EVIDENCE DEFINED

1. Lagon vs. Hooven Comalco Industries, Inc., 349 SCRA 363

Facts:

Petitioner Jose V. Lagon is a businessman and owner of a commercial building in Tacurong, Sultan
Kudarat. Respondent HOOVEN on the other hand is a domestic corporation known to be the biggest
manufacturer and installer of aluminum materials in the country with branch office at E. Quirino
Avenue, Davao City.

Sometime in April 1981 Lagon and HOOVEN entered into two (2) contracts, both denominated Proposal,
whereby for a total consideration of P104,870.00 HOOVEN agreed to sell and install various aluminum
materials in Lagon's commercial building in Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat. Upon execution of the contracts,
Lagon paid HOOVEN P48,00.00 in advance.

On 24 February 1987 respondent HOOVEN commenced an action for sum of money with damages and
attorney's fees against petitioner Lagon before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City.

Lagon, in his answer, denied liability and averred that HOOVEN was the party guilty of breach of
contract by failing to deliver and install some of the materials specified in the proposals; that as a
consequence he was compelled to procure the undelivered materials from other sources; that as
regards the materials duly delivered and installed by HOOVEN, they were fully paid.

On 9 October 1987, upon request of both parties, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection of
Lagon's commercial building to determine whether the items alleged in the complaint and appearing in
the invoices and delivery receipts had been delivered and installed on the premises.

In due course the trial court rendered a decision partly on the basis of the result of the ocular inspection
finding that the total actual deliveries and installations made by HOOVEN cost P 87,140.00. Deducting
therefrom P 48,000.00 which Lagon paid in advance upon execution of their contracts with no further
payments appearing to have been made thereafter, only P 39,140.00 remained unpaid and where Lagon
incurred in delay.

Both parties appealed to the CA. It held that the trial court erred in relying solely on the results of the
ocular inspection since the delivery and installation of the materials in question started as early as 1981,
while the ocular inspection was conducted only in 1987 or six (6) years later, after the entire mezzanine
was altered and the whole building renovated.

Issue: Whether all the materials specified in the contracts had been delivered and installed by
respondent in petitioner's commercial building in Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat.

(The question is basically factual involving as it does an evaluation of the conflicting evidence presented
by the contending parties, including the existence and relevance of specific surrounding circumstances,
to determine the truth or falsity of alleged facts.)

Ruling: No.

The Court found out that:

1. the quantity of materials and the amounts in the delivery receipt are not equal with those in the
invoices;

2. total value of the materials Invoice:117K; Delivery Receipt (DR): 112K; Proposals:104K;

3. under the Proposals Hooven bound itself, bound to invoice when complete and ready for shipment
but invoices were prepared several years after; the project was completed in Aug 1981 but the invoices
were prepared only on 29 Dec 1982; while as for DRs, prepared only on 25 Aug 1983.

It was more strange because the collection of sums of money against Lagon was made only on 24 Feb
1987. More than 5 years after the supposed completion of the project

4. The demand letter of 1983 demanded only for partial payment to cover operation costs clearly
suggesting that clearly suggest that there was no full and complete delivery and installation of materials
ordered by petitioner;

5. DRs were not signed by duly authorized representatives and the deliveries were not made to the
buyer or his duly authorized representative named in the contracts.

6. It is also obvious from the contested delivery receipts that some important details were not supplied
or were left in blank.

While factual issues are not within the province of this Court, as it is not a trier of facts and is not
required to examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence de novo,6 nevertheless, the Court
has the authority to review and, in proper cases, reverse the factual findings of lower courts in these
instances: (a) when the findings of fact of the trial court are in conflict with those of the appellate court;
(b) when the judgment of the appellate court is based on misapprehension of facts; and, (c) when the
appellate court manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify
a different conclusion. This case falls squarely within the foregoing exceptions.

Given this pathetic state of respondent’s evidence, how could it be said that respondent had
satisfactorily proved its case? Essentially, respondent has the burden of establishing its affirmative
allegations of complete delivery and installation of the materials, and petitioner’s failure to pay
therefore. In this regard, its evidence on its discharge of that duty is grossly anemic. We emphasize that
litigations cannot be properly resolved by suppositions, deductions, or even presumptions, with no basis
in evidence, for the truth must have to be determined by the hard rules of admissibility and proof.

The Court of Appeals however faulted the trial court for supposedly relying solely on the results of the
ocular inspection on the premises, which were not conclusive since the inspection was conducted
several years after the disputed materials were allegedly installed therein.

We disagree. The ocular inspection was made by the judge himself, at the request of both petitioner and
respondent, for the exclusive purpose of determining whether the materials subject of this case were
actually delivered and installed. There is therefore no basis to give little evidentiary value on the results
of the ocular inspection, as the Court of Appeals would, and charge the trial court with error for relying
thereon. It is now rather late for any of the parties to disclaim them, especially when they are not in his
or its favor. Furthermore, a cursory reading of the decision of the court a quo will at once show that it
was not premised solely on the results of the ocular inspection but was likewise predicated on other
evidence presented by the parties and well-considered facts and circumstances discussed by the trial
court in its ratio decidendi. We cannot ignore the factual findings of the trial court, which must carry
great weight in the evaluation of evidentiary facts, and in the absence of any indication showing grave
error committed by trial court, the appellate court is bound to respect such findings of fact.

We hasten to add however that petitioner is not entirely free from any liability to respondent. Petitioner
admitted the delivery of materials. The transcript of stenographic notes shows that during the ocular
inspection counsel for respondent manifested in effect that petitioner admitted the delivery and
installation of the second item in his building, and petitioner did not interpose any objection to
respondent’s manifestation— xxx

Petitioner cannot now be heard to complain against its inclusion in the computation of his liability since
his silence virtually amounted to acquiescence. The silence of one of the contracting parties and his
failure to protest against the claims of the other party, when he is chargeable with the duty to do so,
strongly suggest an admission of the veracity and validity of the other party’s claims.

We are not in accord with the trial court’s ruling that petitioner is entitled to actual damages to the
extent of the undelivered materials and undone labor in the amount of P26,120.00. There is no proof
that petitioner already paid for the value of the undelivered and uninstalled materials to respondent.
Therefore, petitioner may not be deemed to have suffered any such damage. We have declared in no
uncertain terms that actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed but must be proved with
reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculations, conjectures or guesswork as to the
fact of damage but must depend upon competent proof that they have indeed been suffered by the
injured party and on the basis of the best evidence obtainable as to the actual amount thereof. It must
point out specific facts that could provide the gauge for measuring whatever compensatory or actual
damages were borne.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28 April 1997 is MODIFIED. Petitioner
Jose V. Lagon is ordered to pay respondent Hooven Comalco Industries, Inc., P6,377.66 representing the
value of the unpaid materials admittedly delivered to him. On the other hand, respondent is ordered to
pay petitioner P50,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees and P46,554.50 as actual
damages and litigation expenses.

2. Baguio Country Club Corporation vs. NLRC

EVIDENCE DEFINED

No. L-55624. November 19, 1982

Gutierrez, Jr., J.,

Facts: Baguio Country Club Corporation filed with the Ministry of Labor office at Baguio City an
application for clearance to terminate the services of respondent Jimmy Sajonas for commission of acts
which would constitute valid grounds for dismissal. Sajonas opposed, saying the dismissal was without
justifiable grounds. After a notice of investigation was issued by the Ministry of Labor-Baguio, the case
was referred to a conciliator who recommended Sajonas’ preventive suspension. The Regional Director
referred the case to the Labor Arbiter, who later denied Baguio Country Club’s application for clearance
to dismiss Sajonas for insufficiency of evidence. Upon appeal to the NLRC, the same was denied and the
LA’s decision was affirmed. Hence, this petition by Baguio Country Club.

Issue: Was Baguio Country Club denied due process because its evidence was not considered by both
the labor arbiter and the NLRC?

Held: YES. The summary procedures used by the public respondents were too summary to satisfy the
requirements of justice and fair play. The decision of the respondent Commission which affirmed the
order to reinstate Mr. Sajonas with full backwages was based on two grounds·First, the evidence
available to the labor arbiter when he decided this case was such that the respondent had not
sufficiently shown a just cause for the complainant’s dismissal. Second, the evidence to support the
application for clearance to dismiss the complainant was submitted too late because it was submitted
only on appeal. The respondent Commission committed grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the
irregular and one-sided procedure adopted by the labor arbiter in arriving at his finding of insufficiency
of evidence and when it decided to uphold a decision not only contrary to the facts but obviously unfair
and unjust.

As pointed out by the petitioner, while an administrative tribunal possessed of quasi-judicial powers is
free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements, it does not mean that it can in justiciable cases
coming before it entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due
process. The ever increasing scope of administrative jurisdiction and the statutory grant of expansive
powers in the exercise of discretion by administrative agencies illustrate our nations faith in the
administrative process as an efficient and effective mode of public control over sensitive areas of private
activity. Because of the specific constitutional mandates on social justice and protection to labor, and
the fact that major labor management controversies are highly intricate and complex, the legislature
and executive have reposed uncommon reliance upon what they believe is the expertise, the rational
and efficient modes of ascertaining facts, and the unbiased and discerning adjudicative techniques of
the Ministry of Labor and Employment and its instrumentalities.

This Court will reverse or modify an administrative decision where the rights of a party were prejudiced
because the administrative findings, conclusions, or decisions are in violation of constitutional
provisions; in excess of statutory authority, or jurisdiction; made upon irregular procedure; vitiated by
fraud, imposition or mistake; not supported by substantial evidence adduced at the hearing or
contained in the records or disclosed to the parties; or arbitrary, capricious, or issued with grave abuse
of discretion.

The instant petition is a timely reminder to labor arbiters and all who wield quasi-judicial power to ever
bear in mind that evidence is the means, sanctioned by rules, of ascertaining in a judicial or quasi-judicial
proceeding, the truth respecting a matter of fact. (Section 1, Rule 128) The object of evidence is to
establish the truth by the use of perceptive and reasoning faculties. The statutory grant of power to use
summary procedures should heighten a concern for due process, for judicial perspectives in
administrative decision making, and for maintaining the visions which led to the creation of the
administrative office.

3. Samalio v Court of Appeals

Facts: Augusto Samalio was an Intelligence Office of the Bureau of Immigration and Detention when a
certain Ms. Weng Sai Qin who was a Chinese and was carrying a Uruguayan passport was brought to him
as there was a suspicion that the latter’s passport was fake. A 500USD was flashed by the Chinese
woman and was instantly grabbed by Samalio. Samalio was being prosecuted for the Violation of Section
46 of the Immigration Law before the Board of Discipline of BID and the crime of Robbery before the
Sandiganbayan. In the administrative case, he was convicted by the BID, which was affirmed by the DOJ
Secretary, CSC and the CA. While in the Sandiganbayan case, he was convicted but he did not appeal
instead he applied for probation. He was challenging the decision of the CA on the basis that the CA
erred in the interpretation of Section 47, Rule 130, ROC and there was no hearing conducted on his case.

Issue: WON Section 47, Rule 130 of the ROC may be applied in administrative cases.

Ruling: Yes. The CSC and the Secretary of Justice did not err in applying Section 47, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules of Court, otherwise known as the "rule on former testimony," in deciding petitioner’s
administrative case. The provisions of the Rules of Court may be applied suppletorily to the rules of
procedure of administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial powers, unless otherwise provided by law or
the rules of procedure of the administrative agency concerned. For Section 47, Rule 130 to apply, the
following requisites must be satisfied:

a. the witness is dead or unable to testify;

b. his testimony or deposition was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative,
between the same parties or those representing the same interests;

c. the former case involved the same subject as that in the present case, although on different
causes of action;

d. the issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the present
case and

e. the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case.

In this case, Weng Sai Qin was unable to testify in the administrative proceedings before the BID
because she left the country even before the administrative complaint against petitioner was instituted.
The testimony of Weng Sai Qin was given in Sandiganbayan was used as basis for filing the
administrative complaint. Hence, the issue testified to by Weng Sai Qin in Sandiganbayan Criminal Case
No. 18679 was the same issue in the administrative case, that is, whether petitioner extorted money
from Weng Sai Qin. Petitioner also had the opportunity to face and cross-examine his accuser Weng Sai
Qin, and to defend and vindicate his cause before the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, all the requisites for the
proper application of the rule on former testimony, as embodied in Section 47, Rule 130, were satisfied.
Thus, the CSC and the Secretary of Justice committed no error when they applied it and took cognizance
of the former testimony of Weng Sai Qin in Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No. 18679 where petitioner
was convicted.
Moreover, administrative bodies are not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure and the
rules obtaining in courts of law. Administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are unfettered
by the rigidity of certain procedural requirements, subject to the observance of fundamental and
essential requirements of due process in justiciable cases presented before them. In administrative
proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied and administrative due
process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense.

The Uniform Rules of Procedure in the Conduct of Administrative Investigations in the CSC which were
applicable to petitioner’s case provided that administrative investigations shall be conducted without
necessarily adhering to technical rules applicable in judicial proceedings. The Uniform Rules further
provided that evidence having materiality and relevance to the administrative case shall be accepted.
Not only was petitioner’s objection to the application of Section 47, Rule 130 a technicality that could be
disregarded; the testimony of Weng Sai Qin in Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No. 18679 was also material
and relevant to the administrative case. Hence, the CSC was correct in applying Section 47, Rule 130
when it took cognizance of the former testimony of Weng Sai Qin in the aforementioned criminal case.

4.EL GRECO vs. COMMISSIONER

FACTS:

On 23 September 2001, the vessel M/V Criston docked at the Port of Tabaco, Albay, carrying a shipment
of 35,000 bags of imported rice, consigned to Antonio Chua, Jr. (Chua) and Carlos Carillo (Carillo),
payable upon its delivery to Albay. Glucer Shipping Company, Inc. (Glucer Shipping) is the operator of
M/V Criston.

The 35,000 bag of rive were seized by virtue of the warrant of Seizure and Detention, issued by the
Legaspi District Collector. The BOC District Collector of the Port of Legaspi thereafter commenced
proceedings for the forfeiture of M/V Criston and its cargo.

To protect their property rights over the cargo, consignees Chua and Carillo filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Tabaco, Albay, a Petition for TRO assailing the authority of the Legaspi District
Collectors to issue the Warrants of Seizure and Detention.

RTC issued a 72-hour TRO conditioned upon the filing by Chua and Carillo of a bond in the amount of
P31,450,000.00, representing the value of the goods. After Chua and Carillo posted the required bond,
the 35,000 bags of rice were released to them.
In the meantime, while M/V Criston was berthing at the Port of Tabaco under the custody of the BOC,
the Province of Albay was hit by typhoon "Manang." In order to avert any damage which could be
caused by the typhoon, the vessel was allowed to proceed to another anchorage area to temporarily
seek shelter. After typhoon "Manang" had passed through Albay province, M/V Criston, however, failed
to return to the Port of Tabaco and was nowhere to be found.

Alarmed, the BOC and the Philippine Coast Guard coordinated with the Philippine Air Force to find the
missing vessel. On 8 November 2001, the BOC received information that M/V Criston was found in the
waters of Bataan sporting the name of M/V Neptune Breeze.

Based on the above information and for failure of M/V Neptune Breeze to present a clearance from its
last port of call, a Warrant of Seizure and Detention under Seizure Identification No. 2001-208 was
issued against the vessel by the BOC District Collector of the Port of Manila.

In the meantime, El Greco, the duly authorized local agent of the registered owner of M/V Neptune
Breeze, Atlantic Pacific Corporation, Inc. (Atlantic Pacific), filed with the Manila District Collector, in
Seizure Identification No. 2001-208, a Motion for Intervention and Motion to Quash Warrant of Seizure
Detention with Urgent Prayer for the Immediate Release of M/V Neptune Breeze. El Greco claimed that
M/V Neptune Breeze was a foreign registered vessel owned by Atlantic Pacific, and different from M/V
Criston which had been involved in smuggling activities in Legaspi, Albay.

Acting favorably on the motion of El Greco, the Manila District Collector issued an Order dated 11 March
2002 quashing the Warrant of Seizure and Detention it issued against M/V Neptune Breeze in Seizure
Identification No. 2001-208 for lack of probable cause that the said vessel was the same one known as
M/V Criston which fled from the jurisdiction of the BOC Legaspi District after being seized and detained
therein for allegedly engaging in smuggling activities. According to the decretal part of the Manila
District Collector's Order:

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT M/V NEPTUNE BREEZE AND M/V CRISTON ARE ONE AND THE SAME VESSEL.

HELD:

Well-entrenched is the rule that findings of facts of the CTA are binding on this Court and can only be
disturbed on appeal if not supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
A review of the records of the present case unveils the overwhelming and utterly significant pieces of
evidence that more than meets the quantum of evidence necessary to establish that M/V Neptune
Breeze is the very same vessel as M/V Criston, which left the anchorage area at Legaspi, Albay, without
the consent of the customs authorities therein while under detention for smuggling 35,000 bags of
imported rice.

The crime laboratory report of the PNP shows that the serial numbers of the engines and generators of
the two vessels are identical hence a Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion, M/V Neptune breeze and M/V Criston
are one and the same vessels.

5. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. TRISTAN C. COLANGGO G.R. No.174935 April 30, 2008

FACTS:

· Oct 25, 1992: Colanggo took the Professional Board Examination for Teachers (PBET) and obtained a
passing rate of 75.98%.

· Oct 1, 1993: He was appointed Teacher I and was assigned to Don Ruben E. Ecleo, Sr. Memorial
National High School in San Jose, Surigao del Norte.

· Subsequently, a complaint questioning the eligibility of teachers in Surigao del Norte was filed in the
Civil Service Commission (CSC) CARAGA Regional Office XIII (CSC-CARAGA) in Butuan City.

o In the course of its investigation, the CSC-CARAGA discovered significant irregularities in respondent’s
documents.

§ The photographs of Colanggo attached to the PBET application form and to the October 25, 1992
picture seatplan did not resemble him.

§ The signature in the PBET application form was markedly different from that affixed on respondent’s
personal data sheet (PDS). It appeared that someone other than respondent filed his PBET application
and still another person took the exam on his behalf.

o CSC-CARAGA then filed a formal charge for dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
service against respondent on Jan 13, 1999.

· Sept 27, 2000: Respondent filed an answer denying the charges against him and moved for a formal
hearing and investigation. CSC granted the motion and scheduled a hearing.

o Respondent failed to appear on the said date but subsequently filed an omnibus motion for the
production of original documents relative to the charges against him and the presentation of persons
who supervised the PBET. à His motion was granted and the concerned proctor and examiners were
subpoenaed.
· CSC concluded that Colanggo did not apply for and take the PBET exam. In Resolution No. 021412, the
CSC found respondent guilty of dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service and
ordered his dismissal. Colanggo’s MR was denied.

o Based on the photographs, it is evident that the person who filed the application form for the PBET is
not the same person who actually took the said examination on October 25, 1992.

§ The disparities of physical features of the former and latter are evident. The person who filed the PBET
has fuller cheekbones and slanted eyes, thinner lips and has a different hairstyle from that of the John
Doe who took the said examination. On the other hand, the latter has thinner cheekbones, elongated
chin, full lips with a moustache and round eyes.

§ Respondent looks older, has full cheekbones, flatter nose and thin lips.

o The signatures appearing of the PBET applicant and that of the PBET examinee are also in different
strokes, curves and slants. Comparing the signatures on the PBET application form and picture seat plan
vis--vis those affixed on the PDS of respondent more evidently reveals that the three are different
persons.

· CA ruled in favor of Colanggo – it annulled and set aside CSC Resolution and ordered the dismissal of
the charges. The photocopies of the PBET application form, picture seat plan and PDS should have been
authenticated. Only documents or public records duly acknowledged or certified as such in accordance
with law could be presented in evidence without further proof.

· CSC’s MR was denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUES:

WON there should be a strict adherence to technical rules of evidence in Admin Cases in the Civil
Service.

WON the photocopies of the PBET application form, picture seat plan and PDS, in resolving the formal
charge against respondent, can be validly considered even if they were not duly authenticated

RULING:

Administrative rules of procedure are construed liberally to promote their objective and to assist parties
in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their respective claims and defenses. Section
39 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides:

“Section 39. The direct evidence for the complainant and the respondent consist of the sworn
statement and documents submitted in support of the complaint or answer as the case may be, without
prejudice to the presentation of additional evidence deemed necessary but was unavailable at the time
of the filing of the complaint and the answer upon which the cross-examination, by the respondent and
the complainant respectively, shall be based. Following the cross-examination, there may be re-direct or
re-cross examination.”

Either party may avail himself of the services of counsel and may require the attendance of witnesses
and the production of documentary evidence in his favor through the compulsory process of subpoena
or subpoena duces tecum.
The investigation shall be conducted for the purpose of ascertaining the truth without necessarily
adhering to technical rules applicable in judicial proceedings. It shall be conducted by the disciplining
authority concerned or his authorized representatives.

The provision above clearly states that the CSC, in investigating complaints against civil servants, is not
bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable in judicial proceedings.

AS APPLIED: CSC correctly appreciated the photocopies of PBET application form, picture seat plan and
PDS (though not duly authenticated) in determining whether there was sufficient evidence to
substantiate the charges against the respondent. It is worth noting that respondent never objected to
the veracity of their contents. He merely disputed their admissibility on the ground that they were not
authenticated.

As a general rule, a finding of guilt in administrative cases, if supported by substantial evidence (or that
amount of evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion), will be
sustained by this Court.

The CSC graciously granted respondent’s motions to ensure that he was accorded procedural due
process. Moreover, it exhaustively discussed the differences in appearances of respondent and the
persons whose photographs were attached to the PBET application form and the picture seat plan. It
likewise compared the various signatures on the said documents.

The penalty of dismissal imposed on respondent was therefore fully in accord with law and
jurisprudence. CSC did not commit GAD. CSC resolution reinstated.

6. G.R. No. 127240 March 27, 2000

ONG CHIA, petitioner,

vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS: Ong Chia was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived
at the port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the Philippines where
he found employment and eventually started his own business, married a Filipina, with whom he had
four children. At the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A.
No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended.

During the hearings, Ong Chia testified as to his qualifications and presented three witnesses to
corroborate his testimony. So impressed was the Prosecutor that the State did not wish to present any
evidence to counteract or refute the testimony of the witnesses for the petitioner as well as the
petitioner himself.

The trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine citizenship. The State,
however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed, arguing that Ong Chia:
(1) failed to disclose all the names by which he is or had been known;

(2) failed to state all his former places of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, §7;

(3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the
Philippines, in violation of §2;

(4) has no known lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes have been insufficient or
misdeclared, also in contravention of §2; and;

(5) failed to support his petition with the appropriate documentary evidence.

The CA reversed the decision of the trial court and denied petitioner's application for naturalization. It
ruled that due to the importance naturalization cases, the State is not precluded from raising questions
not presented in the lower court and brought up for the first time on appeal.

Petitioner's principal contention is that the appellate court erred in considering the documents which
had merely been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on the basis of which, justified the
reversal of the trial court's decision. Not having been presented and formally offered as evidence, they
are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary value," 12 so it was argued, because under Rule
132, §34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in admitting the documents annexed by the State to its appellant’s brief on
the ground that they were not presented and formally offered as evidence

HELD: NO.

The rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, §34) is clearly not applicable to the present case
involving a petition for naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or
suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient." That is not the case here, since
reliance upon the documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be
the more practical and convenient course of action considering that decisions in naturalization
proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata. 14 Consequently, a final favorable judgment
does not preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the
basis of the same documents.

The reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to
afford the opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility. 16 Petitioner cannot claim that he
was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate
court by the State. He could have included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed with the
Court of Appeals.

Furthermore, the Court notes that these documents — namely, the petition in SCN Case No. 031767,
petitioner's marriage contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and petitioner's income
tax returns — are all public documents. As such, they have been executed under oath. They are thus
reliable. Since petitioner failed to make a satisfactory showing of any flaw or irregularity that may cast
doubt on the authenticity of these documents, it is our conclusion that the appellate court did not err in
relying upon them.

