The European Union As A Diplomatic Actor

‘This volume provides a timely and comprehensive overview of the EU’s
growing role as a diplomatic actor, covering policies, processes and outcome

in key foreign policy fields. It is one of the first attempts to systematically
evaluate the build-up of the EU’s diplomatic capacity in the post-Lisbon
era and is therefore a must-read for all interested in recent changes of EU
diplomatic actorness. I find the volume’s ambition to link the changing
diplomatic role of the EU to the changing nature of modern diplomacy
especially interesting.’
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to University of Oxford - PalgraveConnect - 2015-12-13

— Ole Elgström, Professor of Political Science,
Lund University, Sweden
‘As one of the most complex and constantly evolving international actors
on the planet, the EU poses a major challenge for those interested in under-
standing its global purpose and political capabilities. Different perspectives
and conceptual tools are often necessary to complete the picture, and this
volume combines both in a wide-ranging treatment of how the EU behaves
as a diplomatic actor. It also draws upon insights from both practitioners
and scholars to explain the considerable variance across different EU for-
eign policy domains despite the best efforts of the EU to make itself more
coherent.’
— Michael E. Smith, Professor and Chair in International Relations,
University of Aberdeen, Scotland
‘Based on contributions by an excellent international team consisting of both

senior and junior academics as well as knowledgeable practitioners, this incisive
volume both fills a vacuum and provides the most up to date overview of the
growing role of the EU as a diplomatic actor in the post-Lisbon era.’
— Walter Carlsnaes, Senior Professor (emeritus),
Department of Government, Uppsala University, Sweden
‘This volume underlines that the role of the EU within the emerging multipo-
lar and fragmented world is slowly gaining in importance after the Treaty
of Lisbon (2009) – despite external obstacles as well as internal deficits of
consistency and coherence. The action of the EU as an unprecedented diplo-
matic actor and of the EEAS are analysed in an accurate and comprehensive
way in the main policy fields of trade, human rights, climate change, and
finance, with special attention given to the EU’s impact within multilateral
organizations and regimes. This panel of contributors offers fresh analyses
and contributes to enriching the literature on a crucial issue in EU studies
and international relations.’
— Mario Telò, Emeritus President IEE, Professor on International Relations
at ULB and LUISS, Member of the Royal Academy of Sciences
10.1057/9781137356857 - The European Union as a Diplomatic Actor, Edited by Joachim Koops and Gjovalin Macaj
The European Union in International Affairs series
Series Editors: Sebastian Oberthür is a Professor and Academic Director of the Institute
of European Studies, Vrije Universiteit Brussels, Belgium. Knud Erik Jørgensen is a
Professor in the Department of Political Science and Government, Aarhus University,
Denmark. Alex Warleigh-Lack* is Executive Director of the Centre for Research on
the European Matrix (CRONEM) and Professor of EU Politics at the University of
Surrey, UK. Sandra Lavenex is Professor of International Politics at the University
of Lucerne, Switzerland and Visiting Professor at the College of Europe in Natolin
(Warsaw). Philomena Murray is Jean Monnet Professor in the School of Social and

Political Sciences at the University of Melbourne, Australia.
Editorial board: Stephanie Anderson; Ummu Salma Bava; Grainne de Burca;

Maurizio Carbone; Roy H. Ginsberg; Amelia Hadfield; Stephan Keukeleire; Andrés
Malamud; Sophie Meunier; Michael H. Smith; Ramses Wessel and Reuben Wong.
Thanks to consecutive rounds of enlargement and the stepwise broadening and deep-
ening of internal integration, the EU now undeniably plays a key role in international
politics, law and economics. At the same time, changes in the international system
continue to pose new challenges to the EU. The range of policies implied by the EU’s
international ‘actorness’ grows with every summit, and the EU regularly ‘imports’ and
increasingly ‘exports’ various policies.
Against this backdrop, this book series aims to be a central resource for the growing
community of scholars and policy-makers interested in understanding the interface
between the EU and international affairs. It will provide in-depth, cutting-edge con-
tributions to research on the EU in international affairs by highlighting new develop-
ments, insights, challenges and opportunities. It will encompass analyses of the EU’s
international role, as mediated by its own Member States, in international institutions
and in its strategic bilateral and regional partnerships. It will further examine the
ongoing profusion of EU internal policies with external implications and the ways
in which these are both driven by and feed back into international developments.
Grounded in political science (and its various sub-disciplines, including International
Relations and International Political Economy), law, sociology and history, the series
reflects an inter-disciplinary commitment.
Titles include:
Frauke Austermann
EUROPEAN UNION DELEGATIONS IN EU FOREIGN POLICY
A Diplomatic Service of Different Speeds
Natalie Chaban and Martin Holland

COMMUNICATING EUROPE IN TIMES OF CRISIS
External Perceptions of the European Union
Joachim A. Koops and Gjovalin Macaj (editors)
THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A DIPLOMATIC ACTOR
Alexander Mattelaer
THE POLITICO-MILITARY DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN CRISIS RESPONSE OPERATIONS
Planning, Friction, Strategy
Luis Simon
GEOPOLITICAL CHANGE, GRAND STRATEGY AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
The EU-NATO Conundrum
Louise G. van Schaik
EU EFFECTIVENESS AND UNITY IN MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS
More than the Sum of Its Parts?
Forthcoming titles include:

Dimitrios Bourantonis, Spyros Blavoukos and Clara Portela (editors)
THE EU AND THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
*Alex Warleigh-Lack, is currently on leave as an editor of the series
The European Union in International Affairs series.

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Series standing order ISBN 978–1–137–00501–4 (paperback)
You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing
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The European Union as a
Diplomatic Actor
Edited by
Joachim A. Koops

Dean, Vesalius College and Research Professor, Institute for European Studies,
Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium
and
Gjovalin Macaj
St Antony’s College, University of Oxford, UK
Selection, introduction and editorial matter © Joachim A. Koops and Gjovalin Macaj 2015
Foreword © Pierre Vimont 2015
Individual chapters © Respective authors 2015
All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this
publication may be made without written permission.
No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save
with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright,
Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting
limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House,
6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS.

Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be
liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.
The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work
in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
First published 2015 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN
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ISBN 978–1–137–35684–0
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
The EU as a diplomatic actor / edited by Joachim Koops, Dean and Research Professor,
Vesalius College and Department of Political Science, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium ;
Gjovalin Macaj, PhD Candidate, Department of Politics and International Relations, University
of Oxford, UK.
pages cm
Summary: “This volume assesses the European Union (EU) as a ‘Diplomatic Actor’ in key foreign
policy fields in the post-Lisbon era. It brings together leading scholars and practitioners in order
to examine the main players, processes and outcomes of the EU’s collective diplomatic engagement
in the fields of security, human rights, trade and finance and environmental politics. In addition,
the collection also analyses institutional developments and the EU’s responses to major internal
and external challenges in the context of international politics and global diplomacy. It provides
the first comprehensive overview of the scope, nature and impact of the EU’s growing role as a
diplomatic actor and offers a comparative analysis of EU diplomacy in bilateral, multilateral and
international fora. By taking stock of the successes and failures of EU diplomacy, this volume
identifies the main internal and external conditions that shape the EU’s influence in global
affairs.”—Provided by publisher.
ISBN 978–1–137–35684–0 (hardback)
1. European Union—Foreign relations. 2. Diplomacy. 3. International relations.
I. Koops, Joachim Alexander. II. Macaj, Gjovalin.
JZ1570.A5E854 2014
327.4—dc23
2014023273
Typeset by MPS Limited, Chennai, India.
Contents
List of Figures and Tables ix

Foreword by Pierre Vimont, Secretary-General,
European External Action Service, European Union x

Acknowledgements xiii
Notes on Contributors xiv
List of Abbreviations xvii
1 Introduction: The European Union as a Diplomatic Actor 1

Joachim A. Koops and Gjovalin Macaj
2 The EU as a Diplomatic Actor in the Post-Lisbon Era: Robust or
Rootless Hybrid? 11
Michael H. Smith
3 EU Diplomacy in Global Governance: The Role of the European
External Action Service 31
Knud Erik Jørgensen
4 Evaluating the Impact of EU Diplomacy: Pitfalls and Challenges 52
Yvonne Kleistra and Niels van Willigen
5 Diplomacy at the Individual Level: The Role of EU Special
Representatives in European Foreign Policy 69
Dominik Tolksdorf
6 Speak Up! Getting the EU a Voice at the UN
General Assembly 88
Fernando Andresen Guimarães
7 The EU as a Coercive Diplomatic Actor?
The EU-3 Initiative towards Iran 103
Tom Sauer
8 The EU’s Role and Performance within the G20
in the Area of Finance and Development 120
Peter Debaere
9 The European Union as an International Trade Negotiator 138
Frank Hoffmeister
vii
viii Contents
10 The EU as a Diplomatic Actor in the Field of Human Rights 155

Karen E. Smith
11 The European Union’s Climate Change Diplomacy 178
Simon Schunz
Index 202
List of Figures and Tables
Figure
3.1 Elite attitudes to foreign policy 41

Tables
4.1 Evaluating the impact of the EU’s non-proliferation policy 55

7.1 Chronological overview of main events with respect
to Iranian nuclear programme 106
10.1 The EU’s ‘voice’ at the HRC 167
10.2 EU unity in voting 168
10.3 Resolutions or decisions sponsored by the EU at the HRC 169
11.1 EU diplomatic activities in the post-2012 climate negotiations 187
ix
Foreword
I would like to pay sincere tribute to the authors of this edited volume we
have in front of us today. By deciding to carry out a thorough study of the
EU as a diplomatic actor they have, in my opinion, positioned themselves

right at the heart of the matter of EU foreign policy. In other words, their
work points exactly to where the problem lies, and where – if there is ever
to be a common foreign policy for the EU – progress needs to be made
and a new mind-set must progressively but steadily find its way into our
institutional framework.
The whole problématique examined by this study dates back to the origins
of the European Union at a time when Member States were eager not to
let EU institutions – and more specifically the European Commission – get
involved in anything related to traditional diplomatic action. The compe-
tence of the then European Community in the field of external action was
strictly restricted to trade, development and later on human rights. But the
heart of foreign policy, namely geo-strategic vision and its implementa-
tion, remained within the firm control of Member States and their national
diplomatic services. Hence, among many other consequences, was the
development of a ‘communautaire mentality’ and an administrative culture in
which European institutions were mostly considered as payers and not players,
and dragged into external initiatives that more often than not lacked political
perspectives and political vision. Not because of any inherent institutional
incapacity, but because of the way in which the whole architecture of the
European system had been designed, the national diplomats were left with
managing the grand political vision and traditional diplomatic ‘games’
while the Commission was given the role of the management expert dedi-
cated to promoting development and cooperation policies. The system of
rotating presidencies only exacerbated this cumbersome division, as suc-
cessive Presidencies of the Union all too eagerly emphasised through the
promotion of their own priorities that changed every six months.
It is only with the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty that this state of play
was completely revised, with the abolition of the pillar system, the emphasis
on a comprehensive approach in external affairs and, most importantly,
the establishment of the function of the High Representative and Vice
President for foreign and security policy and the creation of the European
External Action Service. Thereafter, there was no division between the dif-
ferent strands of EU external action; on the contrary, one single personality
was now in charge of coordinating this whole sector, assisted by a European
diplomatic service in charge of promoting new principles of consistency,
Foreword xi
comprehensiveness and complementarity. In other words, a complete revo-

lution of vision and methods has been initiated, which may not have been
totally understood at the time of the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty and
which may explain the resistance we have been witnessing since then from
all sides of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) matters.
Nevertheless, what may be the most important feature of this genuine
change of mind-set – and one that has been somewhat underestimated – is
the necessity of placing politics at the heart of our external actions. For

this marks its true difference from the previous arrangements, and this is
where diplomats face the same challenge as development experts: in times
of major change, where crises of high magnitude are appearing in all
parts of the European neighbourhood, it is the capacity of the EU to over-
come its traditional, process-driven approach and to go for a much bolder,
politically-inspired vision that will transform the EU into a real diplo-
matic actor. Needless to say, such a transformation is far from easy as it
entails many consequences: first and foremost, the capacity of all Member
States to be united around a common geo-political vision. This may be
an arduous task when one thinks about the many challenges Europe is
presently facing in Ukraine, Libya, Iraq and the Gaza Strip. Such a change
would also require the EU to accept the need to become a fully-fledged
international actor that has to take sides and make choices. This may
make the EU a less consistent and popular player known and appreciated
by every partner in the international community, but more of a realpolitik
actor that may have to take difficult, even unpleasant decisions. In this,
the capacity of the Union to keep all 28 Member States on board cannot
be taken for granted.
Much more could be said about the remarkable transformation the EU is
going through and the many ingredients this new diplomatic mind-set will
need to nourish and promote it: a capacity to make accurate assessments
about the reality we are facing in all parts of the world; an ability to define
the right political objectives and strategy for our EU actions as we try to find
a solution to the many crises we face; an aptitude for listening to our part-
ners in different regions of the world without trying to impose upon them
our own ready-made solutions; a readiness to assemble all the resources
from our institutions’ different services around a clear perspective shared
by all; and, last but not least, a capacity to blend our diverse administrative
cultures in order to come up with a new corporate identity that will, in the
end, be the true trademark of the EU as a genuine player in the international
community.
All of these new features and many others are necessary elements that will
gradually shape the diplomatic action of the EU. This will require patience
and determination but there is little doubt in my mind that the ‘Lisbon
revolution’ in the field of CFSP has been the right choice. It is now up to
xii Foreword
the different European actors to live up to their responsibilities and make a

success of the opportunities embodied in the Treaty. No one else can do it
for them.
Pierre Vimont
Secretary-General, European External Action Service, European Union
Acknowledgements
The idea for this book first emerged in the context of a lecture series, co-
organised by the Vrije Universiteit Brussels’s Institute for European Studies
(IES) and Vesalius College in Spring 2011. Many of the contributors to this

edited volume were part of this lecture series and provided food for some
inspiring discussions on the emerging role of the EU as a Diplomatic Actor.
We are particularly grateful to Professor Sebastian Oberthür, Academic
Director of the IES, for supporting the project from its beginning. We would
also like to thank the IES and Vesalius College for their organisational and
financial support and for providing an excellent working environment that
links both conceptual work and the policy-oriented circles of the Brussels
community.
We would like to express our deep gratitude and appreciation to our con-
tributors. Their inspiration, hard work and excellent cooperation turned the
entire process into a pleasurable intellectual journey. Heartfelt thanks also
go to the many EU diplomats who shared their insights during the duration
of our research project. We would like to thank in particular Pierre Vimont,
Secretary-General of the European External Action Service (EEAS), for agree-
ing to share his insights in his Foreword to this book.
We would like to thank Palgrave Macmillan and in particular Andy Baird
for his professionalism, support and angelic patience in guiding the pro-
cess towards finalisation and print. Similarly, our heartfelt thanks go to
Manavalan BhuvanaRaj for his professionalism and excellent supervision of
the final proof stages of the project.
Finally, we would like to thank Nina, Marina and our families for putting
up with our more frantic periods of editing, writing and mental absence –
we are deeply grateful for all the support, love and understanding.
xiii
Notes on Contributors
Peter Debaere is a post-doctoral research fellow based at the Ghent Institute

for International Studies at Ghent University and funded by the Research
Foundation Flanders. His research focuses on the relationship between the

EU and the G7, G8 and G20 as well as on the reform of the IMF. His findings
have been published in various edited volumes and international journals
including International Politics and Cambridge Review of International Affairs.
Fernando Andresen Guimarães serves in the European External Action
Service (EEAS) as the Head of the United States and Canada Division since
October 2011. Previously, he was the EEAS Advisor for multilateral rela-
tions and in 2010–2011 was tasked by High Representative/Vice President
Catherine Ashton, to head the campaign task force to obtain new modalities
governing the work of the EU as an observer in the UN General Assembly.
From 2004 to 2010, he was the diplomatic advisor to the President of the
European Commission. He also served previously in the UN Department
of Peacekeeping Operations and with the Portuguese Foreign Service at the
Mission to the UN. He holds a PhD from the London School of Economics
and Political Science (1992). His book, The Origins of the Angolan Civil War,
was published in February 1998, revised edition in 2001.
Frank Hoffmeister holds a PhD from the University of Heidelberg (1998) and
served as academic assistant at the Walter Hallstein-Institut für Europäisches
Verfassungsrecht in Berlin before joining the European Commission in
2001. He worked on the Cyprus problem in DG Enlargement, specialised in
EU external relations and WTO law in the Legal Service and acts since 2010
as Deputy Head of Cabinet of the EU Trade Commissioner De Gucht. He is
also teaching international economic law at the Free University of Brussels
and has widely published on international and European law. In 2013,
he co-authored the study book The Law of EU External Relations – Cases,
Materials and Commentary on the EU as an International Legal Actor with P. J.
Kuijper, J. Wouters, G. De Baere and T. Ramopoulos.
Knud Erik Jørgensen is Professor of International Relations in the
Department of Political Science at Aarhus University. He chairs the European
International Studies Association and is the co-editor of the Palgrave Studies
in International Relations. His publications include The European Union and
International Organizations (2009); with Mark Pollack and Ben Rosamond,
Handbook of European Union Politics (2007); International Relations Theory:
A New Introduction (2010); with Oriol Costa, The Influence of International
Institutions on the European Union: When Multilateralism Hits Brussels (2012);
xiv
Notes on Contributors xv
with Katie Laatikainen, Handbook on the European Union and International

Institutions: Performance, Policy, Power (2013). Currently he is one of the five
editors of Sage Handbook on European Foreign Policy (forthcoming).
Yvonne Kleistra is a senior research fellow at the InHolland University
of Applied Science Rotterdam and an independent lecturer of public
administration and international relations. Recent publications include
the co-authored article ‘Evaluating Diplomacy: A Mission Impossible?’
in Evaluation: The International Journal of Theory, Research and Practice

(2010), and ‘Evaluating the European Union’s Diplomatic Performance in
International Institutions’, a co-authored chapter in Routledge Handbook on
Europe and Multilateral Institutions: Performance, Policy, Power (2013).
Joachim A. Koops is Dean of Vesalius College, Vrije Universiteit Brussel
(VUB) and Research Professor at the VUB’s Institute for European Studies
(IES). He is also the director of the Global Governance Institute and
Course Director of the Executive Course in Global Risk Analysis and
Crisis Management. His research focuses on the European Union as an
International Actor, particularly in the field of security, and on relations
between major international organisations. His most recent and forthcom-
ing publications include the monograph The European Union as an Integrative
Power? Assessing the EU’s ‘Effective Multilateralism’ towards NATO and the
United Nations’, Brussels, the Oxford Handbook on UN Peacekeeping Operations
(with N. MacQueen, T. Tardy and P. Williams) and The Responsibility to
Protect: From Norm to Operationalisation (with D. Fiott).
Gjovalin Macaj (PhD) is reading for a DPhil in International Relations at
St Antony’s College, University of Oxford, where he also teaches a course
in International Organization. His research focuses on the logic of the
global human rights regime and of collective action among EU countries
in global governance. His recent publications include ‘Beyond “One
Voice”? Global Europe’s Engagement with Its Own Diversity’, Journal of
European Public Policy 21(7) (with Kalypso Nicolaïdis).
Tom Sauer is Associate Professor in International Politics at the Universiteit
Antwerpen, Belgium. His research interests cover nuclear arms control,
proliferation, disarmament and coercive diplomacy. His latest book is
Eliminating Nuclear Weapons: The Role of Missile Defense (2011). He held
research positions at BCSIA, Harvard University, the EU Institute for Security
Studies in Paris, and has been the holder of an Individual NATO Scholarship.
Sauer has been an intern at UNIDIR and at the European Commission. He is
a member of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs.
Simon Schunz holds a PhD in Social Sciences from the University of
Leuven (KU Leuven). He is currently Scientific Officer at DG Research and
Innovation of the European Commission. Previously, he worked as a senior
xvi Notes on Contributors
and junior researcher at the Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies
and the Leuven International and European Studies (LINES) centre, where
he continues to lecture. He is the co-editor of the volume The European
Union and Multilateral Governance: Assessing EU Participation in United Nations
Human Rights and Environmental Fora (2012, with J. Wouters, H. Bruyninckx
and S. Basu). His latest journal publications include ‘Explaining EU Activism
and Impact in Global Climate Politics: Is the Union a Norm- or Interest-
Driven Actor?’ in Journal of Common Market Studies (2012, with L. Van

Schaik) and ‘Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations: The Multi-Level
Politics of Climate Change Policy in Belgium’ in Journal of Contemporary
European Studies (2012, with S. Happaerts and H. Bruyninckx).
Karen E. Smith is Professor of International Relations at the London School
of Economics and Political Science. She has written extensively on European
Union foreign policy, EU–UN relations and the EU’s external human rights
policy. Her most recent books are European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing
World, 3rd edition (2014) and Genocide and the Europeans (2010).
Michael H. Smith is Professor of European Politics and Jean Monnet
Chair in the Department of Politics, History and International Relations at
Loughborough University. He is the co-author of The European Union and the
United States: Competition and Convergence in the World Arena (2008) and a
co-editor of The European Union’s Roles in International Politics: Concepts and
Analysis (2006).
Dominik Tolksdorf is Transatlantic Post-Doc Fellow for International
Relations and Security, since 2014 based at the US Institute of Peace.
Dominik’s research focuses on the European Union’s external relations and
political developments in the Balkans, Eastern Europe and Turkey. Since
2006, he worked for several think tanks in Europe and the United States and
regularly publishes policy papers, op-eds, journal articles and book chapters.
In 2012, he published a monograph on the EU’s policies in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Dominik holds a PhD (in Political Science) from the Ludwig
Maximilian University in Munich.
Niels van Willigen is Assistant Professor of International Relations in the
Institute of Political Science at Leiden University, the Netherlands. He is also
a senior analyst at the Global Governance Institute, Brussels. His professional
fields of interest include theories of international relations, foreign policy
analysis and security studies (more in particular peace operations, arms con-
trol and European security). Recent publications include a book chapter on
the role of the EU in the OSCE in The EU and Effective Multilateralism (2014)
and the monograph Peacebuilding and International Administration (2013).
List of Abbreviations
ACP African, Caribbean and Pacific countries

ACTA Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

AU African Union
CARICOM Caribbean Community
CCP Common Commercial Policy
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CHR Commission on Human Rights
CIMIC Civil-Military Cooperation
COC Civilian Operation Commander
COHOM Working Group on Human Rights
CONUN United Nations Working Party
COP conference of parties
Coreper II Committee of Permanent Representatives
CPCC Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy
DG DEVCO Directorate General Development and Cooperation
EC European Community
EEAS European External Action Service
EIDHR European Initiative for Democracy and Human
Rights
EP European Parliament
EPC European Political Cooperation
ESDI European Security and Defence Identity
ETS Emission Trading System
EU European Union
EUSEC DRC CONGO EU Advisory and Assistance Mission for Security
Reform in DRC
EUSRs European Union Special Representatives
xvii
xviii List of Abbreviations
FAC Foreign Affairs Council

FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FPI Foreign Policy Instruments
FTA Free Trade Agreement
G20 Group of 20
G7 Group of 7
G77 Group of 77

G8 Group of 8
GAERC EU General Affairs and External Relations Council
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
HRC Human Rights Council
HRVP High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ICC International Criminal Court
ICR International Civilian Representative
IMF International Monetary Fund
INC Intergovernmental Negotiation Committee
JCMB Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board
LDC Least Developed Countries
MEF Major Economies Forum
MERCOSUR Common Market of the South
NAMAs Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group
NWS Nuclear Weapon States
OPCW Organization on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PEC President of the European Council
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
TNAs Transnational actors
TPC Trade Policy Committee
UN United Nations
List of Abbreviations xix
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UNSG United Nations Secretary-General
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
WPIEI-CC Working Party on International Environmental
Issues-Climate Change
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1
Introduction: The European Union
as a Diplomatic Actor
Joachim A. Koops and Gjovalin Macaj

The European Union’s (EU’s) nature, policies and impact as an international
actor have been the subject of analytical scrutiny and a wide range of con-
ceptual and empirical case studies since the early 1970s (Allen and Smith,
1990, 1998; Bretherton and Vogler, 2006; Cosgrove and Twitchett 1970;
Galtung, 1973; Jupille and Caporaso 1998; Ginsberg, 2001, 1999; Hill,
1993; Koops, 2011; Sjöstedt, 1977). In parallel, scholars also began to reflect
on the European Community’s (EC) activities, role and presence in inter-
national diplomacy and examined the EU’s emerging ‘diplomatic persona’
distinct from its own member states (Hill and Wallace, 1979, p. 47; see also
Cosgrove and Twitchett, 1970, p. 44; Sjöstedt, 1977, p. 20). However, it was
not until the late 1990s and early 2000s that the ‘EU as a diplomatic actor’
has become a more extensively studied subject in its own right (Bátora,
2005; Bruter, 1999; Duke, 2002; Keukeleire, 2003; Keukeleire et al., 2009).
While these studies focused mostly on the EU’s newly created Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) – and hence on the EU’s ‘CFSP diplo-
macy’ (Keukeleire, 2003, p. 36) – the recent surge of interest in and studies of
the EU as a diplomatic actor has been a result of the Treaty of Lisbon’s inno-
vation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) (Bicchi, 2012; Carta
and Duke, 2014; Duke, 2009; Smith, 2013; Spence, 2009; Vanhoonacker and
Reslow, 2010) and the deliberate build-up of the EU’s diplomatic capacity in
the post-Lisbon era (Carta, 2011, 2013; Hocking and Bátora, 2009; Mahncke
and Gstohl, 2012; Neumann, 2011).
While the literature on the EU’s role in international diplomacy has thus
grown significantly during the last four decades, there are still relatively
few studies that analyse the processes, policies and outcomes of the EU as a
diplomatic actor across key foreign policy fields. With this volume, we seek
to provide our contribution to fill this gap, gradually.
This edited volume assesses the EU as a diplomatic actor in key policy
fields in the post-Lisbon era. We examine the main players, processes
and outcomes of the EU’s collective diplomatic engagement in the fields
of security, human rights, trade and finance and environmental politics.
1
2 Joachim A. Koops and Gjovalin Macaj
In addition, this book also analyses institutional developments and the

EU’s responses to major internal and external challenges in the context of
international politics and global diplomacy. This volume’s main aim is to
provide a comprehensive overview of the scope, nature and impact of the
EU’s growing role as a diplomatic actor. By taking stock of the successes and
failures of EU diplomacy, we also seek to identify the main internal and
external conditions that shape the EU’s influence in global affairs.

Common analytical framework: the European Union as a
diplomatic actor
In this volume, we adopt a multi-level and multi-actor perspective

(Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014; Koops, 2011) of the EU as a diplomatic
actor. This means that contributors are encouraged to assess the role and
impact of key actors at the individual, organisational, member state and
international levels when considering the overall impact of EU diplomacy.
Thus, the ‘EU as a diplomatic actor’ perspective focuses on the EU’s capacity
to engage authoritatively in the core processes of negotiation, representa-
tion and communication in order to influence third parties. This perspec-
tive also includes an awareness of the (sometimes contradictory) interplay
between the EU’s institutions themselves (Council, Commission, Parliament
and the EEAS) as well as between those institutions and the policies of (a
coalition of) key EU member states (Hocking and Spence, 2002). Thus,
this volume also seeks to open the ‘black-box’ of the EU and to examine
the relevant actors, their competences and negotiating mandates in the
specific policy-fields. Thereby, it aims to uncover how power constella-
tions, institutional processes and inter-institutional relations affect the
diplomatic performance of the EU. An important, but often neglected
aspect of diplomatic engagement also lies at the level of the individual:
personal skills, relations with other diplomats and the reputation/standing
of a certain negotiator considerably influence overall outcomes (Cosgrove
and Twitchett, 1970, p. 40). In this light, our understanding of the EU as a
diplomatic actor also seeks to uncover cases in which the skills of individual
diplomats proved to be decisive (see chapters by Guimarães and Tolksdorf in
this volume). Furthermore, the contributors in this volume are asked to shed
light on the different ways in which the EU adapts to different negotiating
partners and fora – be they bi-lateral, multilateral or inter-organisational.
Overall, by analysing the EU’s impact as a diplomatic actor, this volume
also highlights how the EU shapes both the institution and practice of diplo-
macy, while at the same time, it is being shaped by the changing nature
and domains of modern diplomacy itself (see Michael H. Smith’s chapter in this
volume). Indeed, diplomacy has traditionally been conceived of as essentially a
dialogue between states or, as Watson (1982, p. xvi) put it, ‘(…) the process of
dialogue and negotiation by which states in a system conduct their relations
The European Union as a Diplomatic Actor 3
and pursue their purposes by means short of war’. More concretely, diplomacy
is an extension and implementation of foreign policy goals and objectives of
states. However, the growing role of the EU as a diplomatic actor – particularly
in the post-Lisbon era – has challenged the state-centric nature of diplomacy
itself (Bátora, 2005; Jönsson and Hall, 2005). At a basic level, the existence of
EU diplomacy necessarily implies some sort of non-state or collective agency
to promote collective diplomacy. Since the opening of the first European
Commission delegation in London in 1955, the EU has been engaged in

diplomatic activity even if it has not been considered or recognised as such
(see Michael H. Smith’s chapter in this volume). The deliberate emphasis
in the Treaty of Lisbon of 2009 on building an (at least in theory) inter-
institutional diplomatic service has been seen as a major ‘diplomatic turn’ in
the EU’s evolution as an international actor (Carta, 2011). Recent successful
initiatives, such as Catherine Ashton’s mediation in the Serbia-Kosovo dis-
pute (Blockmans, 2013) as well as the small but encouraging break-through
in the nuclear negotiations with Iran (see Sauer’s chapter in this volume),
have raised not only the profile of the EEAS but also the general interest in
the EU’s role as a diplomatic actor more generally. Thus, the contributors to
this volume have been asked to weigh up the scope and nature of the EU
as a diplomatic actor in the light of successful and failed initiatives in the
post-Lisbon era.
Outline of this volume’s contributions and key findings
The book brings together leading scholars and practitioners in order to

examine historical, institutional and policy aspects of the EU’s growing role
in global diplomacy. The first three chapters provide the theoretical tools and
historical context for understanding and assessing the EU’s growing role in
global diplomacy. Thereafter, Chapters 5 and 6 provide an assessment of the
role of the ‘individual’ in the practice of diplomacy. Finally, Chapters 7–11
assess in detail the EU’s policies, processes and performance as a diplomatic
actor in the fields of security, finance, development and trade, human rights
promotion and climate change.
In Chapter 2, Michael H. Smith provides a comprehensive outline of the
emergence of the EU as a diplomatic actor in the wider context of the evolu-
tion of the nature and practice of diplomacy itself. He argues that many of
the long-standing activities of the EU (e.g. trade) are diplomatic in nature
and that the EU constitutes a diplomatic system in and for itself. Yet the EU
continues to struggle with issues of representation, coherence and consist-
ency even after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. The intense internal
coordination efforts continue to affect the effectiveness and adaptability of
the EU in the world of contemporary diplomacy. In this context, Smith
argues that the changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty were more of a
response to internal problems and the desire to see the EU more effectively
represented in the international arena, rather than being a response to the

external demands in a changing environment. The chapter offers succinct
conceptual clarifications of the ‘hybrid’ nature of the EU’s diplomatic actor-
ness and analyses the extent to which the EU is able to respond to the new
range of diplomatic actors, contexts and power shifts in the global arena.
In Chapter 3, Knud Erik Jørgensen looks ahead and examines the creation
of the EEAS and situates the politico-diplomatic challenges it faces within
the wider changing context of the future of multilateralism and global

governance. The chapter provides a critical perspective on issues of institu-
tional design and the diplomatic potential of the EEAS. Jørgensen calls for
more political and strategic thinking beyond a culture of legal thinking and
formal representation. In addition, the chapter argues for a more differenti-
ated approach in EU diplomacy that embraces, rather than avoids, issues of
high politics in order to prevent the EEAS from slipping into bureaucratic
irrelevance. Jørgensen argues that the future success of the EEAS and the EU
in global diplomacy hinges on a more pragmatic support of and approach
to multilateral processes and institutions in global politics.
In Chapter 4, Yvonne Kleistra and Niels van Willigen explore the concep-
tual and analytical debates on how to evaluate EU diplomacy and its wider
impact on global affairs. By drawing on a variety of theoretical approaches,
the authors explore the extent to which existing evaluation tools in foreign
policy can be applied to EU diplomacy. Both authors underline the challenge
of this endeavour, given the EU’s multi-level and multi-stakeholder nature.
The authors make a clear distinction between concepts of effectiveness, per-
formance and impact as well as input, output and outcome in order to differ-
entiate and capture the effects of EU diplomacy and degree of success in the
external environment. Despite the understandable urge among scholars and
the policy-oriented community to inquire into what precisely EU diplomacy
achieves in practice, the authors warn against evaluating EU diplomacy at
the aggregate level. Given its multi-level and pluralistic nature, the authors
opt instead for opening the EU ‘black-box’ in order to disentangle the mul-
tiple actors and to trace and attribute specific outcomes to specific actors
and to evaluate their performance separately. The authors acknowledge the
difficulty of identifying the cause and effect of specific actions, especially in
multilateral settings, but this should not discourage researchers from tracing
the impact of specific actors in the EU as well as the member states’ overall
influence. While the difficulties associated with evaluating EU diplomacy
are not just specific to the EU, but apply to every foreign policy actor, the
authors acknowledge that the EU’s complexity makes the task of systemati-
cally evaluating its impact all the harder.
In Chapter 5, the first of two chapters dealing with the ‘individual
level’, Dominik Tolksdorf examines the role and impact of the EU Special
Representatives (EUSRs) in the broader context of EU diplomacy. The chapter
first offers an account on the specific mandates and appointments of the EUSRs
in light of the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. It then assesses their
specific roles as coordinators, negotiators and mediators in advancing the

EU’s objectives, especially in relation to state-building processes. The author
places particular emphasis on the importance of EUSRs in implementing
specific objectives of EU foreign policy in the field of state-building. The
chapter highlights how EUSRs have played a crucial role in coordinating
the often disparate actions of different EU players and institutions as well
as the relation between the EU and other international actors involved in
the field. Finally, the chapter identifies the main characteristics and the

extent of diplomatic skills of various EUSRs in the context of successfully
advancing EU diplomacy. Thus, the chapter serves as a reminder that the
success of EU diplomacy hinges not only on effectiveness and coherence at
the inter-institutional and national levels but also on the skills and impact
of core senior individuals.
In a similar vein, Fernando Andresen Guimarães provides, in Chapter 6, an
extensive reflection on the successful diplomatic outreach campaign in the
context of attaining an ‘enhanced observer status’ at the United Nations
General Assembly. At the outset, the chapter provides an overview of the
EU’s first unsuccessful attempt at attaining the necessary support and votes
for its resolution in 2010 and examines the reasons for failure. In the second
part of the chapter, the author provides a practitioner view on the diplo-
matic ‘global outreach campaign’ behind the subsequent successful attempt
of getting the resolution passed in 2011. The chapter provides an instruc-
tive case study of the internal and external factors that can constrain EU
influence and diplomatic success in multilateral settings and offers useful
lessons for an integrative, flexible and pragmatic approach to diplomacy.
The chapter highlights both the difficulties and importance of ‘diplomatic
outreach’ and makes a strong case for the value-added of the EEAS led by the
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs & Security Policy/Vice-
President of the European Commission (HRVP) in providing a well-defined
strategy, coordination and effective negotiation. Finally, the case study also
highlights the EU’s ability to learn from past mistakes and for adapting to
an external environment that is not naturally inclined towards specific EU
negotiation positions.
In Chapter 7, Tom Sauer examines the effect of coercive EU diplomacy in
relation to the international diplomatic attempts to stop Iran’s nuclear pro-
gramme. By analysing the different rounds of negotiations from 2003 until
November 2013, the author assesses the role of EU diplomacy in light of internal
divisions among EU member states and institutions as well as external
differences with global actors like the United States in addressing the Iranian
nuclear issue. In light of the diplomatic agreement in November 2013, the
chapter provides arguments for cautious optimism. While the chapter’s
analysis of EU diplomacy vis-à-vis the Iran’s nuclear programme sheds light
on the role the EU can play in resolving international security problems,
it also highlights its continuing limitations. Tom Sauer stresses the chal-
lenge of mobilising a complex diplomatic system to deal with a complex
international security issue, especially in light of diverging views among

member states. However, despite strategic disagreements over whether to
employ hard or soft instruments to solve the issue, the author argues that
the EU was nevertheless able to adapt to the behaviour of Iran: intransigent
behaviour was matched by a harder approach (including sanctions). This
shows a level of flexibility and adaptability of EU diplomacy to the negotiat-
ing environment, something that is often seen as lacking. The author also
calls for a better understanding of Iran’s security concerns and negotiating

behaviour, underlining the importance of a balanced approach to both
‘empathising’ with the negotiating partner’s position as well as applying
coercive diplomacy through sanctions.
In Chapter 8, the first of two chapters on the EU’s diplomatic impact in the area
of trade, finance and development, Peter Debaere examines the EU’s role and
performance within the Group of 20 (G20) in the field of finance and devel-
opment. The chapter provides important insights into how the EU institu-
tions tried to carve out their own role within the G20 and a new global
environment in the wake of the financial crisis. The author outlines some
of the key challenges the EU faces, alongside competing interests from core
EU member states, in the club-like ‘minilateral’ environment of the G20.
By focusing on two case studies in the area of finance and development,
Peter Debaere argues that the EU’s diplomatic behaviour depends more on
the mode of interaction within the G20 than on internal EU factors, such
as the allocation and distribution of competences. The chapter also argues
that the strategy of speaking with a single voice is not always appropriate
and outlines the conditions when this strategy might or might not work.
In Chapter 9, Frank Hoffmeister offers a comprehensive and fresh analysis
of the legal foundations of the EU’s policy-making in the field of interna-
tional trade after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. With the help
of concrete cases involving bilateral trade diplomacy (e.g. the EU-Korea
trade agreement), plurilateral diplomacy (e.g. the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement) and multilateral diplomacy (the WTO and Doha process), the
chapter provides a detailed account of the EU’s influence in trade diplomacy.
The chapter places particular emphasis on the impact of internal coordi-
nation and division of competences within the EU in order to assess the
EU’s role in international trade policy. The chapter thus offers a solid legal
analysis of the internal operation and external impact of EU trade policy.
Despite the highly integrated nature of this area, Hoffmeister shows that
the complex interplay between EU actors does not correspond to the often-
held belief that the EU’s trade policy is entirely monolithic and coherent.
Especially in the light of the growing powers of the European Parliament
in this area, trade policy has become increasingly politicised and therefore
more difficult to manage. The refusal of the European Parliament to ratify the
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) illustrates this novel develop-
ment and the Parliament’s increasing powers. It also highlights that EU trade
policy will be ever more pressed to take into consideration the Parliament’s
concerns about fundamental freedoms and human rights. Balancing trade
interests with the promotion of EU values might become increasingly difficult
to reconcile in the future. Yet, despite these complexities, the chapter high-
lights that the EU’s trade diplomacy continues to wield formidable influence
in both multilateral and bilateral settings and can therefore still be considered
as the ‘gold standard’ of the EU’s diplomatic influence world-wide.
In Chapter 10, Karen Smith offers a comprehensive analysis of the mecha-

nisms and effects of EU diplomacy in the area of external human rights pro-
motion and protection. It analyses the internal and external dimensions of
the EU’s human rights diplomacy at both the bilateral and multilateral levels
as well as the instruments the EU has at its disposal in order to advance its
human rights objectives. The chapter focuses particularly on the challenges
of EU diplomacy and on the potential strategies the EU could pursue to
increase the effectiveness of its actions. Karen Smith offers a critical review
of EU human rights diplomacy, by emphasising the challenges the EU con-
tinues to face in formulating a consistent and credible human rights policy.
The limitations of EU diplomacy in this field are seen as a result of competing
interests and views among EU member states and the increasingly challeng-
ing international context. This is particularly true for the EU’s engagement at
the United Nations Human Rights Council. The chapter concludes by argu-
ing that if the EU aims to be effective it does not only need to engineer and
express a clear single message, but it also needs to back it up with various
forms of pressure – including sanctions and conditional aid. The chapter
therefore argues that persuasion and diplomacy alone are not sufficient for
the effective promotion of human rights abroad.
Finally, in Chapter 11, Simon Schunz offers a comprehensive analysis of
the evolution and actions of the EU as a diplomatic actor in global climate
politics between 2007 and 2012. In so doing, the chapter sheds light on the
conditions that determine both the EU’s failures and successes in climate
change negotiations. In particular the chapter questions two widespread
assumptions about the EU in international affairs: namely, that ‘one voice’
and ‘leadership by example’ necessarily increase the leverage of the EU
in multilateral climate negotiations. More specifically, Schunz argues that
while ‘one voice’ might be a necessary condition for EU influence, it does
not necessarily lead to external impact. Nor does the high degree of proac-
tivity explain the potential and actual performance of the EU in multilateral
negotiations. Instead, the chapter calls for more context-sensitive EU action
that explores and takes into account the concerns and interests of third
countries, and not just the major players like the United States or China.
Crucially, the chapter explains the EU’s (limited) impact in global climate
politics by pointing to a major disconnect between internal demands and
function of EU action and the external demands and negotiating opponents
in a changing international context.
Taken together, this volume provides a first general stocktaking of the

EU’s activities, processes and performance as a diplomatic actor in the post-
Lisbon era. While the case studies in this volume highlight some important
successes in the EU’s conduct of diplomacy, persistent and familiar internal
and external limitations continue to prevent the EU from unfolding its full
potential on the international stage.
Indeed, this volume highlights persisting internal and external constraints
on the EU’s capacity to wield diplomatic influence. Internally, the EU’s

capacity to engage effectively in diplomatic activity depends both on the
allocation of competences within the EU and the member states’ willing-
ness to act collectively on behalf of the EU. The clearest expression of EU
diplomatic actorness can be observed in areas of exclusive EU competence
such as in trade, where the EU can negotiate binding agreements with third
countries. In areas where the EU possesses shared competences or partial
powers, the EU’s room for manoeuvre and overall impact is co-determined
by the foreign policy interests of core member states. In this case, extensive
internal coordination among EU institutions and member states precedes
external action and the preferences at the national level circumscribe the
EU’s ability to engage in diplomatic activity. Externally, the EU impact is
mediated by the structure of the setting in which it operates and by the
power, positions and perceptions of third parties. External structure can
constrain EU agency even where it has strong competence, or strengthen it
even when it has limited or no competence (see Debaere’s chapter in this
volume; see also Macaj and Nicolaïdis, 2014).
The EU’s performance, reach and impact as a diplomatic actor remains
a work in progress. From the early beginnings of the EU’s tentative impact
on international affairs in the 1970s to the post-Lisbon institutional inno-
vations and policy priorities during the last five years, the EU has made
significant advances in influencing diplomatic outcomes across all major
foreign policy fields. As the contributions in this volume highlight, the EU’s
influence in global diplomacy is set to grow even further and will continue
to raise challenging questions about the EU’s role, behaviour and impact in
international affairs.
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2
The EU as a Diplomatic Actor in the
Post-Lisbon Era: Robust or Rootless
Hybrid?

Michael H. Smith
Introduction
The past five years have seen the introduction and initial institutionalisation of
a new system of diplomatic action in the European Union (EU), following the
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and the setting up of the European External
Action Service headed by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HRVP),
along with the establishment of the office of President of the European Council
(PEC). It is also fair to say that these five years have been the context for radi-
cal challenges to EU assumptions about the diplomatic institutions, role and
capacity of the Union, and to the Union’s capacity for action in specific arenas.
Debates and conflicts about the setting up of the new system have accompa-
nied challenges from the external arena that have often seemed to paralyse
or – perhaps more dangerously – to by-pass the Union, even in areas where it
has an established and significant set of interests. In terms of policy formation
and implementation, this has been a turbulent and demanding period, and
it has generated doubts in some quarters about the efficiency and effective-
ness of the new EU diplomatic machine (Balfour et al., 2012; Balfour et al.,
2015; Emerson et al., 2011; Hemra et al., 2011; Lehne, 2011; Smith, 2013).
The purpose of this chapter is to set these debates and challenges into a
context that is broader in two ways. First, it puts the emergence of the EU’s
system of diplomacy into a broader context of evolution and development
concerning diplomacy in general. And second, it attempts to evaluate the
demands on and the responses generated by EU diplomacy in terms not
only of the immediate challenges of the past five years, but also of the
broader development of diplomacy within the European integration pro-
cess. To be more specific, this chapter explores the development of a hybrid
system of diplomacy within the EU, and questions whether this hybridity is
robust (and thus able to significantly extend the EU’s diplomatic presence in
the world arena) or rootless (and thus a source of problems in the promotion
of the EU’s global diplomatic role).
11
12 Michael H. Smith
This chapter begins by exploring issues relating to the nature of diplomatic

actors in the twenty-first century, and particularly the changing demands of
representation, communication and negotiation. The development of multi-
level and multi-stakeholder diplomacy creates new questions about diplo-
matic capacity, the opportunities for diplomatic action, the action itself and
its impact; these combine with the changing nature of the global diplomatic
milieu to produce a set of challenges affecting all diplomatic actors. This
discussion is then applied to the nature of the EU as an ‘emerging diplo-

matic actor’ in the post-Lisbon period, and in particular to the problems
that emerge in three areas: (1) boundaries, representation and legitimacy,
(2) roles, locations, rules and culture, (3) coherence and consistency. It is
argued that the post-Lisbon EU institutionalises hybridity in its diplomacy,
and that this combines with the fuller insertion of the EU into the global
diplomatic system to create a series of challenges and pressures. These are
considered in the final part of this chapter, which identifies a number of chal-
lenges for the EU, including those of implementing Lisbon itself, of respond-
ing to the new range of diplomatic actors and contexts, and of responding
to shifts in power within the global arena. This chapter concludes that the
EU is a more robust diplomatic actor than it was before Lisbon, but that
there are substantial internal and external risks in what might be seen as a
‘rootless’ diplomacy raising questions of legitimacy and leverage.
What is a diplomatic actor?
Central to any evaluation of the EU as a diplomatic actor is a set of assump-

tions and arguments about the nature of diplomatic ‘actorness’. There has
been much debate in EU scholarly circles about the nature of the EU’s
‘actorness’ (for example Bretherton and Vogler, 2006; Hill and Smith, 2011;
Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008; Koops, 2011; Sjursen, 2007; Whitman,
2011), but it is important to recognise that there has been a parallel, if
unconnected debate in international relations scholarship about the nature
of diplomacy and of the actors that pursue it (Hocking and Smith, 2011). It
is widely agreed that the nature of diplomacy can be understood in terms
of three continuing functions: those of representation, communication and
negotiation. Representation includes such activities as establishing a diplo-
matic presence in various more or less institutionalised arenas, and main-
taining a focus for the expression of interests or values. Communication
includes activities relating to the gathering of information, evaluation and
synthesis, and the projection of messages reflecting key interests and values.
Negotiation encompasses a spectrum of bargaining and problem-solving
activities, and can be carried out in a wide variety of more or less structured
arenas. Historically, these diplomatic roles have been carried out predomi-
nantly by the diplomatic services of national states, but in the current era
there has been a proliferation of diplomatic and quasi-diplomatic contexts
The EU as a Diplomatic Actor 13
and roles that have created major challenges to the traditional assumptions,
rules and conventions of state-based diplomacy.
Another key element in a conception of diplomacy is that of diplomatic
action. In a very crude sense, it can be asserted that diplomatic action is
what diplomats do – and traditionally this has been expressed in rather for-
mal sets of approved and disapproved behaviours, encompassing (for exam-
ple) the distinctions between diplomacy and espionage, or less dramatically
the distinction between diplomacy and commerce. The existence of these

formal distinctions, of course, does not rule out the existence of informal
linkages of a more or less intimate kind between diplomacy and other
spheres of international action. Nor does it imply that diplomacy somehow
exists in a sealed universe: it is important to be aware that diplomatic action
by diplomatic agents is carried out within a broader context of structures,
strategies, institutions, rules and cultures. This context may be thought of
in national terms – the position of diplomats and diplomacy in society and
their relationship to the state – but it should also be located within a broader
international context, in which diplomats have been seen as constituting a
kind of international elite network, often with more in common with other
members of the network than with their home societies.
The discussion so far could be seen as an expression of a traditional view
of diplomacy: diplomats have distinctive roles that arise out of the opera-
tion of an interstate system, and the system has developed a framework for
the conduct of diplomacy that expresses its special nature and its key role
in interstate communication or negotiation. But the study of diplomacy has
had to take increasing account of often radical and transformational changes
in the global arena that have challenged the nature both of diplomacy and
of the accepted range of diplomatic actors. Diplomacy has broadened its
scope, and has developed into a multi-level activity engaging a multitude of
stakeholders, both traditional and novel. This in turn has created a number
of important constraints and opportunities that surround the operation of
diplomacy and of diplomatic actors.
Broadly, these constraints and opportunities can be summarised as those
of boundaries, complexity and legitimacy (Hocking and Smith, 2011).
Boundaries have traditionally been seen as symbolic of separations, and
the role of diplomacy has been built upon the management of the separa-
tions between national societies and cultures. In the contemporary world
arena, though, the emphasis has shifted radically towards connections that
often transcend or permeate national boundaries, and diplomats have had
to develop roles as ‘boundary-spanners’, operating at complex interfaces
between institutions, practices and values that are often only indirectly
associated with national states (Hocking and Smith, 2011). Complexity has
become one of the more over-used and underdefined terms in the descrip-
tion of contemporary international relations (and of course of the EU!), but
it is undeniable that one of the roles of contemporary diplomatic actors has
14 Michael H. Smith
become the management of complex processes that spill across national

boundaries and that are often framed by novel institutions and values
(whether for ‘good’ in the case of many global governance institutions, or
for ‘bad’ in the case of terrorist organisations). This has led not only to a
transformation of the roles of national diplomatic services, but also to the
emergence of new types of diplomatic actors not set within the national
context. In turn, this has led to substantial challenges of legitimacy; on the
one hand, it is no longer to be taken for granted that national diplomatic

actors have unquestioned legitimacy, and on the other, it has become clear
that a range of quasi-diplomatic actors or ‘para-diplomats’ can enter into
established processes or create new ones that threaten to ignore the state-
based system of diplomacy. These quasi-diplomatic actors can include repre-
sentatives of non-governmental organisations, of business or of specialised
interest groups, as well as individuals. In this context, it is more appropriate
to talk in terms of diplomacy as a ‘catalytic’ or ‘management’ process asso-
ciated with networks rather than with national boundaries, and with the
ordering of complexity rather than the manipulation of national resources
and interests.
How are we to gain leverage, in analytical terms, on this apparently baf-
fling set of developments, and particularly on the apparent impossibility of
arriving at a stable definition of diplomatic ‘actorness’? I would propose that
an analytical framework should centre on four elements. The first of these is
capacity – in other words, the institutional and other resources necessary to
establish and pursue a coherent diplomatic presence in the global arena. The
second is opportunity – not as a single dimension, but as part of a spectrum
created by the existence of more or less accommodating opportunity struc-
tures in the global arena. The third is action – the range of instruments or
repertoires available and the ways in which a given actor deploys them. The
final element is impact – the evidence that diplomatic action by a given entity
has an effect on the political processes and political outcomes in a given sec-
tor, region or arena within the global system. If all four of these qualities –
capacity, opportunity, action and impact – are available to or created by a
given actor, then they can be assumed to be an effective diplomatic actor. If
one or more of these is lacking, then actorness is thrown into question and
becomes in itself a matter for evaluation and critique – and of course, there
is no guarantee at all that what bestows actorness in one set of circumstances
will work in other sets of circumstances. It will be noted, of course, that this
kind of discussion intersects strongly with other discussions of the EU as an
international actor (see discussions in Bretherton and Vogler, 2006; Ginsberg,
2001 for example); but in this case, it situates the EU within an area, that of
diplomacy, which has itself been subject to debate and questioning in the
study of international relations. At a number of points in the subsequent
argument, this chapter will return to this issue of effectiveness and relate it to
specific dilemmas or challenges for the EU.
The three sets of questions identified in this part – the changing func-
tions of diplomacy, the problems created by new issues and networks, and
the problem of measuring effectiveness – link strongly to the key themes
running through this book. In the first place, they give evidence of the
kind of multi-level participation and negotiation identified by the editors
as a central concern for analysis, and of the problems of representation,
coordination and coherence that attend EU diplomacy. Second, they raise in
a focused way the relationship between internal coherence and external

impact, since the pressures on diplomatic machines in general are presented
in a concentrated form by the EU, which has a complex internal structure
and multiple forms of representation. Third, they sharpen the questions
raised about negotiation and advocacy, throwing into relief the potential
problems arising from variations in strategic positioning and the need
for flexibility and responsiveness. Finally, the focus on the ways in which
capacity, opportunity, action and impact interact to condition the overall
effectiveness of diplomacy provides a strong link to the questions raised by
the editors about ‘impact, performance and power’ in EU diplomacy. The
following section builds on these general observations by specifying some
of the key diplomatic challenges of the post-Cold War era.
Diplomatic actors and diplomatic challenges in the

twenty-first century
We have seen that the changing nature of world politics in general has
placed new pressures on the institutions and practices of diplomacy, and
that as a result there has been at least a partial transformation of diplomacy
as a feature of world politics. In this section, the argument moves on to
identify a number of more specific challenges that have emerged from the
post-Cold War era, and to reflect on them in the light of the key elements
of diplomacy – representation, communication and negotiation. This will
form the second part of the background to the later argument about EU
diplomacy.
A first key feature of the post-Cold War diplomatic milieu concerns system
structure. Whereas during the Cold War period there was a high degree of
(but not complete) bipolarity in the system, we are now confronted with
a system that has been through several mini-phases within a twenty-year
period. Initial perceptions of unipolarity in the immediate post-Cold War
period, and of the USA as the dominant feature of a ‘new world order’,
were not without foundation, and indeed there are still elements of this
perception especially in the area of hard security. But it became clear during
the 1990s that perceived unipolarity did not prevent actual untidiness and
disorder. By the early 2000s, it was equally clear that there was an emerging
multipolar system, albeit one of uneven multipolarity in which the emerg-
ing new power centres varied widely in their capacity or their inclination
16 Michael H. Smith
to play roles in the establishment and maintenance of world order. Quite

apart from system structure, it remained unclear what the principles of this
emerging multipolar world might be – in particular, would it be a world
in which multilateralist principles as well as a multipolar distribution of
resources would play a key role? The ‘incompleteness’ of the emerging world
order has become a preoccupation of analysts (see for example Foot and
Walter, 2011; Grevi and de Vasconcelos, 2008) but from the point of view
of the argument here, the key implications are those for diplomacy. In an

incompletely multipolar world, with uncertainty about the principles on
which the world might be ordered, diplomacy has to confront not only the
issues raised in the previous section (boundaries, complexity, legitimacy)
but also the problem of uncertainty itself, with concomitant needs for rapid
adaptation and flexibility of evaluation and action.
This element of uncertainty links to the second key challenge to be
explored here: that of the global opportunity structure (see Smith, 2009,
2012, 2013a). In a way, the imposed rigidity of the Cold War made the
opportunity structure for secondary and other actors intelligible – they
had to play within the existing structure and to take advantage of ‘gaps’ in
the relations between the Superpowers as they occurred. For the dominant
powers, the context was also largely a given, but of course this also encour-
aged rigidity of thinking and of responses to change when it did occur. The
opportunity structure in a unipolar world, in similar fashion, would be set
largely by the relations between the single dominant power and all other
actors, with perhaps secondary regional or other groupings as mediators.
In an incompletely multipolar world, though, the opportunity structure is
highly differentiated, and the task of diplomacy in responding to it is com-
plicated as a result. It is difficult to establish a settled view of incentives and
constraints, and of the ways in which change in the arena is likely to impact
on given actors or sets of actors.
This means that what might be described as the ‘space’ for diplomacy
has become much more difficult to establish and maintain. As noted in the
previous section, diplomacy and diplomats have become more differenti-
ated and diverse; the changes in the world political arena have helped to
underpin a process of what might be described as ‘hybridisation’, parallel
to that in national systems of diplomacy, whereby diplomatic spaces have
been opened up and ‘invaded’ by different actors and influences and there
has been a coming together of diverse sets of rules and practices. Much
diplomacy is now carried on in mixed networks, but it also has to be noted
that there is a powerful persistence of some of the traditional hierarchical
assumptions and practices, especially where issues of ‘hard security’ are at
stake. The sites for diplomatic activity have changed and diversified, and
linkages between diplomatic actions and actors have become more impor-
tant, but the traces of Westphalian politics are still substantial.
It was noted earlier that one aspect of diplomacy is the ‘management’

