001 MUNSAYAC-DE VILLA v.
COURT OF APPEALS (APASAN)
October, 24, 2003 | Panganiban, J. | Intestate Proceedings
PETITIONER: Grace F. Munsayac-de Villa, et al.
RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals; Judge Antonio C. Reyes, Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 61; Nora F. Munsayac-
Visperas (Represented by her heirs); and Gelacio F. Munsayan Jr.
SUMMARY: An intestate proceeding was filed by three (Grace Munsayac-De
Villa, Lily Munsayac-Sunga, Roy Munsayac [DE VILLA et al.,]) of the five
children of the late spouses Gelacio and Vicenta Munsayac for letter of
administration nominating De Villa as administatrix of the intestate of their
parents. This was opposed by the two (2) other children of the late spouses
(Gelacio Munsayac and Nora Munsayac-Visperas). Furthermore, the siblings
failed to amicably settle despite the approved 60-day suspension of the
proceedings. Subsequently, DE VILLA et al., filed a request for inhibition
against Judge Reyes, who was the trial judge of the intestate proceeding. Barely
a week after the request for inhibition, DE VILLA et al., filed a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Court of Appeals which mainly
question the order of Judge Reyes directing DE VILLA et al., to produce several
documents and ordering their arrest due to failure to comply. The CA nullified
and set aside the said order of Judge Reyes (but did not order the inhibition).
Hence, this petition. Issue is whether or not the CA erred in not ordering the
inhibition of Judge Reyes. The SC held NO. At the outset, the SC took note of
the intestate case (main case) which was already decided with finality (since
there was already an extrajudicial partition) before the CA (take note that this
present case is the inhibition case which was only an offshoot of the intestate
case). Thus, the request for inhibition is already moot and academic since the
main case was already decided with finality. Consequently, the lifting of any
freeze order and the return of any property previously deposited with the court
should be effected. (See doctrine)
DOCTRINE: Once a case has been decided with finality, a petition for the
inhibition of the judge therefrom becomes moot and academic. The judge had
no more discretion to decide whether the amounts and the property deposited
should be released. Likewise, any standing order on any property in relation to
the special proceedings should be lifted. A tribunal acting as a probate court
exercises limited jurisdiction. However, the determination of whether a property
should be included in the inventory is within its probate jurisdiction. Such
determination is only provisional -- not conclusive -- in character and subject to
the final decision in a separate action that may be instituted by the parties.
FACTS:
1. The present controversy before the Supreme Court stems from Special
Proceeding Case No. 704-R, entitled In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of
the Late Gelacio Munsayac, Sr. and the Late Vicenta Munsayac and
pending before Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City.
2. The said special proceeding case was filed on November 17, 1998 by Grace
F. Munsayac-De Villa (DE VILLA), Lily F. Munsayac-Sunga (SUNGA)
and Roy Peter F. Munsayac (ROY) three (3) of the five (5) children of the
late Spouses GELACIO and VICENTA MUNSAYAC for letters of
administration nominating DE VILLA as administratrix of the intestate
estate of their parents.
3. DE VILLA’s nomination was opposed by the two (2) other children of the
late Munsayac Spouses, namely, Gelacio F. Munsayac, Jr. (MUNSAYAC,
JR.) and the late Nora F. Munsayac-Visperas (VISPERAS), who nominated
MUNSAYAC, JR. as administrator of the late Munsayac Couples intestate
estate.
4. MUNSAYAC, JR. was eventually appointed administrator pursuant to
Judge Reyes’ Order dated March 22, 2000, replacing Lawyer Ceasar G.
Oracion as special administrator of the said intestate estate, pursuant to the
Order dated April 27, 1998.
5. Despite the approved 60-day suspension of the proceedings to enable the
parties to discuss an amicable settlement, the siblings failed to arrive at
settlement of the intestate estate of the late Munsayac Couple.
6. REQUEST FOR INHIBITION: Even the efforts of DE VILLA et al to
inhibit Judge Reyes further complicated the intestate proceedings. Thus,
there was the Request for Inhibition which was filed by DE VILLA and
SUNGA.
7. PETITION FOR CERTIORARI: Barely a week after the aforesaid
Request for Inhibition was filed and before Judge Reyes could act on it, DE
VILLA et al filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
before the Court of Appeals on October 4, 1999, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
NO. 55193 which questions, among others, Judge Reyes’ Order in open
court dated September 29, 1999 directing/ordering DE VILLA to produce
by 2:00 p.m. in the afternoon of the same date certain bank time deposit
certificates/documents; and the order of arrest of DE VILLA by about 4:00
p.m. in the afternoon of the same date, for failure to produce the said bank
certificates/documents.
8. ADMINISTRATIVE CASE (not important): Pending the resolution of
CA-G.R. SP NO. 55193, DE VILLA et al filed an administrative case dated
July 11, 2000 before the Supreme Court, docketed as OCA IPI NO. 00-989-
RTJ, which not only prayed for Judge Reyes’ suspension and permanent
removal from office on grounds of grave misconduct and serious
inefficiency.
9. Acting on the Omnibus Motion dated April 24, 2000 which was filed by
MUNSAYAC JR., Judge Reyes issued the Order dated May 4, 2000, which
underscored the order to surrender, under pain of contempt, the following:
a. the amount of the bank investment discovered in the names of the
late VICENTA, DE VILLA and SUNGA made with the United
Coconut Planters Bank, Baguio City (UCPB) under Investment
Confirmation No. 0666 worth P13,506,343.33, and which amount
was not disclosed by the petitioners in the estate return tax; and
b. all the pieces of jewelry given by the late VICENTA to DE VILLA
and SUNGA, subject of the freeze order with the China Banking
Corporation.
10. The Court of Appeals substantially reiterated the import of the Order dated
May 4, 2000 (RATIO 9), by issuing the Order dated May 24, 2000 and, on
the account of DE VILLA et al’s failure to faithfully comply therewith,
issued the Order dated June 22, 2000, which contained the following
decretal portion:
a. WHEREFORE, for their failure to comply with the Order of this
Court dated May 24, 2000, the petitioners Grace de Villa, Lily
Sunga and Peter Roy Munsayac are hereby ordered ARRESTED in
accordance with Section 8, Rule 71, of the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure, until their compliance to immediately surrender in
custodia legis to this Court for the Special Administrator the
amount of P13,506,343.33 plus the legal interest of 12% per
annum compounded annually, from May 1995 until fully complied
with or a total amount of P23,802,788.00 more or less, as of May,
2000.
b. The petitioners Grace de Villa, Lily Sunga and Peter Roy
Munsayac are likewise ORDERED to surrender in custodia legis
to this Court for the Special Administrator the amount of
P15,298,835.95 and P3,010,822.02 plus the legal interest of 12%
per annum compounded annually, from May 1995 until fully
complied with or a total amount of P32,267,868.00, more or less,
as of May 2000, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Order.
11. CA RULING: The CA nullified the order issued by Judge Reyes ordering
the arrest of DE VILLA et al.
a. The CA ruled that the judge had summarily ordered the arrest of
DE VILLA et al., without any written charge filed against them or
any hearing conducted thereon.
b. With regard to the request for inhibition, the CA however held that
there was no convincing proof that the demeanor of the judge
warrants the granting of the said request. The CA further held that
the request for inhibition was unacceptable because DE VILLA et
al., did not come to the court with clean hands.
12. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
1. WoN the CA erred in not ordering the inhibition of Judge Reyes - No
because the instestate case (main case) was already decided with finality,
and therefore Judge Reyes must life the freeze order and cause the return of
the property or money still in custodia legis.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the prayer for the inhibition of Judge Antonio C. Reyes
is hereby DENIED for being moot and academic. However, he is DIRECTED to
immediately lift any order he made on properties relative to Special Proceedings No.
704-R. He is further ORDERED to cause the return of any amount or property
originally deposited by petitioners in custodia legis.
RATIO:
1. The SC emphasizes at the outset that the main case (intestate case) from which
this Petition arose has already been decided by the CA. The Decision is now fi-
nal and executory. Already terminated in that main case was Special Proceed-
ings No. 704-R, which had given rise to a number of incidents and petitions in-
cluding the herein matter. In CA-GR SP No. 64025 (this case was only men-
tioned on this part, but perhaps it was the intestate case which was appealed be-
fore the CA), the CA found that Judge Reyes had gravely abused his discretion
when he disallowed the Extrajudicial Partition executed by the heirs of the Mun-
sayac spouses.
2. DE VILLA et al., however, argue that since there are still matters pending be-
fore the trial judge, such as the withdrawal/release of money deposited
in custodia legis and the lifting of a freeze order on certain jewelry, his inhibi-
tion is still needed.
3. The SC disagrees. After the CA terminated Special Proceedings No. 704-R, the
Court sees no more reason why the inhibition of Judge Reyes should still be an
issue. The Petition (for inhibition) therefor has already become moot and
academic in view of the termination of the main case (intestate). How can he
be inhibited from a case that has already been decided with finality?
4. It should be clear that the CA Decision terminating Special Proceedings No.
704-R found that the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition executed by all the
parties was the final, complete and absolute settlement of their respective
shares and claims as heirs of deceased spouses Gelacio Munsayac, Sr. and
Vicenta Munsayac. As such, any and all incidents relating to the special
proceedings should also be deemed to have been terminated.
5. When Judge Reyes issued his Orders commanding the bank manager of the Chi-
na Bank branch in Baguio City to freeze the safety deposit box of DE VILLA et
al., and to deposit certain amounts in custodia legis, he did so as the presiding
judge in the probate court that was hearing Special Proceedings No. 704-R. Now
that the case has finally been terminated, it follows that neither he nor his
 court has any more right to hold the properties that were the subject of his
Orders in the special proceedings.
6. The lifting of any freeze order and the return of any property previously
deposited with the court should be effected. The judge had no more discre-
tion to decide whether the amounts and the property deposited
should be released. Likewise, any standing order on any property in rela-
tion to the special proceedings should be lifted. This ruling reiterates the
long-standing principle that a tribunal acting as a probate court exercises
limited jurisdiction. However, the determination of whether a property
should be included in the inventory is within its probate jurisdiction. Such
determination is only provisional -- not conclusive -- in character and sub-
ject to the final decision in a separate action that may be instituted by the
parties.
7. In a train of decisions, the SC has consistently enunciated this settled, corollary
principle: generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or owner-
ship, but it may do so if the interested parties are all heirs; or the question is one
of collation or advancement; or the parties consent to its assumption of jurisdic-
tion and the rights of third parties are not impaired. These principles, however,
have no more application in this case, since the main proceedings for the settle-
ment of the intestate estate of the deceased couple have already been decided
and terminated. Indeed, every litigation must come to an end.
8. To be sure, the SC is not tasked to look into the ownership of the properties de-
posited with or ordered frozen by the lower court during the progress of the spe-
cial proceedings. Neither can Judge Reyes do so now. Whether those properties
should have been adjudicated by the legal heirs of the Munsayac spouses is be-
side the point at this time. The former have already entered into an Extraju-
dicial Partition representing the final, complete and absolute settlement of
their shares as heirs of the latter. What is left to be done is simply the lifting
of any freeze order and the release of any property originally deposited by
petitioners in custodia legis.
 002 In KAW SINGCO (Arcenas) No. 48754, November 26, 1941, and Bernabe vs.Vergara, G.R. No. 48652,
June 30, 1943| Moran, J. | Jurisdiction September 16, 1942.
2. It is maintained that SC’s interpretation of Article VIII, section 2, No. 3, of the
Constitution, and section 138, No. 3, of the Revised Administrative Code, as
ADMINISTRATIX-APPELLEE: SY OA
enunciated in Reyes vs. Diaz, G.R. No. 48754 and Bernabe et al. vs. Vergara,
OPPOSITOR-APPELLANT: CO HO
G.R. No. 48652, is erroneous.
SUMMARY: CO HO is seeking reconsideration of the SC resolution holding an
ISSUE/s:
earlier case in favor of SY OA. CO HO contends that the issue at hand does not in-
1. W/N the term “jurisdiction” means jurisdiction over the subject-matter only –
volve jurisdiction over the subject matter but of venue, and hence, a question of fact
YES. A perusal of all the laws of jurisdiction in the Philippines — Act No. 136
because the question involves the residence of the decedent at the time of death
and its amendments; Philippine Constitution, Article VIII, sections 2 and 3; and
(Camarines Sur or Manila). CO HO maintains that the SC erroneously interpreted
Commonwealth Acts Nos. 3 and 259 — will readily show that the word "juris-
Article VIII, Section 2, No. 3 of the Constitution and Section 138 of the Revised
diction" as used in their different provisions is intended to have reference to the
Administrative Code as held in Reyes v. Diaz and Bernabe v. Vergara. The issue in
subject-matter only.
this case is whether or not the SC erroneously applied the interpretation of the term
“jurisdiction in the present case. The SC held in the negative and upheld the rulings
RULING: Motion for reconsideration is denied.
in Reyes and Bernabe. The term "jurisdiction" as used in the Constitution and in the
statutes, means jurisdiction over the subject-matter only, unless an exception is clear-
RATIO:
ly intended by reason of its employment in a breader sense. A perusal of all the laws
2. In Reyes vs. Diaz, the term "jurisdiction" as used in the Constitution and in the
of jurisdiction in the Philippines — Act No. 136 and its amendments; Philippine
statutes, means jurisdiction over the subject-matter only, unless an exception
Constitution, Article VIII, sections 2 and 3; and Commonwealth Acts Nos. 3 and 259
is clearly intended by reason of its employment in a breader sense.
— will readily show that the word "jurisdiction" as used in their different provisions
a. Because independently of the American laws and facts involved in the
is intended to have reference to the subject-matter only. Note, that in probate cases
American decision cited, such interpretation appears to be the clear in-
the place of residence of the deceased is regarded as a question of jurisdiction over
tent of our substantive laws.
the subject-matter, but it depends and SC can opt to decline to follow this view be-
3. A perusal of all the laws of jurisdiction in the Philippines — Act No. 136 and its
cause of its mischievous consequences. Note further that, the Law on Jurisdiction
amendments; Philippine Constitution, Article VIII, sections 2 and 3; and Com-
confers upon CFI jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of
monwealth Acts Nos. 3 and 259 — will readily show that the word "jurisdic-
residence of the deceased. Since, however, there are many courts of First Instance in
tion" as used in their different provisions is intended to have reference to
the Philippines, the Law of Procedure, Act No. 190, section 600, fixes the venue or
the subject-matter only.
the place where each case shall be brought. Thus, the place of residence of the de-
a. Ergo, it can be assumed that “jurisdiction” as used in clause 3 of the
ceased is not an element of jurisdiction of venue. And it is upon this ground that in
section 2 of Article VIII of the Constitution and in clause 3 of section
the new Rules of Court the province where the estate of a deceased person shall be
138 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Common-
settled is properly called "venue."
wealth Acts Nos. 3 and 259, is intended to refer to the same kind of ju-
risdiction, since there is nothing therein to show that it is employed in a
DOCTRINE: Jurisdiction of Supreme Court is one over subject matter since upon
broader sense
perusal of all the laws of jurisdiction in the Philippines, the word “jurisdiction” is
4. (See end of digest for provision) In Reyes, the question of jurisdiction referred to
intended to have reference to the subject matter only.
in clause 3 of Section 138 of the Revised Administrative Code, is one which
FACTS: calls for interpretation and application of the law of jurisdiction which distrib-
1. CO HO seeks the reconsideration of SC resolution which reads as follows: utes the judicial power among the different courts in the Philippines.
a. The issue involved in G.R. No. 43444 did not involve a jurisdiction over the a. CO HO maintains that if such issue of jurisdiction is merely question of
subject-matter but rather of venue which in turn hinges on a question of fact, i.e., law, then clause 3 would be a surplusage, for it would be covered by
whether the deceased, at the time of his death, was residing in Camarines Sur or clause 6 of the same provision which confers upon the Supreme Court
in the City of Manila, pursuant to the ruling laid down in Reyes vs. Diaz G.R. exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases in which only errors or
question of law are involved. SC held the same was a misapprehension.
5. Under clause 6, the SC may entertain appellate jurisdiction when absolutely no
question of fact are involved in the appeal. But under clause 3, there may be is-
sues of fact involved, but if aside from such issues the question of jurisdiction
over the subject matter is properly raised, the SC shall have appellate jurisdic-
tion, in exactly the same manner as under clause No. 1 where the Supreme Court
shall have the same appellate jurisdiction when the constitutionality or validity
of a law is raised regardless of any question of fact that there might be upon oth-
er issues.
6. SC is not unaware of existing decisions to the effect that in probate cases the
place of residence of the deceased is regarded as a question of jurisdiction
over the subject-matter. But SC declined to follow this view because of its
mischievous consequences.
a. For instance, a probate case has been submitted in good faith to a CFI
of a province whether the deceased had not resided.
b. All the parties, however, including all the creditors, have submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and the case is completely
finished except for a claim of a creditor who also voluntarily filed it
with said court but on appeal from an adverse decision raises for the
first time in this Court the question of jurisdiction of the trial court for
lack of the residence of the deceased in the province.
c. If we consider such question of residence as one affecting the jurisdic-
tion of the trial court over the subject-matter, the effect shall be that the
whole proceedings including all decisions on the different incidents
which have arisen in court will have to be annulled and the same case
will have to be commenced anew before another court of the same rank
in another province. That this ministration of justice is too obvious to
require comment.
7. Furthermore, section 600 of Act. No. 190, providing that the estate of a deceased
person shall be settled in the province whether he had last resided could not have
been intended as defining the jurisdiction of the probate court over the subject-
matter, because such legal provision is contained in law of procedure dealing
merely with procedural matters, and, as we have said time and again, procedure
is one thing and jurisdiction over the subject-matter is another.
8. The law of jurisdiction — Act No. 136, Section 56, No. 5 — confers upon CFI
jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of the
deceased. Since, however, there are many courts of First Instance in the Philip-
pines, the Law of Procedure, Act No. 190, section 600, fixes the venue or the
place where each case shall be brought. Thus, the place of residence of the de-
ceased is not an element of jurisdiction of venue. And it is upon this ground that
in the new Rules of Court the province where the estate of a deceased person
shall be settled is properly called "venue." (Rule 75, section 1.)
RELEVANT PROVISION:
Section 138 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth
Acts Nos. 3 and 259.
Sec. 138. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. — The Supreme Court shall have such
original jurisdiction as may be possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the
Philippines at the time of the approval of this Act, including cases affecting ambas-
sador, other public ministers, and consuls.
The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modi-
fy or affirm, on appeal certiorari or writ or error, as the law of rules of court may
provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior court as herein provided, in —
(1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, or-
dinance, or executive order or regulation as in question;
(2) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment or toll, or
any penalty imposed in relation thereto;
(3) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is issue:
(4) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is
death or life imprisonment, and those involving other offenses which, alt-
hough not so punished, arose out of the same occurrence or which may have
been committed by the accused on the same occasion, as the giving rise to
the more serious offense, regardless of whether the accused are charged as
principals, accomplices, or accessories, or whether they have been tried
jointly or separately.
(5) All civil cases in which the value in controversy exceeds fifty thousand
pesos, exclusive of interests and costs, or in which the title or possession of
real estate exceeding in value of sum of fifty thousand pesos to be ascer-
tained by the oath of a party to the cause or by other competent evidence, is
involved or brought in question. The Supreme Court shall likewise have ex-
clusive jurisdiction over all appeals in civil cases, even though the value in
controversy, exclusive of interests and costs, is fifty thousand pesos or less,
when the evidence involved in said cases is the same as the evidence sub-
mitted in an appealed civil case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Court as provided herein.
(6) All other cases in which only errors or questions of law are involved.
 Hon. Fernandez v. Maravilla (Linds)
Mar. 31, 1964 | Barrera, J. | Nature of Settlement of Estate
PETITIONER: Hon. Fernandez (judge of CFI), Asuncion Maravilla, et. al.
RESPONDENTS: Herminio Maravilla
SUMMARY: Herminio filed with the CFI a petition for the probate of the will
of his wife, Digna. The will declared him as the universal heir and executor. The
siblings of Digna opposed the probate on grounds, inter alia, that the will was
not signed on each page by the witnesses. On motion of Herminio, opposed by
the siblings, the court appointed him as the special administrator. The siblings
filed a petition for the appointment of one of the siblings’ son, Eliezar, as a
special co-administrator to protect their interests. Meanwhile, Herminio
appealed the order denying probate of the will. The siblings filed a petition for
the removal of Herminio as administrator as he failed to comply with the duty
of inventory and that he lacks qualifications. This was opposed by Herminio, as
he already filed the inventory before said petition. The trial court conducted
hearings with regard to the petitions, and resolved to appoint Eliezar as special
co-administrator. Herminio assailed said appointment through certiorari and
prohibition before the CA. In the CA, a sibling filed a petition to certify the
action to the SC since the Rule 65 petition is not in aid of the CA’s appellate
jurisdiction and hence it has no jurisdiction over it. The CA rendered a decision,
granting the writs of certiorari, and declaring the appointment of Eliezar null
and void.
The issue is whether the petition for certiorari and prohibition was in aid of the
CA’s appellate jurisdiction.
No. This Court has already held that even if the deceased had left no debts, upon
the dissolution of the marriage by the death of the husband or wife, the
community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated in the
testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. Under Section 2, Rule
75, of the Rules of Court, the property to be administered and liquidated in
testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse is, not only that part of
the conjugal estate pertaining to the deceased spouse, but the entire conjugal
estate. The theory1 on which the CA decision was anchored is erroneous.
1 the removal of respondent as special administrator, as he failed to file an
The CA assumed jurisdiction over the present case on the theory that "the amount in
controversy relative to the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator
to protect the interests of respondents (herein petitioners) is only P90,000.00 more or
less, i.e., one fourth of the conjugal property" (of respondent and the deceased Digna
Maravilla) which, is per inventory submitted by respondent as special administrator
is valued at P362,424.90.
As regards the question of appointment as a special administrator, the Rules of
Court does not contain any. the reason being, that the appointment of such
special administrator is merely temporary and subsists only until a regular
executor or administrator is duly appointed.
DOCTRINE: This Court has already held that even if the deceased had left no
debts, upon the dissolution of the marriage by the death of the husband or wife,
the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated in the
testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse.
The Rules of Court contain no provision on special co-administrator, the reason
being, that the appointment of such special administrator is merely temporary
and subsists only until a regular executor or administrator is duly appointed.
Thus, it would not only be unnecessary but also impractical
FACTS:
1. Herminio Maravilla filed with the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental a petition for probate of the will (Spec. Proc. No. 4977) of his
deceased wife Digna Maravilla who died on August 12 of that same year. In
the will the surviving spouse was named as the universal heir and executor.
2. Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla (brother and sisters of the deceased
Digna Maravilla) filed an opposition to the probate of the will, on the
ground, inter alia, that the will was not signed on each page by the testatrix
in the presence of the attesting witnesses and of one another.
3. On motion of respondent Herminio, which was opposed by Pedro,
Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, the court issued an order appointing him
special administrator of the estate of the deceased.
4. Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, filed with the court a petition for
appointment of Eliezar Lopez (son of Asuncion Maravilla) as special co-
administrator to protect their interests, on the ground that the will, having
been denied probate, they are the legal heirs of the decedent.
5. Herminio filed with the court his notice of appeal, appeal bond and record
on appeal, from the decision denying probate of the will. Some devisees
under the will, likewise, appealed from said decision.
6. Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, filed with the court a petition for
inventory within 3 months from his appointment and qualification as special
administrator, as provided for in Section 1, Rule 84, of the Rules of Court.
a. To this petition, respondent filed an opposition, on the ground that
said provision of the Rules of Court does not apply to a special
administrator, and an inventory had already been submitted by
 him, before said petition for his removal was filed.
7. The trial court heard the pending petitions and motions.
8. After said hearing, the court appointed Eliezar Lopez as special co-
administrator in an order dictated open court, to protect the interests of
Pedro, Asuncion and Regina Maravilla.
9. Herminio assailed the appointment through certiorari and prohibition with
TRO application. CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction.
10. Petitioners Regina Maravilla, et al. filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition to certify the case to the Supreme Court, on the grounds that the
principal amount in controversy in this case exceeds P200,000.00, and the
writs (of certiorari and prohibition) prayed for are not in aid of appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, since the probate case is not on appeal
before it.
a. Herminio filed an opposition. on the grounds that the amount in
controversy is less than P200,000.00 and the decision of the
probate court (of February 8, 1960) is now on appeal before the
Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R); hence, the writ prayed
for is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, and the present case does
not involve title to or possession of real estate exceeding in value
P200,000.00.
11. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the writs (certiorari and
prohibition) prayed for by Herminio, and declaring null and void the
appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator. MR was denied.
ISSUE/s:
1. Whether the petition for certiorari and prohibition was in aid of the Court of
Appeals’ appellate jurisdiction – No, that the Court of Appeals has no
appellate jurisdiction over said testate proceedings cannot be doubted,
considering that the properties therein involved are valued at P362,424,90,
as per inventory of the special administrator. The Court of Appeals, in the
decision appealed from, assumed jurisdiction over the present case on the
theory that "the amount in controversy relative to the appointment of Eliezar
Lopez as special co-administrator to protect the interests of respondents
(herein petitioners) is only P90,000.00 more or less, i.e., one fourth of the
conjugal property" (of respondent and the deceased Digna Maravilla)
which, is per inventory submitted by respondent as special administrator is
valued at P362,424.90.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals of May 16, 1961 is
set aside and another one entered also setting aside the order of the trial court of
March 5, 1960, appointing Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator. Without costs.
So ordered.
RATIO:
1. Under Section 2, Rule 75, of the Rules of Court, the property to be
administered and liquidated in testate or intestate proceedings of the
deceased spouse is, not only that part of the conjugal estate pertaining
to the deceased spouse, but the entire conjugal estate.
2. This Court has already held that even if the deceased had left no debts, upon
the dissolution of the marriage by the death of the husband or wife, the
community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated in
the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse.
3. In a number of cases where appeal was taken from an order of a probate
court disallowing a will, this Court, in effect, recognized that the amount
or value involved or in controversy therein is that of the entire estate.
4. Not having appellate jurisdiction over the proceedings in probate (CA-G.R.
No. 27478-R), considering that the amount involved therein is more than
P200,000.00, the Court of Appeals cannot also have original jurisdiction to
grant the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by respondent in the
instant case, which are merely incidental thereto.
5. In the United States, the rule is that "proceedings in probate are appealable
where the amount or value involved is reducible to a pecuniary standard, the
amount involved being either the appellant's interest or the value of the
entire estate according as the issues on appeal involve only the appellant's
rights or the entire administration of the estate. ... In a contest for
administration of an estate the amount or value of the assets of the estate is
the amount in controversy for purposes of appeal." (4 C.J.S. 204).
6. Note also that the present proceedings under review were for the annulment
of the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator and to
restrain the probate court from removing respondent as special
administrator. It is therefore, a contest for the administration of the estate
and, consequently, the amount or value of the assets of the whole estate is
the value in controversy. It appearing that the value of the estate in dispute
is much more than P200,000.00, the Court of Appeals clearly had no
original jurisdiction to issue the writs in question.
Respondent also contends that appeals in special proceedings, as distinguished
from ordinary civil cases, are within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals, since they are not enumerated in Section 17 of the Judiciary
Act, as amended.
7. Granting, arguendo, that a special proceeding is not a civil action, it has
never been decided that a special proceeding is not a "civil case". On
the other hand, it has been held that the term "civil case" includes
special proceedings. Moreover, Section 2, Rule 73, of the Rules of Court
provides that the rules on ordinary civil actions are applicable in special
proceedings where they are not inconsistent with, or when they may serve
to supplement the provisions relating to special proceedings. Consequently,
 the procedure of appeal is the same in civil actions as in special
proceedings.
8. The cases cited by respondent where this Court ruled that the separate total
claim of the parties and not the combined claims against each other
determine the appellate jurisdictional amount, are not applicable to, the
instant case, because Section 2, Rule 75 of the Rules of Court is explicit
that the amount or value involved or in controversy in probate
proceedings is that of the entire estate. Assuming, arguendo, that the rule
in the cases cited by respondent is here applicable, it should be noted that
respondent claims the whole estate of at least more than 3/4 thereof. Said
claim, reduced to a pecuniary standard, on the basis of the inventory, would
amount to more than P200,000.00 and, consequently, within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
9. While it is true that questions of fact have been raised in the probate
proceedings (Spec. Proc. No. 4977, CFI of Negros Occidental) which was
appealed by respondent to the Court of Appeals, it becomes immaterial, in
view of Sections 17 and 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended,
providing that the Supreme Court shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over "all cases in which the value in controversy exceeds two hundred
thousand pesos, exclusive of interests and costs", and that "all cases which
may be erroneously brought to the Supreme Court, or to the Court of
Appeals shall be sent to the proper court, which shall hear the same as if it
had originally been brought before it".
10. On the question of the appointment of petitioner Eliezar Lopez as special
administrator, we agree with respondent that there was no need for it. Note
that the Rules of Court contain no provision on special co-administrator, the
reason being, that the appointment of such special administrator is merely
temporary and subsists only until a regular executor or administrator is duly
appointed. Thus, it would not only be unnecessary but also impractical, if
for the temporary duration of the need for a special administrator, another
one is appointed aside from the husband, in this case, upon whom the duty
to liquidate the community property devolves merely to protect the interests
of petitioners who, in the event that the disputed will is allowed to probate,
would even have no right to participate in the proceedings at all.
 004 MATUTE v. CA (Buenaventura)
January 31, 1969| Castro, J. | Rule 72, Section 2
PETITIONER: Jose Matute
RESPONDENTS: CA and Matias Matute
SUMMARY:
Carlos S. Matute filed a petition praying for the removal of Matias S. Matute as
co-administrator and his (Carlos’) appointment in such capacity, alleging that
Matias has neglected to render a true, just and complete account of his
administration, and that he is not only incompetent but also negligent in his
management of the estate. Respondent Matias interposed an opposition to the
aforesaid petition.
The Court removed co-administrator, Matias S.Matute, as such co-administrator
of the estate and orders him to submit a final accounting of his administration
together with his past administration accounts which have not been approved.
Matias interposed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with
preliminary mandatory injunction praying that the aforesaid order be set aside as
a nullity for having decreed his removal without due process and the
appointment of Jose S. Matute without the requisite hearing.
The CA gave due course to the aforesaid petition and resolved to grant a writ of
preliminary injunction.
Jose S. Matute moved for the dismissal of the abovementioned petition on the
ground that the CA does not have jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same
since the value of the estate involved is more thanP200,000 and that the value of
the Amadeo Matute Olave estate for purposes of jurisdiction had already been
resolved where the CA refused to take jurisdiction over a petition
for certiorari contesting the appointment of Matias Matute as co-administrator.
ISSUES:
(1) the removal of the respondent as co-administrator of the Matute estate, and
(2) the appointment of the petitioner as the new co-administrator.
RULING:
The settled rule is that the removal of an administrator under section 2 of
Rule 82 lies within the discretion of the court appointing him. As aptly
expressed in one case, “The sufficiency of any ground for removal should thus
be determined by the said court, whose sensibilities are, in the first place,
affected by any act or omission on the part of the administrator not conformable
to or in disregard of the rules or the orders of the court.” Consequently,
appellate tribunals are disinclined to interfere with the action taken by a probate
court in the matter of the removal of an executor or administrator unless positive
error or gross abuse of discretion is shown.
In the case at bar, we are constrained, however to nullify the disputed order of
removal because it is indubitable that the probate judge ousted the respondent
from his trust without affording him the full benefit of a day in court, thus
denying him his cardinal right to due process.
Without forgetting such patent denial of due process, which rendered the order
of removal a nullity, let us examine the merits of the probate judge’s motu
propio findings to determine whether they warrant the ouster of the respondent.
Even granting arguendo that the removal of Matias is free from infirmity, this
Court is not prepared to sustain the validity of the appointment of the petitioner
in place of the former. To start with, the record does not disclose that any
hearing was conducted, much less that notices were sent to the other heirs and
interested parties, anent the petition for the appointment of Jose S. Matute,
among others, as co-administrator vice Matias S. Matute.
It is pertinent to observe that any hearing conducted by the probate court was
confined solely to the primary prayers of the separate petitions of Carlos S.
Matute, and the Candelario-Matute heirs seeking the ouster of Matias S. Matute.
The requirement of a hearing and the notification to all known heirs and other
interested parties as to the date thereof is essential to the validity of the
proceeding for the appointment of and administrator “in order that no person
may be deprived of his right or property without due process of law.” (Eusebio
vs. Valmores, 97 Phil. 163)
Moreover, a hearing is necessary in order to fully determine the suitability of
the applicant to the trust, by giving him the opportunity to prove his
qualifications and affording oppositors, if any, to contest the said application.
The provision of Rule 83 that if “there is no remaining executor or
administrator, administration may be granted to any suitable person,” cannot be
used to justify the institution of Jose S. Matute even without a hearing, because
such institution has no factual basis considering that there was a general
administrator (Carlos V. Matute) who remained in charge of the affairs of the
Matute estate after the removal of Matias S. Matute. The abovecited provision
evidently envisions a situation when after the removal of the incumbent
administrator no one is left to administer the estate, thus empowering the
probate court, as a matter of necessity, to name a temporary administrator (or
caretaker), pending the appointment of a new administrator after due hearing.
Such circumstance does not obtain in the case at bar.
Upon the foregoing disquisition, we hold that the respondent Court of Appeals
was without jurisdiction and that the controverted order is a nullity and must
therefore be set aside in its entirety.
DOCTRINE:
After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the
defendant without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is
not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and law
the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.
The application of the Rule in special proceedings, like the case at bar, is
authorized by section 2 of Rule 72 which direct that in the "absence of special
provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary civil actions shall be, as far as
practicable, applicable in special proceedings."

FACTS:
1. On August 20, 1965 Carlos S. Matute, the full-blood brother of Matias S.
Matute, filed in special proceeding 25876 (settlement of the Matute estate) a
petition praying for the removal of Matias as co-administrator and his
(Carlos') appointment in such capacity. Carlos alleged that "for a period of
more than two years from the date of his appointment (on May 29, 1963),
Matias S. Matute has neglected to render a true, just and complete account
of his administration," and that he "is not only incompetent but also
negligent in his management of the estate under his charge consisting of
five haciendas on account of a criminal charge for murder filed against him
which is occupying most of his time."1awphil.ñêt
2. Matias interposed an opposition to the petition, wherein he contended that
the allegation is completely without basis and false, because the records
show that under date of May 20,1964, he submitted to this Honorable Court
with copies furnished to all the parties concerned, including Carlos S.
Matute, his accounting for 1963, that on Feb. 8, 1965, he filed his
accounting for 1964, which accounts for 1963 and 1964 have been
approved by majority of the heirs composing of 63% interests in the estate.
That his competence to act as administrator has been established to the
satisfaction of this Honorable Court as evidenced by his appointment by
a fixed, final and executory order dated May 29, 1963; and Carlos S. Matute
is now estopped from denying his competence and qualification by reason
of his failure to object to the appointment of herein Judicial Administrator
at the time the application was made therefor; and that the "criminal charge"
is nothing but a trumped-up affair initiated by persons intent on intimidating
the herein Judicial Administrator into betraying his sworn duty to protect
and safeguard the interest of the Estate. The records of the said case will
also reveal that it has not occupied any time at all of the herein Judicial
Administrator, there was only a single hearing last December 1964 on his
application for bail
3. On September 21, 1965 the heirs of Matute moved for the immediate
appointment of Agustina Matute Candelario,Carlos S. Matute and Jose S.
Matute, herein petitioner, as joint co-administrators or anyone of them in
place of Matias S. Matute, whose removal they also sought together with
the ouster of the general administrator Carlos V. Matute, on the following
additional grounds:
1. Despite the vast resources and income of the estate, the present
administrators have failed to pay even the annual real property tax
for the years 1964 and 1965;
2. The financial statements of both administrators were not properly
signed and authenticated by a certified public accountant, and do
not contain the exact entries as filed by former administrators
containing the daily and monthly entries of receipts and
disbursements;
4. Both administrators have deliberately failed to file their inventories and
statements of accounts of time, and did so only when ordered by the probate
court;
5. Both administrators have made unauthorized disbursements as shown by
their financial statements; and
6. The probate court has discretion to remove the administrator.
7. It appears that during the reception of evidence conducted on December 29,
1965 by the probate court , Carlos S. Matute and the Candelario-Matute
heirs submitted respective lists of exhibits in support of their motion to oust
Matias. On January 8, 1966 Matias filed a written objection to the
admission of the movants' exhibits on the ground that the same were
hearsay, self-serving, irrelevant and/or mere photostatic copies of supposed
originals which were never properly identified nor shown in court. Four
days later, the counsel for Matias filed with leave of court a "Motion to
Dismiss and/or Demurrer to Evidence" which avers that "there is no
sufficient evidence on record to justify and support the motions for the
removal of the herein co-administrator Matias S. Matute." In the same
motion, said counsel reserved the right to introduce evidence in behalf of
his client should the motion be denied.
8. On January 31, 1966 the probate court issued an order removing co-
administrator, Matias S.Matute and orders him to submit a final accounting
of his administration and, in his stead appoints Jose S. Matute
9. Matias then interposed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari with preliminary mandatory injunction (CA-G.R. 37039-R)
dated February 1, 1966, praying that the aforesaid order of January 31, 1966
be set aside as a nullity for having decreed his removal without due process
and the appointment of Jose S. Matute without the requisite hearing.
10. CA gave due course to the petition and granted a writ of preliminary
injunction against Jose S. Matute and the Honorable Judge Emigdio Nietes.
Jose S. Matute moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the
CA does not have jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same since the
value of the estate involved is more thanP200,000. He further contended
that the value of the Amadeo Matute Olave estate for purposes of
jurisdiction had already been resolved in CA-G.R. 35124-R where the Court
of Appeals refused to take jurisdiction over a petition
for certiorari contesting the appointment of Matias Matute as co-
administrator, on the groundthat the value of the Matute estate was placed at
P2,132,282.72 as evidenced by a "Compromise Agreement" dated April 12,
1956 which was duly signed by all of the heirs.
 11. Matias Matute does not controvert the petitioner's claim that the value of the
estate of their deceased father exceeds P200,000. He maintains, however,
that the respondent Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over CA-G.R.37039-R
"because the subject matter involved is merely ... the right to collect the
(monthly) rentals due the Estate in the sum of P5,000.00" pursuant to a
contract of lease which he executed in favor of one Mariano Nasser
covering five haciendas of the estate under his separate administration.
12. The foregoing assertion does not merit credence. A searching review of the
record reveals no single pleading, statement, contention, reference or even
inference which would justify the respondent's pretension that the instant
controversy is a mere contest over the right to collect a P5,000 rental. The
dispute pertains to the right to co-administer in general, not the mere
authority to collect a P5,000 monthly rental.
ISSUES:
1. WoN the CA has jurisdiction over the case. – NO, since the value of the
said estate is more thanP200,000, and the total value of the subject estate
determines the jurisdictional amount anent disputes over administration
arising as incidents in a probate or settlement proceeding
2. WoN the removal of Matias as co-administrator of the Matute estate, and
the appointment of Jose as the new co-administrator is proper. – NO, the
probate judge ousted Matias from his trust without affording him the full
benefit of a day in court, thus denying him his cardinal right to due process.
RULING: Upon the foregoing disquisition, we hold that the respondent Court of
Appeals was without jurisdiction over CA-G.R. 37039-R, and that the controverted
order of January 31, 1966 is a nullity and must therefore be set aside in its entirety.
RATIO:
As to the jurisdiction of the CA
1. In this regard, the ruling in Fernandez, et al. vs. Maravilla is determinative
of the jurisdictional issue posed here. In said case, this Court ruled that in a
contest for the administration of an estate, the amount in controversy is
deemed to be the value of the whole estate, which total value should be the
proper basis of the jurisdictional amount. Consequently the Court proceeded
to conclude that the Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari and preliminary injunction prayed for in a petition
concerning a conflict over administration arising as an incident in the main
probate or settlement proceeding if in the first place the principal case or
proceeding falls outside its appelate jurisdiction considering the total value
of the subject estate.
2. Considering that the value of the said estate is more thanP200,000, and
considering further that as enunciated in the Maravilla case the total value
of the subject estate determines the jurisdictional amount anent disputes
over administration arising as incidents in a probate or settlement
proceeding, like the case at bar, then it is indubitable that the respondent
Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction over CA-G.R. 37039-R nor the
judicial authority to grant the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for
therein.
3. Since the respondent Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction over CA-
G.R. 37039-R, we are of the considered opinion that this Court can forestall
further delay in the already protracted proceedings regarding the settlement
of the Matute estate if it now proceeds to resolve the issue of legality of the
abovementioned disputed order, rather than wait for the parties to come
anew on a separate petition in quest for a verdict on the said issue.
Moreover, both the petitioner and the respondent private party have
manifested and elaborated their respective views on this issue and prayed
and pressed for a decision thereon.
As to (1) the removal of the respondent as co-administrator of the Matute
estate, and (2) the appointment of the petitioner as the new co-administrator.
1. Matias contends that the disputed order removing him as co-administrator is
a patent nullity for the following reasons: (1)He was removed in wanton
disregard of due process of law because the probate judge arbitrarily
deprived him of his day in court; (2) The evidence adduced by the movants
is manifestly insufficient, if not devoid of probative value, to warrant his
removal; and (3) He was removed not on the grounds specifically invoked
by the movants but for causes discovered motu propio by the probate judge
in the records of special proceeding 25876 and without affording him the
opportunity to rebut the findings of the said judge.
2. On the other hand, Jose advances the following reasons in support of the
order of removal: (1)The probate judge accorded the respondent all the
opportunity to adduce his evidence but the latter resorted to dilatory tactics
such as filing a "motion to dismiss or demurrer to evidence"; (2) The
evidences presented to sustain the removal of the respondent are
incontrovertible since aside from being documentary, they are parts of the
record of special proceeding 25876; and (3) The evidence on record
conclusively supports the findings of the probate judge.
3. The settled rule is that the removal of an administrator under section 2 of
Rule 82 lies within the discretion of the court appointing him. As aptly
expressed in one case, "The sufficiency of any ground for removal should
thus be determined by the said court, whose sensibilities are, in the first
place, affected by any act or omission on the part of the administrator not
conformable to or in disregard of the rules or the orders of the court."
Consequently, appellate tribunals are disinclined to interfere with the action
taken by a probate court in the matter of the removal of an executor or
administrator unless positive error or gross abuse of discretion is shown.
4. In the case at bar, we are constrained, however to nullify the disputed order
of removal because it is indubitable that the probate judge ousted the
respondent from his trust without affording him the full benefit of a
day in court, thus denying him his cardinal right to due process.
5. It appears that shortly after the reception of evidence for the movants Carlos
Matute and the Candelario-Matute heirs, Jose filed a verified objection to
the admission in evidence of the movants' exhibits on the ground that the
same were hearsay, self-serving, irrelevant and/or mere photostatic copies
of supposed originals which were never properly identified nor produced in
court.
6. Instead of resolving the foregoing motion, the probate judge issued the
controverted order removing the respondent as co-administrator without
giving him the opportunity to adduce his own evidence despite his explicit
reservation that he be afforded the chance to introduce evidence in his
behalf in the event of denial of his motion to dismiss and/or demurrer to
evidence. The acts of the probate judge constituted grave abuse of
discretion which dooms his improvident order as a nullity. In fact, even
without the respondent's reservation, it was the bounden duty of the probate
judge to schedule the presentation and reception of the respondent's
evidence before disposing of the case on the merits because only the
movants at that time had presented their evidence. This duty is projected
into bolder relief if we consider, which we must, that the aforesaid motion is
in form as well as in substance a demurrer to evidence allowed by Rule 35,
by virtue of which the defendant does not lose his right to offer evidence in
the event that his motion is denied. Said Rule states:
(1) After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence,
the defendant without waiving his right to offer evidence in the
event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the
ground that upon the facts and law the plaintiff has shown no right
to relief. (emphasis supplied)
7. The application of the abovecited Rule in special proceedings, like the case
at bar, is authorized by section 2 of Rule 72 which direct that in the
"absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary civil
actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings."
8. But what is patently censurable is the actuation of the probate judge in
removing the respondent, not on the strength of the evidence adduced by the
movants, but on the basis of his (judge's) findings, which he motu
propio gleaned from the records of special proceeding 25876, without
affording the respondent an opportunity to controvert said findings or in the
very least to explain why he should not be removed on the basis thereof.
9. The probate judge did find, as essayed in his disputed order, that the
respondent "has shown indifference to his duties as such co-administrator of
the estate" as evidenced by; (1) the disapproval of his 1964 account by the
probate court in an order dated January 5, 1966 due to his "non-appearance
and non-submission of evidence to sustain his account on the date set for
the presentation of the same;" (2) the considerable decrease in the income of
the properties under his charge, as reflected in said 1964 account, which
circumstance "does not speak well of his diligence and attention to the
administration of said properties;" and (3) the failure of said 1964 account
to disclose the number of calves born during the accounting period,
"thereby indicating a palpable omission of fact which directly reduced the
value of the income or the increase of the assets of the estate."
10. But, significantly, the movants did not specifically invoke the aforesaid
grounds in support of their petition to oust the respondent. All of the said
grounds, which in the mind of the probate judge exposed the supposed
indifference and incompetence of the respondent in the discharge of his
trust, are based on alleged defects of the respondent's 1964 account. Under
these circumstances, it behooved the probate judge to inform the respondent
of his findings before ordering the latter's removal. We concede that the
probate judge enjoys a wide latitude of discretion in the matter of the
removal of executors and administrators and he can cause their ouster at his
own instance. However, before they are deprived of their office they must
be given the full benefit of a day in court, an opportunity not accorded to
the respondent herein.
11. Without forgetting such patent denial of due process, which rendered the
order of removal a nullity, let us examine the merits of the probate judge's
motu propio findings to determine whether they warrant the ouster of the
respondent.
12. As proof of the respondent's "indifference" in the discharge of his duties,
the probate judge cited the court's order of January 5, 1966 disapproving the
respondent's 1964 account for his failure to personally appear on the date
set for the submission of evidence in support of the said account. It must be
emphasized, however, that the respondent, two days before the issuance of
the aforesaid order removing him as co-administrator, seasonably moved
for the reconsideration of the afore cited order of January 5, 1966 on the
ground that his failure to personally attend the scheduled hearing was due to
illness on his part. Evidently, when the probate court decreed the removal of
the respondent, the order disapproving his 1964 account, which was used as
one of the principal justifications for his removal as co-admininistrator,
was not yet final as it was still subject to possible reconsideration.
13. With the order of January 5, 1966 thus revoked, the probate judge's
conclusion that the respondent was "indifferent" to his duties as co-
administrator as evidenced by the disapproval of his 1964 account loses its
principal basis.
14. Again using the 1964 account of the respondent as basis of his finding that
the respondent was guilty of disinterest in the discharge of his trust, the
probate judge stressed that "a verification of said accounting shows the
income of the properties under his (respondent's) charge were very much
 reduced which does not speak well of his diligence and attention to the
administration of the said properties," and that said account failed to report
the number of "offspring of the cattle during the period of accounting
belonging to the estate, thereby indicating a palpable omission of fact which
directly reduced the value of the income or increase of the assets of the
estate." It is pertinent to emphasize here that the said 1964 account is still
pending approval, hence it was premature to use alleged defects in said
account as grounds for the removal of the respondent. If it is now ruled that
the respondent is unfit to continue as co-administrator because of the
alleged infirmities in his account for 1964, the respondent will be greatly
prejudiced in the event that said account is finally approved and the said
defects are found to be nonexistent or so trivial as not to affect the general
validity and veracity of the account. Assuming, however, that the probate
judge correctly observed that the said account reflects a big reduction in the
income of the haciendas under the separate administration of the
respondent, this fact alone does not justify the conclusion that the latter did
not exercise due care and zeal. There is no proof that the decrease in income
had been caused by the respondent's willful negligence or dishonesty.
Needless to stress, varied factors, some beyond the control of an
administrator, may cause the diminution of an estate's income.
15. Anent the failure to report the number of calves born during the accounting
period, granting that the same is true, there is however no evidence on
record to prove that the said omission was deliberate or designed to
prejudice the estate.
16. In his excursion into the records of special proceeding 25876, the probate
judge also found a copy of a so-called "Compliance" submitted by the
respondent which reported "a very staggering amount of over One Million
Pesos supposedly given to the heirs" as advances. The probate judge
proceeded to observe that the "record does not show that the said advances
to the heirs were authorized by the Court in the amounts made to appear in
the 'Compliance.'" He added that a "verification of the record will show that
may be part of this amount supposedly paid by the co-administrator to the
heirs were authorized by the Court but a greater volume of the same was
obviously not authorized." On account of this particular finding, the probate
court concluded, without equivocation, that the respondent had been acting
without previous authority from the probate court. Unfortunately again, the
respondent was not afforded the opportunity to present his side and if
possible to controvert the said finding or correct the impressions of the
judge. Hearing the respondent on this point is imperative because, like the
other grounds upon which the probate judge anchored the order of removal,
it was not put in issue by the movants, neither was a copy of said
"Compliance" submitted in evidence. It bears emphasis that it there were
unauthorized payments of advances to some heirs or simulated grants as the
probate judge appears to theorize, then it is most surprising why the
prejudiced Matute heirs, litigation-proned as they are, did not impugn the
so-called "Compliance." Furthermore, not one of the movants interested in
the removal of the respondent specifically charged the latter with
unauthorized or fictitious payments of advances. It should also be noted that
the said "Compliance" was submitted by the respondent in response to the
probate court's order for the submission of "a list of the heirs who have
personally received the advances from the administration," not from the
respondent alone. It stands to reason, therefore, that the said "Compliance"
could very well be a cumulative list of all the advances given and received
by the Matute heirs from the several administrators of the Matute estate
since 1955. In the absence of concrete evidence that the said "staggering
amount" of over a million pesos advances was disbursed by the respondent
alone during his beleaguered term which commenced only in 1963, we have
no recourse but to jettison the adverse conclusion of the probate judge.
What the probate judge should have done was to afford Matias the chance
to explain and substantiate the facts and the figures appearing in the
aforesaid "Compliance," which unfortunately does not form part of the
record before us. The respondent asserts that if only the probate judge "took
pains to examine fully the voluminous records of the Matute estate, and as
reflected in the very 'Compliance' submitted to the Court ... any
disbursement given to the heirs by all the administrators of the Estate were
by virtue of the several Orders of the Probate Court issued upon joint
motion of all the heirs for their monthly maintenance and support."
17. It likewise appears that the respondent was removed partly due to his failure
to pay the inheritance and estate taxes. In this regard, it bears emphasis that
the failure to pay the taxes due from the estate is per se not a compelling
reason for the removal of an administrator, for "it may be true that the
respondent administrator failed to pay all the taxes due from the estate, but
said failure may be due to lack of funds, and not to a willful omission." In
the case at bar there is no evidence that the non-payment of taxes was
willful.
18. We now come to the second part of the controverted order — the
appointment of the petitioner as co-administrator vice the respondent. Since
the removal of Matias was done with inordinate haste and without due
process, aside from the fact that the grounds upon which he was removed
have no evidentiary justification, the same is void, and, consequently, there
is no vacancy to which the petitioner could be appointed.
19. Even granting arguendo that the removal of Matias is free from infirmity,
this Court is not prepared to sustain the validity of the appointment of the
petitioner in place of the former. To start with, the record does not disclose
that any hearing was conducted, much less that notices were sent to the
other heirs and interested parties, anent the petition for the appointment of
Jose S. Matute, among others, as co-administrator vice Matias S. Matute. In
this regard, it is pertinent to observe that any hearing conducted by the
 probate court was confined solely to the primary prayers of the separate
petitions of Carlos S. Matute, and the Candelario-Matute heirs seeking the
ouster of Matias S. Matute. The corollary prayers contained in the same
petitions for the appointment of Carlos S. Matute, Jose S. Matute and
Agustina Matute Candelario or anyone of them as co-administrator were
never even considered at any of the hearings. The requirement of a hearing
and the notification to all known heirs and other interested parties as to the
date thereof is essential to the validity of the proceeding for the appointment
of and administrator "in order that no person may be deprived of his right or
property without due process of law." (Eusebio vs. Valmores, 97 Phil. 163)
Moreover, a hearing is necessary in order to fully determine the suitability
of the applicant to the trust, by giving him the opportunity to prove his
qualifications and affording oppositors, if any, to contest the said
application.
20. The provision of Rule 83 that if "there is no remaining executor or
administrator, administration may be granted to any suitable person," cannot
be used to justify the institution of Jose S. Matute even without a hearing,
because such institution has no factual basis considering that there was a
general administrator (Carlos V. Matute) who remained in charge of the
affairs of the Matute estate after the removal of Matias S. Matute. The
abovecited provision evidently envisions a situation when after the removal
of the incumbent administrator no one is left to administer the estate, thus
empowering the probate court, as a matter of necessity, to name a
temporary administrator (or caretaker), pending the appointment of a new
administrator after due hearing. Such circumstance does not obtain in the
case at bar.
 05 Sheker v. Estate of Sheker (CELAJE)
G.R. No. 157912 | December 13, 2007 | Austria-Martinez, J. | Section 2, Rule 72
PETITIONER: Alan Joseph A. Sheker
RESPONDENTS: Estate of Alice O. Sheker, Victoria S. Medina-
Administratrix
SUMMARY: The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O.
Sheker and thereafter issued an order for all the creditors to file their respective
claims against the estate. Petitioner Alan filed a contingent money claim, but it
was dismissed on the grounds of failure to pay docket fee, failure to attach
certification against forum-shopping and to attach written explanation.
Petitioner Alan then filed a petition for review challenging the grounds for
dismissal, as well as claiming that rules in ordinary actions are applicable to
special proceedings only in a suppletory manner.
W/N rules in ordinary actions are applicable to special proceedings only in a
suppletory manner. NO, because Section 2, Rule 72, states: In the absence of
special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as
practicable, applicable in special proceedings.
The word “practicable” is defined as: possible to practice or perform; capable
of being put into practice, done or accomplished. This means that in the absence
of special provisions, rules in ordinary actions may be applied in special
proceedings as much as possible and where doing so would not pose an obstacle
to said proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it categorically say that
rules in ordinary actions are inapplicable or merely suppletory to special
proceedings. Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a certification of non-
forum shopping for complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written explanation
for non-personal service and filing, and the payment of filing fees for money
claims against an estate would not in any way obstruct probate proceedings,
thus, they are applicable to special proceedings such as the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person as in the present case.
DOCTRINE: Rules on ordinary civil actions are not just suppletory to special
proceedings. Rules on ordinary civil actions apply to special proceedings when
such rules do not pose an obstacle to the particular special proceeding.
FACTS:
1. The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and
thereafter issued an order for all the creditors to file their respective claims
against the estate.
2. In compliance therewith, petitioner Alan filed on October 7, 2002 a
contingent claim for agent's commission due him amounting to
approximately P206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land
belonging to the estate, and the amount of P275,000.00, as reimbursement
for expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by petitioner Alan in the course
of negotiating the sale of said realties.
3. The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent Victoria) moved
for the dismissal of said money claim against the estate on the grounds that
(1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner Alan failed to attach a
certification against non-forum shopping; and (3) petitioner Alan failed to
attach a written explanation why the money claim was not filed and served
personally.
4. On January 15, 2003, the RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing without
prejudice the money claim based on the grounds advanced by respondent
Victoria. MR denied.
5. Petitioner Alan then filed the present petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner Alan maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a
probate proceeding the rules requiring a certification of non-forum
shopping, a written explanation for non-personal filing, and the payment of
docket fees upon filing of the claim.
6. Petitioner Alan insists that Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court
provides that rules in ordinary actions are applicable to special proceedings
only in a suppletory manner.
ISSUES:
1. W/N rules in ordinary actions are applicable to special proceedings only in a
suppletory manner. NO, because Section 2, Rule 72 states the rules
provided for in ordinary actions shall, as far as practicable, apply in
special proceedings. Suppletorily and "as far as practicable" are NOT
synonymous terms. Rules for ordinary civil actions apply to special
proceedings when such rules would not pose an obstacle to the special
proceeding.
2. W/N the RTC erred in dismissing petitioner's contingent money claim
against respondent estate for failure of petitioner to attach to his motion a
certification against non-forum shopping? YES, because a certification
against non-forum shopping is only required in complaints and other
initiatory pleadings and a contingent money claim against an estate is NOT
a complaint nor an initiatory pleading.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional
Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 dated January 15, 2003 and April 9, 2003,
respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Iligan
City, Branch 6, is hereby DIRECTED to give due course and take appropriate action
on petitioner's money claim in accordance with Rule 82 of the Rules of Court.
RATIO:
1. The petition is imbued with merit.
2. However, it must be emphasized that petitioner's contention that rules in
ordinary actions are only supplementary to rules in special proceedings is
not entirely correct.
3. Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides:
a. Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In the absence of special
provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable,
applicable in special proceedings.
4. Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of Court
govern special proceedings; but in the absence of special provisions, the
rules provided for in Part I of the Rules governing ordinary civil actions
shall be applicable to special proceedings, as far as practicable.
5. The word “practicable” is defined as: possible to practice or perform;
capable of being put into practice, done or accomplished.
6. This means that in the absence of special provisions, rules in ordinary
actions may be applied in special proceedings as much as possible and
where doing so would not pose an obstacle to said proceedings.
7. Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it categorically say that rules in
ordinary actions are inapplicable or merely suppletory to special
proceedings.
8. Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a certification of non-forum
shopping for complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written explanation
for non-personal service and filing, and the payment of filing fees for
money claims against an estate would not in any way obstruct probate
proceedings, thus, they are applicable to special proceedings such as the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person as in the present case.
9. As for the other issue…. the certification of non-forum shopping
is required only for complaints and other initiatory pleadings.
10. The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent money claim against the estate of
a decedent is an initiatory pleading. In the present case, the whole probate
proceeding was initiated upon the filing of the petition for allowance of
the decedent's will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court,
after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all persons having
money claims against the decedent are mandated to file or notify the court
and the estate administrator of their respective money claims; otherwise,
they would be barred, subject to certain exceptions.[5]
11. Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a
motion for creditors' claims to be recognized and taken into consideration in
the proper disposition of the properties of the estate. In Arquiza v. Court of
Appeals, the Court explained thus:
a. x x x The office of a motion is not to initiate new litigation, but to bring a
material but incidental matter arising in the progress of the case in which the
motion is filed.
12. A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the
settlement of the decedent's estate; more so if the claim is contingent since
the claimant cannot even institute a separate action for a mere contingent
claim. Hence, herein petitioner's contingent money claim, not being an
initiatory pleading, does not require a certification against non-forum
shopping.
13. On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of Appeals,[8] that the trial court
has jurisdiction to act on a money claim (attorney's fees) against an estate for services rendered
by a lawyer to the administratrix to assist her in fulfilling her duties to the estate even without
payment of separate docket fees because the filing fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, or the trial court may order the payment
of such filing fees within a reasonable time. After all, the trial court had already assumed
jurisdiction over the action for settlement of the estate. Clearly, therefore, non-payment of
filing fees for a money claim against the estate is not one of the grounds for dismissing a
money claim against the estate.
14. With regard to the requirement of a written explanation… In the present case, petitioner holds
office in Salcedo Village, Makati City, while counsel for respondent and the RTC which
rendered the assailed orders are both in Iligan City. The lower court should have taken judicial
notice of the great distance between said cities and realized that it is indeed not practicable to
serve and file the money claim personally. Thus, following Medina v. Court of Appeals, the
failure of petitioner to submit a written explanation why service has not been done personally,
may be considered as superfluous and the RTC should have exercised its discretion under
Section 11, Rule 13, not to dismiss the money claim of petitioner, in the interest of substantial
justice.
15. The ruling spirit of the probate law is the speedy settlement of estates of deceased persons for
the benefit of creditors and those entitled to residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the
debts and expenses of administration have been paid.[13] The ultimate purpose for the rule on
money claims was further explained in Union Bank of the Phil. v. Santibañez, thus:
a. The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is
mandatory. As we held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:
b. x x x This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the
deceased by informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it,
thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper
one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy
 settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the
distributees, legatees, or heirs. The law strictly requires the prompt presentation
and disposition of the claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle the
affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.
16. The RTC should have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural rule on the requirement of
a written explanation for non-personal service, again in the interest of substantial justice.
 ROBERTS v. LEONIDAS (CRUZ)
April 27, 1984 | Aquino, J. | General Principles
PETITIONER: Ethel Grimm Roberts
RESPONDENTS: Judge Tomas R. Leonidas, Branch 38, Court of First
Instance of Manila; Maxine Tate-Grimm, Edward Miller Grimm II and Linda
Grimm
SUMMARY: The decedent Grimm’s children from his 1st divorced marriage
and the children and wife from his 2nd marriage. Ethel, Grimm’s daughter from
his 1st marriage initiated in the CFI of Manila Branch 20 an intestate proceeding.
Afterward, the Grimm’s 2nd wife, petitioned for reprobate of the wills which
were already admitted into probate in Tooele County, Utah. Ethel sought the
testate proceeding be dismissed, or. alternatively that the two proceedings be
consolidated and heard in Branch 20 and that the matter of the annulment of the
Utah compromise agreement be heard prior to the petition for probate. The issue
in the case is WoN a petition for allowance of wills and to annul a partition,
approved in an intestate proceeding by Branch 20 of the Manila Court of First
Instance, can be entertained by its Branch 38 (after a probate in the Utah district
court). The SC decided in the negative. The judge did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion
to dismiss. A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with
two wills and "no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
proved and allowed." The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that
the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate
proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate
proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue
hearing the two cases.
DOCTRINE: no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
proved and allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).
As a general rule, testate proceedings take precedence over intestate
proceedings over the same estate.
FACTS:
1. Edward M. Grimm an American resident of Manila, died at 78 in the
Makati Medical Center on November 27, 1977. He was survived by:
a. Maxine Tate Grimm (2nd wife)and their two children, named
Edward Miller Grimm II (Pete) and Linda Grimm and
b. Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts (McFadden), his
two children by a first marriage which ended in divorce
2. He executed on January 23, 1959 two wills in San Francisco, California.
a. 1st will disposed of his Philippine estate which he described as
conjugal property of himself and his second wife.
b. 2nd win disposed of his estate outside the Philippines.
3. In both wills, the second wife and two children were favored. The two chil-
dren of the first marriage were given their legitimes in the will disposing of
the estate situated in this country. In the will dealing with his property out-
side this country, the testator said:
a. I purposely have made no provision in this will for my daughter,
Juanita Grimm Morris, or my daughter, Elsa Grimm McFadden
(Ethel Grimm Roberts), because I have provided for each of them
in a separate will disposing of my Philippine property.
4. The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate by Maxine Tate
Grimm and E. LaVar Tate on March 7, 1978 in Tooele County, Utah. Chil-
dren from the 1st marriage were notified of the probate proceeding.
5. Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate petition filed in
Manila by Ethel in January, 1978.
6. In its order dated April 10, 1978, the Third Judicial District Court admit-
ted to probate the two wills and the codicil It was issued upon consideration
of the stipulation dated April 4, 1978 "by and between the attorneys for
Maxine Tate Grimm, Linda Grimm, Edward Miller Grimm II, E. LaVar
Tate, Juanita Kegley Grimm (first wife), Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel
Grimm Roberts"
7. Two weeks later, or on April 25, 1978, Maxine and her two children Linda
and Pete, as the first parties, and Ethel, Juanita Grimm Morris and their
mother Juanita Kegley Grimm as the second parties, with knowledge of the
intestate proceeding in Manila, entered into a compromise agreement in
Utah regarding the estate.
8. It was stipulated that:
a. Maxine, Pete and Ethel would be designated as personal represent-
atives (administrators) of Grimm's Philippine estate (par. 2).
b. Maxine's one-half conjugal share in the estate should be reserved
for her and that would not be less than $1,500,000 plus the homes
in Utah and Santa Mesa, Manila (par. 4).
c. The agreement indicated the computation of the "net distributable
estate". It recognized that the estate was liable to pay the fees of
the Angara law firm (par. 5).
d. The decedent's four children "shall share equally in the Net Dis-
tributable Estate" and that Ethel and Juanita Morris should each re-
ceive at least 12-1/2% of the total of the net distributable estate and
marital share (par 6).
Intestate proceeding No. 113024.-
1. 43 days after Grimm's death, or January 9, 1978, his daughter of the first
marriage, Ethel, 49, filed with Branch 20 of the Manila Court of First In-
 stance intestate proceeding No. 113024 for the settlement of his estate. She
was named special administratrix.
2. On March 11, the second wife, Maxine, filed an opposition and motion to
dismiss the intestate proceeding on the ground of the pendency of Utah of a
proceeding for the probate of Grimm's will. She also moved that she be ap-
pointed special administratrix, She submitted to the court a copy of Grimm's
will disposing of his Philippine estate.
3. The intestate court in its orders of May 23 and June 2 noted that Maxine,
testate case withdrew that opposition and motion to dismiss and, at the be-
hest of Maxine, Ethel and Pete, appointed them joint administrators. Appar-
ently, this was done pursuant to the aforementioned Utah compromise
agreement. The court ignored the will already found in the record.
4. The three administrators submitted an inventory.
a. With the authority and approval of the court, they sold the Palawan
Pearl Project, a business owned by the deceased. Linda and Juanita
allegedly conformed with the sale. It turned out that the buyer,
Makiling Management Co., Inc., was incorporated by Ethel and
her husband, Rex Roberts, and by lawyer Limqueco.
b. Also with the court's approval and the consent of Linda and
Juanita, they sold 193,267 shares of RFM Corporation.
5. Acting on the declaration of heirs and project of partition Judge Conrado M.
Molina in his order of July 27, 1979 adjudicated to Maxine onehalf (4/8) of
the decedent's Philippine estate and one-eighth (1/8) each to his four chil-
dren or 12-1/2%. No mention at all was made of the will in that order.
6. Ethel submitted to the court a certification of the Assistant Commissioner of
Internal Revenue dated October 2, 1979. It was stated therein that Maxine
paid estate tax and penalties and that he interposed no objection to the trans-
fer of the estate to Grimm's heirs. The court noted the certification as in
conformity with its order of July 27, 1979.
7. After November, 1979 or for a period of more than five months, there was
no movement or activity in the intestate case. On April 18, 1980 Juanita
Grimm Morris, through Ethel's lawyers, filed a motion for accounting "so
that the Estate properties can be partitioned among the heirs and the present
intestate estate be closed." Del Callar, Maxine's lawyer was notified of that
motion.
Petition to annul partition and testate proceeding No. 134559.
8. On September 8, 1980, the parties from the 2nd marriage, filed in Branch 38
of the lower court a petition praying for the probate of Grimm's two wills
(already probated in Utah), that the 1979 partition approved by the intestate
court be set aside and the letters of administration revoked, that Maxine be
appointed executrix and that Ethel and Juanita Morris be ordered to account
for the properties received by them and to return the same to Maxine.
9. Grimm's second wife and two children alleged that they were defraud due to
the machinations of the Roberts spouses, that the 1978 Utah compromise
agreement was illegal, that the intestate proceeding is void because Grimm
died testate and that the partition was contrary to the decedent's wills.
10. Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Judge Leonidas denied it for
lack of merit in his order of October 27, 1980.
11. Ethel then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in this Court, pray-
ing that the testate proceeding be dismissed, or. alternatively that the two
proceedings be consolidated and heard in Branch 20 and that the matter of
the annulment of the Utah compromise agreement be heard prior to the peti-
tion for probate.
ISSUE/s:
1. WoN a petition for allowance of wills and to annul a partition, approved in
an intestate proceeding by Branch 20 of the Manila Court of First Instance,
can be entertained by its Branch 38 (after a probate in the Utah district
court). – NO, a testate proceeding is proper in this case and the probate of
the will is mandatory
RULING: WHEREFORE the petition is dismissed. The temporary restraining order
is dissolved. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
1. The judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack
of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion to dismiss.
a. A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died
with two wills and "no will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code;
sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).
b. The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate
of a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate
proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated
with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate
proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.
c. Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this
judgment an opposition and answer to the petition unless she
considers her motion to dismiss and other pleadings sufficient for
the purpose. Juanita G. Morris, who appeared in the intestate case,
should be served with copies of orders, notices and other papers in
the testate case.
 007 Uriate v. CFI (Daguman)
May 29,1970 | Dizon, J. | Jurisdiction and Venue
PETITIONER: Vicente Uriate
RESPONDENTS: CFI of Negros, CFI of Manila, Juan Zamacona and
FACTS:
Higinio Uriate
SUMMARY: Juan Uriate died in Spain and left reasonable properties in
the Philippines, particularly, in Negros Occidental and in Manila. Vicente
Uriate claims to be the son and sole heir of Juan, thereafter, he filed a
petition for intestate settlement of the estate of the deceased in the CFI of
Negros.
Private Respondents, Higinio Uriate et.al. who claims to be the nephews
of Juan opposed the said petition alleging that there is a valid will left by
the deceased in Spain and a copy of which is being requested. They filed
for a settlement of the estate in the CFI of Manila, on the basis of the
alleged will of the deceased.
Vicente filed an opposition to the settlement of estate in the CFI of
Manila stating that the Court of Negros had already acquired original
jurisdiction of the case. The opposition of Vicente was dismissed
together with the intestate proceedings in the CFI of Negros. Hence,
Vicente filed a petition for certiorari questioning the dismissal of the
intestate settlement in the CFI of Negros.ISSUE:WoN the intestate
settlement should be dismissed? YES. The SC held that the dismissal of
the intestate proceeding is proper. Under the Rules on the settlement of
estate, testate proceedings enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.
Therefore, if intestate settlement was filed prior to the finding of the will
of the deceased, then it shall be dismissed to give priority to testate
proceedings.
DOCTRINE: jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance over "all mat-
ters of probate" is beyond question, the matter of
venue, or the particular Court of First Instance where the special
proceeding should be commenced, is regulated by
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides
that the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien,
shall be in the court of first instance in the province
in which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabit-
ant of a foreign country, the court of first instance of
any province in which he had estate
1. Don Juan Uriarte y Goite died. Vicente Uriarte filed with the CFI of
Negros Occidental a petition for the settlement of the estate of the
late Don Juan (Special Proceeding No. 6344) alleging that, as a natu-
ral son of the latter, he was his sole heir, and that, during the lifetime
of said decedent, Vicente had instituted a civil case in the same Court
for his compulsory acknowledgment as such natural son.
2. Higinio Uriarte, nephew of the deceased, filed an opposition to the
3. petition alleging that Don Juan had executed a Will in Spain. He fur-
ther questioned Vicente's capacity and interest to commence the in-
testate proceeding.
4. Juan Uriarte Zamacona, the other private respondent, com-
menced Special Proceeding No. 51396 in the CFI of Manila for the
probate of a document alleged to be the last will of the deceased
5. Juan Uriarte y Goite, and on the same date he filed in Special Pro-
ceeding No. 6344 of the Negros Court a motion to dismiss the same
on the following grounds: (1) that, as the deceased Juan Uriarte y
Goite had left a last will, there was no legal basis to proceed with
said intestate proceedings, and (2) that Vicente Uriarte had no legal
personality and interest to initiate said intestate proceedings, he not
being an acknowledged natural son of the decedent.
6. Vicente Uriarte opposed the aforesaid motion to dismiss contending
that, as the Negros Court was first to take cognizance of the settle-
ment of the estate of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, it had ac-
quired exclusive jurisdiction over same pursuant to Rule 75, Section
1 of the Rules of Court. The Negros Court sustained Juan Uriarte
Zamacona's motion to dismiss and dismissed the Special Proceeding
No. 6344 pending before it.
7. Vicente Uriarte filed an Omnibus Motion in Special Proceeding No.
51396 pending in the Manila Court, asking for leave to intervene
therein; for the dismissal of the petition and the annulment of the
proceedings had in said special proceeding. This motion was denied
by said court.
8.
ISSUE/s:
1. Whether or not the Negros Court erred in dismissing Special Proceeding
No. 6344? No. It has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intes-
tate proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found it that
the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the of the
latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that stage an
administrator had already been appointed, the latter being required to
render final account and turn over the estate in his posses-
sion to the executor subsequently appointed.
2. Whether the Manila Court erred in not dismissing Special Proceeding
No. 51396 notwithstanding prior filing of Special Proceeding No. 6344
in the Negros Court? No. Wrong venue is merely a waiveable procedural
defect, and, in the light of the circumstances obtaining in the instant
case, Vicente Uriarte has waived the right to raise such objection or is
precluded from doing so by laches.
RULING: Judgment in question is affirmed.
RATIO:
Issue 1:
3. While the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance over "all matters
of probate" is beyond question, the matter of venue, or the particu-
lar Court of First Instance where the special proceeding should be
commenced, is regulated by Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules
of Court, which provides that the estate of a decedent inhabitant of
the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien,
shall be in the court of first instance in the province in which he re-
sided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the court of first instance of any province in which he had
estate. Accordingly, when the estate to be settled is that of a nonresident
alien (like the deceased) the Courts of First Instance in provinces where
the deceased left any property have concurrent jurisdiction to take cog-
nizance of the proper special proceeding for the settlement of his estate.
In the case before Us, these Courts of First Instance are the Ne-
gros and the Manila Courts - province and city where the
deceased left considerable properties.
4. In accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate
proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take
precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose.
5. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate pro-
ceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found it that the de-
cedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the of the latter
should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that stage an adminis-
trator had already been appointed, the latter being required to render fi-
nal account and turn over the estate in his possession to the
executor subsequently appointed.
6. This, however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the
alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall con-
tinue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear indication
that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate
proceedings
Issue 2:
1. Wrong venue is merely a waiveable procedural defect, and, in
the light of the circumstances obtaining in the instant case, Vi-
cente Uriarte has waived the right to raise such objection or is
precluded from doing so by laches.
2. Vicente Uriarte knew of the existence of a will executed by
Don Juan since 1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition to
the initial petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344; Vicente Uri-
arte likewise was served with notice of the existence (presence) of
the alleged last will in the Philippines and of the filing of the petition
for its probate with the Manila Court since 1962 when Juan Uriarte
Zamacona filed a motion for the dismissal of Special Proceeding No.
6344.
3. All these notwithstanding, it was only in1963 that he filed with the
Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 an Omnibus motion
asking for leave to intervene and for the dismissal and annulment of
all the proceedings had therein up to that date.
4. To allow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the pro-
bate of the will by the Manila Court and the validity of all the pro-
ceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396 would put a premium
on his negligence. This Court is not inclined to annul proceedings
regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper
venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceed-
ings repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction; more so in a
case like the present where the objection against said proceedings is
raise too late.
5. Vicente Uriarte is entitled to prosecute Civil Case No. 6142 un-
til it is finally determined, or intervene in Special Proceeding
No. 51396 of the Manila Court, if it is still open, or to ask for its reo-
pening if it has already been closed, so as to be able to submit for
determination the question of his acknowledgment as natural
child of the deceased testator, said court having, in its capacity as
a probate court, jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the de-
ceased testator and whether or not a particular party is or should be
declared his acknowledged natural child.
 CUENCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Eleazar) ance and instead, defer to the second court which has before it the petition for
October 26, 1973 | Teehankee, J. | Jurisdiction and Venue probate of the decedent’s alleged last will.