One last point. petitioner's failure to include the address "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" in his petition, in
accordance with §7, C.A. No. 473. This address appears on petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of
Residence, a document which forms part of the records as Annex A of his 1989 petition for
naturalization. N

aturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and
against the applicant. 22 As noted by the State, C.A. No. 473, §7 clearly provides that the applicant for
naturalization shall set forth in the petition his present and former places of residence. 23 This provision
and the rule of strict application of the law in naturalization cases defeat petitioner's argument of
"substantial compliance" with the requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law. On this ground
alone, the instant petition ought to be denied.

7. SASAN SR. vs. NLRC (GR no. 176240)

FACTS: Sasan et al are employed by Helpmate, Inc (HI), a janitorial and messengerial service
provider, and assigned to Equitable PCI Bank in Gorordo Branch, Cebu City. Their services were cut off
when EPCI decided to bid out the janitorial and messengerial jobs to two other service providers. Sasan
et al then filed an action for illegal dismissal alleging that they are regular employees of PCI, and HI has
no authority to dismiss them.

After submission of legal positions to the Labor Arbiter, it concluded that HI is engaged in labor on
contracting as it operates without substantial capital as required by the Labor Code, declaring PCI as the
principal employer and awarding money claims to the employees for their illegal dismissal. PCI and Hi
appealed the LA's decision to the NLRC and submitted for the first time photocopy of documents
proving that they have sufficient capital to operate as an independent contractor. The NLRC modified
the LA's decision taking into consideration the documentary evidence submitted by HI. The petitioners
appeal to CA, which affirmed the NLRC's decision. Further, appealed to the SC, hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC is allowed to receive evidence and give merit with the same introduced
for the first time during appeal?

HELD: The submission of new evidence before the NLRC is not prohibited by its new Rules of Procedure.
Rules of evidence prevailing in in courts of law or equity are not controlling in labor cases. The NLRC and
labor arbiters are directed to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case
speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law and procedure all in the interest of
substantial justice. In keeping with this directive, it has been held that the NLRC may consider evidence,
such as documents and affidavits, submitted by the parties for the first time on appeal. The submission
of additional evidence on appeal does not prejudice the other party for the latter could submit counter-
evidence.
 For the same reasons, we cannot find merit in petitioners' protestations against the
documentary evidence submitted by HI because they were mere photocopies. Evidently, petitioners are
invoking the best evidence rule, espoused in Section 3, Rule130 of the Rules of Court. It provides that:

Section 3. - Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of

inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
itself x x x.

The above provision explicitly mandates that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document,
no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. Notably, certified true copies
of these documents, acceptable under the Rules of Court were furnished to the petitioners. Even
assuming that petitioners were given mere photocopies, again, we stress that proceedings before the
NLRC are not covered by the technical rules of evidence and procedure as observed in the regular
courts. Technical rules of evidence do not apply if the decision to grant the petition proceeds from an
examination of its sufficiency as well as a careful look into the arguments contained in position papers
and other documents.

8. Wilgen Loon vs. Power Master Inc, G.R. No. 189404, 11 December 2013

Facts: Respondents Power Master, Inc. and Tri-C General Services employed and assigned the
petitioners as janitors and leadsmen in various Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT)
offices in Metro Manila area. Subsequently, the petitioners filed a complaint for money claims against
Power Master, Inc., Tri-C General Services and their

officers, the spouses Homer and Carina Alumisin (collectively, the respondents). The petitioners alleged
in their complaint that they were not paid minimum wages, overtime, holiday, premium, service
incentive leave, and thirteenth month pays. They further averred that the respondents made them sign
blank payroll sheets. On June 11, 2001, the petitioners amended their complaint and included illegal
dismissal as their cause of action. They claimed that the respondents relieved them from service in
retaliation for the filing of their original complaint.

The Labor Arbiter partially ruled in favor of petitioners awarding them salary differential, service
incentive leave and thirteenth month pays while denied backwages, overtime, holiday, and premium
pays.

On appeal, the NLRC partially ruled in favor of respondents. The NLRC affirmed the LA’s award of holiday
pay and attorney’s fees. However, it allowed respondents to submit pieces of evidence for the first time
on appeal on the ground that they had been deprived of due process. THE NLRC vacated LA’s award of
salary differential, thirteenth month and service incentive leave pays. and ruled that petitioners were
lawfully dismissed on grounds of serious misconduct and willful disobedience.

The CA affirmed NLRC’s ruling. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether respondents were estopped from submitting pieces of evidence for the first time on
appeal

Ruling: Yes.

A party may only adduce evidence for the first time on appeal if he adequately explains his delay in the
submission of evidence and he sufficiently proves the allegations sought to be proven.

The liberality of procedural rules is qualified by two requirements: (1) a party should adequately explain
any delay in the submission of evidence; and (2) a party should sufficiently prove the allegations sought
to be proven.

1. The respondents failed to adequately explain their delay in the submission of evidence

The NLRC blatantly disregarded the fact that the respondents voluntarily opted not to participate, to
adduce evidence in their defense and to file a position paper despite their knowledge of the pendency
of the proceedings before the LA.

2. The respondents failed to sufficiently prove the allegations sought to be proven

While the court generally admit in evidence and give probative value to photocopied documents in
administrative proceedings, allegations of forgery and fabrication should

prompt the adverse party to present the original documents for inspection.

It was incumbent upon the respondents to present the originals, especially in this case where the
petitioners had submitted their specimen signatures. Instead, the respondents effectively deprived the
petitioners of the opportunity to examine and controvert the alleged spurious evidence by not adducing
the originals. This Court is thus left with no option but to rule that the respondents’ failure to present
the originals raises the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.

9.BANTOLINO VS. COCA COLA

FACTS:

§ 62 employees of the Coca-Cola (the company) filed a complaint for unfair labor practice.

§ Allegedly, the employees, in the performance of their duties as route helpers, bottle segregators, and
others, where replaced and prevented from entering the company premises.

§ Such act by the employer is deemed an illegal dismissal.

§ The company averred that there was no employer-employee relationship thus the Labor Arbiter has
no jurisdiction.

§ The Labor Arbiter then rendered a decision in favor of the employees and ordering the company to
reinstate the complainants to their former posistions with all the rights, privileges and benefits due
regular employees, and to pay their full back wages.

§ Coca-Cola then appealed the decision to the NLRC which sustained the findings of the Labor Arbiter.

§ Then, the company elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the existence of an
employer-employee relationship but set aside the favorable decision of 7 employees for lack of
sufficient evidence.

§ According to the CA, the affidavits of the 7 employees should not have been given probative value for
their failure to affirm the contents thereof and to undergo cross-examination.

§ Only those 3 employees where declared regular employees since they were the only ones subjected
to cross-examination.

ISSUE: WON the affidavits should be given probative value despite the failure of the affiants to affirm
their contents and undergo test of cross-examination.

RULING: Administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical niceties of law and
procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. Indeed, the Revised Rules of Court and prevailing
jurisprudence may be given only stringent application, i.e., by analogy or in a suppletory character and
effect. The submission by respondent, citing People v. Sorrel, that an affidavit not testified to in a trial, is
mere hearsay evidence and has no real evidentiary value, cannot find relevance in the present case
considering that a criminal prosecution requires a quantum of evidence different from that of an
administrative proceeding. Under the Rules of the Commission, the Labor Arbiter is given the discretion
to determine the necessity of a formal trial or hearing. Hence, trial-type hearings are not even required
as the cases may be decided based on verified position papers, with supporting documents and their
affidavits.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN PROOF AND EVIDENCE

PRINCIPLE OF FALSUS IN UNO, FALSUS IN OMNIBUS

1. PEOPLE VS. CASTOR BATIN

FACTS: The RTC of Quezon City convicted father and son, Castor and Neil Batin, of the crime of murder
for the killing of one Eugenio Refugio, who was shot while he was leaning against a mango tree near his
house on St. Peter St, San Paolo Subdivision, Nagkakaisang Nayon, Novaliches, Quezon City.

PROSECUTION’S CASE:

The prosecutors presented witnesses Eusebio Farrales, Vilma Juadinez Rodriguez, Florante Baltazar,
Josephine Refugio, PO3 Marifor Segundo and Police Inspector Solomon Segundo.

1) Eugenio’s wife, Josephine Refugio testified that she was with Eugenio when he was shot, facing him as
he leaned against the mango tree and, in fact, had her arms resting on his shoulders. She recalled that
before the shooting, she was at home when, looking out of the window, she caught sight of Castor Batin
washing his feet at a nearby faucet. Castor was angrily muttering, and she distinctly heard him say,
among the other things he said: Mga matatandang kunsintidor, dapat manahimik na. Then, after
washing himself, Castor moved towards the street. Seeing this, she went to the street because of a
feeling of uneasiness (Para po akong kinakabahan, kasi, ganoon naman ang ginagawa nila lagi, eh,
pagnalalasing). Finding her husband leaning against the mango tree on the side of the street, she went
to him. She tried to talk Eugenio into going home with her because Castor was again into one of his wild
ways (Nagwawala nanaman, daldal ng daldal). As he was talking with Eugenio, she glanced to her left
and saw Neil Batin standing at the gate to their (Batins’) compound, looking towards her and her
husband. A few moments later, Neil went to one of the parked cars, opened its door, and took a gun
from inside. She next noticed Castor going towards Neil as the latter stood at the side of the car and
shouting: Huwag! Castor grabbed the gun from Neil. After the gun was taken from him, Neil just
proceeded towards the right rear of the car. Castor followed Neil and handed the gun back to him.

When she shifted her glance from the Batins, she heard Castor ordering his son: Sige, banatan mo na.
Neil responded by drawing the gun from his waistline, raising and aiming it at her and her husband, and
firing twice from his eye-level. Both Josephine and Eugenio fell to the ground, the former, backwards,
and the latter landing on top of her. As they tried to get up, Eugenio uttered to her: Nanay, may tama
ako. She then pulled her husband by the shoulder of his shirt so that she could take him to their house
as he was already slumped to the right. She later rushed her husband to the Quezon City General
Hospital, where he underwent surgery, but later expired.

2) Other eyewitnesses from the neighborhood were presented namely Eusebio Farrales and Vilma
Juadinez Rodriguez who are neighbors of Eugenio. Both Eusebio and Vilma substantially corroborated
Josephine’s testimonial account.

3) The medico-legal officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service, Dr. Florante Baltazar, conducted an
autopsy on Eugenio's remains. In his Medico-Legal Report, he indicated that Eugenio sustained one
gunshot wound, which was, however, fatal, because "it went slightly upward, slightly anteriorward from
the right to the left of the body, fracturing the right to [the] left [of the] thoracic region, lacerating the
right lumbar region."

4) Police Inspector Solomon Segundo conducted the ballistics examination to ascertain whether or not
the bullet recovered from the victim was fired from the specimen firearm submitted for examination. He
certified that the bullet from the recovery box and the bullet recovered from the victim's body were
fired from the same specimen firearm. This conclusion was arrived at after a test fire and a comparison
under the bullet comparison microscope.

DEFENSE’S ALIBI:

The defense, on the other hand, presented accused Neil Batin, Castor’s common-law wife Maricon
Pantoja, and one Restituto Paller. Neil Batin’s testimony is summarized by the trial court as follows:

Neil substantially claimed that it was his responsibility to conduct his younger brothers to school and
fetch them by car; that he also drove their taxicab; that it was about 7:00 o’clock in morning, while he
was cleaning the family-owned taxicab, that he found a short gun (de bola) underneath it beside the
right rear wheel; that he picked the gun and concealed it in the compartment of the taxicab; that he
continued with his chore of cleaning; that as soon as he finished cleaning the taxicab, he drove the white
Datsun car to Tondo to fetch his six-year old brother Mark, the son of his father with Maricon Pantoja;
that Mark was a pupil at the MagatSalamat Elementary School in Tondo; that after picking up Mark, they
drove to the house of his uncle, Domingo Batin, in Marulas, Valenzuela, to get his clothes from his
cousin; that they arrived there at 11:00 am, and spent around two hours there; that from Marulas, they
went home, arriving at St. Peter Street at around 2:30 pm; that he parked the car on the road in front of
their fence; that he and Mark first entered the house to deposit Mark’s school things and later went
outside to wait for Mark’s mother; that his other brothers were outside; that Castor was also outside
talking with a man whose name he did not know but whom he had seen thrice before as well as with
Boy Iigo in front of the latter’s house; that Iigo’s house was 15 meters from their gate; that Pantoja soon
arrived at around 2:45 pm; that he continued talking and playing with his brothers; and that at that
point he decided to take the gun from the compartment of the taxicab then parked around 2 meters
away from where he and his brothers were and tucked it in his waistline.
Having thus tucked the gun, Neil went to stand at the right rear side of the Datsun car which was parked
facing the mango tree (halos magkatapat lang po). Maricon came out to the street at that point to ask
him about the time he had fetched Mark. It was while he was standing there with the others that,
according to Neil, he suddenly felt the impulse of drawing the gun from his waistline (Bigla kong naisip
ang bunutin ang baril). He thus drew the gun and turned around, but, as he did so, he accidentally pulled
the trigger, causing the gun to fire twice (Tumalikod po ako, tapos nakalabit ko, pumutok ng dalawang
beses).

Neil admitted knowing the late Eugenio Refugio and his wife Josephine because they were his neighbors
with only a high wall separating their houses; but denied seeing them that afternoon beside the mango
tree.

At the sound of gunfire, Castor rushed towards Neil from where he was in front of Iigo’s house, shouting
twice to his son: Huwag! Pantoja, for her part, forced Neil to enter the compound, where she brought
him inside the house of his aunt. Neil concealed the gun in the ceiling of the aunt’s house.

Neil said that he and his father did not grapple inside the Datsun car for possession of the gun; that his
father did not wrest the gun from him; that he did not enter the compound to put bullets in the gun;
that his father did not order him to shoot Eugenio; and that his father was not drunk and challenging
others to a fight. He insisted that he and the Refugios, with whom he was acquainted since 1987, had no
misunderstandings, for he even had shared drinks with the late Eugenio before October 21, 1994.

As regards the testimonies of the defenses two other witnesses, the trial court could not make an
intelligible narrative of the version of the facts presented by them, considering the contradictions it
found in their testimonies. The trial court found glaring Maricon Pantojas self-contradiction as to where
she and the accused were when Eugenio was shot. During the trial, Maricon testified that she, Neil and
Castor were outside their house when Neil drew the gun and accidentally fired. However, in her
affidavit, she alleged that they went outside their house upon hearing a gun explosion and saw Eugenio
Refugio alone holding his stomach x xx we have no any knowledge whether he was hit by a bullet.

RTC RULING: Trial court rendered its Decision finding both accused guilty of murder, qualified by
treachery.

CA RULING: Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision affirming, with modification, the Decision
of the trial court.

ISSUE: W/N there was conspiracy between Neil and Castor in the killing of Eugenio
RULING: YES. The Supreme Court did not give credence to Neil’s testimony, instead gave credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses as well as the findings of the trial court.

As Neil's testimony of accidental shooting had been the only evidence presented by the defense to rebut
the prosecution's evidence concerning the acts of Castor during the incident, we should carefully
scrutinize Neil's testimony to determine his credibility.

Neil claims that while his back was still turned against the Refugios, he suddenly felt the impulse to draw
the gun from his waistline. He drew the gun, turned around with the gun in hand, and accidentally fired
it twice without aiming it at anyone.

As held by the trial court, this account is plainly far-fetched and incredible. As observed by the trial
court,

The revolver involved herein was a mechanical firearm which belonged to the so-called double-
action type of guns. This type has a firing mechanism which permits two methods of firing - the first is by
manually cocking or retracting the hammer and then pressing the trigger to release the hammer; the
second is by applying continuous pressure on the trigger in order to cock the hammer and then releasing
the trigger. The drop of the hammer by either method propels the firing pin forward so that its other
end strikes the primer cap to explode the propellant charge inside the shell which then forces out the
bullet through the gun barrel. From the nature of the firing mechanism of the gun, and there being no
evidence showing that the hammer was manually cocked before the gun fired, it was absolutely
physically impossible for the gun to fire accidentally.

In order to determine for himself how much pressure was necessary to cock the hammer into firing
position, the trial court judge personally tested the trigger pull of the gun. Even assuming that the
passage of time from the date of the shooting caused some change on the efficiency of the firing
mechanism, such change can only show up by way of a weakening of the hammer spring. Nonetheless, it
was not surprising for the trial court judge to find heavy resistance at each trigger pull, such that he
exerted some force to cock the hammer. This actual testing easily validated the conclusion that firing
the gun accidentally and unintentionally was impossible.

Neil's claim that he accidentally fired the gun twice in quick succession is, thus, even more incredible.
Given the difficulty of pulling the trigger to cock the hammer into firing position, it is inconceivable how
the gun could have been fired by Neil twice in quick succession except by a deliberate and intentional
pulling of the trigger.

While the maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is not an absolute rule of law and is in fact rarely
applied in modern jurisprudence, Neil's credibility has been severely tarnished by the foregoing portion
of his testimony. Thus, we should likewise take with a grain of salt the following parts of his testimony
which tend to refute the account of the prosecution concerning the acts of Castor during the incident:
(1) that Neil and Castor did not grapple inside the Datsun car for possession of the gun; (2) that Castor
did not wrest the gun from him; (3) that Neil did not enter the compound to put bullets in the gun; (4)
that Castor did not order Neil to shoot Eugenio; and (5) that Castor was not drunk and challenging
others to a fight.
As stated above, the widow, Josephine Refugio, and the neighbors - - Eusebio Farrales and Vilma
Juadinez Rodriguez - - testified to the fact that Castor handed the gun to Neil and urged the latter to fire
at the Refugio spouses. The trial court, whose assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves great
respect, since it had the important opportunity to observe first-hand the expression and demeanor of
the witnesses at the trial, found these witnesses credible, thus:

From its careful and thorough evaluation of the record, the Court finds that Castor and Neil conspired in
shooting Eugenio. This finding is inexorable because the testimonies of the Prosecution witnesses - that
Castor returned the gun back to Neil; that he instigated Neil to shoot by shouting: "Sige, banatan mo
na"; and that Neil then fired his gun twice - were credible and sufficed to prove Castor's indispensable
cooperation in the killing of Eugenio. Accordingly, Castor was as much liable criminally for the death of
Eugenio as Neil, the direct participant in the killing, was.

The reliability of witnesses Farrales and Rodriguez, for one, cannot be doubted. Being the neighbors of
both the Batins and the Refugios, their claim of witnessing the events that culminated into the shooting
of Eugenio was unassailable. The accused, in fact, could not provide any reason or motive for them to
testify against the Batins unless it was upon the truth.

While Castor was indeed heard to have shouted "Huwag," this cannot be considered as reliable evidence
that he tried to dissuade Neil from firing the gun. It was established by credible testimony that he
handed back the gun to Neil and urged him to shoot the Refugio spouses. Josephine Refugio plainly
stated on cross-examination that Castor shouted "Huwag" while inside the car grappling for possession
of the gun, and not when Neil was aiming the gun at the spouses.

As concluded by the trial court, the circumstances surrounding Castor's utterance of "Huwag!" shows
beyond doubt that Castor shouted the same, not to stop Neil from firing the gun, but to force him to
leave the use of the gun to Castor. These circumstances only confirm the conspiracy between the Batins
in committing the crime: after the Batins grappled for the gun and Castor shouted "Huwag," Castor
finally decided to give the gun to Neil - a crystal-clear expression of the agreement of the Batins
concerning the commission of a felony.

Prosecution witnesses Josephine Refugio and Eusebio Farrales positively indicated in their testimonies
that prior to the shooting of Eugenio Refugio, Castor was drunk, was openly challenging others to a
fight, and was uttering angry words. It was at this juncture that witnesses saw Neil retrieve his gun from
the parked car, after which Castor grabbed the gun from his son, grappled with it, returned it to his son,
and ordered the latter to shoot the Refugios.

There is no doubt in our minds that Castor's words were the determining cause of the commission of the
crime. As presented by the prosecution, Vilma Juadines Rodriguez testified that the eighteen-year-old
Neil Batin asked his father before shooting: "Tay, banatan ko na?" Neil Batin was clearly seeking the
consent of his father before proceeding with the act, and it was Castor's words "Sige, banatan mo na"
that sealed Eugenio Refugio's fate.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the conviction of accused-appellant Castor
Batin for murder is AFFIRMED.
2. Northwest Airlines, Inc. vs. Chiong, G.R. No. 155550,January 31, 2008.

FACTS: On March 14, 1989, Philimare Shipping and Seagull Maritime Corporation (Philimare), as the
authorized Philippine agent of TransOcean Lines (TransOcean), hired respondent Steven Chiong as Third
Engineer of TransOcean’s vessel M/V Elbia at the San Diego, California Port. Under the service crew
agreement, Chiong was guaranteed compensation at a monthly salary of US$440.00 and a monthly
overtime pay of US$220.00, or a total of US$7,920.00 for one year. Subsequently, on March 27, 1989,
Philimare dispatched a Letter of Guarantee to CL Hutchins & Co., Inc., TransOcean’s agent at the San
Diego Port, confirming Chiong’s arrival thereat in time to board the M/V Elbia which was set to sail on
April 1, 1989 (California, United States time). For this purpose, Philimare purchased for Chiong a
Northwest plane ticket for San Diego, California with a departure date of April 1, 1989 from Manila. Ten
(10) days before his scheduled departure, Chiong fetched his entire family from Samar and brought
them to Manila to see him off at the airport.

On April 1, 1989, Chiong arrived at the Manila International Airport (MIA), at about 6:30 a.m.,
three (3) hours before the scheduled time of departure. Marilyn Calvo, Philimare's Liaison Officer, met
Chiong at the departure gate, and the two proceeded to the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) Counter to
present Chiong's seaman service record book for clearance. Thereafter, Chiong's passport was duly
stamped, after complying with government requirements for departing seafarers. Calvo remained at the
PCG Counter while Chiong proceeded to queue at the Northwest check-in counter.

When it was Chiong's turn, the Northwest personnel informed him that his name did not appear
in the computer's list of confirmed departing passengers. Chiong was then directed to speak to a "man
in barong" standing outside Northwest's counters from whom Chiong could allegedly obtain a boarding
pass. Posthaste, Chiong approached the "man in barong" who demanded US$100.00 in exchange
therefor. Without the said amount, and anxious to board the plane, Chiong queued a number of times
at Northwest's Check-in Counter and presented his ticket. However, the Northwest personnel at the
counter told him to simply wait and that he was being a pest.

Frustrated, Chiong went to Calvo at the PCG counter and inquired if she had money so he could
obtain a boarding pass from the "man in barong." Calvo, who already saw that something was amiss,
insisted that Chiong's plane ticket was confirmed and as such, he could check-in smoothly and board the
plane without shelling out US$100.00 for a boarding pass. Ultimately, Chiong was not allowed to board
Northwest Flight No. 24 bound for San Diego that day and, consequently, was unable to work at the
M/V Elbia by April 1, 1989 (California, U.S.A. time). It appears that Chiong's name was crossed out and
substituted with “W. Costine” in Northwest’s Air Passenger Manifest.

Chiong presented as evidence his testimony, testimony of Marilyn Calvo and stamps on his
passport from PCG Counter. On the other hand, Northwest contended that Chiong was a “no show”
passenger and it even filed a criminal case against Chiong for false testimony. Subsequently, an
Information was filed before court. Northwest further said that the existence of the pending case
indicates the falsity of the entire testimony, consistent with the “falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus”
doctrine.
ISSUE: Whether or not the principle of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus applies in the case.

RULING:

No. The legal maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, cited by Northwest, is not a positive rule of
law and is not strictly applied in this jurisdiction. Before this maxim can be applied, the witness must be
shown to have willfully falsified the truth on one or more material points. The principle presupposes the
existence of a positive testimony on a material point contrary to subsequent declarations in the
testimony. However, the records show that Chiong's testimony did not contain inconsistencies on what
occurred on April 1, 1989. Yet, Northwest never even attempted to explain or impugn the evidence that
Chiong passed through the PCG counter on April 1, 1989, and that his passport was accordingly
stamped, obviously for purposes of his departure on that day.