function, and it is clear that the trends described so far in this section have
conspired to make the management role more difficult to perform. At one
level, there persists the idea that diplomacy is about strategic interaction
and strategic management, and that its success or failure is to be judged
by the extent to which it fulfils strategic needs of the actors concerned, in
particular the need to manage strategic partners (see for example Smith,
2014). At another level, it is clear as Stephan Keukeleire and his colleagues

have argued that there is an increasing role for ‘structural diplomacy’, in
which a novel range of actors and instruments are deployed to get beneath
the skin of the ‘target’ and initiate or reinforce structural change in areas
such as governance or the rule of law (Keukeleire, 2003; Keukeleire and
MacNaughtan, 2008; Keukeleire et al., 2009). At a third level, there is the
idea that diplomacy should be ‘transformational’, in the sense that it pro-
jects and reinforces not only institutional solutions but also changes in
ideas and values that can in turn provide openings and leverage for more
traditional forms of influence (Vaisse, 2007). In all of these areas, the core
functions of representation, communication and negotiation acquire new
meanings and new implications, not least because of the impact of new
technologies. But at the same time, there is a persistent – some would say,
resurgent – interest in what might be termed ‘great power diplomacy’,
which might be seen as encouraged by an emergent multipolar world and
which requires the deployment of some old-fashioned skills on the part of
the diplomats.
It is clear from this brief review that diplomacy exists in a world that is
more dynamic and more challenging than its predecessor – not necessarily
more risky, but differently risky and significantly more mercurial. The new
context requires a redefinition of some of the core assumptions about diplo-
macy: for example, what is ‘domestic’ and what is ‘foreign’, what is ‘public’
and what is ‘private’, and who is a legitimate ‘representative’. At the same
time, it raises new problems of control and management for all diplomatic
actors, whilst providing potential new means of management itself, and
thus complicates the question of communication which is at the heart of all
diplomatic activity. Finally, it means that the role of the diplomat as nego-
tiator is transformed, not only by the pervasiveness of negotiation itself but
also because of the challenge to the assumptions on which negotiation takes
place, especially in terms of the linkages between negotiations and negotia-
tors, and the politics of coalition building in new institutional and political
contexts. The key consequent question in terms of the argument here is:
how does this help us define and evaluate the EU as a diplomatic actor, and
the credentials of its emerging system of diplomacy? In the next section, this
chapter explores the ways in which the three key themes of this book can be
related to the EU’s status as an emerging diplomatic actor.
18 Michael H. Smith
The European Union as an emerging diplomatic actor
The EU and its predecessors have been ‘doing diplomacy’ for a long time –
indeed, forms of diplomatic activity can be traced back to the early days of
the European integration project, and they were elaborated and developed
during the 1970s and 1980s in ways that recognisably form the roots of the
current system (Spence, 2009). There is no doubt, though, that at least since
the Maastricht Treaty, there has been a cumulative drive towards the develop-
ment of new diplomatic functions on the part of the EU and that an increas-

ing range of agents within the EU system can be seen as possessing some kind
of diplomatic credentials (in the widest sense). This is partly a function of
the treaties themselves, which have grafted onto the Maastricht ‘root stock’
a widening range of quasi-diplomatic activities, and partly a function of the
EU’s involvement in an increasing range of international transactions that
both demand the core diplomatic roles – representation, communication and
negotiation – and provide opportunities for their performance (Smith, 2012).
As a result of these intersecting tendencies, the EU has developed into an
increasingly consequential actor in a range of diplomatic contexts (see Hill
and Smith, 2011 for general discussion, Smith, 2012 for related discussion). In
the first place, it is a ‘market actor’ or ‘market power’ (Damro, 2012), heavily
involved in the global marketplace and in its regulation, very often through
processes of bilateral, multilateral or ‘bi-multilateral’ negotiation. Secondly,
and increasingly, it has been seen as a ‘security actor’ (Howorth, 2007, 2011),
injecting an EU presence into global or regional security concerns, and capa-
ble of acting in areas such as conflict prevention and crisis management.
Thirdly, and of course centrally for the purposes here, the EU can be seen as
a ‘political actor’ (Ginsberg, 2001; Youngs, 2010) expressing a range of views
on important issues of world or regional order and engaging in a series of
‘foreign policy actions’ to promote or safeguard its interests. Finally, the EU
can be seen as an influential ‘normative actor’ (Manners, 2002; Whitman,
2011), eager to promote and project a view of the ‘good world’ onto the
outside world and to establish a distinctively ‘European’ approach to inter-
national relations in a number of emerging issue areas as well as pursuing the
established concerns of commercial or political influence.
The point to emphasise here is that the EU’s pursuit of status and inter-
ests in these areas inevitably brings with it a demand for diplomacy, and a
demand for the development of EU diplomatic practices. And this is what
has happened within the last two decades, since the establishment of the
essential framework in the Treaty on European Union (TEU). The EU during
this period has been progressively established and elaborated as a diplomatic
milieu; but the point is also that this establishment and elaboration has
taken place in the changing broader diplomatic context discussed earlier in
this chapter (Hocking and Smith, 2011). The intersection and interaction
of these two sets of developments is key to an understanding of the EU’s
potential as an emerging diplomatic actor, and especially to an evaluation

of the ways in which the Lisbon Treaty has realised this potential. The argu-
ment can be pursued by focusing on a number of points arising from the
earlier general discussion.
First, let us consider the issues relating to boundaries, capacity and legiti-
macy identified in the first part of this chapter. In terms of boundaries, the
basic question ‘what is a diplomat?’ has a particular resonance in the EU
context. The historical development of EU diplomacy has in effect created

several classes of ‘quasi-diplomats’ operating within a highly structured
system in which external representation and communication have become
central features (Spence, 2009). In addition to national diplomats pursuing
their tasks within and in relation to the EU institutions, there is the long-
standing group of external relations specialists operating from the European
Commission, and in some areas such as trade executing policy on the basis
of extensive ‘state functions’ that have been allocated to the EU (and more
specifically up to 2010, the European Community). But the Commission
also contains a range of other external relations ‘agents’, operating in envi-
ronments of more or less mixed competence with national diplomats – and
of course, also operating increasingly within global governance institutions.
Such a situation is characteristic for example of negotiations on climate
change and broader international environmental issues, or of develop-
ment policy (Smith, 2013b; Vogler, 2011). Alongside this, the EU (and up
to the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, more specifically the European
Commission) developed a growing network of external representations
and delegations, largely dedicated to commercial and related issues but
increasingly drawn into areas such as human rights, good governance and
other areas in which ‘conditionality’ was exercised or attempted. Outside
the realm of Commission-centred representation, there also grew up a net-
work of specialists and special representatives emanating from the Council
of Ministers and coordinated by the High Representative for Foreign and
Security Policy – for example, focused on EU policy coordination in the
Middle East or sub-Saharan Africa. Without pursuing the matter further at
this point, it seems clear that – perhaps to a unique extent – the boundaries
of EU diplomacy have been shifting and expanding constantly over at least
the past two decades.
In terms of capacity, such a fluidity of boundaries and of implied expecta-
tions has meant that EU diplomacy has experienced a series of challenges.
The first is legal and institutional: given the EU’s status as a ‘community
of law’, it has always placed a great stress on the existence of a solid legal
and institutional base for the development of policy and activity. But EU
diplomacy in its constant state of flux and expansion has constantly tested
the boundaries of this legal and institutional base. Seen from another per-
spective, the need for adaptation of diplomatic strategies and actions in
the face of world events and the demand for EU activity have posed the
20 Michael H. Smith
constant possibility of ‘extra-legal’ or ad hoc responses that then create the

possibility of legal and institutional challenge. Alongside this legal and
institutional aspect, the changing nature of EU diplomacy has created a
diffusion of agency in the international relations of the EU and thus a prob-
lem – part administrative, part political – of defining the resources available
and necessary to the pursuit of key ‘European’ tasks. The net result of this
set of tensions has been a series of disputes – not entirely resolved by treaty
revisions – about the nature, extent and location of the capacity to underpin

EU diplomacy.
Finally, in terms of legitimacy, it can readily be seen that problems of
boundaries and capacity are likely to throw up issues of legitimacy and
‘voice’ in terms of EU diplomacy. One symptom of this is the perennial
question ‘who speaks for Europe?’ (Allen, 1998); this is not only a technical
question but also one of the highest political nature. Leaving aside Henry
Kissinger’s (possibly apocryphal) demand to know what the telephone
number for Europe might be, it is clear that the EU’s system of diplomacy
has come to display the features of a multiple advocacy and multi-level
system of representation and communication. In doing so, as was argued
earlier, it might be essentially reflective of the growth of such systems in
diplomacy more broadly; but in the case of the EU, there are historically
and institutionally rooted features that seem to mark it out. The multiple
systems of representation noted above are linked to multiple diplomatic
cultures, which have come to live in an uneasy coexistence but which
might be very difficult to fuse into something approaching a common EU
voice. This is not to deny that when such a common voice emerges and is
expressed through the new EU agencies it can have a substantial effect – for
example, there is evidence of this in dealings with Iran where the HRVP has
been able to sustain and express a common ‘European’ line. But in general,
the process by which the European External Action Service was constituted
from a mixture of Commission and Council officials, along with members
of national diplomatic services, and on the basis of an inter-institutional
agreement between not only the Commission and the Council but also
the European Parliament, can be seen as a heroic effort to create legitimacy
at least in terms of the EU’s institutional arrangements. Whether it could
create the kind of broader legitimacy that is at least in principle attached to
national diplomatic services is another question completely – and indeed,
the first three years of experience with the post-Lisbon arrangements
seem to indicate that the negotiated deal of 2010 might be seen more as
an uneasy compromise leading to additional fragmentation in the overall
system of EU diplomacy. The EEAS’s own review of its operations, published
in mid-2013, implicitly bore out this kind of evaluation, although putting a
positive ‘spin’ on it (EEAS, 2013).
Given these issues of boundaries, capacity and legitimacy attaching to the
EU’s system of diplomacy, what can we say in addition about the problems
of hierarchies and networks identified earlier in this chapter? These problems

clearly link with those of representation, resources and communication
noted above, and in the case of the EU they come immediately into contact
with a problem that has been widely identified and analysed – that of coher-
ence and consistency (Gebhard, 2011; Nuttall, 2005). The external actions
of the EU, based as they are on a multi-institutional and densely structured
system of governance at the European level, are inherently challenged by
problems of vertical coherence (between the European level and other levels

such as that of the member states) and horizontal coherence (between the
different areas of policy, characterised by different institutional settlements
and political dynamics, that constitute ‘European’ policy). And of course, as
noted earlier, the absence of government means that there is no necessary
final arbiter of policy choices or silencer of debates.
This can be presented as an advantage – the generation of an essentially
deliberative mode of policy development in which multiple voices can be
heard and can influence the outcome – but it can also be presented as a
handicap to the development of consistent and coordinated positions and
actions, or as generating a gap between the self-presentation of the EU and
its capacity to produce effective actions (Hill, 1993). In terms of hierarchies
and networks, it appears that EU diplomacy is based on a partly hierarchical
and partly networked system, but one in which allocations of resources and
responsibilities can be constantly challenged and debated. Not only this,
but different EU institutions can call on connections with different ele-
ments of civil society to buttress their positions, and are more or less open
to influence from business organisations, NGOs and others. There is a lot of
potential for the kinds of ‘loose couplings’ that generate challenges of coor-
dination and execution in the new diplomatic milieus characteristic of the
twenty-first century. But in the EU case, there is an institutionalisation of
the hybrid forms of diplomatic pressure and activity that are seen by some
as a feature of diplomacy at the global level. The ways in which these two
levels of hybridity and complexity may interact are equally complex, and
give rise to phenomena such as that of ‘bimultilateral’ negotiation or three-
level negotiations, in which the basis for the negotiations themselves can be
at issue within the EU at the same time as diplomacy is being used to pursue
them at the international level (Smith, 2005).
The arguments above lead to the conclusion that EU diplomacy is a case
study in the effects of multi-stakeholder diplomacy, characterised by chal-
lenges of roles, location, representation and rules. There is hybridity of partici-
pation, accompanied by the pursuit of multiple interests and characterised
by the indeterminacy of both processes and outcomes. This appears to be
the case in (at least) two dimensions. First, EU diplomacy itself is a product
of diplomatic activity and negotiation at several levels and in several often-
interconnected arenas. Second, EU diplomacy – whilst experiencing the
effects of this ‘internal’ complexity – is injected into an increasing range of
22 Michael H. Smith
international processes characterised by ‘external’ complexity of the kind

discussed earlier. It would be easy at this point simply to throw up one’s
hands and conclude that it is all too complex to bother with – but that is in
itself part of the point.
Faced with this multi-level and multi-stakeholder milieu, we need to
assess the ways in which, at the level of EU diplomacy, it is made compre-
hensible, and in which the search for mechanisms to ensure consistency
and coherence takes place. As noted earlier, and by the editors of this

book, this is a key element in the achievement of coordinated and (by
implication) credible external action. Attention to roles tells us that EU
diplomacy is likely to be used as the vehicle for development and projec-
tion of role-conceptions at the EU level, as well as for the performance of
those roles and evaluation of the effectiveness with which the roles have
been pursued (Elgström and Smith, 2006). It also tells us, however, that
those roles may be contested both from within and outside the EU diplomatic
milieu. Attention to the location of issues and participants, and to the ero-
sion on the separations between different arenas and classes of actors, tells
us that EU diplomacy should be approached in terms of the ways in which
it either seeks to perpetuate ‘traditional’ locations of issues and authority
or seeks to express the interconnectedness and fluidity of diplomatic issues
in the current era. More likely than a finding one way or the other in this
area is a finding that notes the uneasy coexistence of the separations and
the interconnections. Attention to representation is likely to draw attention
to the fact that the EU’s emerging system is in a sense trying to construct
a ‘European’ diplomacy the wrong way round – to fashion a coherent and
unified system of diplomatic representation where there are already several
well established diplomatic or quasi-diplomatic entities in the field. Finally,
attention to rules is likely to alert us to a number of features relating to the
normative basis of EU diplomacy and to some of the internal and exter-
nal contradictions to which this might give rise. We are all familiar with
the assertion that the EU is a ‘normative power’ and/or an ‘ethical power’
(Aggestam, 2008; Manners, 2002; Sjursen, 2007; Whitman, 2011), and also
with the uneasy feeling that this (self-)conception of the EU does not always
work out when it is confronted with reality. In the case of EU diplomacy
specifically, we are led to question the extent to which it can support a nor-
mative/ethical external policy, and thus indirectly to question the effects on
the EU’s diplomacy of fuller insertion into the global diplomatic system, as
opposed to the rather marginal or differentiated ways in which the EU has
been represented to date. We are also led to other questions relating to the
EU’s capacity to comply with or to (re)shape the rules of the global diplo-
matic system, which are fundamental to the Union’s international role(s).
This section has tried to expose the kinds of questions that arise when EU
diplomacy is subjected to examination in terms of the broader developments
in diplomacy set out earlier. It has demonstrated that EU diplomacy can be
analysed and evaluated as a special if not unique case of early twenty-first-

century diplomacy, and that it has developed as a distinctive hybrid form, in
which there is a mingling of different tendencies and pressures. One feature
that emerges strongly from the argument is that there is both an ‘internal’
and an ‘external’ face to this hybridity: the EU is in a number of important
senses a diplomatic system at the European level, but at the same time it is
part of the changing global diplomatic system (Balfour et al., 2015; Batora
and Spence, 2015). This gives rise in turn to a central question for the

future development of EU diplomacy: given that diplomacy has been in a
process of at least partial transformation during (at least) the period since the
end of the Cold War, what exactly is the potential role of the EU in its further
evolution? Two possibilities stand out. First, EU diplomacy as developed over
the past fifty years has been part of that transformation and could be a potent
agent of further transformation. Second, EU diplomacy is at least as likely to
be transformed by as it is to transform the global diplomatic system as a con-
sequence of its further incorporation into the existing structures, thus casting
doubt on any claim that the EU might be a ‘system-determining’ power in
the area of diplomatic practice. The reality is of course that there is likely to
be an uneasy coexistence of these two sets of forces, and in the final part of
this chapter the argument addresses the question of the EU’s role in the light
of developments since the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in more detail, as
a means of focusing the discussion further.
The European Union and the challenges of twenty-first-century

diplomacy: Lisbon and after
It is clear that Lisbon did not unequivocally resolve the question of the
EU’s system of diplomacy. In the first place, it provided for institutions
and patterns of representation, but not without leaving these open to
question and challenge. Thus, the roles of the HRVP and the European
External Action Service (EEAS), the President of the European Council
(PEC), the Commission and the Council, not to mention that of the
European Parliament, were questioned and challenged in a number of
‘internal’ confrontations between 2010 and 2012 (Balfour et al., 2012;
Emerson et al., 2011; Hemra et al., 2011; Lehne, 2011; Smith, 2013). Such
issue areas as development policy and summit diplomacy saw tensions
over the allocation of roles, their performance and the standards by which
they should be evaluated, and as a result the external face of the EU, in the
shape of representation from Brussels but also in the shape of representa-
tion and communication through EU delegations, was often inconsist-
ent and unpredictable. Thus although the Treaty provided for resources,
both administrative and financial, it left largely open the issue of
the budget and of the ways in which personnel would be attached to the
system. It initiated a set of diplomatic practices, based on the idea of ‘doing
24 Michael H. Smith
diplomacy differently’ through the EEAS and the roles of the HRVP and the
PEC, but did not settle the question of the relations between those practices
and the existing, deeply embedded practices of national or European institu-
tions. No clearer illustration could be found than in the vexed question of
‘who speaks for Europe?’ in the United Nations; throughout 2010 and 2011,
this was subject not only to challenge in the UN General Assembly as the
EU pursued ‘enhanced observer status’ (see chapter by Fernando Andresen
Guimarães in this volume), but also to challenge from some member states,

most prominent among them the UK with its refusal to accept the role of the
EEAS except in areas where there was a clear consensus within the Union.
The Lisbon Treaty finally called for a strategic approach to diplomacy, and for
the use of novel diplomatic instruments in pursuit of EU influence, but did
not resolve the issues of international status and credibility that inevitably
lie behind any EU strategic or structural diplomacy (Smith et al., 2015).
As a result, the first four years and more of the post-Lisbon era were inevi-
tably preoccupied with the domestic arrangements essential to giving life to
the EU’s system of diplomacy (Vanhoonacker et al., 2012). But the world will
not wait for this kind of exercise to be completed, and equally inevitably there
have arisen key international challenges that have constituted a test of the
new diplomatic machine even before it has been fully assembled. It is to two
of these that I now turn.
During the gestation period of the new institutional and operational
frameworks, the EU’s diplomatic system has been subject to (at least) two
major challenges that have tested its legitimacy and its credibility. The
first of these is the ‘great power’ test – in other words, the challenge of
establishing EU diplomacy in a world where emergent and actual great
powers are entering into new alignments. The second is the ‘neighbour-
hood’ test – and particularly the test generated by the impact of radical
change in the southern Mediterranean, in the form of the ‘Arab spring’,
which could be seen as demanding the type of structural engagement and
diplomacy that the EU has emphasised elsewhere. To what extent has the
emerging diplomatic system of the EU met these tests?
On the ‘great power’ test, the evidence seems negative. Although the first
HRVP, Catherine Ashton, established good working relationships with the
USA and especially with successive Secretaries of State Hillary Clinton and
John Kerry, it is not clear yet what the benefit is of at last having a specific
telephone number or email address for Europe. Indeed, whilst the Americans
might know the number, it is clear that on many key issues they don’t yet
call it, preferring to deal with individual EU member states according to the
needs of a pragmatic realist policy. The Chinese, partly preoccupied with
their adversarial partnership with the USA, equally show a reluctance to
recognise Brussels as the fount of European diplomacy. Indeed, one signifi-
cant characteristic of the post-Lisbon period so far is that both Beijing and
Washington have followed a more calibrated multi-level diplomacy towards
the EU, differentiating strongly between the EU and the member states. This
may of course be a function of the issues confronted, but it may also reflect
an awareness of the neediness of at least some EU member states in respect
of their national diplomatic identities. Two of the other ‘strategic partners’
identified by the EU, India and Brazil, are ruled especially by their regional
preoccupations and their commercial objectives, and this combination does
not leave much space for the EU to insert itself diplomatically. Finally, the
evidence on EU relations with Russia remains ambiguous: here is the near-

est of neighbours, and a key strategic actor, but one that speaks a different
diplomatic language from that of the normative and multilateralist EU on
many issues. No clearer confirmation of this could be found than the course
of the dispute and then open conflict in Ukraine during 2013–2014. It does
not appear that the call by some for a strengthened set of strategic partner-
ships as the core of a new ‘great power diplomacy’ on the part of the EU has
yet produced a coherent diplomatic response either from the EU or from
its putative partners, and the EEAS’s review of these partnerships has so far
spawned little that is new (EEAS, 2010; see also Renard, 2011).
On the test of the ‘neighbourhood’ and specifically of the ‘Arab Spring’, the
lessons so far seem equally negative. Here is an issue – or a set of issues – where
the EU had a pre-existing institutional engagement, underpinned by resources
in the form of economic assistance and market power, and a clear political
interest in intervening for the cause of democratisation and stabilisation – not
to mention an opportunity to justify its ‘normative power’ rhetoric. But this
has been a crisis (or a succession of crises), in which events from day to day are
unpredictable and in which the deliberative aspect of EU diplomacy is distinctly
disadvantaged. As a result, any diplomatic space that may have existed for the
EU in the early stages of the process seems to have been unexploited and to
have closed down, in favour of diplomacy by contact group and interven-
tion by a coalition of the willing including leading EU member states. At the
same time, there has been self-conscious abstention by other leading member
states, and a distinct lack of consensus on the day-to-day management of
the unfolding challenge. As Sven Biscop has argued, this does not preclude
the development of an effective EU diplomacy in the longer term, based on
a definition of the EU’s vital interests, on the identification of clear priori-
ties and on the dedication of appropriate capabilities, economic, diplomatic
and eventually military, to the management of the long-term stability of the
southern Mediterranean region (Biscop, 2011). The difficulty is that the lack
of consensus on intervention in the region may feed back into the ‘internal’
diplomacy of the EU and create issues for the future development of EU crisis
management capabilities – a danger that seems to have been recognised by
the EEAS itself. Another difficulty is that the attempt by the EU to conduct a
diplomacy towards the region informed by specifically European norms and
values may not coincide with the demands or aspirations of peoples within the
region, and thus that it will lack credibility (Youngs, 2011).
26 Michael H. Smith
Aside from these major and often dramatic challenges, the picture of the
EU’s diplomacy post-Lisbon has been decidedly mixed. In some areas, such
as policy towards Iran on the issue of nuclear weapons, the HRVP has been
able to assert a coordinating role and the EU has been able to back it up
with important measures such as the oil sanctions threatened in early 2012
(see chapter by Tom Sauer in this volume). In other areas, the EEAS and the
HRVP have been less prominent, not to say excluded because of the continu-
ation of pre-Lisbon patterns of external activity; one obvious example here is

external commercial policy, where DG Trade retains its central role in a key
area of economic diplomacy, another is that of climate change policy, where
the climate change Commissioner has played a central role with very little
apparent reference to the EEAS. As noted above, development policy remains
an area of uncertainty, with the EEAS responsible for the development of the
policy framework, DG DEVCO responsible for the finance and for operations,
and EU delegations subject to a series of cross-cutting pressures that are likely
to render the policy in general less credible and effective than it might have
been (Smith, 2013b). Whilst there is evidence that working practices and
conventions are emerging to reduce the possibilities of internal contradic-
tions and external inconsistency, and these were set out in the EEAS’ review
(EEAS, 2013) it is clear that these are by no means eliminated. In a way, of
course, they never will be; but the danger is that the internal tensions atten-
dant on the growth of a consolidated EU system of diplomacy will obstruct
the EU’s capacity to represent, communicate and negotiate effectively in a
challenging global context.
Conclusions
The key aim of this chapter was to put the discussion of current EU diplo-
macy into a rather broader context, both of ideas about diplomacy and
of developments in the global arena. In doing so, it has looked both at
the internal development and at the external projection of EU diplomacy,
within a framework of ideas about the changing roles of diplomats and
changing diplomatic practices. A series of conclusions follow from what has
been argued here.
First, the evolution of the EU’s system of diplomacy needs to be seen in
the long term and in the context of the evolution of diplomacy more gener-
ally. By conducting this kind of analysis and evaluation, EU diplomacy can
be subjected to a series of tests relating to the identity and roles of diplo-
mats, the boundaries of diplomacy, the complexity of diplomatic processes
and the legitimacy of diplomatic activity.
Second, on the basis of these tests and of an appreciation of the long-
term evolution of EU diplomacy, it is clear that EU diplomacy reflects a
process of hybridisation, which has produced (and will continue to produce)
distinctive patterns and practices. This hybridisation results from treaty
negotiations and provisions, from the practice of diplomacy within the EU

and from the broader pressures of the global diplomatic milieu. It can be
discerned in such areas as the relationship between the HRVP and the PEC,
the composition of the EEAS, and the control of resources for the conduct
of EU diplomacy.
Third, the hybridity of EU diplomacy has important consequences for
the effectiveness of different modes of diplomatic activity. In particular, it
permeates into the pursuit of strategic diplomacy, structural diplomacy and

transformational diplomacy, and creates tensions between institutions and
agents at a variety of levels. This multi-level, multi-stakeholder diplomacy is
in some ways reflective of broad trends in diplomacy, but it also expresses a
peculiarly EU context where offices and agents, and the densely institution-
alised relations between them, have direct effects on the focus and effective-
ness of diplomatic activity.
Fourth, Lisbon has made the EU’s system of diplomacy more robust and
grounded in the sense that it has more explicit institutional foundations
and a more unified ‘voice’, but this is only part of the story of a move
towards more effective EU diplomacy. The post-Lisbon era is also a ‘post-
post-Cold War era’, in which the emergence of new centres of power and of
new issues is a predominant feature. In this context, the opportunities for
EU diplomatic assertiveness are crucial and are likely to be challenging – to
put it simply, the openings for EU presence and leverage that existed in the
1990s do not exist now, and they may not exist in the future because of the
closing down of the external opportunity structure. There is an irony here,
because the development of hybrid diplomatic spaces at the global level
might seem to play into the hands of the EU and its experience with pre-
cisely such structures, but at the same time the re-emergence of ‘great power
politics’ seems to militate against this kind of EU assertiveness.
Finally, there is a continuing question of legitimacy attending the
institutions and practices of EU diplomacy. In some ways, this is an issue
of internal legitimacy, arising from the contested nature of the post-
Lisbon institutional framework and more broadly from the problematic
nature of European integration in the era of financial crisis and pervasive
Euroscepticism within the Union. But it is also a matter of external legiti-
macy (linked to the internal legitimacy question) arising out of the some-
times ambiguous nature of the EU presence in institutions or negotiation
processes at the global level. In this sense, the diplomatic system of the EU
in the post-Lisbon era is not rootless, but it may not yet be as robust and
resilient as some might hope.
It is not startling to conclude that the challenges to EU diplomacy are per-
vasive, that the opportunities for EU assertiveness – especially in the light of
persistent internal crisis in the financial sphere – are fewer than they might
have been a decade ago and that the internal and external legitimacy of EU
diplomacy are in question. What this chapter has tried to do is to find an
28 Michael H. Smith
understanding of these challenges in the broader context of EU diplomacy

and the context of diplomacy in general. In doing so, it has addressed the
key themes set out by the Editors of this volume: those of multilevel action
and analysis, especially in relation to representation and communication,
of the relationship between internal coherence and external impact, and
about the conduct of negotiations both with key partners and in turbulent
contexts. Any judgement on the overall performance and impact of EU
diplomacy must necessarily be provisional, but it is clear that it must also

be distinctly mixed, and that there are important lessons to be learned if EU
diplomacy in its next phase is to be more coherent and effective.
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3
EU Diplomacy in Global Governance:
The Role of the European External
Action Service

Knud Erik Jørgensen
Introduction
At the turn of the century, high-level European policy-makers concluded

that the European Union (EU) was punching well below its weight and that
the European voice in global affairs should be strengthened. The European
External Action Service (EEAS) was supposed to be the means to achieve
that end. However, given that the creation of the EEAS became embroiled in
processes of treaty reform, including the derailed Constitutional Treaty, the
EEAS project has been severely delayed. The project is finally being imple-
mented but global power shifts imply that the conditions under which the
EEAS will provide diplomatic services have changed.
EEAS diplomats therefore face startling challenges. Not only are they
about to build the foreign service of a world player, in addition researchers
conclude more frequently than not that the EU’s multilateral diplomacy
experiences severe problems. A report by the Centre for European Policy
Studies concludes that for the EU, the state of affairs in many international
institutions is ‘not satisfactory’ (Emerson and Kaczynski, 2010). While the
meaning of ‘satistactory’ is open for discussion, the finding is nothing else
but alarming. Moreover, Franziska Brantner and Richard Gowan (2009)
point out that within the (high priority) field of human rights the EU’s
influence has been decreasing for more than a decade. Similarly, Jean-Yves
Haine (2009) claims that the liberal internationalist strategy pursued by the
EU is becoming increasingly irrelevant. A comparative study of the EU’s
performance within international institutions concludes that in most of the
analysed cases, performance is in severe need of improvement (Jørgensen
et al., 2011). In some cases, for example, concerning NATO, it is difficult
simply to find out what Europeans want (Biscop et al., 2010; see also Græger
and Haukevik, 2013; Varwick and Koops, 2009).
Multilateral institutions can be regarded as both means and ends. They
can be regarded as manifestations of international cooperation and, thus,
as the antithesis to international conflict. As such, they can be seen as
31
32 Knud Erik Jørgensen
ends, to be cherished in their own right. However, multilateral institu-

tions can also be seen as agents, equipped with mandates to serve speci-
fied functions. Or, put differently, as instruments to be used in order to
achieve political or diplomatic objectives. The distinction between ends
and means also applies to the EEAS. For those involved in constructing
the EEAS, the new institution represents a final accomplishment. It is an
end, an example of institutional reform and effective multilateralism at
home (Duke, 2011; Rijks and Whitman, 2007). The process of creating

the EEAS can be seen as a case of institutional design and the difficult
negotiations throughout 2010 demonstrate that the EEAS did not come
easy (Vanhoonacker and Reslow, 2010). For those who are going to use
the EEAS, for instance in the conduct of multilateral diplomacy, the ser-
vice will foremost be a means to use in order to achieve changing political
objectives.
The EU’s multilateral diplomacy is very extensive and the challenges most
demanding. In order to examine the challenges the emerging EEAS is facing,
it is necessary first to specify the sectors of multilateral diplomacy that the
EEAS is responsible for. In order to do so, it might be useful to begin at the
national level. It is well known that member states organise their foreign
affairs differently (Hocking and Spence, 2006). In some member states, for
example Denmark and Sweden, the ministries of foreign affairs are not only
responsible for foreign policy per se, but also for trade and development pol-
icy. In other member states, for instance in Germany and the UK, trade and
development issues are organised in separate ministries. The EU has chosen
the latter model, that is kept separate DGs for trade and development poli-
cies, indeed the issue of how to cut the cake – that is the organisation of
foreign affairs – has been somewhat politicised.1
This chapter focuses on ten important challenges in the field of multilat-
eral diplomacy. Each challenge is briefly outlined and critically examined.
Moreover, this chapter focuses deliberately on the instrumental dimensions
of the EEAS and multilateral institutions, respectively. This implies that the
(unique) legal-institutional features will be downplayed in exchange of a
strong focus on the political challenges that will keep the EEAS busy for the
foreseeable future.
Conducting multilateral diplomacy underpinned by bilateral

relations and unilateral action
The EEAS organigram (see Appendix) shows that the new foreign service is
meant to cultivate both bilateral and multilateral relations. While perhaps
not presented in such a neat fashion before, this dual track is a continuation
of previous practice. In the conduct of its foreign policy, the EU has always
used several types of foreign policy strategy: unilateral, bilateral and multi-
lateral. The two former strategies might not appear as officially recognised
EU Diplomacy in Global Governance 33
or publicised as the latter, yet de facto they have been part of the strategy
portfolio for a long time.
It should be emphasised that the three strategies are not necessarily mutu-
ally exclusive. Political objectives, pursued by means of multilateral strate-
gies, are often difficult to achieve when they are not underpinned by active
cultivation of bilateral relations or, at times, unilateral action. Unilateral
action can provide the necessary conditions for a major breakthrough in
otherwise stalled multilateral negotiations and bilateral relations sometimes

function as the innovative or dynamic undergrowth, providing the leader-
ship, coalition-building processes, minilateralism and general preparatory
work that might secure an agreement within multilateral diplomacy, often
characterised by a large number of participants.
In order to understand multilateral dynamics, minilateralism has frequently
proved important. Minilateralism is the label we attach to international
agreements that are reached by a select sub-grouping of a larger multilateral
organisation or regime and subsequently adopted by other states. Hence,
minilateralism is characterised by an exclusive group of k-states, that is, key
states within a specific issue area, reaching an agreement which subsequently
is accepted within a larger multilateral setting (Ruggie, 1993). One example is
the policy by France and the UK vis-à-vis the break-up of former Yugoslavia, a
policy which was accepted by partners within the European Union, and sub-
sequently adopted by the UN Security Council (Owen, 1995; Jørgensen, 1995;
Holbrooke, 1998). A second example of minilateralism is the EU3+1 talks
with Iran on nuclear issues, also characterised by three levels of handling an
issue: the exclusive k-group, the EU and the UN Security Council (see chapter
by Tom Sauer in this volume).
Minilateralism should not be conflated with plurilateral agreements being
concluded by a small select grouping of states and subsequently adhered
to by a larger segment of international society. A reference to the plurilat-
eral instrument was made after the 2003 WTO Doha-Round meltdown in
Cancun, when the European Union suggested that given the multilateral
deadlock, perhaps a plurilateral approach would be a desirable or at least a
possible alternative (Lamy, 2012; TWN, 2003). Similarly, non-proliferation
regimes are characterised by an exclusive membership yet a very wide group
of states adhere to the agreements (Meyer, 2009).
The swift fashion in which the deadlocked multilateral Doha-round has
been replaced by bilateral trade agreements demonstrate that DG Trade and
the Commission in general are capable of employing available strategies
and change from one to the other when deemed necessary (Damro,
2012; Woolcock, 2013). The EEAS, being directed first by a former Trade
Commissioner, might have this insight in its ‘lessons learned’ files. In short,
successful multilateral negotiations depend crucially on a rich undergrowth
of bilateral relations, engagements in relevant k-groups and occasional
unilateral action (Nye, 2004; Ruggie, 1993).
Bridging form and content
The EEAS has been created by the Treaty of Lisbon, or, rather by the drafters
of the treaty and its key interpreters, that is, the inter-institutional mingling
that took place throughout 2010. In this fashion, the EEAS has a legal foot-
ing. However, the success of the EU’s multilateral diplomacy will be deter-
mined by capable politics and flexible interpretation of rules and principles.
The age-old distinction between form and content is highly relevant for the
EU’s international performance. The problem is that the EU tends to priori-

tise form over content and its own institutional logic over external context.2
One example concerns the highly developed legalistic culture in which
EU institutions are embedded, as demonstrated when the EU declares that
its strategy towards Russia has ‘expired’. Most strategists would be greatly
surprised to learn that strategies can ‘expire’. It thus seems that European
officials have somehow become prisoners of Europe’s grand strategy objec-
tive of legalising international politics. The EU has become so legal in its
episteme that politics and strategy has been downplayed. A second example
concerns the fabulous mathematics of formal representation (compare to
Bini-Smaghi, 2009). Concerning EU representation in multilateral institu-
tions, it is tempting to focus on legal arrangements and institutional design.
Indeed there are excellent studies on both aspects (Govaere et al., 2004;
Vanhoonacker and Reslow, 2010). However, the challenge for the EEAS is
to avoid going too far in the direction of formal representation, especially
because it will end up being an ‘accountant’, that is, obsessed with counting
or recalculating seats or votes, disregarding that this is just one of several
aspects and in terms of impact not necessarily the most important. Third,
given the ‘generous’ interpretation of the notion ‘strategic’ and the derived
proliferation of strategic partners, one may wonder if the EU eventually ends
up having 192 strategic partners (on strategic partnerships, see Grevi and
Khandekar, 2011).
Outreach, coordination and delegation
Research shows fairly consistently that European diplomats are hard work-
ing yet spend most of their time on internal coordination, leaving limited
time for outreach activities. For the EEAS, it will therefore be a considerable
task to change the balance between coordination and outreach activities.
The point of departure is that the EU is deeply marked by its dual nature,
being both an international subsystem in its own right and an actor within
the wider international system (Hill and Smith, 2008; Jørgensen, 2004).
Whereas coordination of EU member states’ positions counts as diplomacy
in the international subsystem, coordination counts somehow differ-
ently when the EU acts as an international actor. Then it either counts as
a regional level game of classical diplomacy or it counts as EU-domestic

politics that happens to be conducted by diplomats (Jørgensen, 1999). Thus,
while coordination is a precondition for a union of states, the organisation
of coordination and delegation is in severe need of creative thinking.
In the present context, outreach should be understood as interaction
with third-party diplomats, that is, acts of persuasion or coercion, taking
initiatives, seeking influence or providing leadership. Examples of coercive
diplomacy include EU3+1 talks with Iran, especially the use of EU-sponsored

and UNSC-imposed sanctions and, likewise, the use of WTO-authorised
sanctions. Concerning all these issues, the probably most significant feature
is that correlation between degree of coordination and outreach or impact
does not show a consistent pattern. In literally all policy fields, that is, span-
ning environment, trade, UNGA politics, security, development, value pro-
motion and health, is it possible to identify issue areas in which the degree
of EU coordination is fairly high, yet despite this constant, the degree of
outreach varies significantly (Jørgensen and Laatikainen, 2013; Laatikainen
and Smith, 2006).
Outreach has been fairly high within the following issue areas: climate,
trade (WTO), and international justice (ICC). Concerning the WTO case the
EU, being a co-designer and co-creator of the WTO, demonstrates several
attempts at agenda setting, going beyond mere coordination and aspiring
to play a leadership role. In other words, agenda setting can be seen as the
first phase of outreach. Furthermore, the WTO case shows the EU’s flexible
approach to international trade policy: if multilateral strategies do not work,
the EU does not refrain from using bilateral strategies. The EPAs being nego-
tiated between the EU and ACP countries can be seen as a junction between
development and trade policy and also a border case between bilateral and
multilateral strategy. In any case, coordination and outreach has been high.
Moreover, it is easy to identify issue areas, in which coordination is
remarkably high and outreach fairly low. Examples include as diverse areas
as the non-proliferation regimes, UNGA politics and human rights promo-
tion. In these cases, it seems that coordination is so demanding in terms
of manpower and time that not much has been left to interaction with
third parties. The case of the Human Rights Council (HRC) shows that
the EU became involved in creating a new institution that was intended
to leave the vices of the former Commission on Human Rights (CHR)
behind. Concerning membership criteria and other features of the HRC,
the EU-adopted principles that first appeared in Kofi Annan reports (2002,
2004), yet the Union experienced fierce opposition to membership criteria
yet subsequently concluded that the HRC would be better than no institu-
tion (Balducci, 2013; Macaj and Koops, 2012; Smith, 2010). Since the HRC
was founded, the EU has experienced the consequences of that decision,
including the experience of being outvoted fairly consistently.
Despite EU member states stating their commitment to a strengthened

role within the two major international financial institutions, the cases of
the IMF and the World Bank remain important examples of meagre efforts at
coordination and outreach. The introduction of the Euro and the European
Central Bank seems not to have significantly changed this situation (Bini-
Smaghi, 2009). Also coordination within NATO has traditionally been mod-
est. Examples of the contours of a European caucus include opposition to
early 1990s ideas to let NATO go global, impact on certain dimensions of

NATO doctrine (for example, the increased emphasis on CIMIC), the adop-
tion of the Berlin+ formula and the decision to opt for an EU ESDP instead
of a NATO ESDI. Methodolocally, it is somewhat difficult to make a clear
distinction between, on the one hand, outcomes that are caused by deliber-
ate coordination and, on the other hand, outcomes that reflect accidental
consensus. The case of NATO is in several ways fairly special, in part because
the USA enjoys a primus inter pares status, in part because more than a hand-
ful EU member states are not NATO members. This makes a common EU
position somewhat awkward but a caucus of EU member states that are also
members of NATO could be seen as a precondition for EU strategic action
in the field of defence. Neither the end of the Cold War, nor the dissolution
of the Soviet Union has changed this. EU member states seem to enjoy the
luxury of resisting both enhanced coordination and a change to supervised
delegation (Varwick and Koops, 2009).
Paradoxically, a high degree of outreach does not necessarily require
a high degree of coordination but then we are beyond the confines of
common outreach. Perhaps the proceedings at the Rome Conference,
creating the ICC, constitute the prime example of this counter intuitive
combination. Without prior coordination, EU member states simply hap-
pened to agree on the basic principles of what is now known as the ICC.
Subsequently, acknowledging this accidental consensus, support of the
ICC became an aspect of the EU’s international identity and coordination
efforts were enhanced. The European position changed from accidental to
precious, especially when the EU came under attack from abroad, the Bush
Administration not least (Groenleer and Rijks, 2009; Groenleer and van
Schaik, 2005).
A differentiated approach
Despite belonging to the same category, international organisations are

not like units. They have highly different governance structures and mem-
berships. This pronounced diversity explains why one size does not fit all
international organisations and why the EEAS faces a challenge in terms of
figuring out the suitable approach to individual multilateral institutions. In
concrete terms, the EU might be able to optimise impact in the WTO, while
impact in the FAO might require a different approach.
Moreover, multilateral institutions have (primarily) states as members and

therefore need these states to engage in some political gardening to keep
the institutions on track and on mission. Hence, the foreign policy of states
requires a multilateral dimension. Multilateral foreign policy strategies
prioritise the promotion of and commitment to international institutions,
including the resources it takes to cultivate multilateral institutions. The
USA opted for this strategy after the end of WWII and also immediately after
the end of the Cold War. At other times, the commitment to multilateral

institutions has been more ambivalent (Patrick and Forman, 2002).
One of the stated strategic objectives of European foreign policy is to
promote effective multilateralism. Whereas (other) great powers have been
more reluctant or simply incapable of shaping the multilateral system or its
individual institutions – Russia, China, India and Japan have had a modest
impact on the system – middle powers such as Canada and the Nordic states
have traditionally been keen supporters of multilateralism. Given that the
future of the multilateral system partly depends on an increased sense of
ownership among emerging powers, it will be a huge task for the European
Union and its allies to persuade emerging powers to multilateral commit-
ments (concerning the USA, see Patrick, 2010).
Reforming international institutions
Given the EU’s (2003, 2008) declared foreign policy objective of ‘effective
multilateralism’, the EEAS is bound to engage in reforming multilateral
institutions. Most international institutions are creations of the 20th
century and therefore not necessarily suitable for the challenges of the
twenty-first century. Several of the important multilateral institutions were
created during the Cold War and, as the world has subsequently changed,
they are in severe need of more or less comprehensive reform. Anne-Marie
Slaughter and John Ikenberry put it rather brutally, ‘The system of inter-
national institutions that the United States and its allies built after World
War II and steadily expanded over the course of the Cold War is broken’
(Ikenberry and Slaughter 2006: 7). Moreover, international institutions are
characterised by an ever more present negative trade-off between inclusion,
legitimacy and effectiveness. As the number of participant state members
increases, so does the number of veto-players. At the same time, there is
an increasing imbalance between the provision of leadership, which is
fatally lacking, and an ever broader portfolio of global demands and tasks
to handle. It does not help that several key states pay lip service to their
obligations towards international institutions or act as custodians insisting
on yesterday’s arrangements. In short, multilateral institutions are charac-
terised by an ever wider expectation-political investment gap triggering, in
turn, frustration, apathy or cynicism concerning the absence of expected
deliverables.
Examples of this crisis abound, ranging from the stalled UN reform

process, via the dire straits of the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime to the
deadlocked WTO Doha-round and the neverending COP-n process. It is
clear that the crisis requires some exquisite intellectual innovative thinking,
strong political leadership and a dash of pure luck to flesh out sustainable
solutions. The contemporary crisis of multilateralism appears to be more
profound than previous crises and it seems to have several sources. This is
acknowledged by senior observers such as Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent

Scowcroft (Brzezinski and Ignatius 2008). A number of templates for reform
could serve as a source of inspiration. In the Princeton Project, Anne-Marie
Slaughter and John Ikenberry (2006) outline a hugely ambitious plan to
reform and partly refound existing international institutions in order to
make them suitable for contemporary and future tasks.
The need for reform is potentially good news for the EU because if the
Union genuinely aims at an enhanced representation in these organisa-
tions, it appears to be easier to achieve when the institutions are bound to
change.3 Yet it is also bad news, in part because international organisations
are notoriously difficult to reform, in part because other players might prefer
to change the international institutions in directions that are more or less
incompatible with the present international liberal order. Hence, European
policy-makers face difficult dilemmas.
One option would be a long march through international institutional
reform, a march characterised by numerous veto players and a limited
record of successful reforms. In this context, the challenge of setting the
acceptance bar has proven to be an important issue. Two examples suffice to
illustrate the point. Given that the EU templates for the HRC were rejected
by a majority of UN member states, the EU settled for the second or third
best, that is the achievable solution. Third, having in the European Security
Strategy listed support of the UN among top foreign policy objectives, it is
only natural for the EU to try to become involved in UNSC reform, yet it was
quickly realised that many obstacles were in the way for the EU to take such
a role. When it comes to human rights institutions, it was in international
society increasingly acknowledged that the CHR was out of touch with a
range of stakeholders (Alston, 2006). In the context of wider UN reform, a
substitute institution was therefore sought after. While the EU started out
as a dispersed Union, the EU engaged increasingly in this aspect of institu-
tional reform and was successful in terms of actually being a co-founder of
a new institution yet largely unsuccessful in terms of getting EU positions
adopted. It remains to be seen whether the HRC will be an effective multilat-
eral institution in terms of promoting human rights. The case of reforming
FAO also shows that the EU at times is ready to settle for less than the full
portfolio of EU preferences.
A second option would be to initiate new international institutions in
which the EU is represented as the union prefers to be represented. There are
some examples of the EU being engaged in shaping institutionalisation and/

or institutional reform. The institutionalisation of the GATT becoming the
WTO and the CSCE becoming OSCE are two examples. Also the more recent
creation of the UN Peace Building Commission can be seen as an example as
can the recent emergence of G20. The examples show that this option is not
necessarily wishful thinking. On the other hand, the EU has not been deeply
engaged in ongoing attempts to reform the international financial institu-
tions (the IMF and the World Bank), the prime defence organisation in Europe

(NATO), or the backbone of international non-proliferation policy (NPT).
Hence, the EU’s impact on these larger or smaller reforms has been marginal.
Improving EU performance: effective multilateralism abroad

and at home
The EU’s objective of ‘effective multilateralism’ concerns the functioning

of international institutions, yet the objective can be turned upside down.
It can, thus, become an objective concerning the EU’s own performance in
international organisations – effective multilateralism at home. If the EEAS
opts for engagement in such a task, it might find some inspiration in stud-
ies of organisational performance, specifically the four main elements that
constitute performance.
In order to improve effectiveness, that is, the degree to which stated objec-
tives are achieved, the EEAS would need to spend some time on clarifying
what exactly the EU’s objectives are. As a recent publication asks, ‘what do
Europeans want from NATO?’ (Biscop et al., 2010). In fact, such a funda-
mental question is most relevant for all international institutions in which
the EU aims at playing a role. Somewhat surprisingly, analysts often have a
hard time simply identifying the EU’s objectives. Obviously, a much more
important reason to explicitly state European objectives (than satisfying
the needs of analysts) is that it would leave no doubt among third-states or
European public audiences about the means and ends in European multi-
lateral diplomacy.
Efficiency concerns the costs, relative to other organisations, of achieving
stated objectives. While the EEAS itself might be run in a cost-efficient
manner, European diplomacy at large remains the probably most expensive
diplomatic service in the world, employing more than twice the number of
American diplomats. Up to 28 diplomatic services operate simultaneously,
running almost 3,000 embassies, yet at times out of sync or working in
different directions. Without encroaching on national priorities, the EEAS
might consider ways to change the European tradition for relatively low
levels of cost efficiency. In times of severe budget constraints, ministries
of finance might even push in the direction of more functional and cost-
efficient arrangements. Unfortunately the issue of member states’ perspec-
tives on the low-cost efficiency is severely under-researched.
The relevance of the EEAS, perceived by key stakeholders such as EU

member states, should not be taken for granted. While all member states
have ratified the Lisbon Treaty, some governments (for example the British
Conservative-Liberal government) have a hard time understanding (or
accepting) the implications of what member states, including Great Britain
have ratified. Moreover, several (though not all) governments have been
fairly vocal in their criticism of the way in which the EEAS has been func-
tioning. These key stakeholders are increasingly squeezed between effi-

ciency and symbolic politics, that is, the power, pride and prestige of being
represented in international organisations. Minor EU member states tend
to cherish membership because it contributes to their stateness but they
acknowledge that they do not have much to contribute for which reason
minor states only have very few diplomats at the institutions. Larger and
medium-sized EU member states both enjoy the symbolic power, pride and
prestige but are also capable of employing capabilities of significance. Two
European seats less at the IMF board, too many European members of the
G20, generally over-represented and underperforming. In international
media, such headlines pop up more and more frequently, implying that the
current double representation might become a feature of the past. Other
stakeholders wish the EEAS success, provided it delivers according to the
objectives of their wishlist (Gavas and Maxwell, 2010).
Concerning financial viability, the challenge for the EEAS is to secure a suit-
able balance between tasks given and the provision of financial resources. If
the current Zeitgeist is pleading for both downsizing budgets and increasing
global aspirations, it is quite predictable that a gap will emerge between sup-
ply and demand and financial viability would be at risk.
Welcoming a politics of European multilateral diplomacy
The EEAS, being an instrument of the EU’s High Representative, faces the
challenge of finding suitable sponsors for its policies. Any European foreign
policy, worthy of the name, will be determined by the outcome of the poli-
tics of European foreign policy, that is, societal groupings cultivating their
specific and often contending ideas about means and ends of foreign policy.
These groupings comprise political parties, NGOs, media and commercial
interests (consider European shipping companies having a direct interest
in operation Atlanta (Riddervold, 2011). NGOs working on development
issues are illustrative of this dynamic. They might at times be highly critical
of European development policy and programmes but might be turned into
one of the push-factors of policy-making within the field.
The politics of European multilateral diplomacy will not be without prob-
lems, especially because not all political forces are friends of multilateral
diplomacy. Ole Holsti and James Rosenau (1990) make a useful distinction
Cooperative Internationalism
Support Oppose
Support Internationalists Hard-liners
Internationalism
Militant

Oppose Accomodationists Isolationists
Figure 3.1 Elite attitudes to foreign policy

Source: Based on Ole R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau (1990).
between different elite attitudes towards foreign policy. Though their con-
ceptualisation has been developed to analyse American foreign policy, it
seems highly applicable to the European political landscape (see Figure 3.1).
The figure demonstrates that only two out of four categories of elite atti-
tudes favour multilateral action, the difference between them being deter-
mined by attitudes towards the employment of military means – an issue
not unfamiliar in European politics. Hence, the cultivation of multilateral
diplomacy by EEAS diplomats is likely to be appreciated by ‘internationalists’
and ‘accomodationists’, yet bound to be strongly criticised by ‘hardliners’ and
‘isolationists’.4 The EEAS and the making of European foreign policy generally
represent, though unevenly, such foreign policy traditions.
According to the latter two foreign policy traditions, multilateral approaches
are synonymous with inaction, unwarranted constraints on national foreign
policy or in the worst cases both at the time. Hence, it would be irresponsi-
ble to leave decisions concerning crucial issues to multilateral institutions.
If states (or other players) nevertheless opt for multilateralism, they should
use multilateral institutions instrumentally thereby letting multilateral agree-
ments function as window-dressing. Powerful players should not constrain
themselves by means of being embedded in a web of rules and obligations.
A third argument, often applied by opponents of European integration, is
that small states should not give up the formal and symbolic dimensions of
independence or autonomous decision-making power.
Trans-national actors (TNAs) play an increasingly significant role in the
contemporary multilateral system. TNAs frequently contribute to agenda
setting, sometimes provide intellectual leadership; they push for some inter-
national agreements and campaign against other agreements. Prominent
examples include the creation of the International Criminal Court and the
international treaty banning landmines, both initiatives being sponsored
by the European Union and NGOs working in the field of human rights
(Groenleer and Rijks, 2009; Long, 2002). The enduring significance of TNAs
remains an empirical question, yet it is beyond discussion that they increas-
ingly contribute to the politics of multilateralism, despite not being formal

members of the organisations.
If the EEAS develops without such interfaces to the politics of European
foreign policy, it is likely it will become a bureaucratic-diplomatic institu-
tion of limited consequence.
The domestic dimension of multilateral diplomacy
Studies of American policy towards multilateral institutions conclude rather

consistently that domestic politics is the single most important factor when
explaining the dynamics of American multilateral diplomacy (Karns and
Mingst, 1990; Ruggie, 1993). While such conclusions might not apply to
the European case, the domestic dimension of multilateral diplomacy rep-
resents in any case a challenge because domestic actors often have vested
interests in the outcome of multilateral diplomacy, either pleading in favour
of certain solutions or perhaps fearing the worst and therefore pleading for
protection. The EEAS will frequently find itself in two-level games of nego-
tiation, addressing both domestic audiences and international negotiation
partners.
We can therefore ask when European diplomats try to protect European
constituencies from the effects of international agreements and when they
aim at projecting European solutions to global problems. Concerning envi-
ronmental standards, European values, human rights and governance mod-
els, projection seems to be the predominant answer. Most of these areas are
characterised by vocal and/or influential special interest groups who have
played a more or less significant role in taking policy-making international.
In general, when there is a domestic dimension to multilateral diplomacy,
the nature of the diplomatic game changes. It becomes a two- or three-
level game each characterised by specific constraints and opportunities
(Patterson, 1997; Putnam, 1988).
This leads us to a second major aspect of the domestic dimension to
multilateral diplomacy, namely the domestic dimension providing the
opportunity of structural leadership in multilateral diplomacy. A few exam-
ples suffice to illustrate the argument. First, the effectiveness of the NPT
and associated export control regimes clearly hinges on compliance (van
Ham, 2011; Vestergaard and Kienzle, 2013). Hence, it makes a difference for
the EU that implementation of commitments and obligations are handled
swiftly throughout the EU by means of directives. Second, though outside

the EEAS fields of responsibility, CAP reforms since the early 1990s are fre-
quently explained by the fact that each domestic reform strengthened the
EU’s negotiation position in the context of first GATT and subsequently
WTO negotiations (Garzon, 2006; Swinbank and Daugbjerg, 2006).
Leadership and negotiation style

We might expect that the EU is best at grey committee work behind closed
doors and, thus, outside the spotlight of international media, focusing on
spectacular breaking news. However, the world of multilateral institutions is
generally, perhaps contrary to expectations, far from an ideal environment
for the EU, the prime reason being that classical multilateral diplomacy is
strongly state-centric, invites to frequent tactical manoeuvring and requires
profound coordination among EU member states. After all, international
governmental organisations have been created by states and predominantly
have states as members, whereas international regimes have states as con-
tracting parties, the latter being therefore also key interpreters of agreements
and contracts.
In order to differentiate among different kinds of negotiations styles, it is
helpful to use the distinction between a supervised delegation model and a
coordination model again, this time paired with a distinction between reac-
tive and proactive diplomacy.
EU environmental diplomacy was for a long time characterised by reac-
tive, coordinated policy-making (Groen and Oberthür, 2013). The European
Commission was preoccupied with gaining both internal and external
recognition, and the EC foremost responded to environmental challenges.
A similar process from reactive to proactive characterises the trade policy
field, in which the EC was a formidable reactive player for years, actually
during most of the GATT’s existence (Grieco, 1990). With the creation of the
WTO, this style changed profoundly. Whereas the use of the supervised del-
egation model has remained a constant, the EU in the first place contributed
to the institutional design of the WTO, in which the European Commission
is a member in its own right (Mortensen, 2009). The EU became a perfect
match to the second trade superpower, the USA. Furthermore, the EU has
gone proactive in the sense of trying to set the agenda; even with some
success as the Doha Round enterprise is partly based on EU templates for
a world trade agreement. Yet, the EU has also experienced that putting the
Singapore issues on the agenda has provoked quite some opposition and
were taken off the agenda. This process suggests that the aspiring world
trade leader somehow lacks followers, perhaps because the EU’s market
power has been shrinking relatively (Damro, 2012; Woolcock, 2013). Finally,
one can also argue that the EU’s development policy has changed from a
reactive to a proactive mode. The row of Lomé Conventions signals strong
path dependencies, whereas the Cotonou agreements signal discontinuity

and a new start of a long-time relationship with developing countries.
Perhaps the novel enterprise of negotiating EPAs first and foremost demon-
strates that shows of force may backfire (Elgström, 2007). Put differently, the
assignment of trade negotiations to DG Trade resulted in highly asym-
metrical negotiations, in which DG Trade diplomats played the hard-ball
politics they are used to from negotiations with the USA, China and other
world traders. Diplomats from ACP countries were less than a perfect match

and after some time they went into a ‘resist by all means’ approach. The
fact that the UK intervened in the process by publically and effectively
‘unsigning’ the mandate to EU negotiators, contributes to the messy EPA
process (Jørgensen, 2009). In the context of EPAs, it is also significant that
the previous agreements with ACP countries were reached by means of big-
N multilateral fora, whereas the EPAs are characterised by negotiations in
rather small-N fora.
Reactive diplomacy based on a coordination mode of governance charac-
terises negotiation styles in a wide set of policy fields. IMF macroeconom-
ics is representative in the sense that EU member states primarily respond
to initiatives coming from other corners of the world. To the degree they
try to coordinate positions, this coordination is effectively blocked by the
governance structure of the IMF according to which EU member states
belong to several different constituencies in which they sometimes are in
a minority position (Bini-Smaghi, 2009). In contrast to the field of inter-
national finance, the EU coordinates intensively prior to the NPT Review
Conferences. Before the 2005 NPT Review Conference the EU managed to
formulate a consensus position and given the EUs own configuration of
both Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and non-NWS, the consensus agree-
ment had a fair chance to be adopted as the conference conclusion (Müller,
2005). However, despite the common position and the time and manpower
consuming activities it took to hammer out the EU’s Common Position, the
two European NWS – France and Great Britain – abandoned the common
position and started pleading for rolling back previous NPT achievements,
especially previously agreed commitments to disarmament.
Finally, we can turn to a proactive style based on coordination. Despite
being characterised by some variation, diplomacy in UNGA Committees
displays some of the coordination dynamics. In many ways, the degree of
prior coordination is impressive concerning its effectiveness and degree
of consistency. The high percentage of consensus voting by EU member
states raises some serious doubt about one of the default explanations of
EU foreign policy-making: ‘due to different national interests …’, or, ‘due
to different historical traditions …’. The doubt concerns some of the stand-
ard general explanatory factors that are employed in research on European
foreign policy. Variation might well exist across policy fields and moreover,
the consensus achieved might not be more than a thin layer of consensus
that is not of much significance. In the HRC, the EU is actually speaking
with one voice, yet finding itself in a minority position and, therefore,
unable to persuade most ‘swing states’ to subscribe to EU positions (Smith,
2006; 2010). Hence, in this case the intuitively strong explanation of
limited influence – internal disagreement among EU member states – is
irrelevant. The rather common analytical practice of considering lack of
consensus a default mode explanation is in this case less than helpful.

