D.

CIRCUMSTANCES THAT MAY AFFECT THE DETERMINATION OF NEGLIGENCE:

1. Time
2. Place
3. Emergency
4. Gravity of Harm to be Avoided
5. Alternative Cause of Action
6. Social Value or Utility of Activity
7. Person Exposed to the Risk

Cases:

1. Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co., 16 Phil. 8 (1910)

Facts:

 An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries, instituted by David Taylor,
a minor, by his father, his nearest relative.
o The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway and
an electric light system in the city of Manila.
o The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he received the injuries complained
of,15 years of age.
 On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of
age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting one Murphy, an
employee of the defendant.
o Finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy was not in his quarters, the boys walked across the
open space in the neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in the cinders
and ashes from its furnaces. Here they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating
caps scattered on the ground. These caps are approximately of the size and appearance
of small pistol cartridges and each has attached to it two long thin wires by means of
which it may be discharged by the use of electricity. They are intended for use in the
explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have in themselves a considerable
explosive power.
o After some discussion as to the ownership of the caps, and their right to take them, the
boys picked up all they could find, hung them on stick, of which each took end, and
carried them home.
o After crossing the footbridge, they met a little girl named Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years
old, and all three went to the home of the boy Manuel.
o The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps. They trust the ends of the
wires into an electric light socket and obtained no result. They next tried to break the cap
with a stone and failed. Manuel looked for a hammer, but could not find one. Then they
opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish
substance they got matches, and David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted
match to the contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all
three.
o Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap, became
frightened and started to run away, received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel had his hand
burned and wounded, and David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal
capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its
removal by the surgeons who were called in to care for his wounds.
 So this action arises and the trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff. The claim of the plaintiff
shows that evidence in the record sufficiently establishes the contrary, and justifies the court in
drawing the reasonable inference that the caps found on its premises were its property. Thus,
applying the provisions of the Articles 1089 of the Civil Code read together with articles
1902,1903, and 1908 of that Code, the company is liable for the damage which was occurred.
  Not satisfied with the decision of lower court, counsel for defendant and appellant rests his appeal
strictly upon his contention that the facts proven at the trial do not establish the liability of the
company under the provisions of these articles.

Issue:

Whether or not the defendant was guilty of negligence.

Ruling:
No, defendant is not guilty.
The elements of quasi delict are as follows:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person
for whose acts it must respond, was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.
In the case at bar, it is true that Manila Electric has been negligent in disposing off the caps which
they used for the power plant, and that said caps caused damages to Taylor. However, the causal
connection between the company’s negligence and the injuries sustained by Taylor is absent. It is in fact
the direct acts of Taylor which led to the explosion of the caps as he even, in various experiments and in
multiple attempts, tried to explode the caps. It is from said acts that led to the explosion and hence the
injuries.
Taylor at the time of the accident was well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and
physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a
day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses
throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care. The evidence of record leaves no room
for doubt that he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The
series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion admit of no other explanation.
His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone
or a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the applications of a match to the
contents of the cap, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be any reasonable
doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous.
“The just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him through his own fault, and
that he cannot demand reparation therefor from another.”

2. United States vs. Bonifacio, 34 Phil. 65 (1916)

Facts:

 On or about the 31st day of October 1913, in Santa Rita, Batangas, the accused, an engineer
and while conducting the freight train which was going to the municipality of Bauan. At about 10
he saw Eligio Castillo, a deaf-mute, was traveling along the railroad track, and as the said Castillo
did not get off the said track in spite of the whistle or warnings given by the accused, the failed to
stop the train and eventually killed the man.
 When the accused engineer claims that he did all in his power to slow down a few moments
afterwards, after he had blown his whistle without apparently attracting the attention of the
pedestrian, who, about that time, turned and attempted to cross the track.
 o The only evidence as to the speed of the train is the claim of the accused that indicator
showed that he was travelling at the rate of 35 kilometers an hour, the maximum speed
permitted under the railroad regulations for freight trains on that road.
 The lower court held that he was only liable for homicide through simple negligence.

Issue:

Whether or not Bonifacio should be held liable for the death of Castillo.

Ruling:

No, defendant should not be held liable.

Mere conjecture, and inferences unsupported by satisfactory evidence, are not sufficient
to establish a material finding of fact upon which a finding of guilt, beyond a reasonable doubt,
can be sustained.

In this case, the meter statement of facts, as disclosed by the undisputed evidence of record,
sufficiently and conclusive demonstrates that the death of the deaf-mute was the result of a regrettable
accident, which was unavoidable so far as this accused was concerned.

