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G.R. No.

L-53373 until the Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for
review. 7
MARIO FL. CRESPO, petitioner,
vs. On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon.Catalino
HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge, CIRCUIT Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition for review reversed the resolution of
CRIMINAL COURT OF LUCENA CITY, 9th Judicial Dist., THE the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the SOLICITOR immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. 8 A
GENERAL, RICARDO BAUTISTA, ET AL., respondents. motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial
Fiscal dated April 10, 1978 with the trial court, 9 attaching thereto a copy of
the letter of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order of August 2, 1978 the
private prosecutor was given time to file an opposition thereto.10 On
November 24, 1978 the Judge denied the motion and set the arraigniment
stating:
GANCAYCO, J.:
ORDER
The issue raised in this ease is whether the trial court acting on a motion
to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of
the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may For resolution is a motion to dismiss this rase filed by the procuting
refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the fiscal premised on insufficiency of evidence, as suggested by the
merits. Undersecretary of Justice, evident from Annex "A" of the motion
wherein, among other things, the Fiscal is urged to move for
dismissal for the reason that the check involved having been
On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of
issued for the payment of a pre-existing obligation the Hability of
the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo
the drawer can only be civil and not criminal.
in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City which was docketed as Criminal
Case No. CCCIX-52 (Quezon) '77.1 When the case was set for arraigment
the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there The motion's thrust being to induce this Court to resolve the
was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the innocence of the accused on evidence not before it but on that
resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the adduced before the Undersecretary of Justice, a matter that not
information. In an order of August 1, 1977, the presiding judge, His Honor, only disregards the requirements of due process but also erodes
Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion. 2 A motion for reconsideration of the Court's independence and integrity, the motion is considered
the order was denied in the order of August 5, 1977 but the arraignment as without merit and therefore hereby DENIED.
was deferred to August 18, 1977 to afford time for petitioner to elevate the
matter to the appellate court. 3 WHEREFORE, let the arraignment be, as it is hereby set for
December 18, 1978 at 9:00 o'clock in the moming.
A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of
injunction was filed by the accused in the Court of Appeals that was SO ORDERED. 11
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 06978. 4 In an order of August 17, 1977 the
Court of Appeals restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
arraignment of the accused until further orders of the Court. 5 In a comment with petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or
that was filed by the Solicitor General he recommended that the petition be temporary restraining order in the Court of Appeals that was docketed as
given due course. 6 On May 15, 1978 a decision was rendered by the Court CA-G.R. No. SP-08777. 12 On January 23, 1979 a restraining order was
of Appeals granting the writ and perpetually restraining the judge from issued by the Court of Appeals against the threatened act of arraignment
enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case of the accused until further orders from the Court. 13 In a decision of
October 25, 1979 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and lifted the
restraining order of January 23, 1979. 14 A motion for reconsideration of It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation 23 that the fiscal
said decision filed by the accused was denied in a resolution of February determines the existence of a puma facie case that would warrant the
19, 1980. 15 prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal's
discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. It is not prudent or even
Hence this petition for review of said decision was filed by accused permissible for a Court to compel the fiscal to prosecute a proceeding
whereby petitioner prays that said decision be reversed and set aside, originally initiated by him on an information, if he finds that the evidence
respondent judge be perpetually enjoined from enforcing his threat to relied upon by him is insufficient for conviction. 24 Neither has the Court any
proceed with the arraignment and trial of petitioner in said criminal case, power to order the fiscal to prosecute or file an information within a certain
declaring the information filed not valid and of no legal force and effect, period of time, since this would interfere with the fiscal's discretion and
ordering respondent Judge to dismiss the said case, and declaring the control of criminal prosecutions. 25 Thus, a fiscal who asks for the dismissal
obligation of petitioner as purely civil. 16 of the case for insufficiency of evidence has authority to do so, and Courts
that grant the same commit no error. 26 The fiscal may re-investigate a case
In a resolution of May 19, 1980, the Second Division of this Court without and subsequently move for the dismissal should the re-investigation show
giving due course to the petition required the respondents to comment to either that the defendant is innocent or that his guilt may not be established
the petition, not to file a motiod to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice. beyond reasonable doubt. 27 In a clash of views between the judge who did
In the comment filed by the Solicitor General he recommends that the not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the
petition be given due course, it being meritorious. Private respondent offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal's should normally
through counsel filed his reply to the comment and a separate conunent to prevail. 28 On the other hand, neither an injunction, preliminary or final nor
the petition asking that the petition be dismissed. In the resolution of a writ of prohibition may be issued by the courts to restrain a criminal
February 5, 1981, the Second Division of this Court resolved to transfer prosecution 29 except in the extreme case where it is necessary for the
this case to the Court En Banc. In the resolution of February 26, 1981, the Courts to do so for the orderly administration of justice or to prevent the
Court En Banc resolved to give due course to the petition. use of the strong arm of the law in an op pressive and vindictive manner. 30

Petitioner and private respondent filed their respective briefs while the However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation
Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in lieu of brief reiterating that the or control. The same is subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals be reversed and that or the chief state prosecutor as the case maybe and it maybe elevated for
respondent Judge be ordered to dismiss the information. review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or
reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal. Consequently the Secretary of
Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the rase be filed in Court or
It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions either commenced by
otherwise, that an information be filed in Court. 31
complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of the fiscal. 17 The institution of a criminal action depends upon the
sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the complaint or The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action.
information, follow or not fonow that presented by the offended party, The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority
according to whether the evidence in his opinion, is sufficient or not to to hear and determine the case. 32 When after the filing of the complaint or
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 18 The reason information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial
for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the court and the accused either voluntarily submited himself to the Court or
fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private was duly arrested, the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person
persons. 19 It cannot be controlled by the complainant. 20 Prosecuting of the accused. 33
officers under the power vested in them by law, not only have the authority
but also the duty of prosecuting persons who, according to the evidence The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of
received from the complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime committed determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution
within the jurisdiction of their office. 21 They have equally the legal duty not of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper
to prosecute when after an investigation they become convinced that the court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion
evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case. 22 the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it
proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose
permission of the Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation the his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what
finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its
for appropriate action. 34 While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed
judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant
filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the
whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the rase arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a
thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court, 35 The reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who
only qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the reviewed the records of the investigation.
substantial rights of the accused. 36 or the right of the People to due process
of law. 36a In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the
Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be
Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as
a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from
whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been
exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the
the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case. Court.

However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to grant the motion to WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without
dismiss filed by the fiscal upon the directive of the Secretary of Justice will pronouncement as to costs.
there not be a vacuum in the prosecution? A state prosecutor to handle the
case cannot possibly be designated by the Secretary of Justice who does SO ORDERED.
not believe that there is a basis for prosecution nor can the fiscal be
expected to handle the prosecution of the case thereby defying the
superior order of the Secretary of Justice.

The answer is simple. The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all know
1âw phi 1

is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction
of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of his opinion to
the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of
evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its
own independent judgment as to whether the accused should be convicted
or acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk from the responsibility of appearing
for the People of the Philippines even under such circumstances much less
should he abandon the prosecution of the case leaving it to the hands of a
private prosecutor for then the entire proceedings will be null and
void. 37 The least that the fiscal should do is to continue to appear for the
prosecution although he may turn over the presentation of the evidence to
the private prosecutor but still under his direction and control. 38

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information


is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction
or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court.
Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of
Republic of the Philippines circumstances of the instant case, the seriousness of the charges and
SUPREME COURT counter-charges and the nature of the evidence on hand to support them,
Manila we feel that respondent Judge "appeared to have been heedless of the oft-
reiterated admonition addressed to trial judges to avoid even the
SECOND DIVISION impression of the guilt or innocence of the accused being dependent on
prejudice or prejudgment" and, therefore, it was the submission of said
G.R. Nos. L-41213-14 October 5, 1976 official "that the case should he remanded to the trial court for the rendition
of a new decision and with instruction to receive additional evidence
proferred by the accused with the right of the prosecution to present
JORGE P. TAN, JR., CESAR TAN, LIBRADO SODE TEOFANIS
rebuttal evidence as inay be warranted" and, therefore, they interpose no
BONJOC, OSMUNDO TOLENTINO and MARIANO
objection to the remand of the aforementioned criminal cases "for the
BARTIDO, petitioners,
rendition of a new decision by another trial judge, after the parties shall
vs.
have adduced such additional evidence as they may wish to make, under
JUDGE PEDRO GALLARDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
such terms and conditions as this Honorable Court may deem fit to
Circuit Criminal Court, 13th Judicial District, Tacloban City, and
impose. 2
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
On January 30, 1976, private prosecutors submitted their Comment in
ANTONIO, J.:
justification of the challenged Orders of the respondent Judge and objected
to the remand of this case.
In this Special Civil Action for certiorari with Prohibition, petitioners seek
the annulment of respondent Judge's Orders in Criminal Cases Nos.
On February 12, 1976, the petitioners moved to strike out the "Motion to
CCC—XIII-50-L-S'72 and CCC-XIII-51-L-S'72, 1 to wit: (a) Order of July 21,
Admit Attacked Comment" and the "Comment" of the private prosecutor on
1975, denying petitioners' motion for respondent Judge to disqualify or to
the ground that the latter has "absolutely no standing in the instant
inhibit himself from hearing and acting upon their Motion for New Trial
proceedings before this Honorable Court and, hence, without any
and/or Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for New Trial; (b) Order
personality to have any paper of his entertained by this Tribunal.
of July 23, 1975, denying petitioners' Motion for New Trial and/or
Reconsidertion and Supplemental Motion for New Trial; and (c) Order of
July 25, 1975, ordering the transfer of the accused (petitioners herein) from The private prosecutors now contend that they are entitled to appear
Camp Bumpus PC headquarters, Tacloban city, to the Nationial before this Court, to take part in the proceedings, and to adopt a position
Penitentiary, New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa, Rizal. It is likewise sought, in contravention to that of the Solicitor General.
by way of prohibition, to compel respondent Judge to desist from further
proceeding with the afore-mentioned criminal cases. The issue before Us is whether or not the private prosecutors have the
right to intervene independently of the Solicitor General and to adopt a
By Resolution of this Court dated August 27, 1975, the respondent Judge stand inconsistent with that of the latter in the present proceedings.
was required to file his answer within ten (10) days from notice, and in
connection therewith, a temporary restraining order was issued to enjoin There are important reasons which support the view that in the present
the respondent from further proceeding with the afore-mentioned criminal proceedings, the private prosecutors cannot intervene independently of
cases. The petition was subsequently amended to include the People of and take a position inconsistent with that of the Solicitor General.
the Philippines and thereafter, on January 14, 1976, the Solicitor General,
on behalf of the People of the Philippines, submitted his Comment to the To begin with, it will be noted that the participation of the private
petition. The Solicitor General informed this Court, thus: that they are prosecution in the instant case was delimited by this Court in its Resolution
"persuaded that there are bases for stating that the rendition of respondent of October 1, 1975, thus: "to collaborate with the Solicitor General in the
Judge's decision and his resolution on the motion for new trial were not preparation of the Answer and pleadings that may be required by this
free from suspicion of bias and prejudice ... . Considering the Court." To collaborate means to cooperate with and to assist the Solicitor
General. It was never intended that the private prosecutors could adopt a or his attorney is authorized by section 15 of Rule 106 of the Rules of Court,
stand independent of or in contravention of the position taken by the subject to the provisions of section 4 of the same Rule that all criminal
Solicitor General. actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the Fiscal." (Emphasis
There is no question that since a criminal offense is an outrage to the supplied)
sovereignty of the State, it is but natural that the representatives of the
State should direct and control the prosecution. As stressed in Suarez v. Therefore, although the private prosecutors may be permitted to intervene,
Platon, et al., 3 the prosecuting officer "is the representative not of. an they are not in control of the case, and their interests are subordinate to
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to those of the People of the Philippines represented by the fiscal. 9 The right
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and which the procedural law reserves to the injured party is that of intervening
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a in the prosecution for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability for the
case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very criminal action and not of demanding punishment of the accused. 10 As
definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt explained in People v. Orais: 11
shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness
and vigor—indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, ... the position occupied by the offended
he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from party is subordinate to that of the promotor
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to fiscal because, as promotor fiscal alone is
use every legitimate means to bring about a just one." Thus, it was stressed authorized to represent the public
in People v. Esquivel, et al., 4 that there is an absolute necessity for prosecution, or the People of the Philippine
prosecuting attorneys to lay "before the court the pertinent facts at their Islands, in the prosecution of offenders,
disposal with methodical and meticulous attention, clarifying contradictions and to control the proceeding, and as it is
and filling up gaps and loopholes in their evidence, to the end that the discretionary with him to institute and
court's mind may not be tortured by doubts, that the innocent may not suffer prosecute a criminal proceeding, being at
and the guilty not escape unpunished. Obvious to all, this is the liberty to commence it or not, depending
prosecution's prime duty to the court, to the accused, and to the state." It upon whether or not there is, in his opinion,
is for the purpose of realizing the afore-mentioned objectives that the sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of
prosecution of offenses is placed under the direction, control, and the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
responsibility of the prosecuting officer. except when the case is pending in the
Court of First Instance, the continuation of
The role of the private prosecutors, upon the other hand, is to represent the offended party's intervention depends
the offended parts, with respect to the civil action for the recovery of the upon the continuation of the proceeding.
civil liability arising from the offense. 'This civil action is deemed instituted Consequently, if the promotor fiscal desists
with the criminal action, unless the offended party either expressly waives from pressing the charge or asks the
the civil action or reserves to institute it separately.5 Thus, "an offended competent Court of first Instance in which
party may intervene in the proceedings, personally or by attorney, specially the case is pending for the dismissal
in case of offenses which can not be prosecuted except at the instance of thereof, and said court grants the petition,
the offended party. 6 The only exception to this is when the offended party the intervention of the person injured by the
waives his right to civil action or expressly reserves his right to institute it commission of the offense ceases by virtue
after the termination of the case, in which case he lost his right to intervene of the principle that the accessory follows
upon the theory that he is deemed to have lost his interest in its the principal. Consequently, as the
prosecution. 7 And in any event, whether an offended party intervenes in offended party is not entitled to represent
the prosecution of a criminal action, his intervention must always be the People of the Philippine Islands in the
subject to the direction and control of the prosecuting official. " 8 As prosecution of a public offense, or to
explained in Herrero v. Diaz, supra, the "intervention of the offended party control the proceeding once it is
commenced, and as his right to intervene the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the
therein is subject to the promotor fiscal's Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil
right of control, it cannot be stated that an actions and special proceedings in which the Government
order of dismissal decreed upon petiton of or any officer thereof in his official capacity is the party.
the promotor fiscal himself deprives the
offended party of his right to appeal from an xxx xxx xxx
order overruling a complaint or information,
which right belongs exclusively to the (k) Act and represent the Republic and/or the people before
promotor fiscal by virtue of the provisions of any court, tribunal, body or commission in any matter,
section 44 of General Orders, No. 58. To action or proceeding which in his opinion, affects the
permit a person injured by the commission welfare of the people as the ends of justice may require.
of an offense to appeal from an order
dismissing a criminal case issued by a
xxx xxx xxx
Court of First Instance upon petition of the
promotor fiscal, would be tantamount to
giving said offended party of the direction It is evident, therefore, that since the Solicitor General alone is authorized
and control of a criminal proceeding in to represent the State or the People of the Philippines the interest of the
violation of the provisions of the above- private prosecutors is subordinate to that of the State and they cannot be
cited section 107 of General Orders, No. allowed to take a stand inconsistent with that of the Solicitor General, for
58. that would be tantamount to giving the latter the direction and control of the
criminal proceedings, contrary to the provisions of law and the settled rules
on the matter.
Consequently, where from the nature of the offense, or where the law
defining and punishing the offense charged does not provide for an
indemnity, the offended party may not intervene in the prosecution of the Moreover, the position taken by the Solicitor General in recommending the
offense. 12 remand of the case to the trial court is not without any plausible justification.
Thus, in support of his contention that the rendition of the decision and the
resolution on the subsequent motions by the respondent Judge were not
There is no question that the Solicitor General represents the People of the
free from suspicion of bias and prejudice, the Solicitor General stated:
Philippines or the State in criminal proceedings pending either in the Court
of Appeals or in this Court. Thus, Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 478,
"Defining the Powers and Functions of the Office of the Solicitor General", In alleging bias and manifest partiality on the part of
provides: respondent judge, petitioners assert that:

SECTION 1. Function and Organization. (1) The Office of (a) Respondent judge kept improper contact with and was
the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the illegally influenced by the Larrazabals in connection with
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its the decision of the two cases against petitioners herein;
officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. ... (b) In the latter part of 1973, with the trial of the Tan cases
The office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law still in progress, respondent judge received, through one of
office of the Government, and such, shall discharge duties his court stenographers, two bottles of whisky from Mayor
requiring the services of a lawyer. It shall have the following Inaki Larrazabal, brother and uncle of the deceased victims
specific powers and functions: Feliciano and Francisco Larrazabal;