PETITIONERS: ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO, DOCTRINE: If in the course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of
RESPONDENTS: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD first instance it is found that the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the
DIVISION, MANUEL CUENCO, LOURDES CUENCO, CONCEPCION probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings
CUENCO MANGUERRA, CARMEN CUENCO, CONSUELO CUENCO
REYES, and TERESITA CUENCO GONZALEZ The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested
SUMMARY: Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case,
by his widow and two minor sons, residing in Quezon City, and children of the or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record
first marriage, residing in Cebu. Lourdes, one of the children from the first mar-
riage, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the Court of First In-
FACTS:
stance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that the senator died intestate in Manila but a resi-
1. Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died at the Manila Doctors' Hospital,
dent of Cebu with properties in Cebu and Quezon City. The petition still pending
Manila. He was survived by his widow, Rosa Cuenco, herein petitioner, and
with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife (widow), filed a petition
their two (2) minor sons, Mariano Jesus, Jr. and Jesus Salvador, both
with CFI Rizal (Quezon City) for the probate of the last will and testament,
surnamed Cuenco, all residing at 69 Margal St., Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon
where she was named executrix. Rosa also filed an opposition and motion to
City, and by his children of the first marriage, respondents herein, namely,
dismiss in CFI Cebu but the said court held in abeyance resolution over the op-
Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes Cuenco, Concepcion Cuenco Manguera, Carmen
position until CFI Quezon City shall have acted on the probate proceedings. CFI
Cuenco, Consuelo Cuenco Reyes and Teresita Cuenco Gonzales, all of legal
Cebu, in effect deferred to the probate proceedings in the Quezon City court.
age and residing in Cebu.
Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon City, on
2. On 5 March 1964, (the 9th day after the death of the late Senator)
ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu
respondent Lourdes Cuenco filed a Petition for Letters of Administration
already acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The opposition and motion
with the court of first instance of Cebu (Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R), alleging
to dismiss were denied. Lourdes filed special civil action of certiorari and prohi-
among other things, that the late senator died intestate in Manila on 25
bition with preliminary injunction with respondent CA. CA favored Lourdes
February 1964; that he was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death; and
holding that CFI Cebu had first acquired jurisdiction. The issue in this case is
that he left real and personal properties in Cebu and Quezon City.
W/N CFI Quezon City acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion in
3. On the same date, the Cebu court issued an order setting the petition for
taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceed-
hearing on 10 April 1964, directing that due notice be given to all the heirs
ings in pursuance to CFI Cebu's order expressly consenting in deference to the
and interested persons, and ordering the requisite publication thereof at LA
precedence of probate over intestate proceedings. The SC said no. Under the
PRENSA, a newspaper of general circulation in the City and Province of
facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without jurisdiction or with
Cebu.
grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of the intestate peti-
4. The aforesaid order, however, was later suspended and cancelled and a new
tion and deferring to the Quezon City court. Necessarily, neither could the Que-
and modified one released on 13 March 1964, in view of the fact that the
zon City court be deemed to have acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance
petition was to be heard at Branch II instead of Branch I of the said Cebu
of and acting on the probate petition since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu
court. On the same date, a third order was further issued stating that
court must first take cognizance over the estate of the decedent and must exer-
respondent Lourdes Cuenco's petition for the appointment of a special
cise jurisdiction to exclude all other courts, which the Cebu court declined to do.
administrator dated 4 March 1964 was not yet ready for the consideration of
Furthermore, as is undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule of venue and the
the said court, giving as reasons the following:
Quezon City court undisputably had at least equal and coordinate jurisdiction
a. It will be premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet
over the estate. Conversely, such court, may, upon learning that a petition for
regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this proceeding, the requisite
probate of a will has been filed where the decedent resided with his widow and
publication of the notice of hearing not yet having been complied
children, decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition in abey-
with.
 b. Moreover, copies of the petition have not been served on all of the
heirs specified in the basic petition for the issuance of letters of
administration.
5. In the meantime, or specifically on 12 March 1964, (a week after the filing
of the Cebu petition) herein petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed a
petition with the court of first instance of Rizal (Quezon City) for the
probate of the deceased's last will and testament and for the issuance of
letters testamentary in her favor, as the surviving widow and executrix in
the said last will and testament. The said proceeding was docketed as
Special Proceeding No. Q-7898.
6. Having learned of the intestate proceeding in the Cebu court, petitioner
Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed in said Cebu court an Opposition and Motion
to Dismiss, dated 30 March 1964, as well as an Opposition to Petition for
Appointment of Special Administrator, dated 8 April 1964.
7. On 10 April 1964, the Cebu court issued an order holding in abeyance its
resolution on petitioner's motion to dismiss "until after the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City shall have acted on the petition for probate of that
document purporting to be the last will and testament of the deceased Don
Mariano Jesus Cuenco."
8. Such order of the Cebu court deferring to the probate proceedings in the
Quezon City court was neither excepted to nor sought by respondents to be
reconsidered or set aside by the Cebu court nor did they challenge the same
by certiorari or prohibition proceedings in the appellate courts.
9. Instead, respondents filed in the Quezon City court an Opposition and
Motion to Dismiss, dated 10 April 1964, opposing probate of the will and
assailing the jurisdiction of the said Quezon City court to entertain
petitioner's petition for probate and for appointment as executrix in Sp.
Proc. No. Q-7898 in view of the alleged exclusive jurisdiction vested by her
petition in the Cebu court in Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R. Said respondent prayed
that Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and/or
improper venue.
10. In its order of 11 April 1964, the Quezon City court denied the motion to
dismiss, giving as a principal reason the "precedence of probate proceeding
over an intestate proceeding." The said court further found in said order that
the residence of the late senator at the time of his death was at No. 69 Pi y
Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City.
11. Respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion for reconsideration of the Quezon
City court's said order of 11 April 1964 asserting its exclusive jurisdiction
over the probate proceeding as deferred to by the Cebu court was denied on
27 April 1964 and a second motion for reconsideration dated 20 May 1964
was likewise denied.
12. As per the order issued by it subsequently on 15 May 1964, the Quezon
City court noted that respondents-oppositors had opposed probate under
their opposition and motion to dismiss on the following grounds:
a. (a) That the will was not executed and attested as required by law;
b. (b) That the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and
influence on the part of the beneficiary or some other persons for
his benefit;
c. (c) That the testator's signature was procured by fraud and/or that
the testator acted by mistake and did not intend that the instrument
he signed should be his will at the time he affixed his signature
thereto.
13. The Quezon City court further noted that the requisite publication of the
notice of the hearing had been duly complied with and that all the heirs had
been duly notified of the hearing, and after receiving the testimony of the
three instrumental witnesses to the decedent's last will.
14. Instead of appealing from the Quezon City court's said order admitting the
will to probate and naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof,
respondents filed a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction with respondent Court of Appeals (docketed as case
CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) to bar the Rizal court from proceeding with case
No. Q-7898.
15. On 21 November 1964, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of
respondents (petitioners therein) and against the herein petitioner, Rosa
Cuenco, holding that:
a. Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue in proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person, covers both testate
and intestate proceedings.
b. Sp. Proc. 2433-R of the Cebu CFI having been filed ahead, it is
that court whose jurisdiction was first invoked and which first
attached.
c. It is that court which can properly and exclusively pass upon the
factual issues of (1) whether the decedent left or did not leave a
valid will, and (2) whether or not the decedent was a resident of
Cebu at the time of his death.
d. Considering therefore that the first proceeding was instituted in the
Cebu CFI (Special Proceeding 2433-R), it follows that the said
court must exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the Rizal CFI,
in which the petition for probate was filed by the respondent Rosa
Cayetano Cuenco (Special Proceeding Q-7898). The said
respondent should assert her rights within the framework of the
proceeding in the Cebu CFI, instead of invoking the jurisdiction of
another court.
ISSUE/s
W/N the appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the
Quezon City court ordering it to refrain perpetually from proceeding with the testate
proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its
admission to probate of the decedent's last will and testament and appointing
petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond in compliance with the testator's
express wish in his testament – YES, CA erred, because such lower court, may, upon
learning that a petition for probate of a will has been filed where the decedent resided
with his widow and children, decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the
petition in abeyance and instead, defer to the second court which has before it the
petition for probate of the decedent’s alleged last will.
RULING: ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the appealed
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals and the petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction originally filed by respondents with the
Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) is ordered dismissed. No costs.
RATIO:
1. The Judiciary Act concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all Courts
of First Instance over "all matter of probate, both of testate and intestate
estates." On the other hand, Rule 73, section of the Rules of Court lays
down the rule of venue, as the very caption of the Rule indicates, and in
order to prevent conflict among the different courts which otherwise may
properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that "the
court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." The cited
Rule provides:
a. Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent
is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether
a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance in the Province in which he resides at the time of his
death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of
First Instance of the province in which he had estate. The court
first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence, of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not
be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that
court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears
on the record. (Rule 73)
2. It is equally conceded that the residence of the deceased or the location of
his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely
of venue.
3. It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the court with
whom the estate or intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive
jurisdiction.
4. The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that "the court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."
5. A fair reading of the Rule — since it deals with venue and comity between
courts of equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction — indicates that the court with
whom the petition is first filed, must also first take cognizance of the
settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the
exclusion of all other courts.
6. Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the
decedent's last will has been presented in another court where the decedent
obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow
and their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition
before it stating that the decedent died intestate may be actually false, may
decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it in
abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which has before it the
petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last will.
7. This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner-widow's filing with it
a motion to dismiss Lourdes' intestate petition, it issued its order holding in
abeyance its action on the dismissal motion and deferred to the Quezon City
court, awaiting its action on the petition for probate before that court.
8. Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take
cognizance of the intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon City court.
9. Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted
without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and acting on the probate
petition since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must first take
cognizance over the estate of the decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to
exclude all other courts, which the Cebu court declined to do. Furthermore,
as is undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon
City court indisputably had at least equal and coordinate jurisdiction over
the estate.
10. Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition
before it and assumed jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and
deference of the Cebu court, the Quezon City court should be left now, by
the same rule of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts.
11. Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to the Quezon
City court their opposition to probate of the will, but failed to appear at the
scheduled hearing despite due notice, the Quezon City court cannot be
declared, as the appellate court did, to have acted without jurisdiction in
admitting to probate the decedent's will and appointing petitioner-widow as
executrix thereof in accordance with the testator's testamentary disposition.
12. The relatively recent case of Uriarte vs. Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental with facts analogous to the present case is authority against
respondent appellate court's questioned decision.
13. In said case, the Court upheld the doctrine of precedence of probate
proceedings over intestate proceedings in this wise:
a. It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the
distribution of the estate of a deceased person, whether in
accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance
with his will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the
settlement of his estate. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in
the course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of first
instance it is found that the decedent had left a last will,
proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the intestate
proceedings even if at that state an administrator had already been
appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn
over the estate in his possession to the executor subsequently
appointed.
b. This however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the
alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall
continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear
indication that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority
over intestate proceedings.
14. The Court likewise therein upheld the jurisdiction of the second court, (in
this case, the Quezon City court) although opining that certain
considerations therein "would seem to support the view that [therein
respondent] should have submitted said will for probate to the Negros
Court, [in this case, the Cebu court] either in a separate special proceeding
or in an appropriate motion for said purpose filed in the already pending
Special Proceeding No. 6344," thus:
a. But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for
probate to the Negros Court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed the
petition for the purpose with the Manila Court. We can not accept
petitioner's contention in this regard that the latter court had no
jurisdiction to consider said petition, albeit we say that it was not
the proper venue therefor.
15. Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City court's assumption of
jurisdiction over the decedent's estate on the basis of the will duly presented
for probate by petitioner-widow and finding that Quezon City was the first
choice of residence of the decedent, who had his conjugal home and
domicile therein — with the deference in comity duly given by the Cebu
court — could not be contested except by appeal from said court in the
original case. The last paragraph of said Rule expressly provides:
a. ... The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the
place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate,
shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal
from that court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73)
16. The exception therein given, viz, "when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record" could probably be properly invoked, had such
deference in comity of the Cebu court to the Quezon City court not
appeared in the record, or had the record otherwise shown that the Cebu
court had taken cognizance of the petition before it and assumed
jurisdiction.
17. Further, in the case at bar, the Cebu court declined to take cognizance of the
intestate petition first filed with it and deferred to the testate proceedings
filed with the Quezon City court and in effect asked the Quezon City court
to determine the residence of the decedent and whether he did leave a last
will and testament upon which would depend the proper venue of the estate
proceedings, Cebu or Quezon City. The Quezon City court having thus
determined in effect for both courts — at the behest and with the deference
and consent of the Cebu court — that Quezon City was the actual residence
of the decedent who died testate and therefore the proper venue
18. With more reason should the Quezon City proceedings be upheld when it is
taken into consideration that Rule 76, section 2 requires that the petition for
allowance of a will must show: "(a) the jurisdictional facts." Such
"jurisdictional facts" in probate proceedings, as held by the Court in
Fernando vs. Crisostomo" are the death of the decedent, his residence at the
time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he
is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left his estate in such
province."
19. This tallies with the established legal concept as restated by Moran that
"(T)he probate of a will is a proceeding in rem. The notice by publication
as a pre-requisite to the allowance of a will, is a constructive notice to the
whole world, and when probate is granted, the judgment of the court is
binding upon everybody, even against the State. The probate of a will by a
court having jurisdiction thereof is conclusive as to its due execution and
validity."
20. The Court therefore holds under the facts of record that the Cebu court did
not act without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in declining
to take cognizance of the intestate petition and instead deferring to the
testate proceedings filed just a week later by petitioner as surviving widow
and designated executrix of the decedent's last will, since the record before
it (the petitioner's opposition and motion to dismiss) showed the falsity
of the allegation in the intestate petition that the decedent had died
without a will.
21. It is noteworthy that respondents never challenged by certiorari or
prohibition proceedings the Cebu court's order of 10 April 1964 deferring to
the probate proceedings before the Quezon City court, thus leaving the
latter free (pursuant to the Cebu court's order of deference) to exercise
jurisdiction and admit the decedent's will to probate.
22. For the same reasons, neither could the Quezon City court be held to have
 acted without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in admitting
the decedent's will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix in
accordance with its testamentary disposition, in the light of the settled
doctrine that the provisions of Rule 73, section 1 lay down only a rule of
venue, not of jurisdiction.

Concurring Opinion:

J. Barredo
• I only want to stress that in my view, the failure of respondents to question
within a reasonable time the laying of the venue in the Quezon City Court
of First Instance and the assumption of jurisdiction by that court, after the
Court of First Instance of Cebu deferred in its favor, in order to prevent the
holding therein of any proceeding and trial, and their having filed therein a
formal opposition to the probate of the will, makes them guilty of laches,
for which reason they are not entitled to the equitable relief prayed for in
the present petition.

Notes from the book:

- The facts of Uriarte and Cuenco seem similar and yet the Court’s ruling on
which court should the proceedings be concoslidated appears contradictory.
- This is explained by the fact that in Uriarte, there was a showing that the
petitioner in the probate proceedings had knowledge prior to filing the
testate proceedings that an intestate proceeding was already pending.
- In this case (Cuenco), the petition for probate was filed without knowledge
of an existing intestate proceeding.
 009 NATCHER v. CA (Escalona)
October 2, 2001 | Buena, J. | Settlement of Estate
PETITIONER: Patricia Natcher
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Court of Appeals and the Heirs of Graciano Del Ro-
sario, Leticia Del Rosario, Emilia Del Rosario-Manangan, Rosalinda Fuentes
Llana, Rodolfo Fuentes, Alberto Fuentes, Evelyn Del Rosario, and Eduardo Del
Rosario
SUMMARY: Graciano is married to Graciana and have 6 children. They are the
owners of a parcel of land with an area of 9,322 SQ in Manila. Upon the death of
Graciana, Graciano together with his 6 children entered into an extrajudicial set-
tlement of the said estate, they divided the said property where a new title was
given. Graciano donated to his children a portion of his interest in the land
amounting to 4,949.30 SQ leaving only 447 SQ registered under his name as
covered by a title. Subsequently, his remaining lot has also been divided and the
other portion was sold to a third person. Graciano married Natcher, and during
their marriage, Graciano sold his remaining land to Natcher. Graciano died leav-
ing Natcher and his 6 children as heirs. The Children of Graciano filed a com-
plaint against Natcher stating that she employed fraud, misrepresentation and
forgery, in acquired the land by making it appear that Graciano executed a deed
of sale over the said land. The heirs argue that their legitime has been impaired.
The RTC held that the sale between Natcher and Graciano was null and void
because it is prohibited by law and may not be considered as a donation because
of consideration given. Moreover, the RTC noted that the sale could be consid-
ered as an advanced legitime since Natcher is a compulsory heir. The CA ruled
that the RTC went beyond its jurisdiction in resolving the issue of the advanced
legitimes.
The issue is WoN the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to resolve the settle-
ment of estates, particularly the issue of advancement of real property made by
the decedent to the heirs.
The SC held that the RTC is devoid of any authority to rule on the matter. Based
on Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, any question as to the advancement
of property made or alleged to have been made by the decedent to any heir must
be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction over estate proceed-
ings. This is the probate court. Therefore, the RTC acting in its general jurisdic-
tion does not have any authority to render a decision and resolve the issue of
advancement of real property.
DOCTRINE: Before a court can make a partition and distribution of the estate
of a deceased, it must first settle the estate in a special proceeding instituted for
the purpose. A probate proceeding is a kind of special proceeding in this case.
FACTS:
1. Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered own-
ers of a parcel of land with an area of 9,322 square meters located in Manila
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11889. Upon the death of
Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six children, namely: Bayani,
Ricardo, Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana and Nieves, entered into an extrajudicial
settlement of Gracianas estate on 09 February 1954 adjudicating and divid-
ing among themselves the real property subject of TCT No. 11889. Under
the agreement, Graciano received 8/14 share while each of the six children
received 1/14 share of the said property. Accordingly, TCT No. 11889 was
cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 35980 was issued in the name of
Graciano and the six children.
2. Further, on 09 February 1954, said heirs executed and forged an Agreement
of Consolidation-Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver of Rights where
they subdivided among themselves the parcel of land covered by TCT No.
35980 into several lots. Graciano then donated to his children, share and
share alike, a portion of his interest in the land amounting to 4,849.38
square meters leaving only 447.60 square meters registered under Gracianos
name, as covered by TCT No. 35988. Subsequently, the land subject of
TCT No. 35988 was further subdivided into two separate lots where the first
lot with a land area of 80.90 square meters was registered under TCT No.
107442 and the second lot with a land area of 396.70 square meters was
registered under TCT No. 107443. Eventually, Graciano sold the first lot to
a third person but retained ownership over the second lot.
3. On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natch-
er. During their marriage, Graciano sold the land covered by TCT No.
107443 to his wife Patricia as a result of which TCT No. 186059 was issued
in the latters name. On 07 October 1985, Graciano died leaving his second
wife Patricia and his six children by his first marriage, as heirs.
4. In a complaint filed in Civil Case No. 71075 before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 55, herein private respondents alleged that upon
Gracianos death, petitioner Natcher, through the employment of fraud,
misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443, by making it
appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale dated 25 June 1987 in fa-
vor of herein petitioner resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. 107443
and the issuance of TCT No. 186059 in the name of Patricia Natch-
er. Similarly, herein private respondents alleged in said complaint that
as a consequence of such fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been im-
paired.
 5. In her answer dated 19 August 1994, herein petitioner Natcher averred that
she was legally married to Graciano on 20 March 1980 and thus, under the
law, she was likewise considered a compulsory heir of the latter. Petitioner
further alleged that during Gracianos lifetime, Graciano already distributed,
in advance, properties to his children, hence, herein private respondents
may not anymore claim against Gracianos estate or against herein petition-
ers property.
6. After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, rendered a deci-
sion dated 26 January 1996 holding:
a. The deed of sale executed by the late Graciano del Rosario in favor
of Patricia Natcher is prohibited by law and thus a complete nulli-
ty. There being no evidence that a separation of property was
agreed upon in the marriage settlements or that there has been de-
creed a judicial separation of property between them, the spouses
are prohibited from entering (into) a contract of sale;
b. The deed of sale cannot be likewise regarded as a valid donation as
it was equally prohibited by law under Article 133 of the New Civ-
il Code;
c. Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a dona-
tion, it may however be regarded as an extension of advance inher-
itance of Patricia Natcher being a compulsory heir of the deceased.
7. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the lower courts de-
cision ratiocinating, inter alia:
a. It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just
and legal distribution of the estate. The court a quo, trying an ordi-
nary action for reconveyance/annulment of title, went beyond its
jurisdiction when it performed the acts proper only in a special
proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person. XXX
b. X X X Thus the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property
as an advance inheritance. What the court should have done was
merely to rule on the validity of (the) sale and leave the issue on
advancement to be resolved in a separate proceeding instituted for
that purpose. X X X
ISSUES:
1. WoN the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to resolve the settlement of
estates, particularly the issue of advancement of real property made by the
decedent to the heirs – NO. Because matters which involve settlement and
distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province
of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction. Since the RTC
was not constituted as a probate court, it was devoid of any authority to rule
over the issue.
RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court
of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
RATIO:
6. Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action
and special proceedings, in this wise:
a. A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the en-
forcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong.
b. A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are governed
by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to specific rules pre-
scribed for a special civil action.
7. A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right or a particular fact.
8. As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction be-
tween an action and a special proceeding. An action is a formal demand of
ones right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or
by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to def-
inite established rules. The term special proceeding may be defined as
an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party,
or a particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings
are required unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceed-
ings, the remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion.
9. Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of
title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settle-
ment of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of proper-
ty made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding,
which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided
for in the Rules of Court.
10. Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of
the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in the
exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
11. Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to ad-
vancement made or alleged to have been made by the deceased to any heir
may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the es-
tate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding
on the person raising the questions and on the heir.
12. While it may be true that the Rules used the word may, it is neverthe-
less clear that the same provision contemplates a probate court when it
speaks of the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings.
13. Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its
general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an adjudication
and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor of
 herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 71075 for recon- all payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by
veyance and annulment of title with damages is not, to our mind, the proper the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation
vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover, under the present circum- would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitime
stances, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only thereafter can it
probate court so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes.
by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher. 20. A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and proceedings in the
14. At this point, the appellate courts disquisition is elucidating: present case, reveals that the trial court failed to observe established
a. Before a court can make a partition and distribution of the es- rules of procedure governing the settlement of the estate of Graciano
tate of a deceased, it must first settle the estate in a special pro- Del Rosario. This Court sees no cogent reason to sanction the non-
ceeding instituted for the purpose. In the case at hand, the court a observance of these well-entrenched rules and hereby holds that under the
quo determined the respective legitimes of the plaintiffs-appellants prevailing circumstances, a probate court, in the exercise of its limited ju-
and assigned the subject property owned by the estate of the de- risdiction, is indeed the best forum to ventilate and adjudge the issue of ad-
ceased to defendant-appellee without observing the proper pro- vancement as well as other related matters involving the settlement of Gra-
ceedings provided (for) by the Rules of Court. From the aforecited ciano Del Rosario’s estate.
discussions, it is clear that trial courts trying an ordinary action
cannot resolve to perform acts pertaining to a special proceed-
ing because it is subject to specific prescribed rules. Thus, the
court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as an advance
inheritance.
15. In resolving the case at bench, this Court is not unaware of our pronounce-
ment in Coca vs. Borromeo and Mendoza vs. Teh that whether a particular
matter should be resolved by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction is not a jurisdictional
issue but a mere question of procedure. In essence, it is a procedural ques-
tion involving a mode of practice that may be waived.
16. Notwithstanding, we do not see any waiver on the part of herein private re-
spondents inasmuch as the six children of the decedent even assailed the au-
thority of the trial court, acting in its general jurisdiction, to rule on this
specific issue of advancement made by the decedent to petitioner.
17. Analogously, in a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated
the long standing principle that although generally, a probate court may not
decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all
heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties
consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights
of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to de-
cide the question of ownership.
18. Similarly in Mendoza vs. Teh, we had occasion to hold:
a. In the present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but merely
an allegation seeking appointment as estate administratrix which
does not necessarily involve settlement of estate that would have
invited the exercise of the limited jurisdiction of a probate court.
19. Of equal importance is that before any conclusion about the legal share due
to a compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be
taken first. The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting
 010 VALERA v. INSERTO (Fordan)
May 7, 1987 | Narvasa, J. | Jurisdiction of probate court
G.R. No. L-56504
PETITIONERS: Pompillo Valera and Eumelia Valera Cabado
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Judge Sancho Y. Inserto and Manuel R. Fabiana
G.R. No. L-59867-68
PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS: Eumelia V. Cabado, Pompillo Valera, and Hon. Midpantao
L. Adil
RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS: Manuel R. Fabiana, Jose Garin, Hon. CA (10th Division)
SUMMARY: Cabado and Valera were appointed as administrators of the estate of
deceased Spouses Valera. Teresa filed a motion asking that Cabado be declared in
contempt for failure to render an accounting of her administration. However, Cabado
replied that no accounting could be submitted unless Jose, Teresa’s husband return
the 18-ha fishpond to the estate. The Probate Court viewed Teresa’s motion for con-
tempt as well as Cabado's prayer for the fishpond's return to the estate, as having
given rise to a claim for the recovery of an asset of the estate within the purview of
Sec. 6, Rule 87 of the ROC. Thereafter, an order was issued that the fishpond should
be returned to the estate and the Probate Court emphasized that pronouncement re-
garding the estate's title to the fishpond was merely provisional in character and the
parties may pursue their claim of ownership over the same in an ordinary civil ac-
tion.The sheriff served the order to Fabiana wherein the latter voluntarily relin-
quished the possession. However, Fabiano later on filed a complaint-in-intervention
with the Probate Court seeking vindication of his right to the possession of the fish-
pond, based on a contract of lease between himself, as lessee, and Jose, as lessor. But
Judge Adil dismissed his complaint. Thus, Fabiana instituted a separate action for
injunction and damages, with application for a preliminary injunction where a TRO
was issued. In the meantime, Jose, initiated a special action for certiorari, prohibi-
tion, and mandamus with prayer for preliminary injunction in the CA which was also
followed by Fabiana despite the earlier filing of the case in the sala of Judge Inserto.
The CA granted the petitions of Jose and Fabiana claiming that Probate Court indeed
possessed no jurisdiction to resolve the issue of ownership based merely on evidence
adduced at the hearing of a "counter-motion" conducted under Sec. 6, Rule 87.
Hence, the current petition.
The issue is whether or not the CA erred in holding that probate court (presided by
Judge Adil) had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and decide the issue of title
covering a fishpond being claimed by Garin heirs adversely to Spouses Valera. NO.
*doctrine* The facts in this case, however, do not call for the application of the ex-
ception to the rule. As already earlier stressed, it was at all times clear to the Court as
well as to the parties that if cognizance was being taken of the question of title over
the fishpond, it was not for the purpose of settling the issue definitely and perma-
nently, and writing "finis" thereto, the question being explicitly left for determination
"in an ordinary civil action," but merely to determine whether it should or should not
be included in the inventory. This function of resolving whether or not property
should be included in the estate inventory is, to be sure, one clearly within the Pro-
bate Court's competence, although the Court's determination is only provisional in
character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action that
may be instituted by the parties.
DOCTRINE: A CFI (now RTC), acting as a Probate Court, exercises but limited
jurisdiction, and thus has no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of
title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless the
claimant and all the other parties having legal interest in the property consent, ex-
pressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the Probate Court for ad-
judgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced. The reason for
the exception being that the question of whether or not a particular matter should be
resolved by the Court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited juris-
diction as a special court (e.g., probate, land registration, etc), is in reality not a juris-
dictional but in essence of procedural one, involving a mode of practice which may
be waived.
FACTS:
1. In the proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the decedent
spouses Rafael Valera and Consolacion Sarrosa (Spouses Valera), Eumelia
Cabado (Cabado) and Pompillo Valera were appointed administrators2.
2. Teresa Garin (Teresa) filed a motion asking that the Administratrix Cabado be
declared in contempt for her failure to render an accounting of her administra-
tion.
3. Cabado replied that no accounting could be submitted unless Jose Garin (Jose),
Teresa's husband and the movant heirs' father, delivered to the administrator an
18-ha fishpond in Baras, Barotoc Nuevo, Iloilo, belonging to the estate so that it
might be partitioned among the decedents' heirs. Jose opposed the plea for the
fishpond's return to the estate, asserting that the property was owned by his
children and this was why it had never been included in any inventory of the es-
tate.
4. Hon. Judge Midpantao Adil (Judge Adil) viewed the Garin Heirs' motion for
contempt, as well as Cabado's prayer for the fishpond's return to the estate, as
having given rise to a claim for the recovery of an asset of the estate within the
purview of Sec. 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court.
5. Thereafter, the Court issued an Order commanding the Heirs of Teresa Garin
"to reconvey immediately the fishpond in question to the intestate Estate of the
Spouses Valera. The order was predicated based on the testimony of the 2 ad-
ministrators that:
2
Heirs of a deceased daughter of spouses Valera
 a. The fishpond originally belonged to the Government, and had been given
in lease to Rafael Valera in his lifetime;
b. Rafael Valera ostensibly sold all his leasehold rights in the fishpond to his
daughter, Teresa; but the sale was fictitious, having been resorted to mere-
ly so that she might use the property to provide for her children's support
and education, and was subject to the resolutory term that the fishpond
should revert to Rafael Valera upon completion of the schooling of Tere-
sa's children; and
c. with the income generated by the fishpond, the property was eventually
purchased from the Government by the Heirs of Teresa, collectively
named as such in the Original Certificate of Title issued in their favor.
6. Judge Adil ruled that an implies trust has been created, obligating Teresa’s
heirs to restore the property to Spouses Valera’s estate pursuant to Arts. 14533
and 14554 of the Civil Code.
7. The Court also held that the action for reconveyance based on constructive trust
had not yet prescribed, Cabado's motion for the fishpond's reversion to the es-
tate having been filed well within 10 years from June 30, 1980, the date on
which Teresa’s heirs allegedly acquired title over it.
8. On the other hand, the Probate Court itself made clear that the hearing on the
matter was meant "merely to determine whether or not the fishpond should be
included as part of the estate and whether or not the person holding it should be
made to deliver and/or return it to the estate." Thus, the pronouncement regard-
ing the estate's title to the fishpond was merely provisional in character and the
parties may pursue their claim of ownership over the same in an ordinary civil
action.
9. Judge Adil then granted the motion for execution and directed the sheriff to en-
force the direction for the Garin heirs to reconvey the fishpond to the estate.
The corresponding writ was served on Manuel Fabiana (Fabiana), the supposed
encargado or caretaker. Voicing no objection to the writ, and declaring to the
sheriff that he was a mere lessee, Fabiana voluntarily relinquished possession of
the fishpond to the sheriff. The latter, in turn, delivered it to the administrators.
10. However, Fabiana then filed a complaint-in-intervention with the Probate Court
seeking vindication of his right to the possession of the fishpond, based on a
contract of lease between himself, as lessee, and Jose, as lessor. But Judge Adil
dismissed his complaint.
For G.R. No. 56504:
11. Fabiana then instituted a separate action for injunction and damages, with ap-
plication for a preliminary injunction. Hon. Sancho Y. Inserto, presiding judge,
3
Article 1453. When property is conveyed to a person in reliance upon his declared intentions to hold it
for, or transfer it to another or the grantor, there is an implied trust in favor of the person for whose benefit
it is contemplated.
4
Article 1455. When any trustee, guardian or other person holding a fiduciary relationship uses trust funds
for the purchase of property and causes a conveyance to be made to him or to a third person, a trust is
established by operation of law in favor of the person to whom the fund belongs.
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining estate administrators from dis-
turbing Fabiana in the possession of the fishpond as lessee.
12. The administrators filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and to dissolve the
temporary restraining order but Judge Inserto failed to act on their motion,
within what they believed to be a reasonable time considering the circumstanc-
es of the case. Thus, the administrators filed with the SC a special civil action
for certiorari and mandamus, with a prayer for preliminary mandatory injunc-
tion and temporary restraining order.
For G.R. Nos. 59867-68:
13. In the meantime, Jose filed a notice of appeal from the Order issued by Judge
Adil but subsequently abandoned it and instead, he initiated a special action for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with prayer for preliminary injunction in
the CA. This was also followed by Fabian, notwithstanding the pendency in
Judge Inserto’s sala of the case he had earlier filed.
14. The 2 special civil actions were jointly decided by the CA and the latter granted
the petitions and ruled that:
a. The Probate Court indeed possessed no jurisdiction to resolve the issue of
ownership based merely on evidence adduced at the hearing of a "counter-
motion" conducted under Sec. 6, Rule 87;
b. The original and transfer certificates of title covering the fishpond stand in
the names of the Heirs of Teresa as registered owners, and therefore no
presumption that the estate owns the fishpond is warranted to justify re-
turn of the property on the theory that it had merely been borrowed; and
c. Even assuming the Probate Court's competence to resolve the ownership
question, the estate administrators would have to recover possession of the
fishpond by separate action, in view of the lessee's claim of right to supe-
rior possession, as lessee thereof.
15. Hence, the current petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in holding that probate court had no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of and decide the issue of title covering a fishpond being
claimed by Garin heirs adversely to Spouses Valera. – NO, since the facts of
the case does not fall in the exceptions in order for the probate court to have ju-
risdiction and also the latter emphasize that its finding is only provisional in
character and the parties need to file a separate civil action.
2. Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the administrators need to file a sep-
arate action for the recovery of the possession of the fishpond. – NO, since the
determination by the Probate Court of the question of title to the fishpond was
merely provisional.
3. Whether or not the CA erred in sactioning the act of CFI branch in interfering
with and overruling the final judgment of the Probate Court and otherwise frus-
trating and inhibiting the enforcement and implementation of said judgment. –
NO, since the CFI branch exercises primary jurisdiction over the question of
 ownership involving estate property claimed by the estate, they must be deemed
superior to otherwise contrary orders issued by the Probate Court.
RULING: The petition in G.R. No. 56504 is dismissed for lack of merit. The peti-
tions in G.R. No. 59867 and G.R. No. 59868 are denied and the judgment of the CA,
subject thereof, is affirmed in toto. The temporary restraining order dated April 1,
1981 is lifted. Costs against petitioners.
RATIO:
First Issue (Important)
1. Settled is the rule that a CFI (now RTC), acting as a Probate Court, exercises
but limited jurisdiction, and thus has no power to take cognizance of and de-
termine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the
decedent, unless the claimant and all the other parties having legal interest
in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the
question to the Probate Court for adjudgment, or the interests of third per-
sons are not thereby prejudiced, the reason for the exception being that the
question of whether or not a particular matter should be resolved by the Court
in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a spe-
cial court (e.g., probate, land registration, etc), is in reality not a jurisdictional
but in essence of procedural one, involving a mode of practice which may be
waived.
2. The facts in this case, however, do not call for the application of the exception
to the rule. As already earlier stressed, it was at all times clear to the Court as
well as to the parties that if cognizance was being taken of the question of title
over the fishpond, it was not for the purpose of settling the issue definitely and
permanently, and writing "finis" thereto, the question being explicitly left for
determination "in an ordinary civil action," but merely to determine whether it
should or should not be included in the inventory.
3. This function of resolving whether or not property should be included in the es-
tate inventory is, to be sure, one clearly within the Probate Court's competence,
although the Court's determination is only provisional in character, not conclu-
sive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action that may be institut-
ed by the parties.
4. The same norm governs the situation contemplated in Sec. 6, Rule 875 of the
Rules of Court, expressly invoked by the Probate Court in justification of its
5
Sec. 6. Proceedings when property concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently conveyed. - If an executor or
administrator, heir, legatee, creditor, or other individual interested in the estate of the deceased, complains
to the court having jurisdiction of the estate that a person is suspected of having concealed, embezzled, or
conveyed away any of the money, goods, or chattels of the deceased, or that such person has in his posses-
sion or has knowledge of any deed, conveyance, bond, contract, or other writing which contains evidence
of or tends to disclose the right, title, interest, or claim of the deceased to real or personal estate, or the last
will and testament of the deceased, the court may cite such suspected person to appear before it and may
examine him on oath on the matter of such complaint; and if the person so cited refuses to appear, or to
answer on such examination or such interrogatories as are put to him, the court may punish him for con-
holding a hearing on the issue arising from the parties' conflicting claims over
the fishpond.
5. The examination provided in the cited section is intended merely to elicit evi-
dence relevant to property of the decedent from persons suspected of having
possession or knowledge thereof, or of having concealed, embezzled, or con-
veyed away the same. Of course, if the latter lays no claim to the property and
manifests willingness to turn it over to the estate, no difficulty arises; the Pro-
bate Court simply issues the appropriate direction for the delivery of the proper-
ty to the estate. On the other hand, if the third person asserts a right to the prop-
erty contrary to the decedent's, the Probate Court would have no authority to re-
solve the issue; a separate action must be instituted by the administrator to re-
cover the property.
6. In the light of the foregoing principles, the Probate Court could have admitted
and taken cognizance of Fabiana's complaint in intervention, after obtaining the
consent of all interested parties to its assumption of jurisdiction over the ques-
tion of title to the fishpond, or ascertaining the absence of objection thereto. But
it did not. It dismissed the complaint in intervention instead. And all this is now
water under the bridge.
Second Issue
7. Since the determination by the Probate Court of the question of title to the fish-
pond was merely provisional, not binding on the property with any character of
authority, definiteness or permanence, having been made only for purposes of
inclusion in the inventory and upon evidence adduced at the hearing of a mo-
tion, it cannot and should not be subject of execution, as against its possessor
who has set up title in himself (or in another) adversely to the decedent, and
whose right to possess has not been ventilated and adjudicated in an appropriate
action.
8. These considerations assume greater cogency where, as here, the Torrens title
to the property is not in the decedents' names but in others, a situation on which
this Court has already had occasion to rule.
"In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property
covered by Torrens title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such ti-
tle should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evi-
dence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be consider as the owner of the
property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate
ordinary action, particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the prop-
erty itself is in the persons named in the title."
Third Issue
9. Since both the Probate Court and the estate administrators are one in the recog-
nition of the proposition that title to the fishpond could in the premises only be
appropriately determined in a separate action, the actual filing of such a sepa-
tempt, and may commit him to prison until he submits to the order of the court. The interrogatories put to
any such person, and his answers thereto, shall be in writing and shall be filed in the clerk's office.
 rate action should have been anticipated, and should not therefore have come as
a surprise, to the latter.
10. And since moreover, implicit in that recognition is also the acknowledgment of
the superiority of the authority of the court in which the separate action is filed
over the issue of title, the estate administrators may not now be heard to com-
plain that in such a separate action, the court should have issued orders neces-
sarily involved in or flowing from the assumption of that jurisdiction.
11. Those orders cannot in any sense be considered as undue interference with the
jurisdiction of the Probate Court. Resulting from the exercise of primary juris-
diction over the question of ownership involving estate property claimed by the
estate, they must be deemed superior to otherwise contrary orders issued by the
Probate Court in the exercise of what may be regarded as merely secondary or
provisional, jurisdiction over the same question.
 011 DELA CRUZ v. CAMON (GALINDEZ) the administrator but by independent action." The administrator appealed.
30 April 1966 | Sanchez, J. | Probate court’s jurisdiction
ISSUE/s:
1. WoN the demand for rentals is within the jurisdiction of the probate court –
PETITIONER: In the matter of the intestate estate of Thomas Fallon and Anne
NO, because at best, that money is debt to the estate, not against the estate.
Fallon Murphy, deceased, Ignations Henry Bezore etal., Martiniano O. Delacruz
Recovery should be by separate suit commenced by the administrator. This
RESPONDENTS: Emilio Camon
is because of the absence of express statutory authorization to coerce the
lessee debtor into defending himself in the probate court.
SUMMARY: Intestate proceedings were commenced with regard to the estate
of Thomas Fallon and Anne Fallon Murphy. The administrator moved for an
RULING: The appealed order is in accord with the law. It is hereby affirmed. Costs
order to direct Camon, then lessee of the land, to pay rentals. Camon challenged
against appellant. So ordered.
the court’s jurisdiction over his person, and the lower court ruled that the
demand for rentals must be through an independent action.
RATIO:
2. The jurisdiction of the CFI over the subject matter is beyond debate.
ISSUE: WoN the demand for rentals is within the jurisdiction of the probate
However, the court sits as a probate court, which is primarily concerned
court – NO, because at best, that money is debt to the estate, not against the
with the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate. For these
estate. Recovery should be by separate suit commenced by the administrator.
purposes, property in the hands of the estate's administrator comes within
This is because of the absence of express statutory authorization to coerce the
the power of the probate court.
lessee debtor into defending himself in the probate court.
3. Looking at the administrator’s claim for rentals: the amount demanded is
not liqudated. Hence, the lessee may interpose defenses.
(Super short case. See doctrine)
4. Compromise, payment, statute of limitations, lack of cause of action and the
like, may be urged to defeat the administrator's case.
The demand is for money due allegedly for rentals. Camon is a third person.
5. Camon’s opposition to the motion served a warning that at the proper time
Hence, the administrator may not pull him against his will, by motion, into the
he will set up the defense that the administrator, as attorney-in-fact of the
administration proceedings.
declared heirs, had theretofore sold the estate's two-fourths share in
Hacienda Rosario together with "all the rights, title and interest (including
DOCTRINE: Paula v. Escay: When the demand is in favor of the administrator
all accrued rents) that said heirs had inherited from the said deceased."
and the party against whom it is enforced is a third party, not under the court's
6. Appellant administrator in reply admits the facts of the sale of the land, but
jurisdiction, the demand cannot be by mere motion by the administrator, but by
not the rentals due. Hence, the right to collect is still in a fluid state.
an independent action against the third person.
7. The right remains to be threshed out upon a full trial on the merits. Hence,
the money (rentals) allegedly due is not property in the hands of the
administrator; it is not thus within the effective control of the probate court.
8. Neither does it come within the concept of money of the deceased
FACTS: "concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away", which would confer upon the
1. The estate was owner of 2/4 share pro-indiviso of Hacienda Rosario in court incidental prerogative to reach out its arms to get it back and, if
Negros Occidental. The whole hacienda was held in lease by Emilio Camon necessary, to cite the possessor thereof in contempt.
since long before the present intestate proceedings were commenced. 9. At best, that money is debt to the estate, not against the estate. Recovery
2. On October 1962, the administrator of the estate moved the court for an should be by separate suit commenced by the administrator. This is because
order to direct Camon to pay the estate’s 2/4 share of the rentals on the of the absence of express statutory authorization to coerce the lessee debtor
hacienda for crop years 1948-1949 through 1960-1961. into defending himself in the probate court.
a. Sugar land: P62,065 10. Paula v. Escay: When the demand is in favor of the administrator and the
b. Rice land: P2,100. party against whom it is enforced is a third party, not under the court's
3. Camon challenged the probate court’s jurisdiction over his person. The jurisdiction, the demand cannot be by mere motion by the administrator, but
court ruled that the demand for rentals cannot be made "by mere motion by by an independent action against the third person.
11. The demand is for money due allegedly for rentals. Camon is a third person.
Hence, the administrator may not pull him against his will, by motion, into
the administration proceedings.
12. Even matters affecting property under judicial administration may not be
taken cognizance of by the court in the course of intestate proceedings, if
the "interests of third persons are prejudiced".
 012 GIL v. CANCIO (Gonzales)
July 30, 1965 | Bautista Angelo, J. | Subject matter of special proceedings
PETITIONER: Dolores C. Vda. De Gil
RESPONDENT: Agustin Cancio
SUMMARY: Carlos Sr. died testate instituting as his exclusive heir his widow Isa-
bel subject to the condition that should Isabel die, the estate would inherited by Car-
los Jr., the decendent’s adopted son. The will was admitted to probate and Isabel was
appointed as the administratix. During the Japanese occupation, Isabel and Carlos
loaned from Cancio. In payment thereof, they agreed to transfer to Cancio the two
lots from the estate after the same had been finally adjudicated to both or either of
the two heirs. Carlos Jr. died. Isabel filed a motion in the testate proceedings praying
for an order to authorize her to execute the necessary deed of transfer to Cancio or to
his heirs. The court issued an order to pay the estate and inheritance taxes for the
approval of the deed of sale. However, nothing was done so Cancio filed a motion
for the approval of the deed of the sale despite non-payment of taxes. Dolores (co-
administratix, widow of Carlos Jr.) opposed on the ground that Isabel and Carlos Jr.
agreed to sell the property without the court’s authority. The court denied the petition
since the obligation for which the properties were sold was personal in character and
has no connection with the estate, whatever claim Cancio has in connection with said
obligation should be threshed out in a separate action. The issue is WoN a separate
action should be filed for Cancio’s claim – NO. Under Article 1430 of the Civil
Code, the widow and children of the deceased are entitled to certain allowances for
their support out of the estate pending its liquidation and until their shares have been
delivered to them. It is probably for this reason that both widow and the son, who
were the prospective heirs, borrowed money from Cancio in order that they may
have means to support themselves in the interregnum since the estate was then un-
productive, a matter which comes perfectly within the purview of the law.
DOCTRINE: An heir can sell whatever right, interest, or participation he may have
in the property under administration, a matter which comes under the jurisdiction of
the probate court.
FACTS:
1. Carlos Gil, Sr. died testate instituting as his exclusive heir his widow Isabel
Herreros subject to the condition that should the latter die, the estate, if any,
would be inherited by Carlos Gil, Jr., the decedent's adopted son.
2. The decedent's will was admitted to probate, Isabel having been appointed
as the administratrix of the estate. Among the properties constituting the es-
tate were two parcels of residential lands and a house erected thereon situat-
ed in Guagua, Pampanga.
3. During the Japanese occupation, Isabel and Carlos secured from Agustin
Cancio a loan of P89,000.00 and in payment thereof they agreed to transfer
to Cancio the two lots after the same had been finally adjudicated to both or
either of the two heirs.
4. Subsequently, Carlos died, and Isabel H. Vda. de Gil, as administratrix of
the estate of her deceased husband Carlos Gil, Sr., filed a motion in the tes-
tate proceedings (No. 548) praying for an order to authorize her to execute
the necessary deed of transfer of the two lots including the house erected
thereon to Cancio or his heirs.
5. Copy of this motion was served on Dolores C. Vda. de Carlos Gil, Jr. who
expressed her conformity thereto in her capacity as guardian of her minor
children.
6. This motion was approved by Judge Ramon R. San Jose on condition that
the original of the deed of transfer should be submitted to the court for ap-
proval.
7. As Isabel H. Vda. de Carlos Gil, Sr. died before being able to execute the
deed of transfer in favor of Cancio, said deed was executed by Dolores C.
Vda. de Carlos Gil, Jr. in her capacity as co-administratrix and vendor of
the properties, which deed was attached to a motion she filed in the testate
proceedings (No. 548) praying the court for its approval.
8. The probate court issued an order directing the co-administratrix to pay the
estate and inheritance taxes due on the properties covered by the sale before
passing upon the motion filed for the approval of the aforesaid deed of sale.
9. Apparently, nothing was done on the matter by the co-administratrix not-
withstanding the lapse of several years, and so Cancio filed a motion in the
probate proceedings reiterating the former petition of the co-administratrix
requesting for the approval of the deed of sale stating that the Office of the
Commission of Internal Revenue agreed to the registration of said deed of
sale notwithstanding the non-payment of the estate and inheritance taxes in
view of the fact that the value of the properties of the estate is more than
sufficient to answer for whatever estate and inheritance taxes that may be
assessed against the estate.
10. But co-administratrix Dolores C. Vda. de Gil, Jr. filed a strong opposition to
on the ground that the late Isabel H. Vda. de Gil, Sr. and Carlos Gil, Jr. en-
tered into the agreement to sell the properties without the authority of the
court, that the properties subject of the sale had never been finally adjudi-
cated to both or either of the two vendors, and that the alleged deed of sale
should only be considered as an equitable mortgage.
11. The probate court issued an order denying the petition and setting aside the
order of the probate court, which requires the submission of the deed of sale
for the approval of the court upon the theory that since the obligation for
which the properties were sold was personal in character and has no connec-
tion with the estate, whatever claim Cancio has in connection with said ob-
ligation should be threshed out in a separate action. Said order states
a. "…the Court is of the opinion that whatever right Cancio acquired
 under the agreement had between him, on the one hand, and for-
mer administratrix Isabel H. Vda. de Gil and Carlos Gil, Jr., on the
other, that right cannot be enforced in this proceeding, the obliga-
tion contracted during the Japanese occupation by said Isabel H.
Vda. de Gil and Carlos Gil, Jr. being personal to them and the es-
tate having nothing to do with it.
12. Cancio took the case to the Court of Appeals, but the same was later certi-
fied to the SC on the ground that it merely involves questions of law.
ISSUE:
1. WoN a separate action should be filed for Cancio’s claim – NO. An heir can
sell whatever right, interest, or participation he may have in the property
under administration, a matter which comes under the jurisdiction of the
probate court
RULING: WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set aside. The motion
filed by Agustin Cancio date April 1, 1959 praying for the approval of the deed of
sale in question is hereby granted. No costs.
RATIO:
1. It should be noted that when Isabel H. Vda. de Gil, Sr. and Carlos Gil, Jr.
obtained the loan of P89,000.00 from Agustin Cancio on condition that
the same would be paid by transferring to him the two lots and house
which form part of the estate of the deceased Carlos Gil, Sr., said estate
was already under the administration of Isabel because she was then the
administratrix duly appointed by the court, and under the provision of the
will Isabel was instituted as the exclusive heir subject to the condition
that should the latter die the properties would thereby be inherited by
Carlos Gil, Jr., the adopted son of the deceased.
2. On the other hand, it should be borne in mind that under the provision of
Article 1430 of the Civil Code the widow and children of the deceased
are entitled to certain allowances for their support out of the estate pend-
ing its liquidation and until their shares have been delivered to them. It is
probably for this reason that both widow and the son, who were the pro-
spective heirs, borrowed money from Cancio in order that they may have
means to support themselves in the interregnum since the estate was then
unproductive, a matter which comes perfectly within the purview of the
law.
3. And bearing in mind this situation of the two heirs which happened dur-
ing the Japanese occupation, the probate court did not hesitate in approv-
ing the agreement thereby giving to the administratrix the necessary au-
thority to execute the deed of sale covering the two properties of the de-
ceased in favor of Cancio provided that the deed of sale be submitted to
the court for its approval.
4. And this matter is sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 89 of the Rules of
Court, which provides: "When it appears that the sale of the whole or a
part of the real or personal estate, will be beneficial to the heirs, devisees,
legatees, and other interested persons, the court may, upon application of
the executor or administrator and on written notice to the heirs, devisees,
and legatees who are interested in the estate to be sold, authorize the ex-
ecutor or administrator to sell the whole or a part of said estate, although
not necessary to pay debts, legacies, or expenses of administration; . . ."
5. The objection, therefore, of the present administratrix on the ground that
the original agreement between the late administratrix Isabel and Cancio
was without authority of the court has no factual basis.
6. It is true that the agreement between Isabel H. Vda. de Gil, Sr. and Car-
los Gil, Jr., on the one hand, and Cancio, on the other, concerning the
transfer of the two lots in question in payment of the loan of P89,000.00
is conditioned upon the final adjudication of said properties to both or ei-
ther of them, and here such adjudication has not been made in view of
the early death of the two heirs; but this circumstance is now of no con-
sequence considering that it is beyond dispute that the properties left by
the late Carlos Gil, Sr. were inherited, first, by Isabel and, later, by the
children of Carlos Gil, Jr. who inherited them through their father
charged with the commitment in favor of Cancio.
7. As a matter of fact, Dolores C. Vda. de Gil, Jr., co-administratrix of the
estate, is now estopped from disputing the sale because she herself in her
capacity as co-administratrix filed the petition in court asking for the ap-
proval of the same sale which she now disputes for reasons that do not
appear in the record.
8. And there is no doubt that an heir can sell whatever right, interest, or par-
ticipation he may have in the property under administration, a matter
which comes under the jurisdiction of the probate court.
9. It is, therefore, error for the court a quo to say that this matter should be
threshed out in a separate action.
 013 Fule v CA (GUSTILO)
November 29, 1976 | Martin, J. | Actual Residence v Legal Residence
PETITIONER: VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A.
MALVAR, Presiding Judge
RESPONDENTS:CA, PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and AGUSTINA B. GARCIA
SUMMARY: Petitioner Fule petitioned the CFI of Calamba, Laguna to appoint her
as special administratrix to the estate of decedent Garcia, alleging that said decedent
was elected a member of the Constitutional Convention in Calamba, Laguna and had
properties in Calamba. Preciosa Garcia, the surviving spouse filed a motion for re-
consideration on May 8, 1973, contending that the order appointing Fule as special
administratrix was issued without jurisdiction, since no notice of the petition for let-
ters of administration has been served upon all persons interested in the estate. There
has been no delay or cause for delay in the proceedings for the appointment of a reg-
ular administrator as the surviving spouse of A. Garcia, she should be preferred in
the appointment of a special administratrix; and Fule is a debtor of the estate of A.
Garcia. She further alleged she had preferential rights as administratrix and that the
last residence of decedent was in Quezon City. During the hearing of the various
incidents of this case before Judge Malvar, Fule presented the death certificate of A.
Garcia showing that his residence at the time of his death was Quezon City. On her
part, P. Garcia presented the residence certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing
that three months before his death his residence was in Quezon City. The issue is
WoN the term “resides” refers to the actual residence or domicile of the decedent at
the time of his death?-Actual Residence.
The Court ruled that residence connotes actual residence or bodily presence as dis-
tinguished from legal domicile. Decedent’s last residence is Quezon City as indicat-
ed by the death certificate and a power of attorney.
DOCTRINE: In the application of venue statutes and rules, Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules of Court is of such nature- residence rather than domicile is the sig-
nificant factor. In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popu-
lar sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal resi-
dence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as
an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place
and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length of time of resi-
dence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.
FACTS:
1. Virginia Fule (Fule) filed with the CFI of Laguna presided over by
Judge Severo Malvar a petition for letters of administration alleging that
on April 6, 1973, Amado G. Garcia (A. Garcia), a property owner of Calam-
ba, Laguna died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving Real Estate and
Personal Properties in Calamba, Laguna, within the jurisdiction of the said
CFI.
2. She prayed that she be appointed special administratrix which was granted. A
motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia (P. Garcia) on
May 8, 1973, contending that the order appointing Fule as special adminis-
tratrix was issued without jurisdiction, since no notice of the petition for
letters of administration has been served upon all persons interested in the
estate. There has been no delay or cause for delay in the proceedings for
the appointment of a regular administrator as the surviving spouse of A.
Garcia, she should be preferred in the appointment of a special adminis-
tratrix; and Fule is a debtor of the estate of A. Garcia. P. Garcia, therefore,
prayed that she be appointed special administratrix of the estate, in lieu of
Fule, and as regular administratrix after due hearing.
3. While this reconsideration motion was pending resolution before the Court,
P. Garcia filed a motion to remove Fule as special administratrix alleging, be-
sides the jurisdictional ground raised in the motion for reconsideration, that her
appointment was obtained through erroneous, misleading and/or incomplete
misrepresentations; that Fule has adverse interest against the estate; and that she
has shown herself unsuitable as administratrix and as officer of the court.
4. P. Garcia received a "Supplemental Petition for the Appointment of Regular
Administrator ' filed by Fule. This supplemental petition modified the original
petition in four aspects: (1) the allegation that during the lifetime of the de-
ceased A. Garcia, he was elected as Constitutional Delegate for the First Dis-
trict of Laguna and his last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna; (2) the
deletion of the names of P. Garcia and Agustina Garcia as legal heirs of A. Gar-
cia; (3) the allegation that Carolina Carpio, who was simply listed as heir in the
original petition, is the surviving spouse of A. Garcia and that she has expressly
renounced her preferential right to the administration of the estate in favor of
Fule; and (4) that Fule be appointed as the regular administratrix.
5. The admission of this supplemental petition was opposed by P. Garcia for the
reason, among others, that it attempts to confer jurisdiction on the CFI of La-
guna, of which the court was not possessed at the beginning because the origi-
nal petition was deficient.
6. P. Garcia filed an opposition to the original and supplemental petitions
for letters of administration, raising the issues of jurisdiction, venue, lack
of interest of Fule in the estate of A. Garcia, and disqualification of Fule as
special administratrix.
7. An omnibus motion was filed by Fule on August 20, 1973, praying for au-
thority to take possession of properties of the decedent allegedly in the hands of
third persons as well as to secure cash advances from the Calamba Sugar Plant-
ers Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. P. Garcia opposed the motion,
calling attention to the limitation made by Judge Malvar on the power of the
special administratrix, viz., "to making an inventory of the personal and real
properties making up the state of the deceased.
8. P. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition, because (1) jurisdiction over the pe-
tition or over the parties in interest has not been acquired by the court; (2) ven-
ue was improperly laid; and (3) Fule is not a party in interest as she is not enti-
tled to inherit from the deceased A. Garcia.
9. 3 motions were filed by P. Garcia, (a) to enjoin the special administratrix
from taking possession of properties in the hands of third persons which have
not been determined as belonging to Amado G. Garcia; (b) to remove the spe-
cial administratrix for acting outside her authority and against the interest of the
estate; and (c) filed in behalf of the minor Agustina B. Garcia, to dismiss the
petition for want of cause of action, jurisdiction, and improper venue
10. Resolving the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the powers of the
special administratrix are those provided for in Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules
of Court. Ramon Mercado, of the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Mar-
keting Association, Inc., was ordered to deliver to P. Garcia all certificates of ti-
tle in her name without any qualifying words like "married to Amado Garcia"
does not appear. Regarding the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the
issue of jurisdiction had already been resolved in the order of July 2, 1973,
denying P. Garcia's motion to reconsider the appointment of Fule and admitting
the supplemental petition, the failure of Fule to allege in her original petition
for letters of administration in the place of residence of the decedent at the time
of his death was cured. Judge Malvar further held that P. Garcia had submitted
to the jurisdiction of the court and had waived her objections thereto by praying
to be appointed as special and regular administratrix of the estate.
11. During the hearing of the various incidents of this case before Judge Mal-
var, Fule presented the death certificate of A. Garcia showing that his residence
at the time of his death was Quezon City. On her part, P. Garcia presented the
residence certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing that three months before
his death his residence was in Quezon City. Fule also testified that A, Garcia
was residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death, and that he was a del-
egate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention for the first district of Laguna
12. The CA rendered judgment annulling the proceedings before Judge Severo
A. Malvar in Sp. Proc. 27-C of the CFI Calamba, Laguna, for lack of jurisdic-
tion.
13. For the first time, P. Garcia informed Judge Ericta of the pendency of Sp.
Proc. No. 27-C before Judge Malvar of the CFI of Laguna, and the annulment
of the proceedings therein by the CA. She manifested, however, her willingness
to withdraw Sp. Proc. Q-19738 should the decision of the CA annulling the
proceedings before the CFI of Laguna in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C have not yet be-
come final, it being the subject of a motion for reconsideration. Judge Ericta or-
dered the suspension of the proceedings before his court until P. Garcia inform
the court of the final outcome of the case pending before the CA. This notwith-
standing, P. Garcia filed an "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obliga-
tions.”
14. Judge Ernani Cruz Pano, who succeeded Judge Ericta, issued an order
granting P. Garcia's "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" in
that the payments were for the benefit of the estate and that there hangs a cloud
of doubt on the validity of the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of
First Instance of Laguna
ISSUE/s:
1. WoN the term “resides” refers to the actual residence or domicile of the
decedent at the time of his death?-"Resides" should be viewed or under-
stood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habita-
tion of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical
presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term
means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a
given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also
an intention to make it one's domicile.
RULING: WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions of peti-
tioner Virginia Garcia Fule in G.R. No. L-40502 and in G.R. No. L42670 are hereby
denied, with costs against petitioner.
RATIO:
1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the dece-
dent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a
citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration grant-
ed, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in
which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a for-
eign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had
estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of
the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when
the want of jurisdiction appears on the record." With particular regard to letters
of administration.
2. Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court demands that the peti-
tion therefor should affirmatively show the existence of jurisdiction to
make the appointment sought, and should allege all the necessary facts,
such as death, the name and last residence of the decedent, the existence,
and situs if need be, of assets, intestacy, where this is relied upon, and the
right of the person who seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor, or
otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of death of the intestate and his last resi-
dence within the country are foundation facts upon which all subsequent pro-
ceedings in the administration of the estate rest, and that if the intestate was not
an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death, and left no assets in the state,
no jurisdiction is conferred on the court to grant letters of administration.
3. The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifical-
ly the clause "so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or
of the location of the estate," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the
Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Process-
es. It could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject
matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing
merely with procedural matters.
4. In the application of venue statutes and rules, Section 1, Rule 73 of the Re-
vised Rules of Court is of such nature- residence rather than domicile is the
significant factor. In other words, "resides" should be viewed or under-
stood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habita-
tion of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical
presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term
means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a
given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also
an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length of time of resi-
dence is required though; however, the residence must be more than tem-
porary.
5. On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased
Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon
City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to
prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his death. As it is, the
death certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in evidence by
Fule herself and also by P. Garcia, shows that his last place of residence
was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside from
this, the deceased's residence certificate for 1973 obtained three months before
his death; the Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney turning over the
administration of his two parcels of sugar land to the Calamba Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.; the Deed of Donation transferring
part of his interest in certain parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna to Agustina B.
Garcia; and certificates of titles covering parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna,
show in bold documents that Amado G. Garcia's last place of residence was at
Quezon City.
6. While Venue may be waived it appears that Garcia did not waive her
objection to venue improperly laid but availed of the practical resort of
invoking her preferential right as surviving spouse and insisting on the en-
forcement of the proper venue.
 Pacioles v. Chuatoco-Ching (Hilario)
August 9, 2005 | Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. | Jurisdiction of Probate Court
PETITIONER: Emilio Pacioles (Administrator and heir of the intestate estate of
miguelita ching-pacioles)
RESPONDENTS: Miguela Chuatoco-Ching
SUMMARY: Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties worth P10.5M and
stock investments worth P500k, with bank deposits worth P6.5M. Emilio Pacioles,
her husband, filed a verified petition for settlement of Miguelita’s estate, and prayed
for the issuance of letters of administration and that the net residue of the estate be
divided among the compulsory heirs. Miguela (mother in law of Emilio) filed an
opposition to Pacioles’ prayer for the issuance of letters of administration on the
ground that the bulk of Miguelita’s estate is comprised of paraphernal properties. She
prayed that letters of administration be issued to her instead, and filed a motion for
her appointment as special administratrix. The court granted her opposition and ap-
pointed her son, Emmanuel Ching, as joint administrator with Pacioles. Pacioles
submitted an inventory of Miguela’s estate to the intestate court, however, Emmanu-
el did not submit an inventory. Pacioles filed with the intestate court an omnibus
motion praying that an Order be issued directing the payment of estate taxes, pay-
ment of attorney’s fees, and the partition and distribution of the state among the de-
clared heirs. Miguela opposed saying that Pacioles’ motion is premature and preci-
pate since there is yet no determination whether the properties in the inventory are
conjugar, paraphernal, or owned in a joint venture. Miguela claims she owns the bulk
of Miguelita’s estate as an heir and co-owner, and prayed for a hearing to be sched-
uled. So the intestate court denied Pacioles’ prayer for partition and distribution but
allowed payment of estate taxes and attorney’s fees. Pacioles filed a petition for cer-
tiorari with the CA but this was denied, hence he comes before the SC.
Issue: WoN a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass upon questions of
ownership involving properties claimed to be part of the decedent’s estate – YES, if
the purpose is to determine whether or not a property should be included in the in-
ventory. HOWEVER, in this case, Miguela and Emilio accepted the inventory of
Pacioles and Emilio did not submit a separate inventory, so the above rule does not
apply. First, the inventory was not dispurted. Second, Emmanuel (co-
administrator) did not submit his own inventory on behalf of Miguela. Obvious-
ly, Miguela’s purpose here was not to obtain from the intestate court a ruling of
what properties should or should not be included in the inventory. She wanted
something else, i.e., to secure from the intestate court a final determination of
her claim of ownership over properties comprising the bulk of Miguelitas estate.
DOCTRINE: The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an
intestate or a probate court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of
the estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to the determi-
nation of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent ra-
tionale for this rule is that such court exercises special and limited jurisdiction. A
well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a probate
court may hear and pass upon questions of ownership when its purpose is to deter-
mine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory. In such situa-
tions the adjudication is merely incidental and provisional. Here, the key considera-
tion is that the purpose of the intestate court in hearing and passing upon questions of
ownership is merely to determine whether or not a property should be included in the
inventory.
FACTS:
16. Miguelita and Emilio Pacioles are married. Miguela is the mom of Mi-
guelita.
17. Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties worth P10.5M and stock in-
vestments worth P500k, with bank deposits worth P6.5M.
18. Pacioles filed a verified petition for settlement of Miguelita’s estate, and
prayed for the issuance of letters of administration and that the net residue
of the estate be divided among the compulsory heirs.
19. Miguela (mother in law of Emilio) filed an opposition to Pacioles’ prayer
for the issuance of letters of administration on the ground that (a) he is in-
competent and unfit to exercise the duties of an administrator and (b) the
bulk of Miguelita’s estate is comprised of paraphernal properties. She
prayed that letters of administration be issued to her instead, and filed a mo-
tion for her appointment as special administratrix.
20. Pacioles moved to strike out Miguela’s opposition, alleging that the latter
has no direct and material interest in the estate, she not being a compulsory
heir. Further, he claims that as surviving spouse he has the preferential right
to be appointed as administrator.
21. Miguela countered that she has direct and material interest in the estate-
because she gave half of her inherited properties to Miguelita on thecondi-
tion that both of them would undertake whatever business endeavor they
decided to, in the capacity of business partners.
(1) Miguela further nominated her son Emmanuel Ching to act as spe-
cial administrator.
22. The intestate court issued an order appointing Pacioles and Emmanuel
Ching as joint regular administrators of the estate, and both were issued let-
ters of administration after taking their oath and posting the bond. Notice to
Creditors was published in the issues of the Manila Standard, however no
claims were filed against the estate.
 23. Pacioles submitted an inventory of Miguela’s estate to the intestate court,
however, Emmanuel did not submit an inventory.
24. So, the intestate court declared Pacioles and histwo minor children as the
only compulsory heirs of Miguelita.
25. Pacioles filed with the intestate court an omnibus motion praying that an
Order be issued directing the payment of estate taxes, payment of attorney’s
fees, and the partition and distribution of the state among the declared heirs.
26. Miguela opposed saying that Pacioles’ motion is premature and precipate
since there is yet no determination whether the properties in the inventory
are conjugar, paraphernal, or owned in a joint venture. Miguela claims she
owns the bulk of Miguelita’s estate as an heir and co-owner, and prayed for
a hearing to be scheduled.
27. So the intestate court denied Pacioles’ prayer for partition and distribution
but allowed payment of estate taxes and attorney’s fees.
28. Pacioles filed a petition for certiorari with the CA seeking to annul and set
aside the intestate court’s order and resolution denying his prayer for parti-
tion and distribution. The CA dismissed the petition, saying that there was
no GADALEJ.
29. Now Pacioles comes before the SC.
ISSUE/s:
2. WoN a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass upon questions
of ownership involving properties claimed to be part of the decedent’s es-
tate – YES, if the purpose is to determine whether or not a property should
be included in the inventory. However, in this case, Miguela and Emilio ac-
cepted the inventory of Pacioles, so the above rule does not apply.
RULING: SC affirmed the lower courts decision. Pwede rin wherefore.
RATIO:
12. The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intes-
tate or a probate court relates only to matters having to do with the settle-
ment of the estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does not ex-
tend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the
proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court exercises
special and limited jurisdiction.
13. A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or
a probate court may hear and pass upon questions of ownership when its
purpose is to determine whether or not a property should be included in the
inventory. In such situations the adjudication is merely incidental and provi-
sional.
1. Here, the key consideration is that the purpose of the intestate court
in hearing and passing upon questions of ownership is merely to
determine whether or not a property should be included in the in-
ventory.
14. The CA relied heavily on the deviation to the rule in sustaining the jurisdic-
tion of the intestate court to conduct a hearing on Miguela’s claim, and this
is misplaced.
15. First, the inventory was not dispurted. Miguela expressly adopted the in-
ventory prepared by Pacioles in her Opposition. Miguela could have op-
posed Pacioles’ inventory and sought the exclusion of thespecific properties
which she believed or considered to be hers, however she expressly adopted
the inventory.
16. Second, Emmanuel (co-administrator) did not submit his own invento-
ry on behalf of Miguela. He could have submitted an inventory, excluding
therefrom those properties which respondent considered to be hers. The fact
that he did not endeavor to submit one shows that he acquiesced with peti-
tioners inventory.
17. Obviously, Miguela’s purpose here was not to obtain from the intestate
court a ruling of what properties should or should not be included in
the inventory. She wanted something else, i.e., to secure from the intes-
tate court a final determination of her claim of ownership over proper-
ties comprising the bulk of Miguelitas estate.
18. The purpose of the hearing set by the intestate court was actually to deter-
mine the propriety of Miguela’s claim. According to the intestate court, if
it is true that Miguela owns the bulk of (Miguelitas) properties, then it
means that she has a material and direct interest in the estate and,
hence, she should be given her day in court. The intended day in court or
hearing is geared towards resolving the propriety of Miguela’s contention
that she is the true owner of the bulk of Miguelitas estate.
19. Surely, we cannot be deluded by Miguela’s ingenious attempt to secure
a proceeding for the purpose of resolving her blanket claim against Mi-
guelitas estate. Although, she made it appear that her only intent was to
determine the accuracy of Pacioles’ inventory, however, a close review
of the facts and the pleadings reveals her real intention.
20. Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its ju-
risdiction. Its proper course should have been to maintain a hands-off
stance on the matter. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction, sanctioned
and reiterated in a long line of decisions, that when a question arises as
to ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of the de-
ceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not
by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title ad-
verse to that of the deceased and his estate, such question cannot be de-
termined in the course of an intestate or probate proceedings. The in-
testate or probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such conten-
tions, which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction as a regional trial court.
21. Hence, respondents recourse is to file a separate action with a court of gen-
eral jurisdiction. The intestate court is not the appropriate forum for the res-
 olution of her adverse claim of ownership over properties ostensibly be-
longing to Miguelita's estate.
22. At any rate, we must stress that our pronouncements herein cannot
diminish or deprive respondent of whatever rights or properties she be-
lieves or considers to be rightfully hers. We reiterate that the question
of ownership of properties alleged to be part of the estate must be sub-
mitted to the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its general juris-
diction.
 015 POBRE v. GONONG (Marcos)
March 16, 1987 | Alampay, J. | Subject Matter of Special Proceedings
PETITIONER: Francisco E. Pobre
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Judge Arsenio M. Gonong, Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Norte, Branch IV, Iluminada P. Llanes and Felix G. Llanes
SUMMARY: The subject land in the case at bar was first inherited by Maxima
Pobre and Jovita Pobre who were siblings. When Maxima died, Jovita inherited
the whole estate. Upon the death of Jovita, the children of her half brother
became the surviving heirs. Included in the heirs is Petitioner Francisco Pobre
and Respondent Iluminada Pobre Llanes. Francisco filed a petition praying that
he be issued as the administrator of the subject parcel of land. Llanes filed her
opposition contending that Jovita Pobre had disposed of all her properties before
her death and Respondent Llanes has acquired from the former 1/3 of the estate
belonging to the former. Despite such, the lower court later appointed Francisco
as administrator of the estate, who then submitted an inventory of the properties
which included those claimed by Llanes. A motion for reconsideration was filed
by Respondent Llanes who insisted that they are the legal owners and possessors
of some of the properties in the inventory. The MR was denied therefore this led
Respondent Llanes to file an independent Civil Action to Quiet Title with
damages alleging that they purchased most of the lots in questions from Jovita
Pobre and some were donated to them, therefore the properties should be
excluded from the Inventory of the Estate of Jovita Pobre. Peitioner Francisco
Pobre disputed the claim and contended that the instruments of sale and donation
in favor of the Llaneses are fictitious. In the Special Proceedings case,
Respondent Llanes filed a Motion to exclude from the administration of
Petitioner Francisco the properties being claimed by her. The judge then issued
an order denying Llanes’ motion to exclude the properties but then he
reconsidered his order and ordered that the properties be excluded from the
inventory. Petitioner Francisco filed an MR but the same was denied by the trial
court. The latter therefore filed the present petition for Certiorari. The issue in
this case is WoN the issue of ownership of the properties can be passed upon in
the case at bar and therefore be used to determine the exclusion/inclusion of the
properties in the inventory – NO (see doctrine). In the questioned orders,
Respondent Judge provisionally passed upon the question of exclusion of
property from the Inventory. His conclusions regarding the ownership of said
properties are not final but provisional. The final determination of the ownership
of the properties in question in the case at bar, is not to be made in the Intestate
Proceedings, but in a Civil Case which is the separate Civil Action to Quiet
Title, filed by respondent Iluminada Llanes in the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Norte. The assailed orders of exclusion in the intestate proceedings are
merely interlocutory orders, because the question of title of the properties
excluded
DOCTRINE: The general rule is that question of title to property cannot be
passed upon in a testate or intestate proceeding. However, when the parties are
all heirs of the decedent, it is optional upon them to submit to the probate court
the question of title to property and, when so submitted, the probate court may
definitely pass judgment thereon.
FACTS:
9. Parties-litigants in this case are related to each other which can be traced
back to Bonifacio Pobre and Irene Blanco, who was the original owners of
the properties involved. They had only one son, Isidro Pobre.
10. Irene Blanco predeceased Bonifacio Pobre and later Bonifacio Pobre
married Teresa Blanco, to which marriage Maxima Pobre and Jovita Pobre
were born.
11. Isidoro Pobre married Maria Evangelista and out of this marriage were born
the following: Petitioner Francisco E. Pobre; Respondent Iluminada
Pobre Llanes; Violeta Pobre; Josefina Pobre; and Cresencio Pobre.
12. After the death of Bonifacio Pobre and later, Teresa Blanco, all properties
left by them intestate, consisting of 35 parcels of untitled agricultural lands,
were inherited by Maxima Pobre de Quianzon and Jovita Pobre.
13. Maxima Pobre de Quianzon died without any issue and without any will.
Thus, Jovita Pobre inherited the entire estate of her sister, Maxima.
14. Upon the death of Jovita Pobre, Petitioner Francisco Pobre, Respondent
Iluminada Pobre Llanes, Violeta Pobre, Cresencio Pobre, who are all
children of the late Isidoro Pobre, (half-brother of Jovita Pobre and
Maxima Pobre de Quianzon) became the surviving heirs of the intestate
estate of Jovita Pobre as they were the latter's nephews and nieces.
15. Petitioner Francisco Pobre filed a Petition for Letters of Administration
with the Court of First Instance of Ilocos, praying that he be issued as the
administrator of the subject parcel of land and that the said estate be settled
and distributed among their legal heirs.
16. Respondent Illuminada Pobre Llanes filed her opposition to the Petition
alleging that Petitioner Francisco and the other heirs mentioned are
precluded from inheriting the estate of Maxima since the latter was an
illegitimate child and that Jovita Pobre had disposed of all her properties
before her death and Respondent Llanes has acquired from the former 1/3
of the estate belonging to the former.
17. The lower court appointed another special administrator but said
appointment was revoked and Francisco Pobre was later appointed as
administrator of the estate, who then submitted an inventory of the
properties.
18. A motion for reconsideration was filed by Respondent Llanes who insisted
 that they are the legal owners and possessors of the properties in the
inventory to the extent of 1/3 of the whole of the real properties.
19. The MR was denied therefore this led Respondent Llanes to file an
independent Civil Action to Quiet Title with damages alleging that they
purchased most of the lots in questions from Jovita Pobre and some were
donated to them, therefore the properties should be excluded from the
Inventory of the Estate of Jovita Pobre.
20. Peitioner Francisco Pobre disputed the claim and contended that the
instruments of sale and donation in favor of the Llaneses are fictitious.
21. In the Special Proceedings case, Respondent Llanes filed a Motion to
exclude from the administration of Petitioner Francisco the properties being
claimed by her.
22. The lower court treated said motion as a Motion-Complaint and thus
Petitioner Francisco Pobre filed his Answer thereto. He once again denied
the allegations of Llanes and stressed the fact that the properties are still
registered in the name of Teresa Blanco and that the properties were never
validly transferred as the referred deeds of conveyances are fictitious.
23. The judge then issued an order denying Llanes’ motion to exclude the
properties but then he reconsidered his order and held that respondent
Llanes have been in actual possession under claim of ownership therefore
he ordered that the properties be excluded from the inventory.
24. Petitioner Francisco filed an MR but the same was denied by the trial court.
The latter therefore filed the present petition for Certiorari.
ISSUE/s: WoN the issue of ownership of the properties can be passed upon in the
case at bar and therefore be used to determine the exclusion/inclusion of the
properties in the inventory – NO. The general rule is that question of title to property
cannot be passed upon in a testate or intestate proceeding. However, when the parties
are all heirs of the decedent, it is optional upon them to submit to the probate court
the question of title to property and, when so submitted, the probate court may
definitely pass judgment thereon.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in this case is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
RATIO:
21. Petitioner Francsico allege that there was a denial to his right to due process
because there was no actual trial conducted and that the lower court simply
disposed the matter by issuing the orders of exclusion complained of.
22. However, due process was properly observed because Petitioner Francisco
was able to make a Reply to private respondents’ pleading.
23. In the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be
safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of opportunity to be
heard.
24. Respondent Judge afforded Petitioner Francisco and his counsel ample
opportunity to be heard at the hearings of February 24, 1982 and April 15,
1982 but Petitioner and his counsel were absent at those hearings.
25. Even assuming that he was not given prior notice of the various motions of
private respondent Llanes or her rejoinders, it has been held that there is no
denial of due process where the adverse parties were given the opportunity
to file a motion for reconsideration of an order which was issued pursuant to
a petition filed without prior notice to them
26. As the assailed orders do not appear to have been issued with grave abuse
of discretion, said orders cannot be set aside.
27. In said orders, Respondent Judge provisionally passed upon the
question of exclusion of property from the Inventory. His conclusions
regarding the ownership of said properties are not final but
provisional. The final determination of the ownership of the properties
in question in the case at bar, is not to be made in the Intestate
Proceedings, but in a Civil Case which is the separate Civil Action to
Quiet Title, filed by respondent Iluminada Llanes in the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Norte.
28. The assailed orders of exclusion in the intestate proceedings are merely
interlocutory orders, because the question of title of the properties
excluded from the Inventory of the Administrator cannot be
determined by the intestate court.
29. Petitioner Francisco should not rely in the case of Coca v. Pangilinan
wherein in that case after the issues have been joined and in case no
amicable settlement was reached, the probate court should receive evidence
or conduct a full dress hearing on the motion in the form of a complaint.
30. Such case should not be relied on for the case at bar because in such case
the appellees therein did not institute a separate action to determine the
ownership of the portion of the estate involved.
31. The general rule is that question of title to property cannot be passed
upon in a testate or intestate proceeding. However, when the parties are
all heirs of the decedent, it is optional upon them to submit to the
probate court the question of title to property and, when so submitted,
the probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon.
32. The second issue raised by Petitioner Administrator as to whether or not the
exclusion of the properties in question by the lower court was arbitrary for
being based mainly on the Special Administrator's Inventory-Report on the
Status and Possession of Properties, which report has no valid basis.
Petitioner is raising a factual issue which is not a proper subject of certiorari
proceedings
33. As to whether or not private respondents' claim of possession and/or
ownership based on the alleged documents of sale, donation and oral
contract of sale has any factual or legal basis, again the same should not be
resolved at this time and by means of a special civil action for certiorari.
34. On a similar question, the Court ruled: Even assuming the truth of the
private respondents' allegations that the sale of December 29, 1971 was
effected under suspicious circumstances and tainted with fraud and
that the right of Rufina as alleged half-sister and sole heir of Irene
remains open to question, these issues may only be threshed out in a
separate civil action filed by the respondent administrator against the
petitioner and not in the intestate proceedings.
 COCA v. BORROMEO (MENDOZA)
January 31, 1978 | Aquino, J. | Topic
G.R. No. L-27082 January 31, 1978
PETITIONER-APPELLANTS: Intestate Estate of the Spouses Juan C.
Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba. FILOMENO COCA, Administrator, PRIMA
PANGILINAN, and HEIRS OF CONCEPCION PANGILINAN-YAMUTA,
namely, MARIA P. YAMUTA DE ATAY, EUSEBIO P. YAMUTA, and
APOLINAR P. YAMUTA
OPPOSITORS-APPELLEES: GUADALUPE PIZARRAS VDA. DE
PANGILINAN, HEIRS OF FRANCISCO PANGILINAN, namely, FRANCIS,
ALGERIAN, BENJAMIN, PERLA and FRANCISCO, JR., all surnamed
PANGILINAN, and CRISPIN BORROMEO
G.R. No. L-29545 January 31, 1978
ADMINISTRATOR-APPELLANT: FILOMENO COCA
CLAIMANTS-APPELLEES: CRISPIN BORROMEO and GUADALUPE
PIZARRAS VDA. DE PANGILINAN and her Children
SUMMARY: The spouses Juan Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba died intestate.
They ossessed a homestead, consisting of two parcels of land in Misamis Occi-
dental. The Pangilinan spouses were survived by the following heirs: (1) Prima
Pangilinan, (2) Maria, Eusebio and Apolinar all surnamed Yamuta, the children
of Concepcion Pangilinan Yamuta who died in 1961, and (3) Francis, A Benja-
min Perla and Francisco, Jr., all surnamed Pan the children of Francisco Pan
who died in 1948 and who was also survived by his widow, Guadalupe Pizarras.
A Special Proceeding before Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental was
instituted. The appellant Coca contended that the lower court, as a probate court,
has no jurisdiction to decide the ownership of the twelve-hectare portion of Lot
No. 1112. On the other hand, the appellees heirs of Francisco Pangilinan coun-
ter that the lower court did not decide the ownership of the 12 hectares when it
ordered their exclusion from the project of partition.
Issue is WON the ownership of a parcel of land, whether belonging to the de-
ceased spouses or to their heirs, should be decided in the interstate proceeding
or in a separate action. Court held that the instant case may be treated as an ex-
ception to the general rule that questions of title should be ventilated in a sepa-
rate action. Here, the probate court had already received evidence on the owner-
ship of the twelve-hectare portion during the hearing of the motion for its exclu-
sion from the inventory, the only interested parties are the heirs who have all
appeared in the intestate proceeding.
DOCTRINE: GENERAL RULE: a probate court may not decide a question of
title or ownership,
EXCEPTION: the probate court is competent to decide the question of owner-
ship IF:
● the interested parties are all heirs,
● or the question is one of collation or advancement,
● or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate
court and the rights of third parties are not impaired
FACTS:
1. These two cases involve the question of whether the ownership of a parcel
of land, whether belonging to the deceased spouses or to their heirs, should
be decided in the intestate proceeding or in a separate action. Also in issue
in these two cases is the liability of the decedents' estate for the litigation
expenses allegedly incurred in a case regarding that same land. Being relat-
ed cases, their adjudication in a single decision was allowed in this Court's
resolution
2. The spouses Juan Pan and Teresa Magtuba died. They possession a home-
stead, consisting of two parcels of land, located at Barrio Bunawan or
Mauswagon, Calamba, Misamis Occidental.
3. One parcel (Lot No. 1927) has an area of 3.9791 hectares. It was covered by
OCT No. 10 of the registry of deeds of Oriental Misamis in the name of
Juan Pangilinan. It is now covered by TCT No. 86 (T-10).
4. The other (Lot No. 1112) has an area of 18.0291 hectares, covered by OCT
No. P-8419 in the name of the Heirs of Juan Pan , represented by Concep-
cion Pan de Yamuta.
5. According to Guadalupe Pizarras and her children, a third parcel, Lot No.
1920, with an area of 8 hectares which was surveyed in the name of Con-
cepcion Pan and which adjoins Lots Nos. 1927 and 1112, also forms part of
the estate of the deceased Pangilinan spouses.
6. The Pangilinan spouses were survived by the following heirs: (1) Prima
Pangilinan, (2) Maria, Eusebio and Apolinar all surnamed Yamuta, the chil-
dren of Concepcion Pangilinan Yamuta who died in 1961, and (3) Francis,
A Benjamin Perla and Francisco, Jr., all surnamed Pan the children of Fran-
cisco Pan who died in 1948 and who was also survived by his widow, Gua-
dalupe Pizarras. (It is not clear whether Roseller, Demosthenes and Eliza,
all surnamed Japay, were the children of the deceased Helen Pangilinan,
presumably a daughter of Francisco Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba)
7. Special Proceeding No. 508 of the CFI of Misamis Occidental was institut-
ed fior the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouses, Juan C. Pangili-
nan and Teresa Magtuba.
8. The administrator presented a project of partition wherein the combined ar-
eas of Lots Nos. 1112 and 1927, or 22.0082 hectares, were partitioned to
 Crispin Borrome, the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan (Mrs. Pizarras and chil-
dren), to Prima Pangilinan, and the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan.
9. It was also provided in the project of partition that the sum of P5,088.50, as
the alleged debt of the estate to Concepcion Pan should be divided equally
among the three sets of heirs and that Prima Pangilinan and the heirs of
Francisco Pangilinan should pay that amount to the heirs of Concepcion
Pangilinan.
10. The heirs of Francisco Pangilinan (Guadalupe Pizarras, et al.) opposed that
project of partition. They contended that the proposed partition contravened
the lower court's order which recognized the right of the heirs of Francisco
Pan to a twelve-hectare portion of Lot No. 1112; that Prima Pangilinan,
who sold her share to Francisco Pan should be excluded from the partition;
that the total share of the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan in Lot No. 1112 is
12.6720 hectares, while that of the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan is 6.3360
hectares, and that the claim of the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan for
115,088.50 had not been properly allowed.
11. The lower court in its order directed the administrator to pay the debt of the
estate to the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan. It deferred action on the pro-
ject of partition until the ownership of the twelve hectares, which were
claimed by the heirs of Francisco Pan and the six hectares, which were
claimed by Crispen Borromeo is determined in an ordinary action.
12. The lower court, apparently acting on its own volition, tackled once more
the project of partition. After noting that no separate action had been filed to
determine the ownership of the twelve hectares, it issued an order approving
the project of partition but excluding the twelve hectares claimed by the
heirs of Francisco Pangilinan.
13. That order on its face appears to be incomplete because, after excluding the
twelve hectares, the lower court did not bother to decide how the remainder
should be partitioned and whether Prima Pangilinan had a share in that re-
mainder.
14. That is the order under appeal in L-27082 by Filomeno Coca as administra-
tor, Prima Pangilinan and the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan. However, the
said appellants in their brief also assail the lower court's order of December
6, 1963, excluding 18 hectares from the inventory, which order was sus-
tained by the Court of Appeals in its decision in Atay vs. Catolico, CA-G.R.
Nos. 33165-R, and 3426-R, May 14,1964, 5 CAR 1200. This Court refused
to review that decision in its resolution of July 29, 1964, in
L-23088-89, Atay vs. Court of Appeals.
15. The other incident involves the lower court's order of May 11, 1968 which
directed that the claim of the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan for reimburse-
ment of litigation expenses be referred to the clerk of court for reception of
the evidence.
16. In another order, the lower court reiterated its order of October 2, 1965 that
the administrator should pay the heirs of Concepcion Pan the amount to be
reimbursed to her estate. The court further directed the administrator to ac-
count for the income of the estate, to recover any amount due from the spe-
cial administrator, and to pay the claim of Crispin Borromeo and the
amount due to the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan as directed in its order of
August 31, 1966 and in its approval of the accounting of the special admin-
istrator.
17. The Coca, Pangilinan and the heirs of Concepcion Pan also appealed from
those two orders.
18. The appellant contend that the lower court, as a probate court, has no ju-
risdiction to decide the ownership of the twelve-hectare portion of Lot
No. 1112. On the other hand, the appellees" or the heirs of Francisco
Pangilinan counter that the lower court did not decide the ownership of
the twelve hectares when it ordered their exclusion from the project of
partition. So, the problem is how the title to the twelve hectares should
be decided, whether in a separate action or in the intestate proceeding.
ISSUE/s: WON the ownership of a parcel of land, whether belonging to the
deceased spouses or to their heirs, should be decided in the interstate proceeding or
in a separate action.
RULING: WHEREFORE, (1) the lower court's amended order of August 31, 1966,
excluding twelve hectares from the partition of the estate of the deceased Pangilinan
spouses (L-270827) and (2) the two orders dated May 11, 1968, regarding the claim
Guadalupe Pizarras and her children and the debt of the estate to Concepcion
Pangilinan (L-29545) are reversed and set aside.
RATIO:
1. The instant case may be treated as an exception to the general rule that
questions of title should be ventilated in a separate action.
2. It should be clarified that whether a particular matter should be resolved
by the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of
its limited probate jurisdiction is in reality not a jurisdictional question. In
essence, it is a procedural question involving a mode of practice "which
may be waived”
3. As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be passed
upon in the testate or intestate proceeding. That question should be venti-
lated in a separate action. That general rule has qualifications or excep-
tions justified by expediency and convenience.
4. Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or tes-
tate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inven-
tory of a piece of property without prejudice to its final determination in a
separate action.
5. GR: a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership
6. EX: the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership IF:
a. the interested parties are all heirs
b. or the question is one of collation or advancement,
c. or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the
probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired
7. Here, the probate court had already received evidence on the ownership
of the twelve-hectare portion during the hearing of the motion for its ex-
clusion from the inventory, the only interested parties are the heirs who
have all appeared in the intestate proceeding.
8. As pointed out by the appellees, they belong to the poor stratum of socie-
ty. They should not be forced to incur additional expenses (such as filing
fees) by bringing a separate action to determine the ownership of the
twelve hectare portion.
9. The just, expeditious and inexpensive solution is to require the heirs of
Francisco Pangilinan to file in the intestate proceeding, Special Proceeding
No. 508, a motion in the form of a complaint wherein they should set forth
their claim for the twelve hectares in question, stating the ultimate facts in
support of their claim.
10. A new trial should be held on those matters after the filing of the proper
pleadings and in case no amicable settlement is reached. The heirs of Fran-
cisco Pangilinan should file their motion within thirty days from notice of
the entry of judgment this case.
11. The case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in accord-
ance with the guidelines already set forth.
 017 TRINIDAD v. CA (MERILLES)
September 20, 1991 | Paras, J. | Probate Court
PETITIONER: Tomas Trinidad
RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals
SUMMARY:Dimabuyu filed an information against Atty. Trinidad for
violation of PD 957. She alleges that Trinidad failed to deliver the title of the lot
purchased by her from Mother Earth Realty (which the SC considers as an alter
ego of the deceased). Trinidad is the appointed administrator of the estate of the
late Drepin who is the General Manager of Mother Earth Realty. Dimabuyu has
paid in full the purchase price, yet no title was delivered to her.
Trinidad pleaded not guilty to the accusations and alleges that Dimabuyu had
not actually paid all her obligations, that she did not even pay real estate taxes
on the land. Trinidad also argues that Dimabuyu failed to present a claim in the
probate court, and the probate court must first grant him authorization to release
the title of the property to Dimabuyu.
The RTC and CA found Trinidad guilty. The issue before the SC is whether the
lower courts failed to recognize the specific provision of law on the exclusive
jurisdiction of the probate court in reference to the settlement of the estate of a
decedent of which a delivery of title to a lot is one.
The SC held that NO. Exclusive jurisdiction is not with the probate court for
Section 41 of PD 957 explicitly provides that the remedy is in addition to all
other rights and remedies available. However, the SC finds merit in the
contention of Trinidad that he had to await the authorization of the probate court
before delivery of title. The SC notes that Dimaabuyu failed to present a claim
in the probate court, which is why there is a delay in the delivery.
DOCTRINE: It is apparent that whatever rights or remedies accruing to a lot
buyer, Ms. Dimabuyu in this case, under other laws do not foreclose the
application of PD 957
Questions of title to any property apparent still belonging to estate of the
deceased may be passed upon in the Probate Court, with consent of all the
parties, without prejudice to third persons. In fact, third persons may even
intervene in the tstate or intestate proceedings to protect their interest
FACTS:
12. An information was filed with the CFI of Manila, where Atty. Trinidad, the
petitioner, was charged with violation of P.D. 957 for non-delivery of title.
13. The allegations are as follows:
a. On 20 February 1978 to present, the accused is the administrator of
the estate of the late Nicolai Drepin, resident and General Manager
of the Mother Earth Realty Development Corporation, owner-
developer of the Munting Baguio Village Subdivision, located at
Antipolo, Rizal
b. Trinidad had knowledge of the sale of Lot No. 19, Block No. 51 of
the said Subdivision to FRANCISCA T. DIMABUYU for the
purchase price of P14,000,00.
c. He fail to deliver the title of said subdivision lot to the said lot
buyer upon full payment thereof in violation of the aforementioned
P.D. No. 957
14. The prosecution presented only one witness, Francisca T. Dimabuyu. She
testified in her direct and cross:
a. that she filed a case against the accused Tomas Trinidad with
the Task Force of the Ministry (now Department of Justice) for
Violation of P.D. No. 957 for non-delivery of title and she
executed an affidavit in support of her complaint before the Task
Force of the Ministry.
b. She filed this complaint against Tomas Trinidad for the non-
issuance of title wherein there was a contract executed by her with
the Mother Earth Realty Development Corporation
c. She testified that the total price bought by her was P4000 (PLS
NOTE: discrepancy of 10k with the information filed? Di tagalong
mag math lawyers) and that she was paying P38.68 monthly until
full payment is made.
d. She was given receipts which showed that she paid up to
P7000, including amortization.
e. She presented a secretary’s certificate and receipts that payments
were made to Mother Earth Realty Dev. Corp.
f. She went to the National Housing Authority and inquired if the
corporation of the accused is fake. A hearing was held, but
Trinidad did not appear
g. She admitted that she is a signatory to the contract, that she
did not pay real estate taxes of the land, and that she did not go
to probate court.
15. Trinidad in his direct testimony and cross:
a. Testified to the fact that in the Intestate Proceedings of the estate of
the late Nicolai Drepin, he became the Judicial Administrator
appointed in the year 1976
b. That he took hold of the property of the deceased including the
Mother Earth Realty Development Corporation, and also the
unregistered property situated at Antipolo, Rizal.
 c. The whole lot is titled in the name of testator.
d. He continued to receive payments of lots for sale in installment. In
1978 the National Housing Authority stopped the sale of lots, and
his corporation was told to stop operating the property now the
place being under control of the Ministry of Human Settlements.
e. According to him, Ms. Francesca T. Dimabuyu had not complied
with all the requirements for the complainant had not paid the
taxes.
f. He asked the Probate Court as administrator to allow him to
execute a Deed of Sale to his lot buyers and he was allowed in
November 1982 (note that Dimabuyu did not intervene in the
probate proceedings)
g. The Mother Earth Realty Development Corporation, according to
him, is not in business now, and he is not the administrator.
h. His duties as administrator are with the full authority to take
possession of all properties of the deceased.
i. He admitted that he was not able to deliver any title to
Francesa Dimabuyu for according to him the Dimabuyu had
not actually paid all her obligations because there is no
adjustment considering the value of the peso which has
declined these days. Dimabuyu has not even paid the taxes of
the land so that the contract has not been duly complied with.
16. The RTC rendered judgement finding Trinidad guilty of violation of PD957
17. The case was elevated tot he IAC which affirmed the RTC decision in toto
18. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/s:
2. Whether or not the IAC was in error in not recognizing the specific
provision of law on the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court in
reference to the settlement of the estate of a decedent of which a delivery of
title to a lot is one - NO. Exclusive jurisdiction is not with the probate court
for Section 41 of PD 957 explicitly provides that the remedy is in addition
to all other rights and remedies available.
RULING: We therefore see no criminal intent whatsoever on his part and
accordingly the judgment of the appellate court is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, with costs de officio.
RATIO:
1. The SC finds that the contention is without merit.
2. Section 41. Other Remedies. — The rights and remedies provided in this
Decree shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that
may be available under existing laws.
3. From the foregoing, it is apparent that whatever rights or remedies
accruing to a lot buyer, Ms. Dimabuyu in this case, under other laws do
not foreclose the application of PD 957.
4. In the case at bar, it is uncontroverted that Ms. Dimabuyu has fully paid in
monthly installments the agreed purchase price for the lot.
5. Notwithstanding full payment, Trinidad has failed and refused to deliver to
Ms. Dimabuyu the certificate of title corresponding to the lot despite
numerous demands.
6. Trinidad maintains that to proceed execute the deed of absolute sale without
the go-signal of th Probate Court is to be recreant to his sworn duty as
administrator, as well as to render void his actuations done without the
permission of the Probate Court.
a. This contention is correct and is impressed with merit.
b. Inasmuch as the owner-seller of the property was already
deceased and there were proceedings in the Probate Court, it
was incumbent for the Probate Court to first give
authorization to administrator of the estate to deliver titles of
lots which had previously been sold.
7. Dimabuyu had been instructed by Trinidad to file the proper petition or
motion with he Probate court for delivery of said title but Dimabuyu
disregarded said instructions.
8. If at anybody should be blamed, it should be Dimabuyu herself for her
failure to obtain the needed authorization fro the court.
9. Questions of title to any property apparent still belonging to estate of
the deceased may be passed upon in the Probate Court, with consent of
all the parties, without prejudice to third persons.
a. In fact, third persons may even intervene in the testate or intestate
proceedings to protect their interest
10. The SC uphold Trinidad’s contention therefore that if he had proceeded to
immediately cause the delivery of the title of private complainant herein, he
could have been held liable for a blatant disregard of the jurisdiction and
function of the Probate Court.
11. Truly, he was caught between the horns of a dilemma which was not of his
own making.
12. If the probate proceedings referred to in this case are still going on, the
proper remedy of Dimabuyu herein is to file before said Probate Court her
claim for the delivery of the title of the lot she has purchased.
13. If on the other hand, said probate proceedings are already closed and
terminated, the Mother Earth Realty Development Corporation through its
present President or General Manager is hereby ordered to cause the
delivery of said title to Ms. Dimabuyu, within the shortest possible time, as
soon as all the requirements therefore have been complied with.
14. The SC gives this remedy to prevent Ms. Dimabuyu from being prejudiced.
Melencio-Herrera, dissenting:
 1. It should not be the obligation of the buyer to file before Probate Court her claim for
delivery of the title against estate of the decedent.
2. That was Trinidad’s obligation as administrator not only of the estate of the
decedent but also administrator/manager of the development corporation.
3. Article 1495 of the Civil Code mandates that the vendor is bound transfer the
ownership of and deliver, as well as warrant thing which is the object of the sale.
4. The vendee has the right receive, and the vendor the corresponding obligation to
transfer to the former, not only the possession and enjoyment of the land but also the
certificate of title

Padilla, dissenting:
1. The SC seems to overlook the fact that the gravamen of the offense — a special
offense— under P.D. 957 is that Trinidad, as manager of the subdivision developer,
accepted the installment payments until the purchase price had been fully
paid without being able to deliver the title to the private complainant-buyer.
2. If there was any one required or duty bound to seek and obtain the authority of the
probate court to execute the deed of sale in favor of Dimabuyu it was the Trinidad
and none other. And if, for any reason, he had no authority forthcoming from the
probate court to execute the deed of sale, he certainly had no right or business to
continue collecting or receiving payments from the private complainant.
 018 SOLIVIO v. CA (PELIÑO)
February 12, 1990 | Medialdea, J. | Jurisdiction
PETITIONER: Celedonia Solivio
RESPONDENTS: The Honorable Court of Appeals and Concordia Javellana Villanueva
SUMMARY: Esteban died without any ascendants nor descendants, and was survived
only by Celedonia, his maternal aunt, and Concordia, his paternal aunt. Esteban, on
several occasions relayed that he would like to place his estate in a foundation, named
after his mother, that would help poor but deserving students obtain a college education,
but he died without setting it up. Celedonia and Concordia agreed to carry out Esteban’s
plan, and pursuant to this, Celedonia took care of the proceedings leading to the formation
of the foundation and also instituted special proceedings for her appointment as
administratrix of the estate, but later amended praying that she be declared the sole heir,
and that after payment of all claims and accounting, the estate be adjudicated to her. RTC
Br. 23 declared her as sole heir and she paid all the obligations of the estate, etc.
Concordia filed a MR of the court’s order declaring Celedonia as the sole heir of Esteban
because she was claiming that she was also an heir, but the motion was denied because of
tardiness. Instead of an appeal, she filed 1 yr and 2 mos later in RTC Br. 26 for
partition, recovery of possession, ownership, and damages. RTC Br. 26 ruled in favor
of Concordia. On Concordia’s motion, RTC Br. 26 ordered the execution of its judgment
pending appeal and required Celedonia to submit an inventory and accounting of the
estate. In Celedonia’s MR, she averred that the properties had already been transferred to
and in possession of the foundation; trial court denied her MR. Celedonia perfected an
appeal to the CA, but the CA affirmed the decision of RTC Br. 26 in toto. Hence, this
petition. The main issue in this case is whether or not Br. 26 had jurisdiction to entertain
the case for partition and recovery of Concordia’s share of Esteban’s estate even while the
probate proceedings in Br. 23 were still pending. The SC held in the negative. It is the
order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the persons
entitled thereto that brings to a close the intestate proceedings, puts an end to the
administration, and thus far relieves the administrator from his duties. The order declaring
Celedonia as the sole heir of Esteban’s estate did not toll the end of the proceedings, since
the last paragraph of the order directed the administratrix to “hurry up the settlement of
the estate.” The separate action was improperly filed for it is the probate court that has
exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate. A court should
not interfere with probate proceedings pending in a co-equal court.
DOCTRINE: It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the
estate to the persons entitled thereto that brings to a close the intestate proceedings, puts
an end to the administration, and thus far relieves the administrator from his duties.
FACTS:
25. Esteban Javellana, Jr. (Esteban) was the author of the 1st post-war Filipino
nove, “Without Seeing the Dawn”.
a. He died a bachelor, with no ascendants, descendants, brothers, sisters,
nephews, or nieces.
b. His only surviving relatives are: (1) Celedonia Solivio (Celedonia) his
maternal aunt (spinster sister of his mother) and (2) Concordia
Javellana-Villanueva, the sister of his deceased father.
26. Esteban’s mother (Salustia) and Celedonia took care of Esteban.
27. When Salustia got married to Esteban’s father, she brought paraphernal
properties into the marriage which she inherited from her mother, but there
was no conjugal property acquired during her marriage with Esteban’s
father since their marriage was short-lived.
28. When Salustia died, she left all her properties to Esteban, including a house
and lot in IloIlo City where she, Celedonia, and Esteban lived.
a. The properties were subsequently transferred to Esteban.
29. During his lifetime, Esteban had more than once expressed to Celedonia
and some close friends that he plans to place his estate in a foundation to
honor his mother and to help poor but deserving students obtain a college
education, but he died of a heart attach without being able to set it up.
a. 2 weeks after the funeral, Celedonia and Concordia were deciding what
to do with Esteban’s properties.
b. Celedonia told Concordia of Esteban’s desire to place the estate in a
foundation to be named after his mother.
c. Concordia agreed to carry out this plan and this fact was admitted by
her in the “Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider the Order”
30. Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the
proceedings leading to the formation of the foundation, Celedonia, in good
faith and upon counsel’s advice, filed on 8 March 198, Spl. Proceeding No.
2540 for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate of Esteban.
a. She later filed an amended petition praying that letters of admin be
issued ot her, she be declared the sole heir, that after payment of all
claims and rendition of inventory and accounting, the estate be
adjudicated to her.
b. After due publication and hearing of the petition, as well as the
amended one, she was declared sole heir of Esteban’s estate and her
reasons for doing so were:
i. Properties of the estate had come from her sister, Salustia;
ii. She is Esteban’s nearest relative on his mother’s side;
iii. With her as sole heir, the disposition of the properties of the
estate to fund the foundation would be facilitated.
31. RTC Br. 236 declared Celedonia as the sole heir of Esteban.
a. She sold the properties to pay taxes and other obligations, and
established the foundation in Solustia’s name, which was registered in
the SEC.
32. On 7 August 1978, Concordia filed a MR of the court’s order declaring
Celedonia as the sole heir of Esteban because she was claiming that she was
also an heir, but the motion was denied because of tardiness.
6
It was previously CFI, but during the case, nagging RTC na yung CFI.
 a. Instead of an appeal, she filed 1 yr and 2 mos later in RTC Br. 26
for partition, recovery of possession, ownership, and damages.
b. RTC Br. 26 ruled in favor of Concordia.
c. On Concordia’s motion, RTC Br. 26 ordered the execution of its
judgment pending appeal and required Celedonia to submit an
inventory and accounting of the estate.
d. In Celedonia’s MR, she averred that the properties had already been
transferred to and in possession of the foundation; trial court denied her
MR.
33. Celedonia perfected an appeal to the CA, but the CA affirmed the decision
of RTC Br. 26 in toto.
34. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/s:
1. WON Br. 26 had jurisdiction to entertain the case for partition and recovery
of Concordia’s share of Esteban’s estate even while the probate proceedings
in Br. 23 were still pending. - NO, the order declaring Celedonia as the sole
heir of Esteban’s estate did not toll the end of the proceedings.
2. WON Concordia was prevented from intervening in the probate
proceedings through extrinsic fraud. - NO, she knew of the special
proceedings and probate proceedings are in rem and publication was done.
3. WON Esteban’s properties were subject to reserva truncal in favor of
Celedonia. - NO, Esteban was not an ascendant, but the descendant of the
origin.
4. WON Concordia may recover her share of the estate after she had agreed to
place it in the foundation and notwithstanding the fact that the foundation
has been formed and the properties have already been transferred to it. -
NO, she already agreed to it, thus, must honor it.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The decision of
the trial court and CA are hereby SET ASIDE. Concordia is declared an heair of the
late Esteban, entitled to ½ of his estate. However, conformably with the agreement
between her and her co-heir, Celedonia, the entire estate of Esteban should be
conveyed to the foundation of which both Celedonia and Concordia shall be trustees,
and each shall be entitled to nominate an equal number of trustees to constitute the
Board of Trustees of the foundation which shall administer the same for the purposes
set forth in its charter. Celedonia, as administratrix of the estate, shall submit to the
probate court an inventory and accounting of the estate of the deceased preparatory
to terminating the proceedings therein.
RATIO:
On whether Br. 26 had jurisdiction to entertain Concordia’s petition despite the
pending probate proceedings in Br. 23
1. It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the
estate to the persons entitled thereto that brings to a close the intestate
proceedings, puts an end to the administration, and thus far relieves the
administrator from his duties.
2. The order declaring Celedonia as the sole heir of Esteban’s estate did not
toll the end of the proceedings, since the last paragraph of the order directed
the administratrix to “hurry up the settlement of the estate.”7
3. In view of the pendency of the probate proceedinsg, Concordia’s motion to
set aside the order declaring Celedonia as the sole heir and to have herself
declared as a co-heir and to recover her share was properly filed in the
probate case.
a. Her remedy when the court denied her motion was to elevate the denial
to the CA by way of a review on certiorari, but instead, she filed after
more than a year, a separate aaction for the same purpose in Br. 26.
4. The separate action was improperly filed for it is the probate court that
has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the
estate.
a. The probate court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to make
distribution, has power to determine the proportion or parts to
which each is entitled. The power to determine the legality or
illegality of the testamentary provision is inherent in the
jurisdiction of the court making a just and legal distribution of the
inheritance. To hold that a separate and independent action is
necessary would be contrary to the general tendency of the
jurisprudence of avoiding multiplicity of suits and is expensive,
dilatory, and impractical.
b. A judicial declaration that a certain person is the only heir of the
decedent is exclusively within the range of the administratrix
proceedings and cannot properly be made an independent action; a
7
2. As regards the second incident [Motion for Declaration of Miss Celedonia Solivio as Sole Heir, dated March 7, 1978],
it appears from the record that despite the notices posted and the publication of these proceedings as required by law, no
other heirs came out to interpose any opposition to the instant proceeding. It further appears that herein Administratrix is
the only claimant-heir to the estate of the late Esteban Javellana who died on February 26, 1977.
During the hearing of the motion for declaration as heir on March 17, 1978, it was established that the late Esteban
Javellana died single, without any known issue, and without any surviving parents. His nearest relative is the herein
Administratrix, an elder [sic] sister of his late mother who reared him and with whom he had always been living with
[sic] during his lifetime.
xxxxxxxxx
2. Miss Celedonia Solivio, Administratrix of this estate, is hereby declared as the sole and legal heir of the late Esteban S.
Javellana, who died intestate on February 26, 1977 at La Paz, Iloilo City.
The Administratrix is hereby instructed to hurry up with the settlement of this estate so that it can be terminated. (pp, 14-
16, Record)
 separate action for declaration of heirs is not proper.
5. A court should not interfere with probate proceedings pending in a co-
equal court.
a. Guilas v. Judge of the CFI of Pampanga: The probate court loses
jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the
payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the
heirs entitiled to receive the same. The finality of the approval of
the project of partition by itself alone does not terminate the
probate proceeding.
b. As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been
complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed
and terminated; because a judicial partition is not final and
conclusive and does not prevent the heirs from bringing an action
to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period therefore has
not elapsed.
c. The better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his
share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in the same
probate or administration proceedings, or for reopening of the
probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed,
and not through an independent action, which would be tried by
another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order
of the probate or intestate court already final and executed and re-
shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of.
6. Difference between the Litam v. Rivera case and Guilas case:
a. Litam: despite pendency of special proceedings for settlement of
intestate estate of the deceased, the plaintiffs filed a civil action where
they claimed that they were the children by a previous marriage, the
trial court declared that they were not children of the deceased, but on
appeal, the SC ruled that the declarations were improper because it is
within the exclusive competence of the court in the special proceedings
in which it is not as yet, in issue, and will not be, ordinarily, in issue
until the presentation of the project of partition.
b. Guilas: Estate proceedings had already been closed and terminated for
over 3 yrs, the action for annulment of project of partition was allowed.
c. In this case: estate proceedings are still pending, but nonetheless,
Concordia had lost her right to have herself declared as co-heir in said
proceedings, SC has opted to proceed to discuss the merits of her claim
in the interest of justice.
7. The orders of RTC Br. 26 setting aside the probate proceedings on the
ground of extrinsic fraud and declaring Concordia a co-heir, ordering
partition of the estate and requiring Celedonia to submit an inventory were
improper since these lie within the exclusive competence of the probate
court.
On the issue of extrinsic fraud
1. Extrinsic fraud - any act or conduct of the prevailing party which prevented
a fair submission of the controversy.
2. In this case, extrinsic fraud claim is not warranted since: (a) Concordia was
not unaware of the special proceedings intended to be filed by Celedonia.
Concordia was not prevented from intervening in the proceedings, rather,
she stayed away by choice. She also knew that the estate came exclusively
from Esteban’s mother; (b) Probate proceedings are in rem. Notice of time
and place of hearing of petition are required to be published (Rule 76, Sec.
3 in rel. to Sec. 3, Rule 79 of ROC). There was publication in “Bagong
Kasanag” and this is considered as constructive notice.
On the issue of reserva troncal
1. The claim of Celedonia that the property is reserva troncal has no merit.
Esteban was not an ascendant of his mother, but the descendant. Therefore,
he did not hold his inheritance subject to a reservation in favor of his aunt,
who is his relative within the 3rd degree on his mother’s side.
On Concordia’s ½ share
1. Concordia agreed to deliver the estate of Esteban to the foundation in an
agreement which she ratified and confirmed in her “Motion to Reopen
and/or Reconsider Order dated April 3, 1978”; she is bound by that
agreement.
a. It is true that she did not waive her inheritance in favor of Celedonia,
but she did agree to place all of Esteban’s estate in the foundation.
b. Since what she made was a judicial admission, no further evidence is
needed to prove the agreement. This agreement was also never
impugned. Her husband also confirmed the agreement, but endeavored
to dilute it by alleging that his wife didn’t intend to give all, but only
half of her share.
c. Records show that the foundation “Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana
Foundation” was established and duly registered in the SEC. Having
agreed to contribute her share of Esteban’s estate to the foundation,
Concordia is obligated to honor her commitment as Celedonia has
honored hers.
 019 IGNACIO V. REYES (EMAR)
Jul 12, 2017 | Peralta | General Principles; Certiorari - final v. interlocutory
PETITIONER: Teresa R. Ignacio (Teresa)
RESPONDENTS: Ramon Reyes, Florencio Reyes, Jr., Rosario R. Du and Carmel-
ita R. Pastor
SUMMARY: Administratrix Teresa, with the approval of the intestate court Pasig
RTC Br 151, leased the Florencio Sr. estate’s parcels of land in Baguio to different
persons. Other heirs of Florencio Sr., as alleged co-owners of the properties (re-
spondents in this case) filed before the Baguio RTC 3 complaints for partition, an-
nulment of lease contract, accounting and damages with prayer for issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction against Teresa and the lessees because the co-owners
did not receive their share (Fact # 11). The Baguio RTC stated that it awaits a Re-
quest Order from the intestate court regarding the possible distribution of the sub-
ject properties so the respondents filed a motion before the intestate court for issu-
ance of an order allowing Baguio RTC’s (1) distribution of the heirs' aliquot shares
in the co-owned properties' net income, and (2) partition of the said properties
which the intestate court denied. The respondents filed a petition for certiorari be-
fore the CA assailing such denial. CA reversed the intestate court’s denial and di-
rected the Baguio RTC to partition the properties. Teresa’s MR was denied so Te-
resa went to the SC alleging that the petition for certiorari was not the proper rem-
edy (Fact #19) ISSUE: WON the assailed orders were final or interlocutory in na-
ture; thus making the petition for certiorari before the CA the proper remedy –
YES. (continue to doctrine)
DOCTRINE: Orders denying motion to allow the distribution of the estate's and
co-owners' shares in the subject properties were interlocutory because such denial
was not a final determination of co-ownership since in a special proceeding for the
probate of a will, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the pro-
bate court cannot resolve with finality.
Note: There are 2 courts in this case:
Intestate Court – Pasig RTC
Court with jurisdiction over the disputed real properties– Baguio RTC
FACTS:
1. Jul 11, 1967: Angel Reyes and Oliva R. Arevalo filed before the then Rizal CFI
(Pasig RTC Br 151; hereinafter intestate court) a Petition for Letters of Admin-
istration of the Estate of their deceased father Florencio Reyes, Sr., and enumer-
ated the surviving heirs, namely: Oliva, Francisca Vda. de Justiniani, Angel,
Amparo R. Avecilla, Ramon Reyes, Teresa, Rosario R. Du, Jose Reyes, Soledad
Reyes, Carmelita R. Pastor, and Florencio Reyes, Jr.
2. Jul 15, 1967: Intestate court appointed Oliva as the special administratrix of the
Florencio Sr. estate.
3. November 23, 1967: Oliva was appointed as the regular administratrix.
4. 1982: Florencio, Jr. replaced Oliva.
5. Aug 8, 1994: Teresa became the administratrix.
6. Dec 5, 1994: Teresa executed a lease contract over a 398sqm land at Magsaysay
Avenue, Baguio (Magsaysay property) in favor of Gonzalo Ong, Virginia Lim,
Nino Yu, Francisco Lim and Simona Go.
7. July 15, 1996: Intestate court approved the lease contract upon Teresa's June 4,
1996 motion.
8. Sept. 26, 1996: intestate court allowed Teresa to enter into a lease contract over
646 sqm land at Session Road, Baguio City (Session Road property) to Fa-
mous Realty Corporation (FRC).
9. October 29, 1996, Teresa leased the Session Road property to FRC for Jul 1,
1996 - Jun 30, 2003, with a monthly rental of P135,000.00.
10. Jan 1997: Teresa leased the properties located at Loakan Road, Baguio City
covered by TCT Nos. T-26770 and T-26772 (Loakan and Military Cut-off
properties), in favor of ATC Wonderland, Inc. and, subsequently, to Gloria de
Guzman and Sonshine Pre-School for 10y, effective Sept 1, 1996 - Aug 31,
2006.
11. Sept 25, 2001: The other heirs: Respondents Ramon, Florencio Jr., Rosario and
Carmelita, and the Heirs of Amparo, Intestate Estate of Soledad, Jose and Intes-
tate Estate of Angel (plaintiffs) filed before the Baguio RTC, Br. 3, 3 complaints
for partition, annulment of lease contract, accounting and damages with prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against Teresa and the les-
sees of the subject Baguio properties; alleging:
a. with the exception of the lessees, the parties and the Florencio Sr. estate
own 1/10 of each of the Session Road, Loakan and Military Cut-off, and
Magsaysay properties.
b. Teresa misrepresented that the Florencio Sr. estate is the sole owner of the
properties and leased the same to the other parties without their conformity.
c. Florencio Sr. estate is different from the Heirs of Florencio Sr. and Heirs of
Salud.
d. As co-owners, they have not received their share in the monthly rentals of
the properties aforementioned due to Teresa's failure to duly account for
the same. Thus, they are asking for the partition of the properties, for the
accounting of all the rentals, income or profits derived, and deliver the
same to the plaintiffs, for the annulment of the lease contracts and order the
lessees to vacate the premises, and for the payment of damages.
12. Baguio RTC directed and commissioned a team of auditors with Leticia
Clemente as the head accountant to conduct an accounting of the properties.
 Based on the Report,16 Teresa, as administratrix of the Florencio Sr. estate, had
a total cash accountability of P15,238,066.51.
13. Aug 27, 2003: Baguio RTC manifested that it shall await a Request Order from
the intestate court regarding the possible distribution of the subject properties.
14. Jan 19, 2004: respondents and others filed a motion before the intestate court
praying for the issuance of an order allowing
a. distribution of the heirs' aliquot shares in the co-owned properties' net in-
come, and
b. partition of the said properties by the Baguio RTC.
15. Apr 13, 2004: Intestate court denied the motion, stating that:
This Court cannot allow the Baguio Court to partition the property of the estate because this Court already
has jurisdiction over the matter. In fact, this Court is wondering why actions for partition are being enter-
tained in other jurisdictions when such can be readily addressed by this Court as an estate court.
WHEREFORE, finding no merit in the instant motion, the Court hereby DENIES the same.
16. June 14, 2012: Intestate court denied respondents' MR.
17. Respondents filed before the CA a petition for certiorari assailing the Orders
(preceding 2 facts) disallowing the partition of the Baguio properties.
18. March 27, 2014: CA granted the petition and annulled and set aside the assailed
Orders of the intestate court.
19. Upon denial of her MR, Teresa filed this case before the SC, alleging:
a. There is an appeal or other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordi-
nary course of law available to the respondents
b. The intestate court asserted its jurisdiction and authority over the subject
properties and proceeded to conduct hearings to resolve the issues of ac-
counting, payment of advances, and distribution of assets and the proceeds
of the sale of the estate properties.
c. Baguio RTC opted to defer and not to proceed with the cases. Thus, it is
logical and proper that the respondents ask the Baguio RTC to proceed
with the case and then appeal the same if denied.
d. The obligations enumerated in Sec 1, R908 has not yet been fully paid.
Thus, it would be premature for the TC to allow the advance distribution of
8
Section 1. When order for distribution of reside made. — When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses
of administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in ac-
cordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or administrator, or of a
person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the
persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled, and such
persons may demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other
person having the same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the law-
ful heirs of the deceased person or as the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law,
the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
the estate. A partial and premature distribution of the estate may only be
done upon posting of a bond, conditioned upon the full payment of the ob-
ligations, which was not done in the present case.
e. respondents are asking the TC to violate the RoC.
f. The challenged orders were not issued with grave abuse of discretion.
20. However, Teresa’s Partial Motion to Dismiss before the SC, Teresa agrees with
the CA findings that the Magsaysay property is co-owned by the parties, and
should not be covered by the estate proceedings.
ISSUE: WON the assailed orders were final or interlocutory in nature; thus making
the petition for certiorari before the CA the proper remedy – YES. The order assailed
was a denial of partition and distribution of shares and was not a final determination
of co-ownership since in a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the question
of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with
finality.
RULING: Petition for review on certiorari filed by Teresa is DENIED. CA Deci-
sion and Resolution are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, such that the Baguio
RTC, Branch 3 is DIRECTED to RESUME trial on the merits in SCA Nos. 5055-
R, 5056-R, and 5057-R to determine the ownership of the subject properties and to
partition as co-owners, if proper.
RATIO:
1. GR: Petition for certiorari is valid only when the question involved is an error of
jurisdiction, or when there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or ex-
cess of jurisdiction on the part of the court or tribunals exercising quasi-judicial
functions.
Final judgment or order
2. One that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court
in respect thereto.
3. Examples:
a. Adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at
the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the par-
ties are and which party is in the right;
b. Judgment dismissing an action on grounds of res judicata or prescription.
4. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy
or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has been made or
provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, condi-
tioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.
5. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties' next
move (which among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial
or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately to cause the exe-
cution of the judgment once it becomes "final" or, to use the established and
more distinctive term, "final and executory."
Interlocutory order
6. Does not finally dispose of the case
7. Does not end the Court's task of adjudicating the parties' contentions and deter-
mining their rights and liabilities as regards each other
8. Indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court
9. Examples: Order:
a. denying a motion to dismiss under R16,
b. granting a motion for extension of time to file a pleading,
c. authorizing amendment thereof, or granting or denying applications for
postponement, or production or inspection of documents or things, etc.
10. May not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may
eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case.
On WON the assailed orders are interlocutory orders
11. The assailed April 13, 2004 and June 14, 2012 Orders denying respondents'
motion to allow the distribution of the estate's and co-owners' shares in the
subject properties were interlocutory because such denial was not a final de-
termination of their alleged co-ownership.
12. The intestate court merely asserted its jurisdiction over the properties which
were allegedly co-owned with the Florencio Sr. estate.
13. Jurisdiction of the TC as an intestate court is special and limited as it relates
only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the
estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of ques-
tions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. This is true whether or
not the property is alleged to belong to the estate.
14. The doctrine, “In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the question of
ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with
finality” applies with equal force to an intestate proceeding as in this case.
"[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or deter-
mine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside par-
ties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or
should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If
there is not dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing
parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title be-
cause the probate court cannot do so.”
15. Agtarap v. Agtarap states the instances when the intestate court may pass upon
the issue of ownership:
a. Probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate pro-
ceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a
piece of property without prejudice to the final determination of owner-
ship in a separate action.
b. If the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one
of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of ju-
risdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not im-
paired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership.
Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the set-
tlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the sta-
tus of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or
exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
16. The GR on the limited jurisdiction of the RTC as intestate court is applicable in
SCA Nos. 5055-R and 5056-R.
17. As to the Magsaysay property in SCA No. 5057-R, the certificate of title shows
that the rights of parties other than heirs of Florencio Sr. will be impaired
should the intestate court decide on the ownership of the property.
18. Respondents presented certificates of title of the properties registered under their
names and the Florencio Sr. estate, and their respective shares.
19. Bolisay v. Judge Alcid: If a property covered by Torrens Title is involved, the
presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the
absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should
be considered as the owner of the property in controversy until his title is nulli-
fied or modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when possession
of the property itself is in the persons named in the title.
20. They are considered the owners of the properties until their title is nullified or
modified in an appropriate ordinary action. The co-ownership of the said proper-
ties by virtue of the certificates of title is a common issue in the complaints for
partition filed before the Baguio RTC.
21. Intestate court committed grave abuse of discretion when it asserted jurisdiction
over the subject properties since its jurisdiction relates only to matters having to
do with the settlement of the estate of deceased persons. Any decision that the
intestate court would render on the title of the properties would at best be merely
provisional in character, and would yield to a final determination in a separate
action.
22. An action for partition under R69 is typically brought by a person claiming to be
the owner of a specified property against a defendant or defendants whom the
 plaintiff recognizes to be his co-owners, and is premised on the existence or
non-existence of co-ownership between the parties.
23. Lim De Mesa v. CA: Determination of the existence of co-ownership is the first
stage to accord with the remedy of judicial partition.
The first stage of an action for judicial partition and/or accounting is concerned with the determination of
whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists and a partition is proper, that is, it is not otherwise legally
proscribed and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This
phase may end in a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to the desired partition either because a co-
ownership does not exist or a partition is legally prohibited. It may also end with an adjudgment that a co-
ownership does in truth exist, that partition is proper in the premises, and that an accounting of rents and
profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. In the latter case, "the parties
may, if they are able to agree, make partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and
the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon by all the parties." In either case, whether the action is
dismissed or partition and/or accounting is decreed, the order is a final one and may be appealed by any
party aggrieved thereby.
24. Baguio RTC shirked from its duty when it deferred the trial to await a request
order from the intestate court regarding the possible distribution. In fact, it has
not yet made a definite ruling on the existence of co-ownership. There was no
declaration of entitlement to the desired partition either because a co-ownership
exists or a partition is not legally prohibited.
25. It is for the TC to proceed and determine once and for all if there is co-
ownership and to partition the subject properties if there is no legal prohibition.
26. It is best for the Baguio RTC to settle whether the respondents are claiming
ownership over the properties by virtue of their title adverse to that of their late
father and his estate and not by any right of inheritance.
 020 CUA v. VARGAS (Sarmiento)
October 31, 2006 | Azcuna, J. | Rule 74, Section 1
PETITIONER: Joseph Cua
RESPONDENTS: Gloria Vargas, Aurora Vargas, Ramon Vargas, Marites
Vargas, Edelina Vargas and Gemma Vargas
SUMMARY: Parcel of land was left behind by Paulina Vargas. A notarized
Extrajudicial Settlement among heirs was executed but not all the heirs partici-
pated nor signed the document. Then the settlement was published. Another Ex-
trajudicial Settlement with Sale was executed. A portion of the land was sold to
Cua, without notifying the other heirs. Upon knowledge of the transaction, heirs
of Vargas tried to redeem the property by exercising their right of legal redemp-
tion. When the offer to redeem was refused Gloria Vargas filed a case for an-
nulment of Extra Judicial Settlement and Legal Redemption of the lot with the
MTC of Virac, Catanduanes against petitioner Cua. They claimed that the Extra
Judicial Settlement Among Heirs and the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs
with Sale were null and void and had no legal and binding effect on them be-
cause they were not notified and did not participate in the proceedings. They
likewise alleged that the 30-day period following a written notice by the vendors
to their co-owners for them to exercise the right of redemption of the property
had not yet set in as no written notice was sent to them. The court sided with the
respondent heirs of Vargas. The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is
an ex parte proceeding. The rule states, however, that persons who do not partic-
ipate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby. It
contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before any deed of settle-
ment and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to
participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not
after such an agreement has already been executed as what happened in the in-
stant case with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among
heirs. While the heirs who can validly dispose of their pro indiviso share, the
respondents Vargas are given the right to redeem these shares pursuant to Article
1088 of the Civil Code. The right to redeem was never lost because respondents
were never notified in writing of the actual sale by their co-heirs. Based on the
provision, there is a need for written notice to start the period of redemption
DOCTRINE: Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. That persons who
do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be
bound thereby.The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive
notice to the heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because the
same was notice after the fact of execution.
1. A parcel of residential land with an area of 99 square meters located in San
Juan, Virac, Catanduanes was left behind by the late Paulina Vargas.
2. On February 4, 1994, a notarized Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs
was executed by and among Paulina Vargas" heirs, namely Ester Vargas,
Visitacion Vargas, Juan Vargas, Zenaida V. Matienzo, Rosario V. Forteza,
Andres Vargas, Gloria Vargas, Antonina Vargas and Florentino Vargas,
partitioning and adjudicating unto themselves the lot in question, each one
of them getting a share of 11 square meters. Florentino, Andres, Antonina
and Gloria, however, did not sign the document.
a. Only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario signed it.
b. The Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was published in the
Catanduanes Tribune for three consecutive weeks.[3]
3. On November 15, 1994, an Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with
Sale[4] was again executed by and among the same heirs over the same
property and also with the same sharings.
a. Once more, only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario
signed the document and their respective shares totaling 55 square
meters were sold to Joseph Cua, petitioner herein.
b. According to Gloria Vargas, the widow of Santiago Vargas and
one of respondents herein, she came to know of the Extra Judicial
Settlement Among Heirs with Sale dated November 16, 1994 only
when the original house built on the lot was being demolished
sometime in May 1995.[5]
c. She likewise claimed she was unaware that an earlier Extra Judi-
cial Settlement Among Heirs dated February 4, 1994 involving the
same property had been published in the Catanduanes Tribune.[6]
4. After knowing of the sale of the 55 square meters to petitioner Cua, Gloria
Vargas tried to redeem the property by exercising her right of legal redemp-
tion of said five (5) shares as well as other shares which Cua may likewise
have acquired by purchase.
5. When the offer to redeem was refused Gloria Vargas filed a case for annul-
ment of Extra Judicial Settlement and Legal Redemption of the lot with the
MTC of Virac, Catanduanes against petitioner Cua. Joining her in the action
were her children with Santiago, namely, Aurora, Ramon, Marites, Edelina
and Gemma, all surnamed Vargas.
a. Respondents Vargas claimed that as co-owners of the property,
they may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimburs-
ing him the price of the sale.
 b. They likewise alleged that the 30-day period following a written
notice by the vendors to their co-owners for them to exercise the
right of redemption of the property had not yet set in as no written
notice was sent to them.
c. In effect, they claimed that the Extra Judicial Settlement Among
Heirs and the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale
were null and void and had no legal and binding effect on them.
6. MTC rendered a decision in favor of Cua, declaring the Deed of Extra Judi-
cial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale valid and binding.
a. The MTC upheld the sale to petitioner because the transaction pur-
portedly occurred after the partition of the property among the co-
owner heirs. The MTC opined that the other heirs could validly
dispose of their respective shares.
b. Moreover, the MTC found that although there was a failure to
strictly comply with the requirements under Article 1088 of the
Civil Code[ for a written notice of sale to be served upon respond-
ents by the vendors prior to the exercise of the former's right of re-
demption, this deficiency was cured by respondents' actual
knowledge of the sale, which was more than 30 days before the fil-
ing of their complaint, and their consignation of the purchase price
with the Clerk of Court, so that the latter action came too late.
c. MTC ruled that respondents failed to establish by competent proof
petitioner's bad faith in purchasing the portion of the property
owned by respondents' co-heirs.
7. RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC
8. CA reversed the rulings of both lower courts, declaring that the Extra Judi-
cial Settlement Among Heirs and the Extra Judicial Settlement Among
Heirs with Sale, were void and without any legal effect.
a. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, [16] the extra-
judicial settlement made by the other co-heirs is not binding upon
respondents considering the latter never participated in it nor did
they ever signify their consent to the same.
ISSUE:
Whether the heirs are deemed constructively notified and bound, regardless
of their failure to participate therein, by an extrajudicial settlement and partition of
estate when the extrajudicial settlement and partition has been duly published—NO.
The law requires that the co-heirs had notice actually participated in the settlement,
and not notice only after the fact of settlement.
Assuming a published extrajudicial settlement and partition does not bind
persons who did not participate therein, whether the written notice required to be
served by an heir to his co-heirs in connection with the sale of hereditary rights to a
stranger before partition under Article 1088 of the Civil Code can be dispensed with
when such co-heirs have actual knowledge of the sale such that the 30-day period
within which a co-heir can exercise the right to be subrogated to the rights of a pur-
chaser shall commence from the date of actual knowledge of the sale—NO. Written
notice cannot be dispensed with.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against
petitioner.
RATIO:
Petitioner Cua argues, as follows:
1. First, the acquisition by petitioner Cua of the subject property subsequent to
the extrajudicial partition was valid because the partition was duly pub-
lished.
a. The publication of the same constitutes due notice to respondents
and signifies their implied acquiescence thereon. Respondents
Vargas are therefore estopped from denying the validity of the par-
tition and sale at this late stage, thus no right to redeem
2. Second, the MTC had no jurisdiction over the complaint because its subject
matter was incapable of pecuniary estimation. The complaint should have
been filed with the RTC.
3. COURT’S RULING: The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is
an ex parte proceeding.
a. The rule plainly states, however, that persons who do not partici-
pate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be
bound thereby.
b. It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before any
deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice
calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extra-
judicial settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement
has already been executed as what happened in the instant case
with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement
among heirs.
c. The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive
notice to the heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it
 because the same was notice after the fact of execution. The re-
quirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors
and was never intended to deprive heirs of their lawful participa-
tion in the decedent's estate.
d. The records of the present case confirm that respondents Vargas
never signed either of the settlement documents, having discovered
their existence only shortly before the filing of the present com-
plaint. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial settlements do not
bind respondents, and the partition made without their knowledge
and consent is invalid insofar as they are concerned.
7. As to the issue of lack of jurisdiction, petitioner is estopped from raising the
same for the first time on appeal. Petitioner actively participated in the pro-
ceedings below and sought affirmative ruling from the lower courts to up-
hold the validity of the sale to him of a portion of the subject property em-
bodied in the extrajudicial settlement among heirs.
a. Having failed to seasonably raise this defense, he cannot, under the
peculiar circumstances of this case, be permitted to challenge the
jurisdiction of the lower court at this late stage.

