ordering his client to permit the buyers to pay the balance of the purchase price of
VERLEEN TRINIDAD v. ATTY. ANGELITO VILLARIN, AC. No. 9310, 2013-02-
27
Facts:
The instant case stemmed from a Complaint for specific performance filed with the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) by the buyers of the lots in Don
Jose Zavalla Subdivision against the subdivision's owner and developer Purence
Realty Corporation and Roberto
Bassig.
In the final adjudication of that case on 11 October 2000, the HLURB ordered the
respondents therein to accept the payments of the buyers under the old purchase
price.
The HLURB ordered the owner and the developer to deliver the Deeds of Sale and
the Transfer Certificates of Title to the winning litigants. The Decision did not evince
any directive for the buyers to vacate the property.
Purence Realty and Roberto Bassig did not appeal the Decision, thus making it final
and executory. Thereafter, the HLURB issued a Writ of Execution.[1] It was at this
point that respondent Villarin entered his special appearance to represent Purence
Realty.[2] Specifically, he filed an Omnibus Motion to set aside the Decision and to
quash the Writ of Execution[3] for being null and void on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction due to the improper service of summons on his client.
respondent sent demand letters to herein complainants.[5] In all of these letters, he
demanded that they immediately vacate the property and surrender it to Purence
Realty
Purence Realty, as represented by respondent, filed a Complaint for forcible entry
before the Municipal Trial Court
Aggrieved, the four complainants filed an administrative case against
respondent.[10] A month after, Alojado, Villamin and Tolentino filed a disbarment
case against respondent
As found by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)[12] and affirmed by its Board
of Governors,[13] complainants asserted in their respective verified Complaints that
the demand letters sent by Villarin had been issued with malice... and intent to
harass them. They insisted that the letters also contravened the HLURB Decision
the subdivision lots.
Issues:
whether respondent should be administratively sanctioned for sending the demand
letters despite a final and executory HLURB Decision directing, not the ejectment of
complainants, but the payment of the purchase price of the... lots by the subdivision
buyers.
Ruling:
the issuance thereof was not malicious.
respondent counsel merely acted on his legal theory... that the HLURB Decision was
not binding on his client, since it had not received the summons. Espousing the
belief that the proceedings in the HLURB were void, Villarin pursued the issuance
of demand letters as a prelude to the ejectment case he would later on file to
protect... the property rights of his client.
As the lawyer of Purence Realty, respondent is expected to champion the cause of
his client with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion.[19] This simply means that
his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense[20] including
the institution of an ejectment case that is recognized by our property laws.
Nevertheless, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides the limitation that
lawyers shall perform their duty to the client within the bounds of law.[22] They
should only make such defense only when they believe it to be honestly debatable
under the... law.[23] In this case, respondent's act of issuing demand letters, moved
by the understanding of a void HLURB Decision, is legally sanctioned. If his theory
holds water, the notice to vacate becomes necessary in order to file an action for...
ejectment.[24] Hence, he did not resort to any fraud or chicanery prohibited by the
Code,[25] just to maintain his client's disputed ownership over the subdivision lots.
Even so, respondent cannot be considered free of error. The factual findings of the
IBP board of governors reveal that in his demand letter, he brazenly typified one of
the complainants, Florentina Lander, as an illegal occupant. However, this
description is the exact opposite... of the truth, since the final and executory HLURB
Decision had already recognized her as a subdivision lot buyer who had a right to
complete her payments in order to occupy her property.
Given that respondent knew that the aforementioned falsity totally disregarded the
HLURB Decision, he thus advances the interest of his client through means that are
not in keeping with fairness and honesty. What he does is clearly proscribed by Rule
19.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which requires that a lawyer shall employ only fair and
honest means to attain lawful objectives. Lawyers must not present and offer in
evidence any document that they know is false.

the penalty of reprimand with a stern warning is appropriate.

JOHNNY M. PESTO, complainant, vs. MARCELITO M. MILLO, respondent.

(ADM. CASE NO. 9612. March 13, 2013.)

FACTS:

Johnny Pesto, a Canadian national, charged Atty. Marcelito M. Millo with conduct
unbecoming an officer of the Court, misleading his client, bungling the transfer of
title, and incompetence and negligence in the performance of his duty as a lawyer.
Johnny averred that his wife Abella retained the services of Atty. Millo to handle the
transfer of title over a parcel of land to her name, and the adoption of her niece; that
among other transgressions, Atty. Millo repeatedly gave them false information to
explain his inability to complete the transfer of title; that Atty. Millo likewise made
them believe that the tax for the property had been paid, but they found out that he
had not yet paid the tax. Likewise, Johnny blamed Atty. Millo for letting the adoption
case be considered closed due to two years of inaction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Millo violated Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

HELD:

Yes. The Supreme Court stated that Atty. Millo’s acceptance of the sums of money
from Johnny and Abella to enable him to attend to the transfer of title and to complete
the adoption case initiated the lawyer-client relationship between them. From that
moment on, Atty. Millo assumed the duty to render professional service to them as
his clients. Yet, he failed to discharge his duty. He was inefficient and negligent in
going about what the professional service he had assumed required him to do. The
Supreme Court further explained that Atty. Millo had the obligation to serve his
clients with competence and diligence. Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, expressly so demanded of him, to wit:
CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
The Court held Atty. Millo guilty of violating Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer’s Oath and suspended him from the
practice of law for a period of six months.
 Ramirez v. Bagayang-Margallo
A.C. No. 10537
February 3, 2015
Facts:
Complainant Reynaldo Ramirez (Ramirez) engaged Atty. Margallo’s services
as legal counsel in a civil case for Quieting of Title entitled “Spouses Roque v.
Ramirez.” According to Ramirez, Atty. Margallo contacted him as per a referral
from a friend of Ramirez’s sister. He alleged that Atty. Margallo had offered
her legal services on the condition that she be given 30% of the land subject
of the controversy instead of attorney’s fees. It was also agreed upon that
Ramirez would pay Atty. Margallo P1,000.00 per court appearance.
On October 19, 2006, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision
adverse to Ramirez. Atty. Margallo advised him to appeal the judgment. She
committed to file the Appeal before the Court of Appeals. The Appeal was
perfected and the records were sent to the Court of Appeals sometime in 2008.
On December 5, 2008, the Court of Appeals directed Ramirez to file his
Appellant’s Brief. Ramirez notified Atty. Margallo, who replied that she would
have one prepared.
On January 8, 2009, Ramirez contacted Atty. Margallo to follow up on the
Appellant’s Brief. Atty. Margallo informed him that he needed to meet her to
sign the documents necessary for the brief. On several occasions, Ramirez
followed up on the status of the brief, but he was told that there was still no
word from the Court of Appeals.
On August 26, 2009, Atty. Margallo informed Ramirez that his Appeal had
been denied. She told him that the Court of Appeals’ denial was due to
Ramirez’s failure to establish his filiation with his alleged father, which was the
basis of his claim. She also informed him that they could no longer appeal to
this court since the Decision of the Court of Appeals had been promulgated
and the reglementary period for filing an Appeal had already lapsed. Ramirez
went to the Court of Appeals. There, he discovered that the Appellant’s Brief
was filed on April 13, 2009 with a Motion for Reconsideration and Apologies
for filing beyond the reglementary period.
Ramirez alleged that Atty. Margallo had violated Canon 17 and Canon 18,
Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
By way of defense, Atty. Margallo argued that she had agreed to take on the
case for free, save for travel expense of P1,000.00 per hearing. She also
claimed that she had candidly informed Ramirez and his mother that they only
had a 50% chance of winning the case. She denied ever having entered into
an agreement regarding the contingent fee worth 30% of the value of the land
subject of the controversy. Atty. Margallo asserted that she would not have
taken on the Appeal except that the mother of Ramirez had begged her to do
so. She claimed that when she instructed Ramirez to see her for document
signing on January 8, 2009, he ignored her. When he finally showed up on
March 2009, he merely told her that he had been busy. Her failure to
immediately inform Ramirez of the unfavorable Decision of the Court of
Appeals was due to losing her client’s number because her 8-year-old
daughter played with her phone and accidentally erased all her contacts.
The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and
approved the recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline. The
Board of Governors resolved to recommend a penalty of reprimand to Atty.
Margallo with a stern warning that repetition of the same or similar act shall be
dealt with more severely.
Issue: Whether Atty. Margallo should be held administratively liable?
Held:
Yes, Atty. Mercedes Buhayang-Margallo’s (Atty. Margallo) inaction resulted in
a lost appeal, terminating the case of her client not on the merits but due to
her negligence. She made it appear that the case was dismissed on the merits
when, in truth, she failed to file the Appellant’s Brief on time. She did not
discharge her duties of candor to her client.
Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility clearly provide:
CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT
AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE
REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE
AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection there with shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case
and shall respond within a reasonable time to client’s request for information.
Respondent Atty. Margallo was unjustifiably remiss in her duties as legal
counsel to Ramirez. The lack of communication and coordination between
respondent Atty. Margallo and her client was palpable but was not due to the
lack of diligence of her client. This cost complainant Ramirez his entire case
and left him with no appellate remedies. His legal cause was orphaned not
because a court of law ruled on the merits of his case, but because a person
privileged to act as counsel failed to discharge her duties with the requisite
diligence. Her assumption that complainant Ramirez was no longer interested
to pursue the Appeal is a poor excuse. There was no proof that she exerted
efforts to communicate with her client. This is an admission that she
abandoned her obligation as counsel on the basis of an assumption.
Respondent Atty. Margallo failed to exhaust all possible means to protect
complainant Ramirez’s interest, which is contrary to what she had sworn to do
as a member of the legal profession. For these reasons, she clearly violated
Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
EDUARDO A. MAGLENTE,*Complainant, v. ATTY. DELFIN R. AGCAOILI,
JR., Respondent. A.C. No. 10672, March 18, 2015
COMPLAINANTS’ CONTENTION:
Complainant, as President of “Samahan ng mga Maralitang Taga Ma. Corazon
III, Incorporated”(Samahan), alleged that he engaged the services of
respondent for the purpose of filing a case in order to determine the true owner
of the land being occupied by the members of Samahan.2 In connection
therewith, he gave respondent the aggregate amount of P48,000.00 intended
to cover the filing fees for the action to be instituted, as evidenced by a written
acknowledgment executed by respondent himself.3 Despite the payment,
respondent failed to file an action in court. When confronted, respondent
explained that the money given to him was not enough to fully pay for the filing
fees in court.4Thus, complainant asked for the return of the money, but
respondent claimed to have spent the same and even demanded more
money.5 Complainant further alleged that when he persisted in seeking
restitution of the aforesaid sum, respondent told him to shut up because it was
not his money in the first place.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:
Respondent denied spending complainant’s money, explaining that he had
already prepared the initiatory pleading and was poised to file the same, when
he discovered through the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo
City that the filing fee was quite costly. This prompted him to immediately relay
such information to complainant who undertook to raise the amount needed.
While waiting, however, the instant administrative case was filed against him.
IBP-CBD RECOMMENDATION:
Atty. Agcaoili is guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), and accordingly, recommended that he be: (a) meted
with the penalty of Censure, with a warning that a repetition of the same will
be met with a stiffer penalty; and (b) directed to account for or return the
amount of P48,000.00 to complainant.
IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS:
It increased the recommended penalty from Censure to suspension from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) months.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
Atty. Agcaoili is found GUILTY of violating Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of Canon
16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the CPR. Accordingly, he is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective
upon his receipt of the SC Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition
of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. He was also
ordered to return to complainant Eduardo A. Maglente the amount of
P48,000.00 he received from the latter within ninety (90) days from the finality
of this Decision.
It must be stressed that once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is
duty-bound to serve the latter with competence, and to attend to such client’s
cause with diligence, care, and devotion, whether he accepts it for a fee or for
free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed upon him.16 Therefore, a lawyer’s neglect of a legal
matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for
which he must be held administratively liable for violating Rule 18.03, Canon
18 of the CPR.
The lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the
money was spent for the intended purpose when a lawyer receives money
from the client for a particular purpose. Consequently, if the money was not
used accordingly, the same must be immediately returned to the client. A
lawyer’s failure to return the money to his client despite numerous demands is
a violation of the trust reposed on him and is indicative of his lack of integrity,
as in this case.
It is well to note that “while the Court has previously held that disciplinary
proceedings should only revolve around the determination of the respondent-
lawyer’s administrative and not his civil liability, it must be clarified that this rule
remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil in nature –
for instance, when the claim involves moneys received by the lawyer from his
client in a transaction separate and distinct [from] and not intrinsically linked to
his professional engagement. Since the aforesaid amount was intended to
answer for filing fees which is intimately related to the lawyer-client relationship
between complainant and respondent, the Court finds the return thereof to be
in order.
APPLICABLE CPR:
CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE
AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and
his negligence in connection [therewith] shall render him liable.
CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND
PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.
Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when
due or upon demand.
 RE: DECISION DATED AUGUST 19, 2008, 3RD DIVISION, COURT OF
APPEALS IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 79904 [HON. DIONISIO DONATO T.
GARCIANO, ET AL. V. HON. PATERNO G. TIAMSON, ETC., ET AL.],
Petitioner, v. ATTY. JOSE DE G. FERRER, Respondent.
On July 27, 2001, Dionisio Donato T. Garciano (Garciano), then Mayor of
Baras, Rizal, sought to appoint Rolando Pilapil Lacayan (Lacayan) as
Sangguniang Bayan Secretary, replacing Nolasco Vallestero (Vallestero).[7]
The appointment was opposed by Wilfredo Robles (Robles), then Vice Mayor
of Baras, Rizal. He said that the position is not vacant and that it is the vice
mayor, not the mayor, who has the authority[8] to appoint the Sangguniang
Bayan Secretary.
Garciano insisted and removed Vallestero's name from the payroll. Vallestero
sued Garciano before the Sandiganbayan. Vallestero, Robles, and other
Sangguniang Bayan members also filed a "complaint for mandamus and
damages with preliminary mandatory injunction"against Garciano and other
municipal officials (Garciano, et al.) before the Regional Trial Court of Morong,
Rizal. They sought for the payment of their respective salaries.
On June 24, 2003, the Regional Trial Court ordered Garciano, et al. to release
the funds and pay Vallestero's salaries and other benefits. Garciano, et al. did
not heed the Regional Trial Court's order; hence, they were found liable for
indirect contempt.
Appealing the trial court's ruling, Garciano, et al., through their counsel, Atty.
Ferrer, filed a Petition for Certiorari (First Petition) on October 9, 2003 before
the Court of Appeals. This was raffled to the Eleventh Division[19] and was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 79752.
On October 16, 2003, Garciano, et al., through Atty. Ferrer, filed another
Petition for Certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order (Second Petition) before the
Court of Appeals. This was raffled to the Third Division and was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 79904.
On the same day, Garciano, et al. filed before the Court of Appeals Eleventh
Division an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Withdraw Petition Under Rule 17
Section 1[of the Revised Rules of Court.[25] They allegedly moved to withdraw
the First Petition to avail themselves of other remedies, especially since a
comment had not yet been filed.
On October 17, 2003, the Court of Appeals Third Division issued a temporary
restraining order, effective for 60 days and conditioned upon the posting of a
bond amounting to P100,000.00.
Meanwhile, in its Resolution dated October 24, 2003, the Court of Appeals
Eleventh Division granted Garciano, et al.'s Motion to withdraw the First
Petition.
In their Reply to the Comment on the Second Petition, Garciano, et al. admitted
filing the First Petition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 79752, which was similar
to the Second Petition.[30] However, they maintained that the withdrawal of
the First Petition was made in good faith and in order to correct the technical
defect of the First Petition, which was solely verified by Garciano.
Garciano, et al. insisted that they did not commit perjury when they stated in
the verification of their Second Petition that there was no pending petition filed
involving the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court.[32] Garciano, et al.
also argued that when they withdrew the First Petition, there was no adverse
opinion yet issued by the Eleventh Division.[33] Finally, they claimed that the
divisions of the Court of Appeals are not different courts in relation to the other
divisions, and both divisions where the Petition were filed are part and parcel
of one court. Hence, there was no forum shopping.
Issue:
Whether respondent Atty. Jose De G. Ferrer should be held administratively
liable for violating the rule against forum shopping.
Held:
We affirm the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the Report and
Recommendation of Commissioner Hababag. Respondent is guilty of violating
the rule against forum shopping.
Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides the rule against forum
shopping:
Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. — The plaintiff or principal party
shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a
claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously
filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed
any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial
agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is
pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete
statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn
that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall
report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid
complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for
the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon
motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-
compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect
contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and
criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful
and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary
dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a
cause for administrative sanctions.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jose De G. Ferrer is hereby SUSPENDED