(a) Represent the Governemnt in the Supreme Court and (c) On one occasion, Mayor Larrazabal had a short talk
the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent with respondent judge, after which the latter received from
one of the private prosecutors a bottle of wine wrapped in new trial were not free from suspicion of bias and prejudice
a newspaper which was "thick" and "bulky" and which (See Martinez Gironella, 65 SCRA 245 [July 22, 1975]).
allegedly contained "something else inside";
Considering the circumstances of the instant case, the
(d) Respondent judge prepared the decision in the Tan seriousness of the charges and counter-charges and the
cases based on the memorandum of the prosecution which nature of the evidence on hand to support them, we feel
was literally copied in said decision although with some that respondent Judge appeared to have been heedless to
corrections; and the oft-reiterated admonition addressed to trial judges to
avoid even the impression of the guilt or innocence of the
(e) After an alleged meeting with Mayor Inaki Larrazabal, accused being dependent on prejudice or prejudgment
respondent judge amended his already prepared decision (Fernando, J., Concurring opinion, Martinez Gironella,
in the two criminal cases involved herein by changing the supra, at 252). ...
penalty of double life sentence for the double murder
charge against the petitioners to the death penalty. It is undisputed that the sole purpose of courts of justice is to enforce the
laws uniformly and impartially without regard to persons or their
The foregoing alleged irregularities are mainly supported circumstances or the opinions of men. A judge, according to Justice
by an affidavit executed on June 26, 1975 by Gerardo A. Castro, now Chief Justice of this Court, should strive to be at all times
Makinano Jr., court stenographer of the Circuit Criminal "wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. Elementary due
Court, Tacloban City (Annex "E", Petition). The truth of the process requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal.
charges made in such affidavit are denied by respondent A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty, of doing
judge (in his answer to the instant petition dated October it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to
11, 1975), who in turn claims that it was petitioners who his integrity. 13 Thus, it has always been stressed that judges should not
tried to bribe him into acquitting them in the aforesaid only be impartial but should also appear impartial. For "impartiality is not a
criminal cases, after they were illegally furnished a copy of technical conception, It is a state of mind" 14 and, consequently, the
the draft of his decision of conviction by the same court "appearance of impartiality is an essential manifestation of its reality. 15 It
stenographer Gerardo A. Makinano Jr. (please see Answer must be obvious, therefore, that while judges should possess proficiency
of respondent judge, pp. 12-13). Unlike in the cases in law in order that they can competently construe and enforce the law, it
of Mateo vs. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 191 (1973), and Castillo vs. is more important that they should act and behave in such a manner that
Juan, 62 SCRA 124 (1974) relied upon mainly by herein the parties before them should have confidence in their impartiality.
petitioners, the facts alleged as constituting the grounds for
disqualifying the respondent judge in the instant petition It appears, however, that respondent Judge is no longer in the judicial
are disputed. service, hence, the question as to whether or not he should be disqualified
from further proceeding with the aforementioned criminal cases has
Apart from the sworn statements submitted before this already become moot.
Court in support or in denial of the alleged bribery of
respondent judge, we have been informed of evidence WHEREFORE, this Court grants the petition and hereby demands the case
obtained by the National Bureau of Investigation when it to the trial court in order that another Judge may hear anew petitioners'
cannot appropriate for us at this time, however, and we are motion for new trial and to resolve the issue accordingly on the basis of the
unable to do so, to submit to this Court definite conclusions evidence. No Special pronouncement as to costs.
on the charges and counter-charges. An exhaustive inquiry
and open hearing should perhaps precede the making of Fernando, (Chairman), Barredo, Aquino, and concepcion Jr. JJ., concur.
categorical conclusions. But we are persuaded that there
are bases for stating that the rendition of respondent THIRD DIVISION
Judge's decision and his resolutions on the motions for
[G.R. NO. 152644 : February 10, 2006] 7942"),9 and Article 36510 of the Revised Penal Code ("RPC") for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.11
JOHN ERIC LONEY, STEVEN PAUL REID and PEDRO B.
HERNANDEZ, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the following grounds: (1)
the Informations were "duplicitous" as the Department of Justice charged
DECISION
more than one offense for a single act; (2) petitioners John Eric Loney and
CARPIO, J.: Steven Paul Reid were not yet officers of Marcopper when the incident
subject of the Informations took place; and (3) the Informations contain
The Case allegations which constitute legal excuse or justification.
This is a Petition for Review 1 of the Decision2 dated 5 November 2001 and The Ruling of the MTC
the Resolution dated 14 March 2002 of the Court of Appeals. The 5 November
2001 Decision affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court, Boac, In its Joint Order of 16 January 1997 ("Joint Order"), the MTC12 initially
Marinduque, Branch 94, in a suit to quash Informations filed against deferred ruling on petitioners' motion for lack of "indubitable ground for the
petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez quashing of the [I]nformations x x x." The MTC scheduled petitioners'
("petitioners"). The 14 March 2002 Resolution denied petitioners' motion for arraignment in February 1997. However, on petitioners' motion, the MTC
reconsideration. issued a Consolidated Order on 28 April 1997 ("Consolidated Order"),
granting partial reconsideration to its Joint Order and quashing the
The Facts Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. The MTC maintained the
Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez are the Informations for violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of the RPC. The MTC
President and Chief Executive Officer, Senior Manager, and Resident held:
Manager for Mining Operations, respectively, of Marcopper Mining [T]he 12 Informations have common allegations of pollutants pointing to
Corporation ("Marcopper"), a corporation engaged in mining in the province "mine tailings" which were precipitately discharged into the Makulapnit and
of Marinduque. Boac Rivers due to breach caused on the Tapian drainage/tunnel due to
Marcopper had been storing tailings3 from its operations in a pit in Mt. negligence or failure to institute adequate measures to prevent pollution and
Tapian, Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to siltation of the Makulapnit and Boac River systems, the very term and
the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. It appears that Marcopper had placed a condition required to be undertaken under the Environmental Compliance
concrete plug at the tunnel's end. On 24 March 1994, tailings gushed out of Certificate issued on April 1, 1990.
or near the tunnel's end. In a few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged The allegations in the informations point to same set [sic] of evidence
millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. required to prove the single fact of pollution constituting violation of the
In August 1996, the Department of Justice separately charged petitioners in Water Code and the Pollution Law which are the same set of evidence
the Municipal Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque ("MTC") with violation of necessary to prove the same single fact of pollution, in proving the elements
Article 91(B),4 sub-paragraphs 5 and 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1067 or the constituting violation of the conditions of ECC, issued pursuant to the
Water Code of the Philippines ("PD 1067"),5 Section 86 of Presidential Decree Philippine Mining Act. In both instances, the terms and conditions of the
No. 984 or the National Pollution Control Decree of 1976 ("PD 984"),7 Section Environmental Compliance Certificate were allegedly violated. In other
1088 of Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 ("RA words, the same set of evidence is required in proving violations of the three
(3) special laws.
After carefully analyzing and weighing the contending arguments of the respondent's appeal was raffled to Branch 38. On public respondent's
parties and after taking into consideration the applicable laws and motion, Branch 38 ordered public respondent's appeal consolidated with
jurisprudence, the Court is convinced that as far as the three (3) aforesaid petitioners' petition in Branch 94.
laws are concerned, only the Information for [v]iolation of Philippine Mining
The Ruling of Branch 94
Act should be maintained. In other words, the Informations for [v]iolation of
Anti-Pollution Law (PD 984) and the Water Code (PD 1067) should be In its Resolution14 of 20 March 1998, Branch 94 granted public respondent's
dismissed/quashed because the elements constituting the aforesaid appeal but denied petitioners' petition. Branch 94 set aside the Consolidated
violations are absorbed by the same elements which constitute violation of Order in so far as it quashed the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD
the Philippine Mining Act (RA 7942). 984 and ordered those charges reinstated. Branch 94 affirmed the
Consolidated Order in all other respects. Branch 94 held:
Therefore, x x x Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-44, 96-45 and 96-46 for [v]iolation of
the Water Code; and Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-47, 96-48 and 96-49 for After a careful perusal of the laws concerned, this court is of the opinion that
[v]iolation of the Anti-Pollution Law x x x are hereby DISMISSED or QUASHED there can be no absorption by one offense of the three other offenses, as
and Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-50, 96-51 and 96-52 for [v]iolation of the [the] acts penalized by these laws are separate and distinct from each other.
Philippine Mining Act are hereby retained to be tried on the merits. The elements of proving each violation are not the same with each other.
Concededly, the single act of dumping mine tailings which resulted in the
The Information for [v]iolation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code should
pollution of the Makulapnit and Boac rivers was the basis for the
also be maintained and heard in a full blown trial because the common
information[s] filed against the accused each charging a distinct offense. But
accusation therein is reckless imprudence resulting to [sic] damage to
it is also a well-established rule in this jurisdiction that -
property. It is the damage to property which the law punishes not the
negligent act of polluting the water system. The prosecution for the "A single act may offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated
[v]iolation of Philippine Mining Act is not a bar to the prosecution for reckless provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or
imprudence resulting to [sic] damage to property.13 element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of
the information under one does not bar prosecution under the other. x x x."
The MTC re-scheduled petitioners' arraignment on the remaining charges on
28 and 29 May 1997. In the hearing of 28 May 1997, petitioners manifested xxxx
that they were willing to be arraigned on the charge for violation of Article
365 of the RPC but not on the charge for violation of RA 7942 as they intended [T]he different laws involve cannot absorb one another as the elements of
to appeal the Consolidated Order in so far as it maintained the Informations each crime are different from one another. Each of these laws require [sic]
for that offense. After making of record petitioners' manifestation, the MTC proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not although they
proceeded with the arraignment and ordered the entry of "not guilty" pleas stemmed from a single act.15
on the charges for violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of the RPC. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging
Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial that Branch 94 acted with grave abuse of discretion because (1) the
Court, Boac, Marinduque, assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order Informations for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942 and the Article 365 of
maintaining the Informations for violation of RA 7942. Petitioners' petition the RPC "proceed from and are based on a single act or incident of polluting
was raffled to Branch 94. For its part, public respondent filed an ordinary the Boac and Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of mine tailings" and (2) the
appeal with the same court assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order duplicitous nature of the Informations contravenes the ruling in People v.
quashing the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. Public Relova.16 Petitioners further contended that since the acts complained of in
the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942 are "the very same This Court firmly agrees in the public respondent's understanding that the
acts complained of" in the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC, the laws by which the petitioners have been [charged] could not possibly absorb
latter absorbs the former. Hence, petitioners should only be prosecuted for one another as the elements of each crime are different. Each of these laws
violation of Article 365 of the RPC.17 require [sic] proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not,
although they stemmed from a single act. x x x
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
xxx
In its Decision of 5 November 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed Branch 94's
ruling. The appellate court held: [T]his Court finds that there is not even the slightest indicia of evidence that
would give rise to any suspicion that public respondent acted with grave
The records of the case disclose that petitioners filed a motion to quash the
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in reversing the
aforementioned Informations for being duplicitous in nature. Section 3 of
Municipal Trial Court's quashal of the Informations against the petitioners for
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court specifically provides the grounds upon
violation of P.D. 1067 and P.D. 984. This Court equally finds no error in the
which an information may be quashed. x x x
trial court's denial of the petitioner's motion to quash R.A. 7942 and Article
xxx 365 of the Revised Penal Code.18

[D]uplicity of Informations is not among those included in x x x [Section 3, Petitioners sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied their
Rule 117]. motion in its Resolution of 14 March 2002.

xxx Petitioners raise the following alleged errors of the Court of Appeals:

We now go to petitioners' claim that the resolution of the public respondent I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A R[E]VERSIBLE ERROR IN
contravened the doctrine laid down in People v. Relova for being violative of MAINTAINING THE CHARGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE PHILIPPINE MINING ACT
their right against multiple prosecutions. (R.A. 7942) AND REINSTATING THE CHARGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE WATER
CODE (P.D. 1067) AND POLLUTION CONTROL LAW (P.D. 984), CONSIDERING
In the said case, the Supreme Court found the People's argument with respect THAT:
to the variances in the mens rea of the two offenses being charged to be
correct. The Court, however, decided the case in the context of the second A. THE INFORMATIONS FOR VIOLATION OF THE WATER CODE (P.D. 1067), THE
sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution (now under Section 21 of POLLUTION CONTROL LAW (P.D. 984), THE PHILIPPINE MINING ACT (R.A.
Article III of the 1987 Constitution), rather than the first sentence of the same 7942) AND ARTICLE 365 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE PROCEED FROM AND
section. x x x ARE BASED ON A SINGLE ACT OR INCIDENT OF POLLUTING THE BOAC AND
MAKULAPNIT RIVERS THRU DUMPING OF MINE TAILINGS.
xxx
B. THE PROSECUTION OF PETITIONERS FOR DUPLICITOUS AND MULTIPLE
[T]he doctrine laid down in the Relova case does not squarely apply to the CHARGES CONTRAVENES THE DOCTRINE LAID DOWN IN PEOPLE v. RELOVA,
case at Bench since the Informations filed against the petitioners are for 148 SCRA 292 [1986 THAT "AN ACCUSED SHOULD NOT BE HARASSED BY
violation of four separate and distinct laws which are national in character. MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS FOR OFFENSES WHICH THOUGH DIFFERENT FROM
xxx ONE ANOTHER ARE NONETHELESS EACH CONSTITUTED BY A COMMON SET
OR OVERLAPPING SETS OF TECHNICAL ELEMENTS."
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the Informations. On this score
THAT THE ELEMENT OF LACK OF NECESSARY OR ADEQUATE PRECAUTION, alone, the petition deserves outright denial.
NEGLIGENCE, RECKLESSNESS AND IMPRUDENCE UNDER ARTICLE 356 [sic] OF
The Filing of Several Charges is Proper
THE REVISED PENAL CODE DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE AMBIT OF ANY OF
THE ELEMENTS OF THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE WATER CODE, Petitioners contend that they should be charged with one offense only -
POLLUTION CONTROL LAW AND PHILIPPINE MINING ACT CHARGED AGAINST Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property - because (1) all the
PETITIONERS[.]19 charges filed against them "proceed from and are based on a single act or
incident of polluting the Boac and Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of mine
The Issues
tailings" and (2) the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC "absorbs"
The petition raises these issues: the other charges since the element of "lack of necessary or adequate
protection, negligence, recklessness and imprudence" is common among
(1) Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be
them.
quashed for duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property should stand; andcralawlibrary The contention has no merit.

(2) Whether Branch 94's ruling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, As early as the start of the last century, this Court had ruled that a single act
contravenes People v. Relova. or incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated
provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than
The Ruling of the Court
one offense.24 The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that
The petition has no merit. no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for "the same
offense."25 In People v. Doriquez,26 we held that two (or more) offenses
No Duplicity of Charges in the Present Case arising from the same act are not "the same"'
Duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or information charges x x x if one provision [of law] requires proof of an additional fact or element
more than one offense, as Section 13 of Rule 11020 of the 1985 Rules of which the other does not, x x x. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws
Criminal Procedure clearly states: (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of
Duplicity of offense. - A complaint or information must charge but one them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses
offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is
punishment for various offenses. not an essential element of the other.27 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary

In short, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Here, double jeopardy is not at issue because not all of its elements are
Information charges more than one offense.21 present.28 However, for the limited purpose of controverting petitioners'
claim that they should be charged with one offense only, we quote with
Under Section 3(e), Rule 11722 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, approval Branch 94's comparative analysis of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942, and
duplicity of offenses in a single information is a ground to quash the Article 365 of the RPC showing that in each of these laws on which petitioners
Information. The Rules prohibit the filing of such Information to avoid were charged, there is one essential element not required of the others, thus:
confusing the accused in preparing his defense.23 Here, however, the
prosecution charged each petitioner with four offenses, with each In P.D. 1067 (Philippines Water Code), the additional element to be
Information charging only one offense. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke established is the dumping of mine tailings into the Makulapnit River and the
entire Boac River System without prior permit from the authorities Consequently, the filing of the multiple charges against petitioners, although
concerned. The gravamen of the offense here is the absence of the proper based on the same incident, is consistent with settled doctrine.
permit to dump said mine tailings. This element is not indispensable in the
On petitioners' claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC
prosecution for violation of PD 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), [RA] 7942 (Philippine
"absorbs" the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942, suffice
Mining Act) and Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code. One can be validly
it to say that a mala in se felony (such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
prosecuted for violating the Water Code even in the absence of actual
Damage to Property) cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes (such as those
pollution, or even [if] it has complied with the terms of its Environmental
violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes the former a felony is
Compliance Certificate, or further, even [if] it did take the necessary
criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa); what makes the latter crimes are
precautions to prevent damage to property.
the special laws enacting them.
In P.D. 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), the additional fact that must be proved is the
People v. Relova not in Point
existence of actual pollution. The gravamen is the pollution itself. In the
absence of any pollution, the accused must be exonerated under this law Petitioners reiterate their contention in the Court of Appeals that their
although there was unauthorized dumping of mine tailings or lack of prosecution contravenes this Court's ruling in People v. Relova. In particular,
precaution on its part to prevent damage to property. petitioners cite the Court's statement in Relova that the law seeks to prevent
harassment of the accused by "multiple prosecutions for offenses which
In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), the additional fact that must be
though different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a
established is the willful violation and gross neglect on the part of the accused
common set or overlapping sets of technical elements."
to abide by the terms and conditions of the Environmental Compliance
Certificate, particularly that the Marcopper should ensure the containment This contention is also without merit.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
of run-off and silt materials from reaching the Mogpog and Boac Rivers. If
there was no violation or neglect, and that the accused satisfactorily proved The issue in Relova is whether the act of the Batangas Acting City Fiscal in
[sic] that Marcopper had done everything to ensure containment of the run- charging one Manuel Opulencia ("Opulencia") with theft of electric power
off and silt materials, they will not be liable. It does not follow, however, that under the RPC, after the latter had been acquitted of violating a City
they cannot be prosecuted under the Water Code, Anti-Pollution Law and the Ordinance penalizing the unauthorized installation of electrical wiring,
Revised Penal Code because violation of the Environmental Compliance violated Opulencia's right against double jeopardy. We held that it did, not
Certificate is not an essential element of these laws. because the offenses punished by those two laws were the same but because
the act giving rise to the charges was punished by an ordinance and a national
On the other hand, the additional element that must be established in Art. statute, thus falling within the proscription against multiple prosecutions for
365 of the Revised Penal Code is the lack of necessary or adequate the same act under the second sentence in Section 22, Article IV of the 1973
precaution, negligence, recklessness and imprudence on the part of the Constitution, now Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. We held:
accused to prevent damage to property. This element is not required under
the previous laws. Unquestionably, it is different from dumping of mine The petitioner concludes that:
tailings without permit, or causing pollution to the Boac river system, much "The unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance [of Batangas City]
more from violation or neglect to abide by the terms of the Environmental is not the same as theft of electricity [under the Revised Penal Code]; that
Compliance Certificate. Moreover, the offenses punished by special law are the second offense is not an attempt to commit the first or a frustration
mal[a] prohibita in contrast with those punished by the Revised Penal Code thereof and that the second offense is not necessarily included in the offense
which are mala in se.29 charged in the first information."
The above argument[] made by the petitioner [is] of course correct. This is
clear both from the express terms of the constitutional provision involved -
which reads as follows:

"No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act." x x x

and from our case law on this point. The basic difficulty with the petitioner's
position is that it must be examined, not under the terms of the first sentence
of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution, but rather under the second
sentence of the same section. The first sentence of Article IV (22) sets forth
the general rule: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not
available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from
the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first
and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts. The
second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the general
proposition: the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is
available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different
from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the
Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or
set of acts. x x x30 (Italicization in the original; boldfacing supplied)

Thus, Relova is no authority for petitioners' claim against multiple


prosecutions based on a single act not only because the question of double
jeopardy is not at issue here, but also because, as the Court of Appeals held,
petitioners are being prosecuted for an act or incident punished by four
national statutes and not by an ordinance and a national statute. In short,
petitioners, if ever, fall under the first sentence of Section 21, Article III which
prohibits multiple prosecution for the same offense, and not, as in Relova, for
offenses arising from the same incident.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 5


November 2001 and the Resolution dated 14 March 2002 of the Court of
Appeals.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION Acting upon such Order, the prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing
out the word "Homicide" and instead wrote the word "Murder" in the caption
[G.R. NO. 157472 : September 28, 2007]
and in the opening paragraph of the Information. The accusatory portion
SSGT. JOSE M. PACOY, Petitioner, v. HON. AFABLE E. CAJIGAL, PEOPLE OF remained exactly the same as that of the original Information for Homicide,
THE PHILIPPINES and OLYMPIO L. ESCUETA, Respondents. with the correction of the spelling of the victim's name from "Escuita" to
"Escueta."7
DECISION
On October 8, 2002, the date scheduled for pre-trial conference and trial,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: petitioner was to be re-arraigned for the crime of Murder. Counsel for
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed petitioner objected on the ground that the latter would be placed in double
by SSGT. Jose M. Pacoy1 (petitioner) seeking to annul and set aside the Orders jeopardy, considering that his Homicide case had been terminated without
dated October 25, 20022 and December 18, 20023 issued by Presiding Judge his express consent, resulting in the dismissal of the case. As petitioner
Afable E. Cajigal (respondent judge) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch refused to enter his plea on the amended Information for Murder, the public
68, Camiling, Tarlac in Criminal Case No. 02-42. respondent entered for him a plea of not guilty.8