4. This is not to say, though, that respondents' co-heirs cannot validly sell their
hereditary rights to third persons even before the partition of the estate.
a. The heirs who actually participated in the execution of the extraju-
dicial settlements, which included the sale to petitioner of their pro
indiviso shares in the subject property, are bound by the same.

5. Nevertheless, respondents Vargas are given the right to redeem these shares
pursuant to Article 1088 of the Civil Code. The right to redeem was never
lost because respondents were never notified in writing of the actual sale by
their co-heirs. Based on the provision, there is a need for written notice to
start the period of redemption, thus:
a. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger be-
fore the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to
the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the
sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the
time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.
b. Period of one month shall be reckoned from the time that a co-heir
is notified in writing by the vendor of the actual sale. Written no-
tice is indispensable and mandatory,[20] actual knowledge of the
sale acquired in some other manner by the redemptioner notwith-
standing. It cannot be counted from the time advance notice is giv-
en of an impending or contemplated sale. The law gives the co-heir
thirty days from the time written notice of the actual sale within
which to make up his or her mind and decide to repurchase or ef-
fect the redemption.[21]
c. Though the Code does not prescribe any particular form of written
notice, the method of notification remains exclusive, there being
no alternative provided by law.[22]

6. Considering, therefore, that respondents' co-heirs failed to comply with this

requirement, there is no legal impediment to allowing respondents to re-
deem the shares sold to petitioner given the former's obvious willingness
and capacity to do so.
 PORTUGAL v. PORTUGAL-BELTRAN (SIAPNO)
August 16, 2005 | Carpio Morales, J. | Determination of Heirship
PETITIONER: Isabel P. Portugal and jose Douglas Protugal Jr.
RESPONDENTS: Leonila Portugal-Beltran
SUMMARY: Portugal-Beltran executed an “Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole
Heir of Estate of Deceased Person” adjudicating to herself the parcel of land.
Puerta and Portugal Jr. filed before RTC a complaint against Portugal-Beltran
for annulment of the Affidavit alleging that she is not related whatsoever to the
deceased Portugal, hence, not entitled to inherit the parcel of land. But such was
dismissed by the RTC for lack of cause of action on the ground that Puerta and
Portugal Jr.’s status and right as putative heirs had not been established before a
probate court, and lack of jurisdiction over the case. Puerta and Portugal Jr.
thereupon appealed to the CA which affirmed the RTC’s dismissal of the case.
Issue is WON Puerta and Portugal Jr. have to institute a special proceeding to
determine their status as heirs before they can pursue the case for annulment of
Portugal-Beltran‘s Affidavit of Adjudication and of the title issued in her name.
SC held NO. The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the
adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the spe-
cial proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending,
or if there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances
of the case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among other issues,
heirship should be raised and settled in said special proceedings. Where special
proceedings had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, or if
a putative heir has lost the right to have himself declared in the special proceed-
ings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil
action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to bring about the annul-
ment of the partition or distribution or adjudication of a property or properties
belonging to the estate of the deceased
However, In the present case, the only property of the intestate estate of Por-
tugal is the parcel of land, to still subject it to a special proceeding which
could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of Puerta and
Portugal Jr. as heirs is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of
an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the
parties to the civil case-subject of the present case, could and had already in
fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over
the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial. Therefore, there being no
compelling reason to still subject Portugal‘s estate to administration proceedings
since a determination of Puerta and Portugal Jr.‘s status as heirs could be
achieved in the civil case filed by Puerta and Portugal Jr., the trial court should
proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and
render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.
DOCTRINE: Generally, if the special proceedings are pending, or if there are
no special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a
need to file one, then the determination of heirship should be raised and settled
in said special proceedings. However, an exception to this rule is this case
wherein filing of special proceedings would be burdensome.
FACTS:
1. Jose Q. Portugal (Portugal) married Paz Lazo. Subsequently, he married
married petitioner Isabel de la Puerta (Isabel).
2. Isabel gave birth to Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., her herein co-petitioner
while Paz gave birth to a girl, Leonila Portugal, herein respondent.
3. Portugal and his 4 siblings executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and
Waiver of Rights over the estate of their father who died intestate. In the
deed, Portugal’s siblings waived their rights, interests, and participation
over a parcel of land located in Caloocan in his favor.
4. The Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City issued a TCT covering the Caloocan
parcel of land in the name of Jose Q. Portugal, married to Paz C. Lazo. Later
on, Paz died. Subsequently, Portugal died intestate.
5. Respondent Leonila executed an Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of
Estate of Deceased Person adjudicating to herself the Caloocan parcel of
land. The TCT in Portugal’s name was subsequently cancelled and another
TCT was issued by the Registry of Deeds the name of respondent, Leonila
Portugal-Beltran.
6. Petitioners Isabel and Jose Douglas filed before the RTC of Caloocan City on
July 23, 1996 a complaint against respondent for annulment of the Affida-
vit of Adjudication executed by her and the transfer certificate of title is-
sued in her name.
7. Petitioners Isabel and Jose Douglas alleged that respondent Leonila is not
related whatsoever to the deceased Portugal, hence, not entitled to inherit
the Caloocan parcel of land and that she perjured herself when she made
false representations in her Affidavit of Adjudication.
8. RTC of Caloocan dismissed the case for lack of cause of action on the
ground that petitioners status and right as putative heirs had not been es-
tablished before a probate court, and lack of jurisdiction over the case, cit-
ing Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario.
9. Petitioners Isabel and Jose Douglas thereupon appealed to the CA. The ap-
pellate court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the case.
 10. Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, alleging that the ap- gations made in his petition in the special proceeding, with the addition of
pellate court rendered a faulty decision. a list of properties allegedly acquired during the marriage of the decedent
and Marcosa. Finding the issue raised in the civil case to be identical to
ISSUE: WON Isabel and Jose Douglas have to institute a special proceeding to de- some unresolved incidents in the special proceeding, both were jointly
termine their status as heirs before they can pursue the case for annulment of Portu- heard by the trial court, following which it rendered a decision in the civil
gal-Beltran’s Affidavit of Adjudication and of the title issued in her name – NO, this case dismissing it, declaring, inter alia, that the plaintiffs Dy Tam et al. are
case is an exception to the general rule because in this case, there was only one par- not the children of the decedent whose only surviving heir is Marcosa. On
cel of land and filing of special proceedings would be burdensome. appeal, one of the issues raised for determination was whether they are
the legitimate children of Rafael Litam. This Court went on to opine in Li-
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Sep- tam, however, that the lower court should not have declared, in the deci-
tember 24, 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE. Let the sion appealed from, that Marcosa is the only heir of the decedent, for
records of the case be REMANDED to the trial court, Branch 124 of the Regional such declaration is improper in the civil case, it being within the exclusive
Trial Court of Caloocan City, for it to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties competence of the court in the special proceeding.
and render a decision. 3. In Solivio, cited in Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, there was a special
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased before the
RATIO:
RTC which declared as sole heir Solivio, the decedents maternal aunt-half
1. In the cited case of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the therein peti-
sister of his mother. Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, the decedents pater-
tioners executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased
nal aunt-sister of his father, moved to reconsider the courts order declar-
Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay. They later discovered on that a portion of the
ing Celedonia Solivio as sole heir of the decedent, she claiming that she too
two lots had been titled in the name of the respondents. The therein peti-
was an heir. The court denied the motion on the ground of tardiness. In-
tioner Heirs filed a complaint for annulment of titles. But the plaintiffs who
stead of appealing the denial of her motion, Concordia filed a civil case
claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay have
against Celedonia before the same RTC, for partition, recovery of posses-
not shown any proof or even a semblance of it except the allegations that
sion, ownership and damages. The civil case was raffled to Branch 26 of
they have been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple. Now, the
the RTC, which rendered judgment in favor of Concordia. On appeal by
determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased couple must be
Celedonia, the appellate court affirmed the said judgment. On petition for
made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary
review by Celedonia who posed whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had
suit for reconveyance of property. This must take precedence over the ac-
jurisdiction to entertain the civil action for partition and recovery of Con-
tion for reconveyance. On petition for certiorari by the Heirs, this Court,
cordia Villanueva’s share of the estate of the deceased while the estate
albeit holding that the petition was an improper recourse, found that the
proceedings were still pending. The Court held that in the interest of or-
trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case
derly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a
citing Litam et al. v. Rivera and Solivio v. Court of Appeals.
decedents estate, a court should not interfere with [estate] proceedings
2. In the above-cited case of Litam, Gregorio Dy Tam instituted a special pro-
pending in a co-equal court, citing Guilas v. CFI Judge of Pampanga. This
ceeding for issuance of letters of administration before the CFI, alleging in
Court, however, in Solivio, upon considering that the estate proceedings
his petition that he is the son of Rafael Litam who died and is survived by
are still pending, but nonetheless [therein private respondent-Concordia
him and his therein named 7 siblings who are children of the decedent by
Villanueva] had lost her right to have herself declared as co-heir in said
his marriage to Sia Khin celebrated in China; that the decedent contracted
proceedings, opted to proceed to discuss the merits of her claim in the
in the Philippines another marriage with Marcosa Rivera; and that the de-
interest of justice, and declared her an heir of the decedent.
cedent left neither a will nor debt. Dy Tam thus prayed for the issuance of
4. The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse
letters of administration to Marcosa Rivera, surviving spouse of decedent.
parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the
The CFI granted the petition. While the special proceeding was pending, Dy
special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings
Tam and his siblings filed a civil case before the same court, against the es-
are pending, or if there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under
tate of Litam. In their complaint, Dy Tam substantially reproduced the alle-
 the circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the determination
of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said spe-
cial proceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted but had
been finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost
the right to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir
and he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action
can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to bring about the annul-
ment of the partition or distribution or adjudication of a property or
properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.
5. In the case at bar respondent Portugal-Beltran believing rightly or wrongly
that she was the sole heir to Portugal’s estate, executed the questioned Af-
fidavit of Adjudication. Said rule is an exception to the general rule that
when a person dies leaving a property, it should be judicially administered
and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the
order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in
case he did, he failed to name an executor therein.
6. Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A probate
or intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs
of a deceased.
7. It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the
intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject
it to a special proceeding just to establish the status of petitioners as
heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs
and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in
light of the fact that the parties to the civil case subject of the present
case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial
court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined
during pre-trial.
8. In fine, the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented
by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the is-
sues it defined during pre-trial, to wit:
a. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose
Q. Portugal, is valid
b. Which of the plaintiff, Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P.
Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal (Sr.)
c. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can
still be contested by plaintiffs
d. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claim under the
complaint
 022 In Re: Delgado (TIMBOL)
January 27, 2006 | Corona, J. | Affidavit of Self-Adjudication
PETITIONER: IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA
DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA and other HEIRS
OF LUIS DELGADO, namely, HEIRS OF CONCHA VDA. DE AREVALO, HEIRS OF LUISA DELGADO
VDA. DE DANAO, ANGELA DELGADO ARESPACOCHAGA, TERESA DELGADO PERLAS, CAROLINA
DELGADO-ARESPACOCHAGA, RODOLFO DELGADO, BENJAMIN DELGADO, GLICERIA DELGADO
and CLEOFAS DELGADO; and HEIRS OF GORGONIO DELGADO, namely, RAMON DELGADO CAMPO,
CARLOS DELGADO CAMPO, CLARITA DELGADO CAMPO-REIZA, YOLANDA DELGADO ENCINAS,
FELISA DELGADO CAMPO-ENCINAS and MELINDA DELGADO CAMPO-MADARANG
RESPONDENTS: HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, namely, GUILLERMO R.
DAMIAN and JOSE R. DAMIAN; HEIRS OF HORTENCIA RUSTIA CRUZ, namely, TERESITA
CRUZ-SISON, HORACIO R. CRUZ, JOSEFINA CRUZ-RODIL, AMELIA CRUZ-ENRIQUEZ and FIDEL R.
CRUZ, JR.; HEIRS OF ROMAN RUSTIA, SR., namely, JOSEFINA RUSTIA ALBANO, VIRGINIA RUSTIA
PARAISO, ROMAN RUSTIA, JR., SERGIO RUSTIA, FRANCISCO RUSTIA, LETICIA RUSTIA-MIRANDA;
and GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, as Oppositors; and GUILLERMA RUSTIA, as Intervenor
SUMMARY: Josefa Delgado died intestate. Several months after, Guillermo
Rustia, widower, executed an affidavit of self-adjudication of the remaining
properties of Josefa Delgado, declaring that he is the sole heir. However, the
petitioners contend that (1) Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado, the mother of
Josefa, were never married and thus, Luis Delgado (Half-brother) is entitled to
inherit in the intestate estate of Josefa; (2) Josefa and Guillermo were never
married, and thus he is not entitled to inherit. Eventually, Guillermo passed
away without a will. Luisa Delgado, the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed for a
petition for letters of administration. The RTC then appointed Carlota Delgado
(who substituted her sister Luisa) as administratix of the estate. The RTC held
that the AFFIDAVIT OF SELF-ADJUDICATION of the estate of Josefa
Delgado executed by the late Guillermo Rustia is SET ASIDE. On appeal, the
issue of the validity of the AFFIDAVIT OF SELF-ADJUDICATION executed
by Guillermo Rustia is REMANDED to the trail court for further proceedings.
The issue before the court, relevant to the discussion is whether or not the
AFFIDAVIT OF SELF-ADJUDICATION of Guillermo Rustia is valid.
The Court held that NO, the affidavit should annulled. Guillermo Rustia and
Josefa Delgado were married. There is a presumption of marriage, despite the
absence of a marriage contract. There are other evidences that can support the
presumption, such as the testimonies, and certificate of identities, passports,
declarations, and titles to the properties. Thus, Guillermo is entitled to inherit.
However, Guillermo is not the sole heir. Given the premise that Luis
Delgado and the other siblings of Josefa survived the latter, and that since
they are all illegitimate heirs, they may inherit from Josefa. Therefore,
Guillermo is NOT the SOLE heir. Sec. 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court
require that adjudication by an heir of the decedents entire estate to
himself by means of an affidavit is allowed only if he is the SOLE heir to
the estate.
DOCTRINE: SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between
heirs. – If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or
the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly
authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a
public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they
disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one
heir, he may adjudicate to himself the estate by means of an affidavit filed
in the office of the register of deeds.
FACTS:
1. The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be
divided into two groups:
a. The alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and
full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and
nieces, and
i. Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa Delgado by
one Lucio Campo. Since Felisa and Lucio were not
married, Josefa and her 5 other siblings are all natural
children
ii. However, before Lucio, there was Ramon Osorio, with
whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado, born out of
wedlock
iii. The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon
Osorio ever got married is crucial to the claimants
because the answer will determine whether their
successional rights fall within the ambit of the rule against
reciprocal intestate succession between legitimate and
illegitimate relatives.
iv. If Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado had been validly
married, then their only child Luis Delgado was a
legitimate half-blood brother of Josefa Delgado and
therefore excluded from the latter’s intestate estate. He
and his heirs would be barred by the principle of absolute
separation between the legitimate and illegitimate
families.
 v. Conversely, if the couple were never married, Luis
Delgado and his heirs would be entitled to inherit from
Josefa Delgado’s intestate estate, as they would all be
within the illegitimate line.
b. The alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters,
his nephews and nieces, his illegitimate child, and the de facto
adopted child (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents
i. Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any
children, and so they took into their home the youngsters
Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia (ampun-
ampunan)
ii. Guillermo Rusita, however, did manage to father an
illegtimate child
2. Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She was survived
by Guillermo Rustia and some collateral relatives (the petitioners herein)
3. Several months later, on June 15, 1973, Guillermo Rustia executed an
AFFIDAVIT OF SELF-ADJUDICATION of the remaining properties
comprising her estate
4. PETITIONERS CONTENTIONS:
a. Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado were never married. In support
thereof, they assert that no evidence was ever presented to
establish it, not even so much as an allegation of the date or place
of the alleged marriage. Hence, Luis Delgado and his heirs would
be entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado’s intestate estate.
b. That Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado were never married but
only live together as husband and wife. To prove their assertion,
PETITIONERS pointed out that no record of the contested
marriage existed in the civil registry
5. Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was survived
by his sisters Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz,
and by the children of his predeceased brother Roman Rustia Sr., namely,
Josefina Rustia Albano, Virginia Rustia Paraiso, Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio
Rustia, Francisco Rustia and Leticia Rustia Miranda
6. On May 8, 1975 Luisa Delgado, the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed the
original petition for letters of administration of the intestate estates of the
Sps. Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia with the RTC of Manila, Br. 55
7. The petition was opposed by the following:
a. The sisters of Guillermo Rustia, namely: Marcian Rustia vda. De
Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz
b. The heirs of Guillermo Rustia’s late brother, Roman Rustia, Sr.,
and
c. The ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia
8. The opposition was grounded on the theory that Luisa Delgado and the
other claimants were barred under the law from inheriting from their
illegitimate half-blood relative Josefa Delgado
ISSUE/s:
1. Whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado – Yes. Despite the absence of a marriage contract, there arises a
presumption of marriage. This presumption may be supported by different
documents, such as passports, declarations, certificate of identities, and title
to properties, as well as testimonies.
2. Who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
are – As to Josefa Delgado, her lawful heirs include not only her natural
siblings from Luis Ocampo and Felisa Delgado’s relationshiop, but also the
heirs of Luis Delgado, illegitimate half-brother of Josefa from the
relationship of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio. As to Guillermo Rustia,
his lawful heirs include the sisters, nephews and nieces. The ampun-
ampunan are not lawful heirs, because they were not adopted in accordance
with the law
3. Whether or not the affidavit of self-adjudication of Guillermo is valid – NO.
Affidavit of Self-adjudication may only valid if there is only a sole heir. In
this case, Josefa was survived by Guillermo and the formers siblings,
nephews and nieces.
4. Who should be issued letters of administration – Carlota Delgado should be
appointed as administratix of the estate by virtue of Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the
Rules of Court.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990
decision of the RTC Manila, Branch 55) is hereby DENIED. The assailed October
24, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the following
modifications:
1. Guillermo Rustia’s June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-adjudication is hereby
ANNULLED.
2. The intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the intestate estate of
Josefa Delgado. The remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of
Josefa Delgado who survived her and (b) the children of any of Josefa Delgado’s
full- or half-siblings who may have predeceased her, also surviving at the time of her
death. Josefa Delgado’s grandnephews and grandnieces are excluded from her estate.
In this connection, the trial court is hereby ordered to determine the identities of the
relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to share in her estate.
3. Guillermo Rustia’s estate (including its one-half share of Josefa Delgado’s estate)
shall be inherited by Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz
(whose respective shares shall be per capita) and the children of the late Roman
Rustia, Sr. (who survived Guillermo Rustia and whose respective shares shall be per
stirpes). Considering that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia
Cruz are now deceased, their respective shares shall pertain to their estates.
4. Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of Guillermo
Rustia and Josefa Delgado shall issue to Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a
nominee from among the heirs of Guillermo Rustia, as joint administrators, upon
their qualification and filing of the requisite bond in such amount as may be
determined by the trial court.
RATIO:
On the marriage of Guillermo and Josefa
1. First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of
marriage, its absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took place.
Once the presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may be presented
in support thereof.
2. The evidence need not necessarily or directly establish the marriage but
must at least be enough to strengthen the presumption of marriage.
a. Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs.
Guillermo Rustia, the passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia,
the declaration under oath of no less than Guillermo Rustia that he
was married to Josefa Delgado and the titles to the properties in the
name of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado," more than
adequately support the presumption of marriage.
b. These are public documents which are prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein. No clear and convincing evidence sufficient to
overcome the presumption of the truth of the recitals therein was
presented by petitioners.
3. Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners’ own witness whose testimony
they primarily relied upon to support their position, confirmed that
Guillermo Rustia had proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado and that
eventually, the two had "lived together as husband and wife." This again
could not but strengthen the presumption of marriage.
4. Third, the baptismal certificate was conclusive proof only of the baptism
administered by the priest who baptized the child. It was no proof of the
veracity of the declarations and statements contained therein, such as the
alleged single or unmarried ("Señorita") civil status of Josefa Delgado who
had no hand in its preparation.
5. Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia
and Josefa Delgado. In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans
toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in
marriage are presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual order of
things in society and, if the parties are not what they hold themselves out to
be, they would be living in constant violation of the common rules of law
and propriety. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume
marriage.
On the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado (RELEVANT)
1. Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado
and Ramon Osorio. The oppositors (now respondents) chose merely to rely
on the disputable presumption of marriage even in the face of such
countervailing evidence as (1) the continued use by Felisa and Luis (her
son with Ramon Osorio) of the surname Delgado and (2) Luis Delgado’s
and Caridad Concepcion’s Partida de Casamiento identifying Luis as "hijo
natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado).
2. All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame the
rebuttable presumption of marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio
were never married. Hence, all the children born to Felisa Delgado out of
her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his
half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the
decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado, were her natural children
3. The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and
legitimate children of the same parent, even though there is unquestionably
a tie of blood between them. It seems that to allow an illegitimate child to
succeed ab intestato (from) another illegitimate child begotten with a
parent different from that of the former, would be allowing the illegitimate
child greater rights than a legitimate child.
4. Notwithstanding this, however, we submit that succession should be
allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of the
half-blood. The reason impelling the prohibition on reciprocal successions
between legitimate and illegitimate families does not apply to the case
under consideration. That prohibition has for its basis the difference in
category between illegitimate and legitimate relatives.
5. There is no such difference when all the children are illegitimate
children of the same parent, even if begotten with different persons.
They all stand on the same footing before the law, just like legitimate
children of half-blood relation.
6. We submit, therefore, that the rules regarding succession of legitimate
brothers and sisters should be applicable to them. Full blood illegitimate
brothers and sisters should receive double the portion of half-blood
 brothers and sisters; and if all are either of the full blood or of the
half-blood, they shall share equally.
7. Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by
full-blood, except Luis Delgado, her half- brother. Nonetheless, since they
were all illegitimate, they may inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of
them are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado.
8. We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews,
nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado.
a. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of
representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of the
children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces).
b. Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and
grandnieces. Therefore, the only collateral relatives of Josefa
Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her
brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the
time of her death on September 8, 1972. They have a vested right
to participate in the inheritance.
c. The records not being clear on this matter, it is now for the trial
court to determine who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or
their children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of her death.
Together with Guillermo Rustia, they are entitled to inherit from
Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil
Code:
i. Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children
survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be
entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers
and sisters or their children to the other one-half.
9. Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia,
Guillermo could not have validly adjudicated Josefa’s estate all to
himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is clear. Adjudication
by an heir of the decedent’s entire estate to himself by means of an
affidavit is allowed only if he is the SOLE heir to the estate:
a. SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs.
– If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of
age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal
representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may,
without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among
themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in
the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they
may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one
heir, he may adjudicate to himself the estate by means of an
affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. x x x
On the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia
1. Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which [created] between
two persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate
paternity and filiation. Only an adoption made through the court, or in
pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of
Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at all, but is
wholly and entirely artificial.
2. To establish the relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly carried
out, otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is
never presumed, but must be affirmatively [proven] by the person claiming
its existence.
3. Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the estate of
Guillermo Rustia, namely, intervenor Guillerma Rustia and the
ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia, are not lawful heirs of the
decedent.
4. Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no descendants,
ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the
lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants,
consisting of his sisters, nieces and nephews.
On the appointment of Letters of Administration
1. An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the
intestate estate of the decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court
prescribes an order of preference in the appointment of an administrator:
a. Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If
no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a bond, or a person
dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
i. (a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be,
or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or
to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or
next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and
 willing to serve;
ii. (b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may
be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be
incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow or
next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death
of the person to apply for administration or to request
that the administration be granted to some other person,
it may be granted to one or more of the principal
creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
iii. (c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to
serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court
may select.
2. In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the
interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference
does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases
where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be
represented in the management of the estates, a situation which obtains
here.
3. It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the
persons of Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and a nominee of the
nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia. They are the next of kin of the
deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia, respectively.
 023 UTULO v. PASION (CHIQUI)
September 30, 1938 | Imperial, J. | Judicial Administration
PETITIONER: Pablo G. Utulo, applicant and appellee
RESPONDENTS: Leona Pasion Viuda De Garcia, oppositor and appellant
SUMMARY: Juan Sanchez died intestate leaving Leona Pasion and three legiti-
mate children. One of his children, Luz Garcia, died during the pendency of the
administration proceedings. This event prompted her husband Pablo Utulo to file
for administration proceedings of the property of Luz. Leona objected to this say-
ing that there was no occasion for judicial administration because there was no
indebtedness and if there is need of administration, she, as the mother, had a better
right. W/N administration proceedings are necessary – NO, when there are no
debts or obligations pending to be paid, the heirs are not bound to submit the prop-
erty for judicial administration. The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of
the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and deliv-
ered to them a deed for the same before his death. In the absence of debts existing
against the estate, the heirs may enter upon the administration of the said property
immediately. When the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no debts, there is
no reason why the estate should be burdened with the costs and expenses of an
administrator. In order for Utulo to intervene in said intestate and to take part in
the distribution of the property, it is not necessary that the administration of the
property of his deceased wife be instituted —an administration which will take up
time and occasion inconveniences and unnecessary expenses.
DOCTRINE: This court repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving
pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not are not bound to
submit the property to a judicial administration, which is always long and costly,
or to apply for the appointment of an administrator by the court. It has been uni-
formly held that in such case the judicial administration and the appointment of an
administrator are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings.
FACTS:
1. Juan Garcia Sanchez died intestate, and in the proceedings instituted in the
Court of First Instance of Tarlac for the administration of his property,
Leona Pasion Vda. de Garcia, the surviving spouse and the herein opposi-
tor, was appointed judicial administratrix.
2. The said deceased left legitimate children, named Juan Garcia, Jr., Patrocin-
io Garcia and Luz Garcia who, with the widow, are the presumptive forced
heirs. Luz Garcia married the applicant Pablo G. Utulo and during the pen-
dency of the administration proceedings of the said deceased, she died in
the said province without any legitimate descendants, her only forced heirs
being her mother and her husband.
3. Utulo commenced in the same court the judicial administration of the prop-
erty of his deceased wife, stating in his petition that her only heirs were he
himself and his mother-in-law, the oppositor, and that the only property left
by the deceased consisted in the share due her from the intestate of her fa-
ther, Juan Garcia Sanchez, and asking that he be named administrator of the
property of said deceased.
4. Leona objected to the petition, opposing the judicial administration of the
property of her daughter and the appointment of the applicant as administra-
tor.
a. She alleged that inasmuch as the said deceased left no indebted-
ness, there was no occasion for the said judicial administration.
b. She stated that should the court grant the administration of the
property, she should be appointed the administratrix thereof inas-
much as she had a better right than the applicant.
5. After the required publications, trial was had and the court finally issued the
appealed order to which Leona excepted and thereafter filed the record on
appeal which was certified and approved.
6. Leona assigns five errors allegedly committed by the trial court, but these
assigned errors raise only two questions for resolution, namely: whether up-
on the admitted facts the judicial administration of the property left by the
deceased Luz Garcia lies, with the consequent appointment of an adminis-
trator, and whether the appellant has a better right to the said office than the
appellee.
ISSUE/s:
1. W/N administration proceedings are necessary – NO, when there are no
debts or obligations pending to be paid, the heirs are not bound to submit
the property for judicial administration.
RULING: The appealed order should be reversed, with the costs of this instance to
the applicant-appellee. So ordered.
RATIO:
1. "If no executor is named in the will, or if a person dies intestate, administra-
tion shall be granted" etc. This provision enunciates the general rule that
when a person dies leaving property in the Philippine Islands, his property
should be judicially administered " and the competent court should appoint
a qualified administrator, in the order established in the section, in case the
 deceased left no will, or in case he had left one should he fail to name an
executor therein. However, this is subject to exceptions.
a. According to the first, when all the heirs are of lawful age and
there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to
partition the property without instituting the judicial administration
or applying for the appointment of an administrator.
b. According to the second, if the property left does not exceed six
thousand pesos, the heirs may apply to the competent court, after
the required publications, to proceed with the summary partition
and, after paying all the known obligations, to partition all the
property constituting the inheritance among themselves pursuant to
law, without instituting the judicial administration and the ap-
pointment of an administrator.
2. This court repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending
obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not are not bound to
submit the property to a judicial administration, which is always long and
costly, or to apply for the appointment of an administrator by the court. It
has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial administration and the
appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary proceed-
ings.
3. In Ilustre v. Frodonza:
a. Under the provisions of the Civil Code (arts. 657 to 661) the rights
to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of
his death; in other words, the heirs succeeded immediately to all of
the property of the deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the
heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if
the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the
same before his death.
b. In the absence of debts existing against the estate, the heirs may
enter upon the administration of the said property immediately. If
they desire to administer it jointly, they may do so. If they desire to
partition it among themselves and can do this by mutual agree-
ment, they also have that privilege. The Code of Procedure in Civil
Actions provides how an estate may be divided by a petition for
partition in case they cannot mutually agree in the division. When
there are no debts existing against the estate, there is certainly no
occasion for the intervention of an administrator in the settlement
and partition of the estate among the heirs.
c. When the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no debts, there is
no reason why the estate should be burdened with the costs and
expenses of an administrator.
d. The property belonging absolutely to the heirs, in the absence of
existing debts against the estate, the administrator has no right to
intervene in any way whatever in the division of the estate among
the heirs. They are co-owners of an undivided estate and the law
offers them a remedy for the division of the same among them-
selves.
4. If then the property of the deceased, who dies intestate, passes immediately
to his heirs, as owners, and there are no debts, what reason can there be for
the appointment of a judicial administrator to administer the estate for them
and to deprive the real owners of their possession to which they are imme-
diately entitled?
5. The right of the heirs in cases like the one we are discussing, also exists in
the division of personal as well as the real property. If they cannot agree as
to the division, then a suit for partition of such personal property among the
heirs of the deceased owner is maintainable where the estate is not in debt,
the heirs are all of age, and there is no administration upon the estate and no
necessity thereof. (Jordan vs. Jordan.)
6. The SC is convinced that if the courts had followed it in all cases to which it
has application, their files would not have been replete with unnecessary
administration proceedings as they are now.
7. There is no weight in the argument adduced by Utulo to the effect that his
appointment as judicial administrator is necessary so that he may have legal
capacity to appear in the intestate of the deceased Juan Garcia Sanchez. As
he would appear in the said intestate by the right of representation, it would
suffice for him to allege in proof of his interest that he is a usufructuary
forced heir of his deceased wife who, in turn, would be a forced heir and an
interested and necessary party if she were living. In order to intervene in
said intestate and to take part in the distribution of the property it is not nec-
essary that the administration of the property of his deceased wife be insti-
tuted —an administration which will take up time and occasion inconven-
iences and unnecessary expenses.
8. Also, there is no need to determine which of the parties has preferential
right to the office of administrator.
 024 Sampilo v. CA (Valle)
28 Feb 1958 | Labrador, J. | Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
PETITIONER: Benny Sampilo and Honorato Salacup
RESPONDENTS: CA and Felisa Sinopera
SUMMARY:
When Tolete died, he left four parcels of land and his heirs who were his widow,
Leoncia, and several nieces and nephews. Leoncia executed an affidavit that
Tolete left no other heir but her and that she is the only person to inherit the
properties. This was registered in the Office of Registry of Deeds in Pangasinan.
On the same day, it was sold to Sampilo for 10 000. On June 17, Sampilo sold it
to Salacup for 50 000. On March 1950, Sinopera instituted proceedings for the
administration of the etstae of Tolete as administratix.
She also brought this action on June 20 1950 where she alleged that Leoncia had
no right to execute the affidavit of adjuciation and that neither Sampilo and
Salacup acquired any rights over the four parcels. The TC ruled in favor of
Sinopera and the CA modified the decision that only one half of the parcels got o
Sinopera.
Salicup and Sampilo now appealed to the SC alleging that Sinopera’s right to
bring the action has prescribed since it was brought beyond the two year
prescription period and that she was barred under the statute of limitations.
The SC held that Sinopera is not barred by the two year prescription and the
statute of limitations.
The two year prescription (see doctrine) does NOT apply to her because not all
the heirs interested have participated in the extrajudicial settlement, the Court of
Appeals having found that the decedent left aside from his widow, nephews and
nieces living at the time of his death.
Neither is she barred by the statute of limitations. There is nothing in the old
rules or the current rule which shwos clearly a statute of limitations and a bar of
action against third persons.
DOCTRINE:
The provisions of Section 4 of Rule 74, barring distributees or heirs from
objecting to an extrajudicial partition after the expiration of two years from such
extrajudicial partition, is applicable only
(1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the
extrajudicial partition, and, in addition,
(2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied
with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the
extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians.
FACTS:
35. Teodoro Tolete died intestate Jan 1945. He left four parcels of land of the
cadastral survey of San Manuel, pangasinan. His heirs were his widow,
Leoncia de Leon, and several nieces and nephews (children of deceased
siblings).
36. July 25 1946: Without any judicial proceedings, Leoncia executed an
affidavit stating that “the decased, Teodoro Tolete, left no children or
respondent neither ascendants or acknowledged natural children neither
brother, sister, nephews or nieces, but the, widow Leoncia de Leon, the
legitimate wife of the deceased, the one and only person to inherit the above
properties.”
37. The affidavit was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds (ORD) of
Pangasinan. On the same day, she executed a deed of sale of the parcels of
land to Benny Sampilo for Php 10 000. This sale was also registered.
38. June 17 1950: Sampilo sold the said aprcels to Honorato Salacup for Php
50 000 and this sale was also registered.
39. March 1950: Felisa Sinopera instituted proceedings for the administration
of the estate of Tolete and having secured her appointment as administratix,
brought the present action on June 20 1950. Notice of lis pendens was filed
in the ORD and said notice was recorded on the CTCs on June 26 1950.
This notice was subsequent to the registration of the deed of sale in favor of
Salacup.
40. Sinopera’s complaint alleged that Leoncia had no right to execute the
affidavit of adjucication and that Salacup acquired no rights to the lands,
and that neither Sampilo acquired any right to the properties.
41. Sampilo and Salacup filed an amended answer alleging that the complaint
states no cause of action, that if such cause exists, the same is barred by the
statute of limitations; that they are innocent purchasers for value, and that
the complaint is malicious, frivolous, and spurios, intended to harass them.
42. The TC rendered judgment for Sinopera, declaring the affidavit and Both
deeds of sale as null and void. It declared Sinopera as owner of half portion
of the four parcels of land and that Leoncia’s usufructuary rights are
terminated.
43. The decision was modified that the deeds of sale in so far as the one-ha;f is
concerned, and adjudicating this one half to the heirs is premature. The
deeds are only null and void in sofar as the properties thereby conveyed
exceed the portion that responds to Leoncia. It ordered Sampilo and Salacup
to deliver to Sinopera only the one half of the land. They reserved to
Salacup the right to claim and secure adjudiscation in his avor of whatever
portion of said properties may correspond to Leoncia.
 44. Sampilo and Salacup appealed to the SC by certiorari. They claim that
Sinopera’s right of action to recover and the co-heir’s participation to the
lands in question had prescribed at the time the action to recover was filed.
a. They also claim that they are innocent purchasers for value
ISSUE/s:
1. WoN Sinopera’s right of action to recover has prescribed – No. The two
year prescription only applies to (1) persons who have participated or taken
part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition and (2) when the provisions
of sec 1 rule 74 have been strictly complied with i.e. that all the persons or
heirs have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented
through guardians. The case fails to comply with both requirements. So the
two year bar does not apply.
35. WoN the action is barred by the statute of limitations – No. The action is
one based on fraud, as the widow had declared in her affidavit of partition
that there are no other heirs except herself. Sinopera’s right which is based
on fraud, with prescription of four years, does not appear to have lapsed.
Judicial proceedings were instituted in March 1950 and these were
instituted soon after the discovery of fraud.
2.
RULING: Finding no error in the decision of the Court of Appeals, we hereby
affirm it in toto, with costs against the petitioners. So ordered.
RATIO:
36. Sampilo and Salacup argue that the action was instituted almost four years
after the affidavit of adjudication was registered in the ORD of Pangasinan,
the right of action of the administratix has prescriped and lapsed because
the same was not brought within two years as prescribed in Sec 4, Rule 74
of the ROC and Sec 1 of the same rule.
37. The SC held that in Sec 1, the provision has two parts. The first refers to a
case in which there are two or more heirs interested in the estate and the
second, there is only one heir. The section was taken from Sec 59 of the Old
Code of Civil procedure which says
a. Sec 596. Settlement of Certain Intestates Without Legal
Proceedings. — Whenever all the heirs of a person who died
intestate are of lawful age and legal capacity and there are no debts
due from the estate, or all the debts have been paid the heirs may,
by agreement duly executed in writing by all of them, and not
otherwise, apportion and divide the estate among themselves, as
they may see fit, without proceedings in court.
38. If there are two or more heirs, both or all of them should take part in the
extrajudicial settlement. This is made more imperative in the old law by the
clause “and not otherwise.”
39. By the title of Section 4, the "distributees and estate" indicates the persons
to answer for rights violated by the extrajudicial settlement. On the other
hand, it is also significant that no mention is made expressly of the
effect of the extrajudicial settlement on persons who did not take part
therein or had no notice or knowledge thereof.
40. There cannot be any doubt that those who took part or had knowledge of the
extrajudicial settlement are bound thereby. As to them (those who took
part or had knowledge) the law is clear that if they claim to have been
in any manner deprived of their lawful right or share in the estate by
the extrajudicial settlement, they may demand their rights or interest
within the period of two years, and both the distributes and estate would
be liable to them for such rights or interest.
41. Evidently, they are the persons in accordance with the provision, who may
seek to remedy, the prejudice to their rights within the two-year period.
42. But as to those who did not take part in the settlement or had no notice
of the death of the decedent or of the settlement, there is no direct or
express provision. It is unreasonable and unjust that they also be required
to assert their claims within the period of two years. To extend the effects
of the settlement to them, to those who did not take part or had no
knowledge thereof, without any express legal provision to that effect,
would be violative of the fundamental right to due process of law.
43. The procedure outlined in Sec 1, Rule 74 of extrajudicial settlement, or by
affidavit, is an ex parte proceeding. It cannot, by any reason or logic, be
contended that such settlement or distribution would affect third persosn
who had no knowledge either of the death or of the extrajudicial settlement
or affidavit. Especially as no mention of such effect is made.
44. In Ramirex v. Gmur,
a. “we are of the opinion and so hold that the provisions of Section 4
of Rule 74, barring distributees or heirs from objecting to an
extrajudicial partition after the expiration of two years from
such extrajudicial partition, is applicable only
b. (1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had
notice of the extrajudicial partition, and, in addition,
c. (2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been
strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the
decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are
represented by themselves or through guardians.
45. The case at bar fails to comply with both requirements because not all the
heirs interested have participated in the extrajudicial settlement, the Court
of Appeals having found that the decedent left aside from his widow,
nephews and nieces living at the time of his death.
46. Sampilo and salacap allege that the action is barred by statute of liitations.
47. The SC held that there is nothing in the old rules or the current rule which
shwos clearly a statute of limitations and a bar of action against third
persons. It is only a bar against the parties who had taken part in the
extrajudicial proceedinsg but not against third persons not parties thereto.
 Also, the statue of limitations is contained in a different chapter.
48. But even if Sec 4, Rule 74 is a statute of limitations, it is still unavailing.
The action is one based on fraud, as the widow had declared in her affidavit
of partition that there are no other heirs except herself. Sinopera’s right
which is based on fraud, with prescription of four years, does not
appear to have lapsed. Judicial proceedings were instituted in March
1950 and these were instituted soon after the discovery of fraud.
49. In any case, the defendants have the burden of proof as to their claim of the
statute of limitations, which is their defense, and they have not proved that
when the action was instituted, four years had already elapsed from the date
that the interested parties had actual knowledge of the fraud.