People vs. Letigio G.R. No. 112968. February 13, 1997

FACTS:

That on or about 1:15 o’clock dawn of the 23rd day of May, 1989 at barangay Don Andres
Soriano (DAS), Toledo City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, all armed with
firearms and a knife, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation, treachery and abuse of superior
strength, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, shoot one JIMMY REPUNTE, hitting him
in his body and while the victim fell down accused AMAY RAVANES, hack(ed) his neck and stab(bed) him,
which cause(d) his instantaneous death.

Appellant assails the credibility of prosecution witnesses Taneo and Repunte" Jr." especially as
regards their identification of appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crime. Firstly" appellant avers
that Taneo could not have seen the actual shooting incident considering his claim that he hid
immediately upon hearing the first gun report. Appellant contends that at a distance of fifteen meters"
Taneo could not have recognized the firearm that appellant was carrying. To the appellant" such
testimony is a “brazen lie” considering Dr. Cerna’s testimony that the victim was shot by a .38 caliber
revolver.

Obviously a futile attempt to cast a doubt on Taneo’s credibility, " appellant’s contention deserves scant
consideration for it does not change the fact that appellant was with his co-accused Nemenzo and
Ravanes during the shooting incident. Appellant also stresses the alleged inconsistency between the
description of his attire by the two prosecution witnesses ---Taneo depicted him as wearing a headband
and a T-shirt with long pants while Felix portrayed him as the polo jacket-wearing assailant.

Alleging that both prosecution witnesses had “deliberately and wantonly lied” in inculpating
him, appellant contends that the maxim falsus in unus, falsus in omnibus should be applied for his
exculpation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the principle of falsus in unus, falsus in omnibus applies in the present case.

RULING: NO.
 In People v. Manalansan, the Court said: x x x. The maxim falsus in unus, falsus in omnibus does
not lay down a categorical test of credibility. While the witnesses may differ in their recollections of an
incident, it does not necessarily follow from their disagreements that all of them should be disbelieved
as liars and their testimonies completely discarded as worthless.

In People v. Pacapac, the Court added that the maxim· x x x is not a positive rule of law or of
universal application. It should not be applied to portions of the testimony corroborated by other
evidence, particularly where the false portions could be innocent mistakes. Moreover, the rule is not
mandatory but merely sanctions a disregard of the testimony of a witness if the circumstances so
warrant. To completely disregard all the testimony of a witness on this ground, his testimony must have
been false as to a material point, and the witness must have a conscious and deliberate intention to
falsify a material point.

Verily, because appellant failed to unsettle the material point of his complicity in the killing of
Jimmy Repunte notwithstanding the grueling cross-examination of the two prosecution witnesses,
whatever contradictions and inconsistencies might have been present in their testimonies as to
peripheral and collateral matters may not result in the total abrogation of their respective testimonies.

ALIBI; FRAME-UP; SELF-DEFENSE

1. People of the Philippines v Rommel Dela Cruz

Reyes, R.T. J,

Facts: According to the witnesses, Dela Cruz came from behind and stabbed Santarin once. Santarin fell
to the ground, chin first. Pader and Viscaya were instantly shocked and were unable to move. Dela Cruz
immediately fled the scene. Santarin later died in the hospital. Dela Cruz claimed he did not join the
group of Santarin and instead went to see his clients. He claims he did not go home but instead slept in a
parked passenger jeep.

Issue: Whether or Not Dela Cruz defense may be appreciated

Ruling: No. For the defense of alibi to prosper, appellant must establish that (a) he was in
another place at the time of the commission of the offense; and (b) he was so far away that he
could not have been physically present at the place of the crime, or its immediate vicinity, at
the time of its commission.
2. PEOPLE vs. HENRY GUERRERO y AGRIPA

Brion, J.:

FACTS: AAA testified that the appellant was the kumpadre of her mother and a frequent visitor at her
parent’s house. On May 30, 1998, at around 5:00PM, the appellant, who was standing beside the
window of his house, called her. She approached the appellant who then grabbed her arms and dragged
her inside his house, where she was raped.

The prosecution charged the appellant before the RTC with the crime of rape.

The appellant gave a different version of the events. He declared that on May 30, 1998, he went to the
house of the spouses Felipe where he worked as a carpenter. He did not leave the Felipes’ house until
he finished his work at 9:00PM.

The RTC convicted the appellant of the crime of rape in its decision. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
The CA gave credence to AAA’s testimony which it found to be corroborated on material points by the
medico-legal report and testimony of Dr. Freyra. The appellant merely presented the weak defenses of
denial and alibi.

ISSUE: WON the RTC erred in convicting him despite the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt

RULING: NO.

For the charge of rape to prosper, the prosecution must prove that: (1) the offender had carnal
knowledge of a woman; and (2) he accomplished the act through force, threat, or intimidation or when
she was deprived of reason or was otherwise unconscious, was under 12 yrs of age, or was demented.
In her testimony, AAA positively identified the appellant as her rapist. She never wavered in this
identification.

AAA’s testimony strikes us to be clear, convincing and credible, corroborated as it was in a major way by
the medico-legal report and the testimony of Dr. Freyra. It bears emphasis that during the initial phases
of AAA’s testimony, she broke down on the witness stand when the prosecution asked her questions
relating to the rape she suffered. This, to our mind, is an eloquent and moving indication of the truth of
her allegations. In addition, our examination of the records gives us no reason to doubt AAA’s testimony
or suspect her of any ulterior motive in charging and testifying against the appellant. We have held time
and again that testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature, as in this case, deserve full
credence considering that no young woman, especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of
defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter subject herself to a public trial if
she had not been motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against her.

Clearly, the prosecution positively established the elements of rape required under Article 266-A. First,
the appellant succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the victim; AAA was steadfast in her assertion
that the appellant tried to force his penis into her vagina. We have said often enough that in concluding
that carnal knowledge took place, full penetration of the vaginal orifice is not an essential ingredient,
nor is the rupture of the hymen necessary; the mere touching of the external genitalia by a penis
capable of consummating the sexual act (as part of the entry of the penis into the labias of the female
organ) is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge.

In stark contrast with the prosecution’s case is the appellant’s alibi of having been in the Felipes’ house
at the time the rape was committed. He maintained that he never left the Felipes’ house from 7:00 a.m.
up to 9:00 a.m. of that day. By the appellant’s own admission, however, the residence of the Felipe
spouses is also located at Batasan Hills, and was a mere 30-minute walk, more or less, from his
(appellant’s) house where the rape was committed. Considering the proximity of these places, we
cannot accord any value to the appellant’s alibi. For the defense of alibi to prosper, proof of being at
another place when the crime was committed is not enough; the accused must likewise prove that it
was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity when the
crime was committed.

Moreover, we cannot help but note that the alibi of the accused is totally uncorroborated; only the
appellant testified about his presence elsewhere. Already a weak defense, alibi becomes even weaker
when the defense fails to present corroboration. The alibi totally falls if, aside from the lack of
corroboration, the accused fails to show the physical impossibility of his presence at the place and time
of the commission of the crime.

3.People vs. De Leon

G.R. No. 180762. March 4, 2009. Ynares, Santiago, J.

FACTS: At around 8:30 in the evening of April 5, 1986, Aquilina Mercado Rint and her sister, Leonisa,
together with their nephew, Junior, were inside a hut owned by their father Rafael Mercado located on
a tumana in Nueva Ecija. Due to the loud and insistent barking of their dogs, Aquilina peeped through
the window and saw five men she recognized as Gaudencio Legaspi and the other appellants. Aquilina
and Leonisa hurriedly went out of the hut and hid behind a pile of wood nearby while Junior was
dispatched to call for help.

They saw appellants surround the hut and set to fire the cogon roofing. While the hut was burning,
Leonisa grabbed a flashlight from her sister the same at the group in order to see them more clearly.
Upon seeing a light focused on them, Gaudencio ordered the others to leave and the men immediately
fled the premises. By the time Junior arrived with his uncles, the hut was already razed to the ground.

The police officer conducted an investigation at the scene of the crime and saw a big wood still on fire.
They also testified that prior to the incident, appellants had been to the premises, destroyed the plants,
the fence and a hut which was first built therein. Appellants likewise physically attacked their father and
issued threats that if he would not give up his claim on the land, something untoward would happen to
him; and that their father Rafael filed several cases for Malicious Mischief, Forcible Entry and Serious
Physical Injuries against appellants.

Appellants denied the charge against them.

(ALIBI)

Carlito alleged that on the day of the alleged incident, he was working in Cavite where he had been
staying for a year with his family; that his uncle Gaudencio was originally in possession of the tumana
contrary to Rafael’s claims; that his uncle used to plant vegetables and make charcoal therein until 1975
when he took over upon the latter’s request; and that when Gaudencio passed away in 1987, he applied
for a patent over the tumana with the Bureau of Lands.

Carlito also alleged that there was actually no structure on the premises because Rafael’s attempt to
build a hut was foiled by his helper, herein appellant Nelio. On cross examination however, he admitted
that on March 12, 1986, he destroyed the first hut constructed by Rafael on the subject tumana when
the prosecution confronted him with evidence which showed that he was found guilty of Malicious
Mischief in a criminal case filed against him by Rafael before the Municipal Trial Court of Peñaranda.

Nelio testified that on the day of the incident, the appellants were in their respective homes and could
not have gone to the tumana to commit the crime as charged; that the burnt parts depicted in the
pictures presented by the prosecution were actually parts of tree trunks turned to charcoal; and that the
cogon and bamboo shown in the pictures were materials brought by Rafael into the landholding during
the latter’s unsuccessful attempt to build a hut on the tumana

Bien also vehemently denied the charges against him and attributed the same to complainants’ desire to
grab the tumana which rightfully belongs to his mother. He testified that since 1982, he has been living
in Rizal, Nueva Ecija which is about 35 kilometers away from Peñaranda.For his part, Filoteo
corroborated the claims made by his co- appellants.

The trial court ruled that the appellants were guilty of arson and was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE: WON the appellants are guilty of arson

RULING: YES. In the instant case, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, found the testimonies of
witnesses Aquilina and Leonisa worthy of credence, thus: The inconsistencies and contradictions
presented in the case at bench do not detract from the fact that Rafael’s house was intentionally burned
by accused-appellants who were positively identified by witnesses Aquilina and Leonisa. Positive
identification, where categorical and consistent, without any showing of ill-motive on the part of the
eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial which, if not substantiated by clear
and convincing proof, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. The
appellants had not shown that it was physically impossible for them to be present at the time and place
of the crime. Thus, we find no reason to disturb the trial court’s reliance on the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses.

Proof of the corpus delicti is indispensable in the prosecution of arson, as in all kinds of criminal
offenses. Corpus delicti means the substance of the crime; it is the fact that a crime has actually been
committed. In arson, the corpus delicti is generally satisfied by proof of the bare occurrence of the fire,
e.g., the charred remains of a house burned down and of its having been intentionally caused. Even the
uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible, may be enough to prove the corpus delicti
and to warrant conviction. The corpus delicti has been satisfactorily proven in the instant case.

4.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAÑAGA

G.R. Nos. 138874-75 - July 21, 2005

PONENTE: HILARIO DAVIDE, Jr.

FACTS: On the night of July 16, 1997, Larrañaga and seven others kidnapped the Chiong sisters near the
west wing entrance of Ayala Center Cebu, the two [women] were raped but only Marijoy's body was
found while the other sister's body, was never found.

The accused [appellants] were charged and later on convicted of the crimes of of (a) special complex
crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention [Larrañaga, Aznar, Adlawan, Caño, Balansag; and
(James Andrew) Uy] ; and (b) simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention [Larrañaga, Aznar,
Adlawan, Caño, Balansag; (James Andrew) Uy; and (James Anthony) Uy]
The case was centered on the testimony of a co-defendant, David Valiente Rusia who only appeared 10
months after the incident. In exchange for immunity, he [Rusia] testified against his codefendants, he
claimed that he was with Larrañaga in Ayala Center, Cebú early in the evening of July 16.

Larrañaga raised in his defense that he was in Quezon City and not in Cebu at the time when the crime is
said to have taken place, some thirty five witnesses, including his friends and teachers, testified under
oath to prove this, however, all were rejected by the court; he further contended that the body found in
the ravine was not Marijoy's but somebody else's. While, Aznar, Adlawan, Balansag and Caño, on the
other hand, questioned Rusia’s testimony for being incredible, inconsistent, and unworthy of belief.

ISSUES:

Whether the Court erred –

1. in according credence to Rusia’s testimony;

2. in rejecting appellants’ alibi;

3. in holding that the trial court did not violate their right to due process when it excluded the testimony
of other defense witnesses; and

4. in holding that the body found in Tan-awan, Carcar was that of Marijoy.

RULING:

1. The trial court took into consideration not only Rusia's testimonies but also the physical evidence and
the corroborative testimonies of other witnesses for being strikingly compatible. Physical evidence being
one of the highest degrees of proof is give more weight than all witnesses put together. Even assuming
that his testimony standing alone might indeed be unworthy in view of his character, it is not so when
corroborated with other evidence.

2. It is a well settled rule that the defense of alibi is inherently weak for being a negative evidence and
self-serving, it cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of witnesses who testify on clear and
positive evidence. Moreover, alibi becomes LESS credible when it is corroborated only by relatives or
close friends of the accused. In the case at bar, the accused failed to meet the requirements of ali bi.
Larrañaga failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him
to be at Ayala Center Cebu during the abduction. His claimed of being in Quezon City at that time, failed
to satisfy the required proof of physical impossibility. It was shown that it takes only an hour to travel by
plane from Manila to Cebu and that there were four airlines flying the route. Indeed, Larrañaga’s
presence in Cebu City on the night of July 16, 1997 was proved to be not only a possibility but a reality.

3. Prof. Bailen, was properly excluded for being not a finger-print expert but an archaeologist; and that
his report consists merely of the results of his visual inspection of the exhibits already several months
old. While, the affidavit of Atty. Villarin of the NBI was found to be not testifying in the said for it only
contains his own unsubstantiated opinions, his self-congratulatory remarks, and his unmitigated
frustration over failing to get a promotion when almost everyone else did. Lastly, Dr. Fortun’s separate
study cannot be classified as newly-discovered evidence warranting belated reception because
Larrañaga could have produced it during trial had he wanted to.
4. Inspector Edgardo Lenizo, a fingerprint expert, testified that the fingerprints of the corpse match
those of Marijoy's; that the packaging tape and the handcuff found on the dead body were the same
items placed on Marijoy and Jacqueline while they were being detained; that the recovered body had
the same clothes worn by Marijoy on the day she was abducted; and that the members of the Chiong
family personally identified the corpse to be that of Marijoy's.

5.

6. PEOPLE vs. UBIÑA, G.R. No. 176349, July 10,2007

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS: In the morning of October 9, 2000 appellant Orlando Ubiña went to Tabang Elementary School in
Tabang, Sto. Niño, Cagayan where the victim AAA was a student to inform her that her grandfather was
in a hospital and needed her there. Ubiña brought AAA to Allcapan, Cagayan in a house. In a room in
that house, Ubiña removed AAA’s pants and thereafter inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA resisted
and cried. The appellant Ubiña sexually abused AAA five (5) times in the seven (7) days they stayed in
Allacapan. On October 16, 2000 appellant brought AAA to her grandfather's house located in Campo,
Sto. Nino, Cagayan. Ubiña molested her twice at that location.

After three (3) days her grandfather brought her home to San Manuel . The next day she told her father
about her ordeal and AAA’s father reported the matter to the police the following day.

AAA was brought to the Cagayan Valley Medical center where Dr. Alcantara medically examined her.
The examination disclosed several hymenal lacerations. The appellant was charged of rape defined and
penalized by Article 335 of the RPC by the assistant Provincial Prosecutor.

For his defense, Ubiña denied that he raped AAA. He stated that after bringing AAA home, he went to
his farm to pick up his wife. That he did not bring AAA to Allacapan. That heon October 16, 2000 was at
Maguiling, Piat, Cagayan to have his buffalo carabo vaccinated, that he only went home by 5:00 oclock
in the afternoon. That the reason AAA accused him of rape was because of her father’s jealousy since he
received a carabao as a dowry from his father in law. (AAA’s grandfather)

The RTC found Ubiña to be guilty of the crime of Rape and sentenced to 30 years in prison.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision with modification. The CA imposed the single indivisible penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower courts erred in giving credence to the inconsistent testimony of AAA

Whether or not the lower courts erred in rejecting appellants defenses of denial and alibi

RULING:

No. When a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape was committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and
sincerity. Also, in a long line of cases, we have held that if the testimony of the rape victim is accurate
and credible, a conviction for rape may issue upon the sole basis of the victim's testimony because no
decent and sensible woman will publicly admit being a rape victim and thus run the risk of public
contempt unless she is, in fact, a rape victim.

It is well-settled that the evaluation of the witnesses’ credibility is a matter best left to the trial court,
because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor,
conduct and attitude.

The alleged inconsistencies in AAA’s testimony, i.e., her inability to remember the house where she was
raped and her father’s alleged unnatural reaction upon knowing that his daughter was raped, are
inconsequential matters that do not bear upon the elements of the crime. What is decisive in a
prosecution for rape is whether the commission of the crime has been sufficiently proven. For a
discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony of a witness, to serve as basis for acquittal, must refer to
the significant facts vital to the guilt or innocence of the accused for the crime charged.

No. Denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses and constitute self-serving negative evidence which
can not be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the positive declaration of credible witnesses. To
be believed, denial must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability; whereas for alibi to
prosper, it must be proven that during the commission of the crime, the accused was in another place
and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis. In the instant case, it was not
shown that it was physically impossible for appellant to be at the scene of the crime when it was
committed. Moreover, nobody corroborated his alibi.

7. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JOSE BELMAR UMAPAS Y CRISOSTOMO,

ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
FACTS:

In the evening of November 30, 1998, around 11 o'clock, appellant mauled his wife Gemma Gulang
Umapas (Gemma) and, with the use of alcohol intended for a coleman or lantern, doused her with it and
set her ablaze at their home. Gemma was brought toa hospital for treatment by a certain Rodrigo
Dacanay who informed the attending hospital personnel, which included Dr. Arnildo C. Tamayo (Dr.
Tamayo), that it was appellant who set her on fire. Gemma was found to have suffered the following
injuries: contusions on the left cheek and on the lower lip, lacerations on right parietal area and on the
left temporal area, and thermal burns over 57% of her body. Due to the severity of the injuries, the
victim died on December 5, 1998 from multiple organ failure secondary to thermal burns.The police
authorities were unable to talk to Gemma immediately after the incident as they were prevented from
doing so by the attending physician at the hospital's emergency room. But the following day, December
1, 1998, around 1:30 p.m., SPO1 Anthony Garcia (SPO1 Garcia) was able to interview the victim at her
hospital bed. Though she spoke slowly with eyes closed, Gemma was said to be coherent and agreed to
give a statement about the incident which included her identifying her husband, Umapas, as her
assailant. Gemma was asked if she felt that she was dying, and she said "yes." SPO1 Garcia reduced her
statement in writing and the same was attested thru the victim's thumbmark. A nurse who was present
when the statement of the victim was taken signed as witness.On January 5, 1999, an Information was
filed against appellant Jose Belmar Umapas y Crisostomo for parricide.Appellant, for his part, narrated
that on November 30, 1998, he was with a certain Rommel fishing in Kalakhan. They left at 5 o'clock in
the afternoon and returned at 2 o'clock in the morning the following day to their residence at 195 Lower
Kalakhan, Olongapo City. When appellant went home, there was a commotion, but he claimed not to
know what the commotion was all about. There were many people in the vicinity of their house. He then
learned from the neighbors who were outside their house that his wife was brought to the hospital but
was not told why. His four children were in their house and they told him that their mother is in the
hospital. When he learned about this, appellant allegedly dressed up to go to the hospital, but he was
not able to go because he was stopped by the people from the barangay. He was instead brought to the
police precinct and was detained.

ISSUE:

WHETHER THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT BASED ON
THE ALLEGED DYING STATEMENT OF THE VICTIM GEMMA UMAPAS, ADMITTING THE SAME AS A DYING
DECLARATION AND PART OF RES GESTAE

2. W/N the defense of alibi shall be upheld.

RULING:

1. While witnesses in general can only testify to facts derived from their own perception, a report in
open court of a dying person's declaration is recognized as an exception to the rule against hearsay if it
is "made under the consciousness of an impending death that is the subject of inquiry in the case." It is
considered as "evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware
of his impending death would make a careless and false accusation." Four requisites must concur in
order that a dying declaration may be admissible, thus: First, the declaration must concern the cause
and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death. This refers not only to the facts of the assault
itself, but also to matters both before and after the assault having a direct causal connection with it.
Statements involving the nature of the declarant's injury or the cause of death; those imparting
deliberation and willfulness in the attack, indicating the reason or motive for the killing; justifying or
accusing the accused; or indicating the absence of cause for the act are admissible. Second, at the time
the declaration was made, the declarant must be under the consciousness of an impending death. The
rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and imminent
death must be entered by the declarant. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession
of death in point of fact that renders the dying declaration admissible. It is not necessary that the
approaching death be presaged by the personal feelings of the deceased. The test is whether the
declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on death as certainly impending. Third, the
declarant is competent as a witness. The rule is that where the declarant would not have been a
competent witness had he survived, the proffered declarations will not be admissible. Thus, in the
absence of evidence showing that the declarant could not have been competent to be a witness had he
survived, the presumption must be sustained that he would have been competent. Fourth, the
declaration must be offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant
is the victim. In the present case, all the abovementioned requisites of a dying declaration were met.
Gemma communicated her ante-mortem statement to SPO1 Garcia, identifying Umapas as the person
who mauled her, poured gasoline on her, and set her ablaze. Gemma's statements constitute a dying
declaration, given that they pertained to the cause and circumstances of her death and taking into
consideration the severity of her wounds, it may be reasonably presumed that she uttered the same
under the belief that her own death was already imminentThere is ample authority for the view that the
declarant's belief in the imminence of her death can be shown by the declarant's own statements or
from circumstantial evidence, such as the nature of her wounds, statements made in her presence, or by
the opinion of her physicianWhile more than 12 hours has lapsed from the time of the incident until her
declaration, it must be noted that Gemma was in severe pain during the early hours of her admission.
Dr. Tamayo even testified that when she saw Gemma in the hospital, she was restless, in pain and
incoherent considering that not only was she mauled, but 57% of her body was also burned.She also
underwent operation and treatment, and was under medication during the said period. Given the
circumstances Gemma was in, even if there was sufficient lapse of time, we could only conclude that at
the time of her declaration, she feared that her death was already imminent. While suffering in pain due
to thermal burns, she could not have used said time to contrive her identification of Umapas as her
assailant. There was, thus, no opportunity for Gemma to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.
Moreover, Gemma would have been competent to testify on the subject of the declaration had she
survived. There is nothing in the records that show that Gemma rendered involuntary declaration.
Lastly, the dying declaration was offered in this criminal prosecution for parricide in which Gemma was
the victim. It has been held that conviction or guilt may be based mainly on the ante-mortem
statements of the deceased.[35] In the face of the positive identification made by deceased Gemma of
appellant Umapas, it is clear that Umapas committed the crime.
2. We, likewise, do not find credence in appellant's defense of alibi. It is axiomatic that alibi is an
inherently weak defense, and may only be considered if the following circumstances are shown: (a) he
was somewhere else when the crime occurred; and (b) it would be physically impossible for him to be at
the locus criminis at the time of the alleged crim. The requirements of time and place must be strictly
met. It is not enough to prove that appellant was somewhere else when the crime happened. They must
also demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to have
been at the scene of the crime at the approximate time of its commission. Unless substantiated by clear
and convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law. A
mere denial, like alibi, is inherently a weak defense and constitutes self-serving negative evidence, which
cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.Under the circumstances, there is the possibility that appellant could have been
present at the locus criminis at the time of the incident considering that where he claimed to have gone
fishing and his residence are both in Kalakhan. Accordingly, appellant's defense of alibi must fall.