The existing literature on the topic does not allow us to conclude whether
the EU’s diplomatic skills in entrepreneurial leadership have been fully
exploited, that is the degree to which the EU has tried to form alliances
and sought alignment with like-minded countries. It is similarly difficult
to know if the option of issue-linkage has been explored. In summary, the
prime downside of thorough coordination seems to be that European dip-
lomats spend so much time on internal coordination that they have limited
time to interact with third-party states, seek alignments, engage in persua-
sion or explore potential issue linkages. Finally, the cumbersome process
of common interest-formation makes the EU a fairly inflexible negotiator.
Abandoning multilateralism as political ideology
The EU, being built on a profound multilateral edifice, is somehow bound to

cherish multilateralism. The ‘multilateralism-as-an-end-in-itself’ discourse
has been widespread within the EU and to some degree still is. For some,
multilateralism serves as an ideology according to which the qualities of
multilateral institutions are a matter of belief or faith and, thus, beyond
debate and critical examination. Multilateral institutions are seen as morally
superior to other foreign policy strategies (Richardson, 2002). Furthermore,
multilateralism is seen as an end in itself for which reason the instrumental
dimension is systematically downplayed. Being multilateral is what counts
and even if nothing can be achieved, it remains imperative to keep the mul-
tilateral machinery in place. In some understandings, multilateralism and
the UN are synonymous. Still others conceive of multilateralism, character-
ised by inclusion, participation and legitimacy, as a kind of supra-national
democracy (Cox, 1992). Due to its global membership, only the UN is
considered a genuine example of multilateralism. Interestingly, the authors
of the European Commission’s annual reports seem to take this stance
(European Commission, annual general report) and these authors might
now find themselves in the EEAS. The positive version has also been called
globalism and adherents argue that global agreements should be prioritised
even if the number of veto players implies almost a guarantee that no agree-
ment is the likely outcome. The alternative, in terms of an agreement con-
cluded by the, say, 14 most important states for (for example) global climate,
is dismissed and accompanied by grave concerns about legitimacy. Similarly,

plurilateral agreements are also dismissed because they are by their nature
essentially exclusive.
Conclusion and perspectives
Leaving formal legal-institutional issues behind, this chapter has focused

on some of the important politico-diplomatic challenges the EEAS is facing.

While legal-institutional issues are important, it does not follow that other
issues are unimportant. Some of the political challenges identified are
homegrown, for example, overcoming the ideological approach to multi-
lateralism and the use of bilateral and unilateral strategies for multilateral
ends, whereas others are genuine international issues (such as the reform of
multilateral institutions). Many multilateral institutions were born during
the Cold War bipolarity; yet seem to have to grow up under conditions of
either unipolarity or multipolarity.
It is also clear from the review above that the political challenges the EEAS
are facing are as wideranging as one might suspect when dealing with a
global player. They span the entire politico-military-diplomatic field, essen-
tially everything between non-proliferation, crises management and the
promotion of human rights.
Moreover, the challenges cover a wider horizon than many diplomats
from smaller member states are used to. Hence, existing priorities will neces-
sarily have to be reconsidered and cultures of concern and engagements will
be merged or trigger contending perspectives.
Finally, it is a promising and refreshing sign that the EEAS – differently
from the CFSP and the ESDP/CSDP – is not called a policy. It is called an
external action service or, in generic terms, an institution.
Notes
1. The former DG Development has been split into two parts, one of which has been
subsumed by the EEAS.
2. This was clearly demonstrated in a negative fashion during the first phase of the
EU’s diplomatic campaign aimed at upgrading the EU’s status within the UN (see
Fernando Guimaraes’ chapter in this volume).
3. What is suggested here is a tendency, not a law-like phenomenon. While the role
of the EU in creating the UN Peacebulding Commission provides evidence in
support of the hypothesis, the case of the creation of the Human Rights Council
points in a different direction. In order to arrive at more conclusive findings, more
research is required.
4. Following Holsti and Rosenau’s terminology, isolationists do not support nei-
ther military nor cooperative internationalism. Eric A. Nordlinger elaborates
on the topic in Isolationism Reconfigured. American Foreign Policy for a New
Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1996). Contemporary European
representatives of this school of thought include especially nationalist and popu-

list political currents but research on the topic is fairly limited.
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4
Evaluating the Impact of EU
Diplomacy: Pitfalls and Challenges
Yvonne Kleistra and Niels van Willigen

Introduction
The art and science of policy evaluation has a longstanding tradition in

the context of national public policy.1 This is less the case with diplomacy
evaluation in the EU. As far as its external relations are concerned, the EU
has some experience with assessing the impact of its more tangible activi-
ties in the fields of trade, development cooperation and humanitarian aid
policies. However, for foreign policy analysts, evaluation scientists and
practitioners, the assessment of EU diplomacy constitutes relatively new
territory. Here the key question is: which road should be taken? Do state-
based evaluation approaches and the existing evaluation practice in other
domains of EU policy provide a sufficient basis? Or do the hybrid nature
of the EU (being neither a state nor an international organisation, but
something in between) and the alleged unique features of EU diplomacy
require the development of new and tailor-made evaluation approaches? In
this chapter, we try to answer these questions by exploring the pitfalls and
challenges of evaluating EU diplomacy. The starting point of our analysis
is the new institutional framework that was introduced in the Lisbon
Treaty in 2009. At the same time, we emphasise that it would be wrong
to assume that the Lisbon Treaty completely defines how the EU operates.
Organisations amount to more than their formal structures and are heavily
influenced by all kinds of informal processes (Meyer and Rowan, 1991).
In the first section, we argue that evaluating the impact of EU diplomacy
goes beyond measuring effectiveness and performance. Impact measurement
is more than just establishing the extent to which the EU reaches its foreign
policy objectives (effectiveness) and whether this is done in an efficient, rele-
vant and financially viable way (performance). Measuring impact starts with
performance measurement, but goes one step further by posing the question
of to what extent the performance of EU diplomats influences the outside
world. Secondly, we argue that diplomacy should not be seen as merely
an instrumental activity aimed at implementing foreign policy decisions.
52
Evaluating the Impact of EU Diplomacy 53
Instead, foreign policy decision-making should be part of the evaluation of

the impact of EU diplomacy. Thirdly, we explore the challenges and pitfalls
of evaluation as a result of the variety of actors at the helm of European
foreign policy-making. We argue that the heterogeneous nature of the EU’s
foreign policy architecture calls for an evaluation design that considers the
diplomatic undertakings of single diplomatic actors alongside the EU on an
aggregate level. In that sense, we make a case for opening up the ‘black box’
of the EU and examining the specific diplomatic actors, their competences

and negotiating mandates. Fourthly, we argue that the EU’s diplomacy is sub-
jected to complex causality. We explain that the challenge is to evaluate EU
diplomacy in such a way that the complexity of foreign policy issues and the
dynamics of EU foreign policy-making and implementation are taken into
account. Fifthly, we claim that different policy areas, different diplomatic
activities and different diplomatic settings need to be distinguished when one
evaluates the impact of EU diplomacy. Finally, we wrap up our summary of the
main pitfalls and challenges, and formulate an answer to the question of to
what extent the evaluation of EU diplomacy demands different strategies as
compared to the evaluation of state-based diplomacy.
Measuring impact
The EU has a special position in the international arena. It is not merely

a collection of states that uses the EU as a vehicle to voice and reinforce
national views on regional and international issues. The EU also acts on
the international stage as a group of states with shared experiences that are
committed to several common foreign policy goals. One of the reasons that
an EU foreign policy exists at all is that most European states share com-
mon, broadly defined foreign policy goals or values such as the promotion
of human rights, international cooperation (‘effective multilateralism’),
non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, political and military sta-
bility in the neighbourhood and energy security. The existence, expansion
and promotion of common foreign policy goals have led to several con-
ceptualisations of the EU as a collective actor, despite the often substantial
differences that lie behind the common goals. In the 1970s, the European
Community (EC) was characterised as a ‘civilian power’ as opposed to a
military power. The EC was thought to have a collective preference for
cooperation and civilian foreign policy tools (Duchêne, 1972). Thirty years
later, the debate was reinvigorated with the slightly different qualification
of the EU as a ‘normative power’ (Manners, 2002). The idea of ‘normative
power Europe’ has been criticised by pointing to alternative conceptualisa-
tions of the EU as a collective foreign policy actor. For example, instead of
a normative power, the EU could be seen as a hegemonic power imposing
its norms on countries in the neighbourhood (Bicchi, 2006; Hyde-Price,
2006). In turn, this perspective is challenged by the concept of the EU as
54 Yvonne Kleistra and Niels van Willigen
a ‘transformative power’ wherein the key political process is that of a con-

tinuous engagement with other states within the EU, a kind of ‘Eurosphere’,
whereby candidate member states participate in the process long before
admission and are transformed as a result (Leonard, 2005: 7–9).
Whether a civilian, normative, hegemonic or transformative power, it
is clear that the EU is increasingly seen as a collective actor of some sort.
Although the notion of actorness is perhaps most appropriate in traditional
areas of EU policy-making such as agriculture and trade, recognising its col-

lective actorness in other areas such as international security has become
increasingly relevant. It is, therefore, perhaps more important to focus on
actorness as such, rather than on determining what kind of actor the EU is
exactly (Smith, 2005). So, both the notion of collective actorness and the
existence of broadly defined foreign policy objectives give rise to the need
to evaluate the EU as a separate, independent and recognisable actor in
international politics.
In doing so, the first pitfall for foreign policy evaluators is not distinguishing
clearly between measuring effectiveness, performance and impact. First, effec-
tiveness refers to goal achievement ‘without reference to the underlying capac-
ity of the entity, the impact of complicating constraints, or the manner by
which outcomes are achieved’ (Gutner and Thompson, 2013: 58). Second, per-
formance measurement includes effectiveness, but also takes ‘the underlying
capacity’ of the organisation into account. Jørgensen (2013) offers a framework
for analysing the performance of the EU. Building on the work of Lusthaus
et al. (2005) Jørgensen argues that performance measurement encompasses
four performance indicators, including effectiveness, relevance, efficiency and
financial viability. Based on this, we argue that good (diplomatic) performance
by the EU means that the organisation achieves its goals (effectiveness), meets
the needs and has the support of the principal stakeholders (relevance), has an
acceptable cost-benefit ratio (efficiency) and has the necessary funding to carry
out its tasks (financial viability). Third, impact measurement goes beyond per-
formance measurement in the sense that it poses the question of whether or
not performance has had an effect on the issue at hand. As we shall point out
below, impact is more about ‘effects’ than ‘effectiveness’.
Before we delve into the issue of impact measurement, it is necessary to
point out that in evaluation language, a distinction is made between input,
output, outcome and impact. Input refers to the human, material and/or
financial resources used to achieve a policy goal, output to the ‘products’
of policy-making, that is concrete policies, and outcome to the effect(s) of
the policy outputs (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). Confusingly, impact
also refers to the effects of policy outputs. Therefore, in the evaluation
literature as well as in evaluation practice, impact is often treated as being
synonymous with outcome. Nonetheless, outcome is generally defined as
the short-term or medium-term effects of a policy, whereas impact refers
mostly to the long-term effects or the ‘final level of the causal chain’
(White, 2010: 154). The challenge of outcome and impact measurement is

to attribute concrete policy interventions to outcomes and impacts. These
kinds of measurements lead to a more specific definition of impact, that
is: ‘the difference in the indicator of interest (Y) with the intervention (Y1)
and without the intervention (Y0)’ (White, 2010: 154).
Arguably, intervention outcome and impact evaluations, in which the
evaluator aims to find out whether a concrete policy led to changes, are
the most difficult kind of evaluations there are (Bjurulf et al., 2013: 56).

That being said there is a variety of approaches and methods that could be
used for carrying out this kind of evaluation. One approach is attribution
analysis, which uses quantitative methods to attribute ‘observed changes
to the intervention being studied’ (White, 2010: 159). Another approach
is contribution analysis, which is ‘based on the existence of, or more usu-
ally, the development of a postulated theory of change for the intervention
being examined’ (Mayne, 2012: 271). It uses qualitative methods and has
been applied ‘in the context of EU policies in the areas of development aid,
agriculture, employment, and governance’ among others (Delehais and
Toulemond, 2012: 281).
Making a distinction between input, output, outcome and impact is useful
for evaluating EU diplomacy too. Table 4.1 illustrates how this can be done
using the example of evaluating the impact of the EU’s non-proliferation
policy. An evaluator would start by identifying the general foreign policy
goal (provided there is one; see below), followed by more specific foreign
Table 4.1 Evaluating the impact of the EU’s non-proliferation policy
Foreign policy goals
General foreign policy goal ‘To prevent, deter, halt and, where possible, eliminate
programmes for the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and missiles’ (European Union,
2003)
Specific foreign policy goals Specific policy goals such as strengthening the
Organization on the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW) or the Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC)
Foreign policy input Financial, material and human resources that are used
to reach the foreign policy goals
Foreign policy output Specific policies such as joint actions to support the
OPCW and BWC
Foreign policy outcome The short- and medium-term effects of these specific
policies: the extent to which they strengthened the
OPCW and BWC
Foreign policy impact The long-term effects of specific policies; the extent
to which they prevented, halted and eliminated
programmes for the proliferation of WMD
policy goals. This would be followed by the input, output, outcome and
impact analysis.
As we will explain below in more detail, impact evaluation raises some
serious methodological problems, which are related to complex causality.
Most important here is the observation that intervention impact evaluation
is built on the premise of a homogenous actor formulating concrete goals
and travelling a straight road in order to reach those goals. In this chapter,
we take the view that the EU as a homogenous diplomatic actor does not

exist, but rather that the EU consists of different diplomatic actors striv-
ing (but not always succeeding) to be consistent and coherent. In short,
evaluating the diplomatic impact of the EU is difficult. This is not to say
that measuring impact is by definition ‘elusive and unreachable, too long-
term or impossible to assess’ (Chigas and Woodrow, 2008: 19). Nonetheless,
as we argue below, measuring impact involves some challenges regarding
the nature of EU diplomacy, the heterogeneity of EU actorness, causal
complexity and the differences between diplomatic settings, activities and
policy areas.
EU diplomacy as a multilevel process
The second pitfall when evaluating the impact of EU diplomacy is account-

ing for diplomacy at a largely instrumental level. Narrowly defined, diplo-
macy is ‘an instrument, a method, a technique’ to execute foreign policies
(Carta, 2013: 41). According to this narrow understanding, diplomacy
‘consists of communication between officials designed to promote foreign
policy either by formal agreement or tacit adjustment’ (our emphasis,
Berridge, 2010: 1). The instrumental understanding implies that diplomacy
is mainly about foreign policy implementation and not so much about
foreign policy making (Smith et al., 2008). This could be a reason to make
a distinction between diplomatic studies (focusing on interactions between
foreign policy actors) and foreign policy analysis (focusing on particular
foreign policy actors) (Pigman, 2013: 73). However, as argued below, for-
eign policy analysis should be included when evaluating the impact of EU
diplomacy. EU diplomacy should be perceived as a multilevel process, in
which the decision-making, bargaining, negotiating – and perhaps wheeling
and dealing – of politicians, diplomats and other actors is connected to the
implementation of projects, programmes, resolutions, démarches, joint dec-
larations and so on.
A pitfall for evaluators who assess the impact of EU diplomacy is to
ignore the foreign policy decision-making dimension and overemphasise
the instrumental dimension. Here the underlying disciplinary differences
between policy-making analysts and policy evaluators come to the surface.
Traditionally, the main interest of public policy analysts has been on the dif-
ferent stages of the policy cycle, including decision-making, as a subject of
scholarly investigation (Birkland, 2011; Dunn, 2008; Howlett et al., 2009).

These analysts spend their time and energy on laying bare the content and
meaning of the decision-making process, as such. Policy evaluation almost
always involves bureaucrats and politicians within the government, dealing
with the process of finding out about the policy in question, the means
being employed and the objectives being served (Howlett and Ramesh,
1995: 168). The emphasis of policy evaluators is usually on results, that is,
the outputs, outcomes and impact of the decision-making process rather

than the decision-making process as such (Fitzpatrick et al., 2010; Weiss,
1998). This focus is understandable. In national settings, the requirements
of public accountability in the era of New Public Management ensure that
the focus of policy evaluators is targeted almost exclusively on the tangible
outputs of the foreign policy process (Abma and Noordegraaf, 2003: 285;
Osborne and Gaebler, 1992).
How obvious the reasons for this assessment tendency may be, evaluators
that embark on the treacherous terrain of foreign policy assessment need to
realise that merely concentrating on foreign policy implementation can lead
to drawing erroneous conclusions. This is especially true for EU diplomacy
which is a shelter for a concert of political opinions and positions from a
variety of EU institutions and national capitals rather than a comprehensive
strategy originating from the drawing boards of a single foreign policy actor
(Leonard, 2005). Even if there seems to be a common policy, it might be the
case that during negotiations, the preferences of single member states ‘spoil’
the diplomatic process. It has, for example, been argued that this was the
case during the climate negotiations in Copenhagen in 2010 (Groen and
Niemann, 2012).
Consequently, both the decision-making and the implementation phases
are prone to internal political conflicts between the major foreign policy
actors; whether they are member states or EU institutions. In practice that
means that all foreign policy actors need to be taken into account and not
only the implementing institutions. A study that evaluates the performance
of the EEAS, therefore, does not necessarily shed light on the impact of the
EU. Thus, rather than taking into account either foreign policy decision-
making or foreign policy implementation, it is necessary to take both stages
of the policy cycle into account when evaluating EU diplomacy. In short,
someone evaluating the impact of EU diplomacy needs to be both a policy-
making analyst as well as a policy evaluator.
The EU as a heterogeneous diplomatic actor
A third pitfall is to see the EU after Lisbon as a homogenous diplomatic

actor. One might be tempted do so because of the several changes that
the Lisbon treaty brought about. The new legal personality of the EU, the
establishment of the President of the European Council, the EEAS and
the High Representative might strengthen the EU as a diplomatic actor on

an aggregate level, but do not change the heterogeneous nature of EU diplo-
macy. Lisbon streamlined the European foreign policy architecture, but did
not homogenise it. Arguably, the Lisbon Treaty facilitates the creation of a
coherent and consistent foreign policy, but it is still be the product of the
coordinated and negotiated positions of many different actors.
Heterogeneity is defined by the diversity of actors involved in foreign
policy-making and by the competing foreign policy interests and priorities

of these actors. First of all, the Lisbon Treaty makes several actors respon-
sible for making and implementing EU foreign policy. The first actor to
be mentioned is the European Council, which as a decision-making body,
identifies the strategic interests and objectives of the EU. Its decisions ‘shall
relate to the common foreign and security policy and to other areas of the
external action of the Union’ (European Union: Article 22). The second
decision-making body is the Foreign Affairs Council, which, ‘elaborates the
Union’s external action on the basis of strategic guidelines laid down by the
European Council’ (European Union, 2007: Article 16).
These two institutions are chaired by the President of the European
Council and the High Representative respectively. The President of the
European Council replaced the rotating presidency of the European Council
and is tasked to ‘chair it and drive forward its work’ as well as to ‘facilitate
cohesion and consensus’ within the European Council (European Union,
2007: Article 15). This latter task makes him a separate actor from the
European Council and the vagueness of the President’s mandate leaves
ample room for manoeuvre and autonomous action (Missiroli, 2010). The
President indirectly co-decides the strategic interests and objectives of the EU
through its facilitating role, and thus has an independent influence on
European Council decisions. Moreover, the President of the European
Council represents the EU externally ‘on issues concerning its common
foreign and security policy’ (European Union, 2007: Article 15). The High
Representative chairs the Foreign Affairs Council and conducts the ‘Union’s
common foreign and security policy’ (European Union, 2007: Article 18).
The High Representative is responsible for the EEAS, which, in turn, assists
the High Representative to fulfil its mandate.
The High Representative is also one of the Vice Presidents of the European
Commission. Traditionally the European Commission has played a large
role in foreign affairs, particularly concerning topics such as trade, enlarge-
ment, development and humanitarian aid. Regarding the current role of
the European Commission, the Lisbon Treaty states: ‘With the exception
of the common foreign and security policy, and other cases provided for in
the Treaties, [the European Commission] shall ensure the Union’s external
representation’ (European Union, 2007: Article 17). In practice, this entails
that the European Commission continues to play a substantial role in for-
eign policy. For example, it is exclusively responsible for trade, enlargement
and the European Neighbourhood policy and it shares competences with

the EEAS in the field of development (Carta, 2013: 47). The double-hatting
of the High Representative as Vice-President should facilitate cooperation
between the EEAS and the European Commission.
A few words need to be said on the rotating presidency. The Treaty of
Lisbon transferred all tasks of the rotating presidency of the Foreign Affairs
Council to the High Representative. However, in practice, the rotating presi-
dency continues to play a role in the EU’s external representation (Kaczynski,

2011). Three concrete examples are the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) and the Organization on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
(OPCW) in which the EU is not formally represented by an ambassador of
the EEAS, but by the rotating presidency (Delaere and Van Schaik, 2012;
Glavind, 2013; Van Willigen, 2014).
The last EU institution that should be mentioned is the European
Parliament. The European Parliament, traditionally a minor actor in the
realm of EU foreign policy, has gained greater influence under the Lisbon
Treaty. First, it needs to be consulted about foreign policy falling under the
Common Foreign and Security Policy. Second, the European Parliament
should be informed about negotiation mandates and negotiation processes,
and must give its assent to agreements concluded between the EU and third
countries or international organisations (Vanhoonacker, 2011; Drieskens
and Van Schaik, 2010: 10).
Apart from the fact that several actors play a role in EU diplomacy, the heter-
ogeneous nature of the EU’s foreign policy is also reflected by the heterogeneity
of preferences between (1) the member states and (2) the institutions involved
in foreign policy making. When the issue at hand concerns exclusive member
state competence, the 28 national capitals need to reach consensus in order
to decide on common positions and joint actions in the European Council or
the Foreign Affairs Council. In case of exclusive EU competence, a qualified
majority vote is still needed. Arguably the Europeanisation of foreign policy
facilitates consensus and smooth decision-making (Drent, 2010; Wong, 2011).
However, practice shows that reaching consensus on foreign policy objectives
can still be cumbersome. This needs to be taken into account when evaluating
EU diplomacy. Furthermore, the different roles of institutional foreign policy
actors need to be recognised. For example, the European Commission and the
Foreign Affairs Council might have different ideas about specific foreign policy
strategies when dealing with an issue in which they share competence, such
as environmental policy. Also, at least for the next few years, heterogeneity of
preferences can be expected to exist within the EEAS. The EEAS consists of three
components: one-third is recruited from the European Commission, one-third
from the national capitals and one-third from the Council secretariat. It will
take time before the EEAS has evolved into a coherent diplomatic institution
(Carta, 2013: 48).
The existence of different diplomatic actors with different preferences ren-

ders the diplomatic process itself heterogeneous. Depending on the policy
area and topic, the EU can be represented externally by the President of the
European Council, the High Representative, the European Commission or
even a member state through the rotating presidency – as is illustrated by
the cases of the OSCE, the OPCW and the IAEA. The fact that the lead nego-
tiator changes with the negotiating arena and/or the subject being discussed
makes the overall EU approach to negotiations prone to inconsistencies. For

example, during the Copenhagen Climate Conference (December 2009), the
EU was speaking with different voices: the negotiation leaders in the techni-
cal working groups; the troika led by the Swedish presidency; the ministers
of environment who met at the ministerial level in Copenhagen; and – in
the closing days – by the heads of state who had less detailed knowledge,
but a greater desire to reach an agreement due to the high public profile of
the negotiations (Woolcock, 2012: 143). Woolcock also points to an early
example of inter-institution debate on who should represent the EU in UN
negotiations on the control of mercury, a chemical substance with neuro-
toxic effects that is widely used in industrial processes and in products like
batteries and thermometers. In 2010, the European Commission argued that
it did not need to share the negotiating role with the Council and withdrew
the EU negotiating position when the Council insisted on a shared role. This
dispute was widely interpreted as a proxy for the issue of who would negoti-
ate the more high-profile issue of climate change (Woolcock, 2012: 128). It
also constitutes a clear indication that the Lisbon institutional arrangements
cannot be conceived of as a willingness of the member states to transfer de
facto competence for any international negotiations whatsoever without
further thought.
What consequences does heterogeneity have for evaluating the EU’s for-
eign policy? From the point of view of policy evaluation, the consequences
of heterogeneity pose an additional challenge. Heterogeneity means that
evaluating the EU’s foreign policy at an aggregate level only tells half of the
story. Evaluation should also take into account the different actors respon-
sible for different parts of the diplomatic process, since this tells us more
about the impact of EU diplomacy. In doing so, the policy evaluator would
adopt the framework proposed by the ‘new institutionalism’ in political
science. This would imply adopting a differentiated conception of the EU,
in which the different actors and institutions involved in diplomacy ‘do
not necessarily “fit” together to form a whole’ (Marsh and Stoker, 2010: 69).
EU diplomacy and complex causality
Earlier in this chapter, we described the pitfall of not perceiving EU diplo-

macy as a multilevel process, with the unwelcome result of stripping
diplomacy of its political dimension by assessing it exclusively at the level
of implementation. Here it is necessary to realise that recognising the link

between the political dimension and the instrumental dimension is only a
first step on the treacherous road of evaluating diplomacy. In this section,
we explain that a fourth pitfall is assuming that the impact of EU diplomacy
can be assessed by conducting an analysis by simply linking foreign policy
goals to short-, medium- and long-term foreign policy outcomes. A linear
approach like this works best when policy objectives are unambiguously
clear and when it is possible to distinguish between the changes caused by

EU policy and the changes caused by other actors. However, the EU’s foreign
policy objectives are often rather vague and general, and (particularly in
multilateral settings) the outcomes are influenced by what other diplomatic
actors do (Van Willigen and Kleistra, 2013). Therefore, among the main
challenges that evaluators of European diplomacy face are: the identifica-
tion of policy objectives, the selection of an evaluation design that takes
into account the dynamics of the policy process, and the presentation of
evaluation results in terms of the EU as a heterogeneous actor.
Diplomatic processes are characterised by complex causality in which
the outcomes flow from ‘the convergence of several conditions, independent
variables, or causal chains’ (George and Bennett, 2005: 212). Foreign policy
issues can be seen as public problems that affect the society at large, that
is, problems with a regional or global character. These include, for example,
the objective to achieve progress in the Middle East peace process as well
as progress in climate negotiations. Three characteristics of public problems
are relevant in relation to foreign policy issues (Bruijn, 2004). First of all,
public problems are plural rather than singular and, secondly, they are inter-
related. Plurality and interrelatedness entail that the public problem is to
be approached from different perspectives at the same time in order to be
grasped and understood. The efforts of the EU in Afghanistan, for example,
should be considered and assessed within a framework of several interlinked
(but not always perfectly aligned) goals such as sustainable development,
promotion of human rights, combating terrorism and regional stability. This
is only one example, but the EU deals with a wide variety of plural foreign
policy issues ranging from non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-
tion to trade negotiations at the World Trade Organization. Thirdly, public
problems are not static, but are rather the object of constant public recon-
sideration. For example, for a long time, climate change was not considered
a foreign policy issue, but it has since been defined as a global challenge.
The dynamics of EU foreign policy-making makes it difficult (although
not impossible) for evaluators to capture the essence of EU decision-making
and diplomacy in an evaluation model or framework. Here the main pitfall
is ignoring the evaluation implications of complexity and volatility and
considering EU foreign policy-making as a neatly defined linear process with
a clear beginning and a clear end. Instead of jumping from policy objec-
tives to outcomes, the main task (and challenge) of an evaluator should
be opening up the black box and on deconstructing its messy EU foreign

policy-making content. Especially when it concerns multilateral diplomacy
(see below), the outcomes are the result of concerted action and need to be
evaluated as such. Nonetheless, through intervention impact evaluation,
the EU’s diplomatic interventions could be causally linked to the outcomes
of a multilateral negotiation process. In doing so, an evaluation should
take into account the diplomatic context within which the outcomes were
realised.

This context not only explains the extent to which specific policy out-
comes should be considered to be the direct effects of EU policies, but also
the extent to which these outcomes can be attributed to the interventions of
other actors or the extent to which it is due to other parties that certain EU
goals have not been reached. In this respect, it is relevant to note that there
might be structural factors that facilitate or impede the impact of EU diplo-
macy. According to several studies, the potential impact of the EU on world
affairs is determined by its position in a multipolar world. Laatikainen has
identified three ways in which scholars try to fit the EU ‘into the emerging
multipolar context’ (2013: 476). First, some studies show that the influence
of the EU in the world is decreasing (Mahbubani, 2008; Youngs, 2010).
Others contend that the EU is and will be one of the great powers of the
twenty-first century (Khanna, 2009; Smith, 2011). Finally, as we mentioned
briefly above, there is a vision in which the EU is the first among the great
powers (Leonard, 2005, McCormick, 2007). The influence of the multipolar
context would entail that even when the EU has a perfectly functioning
diplomatic system, its impact is at least partly influenced by international
systemic conditions.
Diplomatic settings and diplomatic activities and policy areas
Finally, when evaluating EU diplomacy, one should avoid the pitfall of not
distinguishing between different diplomatic settings, diplomatic activities
and policy areas. Regarding multilateral diplomatic settings, for example,
EU performance in international institutions proves to be influenced by the
legal framework, domestic EU politics, the status of relevant EU legislation
and policies and the international context (Jørgensen et al., 2011). That
makes it important to look at the context or the diplomatic setting.
Roughly speaking, two specific diplomatic settings can be distinguished:
bilateral and multilateral. The EU’s involvement in multilateral diplomacy
(e.g., in the form of its participation in international institutions) needs to
be evaluated differently than bilateral diplomacy (in the form of a trade
agreement with a single country, for example). In the literature, a qualitative
distinction is made between bilateralism and multilateralism. Bilateralism is
value-free in the sense that it is not necessarily organised around guiding
principles. Also, bilateral arrangements are often dominated by the strongest
actor (Wright, 2013: 177). In settings in which the EU engages in bilateral

diplomatic relations with a state, the EU is often the dominant actor. A con-
crete example is the European Neighbourhood Policy. As an economic giant,
the EU can demand ‘EU standards and practices’ as a condition for entering
into an agreement with neighbouring states (Casier, 2010: 103). In contrast
to bilateralism, multilateralism entails a form of interaction between states
‘along a set of basic principles that lay out certain expectations of behaviour
that all parties must agree to and abide by, including the strongest party’

(Wright, 2013: 177). In contrast to bilateral settings, in the context of mul-
tilateral diplomacy, the EU is, per definition, one of many actors. Its impact
is co-determined by the other actors as well as by contextual factors such
as the broader international political constellation and formal and informal
rules and procedures (Jørgensen et al., 2011).
The EU’s position in multilateral settings should be qualified further. The
EU has different roles and competences in different multilateral settings. In
some settings, the EU is an informal participant, in others it is an observer
with limited formal power and in still other settings it might participate
fully as if it were a state. As mentioned above, the former is the case with
the EU’s representation in the OSCE, the IAEA and the OPCW. It has no
formal observer status, but acts through the rotating presidency. Secondly,
in many international settings such as the Ottawa Convention (banning
anti-personnel landmines), the International Labour Organization or the
Council of Europe, for example, the EU is a formal observer. In addition,
since May 2011, the EU has an enhanced observer status within the General
Assembly of the UN. An example of the third category is the EU’s position
in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Since 1 January 1995, the EU is a
member in its own right, as are each of its 28 member states – adding up
to 29 ‘European’ WTO members. The EU holds a similar membership posi-
tion in the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). From an evaluation
perspective, it is important to keep these different EU positions in mind.
Formal membership gives the EU voting power and, consequently, a more
powerful position than is offered by observer or informal participant status.
Apart from diplomatic settings, one should also distinguish between dif-
ferent diplomatic activities. The EU has a variety of foreign policy tools at
its disposal ranging from making declarations, undertaking high-level visits,
supporting other international organisations and undertaking diplomatic
démarches, to imposing diplomatic or economic sanctions or sending peace-
keeping troops under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)
(Smith, 1998). Foreign policy instruments are unequal when it comes
to having a potential impact on international politics (Kleistra and Van
Willigen, 2010). Issuing a statement of condemnation of human rights vio-
lations in country x is obviously less compelling than imposing economic
sanctions in response to human rights violations, for example. Therefore,
on the whole, issuing a declaration is a low-cost instrument since it is not as
powerful in terms of direct effects and potential impact as economic sanc-

tions are. As such, if one seeks to evaluate the impact of the EU, one should
take into account which instruments are at the EU’s disposal. For example,
until the Spring of 2011, the EU had a rather weak status of observer within
the General Assembly of the United Nations. In a situation such as this, it
would make little sense to blame the EU for having minimal impact on the
course of events. However, since May 2011, the EU has enjoyed an enhanced
observer status as a result of which it is allowed to make statements, fully

participate in discussions and submit proposals and amendments (for more
information, see Fernando Andresen Guimarães’ chapter in this volume).
With its new status, the potential impact of the EU has grown, albeit mod-
estly, and thus needs to be taken into account.
Finally, one must distinguish between different policy areas. Traditionally,
the EU has been a relatively large and strong actor when it comes to topics
like environmental politics, development cooperation, human rights and
trade (Meunier and Nicolaïdis, 2011). Particularly in the fields of environ-
ment and trade, the EU is regarded as a great power (Elgström, 2007). In
turn, when it comes to conflict management, military intervention and
peace operations, the EU is often heavily criticised for its lack of leverage
(Koenig, 2012). That means that the potential impact of the EU differs across
different policy areas.
Keeping the arguments made above in mind, we conclude that it is nec-
essary to use tailor-made evaluation designs that account for differences in
diplomatic settings, diplomatic activities and policy fields. The remaining
question to answer is to what extent we need tailor-made evaluation designs
as compared to evaluation designs for national settings. In other words: how
different is EU diplomacy from national diplomacy?
EU diplomacy: a different ball game?
We conclude this chapter by highlighting that the requirements of the eval-

uation of contemporary national diplomacy and EU diplomacy are not that
different. Distinguishing between effectiveness, performance and impact is
as important in national settings as it is when evaluating the EU diplomacy.
Moreover, diplomacy in a national setting is also a multilevel process that is
characterised by complex causality and is influenced by varying diplomatic
settings, activities and policy areas.
At first sight, a difference might be that national diplomacy is more homog-
enous in the sense that fewer actors are involved in foreign policy and, as a
result, there are fewer conflicting interests to be reconciled. Traditionally, an
EU member state could rely on its Foreign Policy Executive (FPE), that is a
relatively coherent ‘group of executive policymakers and officials that have
primary responsibility within the government over the determination of
foreign policy’ (Ripsman, 2002: 43). However, it should be realised that the
traditional position of the FPE in EU member states has eroded over the past
few decades. In fact, the FPE – which was located primarily in the ministry
of Foreign Affairs – has been broadened. A variety of other governmental
actors, including other ministries and parliaments became involved in for-
eign policy-making. For example, in all EU-member states, ministries such
as commerce, finance, transport, environment and defence communicate
directly with their counterparts in other countries (Berridge, 2010: 15).
National foreign policy became increasingly heterogeneous because of a

process of domestication which entails the increased involvement of domes-
tic actors (Verbeek and Vleuten, 2008). These actors include not only other
branches of government, but also private actors such as companies, pressure
groups and non-governmental organisations. For evaluation scientists, this
means that when one wants to assess the impact of a member state’s diplo-
macy, the heterogeneous nature of the modern FPE should be taken into
account. In other words, this heterogeneity calls for an approach similar to
that used to evaluate EU diplomacy. Increasingly, states, not unlike the EU,
are arenas in which different interests compete to formulate and execute
foreign policy.
In sum, evaluation designs for the EU need not necessarily be very differ-
ent from evaluation designs used to assess national diplomacy. Both the EU
and single member states should be seen as arenas in which different actors
operate. The EU is only more complex in the sense that it adds heterogene-
ity at the European level to heterogeneity at the national level. National
interest groups, for example, might focus directly on the EU or address
the national authority and the EU at the same time. Also, more so than
in national settings, EU politicians and diplomats serve different masters
depending on the foreign policy issue at hand, the level of decision-making
and whether foreign policy decision-making or foreign policy implemen-
tation is in question. Nonetheless, this is a difference in degree, not in
principle. Therefore, the pitfalls and challenges for evaluating EU diplomacy
are largely the same as those in national settings.
Note
1. Parts of this chapter are based on earlier published work (Kleistra and Van Willigen
2010; Van Willigen and Kleistra 2013). Earlier drafts were presented at the EU in
International Affairs III Conference (Brussels, 3–5 May 2012) and at the 6th Pan-
European Conference on EU Politics (Tampere, 13–15 September 2012). Thanks to
the editors, Benjamin Pohl and Jessica Kroezen for their useful comments.
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5
Diplomacy at the Individual
Level: The Role of EU Special
Representatives in European

Foreign Policy
Dominik Tolksdorf
Introduction
By creating the position of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the EU Commission (HRVP)
and by establishing the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Lisbon
Treaty changed the conduct of EU foreign policy significantly. One diplo-
matic instrument that has remained intact is the European Union Special
Representatives (EUSRs), who are appointed by the Council and operate
under the responsibility of the HR/VP. What is the added value of the EUSRs
for EU foreign policy and why have they been retained as a policy tool? This
chapter will analyse the role of the EUSRs in the implementation of the
Union’s foreign policy and particularly focus on their value for EU diplo-
macy at the individual level.
The first part of this chapter introduces the mandates and the appoint-
ment procedures of the EUSRs. The second part analyses the EUSRs’
activities, including their contribution to the coordination of EU actors
and to the coordination of EU policies with the activities of other inter-
national actors in third countries. In addition, by analysing the EUSRs’
involvement in domestic politics and conflict resolution efforts in their
mandate areas the chapter points out that their skills as negotiators and
mediators can be an added value for EU foreign policy. In this respect,
it is important for the EUSRs to coordinate their activities with the EU
institutions that are dealing with foreign policy issues, particularly the
External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Commission (EC). The
third part of this chapter therefore focuses on the institutional setting
of the EUSRs in the EU’s foreign policy system and points out future
challenges in this respect.
69
70 Dominik Tolksdorf
The mandates of the EUSRs
The first EUSRs were deployed in 1996 and thus even before the post of a
Secretary-General of the Council Secretariat and High Representative for
the CFSP (SG/HR) was created in 1999. In these initial years, the main task
of the EUSRs was to engage in conflict resolution on behalf of the EU, to
gain information about ongoing conflicts and to help the Union develop
a common policy towards a given country or region1, and as some observ-
ers have pointed out, the EUSR could thus contribute to shaping the EU’s

profile as an international actor (Adebahr, 2009: 59; Grevi, 2007: 41–42).
Following the deployment of the first missions in the framework of the
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in 2003, the EUSRs also
became relevant for coordinating the missions on the ground. Finally,
being in constant contact with representatives of other international
organizations, the EUSRs also act as ‘agents of effective multilateralism’
(Grevi, 2007: 142).
EUSRs can be appointed for single countries, regions and for thematic
issues.2 With regard to mandate areas, the EUSRs can be broadly divided
into three geographical groups: (1) EUSRs in the western Balkans and thus
potential future EU member states, (2) EUSRs in regions that are addressed
by the EU in the framework the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and
(3) EUSRs in regions that are not in the EU’s direct neighbourhood, but that
are for one or another reason in the Union’s strategic interest. However,
not all EUSRs are physically located in their mandate areas: While only the
EUSRs for Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are based in the
field and are also ‘double-hatted’ as head of EU delegations, it has become a
routine that most of the EUSRs are located in Brussels from where they
regularly visit their mandate areas.3
EUSR posts are usually filled with national diplomats that previously held
high positions in international organisations, EU institutions or in national
politics. All variants have their advantages: politicians usually bring a
politically high standing to their mandates, but some EUSRs have also been
regarded in Brussels as too independent-minded and unwilling to integrate
themselves into the EU hierarchies. In contrast, diplomats and EU officials
are trained to respect hierarchies, are often familiar with EU policy-making
and their often multilateral background helps them to more easily ‘build
bridges’ with third countries and international organisations (Adebahr,
2009: 60, 134–35, 178). Similar to the selection of other high-ranking posi-
tions in the EU, the nomination of the EUSRs is frequently a controversial
issue between the member states (interview with EU official, 2011).4 Also
the selection of the EUSRs’ mandate areas is a politically sensitive issue
in which the Council has – like in any other EU policy field – to strike a
balance between the interests of the member states. For example, some of
Diplomacy at the Individual Level 71
the member states have specific interests in their former colonies and are
sensitive when it comes to the appointment of EUSRs to those countries
or regions.
The legal basis for the appointment, the extension of a EUSR is a ‘Joint
Action’ by the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), which provides the EUSRs
with mandates ‘in relation to particular policy issues’ (European Union,
2010: Art. 33). Whereas EUSRs were initially appointed by unanimous
decisions, the Lisbon Treaty changed the formula to a qualified majority

vote. The EUSRs are not part of the formal hierarchy of the EEAS but remain
de facto a Council instrument. However, the Council has to consider the
choice of the HR/VP who has the sole competence to propose a man-
date for a new EUSR (European Union, 2010: Art. 33) and can in theory
also block the nomination of new EUSRs.5 In this respect, a first trial of
strength between the HR/VP and the Council came in July 2010 when
a heated debate took place between HR/VP Catherine Ashton and the
member states about the removal of a number of EUSRs. On the basis of
a proposal by Robert Cooper, Ashton’s top advisor in the EEAS, the HR/VP
announced that the mandates of several EUSRs were to be terminated by
February 2011 and their work to be handed over to the new EU delega-
tions and/or their portfolios taken over by the EEAS in Brussels. This led to
stern opposition by some member states. As an example, the Baltic States,
Finland, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria
argued that a EUSR should remain responsible for conflict resolution in
the South Caucasus as, due to a lack of personnel in the EEAS, no other EU
official could take care of this task. As a compromise solution, the EUSR
for the South Caucasus and the EUSR for the crisis in Georgia were merged
in 2011.
While Catherine Ashton succeeded in removing some EUSRs (e.g., the
EUSR for the Great Lakes Region, whose tasks were taken over by EEAS
staff), particularly developments in Africa and the Middle East since 2011
led the Council to appoint new EUSRs for the Southern Mediterranean,
the Horn of Africa, Sahel, and the Middle East peace process (whose
mandate was again terminated in 2013). As a result, Ashton’s plan to limit
the activities of the EUSRs and thus to indirectly strengthen the EEAS was
undermined by the Council. Although the Lisbon Treaty gave the HR/VP a
powerful role with respect to the proposal of EUSR nominations, the past
three years demonstrated that the HR/VP will not refrain from formally
proposing the mandate for a new EUSR if a group of member states is
pushing for it.6
In this respect, it is important to stress that retaining the EUSRs has practi-
cal advantages with regards to staff and funds: First, when the Lisbon Treaty
entered into force, it was generally assumed that the EEAS would employ
a much higher number of staff, which did not materialise. As a result, the
service is hardly able to cover all policy areas that were initially envisaged for
it. Also the managing directors that were supposed to take over tasks from
the EUSRs are oftentimes overloaded with other responsibilities and hardly
have time to regularly travel to the conflict areas. Another practical reason
for retaining the EUSRs is their funding: Whereas the EEAS’s budget is
part of the regular EU budget and thus under supervision of the European
Parliament (EP), all administrative and operational expenditure result-
ing from EUSRs’ activities are administered by the Service for Foreign

Policy Instruments (FPI), a joint service by the Council and the European
Commission (EC). Although the FPI has to ensure that that all expendi-
tures are ‘in accordance with the principle of sound financial manage-
ment’, the EUSRs have some autonomy of how precisely they use their
budgets.7 As a result, with a limited oversight role of the EP, the EUSRs are
a rather flexible tool that can be deployed by the Council for mediation
and conflict resolution efforts.
The role of the EUSRs as coordinators, negotiators and

mediators
Given the fact that almost 50 EUSRs have been mandated since 1996, a com-
prehensive analysis of the activities of all officeholders is beyond the scope
of this article.8 The following part therefore provides a general analysis of
the range of activities that EUSRs are involved in.
As pointed out above, the first basic task that all EUSRs are expected to ful-
fil is to provide information on the political situation in their mandate areas
to the EU institutions and to the national foreign ministries. The EUSRs have
therefore often been depicted as the EU’s ‘ears and eyes’ (Grevi, 2007: 11).
The EUSRs’ reporting is particularly interesting for smaller member states
that do not have embassies in the crisis areas9 and that have in the past
often pushed for the appointment of a EUSR. For them, the regular report-
ing by the EUSRs can be among the most important sources of information
on the political developments in the mandate area. This has partly changed
with the Lisbon Treaty that envisioned a more political role for the EU del-
egations, which were formerly mainly dealing with trade issues. A second
basic task of all EUSRs is to demonstrate the EU’s interest and engagement in
the mandate area (see for example Council of the EU 2005, S239/05). Thus,
the EU has used the EUSRs to increase its visibility; a good example in this
respect was the EUSR for Central Asia.
A third basic task of the EUSRs is their contribution to the formulation
of an EU policy and/or strategy towards the mandate area. At the time the
first EUSRs were deployed, the EU did not yet have common strategies
for various countries and regions. The EUSRs were therefore sometimes
deployed as proxies for a common policy, but also to help formulate a
common EU strategy. As examples, the EUSR for the Great Lakes region
was tasked to provide input for the formulation of a common EU position,
which was, however, due to the diverging interests of the former colonial
powers France, the UK and Belgium, a difficult undertaking (Adebahr,
2009: 24–25, 118). Similarly, due to specific interests in the region, the
formulation of a common EU position on the South Caucasus has often
been difficult. Also the EUSRs for the Southern Mediterranean, the Horn of
Africa, the Sahel and Central Asia were particularly deployed to assist the

EU institutions in formulating and/or revising the EU’s policies towards
these regions.10
Besides these three basic tasks, the EUSRs have particularly contributed
to the coordination of EU actors in the field and the coordination of the
EU’s policies with the activities of other international actors. In addition,
by supporting state-building and democratic transformation processes,
some EUSRs have become involved in local politics. Finally, most EUSRs
also contribute to conflict resolution efforts in their mandate areas. By
analysing these issues in the following, this chapter argues that the EUSRs’
skills as coordinators, negotiators and mediators can be an added value for
EU foreign policy.
The EUSRs’ contribution to the coordination of EU actors in the field

The innovations of the Lisbon Treaty, including the establishment of the
EEAS, the HR/VP and the upgrading of the EU Delegations (EUDs) to more
political entities are to bring more coherence to EU foreign policy.11 Prior
to the Lisbon Treaty’s entry into force in 2010, the EUSRs were in some
cases mandated to contribute to a better coordination of EU actors in third
countries that were usually only loosely coordinated by the rotating local
EU Presidency. Since Lisbon, the heads of the EUDs or respectively by the
‘double-hatted’ EUSRs in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo
are tasked to arrange coordination meetings of the national ambassadors
in third countries. There is no formal hierarchy between the EUSRs and
the national ambassadors, but as being mandated by the 28 foreign minis-
ters, the ‘double-hatted’ EUSRs generally have a ‘high standing’ among the
national ambassadors. However, a principle barrier in the EUSRs’ activities
was in the past a lack of understanding among national diplomats of the
added value of the EUSRs in ensuring a coordinated EU position on the
ground.12 In such circumstances it became difficult for the EUSRs to com-
pletely fulfil their coordination function.
The harmonisation of the EU position is important because the EUSRs
often participate in international coordination groups where they have
to represent a common EU position. With different interests among the
member states, this is oftentimes difficult. For example, in the Great Lakes
Region, the EUSR could only become truly proactive after the EU had
reached internal consensus on its policies towards the region (Adebahr,

2009: 184). Telling is also the example of Afghanistan: as almost all member
states provide assistance to the country, national ministers often visited
Afghanistan and presented new bilateral initiatives without informing the
EUSR. This can easily lead to the perception among Afghan politicians that
there is no common EU policy on Afghanistan. To avoid this the Council in
2009 adopted the ‘EU Action Plan for Afghanistan and Pakistan’ which aims
to better align EU programmes with the member states’ resources (Council

of the EU, 2009). The EUSR is responsible for driving forward the action
plan and for preparing regular implementation reports. However, although
the EUSR regularly chairs meetings of the national ambassadors in Kabul,
he cannot force them to pursue a specific policy direction (interview with
EU official, 2011).
Similar to Afghanistan, a coordinated EU approach in South Sudan was
at times difficult because some member states felt that ‘they needed to be
seen or heard’ in the country (UK House of Lords, 2011: 37; Van der Zwan,
2011: 24). The situation improved with the set-up of Sudan Task Force in
November 2010, which was headed by the former EUSR Rosalind Marsden
in Brussels (interview with EU officials; see also Council of the EU, 2010c: 9).
EU task forces in Tunisia, Jordan and Egypt that serve as coordination plat-
forms between regional interlocutors, the EU member states and different
EU donor institutions (UK House of Commons, 2013).
Another key task of the EUSRs is their liaising with CSDP actors on the
ground. EUSRs have often proposed CSDP deployments in their regions,
and as the missions demonstrated tangible European commitments to the
regions, the EUSRs ‘standing’ among local politicians also benefited from
their launch (Grevi, 2007: 114). At some point, there have been CSDP mis-
sions in almost all of the EUSRs’ mandate areas. In line with their function
to ensure the overall coordination of the EU’s political activities on the
ground, some EUSRs were integrated into the chain of command of the
civilian CSDP operations. By 2006, a pattern had emerged in which the heads
of the CSDP missions reported to the EUSR on their activities who then
reported to the SG/HR and the Political and Security Committee (PSC).
Being integrated into the chain of command of the CSDP missions, the
EUSRs in some cases had to coordinate between the ECDs and the CSDP
missions. For example, after the Council had deployed the EU Advisory
and Assistance Mission for Security Reform in the Democratic Republic
of Congo (EUSEC RD CONGO) in June 2005, disagreements emerged
with the ECD on proper cooperation mechanism between the new CSDP
mission and the EC projects in the demobilisation and reintegration of
combatants in Eastern Congo. After months of inter-institutional wran-
gling, the EU in November 2006 adopted a joint Council/EC paper that
outlined the EU approach to security sector reform in the DRC (Grevi,
2007: 116–117).
Turf wars between CSDP missions and the EC ultimately resulted in the
introduction of a ‘double-hatted’ EUSR and head of ECD in Macedonia
in 2005. The new model led to enhanced policy coordination between the
Council and the EC and a more coherent EU position (see Flessenkemper,
2007).13 As will be shown below, this model was for legal reasons not
possible in all EUSRs’ cases. The constellation in which the EUSRs were
integrated into the chain of command of the CSDP missions changed in
2008 with the creation of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability

(CPCC). The CPCC is headed by the Civilian Operation Commander
(COC), who exercises command and control of the civilian CSDP mis-
sions at the strategic level, and thus provides instructions to the heads
of the missions and reports directly to the HR/VP on the operations. As
a consequence of these institutional changes, the EUSRs were left with
the task to provide ‘local political guidance’ to the heads of the civilian
missions and to give ‘political advice’ to the force commanders of the
military CSDP operations.14 This procedure has remained intact with the
Lisbon Treaty.
Also with regard to their own activities, the EUSRs have to take into
account the coordination with the EUDs (the former European Commission
delegations, ECDs). Pre-Lisbon, there was in practice a relatively clear divi-
sion of labour between the EUSR offices and the ECDs if they were deployed
to the same country: the EUSRs were supposed to contribute to conflict
resolution and to bring political capital to countries or regions in which
the EU has security interests, and were thus provided by the Council with
political mandates. In contrast, the ECDs were mainly responsible for the
implementation and monitoring of EU projects in the host countries.
In order to demonstrate EU coherence vis-à-vis local stakeholders, the
EUSRs frequently included the ECD heads in their activities. In return, the
ECDs often provided technical and logistical support to the EUSR offices.
Nevertheless, there were in practice clearly limits to a close coordination
between the EUSRs and the ECDs. This can be illustrated in the Western
Balkans, where the EC is assisting the countries in their pre-accession pro-
cess with the EU (in the framework of the Stabilisation and Association
Process).
Although through their work the EUSRs are also supposed to enhance
the membership perspective of the Western Balkans, since 2002 they
have often concentrated on political issues in order to strengthen state-
building processes. In these efforts, they could be tempted to use the EU
conditionality of the pre-accession process for ‘political’ purposes. A good
example is the EU’s support to police reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
in which the former EUSR Paddy Ashdown convinced the European
Commission to apply EU conditionality in order to increase the EUSR’s
lever to push for police reform. The conditions set by the EUSR, however,
could not be considered as ‘European’ standards and had to be abandoned,
leading to the weakening of EU conditionality in the pre-accession pro-

cess with the country (Tolksdorf, 2012). This example illustrates that a
close cooperation between the EC and the EUSRs, that often pursued a
much more political agenda than the ECDs, could be critical in some
circumstances.
A problematic relationship between the EUSRs and the former ECDs
could also appear in constellations in which the EUSRs were ‘double-
hatted’ as heads of international offices. The EUSR in Bosnia and

Herzegovina was also mandated as the High Representative for Bosnia
and Herzegovina (2002 to 2011) and in this function retained executive
powers that allowed him to regularly intervene in Bosnian politics. As
being mandated to supervise the implementation of the Dayton Peace
Agreement, the so-called ‘Bonn Powers’ give the High Representative
the authority to dismiss local politicians from public office if they are
obstructing the implementation of the Dayton agreement. This inter-
ventionist approach, which has been used mostly until 2006, is in con-
tradiction with the EU’s pre-accession process, in which the European
Commission applies an approach that is based on the concept that
reforms have to be adopted and implemented in ‘local ownership’.
Due to his executive functions in the country, the High Representative
could for a long time not become ‘double-hatted’ as head of EUD. As a
result, both, the EUSR and the head of the ECD represented the EU in
the country, leading oftentimes to confusion among local politicians.
A ‘double-hatting’ of the EUSR and the head of the EUD finally mate-
rialised in 2011 after the EUSR was decoupled from his role as High
Representative (Tolksdorf, 2012).
Similarly, the EUSR in Kosovo between 2008 and 2012 also acted as the
International Civilian Representative for Kosovo. This ‘double-hatting’ was
from the beginning a delicate combination: While the EUSR in Kosovo
represented all EU member states, including those that do not recognise
Kosovo’s independence, the International Civilian Representative (ICR)
only represents countries that have acknowledged Kosovo’s statehood. The
‘double-hatting’ of Pieter Feith, who served as EUSR/ICR between 2008 and
2012, was an ill-fated constellation which raised much confusion about
the role of the EUSR/ICR in Kosovo. Since the EU remains divided on
the Kosovo issue, the EU Office in Prishtina (which, for the same reason,
cannot be named EU delegation) has to act ‘status neutral’. Similar to
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EUSR in Kosovo could only become ‘double-
hatted’ EUSR/head of the EU Office after the ICR had been dissolved in
September 2012.
Since the Lisbon Treaty, all country-specific EUSRs were merged with
the EUDs and since have a ‘double-hatted’ mandate. There are, however,
still a number of EUSRs with a regional mandate, for example the Horn of
Africa or Sahel. In their mandates, the EUSRs are requested to seek a close
coordination with the EUDs, and also the heads of the EUDs ‘shall make
best efforts to assist the EUSR in the implementation of the mandate’ (see
Council of the EU, 2011d). There are to date some positive indications
in this respect: for instance, the EUDs often provide office space on their
premises for the political advisors of the EUSRs with a regional mandate.
This constellation allows the EUDs to benefit from the political experience
of the EUSR team members.15
The EUSRs’ contribution to the coordination of EU efforts with other

international organisations
A coordinated EU position in the field is important when the EUSRs meet
with local politicians and when they participate in forums with diplomats
and representatives of other international organisations. Many EUSRs
participate in international coordination forums in conflict areas, includ-
ing the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) in Afghanistan,
which supervises the implementation of the ‘Afghan Compact’16, the
Peace Implementation Council Steering Board in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
which supervises the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement, the
International Steering Group for Kosovo (ISG), which supervised the state-
building process in Kosovo until September 2012. EUSRs that contributed
and participated in international conflict resolution forums are the EUSR
for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia, who participates in the
Geneva International Discussions, the main forum where all parties to the
conflicts in Georgia meet in person, and the former EUSR for the Middle
East Peace Process, who contributed to the preparation of the Middle East
Quartet envoys’ meetings.
In addition, all EUSR are expected to cooperate more or less closely with
the key international actors in the field, including international organi-
sations like the UN and its sub-agencies, the OSCE, NATO and regional
organisations like the AU. In many cases, the EUSRs also retain close con-
tacts with other special envoys of countries like the U.S. or the Russian
Federation. In these efforts, the EUSRs can often draw on their experience
as diplomats and/or former officials of international organisations. If UN
representatives are present on the ground – like in Afghanistan or South
Sudan – the EUSRs are to closely cooperate with them and to support
‘the pivotal role played by the UN’ in the country (see Council of the
EU, 2011d). As an example, the EU supported the UN’s efforts in the
political transition process in the Democratic Republic of Congo through
EC assistance programmes, a number of CSDP missions and election
observation missions. The CSDP missions were coordinated by the EUSR.
In the context of the inter-ethnic riots in Kyrgyzstan in June 2010, the
EUSR for Central Asia closely coordinated his mediation activities with
the UN and OSCE special envoys on the ground (interview with EU
official, 2011).
While a close cooperation between the EUSRs and their OSCE counter-
parts is/was particularly important for the EUSR for the South Caucasus
and the crisis in Georgia, the former EUSR for Central Asia and the former
EUSRs for Moldova, the cooperation with NATO representatives has been
important in places where NATO had launched military operations (such
as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia and Afghanistan). For
example, the EUSR for Afghanistan participates in the NATO Provincial
Reconstruction Teams steering committee and its working groups. Finally,

with the help of the EUSRs, the EU has in the past years also enhanced
its cooperation with regional organisations like the AU. Considering
the AU as ‘a political organization with an important role to play in
ensuring stability and development in Africa’ (Council of the EU, 2007b),
the Council and the European Commission in December 2007 jointly
appointed a EUSR to the AU, who is to strengthen the EU-AU partnership
in all areas outlined in the ‘Joint Africa-EU Strategy’. The other EUSRs in
Africa – the EUSR for the Southern Mediterranean Region, the EUSR for
the Horn of Africa and the EUSR for Sahel – are mandated to strengthen
this partnership.
The EUSRs’ involvement in local politics

All EUSRs maintain contacts with local politicians and civil society actors.
By supporting state-building processes, institution-building and democratic
transformation processes, some EUSRs are indirectly involved in local
policy-making. The degree of influence on the local actors varies among the
officeholders and the EUSRs in the Western Balkans (that is in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Kosovo and formerly in Macedonia) are – compared to their
colleagues – in a rather influential position as ‘their’ countries are potential
EU member states. Being partially mandated to support the state-building
and the EU pre-accession processes, the EUSRs in Bosnia and Herzegovina
and the EUSR in Kosovo have in the past been deeply involved in domestic
politics. As mentioned above, the EUSR in Bosnia and Herzegovina was also
‘double hatted’ as High Representative, who is supervise the implementa-
tion of the Dayton Peace Agreement, and had significant influence on local
politics. Similarly, the EUSR in Kosovo was ‘double hatted’ as International
Civilian Representative and was in this function to oversee the implementa-
tion of the ‘Ahtisaari Plan’.
Also other EUSRs are/were involved in state- and institution-building pro-
cesses, although to a lesser extent than those two EUSRs mentioned above:
the EUSR for Sudan and South Sudan was, among others, to closely liaise
with South Sudan’s government in order to promote institution-building
(Council of the EU, 2011a), the EUSR in Afghanistan is to advise the Afghan
government in areas like good governance, rule of law, electoral reforms and
security sector reforms (Council of the EU, 2011d), the EUSR for the Middle
East peace process was to contribute to reforms in the Palestinian territories

(Council of the EU, 2013), the EUSR for the Great Lakes Region was to
contribute to a comprehensive security sector reform in the Democratic
Republic of Congo, and the EUSR to the African Union is to support
institution-building in the African Union and particularly its crisis manage-
ment capabilities (Council of the EU, 2011e).
In contrast to their colleagues in the Western Balkans, most EUSRs are
dispatched to regions in which the EU does not have the ‘EU member-

ship carrot’ at its disposal. This can have significant impact on a special
representative’s ability to influence domestic politics, limiting their abil-
ity to support democratic transformation processes. As an example, the
EUSR for Central Asia was to support the implementation of the EU’s
‘Central Asia Strategy’. While the EU is often criticised for focusing too
much on security and energy policies instead of human rights issues in
the region (see e.g. Boonstra, 2011: 13; International Crisis Group, 2006:
ii), the EUSR for Central Asia attempted to raise human rights issues in all
talks with local politicians. The officeholder was, however, in a dilemma:
by taking a too critical stance towards the interlocutors’ human rights
records, the EUSR risked to lose political contacts and, thus, overall
influence (interviews with EU officials, 2011). The EUSRs therefore argue
that they have no other choice than to gradually gain trust among the
regional leaders and to diplomatically influence their attitudes on human
rights issues. The former EUSR for Central Asia, Patricia Flor, argued that
the Central Asia governments have a ‘long-term view of transforma-
tion’ with a slow pace of reform. The EU would only be able to achieve
transformation if it engaged on a long-term basis and ‘with the necessary
patience’ (Global Observatory, 2013). Also the EUSR for the Southern
Mediterranean is to contribute to the implementation of the Union’s
human rights policy by maintaining close contact with all parties that are
involved in the transformation processes (Council of the EU, 2011b) and
to gradually become involved in advising the governments in Northern
Africa on reform processes.
The EUSRs’ contribution to conflict resolution efforts

As most EUSRs are appointed for ‘crisis areas’, they are to represent the EU’s
contribution to conflict resolution efforts and to raise its profile in this
policy field. As an example, the priority of the EUSR for South Caucasus
and the crisis in Georgia is his contribution to conflict resolution in the
framework of the ‘Geneva International Discussions’. By fully support-
ing the territorial integrity of Georgia, the EU has a clear position on the
conflicts. Although the EU is thus not considered as a impartial actor in
the negotiations, the former EUSR succeeded in creating some trust
among the participants, in keeping the conflicting parties involved in
the discussions and in consolidating the negotiations forum, which is

the only international forum where the parties meet (interviews with EU
officials, 2011).
When it comes to immediate crisis management, the EUSR for Central
Asia, Pierre Morel, became important during the inter-ethnic crisis in
Kyrgyzstan in summer 2010. As there was a lack of information on the situ-
ation in the country among the EU member states (only four member states
maintain embassies in Bishkek), the EUSRs’ reporting on the crisis became

important for the Council. On this basis, an EU position on the conflict was
consolidated rather quickly. During the crisis, the EUSR closely cooperated
with the special envoys of the OSCE and the UN and established a division
of labour with them: while the OSCE special envoy held constant contact
with the interim government in Bishkek, the EUSR in cooperation with
the German embassy maintained close contacts with human rights groups
in the country and through mediation helped to prevent further conflict
(interview with EU official, 2011).
Also the EUSR for Sudan and South Sudan was involved on several
occasions in conflict resolution efforts. Prior to South Sudan’s declaration
of independence in 2011, the EUSR supported conflict resolution efforts
in the region by assisting former South African President Thabo Mbeki’s
efforts to convince the representatives of Sudan and South Sudan to
sign an agreement in which they renounced all efforts to destabilise one
another (van der Zwan, 2011: 12). Among the advantages of the EUSR in
conflict resolution efforts vis-à-vis the EUDs in Sudan and South Sudan
was the EUSR positioning in Brussels. In any crisis between both states, for
example with respect to the control and access to the oilfields along the
North–South border, the EUDs in Khartoum or Juba can hardly intervene
as they will be considered as prejudiced. In fact, they are for several rea-
sons dependent on cooperation with the governments of Sudan and South
Sudan, for example when implementing EU projects in both countries.
In contrast to the EUDs, the EUSRs can more easily mediate between the
conflict parties without fearing to damage relations with a particular side
(interview with EU official, 2011).
The latter example illustrates that the EUSRs can provide a service that
neither the EUDs nor the EEAS in its current structure are able to deliver. As
observers have argued, both entities do not have the flexibility of the EUSRs
in terms of travelling and participating in conflict resolution forums, liais-
ing with all parties to the conflict on a permanent basis, interacting directly
with international organisations relevant to the conflicts, undertaking shut-
tle diplomacy in crisis situations and retaining some presence in Brussels to
focus the EU’s attention on the conflicts (Socor, 2010). The diplomatic suc-
cesses of the EUSRs are, however, difficult to measure as mediation processes
oftentimes lack transparency.
The EUSRs’ relations with the relevant EU institutions
The success of the EUSRs’ activities, however, not only depends on their
diplomatic skills, but also to large extent on their cooperation with EU
institutions that are involved in the implementation of EU foreign policy.
As will be illustrated, the complicated institutional network in which the
EUSRs operate can have constraints on their performance as the EU’s top
diplomats. In order to fulfil their mandates properly, the EUSRs therefore
have to maintain close contacts and coordinate their activities with the

relevant EU institutions, particularly the External Action Service (EEAS) and
the European Commission (EC).
As pointed out, it is formally the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) that
appoints and mandates the EUSRs. De facto, it is however the PSC which
maintains a privileged link with the EUSRs and remains their primary point
of contact within the Council. Within the framework of the mandate, the
PSC provides the EUSR with strategic guidance and political direction ‘with-
out prejudice to the powers of the HR’(see e.g. Council of the EU, 2011c: 2).
The HR/VP gives the EUSRs operational directions and regularly informs
the PSC about the EUSRs’ activities. In some cases, the EUSRs also report
in person to the PSC. In addition, the EUSRs report on their activities
through biannual mandate implementation reports for the Council, the
HR/VP and the EC. Council working groups, that consist of national dip-
lomats and are chaired by EEAS officials, closely follow the EUSRs’ work
and – in conjunction with the HR/VP – prepare new mandates. On this
basis, the decides on the extension, amendment or termination of the
EUSR’s mandates.
The main task of the HR/VP is the conduct of the CFSP/CSDP, in
which she is assisted by the EEAS (European Union, 2010: Art. 27(3) and
the EUSRs. The latter operate under Catherine Ashton’s authority but
they are not part of the formal hierarchy of the EEAS (Tolksdorf, 2013).
This constellation can lead to some confusion among EU officials. As
Ashton’s predecessor Javier Solana had multiple tasks in the conduct of
the CFSP, he had in practice little contact with most EUSRs. Similarly, also
Catherine Ashton, being absorbed with the establishment of the EEAS,
the CFSP implementation and other tasks, barely has time to oversee the
EUSRs’ activities in detail (interview with EUSR, 2013). An institution for
overseeing the EUSRs’ activities would be the EEAS, which, however, does
not have the authority to do so. Since a clear supervision of the EUSRs’
is in practice not given by the HR/VP and the EEAS, they retain some
autonomy in their activities. Some EU officials therefore refer to them as
‘free electrons within the EU system’ (interview with EU official, 2011).
This can potentially lead to coordination challenges between the EUSRs,
the EEAS and the EUDs.
To ensure coordination between the EUSRs and the EEAS, all EUSRs’
mandates stipulate that they ‘shall work in close coordination’ with the
EEAS, and also Catherine Ashton promised to ensure that ‘the right coor-
dination is established between the EUSRs and the relevant departments
in the EEAS’ (European External Action Service, 2010). This coordination
has, however, not been further defined. Although there are since 2003
specific working procedures for the EUSRs (see Council of the EU, 2003;
Council of the EU, 2007a), they do not spell out the working relations

with the EEAS that did not yet exist at the time. In practice, most EUSR
team members have pointed out that a close coordination with the man-
aging directors and their units in the EEAS ‘makes life easier’. Although
the EEAS staff would be at times irritated how independent the EUSRs can
work, the cooperation to date apparently works well (interviews with EU
officials, 2011).
A close EUSR-EEAS cooperation, however, has its legal limits. As the
EEAS budget is not very generously vested, the service permanently lacks
funds and staff. The EEAS units might therefore be tempted to ‘integrate’
the members of the EUSR teams – particularly those that are based in
Brussels – into their daily work. However, since the EUSRs’ expenditures
are financed through a different budget than the EEAS, it is important
that EUSR staff is not ‘doing the work of the EEAS staff’. This is par-
ticularly important for the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI),
which administers the EUSRs’ budget and is regularly audited by the EU
Court of Auditors. The FPI therefore has to follow the EU Treaty and the
Union’s financial regulations and to demonstrate vis-à-vis the Court that
the EUSRs’ expenditures are ‘in accordance with the principle of sound
financial management’ (interview with EU official, 2011). In sum, while
the EUSR teams and the EEAS are supposed to closely coordinate their
activities, there are specific rules that need to be kept in mind in their
cooperation.
For their daily work, the EUSRs also need to cooperate with the European
Commission (EC). The EC still implements large parts of the EU’s exter-
nal relations, and during their tenures, the EUSRs usually cannot work
effectively without the EC, which can back up and tangibly support their
diplomatic activities through financial aid (interviews with EU officials,
2011). Less important for the daily work of the EUSRs is the EP. Although
the Parliament has gained in the ‘Madrid Compromise’ of June 2010
budgetary control over the EEAS, the EUSRs’ expenditures are not part of
the EEAS budget. Nevertheless, the Lisbon Treaty stipulates that the EUSRs
‘may be involved in briefing the European Parliament’ (European Union,
2010: Lisbon Treaty Art. 36). In the ‘Madrid Compromise’, the EP also
informally ensured that the EUSRs must present themselves in the EP’s
Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET) before taking up their posts (EU Inside,
2010). Although this is only an informal practice and ‘an approach of the
Council to accommodate the EP’ (interview with EU official, 2011), it is

apparently effective: Since 2010, the EUSRs have regularly reported on
their activities in the AFET, and its former chairman Gabriel Albertini (EPP)
in October 2011 stated himself satisfied with the reporting by the EUSRs
(The Parliament, 2011).
Conclusion

The EUSRs have facilitated the conduct of the CFSP by contributing to
the formulation of EU strategies and policies, coordination of EU actors
in the field, establishing contacts with other international organisations,
and supporting political (transformation) processes in their mandate areas.
Through these activities, the EUSRs have contributed to the EU’s profile as a
diplomatic actor. Although there is no specific success story with regard to
conflict resolution, they remain an important policy tool that the EU can
deploy in this policy field.
Against the will of Catherine Ashton, the EUSRs have been retained as a
policy tool in the post-Lisbon era. Among the reasons is the fact that the EEAS
remains in many aspects a work in progress. Due to limited staff numbers,
few EEAS officials are able to contribute to conflict resolution efforts on
a regular basis in regions and countries that are in the strategic interest
of the EU. At the same time, EUSR appointments illustrate the assertive-
ness of the Council to remain the principal in the EU’s conflict resolution
efforts, and thus to retain sufficient control over the policy substance of
the CFSP. The member states can theoretically even use ‘their’ EUSRs to
counterbalance the growing influence of powerful units in the EEAS. This
would contradict the initial philosophy of the EEAS’s creation of a more
integrated and coherent EU foreign policy – and should be prevented by
all means.
Notes
1. The first EUSR was the Italian diplomat Aldo Ajello, a former UN Special
Representative for Mozambique, who was in March 1996 deployed to the Great
Lakes Region in Africa. After the Rwandan civil war, Ajello was to support the
ongoing crisis management efforts by international and African actors in the
region and to help with the preparations of a peace conference. In addition,
Ajello was to make recommendations to the Council on future EU measures.
2. Former SG/HR Javier Solana remarked in 2005 that the EUSR are ‘the visible expres-
sion of the EU’s growing engagement in some of the world’s most troubled coun-
tries and regions. The list of where we have EUSRs is, in part, also a list of where
our foreign and security policy priorities lie’ (Council of the EU, 2005). The first
thematic officeholder was the EUSR for Human Rights, appointed in July 2012.
3. This has different reasons: first, it became clear over the years that regional
EUSRs that are based in Brussels pose less conflict potential with the heads of
the EU delegations (EUDs, the former European Commission delegations, ECDs).

Second, being based in Brussels gives the EUSRs the advantage to closely follow
EU decision-making. At the same time, this constellation prevents the EUSRs
from acting too independently from the EU headquarters, which was oftentimes
a concern of former SG/HR Javier Solana (interview with EU official, Brussels,
2011). Finally, a regional EUSR mandate such as for Central Asia or the South
Caucasus forbids choosing one of the countries in the mandate area for perma-
nent residence (Adebahr, 2009: 142/143).
4. After 2004, particularly the new member states had to be taken into account in
the EUSRs’ nominations.

5. Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the Council could appoint a EUSR ‘whenever it deems
it necessary’ (European Union, 2006: Art. 18(5). It was, however, practice that
the SG/HR made a recommendation to the PSC that discussed the issue before a
decision was formally taken by the Council.
6. In the ‘EEAS Review’ of 2013, Catherine Ashton argued that the current status
of EUSRs is ‘an anomaly post Lisbon’ and should therefore ‘be fully integrated
within the EEAS, while retaining a close link to Member States via the PSC.’
(European External Action Service, 2013: 4/5).
7. Due to the different dimensions of their mandates, the budgets of the EUSRs
differ significantly from each other. In 2011, the EUSRs with the largest budgets
were the EUSR in Bosnia and Herzegovina (€3.74 million) and the EUSR in
Afghanistan (€3.56 million), whereas the EUSR to the African Union had the
lowest budget (€715,000). The budget covers all expenditures of the EUSRs’ activi-
ties and the personnel costs of their teams. The teams are usually composed of
regional experts, policy advisors (some of them are based in Brussels to ensure the
liaising with the EU institutions), and – if based abroad – local staff. The member
states can also propose the secondment of national staff to the EUSR teams.
8. A precise analysis of the performance of individual EUSRs must take into account
the environment in which they operate. Such assessments are rather feasible in
country or region specific studies.
9. Such a situation was for example given in the Great Lakes region, the South
Caucasus, Central Asia, Sudan and Macedonia. Germany is the only member state
that has embassies in all five Central Asian states.
10. See the EU’s ‘Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity’ for the southern
Mediterranean, the ‘Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa’, the ‘EU Strategy
for Security and Development in the Sahel’ and the ‘EU-Central Asia Strategy’.
The latter illustrates how EUSRs can contribute to the formulation and the
implementation of an EU strategy: Pierre Morel, the first EUSR for Central Asia,
in cooperation with the Council Secretariat and the EC drafted a policy paper
outlining options and recommendations for an EU strategy. On this basis, the
German Presidency in the first half of 2007 drafted a strategy which was adopted
by the European Council. The EUSR was to monitor, to report and to advice on
the strategy’s implementation.
11. In order to support the work of the EEAS, the political departments of the EUDs
are to be upgraded with more capacities for political reporting and analysis.
12. Some member states also tend to deploy special envoys to crises areas. As exam-
ples, the UK, the Netherlands and Sweden appointed special envoys for Sudan,
and the UK, France, Germany appointed special envoys for Afghanistan. In
Sudan, these special envoys even held coordination meetings among themselves
(Buckley, 2010: 5).
13. In practical terms, although the two offices were merged to one EU mission, they
retained separate budgets and lines of command and reporting. While most staff
remained contracted by the ECD, advisors in the politico-diplomatic field were
contracted under the EUSR budget. This practice still exists in the post-Lisbon
system.
14. Among the reasons for this change were the concerns by the EU headquarters that
the (rather technical) CSDP missions could become too much involved in political
affairs. As an example, the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina at some
point feared to get too much absorbed into the political agenda of the EUSR and
High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina (see Tolksdorf, 2012: 210).

15. As an example, one of the political advisors of EUSR for Central Asia who was
based in Almaty (Kazakhstan) was deployed to support the EUD in Ashgabad
(Turkmenistan), which did not yet have a fully functioning political section. In
this process, the EUSR team closely cooperated with the relevant units in the
EEAS and its legal service (interview with EU official, 2011).
16. The participation of the ambassadors depends on the size of their country’s devel-
opment assistance and their contribution to the NATO troops in Afghanistan.
From the EU member states, the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and France
are represented in the JCMB.
References
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Louis Michel, European Commissioner for Relations with Africa, Caribbean and
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Representative for the Southern Mediterranean Region’, Doc. 2011/424/CFSP,
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Representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia’, Doc. 2011/518/
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European Union Special Representative to the African Union’, Doc. 2011/621/CFSP,
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of the European Union Special Representative for the Middle East peace process’,
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European Diplomatic Service’, 11/07/2010.
European External Action Service (2010) ‘Speech by High Representative Catherine
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6
Speak up! Getting the EU a Voice at
the UN General Assembly
Fernando Andresen Guimarães

Introduction
With the address by the President of the European Council in the gen-
eral debate that opened the 66th session of the United Nations General
Assembly (UNGA) on 22 September 2011, a small but historic step was taken
for the participation of the European Union (EU) in the work of the United
Nations (UN). Of course, the EU had already been for many years an active
and prominent participant in the work of the UN. But for the very first time,
its positions in the yearly meeting of leaders that kicks-off the UN season
were conveyed not by an EU member state but by the permanent President
of the European Council. Adding a collective voice to that of its member
states at the UN can only serve in the long run to strengthen the role of the
EU in the work of that organisation, for the benefit of the UN, and as an
international actor more broadly.
The invitation for the EU to speak in the General Debate was one of
the concrete and perhaps most visible consequences of the adoption of a
resolution in the General Assembly, which attributed new modalities gov-
erning the role of the EU as an observer in the UN General Assembly. The
resolution also allows the EU representatives to play a more comprehensive
and coherent role in the work of the General Assembly, from the start of
informal negotiations all the way through to the formal presentation of EU
positions. Above all, it marked clearly the evolution of the EU at the UN,
realising the vision in the Lisbon Treaty and recognising the unique nature
of the Union.
On 3 May 2011, the UNGA adopted this resolution – 65/276 – with 180
votes in favour, none against and two abstentions. Thus, the EU gained
working arrangements in the UNGA to allow the external representatives
foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty to take over from the rotating presidencies in
speaking on behalf of the EU and its member states. This successful outcome
came after many months of collective and comprehensive effort by the EU
and its member states in New York, in Brussels and in third-country capitals
88
Getting the EU a Voice at the UN General Assembly 89
to convince the UN membership to support the initiative. Most notably, it

came after an intensified campaign was undertaken following a setback on
14 September 2010, when the effort to have a resolution adopted faltered
after a vote to defer action on the EU’s draft text.
How this positive result was achieved is the subject of this chapter, which
seeks to identify the main elements of the diplomatic effort undertaken by
Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (the HRVP),

and the European External Action Service, working with EU member states
towards a decision that would first and foremost ensure that the EU had a
voice in the UN General Assembly.
Obstacles do, however, remain to the development of the role of the EU
at the UN, not least due to the state-centric nature of that international
organisation. This makes difficult any further strengthening of rights for
the EU at the General Assembly, for example, the right to vote, short of a
politically challenging revision of the UN Charter to allow another category
of members in addition to states. Resolution 65/276 is a significant step as
far as the role of the EU in the General Assembly is concerned. But the abil-
ity of the EU to be represented by the Lisbon Treaty arrangements remains
limited, both at the UN and in other multilateral fora.1
Nevertheless, the adoption of resolution 65/276 was an important
achievement. At the practical level, it now permits the EU to be heard in the
yearly General Debate, not in the form of the leader of a country holding
the rotating presidency but in the person of the President of the European
Council. Perhaps more significantly in view of its practical consequences
in the year-round work of the UNGA, the resolution enables the EU to
continue to act effectively at the UN as a regional or negotiating group: par-
ticipating, negotiating and speaking early in formal meetings to present its
positions, as the rotating EU presidencies had been able to do.
In fact, this resolution was needed to avoid the EU inadvertently being
weakened at the UN by the Lisbon Treaty. Member states exercising the
rotating Council presidencies had no restrictions as UN members in partici-
pating fully on behalf of the EU in the meetings of the General Assembly,
its committees and working groups. But in succeeding the European
Community, the EU became an observer in the General Assembly and was
thus seriously limited by practice in its ability to participate in meetings. It
was obliged to speak only at the end of debates – if at all, as in the case of
the General Debate where no observer, with the exception of Palestine (an
observer entity) and the Holy See (the only observer state), had hitherto
been invited to speak.
The advent of the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of a role for the
permanent EU representatives at the UN – the President of the European
Council, the European Commission and its President, the HRVP, the EU
Delegation – called for new modalities to be approved for the effective
90 Fernando Andresen Guimarães
participation of the EU in the work of the General Assembly.2 This was not
an unreasonable or unduly ambitious objective since the General Assembly
had twice before decided on new modalities of participation for observers:
Palestine (1998) and the Holy See (2004).
First attempt
The EU Delegation and member states’ missions in New York began in

late 2009 to develop proposals on how to overcome the fact that the
EU’s observer status at the UNGA neither allowed it to participate in the
General Debate nor to speak early in other meetings of the UNGA. After a
lengthy period of internal coordination, a proposal – in the form of a draft
resolution – was made known to the UN membership in July 2010 and
tabled on 30 August. EU lobbying efforts in support of the draft resolution
were concentrated primarily in New York. The objective was to obtain a
quick decision in time for participation in the 65th UNGA General Debate
in September. The reaction to the draft by the UN membership seemed ini-
tially not to include any outright opposition.
By early September, however, after the draft resolution had been tabled
and as the EU’s prospective date for a decision rapidly approached, reserva-
tions began to surface more clearly regarding the EU’s ideas. Dissatisfaction
was focused (both for and against) on the implications of such a resolution
for other regional organisations and on questioning the legal basis of the
EU proposal. Just before the day foreseen for a decision, the EU was receiv-
ing clear signals in favour of postponing action on the draft resolution and
undertaking a comprehensive consultation process involving the entire UN
membership. Caribbean countries joined the African group and made it
known that they would move for a deferral should the EU insist on taking
action on its proposal.
The EU did decide to postpone action but only until the next day –
14 September – the very last day of the 64th UNGA session, and thus the last
opportunity to secure the possibility for President Van Rompuy to deliver
the EU’s speech at the General Debate the following week. The text was
amended to accommodate requests, particularly from African countries,
that would allow regional organisations, such as the African Union and the
League of Arab States, to follow suit. But these actions proved to be insuf-
ficient. The African group, although divided on the substance, joined the
Caribbean countries (CARICOM) and some Pacific island states in tabling a
motion to adjourn the debate on the EU draft text, claiming the need for
more time to consider the initiative. Believing that such a motion would
fail and that it had sufficient support to adopt its draft resolution, the EU
proceeded and opposed the motion. However, it lost the vote by a narrow
margin and the motion was adopted.3 Action on the EU draft was, therefore,
deferred.
Setback
This reversal caused much consternation in Europe; it was said to reflect

the EU’s inability to count on the support of a large number of countries,
including cooperation partners. But ultimately, it resulted from a combina-
tion of different factors that had relatively little to do with the state of the
EU’s external relations and more to do with how things are done at the UN
and the perceived implications of the EU’s draft resolution on the distribu-
tion of power at the UN.

Quite evidently, the EU had not had enough time between July and
September 2010 to ensure knowledge and acceptance of its initiative among
the UN membership, and consequently fell afoul of some procedural con-
cerns. In subsequent contacts, many UN members complained that they
had not been adequately consulted nor given enough time to consider the
proposal. The EU Delegation and member state missions in New York had
in effect lobbied all UN member representatives but no wide-ranging cam-
paign had been undertaken at the level of capitals owing to lack of time.
This left the New York-based UN ambassadors of third countries in the lead
in determining positions on the EU initiative and they did so more with
local UN concerns in mind. In fact, it can be said that on 14 September, the
draft resolution fell victim to the mechanics of UN processes without being
strengthened by the dynamics of EU relations more broadly.
But it should not be underestimated that there were then, and there
remained, reservations among some of the UN membership to what the EU
was proposing, namely that it was overreaching. A view of the nature of
the EU’s initiative seemed to take hold – namely that, if allowed, the EU
would emerge with a greater capacity for action at the UN, when the reality
was that the EU was asking merely for continuity; to be able to present the
EU’s positions at the UN just as any EU Member State had done previously
when acting as EU presidency. Among the reservations detected were: a dis-
comfort felt broadly among the UN membership that this new departure in
the status of a non-state actor at the UN would alter the intergovernmental
nature of the UN; that the resolution would usher in an era of regional bloc
dominance; and that it would strengthen the EU vis-à-vis other regional
organisations, give it quasi-membership status and a 28th voice at the UN.
This led to a questioning of the legal basis of the initiative by some who
argued that it was in contradiction with the UN Charter.
There are good reasons to believe that should a vote on the draft resolution
itself have taken place on 14 September, it would have been adopted. An open
rejection of an EU proposal in a straight yes/no vote would have given many
countries pause. It was thus understandable that the EU decided to proceed to
a vote under the circumstances at the time. There was pressure to get the new
arrangements in place for the new UNGA session, which began the following
week, and to avoid getting bogged down in a long consultation process. But
in the face of calls for postponement, submitting the draft resolution to a vote
clearly carried a high degree of risk since it was possible to argue – as did the
African, Caribbean and Pacific members of the UN – that there had not been
enough time to consider the EU proposal properly in that short period from
July to early September, which included the summer holiday period.
In the end, procedural objections led to the success of the no-action
motion, avoiding a direct vote on the merits of the proposal. Had such a
direct vote taken place, it may well have succeeded, given that the proce-

dural tally had been close and that many UN members would have been
loath to vote directly against the EU. But it may well have left the EU in a
precarious position, with the UN divided about its new role. As it turned
out, the vote to defer action on the EU proposal did succeed and the EU was
forced to come up with another way to secure the desired result.
The global campaign
In response to the 14 September setback, HRVP Ashton decided to launch a

global campaign coordinated by the EEAS in support of the work of the EU
Delegation and member states’ missions to the UN, with a view to establish-
ing the conditions necessary to secure modalities for the EU that would per-
mit its effective participation in the work of the UN. The goal was to build
up broad support for the EU’s initiative on the basis that 1) on substance, it
did not represent a real change to the prevailing situation at the UN before
the Lisbon Treaty but merely an accommodation to the very specific nature
of the EU, and 2) that, on process, the EU would henceforth undertake a
deliberate and timely consultation of the UN membership, seeking a deci-
sion in principle by consensus.
In a first step, the HRVP presented her strategy to the Foreign Affairs
Council for endorsement on 25 October 2010. This strategy, based on
recommendations made by the EU Heads of Mission to the UN, sought to
change the dynamics of the issue: ‘from the 14 September decision to defer
action into a vote of confidence in the EU’s work at the United Nations’. To
do so, it was necessary to undertake an intensified collective campaign in
New York, in Brussels, in EU capitals and in third countries directly, in order
to show clearly that the EU was responding to the concerns expressed by
consulting widely, that it was resolved to continue consultations to under-
stand and address the issues raised, and that it was committed absolutely to
having a resolution adopted and to that end would be requesting the sup-
port of all UN members.
This intensified campaign would be conducted under a few guiding prin-
ciples developed from the assessment of efforts thus far, namely that:
• the issue would be raised as an EU priority in meetings with third coun-

tries at all levels, particularly in high-level meetings;
• the EU would signal clearly its objective to have the resolution adopted
by consensus;
• all 165 non-EU UN members would be engaged;
• the EU would move for a decision when the time was right;
• the EU would engage the UN membership in the traditional form of
‘consultations of the whole’.
Rolling out the campaign

After the HRVP’s strategy was endorsed by member states, the EEAS focused
first on establishing and ensuring coherence in the messaging. It was evi-
dent that some perceptions regarding the nature of the EU’s proposal would
need to be clarified and indeed limited. For example, earlier reference to the
proposal that it would ‘upgrade’ the EU’s status and capacity for action at
the UN would need to be corrected: the UN membership had to understand
that the EU’s status would be left unchanged – all that was sought were
working arrangements to allow the EU to intervene in debates as before.
It would be difficult to convince third countries of the true nature of the
EU’s initiative if representatives were inadvertently calling for an upgrade
or a strengthening of the EU’s status at the UN. Second, it was important
to mute criticism of countries that had voted ‘against’ the EU in the proce-
dural vote on 14 September. In addition to conceding the point that the UN
membership may legitimately have wanted more time to consider all the
implications of the resolution, it is very difficult to seek support in a climate
of recrimination.
In Brussels, starting with a comprehensive rolling-out of the new strategy
and then on a regular basis, the EEAS briefed the Commission, the Council
(the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper II), the Political and
Security Committee, and the United Nations Working Party (CONUN)),
and the European Parliament (the Foreign Affairs committee – AFET EU-UN
working group), as well as the EU Heads of Delegation, who had gathered
in Brussels for their yearly meeting at headquarters. Arrangements were
made and implemented swiftly to provide concise, tailored written brief-
ings, particularly to the President of the European Council, the President
of the European Commission, the HRVP, other Commissioners, MEPs, as
well as Heads of Delegation and other senior officials in the EEAS and the
Commission for use in meetings with third countries (either in Brussels or
during visits), in summits and other high-level events. In addition to regular
oral briefings of the Council mentioned above, the EEAS established a net-
work of member state points of contact in capitals in order to have a dedi-
cated system of sharing information quickly on campaign efforts. Tailored
written briefings for use in meetings with third countries were also offered
and provided to member state foreign ministries.
In parallel to the efforts to implement the HRVP’s strategy and establish
coherent messaging across the board within the EU on what was wanted
at the UN and how it was to be achieved, the EEAS worked in close coor-
dination with the EU Delegation and member states missions in New York
to develop and issue a set of clear instructions on 22 October to both EU
delegations and EU member states representing the EU in non-EU capitals of
UN members with a view to carry out demarches, signalling the EU’s inten-
tion to consult globally and comprehensively as well as its commitment to
pursue the adoption by the UN General Assembly of a resolution on the
necessary modalities for the EU.

A second round of tailored demarches was prepared and launched in
mid-December following the holding of the first ‘informal consultations
of the whole’ with the UN membership in New York on 22 November
2010. A third and final round of demarches in third-country capitals was
undertaken on 28 March 2011 with the delivery of a letter from the HRVP
to all 165 non-EU members of the UN referring to the tabling of our draft
resolution and requesting support for action in the General Assembly on
3 May 2011. A crucial factor in the success of demarches in third countries,
and indeed in the success of getting the resolution adopted the second time
around, was the inclusion of EU member states in the demarches made.
Their participation removed all doubt as to the commitment of EU member
states to the initiative and brought to bear locally the various strengths
member state ambassadors may have had personally or nationally.
The EEAS also focused its attention on those third-country ambassadors in
Brussels, who were seen to be an important channel of communication to
make the EU’s case in third countries. Adding their perspective from Brussels
on relations with the EU provided a balance in third-country capitals to
the UN-centric views that may have been provided from New York by their
respective colleagues at the UN. This was an important complement to the
campaign efforts being undertaken in New York and in third-country capi-
tals directly, and ensured clarity, coherence and consistency in the messages
of the EU regarding its initiative.
In view of the predominance of African, Caribbean and Pacific countries
(ACP) among those that did not vote with the EU on 14 September, these
were the object of particular attention by the EEAS. In coordination with the
demarches undertaken in New York and in their respective capitals, and in a
complementary manner to individual bilateral meetings, the EEAS engaged
the ACP Secretary-General and the ACP ambassadors in Brussels to promote
a collective understanding of the EU initiative. Following individual meet-
ings with ambassadors, the EEAS also briefed respectively the African group
of ambassadors and those of the Caribbean. The sequence of first meeting
ambassadors bilaterally before going into a meeting of the wider group was
seen as helpful to disseminate understanding of the EU’s initiative.
Additional efforts were focused particularly on the African Union summit
in Addis Ababa at the end of January 2011, where Commissioner Andris
Piebalgs, supported by the EEAS, met with a number of African countries
to discuss the EU’s initiative at the UN. Obtaining the support of the 54
members of the African group at the UN was a crucial objective of the cam-
paign. While a large majority of these countries expressed bilaterally their
support for the EU resolution, the position of the group at the UN remained
unclear due to the continued resistance of a small minority among them
that had effectively aligned themselves with the Caribbean. The Caribbean
Community – CARICOM – played a leading role in the affair. Already at the
time of the first attempt in September 2010, the Caribbean countries took a

substantive position of reservation regarding the EU’s initiative, arguing that
it was not in conformity with the UN Charter nor with the intergovernmen-
tal nature of the UN, and that the issue was of a fundamental nature that
needed to be treated generally and not specifically to the EU. They were also
among those that were critical of the EU for not having undertaken informal
consultations of the whole UN membership before proceeding to action.
Even after the EU had reached out substantially to the entire UN member-
ship in New York, in Brussels and in their respective capitals, and even after
the EU undertook an open process of well-attended informal consultations
on the EU’s draft resolution, a small group of Caribbean countries continued
to hold strong reservations about the initiative.
The EU’s campaign in New York, Brussels and third countries focused on
systematically engaging the UN membership bilaterally and in groups, as well
as collectively in the consultations of the whole at the UN, to ensure clarity
and understanding of its initiative. Furthermore, the EU signalled clearly that
its preference would be to adopt a decision in the General Assembly by consen-
sus. This UN practice helps to secure the support of many countries that would
otherwise feel uncomfortable to vote yes or no. As a result of this campaign
approach, each and every member (and even observer) of the UN could be
heard and engaged on the substance and the procedure of the EU’s initiative.
For example, the EU was able even to address a specific difficulty raised by an
observer – the Holy See – during informal consultations on 14 February 2011.
In support of negotiating efforts at the UN, the EEAS undertook a mission to
the Vatican and subsequent discussions in New York soon reached an agree-
ment with the Holy See.
Success!
By early spring 2011, the campaign had managed to meet its objective of
reaching out and consulting comprehensively. The entire UN membership
now knew what the EU wanted and why, and had in turn been given ample
opportunity to voice any concerns. It was clear, however, after a round of
consultations of the whole in New York on 14 February that while most UN
members were now ready to support the EU, reservations persisted on the
part of a small number of Caribbean and Pacific islands.
Discussion among EU missions in New York began to centre on the need
to set a date for action. There was growing impatience with a small number
of delegations that continued to call for negotiation of the EU’s text in con-
sultations of the whole, while refusing to engage bilaterally with the EU.
Furthermore, the African group members continued to maintain a degree
of ambiguity in their positions. On the one hand, they recognised that the
EU had moved considerably to meet their concerns regarding the possibility
of other regional organisations such as the African Union benefiting from
similar arrangements in the future. But, on the other hand, they kept their
support for the EU proposal conditional on a (then non-existing) common

position of the group. EU missions in New York felt that enough had been
done in the campaign and recommended that the EU move for a decision,
thereby putting pressure on the UN membership to take their positions.
This was understandable. The EU had done a lot. But the question was: had
it done enough? And, above all, was it generally accepted that the EU had
done everything normally expected at the UN to promote a proper under-
standing of and obtain support for an initiative of this type?
In late March, on the basis of the recommendation from the EU missions
in New York, HRVP Ashton – in agreement with President Van Rompuy and
President Barroso, and endorsed by Coreper II – decided to table a revised
draft resolution at the UN, supported by a further round of demarches in
non-EU member states of the UN, making it clear that the EU was now mov-
ing towards a decision. To avoid any misunderstanding, it was important to
communicate widely and comprehensively among the UN membership to
ensure clear and full knowledge of the EU’s movements and intentions. By
early April, the Caribbean countries had agreed to engage in direct discus-
sions on the EU’s text in New York, which was a crucial step in the broader
interest of showing the willingness of the EU to do everything it could to
reach an agreement.
The EU Delegation in New York worked hard with EU member states’ mis-
sions to reach an agreement with the Caribbean but this was a very difficult
exercise. It was clear that the hard-line position of CARICOM in resisting
anything but the neutralisation of the EU’s initiative was advocated only by
a very small minority among them. But group solidarity prevailed and the
uncompromising stance was taken on behalf of all members of the group.
For example, despite ongoing discussions between them and the EU to find
a compromise, CARICOM representatives distributed proposals to the entire
membership of the UN that were clearly incompatible with the EU’s initia-
tive, because they would in essence nullify its effect and were, therefore,
unacceptable to the EU. The discussions came to an abrupt end.
EU ambassadors in New York proposed then to go for immediate action.
Before doing so, the concern in the EEAS was to ensure that the UN mem-
bership understood that the EU was moving towards action after doing its
utmost to engage CARICOM. This was crucial not only to secure the backing
of these ACP partners but also to consolidate support for the EU more widely
since accommodating the Caribbean, within reason, was widely considered
to be a bellwether of how well the EU had done its job. To do so, a brief addi-
tional delay was seen as necessary as well as the inclusion of some further
amendments in the text in order to show the EU’s good will and spirit of
compromise. A revised draft was tabled and a date for adoption after Easter
was fixed and communicated to all the UN membership.
As the date approached, the EU’s efforts to make its case to CARICOM
intensified with direct letters and telephone calls from Presidents Van
Rompuy and Barroso to the heads of government in the region. However,

broad manifestations of support for the EU from the region did not trans-
late in progress on the ground in New York. Then, quite unexpectedly, and
despite the long and comprehensive engagement of the UN membership
on the issue, the African group in New York requested more time to discuss
the issue. This suddenly raised the spectre of an outcome similar to the set-
back vote of 14 September. The carefully constructed campaign seemed to
be unravelling in the face of resistance from four or five countries, which
remained opposed and the EU could again face the undesirable scenario of
a contested and divisive vote.
Pushing ahead with the planned date for action on the draft resolution
presented the EU with risks. Even if such a vote could probably have been
won at that point, following the EU’s extensive global campaign, where
would that leave the stated goal of changing the situation into ‘a vote of
confidence’ in the work of the EU? And what if on the day of the vote a
‘killer amendment’ (for example, a seemingly innocent reaffirmation of the
UN Charter’s language on the primacy of states’ rights designed to nullify
the modalities sought by the EU) would have been proposed and approved,
successfully neutering the initiative? There was agreement among all con-
cerned that the scenarios for action on the EU’s resolution were very difficult
and preparations were made to counter any possible delaying or spoiling
tactic in the form of procedural motions or killer amendments.
This was the situation when HRVP Ashton decided to travel to New York
to undertake a final direct push on the ground before action was taken
on the draft resolution, which was scheduled for Tuesday 3 May. By any
measure, the EU had done everything considered necessary for this kind of
initiative: the draft resolution had been tabled in good time (late March),
all capitals had been lobbied directly with a letter from the HRVP, and the
EU remained demonstrably open to engagement with CARICOM to address
their concerns, thereby conveying the image of a patient and deliberative
partner but one determined to proceed to a decision. But the danger of an
upset remained.
Less than a day ahead of the vote, HRVP Ashton engaged directly with the
CARICOM Permanent Representatives in New York. But an initial outreach
to the Caribbean ambassadors in the morning of 2 May seemed to produce
no results. As the final campaign event in the pre-vote phase began that
evening – an EU Delegation reception hosted in honour of the HRVP to
which all UN representatives had been invited – it seemed that action the
next day would surely follow the worst-case scenarios of no-action motions
and ‘killer amendments’, which the EU was prepared for but wished to
avoid.
In the meantime, however, HRVP Ashton had tasked Pedro Serrano, the
Acting Head of the EU Delegation, to continue reaching out to CARICOM
and that evening he received an indication that they might be willing
to reach an agreement on the basis of compromise elements. The EU

had been there before with its Caribbean partners but a glint of daylight
seemed to show. At the reception, many UN member representatives had
come and gone, following brief speeches by HRVP Ashton and the UN
Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, who – unsolicited – openly endorsed the
EU initiative. At that point, the Caribbean ambassadors arrived in a group
and intense discussions then ensued, directed by HRVP Ashton, until an
agreement was reached provisionally on the spot between the HRVP and
the spokesperson for the Caribbean ambassadors. A meeting of the EU Heads
of Mission was then called for early next morning and that agreement was
validated by EU member states.
On the morning of 3 May, the day scheduled for action on the EU initia-
tive, intense activity continued in order to ensure that the amended draft
resolution following the agreement with the Caribbean was made known
to all in the General Assembly. In particular, agreement was sought from
the African group in view of the position it had taken recently asking for a
further postponement of action. In the end, as requested by the EU, both
CARICOM and the African group conveyed clearly to the rest of the mem-
bership their agreement with the EU. In fact, the meeting of the General
Assembly did not formally start for some time as these crucial manoeuvres
were carried out.
The session proceeded only after a significant delay following much
floor activity aimed at avoiding any possible confusion and ensuring that
all UN members were made aware of the situation of agreement with the
aforementioned groups and therefore of the possibility of having the draft
resolution adopted by consensus. When the acting President of the General
Assembly moved for a decision, it seemed a very strong possibility that the
EU had actually reached its goal of getting a consensus on the resolution.
But, in an action that deviated from the supportive position of the African
group, Zimbabwe submitted an amendment to the EU draft resolution and
then asked for a recorded vote. The amendment was resoundingly defeated
and the result of the vote on the resolution itself – 180 votes in favour,
0 against and the 2 abstentions of Syria and Zimbabwe (in reality for reasons
unrelated to the initiative at hand) – was unequivocal.
The adoption of the EU’s resolution was marked by a round of applause
and in a historic first, HRVP Ashton was given the floor to speak from the
EU’s observer seat and address the General Assembly after the vote. As a line
of delegates formed to congratulate the HRVP, it was clear that the EU had
indeed achieved a ‘vote of confidence’ in the work of the EU at the UN.
Conclusion: what was gained, what was lost

and what does it mean
The resolution

The adoption of resolution 65/276 now permits the representatives of the
EU foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty broadly to carry out the same functions
of presenting appropriately the positions of the EU at the UN. As men-
tioned above, this was best personified just four and half months later on
22 September 2011 in the address of President Van Rompuy at the General
Debate alongside other world leaders. The EU can now participate in the
general debate of the General Assembly, following the practice of the only
two other observers that have that right – Palestine and the Holy See – and
able to speak at the end of any morning or afternoon session taking into
account the level of the EU representative.
Of great importance for the work of the EU at the UN throughout the
year, the arrangements also give the EU delegation the right to be inscribed
in the speakers list of formal UN meetings among representatives of major
groups. In effect, this allows EU representatives to replace the rotating
presidencies, present EU positions in formal meetings and thereby assume
responsibility for the full process of negotiations and representation from
start to finish, thereby ensuring continuity of work and effectiveness. While
there persists a divergence with CARICOM on whether the resolution allows
the EU to speak before other UN member states representing groups, the UN
Secretariat’s interpretation of the resolution does not support this view and
the practice today is that the EU speaks ‘among’ representatives, as agreed
and stated in the resolution.4
Other modalities achieved also permit EU representatives and particularly
the EU Delegation to carry out their functions at the UN. The resolution
allows written EU communications to be distributed by the Delegation as
official UN documents, without having to go through a member state as
before, and it gives EU representatives the right to present proposals and
amendments orally in formal sessions of the General Assembly and in inter-
national conferences. This latter arrangement strengthens the role of the EU
representatives in UN proceedings and is a departure from previous practice,
as it had not been granted to Palestine and the Holy See. But, as a concession
to obtain an agreement on the resolution, it was itself circumscribed in the
final phase of the negotiations not to allow the EU to submit these propos-
als and amendments to a vote. This must still be done by a member state.
The imperative of obtaining broad support and ensure the passage of
the resolution with the core elements for the EU (undertaking visibly the
representation of the EU by speaking in the General Debate and being able

to negotiate and present proposals from start to finish in the work of the
General Assembly year-round) did lead the EU to agree to the limitation of
other arrangements in the final round. Namely, the resolution allows EU
representatives to exercise the right of reply but this has been restricted to
only one intervention per item and only regarding positions of the EU. The
latter criterion is unproblematic since the EU representatives by definition
can only express agreed positions of the EU. The significant fact is that, even

if it can only do so once, the EU does have the right of reply.
The resolution is explicit about the rights EU representatives do not have:
the right to vote, the right to co-sponsor draft resolutions or decisions,
and the right to present candidates. With the exception of the right to
co-sponsor draft resolutions, these rights had also not been given to Palestine
and the Holy See. This does, therefore, conform to the existing practice. As
far as co-sponsorship is concerned, the EU does this anyway through the
individual co-sponsorship of each and every one of its member states.
Not mentioned in the resolution is one final concession that the EU made
at the end of the process to ensure adoption of the resolution not to claim
the right to raise points of order. According to the UN Secretariat, the fact
that the EU dropped this element from its draft resolution signifies that this
right has not been given, and it does represent a loss to EU representatives
in the cut and thrust of UN meetings not to be able to speak for the EU on
points of order and procedure. But this limitation can be overcome by close
coordination with EU member states.
A final word on the arrangements contained in the resolution is due on seat-
ing. The text states that the EU shall be ensured settings among the observers.
While UN member states have six seats on the floor of the General Assembly
hall, other observers have only two along the side of the hall, but according
to the precedent set by Palestine and the Holy See, the EU could have tried to
match the state-like 6-seat arrangements accorded to them. But the EU explic-
itly did not pursue this arrangement as a way of stressing that it was not after
treatment as if it was a state. The real significance of the seating provision is
that the EU is now guaranteed a seat, which is particularly important in the
much more frequent cases when meetings occur in smaller rooms at the UN
and elsewhere.
The campaign
As far as the successful campaign to secure the adoption of the UNGA reso-
lution is concerned, it is worth underlining the following elements of what
was one of the first successful global diplomatic outreach initiatives by the
EU after the Lisbon Treaty:
First, direct leadership of EU efforts by the HRVP, supported by the EEAS and
the EU Delegation, was essential for success. This allowed the development
of a comprehensive and global strategy, fully endorsed by EU Member

States, with coordinated action in New York, Brussels and third countries.
Furthermore, the HRVP personally ensured the successful negotiation of the
draft resolution text in the final phase of the process, which led to broad
agreement and the adoption of the resolution in positive circumstances.
The full engagement in the campaign of the President of the European
Council, the President of the European Commission, the HRVP and
Commissioners was of great value to convey messages and promote the

initiative at the highest levels. The consistency and coherence of cam-
paign messages from all EU players, namely the Delegations abroad, the
Commission, the Council, member states and the European Parliament,
was essential and secured effectively by the EEAS through centralised and
coordinated briefings.
The swift flow of information between the EEAS, the EU Delegation and
member state missions in New York, EU delegations and member state
embassies elsewhere on action undertaken in the campaign was an impor-
tant contribution to success. The establishment of a network of contacts
in EU member states ensured the swift flow of information and prompt,
coordinated action.
The coordination by the EEAS of timely and targeted demarches in third
countries by EU delegations and member state embassies was also an impor-
tant factor in the success of the campaign, informing and reassuring third
countries that the EU was listening and engaging, as well as on what and
when the EU would act.
Finally, the campaign strategy to seek favourable conditions for adoption –
that is, to promote good knowledge and acceptance of the initiative; dem-
onstrate respect for UN practices and processes; and ensure sufficient lead
times for action – and not to be governed by arbitrary time constraints,
proved to be successful. Seeking (and being seen to seek) consensus empha-
sised the good will of the EU and ultimately isolated deliberate political
opposition to the EU’s initiative, preventing it from falling victim to proce-
dural complications. This approach garnered crucial political capital at the
UN, securing not only the adoption of the resolution in a positive atmos-
phere but also an auspicious start to its new role in the UN.
Obtaining the resolution, under challenging circumstances and even at a
time when the EU of the Lisbon Treaty was only beginning to take shape,
was a clear demonstration of the value-added of the HRVP and the EEAS,
which provided a strategy, coordination and effective negotiation to pro-
duce the successful result. It is, of course, a case that is specific to the UN and
its particularities but, it also reflects clearly some of the difficult issues the
EU faces in engaging effectively in a world of states and suggests that a prag-
matic, flexible and adaptive approach is necessary to obtain even incremen-
tal progress in the further development of the EU’s role in external action.
Notes
Fernando Andresen Guimarães serves in the European External Action Service and
from October 2010 to May 2011 was tasked by HRVP, Catherine Ashton, to head the
campaign task force at the EEAS HQ to support efforts to obtain new modalities gov-
erning the work of the European Union as an observer in the UNGA.
1. For more details of the post-Lisbon Treaty participation of the EU in the work of
the United Nations and on the modalities sought and obtained in GA resolution
65/276, see Serrano de Haro (2012/4).

