Laperal v.

Republic 116 Phil 672

Facts: Elisea Laperal married Enrique Santamaria. They are now legally separated. Elisea wants to
resume the use of her maiden name. Petition was opposed by the City Attorney on the ground that it
violates Art. 372 of the CC and that is not sanctioned by the Rules of Court. The lower court originally
dismissed the petition but changed its mind and granted it on the ground that it was merely for a change
of name. It also reasoned that the use of the married name would give rise to confusion in the woman‘s
finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.

Issue: WON a wife can use her maiden name after a decree of legal separation has been granted.

Held: No. Legal Separation alone is not a ground for wife‘s change of name. Art 372 specifically
mandates the wife to continue using name and surname employed before the legal separation. Her
marriage status is unaffected by the separation. Rule 103 (provision for a change of name in general)
does not prevail over the mandatory provision of Art. 372.

The petitioner owns extensive business interests, the continued used of her husband surname may
cause undue confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. This
finding is however without basis. In the first place, these were not the causes upon which the petition
was based; hence, obviously no evidence to this effect had been adduced. Secondly, with the
issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, the conjugal partnership between petitioner and
her husband had automatically been dissolved and liquidated. (Art. 106[2], Civil Cod). Consequently,
there could be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.

Francisco vs CA

Facts: Petitioner Teresita Francisco is the wife of respondent Eusebio Franciso. Eusebio‘s children by the
first marriage are also respondents in the case. The spouses have acquired a sari-sari store, a residential
house and lot, an apartment house, and an additional house and lot, which were all administered by
Eusebio until he was invalidated by tuberculosis, heart disease, and cancer. Eusebio‘s children by the
first marriage succeeded in securing a general power of attorney from their father which authorized
Conchita (one of the children) to administer the house and lot and the apartment. Petitioner filed a case
for the annulment of the general power of attorney and to be declared administratix of the properties. Trial
court rendered judgment in favor of the private respondents, saying that petitioner failed to prove that the
properties were acquired during the marriage. CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue: WON CA erred in ruling that the properties are not conjugal but capital

Held: NO. The party who invokes A160 must prove that the property in controversy was acquired during
the marriage. Proof of acquisition during overture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the
presumption in favor of conjugal partnership. This presumption is rebuttable only with strong, clear, and
convincing evidence. Petitioner, however, admitted that Eusebio brought the land into their marriage, and
evidence showed that he inherited it from his parents. The property should be regarded as his own
exclusively pursuant to A148 of CC. Essentially, property owned by a spouse prior to the marriage, and
brought to the marriage, is considered as his/her separate property. Acquisitions by lucrative title are
properties acquired gratuitously by inheritance, devise, legacy, or donation. Hence, even if it was
acquired during the marriage, is it is Eusebio‘s exclusive property by virtue of lucrative title. Also, the fact
that the land was registered in the name of ―Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco,‖ is no
proof that the property was acquired during the spouses‘ covered to. It is merely descriptive of the civil
status of Eusebio. Finally, Eusebio was not suffering from serious illness to impair his fitness to administer
his property.
Tan v Andrade

Facts:

Rosario Vda. De Andrade (Rosario) was the registered owner of four parcels of land known as Lots 17,
18, 19, and 205 situated in Cebu City (subject properties) which she mortgaged to and subsequently
foreclosed by one Simon6 Diu (Simon).7 When the redemption period was about to expire, Rosario sought
the assistance of Bobby Tan (Bobby) who agreed to redeem the subject properties. 8 Thereafter, Rosario
sold the same to Bobby and her son, Proceso Andrade, Jr. (Proceso, Jr.), for ₱100,000.00 as evidenced
by a Deed of Absolute Sale9 dated April 29, 1983 (subject deed of sale). On July 26, 1983, Proceso, Jr.
executed a Deed of Assignment,10 ceding unto Bobby his rights and interests over the subject properties
in consideration of ₱50,000.00. The Deed of Assignment was signed by, among others, Henry Andrade
(Henry), one of Rosario’s sons, as instrumental witness. Notwithstanding the aforementioned Deed of
Assignment, Bobby extended an Option to Buy11 the subject properties in favor of Proceso, Jr., giving the
latter until 7:00 in the evening of July 31, 1984 to purchase the same for the sum of ₱310,000.00. When
Proceso, Jr. failed to do so, Bobby consolidated his ownership over the subject properties, and the
TCTs12 therefor were issued in his name.

On October 7, 1997, Rosario’s children, namely, Grace, Proceso, Jr., Henry, Andrew, Glory, Miriam Rose,
Joseph (all surnamed Andrade), Jasmin Blaza, and Charity A. Santiago (Andrades), filed a complaint 13 for
reconveyance and annulment of deeds of conveyance and damages against Bobby before the RTC,
docketed as Civil Case No. CEB 20969. In their complaint, they alleged that the transaction between
Rosario and Bobby (subject transaction) was not one of sale but was actually an equitable mortgage
which was entered into to secure Rosario’s indebtedness with Bobby. They also claimed that since the
subject properties were inherited by them from their father, Proceso Andrade, Sr. (Proceso, Sr.), the
subject properties were conjugal in nature, and thus, Rosario had no right to dispose of their respective
shares therein. In this light, they argued that they remained as co-owners of the subject properties
together with Bobby, despite the issuance of the TCTs in his name.