from the practice of law for six (6) months for engaging in forum shopping,
effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same and similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
AVIDA LAND CORPORATION v. ATTY. AL C. ARGOSINO, AC. No. 7437,
2016-08-17
Facts:
Complainant is a Philippine corporation engaged in the development and sale
of subdivision houses and lots.[6] Respondent was counsel for Rodman
Construction & Development Corporation (Rodman).
Complainant entered into a Contract to Sell with Rodman,[8] under which the
latter was to acquire from the former a subdivision house and lot in Santa
Rosa, Laguna through bank financing. In the event that such financing would
be disapproved, Rodman was supposed to pay the full contract price of
P4,412,254.00, less the downpayment of P1,323,676.20, within 15 days from
its receipt of the loan disapproval.[9]
After settling the downpayment, Rodman took possession of the
property.[10]In three separate letters[11], complainant demanded that
Rodman pay the outstanding balance of P3,088,577.80.[12] Both parties
agreed that the amount would be paid on a deferred basis within 18 months.[
Rodman made a partial payment... to P1,458,765.06 from March 1999 to July
1999, which complainant disputed.[
Consequently, complainant rescinded the Contract to Sell by notarial act, and
demanded that Rodman vacate the subject property.[15]As Rodman remained
in possession of the property,[16] complainant filed an unlawful detainer case
against the former before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Makati City.[17]
Rodman filed a Complaint before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) seeking the nullification of the rescission of the Contract to Sell. It
also prayed for the accounting of payments and the fixing of the period upon
which the balance of the purchase price should be paid.
The MTC took cognizance of Rodman's HLURB Complaint, and dismissed the
unlawful detainer case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.[19]
HLURB Regional Office No. IV (HLURB Regional Office), through its arbiter
Atty. Ma. Perpetua Y. Aquino, similarly dismissed Rodman's Complaint and
ordered it to pay damages and attorney's fees.[20] Rodman appealed the
ruling to the HLURB Board of Commissioners (HLURB Board).[21]
In its subsequent Decision,[22] the HLURB Board modified the arbiter's ruling,
directing Rodman "to immediately pay its outstanding balance failing in which
respondent shall have the right to rescind the contract subject to a refund of
all the sums paid by complainant less deductions as may be stipulated in the
contract and less monthly... compensation for the use of the premises at the
rate of 1% of the contract price per month."[23]
Complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration[24] of the HLURB Board's
Decision, questioning the order to refund the sums paid by Rodman less
deductions in case of a rescission of the contract. Rodman filed a
Comment/Opposition[25] to complainant's motion and sought a clarification of
certain aspects of the Decision,[26] but did not move for reconsideration.
The HLURB Board thereafter issued a Resolution[27] modifying its earlier
Decision... complainant (Rodman) is directed to immediately pay to the
respondent (herein complainant) its outstanding balance of P1,814,513.27,
including interests and penalties... failing in which, the respondent shall have
the right to rescind the contract subject to a refund of all the sums paid by the
complainant less deductions as may be stipulated in the contract and less
monthly compensation for the use of the premise... neither of the parties
appealed the judgment within the period allowed, it became final and
executory.
The parties thereafter attempted to arrive at a settlement on the judgment, but
their efforts were in vain.[28] With the judgment award still not satisfied after
the lapse of six months, complainant filed a motion for writs of execution and
possession[29] before the HLURB Board.
Respondent filed an Opposition/Comment on the motion and subsequently a
Rejoinder[30] to complainant's Reply.[
HLURB Board granted complainant's motion and remanded the case records
to the HLURB Regional Office for proceedings on the execution of the
judgment and/or other appropriate disposition.
Respondent moved for reconsideration of the Order... issues on the
computation of interests. Complainant filed an Opposition[34] and
Rejoinder,[35] to which respondent filed a Reply[36] and Sur-rejoinder.[37]
Board issued an Order[38] denying Rodman's Motion for Reconsideration...
respondent filed a Motion for Computation of Interest[40] before the HLURB
Regional Office,... Complainant filed its Opposition with Motion for Issuance of
Writ of Execution and Possession.
HLURB Regional Office accordingly computed the interest due, arriving at the
total amount of P2,685,479.64 as payment due to complainant. It also directed
the issuance of a Writ of Execution implementing the HLURB Board's earlier
Resolution.[43]
Instead however of complying with the Order and the Writ of Execution,[44]
respondent, on behalf of Rodman, filed a Motion (1) to Quash... the Writ of
Execution; (2) for Clarification; and (3) to Set the Case for Confere
Conference... said motion injected new issues and claims and demanded the
inclusion in the Order of a "provision that upon actual receipt of the amount of
P2,685,479.64, [complainant] should simultaneously turn-over the duplicate
original title to Rodman." (Emphasis omitted)
Respondent also filed a Petition[46] to Cite Complainant in Contempt for
issuing a demand letter to Rodman despite the pendency of the latter's Motion
to Quash the Writ of Execution.
the HLURB Regional Office summoned the parties to a conference to thresh
out the problems with the execution of the writ. The conference, however,
failed to serve its purpose.
Respondent thereafter moved for the inhibition of Atty. Aquino as arbiter of the
case and for the setting of a hearing on the Petition to Cite Complainant in
Contempt.[47] The motion alleged that Arbiter Aquino had shown bias in favor
of complainant, and that she had failed to set the Petition for hearing.[48]
HLURB Regional Office (1) denied the motion for inhibition; (2) granted
complainant's Motion for Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution and Writ of
Possession; and (3) directed complainant to comment on the Petition citing
the latter for contempt.
Respondent moved for reconsideration of the aforementioned Order,
reiterating that Arbiter Aquino should inhibit herself from the case because of
her bias. Arbiter Aquino eventually yielded and ordered the re-raffle of the
case, which went to Arbiter Raymundo A. Foronda.
When complainant filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve Pending Motion
for the Issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution, respondent submitted his
vehement Opposition.
He insisted that his Motion to be Furnished with Notice of Re-raffle should be
acted upon firs... and argued that "the merits of the instant case as well as the
motions filed in relation thereto must be re-evaluated by the new handling
arbiter after the re-raffling... respondent filed a Manifestation on the Notice of
Conference issued by Arbiter Foronda. The Manifestation stated that Rodman
would be attending the conference, not to submit itself to the jurisdiction of
Arbiter Foronda, but to facilitate the re-raffling of the case.
respondent filed a Motion for Inhibition against Arbiter Foronda, claiming that
his designation violated due process. He said the re-raffle was questionable
because he was not notified of its conduct despite his earlier Motion to be
Furnished with Notice of Re-raffle.
the parties submitted various pleadings on the issue of whether or not Arbiter
Foronda could rule on the pending motions.
Arbiter Foronda held that (1) the notice of re-raffle was not an indispensable
prerequisite for a substitute arbiter to have jurisdiction over a case at the
execution stage; (2) the claim of
Rodman that its Motion for Reconsideration of the 23 April 2008 Order had
remained unresolved was rendered moot by Arbiter Aquino's eventual
inhibition from the case; and (3) Rodman's prayer for the... summary dismissal
of complainant's motions to resolve the Motion for the Issuance of an Alias
Writ of Execution was denied
Resolution put an end to the long-drawn-out dispute, as respondent did not file
any more pleadings.
On 21 February 2007, in the midst of the squabble over the HLURB case,
complainant - through its vice president for project development Steven J. Dy
- filed a Complaint-Affidavit[50] against respondent for alleged professional
misconduct and violation of the Lawyer's Oath. The Complaint alleged that
respondent's conduct in relation to the HLURB case manifested a disregard of
the following tenets:[... his Comment,[52] respondent claimed that what
primarily caused the delays in the HLURB case were the legal blunders of
complainant's counsel
Respondent also raised the issue of complainant's counsel's erroneous acts
of notarial rescission and filing of an ejectment suit before the trial court. These
acts allegedly contributed to the delay in the resolution of the dispute.[55]...
argued that he could not have possibly caused delays in the execution of the
Decision dated 22 June 2005 at the time the instant Complaint was filed on 21
February 2007, as complainant filed its Motion for Writ of Execution before the
HLURB Regional Office only in April 2007.[56]... respondent asserted that he
merely followed his legal oath by defending the cause of his client with utmost
dedication, diligence, and good faith.[57]As respondent allegedly continued
performing dilatory and frivolous tactics, complainant filed Supplemental
Complaints[58] against him.
Court referred this case to the IBP for investigation, report, and
recommendation.[... the IBP issued a Resolution adopting and approving the
Investigating Commissioner's Report and Recommendation on the
Complaint.[60] Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration or a petition
within the period allowed.
Respondent is guilty of professional misconduct.