2. The new EU representatives do not have any difficulties in presenting EU positions
in the Security Council since its rules of procedure allow them to be invited to
participate in Security Council meetings under similar conditions to EU member
states representing the rotating EU presidency.
3. 75 votes in favour, 71 against, 26 abstentions, and 19 not voting.
4. Note by the Secretary-General on the Participation of the European Union in the
work of the United Nations, A/65/856, 1 June 2011.
References
Serrano de Haro, P. D. (2012) ‘Participation of the EU in the work of the UN: General
Assembly Resolution 65/276’ in Centre for the Law of EU External Relations working
paper 2012/4.
United Nations General Assembly (2011) Note by the Secretary-General on the
Participation of the European Union in the work of the United Nations, A/65/856,
1 June 2011.
7
The EU as a Coercive Diplomatic
Actor? The EU-3 Initiative
towards Iran

Tom Sauer
Introduction
Iran’s nuclear programme has been part of the international picture since
2003. While the EU is not (yet) an immediate neighbour of Iran, and
while the EU does not have the reputation of dealing with ‘hard’ security
threats like nuclear proliferation, the EU – and more in particular the UK,
France and Germany – surprised the rest of the world by taking on the
Iranian issue.1 The EU-3 did not only negotiate; they were also prepared
to use threats and carry them out in the form of economic sanctions. This
approach is called coercive diplomacy (George, 1997; Jakobsen, 1998; Sauer,
2007; Schelling, 1966).
Three elements characterise coercive diplomacy in general: 1) a demand;
2) a threat; and 3) time pressure. Sometimes, positive incentives are also part
of the game. Coercive diplomacy begins with a specific demand formulated
vis-à-vis the opponent. The objective of the demand is to stop or reverse an
action that the opponent has started. As this demand is supplemented with
a threat, the demand has to be understood as a requirement. The success
or failure of coercive diplomacy depends on whether the demand will be
executed.
Second, the demand has to be supported by a threat. ‘If you do not agree
with this demand, I will punish you by doing X or Y’. As Alexander George
(1997: 4) has pointed out: ‘the general idea of coercive diplomacy is to
back one’s demand on an adversary with a threat of punishment for non-
compliance that he will consider credible and potent enough to persuade
him to comply with the demand.’ Most of the time, the threat has to be
made explicit. The latter can be further supported by action, for example,
economic sanctions.
Third, it is not sufficient to have a demand combined with a threat.
Coercive diplomacy also requires some kind of time pressure. Peter Viggo
Jakobsen (1998: 29) states that: ‘Opponents will simply not perceive a threat
of force as credible unless it is accompanied by a deadline for compliance.’
103
104 Tom Sauer
In theory, coercive diplomacy looks like an efficient approach to persuade

opponents and at the same time to prevent war. In reality, many factors have to
be present in order to make coercive diplomacy a success: a legitimate demand,
a credible threat, support by public opinion in carrying out the threat, the
motivation to win the contest of will and so on (Sauer, 2007). The success rate
of coercive diplomacy is rather low. It is not by chance that the title of George’s
book is The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy. Nevertheless, if the opponent is intran-
sigent, coercive diplomacy may be a valid alternative to war.

Before describing and analyzing EU’s coercive diplomacy vis-à-vis Iran,
one should keep in mind that the EU is not used to playing such a strategic
role in international politics. This is arguably the first time ever that the EU
is so much involved in trying to resolve an international security problem
that at first sight is not an urgent and large-scale threat for the EU and its
member states.
On the other hand, it is not that the EU has neglected the threat of weap-
ons of mass destruction, although the USA took the lead in fighting prolif-
eration in the past. The start of a common European approach dates back to
1981 when a working group on nuclear non-proliferation was created in the
framework of the European Political Cooperation (EPC). In the second half
of the 1980s, the working group met four times per year. Joint statements
in international organisations like the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the UN General Assembly
followed. When the so-called Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
was established in the beginning of the 1990s, non-proliferation was men-
tioned as one of the specific items. In preparing the Extension Conference
of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1995, the EU agreed on a
joint action. In the second half of the 1990s and even beyond, the EU non-
proliferation activities slowed down to a certain extent due to differences
amongst member states, for example during the review conferences of the
NPT once every five years.
The internal divisions amongst EU member states became especially tense
before and during the Iraq war in 2003. The latter can be regarded as a
preventive war against an alleged weapon of mass destruction programme,
which later on appeared not to exist. This debacle on behalf of the EU, and
in hindsight also the USA, was the trigger for the EU to improve its own
non-proliferation policy. Iran became its first test case.
The EU’s reaction to Iran’s nuclear programme
The difference between a civilian and a military nuclear programme is that

the former aims at generating electricity, while the latter can be used to
produce nuclear weapons. An inherent difficulty in preventing the spread
of nuclear weapons is that the technology that is used for building civilian
reactors can also be used for military purposes.
Iran is a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and is

therefore legally bound not to acquire nuclear weapons. While Iran has the
right under the NPT to build a nuclear programme for civilian purposes, it
also has the obligation to declare its activities to the IAEA. The problem is
that Iran had not declared everything. Teheran, for instance, admitted in
the summer of 2003 to have experimented in the past with uranium conver-
sion. Many observers therefore believe that Iran has been trying to acquire
nuclear weapons in secret, or has at least been trying to build up the capa-

bilities that are needed to produce nuclear weapons (Fitzpatrick, 2006). Core
elements of these rumours were already confirmed when the IAEA visited
Iran in the second half of February 2003 (IAEA, 2003).
While the EU in the past may have reacted with a non-binding statement
or would not have reacted at all because of internal divisions, this time
the EU reacted promptly. A couple of weeks after IAEA Director-General
Mohammed El Baradei visited Iran and confirmed the existing rumours
in February 2003, the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs (the late Anna
Lindh) proposed in the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council
(GAERC) to come up with a new EU non-proliferation policy. Most observ-
ers link the Basic Principles for an EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons
of Mass Destruction (Council, 2003), which later on were complemented by
the European Security Strategy, to the conflict in Iraq – and in particular the
divisions within the EU and the absence of a constructive alternative to the
belligerent plans of the neoconservative administration in the USA. But
it cannot be denied that the Iranian and North Korean programmes also
played a crucial role (Alvarez-Verdugo, 2006; Denza, 2005; Portela, 2003;
Sauer, 2004).
On 21 October 2003, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of France, the UK
and Germany – the so-called ‘EU-3’ – flew to Teheran to negotiate directly
with the Iranian regime. Dominique de Villepin, Jack Straw and Joschka
Fisher succeeded in signing an agreement with Iran. In exchange for further
negotiations, Iran agreed to suspend its enrichment programme, to sign
the Additional Protocol of the IAEA and to adhere to the Protocol in the
meantime.2 This was perceived as a major breakthrough. Days later, Iran
submitted a ‘full’ declaration about its nuclear programme to the IAEA.
Unfortunately, over the next months, it became clear that Iran still had not
declared everything, and the agreement broke down.
The EU-3 proposed a new overall deal with Iran on 21 October 2004 that
would include the start of broader negotiations, economic benefits and the
delivery of light water reactors.3 This second EU-3/Iran agreement was formally
signed in Paris on 14 November 2004, and included a renewal of the suspension
of the Iranian nuclear programme.4 This second agreement between the EU and
Iran also fell apart. Since then: the EU gradually increased the pressure (includ-
ing economic sanctions) (see Table 7.1), resulting in an Interim Agreement
between the EU-3 + 3 and Iran, signed on 24 November 2013. The deal includes
106 Tom Sauer
Table 7.1 Chronological overview of main events with respect to Iranian nuclear
programme
Years Events
February 2003 IAEA visit to Iran confirms non-declared installations

June 2003 Basic Principles for an EU Strategy Against Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction (Draft), with the final document
agreed upon in December 2003
October 2003 The (first) EU-Iran agreement

November 2003 ‘Full’ declaration by Iran
December 2003 High Representative for CFSP Javier Solana joins EU-3
March 2004 IAEA warns of missing parts in Iran’s declaration of November
2003
May 2004 Second ‘full’ declaration by Iran
September 2004 Iran starts uranium conversion, followed by EU ultimatum
November 2004 The second EU-Iran agreement, including the suspension of
conversion
June 2005 Ahmadinejad wins the presidential elections
August 2005 New EU proposal is rejected by Iran, and conversion is restarted
January 2006 Iran starts uranium enrichment
February 2006 The Iranian file moves from IAEA to United Nations Security
Council: the EU-3+3 (or the P-5 + 1) take over negotiations
June 2006 New proposal by EU-3+3 to Iran offered by Javier Solana
July 2006 The (first) UN SC resolution 1696
December 2006 The (second) UN SC resolution 1737, including (for the first time)
economic sanctions
March 2007 The (third) UN SC resolution 1747
August 2007 IAEA and Iran agreed on an Action Plan
March 2008 The (fourth) UN SC resolution 1803
June 2008 A new proposal by EU-3+3 to Iran offered by Solana
September 2008 The (fifth) UN SC resolution 1835
June 2009 Ahmadinejad wins presidential elections again, followed by
massive protests and repression
June 2010 ‘Shadow war’ becomes visible with Stuxnet (cyberwar) and the
murder of Iranian nuclear scientists
May 2010 Brazilian-Turkish agreement with Iran, but immediately rejected
by USA and EU
June 2010 The (sixth) UN SC resolution 1929
mid-2010 New unilateral economic sanctions by USA and EU
January 2012 EU announces (unilateral) oil embargo vis-à-vis Iran from July
2012 onwards
July 2012 EU oil embargo enters into force
June 2013 Rouhani succeeds Ahmadinejad as President
November 2013 Interim-Agreement between the EU-3+3 and Iran
a partial sanction relief in exchange of limiting Iran’s nuclear programme: no

enrichment beyond 5%; neutralising the 20% enriched uranium; no expansion
of the number of gas centrifuges; and freezing the Arak heavy water facility. It
remains to be seen whether this major agreement, the first in ten years, will be
implemented and will be supplemented with a General Agreement in 2014.
The remainder of this chapter analyses the EU approach vis-à-vis the

Iranian nuclear programme by using the analytical framework of this book:
1) multi-level analysis: who is negotiating with whom? 2) the conduct and
process of negotiations and practice and 3) the overall impact, performance
and power of the EU.
Multi-level analysis: who is negotiating with whom?

Overall, in terms of cohesion, the EU-3 and the EU High Representative –
first Solana, and later on Lady Ashton – have done a rather good job. While
there was a lot of internal – and sometimes even public criticism – vis-à-vis
the EU-3, when push came to shove the EU spoke most of the time with
‘one’ voice, namely the EU High Representative. For a sensitive foreign
policy issue such as the Iranian nuclear programme, a level of cohesion with
respect to EU foreign policy – already throughout a period of ten years – is
noticeable.
The remainder of this chapter, however, looks to the criticisms and the
internal differences within the EU. The fact that the EU initiative in 2003
came from the EU-3 – the UK, France, and Germany – was criticised by Italy
and the smaller member states. An Italian security expert put it this way:
‘[Italy] has insisted that the threesome club be broadened and made more
EU-wide’ (Missiroli, 2006: 5). The EU-3 format was indeed new and had
no institutional basis. On the other hand, nothing forbids the three most
powerful countries in the EU to take a common initiative. As they did not
present themselves as the EU, but as the EU-3, it was hard to make a formal
complaint. After a while, and especially when the EU-3 efforts were regarded
as less successful, the criticisms by other member states diminished. For the
first time the EU-3 was even mentioned in formal EU documents in 2011
(see, for example, Council of the EU, 2012).
An institutional debate arose between the European Commission and the
European Council. While the European Commission preferred to rescue the
Trade and Association Agreement talks with Iran and did not want to link
it with the nuclear issue, the European Council Secretariat (and the EU-3)
won the internal debate, and the trade talks were suspended in June 2003
(Beatty, 2003; Everts, 2003). The demarche of the EU-3 in October 2003 was
a compromise between both approaches: while it put pressure on Iran, it
also promised negotiations.
Further, right from the beginning, tension between using a hard and/or
soft approach existed internally among the EU member states, explained by
both economic interests and ideological differences of the member states. In
2010, the EU was still the largest trading partner of Iran with 20 per cent of
the Iranian trade coming from (22 per cent) and going to (18 per cent) the
EU (European Commission, DG Trade, 2012). The trade volume increased
from EUR15 billion in 2002 to EUR 24 billion in 2010, but declined signifi-
cantly since 2012 (European Commission, DG Trade, 2013). Eighty per cent
108 Tom Sauer
of Europe’s imports from Iran were oil products. The following European
energy concerns held contracts with Iran: ENI (Italy), Total (France), Repsol
(Spain), Shell (UK/Netherlands), Hydro-Statoil (Norway), OMV (Austria) and
EGL (Switzerland) (Ottolenghi, 2009: 158). According to Ottolenghi (2009:
161), ‘thousands of jobs depend on the smooth functioning of this vital
and profitable trade’. In relative terms, only four per cent of Europe’s energy
imports came from Iran, although the percentage in some EU countries was
much higher, such as in Greece (25 per cent) and in Italy (12.5 per cent)

(Ottolenghi, 2009: 163–164). It is, therefore, not by chance that EU member
states which had substantial trade relations with Iran (such as Greece, Italy,
Austria, Germany and Spain) were the least interested in imposing heavy
sanctions, while states that did not have substantial trade relations with Iran
(such as the UK and the Netherlands) – or that let security priorities prevail
(such as France) – were more in favour of a hardliner approach.
Even within states, the policy vis-à-vis Iran sometimes depended on
who was in power. The best example is France; under President Chirac,
France was rather soft towards Iran. President Sarkozy’s policy, in con-
trast, was even more severe than the USA. President Chirac believed that
the problems had to do with a general lack of trust between the West and
Iran. President Sarkozy went further, blaming solely Iran (Erastö, 2013).
Chirac, in contrast to Sarkozy, also avoided mixing the nuclear issue with
other grievances vis-à-vis Iran; even denying in the beginning of 2007
that a nuclear Iran would be a problem (Erastö, 2013). Personal prefer-
ences sometimes do make a difference in international politics.
While during the whole conflict both the hardliners and the ‘softies’
within the EU were able to win temporary games depending on the circum-
stances, most of the time the hardliner approach prevailed. While the EU-3
in 2003 could have been regarded as a kind of mediator between the USA
and Iran, later on – already from the end of 2004 – the EU-3 clearly moved
to the USA’s position and tried to oppose Iran with increasingly harsh
measures, especially in comparison with Russia and China. Sometimes, it
was even hard to distinguish the European from the American position.
From 2012 onwards, both the EU and the USA imposed harsh, unilateral
economic sanctions against Iran. The main explanation for this switch is
the domination of those internal actors within the EU that stood for a more
assertive role in the world.
A similar evolution can be detected in the Iranian camp. While Iran was
willing to compromise in the spring of 2003, and signed two agreements
with the EU, it gradually became more intransigent, partly because it seemed
disappointed with the size of the carrots and the slow speed of the nego-
tiations. Both processes also stimulated each other: as the Iranians became
more stubborn, the hardliner approach inside the EU could more easily
overcome internal criticism.
The longer it took for the EU to resolve the impasse, the more internal
frictions arose – however, without undermining the EU policy vis-à-vis Iran
as a whole. What follows are examples of such public debates amongst EU
member states. Germany was, for instance, openly against new economic
sanctions by the UN in January 2007. French President Chirac stated at the
end of January 2007 that it would be very hard to prevent Iran from going
nuclear; he preferred a nuclear Iran to a war with Iran. Similarly, an inter-
nal EU report in February 2007 stated that economic sanctions probably

would not make a difference and the report admitted that the EU approach
had failed (Dombey and Schmid, 2007). Germany publicly announced
in February 2007 that it wanted to offer positive incentives to Iran; four
months later, it tried (but failed) again (Dombey and Findler, 2007). In
September 2007, EU officials criticised American pressure on European
firms. Austria, who imports a rather large part of its oil from Iran, used its
veto power in the EU Council against further sanctions in October 2007
(DSL, 2007). German Minister of Foreign Affairs Steinmeier accused the USA
and France of being hypocritical. They pressured states like Germany to halt
its trade relations with Iran and leaked the names of German firms that
were continuing doing business in Iran, while German export towards Iran
in reality had significantly dropped, and while French and American firms
continued doing business with Iran (DGS, 2007). Also Spain publicly criti-
cised the hard-line approach of the EU-3 in October 2007 (Kubosova, 2007).
As the drumbeat for going to war went up since 2010, some EU member
states – like Germany – distanced themselves from such rhetoric (NTI, 2011 a).
In late 2011, the UK by contrast, let the world know that it was prepared to
participate in a military attack, if necessary (Hopkins, 2011). Remarkably,
six former Ambassadors of different EU member states that had been
posted in Teheran criticised the EU policy in June 2011. They pled for more
engagement with Iran (Dalton 2011).
The initial reaction by Greece – and to a lesser extent by Italy and
Spain – to the French proposal for an oil embargo in the beginning of
December 2011 was negative. According to an EU official, Greece was not
alone: ‘People don’t say it out loud. But there is an understanding oil sanc-
tions would hurt the EU rather than hitting Iran where it hurts and would
make oil cheaper for China’ (Rettman, 2012). Nevertheless, the EU as a
whole agreed in January 2012 to impose harsh sanctions – including an oil
embargo – on Iran, starting in July 2012. The political and socio-economic
situation in Greece explains why it lost the debate inside the EU. Another
more structural explanation is path dependency: once sanctions are started
up, logic is to make them more stringent as long as the opponent does not
give in.
To conclude, there were many differences of opinion and underlying
interests amongst EU member states. Nevertheless, the overall Iran policy of
110 Tom Sauer
the EU was rather consistent. This is likely to remain so in the future, except
in case of a military attack against Iran.
The conduct and process of negotiations and advocacy
With respect to the conduct and process of negotiating, a distinction can be

made between the strategy and the tactics.
Strategy

The EU should in principle have thought over the costs and benefits of its
strategy. Apparently, the EU, or at least the EU-3, judged in the summer of
2003 that the benefits of taking on Iran were higher than the costs. The
EU-3 was apparently convinced that they could press Iran in giving up its
programme.
However, it could have been predicted that it would not be an easy ride.
From an Iranian perspective, it is not that illogical to try to acquire nuclear
weapons.5 From a security point of view, Iran is situated in one of the most
volatile regions in the world. Iran is surrounded by the USA in the West
(NATO member state Turkey), in the East (Afghanistan, Pakistan), and in
the South (Persian Gulf States, USA fleet in the Persian Gulf). President
Bush categorised Iran as member of the ‘axis of evil’ in 2002. Such exter-
nal pressure creates a rallying-around-the-flag phenomenon. The Iranian
opposition – if allowed – would have a hard time opposing a nuclear
(weapons) programme.
Iran has also been attacked by a neighbouring state – Iraq – and the eight-
year war with Iraq killed more than 500,000 Iranians, which had – and still
has – a tremendous psychological impact on both the Iranian leadership
and people. Iraq, at that time supported by the USA, used chemical weapons
against Iran. The latter convinced Ayatollah Khomeini to restart the nuclear
programme in the second half of the eighties. In addition, another state
in the region – Israel – possesses nuclear weapons. The international com-
munity implicitly accepts this reality, despite the fact that Israel has never
signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Further, ‘rogue states’ without nuclear weapons (like Afghanistan, Iraq and
more recently Libya) have been attacked by the USA, while ‘rogues’ with
nuclear weapons (like Pakistan and North Korea) have not been attacked by
the USA. This observation undoubtedly further stimulated hard-liners inside
Iran to continue its nuclear programme.
The dominating perception in Teheran was probably that obtaining nuclear
weapons may be the only guarantee for Iran not to be invaded by the USA
(Sebenius and Michael Singh, 2013). The only realistic alternative would have
been security guarantees that can only be credibly provided by the USA. As
the latter were never on the table, one can wonder why the EU believed that
it could ever convince Iran. As Avis Bohlen, former Assistant Secretary of State
for Arms Control, stated: ‘there was very little chance of [successful EU negotia-
tions] without US involvement’ (Bergenäs, 2010). That involvement, especially
with respect to (public) security guarantees, was absent. Hunter (2010: 150)
agrees: ‘the US government has never been willing to take the extra – and very
likely essential – step of being clear, in public and without ambiguity, about a
possible bargain: security for security’. The EU-3, however, did succeed in con-
vincing the USA to start talking to Iran.
Last but not least, nuclear weapons provide prestige, both internally and

externally, at least according to its advocates (Sagan, 1996). Regional powers
do like to obtain symbols of prestige, such as nuclear weapons. With Iraq
on the losing side during and beyond the 1990s, Iran became perceived as
the upcoming regional power in the Middle East. The Indian and Pakistani
tests in 1998 made further clear that governments conducting nuclear tests
gain popularity at home; by testing nuclear weapons, the political regimes
in those developing states prove to their constituencies that they are able
to finish complex technological projects successfully, such as building ‘the
bomb’.
It is very hard to understand why this proliferation logic did, and still
does, not ring a bell with European decision-makers. The EU-3 was appar-
ently blinded by different factors in 2003: first of all, the EU was regarded as
‘the usual suspect’ to take the diplomatic initiative due to a lack of alterna-
tives: the USA did not have any diplomatic relations with Iran since 1979,
and President Bush was not about to change that. China did not play the
role of mediator in international politics (yet), except maybe in its immedi-
ate neighbourhood. Russia was not really regarded as a trustworthy actor
in world politics, due to its more assertive external policy under President
Putin. The only regional power left was the EU. In addition, EU member
states had the benefit of always having maintained diplomatic and eco-
nomic relations with Iran, including after the 1979 revolution. At the end
of 2002, the EU had even started ‘Trade and Association Agreement’ negotia-
tions with Teheran. The latter could be exploited by the EU to put pressure
on Iran, or at least that was the plan.
Secondly, since the 1990s the EU has been trying to become more visible
in world politics. Already for decades, Europe has been criticised for being
an economic giant and a military dwarf. Although it had taken substantial
institutional steps into the direction of a more assertive foreign policy,
major issues in world politics (like proliferation, terrorism or energy secu-
rity) had not been substantially tackled. Worse, the Iraqi crisis in 2002–2003
had hopelessly divided the EU into the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe. The USA
again called the shots. Most people in the EU, and the rest of the world, were
opposed to the Iraqi war, but their governments did not do much to prevent
it, or if they did could not convince the USA to change its mind.
This frustration inside Europe (including in the UK) freed a lot of energy
in the form of new thinking to take its own security and defence policy
112 Tom Sauer
more seriously. Nuclear non-proliferation seemed a perfect case. Not only

the Iraqi issue, but also the Iranian and North Korean nuclear crises erupted
in the summer of 2002. The Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs took the
initiative to draft an EU Non-Proliferation Strategy in February 2003 and
succeeded in convincing her colleagues in the General Affairs and External
Relations Council to support the initiative. At the same time, a broader
exercise was going on to draft a complete European Security Strategy for the
first time ever. Both strategies were written in the spring of 2003, their drafts

were adopted at the Thessaloniki Summit in June 2003, and their final drafts
were formally adopted in December 2003 (Alvarez-Verdugo, 2006; Portela,
2003; Sauer, 2004).
Resolving one of both concrete non-proliferation crises was regarded as
the ideal signal to the rest of the world that the EU was not only on paper,
but also in practice, ready to take on its responsibility as a strategic actor.
A Polish Foreign Affairs official admitted: ‘The EU involvement in the talks
with Iran is an example for the Union’s ambition to become involved in
big issues’ (Bergenäs, 2010: 500). The Iranian crisis was geographically more
suitable for the EU than North Korea, for which China took the lead.
These two factors may have blinded those inside the EU who wanted to
enhance Europe’s strategic role to potential roadblocks (Arfazadeh Roudsari,
2007). The EU – and especially those member states (the UK, France and
Germany) and institutions (European Council) that favoured a bigger role
for the EU on the world stage – basically saw only the potential benefits
of its strategy vis-à-vis Iran; not the potential risks. The decision to ‘fight’
Iran was taken on the basis of the combination of a kind of euphoria, and
of rash ambition in London, Paris, and Berlin, as well as in the EU Council
Secretariat in Brussels.
Euphoria is part of the explanation; the lack of empathy by the EU is
another. For some, it seems very difficult to imagine how it feels to be a
decision-maker in Teheran nowadays. For instance, Bruno Tertrais – a French
defence expert close to the government – stated in 2007: ‘I don’t think that
Iran’s nuclear program is driven by security concerns’ (Tertrais, 2007). Such
declarations illustrate the continuing underestimation of Iran’s motivation
to acquire all the necessary facilities that would allow them to produce fis-
sile materials that can be used for both a civilian and military programme.
One EU diplomat that was actively involved in the negotiations said later
on: ‘When we were negotiating [with Iran] after the Paris agreement, we
were speaking about endless suspensions, and we were also speaking about
the dismantlement of the enrichment facilities. This probably would be
perceived by any country as offensive or against their dignity. … There
have been stages where I think we have been too tough and too inflexible’
(Bergenäs, 2010: 505).
In case the 2013 Interim Agreement is implemented and followed by an
overall agreement (or another series of interim agreements), the previous
analysis is probably too severe for the EU-3. What certainly may have made
a difference were the harsh economic sanctions, including an oil boycott
and huge financial restrictions, since 2012, that many observers had not
expected. Further research however is in order to find out the exact impact
of these sanctions on the Iranian economy and the resulting elections in
June 2013. Fact is that there are other factors besides sanctions that explain
the signing of the Interim Agreement. Iran only agreed with the Agreement
because the international community included incentives, which it had

not used before, namely that Iran had the right to keep a civilian nuclear
programme, including limited enrichment facilities. Partly due to the latter,
sceptics continue to question the viability of the Interim Agreement. For
the moment, it is impossible to provide a definite assessment of the EU’s
strategy vis-à-vis Iran.
Tactics
With respect to negotiation tactics by the EU, at least three criticisms can
be voiced: 1) that the EU changed from being a mediator to being a coercer
(Sauer, 2007); 2) that the EU was not very creative in coming up with new
and attractive proposals to Iran; and 3) that there were many empty threats
made by the EU.
In the beginning, the EU was perceived as being a mediator. The EU put
pressure on Iran, but it also tried to give the Iranians more time, at least
more than the USA. The USA for instance wanted to bring the Iranian file
much sooner from the IAEA to the UN Security Council. Many IAEA Board
resolutions, for instance the one in November 2003, were rather moderate,
thanks to the Europeans.
Up to November 2004, the EU could have lived with limited enrichment.
But from that point onwards, it closed that option under pressure from the
USA. Since then, both the USA and the EU required that Iran would first sus-
pend its enrichment before anything else. Later on, the positions of the USA
and the EU were even harder to distinguish. For instance, the Europeans
drafted the IAEA resolution in January 2006 to move the Iranian file to the
UN Security Council. Is it then surprising to hear Ahmadinejad say that he
was not interested to talk to the EU anymore?
Each time that the soft approach seemed to win, the USA intervened.
Most of the time, the USA succeeded in changing the EU’s point of view,
partly because the EU was afraid of another clash with the USA (just like in
2003), partly because two of the EU-3 (France and the UK) had a similar view
as the USA. This happened for instance in the beginning of 2004 when the
USA informed the EU that Iran had not provided a complete declaration.
When Germany seemed to prefer limited enrichment in June 2006, it was
the USA that prevented it. One year later, the same happened. In July 2007,
an EU diplomat in Vienna warned: ‘we are coming to a situation where five
out of six (powers) would support further talks, and only one would insist
114 Tom Sauer
on a complete suspension before talking’ (NTI, 2007). Somewhat later, it

was leaked by the press (via the USA?) that German firms were continuing
doing business with Iran. The USA also tried to halt efforts of IAEA Director-
General El Baradei, when he proposed a new timetable to the Iranians in
May 2007 and when he succeeded to convince the Iranians to come up
with a new timetable with respect to the remaining issues to be clarified
with the IAEA in August 2007. When the EU did not support El Baradei at
the IAEA Board meeting in September 2007, El Baradei left angry the room.

The day after the EU and the USA back-peddled, and formally supported the
Director-General.
Secondly, it seems that there was also lack of creativity on behalf of the
EU. The EU promised a lot in the agreement of October 2003, but it declined
to follow up with concrete proposals, or only very slowly. Exactly the same
happened one year later: the Iranians got the impression that the EU was
slow in providing what they had asked for. The EU preferred to wait for the
outcome of the Iranian presidential elections in May 2005. Further, the EU
proposals in August 2005 did not convince Iran. Only in the beginning of
June 2006 was a reasonable offer made by Solana, who spoke for the EU-3+3.
But even that package did not include American security guarantees, and
it made everything conditional on the prior suspension of enrichment by
Iran. In addition, it was an offer made with a Western knife pointing to the
Iranian throat, as Solana threatened to draft a UN Security Council resolu-
tion in case Iran did not agree.
Peter Jenkins, a former British envoy, rightly called the Western approach
a ‘positional negotiating’ stance. To hang on to your position during nego-
tiations is fair enough, certainly in the first stages. But when both actors do
so, the one that has the most to lose should normally take a first step in the
direction of a compromise. As a diplomat in Vienna predicted: ‘The US will
push very hard until the last minute in the hope of getting the Iranians to
give in but at the end of the day they will accept some form of enrichment
activity’ (Adler, 2006). The more Iran makes progress with enrichment, the
more the USA and the EU will come under pressure to give in. That is exactly
what happened with the Interim Agreement of November 2013.
Many non-governmental observers – like the International Crisis Group
(ICG, 2006), MIT experts (Forden and Thomson, 2006), the Atlantic Council
of the USA (Luers et al., 2008) – had proposed technological solutions that
would accept limited enrichment or multilateral fuel production inside Iran.
The EU proposed none of these solutions to Iran until September 2009.
Nevertheless, Iran declined the solutions several weeks later. Only after the
imposition of harsher economic sanctions by the EU and the USA in 2012,
the Iranian leadership concluded after the presidential elections that it was
time for change.
Third, the European threat was sometimes hollow, and Iran knew that.
For instance, in the framework of the agreement of October 2003, the EU-3
threatened to send the file to the UN Security Council in case of violation

by Iran. That was an empty threat, as Russia and China would have blocked
such a move, and Iran was fully aware of that. When the negotiations broke
off in June 2004, nothing happened (Delpech, 2010). This further under-
mined the already weak position of the EU-3. It points to the weaknesses
of the instrument of coercive diplomacy, or better to the many conditions
(like a credible threat) that have to be fulfilled before coercive diplomacy
can work.

Overall impact, performance and power
A major objective of the EU since 2003 is to prevent Iran from acquiring

nuclear weapons. It is too soon to make a final verdict of the EU’s policy.
In any event, Iran began the conversion and enrichment of uranium,
something the EU has tried to prevent. Since January 2006, the EU has
asked Iran to suspend enrichment. Iran refused to do so, despite diplomatic
pressure and economic sanctions – including in the form of UN Security
Council resolutions – from the USA, UN and EU (Smolnikov, 2007). Only in
November 2013, the EU-3 – together with the USA (and Russia and China) –
succeeded in halting the further expansion of the Iranian enrichment
programme. At that time, Iran possessed 19,000 gas centrifuges of which
10,000 were actively spinning. It had also enriched 200 kg of 20% enriched
uranium, which is in theory enough for one atomic bomb. Interestingly,
after the Interim Agreement was signed press reports indicated that the USA
had been negotiating with Iran in secret. These secret bilateral negotiations
were set up in March 2013, which is before the coming to power of Rouhani
(NTI, 2013). The latter nuances the overall influence of the EU-3.
Earlier on, the EU did sign two agreements with Iran, which led to a
temporary suspension. The latter has slowed down the Iranian nuclear
programme. These agreements also obliged Iran to sign and adhere to the
IAEA Additional Protocol, which meant that the IAEA had significantly
more leverage to verify declared and undeclared installations in the coun-
try. This, however, only lasted until February 2006 when the Iranian file
was sent to the UN Security Council, and Iran reacted by not adhering
anymore to the Additional Protocol.6 Lastly, thanks to the two agreements,
Iran has provided much more information about its nuclear programme
than in the past.
Since the end of 2006, economic sanctions have also been used to pres-
sure Iran. Until 2010, economic sanctions vis-à-vis Iran were rather limited.
They consisted of an arms embargo, an asset freeze and visa bans on people
linked to the nuclear programme, the blocking of Iranian banks (exclud-
ing the Iranian Central Bank), and the blocking of shipping lines that are
engaged in nuclear procurement activity. Even since 2010, a debate exists
to what extent these more substantial sanctions do bite. British Foreign
116 Tom Sauer
Office official Jon Davies for instance admitted in September 2011: ‘Being
frank, [Western penalties have] not achieved the effects we wanted’ (NTI,
2011 b). On the other hand, two months later, Kenneth Katzman (USA
Congressional Research Service) stated that the sanctions regime is ‘starting
to make things a lot worse (for Iran)’(NTI, 2011 c). The volume of Iranian
production and export of oil has seriously declined (Bozorgmehr, 2010).
Already in 2010 Chubin (2010: 80–81) predicted: ‘the regime today is a revo-
lutionary one superimposed on a post-revolutionary society. There cannot

be much mileage left in this model’.
Since 2012, the magnitude of the economic sanctions was such that they
really seemed to have an impact on the Iranian economy. Presidential can-
didate Rouhani promised to improve the economy by trying to negotiate an
agreement with the international community. Rouhani was already elected
in the first round. He also carried out his promised: within four months in
power, he managed to sign a deal with the EU-3+3.
Lessons learned
The EU wants to be a global actor, not only economically, but also politically.
That is why the EU-3 took the initiative in 2003 to try to resolve the nuclear
impasse in Iran. Ten years later, there is finally an Interim Agreement. If the
Agreement is implemented and if a General Agreement can be negotiated,
the EU policy vis-à-vis Iran that started in 2003 can be regarded as a success.
If the Agreement however falls apart and Iran succeeds in acquiring nuclear
weapons, the EU effort has to be categorised as a failure, and the EU’s reputa-
tion as a strategic actor would go down.
But regardless of the final outcome, the EU-3 format, which is an informal
security arrangement, worked well and the odds are that it will be used again
in the future to manage other international crises.
Notes
1. I use the concepts of EU-3 and EU interchangeably as the EU as a whole agreed in
the Autumn of 2003 with the EU-3 Iran initiative. The EU High Representative –
first Solana, later on Ashton – was added to the negotiating team on demand by
the non-EU-3 in December 2003.
2. Iran signed the Additional Protocol of the IAEA on 18 December 2003.
3. Light water reactors are more proliferation resistant than HEU reactors.
4. http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2004/infcirc637.pdf.
5. Realists explain the acquisition of nuclear weapons by states predominantly by
pointing to security concerns (apart from prestige) (Frankel, 1993). A minority of
the Realists even regard nuclear proliferation as stabilising (Waltz, 1981). Waltz
recently applied his theory to Iran (Waltz, 2012).
6. There are, however, still IAEA inspectors in Iran due to the original Iran-IAEA
Agreement.
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8
The EU’s Role and Performance
within the G20 in the Area of
Finance and Development

Peter Debaere
Introduction
In response to the global financial crisis of 2008, the G20 started meeting at
the level of Heads of State and Government. From then onwards, the G20
has quickly risen to become the most prominent forum for international
economic cooperation. The President of the eurogroup, Jeroen Dijsselbloem,
even stated that the value of the euro is more appropriately discussed in the
G20 than in the eurogroup (Blade, 2013). Soon, the G20 agenda expanded
to embrace other topics as well such as development, food security and
employment.
The emergence of the G20 is the expression of multipolarity and the shift-
ing power dynamics in the international system. For the EU and its member
states, the G20 is a new channel through which it can maintain high-level
multilateral diplomatic relations with the emerging powers. The G20 rep-
resents a new diplomatic reality for the EU, although it is quite familiar
with the informal and exclusive G-format given its involvement in the G8.
The G20 is, for example, not as eurocentric as other international finan-
cial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the G7.
Furthermore, in the G20, countries participate and negotiate as individual
members rather than as (regional) blocs or constituencies as in the United
Nations or the Bretton Woods institutions.
This setting challenges the EU as a diplomatic actor. To what extent and
under which circumstances is EU coordination appropriate in the G20 and
does internal coherence advance or compromise external impact? How
flexible can or should an EU position be in the informal and ad hoc G20
context? Who represents the EU and to what extent are the non-G20 EU
member states involved in the preparation of G20 meetings? This chapter
attempts to address these issues by examining the way the EU prepares and
coordinates for the G20 process as well as how it performs during G20 meet-
ings. It argues that the EU’s diplomatic behaviour depends on the mode
of interaction within the G20 rather than internal EU factors such as the
120
The EU’s Role and Performance within the G20 121
distribution of competences. This argument is illustrated by two case stud-

ies on finance and development. But first, this chapter proceeds with a brief
historical overview of the EU’s evolution as a diplomatic actor in the G8.
Precedents: the EU in the G8
In order to fully understand the dynamics of the G20 and the position of the
EU and the member states in this context, it is imperative to go back to the

beginning of G-summitry. The G8 (and G20) have its origins in 1975 when
the leaders of six leading industrialised countries – France, the UK, Germany,
Italy, the USA and Japan – gathered in Rambouillet to discuss mainly eco-
nomic and financial issues. The forum was extended to include Canada in
1976 and Russia in 1998, thus becoming the G8.1 Initially, this ‘Western
Economic Summit’ was conceived as a one-time informal gathering. The
idea of a multilateral summit meeting to consider economic issues in a
personal and exclusive setting was pushed by the former French President
Giscard. Together with his colleagues from Germany, Italy and the UK,
he envisaged an informal meeting which would primarily foster personal
relations between the leaders of the most powerful industrial democracies,
not designed to take decisions and without any bureaucratic involvement.
The Americans, on the other hand, sought a decision-making institution to
identify unresolved global policy problems and seek solutions. Supported
by its own preparatory and follow-up apparatus, this forum would allow for
effective international policy coordination (Putnam and Bayne, 1987: 35).
When it became clear that the summit was to be repeated annually and
tended to assume more of a decision-making role, the excluded European
Community member states feared to be treated as second-class mem-
ber states. Therefore, they advocated strongly for representation of the
European Community – the Netherlands even threatened to stop lending
to the UK or France for this reason (Jenkins, 1989: 65). Also the European
Commission lobbied intensively for representation at the summit based
on the grounds that only the European Community was authorised to act
on certain economic subjects such as international trade. In this context,
it deemed an agreement on export credits of the 1976 Puerto Rico summit
illegitimate because it interfered with Community competence (Niemann
and Huigens, 2011: 424).
However, the European G8 members were not eager to involve the
European Community. Particularly the French President Giscard was firmly
opposed to involving the European Community arguing that its inclusion
would mean a broadening of the agenda to political affairs and an endan-
gering of the informal exchange of views among the leaders (Bonvicini
and Wessels, 1984: 172). After long discussions and a strong resolution by
the European Parliament, the European Council decided in 1977 that the
President of the Commission and the rotating President of the Council
122 Peter Debaere
would be invited to take part in those sessions that deal with items that fall
under Community competence, such as international trade (Hainsworth,
1990). The non-European G8 members accepted the Community presence
without difficulties.
Nevertheless soon, the participation of the Commission in the G8 sum-
mits and its preparations was extended to cover all items. Already in 1978,
the Commission’s presence at the summits had become uncontested. The
European Commission fully participated in all economic sessions and its

preparations at the 1978 Bonn summit. In 1981, it was allowed to take
part in the political discussions and joined the preparations one year later
(Putnam and Bayne, 1987: 151–152). In 1987, the Commission drew up
for the first time a detailed working paper dealing with the problem of
sub-Saharan African debt, which served as the basis for summit discussions
(Hainsworth, 1990). A few years later, the G8 tasked the Commission to
coordinate Western aid to the Central and Eastern European Countries after
the collapse of communism. The resulting PHARE programme illustrates
the recognition of the European Commission’s role and capabilities in the
G8. Although the Commission fully participates in the G8, the EU is still
not considered as a member and cannot host a summit or assume the G8
presidency – depriving it from substantial agenda-setting powers.
According to Niemann and Huigens (2011), the increased importance
of the European Commission in the G8 context is due to the flexibility
and informality of the G8, the evolving European integration process as
well as the Commission’s capabilities, standing and entrepreneurship.
Using a principal-agent perspective, they also argue that the member
states’ incentives to rely on the Commission changed over time. On the
one hand, the European G8 members have realised that the European
Commission adds significant value to the G8 debates. On the other hand,
the G8 summits appeared not to undermine the role of the EU as some
small EU countries originally feared.
The original arrangement of EU representation in the G8 also included the
rotating Council Presidency next to the European Commission. However,
in the first years, the summits were always (deliberately) organised when a
European G8 member held the Presidency of the Council. The Community’s
enlargement in 1986 made this practice no longer workable. But the Council
Presidency never really played a role of significance in the G8. When the
rotating Council Presidency was not held by a G8 country, the involvement
of the EU Council Presidency in the G8 process depended largely on the
country’s commitment and its disposal of diplomatic resources. Also the fact
that the Council Presidency rotates on a six-month basis limited its ability to
become fully involved in the G8 process. Moreover, the country holding
the Presidency operated as freely as the other G8 members, seldom acting as
spokesman of the EC/EU (Putnam and Bayne, 1987: 152–153). Only since
the introduction of a permanent President of the European Council by the
Treaty of Lisbon, Council representation has been strengthened in the G8

(Debaere and Orbie, 2013).
As said, the EU and particularly the European Commission has secured its
diplomatic involvement in the G8. The Commission has been accepted and
appreciated as a full participant in the G8 process. Its presence among this
select group of nation-states has contributed to its diplomatic prestige and
international standing. But has the EU also been able to valorise its presence
in the G8 into actual impact?

Since the EU makes up half of G8 membership, it has the potential to
exert significant influence over the G8 outcome. Fischer (2001) compared
the conclusions of the G8 summit and the European Council, both under
the German chairmanship in June 1999. He found that both documents
were very similar and contained the same wording. Fischer concludes
that, ‘the limits of the G8 summit were set – indirectly – at the European
Council as far as direct competencies of the EU were concerned’ (Fischer,
2001:138). Other studies have concluded that whenever the Community
could agree on an effective joint position its views would largely prevail
in the G8 communiqués (Putnam and Bayne, 1987; Ullrich and Donelly,
1998). In the early years of the G8, a meeting of the European Council
was always held shortly before the summit in order to coordinate a com-
mon position on key agenda items of the summit. Yet, since the mid-
1980s, these coordination meetings have been declining in importance,
with the Commission now merely informing the member states on the
G8 agenda (Huigens and Niemann, 2012: 111). Generally, the prevailing
opinion is that there is no reason for coordination if the position of EU
G8 countries does not interfere with existing EU positions or policies, or
if these countries do not bind the EU in any way with their respective
positions within the G8 (Gstöhl, 2008).
Even without explicit prior coordination, the positions of the EU G8 par-
ticipants follow common lines based on basic European interests and the
iterative deliberations within the EU. They do nevertheless avoid presenting
themselves as a strong coalition in the G8. European bloc forming would
upset other summit participants by polarising the debate and undermining
the flexibility and informality of the G8 process (Bonvicini and Wessels,
1984). At the 2008 Hokkaido Toyako summit for example, the EU raised
annoyance in the Japanese delegation as a united European position on
climate change determined the pace of the summit negotiations (Huigens
and Niemann, 2012: 112). Beside affecting the G8 process, the pressure
of a unified European bloc is of course also hard to resist by non-EU G8
members. The concerted resistance of the European countries to move on
the issue of agricultural subsidies at the 1990 Houston summit and their
coordinated positions on the Soviet-Union and the Brazilian forests were
met with irritation from the then-USA President G. H. Bush (Apple, 1990;
Bayne, 2000: 71–72).2
124 Peter Debaere
For the European Commission, the G8 context is particularly challeng-

ing. On the one hand, the Commission is the agent of all EU member
states, representing the Union as a whole in the G8. On the other hand,
the Commission’s presence in the G8 basically depends upon the consent
of the European G8 members. Therefore, it avoids too harsh confronta-
tions with its European colleagues in the G8. This situation affects the
diplomatic role of the European Commission at least in two ways. First, the
European Commission refrains from encouraging extensive EU coordina-

tion as this would be ‘political suicide’ (Nasra et al., 2009: 10). However in
some instances, for instance on climate change at the 2008 G8 summit, the
Commission may facilitate coordination among EU participants in the G8,
but only on the latter’s request. Second, the presence of four EU member
states constrains the Commission’s room of manoeuvre in the G8 (Nasra
et al., 2009). If the Commission is not fully backed by the other member
states its credibility would suffer. Therefore, the Commission does not act
independently and rarely takes the initiative in G8 discussions (Huigens and
Niemann, 2012: 113; Putnam and Bayne, 1987: 153). To summarise, while
the European Commission enjoys considerable autonomy vis-à-vis the non-
G8 EU member states, its diplomatic leeway in the G8 is constrained by the
EU countries in the G8. Nevertheless, EU and non-EU G8 countries value
the European Commission’s presence in the G8 because of its expertise and
(financial) contributions to G8 initiatives.
The EU in the G20: from council to commission
The East-Asian financial crisis of the late-1990s made the G7 countries real-
ise that the international financial architecture had to be strengthened by
including emerging market economies. Hence in 1999, they launched the
G20 forum bringing together the finance ministers and central bank gover-
nors of the G7, twelve emerging economies and the EU (Hajnal, 2007).3 In
contrast to the G8, the EU was granted official membership of the G20 from
the very beginning. Also contrary to the G8, the European Commission was
only given a marginal role in the G20. It participated at a technical level
in the EU delegation, while the representation of the EU was left to the
finance minister of the rotating Council Presidency and the President of the
European Central Bank. During its first decade, the G20 lived a quiet exist-
ence as a consultative and consensus-building group (Bini Smaghi, 2006:
266). Because of its low political salience and the fact that the EU acquired
official G20 membership right from the start, the G20’s creation did not
cause any significant contestation in the EU (Debaere et al., 2014).
In reaction to the outbreak of the 2007–2008 global financial crisis, the
G20 was upgraded to the level of Heads of State and Government. The
first G20 leaders summit in November 2008 also constituted an upgrade of
the role of the European Commission in the G20. The Commission’s
status in the G20 was elevated from the technical level to the highest
political level with the European Commission President representing
the EU next to the President of the European Council.4 The sudden
entrance of the Commission at the G20 is probably due to its expertise
and competences in the area of financial market regulation as well as
its involvement in the decision to hold an international crisis summit
(Debaere et al., 2014). That decision was taken in October 2008 at a meet-
ing of the French President Sarkozy, holding the Council Presidency, and

the European Commission President Barroso with former US President
G. W. Bush at Camp David.
Quickly, the European Commission assumed the responsibility of the
EU’s participation in the G20. It is fair to consider the Commission as
the backbone of the Union’s G20 delegation (Debaere and Orbie, 2012).
An informal division of labour was agreed between the Presidents of the
European Council and the European Commission with the former focusing
on the G8 and the latter mainly dealing with the G20 (Pop, 2010). In addi-
tion, senior Commission officials represent the EU in the G20’s preparatory
(sous)-sherpa meetings and the EU’s internal preparation for the G20 is
coordinated by the Commission’s services. Furthermore at working group
level, the European Commission is often the EU’s sole representative. For
example, the G20 Washington summit established four working groups
to elaborate the proposals made by the leaders. On behalf of the EU only
the Commission took part in those working groups as the Czech Council
Presidency did not have the capacity to participate in all working groups
(Debaere, 2010: 148).
The Treaty of Lisbon aims to strengthen the EU’s external representa-
tion. At the level of Heads of State and Government, the Treaty is clear and
introduces a permanent President of the European Council to represent the
EU externally. However, the treaty does not provide clear instructions on
how the EU is to be represented at ministerial level and in working groups.
According to the European Commission, the Lisbon Treaty grants the
Commission the sole responsibility for the Union’s external representation
in matters of monetary and financial affairs. It was therefore in favour to
minimise the role of the rotating Presidency in the G20. But several mem-
ber states reacted strongly against these attempts and wished to maintain
the Council representation at ministerial level. Eventually, and after an
opinion of the Council’s Legal Service, the Commission and the member
states reached a provisional agreement that the Council Presidency would
continue to be included in the EU delegation for the G20 minister meetings
(Emerson et al., 2011). Nevertheless, the presence of the rotating Council
Presidency remains a controversial issue. Both in 2011 and 2012, the G20
chairs, who have the final say on G20 invitations, hesitated to invite the
rotating EU Council Presidency to certain G20 ministerial meetings, but
eventually decided to do so.
126 Peter Debaere
The diplomatic role of the EU in the G20
The recent rise of the G20 poses a number of questions on the diplomatic
role of the EU. Is the EU able to exert influence over the G20 outcomes
knowing that the EU only accounts for one-fifth of G20 membership while
it represents half of the G8? Does EU coordination strengthen the perfor-
mance of the EU in the G20? Does official EU membership imply that the
non-G20 EU member states are actively involved in the G20 process? Is the
EU able to adapt to the flexible and informal nature of the G20?

The answers to these questions and, thus, the diplomatic role of the EU
in the G20 seem to differ across the G20 structure. The main argument in
this chapter is that this is primarily due to the varying mode of interaction
in the G20. This argument adds to the growing recognition among scholars
that the external context has a significant influence on how the EU behaves
in international settings (Jørgensen et al., 2011). Still, little systematic atten-
tion has been paid to the question of how the character of the multilateral
system influences, constrains or enables the EU to act (Kissack, 2010: 5).
This challenges the widespread view that the EU performs best in interna-
tional institutions in areas where the EU member states are most integrated,
where that integration is then reflected in the level of EU competence, and
consequently where the member states then speak with one voice (Dee,
2012: 190). EU competences are indeed often suggested as an explanation
for the EU’s actorness in international organisations. However, this is of
limited explanatory value in the G20 context since G20 discussions seldom
follow the EU’s internal distribution of competences. The G20 deals with a
large number of heterogeneous matters that often entail multiple dimen-
sions across several policy domains. Practice shows that, in such discussions,
aspects of the EU’s diplomatic role (for instance the extent to which the EU
coordinates its position) do not correlate with EU competences. Instead, it is
argued that the EU’s diplomatic behaviour depends on whether interaction
in the G20 is based on bargaining or arguing.
In international negotiations, arguing and bargaining represent two dis-
tinct typologies of decision-making (Kotzian, 2007; Risse, 2000; Susskind,
2008). Bargaining refers to the maximisation of interests without the inten-
tion to alter its preferences. Actors try to limit the choices available to their
negotiating partners by making threats, promises and demanding conces-
sions. Bargaining is the typical approach to negotiation in high-politicised
arenas where the protection of national interests is a major goal. Often these
negotiations involve a transfer of (financial) resources from some actors to
others (Elgstrom and Jönsson, 2000: 701). Arguing implies that actors aim at
convincing others of the value of a certain policy option based on claims of
validity. The participants rely on the power of the better argument instead
of strategic behaviour. In contrast to bargaining, the preferences and inter-
ests of the actors are no longer fixed and the actors are prepared to change
their views. As Naurin (2009: 36) notes, the ‘purpose of arguing is the trans-
formation of preferences, which may bring the parties closer to a common
position.’ Arguing is more likely to occur in informal, network-like settings
based on non-hierarchical relations (Risse, 2000: 19). In addition, arguing
seems to be most common when the pressure and the political stakes are
low (Niemann, 2006; Naurin, 2009).
Arguing and bargaining are both ideal types of how actors negotiate.
Mostly, negotiations combine both modes of interaction. Nonetheless in

the G20, it is possible to identify a dominant mode in certain policy areas.
Moreover, the mode of interaction differs across individual policy domains
in the G20. This is illustrated in the next sections by two case studies on
finance and development. In each case study, we will look at the mode of
interaction and how it shapes two aspects of the diplomatic role of the EU
in the G20: internal preparation and external performance.
Case study I: Finance

Rooted in the financial crises of 1999 and 2008, the G20 is still primarily a
forum for financial and economic cooperation. Since its upgrade to leaders’
level in 2008, the G20’s financial and economic portfolio ranges from crisis
resolution (including a $1 trillion stimulus package in 2009), to crisis pre-
vention by regulating financial markets, to the reform of the international
institutional architecture. The reform of the Financial Stability Board and
the IMF are the most important illustrations of the latter. So far, the G20 has
not really been able to move beyond its role as crisis committee. Especially
since the agenda in 2011 and 2012 was hijacked by the eurocrisis.
The financial and economic discussions within the G20 are clearly char-
acterised by bargaining. Since the global financial crisis, financial regulation
has become highly politicised although it concerns very technical issues
(Tsingou, 2010: 28). Bankers’ bonuses, bank levies and bank capital require-
ments were at the centre of political and public debate. Moreover, in this
politicised context, the stakes were high as the financial sector is consid-
ered a fundamental part of the national economy with repercussions on
all the other economic sectors (Zysman in Quaglia, 2010: 28). Hence, G20
countries sought and still seek to maximise their preferences during nego-
tiations on financial regulatory measures, often by using threats. Former
French President Sarkozy, for example, publicly threatened to walk out of
the G20 meeting if his demands for tighter global financial regulation were
not met (Chrisafis et al., 2009). Similarly, G20 countries bargained on the
reform of the IMF quota and governance. Reforming the IMF is considered
as a zero-sum game since a change in a member’s quota5 affects the rela-
tive quota share of the other members. Actors increased the pressure and
used bargaining techniques to maximise their demands. Illustrative is the
USA threat to veto a renewal of the anomalous number of 24 chairs in the
Fund’s executive board. This would have reduced the executive board to the
128 Peter Debaere
default number of 20 members and put enormous pressure on the European

(over)representation within the board (Lesage et al., 2013). A third example
of the bargaining atmosphere in financial and economic G20 discussions
is the discussion on currencies between the USA and China in particular.
While it might seem that both sides try to convince the other of one’s
preferred exchange rate policy, the goal is to make the other comply with
one’s demands and to make concessions. Neither China nor the USA really
appears to be open to be persuaded by the ‘better argument’.