Minor issues
1. Sampilo and Salacup are not innocent purchasers for value. This was found
by the CA. Leoncia’s nephew is Sampilo and he had been living with
Leoncia. Both Sampilo and the heirs of the deeased are residents of San
Manuel, Pangasinan. It is hard to believe that Sampilo did not know the
existence of the heirs and that he was not aware that they were the heirs.
Sampilo also accompanied Leoncia to the notary public where the affidavit
of adjuciation and deed of conveyance were prepared. Also there is no
showing that the consideration of 10 000 was paid.
 025 JEREZ v. NIETES (VICENCIO)
Dec. 27, 1969 | Fernando, J. | Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
PETITIONER: Lucrecia Jerez, and Julia, Julieta, Eva, Carmelo, Jose and Eliseo
Jalandoni
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Emigdio V. Nietes, Judge of Court of First Instance of Iloi-
lo, Lucilo Jalandoni and Victoria Jalandoni de Gorriceta
SUMMARY: Nicolas Jalandoni died. A special proceeding for the settlement of his
estate was filed before Judge Nietes, who approved the project of partition and final
accounting, with petitioner Lucrecia Jerez, Nicolas’ widow, as administratrix. How-
ever on June 29, respondent Lucilo Jalandoni, alleging that he is the natural child of
Nicolos, and Victoria Jalandoni, alleging that she is an illegitimate daughter, sought
to be allowed to intervene, through a verified petition, on the ground that they were
preterited in the project of partition. Judge Nietes’s order allowing the intervention
and reopening the proceedings to allow Lucilo and Victoria to present evidence, is
the subject of this petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Lucrecia et al. The
CA however denied this petition. Issue: WoN the order of Judge Nietes allowing the
intervention and reopening of proceedings is proper – NO.
The SC ruled that the action of Judge Nietes was premature. Although the Court ini-
tially said that ‘rather than require any party who can allege a grievance that his in-
terest was not recognized in a testate or intestate proceeding to file a separate and
independent action, he may within the reglementary period secure the relief that is
his due by a reopening of the case even after a project of partition and final account-
ing had been approved,” the Court said that Respondent Judge Nietes acted too soon.
The verified motion on the part of private respondents (Lucilo and Victoria) did not
suffice to call into play the power of respondent Judge to allow intervention. (Read
doctrine)
DOCTRINE: There must be proof beyond allegations in such motion (to intervene)
to show the interest of the private movants. In the absence thereof, the action taken
by respondent Judge (who accepted the same) could be considered premature.
(From dissent in CA): Under Section 2, Rule 12, Revised Rules of Court (Note: this
is Rule 19, Section 1 now), ‘a person may, before or during a trial, be permitted by
the court, in its discretion, to intervene in an action, if he has legal interest in the
matter in litigation.’
FACTS:
30. Nicolas Jalandoni died on October 3, 1960. Before the end of that month,
on October 27, a special proceeding for the settlement of his estate was filed
before the sala of respondent Judge Nietes, with petitioner Lucrecia Jerez,
his widow, being appointed as administratrix.
31. A project of partition and final accounting was submitted on June 14, 1966,
resulting in an order from respondent Judge Nietes dated June 15, 1966, ap-
proving the same.
32. On June 29, 1966, respondent Lucilo Jalandoni, alleging that he is an
acknowledged natural child of the late Nicolas Jalandoni, and respondent
Victoria Jalandoni de Gorriceta, alleging that she is an illegitimate daughter,
sought to be allowed to intervene on the ground that they were preterited in
the project of partition which they would have respondent Judge reject for
being contrary to law.
33. Then came on July 80, 1966 an order of respondent Judge Nietes allowing
intervention and reopening the proceedings to permit the movants, now pri-
vate respondents (Lucilo & Victoria), “to present whatever evidence they
may have to show their right to participate in the estate of the deceased.”
34. After a MR, filed by petitioners (Lucrecia, et al.) was denied, the matter was
elevated to the CA on a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prelimi-
nary injunction filed on September 3, 1966.
35. The CA in a resolution of September 21, 1966 denied such petition to annul
and set aside the order of respondent Judge. The basis for such resolution:
(1) “...that the determination of a prima facie interest in an estate to justify
reopening proceedings for the settlement thereof is primarily addressed to the
sound discretion and judgment of the probate court;
(2) that, while no supporting documents are appended to the motion to reopen
tending to show the personality to intervene, the said motion is nevertheless
verified upon oaths of the claimants of interest and the probate court has
authority to require the submission of at least a prima facie showing of said
interest;
(3) that, because the closure order aforesaid had not yet become final, the
requirements of Rule 38 respecting relief from judgment do not apply and,
hence, the failure of the motion to reopen to allege any of the grounds therein
stated is not fatal;
(4) that the better practice in case of the appearance of alleged preterited heirs is to
secure relief by reopening the proceedings by a proper motion within the
reglementary period (citing Ramos, et al case), it being desirable that all aspects
of a controversy be ventilated in the same proceeding and thus avoid
multiplicity of suits...”
36. Two Justices dissented from the aforesaid resolution, the dissenting opinion
being penned by Justice Lucero with whom Justice Villamor concurred. The
dissent is premised on the following considerations:
(1) “We should not let Lucilo Jalandoni (alleged acknowledged natural son)
and Victoria Jalandoni de Gorriceta (alleged illegitimate daughter) to
come in first and identify themselves later, because the better policy ac-
cording to jurisprudence (Asinas vs. Court) is to require them first to
produce prima facie evidence of such a civil status before opening the
door and letting them in.
 (2) Under Section 2, Rule 12, Revised Rules of Court (Note: this is Rule
19, Section 1 now), ‘a person may, before or during a trial, be per-
mitted by the court, in its discretion, to intervene in an action, if he
has legal interest in the matter in litigation.’
(3) The possibility of interlopers getting in for a share in the estate cannot be
totally discounted specially considering that the present intestate pro-
ceedings had been pending for the last six (6) years without a motion to
intervene having been filed by the present claimants in spite of the no-
tice of publication and the in rem character of the intestate proceedings.
(4) According to their residence certificate, the claimants are residents of
Iloilo City. The procedure adopted by the lower court is more conducive
to prejudice and unnecessary loss of time, effort and expense than the
method suggested by jurisprudence of requiring first a prima facie evi-
dence of status before letting them come in to intervene.
(5) Hence, the order of July 30, 1966 sought to be nullified under the pre-
sent petition insofar as it reconsidered the approval of the project of par-
tition and the first accounting is unjustified, as practically putting the
cart before the horse instead of the horse before the cart.
(6) Moreover, the claims can be asserted in a separate action against the le-
gitimate children to whom the share of the deceased Nicolas Jalandoni
was adjudicated.
ISSUE/s:
3. WoN Respondent Judge Nietes’s order of reopening the proceedings and
reconsidering the approval of the project of partition and final accounting is
proper – NO, it is premature. Respondents Lucilo and Victoria must first
present evidence to justify their right to intervene in the intestate proceed-
ing.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the resolution of September 21, 1966 of the Court of Appeals is
hereby modified in the sense that respondent Judge, Honorable Emigdio V. Nietes of the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo Judicial District, Branch I, or whoever may be acting in his
place, is directed to require private respondents Lucilo Jalandoni and Victoria Jalandoni
de Gorriceta to present evidence to justify their right to intervene in Special Proceeding
No. 1562 re Intestate Estate of Nicolas H. Jalandoni pending before such sala. In the event
that they could so justify such a right, the lower court on the basis of such evidence is to pro-
ceed conformably to law.
RATIO:
23. The challenged resolution cannot be reversed insofar as it recognized the
power of respondent Judge to reopen the proceedings and allow interven-
tion.
24. An indication of how such an issue should be resolved is to be found in an
opinion of Justice Tuason in Ramos v. Ortuzar, referred to in the resolution
of the CA. Thus:
1. “The only instance that we can think of in which a party interested in
a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when
he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or
through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence.
2. Even then, the better practice to secure relief is reopening of the
same case by proper motion within the reglementary period, instead
of an independent action the effect of which, if successful, would be,
as in the instant case, for another court or judge to throw out a deci-
sion or order already final and executed and reshuffle properties long
ago distributed and disposed of.”
25. We (the SC) do so now and definitely hold that rather than require any
party who can allege a grievance that his interest was not recognized in
a testate or intestate proceeding to file a separate and independent ac-
tion, he may within the reglementary period secure the relief that is his
due by a reopening of the case even after a project of partition and final
accounting had been approved.
26. Such a view finds support in the doctrine of liberality as to pleas for in-
tervention so consistently followed and adhered to by this Court. As
was emphatically expressed by Justice Makalintal, speaking for this Court,
in Balane v. De Guzman: “Respondent Judge would have done well to
brush aside narrow technicalities in this case, allow the intervention prayed
for and thus avoid needless delay in the resolution of the conflicting inter-
ests of all the parties.”
27. The question remains, however, whether Judge Nietes did so in the appro-
priate manner. It is not the existence of the power but the mode of its exer-
cise that is open to question.
28. It is indisputable that after the project of partition and final accounting
was submitted by the counsel for petitioner Lucrecia Jerez, as adminis-
tratrix, on June 14, 1966, respondent Judge Nietes approved the same
and declared closed and terminated the intestacy the next day, June 15,
1966.
29. Subsequently, on a verified petition by private respondents (Lucilo &
Victoria), filed on June 29, 1966, based on the assertion made that they
should have had a share in the estate as illegitimate children but that
they were omitted in the aforesaid project of partition, they sought to
be allowed to intervene and “to have the project of partition rejected
for being contrary to law.”
30. Such a pleading, without more, resulted in the questioned order of July
30, 1966, reopening the proceedings and reconsidering the approval of
the project of partition and final accounting, to enable the private re-
 spondents “to present whatever evidence they may have to show their
right to participate in the estate of the deceased.”
31. Although the recognition of their right to intervene appeared to be ten-
tative and conditional, it cannot be denied that they were given a stand-
ing sufficient to set aside the project of partition.
32. Respondent Judge Nietes acted too soon. The verified motion on the
part of private respondents (Lucilo and Victoria) did not suffice to call
into play the power of respondent Judge to allow intervention.
33. There must be proof beyond allegations in such motion to show the in-
terest of the private movants. In the absence thereof, the action taken
by respondent Judge could be considered premature.
34. As was stated by us (SC) in an opinion penned by Justice Sanchez: “No
one may quibble over the existence of the court's discretion on whether
to admit or reject intervention. But such discretion is not unlimited.”
 RAMOS v. ORTUZAR (Salve)
August 29, 1951 | Tuason, J. | Prescription, Salutary doctrines, Acknowledgement
PETITIONER: Martina Ramos, et al.
RESPONDENTS: Cardidad Ortuzar, et al.
SUMMARY: Martina Ramos and her sons Richard and Marvin Hill claimed to be
Percy A. Hill’s (deceased) lawful wife and legitimate children. They brought action
in the CFI to annul the judicial partition of the deceased’s estate among his other
children and last wife, and the sale by these of the bulk of the property to their co-
defendant Maximo Bustos. Percy cohabited with Martina Ramos and begot Richard
and Marvin. Percy married Helen Livingstone and had 3 children. Helen died. Percy
married Caridad Ortuzar by whom he had one daughter. Proceedings for the settle-
ment of Percy A. Hill’s estate were commenced and Caridad Ortuzar was appointed
administratrix. The declared heirs and distributees (Caridad Ortuzar, her daughter
and the deceased’s children by Helen Livingstone) sold six tracts of land left by Hill
to Maximo Bustos for P120,000. Martina Ramos never entered an appearance, per-
sonally or through counsel, in Percy A. Hill’s intestate proceedings to claim a share
in the decedent’s estate. She came forward claiming to be Hill’s wife for the first
time six years after the partition and adjudication of the estate and after the record of
the case had disappeared.
WoN the action of Ramos has already prescribed – YES, because she slept over her
alleged right for more than 30 years and woke up only after the properties had been
partitioned and distributed by final judgments.
WoN Richard and Marvin Hill were only witnesses to the proceedings to determine
their civil status – No, because they were the ones who set the court in motion, and
they were active parties to the point of attempting to appeal. The proceeding for pro-
bate is one in rem and the court acquires jurisdiction over all persons interested
WoN Richard and Marvin Hill were acknowledged as natural children – No, because
there were no acknowledgements in public documents and the action was barred by
Percy A. Hill’s death.
DOCTRINE: "The proceeding for probate is one in rem and the court acquires ju-
risdiction over all persons interested, through the publication of the notice prescribed
by sec. 630 C. P. C.; and any order that may be entered therein is binding against all
of them."
Salutary doctrines (principles of orderly procedure, estoppel, laches and prescription
and the expressed policy of putting an end at the earliest possible date to all litiga-
tions, especially probate cases ) that apply in probate proceedings also apply in intes-
tate proceedings.
FACTS:
1. Claiming to be the deceased Percy A. Hill’s lawful wife and legitimate children,
respectively, Martina Ramos and her sons Richard Hill and Marvin Hill brought
this action in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija to annul the judicial
partition of the deceased’s estate among his other children and last wife, and the
sale by these of the bulk of the property to their co- defendant Maximo Bustos.
2. Percy A. Hill, an American and retired officer of the Philippine Constabulary,
cohabited with Martina Ramos in Muñoz, then a barrio of San Juan de Guimba,
province of Nueva Ecija, from 1905 to 1914 and begot with her six children,
two of whom are Richard Hill and Marvin Hill and the others died in infancy.
3. In 1914, Percy A. Hill canonically married an American woman by the name of
Helen Livingstone and of that union three children were born, all of whom now
reside in the United States. Helen Livingstone died in 1922, and in 1924, Hill
married Caridad Ortuzar by whom he had one daughter.
4. It is Caridad Ortuzar and all the children had by her and Helen Livingstone
who, besides Maximo Bustos, have been made defendants.
5. On September 3, 1937, proceedings for the settlement of Percy A. Hill’s estate
were commenced and Caridad Ortuzar was appointed administratrix.
6. On March 27, 1947, the declared heirs and distributees (Caridad Ortuzar, her
daughter and the deceased’s children by Helen Livingstone) sold six tracts of
land left by Hill to Maximo Bustos for P120,000
7. Martina Ramos stated in her deposition that after their marriage in 1905, she
and Percy A. Hill lived in Muñoz, first in a small house and later in a big house,
that about November, 1941, her husband broke to her the news "that he was go-
ing to get a woman helper . . . to assist me in my work;" that "afterwards he
came back with a woman . . . who did not look like a maid" at all, and took the
newcomer to the Central Agricultural School to live; that later Hill begged her
(Martina) to forgive him, and "because of the intervention of some prominent
people in the community," she "yielded to let the woman stay."
8. But, she added, "in order not to see them often" she told her "husband" that she
"preferred to have a house in front of the big house where to run a big store"
and continued "managing and helping in the supervision of the tenants and the
cultivation of the lands in question."
9. The only part of this testimony which has a ring of truth is that which says that a
house or store was built for this plaintiff across the street from the big house and
that she moved to the new house with her children. Far from sustaining the ex-
istence of marriage, this conduct only confirms that Martina Ramos was not
Percy A. Hill’s wife
10. Common observations and human psychology reject the thoughts that this
woman could have consented with banishment from conjugal home and her
husband with another woman.
11. Martina Ramos might have actually been married to another guy, Teodoro To-
bias, evidenced by Torrens title, mortgage deed, and deed of sale.
12. Martina Ramos never entered an appearance, personally or through counsel, in
Percy A. Hill’s intestate proceedings to claim a share in the decedent’s estate.
She came forward claiming to be Hill’s wife for the first time six years after the
partition and adjudication of the estate and after the record of the case had dis-
appeared
ISSUE/s:
4. WoN the action of Ramos has already prescribed – YES, because she slept over
her alleged right for more than 30 years and woke up only after the properties
had been partitioned and distributed by final judgments.
5. WoN Richard and Marvin Hill were only witnesses to the proceedings to deter-
mine their civil status – No, because they were the ones who set the court in mo-
tion, and they were active parties to the point of attempting to appeal. Repudia-
tion of the decision or order now that they have lost, on the tenuous ground that
they were only witnesses, is both unfair and contrary to the principles of orderly
procedure, estoppel, laches and prescription and the expressed policy of putting
an end at the earliest possible date to all litigations, especially probate cases.
6. WoN Richard and Marvin Hill were acknowledged as natural children – No,
because there were no acknowledgements in public documents and the action
was barred by Percy A. Hill’s death.
RULING: The appealed decision is affirmed in so far as it declares that Percy A.
Hill and Martina Ramos were not legally married and reversed as to the rest of the
findings and pronouncements with costs against the plaintiffs as appellants and ap-
pellees.
RATIO:
Prescription
35. Percy A. Hill and Helen Livingstone possessed these properties since 1914 ad-
versely; exclusively, publicly and in the concept of owners, and from this view-
point whatever right Martina Ramos might have had in the said properties has
been lost by prescription. She slept over her alleged right for more than 30 years
and woke up only after the properties had been partitioned and distributed by fi-
nal judgments and changed hands,
Salutary doctrines
36. In Percy A. Hill’s intestate proceedings, Richard and Marvin Hill intervened, or
sought to intervene, on the allegation that they were the deceased’s legitimate
sons entitled to share in the inheritance. Before intervention was allowed, the
Hill brothers were required to establish their right and interest in the estate, and
to this end formal hearing was held and testimony, consisting of 18 pages, was
taken. After the hearing, the petition to intervene was denied
37. It is a clear mistake, contrary to the evidence of record, to say that Richard Hill
and Marvin Hill were mere witnesses in the proceeding to determine their civil
status. They were the ones who set the court in motion, and they were active
parties to the point of attempting to appeal
38. Repudiation of the decision or order now that they have lost, on the tenuous
ground that they were only witnesses, is both unfair and contrary to the princi-
ples of orderly procedure, estoppel, laches and prescription and the expressed
policy of putting an end at the earliest possible date to all litigations, especially
probate cases.
39. "The proceeding for probate is one in rem (40 Cyc., 1265) and the court acquires
jurisdiction over all persons interested, through the publication of the notice pre-
scribed by sec. 630 C. P. C.; and any order that may be entered therein is bind-
ing against all of them."
40. There is no reason why, by analogy, these salutary doctrines should not apply to
intestate proceedings.
1. The only instance that we can think of in which a party interested
in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is
when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control
or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence.
Even then, the better practice to secure relief is reopening of the
same case by proper motion within the reglementary period, in-
stead of an independent action
Acknowledgement of natural children
41. There are two forms of acknowledgment — voluntary and compulsory. None of
the requirements of Art. 131 of the Spanish Civil Code, which deals with volun-
tary recognition, have been shown; namely, "acknowledgment in a will, or in
some other public documents." Although the civil registry of Marvin Hill’s
birth, which states that this plaintiff was Percy A. Hill’s legitimate child, is in
evidence, an acknowledgment in the record of birth is not recognized in this
country for the reason that Art. 326, which defines the record of birth mentioned
in Art. 131, had never been put into effect in the Philippines. (Samson v. Cor-
rales, 48 Phil., 401.)
42. Supposing the latter to be the rationale of the decision, the action was barred by
Percy A. Hill’s death. By Article 137 "action for the acknowledgment of natural
child may be commenced only during the lifetime of the supposed parents," ex-
cept when the parents’ death occurred during the minority of the child, in which
case the latter may commence the action within certain period after the attain-
ment of his or her majority. Being of age when their father died, Richard Hill
and Marvin Hill do not come within the saving clause.
No amendments
43. While material variances between allegations and proof may be corrected by
amendment so as to bring the former into conformity with the latter (Ramirez v.
 Orientalist Co. and Fernandez, supra), the plaintiffs neither amended the com-
plaint nor were required to do so. In fact, appealing from the pronouncement
that they were only recognized natural children, they now insist vehemently both
as appellants and appellees that they were begotten of lawful wedlock. They are
not content with anything less.
44. Even if the plaintiffs had amended their allegations to adapt them to the evi-
dence, amendment in this case would hardly do away with the unfairness of
granting them a relief on a theory not put in issue by the pleadings. For one
thing, the evidence on which the court based its judgment that Richard Hill and
Marvin were recognized natural children, was adduced solely to show the al-
leged marriage between their parents; the matter of acknowledgment of the
plaintiffs by their father was far from the parties’ minds, and that judgment ap-
pears to have been a surprise to the plaintiffs themselves, to judge from their ap-
peal, as well as to the defendants.
 027 PEREIRA v. COURT OF APPEALS (APASAN)
June, 20, 1989 | Gangayco, J. | Extrajudicial settlement
PETITIONER: Victoria Bringas Pereira
RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals and Rita Pereira Nagac
SUMMARY: Andres de Guzman Pereira (Andres) died intestate and was
survived by his legitimate spouse Victoria Pereira (Victoria) and sister Rita
Nagac (Rita). Rita instituted before the RTC an intestate proceeding for the
issuance of letters of administration in her favor pertaining to the estate of
Andres. This was opposed by Victoria who filed a motion to dismiss alleging
that there exists no estate of Andres for purposes of administration, and if any
exists, then she should be the one to be appointed as the administrator of the
estate as the surviving spouse. The RTC appointed Rita as the administrator and
this was affirmed by the CA. Hence this petition. Issues are: 1.) whether or not
there exists an estate of the deceased for purposes of administration; 2.) whether
or not a judicial administration proceeding is necessary where there are no debts
left by the decedent; and 3.) whether or not the surviving spouse or the
surviving sister has better right to be the administrator of the estate.
For the first issue, the SC held that the present issue is for the probate court to
decide since they are in the best position to receive and scrutinize all the
pertinent pieces of evidence for the special proceeding. However, the court's
determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to
the final decision in a separate action which may be instituted by the parties.
For the second issue, the SC held that as a general rule, it is NOT required,
unless for good reason, which depends on the circumstances of each case. In the
present case, the parties admit that there are no debts of the deceased to be paid.
What is at once apparent is that these two heirs are not in good terms. The only
conceivable reason why Rita seeks appointment as administratrix is for her to
obtain possession of the alleged properties of the deceased for her own
purposes, since these properties are presently in the hands of Victoria who
supposedly disposed of them fraudulently
For the third issue, the Court did not find it necessary to resolve the issue
because the judicial administration proceeding was unnecessary and there was
no good reason propounded by the parties for the court to consider otherwise.
DOCTRINE: The GENERAL RULE is that when a person dies leaving
property, the same should be judicially administered and the competent court
should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Section 6,
Rule 78, in case the deceased left no will, or in case he had left one, should he
fail to name an executor therein. An EXCEPTION to this rule is established in
Section 1 of Rule 74. Under this exception, when all the heirs are of lawful age
and there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition
the property without instituting the judicial administration or applying for the
appointment of an administrator. Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of
Court, however, does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration
proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire
to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action for partition.
FACTS:
1. Andres de Guzman Pereira (Andres) passed away on January 3, 1983 at
Bacoor, Cavite without a will. He was survived by his legitimate spouse of
ten months, the herein petitioner Victoria Bringas Pereira (Victoria), and his
sister Rita Pereira Nagac, the herein private respondent.
2. On March 1, 1983, Rita instituted before the Regional Trial Court of
Bacoor, Cavite, Special Proceeding No. RTC-BSP-83-4 for the issuance of
letters of administration in her favor pertaining to the estate of Andres. In
her verified petition, Rita alleged the following:
a. that she and Victoria are the only surviving heirs of the deceased;
that the deceased left no will;
b. that there are no creditors of the deceased;
c. that the deceased left several properties, namely: death benefits
from the Philippine Air Lines (PAL), the PAL Employees
Association (PALEA), the PAL Employees Savings and Loan
Association, Inc. (PESALA) and the Social Security System (SSS),
as well as savings deposits with the Philippine National Bank
(PNB) and the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB),
and a 300 square meter lot located at Barangay Pamplona, Las
Pinas, Rizal and
d. finally, that Victoria had been working in London as an auxiliary
nurse and as such one-half of her salary forms part of the estate of
the deceased.
3. On March 23, 1983, Victoria filed her opposition and motion to dismiss the
petition of Rita alleging that there exists no estate of the deceased for
purposes of administration and praying in the alternative, that if an estate
does exist, the letters of administration relating to the said estate be issued
in her favor as the surviving spouse.
4. The Regional Trial Court, appointed Rita as administratrix of the intestate
estate upon a bond posted by her in the amount of Pl,000.00. The trial court
ordered her to take custody of all the real and personal properties of the
deceased and to file an inventory thereof within three months after receipt
of the order.
5. As a result, Victoria brought the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate
court affirmed the appointment of Rita. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/s:
WoN there exists an estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira for
 purposes of administration - Not for the SC to decide but rather for the
probate court
WoN a judicial administration proceeding is necessary where there are no debts
left by the decedent - As a rule NO, unless there is good reason which
depends on the circumstances of each case; and
WoN the surviving spouse or the surviving sister of a deceased has better right
to be appointed as administatrix of the estate - Court did not find it
necessary to delve into this issue because the judicial administration
proceeding was found to be unnecessary
RULING: WHEREFORE, the letters of administration issued by the Regional Trial
Court of Bacoor to Rita Pereira Nagac are hereby revoked and the administration
proceeding dismissed without prejudice to the right of private respondent to
commence a new action for partition of the property left by Andres de Guzman
Pereira.
RATIO:
First Issue
1. CONTENTIONS OF THE SURVIVING SPOUSE: Victoria contends
that there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes of administration for
the following reasons: firstly, the death benefits from PAL, PALEA,
PESALA and the SSS belong exclusively to her, being the sole beneficiary
and in support of this claim she submitted letter-replies from these
institutions showing that she is the exclusive beneficiary of said death
benefits; secondly, the savings deposits in the name of her deceased
husband with the PNB and the PCIB had been used to defray the funeral
expenses as supported by several receipts; and, finally, the only real
property of the deceased has been extrajudicially settled between the
petitioner and the private respondent as the only surviving heirs of the
deceased. She further asks the SC to declare that the properties specified do
not belong to the estate of the deceased on the basis of her bare allegations
as aforestated and a handful of documents.
2. CONTENTIONS OF THE SURVIVING SISTER: Rita argues that it is
not for Victoria to decide what properties form part of the estate of the
deceased and to appropriate them for herself. She points out that this
function is vested in the court in charge of the intestate proceedings.
3. The resolution of this issue is better left to the probate court before
which the administration proceedings are pending. The trial court is in
the best position to receive evidence on the discordant contentions of
the parties as to the assets of the decedent's estate, the valuations
thereof and the rights of the transferees of some of the assets, if
any. The function of resolving whether or not a certain property should
be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by
the administrator is one clearly within the competence of the probate
court. However, the court's determination is only provisional in
character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a
separate action which may be instituted by the parties.
Second Issue
4. Assuming, however, that there exist assets of the deceased Andres for
purposes of administration, the SC nonetheless find the administration
proceedings instituted by Rita to be unnecessary as contended by Victoria
for the reasons herein below discussed. The GENERAL RULE is that
when a person dies leaving property, the same should be judicially
administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified
administrator, in the order established in Section 6, Rule 78, in case the
deceased left no will, or in case he had left one, should he fail to name
an executor therein. An EXCEPTION to this rule is established in
Section 1 of Rule 74. Under this exception, when all the heirs are of
lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree
in writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial
administration or applying for the appointment of an administrator.
5. Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not
preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if
the estate has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for
good reasons to an ordinary action for partition. It should be noted that
recourse to an administration proceeding even if the estate has no debts is
sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons for not resorting to an action
for partition. Where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the
estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding
without good and compelling reasons.
6. Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without
leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not,
are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration,
which is always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an
administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly held that in such case the
judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are
superfluous and unnecessary proceedings.
7. Now, what constitutes "good reason" to warrant a judicial
administration of the estate of a deceased when the heirs are all of legal
age and there are no creditors will depend on the circumstances of each
case.
8. In Monserrat v. Ibanez, the SC held that: “Again the petitioner argues that
only when the heirs do not have any dispute as to the bulk of the hereditary
estate but only in the manner of partition does section 1, Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court apply and that in this case the parties are at loggerheads as to
the corpus of the hereditary estate because respondents succeeded in
sequestering some assets of the intestate. The argument is unconvincing,
 because, as the respondent judge has indicated, questions as to what
property belonged to the deceased (and therefore to the heirs) may properly
be ventilated in the partition proceedings, especially where such property is
in the hands of one heir.”
9. In Intestate Estate of Mercado v. Magtibay, the SC held that: “if the reason
for seeking an appointment as administrator is merely to avoid a
multiplicity of suits since the heir seeking such appointment wants to ask
for the annulment of certain transfers of property, that same objective could
be achieved in an action for partition and the trial court is not justified in
issuing letters of administration.
10. In Utulo v. Pasion vda. de Garcia, the SC did not find so powerful a reason
the argument that the appointment of the husband, a usufructuary forced
heir of his deceased wife, as judicial administrator is necessary in order for
him to have legal capacity to appear in the intestate proceedings of his
wife's deceased mother, since he may just adduce proof of his being a
forced heir in the intestate proceedings of the latter.
11. The Court sees no reason not to apply the latter doctrine (Utulo case) to the
case at bar. There are only two surviving heirs, a wife of ten months and a
sister, both of age. The parties admit that there are no debts of the deceased
to be paid. What is at once apparent is that these two heirs are not in good
terms. The only conceivable reason why Rita seeks appointment as
administratrix is for her to obtain possession of the alleged properties of the
deceased for her own purposes, since these properties are presently in the
hands of Victoria who supposedly disposed of them fraudulently.
12. The Court is of the opinion that this is not a compelling reason which will
necessitate a judicial administration of the estate of the deceased. To
subject the estate of Andres, which does not appear to be substantial
especially since the only real property left has been extrajudicially
settled, to an administration proceeding for no useful purpose would
only unnecessarily expose it to the risk of being wasted or squandered.
In most instances of a similar nature, the claims of both parties as to
the properties left by the deceased may be properly ventilated in simple
partition proceedings where the creditors, should there be any, are
protected in any event.
13. The SC therefore holds that the court below before which the administration
proceedings are pending was not justified in issuing letters of
administration, there being no good reason for burdening the estate of the
deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira with the costs and expenses of an
administration proceeding.
 028 CUA v. VARGAS 2006 (Arcenas)
October 31, 2006 | Azcuna, J. | Action to Annul Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
PETITIONER/S: Joseph Cua
RESPONDENTS: Gloria A. Vargas, Aurora Vargas, Ramon Vargas, Marites Var-
gas, Edelina Vargas And Gemma Vargas (herein VARGASES)
SUMMARY: The decedent, Paulina Vargas, left behind a parcel of residential land
with an area of 99 sq. m. and the heirs of Paulina executed a notarized Extra Judicial
Settlement Among Heirs (EJS 1) where each heir gets 11 square meters. However,
not all of the heirs signed it. EJS 1 was published in the Catanduanes Tribune for 3
consecutive weeks. Later, an Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale (EJS
2) was executed among the heirs over the same property with the same sharings, but
again not all heirs signed it. The heirs who signed it sold their respective shares, to-
taling 55 sq. m., to JOSEPH CUA (CUA). Now, the heir-respondents (VARGASES)
filed a case with the MTC contesting the sale and seeking the nullification of EJS 1
and EJS 2, claiming she and the others were unaware of EJS 1 and 2, and consigning
the amount of Php 100, 000 (representing the purchase price for the land) with the
Clerk of Court. VARGASES claim that the 30-day redemption period had not yet set
in since there was no written notice sent to them and the the EJS 1 and 2 were null
and void and not legally binding on them. MTC ruled in favor of CUA and dismissed
the complaint. RTC affirmed the ruling. CA reversed and held EJS 2 void according
to Section 1, Rule 74 of the ROC (not binding since VARGASES did not participate
nor consent to the EJS). Hence, this petition by CUA. The issues in this case are: (1)
Whether heirs are deemed constructively notified and bound, by an EJS and partition
of estate when the EJS and partition have been duly published, even if they did not
participate. The SC held in the negative. Publication of settlement among heirs does
not constitute constructive notice because the same is notice after the fact of execu-
tion. The publication requirement is intended to protect creditors and not to deprive
heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent’s estate. The procedure outlined in
Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding, which states that persons who do not
participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby.
The records of the present case confirm that VARGASES never signed either of the
settlement documents, having discovered their existence only shortly before the fil-
ing of the present complaint; hence, they are not bound and
(2) Whether the written notice can be dispensed with when such co-heirs have actual
knowledge of the sale such that the 30-day period within which a co-heir can exer-
cise the right to be subrogated to the rights of a purchaser shall commence from the
date of actual knowledge of the sale. The SC held in the negative. Based on Article
1088, there is a need for written notice to start the period of redemption, thus:
Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition,
any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reim-
bursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one
month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.
Hence, written notice is indispensable and mandatory, actual knowledge of the sale
acquired in some other manner by the redemptioner notwithstanding. The one-month
period shall be reckoned from the time that a co-heir is notified in writing by the
vendor of the actual sale.
DOCTRINE: The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex
parte proceeding, which states that persons who do not participate or had no notice
of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that
has been sent out or issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed
upon and not after such an agreement has already been executed as what happened in
the instant case with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement
among heirs.
FACTS:
1. A parcel of residential land (area of 99 sq. m) located in San Juan, Virac,
Catanduanes was left behind by the late Paulina Vargas.
2. February 4, 1994 – a notarized Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs (EJS
1) was executed by and among Paulina Vargas' heirs9, partitioning and ad-
judicating unto themselves the lot in question. Each gets a share of 11
square meters.
a. However, Florentino, Andres, Antonina and Gloria did not sign the
document; only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario
signed it
b. The Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was published in the
Catanduanes Tribune for three consecutive weeks
3. November 15, 1994 – an Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale
was again executed by and among the same heirs over the same property
and also with the same sharings.
a. Note: Only the HEIRS-SELLERS signed the document and their
respective shares totaling 55 square meters were sold to Joseph
Cua (CUA)
4. According to Gloria, the widow of Santiago Vargas, she came to know of
the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale dated November 16,
1994 only when the original house built on the lot was being demolished
sometime in May 1995.
a. She claimed she was unaware that an earlier Extra Judicial Settle-
ment Among Heirs dated February 4, 1994 involving the same
property had been published in the Catanduanes Tribune.
9
Ester Vargas, Visitacion Vargas, Juan Vargas, Zenaida V. Matienzo, Rosario V.
Forteza, Andres Vargas, Gloria Vargas, Antonina Vargas and Florentino Vargas
 b. Gloria tried to redeem the property through a letter sent to CUA
(see end of digest for full letter). The offer was refused and failed
to reach an amicable settlement at the barangay level.
c. Hence, Gloria filed a case for annulment of EJS and Legal Re-
demption of the lot with the MTC of Virac, Catanduanes against
CUA and consigned the amount of P100,000 (amount of purchase
price) with the Clerk of Court.
d. Joining her in the action were her children with Santiago, namely,
Aurora, Ramon, Marites, Edelina and Gemma.
5. Carlos Gianan, Jr. and Gloria Arcilla, heirs of the alleged primitive owner
of the lot in question, Pedro Lakandula, intervened in the case.
6. The VARGASES (respondents) claimed that as co-owners of the property,
they may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him
the price of the sale.
a. They alleged that the 30-day period following a written notice by
the vendors to their co-owners for them to exercise the right of re-
demption of the property had not yet set in as no written notice was
sent to them.
b. They claimed that the BOTH Extra Judicial Settlement Among
Heirs and the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale
were null and void and had no legal and binding effect on them.
7. MTC RULING: in favor of CUA; ergo, dismissed the complaint of the
VARGASES, and declared the Deed of Extra Judicial Settlement Among
Heirs with Sale is valid and binding.
a. The MTC upheld the sale to CUA because the transaction purport-
edly occurred after the partition of the property among the co-
owner heirs. The MTC opined that the other heirs could validly
dispose of their respective shares.
b. MTC ruled that although there was failure to strictly comply with
Article 1088 of CC (prior written notice to VARGASES for re-
demption), this deficiency was cured by VARGASES’ actual
knowledge of the sale, which was more than 30 days before the fil-
ing of their complaint, and their consignation of the purchase price
with the Clerk of Court, so that the latter action came too late.
c. Finally, no competent proof of CUA’s bad faith in purchasing the
land.
8. RTC RULING: affirmed ruling of MTC.
9. CA RULING: reversed both lower courts and declared the Extra Judicial
Settlement Among Heirs and the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs
with Sale were void and without any legal effect.
a. Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court – the extrajudicial settle-
ment made by the other co-heirs is not binding upon VARGASES
considering the latter never participated in it nor did they ever sig-
nify their consent to the same.
10. CUA’s MR was denied, so he filed a petition for review. He argues that:
a. the acquisition of the subject property subsequent to the extrajudi-
cial partition was valid because the partition was duly published.
i. The publication of the same constitutes due notice to
VARGASES and signifies their implied acquiescence.
Hence, the VARGASES are estopped from denying the
validity of the partition and sale at this late stage and no
longer have right to redemption.
ii. CUA is a possessor and builder in good faith.
iii. MTC had no jurisdiction over the complaint because its
subject matter was incapable of pecuniary estimation;
hence, should have been filed with the RTC.
iv. there was a non-joinder of indispensable parties, the co-
heirs who sold their interest in the subject property not
having been impleaded by the VARGASES.
v. the appeal to CA should have been dismissed since it was
not properly verified and Gloria failed to indicate that she
was authorized to represent the other heir-respondents to
initiate the petition
ISSUE/s:
1. Whether heirs are deemed constructively notified and bound, by an EJS and
partition of estate when the EJS and partition have been duly published,
even if they did not participate – NO. Publication of settlement among heirs
does not constitute constructive notice because the same is notice after the
fact of execution. The publication requirement is intended to protect credi-
tors and not to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent’s
estate.
2. Whether the written notice can be dispensed with when such co-heirs have
actual knowledge of the sale such that the 30-day period within which a
co-heir can exercise the right to be subrogated to the rights of a purchaser
shall commence from the date of actual knowledge of the sale – NO. Writ-
ten notice is indispensable and mandatory, actual knowledge of the sale ac-
quired in some other manner by the redemptioner notwithstanding. The one-
month period shall be reckoned from the time that a co-heir is notified in
writing by the vendor of the actual sale.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
RATIO:
PUBLICATION IS NOT CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE TO HEIRS
1. The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding,
which states that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an
extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby.
 a. It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before any
deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice
calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extra-
judicial settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement
has already been executed as what happened in the instant case
with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement
among heirs.
2. The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice
to the heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because the
same was notice after the fact of execution. The requirement of publica-
tion is geared for the protection of creditors and was never intended to
deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent's estate.
a. The records of the present case confirm that VARGASES never
signed either of the settlement documents, having discovered their
existence only shortly before the filing of the present complaint.
b. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial settlements do not bind
VARGASES, and the partition made without their knowledge and
consent is invalid insofar as they are concerned.
WRITTEN NOTICE IS INDISPENSABLE AND MANDATORY
1. Still, the other co-heirs can validly sell their hereditary rights to third per-
sons even before partition of the estate.
2. Hence, the heirs who actually participated in the execution of the EJS,
which included the sale to CUA of their pro indiviso shares in the subject
property, are bound by the same. VARGASES are given the right to redeem
these shares pursuant to Article 1088 of the Civil Code. The right to redeem
was never lost because they were never notified in writing of the actual sale
by their co-heirs.
3. Based on the provision, there is a need for written notice to start the period
of redemption, thus:
a. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger be-
fore the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to
the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the
sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from
the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the ven-
dor. (Emphasis supplied.)
b. The one-month period shall be reckoned from the time that a co-
heir is notified in writing by the vendor of the actual sale.
c. Written notice is indispensable and mandatory,20 actual
knowledge of the sale acquired in some other manner by the
redemptioner notwithstanding.
4. Though the Code does not prescribe any particular form of written notice
nor any distinctive method for written notification of redemption, the meth-
od of notification remains exclusive, there being no alternative provided by
law.
a. This proceeds from the very purpose of Article 1088, which is to
keep strangers to the family out of a joint ownership, if the pres-
ence of outsiders be undesirable and the other heir or heirs be will-
ing and in a position to repurchase the share sold.
b. The obligation to serve written notice devolves upon the vendor
co-heirs because the latter are in the best position to know the other
co-owners who, under the law, must be notified of the sale to re-
move all uncertainty as to the fact of the sale, its terms and its per-
fection and validity, and quiet any doubt that the alienation is not
definitive.
5. Considering, therefore, that the co-heirs failed to comply with this require-
ment, there is no legal impediment to allowing VARGASES to redeem the
shares sold to CUA given the former's obvious willingness and capacity to
do so.
CUA NOT IN GOOD FAITH
6. Likewise untenable is CUA’s contention that he is a builder in good faith.
CUA derived his title from the EJS 2 which he was very much aware that
not all of the heirs participated therein as it was evident on the face of the
document itself.
7. Because the property had not yet been partitioned in accordance with the
ROC, no particular portion of the property could have been identified as yet
and delineated as the object of the sale. Despite this glaring fact, CUA still
constructed improvements on the property. For this reason, his claim of
good faith lacks credence.
LACK OF JURISDICTION CANNOT BE RAISED
1. CUA is estopped from raising the same for the first time on appeal. CUA
actively participated in the proceedings below and sought affirmative ruling
from the lower courts to uphold the validity of the sale to him of a portion
of the subject property embodied in the extrajudicial settlement among
heirs.
NON-JOINDER OF INDISPENSABLE PARTIES LACKS MERIT
1. An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom there can be no
final determination of an action and who is required to be joined as either
plaintiff or defendant
2. VARGASES concede that the other heirs acted within their hereditary
rights in doing so to the effect that the latter completely and effectively re-
linquished their interests in the property in favor of CUA. CUA thus
stepped into the shoes of the other heirs to become a co-owner of the prop-
erty with VARGASES.
3. As a result, only CUA's presence is absolutely required for a complete and
final determination of the controversy because what respondents seek is to
be subrogated to his rights as a purchaser.
VERIFICATION AND NON-FORUM SHOPPING RELAXED IN THIS CASE
 1. CUA contends that the petition should have been dismissed (CA level) cit- instrument, or stipulation in the action for partition, or of the affidavit in the office of the register of deeds,
a bond with the said register of deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal property
ing Gloria’s failure to: (1) indicate that she was authorized to represent her
involved as certified to under oath by the parties concerned and conditioned upon the payment of any just
co-respondents in the petition, and (2) state the basis of the alleged truth of claim that may be filed under section 4 of this rule. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if
the allegations. no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two (2) years after the death of the decedent.
2. GR: is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the Chanroblespublishingcompany.
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of
plaintiffs or petitioners in a case and the signature of only one of them is in-
general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial
sufficient. settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice
3. BUT, Under justifiable circumstances, the Court has relaxed the rule requir- thereof.
ing the submission of such certification considering that although it is ob-
ligatory, it is not jurisdictional
a. Thus, when all the petitioners share a common interest and invoke
a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of
them in the certification against forum shopping substantially
complies with the rules.
b. The co-respondents of Gloria Vargas in this case were her chil-
dren. Hence, the Court deems it sufficient that she signed the peti-
tion on their behalf and as their representative.

LETTER TO CUA
29th June 1995
Mr. Joseph Cua
Capilihan, Virac, Catanduanes
Sir:
This is in behalf of my client, Ms. Aurora Vargas, (c/o Atty. Prospero V. Tablizo) one of the lawful heirs
of the late Paulina Vargas, original owner of Lot No. 214 of Virac, Poblacion covered by ARP No. 031-
0031 in her name.

I understand that a document "Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale" was executed by some of
my client's co-heirs and alleged representatives of other co-heirs, by virtue of which document you ac-
quired by purchase from the signatories to the said document, five (5) shares with a total area of fifty-five
square meters of the above-described land.

This is to serve you notice that my client shall exercise her right of legal redemption of said five (5) shares
as well as other shares which you may likewise have acquired by purchase. And you are hereby given an
option to agree to legal redemption within a period of fifteen (15) days from your receipt hereof.

Should you fail to convey to me your agreement within said 15-day-period, proper legal action shall be
taken by my client to redeem said shares.

RELEVANT PROVISIONS:

Section 1, Rule 74, ROC - Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. — If the decedent left no
will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal
representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration,
divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the
register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is
only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of
the register of deeds. The parties to an extrajudicial settlement, whether by public instrument or by
stipulation in a pending action for partition, or the sole heir who adjudicates the entire estate to himself by
means of an affidavit shall file, simultaneously with and as a condition precedent to the filing of the public
 029 Benatiro v. Cuyos (Linds)
July 30, 2008 | Austria-Martinez, J. | Publication of Extrajudicial Settlement
PETITIONER: Sps. Benatiro and Cuyos-Benatiro, substituted by their heirs
RESPONDENTS: Heirs of Evaristo Cuyos (Gloria, Patrocenia, Numeriano,
Enrique)
SUMMARY: Sps. Evaristo and Agatona had 9 childred. When Evaristo die, he
left 6 parcels of land covered by tax declarations in the name of Agatona. One
of the heir, Gloria, filed a petition for letters of administration, which was
opposed by her brother, Francisco. During the course of the case, they
manifested that they had come to an agreement to settle their case. The clerk of
court was appointed by the court as the commissioner for the extrajudicial
settlement. The commissioner subpoenaed the heirs and 3 failed to attend
(Gloria, Numeriano, Enrique Cuyos). The present heirs agreed on a settlement.
The CFI approved the compromise agreement.
Sometime later, the heirs of Evaristo allegedly learned that tax declarations in
the name of their mother were cancelled and a new one was issued in the name
of the co-heir Columba. Respondent heirs of Evarista filed before the CA a
petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47. CA granted, noting that the
presumption of regularity of the commissioner’s report was overthrown by the
respondent heirs. (Fact 20; Last fact). Hence this action. The Petitioner Sps.
Benatiro argued, inter alia, that since the notice of the commissioner’s report
were sent to all the heirs including respondent heirs of Evaristo, such is binding
among them.
The issue is whether the fact that the notice of the commissioner’s report
(embodying the extrajudicial agreement) were sent to respondent heirs of
Evaristo cures the defect of lack of due process and binds them to the
agreement.
NO. The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding.
The rule plainly states, however, that persons who do not participate or had no
notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby. It contemplates a
notice that has been sent out or issued before any deed of settlement and/or
partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate
in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not after such an
agreement has already been executed as what happened in the instant case with
the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.
The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the
heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was
notice after the fact of execution. The requirement of publication is geared for
the protection of creditors and was never intended to deprive heirs of their
lawful participation in the decedent's estate. In this connection, the records of
the present case confirm that respondent heirs never signed either of the
settlement documents, having discovered their existence only shortly before the
filing of the present complaint. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial
settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition made without their
knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as they are concerned.
Applying the above-mentioned case by analogy, what matters is whether the
heirs were indeed notified before the compromise agreement was arrived at,
which was not established, and not whether they were notified of the
Commissioner's Report embodying the alleged agreement afterwards.
DOCTRINE: The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive
notice to the heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because the
same was notice after the fact of execution. The requirement of publication is
geared for the protection of creditors and was never intended to deprive heirs of
their lawful participation in the decedent's estate.
Long case!!!!! Comprehensive digest but the relevant facts and ruling are in the
summary box so read at your own risk!!!!
FACTS:
1. Spouses Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos were blessed with
nine children.
2. Evaristo died leaving six parcels of land located in Tapilon, Daanbantayan,
Cebu covered by Tax Declarations all under the name of Agatona
Arrogante.
3. One of the heirs, Gloria Cuyos-Talian (respondent Gloria) represented by
Atty. Lepiten, filed before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu, a
petition for Letters of Administration. The petition was opposed by Gloria’s
brother, Francisco, who was represented by Atty. Yray.
4. In the hearing held on January 30, 1973, both parties together with their
respective counsels appeared. Both counsels manifested that the parties
had come to an agreement to settle their case. The trial court on even
date issued an Order appointing Gloria as administratrix of the estate.
5. The Clerk of Court, Atty. Taneo, was appointed to act as Commissioner
to effect the agreement of the parties and to prepare the project of
partition for the approval of the court. The Court of First Instance (CFI)
appointed Atty. Taneo and ordered him to make a project of partition within
30 days from December 12, 1975 for submission and approval of the court.
6. In Taneo’s report, he said that he subpoenaed the nine heirs and only 3
failed to attend (Gloria, Salud, and Enrique Cuyos).
7. The agreements of the present heirs are as follows
a. Consider all income of the properties of the estate during the time
that Francisco Cuyos, one of the heirs, was administering the
properties of the estate (without appointment from the Court) as
having been properly and duly accounted for.
b. Consider all income of the properties of the estate during the
administration of Gloria Cuyos Talian, (duly appointed by the
Court) also one of the heirs as having been properly and duly
accounted for.
c. Consider all motions filed in this proceedings demanding an
accounting from Francisco Cuyos and Gloria Cuyos Talian, as
having been withdrawn.
d. Not to partition the properties of the estate but instead agreed to
first sell it for the sum of ₱40,000.00 subject to the condition that
should any of the heirs would be in a position to buy the properties
of the estate, the rest of the eight (8) heirs will just receive only
Four Thousand Pesos (₱4,000.00) each.
e. Equally divide the administration expenses to be deducted from
their respective share of ₱4,000.00.
8. The Report further stated that Columba, one of the heirs, informed all those
present in the conference of her desire to buy the properties of the estate, to
which everybody present agreed, and considered her the buyer.
9. Atty. Taneo explained that the delay in the submission of the Report was
due to the request of respondent Gloria that she be given enough time to
make some consultations on what was already agreed upon by the majority
of the heirs; that it was only on July 11, 1976 that the letter of respondent
Gloria was handed to Atty. Taneo, with the information that respondent
Gloria was amenable to what had been agreed upon, provided she be given
the sum of ₱5,570.00 as her share of the estate, since one of properties of
the estate was mortgaged to her in order to defray their father's
hospitalization.
10. The CFI disapproved the claim of respondent Gloria for the sum of
₱5,570.00, as the same had been allegedly disregarded by the heirs present
during the conference.
11. The CFI issued an order approving the compromise agreement.
12. The CFI Lope Cuyos as the new administrator of the estate, purportedly on
the basis of the motion to relieve respondent Gloria, as it appeared that she
was already residing in Central Luzon and her absence was detrimental to
the early termination of the proceedings.
13. On May 25, 1979, administrator Cuyos executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
over the six parcels of land constituting the intestate estate of the late
Evaristo Cuyos in favor of Columba for a consideration of the sum of
₱36,000.00.
14. Sometime in February 1998, the heirs of Evaristo Cuyos, allegedly learned
that Tax Declarations in the name of their late mother Agatona Arrogante,
were canceled and new Tax Declarations were issued in Columba’s name;
and that later on, Original Certificates of Titles covering the estate of
Evaristo Cuyos were issued in favor of Columba;
15. Some of these parcels of land were subsequently transferred to the names of
spouses Renato C. Benatiro and Rosie M. Benatiro, son and daughter-in-
law, respectively, of petitioners Gorgonio and Columba, for which transfer
certificates of title were subsequently issued; that they subsequently
discovered the existence of the assailed CFI Order dated December 16,
1976 and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 25, 1979.
16. Respondent Heirs of Evaristo filed a complaint against petitioner Gorgonio
Benatiro before the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems
(COSLAP) of the Department of Justice, which on June 13, 2000 dismissed
the case for lack of jurisdiction.
17. Respondent Heirs filed with the CA a petition for annulment of judgment
under Rule 47. They allege that no meeting for the compromise actually
took place, and the “agreements” were done in close confederacy with the
co-heir Columba; and that the consideration of the sale was not in custodia
legis of the court, so division would not be possible.
18. Petitioner Sps. Benatiros (substituted by heirs) contend that respondent
Heirs of Evaristo’s allegation that they discovered the assailed order dated
December 16, 1976 only in February 1998 was preposterous, as they were
represented by counsel in the intestate proceedings; thus, notice of Order to
counsel was notice to client; that this was only a ploy so that they could
claim that they filed the petition for annulment within the statutory period
of four (4) years; that they have been in possession of the six parcels of land
since May 25, 1979 when the same was sold to them pursuant to the
assailed Order in the intestate proceedings; that no extrinsic fraud attended
the issuance of the assailed order; that Numeriano executed an affidavit in
which he attested to having received his share of the sale proceeds on May
18, 1988; that respondents were estopped from assailing the Order dated
December 16, 1976, as it had already attained the status of finality.
19. CA granted the Rule 47 petition, ruling that the compulsory heirs of the
decedent attested to the fact that no meeting or conference ever happened
among them; that although under Section 3(m), Rule 133 on the Rules of
Evidence, there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of an
official duty, the same may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence
to prove the contrary.
20. The details to support the CA’s decision are: (1) no mention of present
heirs; (2) no proof of attendance of present heirs; (3) no evidence that
absent heirs received the notice of conference; (4) consideration was not
placed in custodia legis; (5) the court was not furnished of the deed of sale
 arising from the settlement.
ISSUE/s:
1. Whether Rule 47 is the proper remedy – Yes, since there is an additional
ground to annul as provided by case law, lack of due process, which is
present in this case.
2. Whether the CA erred in annulling the commissioner’s report which enjoys
the presumption of regularity – the presumption was rebutted by the
findings of the CA contained in Fact 20 (the last fact)
3. Whether there was extrinsic fraud - None, but there was lack of due process
as no conference was actually held.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision dated July 18,
2003 and Resolution dated November 13, 2003 of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch XI, Cebu and the Heirs of Evaristo
Cuyos are DIRECTED to proceed with SP Proceedings Case No. 24-BN for the
settlement of the Estate of Evaristo Cuyos.
RATIO:
R47 is the proper remedy, as there was denial of due process
11. An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud will lie only if
the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character. Extrinsic fraud exists when
there is a fraudulent act committed by the prevailing party outside of the
trial of the case, whereby the defeated party was prevented from presenting
fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by the
prevailing party. Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party
from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where
it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the
manner in which it is procured. The overriding consideration when extrinsic
fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant
prevented a party from having his day in court
12. We find that it should be annulled not on the ground of extrinsic fraud,
as there is no sufficient evidence to hold Atty. Taneo or any of the heirs
guilty of fraud, but on the ground that the assailed order is void for lack
of due process.
The presumption of regularity is overthrown
13. However, there is nothing in the records that would establish that the
alleged subpoenae, supplemented by telegrams, for the heirs to appear in
the scheduled conference were indeed sent to the heirs. In fact, respondent
Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares, one of the heirs, who was presumably present in
the conference, as she was not mentioned as among those absent, had
executed an affidavit dated December 8, 1998 attesting, to the fact that she
was not called to a meeting nor was there any telegram or notice of any
meeting received by her. While Patrocenia had executed on December 17,
2004 an Affidavit of Waiver and Desistance regarding this case, it was only
for the reason that the subject estate properties had been bought by their late
sister Columba, and that she had already received her corresponding share
of the purchase price, but there was nothing in the affidavit that
retracted her previous statement that she was not called to a meeting.
Respondent Gloria also made an unnotarized statement. that there was
no meeting held. Thus, the veracity of Atty. Taneo’s holding of a
conference with the heirs was doubtful.
14. there was no evidence showing that the heirs indeed convened for the
purpose of arriving at an agreement regarding the estate properties, since
they were not even required to sign anything to show their attendance of the
alleged meeting. In fact, the Commissioner's Report, which embodied the
alleged agreement of the heirs, did not bear the signatures of the alleged
attendees to show their consent and conformity thereto.
15. We find the instances mentioned by the CA, such as absence of the names
of the persons present in the conference, absence of the signatures of the
heirs in the Commissioner's Report, as well as absence of evidence showing
that respondents were notified of the conference, to be competent proofs of
irregularity that rebut the presumption. (LAST FACT).
(IMPT) As regards the argument of Petitioner Sps Benatiro (subbed by heirs) that
copies of the Commissioner’s Report embodying the extrajudicial settlement was
sent to the Respondent Heirs of Evaristo
16. The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding.
The rule plainly states, however, that persons who do not participate or had
no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby. It
contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before any deed of
settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested
parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and
partition), and not after such an agreement has already been executed as
what happened in the instant case with the publication of the first deed of
extrajudicial settlement among heirs.
17. The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to
the heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because the same
was notice after the fact of execution. The requirement of publication is
geared for the protection of creditors and was never intended to deprive
heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent's estate. In this connection,
the records of the present case confirm that respondents never signed either
 of the settlement documents, having discovered their existence only shortly equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations or
before the filing of the present complaint. Following Rule 74, these the doctrine of laches when to be so, a manifest wrong or injustice would
extrajudicial settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition made result.
without their knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as they are 23. In this case, respondent heirs of evaristo learned of the assailed order only
concerned. sometime in February 1998 and filed the petition for annulment of judgment
18. Applying the above-mentioned case by analogy, what matters is whether the in 2001. Moreover, we find that respondents' right to due process is the
heirs were indeed notified before the compromise agreement was arrived at, paramount consideration in annulling the assailed order. It bears stressing
which was not established, and not whether they were notified of the that an action to declare the nullity of a void judgment does not prescribe.
Commissioner's Report embodying the alleged agreement afterwards. 24. Finally, considering that the assailed CFI judgment is void, it has no legal
and binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of
As regards Petitioner Sps Benatiro’s argument that the action to assail the law, it is non-existent. Hence, the execution of the Deed of Sale by Lope in
judgment/order is already barred. favor of Columba pursuant to said void judgment, the issuance of titles
pursuant to said Deed of Sale, and the subsequent transfers are void ab
19. A void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid judgment, initio. No reversible error was thus committed by the CA in annulling the
but may be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal in judgment.
which effect is sought to be given to it. It is attended by none of the
consequences of a valid adjudication. It has no legal or binding effect or
efficacy for any purpose or at any place. It cannot affect, impair or create
rights. It is not entitled to enforcement and is, ordinarily, no protection to
those who seek to enforce. All proceedings founded on the void judgment
are themselves regarded as invalid. In other words, a void judgment is
regarded as a nullity, and the situation is the same as it would be if there
were no judgment. It, accordingly, leaves the parties litigants in the same
position they were in before the trial.
20. The CFI's order being null and void, it may be assailed anytime, collaterally
or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any
action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred by laches.41
Consequently, the compromise agreement and the Order approving it must
be declared null and void and set aside.

As to the argument that the suit to assail the judgment/order is barred by laches

21. The principle of laches or "stale demands" ordains that the failure or
neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier,
or the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.
22. There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of
demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular
circumstances. The question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion
of the court and, being an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by
equitable considerations. It cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetrate
fraud and injustice. It is the better rule that courts, under the principle of
 030 PEDROSA v. CA (BUENAVENTURA)
March 5, 2001 | Quisumbing, J. | Prescriptive Period
PETITIONER: Maria Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Court of Appeals, Carmen, Mercedes & Ramon, all surnamed
Rodriguez, Rosalina Rodriguez, Chan Lung Fai, Mateo Tan Te, Te Eng Suy, Loreta Te,
Victorio S. Detalia, Jerome Deiparine, Petronilo S. Detalia, Hubert Chiu Yulo, Paterio N.
Lao, Lorensita M. Padill, Immaculate Concepcion College and Lilian Express, Inc. and
Tio Tuan
SUMMARY: Miguel and Rosalina adopted Elena. Miguel died intestate. Elena and
Rosalina entered into an extrajudicial settlement of the estate, adjudicating between
themselves the estate. Rodriguezes filed an action to annul Elena’s adoption, but the CFI
upheld the validity; they filed an appeal in the CA. While the appeal was pending, the
Rodriguezes entered into an extrajudicial settlement with Rosalina for the partition of the
estate of Miguel and of another sister. Rosalina acted as the representative of the heirs of
Miguel. Because of the DESP, the Rodriguezes were able to secure new TCTs over the
parcels of land and were able to transfer it to 3rd parties (other respondents). The parties in
the appeal filed a joint MTD. CA dismissed the appeal, upholding the validity of Elena’s
adoption. Elena sent her daughter to get their share in the partition from the Rodriguezes
but were not given since they were not blood relatives. Elena filed a complaint to annul
the 1983 partition, filed on January 28, 1987 and amended on March 25, 1987. RTC
dismissed the complaint. Elena appealed to the CA and the CA affirmed the RTC’s
decision. Elena filed a MR, but was also denied by the CA. Hence, this petition. The issue
in this case is whether or not the complaint for the annulment of the DESP had already
prescribed. The SC answered in the negative. The SC held that Section 4, Rule
74 provides for a 2-year prescriptive period (1) to persons who have participated or taken
part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and in addition (2) when the provisions of
Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of
the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by
themselves or through guardians. Elena, based on records, did not participate in the
extrajudicial partition. Hence the 2-year prescriptive period is not applicable in her case.
The applicable prescriptive period here is 4 years as provided in Gerona v. De Guzman,
where the action to annul a deed of extrajudicial settlement upon the ground of fraud may
be filed within 4 years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have
taken place when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new
certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively. Considering that
Elena’s complaint was filed on January 28, 1987, or 3 yrs and 10 mos after the questioned
extrajudicial settlement dated March 11, 1983, was executed, her action against the
respondents on the basis of fraud has not yet prescribed.
DOCTRINE: (as found in the book) The prescriptive period stated under Section 4
applies only to persons who participated, took part in, or had notice of the settlement of,
the estate provided under Rule 74.
FACTS:
1. On April 8, 1946, the spouses Miguel Rodriguez (Miguel) and Rosalina J.
de Rodriguez (Rosalina) initiated proceedings before the CFI of Ozamiz
City for the legal adoption of Maria Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa (Elena).
a. On August 1, 1946, the CFI granted the petition and declared Elena the
adopted child of Miguel and Rosalina.
2. On April 29, 1972, Miguel died intestate.
a. Thereafter, Elena and Rosalina entered into an extrajudicial settlement
of Miguel’s estate, adjudicating between themselves in equal propor-
tion the estate of Miguel.
3. On November 21, 1972, private respondents (Rodriguezes) filed an action
to annul the adoption of Elena before the CFI of Ozamiz City, with Elena
and herein respondent Rosalina as defendants.
a. On August 28, 1974, the CFI denied the petition and upheld the validity
of the adoption; private respondents appealed the decision to the CA.
4. On March 11, 1983, while said appeal was pending, the Rodriguezes en-
tered into an extrajudicial settlement with Rosalina for the partition of the
estate of Miguel and of another sister, Pilar. Rosalina acted as the repre-
sentative of the heirs of Miguel. Pilar had no heirs except her brothers and
sisters.
a. The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition (DESP) covered 14
parcels of land covering a total area of 224,883 sq.m. These properties
were divided among Jose, Carmen, Mercedes, Ramon and the heirs of
Miguel, represented solely by Rosalina.
b. The heirs of Miguel were given 226 sq.m. of parcel 2, and 9,567 sq.m.
and 24,457 sq.m. of parcels 7 and 9, respectively. The total land area al-
located to the heirs of Miguel was 34,250 sq.m.
5. Armed with the DESP, respondents Rodriguezes were able to secure new
TCTs and were able to transfer some parcels to the other respondents.10
6. On June 19, 1986, the parties in the appeal which sought to annul the adop-
tion of Elena filed a joint Motion to Dismiss.
a. On June 25, 1986, the CA dismissed the appeal, but upheld the validity
Elena’s adoption.
b. Thereafter, Elena sent her daughter, Loreto Jocelyn, to claim their share
of the properties from the Rodriguezes. The latter refused saying that
10
Lots 504-A-6, 504-B-3 and 504-C-4, portions of Parcel 3, designated as Lot 504, were transferred to respondents
Chuan Lung Fai, but not included in the Deed of Settlement and Partition, were transferred to respondent Lilian Express,
Inc. and are now registered under TCT No. T-11337. Parcel 6, Lot 560, was subdivided among Ramon, Jose, Carmen and
Mercedes and was designated as Lots 560-A, 560-B, 560-C, 560-D and 560-E. Lot 560-A covering 500 square meters
was transferred to respondent Victorino Detall and was subsequently transferred to Jerome Deiparine who registered it
under his name under TCT No. T-10706. Lot 560-B with 500 square meters was transferred to respondent Petronilo
Detalla and was later transferred to respondent Hubert Chiu Yulo who registered it under his name under TCT No. T-
11305. Lot 560-C was transferred and registered under the name of respondent Paterio Lao with TCT No. T-10206. Lot
560-D was sold to and subsequently registered in the name of Lorensita M. Padilla under TCT No. T-10207. The remain-
ing portion, Lot 560-E consisting of 43,608 square meters was bought by respondent Immaculate Concepcion College
and was registered in its name under TCT No. T-10208.
 Maria Elena and Loreto were not heirs since they were not their blood
relatives.
7. Elena filed a complaint to annul the 1983 partition.
a. The said complaint was filed on January 28, 1987, but was later
amended on March 25, 1987 to include the allegation that earnest ef-
forts toward a compromise were made but failed.
b. The RTC dismissed the complaint.
8. Elena appealed to the CA.
a. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC based on the following:
i. that the participation of Rosalina has already estopped her from
questioning the validity of the partition, and since she is already
estopped, it naturally follows that Elena, her successor-in-interest,
is likewise estopped, applying Article 1439 of the Civil Code;
ii. that the appeal of Maria Elena and her claim that the partition is
null and void is weakened by her inconsistent claim that the parti-
tion would have been alright had she been given a more equitable
share;
iii. the action is essentially an action for rescission and had been filed
late considering that it was filed beyond the 4 year period provided
for in Article 1100 of the Civil Code;
iv. that fraud and/or bad faith was never established.
9. Elena filed a MR, which was denied by the CA on December 20, 1994.
ISSUE/s:
3. WON the complaint for annulment of the “Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement
and Partition” had already prescribed. - NO, the 2 year period does not
apply to her since she was not able to participate in the extrajudicial
partition or settlement. So the applicable period is the 4-year period.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the
CA is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The “Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement
and Partition” executed by private respondents on March 11, 1983 is declared
invalid. The amount of P100,000.00 is hereby awarded to Elena as damages to be
paid by private respondents, who are also ordered to pay the costs.
RATIO:
On whether the complaint for annulment of the DESP has already prescribed
1. Elena: the complaint for annulment of the extrajudicial partition has not yet
prescribed since the prescriptive period which should be applied is 4 years
following the case of Beltran v. Ayson.
a. Sec. 4, Rule 74 which provides for a 2-year prescriptive period needs
two requirements: (1) the party assailing the partition must have been
given notice and (2) the party assailing the partition must have
participated therein. Elena insists that these requirements are not
present in her case, since she did not participate in the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition.
b. Villaluz v. Neme: a deed of extrajudicial partition executed without
including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge and consent to the
same, is fraudulent.
c. She asserts that she is an adoptive daughter and thus an heir of Miguel.
d. She also contends that the respondent buyers were buyers in bad faith
since they failed to exercise the necessary due diligence required before
purchasing the lots. In the alternative, Elena wants to redeem the said
lots as a co-owner of respondent Rodriguezes under the provisions of
Article 1620 of the New Civil Code.
e. Lastly, Elena asserts that she will suffer lesion if the partition would be
allowed. She asks for the rescission of the said partitioning under
Articles 165-175 of the Civil Code.
2. Respondents: claim that the action of petitioner had already prescribed.
a. Elena and Rosalina already have their shares in the estate of Miguel
Rodriguez reflected in the compromise agreement they entered into
with the respondent Rodriguezes in AC- G.R. SP 00208.
b. Finally, respondents aver that the non-participation of Elena in the
extrajudicial partition was understandable since her status as an adopted
child was then under litigation. The shares of Miguel’s heirs were
adequately protected in the partition.
3. SC: Section 4, Rule 74 provides for a 2-year prescriptive period (1) to
persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the
extrajudicial partition, and in addition (2) when the provisions of Section 1
of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs
of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are
represented by themselves or through guardians.
a. Elena, based on records, did not participate in the extrajudicial
partition. Patently then, the two-year prescriptive period is not
applicable in her case.
b. The applicable prescriptive period here is 4 years as provided
in Gerona v. De Guzman, where the action to annul a deed of
extrajudicial settlement upon the ground of fraud may be filed within 4
years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to
have taken place when said instrument was filed with the Register of
Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of
respondents exclusively.
c. Considering that Elena’s complaint was filed on January 28, 1987,
or 3 yrs and 10 mos after the questioned extrajudicial settlement
dated March 11, 1983, was executed, her action against the
respondents on the basis of fraud has not yet prescribed.
 d. Section 1 of Rule 74 11 is the applicable rule on publication of of Maria Elena. Since Miguel predeceased Pilar, a sister, his estate
extrajudicial settlement. Based on the provision, without the automatically vested to his child and widow, in equal
participation of all persons involved in the proceedings, the shares. Respondent Rodriguezes interests did not include Miguels
extrajudicial settlement cannot be binding on said persons. The rule estate but only Pilars estate.
contemplates a notice which must be sent out or issued before the Deed
of Settlement and/or Partition is agreed upon, i.e., a notice calling all Other issues
interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial 1. On whether Elena could redeem the properties from the buyers: SC said that
settlement and partition, not after, which was when publication was since Torrens title has already been issued, it cannot be collaterally
done in the instant case. attacked. The validity of the title can only be raised in an action expressly
e. Following Rule 74 and the ruling in Beltran vs. Ayson, since Maria instituted for that purpose.
Elena did not participate in the said partition, the settlement is not 2. On whether Elena is entitled to actual or moral damages: SC said she isn’t
binding on her. entitled since no evidence or proof was presented to substantiate, however,
f. The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply when the deed since Elena technically sustained injury, was unlawfully deprived of legal
of extrajudicial partition is sought to be annulled on the ground of participation in the partition of the estate of her adoptive father, that the
fraud. A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including respondents transferred the property to 3rd parties, and the case has dragged
some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is for more than a decade, she is entitled to P100,000 nominal damages for the
fraudulent and vicious. Elena is an heir of Miguel together with her technical injury suffered.
adopting mother, Rosalina. Being the lone descendant of Miguel, she
excludes the collateral relatives of Miguel from participating in his
estate, following the provisions of Article 1003 of the Civil CodeThe
private respondent Rodriguezes cannot claim that they were not aware
of Maria Elenas adoption since they even filed an action to annul the
decree of adoption. Neither can they claim that their actions were valid
since the adoption of Maria Elena was still being questioned at the time
they executed the deed of partition. The complaint seeking to annul the
adoption was filed only 26 years after the decree of adoption, patently a
much delayed response to prevent Elena from inheriting from her
adoptive parents. The decree of adoption was valid and existing. With
this factual setting, it is patent that private respondents executed the
deed of partition in bad faith with intent to defraud Elena.
g. Segura v. Segura: Sec. 4, Rule 74 provides in gist that a person who has
been deprived of his lawful participation in the estate of the decedent,
whether as heir or as creditor, must assert his claim within two years
after the extrajudicial or summary settlement of such estate under
Sections 1 and 2 respectively of the same Rule 74. Thereafter, he will
be precluded from doing so as the right will have prescribed. It does not
apply to the partition in question which was null and void as far as the
plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only valid partitions.
h. To say that Elena was represented by Rosalina in the partitioning is
imprecise. Elena, the adopted child, was no longer a minor at the time
Miguel died. Rosalina, only represented her own interests and not those

11
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the
manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has
not participated therein or had no notice thereof.
 031 Gerona v. De Guzman (CELAJE)
G.R. No. L-19060 | May 29, 1964 | Concepcion, J. | Prescription for an action to
nullify a deed of Extrajudicial Settlement
PETITIONER: IGNACIO GERONA, MARIA CONCEPCION GERONA,
FRANCISCO GERONA AND DELFIN GERONA (grand-children from
Marcelo's 1st wife)
RESPONDENTS: CARMEN DE GUZMAN, JOSE DE GUZMAN,
CLEMENTE DE GUZMAN, FRANCISCO DE GUZMAN, RUSTICA DE
GUZMAN, PACITA DE GUZMAN, AND VICTORIA DE GUZMAN
(children from Marcelo's 2nd wife)
SUMMARY: In 1948, respondents (children of Marcelo de Guzman from his
second wife) executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement which fraudulently
excluded the petitioners (grandchildren of Marcelo from his first wife). But it
was only in 1956 or 1957 that petitioners discovered the fraud. In 1958, peti-
tioners then filed an action to nullify said deed of extra-judicial settlement.
Lower courts dismissed petitioner's claim on the ground of prescription.
W/N prescription applies and when does it begin? Yes and from registration
of the deed of extrajudicial settlement with the Register of Deed in 1948.
Although, as a general rule, an action for partition among co-heirs does not
prescribe, this is true only as long as the defendants do not hold the property in
question under an adverse title. The statute of limitations operates, as in other
cases, from the moment such adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the
property. When respondents executed the aforementioned deed of extra-judicial
settlement stating therein that they are the sole heirs of the late Marcelo de
Guzman, and secured new transfer certificates of title in their own name, they
thereby excluded the petitioners from the estate of the deceased, and,
consequently, set up a title adverse to them. Further, because the grounds to
annul is based on the ground of fraud, the action must have been filed within 4
years from the discovery of the fraud. However, the fraud here was deemed to
be constructively discovered in 1948, from the moment the deed of extrajudicial
settlement was registered with the Register of Deeds, for registration constitutes
as constructive notice to the world.
DOCTRINE: Prescription applies to bar an action to nullify a deed of extraju-
dicial settlement or an action for partition of an estate when some of the parties
are holding the property under an adverse title vis-à-vis the other parties.
FACTS:
7. In a complaint filed in 1958, petitioners (grand-children from the first wife)
herein, namely, Ignacio, Maria Concepcion, Francisco and Delfin, all
surnamed Gerona, allege that they are the legitimate children of Domingo
Gerona and Placida de Guzman.
8. That the latter, Placida, who died on August 9, l941 was a legitimate
daughter of Marcelo de Guzman and his first wife, Teodora de la Cruz.
9. That after the death of his first wife, Marcelo de Guzman married Camila
Ramos, who begot him several children, namely, respondents (children
from second wife) Carmen, Jose, Clemente, Francisco, Rustica, Pacita and
Victoria, all surnamed De Guzman; that Marcelo de Guzman died on
September 11, 1945.
10. That subsequently, or on May 6, 1948, respondents (children from the
second wife) executed a deed of "extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the
deceased Marcelo de Guzman," fraudulently misrepresenting therein that
they were the only surviving heirs of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman,
although they well knew that petitioners (grandchildren from the first wife)
were, also, his forced heirs.
11. That respondents had thereby succeeded fraudulently in causing the transfer
certificates of title to seven (7) parcels of land, issued in the name of said
deceased, to be cancelled and new transfer certificates of title to be issued in
their own name, in the proportion of l/7th individual interest for each.
12. That such fraud was discovered by the petitioners only the year before the
institution of this case.
13. Accordingly, the petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered nullifying
said deed of extra-judicial settlement, insofar as it deprives them of their
participation of l/8th of the properties in litigation; ordering the respondents
to reconvey to petitioners their aforementioned share in said properties;
14. ordering the register of deeds to cancel the transfer certificates of title
secured by respondents as above stated; and sentencing respondents to pay
damages and attorney's fees.
15. In their answer, respondents maintained that petitioners' mother, the
deceased Placida de Guzman, was not entitled to share in the estate of
Marcelo de Guzman, she being merely a spurious child of the latter, and
that petitioners' action is barred by the statute of limitations.
16. After appropriate proceedings, the trial court rendered a decision finding
that petitioners' mother was a legitimate child, by first marriage, of Marcelo
de Guzman; that the properties described in the complaint belonged to the
conjugal partnership of Marcelo de Guzman and his second wife, Camila
Ramos; and that petitioners' action has already prescribed, and,
accordingly, dismissing the complaint without costs. CA affirmed.
 17. Petitioners maintain that since they and respondents are co-heirs of the this jurisdiction that an action for reconveyance of real property based upon
deceased Marcelo de Guzman, the present action for partition of the latter's a constructive or implied trust, resulting from fraud, may be barred by the
estate is not subject to the statute of limitations of action. statute of limitations.
18. Petitioners further claim that, if affected by said statute, the period of four 5. Inasmuch as petitioners seek to annul the aforementioned deed of "extra-
(4) years therein prescribed did not begin to run until actual discovery of the judicial settlement" upon the ground of fraud in the execution thereof, the
fraud perpetrated by respondents, which, it is claimed, took place in 1956 or action therefor may be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the
1957; and that, accordingly, said period had not expired when the present fraud.
action was commenced on November 4, 1958.
6. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place, in the case at bar, on June
25, 1948, when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds Land
new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively,
ISSUES:
for the registration of the deed of extra-judicial settlement constitutes
17. W/N the statute of limitations applies to an action to nullify an extra- constructive notice to the whole world.
judicial settlement? Yes. The statute of limitations operates from the
moment such adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the property,
which, in this case, was when respondents executed the deed of extra-
judicial settlement which excluded herein petitioners.
18. W/N prescription started from actual discovery of the fraud in 1956 or
1957? No. It started when the deed of extra-judicial settlement was filed
with the Registered of Deeds for the registration of the deed of extra-
judicial settlement constitutes constructive notice to the whole world.

RULING: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed,

with costs against petitioners herein.