Issues:

The only issue before Us is whether respondent's act of filing numerous

pleadings, that caused delay in the execution of a final judgment, constitutes
professional misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and the Lawyer's Oath

Ruling:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Al C. Argosino is found GUILTY

of violating Rules 10.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and the Lawyer's Oath, for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for one (1) year effective upon the finality of this Resolution. He is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more
severely.
Gloria Jinon vs Atty. Leonardo Jiz
692 SCRA 348 – Legal Ethics – Duty To Return Client’s Fund
FACTS: In 2003, Gloria Jinon engaged the services of Atty. Leonardo Jiz to
help her recover a land title from her sister-in-law. Jinon paid Atty. Jiz
Php17,000.00 as acceptance fee.
After accepting the case, Atty. Jiz sent demand letters to Jinon’s sister-in-law,
collected rents from the tenant of the disputed property, and gave legal advice
to Jinon. At the same time, he asked Php45,000.00 from Jinon which he said
will be used as expenses in the transfer of title. But Atty. Jiz never made a
move to cause the title to be transferred in Jinon’s name.
Eventually, Jinon decided to terminate the services of Atty. Jiz. And since the
title was not transferred in her name, she demanded that Atty. Jiz return the
Php45,000.00 she earlier paid as well as the rents that Atty. Jiz had been
collecting (amounting to Php12,000.00). Atty. Jiz only returned Php5,000.00
from the rent.
Jinon then filed an administrative case against Atty. Jiz. Jinon demanded that
Atty. Jiz return the Php45,000.00, the remaining Php7,000.00 rent, as well as
the Php17,000.00 acceptance fee.
In his defense, Atty. Jiz averred that Jinon agreed that his services will be
worth Php75,000.00; and that his services will only cover the protection of the
rights of Jinon against her sister in law and not for the recovery of title. As
such, deducting the Php45,000.00 and the acceptance fee of Php17,000.00,
Jinon actually still owe Atty. Jiz Php13,000.00.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Leonardo Jiz violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
HELD: Yes, he violated Canons 16 and 18. Atty. Jiz was remiss in his duties
as a lawyer in neglecting his client’s case and misappropriating her fund. The
defense raised by Atty. Jiz cannot be given credence because it appears that
the receipt for the acceptance fee he received from Jinon showed that the
Php17 k was the “full payment”. The receipt was even signed by him. Said
amount is also sufficient to cover the actual legal services he rendered to
Jinon.
Since he was not able to act on the transfer of title, he must return Jinon’s
money. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for the
processing of transfer of land title, but not used for the purpose, should be
immediately returned. A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held
by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has
appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed to him
by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of
professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and
deserves punishment. Atty. Jiz was suspended for two years.
 Sps. San Pedro vs. Atty. Mendoza
Facts:
On or about November 21, 1996, complainants engaged the services of
respondent to facilitate the transfer of title to property, in the name of Isabel
Azcarraga Marcaida, to complainants.2 Complainants then gave respondent
a check for ₱68,250.00 for the payment of transfer taxes.3 They also gave
respondent a check for ₱13,800.00 for respondent’s professional fee.4
Respondent failed to produce the title despite complainants’ repeated follow-
ups.
Several letters were sent by respondent explaining the delay in the transfer of
title.6 However, respondent still failed to produce the title.
Complainants subsequently referred the case to the barangay.7 Respondent
refused to return the amount complainants gave for the transfer taxes.8
Complainants were then issued a certificate to file action.9 They also sent a
letter demanding the refund of the money intended for the transfer taxes.10
Respondent still did not return the money.
Issue: Whether respondent is guilty of violating Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for failing to hold in trust the money of his clients?
Ruling: Yes.
After considering the parties’ arguments and the records of this case, this court
resolves to adopt and approve the Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-839
dated June 22, 2013 of the IBP Board of Governors.
It has been said that "[t]he practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers
who meet the high standards oflegal proficiency and morality. Any conduct that
shows a violation of the norms and values of the legal profession exposes the
lawyer to administrative liability."35
An examination of the records reveals that respondent violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND
PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.
Rule 16.02 – A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart
from his own and those of others kept by him.
Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when
due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may
apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and
disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also
have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured
for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s
interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.
Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of
justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling
for the client.
Similarly, Rule138, Section 25 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt. — When an attorney
unjustly retains in his hands money of his client after it has been demanded,
he may be punished for contempt as an officer of the Court who has
misbehaved in his official transactions; but proceedings under this section
shall not be a bar to a criminal prosecution.
A lawyer’s duty under Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is
clear:
The fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel and client imposes
on a lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received
for or from the client[,] [thus] . . . [w]hen a lawyer collects or receives money
from his client for a particular purpose (such as for filing fees, registration fees,
transportation and office expenses), he should promptly account to the client
how the money was spent. If he does not use the money for its intended
purpose, he must immediately return it to the client. His failure either to render
an accounting or to return the money (if the intended purpose of the money
does not materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
[The lawyer’s] failure to return the client’s money upon demand gives rise to
the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice
of and in violation of the trust reposed in him by the client.
Respondent admitted that there were delays in the transfer of title of property
to complainants’ name.1âwphi1 He continuously assured complainants that
he would still fulfill his duty. However, after three (3) years and several
demands from complainants, respondent failed to accomplish the task given
to him and even refused to return the money. Complainants’ alleged failure to
provide the necessary documents to effect the transfer does not justify his
violation of his duty under the CPR.
 JUN B. LUNA, Complainant, v. ATTY. DWIGHT M. GALARRITA,
Respondent.
Jun B. Luna vs Atty, Dwight M. Galarrita
AC 10662, July 07, 2015
Leonen, J.
Facts: Luna filed an Affidavit-Complaint against his lawyer, Atty. Galarrita
before the IBP. He alleged that he retained Atty. Galarrita’s legal services in
filing a foreclosure complaint against Jose Calvario who allegedly owed him
P100,000 secured by a Real Estate Mortage. After his formal offer of evidence,
Atty. Galarrita opted to enter into a settlement with the other party without
informing him and without delivering to him the settlement proceeds.
When Luna learned of the settlement, he wrote to the respondent stating that
the settlement is beyond what they discussed. Atty. Galarrita replied that he
entered into the settlement because he was certain that it was better than
winning the case and asked for understanding since he had not received any
appearance fee for numerous hearings. Luna mentioned that delay in
retainer’s fee payments was due to Atty. Galarrita’s negligence in handling the
case. The respondent explained that the reason why the case was archived
was because he could not attend several hearings for lack of meal and
transportation allowance going to Gumaca, Quezon, but such fact is moot
because the case was not dismissed by the court.
Luna received a letter from one of the heirs of Jose Calvario, Emma Tayag,
and again from Lutchiare Calvario, regarding the delivery of title since they
paid the P100,000 settlement amount.
In his answer, Atty. Glarrita prays for the dismissal of the disbarment case,
claiming that he entered into the Compromise Agreement by virtue of a Special
Power of Attorney. Also, he added that under their General Retainership
Agreement, Luna shall pay him P4,000 monthly and after 4 years, the client
owes him an unpaid balance of P208,000. He argues for an application of the
rule on retaining lien.
The Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Galarrita guilty of violation Rule
16.03 of the CPR and recommended his suspension from the practice of law
for 1 year. The IBP board of Governors modified the recommendation,
recommending the respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for 6
months and ordered to return the amount of P100,000.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for entering
into a Compromise Agreement without his client’s consent, then refusing to
turn over the settlement proceeds received.
Held: Yes. Complainant Luna entrusted Atty. Galarrita with handling the civil
case involving a mortgaged land in Quezon Province, however, without his
consent, the latter settled the case with the other party. There are compelling
reasons to believe that Luna had not given any authority to enter into a
Compromise Agreement: firstly, Luna was not a party to the Compromise
Agreement despite the fact that he was not abroad when the agreement was
executed; secondly, there was no indication that he had agreed to the amount
of P100,000; thirdly, he was not seasonable informed of the execution of the
Compromise Agreement.
Even if such authority was given, the SPA still cannot justify the Compromise
Agreement on February 14, 2006. The SPA was executed on September 16,
2002 before the filing of the complaint. The conclusion seems to be that the
authority given was to enter into a possible settlement during the preliminary
conference or pre-trial.
Rule 16.03 under Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: A lawyer
shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand.
However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof
as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving
notice promptly thereafter to his client.
The respondent entered into the Compromise Agreement without the client’s
consent and continued to act in bad fait by refusing to turn over the P100,000
settlement amount received. It is not amiss to state that he entered into the
said agreement with the motivation to hold on to it and pave the way for the
payment of his attorney’s fees. In doing so, he violated the trust reposed in him
by his client and violated Rule 16.03.
The CPR allows the lawyer to apply the money retained to satisfy his lawful
fees. However. This provision assumes that the client agrees with the lawyer
as to the amount of the attorney’s fees and as to the application of the client’s
fund to pay his lawful fees and disbursements.
Atty. Galarrita is suspended from the practice of law for 2 years, with a stern
warning. He is ordered to return to the complainant Luna the amount of
P100,000 with legal interest of 6% per annum from February 2006 until fully
paid, without prejudice to the filing of a collection case for retainer’s fee against
complainant Luna.
Violations of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the CPR which prohibits a lawyer from
representing conflicting interests and which enjoins a lawyer to observe
candor, fairness, and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with clients.
 Foronda v. Alvarez A.C. No. 9976, June 25, 2014

Facts: The complainant institute a case for the nullification of her marriage.
The respondent was referred to her and the complainant agreed to engage his
services for a fee of ₱195,000.00. The complainant averred that the
respondent promised to file the petition after he received the full payment of
his attorney’s fee. The complainant inquired about the status of her case and
was allegedly told by the respondent that her petition was pending in court;
and in another time, she was told that a decision by the court was already
forthcoming. However, when she came back to the country in May 2009, the
respondent told her that her petition was still pending in court and apologized
for the delay. Eventually, the complainant was able to get a copy of her petition
and found out that it was filed a year later. The complainant further alleged in
her complaint that the week after she signed the contract of service with the
respondent, the latter requested for a meeting. Thinking that they were going
to discuss her case, she agreed. But during the meeting, the respondent
invited her to be an investor in the lending business allegedly ran by the
respondent’s sister-in-law which he said can earn five percent (5%) interest
per month. According to the complainant, upon presentment of these checks,
the drawee-bank honored the first two (2) checks, but the rest were dishonored
for being drawn against a closed account. When she brought the matter to the
respondent, he promised to pay her in cash. He actually paid her certain
amounts as interest through her representative. Nevertheless, the respondent
failed to pay the entire obligation as promised.