There is no obligation on an engine driver to stop, or even to slow down his engine, when he sees
an adult pedestrian standing or walking on or near the track, unless there is something in the appearance
or conduct of the person on foot which would cause a prudent man to anticipate the possibility that such
person could not, or would not avoid the possibility of danger by stepping aside.

The engine driver to adopt every measure in his power to avoid the infliction of injury upon any
person and to slow down, or stop altogether if that be necessary, should he have reason to believe that
only by doing so can an accident be averted. But he fairly assume that all persons walking or standing on
or near the railroad track, except children of tender years, are aware of the danger to which they are
exposed; and that they will take reasonable precautions to avoid accident, by looking and listening for the
approach of trains, and stepping out of the way of danger when their attention is directed to an oncoming
train.

There was nothing in the appearance or conduct of the victim of the accident in the cast at bar
which would have warned the accused engine driver that the man walking along the side of the tract was
a deaf-mute, and that despite the blowing of the whistle and the noise of the engine he was unconscious
of his danger.

It was not until the pedestrian attempted to cross the track, just in front of the train, that the
accused had any reason to believe that his warning signals had not been heard, and by that time it was
too late to avoid the accident. the accused was without fault; and that the accident must be attributed
wholly to the reckless negligence of the deaf-mute, in walking on the track without taking the necessary
precautions to avoid danger from a train approaching him from behind.

The evidence of record in the case at bar clearly and satisfactorily discloses that even if the train
was running at a speed slightly in excess of the maximum speed prescribed in the regulations, that fact
had no causal relation to the accident and in no wise contributed to it.

Decision was reversed. Bonifacio was acquitted.

3. Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 303 (1996)

Facts:

 This case is an action to recover damages based on quasi-delict, for serious physical injuries
sustained in a vehicular accident.

Petitioner’s version of accident

 At around 2:00am of June 24, 1990, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi
Lancer from her restaurant at Marcos highway to her home at Palanza Street, Araneta Avenue.
She was heading towards the direction of Manila when she noticed that she had a flat tire.
 She stopped at a lighted place where there are people to verify the problem and to solicit help if
needed. When she realized that she cannot reach home in that condition, she parked along the
sidewalk (1½ feet away) with her emergency lights on. She went to the rear to open the trunk.
 She was on the left side of the rear of her car to fix the tires when she was bumped by another
Lancer driven by Richard Li but registered under Alexander Commercial, Inc. Lourdes was thrown
to the windshield of Li’s Lancer, which was destroyed, and then she fell to the ground. She was
pulled out from under Li’s car.
 Her left leg was severed up to the middle of the thigh which was later amputated above the knee
at the hospital. She was confined for 20 days and was eventually fitted an artificial leg. Her
expenses totaled to P147,000 (P120,000 for confinement; P27,000 for artificial leg) which was
paid for by the defendant’s car insurance.

Private Respondent’s version of accident

 Richard Li denied that he was negligent. He was travelling at 55kph on a rainy night. Visibility was
affected, the road was wet, and the traffic is light.
 He testified that he was driving on the right lane when he was suddenly confronted with a car
coming from the opposite direction, traveling at 80kph with full bright lights. He instinctively
swerved right to avoid collision with the oncoming vehicle, instead, he bumped Lourdes’ car,
which he claimed that he did not see because of its color.
 He also stated that the parking lights were not on and that the area was poorly lighted. He also
claimed that the rear of Lourdes’ car was protruding on the outer portion of the right lane.

 A witness said that Li’s car came approaching very fast and that the car was zigzagging. He also
stated that Li was under the influence of liquor as he could smell it very well. He observed that
Lourdes’ car was parked parallel and very close to the sidewalk. He claimed that it was not
raining by the time of the accident but only drizzling.
 Lower court sustained the plaintiff's submissions and found defendant Richard Li guilty of gross
negligence and liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
 CA affirmed the decision of the lower court however absolved the Li's employer, Alexander
Commercial, Inc. from any liability towards petitioner Lourdes Valenzuela
 Both parties assail the respondent court’s decision.
o Richard Li contends that he should not be held liable for damages because the proximate
cause of the accident was Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela's own negligence. Alternatively, he
argues that in the event that this Court finds him negligent, such negligence ought to be
mitigated by the contributory negligence of Valenzuela.
o Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela assails the respondent court's decision insofar as it absolves
Alexander Commercial, Inc. from liability as the owner of the car driven by Richard Li and
insofar as it reduces the amount of the actual and moral damages awarded by the trial
court

Issues:

1. Whether or not Li was liable or the injuries sustained by Lourdes.

 2. Whether or not Lourdes was guilty of contributory negligence.

Ruling:

1. Yes, Li was liable for the injuries because the Court found him negligent in driving his
company-issued Mitsubishi Lancer.

