez

G.R. NO: 134530 DATE: December 4, 2000

PONENTE: De Leon, Jr., J:

NOTE 1 (other bases of conviction of the trial court):

NOTE 2: RTC to SC -- This is automatic review of Decision of the RTC.

Case #11 TOPIC: Rule 128, Section 3, Admissibility of Evidence

CASE TITLE: Navarro vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. NO: 121087 DATE: August 26, 1999

CASE TITLE: Reyes y Capistrano v. People

G.R. NO: 229380 DATE: June 6, 2018

ISSUE: WON the conviction should be upheld.

RULING: No, Reyes must be ACQUITTED.

CASE TITLE: PEOPLE V. GAJO Y BUENAFE

G.R. NO: 217026 DATE: January 22, 2018

PONENTE: Del Castillo, J.

CASE TITLE: People v Acosta

G.R. NO: 238865 DATE: January 28, 2019

Case #15 TOPIC: Sec. 3- Admissibility of Evidence

CASE TITLE: Ladaga v. Mapagu

G.R. NO: 189689 DATE: November 13, 2012

DOCTRINE: In Amparo cases, the requirement of admissibility is relaxed. An evidence otherwise

Case # 16 TOPIC: Rule 129 What Need Not Be Proved

G.R. NO: G.R. No. 221732 DATE: , August 23, 2017

Generally speaking, judicial notice has three material requisites:

(1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;

CASE TITLE: Peltan Development Inc vs CA

G.R. NO.: 117029 DATE: March 19, 1997

CASE TITLE: Candelaria v. People

G.R. NO: 209386 DATE: December 8, 2014

ISSUE: Whether the CA was correct in modifying the amount to be indemnified.