In his defense, Bobby contended that the subject properties were solely owned by Rosario per the TCTs
issued in her name14 and that he had validly acquired the same upon Proceso, Jr.’s failure to exercise his
option to buy back the subject properties.15 He also interposed the defenses of prescription and laches
against the Andrades.1

Issue: WON the CA erred in ruling that the subject properties are conjugal in nature.

Held: In this case, records reveal that the conjugal partnership of Rosario and her husband was
terminated upon the latter’s death on August 7, 197843 while the transfer certificates of title over the
subject properties were issued on September 28, 1979 and solely in the name of "Rosario Vda. de
Andrade, of legal age, widow, Filipino."44 Other than their bare allegation, no evidence was adduced by
the Andrades to establish that the subject properties were procured during the coverture of their parents
or that the same were bought with conjugal funds. Moreover, Rosario’s declaration that she is the
absolute owner of the disputed parcels of land in the subject deed of sale45 was not disputed by her son
Proceso, Jr., who was a party to the same. Hence, by virtue of these incidents, the Court upholds the
RTC’s finding46 that the subject properties were exclusive or sole properties of Rosario.

Besides, the Court observes that laches had already set in, thereby precluding the Andrades from
pursuing their claim. Case law defines laches as the "failure to assert a right for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either
abandoned or declined to assert it."47

Records disclose that the Andrades took 14 years before filing their complaint for reconveyance in 1997.
The argument that they did not know about the subject transaction is clearly belied by the facts on record.
It is undisputed that Proceso, Jr. was a co-vendee in the subject deed of sale,48 while Henry was an
instrumental witness to the Deed of Assignment49 and Option to Buy50 both dated July 26, 1983. Likewise,
Rosario’s sons, Proceso, Jr. and Andrew, did not question the execution of the subject deed of sale made
by their mother to Bobby.51 These incidents can but only lead to the conclusion that they were well-aware
of the subject transaction and yet only pursued their claim 14 years after the sale was executed.

Due to the above-stated reasons, Bobby’s petition in G.R. No. 171904 is hereby granted.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby (a) GRANTS the petition of Bobby Tan in G.R. No. 171904; and (b)
DENIES the petition of Grace Andrade, Charity A. Santiago, Henry Andrade, Andrew Andrade, Jasmin
Blaza, Miriam Rose Andrade, and Joseph Andrade in G.R. No. 172017. Accordingly, the Decision dated
July 26, 2005 and Resolution dated March 3, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71987 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the April 6, 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, Branch 19 in Civil Case No. CEB 20969 is REINSTATED.

Veloso v Martinez

FACTS: Plaintiff commenced an action to recover of the defendant the possession of a certain parcel of
land together with the sum of P125 per month. Defendant answered and filed a counterclaim for services
rendered by the deceased to the plaintiff and recovery of certain jewelry alleged to be in the possession in
the plaintiff. The jewels in question before the possession of the same was given to the plaintiff belonged
to the defendant personally and that she had inherited the same from her mother. Defendant Lucia is the
widow of Domingo Franco and after the death of her husband she was appointed as the administratrix. A
short time before the death of Domingo he borrowed from plaintiff money and gave as security the
jewelry.

ISSUE: WON the jewelry in question a paraphernal property of Lucia.

HELD: Yes. RATIO: The record shows that the jewels were the sole and separate property of the wife,
acquired from her mother, and in the absence of further proof, we must presume that they constituted a
part of her paraphernal property. As such paraphernal property she exercised dominion over the same.
(Article 1382, Civil Code.) She had the exclusive control and management of the same, until and unless
she had delivered it to her husband, before a notary public, with the intent that the husband might
administer it properly. (Article 1384, Civil Code.) There is no proof in the record that she had ever
delivered the same to her husband, in any manner, or for any purpose. That being true, she could not be
deprived of the same by any act of her husband, without her consent, and without compliance with the
provisions of the Civil Code above cited.