Issue: Whether the delay of filing of the petition and issuance of worthless
check constitute disbarment to the Respondent?

Held: No, the Court finds that the penalty of six months suspension only from
the practice of law is commensurate, with a stem warning that a repetition of
any of the infractions attributed to him in this case, or any similar act, shall
merit a heavier penalty. The Court very well takes note of the fact that the
criminal charges filed against the respondent have been dismissed upon an
affidavit of desistance executed by the complainant. The Court also
acknowledges that he dutifully participated in the proceedings before the IBP-
CBD and that he completely settled his obligation to the complainant, as
evidenced by the Acknowledgment Receipt signed by the complainant’s
counsel. Therein, it was acknowledged that the respondent paid the amount
of ₱650,000.00 in payment for the checks he issued in favor of the
complainant; for the attorney’s fees he received for the annulment case; and
cost and expenses that the complainant incurred in relation to the cases the
latter filed against the respondent including the instant complaint with the IBP.
The respondent was able to file, albeit belatedly, the complainant’s petition. In
addition, he returned in full the money he received as attorney’s fee in spite of
having gone through all the trouble of preparing the required petition and in
filing the same – not to mention the cost he incurred for the purpose.
 NAVARRO & PRESBITERO VS. ATTY. SOLIDUM (2014) A.C. No. 9872
FACTS: Hilda S. Presbitero and Natividad P. Navarro filed a disbarment case
against Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr.
Presbitero and her other daughter, Ma. Theresa P. Yulo, engaged in
the services of Solidum for each of their own cases concerning land. Yulo,
pursuant to her land registration case, convinced Navarro to finance the
expenses. Navarro paid Php200,000 for the registration expenses, but later
learned that the property was already registered in the name of one Teodoro
Yulo.
Meanwhile, Solidum obtained two loans of Php1,000,000.00 from
Navarro and one loan of Php1,000,000.00 to finance his sugar trading
business, securing them with postdated checks and drafting a MOA in each.
Solidum was able to pay complainants a total of Php900,000.00. Thereafter,
he failed to pay either the principal amount or the interest thereon. The checks
issued by Solidum to the complainants could no longer be negotiated because
the accounts against which they were drawn were already closed. When
complainants called Solidum’s attention, he promised to pay the agreed
interest for September and October 2006 but asked for a reduction of the
interest for the succeeding months.
Complainants alleged that Solidum induced them to grant him loans by offering
very high interest rates. He also prepared and signed the checks which turned
out to be drawn against his son’s accounts. Complainants further alleged that
respondent deceived them regarding the identity and value of the property he
mortgaged because he showed them a different property from that which he
owned. Presbitero further alleged that respondent mortgaged his 263-square-
meter property to her for Php1,000,000.00 but he later sold it for only
Php150,000.00.
The IBP-CBD found that respondent was guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility for committing the following acts:
(1) signing drawn checks against the account of his son as if they were
from his own account;
(2) misrepresenting to Navarro the identity of the lot he mortgaged to her;
(3) misrepresenting to Presbitero the true value of the 263-square-meter
lot he mortgaged to her;
(4) conspiring with Yulo to obtain the loans from complainants;
(5) agreeing or promising to pay 10% interest on his loans although he
knew that it was exorbitant; and
(6) failing to pay his loans because the checks he issued were dishonored
as the accounts were already closed.
ISSUE: Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD: Respondent violated at least four provisions: Rule 1.01, Canon 16,
Rule 16.01, and Rule 16.04 of the CPR. Solidum was disbarred from the
practice of law.
Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Respondent agreed to pay a high interest rate on his loan from the
complainants. He drafted the MOA. Yet, when he could no longer pay his loan,
he sought to nullify the same MOA he drafted on the ground that the interest
rate was unconscionable. It was also established that respondent mortgaged
a 263-square-meter property to Presbitero for P1,000,000.00, but he later sold
the property for only P150,000.00, showing that he deceived his client as to
the real value of the mortgaged property. Respondent’s allegation that the sale
was eventually rescinded did not distract from the fact that he did not apprise
Presbitero as to the real value of the property.
Respondent failed to refute that the checks he issued to his client Presbitero
and to Navarro belonged to his son, Ivan Garcia Solidum III whose name is
similar to his name. He only claimed that complainants knew that he could no
longer open a current bank account, and that they even suggested that his
wife or son issue the checks for him. However, we are inclined to agree with
the IBP-CBD’s finding that he made complainants believe that the account
belonged to him. In fact, respondent signed in the presence of Navarro the first
batch of checks he issued to Navarro. Respondent sent the second batch of
checks to Navarro and the third batch of checks to Presbitero through a
messenger, and complainants believed that the checks belonged to accounts
in respondent’s name.
CANON 16. - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND
PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.
Respondent had been negligent in properly accounting for the money he
received from his client, Presbitero. Indeed, his failure to return the excess
money in his possession gives rise to the presumption that he has
misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the
trust reposed in him by, the client.
Rule 16.04. - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s
interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.
Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of
justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling
for the client.
While respondent’s loan from Presbitero was secured by a MOA, postdated
checks and real estate mortgage, it turned out that respondent misrepresented
the value of the property he mortgaged and that the checks he issued were
not drawn from his account but from that of his son. Respondent eventually
questioned the terms of the MOA that he himself prepared on the ground that
the interest rate imposed on his loan was unconscionable. Finally, the checks
issued by respondent to Presbitero were dishonored because the accounts
were already closed. The interest of his client, Presbitero, as lender in this
case, was not fully protected. Respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which presumes that the client is disadvantaged
by the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on his
obligation.6 In his dealings with his client Presbitero, respondent took
advantage of his knowledge of the law as well as the trust and confidence
reposed in him by his client.

Respondent failed to live up to the high standard of morality, honesty, integrity,

and fair dealing required of him as a member of the legal profession. Instead,
respondent employed his knowledge and skill of the law and took advantage
of his client to secure undue gains for himself that warrants his removal from
the practice of law.

Is conduct under Rule 1.01 confined to the performance of a lawyer’s

professional duties? No. A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct
committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his
conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and
good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer
of the court.
 complainant lodged a complaint before the Office of the Punong Barangay of
A.C. No. 7337, September 29, 2014 Brgy. Felisa, Bacolod City. Respondent, however, ignored the summons to
attend a conference before the barangay to resolve the issues.
ROLANDO VIRAY, Complainant, v. ATTY. EUGENIO T.
ATTY. EUGENIO T. SANICAS (Respondent):
SANICAS, Respondent.
He admits that he received P95,000.00 from spouses Lopez on installments,
but denies that he was not authorized to accept it.
FACTS:
Complainant alleges that he engaged the services of respondent relative to a He explains that complainant agreed to pay him additional attorney’s fees
labor case2 he filed against Ester Lopez and Teodoro Lopez III (spouses equivalent to 25% of the total monetary award, on top of the attorney’s fees
Lopez). that may be awarded by the labor tribunal, and to refund all expenses
respondent incurred relative to the case. Thus, from the total award of
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of complainant. Among the order of the court P189,491.60, the sum of P17,226.57 representing respondent’s professional
is also for the Sps. Lopez the complainant the attorney’s fees for the amount fees has to be deducted, leaving a balance of P172,275.13. Then from said
of P17,226.51. amount, complainant proposed that he will get P100,000.00 and the balance
of P72,275.13 shall belong to respondent as and for his additional 25%
Subsequently, an Alias Writ of Execution4 was issued relative to aforesaid attorney’s fees and reimbursement for all expenses he incurred while handling
decision. During the implementation of said writ, however, complainant the case. However, after receiving the amount of P95,000.00 and deducting
discovered that respondent had already collected the total amount of therefrom the amounts of P20,000.007 attorney’s fees, P17,000.00 earlier
P95,000.00 from spouses Lopez. Respondent received said amount in the given to complainant, and P2,000.00 paid to the sheriff, what was left to
following manner: respondent was only P56,000.00. Respondent whines that this amount is way
Date Voucher No. Amount Purpose below the promised 25% attorney’s fees and refund of expenses in the total
02/05/2004 7802 P 20,000.00 Attorney’s fees amount of P72,275.13.
Partial payment for
02/13/2004 7833 10,000.00
judgment INVESTIGATING COMMISSIONER: Respondent be meted the penalty of two
Partial payment for (2) years suspension. Respondent is also ordered to return, in restitution all
02/26/2004 7848 10,000.00
judgment the amounts in his possession which are due to complainant, less his rightful
03/12/2004 7894 20,000.00
Partial payment for attorney’s fees
judgment
Partial payment for IBP Board of Governors: Approved the Report and Recommendation of the
04/02/2004 7932 5,000.00
judgment Investigating Commissioner suspending respondent from the practice of law
Partial payment for for two years, but with the modification that respondent should restitute the
04/06/2004 7941 5,000.00
judgment sum of P85,500.00 to the complainant.
Partial payment for
04/13/2004 7944 5,000.00
judgment ISSUE: Whether the respondent is guilty of gross misconduct for his failure to
Partial payment for promptly account to his client the funds received in the course of his
04/16/2004 7954 10,000.00
judgment professional engagement and return the same upon demand.
Partial payment for
04/30/2004 7977 10,000.00
judgment RULING: Yes. The Court finds respondent Atty. Eugenio T.
Total Amount: P 95,000.00 Sanicas GUILTY of gross misconduct and accordingly SUSPENDS him from
the practice of law for one (1) year with a warning that a repetition of the same
or similar act or offense shall be dealt with more severely. Also, Atty. Sanicas
Complainant also discovered that respondent misrepresented to spouses is ordered to return to complainant, within 90 days from finality of this
Lopez that he is authorized to receive payments on his behalf, when in truth Resolution, the net amount of P85,500.00 with interest at the rate of 6% per
and in fact he is not. Consequently, complainant made several verbal annum from finality of this Resolution until the full amount is returned.
demands to the respondent to remit to him the amount of P95,000.00, less his
attorney’s fees of P20,000.00. But respondent did not budge. Thus,
“The Code of Professional Responsibility demands the utmost degree of In sum, “[r]espondent’s failure to immediately account for and return the money
fidelity and good faith in dealing with the moneys entrusted to lawyers because when due and upon demand violated the trust reposed in him, demonstrated
of their fiduciary relationship.” Specifically, Rule 16.01 of the Code imposes his lack of integrity and moral soundness, and warrants the imposition of
upon the lawyer the duty to “account for all money or property collected or disciplinary action.”
received for or from the client.” Rule 16.03 thereof, on the other hand,
mandates that “[a] lawyer shall deliver the funds x x x of his client when due or
upon demand.”

In this case, respondent on nine separate occasions from February 5, 2004 to

April 30, 2004 received payments for attorney’s fees and partial payments for
monetary awards on behalf of complainant from spouses Lopez. But despite
the number of times over close to three months he had been receiving
payment, respondent neither informed the complainant of such fact nor
rendered an accounting thereon. It was only when an Alias Writ of Execution
was issued and being implemented when complainant discovered that
spouses Lopez had already given respondent the total amount of P95,000.00
as partial payment for the monetary awards granted to him by the labor
tribunal.

To make matters worse, respondent withheld and refused to deliver to the

complainant said amount, which he merely received on behalf of his client,
even after demand. Such failure and inordinate refusal on the part of the
respondent to render an accounting and return the money after demand raises
the presumption that he converted it to his own use.