DELAY AND INITIAL RELUCTANCE IN REPORTING A CRIME

1. PEOPLE vs. ALBERTO L. MAHINAY, G.R. No. 179190, January 20, 2009

FACTS: On 5 April 1998, at around 8:00 p.m., AAA went to the cornfield near her residence in order to
defecate. A neighbor, Sidra, approached her and told her that Mahinay wanted to talk to her. Sidra
dragged AAA towards Sidra’s house. Mahinay met them just outside the house, and forced AAA inside
the kitchen of Sidra’s house. While in the kitchen, Mahinay told AAA that his cousin, Joseph, wanted to
court her. While saying this, Mahinay started touching AAA’s breast. Mahinay then forced AAA to lie
down. He removed her shorts and underwear. AAA tried to break the hold of Mahinay, who responded
by tightening his grip. Mahinay threatened to kill her, and this prevented her from shouting. Mahinay
then raped her. AAA felt helpless, and all she was able to do was cry.

Thereafter, AAA went home. At 11:00 p.m., BBB arrived home. AAA did not tell BBB what happened,
afraid that Mahinay would kill her. It was only five days later, or on 10 April 1998, that BBB learned
about what happened to her daughter, when she was informed by a barangay tanod named Belbin. On
the same day, BBB brought AAA to the San Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center where the latter
underwent physical examination. Dr. Nueva Tagalogin examined AAA and noted that there was an
incomplete healed laceration at the 8 and 5 o’clock positions.

In his defense, Mahinay alleged that he was in the house of his aunt Remedios Lauron. He was not able
to talk to AAA that night.and that BBB fabricated stories against him since the family of AAA and his
family were not in good terms.
RTC and CA- convicted him of the crime of rape

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not AAA’s delay in reporting the incident to her mother was tantamount to giving
consent to the sexual act

2. Whether it is highly improbable for him to have committed the crime of rape because other
persons were in the house where the alleged rape took place.

RULING:

1. No. Neither do we find merit in Mahinay’s insistence that AAA’s failure to report the incident
immediately was tantamount to giving consent to the alleged act of Mahinay. Delay in revealing the
commission of rape is not an indication of a fabricated charge. Many victims of rape never complain or
file criminal charges against the rapist, for they prefer to silently bear the ignominy and pain, rather than
reveal their shame to the world or risk the offender’s making good his threats.

2. No. There is no merit in Mahinay’s contention that it is highly improbable for him to have
committed the crime of rape because other persons were in the house where the alleged rape took
place. According to Mahinay, AAA herself testified that there were other people present when the
alleged rape took place. This is misleading. AAA clearly stated that the people referred to were outside
the house during the incident. This Court has observed in numerous cases that lust does not respect
either time or place.The evil in man has no conscience -- the beast in him bears no respect for time and
place, driving him to commit rape anywhere, even in places where people congregate such as in parks,
along the roadside, within school premises, and inside a house where there are other occupants.

2. Ingal vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 173282, 04 March 2008

Jose S. Ingal was convicted by the Court of Appeals, affirming in toto the decision of the RTC for the
crime of murder of one Rolando N. Domingo a.k.a. Toto.

The prosecution presented the following witnesses, namely: (1) Myrna Nalangan Domingo (mother of
Toto); (2) Aida Bona (please refer to below statements); (3) Rosalinda Tan (please refer to below
statements); (4) Dr. Marcial G. Ceñido (medico-legal); (5) SPO2 Leon Salac, Jr. (member of the Western
Police District (WPD); and (6) PFC Benjamin C. Boco (retired Police Inspector of the WPD assigned to the
Homicide Section).

Aida Bona, a resident of Perla Street, Tondo, Manila, and the owner of the carinderia where the stabbing
took place. She narrated that at around 9:00 p.m. of 2 March 1987, she was in front of her carinderia
and the victim, Rolando Domingo, nicknamed Toto, was eating thereat. While Toto was eating,
petitioner Jose Ingal approached him, pulled his hair and repeatedly stabbed him. She was around an
arm’s length away from Toto when he was stabbed. After petitioner stabbed Toto, he just walked away
as if nothing happened. She shouted for help but nobody came to help. She said she was certain the
assailant was the petitioner because of the right mole on his eyelid. She added she did not see anyone
helping the petitioner when he stabbed the victim. Aside from the victim, only she, Rosalinda Tan, and
the girlfriend of the victim were in the carinderia.

Mrs. Bona explained she gave her first written statement about the incident on 26 August 1994. On the
night of the incident, she told the police about the appearance of the suspect. What she revealed was
reduced into writing but she did not sign it and told the police she would sign the same only if the
suspect would be apprehended. She said she first saw the petitioner on 2 March 1987 and saw him the
second time when he was arrested on 26 August 1994.

Rosalinda Tan, a helper at the carinderia of Mrs. Bona, testified that at around 9:00 p.m. of 2 March
1987, she was attending to the needs of the customers in the carinderia. A person, later identified as the
petitioner, came to the carinderia and stabbed Rolando Domingo. She disclosed she was in front of the
victim, about two meters away, when petitioner placed a towel on the neck of the victim and stabbed
him thrice. Petitioner thereafter removed the towel and walked away towards the end of Perla Street.
Like Mrs. Bona, she executed a sworn statement when petitioner was arrested. She explained that only
one person stabbed the victim.

The trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses Aida Bona and Rosalinda
Tan vis-à-vis petitioner’s defenses of denial and alibi. Mrs. Bona, the owner of the carinderia where the
stabbing happened, informed the authorities that petitioner was the one who stabbed Rolando
Domingo and said that she would not give a written statement until and unless the suspect had been
apprehended. Seven years later, after the arrest of the petitioner, Mmes. Bona and Tan finally gave their
sworn statements pointing to petitioner as the assailant. The court a quo said that the weapon used
(tres cantos) and the manner in which the victim was stabbed (four times with two penetrating stab
wounds on the chest) clearly indicated the intention of petitioner to kill the victim. The victim was
unarmed and was suddenly stabbed several times by the petitioner.

Issue: Whether there was an error in convicting the accused-appellant on the basis of the testimonies of
two (2) alleged eyewitnesses whose statements were given to the police more than seven (7) years after
the commission of the crime on March 2, 1987.

Ruling: No. We find the testimony of Mrs. Bona to be worthy of belief. The statement of the defense
that Mrs. Bona waited for seven years after divulging what she knew about the stabbing incident is
awry. After the incident, Mrs. Bona immediately gave her statement to the police that petitioner was
the one who stabbed the victim. This is evidenced by the Advance Report dated 3 March 1987 prepared
by PFC Benjamin Boco. It is not true that she waited for seven years before revealing what she knew.
What she did not immediately give to the police was her written statement under oath, because she was
fearful that something bad might happen to her because the suspect was still at large. She explained she
would only give her written statement when the suspect was apprehended, because the crime was a
grave offense. This was what she did once petitioner was arrested and jailed.

She cannot be faulted for doing what she did. Fear of reprisal and the natural reluctance of a witness to
get involved in a criminal case are sufficient explanations for a witness’ delay in reporting a crime to the
authorities. Initial reluctance to volunteer information regarding a crime due to fear of reprisal is
common enough that it has been judicially declared as not affecting a witness’ credibility. The fact that
Mrs. Bona did not right away submit a written statement to the police was natural and within the
bounds of expected human behavior. Her action revealed a spontaneous and natural reaction of a
person who had yet to fully comprehend a shocking and traumatic event.

3. People v. Teehankee, Jr.

DELAY AND INITIAL RELUCTANCE IN REPORTING A CRIME

G.R. Nos. 111206-08. October 6, 1995

Puno, Jr., J.

Facts: Claudio Teehankee, Jr. was charged for murder for the killing of Roland Chapman; frustrated
murder which was later elevated to murder for the killing of Maureen Hultman; and frustrated murder
for the wounding of Jussie Leino. Leino was among those used by the prosecution as witness. The facts
show that Chapman and Hultman were among those invited by Leino to a party at his house in Forbes
Park, Makati. Thereafter, they went bar hopping. After a while, Maureen asked Leino to take her home
at Campanilla St., Dasmarinas Village, Makati, to which Chapman tagged along. Maureen then asked
Leino to stop the car along Mahogany St. because she did not want to make any noise in going back to
her house that late. When Leino and Maureen reached the corner of Caballero and Mahogany St., a light
colored Mitsubishi box-type Lancer car stopped and the driver approached them. It was the accused,
Claudio Teehankee Jr. Teehankee asked Leino who he was, then took his wallet and IDs. Chapman then
came around and asked Teehankee why he was bothering them. Teehankee pushed Chapman and then
fired at him. Teehankee then made them sit in the sidewalk and eventually, shot Leino at his jaw, who
did not lose consciousness; and then Maureen, who fell beside Leino. Then Teehankee drove away.

On the other hand, three other witnesses who are also around that area also say that indeed there were
shots fired along the Mahogany and Caballero corner, by a gunman driving a light-colored Lancer. One
of these witnesses was Agripino Cadenas, a private security guard assigned at the house along the same
corner who was on duty at the time of the incident. He was eventually able to identify the plate number
of the car and its somewhat white color. He was also able to see in clear sight the gunman, who he
identified as Teehankee.

In the on-the-spot investigation by the NBI, They also interviewed Agripino Cadenas who was reluctant
to divulge any information and even denied having witnessed the incident. Sensing his reluctance, they
returned to Cadenas’ post at Dasmariñas tillage that night and served him a subpoena, inviting him to
appear at the NBI office for investigation the next day. Cadenas, however, continued to feign ignorance
and bridled his knowledge of the incident. He was lengthily interviewed. At around 2:00 p.m., the NBI
agents informed SOG Chief Ranin that Cadenas was still withholding information from them. Ranin
talked to Cadenas in his office. Cadenas confided to Ranin his fear to get involved in the case. He was
apprehensive that the gunman would harass or harm him or his family. After Ranin assured him of NBI
protection, Cadenas relented. The next day, July 16, 1991, Cadenas gave a full disclosure to Ranin. He
described the gunman’s car as a box-type Lancer with plate number PDW 566. He also identified the
accused as the gunman.

On December 22, 1992, the trial court convicted accused Teehankee of the crimes charged. He was
convicted on the strength of the testimonies of three (3) eyewitnesses who positively identified him as
the gunman. Teehankee interposed the present appeal, contending that the trial court erred in finding
that the accused had been positively identified by the witnesses as the gunman.

Issue: Was Cadenas’ initial reluctance failed to establish the case against the accused.

Held: NO.

Appellant also assails his identification by Cadenas. He contends that Cadenas did not witness the crime.
He stresses that when the Dasmariñas security force and the Makati police conducted an on-the-spot
investigation on the day of the incident, neither came across Cadenas. The next day, in the afternoon of
July 14, 1991, an NBI agent interviewed Cadenas and asked if he saw the incident. He merely replied:
“Nakita ko pero patay na.” He did not volunteer information to anyone as to what he supposedly
witnessed. That same night, the NBI subpoenaed him for investigation. He went to the NBI the next
morning. It was only the next day, July 16, 1991, that he gave his statement to the NBI. Cadenas
allegedly told Ponferrada, his supervisor, that the NBI tortured him.

We reject appellant’s submission. Cadenas’ initial reluctance to reveal to the authorities what he
witnessed was sufficiently explained during the trial. He related that he feared for his and his family’s
safety. His fear was not imaginary. He saw with his own eyes the senseless violence perpetrated by
appellant. He knew appellant belonged to an influential family. It was only after consistent prodding and
assurance of protection from NBI officials that he agreed to cooperate with the authorities. The Court
has taken judicial notice of the natural reticence of witnesses to get involved in the solution of crimes
considering the risk to their lives and limbs. In light of these all too real risks, the court has not
considered the initial reluctance of fear-gripped witnesses to cooperate with authorities as an indicium
of incredulity. It will not depart from this ruling.

Appellant’s assertion that Cadenas was tortured by the NBI is not borne out by the records. Supposedly,
Cadenas passed on to his superior, a certain Ponferrada, information about his torture. The allegation is
an out and out hearsay as Ponferrada was not presented in the witness stand. Cadenas himself stoutly
denied this allegation of torture. The claim of torture is also belied by the fact that Cadenas’ entire
family was allowed to stay with him at the NBI headquarters and likewise extended protection.

4. People v Ortoa

Facts: Accused Felix Ortoa was charged of raping his 13-year-old daughter AAA. AAA stated that her
father started raping her when she was three years old. AAA claimed that she got pregnant and had an
abortion after Ortoa made her take medicines. AAA’s mother, BBB, corroborated the former’s
testimony. Ortoa denied the charge and claimed that he was working at the barbershop on the day the
alleged rape happened. Also, the case was filed due to BBB’s resentment when she found that he was
having an affair. He claimed that there was inordinate delay in reporting the alleged wrongdoing when
he was supposed to have even impregnated AAA in the past

Issue: WON Ortoa’s claim of inordinate delay may be appreciated.

Ruling: No. When BBB first found out about appellant’s sexual transgression, she did not go to the police
right away; instead, she respected AAA’s desire to keep her misfortune a private matter. Indeed, nothing
could be more wrenching for a mother than to watch her own daughter suffer such irreparable injury.
Yet BBB chose to abide by her child’s entreaty. It was only when they were confronted with the
hopelessness of the situation that they finally summoned the courage to have appellant account for his
misdeeds. There is no uniform behavior that can be expected from those who had the misfortune of
being sexually molested. Some may have found the courage early on to reveal the abuse they
experienced; there are those who have opted to initially keep the harrowing ordeal to themselves and
tried to move on with their lives.

In this case, the delay was sufficiently explained by AAA. According to her, when she was still a young
child and already subjected to the revolting behavior of appellant, the latter threatened her with
physical harm should she divulge his misdeeds to anyone else. When she became pregnant, appellant
resorted to emotional blackmail by telling her that he would be imprisoned should she tell anyone about
what he had been doing to her. And when BBB wanted appellant to move out of their house because of
his appalling conduct, appellant had the audacity to confront BBB with the fact that he was the sole
breadwinner of their family. It is therefore clear that appellant used every scheme he could think of to
dissuade AAA and BBB from going to the proper authorities. But more than appellant’s actuations, AAA
was discouraged by the public ridicule that she expected to come her way. In her words:

Nalaman na noon ng aking Mama ang ginagawa ng aking Papa sa akin at tinanong ako kung anong gusto
kong mangyari, ang sabi ko ayoko pa dahil hindi ko pa kaya na humarap sa ibang tao.

POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE DEFENSES

1. People of the Philippines vs. Macalaba

G.R. Nos. 146284-86

January 20, 2003

Facts: Based on a verified information that Abdul Macalaba was driving a carnapped car and was a drug
pusher, the police were ordered to search Abdul. They went to Abdul’s apartment where he was
allegedly selling shabu but he was not there. While looking for Abdul, they saw the suspected carnapped
car. The CIDG officers alighted from their vehicles and positioned and surrounded themselves around
the car. They asked for the car’s certificate of registration. When Abdul opened the zipper of his clutch
bag, the officers saw inside it four plastic sachets of what appeared to be shabu.

The RTC convicted him for violation of Section 16, Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

Issue: Whether or not Abdul violated Section 16, Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
Ruling: The general rule is that if a criminal charge is predicated on a negative allegation, or that a
negative averment is an essential element of a crime, the prosecution has the burden of proving the
charge. However, this rule is not without an exception. Where the negative of an issue does not permit
of direct proof, or where the facts are more immediately within the knowledge of the accused, the onus
probandi rests upon him. Stated otherwise, it is not incumbent upon the prosecution to adduce positive
evidence to support a negative averment the truth of which is fairly indicated by established
circumstances and which, if untrue, could readily be disproved by the production of documents or other
evidence within the defendant’s knowledge or control.

In the instant case, the negative averment that ABDUL had no license or authority to possess
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug, has been fairly indicated by the following
facts proven by the testimonies of the CIDG officers and the forensic chemist: (a) ABDUL was driving the
suspected carnapped vehicle when he was caught, and he appeared to be healthy and not indisposed as
to require the use of shabu as medicine; (b) the contents of the sachets found in ABDUL’s open clutch
bag inside the car were prima facie determined by the CIDG officers to be shabu; and (c) the said
contents were conclusively found to be shabu by the forensic chemist. With these established facts, the
burden of evidence was shifted to ABDUL. He could have easily disproved the damning circumstances by
presenting a doctor’s prescription for said drug or a copy of his license or authority to possess the
regulated drug. Yet, he offered nothing.

2. GOMEZ V. GOMEZ-SAMSON G.R. No. 156284 Feb. 6, 2007

FACTS: Augusto Gomez, claimed that his aunt Consuelo owned 2 parcels of land in Marikina and 1
parcel in Pasig, and that after her death, Rita and Jesus Gomez, his cousins, fraudulently prepared a
Deed on donation inter vivos donating to themselves the said parcels of land.

In another case, Augusto also alleged that his cousins Rita and Jesus, using the same modus operandi
prepared a deed of donation donating to themselves 75 shares in V-Tri Realty, 11, 853 shares of stock of
First Philippine Holdings, Jewelry and Collector’s items in Consuelo’s safety deposit box at PCI Bank,
Marikina, a 1978 Mercedes Benz 200, a 1979 Toyota Corona and P200,000 on money market placement
with BA finance as per a promissory note.

Augusto thus filed 2 complaints praying to nullify the donations, and the TCTs be reconveyed to the
estate of Consuelo Gomez.

The RTC dismissed the complaints. CA affirmed. MR denied. Thus, this review on certiorari.
ISSUE: WON the Court of Appeals seriously erred and is manifestly mistaken in not giving due weight to
the expert opinion of the NBI representative, which the lower court itself sought

RULING: Expert witnesses, though, examine documentary and object evidence precisely to testify on
their findings in court. It is, thus, highly improbable for an expert witness to forget his examination of
said evidence. Consequently, whereas faulty memory may be the reason for the negative testimonies
delivered by ordinary witnesses, this is unlikely to be so with respect to expert witnesses. While we,
therefore, cannot say that positive evidence does not carry an inherent advantage over negative
evidence when it comes to expert witnesses, the process by which the expert witnesses arrived at their
conclusions should be carefully examined and considered. On this respect, Prof. Wigmore states that the
ordinary expert witness, in perhaps the larger proportion of the topics upon which he may be
questioned, has not a knowledge derived from personal observation. He virtually reproduces, literally or
in substance, conclusions of others which he accepts on the authority of the eminent names responsible
for them. In the case at bar, the expert witnesses cited sources as bases of their observations. Francisco
Cruz’s statement that “no finding or conclusion could be arrived at,” has basis on the sources presented
both by him and by Zenaida Torres. Both sets of authorities speak of intersecting ink lines. However, the
typewritten words “Consuelo C. Gomez” barely touch and do not intersect the handwritten signature
Consuelo C. Gomez in Document No. 401. In Document No. 402, said typewritten words and
handwritten signature do not even touch. In the case at bar, therefore, the expert testimony that no
finding or conclusion can be arrived at, was found to be more credible than the expert testimony
positively stating that the signatures were affixed before the typing of the Deeds of Donation. The
former expert testimony has proven to be more in consonance with the authorities cited by both
experts.

While the expert witness’ possible bias in favor of the side for whom he or she testifies, and the fact that
he or she is a paid witness, may be considered by the trial court, the latter should weigh the same with
all the other evidence adduced during trial, as well as with the witness’ deportment, actions, ability, and
character upon the witness stand. The trial court is consequently given the discretion in weighing all
these circumstances in its determination of the expert witness’ credibility, as it is in a better position
than the appellate courts to observe the demeanor of these witnesses. As there is no evidence of abuse
of discretion on the part of the trial court in such determination, the latter is not reviewable by this
Court.

Petition Denied.

3. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROLLY MONTESA y LUMIRAN,

Facts: Montesa has two separate information charging him with the crime of rape. The first incident
happened on September 19, 1997 and the other on Sep. 21 of the same year. He had carnal knowledge
with a 12 year old girl against her will. After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision convicting appellant of
rape.39 Appellant was sentenced to suffer capital punishment in each of the cases. In view of the death
penalty imposed on appellant, the instant cases were elevated to this Court for automatic review.
Issue: Whether or not THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
OF THE CRIMES CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.

Ruling: No. Denial is inherently a weak defense, as it is negative and self-serving. It cannot prevail over
the positive identification and testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. Alibi is
the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to contrive and difficult to prove. Alibi must be proved by the
accused with clear and convincing evidence. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to
prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed. He must likewise prove that it was
physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission. In the cases under consideration, appellant failed to present any clear and convincing proof
that AAA and BBB were induced by Junior Bonilla and Pepito to file the instant cases. Further, Pepito
clarified in his testimony that he did not know, nor had he met, appellant prior to the reporting of the
incidents by AAA and BBB.

4. PEOPLE VS. JOEMARIE CERILLA (GR no. 1777147)

FACTS: An Information was filed against Joemarie Cerilla charging him of the crime of murder for the
killing one Alexander Parreno. It was alleged that the victim along with his daughter Michelle and his
neighbor Phoebe Sedin visited the house of the appellant one afternoon. An hour after they left the
premises, a blackout occurred. On their way home, Michelle who was walking ahead of Alexander with

heard an explosion. Turning her back immediately, she saw the appellant pointing a gun at Alexander
who, at that moment, was staggering towards her Michelle ran to the aid of his father who repeatedly
told her that it was appellant who shot him. The victim also informed his wife and his other daughter,
Novie Parreno, as to who shot him. Alexander was rushed to the hospital but died the following day.

For his defense, the appellant relied on the testimonies of his wife and his step daughter saying he was
at home when the whole incident happened. Later, the policemen went to his house and told him that
he was a suspect in the shooting of Alexander and was then brought to the police station. The following
day, he was subjected to paraffin test the result of which turned out to be negative.

The trial court regarded the victim’s dying declaration as the most telling evidence pointing to appellant
as the assailant and ruled that appellant’s alibi and denial could not prevail over the positive testimonies
of credible witnesses. The same was affirmed by the appellate court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in giving full credence to the evidence presented by the
prosecution?

HELD: No.

A dying declaration is a statement made by the victim of homicide, referring to the material facts
which concern the cause and circumstances of the killing and which is uttered under a fixed belief that
death is impending and is certain to follow immediately, or in a very short time, without an opportunity
of retraction and in the absence of all hopes of recovery. In other words, it is a statement made by a
person after a mortal wound has been inflicted, under a belief that death is certain, stating the facts
concerning the cause and circumstances surrounding his/her death.

As an exception to the rule against hearsay evidence, a dying declaration or ante mortem statement is
evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of his impending
death would make a careless and false accusation.37 It is thus admissible to provide the identity of the
accused and the deceased, to show the cause of death of the deceased, and the circumstances under
which the assault was made upon him. The reasons for its admissibility is necessity and trustworthiness.
The law considers the point of death as a situation so solemn and awful as creating an obligation equal
to that which is imposed by an oath administered in court.

Four requisites must concur in order that a dying declaration may be admissible,

(1) the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's
death. This refers not only to the facts of the assault itself, but also to matters both before and after the
assault having a direct causal connection with it.

(2) at the time the declaration was made, the declarant must be under the consciousness of an
impending death; a fixed belief in inevitable and imminent death must be entered by the declarant -—
whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on death as certainly impending.

(3) the declarant is competent as a witness. The rule is that where the declarant would not have
been a competent witness had he survived, the proffered declarations will not be admissible.

(4) the declaration must be offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in
which the declarant is the victim.

The victim communicated his ante-mortem statement to three persons who testified with unanimity
that they had been told by the victim himself that it was appellant who shot him and these statements
comply with all the requisites of a dying declaration.