On July 4, 2002, an Information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against On October 28, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash with Motion to
petitioner committed as follows: Suspend Proceedings Pending the Resolution of the Instant Motion9 on the
ground of double jeopardy. Petitioner alleged that in the Information for
That on or about the 18th day of March 2002, in the Municipality of Homicide, he was validly indicted and arraigned before a competent court,
Mayantoc, Province of Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this and the case was terminated without his express consent; that when the case
Honorable Court, the said accused with intent to kill, did then and there for Homicide was terminated without his express consent, the subsequent
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot his commanding officer 2Lt. Frederick filing of the Information for Murder in lieu of Homicide placed him in double
Esquita with his armalite rifle hitting and sustaining upon 2Lt. Frederick jeopardy.
Esquita multiple gunshot wounds on his body which caused his instantaneous
death. In an Order10 dated October 25, 2002,11 the respondent judge denied the
Motion to Quash. He ruled that a claim of former acquittal or conviction does
With the aggravating circumstance of killing, 2Lt. Frederick Esquita in not constitute double jeopardy and cannot be sustained unless judgment was
disregard of his rank.4 rendered acquitting or convicting the defendant in the former prosecution;
On September 12, 2002, upon arraignment, petitioner, duly assisted by that petitioner was never acquitted or convicted of Homicide, since the
counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the charge of Homicide. Respondent Information for Homicide was merely corrected/or amended before trial
Judge set the pre-trial conference and trial on October 8, 2002.5 commenced and did not terminate the same; that the Information for
Homicide was patently insufficient in substance, so no valid proceedings
However, on the same day and after the arraignment, the respondent judge could be taken thereon; and that with the allegation of aggravating
issued another Order,6 likewise dated September 12, 2002, directing the trial circumstance of "disregard of rank," the crime of Homicide is qualified to
prosecutor to correct and amend the Information to Murder in view of the Murder.
aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank alleged in the Information
which public respondent registered as having qualified the crime to Murder. Petitioner filed a Motion to Inhibit with attached Motion for Reconsideration.
In his Motion to Inhibit, he alleged that the respondent judge exercised
jurisdiction in an arbitrary, capricious and partial manner in mandating the
amendment of the charge from Homicide to Murder in disregard of the THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND VIOLATED
provisions of the law and existing jurisprudence. THE LAW IN DENYING THE MOTION TO QUASH THE INFORMATION FOR
MURDER.
In his Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner reiterated that the case against
him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND EXCEEDED
which constitutes a ground to quash the information for murder; and that to HIS JURISDICTION AND VIOLATED THE LAW IN ORDERING THE
try him again for the same offense constitutes double jeopardy. Petitioner REINSTATEMENT OF THE INFORMATION FOR HOMICIDE WHICH WAS
stated that contrary to respondent judge's conclusion that disregard of rank ALREADY TERMINATED.15
qualifies the killing to Murder, it is a generic aggravating circumstance which
Petitioner alleges that despite having entered his plea of not guilty to the
only serves to affect the imposition of the period of the penalty. Petitioner
charge of Homicide, the public respondent ordered the amendment of the
also argued that the amendment and/or correction ordered by the
Information from Homicide to Murder because of the presence of the
respondent judge was substantial; and under Section 14, Rule 110 of the
aggravating circumstance of "disregard of rank," which is in violation of
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, this cannot be done, since petitioner
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure; that the
had already been arraigned and he would be placed in double jeopardy.
public respondent's ruling that "disregard of rank" is a qualifying aggravating
In his Order dated December 18, 2002,12 the respondent judge denied the circumstance which qualified the killing of 2Lt. Escueta to murder is
Motion to Inhibit and granted the Motion for Reconsideration, thus: erroneous since, under paragraph 3, Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code,
disregard of rank is only a generic aggravating circumstance which serves to
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion to Inhibit is hereby DENIED
affect the penalty to be imposed upon the accused and does not qualify the
while the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED.
offense into a more serious crime; that even assuming that disregard of rank
Unless ordered otherwise by the Highest Court, the presiding judge shall is a qualifying aggravating circumstance, such is a substantial amendment
continue hearing this case. Further, the Order dated October 25, 2002 is which is not allowed after petitioner has entered his plea.
reconsidered and the original information charging the crime of homicide
Petitioner next contends that the respondent judge gravely abused his
stands.13
discretion when he denied the Motion to Quash the Information for Murder,
In granting the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent judge found that a considering that the original Information for Homicide filed against him was
close scrutiny of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code shows that "disregard terminated without his express consent; thus, prosecuting him for the same
of rank" is merely a generic mitigating14 circumstance which should not offense would place him in double jeopardy.
elevate the classification of the crime of homicide to murder.
Petitioner further argues that although the respondent judge granted his
On April 30, 2003, petitioner filed herein Petition for Certiorari on the Motion for Reconsideration, he did not in fact grant the motion, since
following grounds: petitioner's prayer was for the respondent judge to grant the Motion to
Quash the Information for Murder on the ground of double jeopardy; that his
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND EXCEEDED Motion for Reconsideration did not seek the reinstatement of the
HIS JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE AMENDMENT OF THE INFORMATION Information for Homicide upon the dismissal of the Information for Murder,
FROM HOMICIDE TO MURDER. as he would again be placed in double jeopardy; thus, the respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the Homicide case.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General argues that the respondent judge's which protects the accused not against the peril of second punishment but
Order reinstating the Information to Homicide after against being tried for the same offense. These important legal questions and
initially motu proprio ordering its amendment to Murder renders herein in order to prevent further delay in the trial of the case warrant our relaxation
petition moot and academic; that petitioner failed to establish the fourth of the policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts.
element of double jeopardy, i.e., the defendant was acquitted or convicted,
The Court's Ruling
or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
consent; that petitioner confuses amendment with substitution of The petition is not meritorious.
Information; that the respondent judge's Order dated September 12, 2002
mandated an amendment of the Information as provided under Section 14, We find no merit in petitioner's contention that the respondent judge
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure; and that amendments committed grave abuse of discretion in amending the Information after
do not entail dismissal or termination of the previous case. petitioner had already pleaded not guilty to the charge in the Information for
Homicide. The argument of petitioner - -
Private respondent Col. Olimpio Escueta, father of the victim, filed his
Comment alleging that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the Considering the fact that the case for Homicide against him was already
respondent judge when he denied petitioner's Motion to Quash the terminated without his express consent, he cannot anymore be charged and
Amended Information, as petitioner was not placed in double jeopardy; that arraigned for Murder which involve the same offense. The petitioner argued
the proceedings under the first Information for homicide has not yet that the termination of the information for Homicide without his express
commenced, and the case was not dismissed or terminated when the consent is equivalent to his acquittal. Thus, to charge him again, this time for
Information was amended. Murder, is tantamount to placing the petitioner in Double Jeopardy.18

In his Reply, petitioner reiterates his contention that the amendment of the is not plausible. Petitioner confuses the procedure and effects of amendment
charge of Homicide to Murder after his arraignment would place him in or substitution under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, to wit - -
double jeopardy, considering that said amendment was without his express SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. - A complaint or information may be
consent; and that such amendment was tantamount to a termination of the amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before
charge of Homicide. the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal
The parties filed their respective Memoranda. amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
Generally, a direct resort to us in a Petition for Certiorari is highly improper,
for it violates the established policy of strict observance of the judicial xxx
hierarchy of courts. However, the judicial hierarchy of courts is not an iron- If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in
clad rule.16 A strict application of the rule of hierarchy of courts is not charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or
necessary when the cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in
factual but legal questions.17 accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused would not be
In the present case, petitioner submits pure questions of law involving the placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses to give
proper legal interpretation of the provisions on amendment and substitution bail for their appearance at the trial.
of information under the Rules of Court. It also involves the issue of double with Section 19, Rule 119 of which provides:
jeopardy, one of the fundamental rights of the citizens under the Constitution
SEC. 19. When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense. - When requires or presupposes that the new information involves a different offense
it becomes manifest at any time before judgment that a mistake has been which does not include or is not necessarily included in the original charge,
made in charging the proper offense and the accused cannot be convicted of hence the accused cannot claim double jeopardy.
the offense charged or any other offense necessarily included therein, the
In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment under the
accused shall not be discharged if there appears good cause to detain him. In
first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, or a substitution of information under
such case, the court shall commit the accused to answer for the proper
the second paragraph thereof, the rule is that where the second information
offense and dismiss the original case upon the filing of the proper
involves the same offense, or an offense which necessarily includes or is
information.
necessarily included in the first information, an amendment of the
First, a distinction shall be made between amendment and substitution under information is sufficient; otherwise, where the new information charges an
Section 14, Rule 110. For this purpose, Teehankee v. Madayag19 is offense which is distinct and different from that initially charged, a
instructive, viz: substitution is in order.

The first paragraph provides the rules for amendment of the information or There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a
complaint, while the second paragraph refers to the substitution of the conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the
information or complaint. other, or when the second offense is exactly the same as the first, or when
the second offense is an attempt to commit or a frustration of, or when it
It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and substitution of the
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in, the offense charged in the
information may be made before or after the defendant pleads, but they
first information. In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily
differ in the following respects:
include another when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the
1. Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes, while former, as this is alleged in the information, constitute the latter. And, vice-
substitution necessarily involves a substantial change from the original versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when the
charge; essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those
constituting the latter.20
2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected without leave
of court, but substitution of information must be with leave of court as the In the present case, the change of the offense charged from Homicide to
original information has to be dismissed; Murder is merely a formal amendment and not a substantial amendment or
a substitution as defined in Teehankee.
3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for another
preliminary investigation and the retaking of the plea of the accused; in While the amended Information was for Murder, a reading of the Information
substitution of information, another preliminary investigation is entailed and shows that the only change made was in the caption of the case; and in the
the accused has to plead anew to the new information; andcralawlibrary opening paragraph or preamble of the Information, with the crossing out of
word "Homicide" and its replacement by the word "Murder." There was no
4. An amended information refers to the same offense charged in the original change in the recital of facts constituting the offense charged or in the
information or to an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily determination of the jurisdiction of the court. The averments in the amended
included in the original charge, hence substantial amendments to the Information for Murder are exactly the same as those already alleged in the
information after the plea has been taken cannot be made over the objection original Information for Homicide, as there was not at all any change in the
of the accused, for if the original information would be withdrawn, the act imputed to petitioner, i.e., the killing of 2Lt. Escueta without any
accused could invoke double jeopardy. On the other hand, substitution
qualifying circumstance. Thus, we find that the amendment made in the (i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense
caption and preamble from "Homicide" to "Murder" as purely formal.21 charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.
Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in allowing formal amendments in
cases in which the accused has already pleaded, it is necessary that the Section 7 of the same Rule lays down the requisites in order that the defense
amendments do not prejudice the rights of the accused. The test of whether of double jeopardy may prosper, to wit:
the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. - When an accused
information is whether a defense under the complaint or information, as it
has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or
originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made;
otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent
and when any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge
complaint or information.22 Since the facts alleged in the accusatory portion
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused
of the amended Information are identical with those of the original
had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the
Information for Homicide, there could not be any effect on the prosecution's
dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense
theory of the case; neither would there be any possible prejudice to the rights
charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for
or defense of petitioner.
any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
While the respondent judge erroneously thought that "disrespect on account offense charged in the former complaint or information.
of rank" qualified the crime to murder, as the same was only a generic
Thus, there is double jeopardy when the following requisites are present: (1)
aggravating circumstance,23 we do not find that he committed any grave
a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been
abuse of discretion in ordering the amendment of the Information after
validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the
petitioner had already pleaded not guilty to the charge of Homicide, since the
first.24
amendment made was only formal and did not adversely affect any
substantial right of petitioner. As to the first requisite, the first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid
indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a
Next, we determine whether petitioner was placed in double jeopardy by the
valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or
change of the charge from Homicide to Murder; and subsequently, from
convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
Murder back to Homicide. Petitioner's claim that the respondent judge
express consent.25
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his Motion to Quash the
Amended Information for Murder on the ground of double jeopardy is not It is the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal or termination
meritorious. of the case that bars further prosecution for the same offense or any attempt
to commit the same or the frustration thereof; or prosecution for any offense
Petitioner's Motion to Quash was anchored on Section 3, Rule 117 of the
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in
Rules of Court, which provides:
the former complaint or information.26
SEC. 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the complaint or
Petitioner's insistence that the respondent judge dismissed or terminated his
information on any of the following grounds:
case for homicide without his express consent, which is tantamount to an
xxx acquittal, is misplaced.
Dismissal of the first case contemplated by Section 7 presupposes a definite constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the
or unconditional dismissal which terminates the case.27 And for the dismissal offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or
to be a bar under the jeopardy clause, it must have the effect of form a part of those constituting the latter.28
acquittal.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Homicide is necessarily included in the crime of murder; thus, the respondent
The respondent judge's Order dated September 12, 2002 was for the trial judge merely ordered the amendment of the Information and not the
prosecutor to correct and amend the Information but not to dismiss the same dismissal of the original Information. To repeat, it was the same original
upon the filing of a new Information charging the proper offense as information that was amended by merely crossing out the word "Homicide"
contemplated under the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules and writing the word "Murder," instead, which showed that there was no
of Court - - which, for convenience, we quote again - - dismissal of the homicide case.

If it appears at anytime before judgment that a mistake has been made in Anent the last issue, petitioner contends that respondent judge gravely
charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or abused his discretion in ordering that the original Information for Homicide
information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in stands after realizing that disregard of rank does not qualify the killing to
accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be Murder. That ruling was again a violation of his right against double jeopardy,
placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail as he will be prosecuted anew for a charge of Homicide, which has already
for their appearance at the trial. been terminated earlier.

and Section 19, Rule 119, which provides: We are not convinced. Respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion.
SEC. 19. - When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense -
When it becomes manifest at any time before judgment that a mistake has A reading of the Order dated December 18, 2002 showed that the respondent
been made in charging the proper offense and the accused cannot be judge granted petitioner's motion for reconsideration, not on the ground that
convicted of the offense charged or any other offense necessarily included double jeopardy exists, but on his realization that "disregard of rank" is a
therein, the accused shall not be discharged if there appears good cause to generic aggravating circumstance which does not qualify the killing of the
detain him. In such case, the court shall commit the accused to answer for victim to murder. Thus, he rightly corrected himself by reinstating the original
the proper offense and dismiss the original case upon the filing of the proper Information for Homicide. The requisite of double jeopardy that the first
information. jeopardy must have attached prior to the second is not present, considering
that petitioner was neither convicted nor acquitted; nor was the case against
Evidently, the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, applies only when the
him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.29
offense charged is wholly different from the offense proved, i.e., the accused
cannot be convicted of a crime with which he was not charged in the WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, there being no grave abuse of
information even if it be proven, in which case, there must be a dismissal of discretion committed by respondent Judge.
the charge and a substitution of a new information charging the proper
SO ORDERED.
offense. Section 14 does not apply to a second information, which involves
the same offense or an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily Republic of the Philippines
included in the first information. In this connection, the offense charged SUPREME COURT
necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements Manila
or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information,
THIRD DIVISION Appellant, who guarded Eduardo Zulueta, poked a gun at the latter and took
the latter's wallet containing a pawnshop ticket and ₱50.00, while the
G.R. No. 179943 June 26, 2009
companion of the former, hit the latter on his nape with a gun.9
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
Meanwhile, four members of the group went to the cashier's office and took
vs.
the money worth ₱3,000.00.10 Those four robbers were also the ones who
MARLON ALBERT DE LEON y HOMO, Appellant.
shot Edralin Macahis in the stomach.11 Thereafter, the same robbers took
DECISION Edralin Macahis' service firearm.12

PERALTA, J.: After he heard successive gunshots, Eduardo Zulueta saw appellant and his
companions immediately leave the place.13 The robbers boarded the same
This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), affirming vehicle and proceeded toward San Mateo, Rizal.14 When the robbers left,
with modification the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 76, Eduardo Zulueta stood up and found Julieta Amistoso, who told him that the
San Mateo, Rizal, finding appellant Marlon Lambert De Leon y Homo guilty robbers took her bag and jewelry. He also saw that Edralin Macahis had a
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide. gunshot wound in the stomach. He immediately hailed a vehicle which
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows: transported the injured Edralin Macahis to the hospital.15 Later on, Edralin
Macahis died at the hospital due to the gunshot wound.16
According to the prosecution, in the early morning, around 2 o'clock of
January 7, 2000, Eduardo Zulueta and Fortunato Lacambra III, both gasoline The following day, Eduardo Zulueta identified appellant as one of the robbers
boys; Julieta Amistoso, cashier; and Edralin Macahis, security guard; all who poked a gun at him.17
employees of Energex Gasoline Station, located at Barangay Guinayan, San However, according to appellant, from January 4 to 6, 2000, he stayed at the
Mateo, Rizal, were on duty when a mint green-colored Tamaraw FX arrived house of his Tita Emma at Pantok, Binangonan, Rizal, helping the latter in her
for service at the said gasoline station.3 canteen. On the evening of January 6, at approximately 9 o'clock, appellant
Eduardo Zulueta was the one who attended to the said vehicle. He went to asked permission from his Tita Emma to go to Antipolo. Catherine Homo,
the driver’s side in order to take the key of the vehicle from the driver so that appellant's cousin and the latter's younger brother, accompanied appellant
he could open the gas tank. He saw through the lowered window shield that to the terminal. While waiting for a ride, the vehicle, a Tamaraw FX, of a
there were about six to seven persons aboard the vehicle. He proceeded to certain Christian Gersalia, a relative of appellant and Catherine Homo, passed
fill up ₱50.00 worth of diesel in the gas tank. After doing this, he returned the by. Catherine Homo asked Christian Gersalia if he would allow appellant to
key to the driver. While returning the key, the driver told him that the engine hitch a ride on his vehicle. Christian Gersalia agreed. Aside from Christian
of the vehicle would not start.4 Eduardo Zulueta offered to give the vehicle a Gersalia, there were other passengers in the said vehicle.18
push. While Eduardo Zulueta and fellow gasoline boy Fortunato Lacambra III When the vehicle reached Masinag, where appellant was supposed to alight,
were positioned at the back of the vehicle, ready to push the same, the six he was not allowed to do so; instead, he was asked by the other passengers
male passengers of the same vehicle, except the driver, alighted and to join them in their destination. While on the road, appellant fell asleep.
announced a hold-up. They were armed with a shotgun and .38 caliber pistol.5 When he woke up, they were in a gasoline station. He then saw Christian
Fortunato Lacambra III was ordered to lie down,6 while Eduardo Zulueta was Gersalia and the other passengers conducting a hold-up. He never left the
directed to go near the Car Wash Section.7 At that instance, guns were poked vehicle and was not able to do anything because he was overwhelmed with
at them.8 fear. After he heard the gunshots, Christian Gersalia and the other passengers
went to the vehicle and proceeded towards Marikina. On their way, they Contrary to law.
were followed by policemen who fired at them. The other passengers fired
Criminal Case No. 4748
back at the policemen. It was then that the vehicle hit a wall prompting the
other passengers to scamper in different directions leaving him behind. When That on or about the 7th day of January 2000 in the Municipality of San
the policemen arrived, he was immediately arrested.19 Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating ,
As a result of the above incident, four Informations for Robbery with
together with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan
Homicide were filed against appellant, Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia,
Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey," Alias "Jonard," Alias " Precie" and
Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, an alias "Rey," an
Alias "Renato," whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are
alias "Jonard," an alias "Precie," and an alias "Renato," which read as:
still unknown and still at-large and conspiring and mutually helping and
Criminal Case No. 4747 assisting one another, while armed with unlicensed firearms and acting as a
band, with intent of gain, with aggravating circumstances of treachery, abuse
That on or about the 7th day of January 2000, in the Municipality of San
of superior strength and using disguise, fraud or craft and taking advantage
Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
of nighttime, and by means of a motor vehicle and by means of force, violence
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
and intimidation, employed upon the person of JULIETA A. AMISTOSO, the
together with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan
Cashier of Energex Gasoline Station, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey," Alias "Jonard," Alias " Precie" and
and feloniously rob, steal and carry away the following, to wit:
Alias "Renato" whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are
still unknown and still at-large, and conspiring and mutually helping and a) One (1) ladies ring with sapphire stone valued at ₱1,500.00
assisting one another, while armed with unlicensed firearms and acting as a
b) One (1) Omac ladies wristwatch valued at ₱2,000.00
band, with intent of gain with aggravating circumstances of treachery, abuse
of superior strength and using disguise, fraud or craft and taking advantage c) Guess black bag valued at ₱500.00
of nighttime, and by means of motor vehicle and by means of force, violence
and intimidation, employed upon ENERGEX GASOLINE STATION, owned by d) Leather wallet valued at ₱150.00
Regino C. Natividad, and represented by Macario C. Natividad, did then and e) White T-Shirt valued at ₱175.00
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob, steal and carry away its cash
earnings worth ₱3,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of said Energex to her damage and prejudice in the total amount of ₱4,325.00 and on the
Gasoline Station in the aforesaid amount of ₱3,000.00 and on the occasion of occasion of the said robbery, the above-named accused while armed with
the said robbery, the above-named accused, while armed with unlicensed unlicensed firearms with intent to kill, conspiring and confederating together
firearms with intent to kill, conspiring and confederating together with Rudy with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan
Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey," Alias "Jonard," Alias "Precie" and
Servantes, Alias "Rey," Alias "Jonard," Alias "Precie" and Alias "Renato," Alias "Renato," whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are
whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and still unknown and still at-large, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
still at-large, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, feloniously attack, assault and shoot one EDRALIN MACAHIS, a Security Guard
assault and shoot one EDRALIN MACAHIS, a Security Guard of Energex of Energex Gasoline Station, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound on
Gasoline Station, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound on his trunk his trunk which directly caused his death.
which directly caused his death. Contrary to law.
Criminal Case No. 4749 Alias "Renato," whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are
still unknown and still at-large and conspiring and mutually helping and
That on or about the 7th day of January 2000, in the Municipality of San
assisting one another, while armed with unlicensed firearms and acting as a
Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
band, with intent of gain, with aggravating circumstances of treachery, abuse
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
of superior strength and using disguise, fraud or craft and taking advantage
together with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan
of nighttime, and by means of a motor vehicle and by means of force, violence
Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey," Alias "Jonard," Alias "Precie" and
and intimidation, employed upon the person of EDUARDO ZULUETA, a
Alias "Renato," whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are
gasoline boy of Energex Gasoline Station, did then and there willfully,
still unknown and still at-large, and conspiring and mutually helping and
unlawfully and feloniously rob, steal and carry away the following to wit:
assisting one another, while armed with unlicensed firearms and acting as a
band, with intent of gain, with aggravating circumstances of treachery, abuse a) Pawnshop Ticket from M. Lhuiller Pawnshop for one (1) black Citizen men's
of superior strength and using disguise, fraud or craft and taking advantage watch (automatic) valued at ₱2,000.00
of nighttime, and by means of a motor vehicle and by means of force, violence
b) Cash money worth ₱50.00
and intimidation, employed upon EDRALIN MACAHIS, a Security Guard of
Energex Gasoline Station, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and to his damage and prejudice in the total amount of ₱2,050.00 and on the
feloniously rob, steal, and carry away his service firearm .12 gauge shotgun occasion of the said robbery, the above-named accused, while armed with
with serial number 13265 valued at ₱12,000.00 owned by Alert and Quick (A- unlicensed firearms with intent to kill, conspiring and confederating together
Q) Security Services Incorporated represented by its General Manager with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan
Alberto T. Quintos to the damage and prejudice of said Alert and Quick (A-Q) Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey," Alias "Jonard," Alias "Precie" and
Security Services Incorporated in the aforesaid amount of ₱12,000.00 and on Alias "Renato," whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are
the occasion of the said robbery the above-named accused, while armed with still unknown and still at-large, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
unlicensed firearms, with intent to kill conspiring and confederating together feloniously attack, assault and shoot one EDRALIN MACAHIS, a Security Guard
with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan of Energex Gasoline Station, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound on
Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey", Alias "Jonard", Alias " Precie" and his trunk which directly caused his death.
Alias "Renato", whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are
still unknown and still at-large, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and Contrary to law.
feloniously attack, assault and shoot one EDRALIN MACAHIS, thereby Upon arraignment on March 23, 2000, appellant, with the assistance of
inflicting upon him gunshot wound on his trunk which directly caused his counsel de parte, entered a plea of not guilty on all the charges. Thereafter,
death. trial on the merits ensued.
Contrary to law. The prosecution presented five witnesses, namely: Macario C.
Criminal Case No. 4750 Natividad,20 then officer-in-charge of Energex Gasoline Station where the
incident took place; Edito Macahis,21 a cousin of the deceased security guard
That on or about the 7th day of January 2000, in the Municipality of San Edralin Macahis; Fortunato Lacambra III,22 a gasoline boy of the same gas
Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this station; Eduardo Zulueta,23 also a gasoline boy of the same gas station, and
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating Alberto Quintos,24 general manager of Alert and Quick Security Services, Inc.,
together with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan where the deceased security guard was employed.
Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey," Alias "Jonard," Alias "Precie" and
The defense, on the other hand, presented two witnesses, namely: Catherine compensatory damages for the stolen service firearm if restitution is no
Homo,25 a cousin of appellant and the appellant26 himself. longer possible and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and to pay the costs;