Plata v Yatco

Facts: - 1954 – Amailia Plata purchased land - 1958 – sold the property to Celso Saldana but he resold it
ot her seven months after when she was already married to Gaudencio Begosa - Sept 1958 – Amalia
mortgaged to Cesarea Villanueva the property in consideration of a loan of 3,000. Gaudencio also signed
the deal - Amalia and Gaudencion failed to pay mortgage and the land was then sold to Cesarea and
husband Gregorio. They then sued Gaudencio Begosa alone for illegal detainer which was granted -
However, Amalia resisted all efforts ejecting her from the party since she is claiming that land was her
own paraphernal property and not conjugal property

ISSUE: WON Amalia is bound by the detainer judgment against Gaudencio Begosa

HELD: NO - Sufficiently proved that property contested is her own exclusive paraphernal property since
she owend it before marriage and even if Saldana did give it back to her when she C2013 | PERSONS
AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 94 was already married it did not transform it
to conjugal property since there was no prood that they money paid to Saldana came from common or
conjugal funds. - Thus since Cesarea and Gregorio were also aware that property was paraphernal as
clearly stated in land records, illegal detainer judgment against the husband alone doesn‘t affect the
paraphernal property of Amalia. Thus she had a right to ignore the judgment of eviction against her
husband. RESULT: can‘t decide at the moment whether property is validly conveyed to Cesarea and
Gregorio. Up to CFI of QC.

Facts:
Eduardo Dewara (Eduardo) and petitioner Elenita Magallanes Dewara (Elenita) were married before the
enactment of the Family Code. Thus, the Civil Code governed their marital relations. Husband and wife
were separated-in-fact because Elenita went to work in
California, United States of America, while Eduardo stayed in Bacolod City.
Eduardo, while driving a private jeep registered in the name of Elenita,[4] hit respondent Ronnie Lamela
(Ronnie). Ronnie filed a criminal case for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence[5] against
Eduardo... ound Eduardo guilty of the charge and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
two (2) months and one (1) day to (3) months, and to pay civil... indemnity of Sixty-Two Thousand Five
Hundred Ninety-Eight Pesos and Seventy Centavos (P62,598.70)... levy on Lot No. 234-C, Psd. 26667 of
the Bacolod
Cadastre... l... in the name of "ELENITA M. DEWARA... married to Eduardo Dewara
Thus, Elenita, represented by her attorney-in-fact,... Ferdinand Magallanes, filed a case for annulment of
sale
Petitioner claimed that the levy on execution of Lot No. 234-C was illegal because the said property was
her... paraphernal or exclusive property and could not be made to answer for the personal liability of her
husband. Furthermore, as the registered owner of the property, she received no notice of the execution
sale.
respondent spouses averred that the subject lot was the conjugal property of petitioner Elenita and
Eduardo. They asserted that the property was acquired by Elenita during her marriage to Eduardo; that
the property was acquired with the... money of Eduardo because, at the time of the acquisition of the
property, Elenita was a plain housewife; that the jeep involved in the accident was registered in the name
of petitioner; and that Elenita did not interpose any objection pending the levy on execution of the...
property.
There is no dispute that the subject property was acquired by spouses Elenita and Eduardo during their
marriage
Aside from the assertions of Elenita that the sale of the property by her father and her aunt was in the
nature of a donation because of the alleged gross disparity between the actual value of the property and
the monetary consideration for the sale, there is no other... evidence that would convince this Court of the
paraphernal character of the property.
The records are bereft of proof that the... consent of petitioner's father and her aunt were vitiated or that,
in reality, they intended the sale to be a donation or some other contract.
Issues:
The sole issue for resolution is whether the subject property is the paraphernal/exclusive property of
Elenita or the conjugal property of spouses Elenita and Eduardo.
Ruling:
it is just and proper that Ronnie be compensated for the serious physical injuries he suffered.
It should be remembered that even though the vehicle that hit Ronnie was registered in the name of
Elenita, she was not made a party in the said criminal case. Thus,... she may not be compelled to answer
for Eduardo's liability. Nevertheless, their conjugal partnership property may be held accountable for it
since Eduardo has no property in his name.
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.[21] Registration in the name of the husband or the wife
alone does not destroy this... presumption.[22] The separation-in-fact between the husband and the wife
without judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot retains its conjugal nature.[23]
Moreover, the presumption of conjugal ownership... applies even when the manner in which the property
was acquired does not appear. The use of the conjugal funds is not an essential requirement for the
presumption to arise.[24]
Furthermore, gross inadequacy of the price does not affect a contract of sale, except as it may indicate a
defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended a donation or some other act or contract
Inadequacy of the price per se will not rule out the transaction as one of sale; the price must be grossly
inadequate or shocking to the... conscience, such that the mind would revolt at it and such that a
reasonable man would neither directly nor indirectly consent to it.[27]
Before debts and obligations may be charged against the conjugal partnership, it must be shown that the
same were contracted for, or the debts and obligations should have redounded to, the benefit of the
conjugal partnership
However, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if the property should be
insufficient, the fines and indemnities may be enforced upon the partnership assets only after the...
responsibilities enumerated in Article 161 of the Civil Code have been covered.
Art. 163. The payment of debts contracted by the husband or the wife before the marriage shall not be
charged to the conjugal partnership.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership.
fines and indemnities imposed upon them, may be enforced against the partnership assets after the
responsibilities enumerated in Article 161 have been... covered... if the spouse who is bound should have
no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient;... but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership
such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purposes above-mentioned.
The enumeration above-listed should first be complied with before the conjugal partnership may be held
to answer for the liability adjudged against Eduardo.