Further, Appellant counters that there was absence of any motive on his part to kill the victim; that it
was not clearly proven that he fired a gun, based on the paraffin test; and that he appeared calm and
composed and showed no indication of guilt when he was invited by the police officers shortly after the
commission of the crime. Time and again, we have ruled that a negative finding on paraffin test is not a
conclusive proof that one has not fired a gun because it is possible for a person to fire a gun and yet
bear no traces of nitrates or gunpowder, as when the culprit washes his hands or wears gloves.56 The
trial court correctly rejected the result of the paraffin test in light of the positive identification of
appellant.

5. Marcelo vs. Bungubung, G.R. No. 175201, 23 April 2008

Facts: Bungubung is the Manager of the Port District Office (PDO) of Manila, Philippine Ports Authority
(PPA), South Harbor, Port Area, Manila. He is also the Chairman of the Ports District Security Bids and
Awards Committee (PDSBAC) of the PPA.
On 24 September 2001, Roberto C. Doromal (Doromal), the President of Combat Security & Executive
Protection Agency (CSEPA), a security agency that participated in the bidding for security services for the
PPA, filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Bungubung before PPA Resident Ombudsman Manolo M. Mabini
alleging that Mr. Leopoldo Bungubung and other PPA officials asked for certain amounts from Doromal’s
wife (who is instrumental in negotiating and concluding a contract for PPA) as "balato" for winning the
award where (sic) the latter obliged herself to give ranging from P2,000 to P10,000 a month and then
demanded him P40,000 to P50,000 from him after his wife died. He also alleged that Bungubung asked
for a Mitsubishi Pajero van which because of its expensive value, he cannot afford. He alleges that for
failure to deliver the van, he was served a Notice of Award of the winning bidder STAR SPECIAL
WATCHMAN & DETECTIVE AGENCY, INC. He instructed his men to conduct an investigation and found a
late model Pajero van in front of his residence.

In support of his allegations he submitted an affidavit of his secretary Evalyn Cruz who personally
handed over P50,000 cash to Bungubung and an alleged “blue book” of CSEPA containing detailed
monthly balato or payola paid to PPA officials.

PPA Resident Ombudsman Mabini released a Memorandum/Investigation Report stating that

Bungubung violated RA 3019 and RA 6713 and Art 211 RPC for demanding and receiving balato and
recommended that an administrative complaint be filed against him and that he be placed under
Preventive Suspension for 6 months without pay.

Ombudsman Marcelo found Bungubung liable for Grave Misconduct and dismissed him from service. He
issued an order for filing of a criminal complaint finding probable cause to indict him.

Bungubung sought recourse to CA which ruled in favor of Bungubung and reversing and setting aside the
Orders of the Ombudsman and absolved Bungubung from liability for the charge of grave misconduct,
finding no substantial evidence that Bungubung committed the crime. The CA found for Bungubung for
the following reasons:

Bungubung presented proof that on May 4, 2001, [Doromal] filed a false "hit-and-run" report involving
the Pajero with plate WLA 674 of [Bungubung's] son.

The President of Star Security Agency declared under oath that he did not give [Bungubung] any Pajero;
The Pajero was acquired by [Bungubung's] son from a certain Teresito Uy as evidenced by a notarized
deed of sale;

Issue: Whether or not the finding of administrative offense for grave misconduct against Bungubung is
supported by substantial evidence

Ruling: No.

Among Bungubung's evidence which the Ombudsman failed to consider was a copy of the "Traffic
Accident Incident Report" prepared by the Central Police Traffic Enforcement Office, stating that on 4
May 2001, Doromal filed a false report of a "hit-and-run" incident which supposedly occurred on 1 May
2001 involving the Mitsubishi Pajero van of Bungubung's son. The report was made by the police
investigator in his official capacity; thus, it enjoys the presumption of regularity and is a prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated. The filing of the false report establishes ill motive on the part of
Doromal specifically directed against Bungubung.

The main defense put up by Bungubung is complete denial, a defense which is said to be the weakest,
seldom believed or given weight, as it is easy to fabricate. Nonetheless, Bungubung's denial of –

(a) Cruz's allegation in her affidavit that she personally gave Bungubung P50,000.00 on 16 January 2001;

(b) Doromal's assertion in his affidavit that he gave Bungubung another P50,000.00 in late February
2001; and

(c) Doromal's assertion that Bungubung demanded from him a late model Mitsubishi Pajero van -- is
given weight in this instance.

In the absence of corroborative evidence, the Court would not be prepared to accept the usual lame
defense of denial over the straightforward and positive declaration of a witness since denials constitute
self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the
declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. Thus, in the case of contradictory
declarations and statements, greater weight is generally given to positive testimonies than to mere
denials.

In this instance, however, Bungubung's denial of the allegations against him are supported by his own
controverting evidence. In contrast, Doromal's Complaint-Affidavit and Cruz's Affidavit support only
each other.
6. Kaunlaran Lending Investors, Inc. vs. Uy

FACTS: Loreta Uy (Loreta) filed on 1988 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City a
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. D-9136, for annulment of real estate mortgage and related
documents plus damages against petitioners Kaunlaran Lending Investors, Inc. (KLII) and Lelia Chua Sy
(Lelia), along with Wilfredo Chua (Wilfredo) and Magno Zareno (Magno).

Sometime in 1987, her son Jose U. Sim (Jose), her nephew Virgilio Sim (Virgilio), and Wilfredo agreed to
establish a business of buy and sell of second-hand motor vehicles in which Virgilio would be the
manager, Wilfredo would scout for a financier, and Jose would provide the security for any loan.

Through the efforts of Wilfredo, Lelia, then a Branch Manager of the Far East Bank and Trust Co., Inc.
(FEBTC) in Dagupan City who was alleged to be the owner of the controlling interest in KLII, agreed to
arrange for the grant of a loan.

Jose thus entrusted his mother's land titles and related documents to Wilfredo who in turn delivered
them to Lelia. Lelia thereafter sent Jose to Manila, together with a certain Ed and a certain Doc of KLII, to
have the lands appraised at the main office of FEBTC.

Wilfredo subsequently brought to Loreta's residence loan forms consisting of a promissory note he had
pre-signed as co-maker, a real estate mortgage, and a loan disclosure for Loreta's signature. After Jose
examined the forms, Loreta signed them.

Soon Jose and Virgilio went to Manila to canvass prices of second-hand motor vehicles. While the two
were in Manila, Magno, then the manager of KLII, brought to Loreta's residence the loan forms she had
earlier signed and another set of loan forms, together with a blank Solidbank check drawn from the
account of KLII and a check voucher. Magno explained to Loreta, in the presence of her daughter-in-law
Arlene A. Sim (Arlene)-wife of Jose, that the new set of loan forms would be sent to Manila and that the
proceeds of the loan would be promptly delivered to her residence once she affixes her signature on the
said check and voucher.

When Jose returned home and learned about what transpired during his absence, he confronted Magno
at the KLII office and was told that the documents bearing on the loan application were already sent to
Lelia and that Loreta's signatures on the blank Solidbank check and the check voucher were procured on
Lelia's instructions.

Virgilio and Jose later tried to withdraw the loan application and the titles to Loreta's properties but
Lelia told them that it was no longer possible.
In a subsequent conference among Lelia, Jose, Virgilio, and Wilfredo, Lelia admitted having applied the
loan proceeds amounting to P800,000 to Wilfredo's personal debt to her.

In a related move, Loreta instituted a criminal complaint for estafa against Lelia, Wilfredo, and Magno,
In her Answer with Counterclaim,9 Lelia denied being the owner of the controlling interest of KLII,
claiming that she was only the lessor of the building which housed KLII's office. And she denied
knowledge of the P800,000 loan of Loreta from KLII

Magno and KLII corroborated Lelia's denial of being the owner of the controlling interest in the
company, she being merely the lessor of the building where KLII holds office.

ISSUE: WON CA gravely abused its discretion and evidently misappreciated the testimony of Magno
Zareno by giving it credence, contrary to the findings of [the trial court] which heard and saw him testify

RULING: In overturning the finding of the trial court, the Court of Appeals credited the testimony of
Magno, who testified as a hostile witness for Loreta, that Lelia sent him to Loreta's house to secure her
signature on the loan documents in blank, and that Loreta did not receive any proceeds of the loan. The
Court of Appeals did not proffer any reason, however, for deviating from the trial court's assessment of
Magno's credibility, despite the oft-repeated doctrine that "findings of fact of the trial court carry great
weight and are entitled to respect on appeal absent any strong and cogent reason to the contrary, since,
it is in a better position to decide the question of credibility of witnesses." Furthermore, Magno's
testimony should be received with caution because it contradicts the earlier statements he had made
under oath, such as the Counter-Affidavit and Rejoinder he filed in I.S. No. 88-498 and his verification of
the joint Answer with Counterclaim he and KLII filed in Civil Case No. D-9136.

x x x [C]ourts do not generally look with favor on any retraction or recanted testimony, for it could have
been secured by considerations other than to tell the truth and would make solemn trials a mockery and
place the investigation of the truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. A recantation does not
necessarily cancel an earlier declaration, but like any other testimony the same is subject to the test of
credibility and should be received with caution.

x x x The mere fact that a witness says that what he had declared is false and what he now says is true, is
not sufficient ground for concluding that the previous testimony is false. No such reasoning has ever
crystallized into a rule of credulity. The rule is that a witness may be impeached by a previous
contradictory statement (Section 13, Rule 132, Rules of Court): not that a previous testimony is
presumed to be false merely because a witness now says that the same is false. (Underscoring supplied)

The Court of Appeals credited too the testimony of Jacobo Malicdem, a bookkeeper of Solidbank against
which the P800,000.00 KLII check payable to Loreta was drawn, that KLII did not have the said amount in
the bank as of January and February 1988. Gratuitously assuming that to have been the case, it is
irrelevant given the factual finding of the trial court that the check was converted to cash by the drawer-
KLII itself, which cash was received by Loreta as proven by her signature on the check and on the
discount statement acknowledging receipt thereof
7. PEOPLE VS. ROMEO MIRANDA

G.R. No. 176634

April 05, 2010

FACTS: Automatic review of the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the RTC finding Romeo
Miranda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape against his own daughter AAA.

The prosecution presented AAA, the victim; Police Senior Inspector (P/Sr. Insp.) Ruby Grace Sabino, the
medico-legal officer who conducted the physical examination on AAA; and Senior Police Officer 4 Ramon
Tagle, one of the arresting officers as witnesses.

1. P/Insp. Ruby Grace Sabino testified that she conducted a physical examination of AAA. the findings of
which she reduced into writing in Medico Legal Report:

Hymen: elastic, fleshy type with deep fresh laceration at 6 o'clock position.

Conclusion: Physical findings of the genitalia is definitive evidence of penetration. There is no external
signs of application of any form of physical trauma.

She declared that the laceration was fresh because at the time of the examination, there was blood;
that something has penetrated the vagina or the hymen, and, that there was seminal fluid on the
vagina.

2. AAA testified that she was born on May 27, 1983, as evidenced by her Birth Certificate, hence, she
was 17 years old at the time of the commission of the instant charge. She declared that her father and
mother have been separated for 14 years and are not in speaking terms with each other. She has been
staying with her mother while her father, a jeepney driver, resides in a two-storey house with an
unfinished lower portion.

About noontime of June 23, 2000, while she was fetching water in a "poso" near their house, she came
to learn that the live-in partner of her father died, hence, she went to her father's house to condole. Her
father then told her to look after her half-brother, CCC, and half-sister, BBB. She stayed at his house,
cooked food and washed the dishes. She slept that night with her half-sister in the sala.

On the following day, June 24, 2000, her father left in the morning but returned at lunch time and
stayed in the house for the rest of the day. She was, however, not feeling well because of a high fever
and headache accompanied by vomiting spills which started at noontime of the same day.

After having dinner at 7:00 p.m. and while she was washing the dishes, her father came to know of her
condition and he told his daughter, BBB to finish the dish washing. She then went to the room and after
wearing a pajama over her shorts and panty, she put on the mosquito net. She then laid down and while
preparing herself to rest and go to sleep, she watched TV from 8:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. with a "Good
Morning" towel stuck on her mouth to prevent her from vomiting. When her father turned off the TV,
she asked for the "Vicks Vaporub" placed at the side of the TV set. Accused then entered the mosquito
net and volunteered to massage her head. While he was massaging her head, she felt that both his
elbows were touching her breasts. She tried to evade his elbows saying she would be the one to do the
massaging but he refused. Thereafter, he told her "dededehin niya po ang dede ko" and she replied that
she will tell her mother about it which made him stop and instead, he massaged her hands.

In between sobs, AAA continued testifying that her father then kissed her on her neck while slowly
lifting her T-shirt who thereafter sucked her breasts causing her to push him hard telling him not to do it
to her. Only his two children were inside the house but both were already asleep at that time. After
sucking her breasts, he used his left hand in slowly pulling down her pajama and thereafter her short
and panty. He then held both her arms and with his head going down, he licked her vagina. She resisted
and tried to kick the wall to create some noise to awaken her half-brother and sister but he did not stop.
She did not shout for help out of fear of her father stating "baka saktan niya ako", whom she saw with
red eyes for the first time. Thereafter, he removed his shorts with a garter and his brief and she turned
her back to him but he embraced her to make her face him. He told her that he will insert his penis to
her vagina "pero hinde raw po niya ipuputok yun para hindi daw po ako mabuntis." Then and there, he
laid on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. She felt an entry into her vagina which she
described to be painful. When her father removed his sex organ from hers, she felt something hot
flowed from her vagina.

After the foregoing incident, he got dressed and wiped her vagina with the "good morning" towel. Her
father also asked her if she wants to eat to which she replied in the negative. She then waited for him to
sleep and seeing him asleep, she fixed herself and climbed the fence to get out from the house. She
went to their house in x x x and because her mother was still sleeping, she proceeded to the Barangay
Hall of x x x where she saw her uncle who accompanied her to x x x Police Station where she executed a
sworn statement. She was also brought to Camp Crame for a physical and genital check-up.
3. SPO4 Ramon Tagle's testimony is confined to the fact of apprehension of the accused in the early
morning of June 25, 2000. He declared that he, along with SPO3 Carmelito Dequino and SPO1 Alfredo
Cardenas, effected the arrest of the accused at his house at 1:15 a.m. of June 25, 2000 after his
daughter, AAA, lodged a complaint of Rape against him. He further testified that the accused voluntarily
went with them after he was pinpointed and positively identified by his daughter as the one who raped
her.

DEFENSE:

The defense presented as witnesses Miranda himself and the victim's half-sister, BBB.

1. BBB, 13 years old, testified that the accused is her father while the offended party is her [half] sister.
In the evening of June 24, 2000, she was at their house sleeping. AAA was sleeping at her mother's bed
while her father was at the other bed watching television. She noticed that AAA was vomiting who told
her that she was feeling dizzy and so she slept ahead of her. She could see AAA from where she was
because the room has no door. She identified the pictures of their house situated at x x x taken by her
[half] sister, DDD. She slept beside her brother and father in a "papag." At that time, she heard
"kalampag" outside the house. She and her brother slept ahead of their father.

2. Romeo Miranda denied raping his daughter. He testified that at twelve o'clock midnight of June 25,
2000, he was sleeping with his children when they were awakened by policemen knocking at their
window. He was told to go down by the policemen and after doing so, he was brought directly to the
Municipal Hall where he met his daughter AAA. It was only at that instance that he came to know that
he was being accused of Rape by her. He then asked AAA, "ano bang problema mo?", but she did not
respond. He declared that he was not pinpointed by AAA, but she simply said ..."ako raw", after which,
he was detained in jail. He belied the accusation but did not tell the police of the falsity of the charge for
fear that he might be hurt by them.

ISSUE: W/N the Miranda is guilty of the crime of rape

RULING: YES.

Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following instances: (1)
when force or intimidation is used; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or is otherwise
unconscious; and (3) when she is under twelve (12) years of age. Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals
found that Miranda committed rape under the first circumstance, i.e., by having sexual intercourse with
his 17-year old daughter with the use of force and intimidation.
In the review of rape cases, the credibility of the private complainant is the single most important factor
for consideration. The case of the prosecution stands or falls on the credibility of the victim. This rule is
in accordance with the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two parties, namely the victim
and the accused, are usually involved. In this regard, the appellate court will generally not disturb the
assessment of the trial court on matters of credibility owing to its unique opportunity to observe the
deportment and manner of testifying of witnesses firsthand during the trial unless certain facts of
substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case.

In the instant case, there is no basis for this Court to overturn the finding of the RTC, as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, that the testimony of the victim, AAA, is credible. As the RTC observed, the testimony
of AAA, in which she positively identified her father as the one who ravaged her, is straightforward,
categorical, and spontaneous. AAA's account of her ordeal resonates with sincerity and truthfulness.

In answer to AAA's explicit declaration that she was sexually abused by Miranda, the latter merely
interposes the defense of denial. As between a categorical testimony that rings of truth on one hand
and a bare denial on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. A mere denial, like alibi, is
inherently a weak defense and constitutes self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded
greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.
As against the positive identification and credible testimony by the private complainant, mere denials of
the accused cannot prevail to overcome conviction by the trial court.

Miranda also proffers no credible explanation as to why his own daughter, AAA, would accuse him of
raping her if it was not true. In fact, Miranda admits that he has no misunderstanding with AAA, thus, no
improper motive could be attributed to AAA for charging her father with the commission of such an
atrocious crime. AAA's testimony is worthy of full faith and credence because her only apparent motive
is to bring her father to justice for raping her.

A rape victim's testimony against her father is entitled to greater weight since, ordinarily and
customarily, Filipino children revere and respect their elders. This is too deeply ingrained in Filipino
children and families and is even recognized by law. It is thus unthinkable, if not completely
preposterous, that a daughter would audaciously concoct a story of rape against her father in wanton
disregard of the unspeakable trauma and social stigma it may generate on her and the entire family. A
teenage unmarried lass does not ordinarily file a rape complaint against anybody, much less her own
father, if it is not true.

Moreover, we have held that where a rape victim did not lose time in reporting her father's dastardly
act and in seeking help as soon as she was able to escape, such spontaneous conduct was an eloquent
attestation of her abhorrence and repugnance to her father's perversity. That AAA immediately told her
uncle and police officials about her hellish ordeal and that she willingly submitted herself to physical and
genital examination evince the truthfulness of her charge of rape against Miranda.
FACTUM PROBANS AND FACTUM PROBANDUM

1. PEOPLE vs CORTEZ, G.R. No. 131619-20, February 1, 2000

Facts: Accused BERNIE CORTEZ was charged with the crimes of kidnapping and illegal possession of
explosive, while co-accused RICARDO CALLOS and ROGELIO BETONIO were charged solely with
kidnapping.

LOLITA MENDOZA , the kidnap victim, recounted her ordeal, thus: On December 18, 1994, at about 6:00
a.m., she was in her house, in Sitio Catmon, San Rafael, Rodriguez, Rizal, when accused BERNIE CORTEZ,
RICARDO CALLOS and ROGELIO BETONIO, all armed with bolos, arrived. They were looking for Lolita's
cousin, SANTOS ESMINDA, and were threatening to kill him on sight. Unable to find Santos, they decided
to abduct Lolita to prevent her from reporting the incident to the police. Accompanied by the other two,
accused Callos pointed his bolo at Lolita's back and dragged her to the mountain. They brought her to
the house of PABLO TORRAL, an uncle of accused Cortez, and thereafter continued their search for
Santos.

Hours later, the policemen and the barangay captain rescued Lolita in the house of the Torrals who were
outside the nipa hut, talking to Torrals. She said that she was not prevented from leaving the house, but
she did not attempted to escape for fear that the accused would make good their threat to kill her.

For his part, and defense of alibi, accused BERNIE CORTEZ recounted that he worked in Dulongbayan
when his friend Raffy informed him that the father and son of Santos Esminda were looking for him in
his house so he decided to go home the next day. On his way, he met two policemen who asked if he
knew a man Bernie Cortez, he identified himself. Policemen handcuffed and brought him to his house
where he was told to wait outside. After a few, policemen emerged carrying three bolos and a live
grenade. He was brought to the municipal hall where he met his co-accused for the first time.

For accused ROGELIO BETONIO recounted that in the morning of December 18, 1994, he was en route
to Sitio Catmon, Rizal, when he saw his former co-employee accused RICARDO CALLOS in a jeepney.
Callos was also on his way to Montalban, Rizal. They alighted in Montalban and were walking towards
the direction of Sitio Catmon when they met two policemen who were carrying some bolos. Accused
Cortez, then already in handcuffs, was with them. For no apparent reason, the policemen placed them
under arrest. The identity of accused Cortez was unknown to him at that time.

After trial, the trial court found all the accused guilty as charged. Hence this instant appeal where
appellants impugn their conviction on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.

Issue: Whether or not the court’s order may be impugned on the ground of insufficiency of evidence

Held:

Charge for kidnapping

appellants maintain that the prosecution failed to establish one of the essential elements of the crime,
i.e., deprivation of the victim's liberty.
They point out that PO2 Santos testified that, at the time of the rescue, Lolita was not physically
confined inside the house as they found her standing outside, conversing with Pablo Torral. They stress
that Lolita herself declared that she was not prevented by the Torrals from leaving the house.

In a prosecution for kidnapping, the State has the burden of proving all the essential elements of an
offense. For the crime of kidnapping to prosper, the intent of the accused to deprive the victim of his
liberty, in any manner, has to be established by indubitable proof.

However, it is not necessary that the offended party be kept within an enclosure to restrict her freedom
of locomotion. In the case at bar, the deprivation of Lolita's liberty was amply established by evidence.
When the appellants failed to find Lolita's cousin, they forcibly dragged her to the mountains and kept
her in the house of the Torrals. Appellant Cortez even bound her hands with a belt. Although at the time
of the rescue, she was found outside the house talking to Pablo Torral, she explained that she did not
attempt to leave the premises for fear that the appellants would make good their threats to kill her
should she do so. Her fear is not baseless as the appellants knew where she resided and they had earlier
announced that their intention in looking for Lolita's cousin was to kill him on sight. Certainly, fear has
been known to render people immobile.

Charge for illegal possession of explosive.

We find that the conviction of appellant Cortez is unwarranted. To convict an accused for illegal
possession of firearms and explosive under P.D. 1866, as amended, two (2) essential elements must be
indubitably established, viz: (a) the existence of the subject firearm or explosive which may be proved by
the presentation of the subject firearm or explosive or by the testimony of witnesses who saw accused
in possession of the same, and (b) the negative fact that the accused had no license or permit to own or
possess the firearm or explosive which fact may be established by the testimony or certification of a
representative of the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit that the accused has no license or permit to
possess the subject firearm or explosive.

In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to prove the second element of the crime, i.e, the lack of
license or permit of appellant Cortez to possess the hand grenade. Although the hand grenade seized by
PO2 Santos from appellant was presented in court, the records bear that PO2 Santos did not submit the
grenade to the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit for verification.24 This explains why no certification or
testimony was adduced by the prosecution at the trial to prove that appellant Cortez was not licensed to
possess the explosive. The failure of the prosecution to adduce this fact is fatal to its cause.

CONDITIONAL ADMISSIBILITY AND CURATIVE ADMISSIBILITY

1. SCC Chemicals Corp v CA, State Investment House, Inc. Danilo Arrieta, Leopoldo Halili

Quisumbing, J.
Facts: On December 13, 1983, SCC Chemicals Corporation(SCC for brevity) through its chairman, private
respondentDanilo Arrieta and vice president, Pablo (Pablito) Bermundo, obtained a loan from State
Investment House,Inc., (hereinafter SIHI) in the amount of P129,824.48. The loan carried an annual
interest rate of 30% plus penalty charges of 2% per month on the remaining balance of the principal
upon non-payment on the due date-January 12, 1984. To secure the payment of the loan, Danilo
Arrietaand private respondent Leopoldo Halili executed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement binding
themselves jointly and severally to pay the obligation on the maturity date. SCC failed to pay the loan
when it matured. SIHI then sent demand letters to SCC, Arrieta and Halili, but notwithstanding receipt
thereof, no payment was made.