RATIO:
1. Petitioners' contention is untenable. Although, as a general rule, an action
for partition among co-heirs does not prescribe, this is true only as long as
the defendants do not hold the property in question under an adverse title.
2. The statute of limitations operates, as in other cases, from the moment such
adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the property.
3. When respondents executed the aforementioned deed of extra-judicial
settlement stating therein that they are the sole heirs of the late Marcelo de
Guzman, and secured new transfer certificates of title in their own name,
they thereby excluded the petitioners from the estate of the deceased, and,
consequently, set up a title adverse to them. And this is why petitioners
have brought this action for the annulment of said deed upon the ground
that the same is tainted with fraud.
4. Although, there are some decisions to the contrary, it is already settled in
 AMEROL v. BAGUMBARAN (CRUZ)
September 30, 1987 | Sarmiento, J. | Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
PETITIONER: Liwalug Amerol, Macatan Amerol, Taib Amerol, Dibaratun
Amerol, Dibaratun, Matabalao, Mindalano Dibaratun, Dipundugun Moro, and
Manucao Moro
RESPONDENTS: Molok Bagumbaran
SUMMARY: Bagumbaran alleged that the Almerols forcibly entered his prop-
erty which he acquired two free patent applications. Datomanong, in his coun-
terclaim, stated that he has been and up to the present in continuous occupation
and cultivation of the land since the date he purchased it from Mandal Tondo
and that his co-petitioners named in the complaint are merely his tenants. In-
stead of annulling the patent and title of Bagumbaran within one year from issu-
ance thereof, Datumanong filed a formal protest with before the Bureau of
Lands after the lapse of Nine (9) long years from the issuance of patent in favor
of Bagumbaran and filed a counterclaim reiterating his stand that Bagumbaran
secured patent on the land by means of deceit and fraud, wherefore, he prayed
that said title be annulled, or, alternatively, be ordered to reconvey the said land
to the him. The trial court found Bagumbaram to be guilty of fraud and misrep-
resentation but still denied the counterclaim for the affirmative relief of recon-
veyance on the ground of prescription. The issue is WoN the prescriptive period
for the action to reconvey the title to real property arising from an implied or
constructive trust is 10 yrs or 4yrs. The Court ruled in favor of Dutamanong
(Amerols) and held that the prescription for period for the action to reconvey the
title to real property arising from an implied or constructive trust is 10 yrs. The
point of reference is, or the ten-year prescriptive period commences to run from,
the. date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the real property. Under
the present Civil Code, an implied or constructive trust is an offspring of the
law. Thus, Article 1144 of the New Civil Code is applicable.
DOCTRINE: An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive
trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the
property.
Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the
time the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
FACTS:
1. The only issue for resolution is the prescriptive period of an action for re-
conveyance of real property which has been wrongfully or erroneously reg-
istered under the Torrens System in another's name.
a. Amerols – 10 years
b. Bagumbaran – 4 years
2. The trial court ruled in favor of Bagumbaran and held that the prescriptive
period is 4 years.
3. Bagumbaran alleged that the Almerols forcibly entered his property known
as Lot No. 524, Pls-126 which he wishes to recover
4. the same lot was covered by two free patent applications:
a. that of defendant Liwalug Datomanong (erroneously surnamed
Amerol) which he filed on the 4th day of September, 1953, and
b. that of Molok Bagumbaran which was filed on December 27,
1954.
5. There is also no question regarding the fact that as to these two free patent
applications, that of Molok Bagumbaran was given due course for the 2 ap-
plications. Thus, Original Certificate of Title No. P-466 was duly issued,
owner's duplicate certificate having been furnished to Bagumbaran.
6. However, Liwalug Datomanong had never known of the free patent applica-
tion on the land in question nor was he ever notified or participated in the
administrative proceedings relative to Bagumbaran's free patent application.
a. He claims that he has been and up to the present in continuous oc-
cupation and cultivation of the land since the date he purchased it
from Mandal Tondo.
b. His co-petitioners named in the complaint are merely his tenants.
7. Also, Datomanong did not take appropriate action to annul the patent and ti-
tle of Bagumbaran within one year from issuance thereof. The steps he took
are:
a. He contested said patent and title through a formal protest dated
April 24, 1964, filed before the Bureau of Lands after the lapse of
Nine (9) long years from the issuance of patent in favor of Bagum-
baran.
b. He filed a counterclaim contained in his answer to the complaint,
which answer was filed with this court on December 4, 1964.
i. He reiterated his stand that Bagumbaran secured patent on
the land by means of deceit and fraud, wherefore, he
prayed that said title be annulled, or, alternatively, be or-
dered to reconvey the said land to the him.
8. The trial court found Bagumbaram to be guilty of fraud and misrepresenta-
tion but still denied the counterclaim for the affirmative relief of reconvey-
ance on the ground of prescription
a. On fraud and Misrepresentation of Bagumbaran
i. since 1952 when Mandal Tando transferred the land to
Datumanong, the latter occupied, took possession thereof
and cultivated the same continuously, publicly, adversely
against any claimant and in the concept of owner up to the
present;
 ii. he had introduced considerable improvements such as co-
conut and coffee plantations and other fruit trees besides
his farm house, a mosque, cassava plantation and clearing
and full cultivation of the entire area.
iii. The fact of possession has been attested to by competent
and creditable witnesses like Mandal Tando who con-
veyed the land to the defendant; Hadji Sirad Gomandang,
the barrio captain of Montay, Malabang, Lanao del Sur,
Hadji Rasol Maruhom and Hadji Abdulcadir Pagayawan,
both of Pialot, Malabang, Lanao del Sur who are farmers
and barrio-mates of said defendant; and also Disomnong
Dimna Macabuat, an employee in the office of the District
Land Officer at Marawi City who had officially conduct-
ed occular inspection and investigation of the premises in
connection with the protest of said defendant found there-
on the above-mentioned improvements introduced.
iv. On or before filing his free patent application, Bagum-
baran knew that the land in question which was covered
by his free patent application was then actually occupied
and cultivated by Liwalug Datomanong if not by Mandal
Tando, the original occupant.
v. Moreover, Bagumbaran had expressly recognized the fact
that Mandal Tando is an adjacent land owner north of his
property. On February 19, 1951 Bagumbaran revised the
above-stated tax declaration and secured another and still
he stated therein that his boundary land owner on the
north is Hadji Abdul Gani. [a.k.a.Liwalug Datoma-
nong(Amerol)].
b. Prescription:
i. The patent of Bagumbaran having been registered back in
1955 and in contemplation of law registration thereof is
notice to the whole world and yet Datomanong exerted no
effort whatsoever either to annul the title or institute pro-
ceedings for reconveyance except in his counterclaim
contained in his answer to the complaint in this case at bar
which answer and counter-claim was filed on December
4, 1964, some nine long years from the date of registra-
tion of the patent.
ii. Datumanong unfortunately lost his right to reconveyance
within the period of four (4) years from the date of regis-
tration of said patent.
9. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/s:
1. WoN the prescriptive period for the action to reconvey the title to real
property arising from an implied or constructive trust is 10 yrs or 4yrs– ten
years. The point of reference is, or the ten-year prescriptive period
commences to run from, the. date of the issuance of the certificate of title
over the real property.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Decision dated June 3,
1970 of the then Court of First Instance of Lanao del Sur in Civil Case No. 1354 is
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered ORDERING the re-
spondent to RECONVEY Original Certificate of Title No. P-466 in favor of petition-
er Liwalug Datomanong, free of any encumbrance. Costs against the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
Fraud and misrepresentation
1. Indubitably, the act of Bagumbaran in misrepresenting that he was in actual
possession and occupation of the property in question, obtaining a patent
and Original Certificate of Title No. P- 466 in his name, created an implied
trust in favor of the actual possessor of the said property. The Civil Code
provides:
a. ARTICLE 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud,
the person obtaining it is by force of law, considered a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property
comes.
2. In this case, the land in question was patented and titled in Bagumbaran's
name by and through his false pretenses.
a. Molok Bagumbaran fraudulently misrepresented that he was the
occupant and actual possessor of the land in question when he was
not because it was Liwalug Datomanong.
b. Bagumbaran falsely pretended that there was no prior applicant for
a free patent over the land but there was — Liwalug Datomanong.
3. By such fraudulent acts, Molok Bagumbaran is deemed to hold the title of
the property in trust and for the benefit of Liwalug Datomanong. Notwith-
standing the irrevocability of the Torrens title already issued to BAgum-
baran, he, even being already the registered owner under the Torrens sys-
tem, may still be compelled under the law to reconvey the subject property
to Datomanong.
a. The Torrens system was not designed to shield and protect one
who had committed fraud or misrepresentation and thus holds title
in bad faith.
b. Further, reconveyance does not work to set aside and put under re-
view anew the findings of facts of the Bureau of Lands. In an ac-
tion for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as in-
controvertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the proper-
 ty, in this case the title thereof, which has been wrongfully or erro-
neously registered in another person's name, to its rightful and le-
gal owner, or to one with a better right. That is what reconveyance
is all about.
Prescription
4. Yet, the right to seek reconveyance based on an implied or constructive
trust is not absolute. It is subject to extinctive prescription. Happily, both
parties agree on this point. The seeming impediment however, is that while
the petitioners assert that the action prescribes in ten years, the respondent
avers that it does in only four years.
5. In support of his submission, Bagumbaran invokes several cases. We have
examined the invocations and find them inapplicable.
a. Fabian vs. Fabian, relied on by Bagumbaran, does not square with
the present case. In Fabian, the party who prayed for reconveyance
was not in actual possession and occupation of the property. It was
instead the party to whom title over the property had been issued
who occupied and possessed it. Further, the litigated property had
been in the adverse possession of the registered owner for well-
nigh over twenty-nine big years, hence, reconveyance had been ir-
retrievably lost.
b. Miguel vs. Court of Appeals is also inapplicable. In Miguel, the ac-
tual occupant and possessor of the controverted parcel of land, af-
ter having been enticed by Leonor Reyes, an ambulatory notary
public, with promise of help, engaged and retained the services of
the latter to facilitate the issuance of a patent for the said land in
his (Miguel's) favor. Thus, there existed between the parties a rela-
tionship very much akin to that of lawyer-client and which is simi-
larly fiduciary in character. But Reyes, inspite of his compensation
of one-fifth of the yearly produce of the property, still violated the
trust reposed on him and instead worked for the issuance of the pa-
tent in the name of his own wife. So, after the demise of Leonor
Reyes, the property was fraudulently patented and titled in his
widow's favor. The reconveyance of the property was decreed by
the Court based on "breach of fiduciary relations and/or fraud." It
was shown that the parties were legally bound to each other by a
bond of fiduciary trust, a bond lacking in the case at bar.
c. Finally, the case of Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals can not be
availed of because the period of prescription was not there definite-
ly and squarely settled. In fact, Ramirez underscores a vacillation
between the four-year and the ten-year rule. There it was stated
that "an action for relief on the ground of fraud — to which class
the remedy prayed for by Paguia belong — scan only be brought
within four years after accrual of the right of action, or from the
discovery of the fraud." If the decision just stayed pat on that
statement, there would be merit in the respondent's presentation.
But Ramirez continues: "(I)ndepedently, however, of the alleged
fraud on the part of Ramirez, the right to demand a reconveyance
prescribes after 10 years from accrual of the cause of action, June
22, 1944, the date of registration of the patent and of the issuance
of OCT No. 282- A in his name."
6. Significantly, the three cases cited by Bagumbaran have a common denom-
inator. The cause of action assailing the frauds committed and impugning
the Torrens titles issued in those cases, all accrued prior to the effectivity of
the present Civil Code.
a. The accrual of the cause of action in Fabian was in 1928, in Mi-
guel, February, 1950, and in Ramirez, 1944. It must be remem-
bered that before August 30, 1950, the date of the effectivity of the
new Civil Code, the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190)
governed prescription12.
7. In contrast, under the present Civil Code, we find that just as an implied or
constructive trust is an offspring of the law (Art. 1456, Civil Code), so is the
corresponding obligation to reconvey the property and the title thereto in
favor of the true owner. In this context, and vis-a-vis prescription, Article
1144 of the Civil Code is applicable.13
8. An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must
perforce prescribed in ten years and not otherwise. A long line of decisions
of this Court, and of very recent vintage at that, illustrates this rule. Un-
doubtedly, it is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance based
on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the is-
suance of the Torrens title over the property.
a. The only discordant note, it seems, is Balbin vs. Medalla, which
states that the prescriptive period for a reconveyance action is four
years. However, this variance can be explained by the erroneous
reliance on Gerona vs. de Guzman. But in Gerona, the fraud was
discovered on June 25, 1948, hence Section 43(3) of Act No. 190,
was applied, the new Civil Code not coming into effect until Au-
gust 30, 1950 as mentioned earlier. It must be stressed, at this junc-
12
SEC. 43. Other civil actions; how limited-Civil actions other than for the recovery of real property can
only be brought within the following periods after the right of action accrues:
xxx xxx xxx
3. Within four years: x x x An action for relief on the ground of fraud, but the right of action in
such case shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the fraud;
xxx xxx xxx
13
Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action
accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
 ture, that Article 1144 and Article 1456, are new provisions. They b. dolo incidente, or that which does not have such decisive influence
have no counterparts in the old Civil Code or in the old Code of and by itself cannot cause the giving of consent by refers only to
Civil Procedure, the latter being then resorted to as legal basis of some particular or accident of obligation.
the four-year prescriptive period for an action for reconveyance of 13. If the fraud committed was but an incident to the registration of land (dolo
title of real property acquired under false pretenses. incidents), as in the case at bar, then I would agree that the action for recon-
9. It is abundantly clear from all the foregoing that the action of Datomanong veyance prescribes in ten (10) years. But, where it is necessary to annul a
for reconveyance, in the nature of a counterclaim interposed in his Answer, deed or title before relief could be granted, as when fraud, which vitiates
filed on December 4, 1964, to the complaint for recovery of possession in- consent dolo causante is alleged to have been committed in the execution of
stituted by Bagumbaran, has not yet prescribed. the deed which became the basis for the registration of a parcel of land, the
a. Between August 16, 1955, the date of reference, being the date of action for reconveyance should be filed within four (4) years from the dis-
the issuance of the Original Certificate of Title in the name of the covery of the fraud.
respondent, and December 4, 1964, when the period of prescription
was interrupted by the filing of the Answer cum Counterclaim, is
less than ten years.
10. Bagumbaran also interposed as a deterrent to reconveyance the existence of
a mortgage on the property. He claimed that reconveyance would not be le-
gally possible because the property under litigation has already been mort-
gaged by him to the Development Bank of the Philippines.
a. This claim is untenable otherwise the judgment for reconveyance
could be negated at the will of the holder of the title. By the simple
expedient of constituting a mortgage or other encumbrance on the
property, the remedy of reconveyance would become illusory.
b. In the instant case, the Bagumbaran being doubly in bad faith —
for applying for and obtaining a patent and the Original Certificate
of Title therefor without being in possession of the land and for
mortgaging it to the Development Bank knowing that his Original
Certificate of Title was issued under false pretenses — must alone
suffer the consequences.
11. Besides, given the undisputed facts, we cannot consider the mortgage con-
tracted in favor of the DBP as valid and binding against Datomanong. It
would be most unjust to saddle him, as owner of the land, with a mortgage
lien not of his own making and from which he derived no benefit whatsoev-
er. The consequences of the void mortgage must be left between the mort-
gagor and the mortgagee. In no small measure DBP might even be faulted
for not making the requisite investigation on the possession of the land
mortgaged.
12. PADILLA, J, concurring and dissenting: Concurs to the result but dis-
sents on the sweeping proposition that all actions for reconveyance, based
upon the ground of fraud, prescribed in ten (10) years. A distinction should
be made between the 2 kinds of Fraud:
a. dolo causante or that which determines or is the essential cause of
the consent; and

033 Caro v. CA (Daguman)
December 20,1989 | Medialdea, J. | Prescriptive Period
PETITIONER: Eliseo Caro et.al.
RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals, Sefarin, Jose Jr. and Gemme
Ronzales
SUMMARY: This case involves a 260 square meter parcel of land,
which according to the Caros, is included in the parcel of land pur-
chased by their predecessor, Epifanio Caro from Simeon Gallego.
But it was disputed by the Ronzales claiming such portion to be
included under their names as evidenced by a certificate of title is-
sued in their favor. From the records, the questioned land is the
eastern portion allegedly included in the parcel of land purchased
by Simeon Gallego. On June 4, 1975, Epifanio Caro flied a com-
plaint before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo (Civil Case No.
10235) for cancellation of Certificate of Title No. 0-6836, recon-
veyance, recovery of possession and damages on the ground of
fraud. During the pendency of the case, Epifanio Caro died, so he
was substituted by his heirs, namely, Eliseo Caro, Carlos Caro, Be-
nito Caro, Carmen Caro Batayola and Lorenzo Caro. ISSUE:
Whether the civil action has prescribed? No. An action for recon-
veyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce
prescribe in ten years and not otherwise. A long line of decisions of
this Court, and of very recent vintage at that, illustrates this rule.
Undoubtedly, it is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance
based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years
from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. The trial
court ruled in favor of the Ronzales on the grounds of estoppel, ab-
sence of fraud in the registration of the questioned land and pre-
scription. This ruling was affirmed by the Court of Ap-
peals.Likewise, We affirm, based on the first two grounds but not
on the ground of prescription.
DOCTRINE: An action for reconveyance based on an implied or
constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten years and not otherwise.
A long line of decisions of this Court, and of very recent vintage at that,
illustrates this rule. Undoubtedly, it is now well-settled that an action for
reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten
years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property
FACTS:
45. On May 1946, Simeon Gallego bought a parcel of land from Loreto
Martinez et.al. situated within the población of Jordan, sub-province
of Guimaras with an area of 5,031 sqm and bounded on the North by
Jordan River, Custodia Jalandoni et.al., on the East by Roman
Catholic Church, on the South by Graciana Martinez and on the
West by Jordan River.
46. This land was later sold to Epifanio Caro from Gallego. In 1962,
Trinidad Castem et.al. sold a parcel of land which they inherited
from Custodia Jalandoni situated in the poblacion of Jordan, Sub-
Province of Guimaras, with an area of 1,011 square meters and
bounded on the North by Jordan River; on the East by Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Jaro; on the South by Rafael Gaylan; and on
the West by Jordan River, to Epifanio Caro. The land was then
declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 4135. In
the same year, Epifanio Caro bought another parcel of land from the
heirs of Rafael Gaylan, situated in the poblacion of Jordan, Sub-
Province of Guimaras, with an area of 1,750 square meters and
bounded on the North and East by the heirs of Custodia Jalandoni;
on the South by Simeon Gallego; and on the West by Jordan River,
and declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 3638.
47. In 1963, Epifanio Caro had those three (3) parcels of land surveyed
and were then designated as Lot No. 54. When Blas Gonzales
conducted the survey, he prepared a plan. Epifanio Caro was given a
copy of the plan and he just kept it. During that survey, Epifanio
Caro pointed the boundaries of his parcels of land to the survey team.
48. The parcels of land of Epifanio Caro were denominated as Lot No.
54 and the land claimed by the private respondents Serafin V.
Ronzales, Jose Ronzales, Jr. and Gemme Ronzales, as Lot No. 55.
Epifanio Caro had the three lots consolidated after the survey into
one lot, and Tax Declaration No. 7688 was issued. During the
cadastral proceeding, Epifanio Caro filed an answer for Lot 54.
There is no showing whether or not a title was issued to him.
49. On the other hand, the private respondents (Ronzales) claim that the
 questioned land was formerly owned by Pascuala Lacson and was
declared in her name under Tax Declaration No. 4234. Pascuala
Lacson was married to Domingo Ronzales. Long before World War
II, private respondents and their predessors-in-interest had been
living on the questioned land. When Epifanio Caro bought a parcel
of land from Simeon Gallego, Jose Ronzales, Sr., his brother Serafin
Ronzales, and sister Gemme Ronzales children of Domingo
Ronzales, and Pascuala Lacson, were already living in a house of
semi-strong materials on the questioned land.
50. Sometime in 1964, another survey was conducted. The parcels of
land claimed by Epifanio Caro were denominated as Lot No. 54 and
the land claimed by the private respondents was denominated as Lot
No. 55. Epifanio Caro filed an answer for Lot No. 54 and
Purificacion Ronzales, mother of private respondent Jose Ronzales,
Jr. filed an answer for Lot No. 55. No other person or persons filed
an answer for Lot No. 55. Consequently, Original Certificate of Title
No. 0-6836 was issued in the names of the private respondents, in
equal shares of 1/3 portion each on September 17, 1970.
51. In June 1973, the spouses Epifanio Caro and Paz Caro filed an
ejectment case against Augusta Chavez, Naciso Galila, Timoteo
Parreno, Ramon Aranduque and Rafael Galotera, involving Lot Nos.
56, 59 and 60. In 1974, the spouses filed an ejectment and illegal
detainer case against Ramon Aranduque, Timoteo Parreno and
Augusta Chavez, involving Lot No. 54.
52. On June 4, 1975, Epifanio Caro flied a complaint before the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo (Civil Case No. 10235) for cancellation of
Certificate of Title No. 0-6836, reconveyance, recovery of
possession and damages on the ground of fraud. During the
pendency of the case, Epifanio Caro died, so he was substituted by
his heirs, namely, Eliseo Caro, Carlos Caro, Benito Caro, Carmen
Caro Batayola and Lorenzo Caro.
53. On November 22, 1982, the trial court dismissed the complaint. On
appeal, the dismissal was affirmed by the respondent Court of
Appeals. The motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the
present petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE/s:
4. WoN the action in Civil Case No. 10235 has prescribed – No,
because an action for reconveyance based on an implied or
constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten years and not
otherwise. A long line of decisions of this Court, and of very recent
vintage at that, illustrates this rule. Undoubtedly, it is now well-
settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or
constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the
Torrens title over the property
RULING: Judgment in question is denied.
RATIO:
1. Caro contends that since private respondents (Ronzales) do not own
the questioned land, they are mere trustees and this being the case,
prescription does not lie in an action for reconveyance.
2. We disagree. The case of Liwalug Amerol, et al. v. Molok Bagum-
baran illuminated what used to be a gray area on the prescriptive pe-
riod for an action to reconvey the title toreal property and, corollari-
ly, its point of reference:
3. It must be remembered that before August 30,1950, the date of the
effectivity of the new Civil Code, the old Code of Civil Procedure
(Act No. 190) governed prescription. It provided:
SEC. 43. Other civil actions; how limited.- Civil actions other than for
the recovery of real property can only be brought within the following
periods after the right of action accrues:
xxx xxx xxx
3. Within four years: .... An action for relief on the ground of fraud,
but the right of action in such case
shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the fraud;
xxx xxx xxx
4. In contrast, under the present Civil Code, we find that just as an im-
plied or constructive trust is an offspring of the law (Art. 1456, Civil
Code), so is the corresponding obligation to reconvey the property
and the title thereto in favor of the true owner. In this context, and
vis-a-vis prescription, Article 1144 of the Civil Code is applicable.
Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years
from the time the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.

5. An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive
trust must perforce prescribe in ten years and not otherwise. A
long line of decisions of this Court, and of very recent vintage at
that, illustrates this rule. Undoubtedly, it is now well-settled that
an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive
trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens ti-
tle over the property.
6. The only discordant note, it seems, is Balbin vs. Medalla which
states that the prescriptive period for a reconveyance action is four
years. However, this variance can be explained by the erroneous reli-
ance on Gerona vs. de Guzman. But in Gerona, the fraud was dis-
covered on June 25,1948, hence Section 43(3) of act No. 190, was
applied, the new Civil Code not coming into effect until August
30,1950 as mentioned earlier. It must be stressed, at this juncture,
that article 1144 and article 1456, are new provisions. They have no
counterparts in the old Civil Code or in the old Code of Civil Proce-
dure, the latter being then resorted to as legal basis of the four-year
prescriptive period for an action for reconveyance of title of real
property acquired under false pretenses.
7. An action for reconveyance has its basis in Section 53, paragraph 3
of Presidential Decree No. 1529, which provides:
In all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all
his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud with-
out prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent
holder of the decree of registration on the original petition or applica-
tion, ...
This provision should be read in conjunction with Article 1456 of the
Civil Code, which provides:
Article 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the per-
son obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied
trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.
8. The law thereby creates the obligation of the trustee to reconvey the
property and the title thereto in favor of the true owner. Correlating
Section 53, paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 and Article
1456 of the Civil Code with Article 1144(2) of the Civil Code, supra,
the prescriptive period for the reconveyance of fraudulently regis-
tered real property is ten (10) years reckoned from the date of the is-
suance of the certificate of title. In the present case, therefore, inas-
much as Civil Case No. 10235 was filed on June 4, 1975, it was
well-within the prescriptive period of ten (10) years from the date of
the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 0-6836 on September
17, 1970.
Unfortunately for the Caros, however, We agree with the respond-
ent court and the trial court that the private Respondents (Ronza-
les) did not employ any fraud in securing title to the questioned
land
It is clear, therefore, that as early as 1948, Epifanio Caro was al-
ready aware of the adverse claim of the private Respondents
(Ronzales). He should have been vigilant of his right as the alleg-
edly new owner of the questioned land. What he did was the re-
verse, he slept on his rights for a number of years.
In the recent case of Bagtas v. Court of Appeals, et al., We held that
considerable delay in asserting one's right before a court of justice is
strongly persuasive of the lack of merit of his claim, since it is human
nature for a person to enforce his right when same is threatened or in-
vaded. Thus, he is estopped by laches from questioning the ownership
of the questioned land.
Not only that. There is also estoppel in pais in this case because Epi-
fanio Caro filed his answer with respect to Lot No. 54 only while Pu-
rificacion Villanueva flied her answer with respect to Lot No. 55 (see
Tijam, et al. v. Sibonghanoy, et al., G.R. No. L-21450, April 15,1968,
23 SCRA 29). In addition, the trial court observed (pp. 414-415, Rec-
ords):
“The Tax Declaration of the land bought by Epifanio Caro, Exhibit 4,
states that its adjacent owner on the east is Pascual (sic) Lacson who is
the grandmother of the defendants. When said land was declared in the
name of Epifanio Caro in 1969, the adjacent owner on the East is still
Pascuala Lacson, Exhibit E. The Tax Declaration of the land bought
by Epifanio Caro from the heirs of Custodia Jalandoni, Exhibit 8
shows that the land in question is not an adjacent property. The same is
true with the Tax Declaration of the land bought by Epifano Caro from
the heirs of Rafael Gaylan, Exhibit 9. This clearly shows that Lot No.
55 which originally belonged to Pascuala Lacson is a different and
distinct parcel from the lands bought by Epifanio Caro from Sim-
eon Gallego, from the heirs of Custodia Jalandoni and from the
heirs of Rafael Gaylan (sic).”
 MARQUEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Eleazar)
December 29, 1998 | Romero, J. | Prescription/Constructive Trusts
PETITIONERS: RICARDO F. MARQUEZ, AUREA M. CABEZAS,
EXEQUIEL F. MARQUEZ, SALVADOR F. MARQUEZ, ANTONIO F.
MARQUEZ, and RAFAEL F. MARQUEZ, JR.
RESPONDENTS: COURT OF APPEALS, ALFREDO F. MARQUEZ and
BELEN F. MARQUEZ
SUMMARY: Spouses Rafael Marquez, Sr. and Felicidad Marquez begot twelve
children. Sometime in 1945, the spouses acquired a parcel of land with a lot area
of 161 square meters in Rizal, more particularly described in TCT No. 47572,
wherein the constructed their conjugal home. In 1952, Felicidad Marquez died
intestate. Thirty years later or in 1982, Rafael Marquez, Sr. executed an "Affida-
vit of Adjudication" vesting unto himself sole ownership to the property de-
scribed in TCT No. 47572. Consequently, TCT No. 47572 was cancelled and
TCT No. 33350 was issued in his name. Thereafter, on December 29, 1983 Ra-
fael Marquez, Sr. executed a "Deed of Donation Inter Vivos" covering the land
described in TCT No. 33350, as well as the house constructed thereon to three
of this children. When petitioners (the other children Marquez) learned about
the existence of TCT No. 47572, they immediately demanded that since they are
also children of Rafael Marquez, Sr., they are entitled to their respective shares
over the land in question. Unfortunately, efforts to settle the dispute proved una-
vailing since private respondents ignored petitioners' demands. In view of the
private respondents' indifference, petitioners, now joined by Rafael Jr., filed a
complaint on May 31, 1991 for "Reconveyance and Partition with Damages"
before the trial court alleging that both the "Affidavit of Adjudication" and
"Deed of Donation Inter Vivos" were fraudulent. In their Answer, private re-
spondents argued that petitioner's action was already barred by the statute of
limitations since the same should have been filed within four years from the date
of discovery of the alleged fraud. The issue in this case is whether or not the
action has prescribed. The SC said no because when Rafael Marquez Sr. (the
father), for one reason or another, misrepresented in his unilateral affidavit that
he was the only heir of his wife when in fact their children were still alive, and
managed to secure a transfer of certificate of title under his name, a constructive
trust under Article 1456 was established. In this regard, it is settled that an action
for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten
years from the isuance of the Torrens title over the property.
DOCTRINE: Constructive trusts are created in equity in order to prevent unjust
enrichment. They arise contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress or
abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal, right to property which he ought
not, in equity and good conscience, to hold.
It is settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive
trust prescribes in ten years from the isuance of the Torrens title over the
property.
FACTS:
16. During their lifetime, the spouses Rafael Marquez, Sr. and Felicidad
Marquez begot twelve children, namely: (1) Natividad; (2) Aurea; (3)
Herminigildo; (4) Filomena; (5) Exequel; (6) Salvador; (7) Guadencio; (8)
Rafael, Jr., (9) Belen; (10) Alfredo; (11) Ricardo; and (12) Antonio.
17. Sometime in 1945, the spouses acquired a parcel of land with a lot area of
161 square meters in San Juan Del Monte, Rizal, more particularly
described in TCT No. 47572, wherein the constructed their conjugal home.
18. In 1952, Felicidad Marquez died intestate. Thirty years later or in 1982,
Rafael Marquez, Sr. executed an "Affidavit of Adjudication" vesting unto
himself sole ownership to the property described in TCT No. 47572.
Consequently, TCT No. 47572 was cancelled and TCT No. 33350 was
issued in his name on June 16, 1982.
19. Thereafter, on December 29, 1983 Rafael Marquez, Sr. executed a "Deed of
Donation Inter Vivos" covering the land described in TCT No. 33350, as
well as the house constructed thereon to three of this children, namely: (1)
petitioner Rafael, Jr.; (2) Alfredo; and (3) Belen, both private respondents
herein, to the exclusion of his other children, petitioners herein. As a result
of the donation, TCT No. 33350 was cancelled and TCT No. 47572 was
issued in private respondents' name.
20. From 1983 to 1991, private respondents were in actual possession of the
land. However, when petitioners learned about the existence of TCT No.
47572, they immediately demanded that since they are also children of
Rafael Marquez, Sr., they are entitled to their respective shares over the
land in question. Unfortunately, efforts to settle the dispute proved
unavailing since private respondents ignored petitioners' demands.
21. In view of the private respondents' indifference, petitioners, now joined by
Rafael Jr., filed a complaint on May 31, 1991 for "Reconveyance and
Partition with Damages" before the trial court alleging that both the
"Affidavit of Adjudication" and "Deed of Donation Inter Vivos" were
fraudulent since the private respondents took advantage of the advanced age
of their father in making him execute the said documents.
22. In their Answer, private respondents argued that petitioner's action was
already barred by the statute of limitations since the same should have been
filed within four years from the date of discovery of the alleged fraud.
23. After due proceedings, the trial court, on April 29, 1993, rendered its
decision6 in favor of the petitioners, in this wise:
 a. Prescription cannot set in because an action to set aside a
document which is void ab initio does not prescribe.
b. Both the "Affidavit of Adjudication" and the "Donation Inter
Vivos" did not produce any legal effect and did not confer any
right whatsoever.
c. Equally, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 33350 and 46461 issued
pursuant thereto, are likewise null and void ab initio.
d. Therefore, the inexistence of these documents and certificates of
title is permanent and cannot be the subject of prescription.
24. Private respondents, dissatisfied with the trial court's ruling, sought recourse
before the Court of Appeals. On April 29, 1996, the said court reversed the
trial court's finding, thus:
a. In line with the decision of the Supreme Court in Gerona v. de
Guzman, 11 SCRA 143, 157, the action therefor may be filed
within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud.
b. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place in the case at bar on
June 16, 1982, when the affidavit of self-adjudication was filed
with the Register of Deeds and new certificate of title (No. 33350)
was issued in the name of Rafael Marquez, Sr. (Exhibits E and 5,
page 16, record).
c. Considering that the period from June 16, 1982, when TCT No.
33350 was issued in the name of Rafael Marquez Sr., to May 31,
1991, when appellees' complaint was filed in court, is eight (8)
years, eleven (11) months and fifteen (15) days, appellants' action
to annul the deed of self-adjudication is definitely barred by the
statute of limitation.
25. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration proved unavailing. Hence, they are
now before this Court to raise the issue of whether their action for
reconveyance had prescribed.
ISSUE/s
W/N the action has not prescribed because of the creation of an implied or
constructive trust by virtue of the fraudulent "Affidavit of Adjudication" and "Deed
of Donation" wherein the Petitioners Marquez were allegedly deprived of their just
share over the parcel of land? – YES, when Rafael Marquez Sr., for one reason or
another, misrepresented in his unilateral affidavit that he was the only heir of his
wife when in fact their children were still alive, and managed to secure a transfer of
certificate of title under his name, a constructive trust under Article 1456 was
established. In this regard, it is settled that an action for reconveyance based on an
implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the isuance of the Torrens
title over the property.
RULING: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41214 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Except as to
the award of attorney's fees which is hereby DELETED, the judgment of the trial
court in Civil Case No. 60887 is REINSTATED. No costs.
RATIO:
23. It must be noted that Felicidad Marquez died in 1952; thus, succession to
her estate is governed by the present Civil Code. Under Article 887 thereof,
her compulsory heirs are her legitimate children, petitioners and private
respondent therein, and her spouse, Rafael Marquez, Sr.
24. Now, in 1982, Rafael Marquez, Sr. decided to adjudicate the entire property
by executing an "Affidavit of Adjudication" claiming that he is the sole
surviving heir of his deceased wife Felicidad F. Marquez.
25. As such, when Rafael Marquez Sr., for one reason or another,
misrepresented in his unilateral affidavit that he was the only heir of
his wife when in fact their children were still alive, and managed to
secure a transfer of certificate of title under his name, a constructive
trust under Article 1456 was established.
26. Constructive trusts are created in equity in order to prevent unjust
enrichment. They arise contrary to intention against one who, by fraud,
duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal, right to property
which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold. Prescinding
from the foregoing discussion, did the action for reconveyance filed by the
petitioners prescribe, as held by the Court of Appeals?
27. In this regard, it is settled that an action for reconveyance based on an
implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the isuance of the
Torrens title over the property. For the purpose of this case, the prescriptive
period shall start to run when TCT No. 33350 was issued, which was on
June 16, 1982. Thus, considering that the action for reconveyance was filed
on May 31, 1991, or approximately nine years later, it is evident that
prescription had not yet barred the action.
28. To bolster the foregoing position, the Court of Appeal's reliance on Gerona
v. de Guzman, is misplaced. In Amerol v. Bagumbaran, we ruled that the
doctrine laid down in the earlier Gerona case was based on the old Code of
Civil Procedure which provided that an action based on fraud prescribes
within four years from the date of discovery.
29. However, with the effectivity of the present Civil Code on August 30, 1950,
the provisions on prescriptive periods are now governed by Articles 1139 to
1155. Since implied or constructive trusts are obligations created by law
then the prescriptive period to enforce the same prescribes in ten years.
30. Cognizant of the fact that the disputed land was conjugal property of the
spouses Rafael, Sr. and Felicidad, ownership of the same is to be equally
divided between both of them.
31. Prescinding therefrom, can Rafael Marquez Sr., as trustee of his wife's
share, validly donate this portion to the respondents? Obviously, he cannot,
as expressly provided in Art. 736 of the Civil Code, thus:
 a. Art. 736.Guardians and trustees cannot donate the property
entrusted to them.
32. Moreover, nobody can dispose of that which does not belong to him. Be
that as it may, the next question is whether he can validly donate the other
half of the property which he owns? Again, the query need not detain us at
length for the Civil Code itself recognizes that one of the inherent rights of
an owner is the right to dispose of his property.
33. Whether this donation was inofficious or not is another matter which is not
within the province of this Court to determine inasmuch as it necessitates
the production of evidence not before it.
34. Finally, while we rule in favor of petitioners, we cannot grant their plea for
moral damages and attorney's fees since they have not satisfactorily shown
that they have suffered "mental anguish" as provided in Article 2219 and
Article 2290 of the Civil Code.
35. Similarly, the plea for attorney's fees must likewise be denied because no
premium should be placed on the right to litigate.
 035 HEIRS OF SALUDARES v. CA (Escalona)
January 16, 2004 | Corona, J. | Reconveyance
PETITIONER: Heirs of Pomposa Saludares
RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals, Jose Dator, and Carmen Calimutan
SUMMARY: The heirs and their father, Juan Dator executed a Deed of Extraju-
dicial Partition of the share of Pomposa in the Tanza estate with the eastern por-
tion thereof going to Juan and the western half to the children. Juan remained in
possession of his share until his death. Isabel Dator applied for a free patent over
the entire Tanza estate in behalf of the heirs thus it was awarded. Private re-
spondents filed an action for reconveyance against petitioner heirs. They alleged
that they were the owners in fee simple and they were in possession of the land,
and Isabel Dator obtained free patent in favor of the heirs by means of fraud and
misrepresentation. Petitioners alleged that they and their predecessors in interest
had been in actual, continuous, adverse and public possession of the land in the
concept of owners since time immemorial, and the title to the lot was issued to
them after faithful compliance with the requirements for the issuance of a free
patent.
The issue is WoN the reconveyance is still available notwithstanding the inde-
feasibility of the Torrens Title.
The SC held that the registered owner may still be compelled to reconvey the
registered property to its true owner. Reconveyance does not set aside or re-
subject to review the findings of fact of the Bureau of Lands. Thus, the decree of
registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought is the transfer of the
property or its title, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in an-
other person’s name, to its rightful or legal owner or to the one with a better
right.
DOCTRINE: Reconveyance may still be done despite the presence of a Torrens
Title.
FACTS:
8. At the core of the present controversy is a parcel of land, known as Lot
5793, measuring 8,916 square meters, located at Mahabang Parang, Lucban,
Quezon. The land formed part of the conjugal properties of spouses Juan
Dator and Pomposa Saludares, known as the Tanza estate.
9. Pomposa died on May 1, 1923, leaving herein petitioners, Enrica, Petra,
Restituto, Amado, Delfina, Beata, Vicenta and Isabel, all surnamed Dator,
as her compulsory heirs (hereinafter referred to as Heirs).
10. On February 28, 1940, the Heirs and their father Juan executed a deed of
extra-judicial partition of the share of Pomposa in the Tanza estate. The set-
tlement conferred the eastern half of the Tanza estate to Juan and the west-
ern half to the Heirs.
11. Before the aforementioned partition, Juan was in possession of the entire
Tanza estate. After the partition, the Heirs took possession of their share
and had the same tenanted by a certain Miguel Dahilig, husband of Petra,
one of the Heirs, who in turn managed the land in behalf of the other sib-
lings. Juan, the father, remained in possession of his half of the land until
his death on April 6, 1940.
12. On December 13, 1976, Isabel Dator applied for a free patent over the entire
Tanza estate, including Lot 5793, in behalf of the Heirs. On May 26, 1977,
after all the requirements were complied with, the Register of Deeds of
Quezon awarded Free Patent No. 4A-2-8976 and issued Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) No. 0-23617 in the names of the Heirs.
13. Sometime in 1988, the Heirs were informed by their tenant that private re-
spondents cut some 50 coconut trees located within the subject lot. Thus,
the Heirs sent a letter, dated July 26, 1988, to private respondents demand-
ing an explanation for their intrusion into their property and unauthorized
felling of trees.
14. On August 25, 1988, private respondents retaliated by filing an action for
reconveyance against petitioners, docketed as civil case no. 88-121, in the
Regional Trial Court of Lucena City. Private respondents alleged in their
complaint that: (a) they were the owners in fee simple and possessors of Lot
No. 5793; (b) they bought the land from the successors-in-interest of Petra
Dator, one of the heirs; (c) they were in possession of the subject land from
1966 to the present and (d) petitioner Isabel Dator obtained free patent OCT
P-23617 over Lot 5793 in favor of the Heirs by means of fraud and misrep-
resentation. Thus, private respondents prayed for the cancellation of OCT
P-23617 and the issuance of a new title in their names.
15. In their answer, the Heirs denied having sold any portion of the Tanza estate
to anyone. They alleged that: (a) they and their predecessors-in-interest had
been and were still in actual, continuous, adverse and public possession of
the subject land in the concept of an owner since time immemorial and (b)
title to Lot 5793 was issued in their favor after faithful compliance with all
the requirements necessary for the issuance of a free patent.
16. After trial, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the action primar-
ily on the ground of prescription of action:
17. On appeal, the appellate court reversed the trial court decision:
ISSUES:
2. WoN
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The decision of the Court
of Appeals, dated July 31, 1996, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of
the Regional Trial Court, dated August 27, 1992, is REINSTATED.
RATIO:
50. Notwithstanding the indefeasibility of the Torrens title, the registered owner
may still be compelled to reconvey the registered property to its true own-
er. The rationale for the rule is that reconveyance does not set aside or re-
subject to review the findings of fact of the Bureau of Lands. In an action
for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontroverti-
ble. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property or its title which
has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another persons name, to
its rightful or legal owner, or to the one with a better right.
51. Nevertheless, the right to seek reconveyance of registered property is not
absolute because it is subject to extinctive prescription. In Caro vs. Court of
Appeals, the prescriptive period of an action for reconveyance was ex-
plained:
52. Under the present Civil Code, we find that just as an implied or constructive
trust is an offspring of the law (Art. 1456, Civil Code), so is the correspond-
ing obligation to reconvey the property and the title thereto in favor of the
true owner. In this context, and vis-a-vis prescription, Article 1144 of the
Civil Code is applicable.
53. Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from
the time the right of action accrues:
a. Upon a written contract;
b. Upon an obligation created by law;
c. Upon a judgment.
54. An action for reconveyance has its basis in Section 53, paragraph 3 of Pres-
idential Decree No. 1529, which provides:
55. In all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his
legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud without preju-
dice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder of the decree of registra-
tion on the original petition or application, x x x.
56. This provision should be read in conjunction with Article 1456 of the Civil
Code, which provides:
57. Article 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person
obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for
the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.
58. The law thereby creates the obligation of the trustee to reconvey the proper-
ty and the title thereto in favor of the true owner. Correlating Section 53,
paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 and Article 1456 of the Civil
Code with Article 1144(2) of the Civil Code, supra, the prescriptive period
for the reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property is ten (10)
years reckoned from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title.
59. There is but one instance when prescription cannot be invoked in an action
for reconveyance, that is, when the plaintiff is in possession of the land to
be reconveyed.
60. In a series of cases, this Court permitted the filing of an action for recon-
veyance despite the lapse of ten years and declared that said action, when
based on fraud, is imprescriptible as long as the land has not passed to an
innocent purchaser for value. But in all those cases including Vital vs. Ano-
re on which the appellate court based its assailed decision, the common fac-
tual backdrop was that the registered owners were never in possession of
the disputed property. Instead, it was the persons with the better right or the
legal owners of the land who had always been in possession of the
same. Thus, the Court allowed the action for reconveyance to prosper in
those cases despite the lapse of more than ten years from the issuance of ti-
tle to the land. The exception was based on the theory that registration pro-
ceedings could not be used as a shield for fraud or for enriching a person at
the expense of another.
61. In the case at bar, however, it is the rule rather than the exception which
should apply.
62. This Court does not normally review the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. But
when the findings of fact of the appellate court differ from those of the trial
court, the Court in the exercise of its power of review may inquire into the
facts of a case.
63. The trial court declared the Heirs as having been in actual, open and contin-
uous possession of the disputed lot. On the other hand, the appellate court
ruled that it was private respondents.
64. Private respondents presented documents purportedly showing a series of
transactions which led to the alleged transfer of ownership of Lot 5793 from
the Heirs to them, namely: (1) a Kasulatan Ng Pagbibilihang Lampa-
san, dated April 16, 1940, wherein the disputed lot was allegedly sold by
the Heirs to their sibling Petra Dator and her husband Miguel Dahilig; (2)
an extra-judicial partition showing that, upon the death of Miguel, his heirs
Petra, Angel, Anatalia, Catalina, Felimon and Jacinto, inherited Lot 5793
and (3) two deeds of sale dated December 30, 1978 and March 15,1970
wherein Felimon and Jacinto, and later Catalina, sold their undivided shares
in Lot 5793 to private respondents.
65. Other than the presentation of these documents, however, private respond-
ents failed to prove that they were in actual, open and continuous possession
of Lot 5793.
66. On the other hand, Isabel Dator, who testified for the Heirs, vehemently de-
nied having signed the Kasulatan Ng Pagbibilihang Lampasan and pointed
 out the absence of the signatures of her other siblings Vicenta, Barcelisa and istered real property and in giving due course to said action despite the lapse
Adoracion. of more than 11 years from the issuance of title thereto, which was clearly
67. The Heirs likewise presented proof of payment of realty taxes from 1956 to barred by prescription.
1974 in the names of their deceased parents, and from 1975 to 1988 in their
names.
68. More importantly, the Heirs convincingly established their open and con-
tinuous occupation of the entire Tanza estate, including Lot 5793, through
their tenant Miguel Dahilig. After Miguels death, he was succeeded by
Marcelo Saludares who testified during the trial that: (a) the farm was under
the administration of Beata and Isabel Dator who took over its management
after Petra Dator died; (b) he had been consistently tending the land since
1947; (c) he was the one who planted the various crops and trees thereon,
except for some 100 coconut trees which he explained were planted by oth-
er people in response to the Green Revolution project of then President
Marcos.
69. Saludares identified each and every landmark and boundary of the subject
lot. He also enumerated all the trees planted on the subject lot and, when
asked about the fruits of the land, he told the court that he shared the harvest
with the surviving Heirs.
70. In stark contrast, private respondents witness, farm worker Perpetuo Daya
could not identify the boundaries of the disputed property, its adjoining
owners or recall the dates he worked and tilled the subject lot.
71. Specially noteworthy was the fact that the recorded cadastral claimant of
Lot 5793, Angel Dahilig, testified that he executed a waiver in favor of the
Heirs because they were the true owners of the subject parcel of land.
72. Furthermore, we note private respondent Jose Dators declaration that he
was the cadastral claimant of and free patent applicant for Lot 5794 which
was adjacent to Lot 5793.This being the case, we find private respondents
inaction difficult to understand, considering that they were among those
who received notices of petitioners free patent application dated January 2,
1979 from the Bureau of Lands.
73. If private respondents indeed owned Lot 5793, they should have filed an
application for free patent for it just as they did for Lot 5794, or at least op-
posed the Heirs application for free patent over Lot 5793, to protect their in-
terests. As a matter of fact, they were aware that the Heirs tenant, Marcelo
Saludares, repeatedly harvested the fruits of Lot 5793.
74. But even assuming that private respondents indeed validly acquired Lot
5793 in 1966 as they claimed, they nevertheless slept on their right to se-
cure title thereto. Their unexplained inaction for more than 11 years ren-
dered their demand for reconveyance stale. Vigilantibus sed non dormienti-
bus jura subverniunt. The law aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their
rights. This legal precept finds perfect application in the case at bar.
75. Accordingly, we find that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error
in disregarding the ten-year prescriptive period for the reconveyance of reg-
 036 VDA. DE REYES v. CA (Fordan)
July 26, 1991 | Davide Jr., J. | Summary settlement of estates
PETITIONERS: Maria Vda. De Reyes, Efren Reyes, Elvira Reyes-Timbol, Erlinda
Reyes-Valerio, Ernesto Reyes, Eliazbeth Reyes, Alex, Rafael II, Emelina, and Eve-
lyn, all surnamed Reyes, represented by their mother, Maria Vda. De Reyes
RESPONDENTS: The CA and Spouses Dalmacio Gardiola and Rosario Martillano
SUMMARY: In 1936, the 70 ha. land of the deceased Gavino was surveyed and
subdivided by his heirs. One of the subdivided lots, Lot No. 1-A-14, was allotted to
Rafael Sr., one of Gavino’s children. In 1943, Rafael Sr. sold 23,431 m2 parcel of
land to Dalmacio. In 1967, Gavino’s heirs executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settle-
ment of Estate based on earlier subdivision plan (executed in 1936). The lot that was
intended for Rafael Sr., who was already deceased, was instead adjudicated to his
only son and heir, Rafael Jr. In 1969, some of Gavino’s heirs filed a case of Annul-
ment of Partition and Recovery of Possession before the CFI of Cavite City. The
case was dismissed but Candido (TCT keeper) was ordered to deliver to the heirs
concerned all the TCTs in his possession. After obtaining the TCT for Lot No. 1-A-
14, Maria, et. al, as successors-interest of Rafael Jr., filed a case with the RTC for
recovery of possession or, in the alternative, for indemnification, accounting and
damages against Dalmacio and Rosario. The RTC ruled in favor of Maria, et. al and
ordered Dalmacio and Rosario to relinquish possession or vacate the property in
question. On appeal, the CA ruled in favor of Dalmacio and Rosario and declared
that they were the lawful owners of Lot No. 1-14-A. Hence, the current petition.
The issue is whether or not the partition made by Gavino’s heirs in 1936 was valid
despite the lack of written evidence. YES. The CA correctly held that the partition
made by the children of Gavino in 1936, although oral, was valid and binding. There
is no law that requires partition among heirs to be in writing to be valid. *doctrine*
Even if we are to assume arguendo that the oral partition executed in 1936 was not
valid for some reason or another, we would still arrive at the same conclusion for
upon the death of Gavino in 1921, his heirs automatically became co-owners of his
70 ha land. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of
the decedent. The estate of the decedent would then be held in co-ownership by the
heirs. The co-heir or co-owner may validly dispose of his share or interest in the
property subject to the condition that the portion disposed of is eventually allotted to
him in the division upon termination of the co-ownership pursuant to Art. 493 of the
Civil Code. In the case at bar, the lot sold by Rafael Sr. to Dalmacio is his share in
the estate of his deceased father, Gavino. It is the same property which was eventual-
ly adjudicated to his son and heir, Rafael Jr., represented in turn by his heirs—Maria,
et. al—in the extrajudicial settlement of 1967.
DOCTRINE: In Hernandez vs. Andal, supra, this Court, interpreting Sec. 1 of Rule
74 of the ROC, held that the requirement that a partition be put in a public document
and registered has for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time the
protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object of registration is
to serve as constructive notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of
partition not executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into play when
there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. Where no such rights
are involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for
distribution in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by law. There
is nothing in said section from which it can be inferred that a writing or other formal-
ity is an essential requisite to the validity of the partition. Accordingly, an oral parti-
tion is valid.
FACTS:
37. During his lifetime, Gavino Reyes (Gavino) owned approx. 70 ha of land locat-
ed at Carmona, Cavite. He sought to bring said land under the operation of the
Torrens System but unfortunately, he died in 1921 without the title having been
issued to him. The application was prosecuted by his son, Marcelo Reyes, who
was the administrator of his property.
38. In 1936, the said property was surveyed and subdivided by Gavino’s heirs. The
2 lots, one of which is Lot No. 1-A-14, were allotted to Rafael Reyes, Sr. (Ra-
fael Sr.), one of Gavino’s children and where thereafter the latter secured tax
declarations.
39. In 1941, the original certificate of title for the whole property (OCT No. 255)
was issued. The heirs of Gavino were not aware of this fact.
40. In 1943, Rafael Sr. sold a parcel of land with an area of 23,431 m2 to private re-
spondent Dalmacio Gardiola (Dalmacio).
41. In 1945, the OCT No. 255 was revalidated and the new title is OCT RO-255.
42. In 1967, Gavino’s heirs executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
based on earlier subdivision plan (executed in 1936). The lot that was intended
for Rafael Sr., who was already deceased, was instead adjudicated to his only
son and heir, Rafael Reyes, Jr. (Rafael Jr.). Rosario Martillano (Rosario) also
signed the deed in representation of her mother, Marta Reyes, one of the chil-
dren of Gavino.
43. As a result of the Extrajudicial Settlement, OCT RO-255 was cancelled and in
lieu thereof, several TCTs were issued in the names of the respective adjudica-
tees. One of them is TCT No. 27257 in the name of Rafael Jr. covering Lot No.
1-A-14 where the TCT was kept by Candido Hebron (Candido).
44. In 1969, some of Gavino’s heirs filed a case of Annulment of Partition and Re-
covery of Possession before the CFI of Cavite City. One of the defendants in
said case is Rosario. The case was dismissed but Candido was ordered to deliv-
er to the heirs concerned all the TCTs in his possession.
45. After obtaining the TCT for Lot No. 1-A-14, petitioners (Maria, et. al), as suc-
cessors-interest of Rafael Jr., filed a case with the RTC for recovery of posses-
 sion or, in the alternative, for indemnification, accounting and damages against
Dalmacio and Rosario.
46. In their answer, Dalmacio and Rosario assert that they are the owners of the lot
in question, having bought the same from Rafael Sr.; that the sale was known to
Rafael Jr.; that they have been in possession of the property and have been pay-
ing the land taxes thereon; and that Maria, et. al are barred by prescription
and/or laches.
47. The RTC ruled in favor of Maria, et. al and ordered Dalmacio and Rosario to
relinquish possession or vacate the property in question. It was based on the
finding that:
a. the there is no evidence that the heirs of Gavino entered into any written
agreement of partition in 1936 based on the subdivision plan;
b. there is no identity between Lot No. 1-14-A and the land sold to Dalmacio
and Rosario by Rafael Sr.; and
c. granting, arguendo, that the sale made by Rafael Sr. to Dalmacio and Ro-
sario covered the land in question and that TCT was obtained by means of
fraud, the claim of the latter over the said property is already barred. Ac-
tion for reconveyance prescribes in 4 years from the discovery thereof. If
there was fraud, they could have discovered the same in 1967 when the
partition was made in as much as Rosario was a party to that partition.
48. Dalmacio and Rosario appealed to the CA and the latter ruled in their favor and
declared that they were the lawful owners of Lot No. 1-14-A.
49. Hence, the current petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the partition made by Gavino’s heirs in 1936 was valid de-
spite the lack of written evidence. – YES, since there is no law nor in Sec. 1 Rule 74
of the ROC from which it can be inferred that a writing or other formality is an es-
sential requisite to the validity of the partition.
RULING: Judgment is hereby rendered denying the petition with costs against Ma-
ria, et. al.
RATIO:
45. The SC held that the trial court erred in holding that:
a. there was no partition among the children of Gavino in 1936 since there is
no written evidence in support thereof; yet, it admits that there was a sur-
vey and subdivision of the property and the adjudication of specific subdi-
vision lots to each of the children of Gavino;
b. the land sold by Rafael Sr. to Dalmacio and Rosario is not identical to Lot
No. 1-A-14, the lot specified for and adjudicated to Rafael Jr. in the parti-
tion agreement; and
c. if the land sold by Rafael Sr. to Dalmacio is indeed Lot No. 1-A- 14 and
that TCT was obtained through fraud, the remedy open to the vendee was
an action for reconveyance, which should have been brought within 4
years from the discovery thereof in 1967 when the Extrajudicial Settle-
ment was executed since Rosario, wife of Dalmacio, was a party thereto.
On the issue on partition (Ratio 1a):
46. The CA correctly held that the partition made by the children of Gavino in
1936, although oral, was valid and binding. There is no law that requires parti-
tion among heirs to be in writing to be valid.
47. In Hernandez vs. Andal, supra, this Court, interpreting Sec. 1 of Rule 74 of the
ROC, held that the requirement that a partition be put in a public document and
registered has for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time
the protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object of regis-
tration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It follows then that the intrin-
sic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities does not
come into play when there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not af-
fected. Where no such rights are involved, it is competent for the heirs of an es-
tate to enter into an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a plan dif-
ferent from those provided by law. There is nothing in said section from which
it can be inferred that a writing or other formality is an essential requisite to the
validity of the partition. Accordingly, an oral partition is valid.
48. Barcelona, et al. vs. Barcelona, et al., supra, provides the reason why oral par-
tition is valid and why it is not covered by the Statute of Frauds: partition
among heirs or renunciation of an inheritance by some of them is not exactly a
conveyance of real property for the reason that it does not involve transfer of
property from one to the other, but rather a confirmation or ratification of title
or right of property by the heir renouncing in favor of another heir accepting
and receiving the inheritance.
49. Additionally, the validity of such oral partition in 1936 has been expressly sus-
tained by this Court in the Resolution in GR No. 92811.
50. Even if we are to assume arguendo that the oral partition executed in 1936 was
not valid for some reason or another, we would still arrive at the same conclu-
sion for upon the death of Gavino in 1921, his heirs automatically became co-
owners of his 70 ha land. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of death of the decedent. The estate of the decedent would then be held
in co-ownership by the heirs. The co-heir or co-owner may validly dispose of
his share or interest in the property subject to the condition that the portion dis-
posed of is eventually allotted to him in the division upon termination of the co-
ownership pursuant to Art. 49314 of the Civil Code.
51. In Ramirez vs. Bautista, this Court held that every co-heir has the absolute
ownership of his share in the community property and may alienate, assign, or
mortgage the same, except as to purely personal rights, but the effect of any
14
“Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto,
and he may even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But
the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion
which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.”
 such transfer is limited to the portion which may be awarded to him upon the that they definitely discovered that they were the owners of the property in
partition of the property. question.
52. In the case at bar, the lot sold by Rafael Sr. to Dalmacio is his share in the es- 60. And yet, despite full knowledge that Dalmacio and Rosario were in actual
tate of his deceased father, Gavino. It is the same property which was eventual- physical possession of the property, it was only about 13 ½ years later that they
ly adjudicated to his son and heir, Rafael Jr., represented in turn by his heirs— decided to file an action for recovery of possession.
Maria, et. al—in the extrajudicial settlement of 1967. 61. As stated earlier, the original complaint was filed in the trial court on Mar. 14,
1983. There was then absolutely no basis for the trial court to place the burden
On issues in Ratio 1 b and c: on Dalmacio and Rosario to bring an action for reconveyance within 4 years
53. SC stressed that Rafael Sr. had this property declared for taxation purposes and from their discovery of the issuance of the transfer certificate of title in the
the tax declaration issued was made the basis for the description of the property name of Rafael Jr.
in the deed of sale. Upon the execution of the deed of sale, Dalmacio immedi-
ately took possession of the property. This is the very same property which is
the subject matter of this case and which Maria, et. al seek to recover from
Dalmacio and Rosario. The main evidence adduced for their claim of owner-
ship and possession over it is TCT No. T-27257, covering Lot No. 1-14- A.
They therefore admit and concede that the property claimed by Dalmacio,
which was acquired by sale from Rafael Sr., is none other than Lot No. 1-14-A.
54. The participation of Rosario in the Extrajudicial Settlement did not place Dal-
macio and Rosario in estoppel to question the issuance of TCT. As correctly
maintained by them, Rosario signed it in representation of her deceased mother,
Marta Reyes, a daughter and an heir of Gavino. She did not sign for and in be-
half of her husband, Dalmacio, vendee of the share of Rafael Sr.
55. The same did not operate to divest the vendee of the share of Rafael Sr. in the
estate of Gavino. Maria, et. al, as mere successors-in-interest of Rafael Jr., son
of Rafael Sr., can only acquire that which Rafael, Jr. could transmit to them up-
on his death. The latter never became the owner of Lot No. 1-A-14 because it
was sold by his father in 1943.
56. The issuance of TCT in the name of Rafael Jr., in so far as Lot No. 1-14- A is
concerned, was clearly erroneous because he never became its owner. An extra-
judicial settlement does not create a right in favor of an heir.
57. As this Court stated in the Barcelona case, it is but a confirmation or ratifica-
tion of title or right to property. Thus, since he never had any title or right to
Lot No. 1-14-A, the mere execution of the settlement did not improve his con-
dition, and the subsequent registration of the deed did not create any right or
vest any title over the property in favor of the petitioners as heirs of Rafael Jr.
The latter cannot give them what he never had before. Nemo dare potest quod
non habet.
58. Furthermore, Maria, et. al’s immediate predecessor-in-interest, Rafael Jr., never
took any action against Dalmacio and Rosario from the time his father sold the
lot to the latter. Neither did they bring any action to recover from Dalmacio and
Rosario the ownership and possession of the lot from the time Rafael Jr. died.
59. As categorically admitted by them in their complaint and amended complaint, it
was only in Sept. 1969 when, after the delivery of TCT by Candido to them,
Romulo Lopez et.al v. Luis Gonzaga, Luis Gonzaga and Asuncion Gon-
zaga (HORTALEZA)
January, 31, 1964 | Reyes, J. | Settlement of Estate- Judicial
PETITIONER: Romulo Lopez
RESPONDENTS: Luis gonzaga, et al., Luis gonzaga and Asuncion Gonzaga
SUMMARY: The Petitioners Romulo Lopez et. al (Lopez) are the nearest of kin of
the deceased Soledad Gonzaga Vda. de Ferrer, her brother, sister, nephew and niec-
es. While Luis Gonzaga the principal defendant nephew/brother (in my understand-
ing, the case was super old, there were two Luis Gonzagas, the brother and the neph-
ew, im assuming they're father and son, though never mentioned in the case this is
because the court referred to Luis Gonzaga as a brother and nephew, so confusing or
may be the court just made a mistake) was in control of the property of the deceased.
This led to the claims of Lopez that the use of the property was merely until Luis
Gonzaga continued and was engaged in coconut experimentation which when he
became blind could not have continued to do so. Luis Gonzaga claims however that
he is the sole heir, and that there could not have been intestacy because there was a
will that was put forth and probated. the Clerk of court of Iloilo upon being asked to
put forth a record, claimed that documents, have been burnt during a fire in the peri-
od of war in IloIlo. However, the Registry of Deeds of Negros Occidental showed
that there was a will that was probated. Said will was duly probated in 1935 or 1936
by the Court of First Instance of Iloilo in Special Proceeding No. 2163 and that the
net residue of the estate was adjudicated by the court to said appellee, subject only to
a claim of Consolacion G. de Lopez for P1,000.00. Thereafter, upon sworn petition
of Luis Gonzaga, through his counsel, Francisco S. Hortillas, the Courts of First In-
stance of Iloilo and Occidental Negros ordered the respective Provincial Registers of
Deeds to cancel the Certificates of Title to issue new ones in the Luis’ name. Atty.
Hortillas is the husband of one of the petitioners, and the court cant find any reason
why Atty. Hortillas would lie to deprive his spouse and children their property.
Issues:
(the case was super confusing because of its age, so i checked a number of other
sources, this one is solely mine, i dont know if this is important or not, but since the
heading is judicial ill put it here) WoN as a sole heir , he had no need to ask to ask
the court for adjudication? NO, order of adjudication is the judicial recognition that
in appointing Luis as her only heir the testatrix did not contravene the law, and that
the heir was in no way disqualified to inherit; just as a final order admitting a will to
probate concludes all and sundry from thereafter contending that statutory formal
requirements have not been observed in executing the testament. Instead of contra-
dicting the testamentary institution of heir, the order of adjudication confirms it in
this case.
WoN the failure of the defendant heir to file with the Register of Deeds a certified
copy of his letters of administration and the will, and to record the attested copies of
the will and of the allowance thereof by the court negates the validity of the decree
of probate nor the rights of the devises under the will? NO, The failure of the de-
fendant, Luis Gonzaga, to file with the Register of Deeds a certified copy of his
letters of administration and the will, as provided in Section 90 of Act 496, and
to record the attested copies of the will and of the allowance thereof by the court
under Section 624 of Act 190, does not negate the validity of the judgment or
decree of probate nor the rights of the devisee under the will. At any rate, the
recording of the judicial orders sufficed as notice to interested parties, and was sub-
stantial compliance with the required recording of the will itself. No one faced by the
recorded documents could ignore the reference therein to the probated testament; and
the rule is that knowledge of what might have been revealed by proper inquiry is
imputable to the inquirer
DOCTRINE: The failure of the defendant, Luis Gonzaga, to file with the Register of
Deeds a certified copy of his letters of administration and the will, as provided in
Section 90 of Act 496, and to record the attested copies of the will and of the allow-
ance thereof by the court under Section 624 of Act 190, does not negate the validity
of the judgment or decree of probate nor the rights of the devisee under the will.
FACTS:
1. The original petition was filed with the court a quo on 6 October 1958, al-
leging, among other things, that on Soledad Gonzaga Vda. de Ferrer died
intestate on 11 April 1935 without any issue and leaving real and personal
properties worth P400,000.00;
2. that she was survived by Romulo Lopez et. Al, who are her nearest of kin,
being her brother sisters, nephews, and nieces; that during the lifetime the
deceased, she expressed the wish that as long as her brother, Luis Gonzaga,
the principal defendant, was engaged in his coconut oil experimentation he
could use products and rentals of her properties in furtherance his experi-
ments; that the said scientific venture by said defendant was discontinued
when he became totally blind in October, 1955 in view of which the plain-
tiffs now ask a partition of the estate and the cancellation of titles of lands
allegedly fraudulently transferred by, and in the name of, the defendant.
3. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and
non-inclusion of indispensable parties. The plainttiffs amended their peti-
tion to include the omitted parties. After hearing on the motion to dismiss,
the court denied the said motion. Thereupon, the defendant filed their an-
swer, pleading a denial as to intestacy of deceased, and alleging, among
others, that a will of Soledad Gonzaga Vda. de Ferrer instituted Luis Gon-
zaga as the sole heir estate, and that the will was duly allowed and probated.
4. Several documents were presented to prove the probate of the will As a wit-
ness, the defendant's counsel, Atty. Amelia del Rosario, testified that the
 aforequoted records of the probate court of Iloilo were discovered by her
among the records of the cadastral court in Negros Occidental.( some were
in Spanish)
5. Due to the destruction of the court and property records of Iloilo as a result
of the last war, as attested by the Clerk of Court, no will or probate order
was produced, and neither were attested copies registered with the Office of
the Register of Deeds other than those previously copied in this opinion
6. the copies of judicial pleadings and orders obtained from the Registry of
Deeds of Negros Occidental leave little room for doubt that Dona Soledad
Gonzaga died leaving a will instituting her nephew, the appellee Luis Gon-
zaga y Jesena, as her sole testamentary heir, in default of forced heirs
7. will was duly probated in 1935 or 1936 by the Court of First Instance of Ilo-
ilo in its Special Proceeding No. 2163;
8. The net residue of the estate was adjudicated by the court to said Luis Gon-
zaga, subject only to a claim of Consolacion G. de Lopez for Pl,000.00
(Exh. 2); and that, thereafter, upon sworn petition of appellee, through his
counsel, Francisco S. Hortillas, the Courts of First Instance of Iloilo and
Occidental Negros ordered the respective Provincial Registers of Deeds to
cancel the Certificates of Title standing then in the name of the deceased
Soledad Gonzaga, and in lieu thereof to issue new certificates in the name
of appellee Luis Gonzaga y Jesena, as admittedly was done. In the course of
the years prior to the institution of this case in 1958, appellee held the prop-
erties and dealt with them as sole owner, leasing, encumbering, and selling
some of them.
9. Court was impressed by the statements of attorney Francisco Hortillas,
averring under oath in clear and unmistakable terms, not only once but
twice, before the Courts of First Instance of Itoilo, and Negros , that the de-
ceased Dona Soledad, in her probated will, made Luis Gonzaga y Jesena the
sole heir to her properties.
10. These manifestations are nigh conclusive, for the reason that attorney Hor-
tillas was himself married to Monserrat Gonzaga, a sister of Soledad, who
would have been one of the latter's heirs intestate had it not been for the tes-
tament in favor of the appellee.
11. It taxes credulity beyond all reason to imply (Lopez et. al do) that attorney
Hortillas, violating family ties and affection, conspired with Luis Gonzaga
to deprive his own wife and children (now some of present appellants) of
their lawful share by intestacy in the properties left by Doña Soledad, if it
were untrue that the latter.had duly and properly bequeathed all her estate to
appellee Luis Gonzaga. The authenticity of the sworn petitions of the late
attorney Hortillas are not impugned, and they were actually acted upon and
granted by the two courts of first instance to which he addressed his peti-
tions.
12. Lopez et al. assail the trial court's admission of the said court records on the
ground that Luis Gonzaga failed to lay proper basis, or predicate, for their
admission. Granting that the original will was destroyed with the court rec-
ords in the last war, it is averred that Gonzaga was duty-bound to produce
the copy that, according to Gonzgas deposition, was in the custody of En-
carnacion Gonzaga, as well as that left with attorney Hortillas.
13. The argument is misleading. There is no proof that copies of the will ever
existed other than the one burned while in appellee's possession
14. Neither do we see that Gonzaga was bound to call, or account, for the wit-
nesses to the testament. He was not trying to show that the will complied
with the statutory requirements, but that the will had been admitted to pro-
bate; and of course, the probate decree conclusively established the due ex-
ecution.
15. Lopez et. al contend that if it were true that the will constituted Luis Gon-
zaga as sole heir, he had no need to ask the court for an order of adjudica-
tion. There is no merit to this contention. The order of adjudication is the
judicial recognition that in appointing Luis as her only heir the testatrix did
not contravene the law, and that the heir was in no way disqualified to in-
herit; just as a final order admitting a will to probate concludes all and sun-
dry from thereafter contending that statutory formal requirements have not
been observed in executing the testament. Instead of contradicting the tes-
tamentary institution of heir, the order of adjudication confirms it in this
case.
ISSUE:
1. WoN as a sole heir , he had no need to ask to ask the court for adjudication?
NO, order of adjudication is the judicial recognition that in appointing Luis
as her only heir the testatrix did not contravene the law, and that the heir
was in no way disqualified to inherit; just as a final order admitting a will to
probate concludes all and sundry from thereafter contending that statutory
formal requirements have not been observed in executing the testament. In-
stead of contradicting the testamentary institution of heir, the order of adju-
dication confirms it in this case.
2. WoN the failure of the defendant heir to file with the Register of Deeds a
certified copy of his letters of administration and the will, and to record the
attested copies of the will and of the allowance thereof by the court negates
the validity of the decree of probate nor the rights of the devises under the
will? NO, The failure of the defendant, Luis Gonzaga, to file with the Reg-
ister of Deeds a certified copy of his letters of administration and the will,
as provided in Section 90 of Act 496, and to record the attested copies of
the will and of the allowance thereof by the court under Section 624 of Act
190, does not negate the validity of the judgment or decree of probate nor
the rights of the devisee under the will. At any rate, the recording of the ju-
dicial orders sufficed as notice to interested parties, and was substantial
compliance with the required recording of the will itself. No one faced by
the recorded documents could ignore the reference therein to the probated
 testament; and the rule is that knowledge of what might have been revealed
by proper inquiry is imputable to the inquirer
3. WoN Gonzaga having been appointed administrator, must be deemed a
trustee? NO, no administration could continue to exist after the order of
February 8, 1936 had approved the final account, adjudicated the property
to the only heir, cancelled the bond of the administrator, and ordered the
case "archivado el mismo por terminado". No proof exists that the proceed-
ings were ever reopened. Secondly, the transfer of the certificates of title to
Luis Gonzaga's own name in 1936 would constitute an open and clear repu-
diation of any trust, and the lapse of more than twenty years' open and ad-
verse possession as owner would certainly suffice to vest title by prescrip-
tion in the appellee, since appellants, who knew of the death of Doña Sole-
dad in 1935, never made any move to require Luis to reconvey the property,
or any part thereof
RULING: For the foregoing reasons, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, with
costs against the plaintiffs-appellants.
RATIO:
to issue 1:
1. Lopez et. a; contend that if it were true that the will constituted Luis Gon-
zaga as sole heir, he had no need to ask the court for an order of adjudica-
tion. There is no merit to this contention.
2. The order of adjudication is the judicial recognition that in appointing Luis
as her only heir the testatrix did not contravene the law, and that the heir
was in no way disqualified to inherit; just as a final order admitting a will to
probate concludes all and sundry from thereafter contending that statutory
formal requirements have not been observed in executing the testament.
3. Instead of contradicting the testamentary institution of heir, the order of ad-
judication confirms it in this case. It may well be noted, in passing, that the
order of February 8, 1986 speaks of approval of a "project of partition",
while the petition of January 29, 1936 referred to therein spoke of an order
of adjudication to a single heir. Since the order made evident reference to
the petition of January 29, we agree with the court below that the differ-
ence in terminology was an inadvertent mistake. Anyway, appellants do not
claim under the will or the partition; their theory is that Doña Soledad Gon-
zaga died intestate.
to issue 2:
4. The failure of the defendant, Luis Gonzaga, to file with the Register of
Deeds a certified copy of his letters of administration and the will, as pro-
vided in Section 90 of Act 496, and to record the attested copies of the will
and of the allowance thereof by the court under Section 624 of Act 190,
does not negate the validity of the judgment or decree of probate nor the
rights of the devisee under the will.
5. Section 90 of Act 496 refers to the dealings with registered lands by an ex-
ecutor or administrator; and while Luis Gonzaga was an administrator, this
is beside the point, because his dealings with the lands, if any, during his
tenure as an administrator are not here in question.
6. That the defendant sought judicial orders to effect the transfers to his name
of the certificates of title after the will was probated, and succeeded in hav-
ing them so transferred, are not "dealings" with the property as administra-
tor under section 90 of the Registration Act.
7. Gonzaga sought and obtained the change in title in his own behalf and ca-
pacity. Although the step taken is not exactly what Section 624 of Act 190
directs, the same purpose was achieved that of notice to all strangers of the
cause and nature of the transfers; and it does not appear that anyone was
prejudiced by the defect in registration complained of.
8. At any rate, the recording of the judicial orders" sufficed as notice to
interested parties, and was substantial compliance with the required
recording of the will itself. No one faced by the recorded documents
could ignore the reference therein to the probated testament; and the
rule is that knowledge of what might have been revealed by proper in-
quiry is imputable to the inquirer
to issue 3
9. As to the fact that Luis Gonzaga paid the inheritance taxes as "executor or
administrator", the same is of no importance. It is usual for an Administra-
tor to pay these taxes, since by few no delivery of properties can be made to
the heirs until and unless the inheritance taxes are paid [Internal Revenue
Code, Section 95
10. The contention that Gonzaga, having been appointed Administrator, must
be deemed a trustee up to the present is infantile.
11. In the first place, no administration could continue to exist after the order of
February 8, 1936 had approved the final account, adjudicated the property
to the only heir, cancelled the bond of the administrator, and ordered the
case "archivado el mismo por terminado".
12. No proof exists that the proceedings were ever reopened.
13. Secondly, the transfer of the certificates of title to Luis Gonzaga's own
name in 1936 would constitute an open and clear repudiation of any trust,
and the lapse of more than twenty years' open and adverse possession as
owner would certainly suffice to vest title by prescription to Gonzaga, since
Lopez et. a;, who knew of the death of Doña Soledad in 1935, never made
any move to require Luis to reconvey the property, or any part thereof.
14. The lame explanation that Doña Soledad Gonzaga had expressed the wish
that all the income should go to Luis while he conducted experimental stud-
ies on coconut products is wholly unconvincing as an excuse for the laches;
his right to the income could not have blocked a partition of the capital as-
sets among- appellants, if they had been at all entitled to them.
 002 GUERRERO vs. TERAN (LAGUILLES) Leopoldo Teran to recover P4,129, claimed on the theory that Teran had
March 19, 1909 | Johnson, J. | Appointment and removal of administrators been the administrator of the estate of Antonio Sanchez Munoz.
2. Teran admitted certain allegations and denied others. He admitted that he
owed Guerrero P482, but that Guerrero still owes him P293 for which he
PETITIONER: Salvador Guerrero, guardian of the minors Maria Manuela and
prayed for judgment.
Maria del Carmen Sanchez Munoz
3. The lower court found from the evidence that Teran, as administrator of the
RESPONDENTS: Leopoldo Teran
estate of Antonio Sanchez Muniz, or that part belonging to Guerrero, owed
the latter P3,447. Teran appealed on the ground that the lower court erred in
SUMMARY: Guerrero commenced an action against Teran on the theory that
holding that he managed and administered the estate of Sanchez Munoz
Teran had been the administrator of the estate of Antonio Munoz. Lower court
from Sept. 17, 1901 to Oct. 6, 1906 as a judicial administrator.
found Teran liable for the amounts claimed by Guerrero, so Teran appealed on
4. Based on Teran’s assignment of error, it was found that:
the ground that the lower court erred in holding that he managed and
a. He was appointed as administrator of said estate and that he
administered the estate of Sanchez Munoz from 1901-1906. It was found that it
entered into a bond in the sum of 10,000 dollars, gold, for the
was actually Maria Munoz who was appointed as administrator and guardian of
faithful performance of his duties as the representative of the estate
the minors, but she was not residing in the Philippines at the time that she was
of Antonio Sanchez Munoz;
appointed as such. Because of this, she asked Teran to act as administrator from
b. That the CFI of Albay appointed Maria Munoz y Gomez as
Sept. 7 1901 until March 18, 1902. Subsequently, due to her not being a resident
guardian for the said Maria Manuela and Maria del Carmen
of the Philippines, Maria Munoz was removed as guardian.
Sanchez Munoz;
c. That while there are some indications that Teran continued to act
The issue is WoN non-residents of the Philippines can be appointed as
as the administrator of said estate after the appointment of Maria
administrators.
Munoz y Gomez up to Oct. 6, 1906, the fact exists and must be
accepted as true that Maria Munoz Gomez was the actual
The SC held in the affirmative. It must be clear that Maria Munoz is responsible
representative of Maria Manuela and Maria del Carmen in the
to the minors for the administration of their interests in the estate of Antonio
administration of their interests in the estate of Antonio
Sanchez Munoz from the time of her acceptance of the appointment until her
Sanchez Munoz, and therefore, Maria Munoz, as such guardian
removal. If during this time she allowed other persons to handle the property of
and administratrix of the estate of said minors, must be held
her wars, and if any mismanagement or loss occurred, the responsibility must
responsible for the property belonging to said minors during the
fall upon her. Even if Maria Munoz Gomez was removed as administrator on
period while she was the actual guardian of the minors.
the ground of her not being a resident of the Philippines, there is still nothing in
d. That the CFI, for the reason that Maria Munoz was not a resident
the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only as administrators or
of the Philippines at the time of her appointment, removed her as
guardians.
guardian and appointed Felix Samson as guardian of the minors
and required from him a bond in the amount of P2,000.
However, notwithstanding the fact that there are no statutory requirements upon
5. From the order of the judge annulling the appointment of Maria Munoz, her
this question, the courts, charged with the responsibilities of protecting the
lawyers appealed to the SC, which appeal was subsequently withdrawn. The
estates of deceased persons, wards of the estate, etc., will find much difficulty in
order revoking Maria Munoz therefore became final.
complying with this duty by appointing administrators and guardians who are
not personally subject to their jurisdiction.
ISSUE/s:
1. WoN non-residents of the Philippines can be appointed as administrators –
DOCTRINE: There is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint
YES, because there is nothing in the law that requires being a resident in the
residents only as administrators or guardians.
Philippines as a condition for being appointed as an administrator.