The Court, from the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, found his testimonies to be self-
serving and it was uncorroborated unlike Lourdes’ testimonies which was corroborated by a witness.

He was driving very fast and under the influence of alcohol. The average motorist alert to road
conditions will have no difficulty applying the brakes to a car traveling at the speed claimed by Li. Given a
light rainfall, the visibility of the street, and the road conditions on a principal metropolitan thoroughfare
like Aurora Boulevard, Li would have had ample time to react to the changing conditions of the road if he
were alert - as every driver should be - to those conditions.

2. No. Lourdes was not guilty of contributory negligence, applying the emergency rule.

Under the "emergency rule", an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of
danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted
to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was
brought by his own negligence.

However, the conduct which is required of an individual in such cases is dictated not
exclusively by the suddenness of the event which absolutely negates thoroughful care, but by the
over-all nature of the circumstances.

In this case, SC held that a woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy
night will not be faulted for stopping at a point which is both convenient for her to do so and which is not a
hazard to other motorists. She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or
turn on a dark street or alley where she would likely find no one to help her. It would be hazardous for her
not to stop and assess the emergency (simply because the entire length of Aurora Boulevard is a no-
parking zone) because the hobbling vehicle would be both a threat to her safety and to other motorists.

Valenzuela did exercise the standard reasonably dictated by the emergency and could not be
considered to have contributed to the unfortunate circumstances which eventually led to the amputation
of one of her lower extremities. The emergency which led her to park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora
Boulevard was not of her own making, and it was evident that she had taken all reasonable precautions.

Note (In case kung i-ask ni Atty.): Not having been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating
that it should be absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to Li, Alexander Commercial, Inc.,
based on the principle of bonus pater familias, ought to be jointly and severally liable with the former for
the injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident.

4. Julian del Rosario vs. Manila Electric Co., 57 Phil. 478 (1932)

Facts:
  On August 4, 1930, at around 2pm, a trouble developed in a wire used by the defendant on
Dimas-Alang Street for the purpose of conducting electricity used in lighting the City of Manila
and its suburbs.
 Jose Noguera, who had charge of a tienda nearby, first noticed that the wire was burning and its
connections smoking. In a short while the wire parted and one of the ends of the wire fell to the
ground among some shrubbery close to the way. It was around 2:25 when the scene was
reported to the Manila Electric Company.
 At 4 p. m. the neighborhood school was dismissed and the children went home. Among these
was Alberto del Rosario, of the age of 9 years, who was a few paces ahead of two other boys, all
members of the second grade in the public school. These other two boys were Jose Salvador, of
the age of 8, and Saturnino Endrina, of the age of 10.
 As the three neared the place where the wire was down, Saturnino made a motion as if it touch it.
His companion, Jose Salvador, happened to be the son of an electrician and his father had
cautioned him never to touch a broken electrical wire, as it might have a current, therefore
stopped Saturnino, telling him that the wire might be charged. Saturnino yielded to this
admonition and desisted from his design, but Alberto del Rosario, who was somewhat ahead,
said, I have for some time been in the habit of touching wires.
 Jose Salvador rejoined that he should into touch wires as they carry a current, but Alberto, no
doubt feeling that he was challenged in the matter, put out his index finger and touch the wire. He
immediately fell face downwards, exclaiming "Ay! madre". The end of the wire remained in
contact with his body which fell near the post.
 A crowd soon collected, and someone cut the wire and disengaged the body. Upon being taken
to St. Luke's Hospital but the child was pronounced dead.
 An action was instituted by Julian del Rosario for the purpose of recovering damages from the
Manila Electric Company for the death of his son.

Issue:

Whether or not Manila Electric Company should be held liable for negligence that caused the
death of Alberto.

Ruling:

Yes, the defendant is responsible for the death of Alberto.

When notice was received at the Malabon station at 2.25 p. m., somebody should have been
dispatched to the scene of the trouble at once, or other measures taken to guard the point of danger; but
more than an hour and a half passed before anyone representing the company appeared on the scene,
and in the meantime this child had been claimed as a victim.

In terms of Contributory Negligence, it is doubtful whether contributory negligence can properly

be imputed to the deceased, owing to his immature years and the natural curiosity which a child would
feel to do something out of the ordinary, and the mere fact that the deceased ignored the caution of a
companion of the age of 8 years does not, in our opinion, alter the case.

Even if it was true that the victim was negligent, such an incident would never happen if it the
dangling wire was immediately fixed by the Manila Electric Company.