His unjustified withholding of the funds also warrants the imposition of

disciplinary action against him.
there is nothing in the records which would support respondent’s claim that he
was authorized to receive the payments. Neither is there proof that
complainant agreed to pay him additional 25% attorney’s fees and reimburse
him for all expenses he allegedly incurred in connection with the
case. Respondent did not present any document, retainer’s agreement, or
itemized breakdown of the amount to be reimbursed to support his claim.

Even assuming that respondent was authorized to receive payments, the

same does not exempt him from his duty of promptly informing his client of the
amounts he received in the course of his professional employment. “The
fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel and client imposes on a
lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for
or from the client. He is obliged to render a prompt accounting of all the
property and money he has collected for his client.” “The fact that a lawyer
has a lien for his attorney’s fees on the money in his hands collected for his
client does not relieve him from the obligation to make a prompt accounting.”
Moreover, a lawyer has no right “to unilaterally appropriate his client’s money
for himself by the mere fact alone that the client owes him attorney’s fees.”
 SPS. HENRY A. CONCEPCION AND BLESILDA S. CONCEPCION v.
ATTY. ELMER A. DELA ROSA, AC. No. 10681, 2015-02-03
Facts:
complainants alleged that from 1997[2] until August 2008,[3] respondent
served as their retained lawyer and counsel.
opening a pawnshop business towards the end of 2005. Said business,
however, failed to materialize.
Aware of the fact that complainants had money intact from their failed business
venture, respondent, on March 23, 2006, called Henry to borrow the amount
of P2,500,000.00, which he promised to return, with interest, five (5) days
thereafter.
agreed to lend the aforesaid sum to respondent. She thereby issued three (3)
EastWest Bank checks[5] in respondent's name... respondent signed a piece
of paper containing: (a) photocopies of the checks; and (b) an
acknowledgment that he received the originals of the checks and that he
agreed to return the P2,500,000.00, plus monthly interest of five percent
(5%),... within five (5) days.
the foregoing checks were personally encashed by respondent.
the day respondent promised to return the money, he failed to pay
complainants.
complainants began demanding payment but respondent merely made
repeated promises to pay soon.
complainants, through their new counsel, Atty. Kathryn Jessica dela Serna,
sent another demand letter[11] to respondent.[12] In... his Reply,[13] the latter
denied borrowing any money from the complainants. Instead, respondent
claimed that a certain Jean Charles Nault (Nault), one of his other clients, was
the real debtor.
Complainants brought the matter to the Office of the Lupong
Tagapamayapa in Barangay Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City. The parties,
however, failed to reach a settlement.
the IBP-Misamis Oriental Chapter received complainants' letter-complaint[15]
charging respondent with violation of Rule 16.04 of the CPR.
the IBP-Misamis Oriental Chapter endorsed the letter-complaint to the IBP-
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)... the IBP Investigating Commissioner...
respondent's claim that Nault was the real debtor was found to be implausible.
The Investigating Commissioner remarked that if it is true that respondent was
not the one who obtained the loan, he would have responded to complainants'
demand letter; however, he... did not.
In fine, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that respondent's actions
degraded the integrity of the legal profession and clearly violated Rule 16.04
and Canons 7 and 16 of the CPR.
the Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be disbarred
and that he be ordered to return the P2,500,000.00 to complainants, with
stipulated interest.
the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating
Commissioner's Report... reduced the penalty against the respondent to
indefinite suspension from the practice of law
Issues:
whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for violating
the CPR.
Ruling:
The Court concurs with the IBP's findings
Respondent's receipt of the P2,500,000.00 loan from complainants is amply
supported by substantial evidence.
With respondent's direct transactional involvement and the actual benefit he
derived therefrom,... absent too any credible indication to the contrary, the
Court is thus convinced that respondent was indeed the one who borrowed
the amount of P2,500,000.00 from complainants, which amount he had failed
to return, despite their insistent pleas.
Respondent's theory that Nault is the real debtor hardly inspires belief. While
respondent submitted a document purporting to be Nault's acknowledgment
of his debt to the complainants, Nault, in his Answer to Third Party Complaint,
categorically denied knowing the complainants... and incurring the same
obligation.
On the other hand, complainants were able to submit documents showing
respondent's receipt of... the checks and their encashment, as well as his
agreement to return the P2,500,000.00 plus interest. This is bolstered by the
fact that the loan transaction was entered into during the existence of a lawyer-
client relationship between him and complainants,[45] allowing the former to
wield a greater influence over the latter in view of the trust and confidence
inherently imbued in such relationship.
Under Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, a lawyer is prohibited from borrowing
money from his client unless the client's interests are fully protected
only concern is the determination of respondent's administrative liability; it
should not involve his civil liability for money received... from his client in a
transaction separate, distinct, and not intrinsically linked to his professional
engagement. In this case, respondent received the P2,500,000.00 as a loan
from complainants and not in consideration of his professional services.
Hence, the IBP's recommended... return of the aforementioned sum lies
beyond the ambit of this administrative case, and thus cannot be sustained.

The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer
and his client is one imbued with trust and confidence. And as true as any
natural tendency goes, this "trust and confidence" is prone to abuse. The rule
against borrowing of money by a lawyer from his... client is intended to prevent
the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence over his client.[46] The rule
presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer's ability to use all the
legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation.

respondent borrowed money from complainants who were his clients and
whose interests, by the lack of any security on the loan, were not fully
protected. Owing to their trust and confidence in respondent, complainants
relied solely on the former's word that he... will return the money plus interest
within five (5) days. However, respondent abused the same and reneged on
his obligation, giving his previous clients the runaround up to this day.
Accordingly, there is no quibble that respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the
CPR.

In the same vein, the Court finds that respondent also violated Canon 7 of the
CPR

In unduly borrowing money from the complainants and by blatantly refusing to

pay the same, respondent abused the trust and confidence reposed in him by
his clients, and, in so doing, failed to uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession. Thus, he should be equally... held administratively liable on
this score.

The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound
judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.

Considering the greater amount... involved in this case and respondent's

continuous refusal to pay his debt, the Court deems it apt to suspend him from
the practice of law for three (3) years

The Court also deems it appropriate to modify the IBP's Resolution insofar as
it orders respondent to return to complainants the amount of P2,500,000.00
and the legal interest thereon. It is settled that in disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers, the only issue is whether the... officer of the court is still fit to
be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar.[52] In such cases, the Court's
 acquiescence to the “pawning” of her jewelry becomes immaterial considering
Yu Vs.Atty Dela Cruz that the CPR is clear in that lawyers are proscribed from borrowing money or
A.C. No. 10912. January 9, 2016 property from clients, unless the latter’s interests are fully protected by the
nature of the case or by independent advice. Here, respondent lawyer’s act of
PAULINA T. YU, Complainant vs. ATTY. BERLIN R. DELA CRUZ borrowing does not constitute an exception. Respondent lawyer used his
client’s jewelry in order to obtain, and then appropriate for himself, the
proceeds from the pledge. In so doing, he had abused the trust and confidence
It appears from the records that respondent lawyer agreed to represent reposed upon him by his client. That he might have intended to subsequently
Paulina T. Yu (complainant) in several cases after having received various pay his client the value of the jewelry is inconsequential. What deserves
amounts as acceptance fees. While the lawyer-client relationship was detestation was the very act of his exercising influence and persuasion over
subsisting, respondent lawyer borrowed pieces of jewelry from complainant his client in order to gain undue benefits from the latter’s property. The Court
and pledged the same with the Citystate Savings Bank, Inc. for the amount of has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his
P29,945.50, as shown in the Promissory Note with Deed of Pledge. client is one imbued with trust and confidence. And as true as any natural
Respondent lawyer appropriated the proceeds of the pledge to his personal tendency goes, this “trust and confidence” is prone to abuse. The rule against
use. In order to facilitate the redemption of the said jewelry, respondent lawyer borrowing of money by a lawyer from his client is intended to prevent the
issued to complainant, Citystate Savings Bank Check. Upon presentment, lawyer from taking advantage of his influence over his client. The rule
however, complainant was shocked to learn that the check was dishonored for presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the
the reason, “Account Closed.” Complainant immediately notified respondent legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation. Suffice it to say, the borrowing
lawyer of the dishonor of the check. of money or property from a client outside the limits laid down in the CPR is an
unethical act that warrants sanction.
Complainant demanded for the refund of the acceptance fees received by
respondent lawyer prior to the “abandonment” of the cases and the payment The Court does not harbor any doubt in favor of respondent lawyer. Obviously,
of the value of the jewelry, but to no avail. his unfulfilled promise to facilitate the redemption of the jewelry and his act of
issuing a worthless check constitute grave violations of the CPR and the
For his failure to heed the repeated demands, a criminal case for violation of lawyer’s oath. These shortcomings on his part have seriously breached the
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor highly fiduciary relationship between lawyers and clients. Specifically, his act
against him. of issuing worthless checks patently violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the CPR
which requires that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
A verified complaint was filed with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP- or deceitful conduct.” This indicates a lawyer’s unfitness for the trust and
CBD), where complainant prayed for the disbarment of respondent lawyer on confidence reposed on him, shows such lack of personal honesty and good
account of grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming of a lawyer and moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence, and
commission of acts in violation of the lawyer’s oath. The IBP-CBD required constitutes a ground for disciplinary action, and thus seriously and irreparably
respondent lawyer to submit his answer to the complaint. Despite having been tarnishes the image of the profession. Such conduct, while already off-putting
duly served with a copy of the complaint and the order to file his answer, as when attributed to an ordinary person, is much more abhorrent when exhibited
shown in a certification issued by the Post Master of the Las Piñas Central by a member of the Bar. In this case, respondent lawyer turned his back from
Post Office, respondent still failed to file an answer. the promise that he once made upon admission to the Bar. As “vanguards of
the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves,
Issue: WON respondent violated CPR? especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with
honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.”
Held:

The complaint stemmed from the use by respondent lawyer of his client’s
property. He had, indeed, come into possession of valuable pieces of jewelry
which he presented as security in a contract of pledge. Complainant voluntarily
and willingly delivered her jewelry worth P135,000.00 to respondent lawyer
who meant to borrow it and pawn it thereafter. This act alone shows
respondent lawyer’s blatant disregard of Rule 16.04. Complainant’s
Pedro Ramos vs. Atty. Maria Nympha Mandagan
A.C. No. 11128 April 6, 2016
(Legal Ethics; Canon 16, Code of Professional Responsibility)

Facts
Atty. Mandagan demanded three hundred thousand pesos from Ramos to be
used as bail bond in the event that his petition for bail in the latter’s criminal
case is granted. Ramos’ bail was denied and Atty. Mandagan withdrew as his
counsel without returning the amount despite the demand sent by Ramos’ new
counsel.

Atty. Mandagan argued that the amount was not intended for payment of bail,
but as mobilization expenses. She also alleged that she was never paid
acceptance and appearance fees for legal services.

Issue
Whether respondent is guilty of violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility

Ruling
Yes, the respondent is guilty of violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

The respondent’s failure to make an accounting or to return the money to the

client is a violation of the trust reposed on her. As a lawyer, she should be
scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to her in her professional
capacity because the CPR exacts a high degree of fidelity and trust from
members of the bar.