RULING: The judgment of the lower court is hereby reversed, without any special
FACTS: finding as to costs.
1. Plaintiff Salvador Guerrero commenced an action against defendant
RATIO:
1. The mere fact, that Maria Munoz had been removed as said guardian
did not relieve her from liability to the minors during the time that she
was duly acting as said guardian.
2. It must be clear, that Maria Munoz is responsible to the minors for the
administration of their interests in the estate of Antonio Sanchez Munoz
from the time of her acceptance of the appointment until her removal.
3. If during this time she allowed other persons to handle the property of
her wards, and if any mismanagement or loss occurred thereby, the
responsibility must fall upon her.
4. Unquestionably, she may have an action against the persons to whom she
entrusted the management of said estate for any loss which they may have
negligently and corruptly caused her.
5. Therefore, if any loss occurred to the minors between 1902 until 1906,
they have a right of action only against Maria Munoz as their legal
guardian.
6. In the claim presented by Guerrero against Teran, no dates were given
showing the time of the particular loss occasioned by the latter. As said
earlier, Teran was liable only for losses only during the time that he was
acting as the legal representative of the minors from 1901-1902.
7. There is no proof showing that any of the losses constituting the amount
which Guerrero claimed occurred within this period.
8. From all the evidence gathered, it can be said that Teran was the duly
appointed and recognized representative of the minors from Sept. 17, 1901
until March 18, 1902; that Maria Munoz Gomez was the duly appointed
representative of the minors from March 18, 1902 until Oct. 6, 1906.
9. It was also found that Teran was responsible to Guerrero for the fruits and
profits resulting from their interests in the estate of Antonio Sanchez Munoz
from 1901-1902, and Maria Munoz is responsible for the fruits and profits
resulting from the management of the estate of Antonio Sanchez Munoz
from March 18, 1902 until Oct. 6, 1906.
10. Even if Maria Munoz Gomez was removed as administrator on the
ground of her not being a resident of the Philippines, there is still
nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only
as administrators or guardians.
11. However, notwithstanding the fact that there are no statutory
requirements upon this question, the courts, charged with the
responsibilities of protecting the estates of deceased persons, wards of
the estate, etc., will find much difficulty in complying with this duty by
appointing administrators and guardians who are not personally
subject to their jurisdiction.
 003 Octavio S. Maloles II v. Pacita De Los Reyes Phillips (DAYU)
January 31, 2000 | Mendoza, J. | Testate Proceedings
PETITIONER: Octavio S. Maloles II
RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals, Hon. Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr (as
Presiding Judge of RTC Makati Branch 61, and Pacita De Los Reyes Phillips (as
the alleged executrix of the alleged will of the late Dr. Arturo de Santos)
SUMMARY: Dr. Arturo de Santos, a Filipino and resident of Makati, filed a
petition for probate of his will in RTC Makati Branch 61. He alleged in his
petition that he has no compulsory heirs, named his foundation as his sole
legatee and devisee, and name Pacita de los Reyes Phillips as executrix. Judge
Gorospe, B61 Judge, issued order granting the petition and allowing the will. 10
days after, Dr. de Santos died. Eventually, herein petitioner Maloles II filed a
Motion for intervention, claiming that—as an only child of the testator’s sister
(aka: nephew siya), he was the nearest of kin. He also alleged that he was a
creditor. Thus, he prayed for reconsideration and issuance of letters of
administration in his name. Pacita filed motion for issuance of letters
testamentary with B61, but then later on withdrew. This was granted, while
Maloles II was required to file memorandum of authorities in support of his
claim that B61 still had jurisdiction to allow his intervention. Pacita, however,
refiled the petition again, but this time it was assigned to B65, with Judge Abad
Santos. Judge Abad Santos issued order appointing her as administrator. Maloles
II sought to intervene in B65 case because he’s the sole and nearest of kind, plus
that probate proceedings in B61 was still pending. B65 Judge ordered transfer
back to B61 on ground that it is related to case before Judge Gorospe; however,
Judge Gorospe sent it back to B65 on the ground that there was a pending case
involving the Estate of de Santos pending before the court. Initially, Judge Abad
Santos wanted to return it back again, but eventually took cognizance, and
granted Maloles II’s motion. Pacita appealed with CA, CA reversed the trial
court’s order. Issue is w/n B61 has lost jurisdiction and B65 has acquired
jurisdiction—YES. SC mentions that in cases for the probate of wills, it is well-
settled that the authority of the court is limited to ascertaining the extrinsic
validity of the will. Thus, after the allowance of the will of Dr. de Santos, there
was nothing else for B61 to do except to issue a certificate of allowance of the
will pursuant to Rule 73, §12 of RoC. The petition for probate was filed by Dr.
de Santos, the testator, solely for the purpose of authenticating his will. Upon the
allowance of his will, the proceedings were terminated. On the other hand, the
petition for issuance of letters testamentary was filed by private respondent, as
executor of the estate of Dr. De Santos, for the purpose of securing authority
from the Court to administer the estate and put into effect the will of the testator.
The estate settlement proceedings commenced by the filing of the petition
terminates upon the distribution and delivery of the legacies and devises to the
persons named in the will. Necessarily, therefore, B65 has jurisdiction. Another
Issue is w/n petitioner, being a creditor of late Dr. Arturo de Santos, has a right
to intervene and oppose the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by
respondent—NO, as nephew, he can only inherit based on intestacy. But in this
case, Dr. de Santos had a will and has already been probabted. His interest is not
direct or immediate. Nor does he have any right to intervene in the settlement
proceedings based on his allegation that he is a creditor of the deceased.
DOCTRINE:
Rule 73, §1 actually provides for the venue of actions for the settlement of
the estate of deceased persons. Noteworthy that, although Rule 73, §1 applies
insofar as the venue of the petition for probate of the will is concerned, it does
not bar other branches of the same court from taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of the testator after his death.
Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court requires only an allegation of the
probable value and character of the property of the estate. The true value can be
determined later on in the course of the settlement of the estate
An "interested person" is one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an
heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor, and whose
interest is material and direct, not merely incidental or contingent.
It is a fundamental rule of testamentary succession that one who has no
compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of his entire estate by will.
FACTS:
54. These are petitions for review on certiorari of the decisions of the 13th and
the Special 8 Divisions of the CA, which ruled that petitioner, has no right
to intervene in the settlement of the estate of Dr. Arturo de Santos. These
cases were consolidated considering that they involved the same parties and
some issues raised are the same.
55. July 20, 1995—Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and resident of Makati City,
filed petition for probate for his will in the RTC of Makati (branch 61). In
his petition, he alleged that he had no compulsory heirs; that he had named
in his will as sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc,;
that he disposed by his will his properties with an approximate value of not
less than P2M; and that copies of said will were in the custody of Pacita de
los Reyes Phillips (named executrix). A copy of the will was annexed to the
petition for probate.
56. Feb. 16, 1996—Judge Fernando Gorospe, Jr. of RTC Makati issued order
granting the petition and allowing the will.
57. Feb. 26, 1996—Dr. de Santos died
58. April 3, 1996—petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed motion for interven-
tion claiming that, as only child of Alicia de Santos (testator’s sister) and
Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full-blooded nephew and nearest of
kin of Dr. de Santos. He likewise alleged that he was a creditor of the testa-
tor. Maloles II thus prayed for reconsideration of the order allowing the will
and issuance of letters of administration in his name.
59. Pacita de los Reyes Phillips, private respondent and designated executrix of
will, filed motion for issuance of letters testamentary with Branch 61. Later,
however, she moved to withdraw her motion. This was granted, while
Maloles II was required to file a memorandum of authorities in support of
his claim that Branch 61 still had jurisdiction to allow his intervention.
60. May 13, 1996—Maloles II filed memorandum of authorities. On the other
hand, Pacita, who earlier withdrew her motion for the issuance of letters tes-
tamentary in Branch 61, refiled a petition for the same purpose with RTC
Makati and assigned to Branch 65.
61. June 28, 1996—Upon Pacita’s motion, Judge Salvador Abad Santos of
Branch 65 issued an order appointing her as special administrator of Dr. de
Santos’ estate.
62. July 29, 1996—Maloles II sought to intervene in Branch 65 case (Sp. Proc.
No. M-4343) and to set aside the appointment of Pacita as special adminis-
trator. He reiterated that he was the sole and full-blooded nephew and near-
est of kin of the testator; that he came to know of the existence of Sp. Proc.
No. M-4343 only be accident; that the probate proceedings in Sp. Proc. No.
M-4223 (Branch 61) was still pending; that Pacita misdeclared the true
worth of the testator’s estate; that Pacita was not fit to be the special admin-
istrator of the estate; and that petitioner Maloles II should be given letters of
administration for the estate of Dr. de Santos.
63. August 28, 1996—Judge Abad Santos ordered the transfer of Sp. Proc. No.
M-4343 (B65) to Branch 61 on the ground that “it is related to the case be-
fore Judge Gorospe of RTC Branch 61.”
64. However, it appears that is Sp. Proc. No. M-4223 (B61), Judge Gorospe had
denied (Aug. 26, 1996) Maloles II’s motion for intervention. Petitioner
brought this matter to the CA, which upheld the denial of Maloles II’s mo-
tion for intervention.
65. September 4, 1996—Meanwhile, Judge Gorospe issued order [see end of
case digest] returning the records of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 back to Branch
65 on the ground that there was a pending case involving the Estate of De-
cedent Arturo de Santos pending before said court.
66. Initially, in his decision dated September 23, 1996, Judge Abad Santos ap-
peated firm in his position that “…it would be improper for (B65) to hear
and resolve the petition (Sp. Proc. No. M-4343),” considering that the pro-
bate proceedings were commenced with B61. He thus ordered the transfer
of the records back to the latter branch. However, he later recalled his deci-
sion and took cognizance of the case “to expedite the proceedings.” à Or-
der states: “ Considering the refusal of the Hon. Fernando V. Gorospe Jr. of
Branch 61 to continue hearing this case notwithstanding the fact that said
branch began the probate proceedings of the estate of the deceased and must
therefore continue to exercise its jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others,
until the entire estate of the testator had been partitioned and distributed as
per Order dated 23 September 1996, this branch (Regional Trial Court
Branch 65) shall take cognizance of the petition if only to expedite the pro-
ceedings, and under the concept that the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City is but one court.”
67. November 4, 1996—Judge Abad Santos granted Maloles II’s motion for in-
tervention. Pacita moved for reconsideration but the trial court denied her
motion. She then filed a petition for certiorari in the CA, which rendered a
decision setting aside the trial court’s order on the ground that petitioner
had not shown any right or interest to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. M-4343.
ISSUE/s:
5. WoN B61 has lost jurisdiction to proceed with the probate proceedings
upon its issuance of an order allowing the will of Dr. Arturo de Santos;
WoN B65 acquired jurisdiction over the petition for issuance of letters
testamentary filed by private respondent—YES, after the allowance of the
will of Dr. de Santos, there was nothing else for B61 to do except to issue a
certificate of allowance of the will
6. WoN petitioner, being a creditor of late Dr. Arturo de Santos, has a right to
intervene and oppose the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed
by respondent—NO, an "interested person" is one who would be benefited
by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such
as a creditor, and whose interest is material and direct, not merely incidental
or contingent.
7. WoN private respondent is guilty of forum shopping in filing her petition
for issuance of letters testamentary with B65 knowing fully well that the
probate proceedings involving the same testate estate of the decedent is still
pending with B61—NO, upon the allowance of his will, the proceedings in
B61 were terminated.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decisions of the Court of
Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
76. Issue 1: Petitioner contends that probate proceedings in B61 did not termi-
nate upon the issuance of the order allowing the will of Dr. de Santos. Cit-
ing the cases of Santiesteban v. Santiesteban and Tagle v. Manalo, he ar-
gues that the proceedings must continue until the estate is fully distributed
to the lawful heirs, devisees, and legatees of the testator, pursuant to Rule
73, sec. 1 of the RoC. Consequently, petitioner contends that B65 could not
 lawfully act upon private respondent’s petition for issuance of letters testa-
mentary. à Contention has no merit
77. In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of the
court is limited to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether
the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance
with the formalities prescribed by law.
78. Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted only after the death of the tes-
tator, so much so that, after approving and allowing the will, the court pro-
ceeds to issue letters testamentary and settle the estate of the testator. The
cases cited by petitioner are of such nature. In fact, in most jurisdictions,
courts cannot entertain a petition for probate of the will of a living testator
under the principle of ambulatory nature of wills.
79. However, Art. 838 of the Civil Code authorizes the filing of a petition for
probate of the will filed by the testator himself.15
80. Rule 76, Sec. 1 likewise provides:
81. SEC. 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will. — Any ex-
ecutor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person in-
terested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, peti-
tion the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the
same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition in the court
for the allowance of his will.
82. The rationale for allowing the probate of wills during the lifetime of testator
has been explained by the Code Commission thus:
83. “Most of the cases that reach the courts involve either the testamentary ca-
pacity of the testator or the formalities adopted in the execution of wills.
There are relatively few cases concerning the intrinsic validity of testamen-
tary dispositions. It is far easier for the courts to determine the mental con-
dition of a testator during his lifetime than after his death. Fraud, intimida-
tion and undue influence are minimized. Furthermore, if a will does not
comply with the requirements prescribed by law, the same may be corrected
at once. The probate during the testator's life, therefore, will lessen the
number of contest upon wills. Once a will is probated during the lifetime of
the testator, the only questions that may remain for the courts to decide after
15
CIVIL CODE, ART. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court hav-
ing jurisdiction for the allowance of his will. In such case, the pertinent provi-
sions of the Rules of Court for the allowance of wills after the testator's death
shall govern.
The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules of Court as
may be necessary for the allowance of wills on petition of the testator.
Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either during
the lifetime of the testator or after his death, shall be conclusive as to its due exe-
cution.
the testator's death will refer to the intrinsic validity of the testamentary dis-
positions. It is possible, of course, that even when the testator himself asks
for the allowance of the will, he may be acting under duress or undue influ-
ence, but these are rare cases. After a will has been probated during the life-
time of the testator, it does not necessarily mean that he cannot alter or re-
voke the same before his death. Should he make a new will, it would also be
allowable on his petition, and if he should die before he has had a chance to
present such petition, the ordinary probate proceeding after the testator's
death would be in order.”
84. Thus, after the allowance of the will of Dr. de Santos, there was nothing
else for B61 to do except to issue a certificate of allowance of the will pur-
suant to Rule 73, §12 of RoC. There is, therefore, no basis for the ruling of
Judge Abad Santos of B65 that “Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati having begun the probate proceedings of the estate of the deceased,
it continues and shall continue to exercise said jurisdiction to the exclusion
of all others. It should be noted that probate proceedings do not cease upon
the allowance or disallowance of a will but continues up to such time that
the entire estate of the testator had been partitioned and distributed. […] The
fact that the will was allowed during the lifetime of the testator meant mere-
ly that the partition and distribution of the estate was to be suspended until
the latter's death. In other words, the petitioner, instead of filing a new peti-
tion for the issuance of letters testamentary, should have simply filed a man-
ifestation for the same purpose in the probate court.”
85. Petitioner, who defends the order of Branch 65 allowing him to intervene,
cites Rule 73, §1 which states: llcd
86. Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a cit-
izen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administra-
tion granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in
the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he
is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of
any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cogni-
zance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction as-
sumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of
the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested
in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the rec-
ord.
87. The above rule, however, actually provides for the venue of actions for
the settlement of the estate of deceased persons.
88. In Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, it was held: “The aforequoted Section
1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause "so far as it
depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the
 state," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates:
"Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes." It could
not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, be-
cause such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely
with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing, jurisdiction over the subject
matter is another. The power or authority of the court over the subject mat-
ter "existed was fixed before procedure in a given cause began." That power
or authority is not altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the
manner in which the power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised.
There are cases though that if the power is not exercised conformably with
the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise
it loses the power to exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a
loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather, it means that the court
may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may
thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it.
The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a
strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the
court over the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of
convenience to the parties.”
89. Indeed, the jurisdiction over probate proceedings and settlement of estates
with approximate value of over P100,000.00 (outside Metro Manila) or
P200,000.00 (in Metro Manila) belongs to the RTC under B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended. The different branches comprising each court in one judicial re-
gion do not possess jurisdictions independent of and incompatible with each
other.
90. It is noteworthy that, although Rule 73, §1 applies insofar as the venue of
the petition for probate of the will of Dr. De Santos is concerned, it does not
bar other branches of the same court from taking cognizance of the settle-
ment of the estate of the testator after his death.
91. As held in the leading case of Bacalso v. Ramolote: “ The various branches
of the Court of First Instance of Cebu under the Fourteenth Judicial District,
are a coordinate and co-equal courts, and the totality of which is only one
Court of First Instance. The jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the
judges. And when a case is filed in one branch, jurisdiction over the case
does not attach to the branch or judge alone, to the exclusion of the other
branches. Trial may be held or proceedings continue by and before another
branch or judge. It is for this reason that Section 57 of the Judiciary Act ex-
pressly grants to the Secretary of Justice, the administrative right or power
to apportion the cases among the different branches, both for the conven-
ience of the parties and for the coordination of the work by the different
branches of the same court. The apportionment and distribution of cases
does not involve a grant or limitation of jurisdiction, the jurisdiction attach-
es and continues to be vested in the Court of First Instance of the province,
and the trials may be held by any branch or judge of the court.
92. Necessarily, therefore, Branch 65 of the RTC of Makati City has jurisdic-
tion over Sp. Proc. No. M-4343.
93. Issue 2: Petitioner claims the right to intervene in and oppose the petition
for issuance of letters testamentary filed by private respondent. He argues
that, as the nearest next of kin and creditor of the testator, his interest in the
matter is material and direct. In ruling that petitioner has no right to inter-
vene in the proceedings before B65, the CA held:
94. “The private respondent herein is not an heir or legatee under the will of the
decedent Arturo de Santos. Neither is he a compulsory heir of the latter. As
the only and nearest collateral relative of the decedent, he can inherit from
the latter only in case of intestacy. Since the decedent has left a will which
has already been probated and disposes of all his properties the private re-
spondent can inherit only if the said will is annulled. His interest in the de-
cedent's estate is, therefore, not direct or immediate.
95. His claim to being a creditor of the estate is a belated one, having been
raised for the first time only in his reply to the opposition to his motion to
intervene, and, as far as the records show, not supported by evidence.
96. …[T]he opposition must come from one with a direct interest in the estate
or the will, and the private respondent has none. Moreover, the ground cited
in the private respondent's opposition, that the petitioner has deliberately
misdeclared the truth worth and value of the estate, is not relevant to the
question of her competency to act as executor. Section 2, Rule 76 of the
Rules of Court requires only an allegation of the probable value and charac-
ter of the property of the estate. The true value can be determined later on in
the course of the settlement of the estate.”
97. Rule 79, §1 provides:
98. Opposition to issuance of letters testamentary. Simultaneous pe-
tition for administration. — Any person interested in a will may
state in writing the grounds why letters testamentary should not
issue to the persons named therein as executors, or any of them,
and the court, after hearing upon notice, shall pass upon the suf-
ficiency of such grounds. A petition may, at the same time, be filed for let-
ters of administration with the will annexed. LibLex
99. Under this provision, it has been held that an "interested person" is one who
would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim
against the estate, such as a creditor, and whose interest is material and di-
rect, not merely incidental or contingent.
100. Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be
considered an "heir" of the testator. It is a fundamental rule of testamentary
succession that one who has no compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of
his entire estate by will.16
16
Thus, Art. 842 of the CC provides:
 101. Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may have that there is no related case involving the ESTATE OF DECEDENT ARTURO DE
been preterited in the testator's will. SANTOS pending before this Branch.
102. Nor does he have any right to intervene in the settlement proceedings based There is, however, a case filed by ARTURO DE SANTOS, as petitioner
on his allegation that he is a creditor of the deceased. Since the testator in- under Rule 76 of the Rules of Court for the Allowance of his will during his lifetime
stituted or named an executor in his will, it is incumbent upon the Court to docketed as SP. PROC. NO. M-4223 which was already decided on 16 February
respect the desires of the testator. 1996 and has become final.
103. Only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails to
give bond may the court appoint other persons to administer the estate. It is noted on records of Case No. M-4223 that after it became final, here-
in Petitioner Pacita de los Reyes Phillips filed a MOTION FOR THE ISSUANCE
None of these circumstances is present in this case.
OF LETTERS TESTAMENTARY, which was subsequently withdrawn after this
104. Issue 3: Petitioner contends that private respondent is guilty of forum shop- Court, during the hearing, already ruled that the motion could not be admitted as the
ping when she filed the petition for issuance of letters testamentary (Sp. subject matter involves a separate case under Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, and
Proc. No. M-4343) while the probate proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. M-4223) movant withdrew her motion and filed this case (No. 4343).
were still pending. According to petitioner, there is identity of parties, rights
asserted, and reliefs prayed for in the two actions which are founded on the Octavio de Santos Maloles [II] filed a MOTION FOR INTERVENTION
before Case No. M-4223 and this motion was already DENIED in the order (Branch
same facts, and a judgment in either will result in res judicata in the other.
61) of 26 August 1996 likewise for the same grounds that the matter is for a sepa-
à contention has no merit. rate case to be filed under Rule 78 of the Rules of Court and cannot be included in
105. The petition for probate was filed by Dr. de Santos, the testator, solely for this case filed under Rule 76 of the Rules of Court.
the purpose of authenticating his will. Upon the allowance of his will, the
proceedings were terminated. It is further noted that it is a matter of policy that consolidation of cases
106. On the other hand, the petition for issuance of letters testamentary was filed must be approved by the Presiding Judges of the affected Branches.
by private respondent, as executor of the estate of Dr. De Santos, for the
purpose of securing authority from the Court to administer the estate and
put into effect the will of the testator. The estate settlement proceedings
commenced by the filing of the petition terminates upon the distribution and
delivery of the legacies and devises to the persons named in the will. Clear-
ly, there is no identity between the two petitions, nor was the latter filed
during the pendency of the former. There was, consequently, no forum
shopping.

ORDER:
Acting on the ORDER dated 28 August 1996 of Branch 65, this Court,
transferring this case to this Branch 61 on the ground that this case is related with a
case before this Court, let this case be returned to Branch 65 with the information

One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part
of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.
One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not con-
travene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitimate of said heirs.
Compulsory heirs are limited to the testator's —
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to
their legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.
 004 FERNANDEZ v. DIMAGIBA (DANNAH)
12 October 1967 | Reyes, JBL, J. | Testate Proceedings
PETITIONER: Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes and Luisa Reyes
RESPONDENTS: Ismaela Dimagiba
FACTS:
SUMMARY: The will of the late Benedicta was admitted to probate by the
CFI. It instituted Ismaela as the sole heir. Dionisio et al (oppositors) filed an
opposition alleging forgery, vices of consent, estoppel by laches and revocation
of the will by two deeds of conveyance made by Benedicta in favor of Ismaela,
but which were finally set aside by the SC in August 1954. They then petitioned
for reconsideration and/or new trial insisting that the issues of estoppel and
revocation be considered and resolved. The court overruled the claim that
Ismaela was in estoppel to ask for the probate of the will.
The CA affirmed the lower court’s decision and ruled that the order of the lower
court admitting the will to probate, had become final for lack of opportune
appeal; the same was appealable independently of the issue of implied
revocation; contrary to the claim of the oppositors, there had been no legal
revocation by the execution of the 1943 and 1944 deeds of sale, because the
latter had been made in favor of the legatee (Ismaela) herself.
ISSUES:
1. WoN the decree of the CFI allowing the will to probate had become
final for lack of appeal – YES. It is elementary that a probate decree
finally and definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the
testator and the proper execution and witnessing of his last will and
testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and
enforceable or otherwise
2. WoN the order of the CFI dated July 27, 1959, overruling the estoppel
invoked by the oppositors-appellants had likewise become final – YES.
presentation and probate of a will are requirements of public policy,
being primarily designed to protect the testator's, expressed wishes,
which are entitled to respect as a consequence of the decedent's
ownership and right of disposition within legal limits.
There being no controversy that the probate decree of the Court below was not
appealed on time, the same had become final and conclusive. Hence, the
appellate courts may no longer revoke said decree nor review the evidence upon
which it is made to rest. Thus, the appeal belatedly lodged against the decree
was correctly dismissed.
ISSUE/s:
DOCTRINE: It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively
settles all questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper execution
and witnessing of his last will and testament, irrespective of whether its
provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise
1. The heirs intestate of Benedicta delos Reyes have petitioned for a review
the decision of the CA affirming that of the CFI of Bulacan admitting to
probate the alleged last will and testament of Benedicta, and overruling the
opposition to the probate.
2. On January 1955, Ismaela Dimagiba (respondent), submitted to the CFI a
petition for the probate of the purported will of Benedicta, executed on
October 1930 and annexed to the petition.
3. The will instituted Ismaela as the sole heir.
4. Fernandez et al (petitioners) filed oppositions to the probate. Grounds
advanced were forgery, vices of consent, estoppel by laches and revocation
of the will by two deeds of conveyance made by Benedicta in favor of
Ismaela, but which were finally set aside by the SC in August 1954.
5. The CFI by decision of June 1958 found that the will was genuine and
properly executed; but deferred resolution on the questions of estoppel and
revocation “until such time when we shall pass upon the intrinsic validity of
the provisions of the will or when the question of adjudication of the
properties is opportunely presented."
6. Oppositors Fernandez and Reyes petitioned for reconsideration and/or new
trial, insisting that the issues of estoppel and revocation be considered and
resolved; whereupon, on July 27, 1959, the Court overruled the claim that
Ismaela was in estoppel to ask for the probate of the will, but "reserving
unto the parties the right to raise the issue of implied revocation at the
opportune time”.
7. The CFI appointed Ricardo Cruz as administrator for the sole purpose of
submitting an inventory of the estate, which was done February 1960.
8. On February 1962, the trial court resolved against the oppositors and held
the will of Benedicta “unaffected and unrevoked by the deeds of sale”. The
oppositors then elevated the case to the CA.
9. The CA ruled that the order of the lower court admitting the will to probate,
had become final for lack of opportune appeal; the same was appealable
independently of the issue of implied revocation; contrary to the claim of
the oppositors, there had been no legal revocation by the execution of the
1943 and 1944 deeds of sale, because the latter had been made in favor of
the legatee (Ismaela) herself, and affirmed the decision of the CFI.
10. Hence, this appeal.
 1. WoN the decree of the CFI allowing the will to probate had become final 5. It would be a non sequitur to allow public policy to be evaded on the pretext
for lack of appeal – YES. It is elementary that a probate decree finally and of estoppel. Whether or not the order overruling the allegation of estoppel is
definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the testator and the still appealable or not, the defense is patently unmeritorious and the Court
proper execution and witnessing of his last will and testament, irrespective of Appeals correctly so ruled.
of whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise
2. WoN the order of the CFI dated July 27, 1959, overruling the estoppel
invoked by the oppositors-appellants had likewise become final – YES.
presentation and probate of a will are requirements of public policy, being
primarily designed to protect the testator's, expressed wishes, which are
entitled to respect as a consequence of the decedent's ownership and right of
disposition within legal limits.
3. WoN the 1930 will of Benedicta had been impliedly revoked by her
execution of deeds of conveyance in favor of Ismaela – (Minor issue,
succession related but there was no revocation; SC affirmed CA’s ruling on
the matter)

RULING: In view of the foregoing considerations, the appealed decision of the

Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed. Costs against appellants Reyes and Fernandez.
So ordered.

RATIO:
ISSUE 1
1. Contrary to what the oppositors believe, the decree of the CFI allowing the
will to be probate is NOT interlocutory despite it failing to resolve the
issues of estoppel and revocation propounded in their opposition.
2. They argue that they were entitled to await the trial Court's resolution on the
other grounds of their opposition before taking an appeal, as otherwise there
would be a multiplicity of recourses to the higher Courts. This contention is
without weight, since Rule 109, section 1, expressly enumerates six
different instances when appeal may be taken in special proceedings.
3. There being no controversy that the probate decree of the Court below was
not appealed on time, the same had become final and conclusive. Hence, the
appellate courts may no longer revoke said decree nor review the evidence
upon which it is made to rest. Thus, the appeal belatedly lodged against the
decree was correctly dismissed.

ISSUE 2
4. As to the issue of estoppel, we have already ruled in Guevara vs. Guevara,
98 Phil. 249, that the presentation and probate of a will are requirements of
public policy, being primarily designed to protect the testator's, expressed
wishes, which are entitled to respect as a consequence of the decedent's
ownership and right of disposition within legal limits. Evidence of it is the
duty imposed on a custodian of a will to deliver the same to the Court, and
the fine and imprisonment prescribed for its violation (Revised Rule 75).
 005 NITTSCHER v. NITTSCHER (Gonzales)
November 20, 2007 | Quisumbing, J. | Testate Proceedings
PETITIONER: Cynthia V. Nittscher
RESPONDENT: Dr. Werner Karl Johann Nittscher (deceased), Atty. Rogelio
Nogales and RTC Makati
SUMMARY: Dr. Nittscher filed with the RTC Makati a petition for probate of his
holographic will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Atty. Nogales. The
probate court issued an order allowing the holographic will. When Dr. Nittscher
died, Atty. Nogales filed a petition for letters testamentary for the administration of
the estate of the deceased. Nittscher, the surviving spouse, moved for dismissal but it
was denied. Instead, the court granted the petition for the issuance of the letters tes-
tamentary. Nittscher argues that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter
of this case because Dr. Nittscher was allegedly not a resident of the Philippines;
neither did he leave real properties in the country. The properties listed for disposi-
tion in her husband's will actually belong to her. She insists she was denied due pro-
cess of law because she did not receive by personal service the notices of the pro-
ceedings.
The issues are (1) WoN the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject mater – YES.
Since Dr. Nittscher was a resident of Las Pinas, he correctly filed in the RTC of Ma-
kati City, which then covered Las Piñas, Metro Manila, the petition for the probate of
his will and for the issuance of letters testamentary. (2) WoN the summons were
properly issued to the parties and all persons interested in the probate of the holo-
graphic will of Dr. Nittscher – YES. Records show that Nittscher, with whom Dr.
Nittscher had no child, and Dr. Nittscher's children from his previous marriage were
all duly notified, by registered mail, of the probate proceedings. (3) WoN Nittscher
was deprived of due process – NO. She was notified. She also appeared in court to
oppose the petition.
DOCTRINE: If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his
death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administra-
tion granted, and his estate settled, in the Regional Trial Court in the province in
which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign coun-
try, the Regional Trial Court of any province in which he had estate....
If the testator asks for the allowance of his own will, notice shall be sent only to his
compulsory heirs.
ISSUE:
FACTS:
13. Dr. Werner Karl Johann Nittscher filed with the RTC of Makati City a peti-
tion for the probate of his holographic will and for the issuance of letters tes-
tamentary to Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales.
14. After hearing and with due notice to the compulsory heirs, the probate court
issued an order allowing the said holographic will.
15. Dr. Nittscher died. Hence, Atty. Nogales filed a petition for letters testamen-
tary for the administration of the estate of the deceased. Dr. Nittscher's sur-
viving spouse, Cynthia V. Nittscher, moved for the dismissal of the said peti-
tion. However, the court denied the motion to dismiss, and granted the peti-
tion for the issuance of letters testamentary.
a. Section 4, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides "when a
will has been proved and allowed, the court shall issue letters testa-
mentary thereon to the person named as executor therein, if he is
competent, accepts the trust and gives a bond as required by these
rules."
b. In the case at bar, Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales of the R.P. Nogales Law
Offices has been named executor under the Holographic Will of Dr.
Werner J. Nittscher. As prayed for, let Letters Testamentary be is-
sued to Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, the executor named in the Will,
without a bond.
16. Nittscher moved for reconsideration, but her motion was denied.
17. Atty. Nogales was issued letters testamentary and was sworn in as executor.
18. Nittscher appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that Atty. Nogales’ peti-
tion for the issuance of letters testamentary should have been dismissed out-
right as the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and that she was
denied due process.
19. CA dismissed the appeal and denied the MR. Hence, this petition.
20. Nittscher contends that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
this case because Dr. Nittscher was allegedly not a resident of the Philip-
pines; neither did he leave real properties in the country. The properties listed
for disposition in her husband's will actually belong to her. She insists she
was denied due process of law because she did not receive by personal ser-
vice the notices of the proceedings.
21. Atty. Nogales, however, counters that Dr. Nittscher did reside and own real
properties in Las Piñas, Metro Manila. He stresses that Nittscher was duly
notified of the probate proceedings. Nittscher even appeared in court to op-
pose the petition for the issuance of letters testamentary and that she also
filed a motion to dismiss the said petition.
10. WoN the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject mater – YES.
Since Dr. Nittscher was a resident of Las Pinas, he correctly
filed in the RTC of Makati City, which then covered Las Piñas,
 Metro Manila, the petition for the probate of his will and for the
issuance of letters testamentary.
11. WoN the summons were properly issued to the parties and all
persons interested in the probate of the holographic will of Dr.
Nittscher – YES. Records show that Nittscher, with whom Dr.
Nittscher had no child, and Dr. Nittscher's children from his
previous marriage were all duly notified, by registered mail, of
the probate proceedings.
12. WoN Nittscher was deprived of due process – NO. She was no-
tified. She also appeared in court to oppose the petition.
RULING: Petition denied.
RATIO:
Jurisdiction
1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides:
a. SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled.
— If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines
at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an al-
ien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administra-
tion granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) in the
province in which he resides at the time of his death,
and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court
of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of any prov-
ince in which he had estate. . . .
2. In this case, the RTC and the Court of Appeals are one in their
finding that Dr. Nittscher was a resident of Las Piñas, Metro
Manila at the time of his death. Such factual finding, which we
find supported by evidence on record, should no longer be dis-
turbed.
3. Hence, Dr. Nittscher correctly filed in the RTC of Makati City,
which then covered Las Piñas, Metro Manila, the petition for the
probate of his will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to
Atty. Nogales.
Summons and Due Process
4. Dr. Nittscher asked for the allowance of his own will.
5. In this connection, Section 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court
states:
a. SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be
notified by mail or personally. — . . . If the testator asks
for the allowance of his own will, notice shall be sent on-
ly to his compulsory heirs.
6. In this case, records show that Nittscher, with whom Dr.
Nittscher had no child, and Dr. Nittscher's children from his
previous marriage were all duly notified, by registered mail, of
the probate proceedings. Nittscher even appeared in court to op-
pose respondent's petition for the issuance of letters testamen-
tary and she also filed a motion to dismiss the said petition. She
likewise filed a motion for reconsideration of the issuance of the
letters testamentary and of the denial of her motion to dismiss.
We are convinced Nittscher was accorded every opportunity to
defend her cause. Therefore, her allegation that she was denied
due process in the probate proceedings is without basis.
7. As a final word, Nittscher should realize that the allowance of
her husband's will is conclusive only as to its due execution. The
authority of the probate court is limited to ascertaining whether
the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in ac-
cordance with the formalities prescribed by law. Thus,
Nittscher’s claim of title to the properties forming part of her
husband's estate should be settled in an ordinary action before
the regular courts.
 006 Aluad v Aluad (Gustilo)
October 17, 2008 | Carpio-Morales, J. | Formalities of a Will
PETITIONER: Danilo Aluad, et al
RESPONDENTS: Zenaido Aluad
SUMMARY: Petitioners mother, Maria Aluad (Maria), and Zenaido Aluad (Zenaido) were
raised by the childless spouses Matilde Aluad (Matilde) and Crispin Aluad (Crispin). Crispin
was the owner of six lots of the Pilar Cadastre, Capiz. After Crispin died, his wife Matilde
adjudicated the lots to herself. Matilde executed a document entitled Deed of Donation of Real
Property Inter Vivos (Deed of Donation) in favor of petitioners mother Maria covering all the
six lots which Matilde inherited from her husband Crispin. Original Certificates of Title over
Lot Nos. 674 and 676 were issued in Matildes name. Matilde sold Lot No. 676 to Zenaido by
a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property. Matilde executed a last will and testament,
devising the other lots to Maria, and her remaining properties including Lot No. 674 to
Zenaido. Marias heirs-herein petitioners filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas
City a Complaint for declaration and recovery of ownership and possession of Lot
Nos. 674 and 676, and damages against Zenaido. The trial court, by Decision held that Matilde
could not have transmitted any right over Lot Nos. 674 and 676 to Zenaido, she having
previously alienated them to Maria via the Deed of Donation. The CA reversed the trial courts
decision, it holding that the Deed of Donation was actually a donation mortis causa, not inter
vivos, and as such it had to, but did not, comply with the formalities of a will. Thus, it found
that the Deed of Donation was witnessed by only two witnesses and had no attestation clause
which is not in accordance with Article 805 of the Civil Code. The issue is WoN WoN the
donation is a donation mortis causa or donation inter vivos?- Donation Mortis Causa.
The Court held that held that the donation to petitioners mother one of mortis causa, it having
the following characteristics: (a) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the
death of the transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the
ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive; (b) That before the death of
the transferor, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but
revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to
dispose of the properties conveyed; and (c) That the transfer should be void if the transferor
should survive the transferee. That the donation is mortis causa is fortified by Matildes acts of
possession as she continued to pay the taxes for the said properties which remained under her
name; appropriated the produce; and applied for free patents for which OCTs were issued
under her name. The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have
been observed but they were not, as it was witnessed by only two, not three or more witnesses
following Article 805 of the Civil Code.
DOCTRINE: The Deed of Donation which is, as already discussed, one of mortis causa, not
having followed the formalities of a will, it is void and transmitted no right to petitioners
mother. But even assuming arguendo that the formalities were observed, since it was not
probated, no right to Lot Nos. 674 and 676 was transmitted to Maria. Matilde thus validly
disposed of Lot No. 674 to Zenaido by her last will and testament, subject of course to the
qualification that her (Matildes) will must be probated.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners mother, Maria Aluad (Maria), and Zenaido Aluad (Zenaido)
were raised by the childless spouses Matilde Aluad (Matilde) and Crispin
Aluad (Crispin).
2. Crispin was the owner of six lots of the Pilar Cadastre, Capiz. After Crispin
died, his wife Matilde adjudicated the lots to herself. Matilde executed a
document entitled Deed of Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos (Deed of
Donation) in favor of petitioners mother Maria covering all the six lots
which Matilde inherited from her husband Crispin.
3. The Deed of Donation provided: “That, for and in consideration of the love
and affection of the DONOR [Matilde] for the DONEE [Maria], the latter
being adopted and having been brought up by the former the DONOR, by
these presents, transfer and convey, BY WAY OF DONATION, unto
the DONEE the property above-described, to become effective upon the
death of the DONOR, but in the event that the DONEE should die before
the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no
further force and effect; Provided, however, that anytime during the lifetime
of the DONOR or anyone of them who should survive, they could use[,]
encumber or even dispose of any or even all of the parcels of land herein
donated.
4. Original Certificates of Title over Lot Nos. 674 and 676 were issued in
Matildes name. Matilde sold Lot No. 676 to Zenaido by a Deed of Absolute
Sale of Real Property. Matilde executed a last will and testament,
devising the other lots to Maria, and her remaining properties including Lot
No. 674 to Zenaido.
5. Matilde died on January 25, 1994, while Maria died on September 24 of the
same year. Marias heirs-herein petitioners filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Roxas City a Complaint for declaration and recovery of
ownership and possession of Lot Nos. 674 and 676, and damages against
Zenaido.
6. Petitioners later filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint Already
Filed to Conform to Evidence to which it annexed an Amended Complaint
which cited the donation of the six lots via Deed of Donation in favor of
their mother Maria. Zenaido filed an Amended Answer contending, inter
alia, that the Deed of Donation is forged and falsified and petitioners
change of theory showed that said document was not existing at the time
they filed their complaint and was concocted by them after realizing that
their false claim that their mother was the only daughter of Matilde cannot
in anyway be established by them; and that if ever said document does
exist, the same was already revoked by Matilde when she exercised all acts
of dominion over said properties until she sold Lot 676 to Zenaido and until
her death with respect to the other lots without any opposition from Maria.
7. The trial court, by Decision held that Matilde could not have transmitted
any right over Lot Nos. 674 and 676 to Zenaido, she having previously
alienated them to Maria via the Deed of Donation.
8. On petitioners motion, the trial court directed the issuance of a writ of
execution pending appeal. Possession of the subject lots appears to have in
fact been taken by petitioners.
9. The CA reversed the trial courts decision, it holding that the Deed of
 Donation was actually a donation mortis causa, not inter vivos, and as such
it had to, but did not, comply with the formalities of a will. Thus, it found
that the Deed of Donation was witnessed by only two witnesses and had no
attestation clause which is not in accordance with Article 805 of the Civil
Code (see end of digest).
10. While the appellate court declared Zenaido as the rightful owner of Lot
No. 676, it did not so declare with respect to Lot No. 674, as Matildes last
will and testament had not yet been probated.
ISSUE/s:
1. WoN the donation is a donation mortis causa or donation inter vivos?-
Donation Mortis Causa thus it should follow the formalities of a will.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
RATIO:
1. The Court held that the donation to petitioners mother one of mortis
causa, it having the following characteristics: (a) It conveys no title or
ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the
ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive; (b)
That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be
revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be
provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to
dispose of the properties conveyed; and (c) That the transfer should be
void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
2. The phrase in the earlier-quoted Deed of Donation to become effective upon
the death of the DONOR admits of no other interpretation than to mean that
Matilde did not intend to transfer the ownership of the six lots to petitioners
mother during her (Matildes) lifetime.
3. The statement in the Deed of Donation reading anytime during the lifetime
of the DONOR or anyone of them who should survive, they could use,
encumber or even dispose of any or even all the parcels of land herein
donated. means that Matilde retained ownership of the lots and reserved in
her the right to dispose them. For the right to dispose of a thing without
other limitations than those established by law is an attribute of ownership.
The phrase in the Deed of Donation or anyone of them who should survive
is of course out of sync. For the Deed of Donation clearly stated that it
would take effect upon the death of the donor, hence, said phrase could only
have referred to the donor Matilde.
4. That the donation is mortis causa is fortified by Matildes acts of possession
as she continued to pay the taxes for the said properties which remained
under her name; appropriated the produce; and applied for free patents for
which OCTs were issued under her name. The donation being then mortis
causa, the formalities of a will should have been observed but they were
not, as it was witnessed by only two, not three or more witnesses
following Article 805 of the Civil Code.
5. Further, the witnesses did not even sign the attestation clause, the
execution of which clause is a requirement separate from the
subscription of the will and the affixing of signatures on the left-hand
margins of the pages of the will.
6. Furthermore, the witnesses did not acknowledge the will before the
notary public, which is not in accordance with the requirement of
Article 806 of the Civil Code that every will must be acknowledged
before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The
requirement that all the pages of the will must be numbered
correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page was not
also followed.
7. The Deed of Donation which is, as already discussed, one of mortis
causa, not having followed the formalities of a will, it is void and
transmitted no right to petitioners mother. But even
assuming arguendo that the formalities were observed, since it was not
probated, no right to Lot Nos. 674 and 676 was transmitted to Maria.
Matilde thus validly disposed of Lot No. 674 to Zenaido by her last will
and testament, subject of course to the qualification that her (Matildes)
will must be probated. With respect to Lot No. 676, the same had, as
mentioned earlier, been sold by Matilde to Zenaido on August 26, 1991.
8. Petitioners failed to raise the issue of acquisitive prescription before the
lower courts, however, they having laid their claim on the basis of
inheritance from their mother. As a general rule, points of law, theories, and
issues not brought to the attention of the trial court cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal.
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the
testator himself or by the testators name written by some other person in his presence, and by his
express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of
the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the
will shall, also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last on the left margin and
all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that
that testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name,
under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter
witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator, and of one
another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.

007 Nuguid v. Nuguid (Hilario)
June 23, 1966 | Sanchez, J. | Testate Proceedings
PETITIONER: REMEDIOS NUGUID
RESPONDENTS: FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID
SUMMARY: Rosario (deceased) died leaving her sister Remedios and other
siblings, and her parents Felix and Paz. Remedios (sister of deceased) came to
court to have a holographic will probated. This holographic will named her as
her sister’s sole heir. Felix and Paz (parents of deceased) opposed the probate of
the will saying that the will is null because they were illegally preterited, since
they weren’t mentioned even if they were compulsory heirs. The probate court’s
order held that the will is a complete nullity and thus resulted in the intestacy of
the estate of the deceased. Remedios (sister, sole heir) appealed before the SC.
WoN the probate court correctly declared the will null and void – YES, but
normally its only concern is the extrinsic, and not intrinsic, validity of the will.
The SC allowed it here because they reasoned out that “the case will come back
to them anyway”. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will,
nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted.
And for aught that appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the
court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up once
again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the
will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are
the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well
meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in
question. After all, there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.
DOCTRINE: Normally, the only concern of the probate court is the extrinsic
validity of a will. However, in some circumstances, the probate court may touch
on the intrinsic validity.
FACTS:
1. Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962,
single, without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were
her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6)
brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado,
Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.
2. Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a holographic
will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11
years before her demise. She prayed that it be admitted into probate and that
the letters of administration be issued to her.
3. Felix and Paz (mom and dad) opposed the probate of the will on the ground
that they were illegally preterited, since the will named Remedios as the
sole heir, and that’s void.
4. The probate court's order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will in
question is a complete nullity and will perforce create intestacy of the estate
of the deceased Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed the petition without costs.
5. Remedios (sister) appeals before the SC.
ISSUE/s:
1. WoN the probate court correctly declared the will null and void – YES, but
normally its only concern is the extrinsic, and not intrinsic, validity of the
will. The SC allowed it here because they reasoned out that “the case will
come back to them anyway”.
RULING: SC affirmed the lower courts decision.
RATIO:
1. The case is for the probate of a will. The probate court's area of inquiry is
limited — to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of
the will. The due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity,
and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities by law prescribed, are
the questions solely to be presented, and to be acted upon, by the probate
court.
2. The probate court at this stage of the proceedings — is not called upon to
rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will, the
legality of any devise or legacy therein.
3. A peculiar situation is here thrust upon us. The parties shunted aside the
question of whether or not the will should be allowed probate. For
them, the meat of the case is the intrinsic validity of the will.
4. Normally, this comes only after the court has declared that the will has been
duly authenticated. But petitioner and oppositors, in the court below and
here on appeal, travelled on the issue of law, to wit: Is the will intrinsically
a nullity?
5. We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the
will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be
protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the event of
probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case
will come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic
validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus
added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to
a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of
the provisions of the will in question. After all, there exists a justiciable
controversy crying for solution.
 008 AJERO v. CA (Marcos)
Sept. 15, 1994 | Puno, J. | Allowance of Will (Rule 76)
PETITIONER: Sps. Roberto and Thelma Ajero
RESPONDENTS: The Court of Appeals and Clemente Sand
SUMMARY: Annie Sand died and left a will. In the will, decedent named as
devisees petitioners Sps. Ajero, as well as private respondent Clemente Sand.
Clemente opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's body
nor the signature therein was in decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations
and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was
procured by Sps. Ajero through improper pressure and undue influence. The trial
court admitted the decedent's holographic will to probate. On appeal, said
Decision was reversed, and the petition for probate of decedent's will was
dismissed. The Court of Appeals found that, "the holographic will fails to meet
the requirements for its validity." WoN the CA erred in disallowing the will. –
YES, because Rule 76 provides for an exlusive list for reasons wherein wills can
be disallowed. In the same vein, Article 839 of the New Civil Code also provides
a list for disallowance. Such are not present in this case. These lists are
exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will.
DOCTRINE: Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides that wills shall
be disallowed in any of the following cases:
(a) If not executed and attested as required by law;
(b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will, at
the time of its execution;
(c) If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;
(d) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part
of the beneficiary, or of some other person for his benefit;
(e) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not
intend that the instrument should be his will at the time of affixing his signature
thereto.
FACTS:
68. Annie Sand died and left a will.
69. In the will, decedent named as devisees petitioners Sps. Ajero, private
respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam S. Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar
Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa S. Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr., and their children.
70. Sps. Ajero instituted Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, for allowance of decedent's
holographic will.
71. They alleged that at the time of its execution, she was of sound and
disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue in uence, and was
in every respect capacitated to dispose of her estate by will.
72. Clemente opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's
body nor the signature therein was in decedent's handwriting; it contained
alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent; and,
the will was procured by Sps. Ajero through improper pressure and undue
influence.
73. The petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested the
disposition in the will of a house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del
Norte. He claimed that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in
its entirety, as she was not its sole owner.
74. The trial court admitted the decedent's holographic will to probate.
75. On appeal, said Decision was reversed, and the petition for probate of
decedent's will was dismissed. The Court of Appeals found that, "the
holographic will fails to meet the requirements for its validity." It held that
the decedent did not comply with Articles 81317 and 81418 of the New Civil
Code.
76. It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and
undated, or signed but not dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations
and cancellations made thereon had not been authenticated by decedent.
ISSUE/s: WoN the CA erred in disallowing the will. – YES, because Rule 76
provides for an exlusive list for reasons wherein wills can be disallowed. Such are
not present in this case.
RULING: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, except with respect to the invalidity of the disposition
of the entire house and lot in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94 in Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, dated
November 19, 1988, admitting to probate the holographic will of decedent Annie
Sand, is hereby REINSTATED, with the above qualification as regards the
Cabadbaran property.
RATIO:
107. Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides that wills shall be
disallowed in any of the following cases:
(a) If not executed and attested as required by law;
17
Article 813: When a number of dispositions appearing in a holographic will are signed
without being dated, and the last disposition has a signature and date, such date validates the
dispositions preceding it, whatever be the time of prior dispositions."
18
Article 814: In case of insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will, the
testator must authenticate the same by his full signature.
 (b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will, at the
time of its execution;
(c) If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;
(d) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of
the beneficiary, or of some other person for his benefit;
(e) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not
intend that the instrument should be his will at the time of affixing his signature
thereto."
108. In the same vein, Article 839 of the New Civil Code reads:
"Article 839: The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:
(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at
the time of its execution;
(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or
threats;
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of
the beneficiary or of some other person;
include the subscription, attestation, and acknowledgment requirements
under Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code.
112. In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand, what assures
authenticity is the requirement that they be totally autographic or
handwritten by the testator himself, as provided under Article 810 of the
New Civil Code.
113. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the
disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by
the testator. Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate,
notwithstanding noncompliance with the provisions of Article 814.
114. Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions
were made on the date of the holographic will or on testator's signature,
their presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication
will only result in disallowance of such changes.
115. As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only
upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. However, in
exceptional instances, courts are not powerless to do what the situation
constrains them to do, and pass upon certain provisions of the will.
116. In the case at bench, decedent herself indubitably stated in her holographic
will that the Cabadbaran property is in the name of her late father, John H.
Sand (which led oppositor Dr. Jose Ajero to question her conveyance of the
same in its entirety.). Thus, as correctly held by respondent court, she
cannot validly dispose of the whole property, which she shares with her
father's other heirs.

(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;

(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed
should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto."

109. These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will.
110. Thus, in a petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to
be resolved are:
(1) whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent's last will and
testament;
(2) whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by law;
(3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the
time the will was executed; and,
(4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts
of the decedents.