On December 20, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision27 convicting appellant 4. In Crim. Case No. 4750, finding accused Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo
beyond reasonable doubt of all the charges against him, the dispositive guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, as
portion of which reads: defined and penalized under No. 1 of Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Sec. 9 of R.A 7659, in relation to Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866, as further
1. In Criminal Case No. 4747, finding accused Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo
amended by Sec. 1 of R.A. 8294, having acted in conspiracy with other
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, as
malefactors who have, to date, remained at-large, and sentencing the said
defined and penalized under No. 1 of Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as
Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo to the penalty of Death, taking into
amended by Sec. 9 of R.A. 7659, in relation to Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866, as further
consideration the use of an unlicensed firearm in the commission of the crime
amended by Sec. 1 of R.A. 8294, having acted in conspiracy with other
as an aggravating circumstance and to pay Eduardo Zulueta, victim of the
malefactors who have, to date, remained at-large, and sentencing the said
robbery, in the amount of ₱2,050.00 as compensatory damages for the stolen
Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo to the penalty of Death, taking into
properties if restitution is no longer possible and to pay the costs.
consideration the use of an unlicensed firearm in the commission of the crime
as an aggravating circumstance; to pay Energex Gasoline Station owned by As against accused Rudy Gersalia and Christian Gersalia, who have, to date,
Regino Natividad and represented by Macario C. Natividad the amount of remained at-large, let a warrant of arrest be issued against them and let these
₱3,000.00 as compensatory damages and to pay the costs; cases be, in the meantime, sent to the archives without prejudice to their
reinstatement upon apprehension of the said accused.
2. In Crim. Case No. 4748, finding accused Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, as As against accused Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy
defined and penalized under No. 1 of Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as Servantes, Alias "Rey," Alias "Jonard," Alias "Precie and Alias "Renato," whose
amended by Sec. 9 of R.A. 7659, in relation to Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866, as further true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and are
amended by Sec. 1 of R.A. 8294, having acted in conspiracy with other still at-large, let these cases be, in the meantime, sent to the archives without
malefactors who have, to date, remained at-large, and sentencing the said prejudice to their reinstatement upon the identification and apprehension of
Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo to the penalty of Death, taking into the said accused.
consideration the use of an unlicensed firearm in the commission of the crime
SO ORDERED.
as an aggravating circumstance, and to pay the costs;
The cases were appealed to this Court, however, on September, 21, 2004,28 in
3. In Crim. Case No. 4749, finding accused Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo
conformity with the Decision dated July 7, 2004 in G.R. Nos. 147678-87
guilty beyond reasonable ground of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, as
entitled The People of the Philippines v. Efren Mateo y Garcia, modifying the
defined and penalized under No. 1 of Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as
pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, more
amended by Sec. 9 of R.A. 7659, in relation to Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866, as further
particularly Sections 3 and 10 of Rule 125 and any other rule insofar as they
amended by Sec. 1 of R.A. 8294, having acted in conspiracy with other
provide for direct appeals from the RTCs to this Court in cases where the
malefactors who have, to date, remained at-large, and sentencing the said
penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as well as
Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo to the penalty of Death, taking into
the Resolution of this Court, en banc dated September 19, 1995, in "Internal
consideration the use of an unlicensed firearm in the commission of the crime
Rules of the Supreme Court" in cases similarly involving the death penalty,
as an aggravating circumstance; to indemnify the heirs of Edralin Macahis in
pursuant to the Court's power to promulgate rules of procedure in all courts
the amount of ₱50,000.00 as death indemnity; to pay ₱12,000.00 as
under Article VII, Section 5 of the Constitution, and allowing an intermediate DEATH PENALTIES DESPITE THAT THE CRIME CHARGED WAS PRODUCED BY
review by the CA before such cases are elevated to this Court. This Court ONE SINGLE ACT WHICH SHOULD BE METED WITH A SINGLE PENALTY.
transferred the cases to the CA for appropriate action and disposition.
The OSG, in its Appellee's Brief,34 insisted that all the elements of the crime
The CA, on June 29, 2007,29 affirmed with modification, the Decision of the and the appellant's participation in the crime had been established.
RTC, with the dispositive portion reading:
Appellant, in his Reply Brief,35 argued that the penalty should not be death,
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. but only reclusion perpetua, because the aggravating circumstance of use of
Accused Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo is hereby found guilty beyond unlicensed firearm, although alleged in the Information, was not alleged with
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide of only one count. specificity.

Given the passage of Republic Act 9346 which took effect on 24 June 2006, Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
the penalty imposed upon Marlon de Leon y Homo is hereby reduced or
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons – Penalties.
commuted to reclusion perpetua.
- Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or any person
SO ORDERED. shall suffer:

On December 10, 2007, this Court accepted the appeal,30 the penalty 1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion
imposed being reclusion perpetua. of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when
the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on February 8, 2008, filed its
or arson.
Manifestation and Motion In Lieu of the Supplemental Brief31 dated February
4, 2008 stating that it will no longer file a supplemental brief, considering that In People v. De Jesus,36 this Court had exhaustively discussed the crime of
appellant has not raised any new issue that would require the filing of a robbery with homicide, thus:
supplemental brief.
For the accused to be convicted of the said crime, the prosecution is
32
Appellant filed a Manifestation on February 22, 2008 stating that he re- burdened to prove the confluence of the following elements:
pleads and adopts his Appellant's Brief and Reply Brief as Supplemental Brief.
(1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation
Appellant, in his Brief,33 assigned the following errors: against persons;

I (2) the property taken belongs to another;

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT A CO- (3) the taking is animo lucrandi; and
CONSPIRATOR IN THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE
(4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE SAME AND GUILT BEYOND
committed.37
REASONABLE DOUBT.
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to
II
commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of
ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY OF ROBBERY the robbery.38 The intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of
WITH HOMICIDE, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING FOUR (4) human life.39 The homicide may take place before, during or after the
robbery. It is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to principals of such crime, although not all profited and gained from the
the circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in the commission robbery. One who joins a criminal conspiracy adopts the criminal designs of
of the crime that has to be taken into consideration.40 There is no such felony his co-conspirators and can no longer repudiate the conspiracy once it has
of robbery with homicide through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. materialized.44
The constitutive elements of the crime, namely, robbery with homicide, must
Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on the occasion of
be consummated.
robbery if, for instance, it was committed (a) to facilitate the robbery or the
It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot;
victim of homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or, (d) to eliminate
persons are killed, or that aside from the homicide, rape, intentional witnesses in the commission of the crime. As long as there is a nexus between
mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on the the robbery and the homicide, the latter crime may be committed in a place
occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of other than the situs of the robbery.
homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would still be robbery with
From the above disquisition, the testimonies of the witnesses, and pieces of
homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on the occasion of the robbery,
evidence presented by the prosecution, the crime of robbery with homicide
the felony committed is robbery with homicide. All the felonies committed
was indeed committed. There was no mistaking from the actions of all the
by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into one and
accused that their main intention was to rob the gasoline station and that on
indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word "homicide" is used in
occasion of such robbery, a homicide was committed. The question now is
its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and infanticide.
whether there was conspiracy in the commission of the crime. According to
Intent to rob is an internal act, but may be inferred from proof of violent appellant, the prosecution failed to prove that he was a co-conspirator.
unlawful taking of personal property. When the fact of asportation has been However, this Court finds no merit to appellant's argument.
established beyond reasonable doubt, conviction of the accused is justified
If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the
even if the property subject of the robbery is not presented in court. After all,
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their
the property stolen may have been abandoned or thrown away and
combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and
destroyed by the robber or recovered by the owner.41 The prosecution is not
cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence
burdened to prove the actual value of the property stolen or amount stolen
of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among
from the victim. Whether the robber knew the actual amount in the
them to concert means is proved. That would be termed an implied
possession of the victim is of no moment, because the motive for robbery can
conspiracy.45 The prosecution was able to prove the presence of an implied
exist regardless of the exact amount or value involved.42
conspiracy. The witnesses were able to narrate in a convincing manner, the
When homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery, all circumstances surrounding the commission of the robbery and positively
those who took part as principals in the robbery would also be held liable as identified appellant as one of the robbers. Witness Eduardo Zulueta testified
principals of the single and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide, that appellant was one of the robbers who poked a gun at him, thus:
although they did not actually take part in the killing, unless it clearly appears
Q. Were you able to identify those two armed male persons who poked their
that they endeavored to prevent the same.43
guns at you?
If a robber tries to prevent the commission of homicide after the commission
A: Yes, sir.
of the robbery, he is guilty only of robbery and not of robbery with homicide.
All those who conspire to commit robbery with homicide are guilty as
Q: Kindly look around inside this courtroom and inform the Hon. Court A: Yes, sir.
whether those two (2) persons who poked their guns at you were (sic) present
Q: If that person is inside the courtroom, will you be able to identify him?
now?
A: Yes, sir.
A: Only one, sir, and there he is.
Q: Kindly point to him?
(At this juncture, witness pointing to a certain person who answered by the
name of MARLON ALBERT DE LEON when asked.) A: That man, sir. (Witness pointed to a person who answered by the name of
Marlon Albert de Leon).47
Q: This Marlon De Leon was he the one who guarded you in the carwash or
not? Therefore, it can be inferred from the role appellant played in the commission
of the robbery, that a conspiracy existed and he was part of it. To be a
A: Yes, sir.
conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the execution; he
Q: Now, what happened to you at the carwash where this Marlon De Leon need not even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to
was guarding you? be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. Each
conspirator may be assigned separate and different tasks which may appear
A: His gun was poked at me, sir.
unrelated to one another but, in fact, constitute a whole collective effort to
Q: What else transpired, Mr. Witness, or what else happened to you aside achieve their common criminal objective.48 Once conspiracy is shown, the act
from that? of one is the act of all the conspirators. The precise extent or modality of
participation of each of them becomes secondary,49 since all the conspirators
A: He hit me with his gun on my nape, sir. are principals.
Q: What else, Mr. Witness? As to the credibility of the witnesses, the RTC's findings must not be
A: He got my wallet from my pocket, sir. disturbed. The well-settled rule in this jurisdiction is that the trial court’s
findings on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest degree of
Q: Who hit you with a gun? respect and will not be disturbed on appeal without any clear showing that it
A: His other companion, sir.46 overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weight or substance which could affect the result of the case.50
Appellant was also identified by witness Fortunato Lacambra III, thus:
For his defense, appellant merely denied participating in the robbery.
Q: What about that person who ordered Zulueta to go to the carwash section However, his presence during the commission of the crime was well-
and hit him, was he also armed? established as appellant himself testified as to the matter. Granting that he
was merely present during the robbery, his inaction does not exculpate him.
A: Yes, sir.
To exempt himself from criminal liability, a conspirator must have performed
Q: What kind of firearm was he carrying then? an overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the conspiracy to commit
the felony and prevent the commission thereof.51 Appellant offered no
A: Also .38 caliber, sir.
evidence that he performed an overt act neither to escape from the company
Q: Were you able to identify or recognize that person who approached and of the robbers nor to prevent the robbery from taking place. His denial,
ordered Zulueta to go to the carwash section? therefore, is of no value. Courts generally view the defenses of denial and
alibi with disfavor on account of the facility with which an accused can commuted to reclusion perpetua, but is silent as to how it had arrived into
concoct them to suit his defense. As both evidence are negative and self- such a conclusion.1avvphi1
serving, they cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of
Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659,
prosecution witnesses who testify clearly, providing thereby positive
robbery with homicide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, which
evidence on the various aspects of the crime committed.52
are both indivisible penalties. Article 63 of the same Code provides that, in all
Consequently, the CA was correct in ruling that appellant was guilty only of cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
one count of robbery with homicide. In the crime of robbery with homicide, penalties, the greater penalty shall be applied when the commission of the
there are series of acts, borne from one criminal resolution, which is to rob. deed is attended by one aggravating circumstance.61 It must be remembered
As decided53 by the Court of Appeals: that the Informations filed with the RTC alleged the aggravating circumstance
of the use of unlicensed firearm. Pursuant to the third paragraph of Section 1
A continued (continuous or continuing) crime is defined as a single crime,
of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, such use of an unlicensed
consisting of a series of acts but all arising from one criminal
firearm is a special and not a generic aggravating circumstance in the
resolution.54 Although there is a series of acts, there is only one crime
homicide or murder committed. As explained by this Court in Palaganas v.
committed; hence, only one penalty shall be imposed.55
People:62
In the case before Us, [appellant] and his companions intended only to rob
Generic aggravating circumstances are those that generally apply to all crimes
one place; and that is the Energex gasoline station. That they did; and in the
such as those mentioned in Article 14, paragraphs No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10,
process, also took away by force the money and valuables of the employees
14, 18, 19 and 20, of the Revised Penal Code. It has the effect of increasing
working in said gasoline station. Clearly inferred from these circumstances
the penalty for the crime to its maximum period, but it cannot increase the
are the series of acts which were borne from one criminal resolution. A
same to the next higher degree. It must always be alleged and charged in the
continuing offense is a continuous, unlawful act or series of acts set on foot
information, and must be proven during the trial in order to be
by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force, however long a
appreciated.63 Moreover, it can be offset by an ordinary mitigating
time it may occupy.56 This can be said of the case at hand.
circumstance.
Akin to the extant case is that of People v. De la Cruz,57 wherein the robbery
On the other hand, special aggravating circumstances are those which arise
that took place in several houses belonging to different persons, when not
under special conditions to increase the penalty for the offense to its
absolutely unconnected, was held not to be taken as separate and distinct
maximum period, but the same cannot increase the penalty to the next
offenses. They formed instead, component parts of the general plan to
higher degree. Examples are quasi-recidivism under Article 160 and complex
despoil all those within the vicinity. In this case, the Solicitor General argued
crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. It does not change the
that the [appellant] had committed eight different robberies, because the
character of the offense charged.64 It must always be alleged and charged in
evidence shows distinct and different acts of spoilation in different houses,
the information, and must be proven during the trial in order to be
with several victimized persons.58 The Highest Tribunal, however, ruled that
appreciated.65 Moreover, it cannot be offset by an ordinary mitigating
the perpetrated acts were not entirely distinct and unconnected from one
circumstance.
another.59 Thus, the single offense or crime.
It is clear from the foregoing that the meaning and effect of generic and
Now, this Court comes to the penalty imposed by the CA. The
special aggravating circumstances are exactly the same except that in case of
decision60 merely states that, in view of the enactment of R.A. 9346, the
generic aggravating, the same CAN be offset by an ordinary mitigating
sentence of Death Penalty, imposed upon appellant, is automatically
circumstance whereas in the case of special aggravating circumstance, it the CA correctly appreciated the use of unlicensed firearm as an aggravating
CANNOT be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance. circumstance.

