Bar Matter 1370—Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.

, Requesting Exemption from Payment of IBP

Dues, 458 SCRA 209, May 09, 2005

Facts:

Atty. Arevalo wrote a letter to the SC requesting for exemption from payment of his IBP dues from 1977-
2005 in the amount of P12,035.00. He contends that after admission to the Bar he worked at the Civil
Service Commission then migrated to the US until his retirement. His contention to be exempt is that his
employment with the CSC prohibits him to practice his law profession and he did not practice the same
while in the US. The compulsion that he pays his IBP annual membership is oppressive since he has an
inactive status as a lawyer. His removal from the profession because of non-payment of the same
constitutes to the deprivation of his property rights bereft of due process of the law.

Issues:

1. Is petitioner entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time that he was inactive in the
practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad from
1986-2003?

2. Does the enforcement of the penalty of removal amount to a deprivation of property without due
process?

Held:

1. No. A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation. If the judiciary has inherent
power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee
for that purpose. It would not be possible to put on an integrated Bar program without means to defray
the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with it the power to impose such
exaction.

The payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt.
This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as ones membership in
the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in.

2. No. Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the
holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it [is] clear
that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to
perpetuate its existence, the respondents right to practice law before the courts of this country should
be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory
measure is recognize[d], then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided
altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as
such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyers
public responsibilities.

As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions, one of which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails the
loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.