SIHI presented one witness to prove its claim. The cross-examination of said witness was postponed
several times due to one reason or another at the instance of either party. The case was calendared
several times for hearing but each time, SCC or its counsel failed to appear despite notice. SCC was
finally declared by the trial court to have waived its right to cross-examine the witness of SIHI and the
case was deemed submitted for decision and judgment was rendered in favor of SIHI.

On appeal, SCC contended that SIHI had failed to show, by a preponderance of evidence, that the latter
had a case against it. SCC argued that the lone witness presented bySIHI to prove its claim was
insufficient as the competency of the witness was not established and there was no showing that he had
personal knowledge of the transaction. SCC further maintained that no proof was shown of the
genuineness of the signatures in the documentary exhibits presented as evidence and that these
signatures were neither marked nor offered in evidence by SIHI. Finally,SCC pointed out that the original
copies of the documents were not presented in court. CA affirmed in toto.

Issue: Whether or Not SIHI’s evidence was admissible

Ruling: Yes. Judgment affirmed. As a rule, hearsay evidence is excluded and carries no probative value.
However, the rule does admit of an exception.Where a party failed to object to hearsay evidence, then
the same is admissible. The rationale for this exception is to be found in the right of a litigant to cross-
examine. It is settled that it is the opportunity to cross-examine which negates the claim that the
matters testified to by a witness are hearsay. However, the right to cross-examine may be waived. The
repeated failure of a party to cross-examine the witness is an implied waiver of such right.

DIRECT AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

PEOPLE vs. MATITO GR No. 144405; February 24, 2004

FACTS: On the evening of October 16, 1998, Filomena Raymundo heard gunshots just moments after her
husband Mariano had stepped out of their house to go to their backyard. She rushed towards its
direction and saw her husband bleeding. When she asked what happened, Mariano replied: “Binaril ako
ni Pareng Freddie. Binaril ako ni Pareng Freddie.” Thereafter, he died. Filomena identified accused as the
last persons who had a quarrel with her husband after the latter cut the water supply to their house
because of their unpaid bills. The accused interposed alibi as defense.

The RTC ruled in favor of the prosecution and found the accused guilty of the crime murder.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in appreciating the testimony of the witness as a dying
declaration sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING: No. A dying declaration, also known as statement in articulo mortis, may be received in
evidence under Sec. 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. To be admissible, the following requisites should
be met: 1) the declaration must concern the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s
death; 2) at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of impending
death; 3) he or she is competent as a witness; and 4) the declaration is offered in a case in which the
declarant’s death is the subject of the inquiry. The fact that after being shot, Mariano was able to enter
and house and with the lapse of a significant amount to time before he died in the hospital, it shows
that he had ample time to communicate to his wife the assailant’s identity and therefore could be
considered as a dying declaration.

On the strength of the circumstantial evidence proven in the case, the lower court did not err in
convicting the accused of the crime charged as his guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt. The
combination of the circumstances comprising such evidence forms an unbroken chain that points
appellant as the perpetrator of the crime.

PEOPLE vs. ZALDY GARCIA y ANCHETA

Brion, J.:

FACTS: The prosecution charged the appellant before the RTC with the crime of murder for shooting
Police Chief Inspector Tito Ines Opina, inflicting upon the latter a fatal gunshot wound which directly
caused his death, during an operation to arrest the appellant. The RTC convicted the accused of the
crime of murder, sentencing him to the supreme penalty of death.

The case was elevated to the SC on automatic appeal but was remanded to the CA in accordance with
People vs Mateo.

ISSUE: WON the conviction was proper

RULING: YES.

The appellant contends that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt since no one really
testified that it was he who shot Major Opina.

We clarify at the outset that proof beyond reasonable doubt is not solely established by direct evidence.
In the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may present circumstantial evidence that, under
given conditions, may meet the evidentiary standard of “proof beyond reasonable doubt” in criminal
cases. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2)
the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.The conclusions that can be
drawn from the chain of proven circumstances rather than their number are material to prove the guilt
of the accused. What is paramount is that facts be proven from which inferences may be drawn—with
all the circumstances being consistent with one other—that the accused is guilty and this inference is
consistent with no other conclusion except that of guilt.

The records of this case show that evidence of who actually shot Major Opina is not lacking. In fact, the
evidence is the strongest there is, as the appellant himself admitted in open court that he was the one
who wielded the gun and pulled the trigger.

From the various testimonies, we note that no other person, except for the appellant’s wife and some
children were in the compound at the time of the incident. The compound, surrounded by a fence, had
practically been cordoned off by the time reinforcement came; thus, no other person could go in and
out therefrom. Moreover, testimonies also confirm that the appellant was alone in the house during his
surrender.

Evidence shows too that the fatal shot came from within the house, specifically from behind the screen
door.All these, taken collectively and even without the appellant’s admission, lead to no other
conclusion than that appellant was the only person who could have fired the gun that killed Major
Opina. They constitute too an unbroken chain leading to the conclusion that appellant was responsible
for Major Opina’s death.

The appellant’s contention that he accidentally pulled the trigger of the gun out of nervousness deserves
scant consideration. His conduct after shooting Opina belies this claim. First, appellant traded shots with
SPO4 Oriña immediately after Major Opina was hit. The testimonies of SPO4 Oriña himself and the other
police witnesses, supported by physical evidence of the empty 9mm bullet shells recovered from the
appellant’s house, attest to the exchange of gunfire. A man who shoots another by accident would have
been concerned with the consequences of the accident and does not immediately trade shots with the
shooting victim’s companion. Second, the appellant was fully and adequately armed to do battle, as
shown by the gun magazines and ammunition he subsequently surrendered. It is hard to picture a man
so armed and who had traded shots with the police to be one who would accidentally shoot another.
Finally, a man who accidentally shoots another does not resist and fail to surrender for an extended
time. The prolonged negotiations alone showed lack of concern and repentance—traits and reactions
inconsistent with the claimed accidental shooting. Thus, based on conclusions from the established
facts, we rule out the validity of the appellant’s claim of accidental shooting.

3.People vs. Pascual

G.R. No. 172326. January 19, 2009. Leonardo- De Castro, J.

FACTS: The conviction of accused-appellant, Alfredo Pascual, stemmed from an Amended Information
filed with the RTC for the crime designated as Rape with Homicide and Robbery.

The incident happened in a room at the second floor of House No. 724, Ballesteros St., Barangay New
Zaniga, Mandaluyong City. Last December 24, 2000, at around 10:00 o’clock in the evening, Rodolfo
Jundos, Jr. was preparing to celebrate noche buena with his son and the accused-appellant, Alfredo
Pascual who was with Christopher, his 2-year-old youngest child. Alfredo Pascual appeared to have had
liquor already. For three (3) instances, the accused would ask permission to go inside the house as he
was already sleepy and drunk but nonetheless will return 10 to 15 minutes later, twice still with the child
and only to continue drinking every time he returned. On the third time, he was without the child
anymore until 1:00 o’clock a.m. when he left, leaving Rodolfo Jundos, Jr. alone just outside the aforesaid
house.

Twenty (20) minutes later, Divina Pascual, appellant’s wife, came out of the house looking for her
husband. When informed that the latter had already left, Divina started looking for him inside the house
and later in the billiard hall 10 or 15 minutes away. Moments later, Divina passed the place where
Rodolfo Jundos, Jr. was drinking, rushing upstairs to the second floor of the house. Soon after, Jundos
saw Divina chasing Alfredo running out towards the gate at the same time asking Jundos for help.
Thinking that Alfredo Pascual was making trouble, Rodolfo Jundos, Jr. joined the chase but could not
catch up as Alfredo was running very fast. So Divina told him to instead go upstairs as the accused might
have done something wrong to Ling-ling.

Together, Jundos and Divina rushed to the second floor, finding Ling-ling flat on her back on the floor
almost naked with arms and legs open, her panty and shorts down to her ankle and t-shirt pulled up
above the breast with blood on the right breast. They tried to wake up Ling-ling but the latter was
already dead.

After proper police investigation and coordination, the victim, Lorelyn Pacubas, was brought to the PNP
Crime Laboratory, for autopsy and the examination of the blood found in the place of the incident. The
cause of death is Asphyxia by smothering.

Alfredo denied the charges against him. A forensic chemist, defense witness, confirmed that DNA
testing on the subject specimens was inconclusive and that the result was not good, as the specimens
submitted, i.e. the stained vaginal smear and the dirty white panty, had already undergone serological
analysis.

The trial court found Alfredo guilty of the crime. The CA affirmed.

ISSUES:

(1) WON the circumstantial evidence presented against the accused-appellant is sufficient for his
conviction

(2) WON the result of the DNA examination entitle the accused-appellant to an acquittal

RULING:

1. YES. It is settled that in the special complex crime of rape with homicide, both the rape and the
homicide must be established beyond reasonable doubt. In this regard, we have held that the crime of
rape is difficult to prove because it is generally unwitnessed and very often only the victim is left to
testify for herself. It becomes even more difficult when the complex crime of rape with homicide is
committed because the victim could no longer testify. Thus, in crimes of rape with homicide, as here,
resort to circumstantial evidence is usually unavoidable.

Considering that no one witnessed the commission of the crime charged herein, the weight of the
prosecution’s evidence must then be appreciated in light of the well- settled rule that an accused can be
convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as long as sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by
the prosecution to prove beyond doubt that the accused committed the crime.

Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence
of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience. Under Section 4, Rule
133 of the Revised Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if the following
requisites concur:

“(a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been
established; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.”

Here, the circumstances testified to by the prosecution witnesses lead to the inevitable conclusion that
the accused-appellant is the author of the crime charged.

The chain of events that led to the subject unfortunate incident was candidly narrated by Rodolfo
Jundos, Jr. Said witness testified that on December 24, 2000 at 10:00 p.m., he, together with his family
and other relatives, was preparing for their small celebration outside the house; that accused-appellant
(who appeared to be already drunk) was also there together with his 2-year-old child; that accused-
appellant stayed with them up to 1:00 a.m. of December 25; that during the course of his stay with the
group, accused-appellant left twice to go inside the house but kept on coming back to continue drinking;
that when accused-appellant left for the third time, he did not come back anymore leaving him (Jundos)
alone as his son, Christopher, also left to go to some other place. Some 20 minutes later, accused-
appellant’s wife, Divina, asked him about the whereabouts of the accused-appellant and he instructed
her to look for her husband in several places. Having failed to locate accused-appellant, Divina went
back inside the house.
Arlene Gorospe corroborated the testimony of Jundos that in the early morning of December 25, 2000,
Jundos and the accused-appellant’s wife, Divina, knocked at his door to inform him of the incident after
which he immediately proceeded upstairs and saw the victim naked and lifeless with her t-shirt pulled
up.

Prior to the discovery of her dead body, Jundos also testified that the victim was alone in her room on
the second floor of the house. This fact was known to accused-appellant who admitted as much in his
cross-examination. Eduardo Velasco, who used to visit the sister of the victim and have drinks with
accused-appellant, testified that the latter confided to him his love for the victim.

Furthermore, the statements of accused-appellant’s wife, Divina, immediately after the fateful incident
all the more convince the Court as to accused-appellant’s guilt.

Part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule were Divina’s
utterances to Gorospe after seeing the dead and raped body of the victim, i.e. “May nangyari sa itaas at
galing doon si Boyet,” and her subsequent narration of seeing the accused-appellant going out of the
victim’s room and running away therefrom

In People v. Cantonjos, the Court held that:

“Res gestae utterances refer to those exclamations and statements made by either the participants,
victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or after the commission of the crime, when
the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance
inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate
and to fabricate a false statement. Adeclaration is deemed part of the res gestae and thus admissible in
evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur:

(1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the
declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediately attending circumstances.”

The aforementioned requisites are present in this case. The res gestae or the startling event is the rape
and death of the victim. The statements of Divina to Gorospe were made spontaneously and before she
had the time to contrive or devise such declarations, and said statements all concerned the occurrence
in question or the immediately attending circumstances thereof. In the absence of evidence that the
witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that they were not
so actuated and their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.

2. YES. In People v. Yatar, 428 SCRA 504 (2004), we held that in assessing the probative value of DNA
evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following factors: how the samples were collected, how
they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analysing
the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and
the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

Here, while the DNA analysis of the victim’s vaginal smear showed no complete profile appellant, the
same is not conclusive considering that said specimen was already stained or contaminated which,
according to the forensic chemist, Aida Villoria-Magsipoc, deters a complete and good result for DNA
profiling. She explained in her testimony that generally, with the vaginal smear, they could see if there is
a male profile in the smear. However in this case, when they received the vaginal smear on the stained
slide, the same had already undergone serological analysis. Hence, according to the chemist, the DNA
testing conducted on the specimen subject of this case was inconclusive. In light of this flawed
procedure, we hold that the result of the DNA examination does not entitle accused-appellant to an
acquittal.

4.People vs. Corpuz

G.R. No. 148198, October 01, 2003, 412 SCRA 479.

: YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.

Topic: APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT; EVIDENCE; TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES;FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL
COURT ACCORDED GREAT RESPECT BY THE SUPREMECOURT; EXCEPTION; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR.

Facts: Four private complainants Belinda Cabantog, Concepcion San Diego, Erlinda Pascual and
RestianSurio went to Alga-Moher International Placement Services Corporation to apply for
employment as factory workers in Taiwan. Appellant Elizabeth Corpuz was employed in the said agency
as secretary. Mrs.Reyes, the agency owner, asked the four applicants to pay for the processing fees.
When they returned to the agency, Mrs. Reyes was not around, but the latter called up the appellant to
receive the processing fees of the applicants. When nothing happened to the application of the private
complainants, they decided to ask for the refund of the processing fees they gave. When the refund was
not given, they decided to file their complaint, which resulted to the arrest and detention of the
appellant. The trial court eventually convicted appellant based on its findings that despite the
suspension of the agency’s license, appellant still convinced the applicants to give their money with the
promise to land a job abroad. Moreover, as the registered secretary of the agency, she had
management control of the recruitment business. Appellant was found guilty of Illegal recruitment in
large scale under Section 6 (l) and (m) of R.A. No.8042, otherwise known as "Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 and was sentenced to life imprisonment.

Issue: Whether or not evidence on record may be reviewed as an exception to the rule that findings of
factsof the trial court are accorded by the Supreme Court with great respect.

Held: Yes. Appellant Elizabeth Corpuz is ACQUITTED of the offense charged on the ground of reasonable
doubt. It is axiomatic that findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the collective testimonies
of witnesses and probative weight thereof and its conclusions culled from said findings are accorded by
this Court great respect, if not conclusive effect, because of the unique advantage of the trial court in
observing and monitoring at close range, the conduct, deportment and demeanor of the witnesses as
they testify before the trial court. However, this principle does not apply if the trial court ignored,
misunderstood or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered,
would alter the outcome of the case. The exception obtains in this case. In the case at bar, we have
carefully reviewed the records of the case and found that the prosecution failed to establish that
appellant, as secretary, had control, management or direction of the recruitment agency. Appellant
started her employment with the agency on May 1, 1998 and she was tasked to hold and document
employment contracts from the foreign employers. She did not entertain applicants and she had no
discretion over how the business was managed. The trial court's finding that appellant, being the
secretary of the agency, had control over its business, is not only non sequitur but has no evidentiary
basis.

5.

6. ESPINELI vs PEOPLE

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS: In the early evening of December 15, 1996, Alberto Berbon, a 49-year old Senior Desk
Coordinator of the radio station DZMM, was shot in the head and different parts of the body in front of
his house in Imus, Cavite by unidentified malefactors who immediately fled the crime scene.

Meanwhile. The group of Atty. Orly Dizon of the NBI arrested and took into custody one Romeo Reyes
for the crime of illegal Possession of Deadly Weapon. Reyes confided that he was willing to give vital
information regarding the Berbon case. NBI Agent Segunial interviewed Reyes on February 10, 1997 and
reduced his statement into writing. Reyes claimed that on December 15, 1996 he saw petitioner Jose
Espineli and Sotero Paredes board a red car while armed with .45 caliber firearm and armalite. That
petitioner told Paredes “ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon”. Reyes posted bail and was
released. He jumped bail and was never again heard of.

On June 24, 1997 an information charging petitioner with the crime of murder was filed before the RTC.

The victim’s widow, Sabina Berbon, testified that sometime in February 1997 Reyes sought financial help
so he could transfer his family to the province and protect them from any untoward consequence that
may result from his giving information to the NBI regarding the death of Sabina’s husband.

Rodolfo Dayao, testified that he sold his red Ford Escort car to three persons who came to his residence
in the afternoon of September 1, 1006. He later identified the said car from the photographs to him by
the police officers.

Dr. Ludivino Lagat, the NBI Medico-Legal Officer who conducted post-mortem examination of Alberto
declared in his Autopsy Report That the size of the gunshot wounds, high-powered guns were used in
the killing.
The RTC found the petitioner gulity of the crime of Murder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua.

The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the findings of the trial court. The CA found petitioner
guilty of only homicide since none of the prosecution witnesses saw how the killing of he victim the
qualifying circumstances of superior strength cannot be appreciated while nighttime was not alleged in
the information.

ISSUE: Whether or not the pieces circumstantial evidence presented in this case enough to rule for the
conviction of the accused

Whether or not the sworn statement of Reyes is hearsay and is therefore inadmissible.

RULING: Yes.

Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence would be sufficient to convict
the offender "if i)there is more than one circumstance; ii) the facts from which the inference is derived
are proven; and iii) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt." All the circumstances must be consistent with one another, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent.

The Court has carefully scrutinized the evidence presented in this case in the light of the standards
discussed above and finds the foregoing circumstantial evidence sufficient to support a judgment of
conviction. Several reasons deserve our acceptance of the circumstances upon which petitioner’s
conviction was based, to wit:

First, NBI Agent Segunial testified that he had investigated Reyes and reduced the latter’s statement into
writing declaring, among others, that in the morning of December 15, 1996, he (Reyes) overheard
petitioner telling Sotero "Ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon" and saw them armed with
.45 caliber pistol and an armalite, respectively, before boarding a red car. The CA gave weight to Reyes’
sworn statement in this wise:

The probative value of Romeo Reyes’s worn statement as to the words spoken by appellant to his co-
accused Sotero Paredes in the morning of December 15, 1996 cannot be disputed.
Second, the identification and recognition through photograph by Rodolfo of the 1971 Ford Escort red
colored car as the same car he had sold to Sotero in September 1996 clearly and convincingly prove that
it was the very same red car used in the killing of AlbertoThird, Alberto was shot and killed on December
15, 1996 and the gunmen immediately fled the scene riding a red car which was identified as the same
car previously sold by Rodolfo to Sotero.

Fourth, though the testimony of Dr. Lagat was limited to the post-mortem examination of the cadaver of
Alberto, his findings that the victim suffered multiple gunshot wounds and that the same were caused
by high-powered guns, served as corroborative evidence and contributed in a significant way in
establishing the level of proof that the law requires in convicting petitioner.

Lastly, petitioner’s escape from detention on August 26, 1998 while the case was pending can also be
considered as another circumstance since it is a strong indication of his guilt.

All told, this Court finds the concordant combination and cumulative effect of the alleged established
circumstances, which essentially were the same circumstances found by the trial court and the appellate
court, to have satisfied the requirement of Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, the
incriminating circumstances, when taken together, constitute an unbroken chain of events enough to
arrive at the conclusion that petitioner was responsible for the killing of the victim. on December 15,
1996.

No.

Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends in whole or in part on the competency and
credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce. However, while the
testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person given for the purpose of
establishing the truth of the fact asserted in the statement is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if
the purpose of placing the statement on the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement, or
the tenor of such statement, was made. Regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, when what is
relevant is the fact that such statement has been made, the hearsay rule does not apply and the
statement may be shown.

In the present case, the testimony of NBI Agent Segunial that while he was investigating Reyes, the
latter confided to him that he (Reyes) heard petitioner telling Sotero "Ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas
yang si Berbon" and that he saw the two (petitioner and Sotero) armed with a .45 caliber pistol and an
armalite, respectively, before boardinga red car, cannot be regarded as hearsay evidence. This is
considering that NBI Agent Segunial’s testimony was not presented to prove the truth of such statement
but only for the purpose of establishing that on February 10, 1997, Reyes executed a sworn statement
containing such narration of facts.

CONSPIRACY

1. SIMON FERNAN, JR. and EXPEDITO TORREVILAS, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent. GR. No. 145927

FACTS: Sometime in February, 1977, accused Rolando Mangubat (Chief Accountant), Delia Preagido
(Accountant III), Jose Sayson (Budget Examiner), and Edgardo Cruz (Clerk II), all of MPH Region VII, met
at the Town and Country Restaurant in Cebu City and hatched an ingenious plan to siphon off large sums
of money from government coffers. Mangubat had found a way to withdraw government money
through the use of fake Letter of Advice of Allotments (LAAs), vouchers and other documents and to
conceal traces thereof with the connivance of other government officials and employees. In fine, the
fraudulent scheme involved the splitting of LAAs and Requisition of Supplies and Equipment (RSEs) so
that the amount covered by each general voucher is less than P50,000.00 to do away with the approval
of the Regional Auditor; the charging of disbursements to unliquidated obligations due the previous year
to provide the supposed source of funds; and the manipulation of the books of account by negation or
adjustment, i.e., the cancellation of checks through journal vouchers to conceal disbursements in excess
of the cash disbursement ceiling (CDC), so as not to reflect such disbursements in the trial balances
submitted to the Regional Office. Mangubat enticed Preagido, Cruz and Sayson to join him. All three
agreed to help him carry out his plan. They typed the fake LAAs during Saturdays. Cruz and Sayson also
took charge of negotiating or selling the fake LAAs to contractors at 26% of the gross amount. Preagido
on her part manipulated the General Ledger, Journal Vouchers and General Journal thru negative entries
to conceal the illegal disbursements. The letter-advices covering such allotments (LAA) were generally
not signed by the Finance Officer nor recorded in the books of accounts. Disbursements made on the
basis of these fake LAAs were charged to the unliquidated Obligations (Account 8-81-400), although the
obligations being paid were not among those certified to the unliquidated obligations (Account 8-81-
400) at the end of the preceding year. To conceal the over- charges to authorized allotments, account 8-
81-400 and the excess of checks issued over authorized cash disbursements ceiling, adjustments were
prepared monthly through journal vouchers to take up the negative debit to Account 8-81-400 and a
negative credit to the Treasury Checking Account for Agencies Account 8-70-790. These journal vouchers
in effect cancelled the previous entry to record the disbursements made on the basis of the fake LAAs.
Thus, the affected accounts (Accounts 8-81-400 and 8-70-790), as appearing in the trial balance would
not show the irregularity. The checks, however, were actually issued. The four formed the nucleus of the
nefarious conspiracy. Other government employees, tempted by the prospect of earning big money,
allowed their names to be used and signed spurious documents.

Although the anomalies had been going on for sometime (February 1977 to June 1978), the PNB and
Bureau of Treasury had no inkling about it until the NBI busted the illegal operations. (Some of the
recipients of the stolen funds spent lavishly and bought two cars at a time). The reason for this is that, at
that time, the PNB and Bureau of Treasury were not furnished copy of the mother CDC and the local
branch of the PNB did not receive independent advice from the PNB head office in Manila. There were
no deposits of money made with the PNB from which withdrawals could be charged. Only CDCs were
presented to it, and not knowing that some of the CDCs were fake, the PNB branch paid out the checks
drawn against them. The bank had also no way of knowing what amount was appropriated for the
district; consequently, it did not know if the limit had already been exceeded. Only an insider steep in
government accounting, auditing and banking procedures, particularly their flaws and loopholes, could
have pulled off such an ingenious and audacious plan.

ISSUE: W/N THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN CONVICTING PETITIONERS AS CO-

CONSPIRATORS DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO SPECIFICALLY PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES THAT WOULD IMPLICATE THEM AS CO- CONSPIRATORS AND
JUSTIFY THEIR CONVICTION.