Aside from the aggravating circumstances abovementioned, there is also an After a careful study of the records of the present case, this Court found that
aggravating circumstance provided for under Presidential Decree No. the use of unlicensed firearm was not duly proven by the prosecution.
1866,66 as amended by Republic Act No. 8294,67 which is a special law. Its Although jurisprudence dictates that the existence of the firearm can be
pertinent provision states: established by mere testimony, the fact that appellant was not a licensed
firearm holder must still be established. The prosecution failed to present
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm,
written or testimonial evidence to prove that appellant did not have a license
such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
to carry or own a firearm, hence, the use of unlicensed firearm as an
circumstance.
aggravating circumstance cannot be appreciated.
In interpreting the same provision, the trial court reasoned that such
Finally, it is worth noting that the RTC ordered appellant to indemnify the
provision is "silent as to whether it is generic or qualifying."68 Thus, it ruled
heirs of Edralin Macahis the amount of ₱50,000.00 as death indemnity,
that "when the law is silent, the same must be interpreted in favor of the
₱12,000.00 as compensatory damages for the stolen service firearm if
accused."69 Since a generic aggravating circumstance is more favorable to
restitution is no longer possible and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages. Actual
petitioner compared to a qualifying aggravating circumstance, as the latter
damages were never proven during the trial. Hence, this Court's rulings74 on
changes the nature of the crime and increase the penalty thereof by degrees,
temperate damages apply, thus:
the trial court proceeded to declare that the use of an unlicensed firearm by
the petitioner is to be considered only as a generic aggravating In People vs. Abrazaldo,75 we laid down the doctrine that where the amount
circumstance.70 This interpretation is erroneous, since we already held in of actual damages for funeral expenses cannot be determined because of the
several cases that with the passage of Republic Act No. 8294 on 6 June 1997, absence of receipts to prove them, temperate damages may be awarded in
the use of an unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is now considered as the amount of ₱25,00076 This doctrine specifically refers to a situation where
a SPECIAL aggravating circumstance and not a generic aggravating no evidence at all of funeral expenses was presented in the trial court.
circumstance.71 Republic Act No. 8294 applies to the instant case since it took However, in instances where actual expenses amounting to less than ₱25,000
effect before the commission of the crimes in 21 April 1998. Therefore, the are proved during the trial, as in the case at bar, we apply the ruling in the
use of an unlicensed firearm by the petitioner in the instant case should be more recent case of People vs. Villanueva77 which modified the Abrazaldo
designated and appreciated as a SPECIAL aggravating circumstance and not doctrine. In Villanueva, we held that "when actual damages proven by
merely a generic aggravating circumstance. receipts during the trial amount to less than ₱25,000, the award of temperate
damages for ₱25,000 is justified in lieu of the actual damages of a lesser
In another case,72 this Court ruled that, the existence of the firearm can be
amount." To rule otherwise would be anomalous and unfair because the
established by testimony, even without the presentation of the firearm.73 In
victim’s heirs who tried but succeeded in proving actual damages of an
the said case, it was established that Elmer and Marcelina Hidalgo died of,
amount less than ₱25,000 would be in a worse situation than those who
and Pedro Hidalgo sustained, gunshot wounds. The ballistic examination of
might have presented no receipts at all but would now be entitled to ₱25,000
the slugs recovered from the place of the incident showed that they were
temperate damages.78
fired from a .30 carbine rifle and a .38 caliber firearm. The prosecution
witnesses positively identified appellant therein as one of those who were WHEREFORE, the Decision dated June 29, 2007 of the Court of Appeals is
holding a long firearm. It was also established that the same appellant was hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Marlon Albert de Leon y
not a licensed firearm holder. Hence, this Court ruled that the trial court and Homo is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide, the penalty of which, is reclusion perpetua in view of
the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance. Appellant is also
liable to pay the heirs of the victim, ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages, in
addition to the other civil indemnities and damages adjudged by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-41054 November 28, 1975 depositing the said amount in his own name and personal account with the
Associated Banking Corporation under Account No. 171 (or with the Equitable
JOSE L. GAMBOA and UNITS OPTICAL SUPPLY COMPANY, petitioners,
Banking Corporation under Account No. 707), and thereafter withdrawing the
vs.
same ... ."
COURT OF APPEALS and BENJAMIN LU HAYCO, respondents.
A civil action for accounting (docketed as Civil Case No. 89373 of the Court of
Assistant City Fiscal Leonardo L. Arguelles for petitioner Jose L. Gamboa.
First Instance of Manila) was likewise filed by Lu Chiong Sun, the owner of the
Koh Law Offices for petitioner Units Optical Supply Company. Units Optical Supply Company, complaining that during his hospital
confinement from September 27, 1972 to October 30, 1972, private
Arturo M. Tolentino and Montesa, Manikan and Associates for private respondent initiated discharging the business functions and prerogatives of
respondent. the company. And to paint a shade of validity to this exercise of powers,
private respondent, thru fraud, deceit and machinations duped Lu Chiong Sun
into affixing his signature and thumbprint on a general power of attorney in
MARTIN, J.: his (private respondent's) favor. With the use of this deed, private respondent
This is a petition to review on certiorari the judgment of the respondent Court closed the accounts of Lu Chiong Sun with the Equitable Banking Corporation
of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-03877, promulgated on July 17, 1975, which We and, thereafter, opened accounts in his own name with the same bank and
treat as special civil action (SC Resolution of September 2, 1975), involving with the Associated Banking Corporation.
the proper appreciation of the rule on plurality of crimes, otherwise known While the criminal suits in particular were pending trial on the merits before
as "concursus delictuorum", and the theory of "continuous crime". the twelve branches of the City Court of Manila,1 private respondent
The private respondent Benjamin Lu Hayco was a former employee of commenced on May 15, 1974 a petition for prohibition with preliminary
petitioner company in its optical supply business at Sta. Cruz, Manila. On injunction before the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch XV) against the
January 5, 1973, one hundred twenty-four (124) complaints of estafa under petitioners herein and the City Court Judges of Manila, claiming that the filing,
Article 315, para. 1-b of the Revised Penal Code were filed against him by the prosecution and trial of the seventy-five (75) estafa cases against him is not
petitioner company with the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila. After the only oppressive, whimsical and capricious, but also without or in excess of
procedural preliminary investigation, the Office of the City Fiscal filed jurisdiction of the respondents City Fiscal and the City Court Judges of Manila.
seventy-five (75) cases of estafa against private respondent before the City Private respondent asserts that all the indictments narrated in the seventy-
Court of Manila. Except as to the dates and amounts of conversions, the 75 five (75) informations were mere components of only one crime, since the
informations commonly charge that "... the said accused, being then an same were only impelled by a single criminal resolution or intent. On October
employee of the Units Optical Supply Company ..., and having collected and 31, 1974, the lower court dismissed the petition on the ground that the series
received from customers of the said company the sum of ... in payment for of deposits and the subsequent withdrawals thereof involved in the criminal
goods purchased from it, under the express obligation on the part of the said cases were not the result of only one criminal impulse on the part of private
accused to immediately account for and deliver the said collection so made respondent.
by him to the Units Optical Supply Company or the owners thereof ..., far from As a consequence, private respondent Benjamin Lu Hayco appealed to the
complying with his said aforesaid obligation and despite repeated demands Court of Appeals. On July 17, 1975, the Appellate Court reversed the order of
made upon him ... did then and there ... misappropriate, the lower court and granted the petition for prohibition. It directed the
misapply and convert the said sum to his own personal use and benefit by respondent City Fiscal "to cause the dismissal of the seventy-five (75) criminal
cases filed against petitioner-appellant, to consolidate in one information all independent. Unlike "ideal plurality", this "real plurality" is not governed by
the charges contained in the seventy-five (75) informations and to file the Article 48.3
same with the proper court." The raison d'etre of the ruling of the Court of
Apart and isolated from this plurality of crimes (ideal or real) is what is known
Appeals is that:
as "delito continuado" or "continuous crime". This is a single crime consisting
Where the accused, with intent to defraud his employer, caused the latter to of a series of acts arising from a single criminal resolution or intent not
sign a document by means of deceit and false representation, which susceptible of division. For Cuello Calon, when the actor, there being unity of
document turned out to be a general power of attorney, and with the use of purpose and of right violated, commits diverse acts, each of which, although
said document he closed the accounts of his employer in two banks and at the of a delictual character, merely constitutes a partial execution of a single
same time opened in his name new accounts in the same banks, and then particular delict, such concurrence or delictual acts is called a "delito
made collections from the customers of his employer, depositing them in the continuado". In order that it may exist, there should be "plurality of acts
bank accounts in his name, the series of deposits made by him which he later performed separately during a period of time; unity of penal provision
withdrew for his own use and benefit, constitutes but one crime of estafa, infringed upon or violated and unity of criminal intent and purpose, which
there being only one criminal resolution and the different acts performed means that two or more violations of the same penal provision are united in
being aimed at accomplishing the purpose of defrauding his employer." one and the same intent leading to the perpetration of the same criminal
purpose or aim."4
We thus readily recognize that the singular question in this present action is
whether or not the basic accusations contained in the seventy-five (75) It is not difficult to resolve whether a given set of facts constitutes a single act
informations against private respondent constitute but a single crime of which produces two or more grave or less grave offenses or a complex crime
estafa. under the definition of Article 48. So long as the act or acts complained of
resulted from a single criminal impulse it is usually held to constitute a single
It is provided in Article 48 of our Revised Penal Code, as amended by Act No.
offense to be punished with the penalty corresponding to the most serious
4000, that "(w)hen a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
crime, imposed in its maximum period.5, The test is not whether one of the
felonies or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other,
two offenses is an essential element of the other.6 In People v. Pineda ,7 the
the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be
court even expressed that "to apply the first half of Article 48, ... there must
applied in its maximum period." The intention of the Code in installing this
be singularity of criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written
particular provision is to regulate the two cases of concurrence or plurality of
into the law." Prior jurisprudence holds that where the defendant took the
crimes which in the field of legal doctrine are called "real plurality" and "ideal
thirteen cows at the same time and in the same place where he found them
plurality".2 There is plurality of crimes or "concurso de delitos" when the
grazing, he performed but one act of theft.8 Or, the act of taking the two
actor commits various delictual acts of the same or different kind. "Ideal
roosters, in response to the unity of thought in the criminal purpose on one
plurality" or "concurso ideal" occurs when a single act gives rise to various
occasion, constitutes a single crime of theft. There is no series of acts
infractions of law. This is illustrated by the very article under consideration:
committed for the accomplishment of different purposes, but only of one
(a) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies
which was consummated, and which determines the existence of only one
(described as "delito compuesto" or compound crime); and (b) when an
crime. The act of taking the roosters in the same place and on
offense is a necessary means for committing another offense (described as
the same occasion cannot give rise to two crimes having an independent
"delito complejo" or complex proper). "Real plurality" or "concurso real", on
existence of their own, because there are not two distinct appropriations nor
the other hand, arises when the accused performs an act or different acts
two intentions that characterize two separate crimes. 9
with distinct purposes and resulting in different crimes which are juridically
In the case before Us, the daily abstractions from and diversions of private resolution to embezzle and falsify, but of four or as many abstractions or
respondent of the deposits made by the customers of the optical supply misappropriations had of the funds entrusted to his care, and of as many
company from October 2, 1972 to December 30, 1972, excluding Saturdays falsifications also committed to conceal each of said case. There is nothing of
and Sundays, which We assume ex hypothesi, cannot be considered as record to justify the inference that the intention of the appellant when he
proceeding from a single criminal act within the meaning of Article 48. The committed the malversation in May, 1936 was the same intention which
abstractions were not made at the same time and on the same occasion, but impelled him to commit the other malversations in June, July, and August."
on variable dates. Each day of conversion constitutes a single act with an The ruling holds true when the acts of misappropriation were committed on
independent existence and criminal intent of its own. All the conversions are two different occasions, the first in January, 1955 to December, 1955, and the
not the product of a consolidated or united criminal resolution, because each second in January, 1956 to July, 1956. It cannot be pretended that when the
conversion is a complete act by itself. Specifically, the abstractions and the accused disposed of the palay deposit in January, 1955 to December, 1955,
accompanying deposits thereof in the personal accounts of private he already had the criminal intent of disposing what was to be deposited in
respondent cannot be similarly viewed as "continuous crime". In the above January, 1956 to July, 1956. 12 There is no synonymy between the present
formulation of Cuello Calon, We cannot consider a defalcation on a certain case and that of People, v. Sabbun, 13 where the Court held that the illegal
day as merely constitutive of partial execution of estafa under Article 315, collections made on different dates, i.e., December, 1949; January 1950 to
para. 1-b of the Revised Penal Code. As earlier pointed out, an individual February 1956; March 1956 to September 1957 constitutes a "continuing
abstraction or misappropriation results in a complete offense", because the said collections were "all part of the fees agreed upon
execution or consummation of the delictual act of defalcation. Private in compensation for the service" to be rendered by the accused Sabbun in
respondent cannot be held to have entertained continously the same filing the claim of the spouses Dacquioag for U.S. Veterans benefit and
criminal intent in making the first abstraction on October 2, 1972 for the collecting the pensions received by the widow from time to time. "The
subsequent abstractions on the following days and months until December periodical collections form part of a single criminal offense of collecting a fee
30, 1972, for the simple reason that he was not possessed of any fore- which is more than the prescribed amount fixed by the law" and "were
knowledge of any deposit by any customer on any day or occasion and which impelled by the same motive, that of collecting fees for services rendered."
would pass on to his possession and control. At most, his intent to As We have said, the various acts of defalcation perpetrated by private
misappropriate may arise only when he comes in possession of the deposits respondent in the present case from October 2, 1972 to December 30, 1972
on each business day but not in futuro, since petitioner company operates are susceptible of division with separate criminal intents.
only on a day-to-day transaction. As a result, there could be as many acts of
The respondent Court of Appeals harps upon the act of private respondent in
misappropriation as there are times the private respondent abstracted
allegedly inducing, with intent to defraud, Lu Chiong Sun "to sign a
and/or diverted the deposits to his own personal use and benefit. Thus, it
document by means of deceit and false representation, which document
may be said that the City Fiscal had acted properly when he filed only one
turned out to be a general power of attorney" and with the use of which, he
information for every single day of abstraction and bank deposit made by
closed the accounts of the latter in two banks, at the same time opening in
private respondent. 10 The similarity of pattern resorted to by private
his name new accounts in the same banks, for its conclusion that the acts
respondent in making the diversions does not affect the susceptibility of the
complained of against private respondent constitute one continuous crime of
acts committed to divisible crimes.
estafa. It is striking to note, however, that the accusatory pleadings against
Apropos is the case of People v. Cid, 11 where the Court ruled that the private respondent are founded on Article 315, para. 1-b of the Revised Penal
malversations as well as the falsifications in the months of May, June, July and Code, which defines and penalizes estafa by conversion or misappropriation.
August 1936 imputed to the accused "were not the result of only one In this form of estafa, fraud is not an essential element. 14 According to
Groizard "impudence, barefacedness covetousness, and disloyalty employed and essential to the crime and requisite to its consummation occur in one
in taking advantage of an opportunity take here the place formerly occupied province and some in another, the court of either province has jurisdiction to
by deceit." 15 "Fraudulent intent" in committing the conversion or diversion try the case, it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the
is "very evidently not a necessary element of the form of estafa here case will exclude the other." 19
discussed; the breach of confidence involved in the conversion or diversion of
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the Court of Appeals, subject matter of this
trust funds takes the place of fraudulent intent and is in itself sufficient. The
proceeding, is hereby reversed and set aside. The temporary restraining
reason for this is obvious: Grave as the offense is, comparatively few men
order issued by this Court on August 7, 1975, enjoining the enforcement or
misappropriate trust funds with the intention of defrauding the owner; in
implementation of the said judgment is hereby made permanent. No costs.
most cases the offender hopes to be able to restore the funds before the
defalcation is discovered. We may say in passing that the view here expressed SO ORDERED.
is further strengthened by the fact that of the nine paragraphs of Article 535,
the paragraph here under discussion is the only one in which the words
"fraud", or "defraud" do not occur." 16 In other words, the alleged act of
private respondent in causing, with intent to defraud, Lu Chiong Sun to affix
his signature and thumbprint on the general power of attorney is immaterial
and ineffective insofar as the charges of conversions are concerned. If at all,
the said document may serve only the purpose of closing the accounts of Lu
Chiong Sun with the banks and nothing more. Definitely, there is no necessity
for it before private respondent could commit the acts of defalcation. As a
matter of fact, private respondent resorted to this document only on October
17, 1972, or 15 days after he had already commenced the abstraction on
October 2, 1972. 17

The characterization or description of estafa as a continuing offense cannot


be validly seized upon by private respondent as basis for its inference that the
acts of abstraction in question constitute but a single continuing crime of
estafa. The sole import of this characterization is that the necessary elements
of estafa may separately take place in different territorial jurisdictions
until the crime itself is consummated. The moment, however, that the
elements of the crime have completely concurred or transpired, then
an individual crime of estafa has occurred or has been consummated. The
term "continuing" here must be understood in the sense similar to that of
"transitory" and is only intended as a factor in determining the proper venue
or jurisdiction for that matter of the criminal action pursuant to Section 14,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. 18 This is so, because "a person charged with a
transitory offense may be tried in any jurisdiction where the offense is part
committed. In transitory or continuing offense in which some acts material
G.R. Nos. L-74053-54 January 20, 1988 From the welter of evidence adduced in these two , this Court is convinced
that the two checks involved herein were issued and signed by the accused
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, petitioners,
in connection with the beer purchases made by him on various occasions at
vs.
the Guiguinto, sales office of SMC at Guiguinto, Bulacan and which checks he
NATHANIEL M. GROSPE, Presiding Judge, Branch 44, Regional Trial Court of
handed and delivered to the sales Supervisor of SMC, Mr. Ruben Cornelio,
Pampanga and MANUEL PARULAN, respondents.
who holds office in that municipality. The Court finds it rather difficult to
believe the claim and testimony of the accused that these checks which he
admittedly signed and which he delivered to Mr. Cornelio in blank were filled
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: up without his knowledge particularly the amounts appearing therein which
A special civil action for certiorari seeking to set aside the Decision of in the case of the check involved in Criminal Case No. 2800 amounted to
respondent Presiding Judge of Branch 44, Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, P86,071.20, and, in the case of the check involved in Criminal Case No. 2813,
dismissing Criminal Case No. 2800 for Violation of B.P. Blg. 22, and Criminal amounted to Pl1,918.80. The accused had been engaged in business for some
Case No. 2813 for Estafa, for being "bereft of jurisdiction to pass judgment on time involving amounts that are quite considerable, and it is hard to believe
the accused on the basis of the merits of these cases." that he will agree to this kind of arrangement which placed or exposed him
to too much risks and uncertainties.
Respondent-accused, Manuel Parulan, is an authorized wholesale dealer of
petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC, for short) in Bulacan. But even as this Court is convinced that the accused had issued these checks
to the representative of SMC on the occasions testified to in these cases by
In Criminal Case No. 2800 of the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, he was the witnesses for the prosecution which two checks were subsequently
charged with Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22 for having dishonored due to lack of funds resulting in damage to SMC, the offended
issued a check on 13 June 1983 for P86,071.20) in favor of SMC but which was party herein, this Court, after considering the totality of the evidence and the
dishonored for having been drawn against 'insufficient funds and, in spite of circumstances that attended the issuance of these two checks until they were
repeated demands, for having failed and refused to make good said check to both dishonored by the drawee bank, the Planters Development Bank, at
the damage and prejudice of SMC. Santa Maria, Bulacan, has come to the conclusion that it is bereft of
In Criminal Case No. 2813 of the same Court, Respondent-accused was jurisdiction to pass judgment on the accused on the basis of the merits of
charged with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal these cases.
Code for having made out a check on 18 June 1983 in the sum of P11,918.80 which he reasoned out, thus:
in favor of SMC in payment of beer he had purchased, but which check was
refused payment for "insufficient funds" and, in spite of repeated demands, Deceit and damage are the two essential elements that make up the offenses
for having failed and refused to redeem said check to the damage and involving dishonored checks. And in order that this Court may have
prejudice of SMC. jurisdiction to try these cases, it must be established that both or any one of
these elements composing the offenses charged must occur or take place
The two cases were tried jointly, the witnesses for both prosecution and within the area over which this Court has territorial jurisdiction. Here,
defense being the same for the two suits. however, it is clear that none of these elements took place or occurred within
Based on the facts and the evidence, Respondent Judge arrived at the the jurisdictional area of this Court.
following "Findings and Resolution:" As gleaned from the evidence, the two checks involved herein were issued by
the accused at Guiguinto, Bulacan. They were delivered and handed to
Supervisor Ruben Cornelio of San Miguel Corporation in his capacity as the Upon the attendant facts and circumstances we uphold the Petition.
representative of the company holding office in that municipality where the
The principal ground relied upon by Respondent Judge in dismissing the
transactions of the accused with SMC took place. It was before Supervisor
criminal cases is that deceit and damage, the two essential elements that
Cornelio at Guiguinto, Bulacan that false assurances were made by the
make up the offenses involving dishonored checks, did not occur within the
accused that the checks issued by him were good and backed by sufficient
territorial jurisdiction of his Court in Pampanga, but rather in Bulacan where
funds in his bank, the Planters Development Bank, at Santa Maria, Bulacan,
false assurances were given by Respondent-accused and where the checks he
only to turn out later on that this was not so.
had issued were dishonored. The People maintain, on the other hand, that
The other element of damage pertaining to the offenses charged in these jurisdiction is properly vested in the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga.
cases was inflicted on the offended party, the SMC, right at the moment the
At the outset, it should be pointed out, as the Solicitor General has aptly
checks issued by the accused were dishonored by the Planters Development
called attention to, that there are two dishonored checks involved, each the
Bank, the drawee bank, at Santa Maria, Bulacan which received them from
subject of different penal laws and with different basic elements: (1) On June
the BPI, San Fernando, Pampanga branch for clearing purposes. The
13, 1983, Respondent-accused issued Planters Development Bank (Santa
argument advanced by the prosecution in its memorandum filed herein that
Maria, Bulacan Branch) [PDB] Check No. 19040865 in the sum of P86,071.20
the two checks were deposited by SMC at the BPI, San Fernando, Branch, San
in favor of SMC, which was received by the SMC Supervisor at Guiguinto,
Fernando, Pampanga, where it maintained its accounts after receiving these
Bulacan. The check was forwarded to the SMC Regional Office at San
checks from its Guiguinto Sales Office which bank later on made the
Fernando, Pampanga, where it was delivered to and received by the SMC
corresponding deductions from the account of SMC in the amounts covered
Finance Officer, who then deposited the check with the Bank of the Philippine
by the dishonored checks upon receiving information that the checks so
Islands (BPI), San Fernando Branch, which is the SMC depository bank. On July
issued by the accused had been dishonored by the drawee bank at Santa
8,1983, the SMC depository bank received a notice of dishonor of the said
Maria, Bulacan, is inconsequential. As earlier stated, the element of damage
check for "insufficiency of funds" from the PDB, the drawee bank in Santa
was inflicted on the offended party herein right at the moment and at the
Maria, Bulacan. This dishonored check is the subject of the charge of Violation
place where the checks issued in its favor were dishonored which is in Santa
of the Bouncing Checks Law (BP Blg. 22) in Criminal Case No. 2800 of the lower
Maria, Bulacan.
Court (hereafter, the Bouncing Checks Case).
Respondent Judge then decreed:
(2) On June 18, 1983, Respondent-accused likewise issued PDB Check No.
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered 19040872 in the amount of P11,918.80 in favor of SMC, which was received
dismissing these cases for lack of jurisdiction. also by the SMC Supervisor at Guiguinto, Bulacan, as direct payment for the
spot sale of beer. That check was similarly forwarded by the SMC Supervisor
The bail bond posted by the accused in these cases are ordered cancelled.
to the SMC Regional Office in San Fernando, Pampanga, where it was
This Petition for certiorari challenges the dismissal of the two criminal cases delivered to the Finance Officer thereat and who, in turn deposited the check
on the ground that they were issued with grave abuse of discretion with the SMC depository bank in San Fernando, Pampanga. On July 8,1983,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. the SMC depository bank received a notice of dishonor for "insufficiency of
funds" from the drawee bank, the PDB, in Santa Maria, Bulacan. This
Respondent-accused adopts the contrary proposition and argues that the dishonored check is the subject of the prosecution for Estafa by postdating or
order of dismissal was, in effect, an acquittal not reviewable by certiorari, and issuing a bad check under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal
that to set the order aside after plea and trial on the merits, would subject Code in Criminal Case No, 2813 of the lower Court (briefly, the Estafa Case).
Respondent-accused to double jeopardy.
In the crime of Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check, deceit and damage that municipality or territory has the sole jurisdiction to try the case (People
are essential elements of the offense (U.S. vs. Rivera, 23 Phil. 383-390) and vs. Yabut, L-42902, April 29, 1977, 76 SCRA 624).
have to be established with satisfactory proof to warrant conviction.
Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check, may be a transitory or continuing
For Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law, on the other hand, the elements of offense. Its basic elements of deceit and damage may arise independently in
deceit and damage are not essential nor required. An essential element of separate places (People vs. Yabut, supra). In this case, deceit took place in San
that offense is knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of Fernando, Pampanga, while the damage was inflicted in Bulacan where the
the insufficiency of his funds (Lozano vs. Hon. Martinez, Nos. L-63419, etc., cheek was dishonored by the drawee bank in that place (See People vs.
December 18, 1986; 146 SCRA 323; Dingle vs. IAC, G.R. No. 75243, March 16, Yabut, supra). Jurisdiction may, therefore, be entertained by either the
1987,148 SCRA 595). The Anti-Bouncing Checks Law makes the mere act of Bulacan Court or the Pampanga Court.
issuing a worthless check a special offense punishable thereunder (Cruz vs.
For while the subject check was issued in Guiguinto, Bulacan, it was not
IAC, No. I,66327, May 28,1984,129 SCRA 490. Malice and intent in issuing the
completely drawn thereat, but in San Fernando, Pampanga, where it was
worthless check are immaterial, the offense being malum prohibitum (Que
uttered and delivered. "What is of decisive importance is the delivery thereat
vs. People of the Philippines, et. al., G.R. Nos. 75217-18, September 21, 1987).
The delivery of the instrument is the final act essential to its consummation
The gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a check, not the non-payment
as an obligation" (People vs. Larue, 83 P. 2d 725, cited in People vs.
of an obligation (Lozano vs. Hon. Martinez, supra).
Yabut, supra). For although the check was received by the SMC Sales
A. With the distinction clarified, the threshold question is whether or not Supervisor at Guiguinto, Bulacan, that was not the delivery in contemplation
venue was sufficiently conferred in the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga in of law to the payee, SMC. Said supervisor was not the person who could take
the two cases. the check as a holder, that is, as a payee or indorsee thereof, with the intent
to transfer title thereto. The rule is that the issuance as well as the delivery
Section 14(a) of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, which has been
of the check must be to a person who takes it as a holder, which means "the
carried over in Section 15(a) of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer,
Procedure, specifically provides:
thereof" (Sec. 190, Negotiable Instruments Law, cited in People vs.
SEC. 14. Place where action is to be instituted — Yabut, supra.) Thus, said representative had to forward the check to the SMC
Regional Office in San Fernando, Pampanga, which was delivered to the
(a) In all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the Finance Officer thereat who, in turn, deposited it at the SMC depository bank
court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or in San Fernando, Pampanga. The element of deceit, therefore, took place in
any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place. San Fernando, Pampanga, where the rubber check was legally issued and
In other words, a person charged with a transitory crime may be validly tried delivered so that jurisdiction could properly be laid upon the Court in that
in any municipality or province where the offense was in part committed. In locality.
transitory or continuing offenses in which some acts material and essential to The estafa charged in the two informations involved in the case before Us
the crime and requisite to its consummation occur in one province and some appears to be transitory or continuing in nature. Deceit has taken place in
in another, the Court of either province has jurisdiction to try the case, it Malolos, Bulacan, while the damage in Caloocan City, where the checks were
being understood that the first Court taking cognizance of the Case will dishonored by the drawee banks there. Jurisdiction can, therefore, be
exclude the others (Tuzon vs. Cruz. No. L-27410, August 28, 1975, 66 SCRA entertained by either the Malolos court or the Caloocan court. While the
235). However, if an the acts material and essential to the crime and requisite subject checks were written, signed, or dated in Caloocan City, they were not
of its consummation occurred in one municipality or territory, the Court of
completely made or drawn there, but in Malolos, Bulacan, where they were jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense also lies in the Regional Trial
uttered and delivered. That is the place of business and residence of the Court of Pampanga.
payee. The place where the bills were written, signed or dated does not
And, as pointed out in the Manzanilla case, jurisdiction or venue is
necessarily fix or determine the place where they were executed. What is of
determined by the allegations in the Information, which are controlling
decisive importance is the delivery thereof. The delivery of the instrument is
(Arches vs. Bellosillo, 81 Phil. 190, 193, cited in Tuzon vs. Cruz, No. L-27410,
the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation (People vs. Larue,
August 28, 1975, 66 SCRA 235). The Information filed herein specifically
83 P. 2d 725). An undelivered bill or note is inoperative. Until delivery, the
alleges that the crime was committed in San Fernando, Pampanga, and,
contract is revocable (Ogden, Negotiable Instruments, 5th ed., at 107). And
therefore, within the jurisdiction of the Court below.
the issuance as well as the delivery of the check must be to a person who
takes it as a holder, which means "(t)he payee or indorsee of a bill or note, B. The dismissal of the subject criminal cases by Respondent Judge,
who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof" (Sec. 190, Negotiable predicated on his lack of jurisdiction, is correctable by Certiorari. The error
Instruments Law). Delivery of the check signifies transfer of possession, committed is one of jurisdiction and not an error of judgment on the merits.
whether actual or constructive, from one person to another with intent to Well-settled is the rule that questions covering jurisdictional matters may be
transfer title thereto (Bailey, Brady on Bank Checks, 3rd ed. at 57-59; Sec. 190, averred in a petition for certiorari, inclusive of matters of grave abuse of
Negotiable Instruments Law). Thus, the penalizing clause of the provision of discretion, which are equivalent to lack of jurisdiction (City of Davao vs. Dept.
Art. 315, par. 2(d) states: "By postdating a check, or issuing a check in of Labor, No. L-19488, January 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 111, 115). An error of
payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his jurisdiction renders whatever order of the Trial Court nun and void.
funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the
check," Clearly, therefore, the element of deceit thru the issuance and C. The present petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the void Decision of
delivery of the worthless checks to the complainant took place in Malolos, Respondent Judge does not place Respondent-accused in double jeopardy for
Bulacan, conferring upon a court in that locality jurisdiction to try the case. the same offense. It will be recalled that the questioned judgment was not an
adjudication on the merits. It was a dismissal upon Respondent Judge's
In respect of the Bouncing Checks Case, the offense also appears to be erroneous conclusion that his Court had no "territorial jurisdiction" over the
continuing in nature. It is true that the offense is committed by the very fact cases. Where an order dismissing a criminal case is not a decision on the
of its performance (Colmenares vs. Villar, No. L-27126, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA merits, it cannot bar as res judicata a subsequent case based on the same
186); and that the Bouncing Checks Law penalizes not only the fact of offense (People vs. Bellosillo, No. L-18512, December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 835,
dishonor of a check but also the act of making or drawing and issuance of a 837).
bouncing check (People vs. Hon. Veridiano, II, No. L-62243, 132 SCRA 523).
The case, therefore, could have been filed also in Bulacan. As held in Que vs. The dismissal being null and void the proceedings before the Trial Court may
People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 75217-18, September 11, 1987 "the not be said to have been lawfully terminated. There is therefore, no second
determinative factor (in determining venue) is the place of the issuance of proceeding which would subject the accused to double jeopardy.
the check". However, it is likewise true that knowledge on the part of the Since the order of dismissal was without authority and, therefore, null and
maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds, which is an void, the proceedings before the Municipal Court have not been lawfully
essential ingredient of the offense is by itself a continuing eventuality, terminated. Accordingly, there is no second proceeding to speak of and no
whether the accused be within one territory or another (People vs. Hon. double jeopardy. A continuation of the proceedings against the accused for
Manzanilla, G.R. Nos. 66003-04, December 11, 1987). Accordingly, serious physical injuries is in order. (People vs. Mogol, 131 SCRA 306, 308).
In sum, Respondent Judge had jurisdiction to try and decide the subject
criminal case, venue having been properly laid.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of Respondent Judge of February 17, 1986 is