Hence, bargaining dominates the G20 discussions on financial and eco-
nomic affairs and the EU’s diplomatic role in this area should be seen against
this background. In a bargaining context, EU G20 members, as any other
member, want to maximise their own preferences. Therefore, it is crucial to
extend their influence as much as possible. One option is to act collectively
with the other EU participants in the G20. Although scholars have increas-
ingly questioned the utility of a common EU stance in hostile environments
(Smith, 2010), it is still widely believed in EU policy circles that a coordi-
nated EU position strengthens the influence of the EU in international
institutions and negotiations (Dee, 2012: 198). Indeed, France, Germany,
Italy and the UK (henceforth ‘EU4’) use the EU and their EU membership as
a key instrument to weigh on G20 finance outcomes. EU4 finance officials
confirm that an EU position amplifies their national voices in the G20 and
increases the likelihood ‘to get something out of it’. EU coordination may
occur in advance at EU level, involving all EU member states, and on the
spot during G20 meetings among the EU participants.
As soon as the first G20 leaders’ summit was announced at the end of
2008, France in its role as rotating EU Council President convened an
extraordinary European Council meeting to prepare a common EU posi-
tion. The EU agreed on a five-page document, which has been called ‘agreed
language’. This agreed language served as a non-binding framework and
was kept quite vague to assure a comfortable negotiation margin for the
European representatives in the G20. The EU4 and the EU institutions thus
enjoyed a considerable room of manoeuvre in G20 discussions. This dip-
lomatic flexibility contributed to the successes of the 2008 and 2009 G20
summits. It nevertheless came at the expense of intra-EU relations. Two
examples illustrate this point.
First, at the G20 London Summit of April 2009, leaders attached a list
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
with a classification of countries that can be considered tax havens. The
tax havens issue was talked through at the preceding European Council of
March 2009. At that meeting the EU4 promised that no EU member states
would be listed as a tax haven. Despite this informal but clear agreement,
the EU4 and the European Commission agreed at the London Summit to
attach the OECD-list, including three EU member states, Belgium, Austria
and Luxembourg, as ‘grey’ countries.6 At the ECOFIN Council the day after
the London Summit, those member states reacted strongly against what
they perceived as a ‘betrayal’ of their European partners (Nasra et al., 2009).
Second and also in 2009, the G20 decided to accelerate the next IMF quota
reform from 2013 to 2011 and shift at least five per cent of the IMF quota
from over-represented countries to under-represented emerging economies.
Several European non-G20 countries complained that they were confronted
with a fait accompli arranged between the EU4 and the other members of
the G20 (in particular the USA and China) since this was not coordinated

in advance in the EU.
Both incidents have led to a pressing demand by non-G20 EU member
states to improve the EU’s internal preparation for the G20. After all, in both
cases the G20 decision had a major impact on their national interests. By
2010, the EU developed a fairly extensive, but still informal coordination
process for the G20’s financial and economic agenda. Common EU posi-
tions are coordinated in the ECOFIN-filière with the Economic and Financial
Committee (EFC) and its sub-committees preparing the G20 deputy finance
minister meetings. Based on background papers drafted by the Commission
in liaison with the rotating Council Presidency, the EFC negotiates a rather
detailed document of usually about 10 to 15 pages outlining the priorities
of the EU and its member states. Subsequently, these Terms of References are
forwarded to the ECOFIN Council, which approves them as the non-binding
EU position for the G20 finance ministers meetings.
This process allows the non-G20 EU member states to provide input and
voice their concerns. And although internal EU coordination is largely dom-
inated by G20 EU member states, non-G20 EU member states are able to
influence the EU’s position, particularly by further specifying and sharpen-
ing EU language (Nasra and Debaere, 2012). Also the EU4 see merit in coor-
dinating with the other EU countries. Before attending the G20 meetings,
they consider it useful to level out the different views in the EU in order not
to be picked off on small internal differences by other G20 members. This
strategy strengthens their position which may come particularly handy in
a bargaining context.
The Terms of References represent the guidelines for the partici-
pation of the EU4 and the EU institutions. Generally, the Terms of
References are relatively well respected at G20 level. Since the issues
around tax havens and IMF reform, there have been no major inci-
dents. Nevertheless, the non- G20 EU countries remain suspicious. It is
unclear whether the EU institutions represent the 28 member states,
the EU4 or their own views. Also problems may still arise for issues
that come up at G20 meetings and that have not been talked through
in advance. In such situations, feeding back to the other member
states is simply impossible. Moreover, the EU4 are still able to serve
their own interests in the G20, possibly against the interests of their
EU partners. But the non- G20 EU member states also realise that the
130 Peter Debaere
Terms of References should respect the informal nature of the G20 and
that a stricter EU position might not be appropriate.
In the margin of G20 finance meetings, the EU participants coordinate
systematically, often facilitated by the European Commission. They regu-
larly share information and discuss their negotiation tactics, especially if
strong opposition is expected. Beside opposition strength, also the topic,
the dynamics of the discussions and the level of detail in the Terms of
References determine the frequency and intensity of these additional infor-

mal coordination meetings. During the drafting of the communiqué, EU
coordination is most intensive. The EU participants in the G20 make sure
that some paragraphs are very carefully drafted, especially those on the situ-
ation in the euro zone or the role of the ECB. Often, for strategic reasons,
they propose a common language which is used as a starting point for the
G20 discussions. In this way, the EU avoids to end up with language listing
the other G20 members’ demands and solutions for the euro crisis.
Despite the EU’s significant influence on G20 language about the euro
zone, its general influence in shaping the developments in the group is
modest and declining, according to Jokela (2011). He argues that the EU
has played an influential role in the launch of the upgraded G20, but that
its impact has been eroding since. Beside the key role of the European
Commission, France and Germany to convene an emergency summit at the
end of 2008, the EU was also able to shape the agenda of the first couple of
G20 meetings. At that time, the UK and France had strong agenda-setting
powers with the former as G20 chair in 2009 and the latter as rotating EU
Council Presidency in 2008 and coming G20 chair in 2011. In addition,
the European Commission was seen as a source of innovative thinking and
expertise in providing workable solutions to tackle the crisis (Jokela, 2011).
Overall, the EU and the USA have largely influenced the financial regulation
agenda of the G20. Kern (2011) even contends that in financial markets,
the USA and the EU are still the real G2. However, in the actual adoption
and implementation of specific norms and regulatory standards, the EU has
acted as a follower rather than a leader (Woolcock, 2013: 335).
Case study II: Development

Since 2008, the G20 has not only positioned itself at the centre of global
economic governance, it has also emerged as a forum to discuss develop-
ment cooperation among traditional Western donors and emerging market
economies. Since the 2010 Seoul summit, development has represented a
substantial share of the G20’s agenda. As Alexander (2011: 9) points out,
the G20’s work on development represents a turning point in the history
of international development efforts. Indeed, with the ‘Seoul Development
Consensus for Shared Growth’ and the related Multi-Year Action Plan agreed
at the Seoul Summit, the G20 for the first time embarked on a structural
development agenda.
The G20’s work on development departs from the two-way interconnec-

tion between the financial crisis and the economic situation of low-income
and other developing countries: on the one hand, the developing world
was badly hit by the global financial crisis, but on the other hand, part of
the global recovery has to come from low-income countries as new sources
of global growth (Kharas, 2011). To address both aspects, the G20 countries
concentrate on nine pillars of which four deal with enhancing growth
potentials (infrastructure, human resource development, trade, and private

investment and job creation), the next four deal with managing social and
economic risks (financial inclusion, growth with resilience, food security
and domestic resource mobilisation), and the ninth pillar supports the
others by enhancing knowledge sharing. The G20’s view on development
differs from the G8 approach by focusing on growth rather than on welfare
and poverty. Also the G20 seeks to address long-term structural issues rather
than pledging money for specific projects.
Compared to finance, development is differently embedded in the G20
structure. While the ministers of finance and the central bank governors
deal with financial matters, development falls under the responsibility of the
sherpas, the personal representatives of the Heads of State and Government,
who prepare the G20 leaders summits. The G20’s commitments in the
Multi-Year Action Plan are implemented by the G20 Development Working
Group (DWG) which reports to the sherpas and consists of delegates from
the G20 countries and the European Commission, as well as representa-
tives from relevant international institutions. With the exception of a joint
Finance and Development ministerial meeting in September 2011, there
has not yet been a meeting of G20 Development Ministers. For each pillar,
two to four G20 members are appointed as lead countries or co-facilitators
and prepare the work in the run-up to the DWG meetings. The EU leads the
trade pillar together with the UK and Argentina. Beside trade, the EU also
considers food security, infrastructure, resilient growth and private sector
investments as priority pillars.
Discussions on development in the G20 context, in particular in the
DWG, are characterised by an arguing logic. Since the G20 gathers countries
with different levels of development as well as different recipes for devel-
opment, it is seen as a platform to exchange experiences and discuss what
really works for development. The interaction between advanced industrial
nations and leading developing countries is an effort of enhancing and
disseminating knowledge. According to Lim (2011: 59), the G20 can not
only serve ‘as the premier forum for international cooperation but also as a
premier marketplace for development approaches and practical case studies
based on the actual experiences of its member countries.’ As it is common
in arguing contexts, the pressure and the political stakes are rather low. G20
discussions on development are barely covered in the press and G20 officials
only seldom refer to development topics in their public statements.
132 Peter Debaere
In a context dominated by arguing, it is the power of the better argument

that counts, rather than market power or the power of the purse. Indeed,
since the G20 does not make any commitments for official development
assistance (ODA), the EU’s role as international aid donor is not the central
concern of the G20 countries (Young, 2010). This setting shapes the EU’s
position in the G20 DWG to a large extent and has implications for its
internal preparation and external coordination.
The EU’s preparatory process for the G20’s development agenda differs

substantially from financial affairs. Whereas the 28 EU member states have
plenty of opportunities to shape the EU’s position for the G20 finance
track, the member states’ involvement in the sherpa track is limited to
informative briefings by the EU sherpa to the member states’ ambassadors
in COREPER. In general, the EU position in the sherpa track is a result of
consultation between the several services within the European Commission
without the active involvement of EU member countries. With regard to
development, the Commission only reluctantly briefed the member states
a few times in the Working Party on Development Cooperation (CODEV).
These briefings were purely informative and were not intended to approve
the Commission’s position in the G20 Development Working Group. The
low level of internal coordination for development not only contrasts with
substantial coordination for financial affairs, it also stands out against the
intensive coordination efforts of the EU in the context of other interna-
tional development conferences such as the Busan High Level Forum on Aid
Effectiveness in 2011 or the conferences on Financing for Development in
Monterrey 2002 and Doha 2008.
The reluctance of the Commission to involve the non-G20 EU member
states is shared among the other EU member states in the G20. It is believed
that a strong EU position on development in the G20 would give the wrong
signal to the emerging markets. In the G20, the EU participants want to
break with the classical dividing line between the G77 and the G7. By pre-
senting itself as one bloc, the EU might alienate the BRICs and undermine
efforts to engage them in a responsible donor discourse. But more than
the EU4, the European Commission is supposed to represent the EU in
the G20 DWG. However, it considers a formal negotiation mandate inap-
propriate in the informal context of the G20. Furthermore, it argues that
it acts carefully and according to previously agreed positions and standard
policies. So prior EU-wide coordination is not only deemed undesirable, but
also unnecessary. The position of the European Commission is surprising
given that it is traditionally a strong advocate of more EU coordination on
development (Baroncelli, 2011). Hence, this attitude does raise a number
of questions. Especially given that the rotating Council Presidency does
not counterbalance the powerful position of the Commission in the DWG.
Does the European Commission represent the 28 member states, the large
EU member states or its own agenda? Moreover, if the Commission acts
according to existing policies, to what extent are these standard policies still
useful in discussions that aim at finding new cooperation structures between
old and new donors? Finally, does the practice of information sharing suffi-
ciently address the needs of the non-G20 EU member states? Some member
states are probably keen to provide substantive input for G20 discussion on
development, for example with regard to the G20’s relation with the UN
and the successor of the Millennium Development Goals.
Along the same line, the EU participants in the G20 refrain from coor-

dinating their positions too explicitly in the G20 DWG. The heads of the
European delegations in the G20 DWG meet informally, but extensive coor-
dination at G20 level on development is considered as less relevant. There
is a low level of disagreement among EU participants as they already depart
from a common European perspective. Disagreement is rather situated
between EU and non-EU countries. In addition, because the G20 talks on
development mainly follow an arguing logic, discussing negotiation tactics
is less appropriate. A coordinated EU position could be too fixed and would
constrain attempts to alter preferences and to develop new paradigms. EU
coordination would be inconsistent with an open attitude required in an
arguing context.
Further research is needed to assess the effectiveness of this diplomatic
strategy. At first sight, it seems that this approach does not offer the degree
of influence that the EU might hope for. The EU has for example not been
able to upload some of its core values and priorities to the G20’s develop-
ment language. The Seoul Consensus does not or rarely refer to poverty
reduction, gender issues or the environmental dimension of development.
Unsurprisingly, the EU warmly welcomed the proposal of the Mexican
G20 Presidency in 2012 to include green growth as a crosscutting theme.
Nevertheless, the strategy of approaching the G20 in an uncoordinated way
may produce some results, albeit less tangible. The emerging markets are
still engaged in G20 development discussions. The risk exists that when the
EU would coordinate more explicitly for development, the emerging mar-
kets would lose their interests in the G20 as a forum to discuss development.
Also, positive experiences in the G20 can have spill over effects to other
international organisations by enhancing cooperation between traditional
and new aid donors. In this sense, the G20 functions as a network that fos-
ters personal relationships between officials and experts from G20 countries
and international organisations.
Conclusion
Before examining the EU’s diplomatic role in the G20, this chapter has
sketched the evolution of the EU’s role in the G8. The EU’s involvement in
the G8 evolved from total exclusion to full participation. As it counts for
half of the G8 membership, the EU possesses, and sometimes exploits, the
134 Peter Debaere
ability to substantially shape the G8 discussions, which is not necessarily

the result of explicit prior coordination. Next, this chapter has analysed how
the EU approaches the G20 in two policy areas, finance and development.
It has been illustrated that the EU’s diplomatic behaviour, in particular the
extent to which it coordinates, differs across the G20. This seems to depend
to a large degree on the mode of interaction during G20 discussions.
In this way, this chapter has confirmed the idea that the strategy of
speaking with a single voice is not always appropriate. By introducing the

mode of interaction as a key variable, this chapter tried to specify in which
contexts this strategy could or could not work. For financial and economic
affairs, the EU coordinates quite intensively, both in advance as on the spot.
Prior internal coordination is believed to be useful in a bargaining context
where the participants try to maximise their own interests without the
intention to alter its views. Coordination would also enable the EU to weigh
on G20 finance discussions. In contrast, the European Commission and the
EU4 refrain from involving the non-G20 EU member states in the prepara-
tion of the G20’s work on development. As shown, this is due to the arguing
context of G20 development discussions. It is deemed that EU coordination
would hinder the attempts to convince the other parties of the better argu-
ment. It is however difficult to see whether this strategy has any impact.
This argument adds to the growing recognition among scholars that
the external context has a significant influence on how the EU behaves in
international settings. However, to fully understand the EU’s diplomatic
role in the G20, other factors should be taken into account as well such as
the national interests of EU G20 and non-G20 countries, the distribution of
competences and the perceived relevance of the G20. In addition, this chap-
ter has also illustrated that the diplomatic role might vary within a single
international institution. This aspect of intra-organisational diversity could
also be a subject of further research.
Notes
This chapter draws on several confidential interviews with officials from EU member
states and institutions from 2010–2013.
1. In this chapter, G8 is used consequentially when referring to the ‘political’ G6/7/8
to avoid confusion with the G7, which only deals with financial and economic
affairs.
2. However, more recently, the US officials have complained that what they really
want from the Europeans is some coherence (Gowan and Jones, 2009).
3. The G20 consists of the USA, Japan, Canada, Germany, the UK, France, Italy,
Russia, Australia, Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia,
South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, as well as the European Union.
4. Before the Treaty of Lisbon, that is the President or Prime Minister of the country
holding the rotating Council presidency. Since the entry into force of the Lisbon
Treaty in December 2009, that is the permanent President of the European Council.
5. The quotas are the members’ financial contributions to the IMF and determine
their voting power in the Fund.
6. Countries listed as ‘grey’ on the OECD’s list represent jurisdictions that have com-
mitted to the internationally agreed tax standard, but have not yet substantially
implemented the agreement.
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9
The European Union as an
International Trade Negotiator
Frank Hoffmeister

Introduction
This chapter will analyse the European Union’s trade policy-making. Trade is
widely acknowledged as a model of EU efficiency in the international field
for a number of reasons. First, representing an internal market with over 500
million customers, the EU is still the biggest economic bloc in the world.
Hence, ‘making business’ with the EU gives access to an attractive market
for third-country exporters. In return, third countries, which wish to have
a deal with the EU, are generally ready to make important concessions. In
other words, its sheer economic weight makes the EU usually successful in
international trade negotiations.
Second, foreign trade falls into EU exclusive competence where the
‘Community method’ is applied in its original sense. Accordingly,
the Commission represents the Union with one voice, and third states are
used to negotiate with Brussels rather than with the capitals. Moreover,
the Commission has accumulated the necessary expertise in trade matters,
running a specialised Directorate-General with over 600 officials in charge.
This endows the Commission with a diplomatic capacity, which is largely
acknowledged by its trading partners.
Third, the Union has constantly caught up with new challenges for inter-
national trade. When attention shifted from traditional trade in goods to
trade in services or investment, member states affirmed their belief in the
Community method by transposing the relevant powers to the Union level
with subsequent Treaty changes. This, in turn, increased the credibility of
the Commission as the Union negotiator vis-à-vis third countries, which is
capable of tackling modern issues, as necessary.
However, even though there is a constantly updated legal basis for conduct-
ing a ‘hard’ policy with one voice, the actual internal processes are subject to
struggles between the EU institutions. In particular, after the entry into force of
the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament received more power, which in turn
might also influence the output of the EU’s trade policy.
138
The European Union as an International Trade Negotiator 139
This chapter will thus recall the institutional set-up between the Commission,
the Trade Policy Committee (and the Council) and the Parliament (and its
trade committee). It will look at the novelties of the Lisbon Treaty (for a con-
ceptual analysis see Kleimann and Hillmann, 2010) and will assess first prac-
tice. Three examples will be selected. First, in the bilateral field, this chapter
will evaluate the EU as a diplomatic actor in the context of the ratification
of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Korea and some thematic clauses.
Second, the negotiations with a few selected partners (commonly defined as

‘plurilateral’ as falling short of involving all WTO members1) in the context
of the EU’s negotiations of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA)
serves as an interesting example, since civil society concerns and an internet
campaign prompted the European Parliament to reject its ratification. Finally,
the EU’s performance in the WTO Doha round (commonly referred to as
‘multilateral’ as involving all 160 WTO members) will be briefly reviewed.
Based on these empirical examples, this chapter will conclude with a
first assessment of the EU’s overall impact, performance and power as a
diplomatic actor in the field of international trade. Does the EU perform
as well as in the field of trade as commonly perceived? Is the Commission
in the driving seat when it comes to trade negotiations? To what extent
does the European Parliament exert its newly acquired post-Lisbon pow-
ers? Is the EP’s new power felt, for example, in model clauses in bilateral
FTAs? And finally, is the EU viewed by other actors as a reliable partner
when it comes to the issue of delivering on negotiated trade deals?
Legal foundation
EU exclusive competence on trade

Since the inception of the European Community, the Common Commercial
Policy (CCP) played a crucial role in its external relations. The Treaty dedi-
cated a separate chapter to it, and the European Court of Justice ruled early
on that the Community’s trade competence was exclusive in nature (EJC
1975). The Lisbon Treaty re-affirmed this important point in Article 3 (1) (e)
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It follows
that only the Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts, the mem-
ber states being able to do so themselves only if so empowered by the Union
or for the implementation of Union acts (Article 2 (1) TFEU). The same is
true for international agreements: in the area of trade, it is for the Union
to negotiate and conclude commercial deals, while bilateral agreements
between an individual member state and a third country are no longer per-
mitted, unless the Union grants a specific empowerment.
Scope of the common commercial policy

A precondition for this ‘EU only’ approach is that the substance of an
international agreement falls within the scope of the common commercial
140 Frank Hoffmeister
policy. This has always been the case for trade in goods, but nowadays
under Article 207 (1) TFEU trade in services also falls entirely under EU
competence.2
Moreover, the ‘commercial aspects’ of intellectual property rights are
covered. This confers powers on the EU to negotiate International Property
Rights-related provisions in trade agreements and set provisions for their civil
enforcement. However, where such provisions touch upon criminal enforce-
ment, member states used to invoke their national competence. However, in

2013, the European Court of Justice found that the Lisbon Treaty has con-
ferred exclusive power on the Union for the entire WTO TRIPS Agreement.3
As the latter includes a section on criminal enforcement, it can now be
argued that also these aspects of intellectual property rights are hitherto cov-
ered by the Union’s trade competence (Hoffmeister, 2013b: 389).
Finally, post-Lisbon Union competence also covers ‘foreign direct invest-
ment’ (FDI). While the EU’s free trade agreements already included a market
access agenda on investments, the Treaty has now established the exclusive
competence on FDI as part of the CCP. According to the Commission’s view,
this is complemented by an implied competence on portfolio investments
derived from the internal market chapter on free movement of capital
(European Commission, 2010, p. 8). While this point has been accepted by
the other EU-institutions as well (Council of the European Union, 2010:
§ 7; European Parliament Resolution 2011: §11), there is still controversy
on certain standard clauses for investment protection. For example, a
number of member states in the Council consider that the Union lacks
competence to contract international guarantees against expropriation,
while the Commission and the Parliament are less hesitant on that matter
(Hoffmeister and Ünüvar, 2013: 68–70).
Operationally, this means that future trade agreements involving invest-
ment protection chapters might have to be concluded as so called ‘mixed
agreements’, that is agreements between the Union and all its member states
on the one hand, and one-third country on the other hand.4 While this does
not make much difference for the negotiation phase (the Commission is
usually still in the driving seat), it would add complications at ratification
stage: a mixed agreement does not only have to be ratified by the European
Parliament (for the European Union) but also by each national Parliament
(for the respective national part of the mixed agreement). That is an oddity,
which can only be overcome if the European Court of Justice in Luxemburg
was to confirm the Commission’s broad reading of Union competences
under the Lisbon treaty in a future inter-institutional case.
Representation
On trade matters, the European Commission represents the European
Union. That flows from Article 17 (1) 6 TEU. More specifically in the field
of trade, the Commission is the Union negotiator under Article 218 (3)
TFEU, as trade agreements almost never relate ‘exclusively or principally

to the common foreign security policy’, which would make the High
Representative the lead negotiator.
The first step in the process is a Commission recommendation to the
Council to authorise negotiations. When the Council does so, acting by
qualified majority, it may also address directives to the Commission (Article
218 (4) TFEU). These directives are often called a ‘mandate’ in political sci-
ence literature (see e.g. Niemann, 2011: 12) and practice. From a strictly

legal point of view, the term is not precise. A ‘mandate’ presupposes that
the Council has an original negotiating power, which it transfers to the
Commission, acting strictly within the boundaries of such mandated power.
But in reality, the Treaty sees the Commission as the original negotiator
who is only ‘directed’ by the Council. This also means that the Commission
can well go further than the negotiation directives. Such move would not
be legally impossible (lacking a ‘mandate’), but simply politically risky. The
sanction for such an action could be the rejection of the final agreement
either by the Council or the Parliament. It follows that the Commission
first defines the objectives of a negotiation, makes the recommendations to
the Council and then acts within certain boundaries to ensure subsequent
approval by the other institutions. This is a rather unique institutional
triangle within the European Union, which does not lend itself to a classical
principal-agent model.
Where a negotiation goes beyond the scope of the Union’s competence,
though, there are two scenarios. The member states could either designate the
Commission to negotiate on matters of national competence as well. This
has been the traditional approach, in particular in bilateral negotiations.
Alternatively, the member states would appoint the Presidency to represent
their negotiating positions vis-à-vis the third country. This model has been
more used in the general multilateral context of the EU’s external relations,
for example for environmental negotiations at the UN. For trade, the mem-
ber states usually relied on the Commission as sole negotiator for the entire
range of topics with the remarkable exception of the criminal enforcement
chapters for IPR.
Dynamics of diplomatic negotiation: internal coordination

During negotiations the Commission coordinates the EU position with a
Special Committee of the Council (Article 218 (4) TFEU). In practice, the
Council entrusts this role to the Trade Policy Committee (TPC). Hence,
the Commission negotiators regularly inform the TPC about progress and
problems in the negotiations and receive feedback on member states’ inter-
ests and assessments. This process of coordination between the Commission
and the Council allows a constant refinement and adaptation of EU positions.
At the same time, the Commission is in regular contact with the Parliament.
Under the Lisbon Treaty, the Parliament is to be fully and immediately kept
informed about the negotiations of all international agreements (Article 218

(10) TFEU). In the field of trade policy, this is underlined a second time in
Article 207 (3) 3rd subparagraph TFEU, according to which the Commission
shall report ‘regularly’ on the progress of trade negotiations to the European
Parliament. § 23 of the Framework Agreement between the Commission
and the Parliament of 20 October 20105 further specifies that such informa-
tion also covers the Commission’s recommendation for negotiating direc-
tives. The information is to be channelled through the relevant committee,

where confidentiality is safeguarded through special procedures (§ 24 of
the Framework Agreement). Again, through this process negotiators receive
important indications from leading MEPs about their expectations on a par-
ticular agreement. If those coincide with Council views, the Commission is
likely to fully endorse them. If there is a divergence between Council and
Parliament, a fair balance must be struck.
Signature and conclusion

Once the Commission negotiators have agreed on a draft text and initialled
it, they have to ask for approval of the other EU institutions. In the EU,
a two-step procedure is used. First, the Council takes a decision on sig-
nature – the purpose is to endorse the negotiated text politically and to
declare a willingness to work towards ratification. That latter step is called
‘conclusion’ in the EU context. The Commission proposes to the Council to
take such a ‘conclusion decision’, but the Council can only do so if it has
received prior consent from the European Parliament (Article 218 (6) (a) (v)
TFEU). This is one of the important novelties of the Lisbon Treaty, since
prior to it the Parliament had to be merely ‘consulted’. Together with the
introduction of the ordinary legislative procedure for internal legislation,
the power to give consent to trade treaties has arguably led to a democratisa-
tion of the EU’s trade policy (Hoffmeister, 2011:95).
Pending ratification, the EU can also declare provisional application of
an agreement together with signature. Here, the Parliament does not play
the same role. Council decisions to authorise the provisional application
of an agreement can still be taken on a proposal from the Commission
alone – without the need to ask for prior parliamentary consent (Article
218 (3) TFEU). The latter rule responds to the need to act quickly in some
situations and is an accepted international practice under Article 25 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.6 On the other hand, there
may be important trade agreements that fundamentally define the EU’s
relationship with a third country for a long time. In this situation, EU Trade
Commissioner Karel de Gucht committed to involve the Parliament even
before provisional application (De Gucht, 2010:4). That strikes a delicate
balance between the principles of efficiency and the principle of democratic
legitimacy and endows the EU with the necessary means to act appropri-
ately in the international scene. Having the power to put agreements into
(quick) provisional application, if need be, allows the EU responding differ-

ently to different scenarios. It thus constitutes an important instrument in
the arsenal of policy choices and provides the EU with the necessary flex-
ibility needed in international trade negotiations.
Practice
Bilateral negotiations
EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement

An important bilateral case where the European Union performed as an
international trade negotiator is the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement. As
part of the EU’s strategy to create ‘deep and comprehensive’ agreements
with selected partners in view of the Doha round stand-still at the WTO,
negotiations started in May 2007. The Commission held a regular dialogue
with the TPC and the EP’s trade committee after each of the eight rounds of
negotiations. Catherine Ashton, Trade Commissioner at the time, initialled
the text in October 2009. Most of it was actually covered by EU competence
with the exception of a protocol on cultural cooperation and the criminal
enforcement provisions of the IPR chapter. This meant that the agreement
was a ‘mixed agreement’ to which the EU and all its member states would
become a party on the one side, whereas Korea would be the party on the
other side. Moreover, the feature of ‘mixity’ triggered unanimity in the
Council and the need for 27 national ratifications next to the conclusion of
the agreement by the European Union.
In February 2010, the Commission put forward its proposal for an
implementing regulation for the safeguard mechanism foreseen in the
agreement, followed by the two proposals for signature and provisional
application on the one hand, and conclusion on the other hand in April
that year (European Commission 2010: 49; 136–137). In autumn 2010, the
political battle started surrounding the Council decision on signature and
provisional application. Italy under the leadership of Prime Minister Silvio
Berlusconi defended the position that Europe was not ready for a further
liberalisation of the automotive sector. Echoing the concerns of the Italian
manufacturer Fiat, the government threatened to block the decision. Only
after heavy lobbying at the highest level from a number of member states
and the Commission did Italy agree. However, it insisted that provisional
application should only start on 1 July 2011 and that the Parliament would
have to adopt the safeguard regulation beforehand. That was a piece of EU
legislation setting out the internal procedures if the EU was ever to invoke
the safeguard clause in the agreement,7 which allows either party to restrict
imports because of their increased quantities causing or threatening to
cause serious injury to the domestic industry. In addition, the Commission
fulfilled its commitment to link provisional application politically with
parliamentary consent. Thus, the Council’s decision of 16 September 2010
set two preconditions for provisional application as of 1 July 2011: the

Parliament should have provided a positive vote on conclusion and adopted
the safeguards implementing regulation.8 Politically speaking, these two
linkages were made to convince sceptics of the agreement that all necessary
preparations would have to be put in place to ‘defend’ EU industry against
sudden – and probably unexpected – increases of imports before actual rati-
fication. Moreover, asking for consent before provisional application meant
that all main political factions in the Parliament had to be convinced that

the agreement was in the overall EU interest.
Against that backdrop, discussions between the Council and the
Parliament intensified at the end of 2010 (for details see Kleimann, 2011:
21–25), and the EP’s Committee for Trade (INTA) voted on 26 January 2011
for a remarkable political compromise. While the Parliament did not insist
anymore on a right to initiate a safeguard procedure itself and on a regional
application of a possible safeguard measure, many of its demands applying
to duty drawback and social and environmental issues found their way into
the preamble of the regulation. In return, the Council and the Commission
accepted a number of monitoring, reporting and surveillance duties. The
INTA vote paved the way for an adoption of both the regulation9 and
the consent of the Parliament to the agreement in the plenary session of
17 February 2010 with a broad majority. The Agreement could thus be pro-
visionally applied as of 1 July 2011 as foreseen.10
This case shows that the internal decision-making in the EU on trade
agreements is much more complex than one might assume under a simple
‘one voice’ narrative. While the Commission was clearly in the lead on shap-
ing the agenda and providing for the substance of the agreement, its accept-
ance in the Council and in the Parliament were not a given. This led to a
not insignificant time-gap between initialling and provisional application of
more than one and half year. On the other hand, the intensive discussions
at member state and EP level also mobilised support for the agreement cross-
ing party lines. This again shows the increased politicisation of trade policy
in the Union. Trade agreements are not anymore ‘technical agreements’
which are left to ‘experts’ from the Commission, but they are more and
more perceived as politically so important that a broad consensus is required
for their negotiation and ratification. If such support can be sustained, the
EU may, in return, use all its instruments to conduct an efficient bilateral
trade policy. This includes ‘provisional application’ of a mixed agreement,
pending ratification in all 28 member states.
Thematic clauses
As seen above, the EU-Korea FTA was negotiated before the entry into
force of the Lisbon Treaty. This means that the influence of the European
Parliament on its substance was limited. Arguably, this has changed from
2010 onwards, because the Parliament’s power to reject trade agreements
can be used by influential MEPs to insist that the Commission takes into
account certain issues while negotiating. We can cite three examples where
such influence has already been exerted.
First, there is an expectation in the Parliament that EU-FTAs should con-
tain chapters on human rights (European Parliament, 2010c: § 12). Here, a
traditional clause, which declares that the protection of human rights forms
an ‘essential part’ of the agreement, creates a link between the human rights
situation in a country and the obligations under an international agreement.

In particular, in situations of grave human rights violations, either side may
suspend the operation of the agreement. This right is often specifically men-
tioned in a ‘non-execution’ clause. Again, for the European Parliament, it
is important that this EU practice, which has developed in cooperation or
association agreements defining the political relations with a third country,
is also applied for pure trade agreements. Moreover, there should be a con-
sultation mechanism with the treaty partner (European Parliament, 2010c:
§§ 13–19). This is normally achieved through a cross-reference between
the trade agreement and the political agreement with the third country in
question. Such reference would then allow suspending the trade agreement
if there was a ground under the political agreement to do so. So far, such a
scenario has, however, remained purely theoretical. Nevertheless, the mere
existence of such linkages to a non-execution clause could be questioned by
certain treaty partners, such as Canada, the USA or Japan.
Second, a related issue concerns sustainable development. The Parliament
wishes to see that social and environmental standards are treated in a simi-
lar fashion as human rights provisions (European Parliament, 2010c: § 13).
Such a chapter has been agreed with Korea, Peru and Colombia already.
However, in the negotiations with India the partner was less open to accept
language which is seen as only remotely linked to trade. Here, Commission
negotiators point to the fact that the non-inclusion of these clauses could
lead to severe difficulties in ratification. EP insistence on such clauses thus
makes them a ‘must-have’ in negotiation terms. On the other hand, the
sustainable development chapters have a different enforcement mecha-
nism. Social, labour and environmental issues can be discussed in treaty-
monitoring bodies, as well as between civil society advisors. However,
violations of social or environmental standards would not give rise to a
sanction right of the other side.
Third, the Parliament has gone into the details of the new European
investment policy. In its resolution of 6 April 2011 it emphasises the need
to negotiate standard investment protection clauses (European Parliament,
2011: §19). In the same vein, Parliament wishes to see guarantees in
future EU treaties that the ‘right to regulate’ of the European Union and
its member states is properly safeguarded (European Parliament, 2011:
§§ 23–26). The idea behind this point is to make sure that the high environ-
mental, food safety and other industrial standards cannot be challenged by
international investors per se. Rather, only arbitrary or unfair governmental

or administrative decisions would usually come under the purview of inter-
national investment arbitration. Given that EU member states have differ-
ent traditions on this point in their bilateral investment agreements, it will
be interesting to see how the European Union will address this issue in its
first investment protection chapters, for example with Singapore or Canada.
In sum, we can see a clear influence of the Parliament on the EU’s trade
agenda. The Commission negotiators must nowadays reassure themselves

that their positions are supported by the House if they are put forward
towards third countries as EU positions. To a certain degree, this limits the
flexibilities of the EU as a diplomatic actor. Negotiators are increasingly torn
between the need to promote political EU values, and the imperative to reach
an economically viable deal with the trading partner who may have quite a
different approach to the idea of putting political clauses into trade agree-
ments. Nevertheless, the EU has so far always succeeded to find an agreement
on appropriate wording for such thematic clauses with its trading partners.
Plurilateral negotiations
The picture is quite different when it comes to the Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement (ACTA), our example from the plurilateral field. Here,
the Commission reached agreement with a limited number of like-minded
trading partners, but clashed with the Parliament over the substance of the
agreement.
The EU backed this US-Japanese initiative in 2006 and official nego-
tiations started in 2008 together with Switzerland, Mexico, Singapore,
Australia, New Zealand and Korea. The participants promised to step up
enforcement action against counterfeit goods, generic medicines and copy-
right infringements on the internet. However, during the negotiations, two
‘anomalies’ occurred, one concerning EU representation and one concern-
ing confidentiality.
First, the European Commission was the lead negotiator, but this chapter
on ‘criminal enforcement’ was negotiated by the Presidency on behalf of
the member states. The member states reserved for themselves the power to
address the type and level of criminal penalties, penal procedural law and
cooperation between enforcement authorities. This reflected the pre-Lisbon
case law of the Court of Justice according to which the Community was
competent for criminal offences when this was necessary to ensure effective
compliance with the acquis, but could not determine the type and level of
criminal sanctions or regulate criminal procedure.11 Even after the entry into
force of the Lisbon Treaty, this arrangement was not changed. The member
states did not wish to establish minimum harmonisation measures in the
criminal field through an international agreement. Hence, the criminal
enforcement provisions continued to be negotiated by the Presidency and
ACTA remained a ‘mixed agreement’ from an EU institutional point of view.
Second, the negotiators had agreed on a ‘confidentiality clause’ according

to which they would not share drafts with third parties. Because of this com-
mitment also the Commission only gave general explanations to the public
and the Parliament, which the latter criticised as not being transparent
in its resolution of 10 March 2010 (European Parliament, 2010a: §§ 2–4).
Having assumed office under the Lisbon rules, EU Trade Commissioner Karel
De Gucht changed this practice. He convinced the negotiation partners to
lift the clause and then shared draft texts with the trade committee of the

European Parliament. This allowed the latter to form their views on con-
tentious issues on the basis of the texts rather than on inaccurate hearsay.
Negotiations were then finalised in November 2010. In its resolution of
24 November 2010, the Parliament expressed satisfaction over the consul-
tations and improvements in content. Those related to issues, ‘such as the
observance of fundamental rights, privacy and data protection, respect for
the important role of free Internet, the importance of safeguarding the role
of service providers, and the need to safeguard access to medicine’, which
were actually incorporated into the preamble of the agreement (European
Parliament, 2010b: Preambular Paragraphs F and G).
In June 2011, the Commission adopted two proposals: one on the sign-
ing and one on the conclusion of ACTA (European Commission 2011a,
2011b). It proposed that the Union should not exercise its shared compe-
tence on criminal enforcement. Rather, it would be for both the Union and
all member states to sign and conclude the text. On 16 December 2011,
the Council adopted by unanimity the decision to sign ACTA on behalf of
the Union,12 and indeed, a Union representative actually signed ACTA on
26 January 2012 in Tokyo. At the same time, representatives from all member
states with the exception of Cyprus, Estonia, Germany, the Netherlands and
Slovakia also put their signature under the text.
The fact that a number of member states did not sign the agreement
although they had voted in favour of EU signature just a month before
already demonstrates that significant developments had occurred in the
meantime. In fact, an unprecedented wave of Internet protests and dem-
onstrations in East European and German cities expressed huge discontent
towards the agreement. In particular, the interaction of the agreement with
the freedom of the Internet was questioned, as was the lack of clarity of a
number of provisions. A critical academic opinion of January 201113 further
fuelled the debate, as did an opinion of the EU data protection supervisor
raising doubts about the compatibility of the agreement with the EU’s data
protection principles.14 Against that background, the Commission decided
in February 2012 to seize an opinion of the ECJ on the question whether the
agreement is compatible with the Treaties and in particular the European
Charter of Human Rights. The legal submission was submitted to the
Court on 10 May 2012. Irrespective of this request and despite a call from
Trade Commissioner De Gucht to await the Court opinion, the European
Parliament continued with the consent procedure. In fact, also pointing to a

petition of over 2.8 million online petitioners arguing against ACTA and the
negative advice of INTA rapporteur David Martin, an overwhelming major-
ity of MEPs voted against the agreement at the plenary on 9 July 2012. As
a consequence, most member states terminated their ratification procedure
as well, and in December 2012 the Commission withdrew its application
before the Court.
This example sheds a different light on the diplomatic capacities of the

EU as trade negotiator. For the first time, a trade agreement was rejected by
the Parliament, casting a doubt in the minds of the EU’s trading partners
on the Commission’s abilities to ‘deliver’ a trade agreement at home. It is
clear that the credibility of the chief negotiator may suffer if he does not
enjoy the backing of its own Parliament. This reveals a particular feature
of the European system, when compared with parliamentary systems of
governance in many States. In contrast to those domestic systems, the
Commission cannot be considered as the ‘government’ which commands
per se a sufficient majority in the Parliament. Rather, the Commission has
to secure for each trade agreement support among the main parties in the
Parliament with changing coalitions. Hence, the risk of rejection may be
bigger in controversial files as MEPs are not particularly ‘bound’ to sup-
port the Commission as would be a national MP who is belonging to the
pro-government camp. The discussions on ACTA demonstrate that no such
allegiance could be claimed by the Commission. Rather, if its only argument
fails, namely that a particular agreement would be beneficial for Europe,
then it may be voted down, as it actually was in the ACTA case.
Multilateral negotiations
Being itself an international organisation, the EU traditionally is pushing for
multilateral rules and organisations. This also applies to the trade field, where
the EU has been a leading player in the foundation of the WTO in 1994. In
the same vein, the EU is also supportive of the current Doha Development
agenda, initiated in 2001. In this arena, too, severe complications have arisen
over time, both inside the EU and in the membership at large.
Within the EU, the tension between the Commission and the Council
became at times more accentuated than usual. For example, when a first
draft package on agriculture was on the horizon in summer 2004, the
Council advocated the idea that the Commission had to seek an explicit
Council authorisation before accepting any kind of Chairman’s paper. The
legal theory developed to support this political request that also ‘pre-legal
commitments’ had to be decided by the Council itself. This French theory
was, however, not line with the clear treaty language (at the time Article 300
(1) EC, now Article 218 (3) TFEU). The Commission was thus able to reject
this claim and to preserve its institutional role as lead negotiator without
undue constraints.
On the other hand, within the Commission there was a split between the
Commissioner for Trade and the Commissioner for Agriculture. Given the high
importance of the agricultural dossier in the round, it was decided to give the
portfolio Commissioner a greater say also within international trade negotia-
tions. Such pre-eminence on agricultural trade would have to be exercised, of
course, in close coordination with the Trade Commissioner. This ‘doubling’
of Commission representatives was seen as a functional guarantee that the
Commission would not grant concessions in this sensitive field too easily.

However, in practice, it made negotiations also more difficult – in particular for
the so-called ‘Green Room’ meetings with a limited number of WTO members
present, it would be difficult to have two European representatives occupy-
ing rare seats and speak. In any case, Commissioner Mandelson (Trade) and
Fischer-Boel (Agriculture) were able to agree on a defendable EU position so that
the breakdown of the Round in June 2008 was not due to a lack of European
flexibility but rather due to the uncompromising attitude of the USA (Schwab)
and the Indian (Nath) chief negotiators over the issue of special safeguards for
agricultural products.
In the Barroso II Commission, as of February 2010, this dichotomy
between industry and agriculture interests continued to exist, but created
less practical challenges. EU Trade Commissioner De Gucht tried to unblock
the negotiations on non-agricultural market access (NAMA) with a personal
initiative in Davos 2011, followed by an EU proposal on NAMA in May
that year. However, again due to the inflexibility of others (the USA and
China), no common ground could be achieved to move forward that part
of the negotiations. Instead, the EU has then pushed for a respectable out-
come centred on trade facilitation which eventually materialised at the 9th
Ministerial meeting in December 2013 in Bali.
Seen from other WTO partners, the EU is thus a faithful adherent to the
multilateral system. But if blockages persist in the WTO membership at
large, the EU would also be prepared to go ahead with only those mem-
bers who show a sufficient interest in the dossier as temporary solution
(Hoffmeister, 2013a: 160). A case in point is negotiations on services. Those
have been part and parcel of the Doha Development Agenda, but noth-
ing was ever achieved other than a ‘signalling’ of offers at the Hong-Kong
Ministerial meeting in 2005. As no progress was recorded since then, a group
of currently 21-WTO Members has explored the possibility to negotiate and
conclude a stand-alone agreement in services. The 8th WTO Ministerial
Conference in December 2011 encouraged them to do so, recognising ‘that
Members need to fully explore different negotiation approaches while
respecting the principles of transparency and inclusiveness’. During explora-
tory talks in 2012, the EU insisted that any such initiative would have to
be compatible with the structure and definitions of the WTO agreement
on services (the ‘General Agreement on Trade in Services – GATS’). This
line of thinking was not shared by all partners – in particular, the USA was
also prepared to leave the WTO architecture for the ‘International Services
Agreement’. However, the EU’s approach found a lot of sympathy among
many of the participating States, including the co-chair of the initiative,
Australia. Accordingly, in a declaration of the Chairs of December 2012 con-
vergence on the main parameters of a future agreement was found. It would
be a substitute for the stalled WTO Doha negotiations on services, pursuing
essentially the same objectives in a smaller circle of participants. Moreover,
it would be a transitional vehicle to a new WTO services agreement, trying

to get on board the remaining WTO members as well.
What do these developments tell us for the EU as a diplomatic actor in
the multilateral scene? In my view, the EU’s performance in the WTO shows
that it is well established among the ‘big players’ on world trade and that
its voice has weight. It is custom in Geneva to show respect to Brussels,
presumably for a number of reasons. First, for third countries and the respec-
tive Chairmen of negotiating groups it is easier to speak with one negotia-
tor than with 27. Second, Commission’s network and outreach capacities
figures among the best. Third, on substance, the EU may figure often as a
more moderate player among the developed world, whose attachment to a
free and fair international trading system is seen as credible: the latest insist-
ence on not steering the plurilateral services initiative away from the WTO
and keeping the door open for other WTO members to join at a later stage
may constitute a good example in this respect. Also, at the 9th Ministerial
Conference in Bali the EU played a constructive role in balancing the diverse
interests of WTO members. This helped achieving a good outcome on devel-
opment and agricultural issues (which were more interesting to developing
and some emerging WTO members) as well as on trade facilitation (which
constituted one of the EU’s core negotiation objectives).
Conclusion
International trade is a prototype of effective EU action on the international

scene. Being invested with an exclusive power in the field, the Union speaks
in principle with one voice through the European Commission. This is an
accepted practice which yields results, as can be witnessed by the amount
and quality of EU trade agreements that have been put in place over time.
On the other hand, it has to be admitted that quarrels about ‘mixity’ at the
margins remain. Member state positions on criminal enforcement of IPR
or certain investment protection clauses show that the transfer of power
to Brussels is not easily accepted by specialists in national administrations
who have previously negotiated those matters on their own for their govern-
ments. In this respect, the potential of the new EU trade competences after
Lisbon have not been fully put in practice yet.
While those internal ‘competence battles’ influence the EU’s ability to
act only to a certain degree – while being apt to create confusion among
the partners (Woolcock, 2010: 15), also mixed agreements with the EU
and all its member states on board have usually been ratified, albeit at a
slower pace – the new powers of the European Parliament in the field are
likely to have a stronger impact. As has been demonstrated, its ratification
power sends important signals to the Commission to take a number of
parliamentary requests seriously during negotiations. Those requests usu-
ally transport non-economic concerns and objectives, therefore leading
to a greater politicisation of EU trade policy. That, in turn, also reflects a

demand of the Lisbon Treaty, according to which EU trade policy should
also pursue the broader objectives of the EU’s external action (Article 207
(1) 2nd sentence TFEU).15
While this mechanism worked so far in the bilateral context with respect to
certain horizontal clauses, it failed with respect to ACTA. Despite the fact that
the first resolution of the Parliament of November 2010 on the negotiation
results showed some satisfaction with the EP’s (late) influence over negotia-
tions, the subsequent events showed that most MEPs changed sides. This led
to the rejection of ACTA even though the Commission had taken the unprec-
edented move to ask the Court of Justice to render an advisory opinion on the
human rights compatibility of a trade agreement.
Whether this non-ratification of ACTA will hamper the EU’s credibility
as a trade negotiator in other fields remains to be seen. For the time being,
trade negotiations continue with India, Singapore, Malaysia, Canada and
MERCOSUR. The EU even started negotiations with Japan and the USA
in 2013. None of the EU’s partners have so far declined to engage because
of the risk of a ‘non-delivery’ of the European Parliament. As long as the
rejection of trade agreements will not become the rule in Strasburg, it can
be assumed that also the EU’s trading partners will acknowledge that trade
agreements are subject to democratic scrutiny in the EU by now. Maybe
this is just another sign that the European Union has indeed become an
ordinary player in the international trade scene, where the occasional non-
ratification of a negotiated agreement is part and parcel of a normal risk
between democratic entities.
Finally, the current experience with the WTO Doha round recalls that even
a well-functioning negotiation and more democratic set-up in the EU is not
prone to success alone. It always needs two to tango, and in the WTO case
the number extends now to 160. Here, negotiation results depend on much
bigger economic and political questions. The fact that the Commission
negotiates for the EU in Geneva, which has to balance 28 member state
interests, has certainly not complicated or even stalled the process. Rather,
the inability to conclude the full round reflects different approaches from
other main players, such as the USA, India and China. Only when all these
players construe a balanced package, such as the one adopted in Bali in
December 2013 on trade facilitation, agricultural and development issues,
can the WTO deliver. In a certain way, also this conclusion is re-assuring: it
is not the specific domestic institutional set-up of the European Union

which may create an obstacle to effective trade policy. Rather, it is the clash
of substantive interests, as it has been the case in the trade field from the
very early days on.
Notes
1. Compare the definition used in Article II (3) of the WTO Marrakesh Agreement.

‘Plurilateral’ Trade Agreements are those agreements that have been accepted by a
few WTO members only, whereas ‘Multilateral Trade Agreements’ are those which
are binding the entire WTO membership.
2. Before the Treaty of Lisbon, EU competence for trade in services was scattered. See
ECJ, Opinion 1/94, ECR [1994] ECR I-5267. For a discussion of the situation under
the Nice Treaty see Herrmann (2002: 7–29). Nowadays, Article 207 TFEU covers
in principle all services and serves as the legal basis for ‘external harmonisation’.
See ECJ, Judgment of 22.10.2013, C-137/12, Commission v. Council.
3. ECJ, Judgment of 18.7.2013, C-414/11, Daiichi Sankyo Co. Ltd, §§ 53–62.
4. On the legal concept of ‘Mixed Agreement’ see the contributions in: Koutrakos
and Hillion (2011).
5. Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the
European Commission, OJ 2010, L 304, p. 47.
6. See for example, the ‘Banana Agreement’ between the EU and a number of Latin-
American States which effectively ended a long-trade dispute before the WTO in
late 2009.
7. Article 3.1 of the EU-Korea FTA, OJ 2011, L 127/11.
8. See Council Press Release of 16 September 2010 (http://www.consilium.europa.
eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/116545.pdf). The Council agreed
that provisional application of the agreement will start on 1 July 2011, ‘provided
that the European Parliament has given its consent to the agreement and that a
regulation implementing an EU-South Korea safeguard clause is in force’.
9. Regulation (EU) No. 511/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 11 May 2011 implementing the bilateral safeguard clause of the Free Trade
Agreement between the European Union and its Member States and the Republic
of Korea, OJ 2011, L 145/19.
10. Notice on provisional application, OJ 2011, L 168/1.
11. ECJ, Case C-440/05 Commission v. Council, [2007] ECR I-9097, § 70.
12. See Press Release 18708/11 of the 3137th Council meeting on 15–16 December
2011, at p. 43.
13. Opinion of European Academics on Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, at
http://www.iri.unihannover.de/tl_files/pdf/ACTA_opinion_200111_2.pdf.
14. http://www.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/
Consultation/Opinions/2012/12-04-24_ACTA_EN.pdf.
15. On this novelty of the Treaty see in detail Dimopoulos (2010).
References
Council of the European Union (2010) Conclusions on a comprehensive European
international investment policy, 3041st Foreign Affairs Council meeting,
Luxembourg, 25 October 2010; http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/

docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/117328.pdf
De Gucht, K. (2010), ‘The implications of the Lisbon Treaty for EU Trade policy’, speech
of 8 October 2010 at Oporto, DG Trade, http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-
2014/degucht/headlines/speeches, p. 4.
Dimopoulos, A. (2010), ‘The Effects of the Lisbon Treaty on the Principles and
Objectives of the Common Commercial Policy’, European Foreign Affairs Review,
15(2), pp. 153–170.
European Commission (2010), ‘Communication “Towards a comprehensive European
international investment policy”’, COM final of 7.7.2010.