RULING: No. Indeed, the burden of proving the allegation of conspiracy falls to the shoulders of the
prosecution. Considering, however, the difficulty in establishing the existence of conspiracy, settled
jurisprudence finds no need to prove it by direct evidence. In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, we categorized
two (2) structures of multiple conspiracies, namely: (1) the so- called “wheel” or “circle” conspiracy, in
which there is a single person or group (the “hub”) dealing individually with two or more other persons
or groups (the “spokes”); and (2) the “chain” conspiracy, usually involving the distribution of narcotics or
other contraband, in which there is successive communication and cooperation in much the same way
as with legitimate business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and
retailer, and then retailer and consumer.

We find that the conspiracy in the instant cases resembles the “wheel” conspiracy. The 36 disparate
persons who constituted the massive conspiracy to defraud the government were controlled by a single
hub, namely: Rolando Mangubat (Chief Accountant), Delia Preagido (Accountant III), Jose Sayson
(Budget Examiner), and Edgardo Cruz (Clerk II), who controlled the separate “spokes” of the conspiracy.
Petitioners were among the many spokes of the wheel.

After a close re-examination of the records, the Court finds no reason to disturb the finding of the anti-
graft court that petitioners are co-conspirators of the other accused, headed by Chief Accountant
Rolando Mangubat, who were similarly convicted in practically all the 119 counts of estafa. Undisturbed
is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts and in the absence of strong and compelling reasons or
justifications, it will accord finality to the findings of facts of the SB. The feeble defense of petitioners
that they were not aware of the ingenuous plan of the group of accused Mangubat and the
indispensable acts to defraud the government does not merit any consideration. The State is not tasked
to adduce direct proof of the agreement by petitioners with the other accused, for such requirement, in
many cases, would border on near impossibility. The State needs to adduce proof only when the
accused committed acts that constitute a vital connection to the chain of conspiracy or in furtherance of
the objective of the conspiracy. In the case at bench, the signing of the fake tally sheets and/or delivery
receipts, reports of inspection, and requests for supplies and materials by petitioners on separate
occasions is vital to the success of the Mangubat Group in siphoning off government funds. Without
such fabricated documents, the general vouchers covering the supply of materials cannot be properly
accomplished and submitted to the disbursing officer for the preparation of checks.

2. ROSALINDA SERRANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 123896, June 25, 2003

FACTS: On September 21, 1984, Ramon C. Mojica (Mojica) contacted his friend Nelia Oliva (Oliva), who
worked at Banco Filipino (the bank) in Makati, for the purpose of buying U.S. dollars for the importation
of machinery spare parts for his blanket factory in Cainta, Rizal.
As Oliva told Mojica that her co-employee Mel Lazo (Mel) knew people who were in the business of
selling dollars, Mojica, by telephone, talked to Mel who informed him that she was acquainted with
people who had cashier’s checks drawn from US banks. After the two agreed on the exchange rate at
₱20.50 to a US dollar and to meet at the bank, Mojica repaired that same day, September 21, 1984, to
the bank where he was introduced by Oliva to Mel, petitioner and Nelia.

Petitioner, Nelia and Edna presented a check September 7, 1984 drawn by and against Centerre Bank,
St. Louis, Missouri, U.S.A. for $12,000.00. Assured that it was fully funded,10 Mojica accepted the check
in exchange for which he handed them Metrobank Cashier’s Check dated September 21, 1984 in the
amount of ₱246,000.00. Nelia and petitioner later returned the cashier’s check and, upon petitioner’s
request, Mojica replaced it with Metrobank Cashier’s Check Nos. CC-00288212 and CC-002883,13 both
dated September 21, 1984, for P168,000.00 and P78,000.00, respectively.

The Metrobank checks were encashed on September 24, 1984 by petitioner whose signature, address
and voter’s affidavit number14 appear at the checks’ dorsal portions.

On September 24, 1984, petitioner phoned Mojica and inquired whether he was still willing to purchase
some dollars, informing him that she, Nelia and Edna had another dollar check in the amount of
$10,000.00 and that they were willing to sell the same to him at the same rate of exchange. Mojica, who
accepted the offer, met with them that afternoon at the hotel, bringing with him, on their request, two
cashier’s checks, one for ₱150,000.00 and the other for ₱45,000.00.

At the Regent, Nelia, Edna and petitioner handed Mojica Check No. 0036256317 dated September 7,
1984 drawn by and against Centerre Bank, St. Louis, Missouri, U.S.A. for $10,000.00 in exchange for
Metrobank Cashier’s Check Nos. 00289118 and 002890,19 both dated September 24, 1984, for
₱160,000.00 and ₱45,000.00, respectively. Nelia, Edna, and petitioner once again assured Mojica that
the dollar check was sufficiently funded.20 On that same day, petitioner encashed the Metrobank
cashier’s checks.21

The following day, Serrano phoned Mojica again and offered to sell a $5,000.00 check to him at the
same exchange rate of ₱20.50 to a U.S. dollar.22 Mojica agreed and as usual, as instructed, he brought a
cashier’s check for ₱102,500.00 when they met that same afternoon at the Regent.23

Mojica deposited the dollar checks to his Foreign Currency Deposit Unit (FCDU) Savings Account at the
Cubao branch of Metrobank several weeks after which he was notified that all the dollar checks were
fraudulent,30 drawing him to demand the return of his money from Nelia, Edna and petitioner who,
however, failed to comply.

Hence, three informations were filed charging petitioner, along with Nelia Giron (Nelia) and Edna Sibal
(Edna), with estafa through falsification of commercial documents. Nelia and Edna remained at large.

RTC and CA- 3 counts of estafa

ISSUES: Whether or not her participation in the dollar transactions was limited to her act of introducing
Nelia and Edna to Mel who in turn introduced them to Oliva and eventually to Mojica which cannot, in
any way be considered criminal and cannot be construed as part of a conspiracy

RULING: NO.
This Court is not persuaded. Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary to
prove conspiracy as it may be deduced from the acts of the perpetrators before, during and after the
commission of the crime which are indicative of a common design, concerted action and concurrence of
sentiments.

As the trial court found:

In her direct and cross examination, it clearly showed that Serrano knew every single detail of the three
(3) transactions. She was not only a participant, but was also an instrument in the commencement and
consequently in the consumation (sic) of the three (3) transactions. She arranged their meeting with
Mojica and in all these transactions aside from being present she personally called and advised him to
buy additional bank drafts in the September 24 & 25, 1984 transactions. It was also shown that Serrano
personally received all the proceeds of the Metrobank Cashier’s Checks issued and/or exchanged by
Mojica with the subject bank drafts.

As a matter of fact, she admitted that she was the one who encashed and received the proceeds of the
three (3) fraudulent checks; that she likewise caused and formally applied for the issuance of Metrobank
Cashier’s Check No. 002897 dated September 25, 1984 in the amount of P80,000.00. It has also been
established that Serrano, Giron, and Sibal guaranteed the genuineness of the three (3) subject bank
drafts and that they were sufficiently funded.

So that because of this (sic) false pretenses and fraudulent representations of the three accused, Mojica
was induced to part with his money in the amount of P550,000.00 All these facts belied the claim of
Serrano that she has no participation. As a matter of fact, she admitted that she kept part of the
proceeds, but claim (sic) that it was in payment of the alleged indebtedness of Giron and Sibal to her. In
each transactions (sic) she received P25,000.00, so that she received a total of P75,000.00 which shows
that this was her share in the subject fraudulent transactions.

The falsification of the dollar checks was the necessary means for the commission of estafa. The acts of
petitioner in falsifying the dollar checks and misrepresenting to Mojica that they were genuine and
sufficiently funded on account of which he parted with, in exchange therefor, the Metrobank cashier’s
checks constitute the fraud contemplated under the provision of Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Penal
Code. That petitioner encashed the Metrobank checks and appropriated the proceeds thereof to the
damage and prejudice of Mojica seals her liability.

Accordingly, petitioner is liable for 3 counts of estafa through falsification of commercial documents
under paragraph 2(a) of Article 315 and Article 172 in relation to Article 171(2) of the Revised Penal
Code.

FLIGHT OR NON-FLIGHT OF THE ACCUSED

People of the Philippines vs. Amodia, G.R. No. 177356, 20 November 2008

Facts: On June 10, 2003 at about 3:00 a.m., Richard Avila Roda, an Assistant Manager of Nognog
Videoke Restaurant in Quezon City, went out of the restaurant to invite customers. Once out of the
restaurant, he saw seven persons mauling someone. He noticed that three of the attackers, whom he
later identified as accused-appellants Amodia, Marino, and Lo-oc, were regular customers of their
restaurant. The other four were unknown to him; so was the victim. He saw Lo-oc hold the shoulders of
the victim while Marino and Amodia took turns in beating the victim. One of their companions had a
knife, who, upon seeing Roda, threatened to kill him. As a result of the beating, the victim fell on the
ground. Roda immediately approached the victim and saw blood oozing out of the back of his head. One
of the maulers was about to deliver another blow on the victim but Roda was able to stop him by saying,
"Hindi na kayo naawa." Accused-appellants then went inside the restaurant and drank one bottle of
beer each. Roda did not immediately report the incident because he was threatened by accused-
appellants who were still hanging around the area. He later went home with the owner of the
restaurant.3

Later, in the early morning of the same day, he saw the body of the victim still in the place where he fell.
There were already some barangay tanods and police officers investigating the incident. The victim, later
identified as Jaime Bartina, was then brought to the Quezon City General Hospital. Jaime died at around
5 o'clock in the afternoon of June 10, 2003.

Accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge against them. They denied involvement in the
death of the victim and averred alibi as their defense. According to Lo-oc, at around one to three o'clock
in the morning, he went out of the bar and saw a man slumped on the ground asking for help. He lifted
the man and saw that he was soaked in his own blood. At this time, Amodia and Marino, who were
pedicab drivers, passed by the area. Lo-oc called on the two to help him bring the wounded man to the
hospital. The two, however, refused because pedicabs were not allowed to travel along the national
highway. Consequently, Lo-oc just placed Bartina on a sitting position beside the wall and left him. He
then went back to the bar and continued drinking. He did not report the incident to the authorities.

RTC: Amodia, Marino and Lo-oc were found guilty [beyond reasonable doubt] of the crime of Murder.

CA: Affirmed the decision of RTC.

Issue: Whether non-flight of the assailants signified innocence.

Ruling: No. The accused-appellants' contention that non-flight of the assailants signified innocence was
untenable. Unlike flight of an accused, which is competent evidence against the accused as having a
tendency to establish the accused's guilt, non-flight is simply inaction, which may be due to several
factors. It cannot be singularly considered as evidence or as a manifestation determinative of innocence.

Thus, weighed against the positive testimony of the prosecution eyewitness, accused-appellants'
defenses of denial and alibi lose ground. As correctly ruled by the trial court and affirmed by the CA:

In a situation like this, the rule well settled in this jurisdiction is that positive identification of the
accused, when categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill-motive on the part of an eye
witness testifying on the matter, prevails over denial of [the] accused, which if not substantiated by
clear and convincing evidence, [is] negative and self serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. The
Court is not prepared to depart from said rule as the plain denial of the accused of the crime cannot gain
judicial acceptance nor can it be equated with evidentiary force and value for want of clear and
convincing proof to sustain the same. Besides, the fact remains that the three accused were together, at
one instance, at about 3:00 a.m. of June 10, 2003 at the very site where Bartina was lying bloodied on
the ground and ignored his need to be brought to the hospital to save his precious life.
2. Gumaltico v. People

G.R. No. 146296. October 15, 2007.

Nachura, J.,

Facts: The prosecution’s version of facts shows that Spouses Lipayco went to work at CDO-Foodsphere,
Valenzuela. When the wife, Rebecca, returned home around noon, she found the house’ door to be
broken and discovered their place in shambles, with several items missing including a VHS player. She
reported the incident to the police and hence, an investigation was immediately conducted to which,
two eight (8) year old children, Michael and Angelo, testified that they saw accused Gumaltico enter and
ransack the house. On the other hand, the defense stated that Eduardo Gumaltico was also a worker at
CDO, went around the spouses’ neighborhood to pick something up from one Conchita. While on his
way, he decided to pass by the spouses’ house to see his godson and spouses’ son, Gary. He entered the
door which was already open, but Gary was not there. So, he left the house, went on to see Conchita,
and left. He also stated that what Michael and Angelo mistakenly thought of as a VHS player was his car
stereo instead, which he always carried. He then proceeded to Villamor Airbase, Pasay. When he
returned home in Valenzuela, he learned that Rebecca was looking for him. So he paid her a visit. But
when he went to the Lipayco’s house, he was arrested by the police. Gumaltico was charged with the
crime of Robbery in RTC Valenzuela.

The RTC held that petitioner’s defenses of denial and alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification
of petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime by Michael and Angelo, who testified with sufficient
coherence and clarity. The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC that the petitioner’s defenses of denial and
alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the petitioner by the eyewitnesses which were
categorical, consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the latter’s part. The CA however held
that it is Theft, not Robbery, which is the proper offense because there was no break-in made.

Issue: Does Gumaltico’s non-flight and does the fact that he returned to the spouses Lipayco’s house
indicate innocence.

Held: NO. Lastly, we are not persuaded by petitioner’s contention that the fact that he came back to
the Lipaycos’ house on January 1, 1997 shows that he is innocent of the offense charged. It is
established in this jurisdiction that while flight indicates guilt, non-flight does not mean innocence.
Much like the defenses of alibi and denial, non-flight cannot prevail against the weight of positive
identification of the accused. Therefore, the Court finds no reason to overturn the judgment of
conviction against the petitioner for the crime of Theft as the prosecution sufficiently proved his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

People v Isang

Facts: Ignacio Isang was charged of two counts of rape sometime in the month of June 1996 and of
September 1999. These were committed against his minor daughter AAA. Isang escaped from the
Provincial Jail in 2002. Isang remained at large. The trial court acquitted Isang on the 1996 crime and
convicted on the 1999 crime. The defense claimed that AAA was confused about what constitutes rape
as there was no insertion of penis happened.

Issue: WON the Isang’s escape is an indication of guilt.

Ruling: Yes. Isang escaped from detention during the pendency of the case before the trial court is in
itself an indication of his guilt. The flight of an accused is an indication of his guilt or of his guilty mind.
Flight evidences guilt and a guilty conscience: the wicked flee, even when no man pursues, but the
righteous stand fast as bold as a lion. Also, the claim of the defense regarding AAA’s testimony is
misleading. The testimony was for the 1996 crime in which Isang was already acquitted.

CUMULATIVE EVIDENCE AND CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE

1.MANGANGEY VS SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. NOS. 147773-74

FEBRUARY 18, 2008

FACTS:

• The Municipality of Paracelis, Mountain Province undertook the widening and partial relocation of the
Banilag-Minoli Road. The project was awarded to private contractor Leon Acapen.

• The project was allegedly completed on December 8, 1986 as shown in the Certificate of Inspection
and Acceptance dated December 8, 1986. The certificate was prepared and signed by Construction and
Maintenance Foreman Dennis Mangangey, who attested that he personally inspected the project and
that it was 100% completed in accordance with the agreed specifications.

• In another Certificate of Inspection and Acceptance, with the same date, the signatories, namely:
Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator Gabriel Wanason, petitioner herein, as the Mayor’s
representative; Municipal Revenue Clerk Anselmo Forayo, petitioner herein, as the Treasurer’s
representative; and Bernardo Acapen (now deceased), as the Engineer’s representative, all attested that
they personally inspected the work done by Leon and found the work in accordance with the approved
program of work. The Government subsequently issued a check for PhP 106,970 as payment for the
project.

• Subsequently, somebody complained to COA about the anomalies in the construction of the road. The
COA Regional Director directed Technical Audit Specialist Engr. Hospicio Angluben to conduct an actual
site inspection. Part of his affidavit/report on the inspection stated that out of the 4,010 cu.m. only 365
cu.m. was actually accomplished, but the contract was certified to be completed and fully paid.

• An Amended Information for Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents charged Paracelis Mayor
Matthew Wandag, Municipal Revenue Clerk Forayo, Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator
Wanason, and Construction and Maintenance Foreman of the Office of the Provincial Engineer
Mangangey.

• All pleaded not guilty. Wandag who took flight to the United States.

• SANDIGANBAYAN: Convicted petitioners for the crime of estafa through falsification of public
documents, with the exception of Leon
• In its Decision, the Sandiganbayan found that the signatories of the Certificate of Inspection and
Acceptance, namely, Mangangey, Wanason, Forayo, and the late Bernardo, in their own official
functions, falsified a public document when they attested that they personally inspected the work of
Leon and reported that it was 100% completed in accordance with the plans, specifications, and
contract requirements notwithstanding that the work on the aforesaid project was not yet finished. The
Sandiganbayan found that petitioners conspired with the accused Wandag to defraud the Government

• Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. Hence, we have this petition for
review

RULING: Petition DENIED.

Whether or not, under the facts alleged and proven, the accused may be held liable for the offense of
estafa through falsification of public document – YES

• The Sandiganbayan found that Wandag masterminded the fraud and that the local government
funded road project was neither submitted to public bidding nor were the required documents on the
road project in order when it was launched. Ostensibly, Leon was merely pressured to sign the contract.

• The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioners of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of a
public document penalized under Articles 315 and 171 in relation to Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC).

• There is no question that petitioners were public officials and employees performing their official duty
when they certified in a public document that they inspected and found that the road project was 100%
complete per contract specifications.

• COA Examining Technical Audit Specialist Angluben testified on October 28, 1994 and stated in his
affidavit that the facts in the certificates of inspection and acceptance were false. His testimony was
based on the specifications of the pakyaw contract as evinced by the Individual Project Program for
Roads and Bridges in the Mountain Province, the original Cross-Section of the Program for Banilag-
Minoli Road widening and partial relocation road project, and the earthwork computations. According to
Angluben, the earthworks dug were only 364.5 cu. m., short of the estimated 4,010 cu. m. He also found
that no earthworks were done on the estimated 1,800 cu. m. for removal of slides and overbreaks. The
payment of the completed road project was going to be based on the actual volume of the earthworks
as clearly specified in the pakyaw contract, vis-à-vis the estimates of the volume of earthworks in the
project. The only conclusion that could be drawn is that the Banilag-Minoli Road was far from finished at
the time the certifications were signed by petitioners and when the government paid for the road
project.

• Based on the aforesaid documents and Angluben’s testimony, we agree with the Sandiganbayan that
Mangangey lied in his declarations.

o First, his erroneous identification of the starting point of the project puts into doubt his claim that he
personally inspected the road project.
o Second, we find it suspect that Mangangey, a foreman and a supposed technical expert of the
Provincial Engineers Office, could not specify the width and the extent of the work done on the road.

o Third, Mangangeys report that the actual earthworks excavated were exactly the same as the
approximated volume of earthworks to be excavated is highly improbable. He also offered no proof to
rebut the results of the technical audit of Angluben.

• As to the credibility of Angluben, it is a familiar and fundamental doctrine that the determination of
the credibility of witnesses is the domain of the trial court as it is in the best position to observe the
witnesses demeanor. Angluben’s oral testimony is supported by documentary evidence. Under the
circumstances of this case, we are not inclined to depart from this principle.

• Besides, Forayo and Wanason clearly admitted in their counter-affidavits that they did not personally
inspect the project when they affixed their signatures on the Certificate of Inspection and Acceptance.
According to Forayo, he merely relied on the late Bernardos signature. Wanason said he signed because
he was threatened by Wandag.

• Now, as to the requirement that the accused had a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts
narrated, suffice it to say that a Certificate of Inspection and Acceptance is required in the processing of
vouchers for the payment of government projects. Patently, the falsification of this document by the
petitioners caused the release of the payment for an unfinished road at great cost to the Government.

• Similarly, we find that the charge of estafa through falsification of public documents under Art. 315,
par. 2(a) of the RPC was likewise proven.

o The first element, that the accused made false pretenses or fraudulent representations, need not be
discussed all over. We have sufficiently gone over this matter.

o The same holds true with the requirement that these falsifications were made during the commission
of the crime. The falsified certificates of inspection and acceptance resulted in the government paying
for the unfinished project to the disadvantage and injury of the State. Altogether, the elements of the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document are present.

2. PEOPLE vs. MANALILI G.R. No. 191253 August 28, 2013

FACTS: Apolinario Manalili y Jose (Manalili) was charged before the RTC of Manila with statutory rape as
defined and penalized under Article 266-A, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5(b) of
R.A. No. 7610, otherwise known as “Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act.”

On March 16, 1998, committed abusive acts and lascivious conduct upon the person of AAA, a minor, 10
years of age, he pulled down her panty, caressed her private part, mashed her breast. He also tryied to
insert his penis on the vagina of said minor, and in the process, the penis of said accused touched the
labia of the vagina of said minor, against her will and without her consent, thereby gravely endangering
the normal growth and development of the said child.

On cross-examination, AAA clarified that accused is not her godfather but that of her brother and that
the house number of the accused is 1672, while theirs is 1670. AAA described the place of the incident
in detail. Although it was dark, AAA narrated that she was certain it was Manalili who followed her
inside the house. Familiar with Manalili’s voice, AAA positively identified Manalili when he instructed her
to remove her underwear.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused may be convicted through the testimony of a single witness in a rape
case.

HELD: Yes. Identification of an accused by his voice has been accepted particularly in cases where the
witness has known the malefactor personally for so long and so intimately.―Jurisprudence is instructive
that identification of an accused by his voice has been accepted particularly in cases where, such as in
this case, the witness has known the malefactor personally for so long and so intimately. This Court has
opined that once a person has gained familiarity with another, identification becomes quite an easy task
even from a considerable distance. Furthermore, settled is the rule that the testimony of a single
witness may be sufficient to produce a conviction, if the same appears to be trustworthy and reliable. If
credible and convincing, that alone would be sufficient to convict the accused. No law or rule requires
the corroboration of the testimony of a single witness in a rape case

3. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROMALDO LUMAYAG Y DELA CRUZ

Facts: On or about the 29th day of November 1997, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, with intent of gain and by
means of force, violence and intimidation against persons, to wit: by entering the residence of Eladio
Santos y Gutierrez and Leonor Santos y Reyes located at No. 548 Tahimik St., Pag-ibig sa Nayon, this City,
and once inside for the purpose of enabling said accused, to take, steal and carry away cash money from
the house of said Eladio Santos y Gutierrez and Leonor Santos y Reyes, the said accused with intent to
kill and taking advantage of their superior strength, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously
and treacherously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon said Eladio Santos y Gutierrez and
Leonor Santos y Reyes, by stabbing them repeatedly with the use of bladed weapons and big wooden
stick, hitting them on the different parts of their bodies, thereby inflicting upon them mortal wounds
which were the direct and immediate cause of their deaths and thereafter, the said accused pursuant to
their conspiracy, with intent of gain, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal
and carry away certain things. The prosecution presented Honorata S. Estrella (Estrella), daughter of the
victims; PO2 Rodolfo Paule (PO2 Paule) of the Caloocan Police Station; SPO2 Rolando Ko (SPO2 Ko), PO3
Alberto Gomez, Jr. (PO3 Gomez), and PO2 Ferdinand Flores (PO2 Flores) of the La Loma Police Station;
National Bureau of Investigation Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Floresto Arizala, Jr. (Dr. Arizala); and National
Bureau of Investigation Forensic Biologist I Pet Byron T. Buan (Forensic Biologist Buan) as witnesses. On
the other hand, the defense presented Dela Cruz and Opiniano as witnesses.

Issue: Whether or not the pieces of evidence are enough to convict the accused.

Ruling: Yes. The eyewitness account of Dela Cruz, corroborated by the testimony and findings of Dr.
Arizala and Forensic Biologist Buan, suffices to convict accused-appellant Opiniano of the crime charged.
In contrast, appellant Opiniano could only offer a lame denial and alibi, which were replete with
inconsistencies. There is no corroborative evidence that appellant Opiniano was in another place at the
time the crime was committed; neither was it clearly shown that it was physically impossible for him to
be present at the scene of the crime. All told, the prosecution proved appellant Opiniano's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide. We affirm the findings of fact and conclusions
of law of the Court of Appeals.