The defense that the amount she received was merely for mobilization
expenses was not substantiated by the records.
 CADAVEDO AND BENITA ARCOY-CADAVEDO (both deceased), litigation if there is a contest or litigation over it in court or when it is subject of
substituted by their heirs, namely: the judicial action.34 Following this definition, we find that the subject lot was
HERMINA, PASTORA, Heirs of FRUCTUOSA, Heirs of RAQUEL, still in litigation when Atty. Lacaya acquired the disputed one-half portion. We
EVANGELINE, VICENTE, JR., and note in this regard the following established facts:(1)on September 21, 1981,
ARMANDO, all surnamed CADAVEDO, Petitioners, vs. VICTORINO (VIC) Atty. Lacaya filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case
T. LACAYA, married to Rosa No. 1721; (2) on September 23, 1981, the spouses Ames filed Civil Case No.
Legados, Respondents. 3352 against the spouses Cadavedo; (3)on October 16, 1981, the RTC
granted the motion filed for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case
FACTS: The Spouses Cadavedo acquired a homestead grant over a 230,765- No. 1721 and the spouses Cadavedo took possession of the subject lot on
square meter parcel of land known as Lot 5415 (subject lot) located in Gumay, October 24, 1981; (4) soon after, the subject lot was surveyed and subdivided
Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte. They were issued Homestead Patent No. V- into two equal portions, and Atty. Lacaya took possession of one of the
15414 on March 13, 1953and Original Certificate of Title No. P-376 on July 2, subdivided portions; and (5) on May 13, 1982, Vicente and Atty. Lacaya
1953.On April30, 1955, the spouses Cadavedo sold the subject lot to the executed the compromise agreement.
spouses Vicente Ames and Martha Fernandez (the spouses Ames) Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-4792 was subsequently issued in the name of
the spouses Ames. The present controversy arose when the spouses
Cadavedo filed an action before the RTC against the spouses Ames for sum
of money and/or voiding of contract of sale of homestead after the latter failed
to pay the balance of the purchase price. The spouses Cadavedo initially
engaged the services of Atty. Rosendo Bandal who, for health reasons, later
withdrew from the case; he was substituted
by Atty. Lacaya. On February 24, 1969, Atty. Lacaya amended the complaint
to assert the nullity of the sale and the issuance of TCT No. T-4792 in the
names of the spouses Ames as gross violation of the public land law. The
amended complaint stated that the spouses Cadavedo hired Atty. Lacaya on
a contingency fee basis. The contingency fee stipulation specifically reads: 10.
That due to the above circumstances, the plaintiffs were forced to hire a lawyer
on contingent basis and if they become the prevailing parties in the case at
bar, they will pay the sum of P2,000.00 for attorney’s fees. Eventually
Atty.Lacaya represented the Cadavedo spouses I two other cases in
connection with the subject lot. On appeal to the CA the appellate court
granted attorney’s fee consisting of one-half or 10.5383 hectares of the subject
lot to Atty. Lacaya,
instead of confirming the agreed contingent attorney’s fees of ₱2,000.00

ISSUE: Whether or not the award by the CA of attorey's fees is valid.

HELD: No. The agreement on attorney’s fee consisting of one-half of the

subject lot is void; the petitioners are entitled to recover possession. The
written agreement providing for a contingent fee of P2,000.00 should prevail
over the oral agreement providing for one- half of the subject lot. Atty. Lacaya’s
acquisition of the onehalf portion contravenes Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code
Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code forbids lawyers from acquiring, by purchase
or assignment, the property that has been the subject of litigation in which they
have taken part by virtue of their profession.32 The same proscription is
provided under Rule 10 of the Canons of Professional Ethics.33 A thing is in
 A.C. No. 5067 June 29, 2015
CORAZON M. DALUPAN, Complainant, vs. ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT1,
Respondent.

Facts:
In her affidavit-complaint5 dated April 20, 1999, the complainant claimed that
she was a defendant in a criminal case for grave slander pending before the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. Meanwhile, her
son, Wilmer Dalupan, was also a defendant in a separate criminal case for
grave slander and malicious mischief pending before the same court. In order
to represent the complainant and her son, the complainant engaged the legal
services of the respondent who then charged an acceptance fee of P10,000.
On August 20, 1996, the complainant paid the respondent P5,000 as initial
payment for his
acceptance fee.

On August 27, 1996, the complainant requested the respondent to draft a

Motion to Reduce Bail Bond. However, the respondent allegedly denied the
request and claimed that it was beyond the scope of his retainer services.
Thus, the complainant alleged that she caused a certain Rolly Calbento to draft
the same which was however signed by the respondent.

On January 31, 1997, the complainant paid the respondent the remaining
balance of P5,000 for his acceptance fee. When the complainant asked for an
Official Receipt from the respondent, the latter refused saying that there was
no need for the issuance of a receipt. On that same day, the complainant also
paid the respondent P500 for his appearance fee in the preliminary conference
and arraignment which occurred on the same day.

Issue: whether the respondent should return the payment of the attorney’s fee
to the complainant in the amount of P5,000.

Held:

We disagree with the conclusion of the Investigating Commissioner that the

respondent
should return the payment of the attorney’s fee to the complainant in the
amount of P5,000. acceptance fee refers to the charge imposed by the lawyer
for merely accepting the case. This is because once the lawyer agrees to
represent a client, he is precluded from handling cases of the opposing party
based on the prohibition on conflict of interest. Thus, the [lawyer] incurs an
opportunity cost by merely accepting the case of the client which is therefore
indemnified by the payment of acceptance fee. Since the acceptance fee only
seeks to compensate the lawyer for the lost opportunity, it is not measured by
the nature and extent of the legal services rendered

Penilla vs. Atty. Alcid, Jr.
A.C. No. 9149 September 4, 2013
Facts:
An administrative complaint in the IBPwas filed against respondent,
Atty. Alcid, Jr. for violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and for gross misconduct in the performance of his duty as a
lawyer. This rooted when Penilla entered into an Agreement with Spouses
Garin for the repair of his Volkswagen automobile but despite payment, the
spouses defaulted in their obligation. Penilla decided to file a case for breach
of contract and engaged the service of Atty. Alcid, Jr.
dealing with complainant is gross and inexcusable. Alcid also violated Canon
17 which states that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he
shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. The legal
profession dictates that it is not a mere duty, but an obligation, of a lawyer to
accord the highest degree, fidelity, zeal and fervor in the protection of client’s
interest. The most thorough groundwork and study must be undertaken in
order to safeguard the interest of the client. Atty. Alcid, Jr. has defied and failed
to perform such duty and his omission is tantamount to a desecration of the
Lawyer’s Oath.

The stories of the two sides were quite different from each other.
However, the following events were proven:
Respondent filed a criminal case of estafa when the fact of the case warranted
the filing of a civil case for breach of contract. After the complaint for estafa
was dismissed, Atty. Alcid committed another blunder by filing a civil case for
specific performance and damages before the RTC, when he should have filed
it with the MTC due to the amount involved, that was only P36,000. Also after
the criminal and civil cases were dismissed, respondent was plainly negligent
and did not apprise complainant of the status and progress of both cases he
filed for the Penilla.

Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Alcid, Jr. violated the Laywer’s Oath and Code of
Professional Responsibility when dealing with his client, Penilla.

Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that Atty. Alcid, Jr. violated Canon 17,
18 and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty.
Alcid, Jr. violated his oath under Canon 18 to “serve his client with competence
and diligence” when he filed a criminal case for estafa when facts of the case
would have warranted the filing of a civil case for breach of contract. The errors
committed with respect to the nature of the remedy adopted in the criminal
complaint and the forum selected in the civil complaint were so basic and could
have been easily averted has Alcid been more diligent and circumspect in his
role as counsel for complainant. Alciddid not also apprise complainant of the
status of the cases. This is in violation of Rules 18.03 and 18.04 which oblige
a lawyer to keep his client informed of the status of the case and to respond
with a reasonable time to the client’s request for informationHe paid no
attention and showed no importance to complainant’s cause despite repeated
follow-ups. Atty. Alcid, Jr. is not only guilty of incompetence in handling the
cases. The excuse that Alcidproffered, that their time did not always coincide,
is found by the Court as too lame and flimsy. His lack of professionalism in
HEIRS OF MARCELO SOTTO v. PALICTE G.R. No. 159691 February 17,
2014 Forum Shopping
JULY 17, 2019
FACTS:
In our June 13, 2013 decision in this case, we directed Atty. Mahinay to show
cause “why he should not be sanctioned for committing a clear violation of the
rule prohibiting forum-shopping by aiding his clients in asserting the same
claims at least twice.” The directive was called for by the following observations
made in the decision, to wit:
We start this decision by expressing our alarm that this case is the fifth suit to
reach the Court dividing the several heirs of the late Don Filemon Y. Sotto
respecting four real properties that had belonged to Filemon’s estate (Estate
of Sotto).
The first case held that herein respondent Matilde, one of four declared heirs
of Filemon, had validly redeemed the four properties pursuant to the assailed
deed of redemption, and was entitled to have the title over the four properties
transferred to her name, subject to the right of the three other declared heirs
to join her in the redemption of the four properties within a period of six months.
The second was the civil case filed by Pascuala against Matilde to annul the
former’s waiver of rights, and to restore her as a co-redemptioner of Matilde
with respect to the four properties.
The third was an incident in Civil Case No. R-10027 (that is, the suit brought
by the heirs of Carmen Rallos against the Estate of Sotto). After the trial court
denied their motion for reconsideration for its lack of merit, the heirs of Miguel
elevated the denial to the CA on certiorari and prohibition, but the CA
dismissed their petition. Thence, the heirs of Miguel came to the Court on
certiorari, but the Court dismissed their petition for being filed out of time and
for lack of merit.
The fourth was The Estate of Don Filemon Y. Sotto v. Matilde S. Palicte, et al.,
whereby the Court expressly affirmed the ruling rendered by the probate court
denying the administrator’s motion to require Matilde to turn over the four real
properties to the Estate of Sotto.
The fifth is this case. It seems that the disposition by the Court of the previous
cases did not yet satisfy herein petitioners despite their being the successors-
in-interest of two of the declared heirs of Filemon who had been parties in the
previous cases either directly or in privity. They now pray that the Court undo
the November 29, 2002 decision, whereby the CA declared their action for the
partition of the four properties as already barred by the judgments previously
rendered, and the resolution denying their motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners’ counsel, Atty. Makilito B. Mahinay, committed
forum shopping.
RULING:
What we have seen here is a clear demonstration of unmitigated forum
shopping on the part of petitioners and their counsel. It should not be enough
for us to just express our alarm at petitioners’ disregard of the doctrine of res
judicata. We do not justly conclude this decision unless we perform one last
unpleasant task, which is to demand from petitioners’ counsel, Atty. Makilito
B. Mahinay, an explanation of his role in this pernicious attempt to relitigate
the already settled issue regarding Matilde’s exclusive right in the four
properties. He was not unaware of the other cases in which the issue had been
definitely settled considering that his clients were the heirs themselves of
Marcelo and Miguel. Moreover, he had represented the Estate of Sotto in The
Estate of Don Filemon Y. Sotto v. Palicte.
On July 22, 2013, Atty. Mahinay submitted a so-called Compliance (With
Humble Motion for Reconsideration) containing his explanations, praying that
he not be sanctioned for violating the rule against forum shopping.
The Court considers Atty. Mahinay’s explanations unsatisfactory.
There is forum shopping “when a party repetitively avails of several judicial
remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially
founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in
or already resolved adversely by some other court.” Forum shopping is an act
of malpractice that is prohibited and condemned because it trifles with the
courts and abuses their processes. It degrades the administration of justice
and adds to the already congested court dockets.
An important factor in determining its existence is the vexation caused to the
courts and the parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim
substantially the same reliefs

The test to determine the existence of forum shopping is whether the elements
of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case amounts
to res judicata in the other. Thus, there is forum shopping when the following
elements are present, namely: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties
as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted
and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the
identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in
the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amounts to res
judicata in the action under consideration.