European Commission (2011a) Proposal for a COUNCIL DECISION on the signing,
on behalf of the Europe an Union of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
between the European Union and its Member States, Australia, Canada, Japan,
the Republic of Korea, the United Mexican States, the Kingdom of Morocco, New
Zealand, the Republic of Singapore, the Swiss Confederation and the United States
of America Brussels, 24.6.2011 COM(2011) 379 final, 2011/0166 (NLE)
European commission (2011b) Proposal for a COUNCIL DECISION on the conclu-
sion of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement between the European Union
and its Member States, Australia, Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the United
Mexican States, the Kingdom of Morocco, New Zealand, the Republic of Singapore,
the Swiss Confederation and the United States of America, Brussels, 24.6.2011,
COM(2011) 380 final 2011/0167 (NLE)
ECJ (2013), Judgment of 18.7.2013, C-414/11, Daiichi Sankyo Co. Ltd.
ECJ (2007), Case C-440/05 Commission v. Council, [2007] ECR I-9097.
ECJ (1994), Opinion 1/94, ECR [1994] ECR I-5267.
ECJ, Opinion 1/75, [1975] ECR 1355, part B(2).
European Parliament (2010a), European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2010
on the transparency and state of play of the ACTA negotiations, 10 March
2010 – Strasbourg; http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//
TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2010-0058+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN
European Parliament (2010b), European Parliament resolution of 24 November
2010 on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), 24 November 2010 –
Strasbourg; http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//
TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2010-0432+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN
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on human rights and social and environmental standards in international trade
agreements, 25 November 2010 – Strasbourg; http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/
getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2010-0434
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future European international investment policy, 6 April 2011 – Strasbourg; http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7- TA- 2011-
0141+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN
Herrmann, C. (2002), ‘Trade Policy after Nice – Sisyphus would have done a better
job?’ Common Market Law Review, 39(1), pp. 7–29.
Hoffmeister F. (2011), ‘The European Union’s commercial policy one year after
Lisbon – sea change or business as usual?’ in P. Koutrakos (ed.), The European Union’s
External Relations a Year after Lisbon, CLEER working paper 2011/3, The Hague, pp.
83–96.
Hoffmeister, F. (2013a), ‘Institutional Aspects of Global Trade Governance from an EU
Perspective’, in van B. V. Vooren, S. Blockmans and J. Wouters (eds), The EU’s Role
in Global Governance – The Legal Dimension, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013,
pp. 145–161
Hoffmeister F. (2013b), Aktuelle Rechtsfragen in der Europäischen Außenhandelspolitik,
Zeitschrift für Europarechtliche Studien, 16(2013), pp. 385–401.
Hoffmeister, F. and Ünüvar, G. (2013), ‘From BITs and Pieces towards European Investment
Agreements’, in M. Bungenberg, A. Reinisch and C. Tietje (eds), EU and Investment
Agreements: Open Questions and Remaining Challenges, Baden-Baden, pp. 57–86.
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Era’, CEPS Working Document No. 346, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies.
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Policy under the Treaty of Lisbon’, German Marshall Fund Economic Policy Paper,
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Publishing.
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International Trade’, ECIPE Working Paper, Brussels, January 2010.
10
The EU as a Diplomatic Actor in the
Field of Human Rights
Karen E. Smith

Introduction
The focus of this chapter is on the European Union’s activity in the field
of human rights promotion. It examines the nature, approach and impact
of the EU as a diplomatic actor in the field of human rights, and assesses
the EU’s ability to persuade other countries to protect human rights and
strengthen the international human rights regime.
‘Diplomatic actor’ here encompasses the EU’s activity to promote respect
for human rights using primarily diplomatic instruments – namely dialogue,
démarches and declarations, and representation of the EU in multilateral
fora. This is the activity of persuasion – trying to convince other actors of
the appropriateness of conforming to human rights norms. This chapter
considers the EU’s use of diplomatic instruments in its bilateral relation-
ships with third countries, and in the United Nation’s premier human rights
body, the Human Rights Council. As will be made clear, however, diplomatic
instruments alone do not provide the EU with much leverage, and it is only
through the combination of diplomatic and other instruments that the EU
can hope to improve human rights situations around the world.
This chapter first summarises the academic debate on ‘what works’ in
terms of fostering the protection of human rights in other countries: essen-
tially, diplomatic instruments should be combined with incentives and pres-
sure. This is, however, particularly difficult in a challenging international
environment, in which contestation of the ‘western agenda’ of human
rights and democracy promotion is rife. It is even more difficult given the
EU’s internal ‘turmoil’: the long process of institutional reform culminating
in the Lisbon Treaty, the disarray created when the external relations pro-
visions of Lisbon were implemented, and most importantly, the eurozone
crisis. This chapter then considers the EU’s internal coherence and external
impact: it assesses the kinds of policy instruments the EU generally utilises
to promote respect for human rights, the extent to which the member states
agree on using them firstly in bilateral settings and then in the multilateral
155
156 Karen E. Smith
setting of the Human Rights Council (which replaced the Commission on

Human Rights in 2006), and the influence the EU may have on the protec-
tion of human rights worldwide.
How to encourage respect for human rights? The academic

debate
Does the power of persuasion ‘work’ in terms of encouraging countries to

respect human rights, indicated by their willingness to abide by interna-
tional human rights treaties? The academic literature suggests that persua-
sion can work, but only when combined with incentives or conditionality.
Firstly, it is worth reiterating that the generally understood ‘default posi-
tion’ is that states do not willingly take on international commitments in
the field of human rights, particularly commitments that would expose the
state to international scrutiny or require domestic action to ensure conform-
ity to an international norm. However, this does not always hold where
the domestic ‘culture’ is strongly supportive of international human rights
protection, or to put it another way, the ‘domestic salience’ of international
human rights norms is high (Cortell and Davis, 1996: 456; Simmons, 2009).
If a norm has domestic legitimacy, then the state will conform to it much
more easily.
In the absence of the above, what can overcome the resistance of govern-
ments to accept and conform to international human rights standards? The
academic literature often focuses on material incentives or disincentives
used by more powerful actors (other states or international organisations),
and the use of persuasive arguments by other actors (other states, interna-
tional organisations or transnational advocacy groups). As Hiro Katsumata
(2011: 561) pointed out, ‘the existing literature suggest that norms without
compatibility can be promoted in a local society, when they are backed by
great powers or transnational struggles’.
Many studies highlight the effectiveness of a combination of both strat-
egies. In the ‘spiral model’, Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink (1999: 5)
argue that ‘the diffusion of international norms in the human rights area
crucially depends on the establishment and the sustainability of networks
among domestic and transnational actors who manage to link up with
international regimes, to alert Western public opinion and Western govern-
ments’ (see also Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). Western governments then
put pressure on norm-violating governments to conform to human rights
norms, including by setting conditions for aid or other benefits (that is, by
using conditionality).
In a study of socialisation of European states to democratic practices,
Frank Schimmelfennig, Stefan Engert and Heiko Knobel find that trans-
national advocacy networks are less crucial than ‘socialising agencies’,
namely regional organisations, and persuasion is less effective than material
incentives. Regional organisations pressure non-conforming states within

the region, using incentives and conditions: ‘successful international sociali-
zation … depends on the size and credibility of tangible political incentives
manipulated by the community organizations and the size of political costs
incurred by the target states in adopting fundamental community rules’
(Schimmelfennig et al., 2006: 255).
To sum up, persuasion needs to be combined with incentives or pressure,
which usually takes the form of political conditionality (making benefits

conditional on the fulfilment of goals relating to human rights protection
and democratic rule). In other words, if the EU only uses diplomatic instru-
ments to try to convince other states to comply with international human
rights standards, its impact is likely to be low. Furthermore, however, the
EU has to be credible and consistent, in that not only must other countries
be certain that the rewards or punishments will follow certain behaviours,
but conditionality must be applied in similar situations, meaning that other
considerations (geopolitical or economic) do not intervene in decisions of
whether or not to offer incentives or withdraw benefits (see, for example,
Schimmelfennig, 2008). In addition, the appearance, or existence, of hypoc-
risy (not practicing what is preached) can reasonably be expected to reduce
the credibility of the EU (or any other actor trying to persuade others to
comply with human rights norms). This is a tall order for an intergovern-
mental organisation in which the competing preferences of the member
states can mean that human rights considerations do not play a major role
in decision-making.
A challenging international context…

The international context has never been particularly conducive to the
spread of human rights norms, but in the last few years, there has been
considerable contestation of the ‘western agenda’ on which the promotion
of human rights figures highly (at least rhetorically) (see: Dennison and
Dworkin, 2010; The Economist, 2011; Roth, 2012). During the Cold War,
there were serious divergences between the ‘East’ and the ‘West’ over human
rights standards and implementation (for example, over the primacy of eco-
nomic or political rights) The 1990s seemed, for a time, to herald a different
era, in which more and more countries ‘democratised’, and a consensus
developed that in particularly horrific situations, the international commu-
nity could even step in and protect people against the worst human rights
abuses. However, the 2013 Freedom House index showed the seventh suc-
cessive year of decline in ‘global freedom’, because in 2012 more countries
registered declines in freedom than registered gains. Of course, 2011 was
an astonishing year, with the Arab Spring and signs of reform in Myanmar.
Yet there have since been major setbacks in Mali, repression in Bahrain,
and troubled ‘transitions’ in Egypt or Libya. Furthermore, even if Egypt
or Tunisia (and others) successfully consolidate democracy, they may still
158 Karen E. Smith
not support a strong (sovereignty-challenging) international human rights

regime – indeed they may be cynical about a ‘western’ agenda, given that
the West backed the status quo in the Arab world for so long. Contestation
of the international human rights regime comes from a variety of quarters,
including ‘rising powers’ such as Brazil, China, India and Russia (some
of whom are democracies).1 Even the EU and the USA have clashed over
human rights issues, with the USA rejecting the EU’s acceptance of intrusive
human rights-protecting mechanisms.

In general, there is a clash of norms, between the promotion of human
rights by outsiders and the attachment to a notion of national sovereignty
that attempts to minimise outsider influence.2 On the one side is the
argument that only ‘cooperative’ approaches to promoting human rights
should be used, meaning that the state concerned consents to measures,
which are supportive in nature – such as technical assistance to help the
government implement human rights – and that praise, not ‘naming and
shaming’, encourages governments to protect human rights. The coopera-
tive approach prioritises state sovereignty. On the other side is the argument
that human rights violations occurring in ‘non-cooperative’ states must still
be addressed, and that the principles of sovereignty and domestic jurisdic-
tion cannot shield states from scrutiny of their human rights records. As a
grouping of NGOs has argued, ‘when egregious violations of human rights
are taking place, the concerned state frequently dismisses the allegations
or makes no genuine efforts to address violations. In these cases, viola-
tions often occur as a deliberate policy of the state, rather than because the
state fails to act or lacks the capacity to protect human rights’ (Joint NGO
Submission, 2010).
The contestation is all the more potent because international politics is
becoming more multipolar. As two observers note, ‘as the West loses its
political and economic dominance in global affairs, it must increasingly
compete for influence with rising powers that have shown no interest in pro-
moting human rights or democracy outside their borders – and some of them
not even within their own borders.’ As a result, ‘the harsher international
climate has dampened the effect of many of the tools that the EU has used
to support human rights and democracy, and has exposed weaknesses in the
EU’s approach that were less evident when external circumstances were more
favourable’ (Dennison and Dworkin, 2010).
Thus, when the EU tries to encourage other countries to protect human
rights, or to strengthen the international human rights regime, its appeals do
not fall on fertile ground. It is operating in a context that is not always favour-
able, in which the credibility and consistency of its policies are always under
scrutiny. Alas, as will be seen below, it is the EU’s weaknesses with respect
to credibility and consistency that undermine its rhetorical commitment to
international human rights.
… and a difficult internal context too

The eurozone crisis has dominated EU politics for several years now, and
the damage this has done to the EU’s foreign policy is considerable. As the
European Council on Foreign Relations (2012) noted in its European Foreign
Policy Scorecard 2012, ‘the continent seemed to be losing its agency: where
it was once seen as a critical part of the solution to international problems, it
has now become a problem to be dealt with by others.’ As a result, the EU’s
reputation and its leverage based on its own ‘soft power’ or attractiveness

to others, have suffered. This comes on top of the rather messy implemen-
tation of the Lisbon Treaty reforms, in 2010 and 2011 – with innumerable
reports of chaos and dissatisfaction in the new European External Action
Service, and with public grumbling about the performance of the High
Representative for Foreign Affairs, Catherine Ashton. And of course, the
Lisbon Treaty itself had a tortured history – coming after a decade of inter-
nal negotiations over institutional reform. The EU member states have long
disagreed on how to implement their commitment to promoting human
rights through EU external relations, as will be discussed below, but over-
coming such disagreements is much more challenging if the problems that
the EU is facing are so large.
Furthermore, and of particular relevance to the EU’s credibility on human
rights issues, there has been contestation of a sovereignty-challenging
approach to human rights from within the EU, with many member states
(including France and the UK) contesting the prerogatives of the European
Court of Human Rights or the European Union to question their practices.3
Many NGOs worry that human rights protection in Europe is faltering, as
civil liberties are perceived as conflicting with ‘security’ measures against
terrorism, and Muslims and Roma face discrimination or even worse (Ward,
2012).
What does the EU do to promote human rights?
Although the EU’s founding documents, including the early commitments

to cooperate on foreign policy through European Political Cooperation, do
not explicitly mention the promotion of human rights as a goal of European
external policy, since the 1990s, the EU has repeatedly declared that promo-
tion of human rights is at the ‘heart’ of its foreign policy.4 In December
1998, at the time of the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the EU declared that ‘[b]oth internally and externally, respect
for human rights as proclaimed in the Universal Declaration is one of the
essential components of the activities of the Union’ (European Union state-
ment, 1998: 112). The Lisbon Treaty states that the EU’s external action is to
‘consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the
principles of international law’ (Article 21[2]). In July 2012, an EU Special
160 Karen E. Smith
Representative for Human Rights was appointed, following the publication

of a ‘strategic framework and action plan’ for human rights and democracy
the previous month.5 The Special Representative’s job includes enhancing
dialogue with third countries and action within international organisations.
The Union stresses the universality, indivisibility and interdependence of
all human rights (see, for example, Council of the European Union, 2000;
European Council, 1991). In practice, though, there is more emphasis on
civil and political rights than on social and economic rights. This can be

seen in the priorities of the EU’s main aid programme for human rights,
the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), which
include issues such as strengthening the role of civil society, working
towards the abolition of the death penalty, or building confidence in demo-
cratic electoral processes (European Commission, 2007–2010). A cursory
glance at the ‘thematic issues’ listed in the EU’s annual human rights reports
also illustrates the predominance of political and civil rights, with only one
of twenty-one issues devoted to ‘economic, social and cultural rights’. The
priority given by the EU to political rights over rights that many developing
countries consider to be more important (such as the ‘right’ to food or hous-
ing) is contested in international human rights diplomacy.
The EU and its member states generally maintain that a supportive
approach is preferable, but is not enough when governments are recalcitrant
or refuse to implement human rights standards. However, while the EU
shares the ‘principled belief’ that promoting human rights is a legitimate
aim of foreign policy, it has been divided over ‘causal beliefs’, or what sorts
of policies promote human rights most effectively and what to do in par-
ticular cases of human rights violations.6 There are innumerable cases in
which other interests trump considerations of human rights (for example,
Egypt or Tunisia until the Arab Spring). There are also genuine dilemmas:
the promotion of human rights is not the EU’s only policy objective, and
other objectives or security imperatives can be prioritised in any particular
instance; resources are finite and hard decisions have to be taken about
how to deploy them. In addition, gauging the seriousness of violations in
particular cases can be a matter of (subjective) judgement, and whether to
use negative or positive measures is not a clear-cut issue. However, Northern
states (such as the Czech Republic, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and
the UK) are usually keener on vigorous action, including the use of negative
measures, from naming and shaming to sanctions: this was the case, for
example, in debates over expanding the Cotonou convention to Cuba and
renewing sanctions on Zimbabwe, both in 2003 (see Smith, 2006). Southern
states (France, Italy, Spain) are keener on ‘engaging’ with third countries –
and less keen on prioritising human rights. This is sometimes – but not
always – because competing interests (economic, in particular) prompt
‘engagers’ to argue against negative measures (as happened with respect to
their relations with north African states until the Arab Spring); but they are
also uncomfortable with pursuing a ‘robust’ human rights policy and creat-
ing frictions in diplomatic relations (see: Balfour, 2012; Youngs, 2006).
These divisions between member states usually result in a preference for
dialogue over confrontation, and incentives over sanctions. For example,
hardly any country is excluded from the EU’s ‘circle’ of partners (including
several egregious violators of human rights and democratic principles), as
virtually every country on earth has concluded a cooperation or association
agreement with the EU, or has some other sort of structured dialogue with

the EU. But the divisions also result in inconsistencies: some human rights
violators are treated more lightly than others; some human rights situations
attract more attention than others, depending on the balance of ‘forces’
within the EU (see the section below for specific examples). The problem is
that inconsistency can and arguably does chip away at the EU’s credibility
and leverage. It is too soon to tell whether having a permanent chair of the
Working Group on Human Rights (COHOM) – an innovation following
the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty – will help mediate agreements
between the member states that avoid some of the inconsistencies we have
seen in the past. As Ana E. Juncos and Karolina Pomorska (2011: 110) note,
‘a permanent chair [of working groups] could facilitate consistency in the
formulation of the agenda and could be seen as a more impartial media-
tor than the rotating Presidency.’ But given that socialisation processes
with respect to external human rights policy have thus far not been strong
enough to enable a more consistent policy regarding human rights, this
could be a difficult challenge for some time to come.
So, given this backdrop, what does the EU do to promote human rights in
its bilateral relations and the UN Human Rights Council?
Bilateral relations: the EU’s diplomatic instruments

There are two main types of diplomatic instruments used by the EU to pro-
mote human rights in third countries: dialogue and declarations. Both can
be used as ‘supportive’ measures, but both can be also used to put pressure
on other governments to improve human rights standards. These are backed
up by other measures, including targeted aid and sanctions.
Dialogue
Dialogue is the EU’s modus vivendi. Much of what the EU actually does in
international relations is first, to negotiate agreements with third parties
which set out the format for a structured relationship over time, and then,
to conduct relations with its partners within the framework of those agree-
ments. Depending on the particular agreement, regular meetings can be
held from working group level up to head of state or government level, on
a variety of topics.
Many (though not all) of the EU’s agreements now include a ‘human
rights clause’, which allows the EU to respond to human rights violations
162 Karen E. Smith
by suspending or terminating the agreement in whole or in part. The

human rights clause also provides the basis for including human rights
in the relationship between the EU and the third country. In some cases,
a dedicated sub-committee on human rights has been formed under the
rubric of the agreement, and dialogue is conducted in that framework.7 The
EU also conducts ‘structured human rights dialogues’ with countries such
as Belarus, China and Turkmenistan. These are supposed to ‘enable the EU
to discuss human rights with certain partners at a greater level of detail

than would otherwise be possible’ (European Union, 2011: 11).8 Dialogues
covering human rights are carried out by human rights experts from the
member states’ foreign ministries, who meet as COHOM at EU level.9 The
new Special Representative for Human Rights is also to play a role in human
rights dialogues with third countries.
The EU repeatedly states that it ‘raises’ its concerns about human rights
issues in these dialogues, but it is not clear what follows from this: the EU’s
own reports give no indication of the extent to which the third country
responded to the EU’s concerns, nor whether the EU took any further
action as a result (see, for example, Council of the European Union, 2010a).
Reportedly, the EU discusses numerous cases of individual victims of human
rights abuses in its dialogue with China, and China has complained that too
much energy is spent on individual cases, though ‘EU diplomats claim they
have in the past led to better medical care for prisoners and to early releases,’
(Rettman, 2012).
External assessments of the dialogues are not publicly available. For exam-
ple, the most recent external evaluation (2010) of the EU-China human
rights dialogue is confidential, and the Chair of the European Parliament’s
Sub-Committee on Human Rights had to specifically request the opportu-
nity to view the results of the evaluation – and was warned not to divulge
the contents in public meetings (Council of the European Union, 2010c).
The general public (including NGOs) therefore has no idea what evalua-
tions have concluded regarding the strengths, weaknesses and outcomes
of the EU’s human rights dialogues. Assessing the external impact of these
dialogues is thus extremely difficult. The 2012 EU Strategic Framework and
Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy sets the following goal for
2014: ‘establish priorities, objectives, indicators of progress for EU human
rights dialogue and consultations, to facilitate their review’ (point 32). This
is laudable, but also signals that priorities and indicators have not thus far
been set.
The EU’s attachment to dialogue in general has been criticised. Margo
Picken (2001) notes that ‘constructive engagement’ can substitute account-
ability with assistance: this ‘allows business to continue as usual, while
human rights violations are dealt with through quiet diplomacy, friendly
advice and technical cooperation.’ In a strongly worded piece, Kenneth
Roth (2011: 3–4), executive director of Human Rights Watch accused the EU
of being ‘particularly infatuated with the idea of dialogue and cooperation’,

with an ‘obsequious approach’ to human rights violators such as Uzbekistan
and Turkmenistan. Rather than condemn violations, the EU clings to dia-
logue and cites very little as ‘progress’ to justify continuing with engage-
ment. Roth (2011: 8–9) notes the EU is even averse to putting some pressure
on its dialogue partners:
Dialogues would have a far greater impact if they were tied to concrete

and publicly articulated benchmarks. Such benchmarks would give clear
direction to the dialogue and make participants accountable for concrete
results. But that is often exactly what dialogue participants want to avoid.
The failure to set clear, public benchmarks is itself evidence of a lack of
seriousness, an unwillingness to deploy even the minimum pressure
needed to make dialogue meaningful. The EU, for example, has argued
that publicly articulated benchmarks would introduce tension into a dia-
logue and undermine its role as a ‘confidence-building exercise’, as if the
purpose of the dialogue were to promote warm and fuzzy feelings rather
than to improve respect for human rights.
The preference for dialogue may be the only outcome possible, given inter-
governmental balancing within the EU, but it is very much an unsatisfac-
tory one from the perspective of those hoping for stronger action to hold
governments to account for their actions.
Declarations and démarches

Every year, the EU issues numerous declarations about the human rights sit-
uation in third countries, and delivers démarches expressing concern about
particular cases, including on the death penalty, torture and human rights
defenders. At least one observer has argued that these instruments can be
effective, especially in individual cases of human rights violations (Fouwels,
1997). Given the confidential nature of the démarches, it is hard to gauge
their impact, but it is reasonable to assume that third countries may respond
at least on occasion to such appeals. However, it is also the case that ‘they
are not only interpreted as patronising by the state which is being criticised
but also, importantly, they are often a lowest common denominator on the
EU side’ (European Parliament, 2009). In other words, even with respect to
private communications, the ability of the EU to deliver strong and consist-
ent messages is affected by the intergovernmental nature of policy-making.
While ‘declaratory diplomacy’ is often considered to be largely ineffective,
there are still many third countries that view this as ‘naming and shaming’
and object to being singled out by the EU for such treatment. The EU’s
partners complain that the EU is lecturing and hectoring them. A Chinese
spokesman, for example, said ‘we don’t believe anybody should be a
“teacher” … We do not yield to pressure’ (Rettman, 2012). And right-wingers
164 Karen E. Smith
in the USA objected to EU High Representative Catherine Ashton’s praise for

the Illinois state legislature’s decision to abolish the death penalty. It was
described as ‘condescending’, ‘hectoring’, and indicative of ‘a warped world
view in Brussels that treats the United States as though it were a third world
tyranny in need of enlightened guidance from Europe’ (Gardner, 2011).10
Declarations can send signals, but as with dialogue, if these signals are not
backed up with any further action – either incentives or negative measures –
then the signal sent is not only a weak one in favour of human rights but

also quite a strong one about the EU’s real interests and objectives.
Other instruments
In addition to the diplomatic instruments, the EU does use incentives and
occasionally sanctions in its bilateral human rights policy. The European
Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) provides funding to
civil society groups in third countries to carry out projects to enhance the
protection of human rights. The total funding for EIDHR is €1.1 billion
between 2007 and 2013. But the EIDHR is only about 2 per cent of yearly
external action funding, which means that while this aid can be of use in
particular situations, it is technical assistance and not a substantial ‘carrot’
that can be used to persuade governments to improve their human rights
records.
The few external evaluations of EIDHR spending that have been con-
ducted generally highlight mixed results – as could be expected given its
nature.11 EIDHR funding supports projects implemented by civil society
organisations in the countries concerned. While supporting NGO projects
is one way to foster the development of civil society, it also means that the
EU’s effectiveness is inherently linked to the sound design and effectiveness
of the NGOs on the ground, which is variable. No overall assessment of the
EIDHR has been conducted since the EU Court of Auditors performed one
in 2000 (Court of Auditors, 2000). More importantly, authoritarian regimes
have reacted to policies to support civil society by banning international
funding of domestic groups, and restricting the extent to which foreign
NGOs can operate on their territory (Boucher, 2012). Hence the EIDHR
can have an influence only where there is already an openness to foreign
assistance.
The EU also uses incentives to try to encourage other governments to
respect human rights, but delivering these has been difficult. The EU has
pledged to increase aid to countries where the human rights situation is
improving (see, for example, Council of the European Union, 1998). The
Cotonou agreement allows for increased aid to better-performing countries:
countries are initially allocated a first portion of aid; if they address an
agreed set of ‘governance issues’ (including human rights protection), they
can receive an additional portion of up to 35 per cent of the initial alloca-
tion. Yet Tine van Criekinge (2007) found that actual aid disbursements to
ACP countries are not always made to the neediest and best-performing
countries: other considerations, including the perceived importance of
recipients to the EU or the EU’s desire to concentrate attention in areas
which will boost its image as a global actor, appear to play a role in disburse-
ment decisions. The European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument includes a
‘Governance Facility’, which provided a maximum of €300 million between
2007 and 2012 for European Neighbourhood Policy partners who made
progress in implementing reforms agreed in their Action Plans. The facil-

ity was used rarely, though some extra money was given to countries such
as Morocco and Ukraine; the sums involved were generally not considered
high enough to prompt a government to make substantial changes (Kausch,
2008). In the wake of the ‘Arab Spring’, however, the EU has made available
additional money (€670 million until 2013) to support reform efforts (see,
European Commission and High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy, 2012).
Historically, there have been no systematic procedures for redirecting aid
to countries with good human rights records. Studies of aid allocations have
shown much variation in the practices of the EU and European states with
respect to the impact of human rights considerations on aid allocations
(Crawford, 2001; Zanger, 2000). One recent study compared allocations of
aid by the EU, France, Germany and the UK and found that:
levels of human rights violations do not influence the decision of

European donors on whether or not to give aid to a country – apart from
the UK, which gave more aid to the most repressive countries. When
deciding how much aid to commit to recipients, the level of human
rights violations again hardly played a role in the considerations of the
European donors, with the exception of Germany. (Carey, 2007: 461)
The author did find, however, that the ‘European Commission gave more
aid to countries that had substantially improved their human rights records’
and that if a country had substantially improved its record and had not
previously been receiving aid, then the Commission was likely to add it to
the list of recipients (Carey, 2007: 462). The overall message is that there is
not much consistency in terms of redirecting aid from countries with poor
human rights records to those whose records have been improving. While
third countries may have some incentives to improve their human rights
records, they seem to run little risk of losing out should their progress stall
or reverse.
The EU’s capacity to offer countries other incentives is limited by the
extent to which member states agree to be generous. There are clear limits
to EU generosity, in that improving market access for agricultural products
has always been controversial, and loosening restrictions on immigration
from third countries virtually impossible, with domestic political parties
166 Karen E. Smith
even questioning whether citizens from new EU member states should be

allowed to work throughout the EU.12
As for negative measures, sanctions and the like, these are used fairly
sparingly. Rarely has the EU refused to conclude an agreement with
other countries on the basis of concerns about human rights standards
(Belarus is one exception here, Libya another). Rarely has the human
rights clause been invoked to suspend part of the agreement (and never
the whole agreement). Between 1995 and 2009, it was invoked only on

15 occasions – all with respect to African, Caribbean or Pacific countries
(linked to the EU through the Cotonou Agreement) (European Parliament,
2009). Some countries that are egregiously violating human rights have
been the object of EU sanctions (such as Myanmar and Zimbabwe) but
others have escaped such negative measures (such as the countries of
Central Asia and North Africa). In 2010, for example, only five African,
Caribbean and Pacific countries were the subject of ‘appropriate measures’:
Zimbabwe, Fiji, Guinea, Niger and Madagascar, and only one targeted dia-
logue on the human rights clause had been opened, with Guinea-Bissau
(European Union, 2011: 14). This despite serious problems in other coun-
tries (such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and
Sudan), as even acknowledged in the country sections of the EU’s annual
human rights reports. In the case of North Africa, only after the leaders of
Tunisia and Egypt were deposed were their assets frozen. Indeed in 2010
the EU was preparing to grant Tunisia ‘advanced status’ because it was seen
as ‘an example for the region’ (Dempsey, 2011). Such a position seemed
particularly incongruous after the Arab Spring began in Tunisia in early
2011. The EU now says its policy towards the neighbourhood is based
on ‘more for more’, meaning more rewards for more reforms. Yet it still
does not seem to be differentiating that much between its partners: asso-
ciation agreements are being negotiated with all neighbourhood partners
except Belarus – including countries whose human rights records have
been severely criticised of late, such as Azerbaijan and Armenia. Deep and
Comprehensive Free Trade Areas are to be negotiated with Tunisia, but also
Armenia, Morocco, Egypt and Jordan – none of whom have made similar
steps towards democracy (European Commission and High Representative,
2012).
In sum, it takes a lot for the EU to be moved to impose negative
measures for human rights violations. Instead, consideration of other
factors – commercial interests, energy policy, a desire for ‘stability’ and
so on – contributes to the reluctance to pressure third countries. Policies
that compete with human rights policy are many, and are not made by
human rights experts alone. The European External Action Service, the High
Representative and the new Special Representative for Human Rights might
help join some of the dots, but if human rights are not the priority there
will always be inconsistency in the EU’s external policies, as trade-offs are
inevitable. The problem is that inconsistency deprives the EU of credibility,

particularly in international diplomatic negotiations on human rights.
Multilateral relations: the EU’s diplomacy at the UN

The challenging international context is particularly evident in the UN’s
human rights bodies. Here the EU is outnumbered and persistently con-
tested. Furthermore, the EU’s multilateral diplomacy is poorly integrated
with its bilateral diplomacy. And the inconsistency and credibility problems

the EU has in its bilateral relations can undermine the EU’s message in
multilateral human rights discussions. This section first considers the EU’s
internal coherence at the Human Rights Council (HRC), and then its exter-
nal impact.13
The EU sponsors resolutions and expresses its views on the items discussed
in the HRC. Coordination meetings are held, during which the EU member
states agree on declarations and resolutions to put forward in the EU’s name,
and, hopefully, to vote in the same way on resolutions proposed by other
states in the two bodies. As Table 10.1 shows, the coordination process has
been quite effective in producing EU statements.
Tables 10.2 and 10.3, however, show a less positive record. Table 10.2
reports on the cohesiveness of the EU in voting on resolutions. While the EU
member states were remarkably united in voting the same way for the first
three years of the HRC, since 2009, they have not. Almost all of the ‘split
votes’ have been over issues related to Israeli violations of human rights, and
namely the Goldstone report on the Gaza conflict, and the reaction to the
Israeli measures against the ‘aid flotilla’ in May 2010.
Table 10.1 The EU’s ‘voice’ at the HRC
HRC HRC HRC HRC HRC HRC HRC HRC

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Special
(regular (regular (regular (regular (regular (regular (regular sessions
sessions sessions sessions sessions sessions sessions sessions 1–19
1–3) 4–6) 7–9) 10–12) 13–15) 16–18) 19–21)
Statements
made/ 55 70 96 80 92 91 90 20
interventions
in interactive
debates and
dialogues
Explanations
of vote/ 15 22 34 27 23 37 32 11
statements
made at time
of vote
Note: All data in the tables were compiled from the reports on each session of the Human Rights
Council to the United Nations General Assembly.
168 Karen E. Smith
Table 10.2 EU unity in voting

HRC 2006 HRC HRC HRC HRC HRC HRC HRC
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Special
(regular (regular (regular (regular (regular (regular (regular sessions
sessions sessions sessions sessions sessions sessions sessions 1–19
1–3) 4–6) 7–9) 10–12) 13–15) 16–18) 19–21)
Split 4% (1 15% (3 12.5% 12.5% 14% (2

votes as 0% 0% 0% out of 25 of 20 (4 of 32 (4 of 32 out of
percentage votes) roll-call roll-call roll-call a total

of all roll- votes) votes) votes) of 14
call votes roll-call
votes)
Table 10.3 shows that the number of resolutions that the EU sponsors at the
HRC has dropped, and the reduction is starkest with respect to country situ-
ations.14 The list of ‘country resolutions’ that the EU sponsored in the final
years of the Commission on Human Rights but no longer does in the HRC
is rather long: Belarus, Chechnya, Iran, Iraq, Turkmenistan and Zimbabwe.
The EU does raise particular country situations in its regular statements on
agenda item 4 (‘human rights situations that require the Council’s atten-
tion’), and these do convey the EU’s concerns about the human rights situa-
tions in various countries. But delivering a statement may not result in more
engagement of the HRC with those situations.
The EU’s approach is a response to the divisive and politicised context of
the HRC. The EU is outnumbered, and it has proven difficult to convince
HRC members to support EU resolutions or EU positions. The EU has often
been isolated at the HRC and its outreach is limited (see below for more on
both of these points). As a result, the prevailing view is that the EU should
avoid ‘losing’ and should not run country resolutions that may not attract
a consensus. This has been a successful strategy, in that all of the EU’s
resolutions have been approved by the HRC.15 But such consensus-seeking
behaviour shows how the EU has struggled to further the agenda of the HRC
in line with its own preferences and declared ambitions regarding human
rights promotion.
The EU’s struggles for influence are evident when voting records are ana-
lysed more in depth. The EU has been quite isolated, though its isolation
may be diminishing. In the first 21 regular sessions (2006–2012), there were
a total of 153 roll-call votes. In 94 of them (61.4 per cent), EU member states
were in the minority.16 On those occasions, EU member states were usually
joined only by a few other HRC members, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Canada, Japan, Norway, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, Ukraine and the
USA.17 Because ‘bloc politics’ is so pervasive at the HRC, moderate states
in blocs opposing the EU often find it more attractive to go along with the
Table 10.3 Resolutions or decisions sponsored by the EU at the HRC
HRC 2006 HRC 2007 HRC 2008 HRC 2009 HRC 2010 HRC 2011 HRC 2012 HRC Special
(sessions 1–3) (sessions 4–6) (sessions 7–9) (sessions 10–12) (sessions 13–15) (sessions 16–18) (sessions 19–21) sessions 1–19
2: 8: 9: 6: 3: 6: 6: 4:
Afghanistan Darfur (March Rights of the Rights of the Rights of the Rights of the Rights of the Myanmar (Oct
(Nov) and June) child (March) Child (March) child (March) child (March) child (March) 2007)
Nepal (Nov) Religious North Korea Religious North Korea Freedom of Freedom of Libya (Feb
intolerance (March) discrimi-nation (March) religion (March) religion (March) 2011)
(March and Sudan (March (March) Myanmar North Korea North Korea Syria (August
Dec.) and Sept.) (March) (March) (March) 2011)
Alliance of Myanmar Publi-cation Myanmar Myanmar Syria (Dec
civilisations (March and of sub-comm. (March) (March) 2011)
(Dec) June) reports (March)
Tunisia (March) Syria (March) [+ 1 withdrawn
Follow-up re Myanmar: North Korea (DRC, Nov
Myanmar (Dec) special (March) Belarus (June) Belarus (June)
2008)]
Darfur – Group rapporteur Myanmar
of Experts (Dec) (March) (March)
Liberia (Dec) Liberia: (Sept) Aung San Suu
Burundi (Sept.) Kyi (October)
169
170 Karen E. Smith
Organisation of the Islamic Conference, or the Africa Group, or the Non-

Aligned Movement, than to vote with the EU.
Given that EU member states are in a minority at the HRC, it is impera-
tive that the EU engages in ‘outreach’, to build support for its positions
and resolutions among the wider HRC membership. The EU has noted
that it ‘devotes considerable resources in New York and Geneva to building
a broad, cross-regional base of support for UN resolutions’ in the field of
human rights (Council of the European Union, 2010b). Indeed, the success

the EU has had recently in terms of pushing through the General Assembly
a resolution against the death penalty has been due to its ability to build
just such a cross-regional coalition, but other examples of success are few
and far between.18
Outreach is a significant weakness, though, and diplomats from EU mem-
ber states admit that it needs to be improved. The EU as a whole does little
outreach, partly because the coordination process among the EU-28 takes up
much of the diplomats’ time. While the EU does hold some formal meetings
with some groupings (such as GRULAC or JUSCANZ19), such meetings tend
not to be very fruitful, according to diplomats: the EU’s position tends to be
rigid (because flexibility is difficult to achieve when it must be negotiated
among 28 member states) and thus there can be little of the give-and-take
that can allow for coalition-building.20 The EU also has a ‘burden-sharing’
system, in which member states are assigned the task of liaising with third
countries, but the effectiveness of such approaches varies. Where the mem-
ber state already has close relations with its assigned countries, the system
works well; where relations are not already developed, it functions less well.
Another weakness of the EU’s outreach at the UN in Geneva is that the EU
‘machinery’ in Brussels does not lobby for EU positions in Geneva – unlike
the situation in the USA, where officials in Washington will call other capi-
tals to press for their support. And failure to support EU positions is usually
not an item for discussion in the EU’s bilateral relations with third countries.
In other words, what the EU does in Geneva is poorly integrated with what
the EU does from Brussels and in third countries.
In 2011, there was a noticeable increase in the EU’s activity at the HRC,
due to the combined effects of US membership in the HRC and the Arab
Spring. The USA was absent from the Human Rights Council from 2006
until 2009, depriving the EU of a valuable ally.21 US membership of the HRC
has coincided with a vigorous response to the extraordinary developments
stemming from the Arab Spring. In 2011, the HRC sent investigators to Iran,
Libya and Syria, and the General Assembly agreed to suspend Libya’s mem-
bership of the HRC. The ‘South’ was not united on these developments,
and a transregional coalition could be constructed to push for action by the
HRC. The EU was at the forefront of this, calling for special sessions on Libya
and Syria. It was successful because the external context with respect to the
Arab Spring was accommodating and because it could team up with the
USA. This may be a ‘blip’ or may be a sign of the future. The International
Human Rights Service has warned that ‘politics as usual’ is returning to the
Human Rights Council (International Service for Human Rights, 2011), and
the Arab Spring might not herald the break-up of the ‘anti-North’ bloc. In
fact, the developments in the Arab world have exposed the EU’s prior prefer-
ence for stability over democracy promotion in Arab countries.
The impact of the Lisbon Treaty on the EU’s effectiveness at the UN has
yet to be gauged. The Lisbon Treaty conferred ‘legal personality’ on the EU

as a whole, and indicated that the new High Representative, supported by
the new External Action Service, would represent the EU in international
affairs. This is quite a change, in that the rotating presidency would no
longer be the ‘voice’ of the EU in UN bodies and international negotiations.
A state would no longer represent the EU in international organisations;
instead representatives of a central bureaucracy would do so. As a result, the
EU pushed for enhanced observer status in the UN General Assembly. While
in September 2010 a small majority of UN members voted to postpone a
decision on the EU’s request, in May 2011, the General Assembly approved
it – but on condition that other blocs will be able to request the same status
in future. This could have the effect of solidifying bloc politics at the UN –
a situation in which the EU would be at a disadvantage because it is in a
minority.
The EU has not (yet) requested the same status at the Human Rights
Council: the presidency continues to represent the EU in most debates
at the HRC (and to present EU-sponsored resolutions), with representa-
tion by officials of the EU delegation in some debates (namely panels and
exchanges of views with UN special rapporteurs). The lack of agreement on
how to implement the Lisbon Treaty in Geneva resulted in what one EU
diplomat described as ‘a general crisis’ in the EU delegation in Geneva. On
top of the general uncertainty regarding how the EU was to be represented
in the various international organisations in Geneva, there was no head of
delegation for a year, and no agreement could be reached on resolving the
distribution of responsibilities. This led to the ‘almost total absence of effec-
tive EU representation in all Geneva multilateral fora in 2011’ (Hivonnet,
2012). Ironically, however, this was still a good year for the EU at the HRC –
perhaps because the USA could help make up for any weaknesses in the EU’s
representation.
While an enhanced status for the EU in the Human Rights Council might
counter some of the disadvantages of mere observer status (which include
speaking only after states have spoken), it would not eliminate all of them
and might exacerbate bloc politics because it would fuel perceptions of the
EU as a rich-world bloc. Enhanced status is also unlikely to improve the EU’s
influence at the HRC or the UN General Assembly, as this depends on factors
such as EU unity and consistency: the problem is not the messenger, but the
strength and credibility of the message.22
172 Karen E. Smith
Conclusions
The EU is an active diplomatic actor in the field of human rights. It conducts
human rights dialogues with numerous countries, it issues declarations and
démarches on general human rights issues and on the human rights situa-
tions in particular countries; it is one of the most visible actors at the UN
Human Rights Council. All of this activity illustrates the importance that EU
member states and institutions place on the promotion of human rights in
the EU’s foreign relations.

But as with most things in life, the ‘devil is in the detail’. The member
states are not united on many aspects of the particular implementation of
their general desire to strengthen the protection of human rights interna-
tionally. In any given case, the member states can disagree on the extent to
which human rights should play a prominent role. They especially differ in
terms of their willingness to impose negative measures on countries with
poor human rights records. This leads to inconsistency in the EU’s policy –
which means that the EU’s declarations and dialogues can lack teeth. This
is compounded by a less-than-generous – and consistent – offering of incen-
tives to promote human rights.
Assessing the EU’s external impact is difficult particularly in bilateral rela-
tions: we lack data on the content and outcomes of the EU’s human rights
dialogues, for example. Assessing its impact in the HRC is easier, because
indicators of such impact can be seen: the extent to which other HRC
members support EU positions, the extent to which the EU is isolated, and
so on. At the HRC, the EU has a mixed record – 2011 was a good year for
EU diplomacy (ironically, in view of the ‘crisis’ within the EU delegation
in Geneva), but its successes may prove to be unsustainable. In general,
the weaknesses of EU human rights policy – inconsistency which appears
to be hypocrisy to outsiders – undermine the EU’s diplomacy at the HRC.
The solutions to this situation lie much less in the EU’s mode of representa-
tion (presidency or EEAS), than in the ability of the EU member states and
institutions to agree on a more consistent approach to the promotion of
human rights in their bilateral relations. Without that internal unity, the
EU’s external impact will continue to suffer. Eventually the EEAS may be
able to foster such unity, but this will require leadership at the top (of the
EEAS, of the member states) placing more emphasis on human rights in the
EU’s foreign policy. The 2012 Strategic Framework is a signal that this may
happen in future, but it is too soon to tell whether this will have an impact
on the effectiveness of EU diplomatic action in the area of human rights.
Notes
1. Saari (2009) has documented Russia’s contestation of the European human rights
regime. China’s hostility regarding ‘interference’ on human rights grounds is
well known. The ambivalence of Brazil, India and South Africa towards the
international human rights regime – particularly in the recent case of Syria – is

discussed in Roth (2012).
2. The 2011 review of the UN Human Rights Council brought out these arguments.
See, for example, the general discussion in Human Rights Watch (2011).
3. On contestation of any EU role in ‘internal’ affairs of the member states, see de
Búrca (2011): 674–676. Public (and even government) criticism of the European
Court of Human Rights has been very evident in the last few years, particularly
over cases such as prisoners’ voting rights and the deportation of terrorist suspects.
4. See de Búrca (2011), for an account of the omission of human rights from the
European Economic Community treaty, and a critique of the current EU human

rights system.
5. And these steps were preceded by a ‘renewal’ of the EU’s commitment to pro-
mote human rights in its external action, in December 2011. See: European
Commission and High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy (2011), Council of the European Union (2012a), Council of the European
Union (2012b).
6. On this distinction, see Sikkink (1993), pp. 141–142. Principled beliefs are ‘nor-
mative ideas that specify criteria for distinguishing right from wrong and just
from unjust’. Causal beliefs ‘provide guides for individuals on how to achieve
their objectives’ (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993: 9–10).
7. The cases include: Cambodia, Egypt, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan,
Palestinian Authority, Tunisia and Vietnam. European Union (2011), p. 13.
8. The structured human rights dialogues include those with China, Belarus,
Armenia, African Union, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan and Iran (suspended since 2006).
9. COHOM now has a permanent chair, and meets about once a month.
10. This does show, however, that at least the EU engages on human rights issues
with the USA, an ally and important strategic and trading partner.
11. See the evaluations at: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human- rights/
studies_evaluations_en.htm
12. See, for example, the debate in the UK over allowing Bulgarians and Romanians
to work in the UK (see BBC News, 2013).
13. This section builds on and updates material which first appeared in Smith (2010).
14. I do not include resolutions sponsored by EU member states in these figures, as
those resolutions are not, formally speaking, EU resolutions.
15. The EU did lose a vote on an amendment it proposed to an Africa Group resolu-
tion on Darfur in September-October 2006, and its amendments to the resolution
on Sri Lanka in May 2009 were dismissed as the result of a no-action motion.
16. I have only included votes on which the EU member states who were members
of the HRC all voted the same way; on 12 occasions the EU member states split
their votes. In sessions 1–15 (2006–2010), the EU was in the minority on 64 of 89
occasions (72 per cent); in 2011, the EU was in the minority in 17 out of 32 votes
(53 per cent); in 2012, the EU was in the minority on 13 of 32 votes (40 per cent).
17. Those eight HRC members almost always vote with the EU. In addition,
Cameroon, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay vote regularly (but not always) with the
EU. The list of democratic countries that do not often vote with the EU includes
Argentina, Brazil, Ghana, India, Mauritius, Peru and South Africa. Data compiled
by Benedetta Voltolini.
18. On the death penalty resolution, see Kissack (2008), Another success is the EU’s
cooperation with the Latin America group (GRULAC) to present a yearly resolu-
tion on children’s rights. The issue is a longstanding one, there is predictability
174 Karen E. Smith
in terms of the production of a yearly resolution with GRULAC, and children’s

rights are a relatively uncontroversial topic.
19. Japan, the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
20. Interviews conducted by the author in Geneva and London from March to
October 2008, and October to December 2010.
21. In interviews, diplomats from EU member states repeatedly stressed the harm
caused to the EU’s activity at the HRC by the absence of the USA. The USA can
provide considerable support for EU positions through its more effective lobby-
ing. Interviews conducted by the author in Geneva and London from March to
October 2008, and October to December 2010.

22. For more on the opposition that the EU faces at the UN, see Smith (2013).
References
Balfour, R. (2012) Human Rights and Democracy in EU Foreign Policy: The Cases of
Ukraine and Egypt (Abingdon: Routledge).
BBC News (2013) ‘Immigration from Romania and Bulgaria: Government Accused
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11
The European Union’s Climate
Change Diplomacy
Simon Schunz

Introduction
In much of the literature on global climate politics, and notably on the

United Nations (UN) climate regime, the European Union (EU) has long
been considered as a lead actor in efforts to combat climate change (Gupta
and Grubb, 2000; Oberthür, 2009). Even its apparent marginalisation at the
2009 Copenhagen conference of the parties (COP) has left this assessment
largely unchanged (Wurzel and Connelly, 2010: 286–287). It is, on the one
hand, based on the Union’s internal policies, which have resulted in the
set-up of a regional climate regime around the European Emissions Trading
System (ETS), widely studied by scholars (see, for example, Skjaerseth and
Wettestad, 2009). On the other hand, its unrivalled level of diplomatic
activities in the sphere of global climate negotiations is highlighted as a
major source of its supposed leading role (Gupta and Grubb, 2000). As a
matter of fact, the gradual transformation of climate change into an ever
more ‘important foreign policy issue has rendered this external dimension
of the Union’s climate policy increasingly significant’ (Ott, 2001). Its con-
crete external activities in and their effects on global climate politics have,
however, long remained understudied from a foreign policy and diplomatic
studies perspective.
The EU was de facto active in global climate politics even before it pos-
sessed a real internal climate policy acquis or a common European foreign
policy. The member states of the then European Community (EC) were
jointly engaged in the Intergovernmental Negotiation Committee (INC)
that devised the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) in 1991/2 (Bodansky, 1993). Ever since, the EU has not only rein-
forced its engagement, but also undergone an astounding evolution as an
actor in this domain: its ad hoc concerted participation in the INC process
was transformed into systematic coordination during the Kyoto Protocol
talks (1995–1997) to then develop into a sophisticated arrangement for joint
decision-making and representation in the 2000s (Costa, 2008; Oberthür
178
The European Union’s Climate Change Diplomacy 179
and Ott, 1999; Schunz, 2012). This institutional development has been par-
alleled by an expansion of its diplomatic actions on climate change within
and beyond the UN regime.
Yet, this remarkable evolution does not seem to have yielded many
tangible effects. Despite this development and ‘its efforts, the EU had a
comparatively limited impact on the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol’
(Oberthür and Roche Kelly, 2008: 36). While it arguably had some leverage
over the ratification of this Protocol,1 the tendency of restrained influence

re-surfaced in the latest serious round of UN regime talks, which resulted
in the (intermediate) outcome of post-2012 reform efforts embodied in the
‘Copenhagen Accord’, formalised in 2010 through the Cancun Agreements
(Curtin, 2010; Spencer et al., 2010). Despite undeniable leverage over the
agenda of the talks until about mid-2009, the EU did not attain its core aims
regarding the legally binding nature and magnitude of emission reduction
targets for industrialised and emerging countries with these Agreements
(Curtin, 2010; Purvis and Stevenson, 2010: 5). Moreover, it was painfully
sidelined during the decisive negotiation moments at the crucial December
2009 Copenhagen COP. Even if the negotiations of the years 2011 and
2012 – and most notably the 17th conference of the parties in Durban, South
Africa in 2011, which started a novel negotiation process toward a compre-
hensive legal outcome – represented a slight upward trend in EU diplomacy
and in its leverage over the institutional advances attained on this occasion,
a cross-time trend of rather sub-optimal performance can be detected. The
puzzle this particular outcome, as well as the observed long-term trend,
inevitably poses is: if the EU displayed such high degrees of activity and
evolved toward a genuine climate diplomatic actor over the past 15 to 20
years, how can its limited impact on global climate politics be explained?
To address this question, this chapter engages in a three-fold assessment.
It begins, first, with a comprehensive analysis of the Union’s climate change
diplomacy between 2007 and 2012. Diplomacy is understood here as the
active part of foreign policy occurring at the interface between the domestic
(in this case: EU) and the external (here: global). Key actors of EU diplo-
macy are the EU’s institutions and bodies (the Commission, the Council
Presidency, the High Representative or the External Action Service) or EU
Member States whenever they act explicitly on behalf of or in line with EU
values, interests and goals. As a diplomatic actor, the EU has a whole set of
instruments at its disposal, which operate according to three different logics:
arguing, bargaining or coercion (see the first two columns of Table 11.1,
used below for presenting the results of this analysis) (Smith, 2008). The
assessment of these tools and their impact necessitates a close look at the
EU’s ‘strategy’, at ‘who acts’ on behalf of the EU, by what means, through
which diplomatic channels, and vis-à-vis whom (Brighi and Hill, 2008). This
assessment is embedded into a narrative process-trace that also covers the (i)
domestic (EU actor capacity, foreign policy decision-making and positions as
180 Simon Schunz
key prerequisites for external activity) and (ii) external (global institutions,
power, interest and positions constellations) contexts.2 To keep this process-
trace manageable, emphasis is placed on major interlocutors of the EU (the
‘Umbrella Group’ of non-European industrialised countries including the
USA, Japan, Russia, Australia, Canada and the G-77/China with China and
India3) and key topics in the post-2012 reform talks. Central issues were the
emission reduction targets and actions of developed and developing coun-
tries and the legal form of the outcome. This analysis is, second, followed by

a determination of the EU’s impact on the post-2012 climate negotiations.
Third, the explanatory power of two oft-invoked accounts of the EU’s impact
in global politics – the ‘one voice’ thesis and the ‘active leadership thesis’ –
is scrutinised. These accounts are contrasted with a more overarching
approach that incorporates explanatory factors at several levels of analysis
(EU, global), emphasising the importance of the very notion of diplomacy as
an explanatory factor of EU performance in global climate politics. The key
argument in this exercise is that major conditioning factors of the Union’s
leverage must be searched in its capacity to adapt diplomatically to the
interplay between actors in global (climate) politics.
EU climate change diplomacy and the post-2012 global

climate negotiations (2007–2012)
The domestic context: EU actor capacity and negotiation positions

EU actor capacity depicts its capacity to act as a foreign policy player à part
entière in global politics. It is primarily a function of its legal competences for
climate activity, of internal decision-making and coordination procedures as
well as of external representation arrangements (Wouters et al., 2012). The
analysis that follows demonstrates that the Union possessed a high degree of
actor capacity as a climate diplomatic actor between 2007 and 2012.
Where the legal competence for (external) climate policy has, ever
since the Maastricht Treaty, been shared between the EC and its member
states (Article 174 TEC-Nice), the practical cooperation in decision-making
and external representation has become subject to intricate institutional
arrangements in which the member states have kept almost full control.
This has remained largely unmodified with the Lisbon Treaty (Art. 191
TFEU), despite several changes in the set-up of the EU’s diplomacy. On the
one hand, the Treaty created the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy (HR), responsible for the CFSP and supported by the European
External Action Service (EEAS). The first HR, the UK’s Catherine Ashton, has
repeatedly attempted to define a role for the EEAS in EU external climate
policy. Two desk officers in the EEAS department on ‘Global and Multilateral
Issues’ work on, inter alia, climate change. On the other hand, in areas other
than CFSP, including climate change, the Commission is formally in charge
of the EU’s external representation (Art. 17 TEU), and both a Commissioner

and a DG for Climate Action were set up in 2010. In the period 2010–2012,
however, neither the HR nor the first Climate Commissioner, the former
Danish climate minister Connie Hedegaard, have become central authorities
in EU external climate policy. Despite Hedegaard’s more prominent repre-
sentative role – compared to Environment Commissioners before her – the
member states continue to function as gatekeepers.
Decision-making on external climate policy has, ever since 1994, been

prepared in complex institutional structures under the Environment
Council, with a ‘Working Party on International Environmental Issues-
Climate Change’ (WPIEI-CC) comprising several expert groups as key locus
of authority (Costa, 2008: 536). Since 2004, ‘lead negotiators’, that is indi-
viduals from any member state or the Commission in charge of negotiating
on behalf of the EU, and ‘issue leaders’ design and promote EU positions in
cooperation with the expert groups (Oberthür and Roche Kelly, 2008: 38).
Final decisions on the Union’s mandate for global climate talks are then
taken by consensus in the Environment Council, and have recently tended
to require the endorsement of the European Council.
Once adopted, the EU’s mandate is represented4 in the global arena by the
Climate Troika (current and future Council presidencies, and Commission)
as well as the lead negotiators. The Troika and lead negotiators primarily
ensure EU outreach in meetings linked to the UN climate negotiations. In
global fora beyond the UN climate regime, the EU’s representation involved
also diplomats from, in pre-Lisbon Treaty times, the Commission and the
Council. These were engaged in diplomatic activities at bilateral summits
(EU-China, EU-USA, EU-Latin America, and so on), through bilateral part-
nerships with key countries or regions, and in fora such as the G-8(+5), G-20
and the Major Economies Meeting/Forum (MEF). Since 2010, members of
the European External Action Service are also involved in these activities.
Finally, diplomats from member state embassies and the Commission’s
(since 2010, the Union’s) delegations have been implicated in the EU’s out-
reach in many third countries identified as key to the EU’s interests, includ-
ing the USA, Japan, China, Brazil and India.
Despite at times diverging preferences among what is now the ‘EU-29’ (28
member states + Commission), the Union’s highly developed actor capacity
allowed it to define an elaborate set of positions on key issues negotiated
internationally during the period 2007–2012 (Costa, 2008: 528; Oberthür,
2009: 205–206).
The overarching aim with which the EU entered the post-2012 negotia-
tions was defined in early 2005 as: ‘a multilateral climate change regime
post-2012 with meaningful participation of all developed countries and
(…) of developing countries’, limiting global temperature increase to
2°C (European Commission, 2005: 10). In 2007, the European Council
defined the EU’s official position for the ‘negotiations on a global and
182 Simon Schunz
comprehensive post-2012 agreement’ by calling on industrialised countries

to commit collectively to emissions reductions ‘in the order of 30% by
2020’ and of ‘60% to 80% by 2050 compared to 1990’, (European Council,
2007: 11–12) Provided ‘that other developed countries commit themselves
to comparable emission reductions’ and emerging economies ‘to contribut-
ing adequately’, the EU showed preparedness to reduce its emissions by 30
per cent (European Council, 2007: 12).5 Even if no international agreement
was reached, it made ‘a firm independent commitment’ to reduce emis-

sions by 20 per cent reduction by 2020 (European Council, 2007: 12). The
October 2007 Environment Council reiterated these positions so that the
EU’s stances on targets, the responsibilities of different groups of parties and
on the desired overall outcome (a treaty building on the Kyoto Protocol)
were unequivocally stated even before the official start of the post-2012
negotiations.
After 2009, the Union’s position did not substantially change: its over-
arching approach remained oriented toward its 2°C target, and it had, until
2013, not yet reached an agreement on a collective move to a 30 per cent
reduction target (Agence Europe, 2012a). In the run-up to the Durban sum-
mit in late 2011, it did adapt its stance on the time frame of future action,
however, defending the position that ‘a roadmap, including a timeline
with a final date and process taking into account the 2013–2015 review’
was needed for the negotiations under the Convention (Council of the EU,
2011: 2–3). Only if this could be agreed, it confirmed ‘its openness to a sec-
ond commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol as part of a transition to
a wider legally binding framework’ (Council of the EU, 2011: 2–3). Once a
clear timeline for negotiations on a legally binding agreement was adopted
in Durban, the EU agreed and contributed, in 2012, to a second commit-
ment period, demanding also an acceleration of the pace of the multilateral
talks (Agence Europe, 2012c).
The politics of the post-2012 global climate negotiations

The external context for global climate policy-making attained unprece-
dented levels of complexity during the post-2012 negotiations. It concerned
the institutional set-up, could be observed in the interest and position con-
stellations, and was exacerbated by power asymmetries.
In institutional terms, the 2007 Bali Roadmap had initiated negotiations
under two tracks in the UN regime, which were originally meant to be com-
pleted by late 2009, but could only be concluded in 2012: one on further
commitments for Annex I parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) and
another on ‘long-term cooperative action’ under the Convention (AWG-
LCA) (UNFCCC Secretariat, 2007). While the major industrialised emitter
USA was present in the latter arena, it was not a party to the Kyoto Protocol
and thus absent from the former. Not in the least for this reason, global
climate policies were also debated beyond the UN regime in fora such as the
G-20, G-8(+5), the Major Economies Meeting/Forum (MEF) and many other
regional or inter-regional gatherings (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC), Asia-Europe meetings and so on). This change in quality and
quantity of arenas coincided with a proliferation of reunions, enabling an
almost continual exchange between representatives of the major players
ever since 2008. Finally, climate change became increasingly the subject
of exchanges at various political levels and by different constituencies (for
example environment, development or finance experts) in the diverse fora.