hereby set aside and he is hereby ordered to reassume jurisdiction over
Criminal Cases Nos. 2800 and 2813 of his Court and to render judgment of
either conviction or acquittal in accordance with the evidence already
adduced during the joint trial of said two cases.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 106847 March 5, 1993 Mindanao Kris in Cotabato City, for which reason it is recommended that this
charge be dropped for lack of jurisdiction.
PATRICIO P. DIAZ, Petitioner, vs. JUDGE SANTOS B. ADIONG, RTC, Br. 8,
Marawi City, SULTAN MACORRO L. MACUMBAL, SULTAN LINOG M. INDOL, In the interim, the civil complaint for damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 385-
MACABANGKIT LANTO and MOHAMADALI ABEDIN, Respondents. 91 and raffled to Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court in Marawi City, was set
for Pre-Trial Conference. The defendants therein had already filed their
Rex J.M.A. Fernandez for petitioner.chanrobles virtual law library
respective Answers with Counterclaim.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
Manguran B. Batuampar for respondents. virtual law library

BELLOSILLO, J.: On 18 November 1991, petitioner Diaz moved for the dismissal of the action
for damages on the ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over
VENUE in the instant civil action for damages arising from libel was the subject matter. He vehemently argued that the complaint should have
improperly laid; nonetheless, the trial court refused to dismiss the complaint. been filed in Cotabato City and not in Marawi City. 6chanrobles virtual law
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary library
restraining order, assailing that order of denial 1 as well as the order denying
reconsideration. 2chanrobles virtual law library Pending action on the motion, the presiding judge of Branch 10 inhibited
himself from the case which was thereafter reraffled to the sala of
The facts: On 16 July 1991, the Mindanao Kris, a newspaper of general respondent judge.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
circulation in Cotabato City, published in its front page the news article
captioned "6-Point Complaint Filed vs. Macumbal," and in its Publisher's On 15 June 1991, respondent judge denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss for
Notes the editorial, "Toll of Corruption," which exposed alleged anomalies by lack of merit. Diaz thereafter moved for reconsideration of the order of
key officials in the Regional Office of the Department of Environment and denial. The motion was also denied in the Order of 27 August 1991,
Natural Resources. 3chanrobles virtual law library prompting petitioner to seek relief
therefrom.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On 22 July 1991, the public officers alluded to, namely, private respondents
Sultan Macorro L. Macumbal, Sultan Linog M. Indol, Atty. Macabangkit M. Petitioner Diaz contends that the civil action for damages could not be
Lanto and Atty. Mohamadali Abedin, instituted separate criminal and civil rightfully filed in Marawi City as none of the private respondents, who are all
complaints arising from the libel before the City Prosecutor's Office and the public officers, held office in Marawi City; neither were the alleged libelous
Regional Trial Court in Marawi City. The publisher-editor of the Mindanao news items published in that city. Consequently, it is petitioner's view that
Kris, petitioner Patricio P. Diaz, and Mamala B. Pagandaman, who executed a the Regional Trial court in Marawi City has no jurisdiction to entertain the civil
sworn statement attesting to the alleged corruption, were named action for damages.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
respondents in both complaints. 4chanrobles virtual law library
The petitioner is correct. Not one of the respondents then held office in
On 2 September 1991, the City Prosecutor's Office dismissed the criminal case Marawi City: respondent Macumbal was the Regional Director for Region XII
thus 5 - of the DENR and held office in Cotabato City; respondent Indol was the
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer of Lanao del Norte and
WHEREFORE . . . this investigation in the light of Agbayani vs. Sayo case finds held office in that province; respondent Lanto was a consultant of the
that it has no jurisdiction to handle this case and that the same be filed or Secretary of the DENR and, as averred in the complaint, was temporarily
instituted in Cotabato City where complainant is officially holding office at the residing in Quezon City; and, respondent Abedin was the Chief of the Legal
time respondents caused the publication of the complained news item in the Division of the DENR Regional Office in Cotabato City. 7 Indeed, private
respondents do not deny that their main place of work was not in Marawi filed in the Court of First Instance (Regional Trial Court) of the province or city
City, although they had sub-offices where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the
therein.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the offended
parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First
Apparently, the claim of private respondents that they maintained
Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the
sub-offices in Marawi City is a mere afterthought, considering that it was
commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first
made following the dismissal of their criminal complaint by the City
published . . . . (emphasis supplied).
Prosecutor of Marawi City. Significantly, in their complaint in Civil Case No.
385-91 respondents simply alleged that they were residents of Marawi City, From the foregoing provision, it is clear that an offended party who is at the
except for respondent Lanto who was then temporarily residing in Quezon same time a public official can only institute an action arising from libel in two
City, and that they were public officers, nothing more. This averment is not (2) venues: the place where he holds office, and the place where the alleged
enough to vest jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Marawi City and libelous articles were printed and first
may be properly assailed in a motion to published.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
dismiss.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Private respondents thus appear to have misread the provisions of Art. 360
The Comment of private respondents that Lanto was at the time of the of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, when they filed their criminal and
commission of the offense actually holding office in Marawi City as consultant civil complaints in Marawi City. They deemed as sufficient to vest jurisdiction
of LASURECO can neither be given credence because this is inconsistent with upon the Regional Trial Court of Marawi City the allegation that "plaintiffs are
their allegation in their complaint that respondent Lanto, as consultant of the all of legal age, all married, Government officials by occupation and residents
Secretary of the DENR, was temporarily residing in Quezon of Marawi City." 8 But they are wrong.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
City.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library virtual law library

Moreover, it is admitted that the libelous articles were published and printed Consequently, it is indubitable that venue was improperly laid. However,
in Cotabato City. Thus, respondents were limited in their choice of venue for unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss
their action for damages only to Cotabato City where Macumbal, Lanto and prior to a responsive pleading, the venue cannot truly be said to have been
Abedin had their office and Lanao del Norte where Indol worked. Marawi City improperly laid since, for all practical intents and purposes, the venue though
is not among those where venue can be technically wrong may yet be considered acceptable to the parties for whose
laid.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library convenience the rules on venue had. been devised. 9chanrobles virtual law
library
The third paragraph of Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
R.A. No. 4363, specifically requires that - Petitioner Diaz then, as defendant in the court below, should have timely
challenged the venue laid in Marawi City in a motion to dismiss, pursuant to
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as
Sec. 4, Rule 4, of the Rules of Court. Unfortunately, petitioner had already
provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court when he filed his
the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of the province or city
Answer to the Complaint with Counterclaim. 10chanrobles virtual law library
where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the
offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the His motion to dismiss was therefore belatedly filed and could no longer
offense: Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is a public deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to hear and decide the instant civil action
officer . . . (who) does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be
for damages. Well-settled is the rule that improper venue may be waived and WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and
such waiver may occur by laches. 11chanrobles virtual law library the Temporary Restraining Order heretofore issued is
LIFTED.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner was obviously aware of this rule when he anchored his motion to
dismiss on lack of cause of action over the subject matter, relying on this This case is remanded to the court of origin for further
Court's ruling in Time, Inc. v. Reyes. 12 Therein, We declared that the Court of proceedings.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
First Instance of Rizal was without jurisdiction to take cognizance of Civil Case
SO ORDERED.
No. 10403 because the complainants held office in Manila, not in Rizal, while
the alleged libelous articles were published Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Quiason, JJ., concur.
abroad.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

It may be noted that in Time, Inc. v. Reyes, the defendant therein moved to
dismiss the case without first submitting to the jurisdiction of the lower court,
which is not the case before Us. More, venue in an action arising from libel is
only mandatory if it is not waived by defendant. Thus -

The rule is that where a statute creates a right and provides a remedy for its
enforcement, the remedy is exclusive; and where it confers jurisdiction upon
a particular court, that jurisdiction is likewise exclusive, unless otherwise
provided. Hence, the venue provisions of Republic Act No. 4363 should be
deemed mandatory for the party bringing the action, unless the question of
venue should be waived by the defendant . . . . 13chanrobles virtual law library

Withal, objections to venue in civil actions arising from libel may be waived;
it does not, after all, involve a question of jurisdiction. Indeed, the laying of
venue is procedural rather than substantive, relating as it does to jurisdiction
of the court over the person rather than the subject matter. 14 Venue relates
to trial and not to jurisdiction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library

Finally, Sec. 1 of Rule 16 provides that objections to improper venue must be


made in a motion to dismiss before any responsive pleading is filed.
Responsive pleadings are those which seek affirmative relief and set up
defenses. Consequently, having already submitted his person to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, petitioner may no longer object to the venue
which, although mandatory in the instant case, is nevertheless waivable. As
such, improper venue must be seasonably raised, otherwise, it may be
deemed waived.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
G.R. No. 202124 That the crime committed in the dwelling of the offended party who had not
given provocation for the attack and the accused took advantage of nighttime
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
to facilitate the commission of the offense.
vs.
IRENEO JUGUETA, Accused-Appellant. Contrary to law.2

DECISION In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, appellant, together with Gilbert Estores and
Roger San Miguel, was charged with Multiple Attempted Murder, allegedly
PERALTA, J.:
committed as follows:
This resolves the appeal from the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
That on or about 9:00 o’clock in the evening of 6th day of June, 2002, at
dated January 30, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03252. The CA affirmed the
Barangay Caridad Ilaya, Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon,
judgments of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Gumaca, Quezon,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
finding accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta y Flores guilty beyond reasonable
named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping
doubt of Double Murder in Criminal Case No. 7698-G and Multiple Attempted
one another, armed with short firearms of undetermined calibres, with intent
Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G.
to kill, qualified by treachery, with evident premeditation and abuse of
In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, appellant was charged with Double Murder, superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, allegedly attack, assault, and shoot with the said firearms the house occupied by the
committed as follows: family of Norberto Divina, thereby commencing the commission of the crime
of Murder, directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of execution
That on or about the 6th day of June 2002, at about 9:00 o'clock in the which would have produced it by reason of some cause or accident other than
evening, at Barangay Caridad Ilaya, Municipality of Atimonan, Province of the spontaneous desistance of the accused, that is, the occupants Norberto
Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the Divina, his wife Maricel Divina and children Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann
above-named accused, armed with a caliber.22 firearm, with intent to kill, Divina, both elementary pupils and who are minors, were not hit.
qualified by treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with said firearm Mary CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Grace Divina, a minor, 13 years old, who suffered the following:
Roger San Miguel, however, moved for reinvestigation of the case against
"Gunshot wound - them. At said proceedings, one Danilo Fajarillo submitted his sworn
statement stating that on June 6, 2002, he saw appellant with a certain
Point of Entry – lower abdomen, right, 2 cm. from the midline and 6 cm. from "Hapon" and Gilbert Estores at the crime scene, but it was only appellant who
the level of the umbilicus, directed upward toward the left upper abdomen." was carrying a firearm while the other two had no participation in the
and Claudine Divina, a minor, 3 ½ years of age, who suffered the following: shooting incident. Fajarillo further stated that Roger San Miguel was not
present at the crime scene. Based on the sworn statement of Fajarillo, the
"Gunshot wound - Provincial Prosecutor found no prima facie case against Gilbert Estores and
Point of Entry - 9th ICS along the mid-axillary line, right, 1 cm. diameter Roger San Miguel.4 Thus, upon motion of the prosecution, the case for
Attempted Murder against Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel was
Point of Exit - 7th ICS mid-axillary line, left;" dismissed, and trial proceeded only as to appellant.5
which directly caused their instant death.
At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Norberto Divina, On the other hand, appellant was only able to proffer denial and alibi as his
the victim, and Dr. Lourdes Taguinod who executed the Medico-Legal defense. Appellant's testimony, along with those of Gilbert Estores, Roger San
Certificate and confirmed that the children of Norberto, namely, Mary Grace Miguel, Isidro San Miguel and Ruben Alegre, was that he (appellant) was just
and Claudine, died from gunshot wounds. Dr. Taguinod noted that the watching TV at the house of Isidro San Miguel, where he had been living for
trajectory of the bullet wounds showed that the victims were at a higher several years, at the time the shooting incident occurred. However, he and
location than the shooter, but she could not tell what kind of ammunitions the other witnesses admitted that said house was a mere five-minute walk
were used.6 away from the crime scene.10