In view of the foregoing, Atty. Mahinay was guilty of forum shopping. Under
Revised Circular No. 28-91, any willful and deliberate forum shopping by any
party and his counsel through the filing of multiple petitions or complaints to
ensure favorable action shall constitute direct contempt of court.
 July 27, 2015
[ A.C. No. 9116, March 12, 2014 ]
Eight years later or on April 11, 2007, complainants Nestor Figueras and
NESTOR B. FIGUERAS AND BIENVENIDO VICTORIA, JR.,
Bienvenido Victoria, Jr., as members of the Association, filed a Complaint for
COMPLAINANTS,
Disbarment against respondent before the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline
VS.
(CBD) for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule
ATTY. DIOSDADO B. JIMENEZ, RESPONDENT.
12.03, Canon 12; Canon 17; and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 thereof for his
negligence in handling the appeal and willful violation of his duties as an officer
Facts:
of the court.

Congressional Village Homeowner’s Association, Inc. is the entity in charge of

Issue:
the affairs of the homeowners of Congressional Village in Quezon City. The
Spouses Federico and Victoria Santander filed a civil suit for damages against
Whether or not respondent violated the code of professional responsibility
the Association and Ely Mabanag before the RTC for building a concrete wall
which abutted their property and denied them of their right of way. The spouses
Ruling:
Santander likewise alleged that said concrete wall was built in violation of
Quezon City Ordinance which prohibits the closing, obstructing, preventing or
A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of
otherwise refusing to the public or vehicular traffic the use of or free access to
protecting the latter’s interest with utmost diligence. In failing to file the
any subdivision or community street. The Law Firm of Gonzalez Sinense
appellant’s brief on behalf of his client, respondent had fallen far short of his
Jimenez and Associates was the legal counsel for the Association, with
duties as counsel as set forth in Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of
respondent as the counsel of record and handling lawyer. After trial and
Professional Responsibility which exhorts every member of the Bar not to
hearing, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the Spouses Santander. The
unduly delay a case and to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist
Association, represented by said law firm, appealed to the CA. The CA issued
in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of
a Resolution dismissing the appeal on the ground that the original period to file
the same Code also states that:
the appellant’s brief had expired 95 days even before the first motion for
extension of time to file said brief was filed. The CA also stated that the
Canon 18—A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
grounds adduced for the said motion as well as the six subsequent motions
for extension of time to file brief were not meritorious. The CA resolution
Rule 18.03.—A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
became final.
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
An attorney is bound to protect his client’s interest to the best of his ability and
with utmost diligence. (Del Rosario vs. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 159) A
failure to file brief for his client certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence on
his part. (People vs. Villar, 46 SCRA 107) The respondent has indeed
committed a serious lapse in the duty owed by him to his client as well as to
the Court not to delay litigation and to aid in the speedy administration of
justice. (Canons 21 and 22, Canons of Professional Ethics; People vs. Daban,
43 SCRA 185; People vs. Estocada, 43 SCRA 515).
 A.C. No. 10378 June 9, 2014
JOSE FRANCISCO T. BAENS, Complainant, vs. ATTY. JONATHAN T.
SEMPIO, Respondent.
Legal Ethics; Canons 15, 17, 18; Rule 18.03
FACTS:
The complainant engaged the services of the respondent to represent him and
file a case for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against his wife, Lourdes V.
Mendiola-Baens. In his complaint-affidavit, the complainant alleged, among
others, that the respondent: (1) despite receiving the amount to cover for the
expenses in the said case, failed to file the corresponding petition;(2) even with
the complainant furnishing him a copy of the Summons belatedly filed an
Answer and was able to file it only after the 15-day period stated in the
Summons; (3) failed to make an objection on the petition on the ground of
improper venue as neither the complainant nor his wife were and are residents
of Dasmariñas, Cavite; (4) never bothered to check the status of the case and
thus failed to discover and attend all the hearings set for the case; and (5) as
a result, the case was decided on October 27, 2009 without the complainant
being able to present his evidence.
In his Answer, the respondent denied the allegations in the complaint. In the
mandatory conference held before the IBP-CBD only the complainant
appeared; thus, the respondent was declared as having waived his right to
further participate in the IBP proceedings.
The Investigating Commissioner finds that the respondent is guilty of violation
of the Code and recommended that the respondent be suspended for six (6)
months from the practice of law. Specifically, the Investigating Commissioner
found that the respondent failed to diligently attend to the case and was grossly
negligent in discharging his responsibilities considering the fact that he has
already been fully compensated.
On June 22, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve
the Investigating Commissioner’s report but deemed it proper to increase the
recommended period of suspension from six (6) months to one (1) year.14 On
February 14, 2014, the IBP-CBD transmitted the notice of the resolution and
the case records to the Court for final action pursuant to Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court.15
ISSUE:
WON Atty. Sempio should be suspended from the practice of law.
RULING:
The relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost
trust and confidence. In this regard, clients are led to expect that lawyers would
be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of
diligence in handling their affairs. For his part, the lawyer is expected to
maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full
attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and
whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. Lawyering is not a business; it is a
profession in which duty of public service, not money, is the primary
consideration.
Evidently, the acts of the respondent plainly demonstrated his lack of candor,
fairness, and loyalty to his client as embodied in Canon 15 of the Code. A
lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the
interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar,
and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.
Clearly, it cannot be doubted that the respondent violated Canon 17, and Rule
18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code which states that "a lawyer owes fidelity to the
cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
in him." It further mandates that "a lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence," and that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable." Thus, for the respondent’s negligence and inadequacies in handling
his client’s case, the recommendation of the IBP to suspend the respondent
from the practice of law is well-taken. While the IBP Board of Governors
increased the period of suspension to one year, the Court finds the period of
six months as recommended by the Investigating Commissioner
commensurate to the facts of the case.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the Resolution
dated June 22, 2013 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors in CBD Case No. 10-2673. The Court hereby SUSPENDS Atty.
Jonathan T. Sempio from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS.
 A.C. No. 9976 June 25, 2014 by a friend. He further stated that he was also involved in the said business as
ALMIRA C. FORONDA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE L. ALVAREZ, JR., a partner.
Respondent The respondent admitted that only the first two (2) of the checks he issued
Legal Ethics: Canons 15, 17, Rule 1.01, 18.04, 16.04 of the Code of were honored by the drawee-bank. He stated that prior to the presentment and
Professional Responsibility dishonor of the rest of the checks, he advised the complainant that the third
check should not be deposited just yet due to losses in their lending business
FACTS: caused by the failure of some borrowers to settle their obligations.
The complainant is an overseas Filipino worker in Dubai. In May 2008, she
returned to the Philippines to institute a case for the nullification of her
marriage. The respondent was referred to her and the complainant agreed to
engage his services for a fee of P195,000.00 to be paid as follows: 50% or
P100,000.00 upon the signing of the contract; 25% or P50,000.00 on or before
June 10, 2008; and 25% or P45,000.00 before the filing of the case. The
complainant paid the amounts as agreed. The amount of P45,000.00 was
even paid on June 10, 2008, after being informed by the respondent that the
petition for the annulment of marriage was ready for filing.
The complainant averred that the respondent promised to file the petition after
he received the full payment of his attorney’s fee, or on June 11, 2008. In
September 2008, the complainant inquired about the status of her case and
was allegedly told by the respondent that her petition was pending in court;
and in another time, she was told that a decision by the court was already
forthcoming. However, when she came back to the country in May 2009, the
respondent told her that her petition was still pending in court and apologized
for the delay. Eventually, the complainant was able to get a copy of her petition
and found out that it was filed only on July 16, 2009.
The complainant further alleged in her complaint that the week after she signed
the contract of service with the respondent, the latter requested for a meeting.
Thinking that they were going to discuss her case, she agreed. But during the
meeting, the respondent invited her to be an investor in the lending business
allegedly ran by the respondent’s sister-in-law. The respondent encouraged
her to invest P200,000.00 which he said can earn five percent (5%) interest
per month.
The complainant finally agreed on the condition that the respondent shall issue
personal and post-dated checks in her favor. But according to the complainant,
upon presentment of these checks, the drawee-bank honored the first two (2)
checks, but the rest were dishonored for being drawn against a closed
account.
In his Answer, the respondent admitted that he filed the petition for annulment
only in July 2009 but this was not due to his own fault. The delay was caused
by the complainant herself who allegedly instructed him to hold the filing of the
said petition as she and her husband were discussing a possible reconciliation.
He further claimed that he filed the petition on July 16, 2009 after negotiations
with the complainant’s husband apparently failed.
The respondent also admitted that he invited the complainant to be a partner
in a lending business and clarified that the said business was being managed
 A.C. No. 8085 December 01, 2014
FELIPE LAYOS, Complainant, v. ATTY. MARLITO I. VILLANUEVA,
Respondent.
Legal Ethics; Canon 17 & 18; Rules 18.03 & 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility
FACTS:
This case sprouted from a “Sumbong” filed by complainant charging the
respondent Atty. Villanueva for violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the lawyer’s oath for neglecting the interests of his client.
In the sumbong, it was alleged that respondent constantly fails to appear in
the court hearings which resulted in the RTC’s issuance of an order waiving
the defense’s right to cross-examine a prosecution witness. Despite issuance
of the order, respondent remained absent in which complainant was only able
to move for reconsideration which was denied four years later. Aggrieved
complainant thru respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals which dismissed the case and chastised the respondent for his “lack
of candidness and fervor on his part to champion the cause” of his client. That
it never bothered to know the outcome of the hearings of which he was absent
and for taking a long time before moving to reconsider the RTC’s order.
In its comment, it denied being remiss in its duty. That during the hearing the
criminal case supposed to be amicably settled, that his car broke down and
that he was unable to attend the hearing. That when the car was fixed, he
contacted his secretary to know the outcome and that he was unable to contact
the complainant and never heard from him for a long time, as well as he did
not receive any notices from the RTC. Thus he assumed that the amicable
settlement pushed through. That he had a hard time locating the complainant
who was not at his home address and staying at his workplace at Cavite, which
caused him advance filing fees and expenses, not to mention the complainant
failed to pay attorney’s fees and appearance fees due to him.
The IBP found him to be administratively liable and suspended him from the
practice of law for a period of 6 months, that he failed in his duty to serve the
complainant’s interest with competence and diligence by neglecting the latter’s
criminal case pending before the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondent should be administratively liable for the acts
complained of.
his client of any adverse decision to enable his client to decide whether to seek
an appellate review thereof. The lawyer should not leave the client in the dark
on how the lawyer is defending the client’s interests. In this connection, the
lawyer must constantly keep in mind that his actions, omissions, or
nonfeasance would be binding upon his client. As such, the lawyer is expected
to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and a
clientwho deals with him has the right to expect not just a good amount of
professional learning and competence but also a whole-hearted fealty to the
client’s cause.
In the case at hand, since the car trouble, respondent no longer kept track of
complainant’s criminal case and assumed that it was amicable settled and
terminated. Thereafter the respondent knew that the case was still on-going,
which he attended and discovered the RTC’s issuance of an order which is
prejudicial to his clients cause. Despite it, respondent did not immediately
seek any remedy to further the interest of his client. Instead he merely relied
on the court’s employees to send him a copy of the order. Worse, when he
received the order, it took him a year to move to reconsider. Which Naturally
the RTC and the CA denied the motion for being filed way beyond the
reglementary period. Clearly respondent failed to exercise such skill, care,
diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in
matters of professional employment. The penalty was however modified to a
suspension from 6 months to 3 months, with a stern warning that repetition of
similar act will be dealt with more severely.