4. PEOPLE vs. CRISANTO CIRBETO (GR no. 231359)

FACTS: On 31 December, 2010, at around 3:15p.m., while prosecution eyewitness Roger Dalimoos was
outside a fast food restaurant in front of Marikina Sports Center at the corner of Sumulong Highway and
Toyota Avenue, Marikina City, he saw his friend Ferdinand Casipit together with accused-appellant
walking towards a nearby mall. Dalimoos was on his way home then, so he boarded a jeepney by
hanging on to its end railings. Upon reaching the stoplight at the corner of Sumulong Highway and
Tuazon St., from which vantage point he could still see Casipit and accused-appellant who were already
in front of the mall, Dalimoos saw the latter suddenly pull a knife from the right side of his back, hold
Casipit's shirt with his left hand, and stab him with the knife using his right hand. Accused-appellant was
able to stab Casipit once before the latter managed to run away. However, accused-appellant ran after
Casipit and caught up to him. Thereafter, the former held the latter's shirt again, pulled him to the
ground, and stabbed him repeatedly, resulting in the latter's death.

Consequently, accused-appellant was charged with the crime of Murder. The RTC convicted accused-
appellant as charged. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction of the accused was correct

HELD: Yes.

To successfully prosecute the crime of Murder, the following elements must be established: (1) that a
person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any of the
qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (4) that the killing is not parricide or
infanticide.

In this case, and as correctly found by the courts a quo, the prosecution was able to establish a
confluence of the foregoing elements, considering the following: (1) the victim Casipit was killed; (2)
accused-appellant was positively identified as the one who killed him; (3) Casipit's killing was attended
by treachery, a qualifying circumstance; and (4) the killing is neither parricide nor infanticide.

For his part, accused-appellant's defense is focused on the possible uncertainty over his identification by
Dalimoos, the eyewitness, as the victim's assailant. He insists that Dalimoos was mistaken in identifying
him and may even have been coached to lie in his testimony. The Court is not convinced.

It should be emphasized that the testimony of a single witness, if positive and credible, as in the case of
Dalimoos, is sufficient to support a conviction even in a charge of murder. Time and again, the Court has
held that when the issues involve matters of credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trial court, its
calibration of the testimonies, and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its
conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect. This is so
because the trial court has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and is in the
best position to discern whether or not they are telling the truth. Hence, it is a settled rule that appellate
courts will not overturn the factual findings of the trial court unless there is a showing that the latter
overlooked facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would affect the result of the case.
LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF RULES OF EVIDENCE

1. Quiambao vs. Court of Appeals, 454 SCRA 17

Facts: On 22 December 1990, at around 8:00 in the evening, Espie Catolico (Catolico) was walking along
Capulong Street in Tondo, Manila, inquiring as to the whereabouts of her housemaid Gynalin Garais who
left the house the day before. After having asked her neighbors and bystanders to no avail, an old
woman told her that a certain policeman was looking for her as her housemaid was in his custody. She
went to the area as directed by the old woman but there she was allegedly accosted by petitioner, PO3
Felino Quiambao, a member of the PNP and 5 other persons. Quiambao and his companions forcibly
took Catolico’s handbag and carried away its contents consisting of precious assorted merchandise,
jewelry and other personal items worth approximately P9,000.00. Thereafter, petitioner forcibly herded
Catolico to his owner-type jeep and brought her to the dimly lit portion of North Harbor and, while
thereat, he slapped her on the face several times and warned her not to look anymore for her
housemaid.

Catolico filed a sworn statement with the PNP Inspectorate Division, accusing petitioner and six (6)
others, with robbery-holdup and mauling and another administrative complaint with the Office of the
Hearing Officer at NAPOLCOM, Western Police District,

Manila, charging petitioner with grave misconduct.

On 31 October 1992, the Summary Dismissal Hearing Officer (SDHO) recommended the dismissal of
petitioner.

Petitioner appealed the 31 resolution to the National Appellate Board (NAB) of the NAPOLCOM. The
Third Division of the NAB, rendered a decision affirming the dismissal of petitioner from police service.

On appeal, the appellate court ruled that the petition did not state all the specific material dates
showing that it was filed within the reglementary period provided by law as it failed to state the date
when petitioner received a copy of the Resolution of NAB dated 27 December 1993, denying his motion
for reconsideration of NAB’s decision dated 25 October 1993. It found out that NAB’s decision dated 25
October 1993 was received by

petitioner on 22 November 1993, and on 2 December 1993, he filed his motion for reconsideration. The
said motion, however, was denied on 27 December 1993, but according to the appellate court,
petitioner did not disclose the date when he received such denial. The fifteen-day reglementary period
for filing a petition for review with the Court of Appeals started to run from such date.

Issue: Whether or not the appellate court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in holding that the petition was not meritorious since the petition filed with the
appellate court did not state the date when petitioner received a copy of the Resolution of NAB dated
27 December 1993 to determine if the petition was indeed filed within the reglementary period.
Ruling: Yes.

A certified xerox copy thereof, duly RECEIVED BY PETITIONER ON SEPTEMBER 23, 1996 is hereto
attached as ANNEX “M.”

A reading of the foregoing allegation, however, disclosed the fact that on 27 December 1993, NAB
rendered a resolution denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Although it would seem
anomalous as it is unnatural that the purported resolution was received only by petitioner on 23
September 1996, we are inclined to sustain petitioner’s assertion for the same is supported by the
certified xerox copy of the resolution and the evidence is bereft of any showing that will warrant a
contrary conclusion. Thus, the aforecited allegation substantially complied with the requirements under
Section 6.

The failure to specifically state in the petition on material dates such as the date when the resolution or
order denying a motion for reconsideration was received is a ground for dismissal in accordance with
Section 7 of the administrative circular and Rule 43. But the scenario is not present in the case at bar for
the aforecited paragraph 18 of the petition filed with the appellate court reflected the date when
petitioner actually received the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration, which is 23
September 1996. Procedural rules must be liberally interpreted and applied so as not to frustrate
substantial justice that this Court seeks to achieve.

2. Barcenas vs. Tomas, 454 SCRA 593

FACTS: Respondent Spouses Tomas filed a case for recovery of ownership and possession of real
property with damages against the heirs of Veronica Tolentino. The Complaint stated that after the
death of Benedicto Guerzon, Veronica’s husband, the latter sold a 1-ha portion of her undivided share in
a 14.6-ha property in Nueva Ecija. Respondents took possession of the property immediately after the
sale.

In 1989, the Spouses however migrated to the United States leaving the lot in possession of Victoriano
Tomas. On April 13, 1989, the heirs of Veronica executed an Extrajudicial Partition of the entire Nueva
Ecija property. Thus, a new title was issued in the name of Maximo Guerzon, one of the heirs.

The respondent Spouses presented a Deed of Sale evidencing the sale of the 1-ha lot and also showed
through an Affidavit that Veronica’s children subsequently confirmed the sale. The Petitioner heirs
however denied knowledge of the two documents.

The MTC of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija held that the Respondent Spouses had the better right of possession
over the property. The RTC-Branch 33 of Guimba, Nueva Ecija affirmed this ruling.

In the Court of Appeals, the court dismissed the Petition for Review on several grounds, including the
fact that the pleadings filed with the lower court had not been appended to the Petition in contrary to
Section 2(d) of Rule 42.

ISSUE: Whether or not both the lower courts committed a grave and serious error in giving evidentiary
weight to the purported Deed of Sale and Affidavit as proof of the alleged sale even if said documentary
exhibits have not been properly identified by a competent witness.

RULING: NO
The argument that this Court should reverse the factual findings because certain facts or circumstances
of import have allegedly been overlooked or misinterpreted by the lower courts is unavailing. That kind
of review is done only with regard to factual findings of the CA -- and there are none here -- not of the
RTC or the MTC.

To satisfy the incessant call of petitioners for a factual review, the Court -- despite the foregoing
invocations -- nonetheless looked over the records. It found no adequate basis for their claims.

First, the evidence did not show that petitioners had presented strong, complete, and conclusive proof
that the notarized Deed of Sale was false. Without that sort of evidence, the presumption of regularity,
the evidentiary weight conferred upon such public document with respect to its execution, as well as
the statements and the authenticity of the signatures thereon, stand.

Second, no evidence was presented to establish the fact that the Affidavit confirming the sale had been
forged. Forgery cannot be presumed. Whoever alleges it must prove it by clear and convincing evidence.

ABSENCE OF VESTED RIGHT IN THE RULES OF EVIDENCE

1. CARMEN AYALA DE ROXAS VS. EDWIN CASE

FACTS: Appellant Edwin Case filed a petition before the Land Registration for claim of a right of way
through a passage along the westerly side of the property of Carmen Ayala de Roxas which is bounded
on the north by the Escolta and on the east by the Estero de Sibacon. Case owns the two adjoining
properties lying in the rear of appellee’s premises, and being the dominant tenement, for the benefit of
which the easement is claimed. It also adjoins the rear of that to the west to which the only ingress
appears to have been at that time through this passageway. The claim of the appellant is not that the
right of way exists by necessity but simply that it arises by prescription, founded not on any written
instrument but on immemorial use alone. The appellant, however, here makes the additional point that
since the passage of the Code of Civil Procedure in these Islands, an immemorial prescription does not
call for the same proof as under the Spanish procedure. The third Partida, after stating the various
definite periods applicable to continuous servitudes, says that discontinuous servitudes have no fixed
periods, but must be proved by usage or a term so long that men cannot remember its commencement.

ISSUE: W/N the immemorial use or vested right over a servitude can be established by mere evidence
like the testimony of witnesses over 60 years of age who were acquainted with the servitude during
their lives and who also had heard it spoken of in the same way by their elders, as required under the
Spanish Code.

RULING: NO. The Court held that there is no vested right in a mere rule of evidence. (Aldeguervs.
Hoskyn, 2 Phil. Rep., 500) But the point would be whether this requirement of the Spanish law is not
substantive rather than evidential in its nature, so as to survive the repeal. If substantive, then the
appellant has failed to comply with it; if not substantive, but merely a matter of procedure, then it must
be taken to be replaced by the corresponding provisions of our new code. We find therein no equivalent
provision, other than subsection 11 of section 334, establishing as a disputable presumption ―that a
person is the owner of property from exercising acts of ownership over it or from common reputation of
his ownership. The use of the passage proved in this case cannot be held to constitute acts of ownership
for the reason that it is quite consistent with a mere license to pass, informal in its origin and revocable
in its nature. It seems, however, that under the clause quoted, common reputation of ownership of the
right of way was open to proof and on this theory of the case such testimony, if available, should have
been offered.

The Court is of the opinion that in order to establish a right or prescription something more is required
than the memory of living witnesses. Whether this something should be the declaration of persons long
dead, repeated by those who testify, as executed by the Spanish law, or should be the common
reputation of ownership recognized by the Code of Procedure, it is unnecessary for us to decide.

On either theory the appellant has failed in his proof and the judgment must be affirmed with the costs
of this instance.

HIERARCHY OF EVIDENCE

1. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS LARRY LAVAPIE and SANTOS SAN PASCUAL, SR, G.R. No. 130209.
March 14, 2001

FACTS: Larry Lavapie and Santos San Pascual, Sr., along with several other accused were charged with
the crime of murder of Sonny Sierva. All pleaded not guilty of the crime charges.

For the prosecution, eyewitness Domingo Samonte testified that on March 29, 1989, at around 11 p.m.,
he came from the dance hall in San Vicente with Rogelio Sierva and the victim Sonny Sierva. While on
their way, Rogelio and Sonny talked with some ladies, then, Rogelio went home ahead, and left
Domingo and Sonny behind. While approaching Rogelio’s house, Domingo and Sonny noticed a group of
people coming towards them. Domingo stepped backwards towards Sonny. Sonny focused the
flashlight, which he was holding, on accused-appellant Santos San Pascual, Sr. and accused-appellant
Larry Lavapie, who was then holding a bolo. Accused-appellant Santos San Pascual, Sr. suddenly held the
hands of Sonny behind his back, while accused-appellant Larry Lavapie hacked Sonny on the left side of
the neck. Domingo testified that Sonny was hit on the neck, the same witness pointing to the left side of
his neck. When Sonny fell on the ground, Domingo ran towards some pili trees. Then, Domingo saw two
(2) persons, a boy and a girl, who were following them and holding a torch which they used to lighten
the fallen body of Sonny. Domingo, however, was not able to recognize these two (2) persons. On cross-
examination, Domingo testified that when he witnessed the hacking incident, there were other persons
at the scene of the crime but he was not able to recognize them. Domingo further recounted that after
he saw the hacking incident, he ran towards the back of a pili tree and stayed there until dawn of the
following day. At dawn, he proceeded to his house in Buraburan. He did not report the incident to
anybody else but a certain friend and his wife. Domingo also admitted that when accused-appellant
Santos San Pascual, Sr. held the hands of Sonny behind the latters back, he did not tell Santos San
Pascual, Sr. to stop but just took a step backwards.

Jenny Cordial, a 15-year-old ward of Sonny Sierva’s aunt and Enrico Sierva 15-year-old cousin of the
victim, both testified that on March 29, 1989, at around 11 p.m., they came from a dance in San Vicente,
Buraburan and were on their way home when they came upon the body of Sonny Sierva lying on the
middle of the road. They recognized Sonny Sierva because Cordial was then holding a torch. Cordial and
Enrico Sierva came upon Sonny Sierva, who was lying prostrate on the road, with a hack wound on the
neck, and was almost beheaded. At that instance, both saw accused-appellant Larry Lavapie, who was
holding a bolo, standing at a distance of about five (5) to six (6) meters from the body of Sonny Sierva.
Aside from accused-appellant Larry Lavapie, they also saw other persons at the scene of the crime but
she was not able to recognize them. Thereafter, Cordial and Enrico Sierva ran away and went home to
inform the father of Sonny Sierva of what happened but they were told by his wife that Rogelio Sierva
was also hacked. Incidentally, while on cross-examination, when they saw accused-appellant Larry
Lavapie, he was holding a bolo which was pointed downwards. Cordial described the bolo held by
accused-appellant Larry Lavapie as shiny and sharp, and clear and clean.

Dr. Alicia M. Mercurio, Municipal Health Officer of Buhi II, Camarines Sur, conducted the autopsy on the
body of Sonny Sierva with the finding that there was an “Incised wound at the neck, right side cutting
the whole neck structure with a portion of the skin only on the left side holding it in place about 3 in.
long. Cause of Death Incised wound, neck (almost whole neck) with secondary hemorrhage (massive).”

In his defense, Lavapie testified that after they left the dance at 11:30pm they spent the night in the
barn of Santiago Sanorjo and went home to their respective houses the following day. While accused
Santos San Pascual, Sr., testified that he slept in his house at 7PM and woke up at 5AM.

The lower court found Larry Lavapie and Santos San Pascual, Sr., guilty of the crime of murder.

ISSUE:Whether or not physical evidence should be given greater credence over positive identification
and circumstantial evidence based on the testimonies of prosecution witnesses.

RULING:The foregoing testimony of Samonte is belied by the physical evidence that the deceased, Sonny
Sierva sustained an incised wound at the neck, right side cutting the whole neck structure with a portion
of the skin only on the left side holding it in place about 3 in. long. (Emphasis supplied.) While Samonte
categorically testified that Sonny Sierva was hacked on the neck, at the same time, Samonte
demonstrated by pointing to the left side of his neck; the autopsy report clearly revealed that Sonny
Sierva was hacked on the right side of his neck and not on the left side. This material inconsistency,
consequently, casts a serious doubt on the testimony of Samonte. As we have ruled in People vs.
Vasquez, since the physical evidence on record runs counter to the testimonial evidence of the
prosecution witnesses, conclusions as to physical evidence should prevail. It bears reiteration that
physical evidence is that mute but eloquent manifestations of truth which rate high in our hierarchy of
trustworthy evidence. In the light of the physical evidence obtained in this case, contrary to oral
assertions cannot normally prevail. Greater credence is given to physical evidence as evidence of the
highest order because it speaks more eloquently than a hundred witnesses.

WHEREFORE , for failure of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused-
appellants are guilty of the crime charged, the Decision dated December 16, 1996, of Branch 36 of the
Regional Trial Court of Iriga City in Criminal Case No. IR-2639 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The
accused-appellants are ACQUITTED.

2. GSIS v CA and Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA)

Melo, J.
Facts: GSIS issued a fire policy on the Virginia leaf tobacco owned by ACA stored in warehouse F of Phil.
Tobacco Flue-Curing and Redrying Corp in Novaliches worth P21.4 M. Another policy was issued again
for tobacco stored in the same facility valued at P2M. Fire occurred and burned the warehouse as well
as partially, the tobacco. Because it was an open policy, GSIS employed 3 adjusters and 2 tobacco
experts who recommended the amount of P12.5M after examining the records of ACA. ACA refused to
accept and GSIS made a final offer of P13.5 M. They accepted the same offer which allowed an action to
prove and claim the deficiency of 10M. ACA presented as evidence the testimonies of Dorotea Toledo,
Aurelio de Jesus, Demetrio Tabije, and Patrocinio Torres. CFI dismissed. CA Reversed. GSIS filed an MR
which was denied.

Issue: Whether or Not GSIS is liable for the deficiency

Ruling: The presentation of the testimony of ACA’s witnesses, Doroteo Toledo, Aurelio B. de Jesus,
Demetrio P. Tabije, and Patronicio Torres is nothing but a convoluted attempt of ACA to minimize and
neutralize the impact of GSIS’ evidence. Their testimony cannot prevail over the documentary evidence,
Exhibits QQ to QQ-2022 and Exhibits 134 to 368.Testimonial evidence is easy of fabrication and there is
very little room for choice between testimonial evidence and documentary evidence (Marvel Building
Corporation vs. David, 94 Phil. 376 [1954]). Generally, documentary evidence prevails over testimonial
evidence.

According to ACA’s own documentary evidence examined by GSIS’ adjusters and hired tobacco
experts, 15,669 hogshead of tobacco were withdrawn from the warehouse from 1955 to 1959.In
addition thereto, Exhibits 134 to 368, delivery orders dated August 13 to 16, 1959, indicate that there
were further withdrawals of 1,944 hogsheads from the warehouse during said period. 15,669 hogsheads
plus 1944additional hogsheads, gives us a total of 17,613, hogsheads of tobacco withdrawn from the
warehouse. Deducting17,613 hogsheads of tobacco from the total receipt of33,090 hogsheads of
tobacco gives a total of 15,457 tobacco hogsheads inside the warehouse at the time of the fire
onFebruary 15, 1962. The documentary evidence on record, therefore, clearly supports the position of
petitioner GSIS.

3. PEOPLE VS. BALLENO

FACTS: Accused- appellant Rodrigo Balleno was charged and found guilty of RAPE by the RTC of Pasay
against Jacquelyn Balandra, a 13year-old minor who is the daughter of his live-in partner. In his appeal,
appellant assails Jacquelyn's credibility as a witness by referring to the inconsistency between her
testimony and her sworn statement. In her statement before the police, Jacquelyn stated that there was
no insertion of the penis inside her vagina "Hindi ko naramdaman na naipasok niya kasi po sa may itaas
po ng pepe ko ito naramdaman. Sa loob ng labi ng ari ko." In open court, however, she testified that
appellant inserted his penis inside her vagina.

ISSUE: W/N this inconsistency would impair the credibility of Jacquelyn. If not, what evidence should
prevail between open court declarations and written affidavits

RULING: NO. Open court declarations shall prevail.

It has been held that some discrepancies between the affidavit and the testimony of the witness in open
court do not necessarily impair the credibility of her testimony, for affidavits are generally taken ex
parte and are often incomplete or even inaccurate for lack of searching inquiries by the investigating
officer. An affidavit is not a complete reproduction of what the declarant has in mind because it is
generally prepared by the administering officer and the affiant simply signs it after it has been read to
him. In any case, open court declarations take precedence over written affidavits in the hierarchy of
evidence. Unlike written statements, there is flexibility on the part of the questioner to adapt his
questions to elicit the desired answer in order to ferret out the truth.

In the case at bar, appellant has not shown any material discrepancy between the sworn statement and
testimony of the victim that would seriously taint her credibility and warrant a reversal of the trial courts
factual findings. Even assuming for the sake of argument, that there was no penile penetration of
private complainants vagina because her legs were not spread apart, it has been consistently ruled that
the mere touching of the labia of the woman consummates the crime of rape. Hence, the fact that no
laceration and no ruptured hymen were found in this case, does not necessarily negate rape. The fact
that the hymen was intact upon examination does not, likewise, belie rape, for a broken hymen is not an
essential element of rape, nor does the fact that the victim remained a virgin exclude the crime. In a
prosecution for rape, the material fact or circumstance to be considered is the occurrence of the rape,
which the prosecution in this case was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt. In any event, a medical
examination is not essential in the prosecution of a rape case. A medical examination and a medical
certificate are merely corroborative in character. They are not indispensable requirements for
conviction, for what matters greatly is the clear, unequivocal and credible testimony of the victim.

4. PEOPLE vs. RENE SANTIAGO

Del Castillo, J.:

FACTS: Appellant Rene Santiago was charged with 2 counts of rape for having carnal knowledge of AAA,
who was then an 11-yr old girl, against her will and consent. Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea
of not guilty. Appellant’s defense of denial and alibi was not given any credence by the trial court for
being self-serving and unsubstantiated and considering his positive identification by AAA. The RTC
rendered a Joint Decision convicting appellant of 2 counts of simple rape.

Appellant appealed to the CA, which affirmed in toto the trial court’s ruling.

ISSUE: WON the conviction was proper

RULING: YES.

Appellant argues that AAA did not resist his sexual advances; neither were they against her will.
Interestingly, by arguing in this manner, appellant changed the theory of his defense, i.e., from denial
and alibi to consensual intercourse, to his utter detriment.

As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals:

From a complete denial of the occurrence of the rape incidents when he testified before the trial court,
appellant now makes a sudden turn-around by admitting in the present appeal having had sexual
intercourse with AAA that were, however, consensual as the latter never resisted his advances. But he
offered no reason why AAA would consent to having sexual liaison with him. Albeit, a change in theory
merely accentuates the accused’s lack of credibility and candor. Changing the defense on appeal is an
indication of desperation on the part of the accused-appellant, due to the seeming inadequacy of his
defense adopted in the first instance.
Appellant next claims that the prosecution failed to establish that he intimidated or coerced AAA into
having sexual intercourse with him.

We are not persuaded.

Contrary to appellant’s contention, AAA testified that she was threatened, forced, and coerced into
sexual copulation. When AAA was placed on the witness stand, she categorically testified that during the
first rape incident, appellant threatened to hurt her if she would report the incident to anyone.As
regards the second rape incident, AAA declared that appellant consummated the dastardly act by
pointing an “ice pick” at her.Admittedly, these were not mentioned in AAA’s Sinumpaang Salaysay;
however, they did not diminish her credibility. As correctly held by the appellate court:

It is generally conceded that ex parte affidavits tend to be incomplete and inaccurate for lack of or
absence of searching inquiries by the investigating officer. It is not a complete reproduction of what the
declarant has in mind because it is generally prepared by the administering officer and the affiant simply
signs it after it has been read to him. Hence, whenever there is a variance between the statements in
the affidavit and those made in open court by the same witness, the latter generally [prevail]. Indeed, it
is doctrinal that open court declarations take precedence over written affidavits in the hierarchy of
evidence.

Moreover, during redirect examination, AAA explained that her fear of appellant lingered in her
consciousness and her young mind had yet to recover its bearings at the time she executed the
Sinumpaang Salaysay leading to the incomplete account she made therein. In any case, an errorless
recollection of a harrowing incident cannot be expected from a minor innocent rape victim, like AAA,
especially when she was recounting details of an experience so humiliating and so painful as forced
copulation. What is important is that the victimÊs declarations, both in her sworn statement and her
testimony in court, are consistent on basic matters constituting the elements of the crime of rape and
the positive identification of the culprit.