This evolution of the institutional context toward multi-site, multi-level and
multi-constituency climate politics represented a major logistical challenge
for all actors during the analysed period.
The power constellation6 in global climate policy had equally transformed
since the 1990s: where the EU had been one of the key players in the Kyoto
Protocol negotiations also because of its comparatively high greenhouse gas
emissions, rising emissions in the emerging countries (especially in China
and India), but also their increasing overall political significance resulted in
an increase in the relative power of these players as compared to actors like
Japan or the EU over the course of the 2000s.
In addition to the shifting, asymmetrical power relations, very divergent
interests and positions on key issues rendered negotiations intricate (see,
for example, Dröge, 2010). Regarding targets for developed countries, some
members of the Umbrella Group made quantitatively very limited proposals
(the USA, Canada), while others were more ambitious (the EU, Japan, since
the autumn of 2009 and until the Fukushima reactor catastrophe in early
2011). Developing countries, by contrast, demanded even higher reductions
from Annex I parties throughout the post-2012 negotiations (Dröge, 2010).
On developing country emission reduction actions, developed countries,
including the EU, wished to see greater efforts by the emerging countries,
whereas the latter refused to take on any legally binding actions or targets.
This also implied that the G-77/China preferred a continuation of the Kyoto
Protocol, with a second commitment period specifying targets for devel-
oped countries, whereas Umbrella Group members envisaged either a new
treaty (Japan, Australia) or some other form of agreement made binding
through domestic law (the USA). At the 2009 Copenhagen summit, some
issues were tentatively resolved or at least foreshadowed, including through
the announcement of the creation of a ‘Green Climate Fund’ endowed
with up to $ 100 billion until 2020, as well as the agreement of Annex
I countries to subscribe to (non-binding) emission reduction objectives and
of other major emitters to engage in ‘nationally appropriate mitigation
actions’ (NAMAs) (ENB, 2010). These arrangements were formalised in the
2010 Cancun Agreements. However, the positions and cleavages remained
largely unaltered thereafter, as the gap between the reduction pledges and
the suggestions by climate scientists on the necessity of reducing emissions
by 25–40 per cent by 2020 had remained significant (see ECOFYS, 2011).
184 Simon Schunz
COP 17 in 2011, in deciding on the ‘Durban Roadmap’ for negotiations on

an ‘agreed outcome with legal force’, did not help to overcome main posi-
tional differences either. A major novelty was, however, the Chinese and
Indian agreement to negotiate, by 2015, such an outcome with legal force as
of 2020 (ENB, 2011). Yet, already in 2012 and in the run-up to COP 18 in
Doha, the willingness of these actors was again questioned, as negotiations
proceeded slowly, essentially reaching agreement on a general work plan
toward the 2015 deadline (‘Doha Gateway’) (ENB, 2012).

EU climate change diplomacy
The analysis of the EU’s diplomatic strategy for the post-2012 climate
negotiations is facilitated by the fact that it did not really possess a hid-
den agenda: its diplomacy was almost entirely determined by the openly
acknowledged desire to lead the global negotiation process. In practice, this
amounted essentially to ‘having a position and explaining it’.
In fora outside the UN, such as the G-8+5, the Major Economies Forum
of the world’s 17 key emitters and the G-20, the EU ensured its presence so
as to promote its overall position, but did not take any specific initiatives.
Notable exceptions occurred when EU members held the G-8 presidency
(in parallel to the EU presidency) in 2005 (the UK) and 2007 (Germany).
In both instances, the presidencies, supported by the entire EU, undertook
significant diplomatic attempts to engage other major emitters: the USA and
the emerging powers through the G8+5 Gleneagles Dialogue from 2005 on,
and the USA specifically at the summit in Heiligendamm in 2007 when the
leaders committed to a 50 per cent reduction goal by 2050 (Afionis, 2008).
Mostly, however, the EU’s participation in climate negotiation fora outside
the UN was a reaction to invitations from other parties (for example, the
MEF as an USA initiative). In these arenas, the EU relied mainly on the lim-
ited toolbox of conference diplomacy.
More important than the participation in these fora was arguably the
Union’s bilateral diplomatic activity and the promotion of exchanges with
third countries or other world regions through visits, political dialogue and
so on (for example, EU-ASEM, EU-African Union, EU-China summits and
others). While many of these took primarily the form of exchanges of posi-
tions aimed at trust building and promoting mutual understanding, some
bilaterals also went further. Since the mid-2000s, the Union applied specific
strategies with regard to a number of key countries.
In its relations with selected industrialised countries (the USA, Japan and
Australia), the EU attempted to use its internal policies and legislation as
examples and promoted specifically the Emissions Trading System as an
incentivising tool for reaching emission reductions cost-effectively. The
broad argumentation strategy aimed at promoting its model was chan-
nelled through exchanges at the political and negotiators’ levels, but also
through EU delegations and member state embassies in the various coun-
tries. To cite but one example, representatives from (mostly the bigger and
well-resourced) member states and the Commission (since 2010 Union)

delegation would jointly promote the EU’s position in the US capital
(Interviews with European diplomats, April/May 2009). One key activity
of this ‘local Green Diplomacy Network’ was the carrying out of démarches
before major international meetings, on the basis of the Environment
Council’s negotiation mandate.
The EU’s argumentation strategy was supplemented by practical coopera-
tion initiatives, especially targeted at the emerging powers China and India.

In 2005, the EU-China Summit adopted a Joint Declaration on Climate
Change, establishing a partnership that covered cooperation in the fields of
carbon capture and storage and clean energy technology, but also ensuring
regular dialogues (European Commission, 2009b). In that same year, a joint
action plan and an EU-India Initiative on Clean Development and Climate
Change were concluded to collectively promote public–private partnerships
for research and development of clean technologies as well as continu-
ous dialogue on climate change (European Commission, 2009c). The EU’s
bilateral climate strategy was later expanded to include also other major
emerging economies such as Brazil and South Africa (see, for example, EEAS,
2011). In the period after the Copenhagen summit, the relations between
the EU and these players were only slowly reinforced, while the Union
increasingly focussed its diplomatic efforts on other members of the G-77/
China, notably the Least Developed Countries (LDCs).
In relations with these latter, the EU had tried, but not always suc-
ceeded in forging stronger relations ever since the late 1990s. In 2004,
for instance, the Council adopted an Action Plan on Climate Change in
the Context of Development Cooperation to help developing countries
build capacities for mitigation and adaptation and to engage in partner-
ships (European Commission, 2007: 10). Other initiatives like the Global
Climate Change Alliance or the Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy
Fund (GEEREF), launched by the Commission in 2007/2008, were aimed at
exchanging experiences with countries most vulnerable to climate change,
while supporting them financially (European Commission, 2007).
Following the Copenhagen summit, the EU observed a continued lack of
sufficiently strong engagement with these players and launched new dip-
lomatic initiatives. The ‘Cartagena Dialogue’, bringing together countries
from the G-77 (notably AOSIS and LDCs), the Umbrella Group (Australia,
New Zealand) and from the EU as well as the European Commission, is one
such example.
All these diplomatic activities served – before and after the Copenhagen
summit – one overarching aim: promoting the EU’s objective of concluding
a comprehensive global climate treaty; as by-product, they often promoted
concrete, hands-on cooperation on energy issues (Interviews EU negotia-
tors, 2009).
Key EU diplomatic activities were, however, reserved for the UN nego-
tiation process as such, and thus addressed to the totality of parties to the
186 Simon Schunz
UNFCCC and/or the Kyoto Protocol. The Union’s most significant tools in
the UN talks until 2009 were arguably its 2007 target proposals, its 2008
Climate and Energy Package7 sending an important signal to others that the
EU was serious about its approach and a range of proposals on the specific
set-up of the future climate regime, regularly based on internal legislation
(European Commission, 2009a). The most prominent example of EU diplo-
matic activities based on arguing for its own internal policies was certainly
the ETS. The prospects of building a global carbon market were used as an

aspirational aim and tool for mitigation, for which the ETS could be the pro-
totype, and ‘linkage’ to which the EU intended to employ ‘as political lev-
erage’, essentially vis-à-vis other developed countries (Benwell, 2009: 105).
After 2009, this overarching approach was slightly adapted in two ways:
(i) the EU sought to cooperate with the ‘smaller’ players in the global climate
negotiations, such as through the Cartagena Dialogue; and (ii) it adopted a more
confrontational style vis-à-vis the more reluctant players: the USA, China and
India. Examples of both trends could be observed at the Durban summit, where
the EU – represented by Commissioner Hedegaard – sided with AOSIS and the
LDCs against China and India (ENB, 2011: 30). Although unrelated to the UN
negotiations per se, one cannot but notice a tougher Union stance in other
domains of global climate policy as well, especially since 2011, when it adopted
legislation that would impose a cap on GHG emissions from flights operating to
and from EU airports, thus including some 4,000 EU and non-EU-based aircraft
operators into its ETS. This initially provoked hostile reactions from 29 member
countries of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), and especially
by the USA and the BASIC (Agence Europe, 2012b). In 2012 and 2013, this
prompted the ICAO Council to discuss globally concerted action on aviation
and climate change. This, in turn, led the Commission to suggest ‘stopping the
clock’ in the application of the legislation so as, in its own words, to ‘demon-
strate goodwill’ (European Commission, 2013). Overall, the EU’s move has so far
yielded only a very partial success, however. In October 2013, the ICAO agreed
to negotiating a global agreement on emissions from aviation by 2016, which
is to enter into force in 2020. In return, the EU pledged to apply its legislation
only to flights over European airspace (Agence Europe, 2013).
In synthesis, the Union followed essentially a proactive, leading-by-
example approach in the post-2012 climate negotiations, relying on a set
of diplomatic tools used vis-à-vis specific groups of actors (see Table 11.1).
Determining and explaining the impact of EU climate

change diplomacy
Determining EU impact in the post-2012 global climate negotiations

Impact represents a major determinant of a diplomatic actor’s perfor-
mance in global affairs. It can be defined as the ‘modification of an actor’s
Table 11.1 EU diplomatic activities in the post-2012 climate negotiations
Actors Categories Of Other industrialised Emerging countries LDCs/AOSIS

FP Instruments countries (China, India,
(adapted from Smith 2008) (Umbrella Group) Brazil, etc.)
Persuasion Issue demarches, declarations and Issue demarches before Issue demarches before Declare positions.
statements. COPs, declare positions COPs, declare positions Political dialogue.
Visit and make proposals. and demand more and demand more Visits, send experts,
Initiate political dialogue. ambition. ambition. and organise/support
Send envoys and experts. Political dialogue. Political dialogue. conferences.
Sponsor conferences. Visits, send experts and Visits, send experts and Proposals: argumentation
Support action. organise conferences. organise conferences. for climate policies in
Proposals: argumentation Proposals: argumentation general.
for ambitious climate for climate mitigation
mitigation based on necessity on basis of
climate science, science and economic
economic modelling modelling; proposals to
and own legislation aid them in assuming
(ETS-linkage) – search bigger role.
for mutual gains.
Bargaining Offer diplomatic recognition. Offer to move to 30% Offer to move to 30% Offer technological and
Offer membership. reductions. reductions. energy partnerships aid.
Offer trade, Offer energy Offer technological and (in 2011) Offer a second
cooperation or association agreement. partnerships. energy partnerships. commitment period of
Reduce tariffs. the Kyoto
Increase quota. Protocol (unconditional).
Grant inclusion in the general system
of preferential treatment.
Provide aid.
Extend loans.
Threaten with embargo (ban on exports)
or boycott (ban on imports).
187
(continued)
188
Table 11.1 Continued
Grant diplomatic recognition Conclude energy and Provide aid in terms

Grant membership technological of capacity-building,
Conclude trade, cooperation or partnerships. technology transfer,
association agreement. (in 2011) Offer a second financing of energy
Reduce tariffs. commitment period transitions and
Increase quota. of the Kyoto Protocol adaptation, etc.
Grant inclusion in the GSP. (conditional).
Provide aid.
Extend loans.
Threaten diplomatic sanction. (from 2011) including (from 2011) including
Threaten to refuse recognition. airlines into ETS. airlines into ETS.
Threaten with embargo (ban on
exports) or boycott (ban on imports).
Threaten to:
increase tariffs,
decrease quota,
withdraw GSP,
reduce/suspend aid.
delay conclusion of agreements,
suspend or denounce agreements.
Coercion Impose diplomatic sanction.
Deny recognition.
Decrease quota.
Withdraw GSP.
Reduce or suspend aid.
Suspend or denounce agreements.
behaviour, beliefs or preferences by acts of another actor exerted for the

purpose of reaching the latter actor’s aims’ (Schunz, 2010: 25). Determining
whether an actor actually had an impact presupposes, firstly, being able to
claim that it attained its (foreign) policy objectives. If the actor did attain
(some of) its objectives, this makes it, secondly, necessary to assess whether
it interacted with others in its attempt to impact on them and whether,
following this interaction, a ‘modification of behaviour, beliefs or prefer-
ences’ in the direction of that actor’s objectives occurred (Schunz, 2010:

25–26). Although quite basic, these key notions of impact assessment can
help to heuristically determine EU impact in the post-2012 climate negotia-
tions. A distinction is made between impact on procedure and impact on
outcomes.
Between 2007 and 2009, the EU was widely credited with having exerted
influence over the agenda of global climate talks. With its proactive posi-
tioning strategy and the momentum it tried to build for a novel nego-
tiation process on a legally binding post-2012 climate agreement, it did
arguably have some leverage over the Bali Roadmap. As a matter of fact,
this Roadmap largely responded to its own desires at the time, and may
never have seen the light of day without the Union’s insistence.8 EU impact
on the substance, that is, the result of the negotiations up to and at the
Copenhagen summit (the ‘Copenhagen Accord’) was, however, much more
restrained. The Union did not attain its key objectives regarding the form of
the outcome (which was voluntary rather than binding) and the magnitude
of emissions reductions (which fell short of even the lower limit the EU had
fought for, that is, the 20 per cent reduction until 2020 by developed coun-
tries). Moreover, it had to accept that key non-Annex I emitters like China
and India continued to refuse even discussing legally binding measures for
themselves.
In the post-COP 15 period, the EU was initially not more successful,
although it arguably contributed to keeping the negotiations within the
UN despite attempts by the USA to deal with them in smaller fora among
major emitters. At the Cancun summit in late 2010, the Union did obtain
minimal objectives when key provisions of the Copenhagen Accord were
integrated into the UN negotiation framework. Since this was a compara-
tively minor advance, whose necessity had been widely accepted, the proof
of EU leverage over this outcome can however not be made (ENB, 2010). The
assessment is somewhat different for the negotiations in 2011. In the run-up
to and during COP 17 in Durban, the EU developed a new position (albeit
not a novel approach) on how future global climate negotiations should be
conducted. It now favoured the adoption of the above-mentioned roadmap
towards negotiating a legally binding outcome by 2015, providing thus,
according to observers, ‘the blueprint’ of the final outcome (ENB, 2011).
Again, however, these advancements – and thus also the EU’s impact – were
purely procedural: the logic of the Durban outcome resembled that of the
190 Simon Schunz
Bali Roadmap, only with new deadlines. It did not imply any substantial
breakthroughs, which is why EU impact on the substance of the current
or future outcomes of global climate talks can analytically not be asserted.
A similar assessment can be made for 2012 when the Union contributed to
the adoption of a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol at COP
18, which paved the way for the ‘Doha Gateway’, a timetable toward the
adoption of the ‘agreed outcome’ in 2015 (ENB, 2012).
The validity of common explanations for EU impact in the context

of the post-2012 global climate negotiations
If the EU’s impact on the post-2012 climate negotiations has, as of 2014, at
best been procedural, this pattern, which sets forth the trends of the past
alluded to in the introduction, requires explanation.
The ‘one voice’ thesis: internal coherence – EU external impact?

The ‘one voice’ thesis is explained at length in the introductory chapter of
this volume, and its key features need not be repeated here. In essence, it
depicts the idea that the Union’s effectiveness (and thus impact) as a diplo-
matic actor improves, the closer the EU moves towards the ideal of speaking
with ‘one voice’ that sends a single message on the global stage. In a climate
change context, this thesis has enjoyed popularity among policy-makers
and academics. Connie Hedegaard, for instance, president of the 2009
Copenhagen COP and EU Commissioner for Climate Action since 2010,
declared shortly after COP 15: ‘In those last hours in Copenhagen, China,
India, Japan, Russia, the US (…) each spoke with one voice, while Europe
spoke with many different voices’ (Rankin, 2010). In academia, to give but
one example, the findings of three major research projects on the EU’s role
in global multilateral governance, including on climate change, note: ‘The
EU is more successful in global multilateralism when it has a unified voice’
(MERCURY, EU-GRASP and EU4SEAS, 2011: 2).
Does the ‘one voice’ thesis have any explanatory power for the EU’s
impact as a climate change diplomatic actor in recent years? The process-
trace does not allow for a clear-cut answer to this question.
To begin with, it is evident that the EU did not possess a single voice at
any one point in time during the period 2007–2012. Where the Union may
have come close to this ideal in 2007 and 2008, when the Climate Troika
represented it based on the common position outlined by the European
Council in March 2007, the Union’s message was also spread by other play-
ers (environmental ministers and experts, foreign ministers and diplomats)
through various channels. In 2009 and early 2010, then, the Union clearly
relied on a wide range of representatives, especially at the Copenhagen sum-
mit when leaders of major EU member states negotiated alongside the EU
Troika and lead negotiators. From the spring of 2010 onwards, greater coher-
ence was then again sought, and the tendency to centralise outreach with
the Presidency and, during COPs, the Climate Commissioner, represented

an attempt to converge toward having a ‘single voice’. Nonetheless, even
in 2010, 2011 and 2012, the EU representation arrangement relied on task
sharing by different actors rather than on one representative.
Speaking through many voices does not have to imply cacophony, as these
voices can send the same message. Regarding this broader interpretation of
the ‘one voice’ thesis, the EU fared slightly better, sending the same or similar
messages on key issues negotiated in global climate fora throughout most of

the period 2007–2012. The Copenhagen summit may be considered as the
main (not the only) exception: in its final hours, the EU’s leaders did defend
diverging positions vis-à-vis different interlocutors, notably on central issues
such as the emission reduction targets, thus undermining the Union’s overall
approach. But was this the reason for the Union’s weak performance on that
occasion? This is obviously hard to determine. Counterfactual analysis, draw-
ing on other examples of EU climate change diplomacy in past UN negotia-
tion rounds, can provide some insights. Although the present analysis does
not cover the time period prior to 2007, other studies do (Grubb and Yamin,
2001; Schunz, 2012; Yamin, 2000). And the findings are decidedly mixed:
in some instances, the EU clearly lacked impact due in essence to internal
divergences and cacophonic representation. A major example is COP 6 in
The Hague in 2000. At this summit, the UK sought to forge a deal with the
EU’s main interlocutor, the United States, negotiating without an explicit
Union mandate and in parallel to the French Council Presidency. This led
to a major clash within the EU delegation, and contributed to the failure of
the COP on the whole (Grubb and Yamin, 2001). In other cases, such as the
post-Kyoto negotiations after the summit in The Hague, the EU had to sac-
rifice its environmental integrity concerns with the 2001 Marrakech Accords
that were to operationalise the Kyoto Protocol despite attaining some degree
of coherence short of a single voice. Commentators attribute this largely to a
problematic negotiation context disadvantaging its position (Schunz, 2012).
No clear-cut pattern can thus be detected. This, in turn, implies that even if
the EU had spoken with one voice at the Copenhagen summit, the odds that
it would have been more influential are rather slim, given the many other
intervening factors related to the negotiation context.
In sum, the empirical evidence is far from unequivocal. Not speaking with
a single voice seems to complicate matters for the EU’s climate diplomacy.
Yet, this does not imply that speaking with a single voice suffices to have
an impact. The ‘one voice thesis’ may therefore at best point to a necessary
condition for EU impact. For the Union to perform well as a diplomatic
actor, other conditions need, however, to be fulfilled.
The ‘leadership by example’ thesis: showing the way – EU external impact?

An alternative explanation of the EU’s performance as a diplomatic actor
on climate change similarly finds its roots in policy-makers’ discourse and
192 Simon Schunz
studies of EU external relations. It is – politically – based on the very popular

assumption that the EU needs to lead in global multilateral affairs and –
analytically – on the concept of leadership. The overarching message of this
account of EU impact can be paraphrased as such: if the EU manages to adopt
a coherent set of positions on its climate policy objectives and/or internal cli-
mate policies, promoting those effectively externally will allow it to impact
on others. Explaining the Union’s model through many different channels
is thus considered as a sufficient action to be a successful diplomatic actor.

In the EU discourse, at least prior to the 2009 Copenhagen summit, ref-
erences to leadership were ubiquitous. Exploiting ‘The Power of Example’,
that is using its internal policies to ‘show the way’ to the rest of the world,
represented the openly acknowledged central strategy of the Union’s cli-
mate policy representatives (Runge-Metzger, 2008), which responded also
to repeated calls for EU leadership from European and international civil
society actors. The process-trace documents that and how this approach
informed the policy-making and diplomatic activities of the Union. In the
academic debate on EU external climate policy, the concept of leadership
has equally been widely used, with studies that try to understand ‘who
exercises what kind of leadership, how and when’ having become the main-
stream of sorts when it comes to examining EU climate diplomacy (Gupta
and Grubb, 2000; Oberthür, 2009; Wurzel and Connelly, 2010: 15). A cen-
tral concept in this literature is the Union’s ‘directional leadership’, which
calls for analyses of whether the EU is capable of actually convincing others
by explaining its own model or not. EU under-performance, for example, its
lack of impact on the negotiations that resulted in the Copenhagen Accord,
is interpreted as only a snapshot of reality, and hopes are placed in the long-
term compellingness of the Union’s model and the related strategy to yet
bring about the changes in global climate politics desired by the EU (Wurzel
and Connelly, 2010: 286–287).
Can this popular thesis account for the EU’s performance as a climate
change diplomatic actor? It would presuppose that the Union’s leading-
by-example strategy was generally adequate, but that its representatives
simply did not do enough to explain EU positions and policies so as to
effectively have the Union serve as a model. The evidence presented here
suggests otherwise. In its climate change diplomacy between 2007 and
2012, the EU fully embraced the leadership-by-example approach, carrying
it to near perfection. Yet, as shown, this did not yet yield the desired effects.
In this context, the argument that the Union only needs more time to per-
suade other players can also not convince: besides being virtually impossible
to verify, nothing currently points to a long-term success of the EU’s strategy
unless major players like the USA or China radically alter their approaches
to global climate politics.9
All in all, ‘showing the way’ has not been a very effective strategy for
the EU’s climate change diplomacy, as the link between a high degree
of proactivity in promoting its model and external EU impact remains

unproven. By consequence, the leadership by example thesis also holds
little explanatory potential for the Union’s performance. What it does
underscore, however, is the importance of taking into account how the EU
presents its positions and vis-à-vis whom, pointing to additional variables to
take into account when trying to explain its impact.
Explaining EU impact through placing its climate change diplomacy into context

The two approaches to explaining EU impact discussed so far pay little atten-
tion to the external environment the Union operates in. This environment
is at best regarded as an intervening factor that may be invoked to account
for EU failure. What is more, however, is that they essentially prescribe how
the Union should be doing things, but do not seriously consider what it
really does as a diplomatic actor in this external environment.
A more comprehensive explanation of EU performance as a diplomatic
actor in global (climate) affairs would instead part from the assumption that,
if the domestic context provides the preconditions for EU action – and the
EU did possess relatively high degrees of actor capacity during most of 2007–
2012 –, the global environment and its behaviour as a diplomatic actor will
jointly account for its impact in global (climate) politics. Greater attention
has thus to be directed toward its diplomatic activities, and the global policy
context provided by the post-2012 climate talks.10 Based on this approach,
and following an idiosyncratic explanation of the EU’s under-performance,
some general conditioning factors of its impact in global climate politics
can be identified.
Although the EU managed to be present and active in all the relevant
global climate fora, its overarching strategy of leading by example through
‘frontloading’ detailed propositions encountered two main problems
between 2007 and 2012, and especially at the Copenhagen summit. First,
the strategy embodied the European hope that proactively positing its
(ideal) conception of the post-2012 climate regime would make others fol-
low. It presupposed that its stance was attractive enough to be almost self-
executing. This, in turn, implies that the EU’s representatives must have
believed that other major players were either already on the same wave-
length regarding the desirability of a legally binding post-2012 agreement
centred on market instruments or that they could be easily convinced of
this. The mere explanation of the rationale of its position would thus suffice
to win them over and allow the EU to reach its goals.
In a context in which climate negotiations became increasingly politi-
cised, were conducted at high level and characterised by other parties’
‘backloading’ of positions in anticipation of a final bargain, this reliance
on the magnetism of its model did not exactly provide for a high degree of
compatibility between EU policies and the external context. While the
Union’s argumentation was based on the rationale that climate science was
194 Simon Schunz
undisputable and therefore had to provide the benchmark for the talks,
other major parties perceived the negotiations essentially as a struggle over
energy resources and power in which everything – including the science –
was subject to interpretation and bargaining. When this difference became
very visible during final stages of the 2009 talks, the second problem that is
characteristic of the front-loading approach emerged: the EU’s mandate left
only limited room for manoeuvre. The inflexibility of the Union’s approach
became particularly visible on the issue of the legal form of the outcome.

At a November 2009 APEC summit in Singapore, major non-EU players had
decided that the Copenhagen COP would not produce a legally, but a ‘politi-
cally binding’ outcome (BBC, 2009). Nonetheless, the EU (officially) pursued
its pro-treaty strategy in the final weeks of the talks, and did not prepare for
an alternative scenario. In both cases, the EU acted thus ‘out of sync’ with
the external context, for several reasons. For one, it had manoeuvred itself
into a position that it could not so easily back out of without risking serious
damage to its reputation regarding its ‘leadership’ image. Moreover, influen-
tial member states pushed for keeping the pressure up so as to extract con-
cessions from other countries at COP 15. This strategy would not work, also
because major players knew of the internally different opinions in the EU.
As a result, as one of the Union’s lead negotiators remarked in the aftermath
of COP 15, the EU played the role of the ‘unpopular class goody-goody’
(Agence Europe, 2010). In wanting to retain its image, it failed to under-
stand and address the interests underlying other major parties’ positions.
Regarding the EU’s concrete activities, both the diplomatic efforts and the
tools used vis-à-vis various actor groups did regularly not convince those
players.
When it comes to outreach to the major developed countries, the EU
invested much time in contacts with the USA, especially prior to 2010, using
the described broad argumentation strategy to convince the Obama adminis-
tration of the necessity to act decisively on climate change through binding,
ambitious commitments. Despite close contacts and constant exchanges,
the EU misinterpreted the political developments in the USA, however. An
unwarranted hope was placed in the capacity of the new administration to
achieve a turn-around in US climate politics – even though the messages
expressed by US officials, including president Obama, left no room for
doubts: their position would depend on whatever would result from delib-
erations in Congress.11 Instead of adapting its positions to this evolution,
many in the EU continued to act, at least until COP 15, on the false premise
that the US administration would behave as did its predecessors at the Kyoto
COP and engage in bargaining about targets in Copenhagen, during which
the EU’s 30 per cent offer could be used as a leverage. Besides this strategic
fallacy, as the majority of its efforts focused on the biggest developed coun-
try emitter, the outreach to other industrialised countries was necessarily
more limited. This approach was corrected, to some extent, after 2009, when
the EU further diversified its outreach. The predetermination that came

with the ‘Copenhagen Accord’ as well as continued USA reluctance rooted
in domestic politics still complicate(d) the search for global solutions to the
problem of climate change, however.
Regarding the significant group of emerging countries, notably China,
the EU’s approach of arguing and concluding partnerships appears – in
retrospect – as equally sub-optimal. Its overarching leadership approach
was based on the premise that these parties would be willing to subscribe to

ambitious targets in a treaty, if only the USA did, and if the EU (and other
industrialised countries) adopted targets of at least 30 per cent by 2020.
Energy and technology partnerships were to serve the purpose of further
facilitating mutual understanding. Yet, the Copenhagen summit showed
above all that China and its partners sought to benefit from these privileged
partnerships, but were not interested in anything but very loose cooperation
in the UN regime, as they had also continuously and unequivocally com-
municated throughout the year 2009.12 None of these players demanded
therefore of the EU to be more ambitious than its 20% reduction proposal,
as none of them was actually willing to commit to more than previously
proposed (Purvis and Stevenson, 2010). Apparently, however, the Union’s
strategy was not fully prepared for the possibility that the emerging econo-
mies would not support a legally binding approach. After the summit, the
described change in diplomatic posture vis-à-vis the emerging economies
gained the EU some leverage over the negotiation process when it teamed
up, as of 2011, with the LDCs. Where the latter had not played a key part
in the EU’s climate diplomacy in the second half of the 2000s, this would
change before and at the Durban summit, and yielded an immediate, albeit
limited (procedural) impact. This cooperation was, however, not sustained
at COP 18.
A close scrutiny of EU diplomatic behaviour in context thus yields some
explanatory factors for its under-performance in the post-2012 climate
negotiations. If one agrees that the Union possessed a quite developed actor
capacity, which allowed it to define proactively rather elaborate positions,
its diplomatic action can be invoked to explain its limited impact. In a con-
text in which positions and interests were far apart and in which the Union
defended an outlier position, its non-confrontational persuasion-based
diplomatic style was not bound to yield many advances, at least not in the
context of the multilateral climate negotiations. By contrast, as the 2011
example and others before that, notably the case of convincing Russia of
ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, suggest, if the Union adopts a tougher stance,
diversifies the use of the foreign policy tools it has at its disposal, addresses
other actors’ needs and engages in coalition-building with like-minded play-
ers to confront more reluctant actors, it strongly enhances its chances of
succeeding in global climate politics. In other words, a proactive diplomatic
approach may be necessary, but needs to be more adequately geared toward
196 Simon Schunz
the negotiation context and this latter’s overarching logic, which – in the
case at hand – happened to be one of bargaining. In such a context, the
argumentation for one’s model must be considered as insufficient. This may
be a lesson to retain not only for the Union’s climate diplomats, but also
for those scholars who seek to understand the EU’s performance in global
(climate) politics more widely.
Concluding remarks

This contribution provided a contextual analysis of the EU’s climate change
diplomacy during the post-2012 negotiations within and beyond the UN
regime (2007–2012), highlighting several patterns: while the EU’s actor
capacity was constantly quite highly developed, and while it was very active
as a climate diplomatic actor, its impact in global climate politics remained
fairly limited. Although it did exert some influence over the agenda and
procedures of global climate talks, EU activities reached a clear boundary
when it came to impacting on substance.
This pattern of limited performance was taken as a puzzle requiring expla-
nation. Two key hypotheses were scrutinised. While no clear evidence was
found for the thesis that a ‘single voice’ could earn the EU greater external
impact in global climate politics, the findings clearly pleaded against the
idea that ‘leadership by example’ ensures such impact. In search of a more
comprehensive account of EU under-performance in the post-2012 negotia-
tions, an alternative explanation was introduced that treats EU diplomatic
activities and the external context as main variables. When comparing the
EU’s internal set-up and its diplomatic activities to the external environ-
ment it operated it, one notes that the Union regularly defended outlier
positions, acted out of sync with other actors, and did, for a long time, not
undertake efforts to adequately remedy this, despite growing awareness of
the problem. The discrepancy between a diplomacy that was derived almost
exclusively from domestic considerations and a negligence of the evolving
international context can thus explain the Union’s limited impact on global
climate politics more convincingly than any single-variable, institutional
explanation.
The findings presented in this contribution have several implications
for our understanding of the EU’s climate change diplomacy and for how
to study it. For one, as long as the USA and the major emerging countries
(BASIC) find each other in agreement about the fact that global climate
policy-making is a matter of power politics and thus of foreign and not
environmental policy, attempts at mutual persuasion are not bound to
lead to a comprehensive global agreement. It will therefore also take more
than the simple reliance on the magnetism of its model for the EU to assert
itself as a key player in this power game. Whether the Union is capable of
converting its diplomatic activity into impact will not so much depend on
the (so far unfulfilled) prospect that it may one day be speaking with one
voice in diplomatic matters, but rather on what this voice is going to say.
In this respect, the EU will need to take global climate politics for what it is,
namely a site of foreign policy, and empower itself to act strategically and
in a more long-term perspective. In this endeavour, the EEAS could help in
addressing two of the main shortcomings identified in this analysis13: 1) The
EU’s (over)reliance on the rational argumentation for its own model as key

logic of action vis-à-vis the wider world: in this regard, the Union would be
well advised to reflect on the empty shells in Table 11.1. Its stance at COP
17 and the debate about including non-EU aircraft companies into its ETS
could be indicators that it is prepared to make use of a wider range of tools
in order to attain greater effectiveness in its climate diplomacy. 2) Its inflex-
ibility in adapting its strategy to the evolving negotiation context, rooted in
a tendency of navel-gazing and neglect of other parties’ interests: to remedy
this shortcoming, the External Action Service could be used to gain a bet-
ter understanding of other parties’ preferences and to coordinate the EU’s
strategy more effectively in the future.
Finally, the findings challenge some of the truisms of scholarship on the
EU and global climate (and environmental) politics. Importantly, the widely
accepted idea that the Union is a natural leader in this domain will have to
be reconsidered, particularly by more diligently scrutinising its diplomatic
activities and their effects. Moreover, the usefulness of the one voice and
leadership concepts as analytical tools has to be re-assessed. Their focus
on institutional remedies to EU ineffectiveness and on EU benign behav-
iour promoting cooperation for a common gain have led to blind spots in
the analysis of its role in global politics, as they draw the attention away
from crucial analytical units like the strategic interplay between actors and
its various domestic and international determinants. This needs to be re-
balanced if scholars want to comprehensively understand and explain EU
performance. One step toward this would be more in-depth analyses of the
operation of the EU as a diplomatic actor in specific external environments.
Notes
The author conducted most of the research for this chapter while being a post-
doctoral/doctoral researcher at the Centre for Global Governance Studies and the
Institute for International and European Policy, University of Leuven (KU Leuven),
Belgium. All views expressed are entirely his own, do not reflect the positions of the
European institutions and bodies and do not, in any way, engage any of them.
1. In the period after the 2001 US withdrawal from the Protocol ratification process,
the EU reinforced its activities and ‘saved’ the Protocol, in the eyes of many, nota-
bly by convincing Russia to adopt it. See Douma (2006).
198 Simon Schunz
2. The research presented here is based on a larger study which involved a trian-
gulation of research techniques and sources involving about 30 semi-structured
interviews with EU and non-EU climate negotiators and observers, the analysis
of selected EU, EU member state and UN documents and the non-participatory
observation of the Union’s activities at three UN climate negotiation sessions in
2009, including COP 15.
3. The G-77/China was split along two lines: 1. The least developed countries
(LDCs) stood in stark contrast to the emerging economies (China, India, Brazil,
South Africa), who, from 2009 on, collaborated closely as a group (under the acro-
nym ‘BASIC’); 2. The alliance of small island-states (AOSIS), fearing to succumb

to sea-level rise, was opposed to the oil-producing countries (OPEC).
4. As a component of actorness, ‘representation’ examines whether the EU fulfils
the preconditions for implementing foreign policy, that is whether it has desig-
nated actors to do so, and if those actors coordinate.
5. For the EU, an adequate contribution of the major developing countries would
have consisted in a 15–30 per cent deviation from business-as-usual by 2020.
6. Power is understood here as a relative capacity which depends on material (for
example, size of the economy) and immaterial resources (diplomatic skills, and so
on.). In the climate context, it centrally relies on a country’s share of the world’s
total greenhouse gas emissions.
7. On the climate and energy package, see http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/
package/index_en.htm.
8. The release of the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC in 2007 also had a role
to play in this, however. Purvis and Stevenson( 2010).
9. In 2012/2013, the centerpiece of the EU’s strategy, its ETS, had also come under
increased pressure, rendering the prospects of leading by example even slimmer.
10. Given space limitations, the proceedings of the post-2012 negotiations cannot be
discussed in detail here. They have been analysed elsewhere, see Curtin (2010);
ENB (2010, 2011, 2012); Müller (2010); Spencer et al. (2010).
11. The US Congress did not reach agreement on comprehensive climate legislation
in the analyzed period.
12. Purvis and Stevenson (2010).
13. For a more detailed analysis of the shortcomings of EU foreign climate policy and
a portfolio of possible remedies, see Schunz (2011).
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Index
A CARICOM, see Caribbean Community

ACTA, see Anti-Counterfeiting Trade (CARICOM)
Agreement (ACTA) Cartagena Dialogue, 185, 186
Afghan Compact, 77 CCP, see Common Commercial Policy

Africa Group, 170 (CCP)
African Union, 84n7, 90, 96 Centre for European Policy
Ahtisaari Plan, 78 Studies, 31
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement CFSP, see Common Foreign and Security
(ACTA), 146–7 Policy (CFSP)
EU’s negotiations of the, 139 CHR, see Commission on Human Rights
petitions against, 148 (CHR)
Arab Spring, 24, 25, 157, 165, 170–1 Civilian Operation Commander
arguing, in international negotiations, (COC), 75
126–7 Civilian Planning and Conduct
Ashdown, Paddy, 75 Capability (CPCC), 75
Ashton, Catherine, 24, 89, 102n1, 159 classical multilateral diplomacy, 43
climate change diplomacy
B EU, 184–6
Bali Roadmap, 182, 189–90 EU actor capacity, 180–2
Ban Ki-moon, 98 explanations, 186–96
bargaining global climate negotiations post-2012,
defined, 126 182–4, 186–96
and G20 financial and economic COC, see Civilian Operation
discussions, 127–8 Commander (COC)
Basic Principles for an EU Strategy Against coercive diplomacy
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass defined, 103
Destruction, 105 demand and, 103
Berlusconi, Silvio, 143 elements characterising, 103
bilateralism, 62–3 examples of, 35
bilateral negotiations, 143–6 success rate of, 104
EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement, 143–4 threat and, 103
Thematic clauses, 144–6 time pressure and, 103
bilateral relations, and human rights Cold War, 15–16, 23, 36–7, 157
declarations and démarches, 163–4 collective diplomacy, 3, see also
dialogue, 161–3 diplomacy
incentives/financial aid, 164–6 Commission on Human Rights (CHR),
sanctions, 166–7 35, 156, 168
bimultilateral negotiations, 21 Common Commercial Policy (CCP), 139
Bonn Powers, 76 scope of, 139–40
Bonn summit, 122 Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP), 1, 70, 81, 83, 104
C Common Security and Defence Policy
Cancun Agreements, 179, 183 (CSDP), 63, 70
Caribbean Community (CARICOM), 90, communication, as function of
96–9 diplomacy, 12
202
Index 203
confidentiality clause in negotiations, environmental, 43

147 EU as a heterogeneous diplomatic
conflict resolution efforts actor, 57–60
EUSRs’ contribution to, 79–80 EU climate change, 180–6
in Sudan and South Sudan, 80 European Union Special
Constitutional Treaty, 31 Representatives (EUSRs), role of,
contribution analysis, 55 69–83
Cooper, Robert, 71 examples of coercive, 35
coordination great power, 17, 25
among EU member states, 34–6 introduction, 52–3

between the EUSRs and the measuring impact of, 53–6
EAS, 81–2 as a multilevel process, 56–7
within NATO, 36 multi-stakeholder, 12, 21–2, 27
COP, see Copenhagen conference of the plurilateral, 6
parties (COP) reactive, 44
Copenhagen Accord, 179, 189, state-centric nature of, 3
192, 195 structural, 17, 24
Copenhagen Climate Conference, 60 welcoming a politics of European
Cotonou agreements, 44 multilateral, 40–2
Council of Europe, 63 diplomatic action, 11–14, 16, 172, 195
CPCC, see Civilian Planning and diplomatic actors
Conduct Capability (CPCC) described, 12–15
CSDP, see Common Security and EU performance as, in global (climate)
Defence Policy (CSDP) affairs, 193–6
European Union as an emerging,
D 18–23
Davies, Jon, 116 European Union as heterogeneous,
Dayton Peace Agreement, 76, 77, 78 57–60
declarations, human rights, 163–4 in the twenty-first century,
declaratory diplomacy, 163, see also 15–17
diplomacy diplomatic challenges in the twenty-first
De Gucht, Karel, 147 century, 15–17
démarches, human rights, 163–4 diplomatic negotiations, 141–2
de Villepin, Dominique, 105 Doha Gateway, 190
dialogues, human rights, 161–3, Durban Roadmap, 184
see also negotiations
constructive engagement, 162 E
external assessments of, 162 East-Asian financial crisis of 1990, 124
Dijsselbloem, Jeroen, 120 EC, see European Community (EC)
diplomacy Economic and Financial Committee
bilateral trade, 6 (EFC), 129
coercive, 103 EEAS, see European External Action
collective, 3 Service (EEAS)
and complex causality, 60–2 EFC, see Economic and Financial
conducting multilateral, 32–3 Committee (EFC)
defined, 56 EIDHR, see European Initiative for
and diplomatic action, 13 Democracy and Human Rights
diplomatic settings and diplomatic (EIDHR)
activities and policy areas, 62–4 El Baradei, Mohammed, 105, 114
domestic dimension of multilateral, Emissions Trading System, 184
42–3 entrepreneurial leadership, 45
204 Index
environmental diplomacy, 43, see also and Environment Council, 181

diplomacy on G8 key agenda meeting, 123
Environment Council, 181–2 permanent President of, introduction
EPC, see European Political Cooperation of, 122–3, 125
(EPC) Presidency, 125
ETS, see European Emissions Trading and tax havens, 128
System (ETS) European Council on Foreign
EU, see European Union (EU) Relations, 159
EU3+1 talks with Iran, 35 European Council Secretariat, 107
‘EU Action Plan for Afghanistan and European Court of Human Rights, 159

Pakistan,’ 74 European Court of Justice, 140
EU-China Summit, 185 European Emissions Trading System
EU-India Initiative on Clean (ETS), 178, 186
Development and Climate European External Action Service (EEAS)
Change, 185 abandoning multilateralism as
EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement, political ideology, 45–6
143–4 conducting multilateral diplomacy
European Central Bank, 36 underpinned by bilateral relations
European Commission (EC), 3, 19, 45, and unilateral action, 32–3
69, 81 differentiated approach, 36–7
assistance programmes, 77 domestic dimension of multilateral
diplomatic role of, 124 diplomacy, 42–3
environmental diplomacy and, 43 form and content, bridging, 34
as EU representative at G20, 125 improving EU performance, 39–40
European Council and, 107 leadership and negotiation style,
EUSRs and, 82 43–5
on EU trade agreements, outreach, coordination and
140–1 delegation, 34–6
external relations specialists operating politics of European multilateral
from, 19 diplomacy, 40–2
financial aid offered for human rights reforming international institutions,
improvement, 165 37–9
and Lisbon Treaty, 58, 125 relevance of, 40
and plurilateral negotiations, 146 European Initiative for Democracy and
role in G20, 124–5 Human Rights (EIDHR), 159, 164
role in the G8, 122 European multilateral diplomacy,
WTO and, 43 politics of, 40–2
European Community (EC), 1, 53, 89 European Neighbourhood Policy,
characterised as a ‘civilian power,’ 53 59, 63
and Common Commercial European Neighbourhood Policy
Policy, 139 Instrument, 165
Common Commercial Policy (CCP) European Parliament, 6–7, 20, 23, 59
and, 139 European Commission trade
and European G8 members, 121 agreement reporting, 142
and INC, 178 and Lisbon Treaty, 138
inception of, 139 powers of, 151
European Council, 58 and trade agreements, 142, 145
Action Plan on Climate Change European Political Cooperation (EPC),
in the Context of Development 104, 159
Cooperation, 185 European Security Strategy, 105
Index 205
European Union (EU) representation in international trade,

as an emerging diplomatic actor, 140–1
18–23 sponsored sanctions, 35
bilateral negotiations, 143–6 Strategic Framework and Action
Central Asia Strategy, 79 Plan on Human Rights and
and the challenges of Democracy, 162
twenty-first-century diplomacy, 23–6 trade policy-making of, 138
climate change diplomacy, 180–6 European Union Special Representatives
as a coercive diplomatic (EUSRs)
actor, 103–16 contribution to conflict resolution

competence on trade, 139 efforts, 79–80
Council Presidency in the G8, 122 contribution to the coordination of
declining role in G20, 130 EU actors in the field, 73–7
as a diplomatic actor, 1–8 contribution to the coordination of
as diplomatic actor for human rights EU efforts with other international
promotion, 155 organisations, 77–8
as a diplomatic actor in the post- as coordinators, negotiators and
Lisbon era, 11–28 mediators, 72–3
diplomatic negotiation in involvement in local politics, 78–9
international trade, 141–2 mandates of, 70–2
diplomatic role, in the G20, 126–33 relations with the relevant EU
foreign policy, and eurozone institutions, 81–3
crisis, 159 eurozone crisis, 155, 159
foreign trade in, 138 External Action Service (EAS), 69, 81
in the G8, 121–4
in the G20, 124–5 F
G20’s development agenda, 132 Feith, Pieter, 76
General Affairs and External Relations financial aid, EU and, 164–6
Council (GAERC), 105 Fisher, Joschka, 105
global climate negotiations post-2012, Food and Agricultural Organization
180–6 (FAO), 63
in global climate politics, 178 Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), 58–9,
as a heterogeneous diplomatic actor, 71, 81
57–60 foreign direct investment (FDI), 140
impact on global climate negotiations foreign policy
post-2012, 186–96, 187–8 American, 41
improving performance, 39–40 architecture, 53
incentives for human rights, 164–6 dynamics of, 61–2
and international trade challenges, elite attitudes to, 41
138 EU, and eurozone crisis, 159
leadership by example thesis, 191–3 European Union Special Representatives
multilateral negotiations, 148–50 (EUSRs), role of, 69–83
one voice thesis, 190–1 goals, 55–6
outreach weaknesses at the UN, 170 instruments of, 63–4
plurilateral negotiations, 146–8 Foreign Policy Executive (FPE), 64
Police Mission in Bosnia and Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI), 72
Herzegovina, 85n14 foreign policy strategies
promotion of human rights, 159–61 bilateral, 32–3
reaction to Iran’s nuclear programme, multilateral, 32–3
104–7 unilateral, 32–3
206 Index
FPE, see Foreign Policy Executive (FPE) global freedom, 157

FPI, see Service for Foreign Policy great power diplomacy, 17, 25,
Instruments (FPI) see also diplomacy
Free Trade Agreement (FTA), 139 Green Climate Fund, 183
FTA, see Free Trade Agreement (FTA) Guimarães, Fernando Andresen,
functions of diplomacy 102n1
communication, 12
negotiation, 12 H
representation, 12 Hedegaard, Connie, 181, 190
High Representative for Foreign and

G Security Policy/Vice-President
G8 of the European Commission
EU in the, 121–4 (HRVP), 11, 19
European Commission’s role in, 122 Hokkaido Toyako summit, 123
and European Community, 121 human rights
origins, 121 diplomatic instruments of EU for,
G20 161–7
bargaining on financial and economic and divisions between EU member
discussions, 127–8 states, 160–1
Development Working Group (DWG), encouraging international
131, 133 commitments for, 156–7
EU diplomatic role in, 126–33 norms, international challenges for,
EU in the, 124–5 157–8
European Commission role in, 124–5 and political conditionality, 157
financial and economic portfolio, 127 promotion by EU, 159–61
and global financial crisis of protecting mechanisms, contestation
2007–2008, 120, 124 over, 158
London Summit, 128–9 protection in Europe, 159
and multilateral diplomatic relations, and regional organisations, 156–7
120 violations, and sanctions, 63,
non-G20 EU countries, 129 166–7
work on development, 130–3 violations in non-cooperative
GAERC, see General Affairs and External states, 158
Relations Council (GAERC) Human Rights Council (HRC), 35,
GATT 46n3, 167–71
CAP reforms and, 43 bloc politics at, 168, 170
institutionalisation of, 39 coordination with EU,
General Affairs and External Relations 167, 167
Council (GAERC), 105 and EU outreach weaknesses, 170
Geneva International Discussions, and EU status in, 171
77, 79 resolutions sponsored by EU at the,
Global Climate Change Alliance or 168, 169
the Global Energy Efficiency and
Renewable Energy Fund I
(GEEREF), 185 IAEA, see International Atomic Energy
global climate negotiations (post-2012) Agency (IAEA)
impact of EU on, 186–96, 187–8 IAEA Additional Protocol, 115
politics of, 182–4 ICR, see International Civilian
global financial crisis (2007-2008) Representative (ICR)
and financial regulation, 127 IMF, see International Monetary Fund
and G20 meetings, 120, 124 (IMF)
Index 207
INC, see Intergovernmental Negotiation J

Committee (INC) JCMB, see Joint Coordination and
input, defined, 54 Monitoring Board (JCMB)
Intergovernmental Negotiation Joint Coordination and Monitoring
Committee (INC), 178 Board (JCMB), 77
International Atomic Energy Agency Joint Declaration on Climate Change,
(IAEA), 59, 104 185
International Civilian Representative
(ICR), 76 K
International Civilian Representative for Kerry, John, 24

Kosovo, 76 Khomeini, Ayatollah, 110
International Criminal Court, 42 Kissinger, Henry, 20
International Crisis Group, 114 Kyoto Protocol, 178
international institutions, reforming, EU impact on, 179, 183
37–9
International Monetary Fund (IMF), L
36, 44 leadership
EU member states and, 44 by example, 7
European seats at the board of, 40 intellectual, 42
G20 countries and reform of, 127, 129 and negotiation style, 43–5
reforming of, 127 political, 38
international sanctions, 166–7 leadership by example thesis, 191–3
International Steering Group for League of Arab States, 90
Kosovo (ISG), 77 The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy
international trade (George), 104
bilateral negotiations, 143–6 Lisbon Treaty, see Treaty of Lisbon
Common Commercial Policy (CCP), Lomé Conventions, 43
139–40
diplomatic negotiations in, 141–2 M
EU competence on, 139 Maastricht Treaty, 18, 180
EU representation on the matters of, Madrid Compromise, 82
140–1 mandate, 141
multilateral negotiations, 148–50 Marrakech Accords, 191
negotiations’ signature and Mbeki, Thabo, 80
conclusion, 142–3 minilateralism, 33
plurilateral negotiations, 146–8 mixed trade agreements, 140, 146
Iranian Central Bank, 115 multilateral diplomacy
Iran’s nuclear programme classical, 43
EU’s reaction to, 104–7 domestic dimension of, 42–3
lessons learned, 116 politics of European, 40–2
multi-level analysis of negotiations, structural leadership in, 42
107–10 underpinned by bilateral relations
negotiations and advocacy, conduct and unilateral action, 32–3
and process of, 110–15 multilateralism
overall impact, performance and abandoning as political
power, 115–16 ideology, 45–6
ISG, see International Steering Group for bilateralism vs., 62–3
Kosovo (ISG) European foreign policy and, 37
Isolationism Reconfigured. American improving EU performance through
Foreign Policy for a New Century effective, 39–40
(Nordlinger), 46n4 multilateral negotiations, 148–50
208 Index
multilateral relations, 167–71 Organization for Security and

EU and Human Rights Council, Co-operation in Europe
167–71, 167, 168, 169 (OSCE), 59
EU’s effectiveness at United Nations, Organization on the Prohibition of
171 Chemical Weapons (OPCW), 59
multi-stakeholder diplomacy, 12, 21–2, OSCE, see Organization for Security and
27, see also diplomacy Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
Ottawa Convention, 63
N outcome, defined, 54
NATO, 36 outreach activities

coordination within, 36 agenda setting, 35
EUSRs and, 77–8 of EU, 170
Iran and, 110
Provincial Reconstruction Teams, 78 P
negotiations, 126–7 Paris agreement, 112
arguing in, 126–7 Peace Implementation Council
bargaining in, 126 Steering Board, in Bosnia and
bilateral, 143–6 Herzegovina, 77
diplomatic, 141–2 PEC, see President of the European
as function of diplomacy, 12 Council (PEC)
multilateral, 148–50 Picken, Margo, 162
plurilateral, 146–8 plurilateral diplomacy, 6, see also
post-2012 global climate, 182–4 diplomacy
Non-Aligned Movement, 170 plurilateral negotiations, 146–8
Nordlinger, Eric A., 46n4 Political and Security Committee
NPT, see Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PSC), 74
Treaty (NPT) political conditionality, 157
NPT Review Conferences, 44 political ideology, abandoning
NSG, see Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) multilateralism as, 45–6
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), President of the European Council
38, 104–5 (PEC), 11, 23, 57, 58
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), 104
nuclear weapons, 26, 104–5, 110–11, R
115–16 reactive diplomacy, 44, see also
Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), 44 diplomacy
NWS, see Nuclear Weapon representation, as function of
States (NWS) diplomacy, 12
Rome Conference, 36
Rosenau, James, 40
O Roth, Kenneth, 162
OECD, see Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development S
(OECD) Scowcroft, Brent, 38
oil embargo, 109 Seoul Development Consensus for
OPCW, see Organization on the Shared Growth, 130
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Seoul Summit, 130
(OPCW) Serrano, Pedro, 98
Organisation for Economic Co-operation Service for Foreign Policy Instruments
and Development (OECD), 128 (FPI), 72, 82
Organisation of the Islamic Sikkink, Kathryn, 156
Conference, 170 Slaughter, Anne-Marie, 37
Index 209
Solana, Javier, 83n2 U

Special Representative for Human UN, see United Nations (UN)
Rights, 166 United Nations (UN), 88
spiral model, and human rights, 156 African Union and, 90
Straw, Jack, 105 EU’s diplomacy at the, 167–71
structural diplomacy, 17, see also General Debate, 89–90
diplomacy resolution 65/276, 89
structured human rights dialogues, 162, United Nations Framework Convention
see also dialogues, human rights on Climate Change
Sudan Task Force, 74 (UNFCCC), 178

EU’s impact on, 179
T United Nations General
Terms of References, 129–30 Assembly (UNGA), 24, 44,
TEU, see Treaty on European Union 88–91
(TEU) United Nations Human Rights
TFEU, see Treaty on the Functioning of Council, 7
the European Union (TFEU) Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
TNAs, see trans-national actors (TNAs) 159
Trade Policy Committee (TPC), 141 UN Peace Building Commission, 39,
transformational diplomacy, 17, see also 46n3
diplomacy UNSC-imposed sanctions, 35
trans-national actors (TNAs), 41–2
Treaty of Lisbon, 1, 3, 34 V
and EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement, van Rompuy, Herman, 90, 96–7, 99
144
and European Commission, 125 W
and European Parliament, 138, 141–2 Working Party on International
and EU’s effectiveness at the United Environmental Issues-Climate
Nations, 171 Change (WPIEI-CC), 181
and EU trade policy, 151 World Bank, 36
and introduction of permanent World Trade Organization (WTO),
President of the European Council, 61, 63
122–3 WPIEI-CC, see Working Party on
reforms, 159 International Environmental
and TFEU, 139 Issues-Climate Change (WPIEI-CC)
Treaty on European Union (TEU), 18 WTO, see World Trade Organization
Treaty on the Functioning of the (WTO)
European Union (TFEU), 139 WTO-authorised sanctions, 35

The European Union As A Diplomatic Actor

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‘This volume provides a timely and comprehensive overview of the EU’s

growing role as a diplomatic actor, covering policies, processes and outcome

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‘Based on contributions by an excellent international team consisting of both

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Editorial board: Stephanie Anderson; Ummu Salma Bava; Grainne de Burca;

Natalie Chaban and Martin Holland

Forthcoming titles include:

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*Alex Warleigh-Lack, is currently on leave as an editor of the series

The European Union in International Affairs series.

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Typeset by MPS Limited, Chennai, India.

List of Figures and Tables ix

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1 Introduction: The European Union as a Diplomatic Actor 1

10 The EU as a Diplomatic Actor in the Field of Human Rights 155

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3.1 Elite attitudes to foreign policy 41

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4.1 Evaluating the impact of the EU’s non-proliferation policy 55

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comprehensiveness and complementarity. In other words, a complete revo-

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the different European actors to live up to their responsibilities and make a

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Peter Debaere is a post-doctoral research fellow based at the Ghent Institute

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with Katie Laatikainen, Handbook on the European Union and International

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ACP African, Caribbean and Pacific countries

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FAC Foreign Affairs Council

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UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

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In addition, this book also analyses institutional developments and the

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In this volume, we adopt a multi-level and multi-actor perspective

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Outline of this volume’s contributions and key findings

The book brings together leading scholars and practitioners in order to

represented in the international arena, rather than being a response to the

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specific roles as coordinators, negotiators and mediators in advancing the

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international security issue, especially in light of diverging views among

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Taken together, this volume provides a first general stocktaking of the

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This chapter begins by exploring issues relating to the nature of diplomatic

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What is a diplomatic actor?

Central to any evaluation of the EU as a diplomatic actor is a set of assump-

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