RULING:
The Supreme Court concurs with the IBP’s findings that under Canon 17 and
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It is the lawyer’s duty to serve
his clients duty with zeal, candor and diligence. As such, he must keep abreast
with the developments of his clients case and should inform the latter of the
same as it is crucial in maintaining the latter’s confidence.
As an officer of the court, it is his duty to inform his client of whatever important
information he may have acquired affecting his client’s case. He should notify
 A.C. No. 8235 January 27, 2015
JOSELITO F. TEJANO, Complainant, vs. ATTY. BENJAMIN F.
BATERINA, Respondent.
Legal Ethics; Code of Professional Responsibility; Canon 18.
FACTS:
Complainant filed a civil case against the Province of Ilocos Sur for recovery
of possession of a strip of land. The lot was wholly owned by Tejano’s family
but the Province of Ilocos Sur constructed an access road without instituting
the proper expropriation proceedings. The case was raffled off to Branch 21 of
RTC Vigan in 1988. Judge Arquelada was one of the trial prosecutors assigned
to Branch 21 representing the Province of Ilocos Sur. In 2001, he became the
branch’s presiding judge. The civil case was later on dismissed.
In his affidavit-complaint, complainant accused Judge Arquelada of colluding
with the former’s own counsel, the herein respondent, in Judge Arquelada’s
bid to take possession of the property.
The CBD found that respondent manifestly failed to properly inform the RTC
that his failure to appear in representation of his client was due to his two-year
suspension from the practice of law. The CBD recommended that respondent
be suspended from the practice of law for two years, and be fined in the
amount of P50,000, considering that this is his second disciplinary action. The
IBP-B adopted and approved CBD’s recommendation with modification
(deleted the fine).
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Baterina violated the CPR.
RULING:
Yes.
The Code of Professional Responsibility governing the conduct of lawyers
states:
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE
AND DILIGENCE.
uncertainty." The client "should never be left groping in the dark" and instead
must be "adequately and fully informed about the developments in his case.
The Court notes that in 2001, Atty. Baterina was also suspended for two years
after being found guilty of gross misconduct. In that case, Araceli Sipin-Nabor
filed a complaint against Atty. Baterina for failing to file her Answer with
Counterclaim in a case for quieting of title and recovery of possession where
she and her siblings were defendants. Because of such failure, Sipin-Nabor
was declared by the trial court to be in default and unable to present her
evidence, and which, in turn, resulted in a decision adverse to her.
Atty. Baterina was also found to have "converted the money of his client to his
own personal use without her consent" and "deceived the complainant into
giving him the amount of P2,000.00 purportedly to be used for filing an answer
with counterclaim," which he never did.
The Court likewise noted in that case Atty. Baterina's "repeated failure to
comply with the resolutions of the Court requiring him to comment on the
complaint [which] indicates a high degree of irresponsibility tantamount to
willful disobedience to the lawful orders of the Supreme Court.
These two disciplinary cases against Atty. Baterina show a pattern of
neglecting his duty to his clients, as well as a propensity for disrespecting the
authority of the courts. Such incorrigible behavior is unacceptable and will not
be tolerated among members of the Bar.
For this reason, the Court deems it proper to impose on Atty. Baterina a longer
suspension period of five (5) years.

RULE 18.03 -A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
RULE 18.04 -A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case
and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for
information.
Lawyers have a fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and
their clients, and must act in accordance with the values and norms of the legal
profession as embodied in the CPR.
Atty. Baterina's duty to his clients did not automatically cease with his
suspension. At the very least, such suspension gave him a concomitant
responsibility to inform his clients that he would be unable to attend to their
case and advise them to retain another counsel.
A lawyer -even one suspended from practicing the profession -owes it to his
client to not "sit idly by and leave the rights of his client in a state of
 Nonato v Fudolin (2015) A.C. No. 10138, June 16, 2015
Fact: The complainant alleged that his father, the late Restituto Nonato
(Restituto), was the duly registered owner of a property that became the
subject of ejectment proceedings filed by Restituto against Anselmo
Tubongbanua ( Anselmo), before the MTC. The complainant alleged that
although his father Restituto paid the respondent his acceptance fees, no
formal retainer agreement was executed. The respondent also did not issue
any receipts for the acceptance fees paid. The complainant asserted that
during the pendency of the ejectment proceedings before the MTC, the
respondent failed to fully inform his father Restituto of the status and
developments in the case. Restituto could not contact the respondent despite
his continued efforts. The respondent also failed to furnish Restituto copies of
the pleadings, motions and other documents filed with the court. Thus,
Restituto and the complainant were completely left in the dark regarding the
status of their case. After an exchange of initial pleadings in the ejectment
proceedings, the MTC ordered the parties to submit their respective position
papers. Since neither party complied with the court’s directive, the MTC
dismissed the complaint. The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration
from the order of dismissal. He justified his failure to file the position paper by
arguing that he misplaced the case records, adding that he was also burdened
with numerous other cases. The MTC denied the motion. Because of the
patent negligence, the complainant informed the respondent that his failure to
file the position paper could be a ground for his disbarment. Furthermore, the
complainant, without the respondent’s intervention, entered into an oral
extrajudicial compromise with the daughter of defendant Anselmo. In 2007,
the respondent wrote the complainant and apologized for his repeated failure
to communicate with him. He reasoned out that he failed to file the position
paper due to his poor health. He also claimed that he had suffered a stroke
and had become partially blind, which caused the delay in the preparation of
the pleadings in the ejectment case. The Investigating Commissioner
recommended the respondent’s suspension for one (1) month from the
practice of law.
expect him to perform his obligations diligently. The failure to meet these
standards warrants the imposition of disciplinary action. In this case, the record
clearly shows that the respondent has been remiss in the performance of his
duties as Restituto’s counsel. His inaction on the matters entrusted to his care
is plainly obvious. He failed to file his position paper despite notice from the
MTC requiring him to do so. His omission greatly prejudiced his client as the
Court in fact dismissed the ejectment suit. Because a lawyer-client relationship
is one of trust and confidence, there is a need for the client to be adequately
and fully informed about the developments in his case. A client should never
be left groping in the dark; to allow this situation is to destroy the trust, faith,
and confidence reposed in the retained lawyer and in the legal profession in
general. The court find the respondent’s excuse – that he had an undetected
stroke and was suffering from other illnesses – unsatisfactory and merely an
afterthought. Even assuming that he was then suffering from numerous health
problems (as evidenced by the medical certificates he attached), his medical
condition cannot serve as a valid reason to excuse the omission to file the
necessary court pleadings. The respondent could have requested an
extension of time to file the required position paper, or at the very least,
informed his client of his medical condition; all these, the respondent failed to
do. with all the premises considered, the court suspends the respondent from
the practice of law for a period of two (2) years for violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Issue: Whether the respondent failure to execute his duty due to his health
condition is an inexcusable violation of his Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Held: Yes, A lawyer is bound to protect his client’s interests to the best of his
ability and with utmost diligence. He should serve his client in a conscientious,
diligent, and efficient manner; and provide the quality of service at least equal
to that which he, himself, would expect from a competent lawyer in a similar
situation. By consenting to be his client’s counsel, a lawyer impliedly
represents that he will exercise ordinary diligence or that reasonable degree
of care and skill demanded by his profession, and his client may reasonably
 would be the last extension it would grant. But still Atty. Lavadia NEVER
A.C. No. 5686 TEODULO F. ENRIQUEZ, Complainant, vs. ATTY. SUBMITTED HIS COMMENT. The Court then asked him to show cause why
EDILBERTO B. LAVADIA, JR., Respondent. he should not be held in contempt and to submit his comment with 10 days
from notice, Still, Atty. Lavadia failed to comply. The Court thus imposed on
FACTS: him a ₱1,000.00 fine or imprisonment of five days if he failed to pay the fine
and ordered him to comply with its previous resolutions.
This is a disbarment filed against Atty. Lavadia, Jr. for gross negligence and
inefficiency in the performance of his duties as a lawyer. Atty. Lavadia paid the fine and asked for additional time to file his comment
this time stating that he had moved from Tagbilaran to Cebu because of his
wife’s illness which was caused by "dark-beings." He claimed that a series of
The petitioner Teodulo Enriquez was the defendant in a complaint filed by
unfortunate events plagued them, i.e., their house was razed by a fire, the
Ernesto Ounano, Sr. for forcible entry before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
hard drive of his computer crashing, and his family members falling ill
of Talibon, Bohol. To defend his interest, Enriquez engaged the services of the
due to a "dark being."
law office of Atty. Joselito M. Alo ,R.L.C. Agapay, and Atty. Edilberto B.
Lavadia, Jr. with Atty. Lavadia as the assigned attorney. The Respondent is
Atty. Edilberto B. Lavadia, Jr. The Court thus granted a 30-day extension but still he DID NOT SUBMIT
ANYTHING. The Court in its Resolution imposed a fine of ₱2,000.00 and
referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
On March 18, 2000, in open court, Atty. Lavadia agreed to submit their position
report and recommendation. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)
papers and affidavits within 30 days from the receipt of the pre-trial order after
scheduled a mandatory conference, but both parties failed to appear. Parties
which, the case would be submitted for decision. However, Atty. Lavadia failed
were then ordered to submit their position papers within ten days from receipt
to file the position paper resulting in the defendants being declared in default.
of the Order. In its Report and Recommendation, the IBP CBD recommended
The MCTC rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs.
that Atty. Lavadia be disbarred and his name be withdrawn from the Roll of
Attorneys.
Atty. Lavadia filed a notice of appeal with sufficient bond but was dismissed
based on Section 7(b), Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. The RTC stated that Atty.
The IBP-CBD found that not only did Atty. Lavadia cause material prejudice to
Lavadia failed to file the appeal memorandum after more than 71 days. He
his clients by neglecting his duties as counsel in failing to file the necessary
moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the RTC in its order
pleadings to defend his client’s interest, he also displayed a willful, defiant
pointing out that it had granted four motions for extension and still no appeal
and cavalier attitude by repeatedly defying the resolutions of the Court.
memorandum was filed.
By his actions the IBP CBD considered Atty. Lavadia unfit to dispense his
duties and responsibilities as an attorney.
Hence this disbarment complaint was received by OBC. Enriquez alleged that
in failing to file the necessary pleadings before the court, Atty. Lavadia caused
The IBP Board of Governors (BOG) resolved to adopt the report and
them great damage and prejudice. This constituted gross negligence and
recommendation of the IBP CBD.
inefficiency in the performance of his professional duties as a lawyer. Enriquez
thus prayed that Atty. Lavadia be disbarred.

The Court required Atty. Lavadia to submit his comment but he failed to do so,
He filed two motion for extension citing his heavy case load and family
problems said motion gave Atty. Lavida another 10 days with to file his
comment but still he failed.
So he filed again a motion to extend to file his comment due to his wife’s
continued illness. The Court granted another 30-day period, stating that it
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edilberto B. Lavadia, Jr. is hereby
DISBARRED for violating Canons 11 and 18 and Rules 10.03, 12.03 and 18.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN OFF from the Roll of Attorneys.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Lavadia should be dsbarred?
HELD:

YES, The present case was filed January 2002. And the court granted Atty.
Lavadia every opportunity to file his comment to the complaint. We issued no
less than 8 resolutions ordering him to comment: two of which ordered him to
pay P 1,0000.00 and P 2,000.00 and requiring him to show cause for his failure
to file and to comply with the Court’s resolution. In fine, The court granted him
a total of 155 days of extension to file his comment, in response to his
repeated pleas contained in his numerous ex parte motions. After a lapse of 8
years, The Court referred the case to the IBP where Atty. Lavadia once again
filed a motion for extension to file his position paper but nevertheless failed to
file the same.

While the Court is unsympathetic to the plight of Atty. Lavadia, it cannot

countenance his act of repeatedly pleading for extensions of time and yet not
submitting anything to the Court. This reflects his willful disregard for Court
orders putting in question his suitability to discharge his duties and functions
as lawyer.

The Court cannot stress enough that being a lawyer is a privilege with attached
duties and obligations. Lawyers bear the responsibility to meet the profession’s
exacting standards. A lawyer is expected to live by the lawyer’s oath, the rules
of the profession and the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). The
duties of a lawyer may be classified into 4 general categories namely duties
he owes to the court, to the public, to the bar and to his client. A lawyer who
transgresses any of this duties is administratively liable and subject to the
Court’s disciplinary authority.