Norberto testified that the appellant is his brother-in-law. He recounted that Finding appellant’s defense to be weak, and ascribing more credence to the
in the evening of June 6, 2002, as his entire family lay down on the floor of testimony of Norberto, the trial court ruled that the evidence clearly
their one-room nipa hut to sleep, the "sack" walling of their hut was suddenly established that appellant, together with two other assailants, conspired to
stripped off, and only the supporting bamboo (fences) remained. With the shoot and kill the family of Norberto. Appellant was then convicted of Double
covering of the wall gone, the three (3) men responsible for the deed came Murder in Criminal Case No. 7698-G and Multiple Attempted Murder in
into view. Norberto clearly saw their faces which were illuminated by the light Criminal Case No. 7702-G.
of a gas lamp hanging in their small hut. Norberto identified the 3 men as
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s judgment in Criminal Case No.
appellant, Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel.
7698-G reads:
The 3 men ordered Norberto to come down from his house, but he refused
WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Ireneo
to do so. The men then uttered, "Magdasal ka na at katapusan mo na
Jugueta guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Double Murder defined and
ngayon." Norberto pleaded with them, saying, "Maawa kayo sa amin,
punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby
matanda na ako at marami akong anak. Anong kasalanan ko sa inyo?"
sentenced to suffer Reclusion Perpetua for the death of Mary Grace Divina
Despite such plea for mercy, a gunshot was fired, and Norberto immediately
and to indemnify her heirs in the amount of Php50,000.00 and another to
threw his body over his children and wife in an attempt to protect them from
suffer Reclusion Perpetua for the death of Claudine Divina and accused is
being hit. Thereafter, he heard successive gunshots being fired in the
further ordered to indemnify the heirs of Claudine Divina in the sum of
direction where his family huddled together in their hut.7
Php50,000.00. In addition, he is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victims
When the volley of shots ceased and the three (3) men left, Norberto saw actual damages in the amount of Php16,150.00 and to pay for the costs.
that his two (2) young daughters were wounded. His wife went out of their
SO ORDERED.11
house to ask for help from neighbors, while he and his older daughter carried
the two (2) wounded children out to the street. His daughter Mary Grace died On the other hand, the dispositive portion of the trial court’s judgment in
on the way to the hospital, while Claudine expired at the hospital despite the Criminal Case No. 7702-G, reads:
doctors' attempts to revive her.8
WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Ireneo
In answer to questions of what could have prompted such an attack from Jugueta guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Multiple Attempted Murder
appellant, Norberto replied that he had a previous altercation with appellant defined and penalized under Article 248 in relation to Article 51 of the Revised
who was angered by the fact that he (Norberto) filed a case against Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS
appellant's two other brothers for molesting his daughter.9 and TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision Correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor as maximum for each of the offended
parties; Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Q: What kind of light was there?
Divina. Further, accused is ordered to pay for the costs of the suit.
A: A gas lamp.
SO ORDERED.12
Q: Where was the gas lamp placed at that time?
Aggrieved by the trial court's judgments, appellant appealed to the CA. On
A: In the middle of our house.
January 30, 2012, the CA rendered a Decision affirming appellant's conviction
for the crimes charged.13 xxxx
Dissatisfied with the CA Decision, appellant elevated the case to this Court. Q: when did they fire a shot?
On July 30, 2012, the Court issued a Resolution14 notifying the parties that
they may submit their respective Supplemental Briefs. Both parties A: On the same night, when they had stripped off the wallings.
manifested that they will no longer submit supplemental briefs since they had Q: How many gunshots did you hear?
exhaustively discussed their positions before the CA.15
A: Only one.
The main issue advanced in the Appellant's Brief deals with the
inconsistencies in Norberto's testimony, such as his failure to state from the Q: Do you know the sound of a gunshot? A firearm?
beginning that all three assailants had guns, and to categorically identify A: Yes, sir, it is loud? (sic)
appellant as the one holding the gun used to kill Norberto’s children.
xxxx
The appeal is unmeritorious.
Q: After the first shot, was there any second shot?
At the outset, it must be stressed that factual findings of the trial court, its
assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their A: After that, successive fire shot (sic) followed and my youngest and eldest
testimonies, and the conclusions based on these factual findings are to be daughters were hit.
given the highest respect. Thus, generally, the Court will not recalibrate and
xxxx
re-examine evidence that had been analyzed and ruled upon by the trial court
and affirmed by the CA.16 Q: How many of the three were holding guns at that time?

The evidence on record fully supports the trial court's factual finding, as A: All of them.
affirmed by the CA, that appellant acted in concert with two other individuals,
Q: You mean to tell the honorable court that these three persons were
all three of them carrying firearms and simultaneously firing at Norberto and
his family, killing his two young daughters. Norberto clearly saw all of the having one firearm each?
three assailants with their firearms as there is illumination coming from a
lamp inside their house that had been laid bare after its walling was stripped A: Yes, sir.
off, to wit: Q: And they fired shots at the same time?
Q: When the wall of your house was stripped off by these three persons at A: Yes, sir.
the same time, do you have light in your house?
Q: To what direction these three persons fired (sic) their firearms during that
A: Yes, sir. night?
A: To the place where we were. any one of the circumstances enumerated in Article 248 of the Code is
sufficient to qualify a killing as murder.20 The trial court correctly ruled that
Q: When those three persons were firing their respective firearms, what was
appellant is liable for murder because treachery attended the killing of
your position then?
Norberto’s two children, thus:
A: I ordered my children to lie down.
x x x Evidence adduced show that the family of Norberto Divina, were all lying
Q: How about you, what was your position when you were ordering your down side by side about to sleep on June 6, 2002 at around 9:00 o’clock in
children to lie down? the evening, when suddenly their wall made of sack was stripped off by
[appellant] Ireneo Jugueta, Roger San Miguel and Gilberto Alegre (sic) [Gilbert
A: (witness demonstrated his position as if covering his children with his body Estores]. They ordered him to go out of their house and when he refused
and ordering them to line (sic) down face down) despite his plea for mercy, they fired at them having hit and killed his two (2)
Q: Mr. Witness, for how long did these three persons fire shots at your house? daughters. The family of Norberto Divina were unarmed and his children
were at very tender ages. Mary Grace Divina and Claudine who were shot and
A: Less than five minutes, sir. killed were 13 years old and 3 ½ years old respectively. In this case, the victims
Q: After they fired their shots, they left your house? were defenseless and manifestly overpowered by armed assailants when
they were gunned down. There was clear showing that the attack was made
A: Yes, sir. suddenly and unexpectedly as to render the victims helpless and unable to
defend themselves. Norberto and his wife and his children could have already
Q: And when these persons left your house, you inspected your children to
been asleep at that time of the night. x x x 21
see what happened to them?
Verily, the presence of treachery qualified the killing of the hapless children
A: Yes, sir, they were hit.
to murder. As held in People v. Fallorina,22 the essence of treachery is the
x x x17 sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim without the
slightest provocation on his part. Minor children, who by reason of their
Appellant and the two other malefactors are equally responsible for the
tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense. When an adult person
death of Norberto's daughters because, as ruled by the trial court, they clearly
illegally attacks a child, treachery exists.
conspired to kill Norberto's family. Conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement regarding the commission of a crime and As to the charge of multiple attempted murder, the last paragraph of Article
decide to commit it. Proof of a prior meeting between the perpetrators to 6 of the Revised Penal Code states that a felony is attempted when the
discuss the commission of the crime is not necessary as long as their offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and
concerted acts reveal a common design and unity of purpose. In such case, does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony
the act of one is the act of all.18 Here, the three men undoubtedly acted in by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
concert as they went to the house of Norberto together, each with his own desistance. In Esqueda v. People,23 the Court held:
firearm. It is, therefore, no longer necessary to identify and prove that it is
If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter survives, the crime
the bullet particularly fired from appellant's firearm that killed the children.
committed is either consummated physical injuries, if the offender had no
Murder is defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as the unlawful intention to kill the victim, or frustrated or attempted homicide or frustrated
killing of a person, which is not parricide or infanticide, attended by murder or attempted murder if the offender intends to kill the victim. Intent
circumstances such as treachery or evident premeditation.19 The presence of to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number of
weapons used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of revising such findings and evaluation. This is because the trial court's
wounds inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and determination proceeds from its first-hand opportunity to observe the
(e) the words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries are inflicted by demeanor of the witnesses, their conduct and attitude under grilling
him on the victim. examination, thereby placing the trial court in unique position to assess the
witnesses' credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness, honesty and
In this case, the prosecution has clearly established the intent to kill on the
candor x x x.29
part of appellant as shown by the use of firearms, the words uttered24during,
as well as the manner of, the commission of the crime. The Court thus quotes The records of this case, particularly the testimonies of the witnesses, reveal
with approval the trial court’s finding that appellant is liable for attempted no outstanding or exceptional circumstance to justify a deviation from such
murder, viz.: long-standing principle. There is no cogent reason to overturn the trial court's
ruling that the prosecution evidence, particularly the testimony of Norberto
In the case at bar, the perpetrators who acted in concert commenced the
Divina identifying appellant as one of the assailants, is worthy of belief. Thus,
felony of murder first by suddenly stripping off the wall of their house,
the prosecution evidence established beyond any reasonable doubt that
followed by successive firing at the intended victims when Norberto Divina
appellant is one of the perpetrators of the crime.
refused to go out of the house as ordered by them. If only there were good
in aiming their target, not only Mary Grace and Claudine had been killed but However, the Court must make a clarification as to the nomenclature used by
surely all the rest of the family would surely have died. Hence, perpetrators the trial court to identify the crimes for which appellant was penalized. There
were liable for Murder of Mary Grace Divina and Claudine Divina but for is some confusion caused by the trial court's use of the terms "Double
Multiple Attempted Murder for Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Murder" and "Multiple Attempted Murder" in convicting appellant, and yet
Divina and Judy Ann Divina. But as [appellant] Ireneo Jugueta was the only imposing penalties which nevertheless show that the trial court meant to
one charged in this case, he alone is liable for the crime committed.25 penalize appellant for two (2) separate counts of Murder and four (4) counts
of Attempted Murder.
Meanwhile, the supposed inconsistencies in Norberto's testimony, i.e., that
he failed to state from the very beginning that all three assailants were The facts, as alleged in the Information in Criminal Case No. 7698-G, and as
carrying firearms, and that it was the shots from appellant’s firearm that proven during trial, show that appellant is guilty of 2 counts of the crime of
killed the children, are too trivial and inconsequential to put a dent on said Murder and not Double Murder, as the killing of the victims was not the result
witness's credibility. An examination of Norberto's testimony would show of a single act but of several acts of appellant and his cohorts. In the same
that there are no real inconsistencies to speak of. As ruled in People v. vein, appellant is also guilty of 4 counts of the crime of Attempted Murder
Cabtalan,26 "[m]inor inconsistencies and discrepancies pertaining to trivial and not Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G. It bears
matters do not affect the credibility of witnesses, as well as their positive stressing that the Informations in this case failed to comply with the
identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime."27 Both the trial requirement in Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court that an
court and the CA found Norberto's candid and straightforward testimony to information must charge only one offense.
be worthy of belief and this Court sees no reason why it should not conform
As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one offense,
to the principle reiterated in Medina, Jr. v. People28 that:
otherwise, the same is defective. The reason for the rule is stated in People
Time and again, this Court has deferred to the trial court's factual findings and of the Philippines and AAA v. Court of Appeals, 21st Division, Mindanao
evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, especially when affirmed by the CA, Station, et al.,30 thus:
in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court overlooked or
misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances that would justify altering or
The rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or where separate and distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is
informations is to give the accused the necessary knowledge of the charge the doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shot, such acts
against him and enable him to sufficiently prepare for his defense. The State constitute separate and distinct crimes.34
should not heap upon the accused two or more charges which might confuse
Here, the facts surrounding the shooting incident clearly show that appellant
him in his defense. Non-compliance with this rule is a ground for quashing the
and the two others, in firing successive and indiscriminate shots at the family
duplicitous complaint or information under Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal
of Norberto from their respective firearms, intended to kill not only Norberto,
Procedure and the accused may raise the same in a motion to quash before
but his entire family. When several gunmen, as in this case, indiscriminately
he enters his plea, otherwise, the defect is deemed waived.
fire a series of shots at a group of people, it shows their intention to kill
However, since appellant entered a plea of not guilty during arraignment and several individuals. Hence, they are committing not only one crime. What
failed to move for the quashal of the Informations, he is deemed to have appellant and his cohorts committed cannot be classified as a complex crime
waived his right to question the same. Section 9 of Rule 117 provides that because as held in People v. Nelmida,35 "each act by each gunman pulling the
"[t]he failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before trigger of their respective firearms, aiming each particular moment at
he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a different persons constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise
motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed to a complex crime."36
a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in
Furthermore, the Court notes that both the trial court and the CA failed to
paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule."
take into account dwelling as an ordinary, aggravating circumstance, despite
It is also well-settled that when two or more offenses are charged in a single the fact that the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and 7702-G
complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the contain sufficient allegations to that effect, to wit:
court may convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and
Criminal Case No. 7698-G for Double Murder:
impose upon him the proper penalty for each offense.31
That the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party who had
Appellant can therefore be held liable for all the crimes alleged in the
not given provocation for the attack and the accused took advantage of
Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and 7702-G, i.e., 2 counts of
nighttime to facilitate the commission of the offense.37
murder and 4 counts of attempted murder, respectively, and proven during
trial. Criminal Case No. 7702-G for Multiple Attempted Murder:
Meanwhile, in People v. Nelmida,32 the Court explained the concept of a x x x the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and
complex crime as defined in Article 4833 of the Revised Penal Code, thus: mutually helping one another, armed with short firearms of undetermined
calibres, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery, with evident premeditation
In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however, in
and abuse of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
the eyes of the law and in the conscience of the offender they constitute only
feloniously attack, assault, and shoot with the said firearms the house
one crime, thus, only one penalty is imposed. There are two kinds of complex
occupied by the family of Norberto Divina, thereby commencing the
crime. The first is known as a compound crime, or when a single act
commission of the crime of Murder, directly by overt acts, but did not
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies while the other is known
perform all the acts of execution which would have produced it by reason of
as a complex crime proper, or when an offense is a necessary means for
some cause or accident other than the spontaneous desistance of the
committing the other. The classic example of the first kind is when a single
accused x x x38
bullet results in the death of two or more persons. A different rule governs
In People v. Agcanas,39 the Court stressed that "[i]t has been held in a long First, civil indemnity ex delicto is the indemnity authorized in our criminal law
line of cases that dwelling is aggravating because of the sanctity of privacy for the offended party, in the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial
which the law accords to human abode. He who goes to another's house to policy and apart from other proven actual damages, which itself is equivalent
hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere." to actual or compensatory damages in civil law.42 This award stems from
Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime is committed in the dwelling of Article 100 of the RPC which states, "Every person criminally liable for a felony
the offended party provided that the latter has not given provocation is also civilly liable."
therefor.40 The testimony of Norberto established the fact that the group of
It is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a fine;
appellant violated the victims' home by destroying the same and attacking his
hence, it can be increased by the Court when appropriate.43 Article 2206 of
entire family therein, without provocation on the part of the latter. Hence,
the Civil Code provides:
the trial court should have appreciated dwelling as an ordinary aggravating
circumstance. Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict
shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been
In view of the attendant ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court must
mitigating circumstances. In addition:
modify the penalties imposed on appellant. Murder is punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death, thus, with an ordinary aggravating circumstance of (1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the
dwelling, the imposable penalty is death for each of two (2) counts of deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such
murder.41 However, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, proscribing the indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless
imposition of the death penalty, the penalty to be imposed on appellant the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the
should be reclusion perpetua for each of the two (2) counts of murder defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;
without eligibility for parole. With regard to the four (4) counts of attempted
murder, the penalty prescribed for each count is prision mayor. With one (2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of
ordinary aggravating circumstance, the penalty should be imposed in its Article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's
maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession, may demand
penalty should be from ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years support from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five
of prision mayor, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional, in any of its periods, or anywhere (3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the
from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. This Court finds it apt to deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the
impose on appellant the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) death of the deceased.
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, for each of the four (4) counts In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind
of attempted murder. of monetary restitution or compensation to the victim for the damage or
infraction that was done to the latter by the accused, which in a sense only
Anent the award of damages, the Court deems it proper to address the covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a
matter in detail as regards criminal cases where the imposable penalty person dies, in addition to the penalty of imprisonment imposed to the
is reclusion perpetua to death. Generally, in these types of criminal cases, offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the victim a sum of money as
there are three kinds of damages awarded by the Court; namely: civil restitution. Also, it is apparent from Article 2206 that the law only imposes a
indemnity, moral, and exemplary damages. Likewise, actual damages may be minimum amount for awards of civil indemnity, which is ₱3,000.00. The law
awarded or temperate damages in some instances. did not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount for the
award cannot be changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity indemnity, be adjusted so long as it does not exceed the award of civil
can be validly modified and increased when the present circumstance indemnity.52
warrants it.44
Finally, the Civil Code of the Philippines provides, in respect to exemplary
The second type of damages the Court awards are moral damages, which are damages, thus:
also compensatory in nature. Del Mundo v. Court of Appeals45 expounded on
ART. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example
the nature and purpose of moral damages, viz.:
or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate,
Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to compensate one liquidated or compensatory damages.
for manifold injuries such as physical suffering, mental anguish, serious
ART. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation.
liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more
These damages must be understood to be in the concept of grants, not
aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from
punitive or corrective in nature, calculated to compensate the claimant for
fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
the injury suffered. Although incapable of exactness and no proof of
pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective
amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court, it is imperative, damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and
nevertheless, that (1) injury must have been suffered by the claimant, and (2) as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an
such injury must have sprung from any of the cases expressed in Article injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. These terms
221946 and Article 222047 of the Civil Code. x x x. are generally, but not always, used interchangeably. In common law, there is
preference in the use of exemplary damages when the award is to account
Similarly, in American jurisprudence, moral damages are treated as
for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered
"compensatory damages awarded for mental pain and suffering or mental
by a person as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly
anguish resulting from a wrong."48 They may also be considered and allowed
inflicted,53 the theory being that there should be compensation for the hurt
"for resulting pain and suffering, and for humiliation, indignity, and vexation
caused by the highly reprehensible conduct of the defendant – associated
suffered by the plaintiff as result of his or her assailant's conduct, as well as
with such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross negligence
the factors of provocation, the reasonableness of the force used, the
or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud54 – that intensifies
attendant humiliating circumstances, the sex of the victim, [and] mental
the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages are often used to refer
distress."49
to those species of damages that may be awarded against a person to punish
The rationale for awarding moral damages has been explained in Lambert v. him for his outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are intended
Heirs of Rey Castillon: "[T]he award of moral damages is aimed at a in good measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like him from similar
restoration, within the limits possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; and conduct in the future.55
therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted."50
The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law not
Corollarily, moral damages under Article 222051 of the Civil Code also does having specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense.
not fix the amount of damages that can be awarded. It is discretionary upon The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as
the court, depending on the mental anguish or the suffering of the private it breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim as it causes
offended party. The amount of moral damages can, in relation to civil personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the
prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of
additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a In People v. Cañada,60 People v. Neverio61 and People v. Layco, Sr.,62 the Court
graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance awarded exemplary damages to set a public example, to serve as deterrent
of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its to elders who abuse and corrupt the youth, and to protect the latter from
commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the sexual abuse.
award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the
Existing jurisprudence pegs the award of exemplary damages at
offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award
₱30,000.00,63 despite the lack of any aggravating circumstance. The Court
of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the
finds it proper to increase the amount to ₱50,000.00 in order to deter similar
aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying.
conduct.
Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a
distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to If, however, the penalty for the crime committed is death, which cannot be
the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, imposed because of the provisions of R.A. No. 9346, prevailing
an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle jurisprudence64 sets the amount of ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled
meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code. 56 Before awarding any of the above mentioned damages, the Court, however,
must first consider the penalty imposed by law. Under RA 7659 or An Act to
The reason is fairly obvious as to why the Revised Rules of Criminal Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that
Procedure57 requires aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or Purpose the Revised Penal Laws, and for Other Purposes, certain crimes under
qualifying, to be stated in the complaint or information. It is in order not to the RPC and special penal laws were amended to impose the death penalty
trample on the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature under certain circumstances.65 Under the same law, the following crimes are
of the alleged offense that he or she has committed. A criminal complaint or punishable by reclusion perpetua: piracy in general,66 mutiny on the high
information should basically contain the elements of the crime, as well as its seas,67 and simple rape.68 For the following crimes, RA 7659 has imposed the
qualifying and ordinary aggravating circumstances, for the court to effectively penalty of reclusion perpetua to death: qualified piracy;69 qualified bribery
determine the proper penalty it should impose. This, however, is not similar under certain circumstances;70 parricide;71 murder;72 infanticide, except
in the recovery of civil liability. In the civil aspect, the presence of an when committed by the mother of the child for the purpose of concealing her
aggravating circumstance, even if not alleged in the information but proven dishonor or either of the maternal grandparents for the same
during trial would entitle the victim to an award of exemplary damages. purpose;73 kidnapping and serious illegal detention under certain
circumstances;74 robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons
Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded,
under certain circumstances;75 destructive arson, except when death results
not only due to the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where
as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under the
the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous
article;76 attempted or frustrated rape, when a homicide is committed by
conduct of the offender. In much the same way as Article 2230 prescribes an
reason or on occasion thereof; plunder;77 and carnapping, when the driver or
instance when exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main
occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of
provision, lays down the very basis of the award. Thus, in People v.
the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.78 Finally, RA
Matrimonio,58 the Court imposed exemplary damages to deter other fathers
7659 imposes the death penalty on the following crimes:
with perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing
their own daughters. Also, in People v. Cristobal,59 the Court awarded (a) In qualified bribery, when it is the public officer who asks or demands the
exemplary damages on account of the moral corruption, perversity and gift or present.
wickedness of the accused in sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman.
(b) In kidnapping and serious illegal detention: (i) when the kidnapping or 2. when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the
detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
victim or any other person; (ii) when the victim is killed or dies as a
3. when the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating
consequence of the detention; (iii) when the victim is raped, subjected to
circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty
torture or dehumanizing acts.
shall be applied.
(c) In destructive arson, when as a consequence of the commission of any of
4. when both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the
the acts penalized under Article 320, death results.
commission of the act, the courts shall reasonably allow them to offset one
(d) In rape: (i) when by reason or on occasion of the rape, the victim becomes another in consideration of their number and importance, for the purpose of
insane or homicide is committed; (ii) when committed with any of the applying the penalty in accordance with the preceding rules, according to the
following attendant circumstances: (1) when the victim is under eighteen (18) result of such compensation. (Revised Penal Code, Art. 63)
years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
Thus, in order to impose the proper penalty, especially in cases of indivisible
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
penalties, the court has the duty to ascertain the presence of any mitigating
common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim; (2) when the victim is under
or aggravating circumstances. Accordingly, in crimes where the imposable
the custody of the police or military authorities; (3) when the rape is
penalty is reclusion perpetua to death, the court can impose either reclusion
committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other
perpetua or death, depending on the mitigating or aggravating circumstances
relatives within the third degree of consanguinity; (4) when the victim is a
present.
religious or a child below seven years old; (5) when the offender knows that
he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease; (6) But with the enactment of RA 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of
when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or Death Penalty in the Philippines, the imposition of death penalty is now
the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency; and (7) when prohibited. It provides that in lieu of the death penalty, the penalty
by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed when the law violated makes use of
physical mutilation. the nomenclature of the penalties of the RPC.79
From these heinous crimes, where the imposable penalties consist of two (2) As a result, the death penalty can no longer be imposed. Instead, they have
indivisible penalties or single indivisible penalty, all of them must be taken in to impose reclusion perpetua. Despite this, the principal consideration for the
relation to Article 63 of the RPC, which provides: award of damages, following the ruling in People v. Salome80 and People v.
Quiachon,81 is "the penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense
Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - In all cases in
because of its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the
which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the
offender."82
courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may
have attended the commission of the deed. When the circumstances surrounding the crime would justify the imposition
of the death penalty were it not for RA 9346, the Court has ruled, as early as
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
July 9, 1998 in People v. Victor,83 that the award of civil indemnity for the
penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
crime of rape when punishable by death should be ₱75,000.00 We reasoned
1. when in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating that "[t]his is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the
circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied. penal law and the financial fluctuations over time, but also an expression of
the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against
chastity."84 Such reasoning also applies to all heinous crimes found in RA result of a single design, the amount of civil indemnity and moral damages
7659. The amount was later increased to ₱100,000.00.85 will depend on the penalty and the number of victims. For each of the victims,
the heirs should be properly compensated. If it is multiple murder without
In addition to this, the Court likewise awards moral damages. In People v.
any ordinary aggravating circumstance but merely a qualifying aggravating
Arizapa,86 ₱50,000.00 was awarded as moral damages without need of
circumstance, but the penalty imposed is death because of Art. 48 of the RPC
pleading or proving them, for in rape cases, it is recognized that the victim's
wherein the maximum penalty shall be imposed,92 then, for every victim who
injury is concomitant with and necessarily results from the odious crime of
dies, the heirs shall be indemnified with ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity,
rape to warrant per se the award of moral damages.87 Subsequently, the
₱100,000.00 as moral damages and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
amount was increased to ₱75,000.00 in People v. Soriano88 and P100,000.00
in People v. Gambao.89 In case of a special complex crime, which is different from a complex crime
under Article 48 of the RPC, the following doctrines are noteworthy:
Essentially, despite the fact that the death penalty cannot be imposed
because of RA 9346, the imposable penalty as provided by the law for the In People of the Philippines v. Conrado Laog,93 this Court ruled that special
crime, such as those found in RA 7569, must be used as the basis for awarding complex crime, or more properly, a composite crime, has its own definition
damages and not the actual penalty imposed.1avvphi1 and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Justice Regalado,
in his Separate Opinion in the case of People v. Barros,94 explained that
Again, for crimes where the imposable penalty is death in view of the
composite crimes are "neither of the same legal basis as nor subject to the
attendance of an ordinary aggravating circumstance but due to the
rules on complex crimes in Article 48 [of the Revised Penal Code], since they
prohibition to impose the death penalty, the actual penalty imposed
do not consist of a single act giving rise to two or more grave or less grave
is reclusion perpetua, the latest jurisprudence90 pegs the amount of
felonies [compound crimes] nor do they involve an offense being a necessary
₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱100,0000.00 as moral damages. For the
means to commit another [complex crime proper]. However, just like the
qualifying aggravating circumstance and/or the ordinary aggravating
regular complex crimes and the present case of aggravated illegal possession
circumstances present, the amount of ₱100,000.00 is awarded as exemplary
of firearms, only a single penalty is imposed for each of such composite
damages aside from civil indemnity and moral damages. Regardless of the
crimes although composed of two or more offenses."95
attendance of qualifying aggravating circumstance, the exemplary damages
shall be fixed at ₱100,000.00. "[T]his is not only a reaction to the apathetic In People v. De Leon,96 we expounded on the special complex crime of
societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuation over time, robbery with homicide, as follows:
but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to
heinous crimes x x x."91
commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of
When the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human
of reclusion perpetua only, there being no ordinary aggravating circumstance, life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery. It is only
the Court rules that the proper amounts should be ₱75,000.00 as civil the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances,
indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages and ₱75,000.00 exemplary causes or modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime that
damages, regardless of the number of qualifying aggravating circumstances has to be taken into consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with
present. homicide through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive
elements of the crime, namely, robbery with homicide, must be
When it comes to compound and complex crimes, although the single act
consummated.
done by the offender caused several crimes, the fact that those were the
It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the of robbery with murder under the Revised Penal Code. Here, treachery forms
victim of homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more part of the circumstances proven concerning the actual commission of the
persons are killed, or that aside from the homicide, rape, intentional complex crime. Logically it could not qualify the homicide to murder but, as
mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on the generic aggravating circumstance, it helps determine the penalty to be
occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of imposed.100
homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would still be robbery with
Applying the above discussion on special complex crimes, if the penalty is
homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on the occasion of the robbery,
death but it cannot be imposed due to RA 9346 and what is actually imposed
the felony committed is robbery with homicide. All the felonies committed
is the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the civil indemnity and moral damages
by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into one and
will be ₱100,000.00 each, and another ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages in
indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word "homicide" is used in
view of the heinousness of the crime and to set an example. If there is another
its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and
composite crime included in a special complex crime and the penalty imposed
infanticide.97
is death, an additional ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 moral
In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term "homicide" is to damages and ₱100,000.00 exemplary damages shall be awarded for each
be understood in its generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical composite crime committed.
injuries committed by reason or on occasion of the rape.98 Hence, even if any
For example, in case of Robbery with Homicide101 wherein three (3) people
or all of the circumstances (treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident
died as a consequence of the crime, the heirs of the victims shall be entitled
premeditation) alleged in the information have been duly established by the
to the award of damages as discussed earlier. This is true, however, only if
prosecution, the same would not qualify the killing to murder and the crime
those who were killed were the victims of the robbery or mere bystanders
committed by appellant is still rape with homicide. As in the case of robbery
and not when those who died were the perpetrators or robbers themselves
with homicide, the aggravating circumstance of treachery is to be considered
because the crime of robbery with homicide may still be committed even if
as a generic aggravating circumstance only. Thus we ruled in People v.
one of the robbers dies.102 This is also applicable in robbery with rape where
Macabales:99
there is more than one victim of rape.
Finally, appellants contend that the trial court erred in concluding that the
In awarding civil indemnity and moral damages, it is also important to
aggravating circumstance of treachery is present. They aver that treachery
determine the stage in which the crime was committed and proven during
applies to crimes against persons and not to crimes against property.
the trial. Article 6 of the RPC provides:
However, we find that the trial court in this case correctly characterized
treachery as a generic aggravating, rather than qualifying, circumstance. Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. - Consummated
Miguel was rendered helpless by appellants in defending himself when his felonies, as well as those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
arms were held by two of the attackers before he was stabbed with a knife
by appellant Macabales, as their other companions surrounded them. A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution
In People v. Salvatierra, we ruled that when alevosia (treachery) obtains in and accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when an offender
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, such treachery is to be performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a
regarded as a generic aggravating circumstance. consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator.
Robbery with homicide is a composite crime with its own definition and
special penalty in the Revised Penal Code. There is no special complex crime There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a
felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution
which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other civil indemnity and damages. If a victim suffered mortal wounds and could
than his own spontaneous desistance. have died if not for a timely medical intervention, the victim should be
awarded civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages equivalent
As discussed earlier, when the crime proven is consummated and the penalty
to the damages awarded in a frustrated stage, and if a victim suffered injuries
imposed is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of R.A. 9346, the
that are not fatal, an award of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary
civil indemnity and moral damages that should be awarded will each be
damages should likewise be awarded equivalent to the damages awarded in
₱100,000.00 and another ₱100,000.00 for exemplary damages or when the
an attempted stage.
circumstances of the crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only,
the civil indemnity and moral damages should be ₱75,000.00 each, as well as In other crimes that resulted in the death of a victim and the penalty consists
exemplary damages in the amount of ₱75,000.00. If, however, the crime of divisible penalties, like homicide, death under tumultuous affray, reckless
proven is in its frustrated stage, the civil indemnity and moral damages that imprudence resulting to homicide, the civil indemnity awarded to the heirs of
should be awarded will each be ₱50,000.00, and an award of ₱25,000.00 civil the victim shall be ₱50,000.00 and ₱50,000.00 moral damages without
indemnity and ₱25,000.00 moral damages when the crime proven is in its exemplary damages being awarded. However, an award of ₱50,000.00
attempted stage. The difference in the amounts awarded for the stages is exemplary damages in a crime of homicide shall be added if there is an
mainly due to the disparity in the outcome of the crime committed, in the aggravating circumstance present that has been proven but not alleged in the
same way that the imposable penalty varies for each stage of the crime. The information.
said amounts of civil indemnity and moral damages awarded in cases of
Aside from those discussed earlier, the Court also awards temperate damages
felonies in their frustrated or attempted stages shall be the bases when the
in certain cases. The award of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages in homicide
crimes committed constitute complex crime under Article 48 of the RPC. For
or murder cases is proper when no evidence of burial and funeral expenses is
example, in a crime of murder with attempted murder, the amount of civil
presented in the trial court.104 Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate
indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages is ₱100,000.00 each,
damages may be recovered, as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the
while in the attempted murder, the civil indemnity, moral damages and
victims suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not
exemplary damages is ₱25,000.00 each.
proved.105 In this case, the Court now increases the amount to be awarded as
In a special complex crime, like robbery with homicide, if, aside from temperate damages to ₱50,000.00.
homicide, several victims (except the robbers) sustained injuries, they shall
In the case at bar, the crimes were aggravated by dwelling, and the murders
likewise be indemnified. It must be remembered that in a special complex
committed were further made atrocious by the fact that the victims are
crime, unlike in a complex crime, the component crimes have no attempted
innocent, defenseless minors – one is a mere 3½-year-old toddler, and the
or frustrated stages because the intention of the offender/s is to commit the
other a 13-year-old girl. The increase in the amount of awards for damages is
principal crime which is to rob but in the process of committing the said
befitting to show not only the Court's, but all of society's outrage over such
crime, another crime is committed. For example, if on the occasion of a
crimes and wastage of lives.
robbery with homicide, other victims sustained injuries, regardless of the
severity, the crime committed is still robbery with homicide as the injuries In summary:
become part of the crime, "Homicide", in the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide, is understood in its generic sense and now forms part I. For those crimes106 like, Murder,107 Parricide,108 Serious Intentional
of the essential element of robbery,103 which is the use of violence or the use Mutilation,109 Infanticide,110 and other crimes involving death of a victim
of force upon anything. Hence, the nature and severity of the injuries where the penalty consists of indivisible penalties:
sustained by the victims must still be determined for the purpose of awarding
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is death but reduced to reclusion i. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00
perpetua because of RA 9346:
ii. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
II. For Simple Rape/Qualified Rape:
c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion
1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated: perpetua because of RA 9346:

a. Frustrated: a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00

i. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00 b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00

ii. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00 c. Exemplary damages111 – ₱100,000.00

iii. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00 1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated but merely
attempted:112
b. Attempted:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
i. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
ii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-
2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-
mentioned:
mentioned:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, but merely
2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:
attempted:
a. Frustrated:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00
i. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
III. For Complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code where
b. Attempted: death, injuries, or sexual abuse results, the civil indemnity, moral damages
and exemplary damages will depend on the penalty, extent of violence and b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
sexual abuse; and the number of victims where the penalty consists of
c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00
indivisible penalties:
In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is the same
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion
as the above if the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion
perpetua because of RA 9346:
perpetua although death did not occur.
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
1.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds125 and could have died
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00 if not for a timely medical intervention, the following shall be awarded:

c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00 a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00

1.2 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above- b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
mentioned:
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
1.3 For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
The above Rules apply to every victim who dies as a result of the crime
c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
committed. In other complex crimes where death does not result, like in
Forcible Abduction with Rape, the civil indemnity, moral and exemplary 2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-
damages depend on the prescribed penalty and the penalty imposed, as the mentioned:
case may be.
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
IV. For Special Complex Crimes like Robbery with Homicide,113 Robbery with
Rape,114 Robbery with Intentional Mutilation,115 Robbery with b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00

Arson,116 Rape with Homicide,117 Kidnapping with Murder,118 Carnapping c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
with Homicide119 or Carnapping with Rape,120 Highway Robbery with In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is the same
Homicide,121 Qualified Piracy,122 Arson with Homicide,123 Hazing with Death, as the above if the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua.
Rape, Sodomy or Mutilation124 and other crimes with death, injuries, and
sexual abuse as the composite crimes, where the penalty consists of 2.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds and could have died if
indivisible penalties: not for a timely medical intervention, the following shall be awarded:

1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
perpetua because of RA 9346: b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00 c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
2.3 For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries: b. Attempted:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00 i. Civil indemnity – ₱20,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00 ii. Moral damages – ₱20,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00 If an aggravating circumstance was proven during the trial, even if not alleged
in the Information,128 in addition to the above mentioned amounts as civil
In Robbery with Physical Injuries,126 the amount of damages shall likewise be
indemnity and moral damages, the amount of ₱50,000.00 exemplary
dependent on the nature/severity of the wounds sustained, whether fatal or
damages for consummated; ₱30,000.00 for frustrated; and ₱20,000.00 for
non-fatal.
attempted, shall be awarded.
The above Rules do not apply if in the crime of Robbery with Homicide, the
VI. A. In the crime of Rebellion where the imposable penalty is reclusion
robber/s or perpetrator/s are themselves killed or injured in the
perpetua and death occurs in the course of the rebellion, the heirs of those
incident.1âwphi1
who died are entitled to the following:129
Where the component crime is rape, the above Rules shall likewise apply, and
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
that for every additional rape committed, whether against the same victim or
other victims, the victims shall be entitled to the same damages unless the b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
other crimes of rape are treated as separate crimes, in which case, the
c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00130
damages awarded to simple rape/qualified rape shall apply.
B. For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds in the course of the
V. In other crimes that result in the death of a victim and the penalty consists
rebellion and could have died if not for a timely medical intervention, the
of divisible penalties, i.e., Homicide, Death under Tumultuous Affray,
following shall be awarded:
Infanticide to conceal the dishonour of the offender,127 Reckless Imprudence
Resulting to Homicide, Duel, Intentional Abortion and Unintentional a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
Abortion, etc.:
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
1.1 Where the crime was consummated:
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
C. For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, except those crimes
where there are no stages, i.e., Reckless Imprudence and Death under b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
tumultuous affray: c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
a. Frustrated: VII. In all of the above instances, when no documentary evidence of burial or
i. Civil indemnity – ₱30,000.00 funeral expenses is presented in court, the amount of ₱50,000.00 as
temperate damages shall be awarded.
ii. Moral damages – ₱30,000.00
To reiterate, Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that the minimum amount After all, such reinvestigation would not subject Estores and San Miguel to
for awards of civil indemnity is P3,000.00, but does not provide for a ceiling. double jeopardy because the same only attaches if the following requisites
Thus, although the minimum amount cannot be changed, increasing the are present: (1) a first jeopardy has attached before the second; (2) the first
amount awarded as civil indemnity can be validly modified and increased jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the
when the present circumstance warrants it.131 same offense as in the first. In turn, a first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a
valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d)
Prescinding from the foregoing, for the two (2) counts of murder, attended
when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has been
by the ordinary aggravating circumstance of dwelling, appellant should be
acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated
ordered to pay the heirs of the victims the following damages: (1)
without his express consent.133 In this case, the case against Estores and San
₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity for each of the two children who died; (2)
Miguel was dismissed before they were arraigned. Thus, there can be no
₱100,000.00 as moral damages for each of the two victims; (3) another
double jeopardy to speak of. Let true justice be served by reinvestigating the
₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages for each of the two victims; and (4)
real participation, if any, of Estores and San Miguel in the killing of Mary Grace
temperate damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 for each of the two
and Claudine Divina.
deceased. For the four (4) counts of Attempted Murder, appellant should pay
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱50,000.00 WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of
as exemplary damages for each of the four victims. In addition, the civil Appeals dated January 30, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03252
indemnity, moral damages, exemplary damages and temperate damages is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
payable by the appellant are subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%)
(1) In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, the Court finds accused-appellant Ireneo
per annum from the finality of this decision until fully paid.132
Jugueta GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of the crime of
Lastly, this Court echoes the concern of the trial court regarding the dismissal murder defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, attended by the
of the charges against Gilberto Estores and Roger San Miguel who had been aggravating circumstance of dwelling, and hereby sentences him to suffer
identified by Norberto Divina as the companions of appellant on the night the two (2) terms of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole under R.A.
shooting occurred. Norberto had been very straightforward and unwavering 9346. He is ORDERED to PAY the heirs of Mary Grace Divina and Claudine
in his identification of Estores and San Miguel as the two other people who Divina the following amounts for each of the two victims: (a) ₱100,000.00 as
fired the gunshots at his family. More significantly, as noted by the civil indemnity; (b) ₱100,000.00 as moral damages; (c) ₱100,000.00 as
prosecutor, the testimonies of Estores and San Miguel, who insisted they exemplary damages; and (d) ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages.
were not at the crime scene, tended to conflict with the sworn statement of
(2) In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, the Court finds accused-appellant Ireneo
Danilo Fajarillo, which was the basis for the Provincial Prosecutor's ruling that
Jugueta GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of the crime of
he finds no probable cause against the two. Danilo Fajarillo's sworn
attempted murder defined and penalized under Article 248 in relation to
statement said that on June 6, 2002, he saw appellant with a certain "Hapon"
Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, attended by the aggravating
and Gilbert Estores at the crime scene, but it was only appellant who was
circumstance of dwelling, and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate
carrying a firearm and the two other people with him had no participation in
penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
the shooting incident. Said circumstances bolster the credibility of Norberto
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
Divina's testimony that Estores and San Miguel may have been involved in
mayor, as maximum, for each of the four (4) counts of attempted murder. He
the killing of his two young daughters.
is ORDERED to PAY moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, civil
indemnity of P50,000.00 and exemplary damages of PS0,000.00 to each of
the four victims, namely, Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina
and Judy Ann Divina.

(3) Accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta is also ORDERED to PAY interest at the


rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the time of finality of this decision
until fully paid, to be imposed on the civil indemnity, moral damages,
exemplary damages and temperate damages.

(4) Let the Office of the Prosecutor General, through the Department of
Justice, be FURNISHED a copy of this Decision. The Prosecutor General
is DIRECTED to immediately conduct a REINVESTIGATION on the possible
criminal liability of Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel regarding this case.
Likewise, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Secretary of Justice for
his information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

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