111. For purposes of probating non-holographic wills, these formal solemnities

 ALABAN V CA (ARMAND)
September 23, 2005 | Tinga, J. | Notice and hearing in Probate
PETITIONER: Cynthia Alaban, et al.
RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals and Francisco Provido
SUMMARY: Petitioners who claim to be intestate heirs of the decedent maintain that
they were not made parties to the case in which the decision sought to be annulled
was rendered and, thus, they could not have availed of the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment and other appropriate remedies,
contrary to the ruling of the CA. Petitioners maintain that they were not made parties
to the case in which the decision sought to be annulled was rendered and failure to
notify them of the probate of the will constitute extrinsic fraud that necessitates the
annulment of the RTCs judgment. The issue is WoN petitioners were denied their
day in court during the proceedings before the RTC and thus allowance of the
will shall be annulled. – NO. It has been held that a proceeding for the probate of a
will is one in rem, such that with the corresponding publication of the petition the
court's jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of
the estate of the decedent. Thus, even though petitioners were not mentioned in the
petition for probate, they eventually became parties thereto as a consequence of the
publication of the notice of hearing.
On the other hand, according to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given to
known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator.
Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of the decedent, are neither compulsory nor testate
heirs who are entitled to be notified of the probate proceedings under the
Rules. Respondent had no legal obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for
probate, or to personally notify them of the same.
Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be so notified, the
purported infirmity is cured by the publication of the notice.
DOCTRINE: A proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the
corresponding publication of the petition the court's jurisdiction extends to all persons
interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of the decedent. It is the
publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and
vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. Thus, even though petitioners
were not mentioned in the petition for probate, they eventually became parties thereto
as a consequence of the publication of the notice of hearing.
FACTS:
50. Francisco Provido (respondent) filed a petition, probate of the Last Will and
Testament of the late Soledad Provido Elevencionado. Respondent alleged
that he was the heir of the decedent and the executor of her will.
51. Regional Trial Court (RTC) allowed the probate of the will of the decedent
and directed the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent.
52. Four months later, petitioners who claimed to be intestate heirs of the
decedent filed a motion for the reopening of the probate proceedings and an
opposition to the allowance of the will of the decedent, as well as the
issuance of letters testamentary to respondent, claiming that they are the
intestate heirs of the decedent.
53. Petitioner’s claim that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition
allegint that the signature of the decedent was forged, the will was not
executed in accordance with law, decedent lacked testamentary capacity to
execute a will, properties that no longer belonged to the decedent were
included in the properties listed on the will, non-payment of the correct
docket fees, defective publication, and lack of notice to the other heirs and
prayed that the letters testamentary issued to respondent be withdrawn and
the estate of the decedent disposed of under intestate succession.
54. The RTC denied the motion of the petitioners for being unmeritorious. It
held that petitioners were deemed notified of the hearing by publication and
that the deficiency in the payment of docket fees is not a ground for the
outright dismissal of the petition. It merely required respondent to pay the
deficiency and that the Decision was already final and executory even
before petitioners filing of the motion to reopen.
55. In the CA, petitioners claimed that together with respondent, they have
already discussed the matter of dividing the estate of the decedent and
opined that respondent feigned interest in participating in the compromise
agreement so that they would not suspect his intention to secure the probate
of the will. They claimed that they learnt of the probate proceedings only in
July of 2001, as a result of which they filed their motion to reopen the
proceedings and admit their opposition to the probate of the will only on 4
October 2001. They argued that the RTC Decision should be annulled and
set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction on the part
of the RTC.
56. CA dismissed the petition. It found that there was no showing that
petitioners failed to avail of or resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies
through no fault of their own. Moreover, the CA declared as baseless
petitioners claim that the proceedings in the RTC was attended by extrinsic
fraud.
57. Petitioners maintain that they were not made parties to the case in which the
decision sought to be annulled was rendered and failure to notify them of
the probate of the will constitute extrinsic fraud that necessitates the
annulment of the RTCs judgment.
ISSUE/s:
62. WoN petitioners were denied their day in court during the proceedings
before the RTC and thus allowance of the will shall be annulled. – NO.
It has been held that a proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem,
such that with the corresponding publication of the petition the court's
jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement
of the estate of the decedent.
 judgment, petitioners failed to inform the CA of the pendency of their
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioners. appeal in CA-G.R. No. 74924, even though the notice of appeal was filed
RATIO: way before the petition for annulment of judgment was instituted.
63. No, petitioners were not denied of their day in court and allowance shall be
allowed.
64. Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will,
or any other person interested in the estate may, at any time after the death
of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will
allowed. Notice of the time and place for proving the will must be published
for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province, as well as furnished to the designated or other known heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator.
65. Thus, it has been held that a proceeding for the probate of a will is one in
rem, such that with the corresponding publication of the petition the court's
jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement
of the estate of the decedent.
66. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party
in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. Thus,
even though petitioners were not mentioned in the petition for probate,
they eventually became parties thereto as a consequence of the
publication of the notice of hearing. A perusal of the will shows that
respondent was instituted as the sole heir of the decedent. Petitioners, as
nephews and nieces of the decedent, are neither compulsory nor testate heirs
who are entitled to be notified of the probate proceedings under the Rules.
Respondent had no legal obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for
probate, or to personally notify them of the same.
67. Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be so notified,
the purported infirmity is cured by the publication of the notice. After all,
personal notice upon the heirs is a matter of procedural convenience and not
a jurisdictional requisite.
68. The non-inclusion of petitioners names in the petition and the alleged
failure to personally notify them of the proceedings do not constitute
extrinsic fraud. Petitioners were not denied their day in court, as they were
not prevented from participating in the proceedings and presenting their
case before the probate court.
69. As parties to the probate proceedings, petitioners could have validly availed
of the remedies of motion for new trial or reconsideration and petition for
relief from judgment. For failure to make use without sufficient justification
of the said remedies available to them, petitioners could no longer resort to
a petition for annulment of judgment; otherwise, they would benefit from
their own inaction or negligence.
70. Moreover, petitioners failed to inform the Court of the said pending case in
their certification against forum- shopping. Neither have they done so at any
time thereafter. The Court notes that even in the petition for annulment of
 010 ANCHETA v. GUERSEY-DALAYGON (MERILLES) American citizens who have resided in the Philippines for 30 years.
June 8, 2006 | Austria-Martinez, J. | Allowance of Will Proved Outside of PH a. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle).
2. On July 29, 1979, Audrey died, leaving a will.
a. In it, she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard, who was also
PETITIONER: Alonzo Q. Ancheta
designated as executor.
RESPONDENTS: Candearia Guersey-Dalaygon
b. The will was admitted to probate before the Orphan’s Court of
Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A, which named James N. Phillips as
SUMMARY: Audrey and Richard are American Citizens who resided in the
executor due to Richard’s renunciation of his appointment.
Philippines. When Audrey died, her will was probated in the US court who
c. The court also named Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta (petitioner) of the
appointed Acheta as ancillary administrator. Audrey left several properties,
Quasha Law Offices as ancillary administrator
including a Makati property: 3/4 of which will go to Richard, while 1/4 will go
3. In 1981, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon (respondent) with
to their son Kyle.
whom he has two children: Kimberly and Kevin
4. In October 1982, Audrey’s will was also admitted to probate by the then
Richard remarried. When he died, his will stated that his second wife, Guersey-
CFI of Rizal
Dalaygon, was to inherit his share in the Makati property.
5. As administrator of Audrey’s estate in the Philippines, Ancheta filed an
inventory and appraisal of the following properties:
Both wills of Audrey and Richard were probated.Ancheta filed a project of
a. Audrey’s conjugal share in real estate with improvements located
partition of the Estate of Audrey, while Quasha filed for the partition of the
at 28 Pili Avenue, Forbes Park, Makati, Metro Manila, valued
Estate of Richard. In the Estate of Richard, the courts applied the laws of the
at P764,865.00 (Makati property);
State of Maryland. However, in the Estate of Audrey, the courts did not.
b. a current account in Audrey’s name with a cash balance
of P12,417.97; and
Guersey-Dalaygon filed a case to have the RTC orders in the Estate of Audrey
c. 64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc. worth P64,444.00
annulled on the ground of extrinsic fraud for Ancheta failed to consider US
6. On July 1984, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his
State Laws and relied on PH laws on testate succession. Ancheta argues that the
entire estate to Guersey-Dalaygon, save for his rights and interests over the
RTC orders have attained finality and can not be annulled. The issue in this case
A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle.
is whether the RTC orders have attained finality and can no longer be annulled.
7. The will was also admitted to probate by the Orphan’s Court of Ann
Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A, and James N. Phillips was likewise appointed as
The SC held NO, the orders are declared annulled. Once distribution of estate
executor, who in turn, designated Atty. William Quasha or any member of
becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem. However, in
Quasha Law Offices, as ancillary administrator.
exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for
8. Richard’s will was then submitted for probate before the RTC of Makati
lack of jurisdiction or fraud. Ancheta’s action appears to have breached his
docketed as Special Proceeding No. M-888. Atty. Quasha was appointed
duties and responsibilities as ancillary administrator of the subject estate. While
ancillary administrator.
such breach of duty admittedly cannot be considered extrinsic fraud under
9. On October 1987, Ancheta filed in Special Proceeding no. 9625, a motion
ordinary circumstances, the fiduciary nature of Ancheta’s position, as well as
to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey
the resultant frustration of the decedent’s last will, combine to create a
a. Ancheta later filed a project of partition of Audrey’s estate:
circumstance that is tantamount to extrinsic fraud.
i. Richard being appointed 3/4 of the Makati property,
48.333 shares in A/G Interiors, and P9.3kfront he
DOCTRINE: Once distribution of estate becomes final, its binding effect is
Citibank current account.
like any other judgment in rem. However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of
ii. Kyle received 1/4 undivided interest in the Makati prop,
distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud.
16,111 shares in A/G, and P3k in cash
b. The motion and partition was granted and approved
c. The RTC directed the Register of Deeds of makati to cancel the
FACTS: TCT in the name of Richard and issue a new title in the joint
1. Spouses Audrey O’Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were names of the Estate of W. Richard Guersey and Kyle, directing the
 transfer of respective shares, and the release of the cash
10. Meanwhile in SpecPro No. M-888, Quasha likewise filed a project of
partition where 2/5 of Richard’s undivided interest in the Makati property
was allocated to Guersey-Dalaygon, while 3/5 was to go to Kyle, Kimberly,
and Kevin
11. This was opposed by Guersey-Dalaygon on the ground that under the law of
the State of Maryland "a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of
the testator in the property subject of the legacy.”
12. Since Richard left his entire estate to Guersey-Dalaygon, except for rights
over the A/G shares, his entire 3/4 undivided interest in the Makati property
must be given to Guersey-Dalaygon
13. RTC ruled in favor of Guersey-Dalaygon
14. In the CA, Guersey-Dalaygon filed an amended complaint for the
annulment of the orders in Special Proceeding No. 9625 (Ancheta’s).
Guersey-Dalaygon contended that Ancheta willfully breached his fiduciary
duty when he disregarded the laws of the State of Maryland on the
distribution of Audrey’s estate in accordance with her will.
15. Ancheta denied the allegations and conceded that he acted in good faith in
submitting the project of partition as he had no knowledge of the laws of
Maryland on testate and intestate succession
16. The CA annulled the RTC decisions in SpecPro No. 9625 (Estate of
Audrey)
17. Hence, the herein petition
ISSUE/s:
1. WON the orders in Specpro 9625 (Estate of Audrey) are valid and binding
and can no longer be annulled - NO. The RTC orders are null and void on
the ground of fraud.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The Decision dated March 18,
1999 and the Resolution dated August 27, 1999 of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
1. Ancheta argues that the orders can no longer be annulled because it is a
final judgment, which is "conclusive upon the administration as to all
matters involved in such judgment or order, and will determine for all time
and in all courts, as far as the parties to the proceedings are concerned, all
matters therein determined," and the same has already been executed.
2. He also contends that that he acted in good faith in performing his duties as
an ancillary administrator.
a. He maintains that at the time of the filing of the project of
partition, he was not aware of the relevant laws of the State of
Maryland, such that the partition was made in accordance with
Philippine laws.
b. He also imputes knowledge on the part of Guersey-Dalaygon with
regard to the terms of Aubrey’s will, stating that as early as 1984,
he already apprised respondent of the contents of the will and how
the estate will be divided.
3. Guersey-Dalaygon argues that petitioner’s breach of his fiduciary duty as
ancillary administrator of Aubrey’s estate amounted to extrinsic fraud.
According to respondent, petitioner was duty-bound to follow the express
terms of Aubrey’s will, and his denial of knowledge of the laws of
Maryland cannot stand because petitioner is a senior partner in a prestigious
law firm and it was his duty to know the relevant laws.
4. A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to
the land of the estate in the distributees, which, if erroneous may be
corrected by a timely appeal.
5. Once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem.
6. However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate
may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud.
7. Further, in Ramon v. Ortuzar, the Court ruled that a party interested in a
probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when he is left out
by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or
inadvertence not imputable to negligence
8. The petition for annulment was filed before the 1997 ROC, therefore BP
129 applies.
a. An annulment of judgment filed under B.P. 129 may be based on
the ground that a judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or that
the judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud
b. For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be
extrinsic or actual, and must be brought within four years from the
discovery of the fraud
9. The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the
fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having
his day in court. Ancheta’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution of
Audrey’s estate according to the terms of her will and as dictated by the
applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision
annulling the RTC Orders must be upheld.
10. It is undisputed that Audrey Guersey was an American citizen domiciled in
Maryland, U.S.A. During the reprobate of her will in Special Proceeding
No. 9625, it was shown, among others, that at the time of Audrey’s death,
she was residing in the Philippines but is domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A.
11. Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audrey’s will, especially
with regard as to who are her heirs, is governed by her national law, i.e., the
law of the State of Maryland
12. However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to
the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
 intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be found.
13. While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our
courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them; however, Ancheta,
as ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate, was duty-bound to introduce
in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland.
14. Ancheta admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence the law of the State
of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, and merely relied on the presumption
that such law is the same as the Philippine law on wills and succession.
15. Thus, the trial court peremptorily applied Philippine laws and totally
disregarded the terms of Audrey’s will. The obvious result was that there
was no fair submission of the case before the trial court or a judicious
appreciation of the evidence presented.
16. Well-intentioned though it may be, Alonzo H. Ancheta’s action appears to
have breached his duties and responsibilities as ancillary administrator of
the subject estate. While such breach of duty admittedly cannot be
considered extrinsic fraud under ordinary circumstances, the fiduciary
nature of the said defendant’s position, as well as the resultant frustration of
the decedent’s last will, combine to create a circumstance that is tantamount
to extrinsic fraud.
 001 DE OCAMPO v. SANTOS (PELIÑO)
April 30, 1941| Imperial, J. | Appointment and of Executors, Administrators, and
Special Administrators
APPELLANT: Jose S. De Ocampo
APPELLEE: Ambrosio Santos, Judge of First Instance of Tarlac
SUMMARY: Nicolas died. During the intestate proceedings in the CFI of Tarlac, Jose
requested that he be appointed as administrator since Nicolas died without a will and he
was the nearest relative since he was Nicolas’ son. Jose’s petition was opposed by Paula,
claiming that Jose was an illegitimate child and that she should be the administrator since
she was Nicolas’ widow. But another person named Justa also appeared, claiming that she
should be the administrator since she was the legitimate widow of Nicolas. Paula’s lawyer
proposed that Carlos be appointed as special administrator. Jose didn’t oppose the
appointment of a special administrator, but challenged Carlos’ appointment. Since the
determination of who should be the regular administrator was still pending, the court
appointed Carlos and asked him to pay the bond. Jose filed a MR, but was denied. Hence,
this appeal. The issue in this case is whether or not the CFI abused its discretion by
appointing a special administrator. The parties had agreed to appoint a special
administrator during the pendency of the controversy on the appointment of the regular
administrator. The appointment of Carlos was correct, considering that he was a
disinterested party. The difficulty of appointing a regular or special administrator falls
within the sound discretion of the courts. The order by which the appointees designated
by the law should be appointed may be disregarded by the court when the circumstances
call for it or when the person called is not suitable or partial. In this case, the court was
justified in selecting Carlos, considering that Jose was alleged to be an illegitimate child
and Paula and Justa both claim to be widows of Nicolas; the evidence is not clear as to
who had the better right to be the regular administrator. Jose’s claim that the court lacked
the power to appoint a special administrator is not correct since Art. 1 of Rule 81
authorizes the appointment of a special administrator when the court cannot appoint a
regular administrator in the order established by Art. 6 of Rule 80.
DOCTRINE: The order by which the appointees designated by the law should be
appointed may be disregarded by the court when the circumstances call for it or when the
person called is not suitable or partial. Art. 1 of Rule 81 authorizes the appointment of a
special administrator when the court cannot appoint a regular administrator in the order
established by Art. 6 of Rule 80. (old rules)
**The whole case is in Spanish, wala ako makita na digest, so trinanslate ko from google and tried my
best to understand based on that. Please bear with me haha**
FACTS:
77. The present remedy of certiorari is to annul the August 27, 1940, which
appointed Carlos Rodriguez as special administrator and another order of
September 12, 1940, the motion for reconsideration of the previous order
was presented.
78. In the intestate of Nicolas De Ocampo in the CFI of Tarlac, Jose De
Ocampo (Jose) requested that he be appointed as administrator, alleging that
Nicolas died without a will and that he left properties in the amount of P29k
and that he was one of the closest relatives since he as a son of Nicolas.
a. But the petition was opposed by Paula Apostol (Paula), claiming that
Jose was an illegitimate child of Jose and unable to play the role of
administrator since he lacks integrity, and that she should be the
administrator since she was the widow of Jose.
b. Another person named Justa Samaniego (Justa) also appeared and
claims that she should be the administrator alleging that she was the
legitimate widow of Nicolas.
79. In August 22, 1940, Paula’s lawyer proposed that Carlos Rodriguez, a civil
engineer and resident of Tarlac, be appointed as special administrator.
a. Jose’s lawyer did not oppose the appointment of a special
administrator, but challenged the appointment in favor of Carlos and
insisted that Jose be selected.
80. In view of the proposal and the circumstance that the final selection of the
regular administrator was pending, the Court appointed Carlos as special
administrator, setting the bond of 3k that he had to pay to qualify.
a. Jose filed an MR, but was denied.
81. Jose, instead of appealing the order, filed the present appeal.
ISSUE/s:
8. WON the court abused its discretion by appointing a special administrator. -
NO, the rules authorize the appointment of a special administrator when the
court cannot appoint a regular administrator in the order established in the
rules.
RULING: The petition for certiorari is DENIED, with the costs to Jose.
RATIO:
1. The CFI did not exceed its exercise of discretion or made any error.
2. The parties had agreed to appoint a special administrator during the
pendency of the controversy on the appointment of the regular
administrator.
a. The appointment of Carlos was correct, considering that he was a
disinterested party.
3. The difficulty of appointing a regular or special administrator falls within
the sound discretion of the courts.
4. The order by which the appointees designated by the law should be
appointed may be disregarded by the court when the circumstances call for
it or when the person called is not suitable or partial.
5. In this case, the court was justified in selecting Carlos, considering that Jose
was alleged to be an illegitimate child and Paula and Justa both claim to be
widows of Nicolas.
a. The evidence is still not clear as to who had the better right to be the
regular administrator.
6. Jose’s claim that the court lacked the power to appoint a special
administrator is not correct since Art. 1 of Rule 81 authorizes the
appointment of a special administrator when the court cannot appoint a
regular administrator in the order established by Art. 6 of Rule 80.
 002 SIOCA v. GARCIA (EMAR)
Mar 17, 1923 | Ostrand | Appointment RATIO:
PETITIONER-APPELLANT: Intestate estate of the deceased Geroni- 1. The refusal to appoint Sioca appears in the Sept 30, 1922 order19 of the lower
ma Uy Coque. Juan Navas L. Sioca. court, from which no appeal has been taken, we might well consider the ques-
ADMINISTRATOR-APPELLEE: Jose Garcia tion raised upon this appeal res adjudicata (sic).
SUMMARY: The lower court refused to appoint Sioca, decedent 2. Another reason why the appeal must fail: GR: A probate court cannot arbitrarily
Coque’s surviving spouse, as administrator because it was found that and without sufficient reason disregard the preferential rights of the surviving
Sioca had adverse interest in the estate of such a character as to spouse to the administration of the estate of the deceased spouse. Exception: If
render him unsuitable as administrator. CFI, after two months, ap- the person enjoying such preferential rights is unsuitable, the court may
appoint another person. (Para. 2, sec. 642, Code of CivPro.)
pointed Garcia as administrator. Sioca maintains that the court erred
3. The determination of a person's suitability for the office of administrator rests in
in not appointing him administrator instead of Jose Garcia. ISSUE:
the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment and
WON the Sioca should be appointed as administrator – NO. This ac-
such judgment will not be interfered with on appeal unless it appears af-
tion is barred by res judicata because the lower court’s refusal to ap-
firmatively that the court below was in error.
point Sioca as administrator was not appealed from. More important 4. Here, the court based its ruling on the fact that it appeared from the record in
reason for the topic is that although probate court cannot arbitrarily Civil Case No. 1041 of the same court, that Sioca had adverse interest in the
and without sufficient reason disregard the preferential rights of the estate of such a character as to render him unsuitable as administrator.
surviving spouse to the administration of the estate of the deceased 5. Unsuitableness may consist in adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those
spouse; if the person enjoying such preferential rights is unsuita- immediately interested in the estate. (18 Cyc., 93, 94.)
ble, the court may appoint another person. 6. The court below stated facts which may constitute sufficient grounds for setting
DOCTRINE: 1: Unsuitableness for appointment as administrator may aside the appellant's preferential rights and which, in the absence of proof to the
consist in adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those immedi- contrary, must be presumed sufficient. Whether they are in fact sufficient, we
ately interested in the estate to such an extent as to render the ap- are not in position to determine as we have not before us the record in the afore-
pointment inadvisable. said case No. 1041; it being a record of the court below, that court could proper-
2: The determination of a person's suitability for the office of adminis- ly take judicial notice thereof, but we cannot.
trator rests in the sound judgment of the court exercising the pow-
er of appointment and such judgment will not be interfered with
on appeal unless it appears affirmatively that the court below was
in error.
FACTS:
1. Sept 30, 1922: Lower court refused to appoint Sioca, decedent’s Coque’s surviv-
ing spouse because he had adverse interest in the estate of such a character
as to render him unsuitable as administrator. No appeal was taken.
2. Nov 11, 1922: Samar CFI appointed Garcia as administrator of the estate of de-
cedent Coque.
3. Sioca, Coque’s surviving spouse, filed an appeal, contending that the court erred
in not appointing him administrator instead of Jose Garcia.

ISSUE: WON Sioca, the decedent’s surviving spouse, should be appointed as ad-
ministrator – NO. Unsuitableness for appointment as administrator may consist in
adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those immediately interested in the estate
to such an extent as to render the appointment inadvisable.

RULING: Order appealed from AFFIRMED, with costs against appellant Sioca. 19
No excerpt from the lower court decision.
 003 GIL v. CANCIO (Sarmiento)
July 30, 1965 | Bautista Angelo J. |
PETITIONER: Dolores C. Vda De Gil
RESPONDENTS: Agustin Cancio
SUMMARY: Carlos Gil, Sr. died testate instituting as his exclusive heir his
widow Isabel Herreros subject to the condition that should the latter die the es-
tate, if any, would be inherited by Carlos Gil, Jr., the decedent's adopted son.
Among the properties constituting the estate were two parcels of residential
lands and a house. During the Japanese occupation, the widow Isabel and the
adopted son Carlos secured from one Agustin Cancio a loan of P89,000.00 and
in payment thereof they agreed to transfer to Cancio the two lots after the same
had been finally adjudicated to both or either of the two heirs. Subsequently,
Carlos died, and Isabel H. Vda. de Gil, as administratrix of the estate of her de-
ceased husband Carlos Gil, Sr., filed a motion in the testate proceedings praying
for an order to authorize her to execute the necessary deed of transfer of the two
lots including the house erected thereon to Agustin Cancio or his heirs. As Isabel
H. Vda. de Carlos Gil, Sr. die, before being able to execute the deed of transfer
in favor of Cancio, said deed was executed by. Dolores C. Vda. de Carlos Gil, Jr.
in her capacity as co-administratrix and vendor of the properties which deed was
attached to a motion she filed in the testate proceedings (No. 548) praying the
court for its approval. But, to the surprise of petitioner Cancio, co-administratrix
Dolores C. Vda. de Gil, Jr. filed a strong opposition to the petition on the ground
that the late Isabel H. Vda. de Gil, Sr. and Carlos Gil, Jr. entered into the agree-
ment to sell the properties without the authority of the court, that the properties
subject of the sale had never been finally adjudicated to both or either of the two
vendors, and that the alleged deed of sale should only be considered as an equi-
table mortgage. Issue is whether or not the deed of sale is valid even pending the
probate proceedings. Court held yes. Bearing in mind this situation of the two
heirs which happened during the Japanese occupation, the probate court did not
hesitate in approving the agreement thereby giving to the administratrix the nec-
essary authority to execute the deed of sale covering the two properties of the
deceased in favor of Agustin Cancio provided that the deed of sale be submitted
to the court for its approval. this matter is sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 89 of
the Rules of Court. there is no doubt that an heir can sell whatever right, interest,
or participation he may have in the property under administration, a matter
which comes under the jurisdiction of the probate cour
DOCTRINE: "When it appears that the sale of the whole or a part of the real or
personal estate; will be beneficial to the heirs, devisees, legatees, and other
interested persons, the court may, upon application of the executor or
administrator and on written notice to the heirs, devisees, and legatees who are
interested in the estate to be solid, authorize the executor or administrator to sell
the whole or a part of said estate, although not necessary to pay debts, legacies,
or expenses of administration;
FACTS:
1. Carlos Gil, Sr. died testate in Manila on November 28, 1943 instituting as
his exclusive heir his widow Isabel Herreros subject to the condition that
should the latter die the estate, if any, would be inherited by Carlos Gil, Jr.,
the decedent's adopted son.
a. In due time, the decedent's will was duly admitted to probate, the
widow Isabel having been appointed as the administratrix of the
estate.
2. Among the properties constituting the estate were two parcels of residential
lands and a house erected thereon situated in Guagua, Pampanga.
a. During the Japanese occupation, the widow Isabel and the adopted
son Carlos secured from one Agustin Cancio a loan of P89,000.00
and in payment thereof they agreed on November 21, 1944 to
transfer to Cancio the two lots after the same had been finally ad-
judicated to both or either of the two heirs.
b. Subsequently, Carlos died, and on June 25, 1954 Isabel H. Vda. de
Gil, as administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband Carlos
Gil, Sr., filed a motion in the testate proceedings (No. 548) praying
for an order to authorize her to execute the necessary deed of trans-
fer of the two lots including the house erected thereon to Agustin
Cancio or his heirs.
c. Copy of this motion was served on Dolores C. Vda. de Carlos Gil,
Jr. who expressed her conformity thereto in her capacity as guardi-
an of her minor children on October 21, 1954. This motion was
approved by Judge Ramon R. San Jose on condition that the origi-
nal of the deed of transfer should be submitted to the court for ap-
proval.
3. As Isabel H. Vda. de Carlos Gil, Sr. died sometime in July, 1956, before be-
ing able to execute the deed of transfer in favor of Cancio, said deed was
executed by. Dolores C. Vda. de Carlos Gil, Jr. on July 3, 1956 in her ca-
pacity as co-administratrix and vendor of the properties, which deed was at-
tached to a motion she filed in the testate proceedings (No. 548) praying the
court for its approval.
4. Accordingly, on July 9, 1956, the probate court issued an order directing the
co-administratrix to pay the estate and inheritance taxes due on the proper-
ties covered by the sale before passing upon the motion filed for the ap-
proval of the aforesaid deed of sale.
5. Apparently, nothing was done on the matter by the co-administratrix not-
withstanding the lapse of several years, and so on April 1, 1959, Agustin
Cancio filed a motion in the probate proceedings reiterating the former peti-
tion of the co-administratrix dated July 5, 1956 requesting for the approval
of the deed of sale stating that the Office of the Commission on Internal
Revenue agreed to the registration of said deed of sale notwithstanding the
non-payment of the estate and inheritance taxes in view of the fact that the
value of the properties of the estate is more than sufficient to answer for
whatever estate and inheritance taxes that may be assessed against the es-
tate.
a. But, to the surprise of petitioner Cancio, co-administratrix Dolores
C. Vda. de Gil, Jr. filed a strong opposition to the petition on the
ground that the late Isabel H. Vda. de Gil, Sr. and Carlos Gil, Jr.
entered into the agreement to sell the properties without the author-
ity of the court, that the properties subject of the sale had never
been finally adjudicated to both or either of the two vendors, and
that the alleged deed of sale should only be considered as an equi-
table mortgage.
6. After the parties had submitted their memoranda on the issues raised by the
oppositor, the probate court, Hon. Antonio Cañizares presiding, issued an
order on January 25, 1961 denying the petition and setting aside the order of
the probate court of October 22, 1954 which requires the submission of the
deed of sale for the approval of the court upon the theory that since the ob-
ligation for which the properties were sold was personal in character and
has no connection with the estate, whatever claim Cancio has in connection
with said obligation should be threshed out in a separate action.
7. Cancio took the case to the Court of Appeals, but the same was later certi-
fied to this Court on the ground that it merely involves questions of law.
8. The order of the probate court issued on January 25, 1961 from which the
present appeal was taken reads as follows
a. "Upon consideration of the motion filed on April 1, 1959 by
Agustin Cancio as well as the opposition thereto filed on April 11,
1959 by co-administratrix Dolores C. Vda. de Gil, and after a re-
examination of the petition ex-parte, dated July 5, 1956, of said co-
admdnistratrix and of all the pleadings having reference to the sale
of the estate property therein referred to, the Court is of the opinion
that whatever right movant Cancio acquired under the agreement
had between him, on the one hand, and former administratrix Isa-
bel H. Vda. de Gil and Carlos Gil, Jr., on the other, that right can-
not be enforced in this proceeding, the obligation contracted during
the Japanese occupation by said Isabel H. Vda. de Gil and Carlos
Gil, Jr. being personal to them and the estate having nothing to do
with it.
ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs had the authority to sell properties under their
administration even before the finality of a probate proceedings—YES. It is not
disputed that the vendors were the rightful heirs, in this case.
RULING: Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby set aside. The motion filed
by Agustin Cancio date April 1, 1959 praying for the approval of the deed of sale in
question is hereby granted. No costs.
RATIO:
1. It should be noted that when Isabel H. Vda. de Gil, Sr. and Carlos Gil, Jr.
obtained the loan of P89,000.00 from Agustin Cancio on condition that the
same would be paid by transferring to him the two lots and house which
form part of the estate of the deceased Carlos Gil, Sr., said estate was al-
ready under the administration of Isabel because she was then the adminis-
tratrix duly appointed by the court, and under the provision of the will the
widow Isabel was instituted as the exclusive heir subject to the condition
that should the latter die the properties would thereby be inherited by Carlos
Gil, Jr., the adopted son of the deceased.
2. On the other hand, it should, be borne in mind that under the provision of
Article 1430 of the Civil Code the widow and children of the deceased are
entitled to certain allowances for their support out of the estate pending its
liquidation and until their shares have been delivered to them.
a. It is probably for this reason that both widow and the son, who
were the prospective heirs, borrowed money from Agustin Cancio
in order that they may have means to support themselves in the in-
terregnum since the estate was then unproductive, a matter which
comes perfectly within the purview of the law.
b. And bearing in mind this situation of the two heirs which happened
during the Japanese occupation, the probate court did not hesitate
in approving the agreement thereby giving to the administratrix the
necessary authority to execute the deed of sale covering the two
properties of the deceased in favor of Agustin Cancio provided that
the deed of sale be submitted to the court for its approval.
 c. And this matter is sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 89 of the Rules of
Court, which provides:
i. "When it appears that the sale of the whole or a part of
the real or personal estate; will be beneficial to the heirs,
devisees, legatees, and other interested persons, the court
may, upon application of the executor or administrator
and on written notice to the heirs, devisees, and legatees
who are interested in the estate to be solid, authorize the
executor or administrator to sell the whole or a part of
said estate, although not necessary to pay debts, legacies,
or expenses of administration; * * *.

1. The objection, therefore, of the present administratrix on the ground that the
original agreement between the late administratrix Isabel and Cancio was
without authority of the court has no factual basis.

2. It is true that the agreement between Isabel H. Vda. de GO, Sr. and Carlos
Gil, Jr., on the one hand, and Agustin Cancio, on the other, concerning the
transfer of the two lots in question in payment of the loan of P89,000.00 is
conditioned upon the final adjudication of said properties to both or either
of them, and here such adjudication has not been made in view of the early
death of the two heirs; but this circumstance is now of no consequence con-
sidering that it is beyond dispute that the properties left by the late Carlos
Gil, Sr. were inherited, first, by Isabel and, later, by the children of Carlos
Gil, Jr. who inherited them through their father charged with the commit-
ment in favor of Cancio.

3. As a matter of fact, Dolores C. Vda. de Gil, Jr., co-administratrix of the es-

tate, is now estopped from disputing the sale because she herself in her ca-
pacity as co-administratrix filed the petition in court asking for the approval
of the same sale which she now disputes for reasons that do not appear in
the record.

4. And there is no doubt that an heir can sell whatever right, interest, or partic-
ipation he may have in the property under administration, a matter which
comes under the jurisdiction of the probate court (Estefania R. Vda. de Cruz
vs. Ilagan, 81 Phil., 564).

5. It is, therefore, error for the court a quo to say that this matter should be
threshed out in a separate action.
 6. The court denied this petition and sustained the appointment of Nicolasa.
DE GUZMAN v. LIMCOLIOC (SIAPNO) From these resolutions, Angela appealed.
April 18, 1939 | Avanceña, J. | Spouse Administratix Exception 7. In this instance the Angela contends that the trial court erred in not
appointing her administratrix of the estate of the deceased Proceso and in
appointing Nicolasa as such administratrix without first setting the case for
PETITIONER: Nicolasa De Guzman.
hearing.
RESPONDENTS: Angela Limcolioc
ISSUE/s: WON the trial court erred in not appointing Limcolioc as administratrix of
SUMMARY: Proceso died without a will. He had 2 marriages. He first married
the estate – NO, Nicolasa had more interest in the estate than the widow Angela
Agatona and had 4 children, one of them is Nicolasa. He was subsequently
married to Angela. CFI appointed Nicolasa judicial administratrix of the
RULING: The appealed decision is affirmed.
properties of the deceased Proceso. Angela, widow of the deceased, asked that
this appointment be set aside and that she had named administratrix instead, on
RATIO:
that ground of her preference as the widow. Appeal was denied. Issue in this
1. The principal consideration reckoned with in the appointment of the
case is WON the trial court erred in not appointing Limcolioc as administratrix
administrator of the estate of a deceased person is the interest in said estate
of the estate of the deceased Proceso and in appointing Nicolasa as such
of the one to be appointed as such administrator.
administratrix without first setting the case for hearing - NO, Nicolasa had more
2. This is the same consideration which the law takes into account in
interest in the estate than the widow Angela. The application filed by Nicolasa
establishing the preference of the widow to administer the estate of her
for her appointment alleges that during the marital life of the deceased with his
husband, upon the latter's death, because she is supposed to have an
first wife Agatona, both, through their mutual labor, acquired all the
interest therein as a partner in the conjugal partnership.
properties left by the deceased, not having acquired any property during his
3. But this preference established by law is not absolute, if there are other
second marriage with Angela Limcolioc. The court bore these allegations in
reasons justifying the appointment of an administrator other than
mind. When Angela asked for the reconsideration of the appointment of
surviving spouse.
Nicolasa, she did not deny these allegations. Nicolasa had more interest in the
4. If the interest in the estate is what principally determines the preference in
estate and was therefore rightfully appointed as adminitratix.
the appointment of an administrator of the estate of a deceased person, and
if, under the circumstances of each case, it develops that there is another
DOCTRINE: The principal consideration reckoned with in the appointment
who has more interest therein than the surviving spouse, the preference
of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person is the interest in said
established in the latter's favor becomes untenable.
estate of the one to be appointed as such administrator. But this preference
5. The application filed by Nicolasa for her appointment alleges that during
established by law is not absolute, if there are other reasons justifying the
the marital life of the deceased with his first wife Agatona Santos, both,
appointment of an administrator other than surviving spouse.
through their mutual labor, acquired all the properties left by the
deceased, not having acquired any property during his second
marriage with Angela Limcolioc.
FACTS: 6. The court bore these allegations in mind. It is true that the case was not
1. Proceso de Guzman died on January 1, 1937, without leaving a will. heard for the purpose of establishing these allegations, but when Angela
2. 1st marriage: Married to Agatona Santos, with whom he had four children, asked for the reconsideration of the appointment of Nicolasa, she did not
named Nicolasa, Apolinario, Ana and Tomasa. deny these allegations and merely stated that they do not justify her
3. 2nd marriage: After Agatona's death, the deceased contracted a second appointment as administratrix.
marriage with Angela Limcolioc, with whom he did not have any child. 7. For failure of Angela to deny these allegations, thus taking them for
4. CFI appointed Nicolasa judicial administratrix of the properties of the granted, the court was justified in considering them when it denied the
deceased Proceso. reconsideration of its resolution and when it sustained the appointment of
5. Angela, widow of the deceased, asked that this appointment be set aside Nicolasa.
and that she had named administratrix instead, on that ground of her 8. If the properties left by the deceased Proceso de Guzman were acquired
preference as the widow. during his marriage with Agatona Santos, his children, among them
Nicolasa, have more interest therein than his now widow, Angela
Limcolioc, who would only be entitled, by way of usufruct, to a portion
equal to that corresponding to one of the children who has received no
betterment.
 005 M. CHUA KAY v. OH TIONG KENG (TIMBOL)
January 16, 1936 | Butte, J. | Appointment and Removal of Executors,
Administrators and Special Administrators
FACTS:
PETITIONER: Intestate Estate of the deceased Oh Tiong Keng (alias Oh
Tiong King, alias O Tiong Ken). M. Chua Kay & Company
RESPONDENTS: Widow and Heirs of Oh Tiong Keng
SUMMARY: Oh Tiong Keng died intestate in Sorsogon. His widow presented
a petition in the CFI of Manila for the administration of the estate. Two years
later, the estate was ordered closed having been distributed and the bondof the
administratrix cancelled. M. Chua Kay & Company, one of the creditors of Oh
Tiong Keng, alleged that it was deprived of its opportunity to present its claim
there being no proceeding instituted in the CFI of Sorsogon, where it allegedly
claimed that Oh Tiong Keng was a resident at the time of his death. Hence, Oh
Tiong Keng filed before the CFI of Manila this petition to reopen the estate
proceedings and re appoint the widow as administratrix.
Whether or not the CFI of Manila had jurisdiction to administer the estate.
YES. Firstly, the trial court found that at the time of death, Oh Tiong Keng was
actually a resident of Manila. Secondly, the record on appeal fails to show that
any issue of jurisdiction was raised or decided by the trial court. And lastly, M.
Chua Kay voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court when it
filed this petition.
Whether or not M Chua Kay could have instituted the estate proceedings in
Sorsogon.
ISSUE/s:
It is to be noted that M Chua Kay, if the residence of the deceased was in fact in
the Province of Sorsogon, had the right to present a petition for the appointment
of an administrator at any time after thirty days after the death of Oh Tiong
Keng. Apparently, instead of acting promptly it preferred to rely on the promise
of payment made by the widow and slept on its rights. It is in the public interest
that estates should be administered with the utmost reasonable dispatch and we
see no warrant under the circumstances of this case for reversing the order
appealed from.
DOCTRINE: Sec. 642 (2), Code of Civil Procedure: “if such surviving
husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by
them, be unsuitable, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin neglect for thirty
days after the death of the person to apply for administration, or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or
more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve."
9. Oh Tiong Keng died in Sorsogon on November 9, 1932. His widow
presented a petition in the CFI of Manila for the administration of his estate
a. She was duly appointed and commissioners on claims and
appraisal were likewise appointed on due notice and performed
their duties in accordance with law
b. On July 26, 1934, the estate was ordered closed, the property
thereof having been distributed to the heirs and the bond of the
administratrix having been cancelled
10. M. Chua Kay alleged in substance that it is one of the creditors of the
deceased Oh Tiong Keng in the sum of P20, 249.85
a. That it was expecting that the administration of the estate would be
filed in the CFI of Sorsogon inasmuch as it was the province of Oh
Tiong Ken’s residence at the time of his death
b. That having learned that no such proceeding was filed in the CFI
of Sorsogon, M Chua Kay as one of the creditors of the deceased,
filed such petition to reopen the intestate proceedings of the estate
of Oh Tiong Keng, and to appoint a new commission on claims
and appraisal to pass upon a claim against the said estate
c. That it had no opportunity to present its claim before the
commissioners on claims and appraisal appointed by the latter
court
d. That it was deprived of its opportunity to present its claim by
reason of the fraudulent machinations of the widow and heirs of
the deceased Oh Tiong Keng
5. WoN the CFI of Manila had authority to administer the estate – YES.
Firstly, the trial court found that at the time of death, Oh Tiong Keng was
actually a resident of Manila. Secondly, the record on appeal fails to show
that any issue of jurisdiction was raised or decided by the trial court. And
lastly, M. Chua Kay voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the
court when it filed this petition.
6. WoN M Chua Kay could have instituted the proceedings in Sorsogon –
YES. It is to be noted that M Chua Kay, if the residence of the deceased was
in fact in the Province of Sorsogon, had the right to present a petition for the
appointment of an administrator at any time after thirty days after the death
of Oh Tiong Keng. Apparently, instead of acting promptly it preferred to
rely on the promise of payment made by the widow and slept on its rights.
 1932.
11. Apparently, instead of acting promptly it preferred to rely on the
RULING: The judgment is affirmed with costs against the Appellant. promise of payment made by the widow and slept on its rights.
12. It is in the public interest that estates should be administered with the
RATIO:
6. The substance of M Chua Kay’s arguments on this appeal is that the CFI of utmost reasonable dispatch and we see no warrant under the
Manila had no jurisdiction to administer the estate of Oh Tiong Keng circumstances of this case for reversing the order appealed from.
because at the time of his death he resided in Sorsogon and not in Manila
a. The Trial Court found that although Oh Tiong Keng died in
Sorsogon his residence at the time of his death was in fact Manila
7. The evidence on this issue of fact is conflicting but in the view of which we
take of the case we do not think it is necessary to determine this issue of
fact
8. The record on appeal before us fails to show that any issue of jurisdiction
was raised or decided by the trial court
a. It show furthermore that M Chua Kay voluntarily submitted itself
to the jurisdiction of the trial court when it filed its petition in this
casue praying for the reappointment of the widow as administratrix
and the reappointment of commissioners on claims and appraisal
b. Nor do we deem it proper to go into the question of jurisdiction for
the first time on appeal in this case in view of the circumstances
that the estate has been finally closed for more than a year and a
half and that no action in the CFI of Sorsogon was taken by M
Chua Kay as a creditor until nearly two years after the death of Oh
Tiong Keng
9. The fact that M Chua Kay relied on the personal promise of the widow
that she would pay the claim in small installments and that she failed to
comply with that promise is, in our opinion, no sufficient excuse for the
delay of M Chua Kay in making application for the appointment of an
administrator in Sorsogon
a. Sec. 642 (2), Code of Civil Procedure: “if such surviving
husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the
person selected by them, be unsuitable, or if the husband or
widow, or next of kin neglect for thirty days after the death of
the person to apply for administration, or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may be
granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent
and willing to serve."
10. It is to be noted that M Chua Kay, if the residence of the deceased was
in fact in the Province of Sorsogon, had the right to present a petition
for the appointment of an administrator at any time after thirty days
after the death of Oh Tiong Keng which occurred on November 9,
 006 GUERRERO v. TERAN (CHIQUI)
March 19, 1909 | Johnson, J. | Administrators and Guardians
PETITIONER: Salvador Guerrero, guardian of the minor Maria Manuela and
Maria del Carmen Sanchez Muñoz
RESPONDENT: Leopoldo Teran
SUMMARY: Guerrero filed an action against Teran, as the administrator of the
estate of Muñoz, in order to recover P4,129.56. Teran admitted certain allegations
and said that he owed Guerrero but only for P188.39. Teran was the first adminis-
trator of the estate of Muñoz. He was appointed on 17th day of September, 1901.
After Teran, Maria Muñoz was appointed on the 18th day of March, 1902. The
CFI, after finding out Maria Muñoz was not a resident of the Philippines, removed
her from the position and appointed Samson on 6th day of October, 1906. W/N
Teran should be liable for his debt – YES BUT only for P188.39. The record not
disclosing that any of the amounts claimed by Guerrero were due as a result of the
management of the said estate during the time while the Teran was administering
their interests therein, except the sum of P188.39, admitted to be due by Teran, SC
is of the opinion, and so hold, that the only amount which the Guerrero is entitled
to recover in this action is the said amount of P188.39. As was said above, Teran
was liable for losses only during the time that he was acting as the legal repre-
sentative of the said minors in the management of their estate, from the 17th day
of September, 1901, up to the time that he was superseded by the said Maria
Muñoz y Gomez, on the 18th day of March, 1902.
DOCTRINE: The mere fact, however, that she (Maria Muñoz) had been removed
as said guardian did not relieve her, nor her bondsmen from liability to the minors
during the time that she was duly acting as said guardian. (check ratio #3 for con-
text)
FACTS: (dates are important)
7. On the 18th day of March, 1908, Guerrero commenced an action against
Teran to recover the sum of P4,129.56 and costs. This amount was claimed
by Guerrero from Teran upon the theory that the latter had been the admin-
istrator of the estate of Antonio Sanchez Muñoz from the 1st day of Sep-
tember, 1901, until the 22d day of October, 1906.
8. In answer to the said complaint, Teran admitted certain allegations and de-
nied others. Teran admitted that he owed Guerrero P188.39 but claimed that
Guerrero owed him the sum of P482.14, and that Guerrero, therefore, still
owed to Teran the difference between P188.39 and P482.14, or the sum of
P293.75, for which latter amount Teran prayed for judgment, with interest
and costs against the Guerrero.
9. After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, the lower
court found from the evidence that Teran, as administrator of the estate of
Antonio Sanchez Muñoz, or that part of the said estate belonging to the
Guerrero, owed Guerrero the sum of P3,447.46, with interest at 6 per cent
until the same amount should be fully paid.
10. I will discuss further facts here because SC put it in their ration:
a. First. That the Leopoldo Teran was, on the 17th day of September,
1901, appointed as administrator of said estate. The record also
discloses that Teran entered into a bond in the sum of 10,000 dol-
lars, gold, for the faithful performance of his duties as such repre-
sentative of the estate of Antonio Sanchez Muñoz.
b. Second. The record 'further discloses that upon the 18th day of
March, 1902, the CFI of the Province of Albay appointed Maria
Muñoz y Gomez as guardian for the said Maria Manuela and Ma-
ria del Carmen Sanchez Muñoz, and that the said Maria Muñoz y
Gomez gave the required bond for the faithful performance of her
duties as such guardian.
c. Third. While there are some indications in the record that Teran
continued to act as the administrator of said estate after the ap-
pointment of the said Maria Muñoz y Gomez, up to and including
the 6th day of October, 1906, yet the fact exists and must be ac-
cepted as true that the said Maria Muñoz y Gomez was the actual
representative of the said Maria Manuela and Maria del Carmen
Sanchez Muñoz in the administration of their interests in the estate
of the said Antonio Sanchez Muñoz, from and after the 18th day of
March, 1902, until the 6th day of October, 1906, and therefore said
Maria Muñoz y Gomez, as such guardian and administratrix of the
estate of the said minors, must be held responsible for the property
belonging to said minors during the period while she (Maria
Muñoz y Gomez) was the actual guardian of said minors.
d. Fourth. On the 6th day of October, 1906 CFI of the Province of
Albay, for the reason that the said Maria Muñoz y Gomez was not
a resident of the Philippine Islands at the time of her appointment
(the 18th day of March, 1902) removed her as such guardian ap-
pointed as guardian of said minors Felix Samson, and required
from said Samson, as provisional guardian, a bond in the sum of
P2,000. On the 18th day of October, 1906, the said Samson duly
executed the bond as required.
ISSUE/s:
1. W/N Teran should be liable for his debt – YES BUT only for P188.39. The
record not disclosing that any of the amounts claimed by Guerrero were due
as a result of the management of the said estate during the time while the
Teran was administering their interests therein, except the sum of P188.39,
 admitted to be due by Teran, SC is of the opinion, and so hold, that the only
amount which the Guerrero is entitled to recover in this action is the said
amount of P188.39.
RULING: For the reasons above stated, the judgment of the lower court is hereby
reversed, without any special finding as to costs.
RATIO:
2. From the order of the judge annulling the appointment of the said Maria
Muñoz y Gomez her lawyers appealed to the Supreme Court, which appeal
was subsequently withdrawn. The order therefore revoking the appointment
of the said Maria Muñoz y Gomez became final.
3. The mere fact, however, that she had been removed as said guardian
did not relieve her, nor her bondsmen from liability to the minors dur-
ing the time that she was duly acting as said guardian.
a. It must be clear, therefore, that the said Maria Muñoz y Gomez is
responsible to said minors for the administration of their interests
in the estate of the said Antonio Sanchez Muñoz from the time of
her acceptance of said appointment on the 18th day of March,
1902, up to the time of her removal on the 6th day of October,
1906.
b. If during this time she allowed other persons to handle the
property of her wards and if any mismanagement or loss oc-
curred thereby, the responsibility must fall upon her. Unques-
tionably, she may have an action against the persons to whom
she entrusted the direct management of said estate for any loss
which they may have negligently and corruptly occasioned her.
c. Therefore, if any loss occurred to Guerrero between the 18th day
of March, 1902, and the 6th day of October, 1906, they have a
right of action only against the said Maria Muñoz y Gomez as their
legal guardian and under the law the administratrix of the property
of their estate.
4. In the claim presented by Guerrero against Teran, no dates are given show-
ing the time of the particular loss or losses occasioned by the latter. As was
said above, Teran was liable for losses only during the time that he was act-
ing as the legal representative of the said minors in the management of their
estate, from the 17th day of September, 1901, up to the time that he was su-
perseded by the said Maria Muñoz y Gomez, on the 18th day of March,
1902.
a. There is no proof showing that any of the losses constituting the
amount which the Guerrero claims occurred within this period.
However, Teran acknowledged that of the amount claimed by the
Guerrero, he owes to them the sum of P188.39.
b. There is no claim of any loss or that the estate has not been proper-
ly managed since the appointment of the said Felix Samson on the
6th day of October, 1906.
5. SC reached the following conclusions:
a. First. That, Leopoldo Teran, was the duly appointed and recog-
nized representative of the minors Maria Manuela and Maria del
Carmen Sanchez Muñoz in the administration of their interests in
the estate of the said Antonio Sanchez Muñoz from the 17th day of
September, 1901, until the 18th day of March, 1902.
b. Second. That the said Doña Maria Muñoz y Gomez was the duly
appointed representative of the said minors in the administration of
their interests in the estate of the said Antonio Sanchez Muñoz
from the 18th day of March, 1902, until the 6th day of October,
1906.
c. Third. That the said Leopoldo Teran was responsible to the Guer-
rero (the said minors) for the fruits and profits resulting from their
interests in the estate of the said Antonio Sanchez Muñoz from the
said 17th day of September, 1901, to the 18th day of March, 1902.
d. Fourth. That the said Doña Maria Muñoz y Gomez was responsible
to the Guerrero (the said minors) for the fruits and profits resulting
from the management of the estate of the said Don Antonio
Sanchez Muñoz from the 18th day of March, 1902, until the 6th
day of October, 1906.
6. The record not disclosing that any of the amounts claimed by the Guerrero
were due as a result of the management of the said estate during the time
while the Teran was administering their interests therein, except the sum of
P188.39, admitted to be due by Teran, we are of the opinion, and so hold,
that the only amount which the Guerrero is entitled to recover in this action
is the said amount of P188.39.
7. Doña Maria Muñoz y Gomez was, as above indicated, removed upon the
theory that her appointment was void because she did not reside in the Phil-
ippine Islands.
a. There is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint
residents only as administrators or guardians. However, notwith-
standing the fact that there are no statutory requirements upon this
question, the courts, charged with the responsibilities of protecting
the estates of deceased persons, wards of the estate, etc., will find
much difficulty in complying with this duty by appointing admin-
istrators and guardians who are not personally subject to their ju-
risdiction.
b. Notwithstanding that there is no statutory requirement, the courts
should not consent to the appointment of persons as administrators
and guardians who are not personally subject to the jurisdiction of
our courts here.
 007 Phil trust v. Luzon Surety (Valle)
30 May 1961 | Dizon, J. | Appointment and Removal
PETITIONER: Intestate Estate of James R. Burt, deceased, the Philippine Trust
Co.
RESPONDENTS: Luzon Surety Co, Inc.
SUMMARY:
Francis Picard was appointed as administrator of Burt’s intestate estate. This was
paid with a bond by Luzon Surety. However, he was dismissed by the court and
was replaced by Philtrust as administrator. Philtrust submitted an inventory that
only 57.75 pesos was in his hands. The Court ordered Picard to give the
remaining balance to Philtrust. But Picard only had 972.33 pesos after deducting
expenses. The court found Picard guilty of disbursing funds of the intestate. A
criminal case of estafa was filed against him. Meanwhile, the court ordered
Luzon Surety to show cause why the bond it paid on behalf of Picard should not
be confiscated.
Luzon surety comes to the SC claiming that a probate court cannot, ex proprio,
order the confiscation of an administrator’s bond.
The SC held that the probate court can. And in this case, the condition of the
bond in question is that Picard faithfully execute the orders and decrees of the
court. It was already established that Picard disbursed the funds without
authority, it follows that he and and Luzon surety became bound on the terms of
the bond.
DOCTRINE:
A probate court is possessed with an all-embracing power not only in requiring
but also in fixing the account, and executing or forfeiting an administrator’s
bond. The execution or forfeiture of an administrator’s bond is deemed to be a
necessary part and incident of the administration proceedings as such as its filing
and the fixing of its amount.
FACTS:
82. CFI Manila appointed Francis R. Picard Sr, for administrator of the intestate
estate of James Burt upon bond of 1K. The bond was approved and
submitted with Luzon Surety as the surety of the bond.
83. Did not state why, but Picard was dismissed by the court as administrator
and instead appointed Philippine Trust Co (Philtrust). Philtrust submitted an
inventory report shpwing that only asset that had come into its hands was
Php 57.75 which is the balance of the checking account in PNB.
84. The court issued an order for Picard to deliver 7, 063.58 pesos (the final
amount after all the expenses were deduted) within 48hours from receipt of
the copy to Philtrust. Otherwise, he will be imprisoned for contempt.
85. Picard submitted an itemized statement of disbursements made by him
when he was administrator, hsowing that the funds amounted to Php 7,
986.53 and that after expenses, a balance of 972.33.
86. The court found Picard guilty of having disbursed funds of the estate
without authority. Picard was prosecuted for estafa. He pleaded guilty of the
charge. He was held civilly liable for Php 8K
87. The court issued an order requiring Luzon Surety to show cause why
thebond it filed on behalf of Picard should not be confiscated. Luzon Surety
filed a motion to set aside the order stating that:
a. That the Court cannot order the confiscation of the administratorÊs
bond, on prejudice or injury to creditors, legatees or heirs of the
estate of James R. Burt
b. That a probate court cannot, ex proprio motu, prosecute the probate
bond.
88. The court denied the motion and ordered the confiscation of the bond.
Luzon surety appealed.
ISSUE/s:
9. WoN the probate court, ex proprio, can order the confiscation or forfeiture
of an administrator’s bond – YES, because a probate court is possessed with
an all-embracing power not only in requiring but also in fixing the account,
and executing or forfeiting an administrator’s bond.
RULING: the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed with costs.
RATIO:
117. A probate court is possessed with an all-embracing power not only in
requiring but also in fixing the amount, and executing or forfeiting an
administrator’s bond. The execution or forfeiture of an administrator’s
bond, is deemed to be a necessary part and incident of the administration
proceedings as much as its filing and the fixing of its amount. The rule,
therefore, is that the probate court may have said bond executed in the same
probate proceeding.
118. Also, the condition of the administrator’s bond in question is that Francis L.
Picard shall faithfully execute the orders and decrees of the court; that if he
did so, the obligation shall become void, otherwise it shall remain in full
force and effect.
119. In having been established that Picard disbursed funds of the estate without
authority, the conclusion follows that he had and his surety became bound
upon the terms of their bond.
120. From the nature of the obligation entered into by the surety on an
administrator’s bond, which makes him privy to the proceedings against his
principal, he is bound and concluded, in the absence of fraud and collusion,
by a judgment against his principal, even though said surety was not a party
 to the proceeding.
121. In the case of the De Mendoza vs. Pacheco, the sureties on the
administrator’ s bond were held liable thereon although they were not
parties to the proceeding against the administrator, nor were they notified in
connection therewith prior to the issuance of the court order for the
confiscation of the bond.
122. Lastly, according to Section 11, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, upon the
settlement of the account of an executor or administrator, his sureties, may
upon application, be admitted as a party to such accounting. The import of
this provision is that the sureties are not entitled to notice but may be
allowed to intervene in the settlement of the accounts of the executor or
administrator if they ask for leave to do so in due time.
 008 ANGELES v. MAGLAYA (VICENCIO)
Sept. 2, 2005 | Garcia, J. | Appointment and Removal of Executors
PETITIONER: Belen Sagad Angeles
RESPONDENT: Aleli Corazon Angeles Maglaya
SUMMARY: Aleli Corazon Angeles filed a petition for letters administration and
her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Francisco Angeles. She
avers that she is the sole legitimate child of the deceased and Genoveva Mercado.
Belen Angeles, opposed this claiming that as the surviving spouse, she has a superior
right to the administration of the decedent’s estate. Belen filed an MTD for failure to
state a cause of action alleging that Aleli failed to establish her filiation with the de-
cedent, i.e., her legitimacy. The TC dismissed the MTD. The CA reversed. Issue:
WoN Aleli is a legitimate daughter of Francisco and therefore Aleli’s appointment as
administratrix of Francisco’s estate is proper – NO. The presumption of legitimacy
of Aleli did not arise. (See Doctrine No. 1) No evidence whatsoever was presented of
the execution of the Francisco Angeles-Genoveva Mercado marriage contract; when
and where their marriage was solemnized; the identity of the solemnizing officer; the
persons present, and like significant details. The Birth Certificate was does not like-
wise establish Aleli’s legitimate filiation. It was signed only by the physician, not by
the father and mother jointly as the law requires. (See Doctrine No. 2). Finally,
Belen’s contention that she has a superior right is proper. (See Doctrine No. 3).
DOCTRINE: 1. Presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family Code
may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis therefor, i.e., that the
childs parents were legally married and that his/her conception or birth occurred dur-
ing the subsistence of that marriage.
2. The legitimate filiation of a child is a matter fixed by law itself. It cannot, as the
decision under review seems to suggest, be made dependent on the declaration of the
attending physician or midwife, or that of the mother of the newborn child
3. On the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of the deceased,
the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. (Sec. 6(b),
Rule 78, Rules of Court). When the law speaks of next of kin, the reference is to
those who are entitled, under the statute of distribution, to the decedents prop-
erty; one whose relationship is such that he is entitled to share in the estate as
distributed, or, in short, an heir.
FACTS:
58. The legal dispute between the parties started when, on March 25, 1998, in
the RTC at Caloocan City, Aleli Corazon Angeles filed a petition for letters
of administration and her appointment as administratrix of the intestate es-
tate of Francisco M. Angeles (Francisco).
59. In the petition, docketed as Special Proceedings No. C-2140, Aleli alleged,
among other things, the following:
(1) That Francisco, a resident of Caloocan, died intestate leaving behind four
(4) parcels of land and a building, among other valuable properties;
(2) That she (Aleli) is the sole legitimate child of the deceased and Geno-
veva Mercado, and, together with Belen S. Angeles, decedent’s wife by
his second marriage, are the surviving heirs of the decedent;
60. Belen Angeles opposed the basic petition urged that she, being the surviv-
ing spouse of Francisco, be declared as possessed of the superior right to the
administration of his estate.
61. In support of her opposition and plea, Belen alleged:
(1) having married Francisco on August 7, 1948 before Judge Lucio M. Tian-
co of the MTC of Rizal, a union which was ratified two (2) months later in
religious rites, and that Francisco represented in their marriage contract
that he was single at that time.
(2) Belen also averred that Aleli could not be the daughter of Francisco for,
although she was recorded as Francisco’s legitimate daughter, the corre-
sponding birth certificate was not signed by him.
(3) that Aleli, despite her claim of being the legitimate child of Francisco and
Genoveva Mercado, has not presented the marriage contract between her
supposed parents or produced any acceptable document to prove such un-
ion.
(4) And evidently to debunk Aleli’s claim of being the only child of Francis-
co, Belen likewise averred that she and Francisco had, during their mar-
riage, legally adopted Concesa A. Yamat, et al.
62. In her reply to opposition, Aleli alleged:
(1) that per certification of the appropriate offices, the January to December
1938 records of marriages of the Civil Registrar of Bacolor, Pampanga
where the alleged 1938 Francisco-Genoveva wedding took place, were de-
stroyed.
(2) Aleli dismissed as of little consequence the adoption adverted to owing to
her having interposed with the Court of Appeals a petition to nullify the
decree of adoption entered by the RTC at Caloocan.
(3) Aleli, as petitioner a quo, commenced the presentation of her evidence by
taking the witness stand. She testified having been born on November 20,
1939 as the legitimate child of Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva
Mercado, who died in January 1988.
(4) She also testified having been in open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child. Four (4) other witnesses testified on her behalf.
(5) Aleli also offered in evidence her birth certificate which contained an
entry stating that she was born at the Mary Johnston Hospital, Tondo,
Manila, to Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado and whereon the
handwritten word Yes appears on the space below the
question Legitimate? (Legitimo?); pictures taken during Aleli’s wedding
as bride to Atty. Guillermo T. Maglaya; and a copy of her marriage
 contract. Likewise offered were her scholastic and government service
records.
63. After Aleli rested her case following her formal offer of exhibits, Belen
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition failed to state or
prove a cause of action, it being her stated position that Aleli, by her
evidence, failed to establish her filiation vis-a-vis the decedent, i.e., that she
is in fact a legitimate child of Francisco M. Angeles.
64. The TC on its finding that Aleli failed to prove her filiation as legitimate
child of Francisco, dismissed the petition.
65. The CA reversed, ruled that Aleli has sufficiently established her legitimate
filiation with the deceased Francisco and directed the TC to appoint Aleli as
administratrix. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE/s:
7. WoN Aleli is a legitimate daughter of Francisco and therefore Aleli’s ap-
pointment as administratrix of Francisco’s estate is proper – NO. The pre-
sumption of legitimacy of Aleli did not arise for lack of evidence of a valid
marriage. Belen also has superior right according to the law as surviving
spouse.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the herein assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the order of the trial court dismissing
Special Proceedings No. C-2140 REINSTATED.
RATIO:
71. We are unable to lend concurrence to the CA’s conclusion on the legitimate
status of Aleli, or, to be precise, on her legitimate filiation to the decedent.
72. A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful
marriage. Remove the element of lawful union and there is strictly no legit-
imate filiation between parents and child.
73. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter:
Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legiti-
mate.
74. In finding for Aleli, the CA, citing and extensibly quoting from Tison vs.
Court of Appeals, stated that since Belen opted not to present any contrary
evidence, the presumption on Aleli’s legitimacy stands unrebutted.
75. However, the CA evidently misapplied Tison. The correct lesson of Tison is
that: (a) a child is presumed legitimate only if conceived or born in wed-
lock; and (b) the presumptive legitimacy of such child cannot be attacked
collaterally.
76. A party in whose favor the legal presumption exists may rely on and invoke
such legal presumption to establish a fact in issue. He need not introduce
evidence to prove that fact. For, a presumption is prima facie proof of the
fact presumed.
77. However, it cannot be over-emphasized, that while a fact thus prima facie
eestablished by legal presumption shall, unless overthrown, stand as
proved, the presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family
Code may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis
therefor, i.e., that the childs parents were legally married and that
his/her conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that
marriage. Else, the presumption of law that a child is legitimate does
not arise.
78. In the case at bench, the CA, in its decision under review, did not
categorically state from what facts established during the trial was the
presumption of Alelis supposed legitimacy arose.
79. But even if perhaps it wanted to, it could not have possibly done so. For,
save for Aleli’s gratuitous assertion and an entry in her certificate of
birth, there is absolutely no proof of the decedent’s marriage to Aleli’s
mother, Genoveva Mercado.
80. To stress, no marriage certificate or marriage contract, doubtless the
best evidence of Franciscos and Genoveva’s marriage, if one had been
solemnized was offered in evidence. No priest, judge, mayor, or other
solemnizing authority was called to the witness box to declare that he
solemnized the marriage between the two.
81. None of the four (4) witnesses Aleli presented could say anything about, let
alone affirm, that supposed marriage. At best, their testimonies proved that
Aleli was Franciscos daughter. For example, Tomas Angeles and Paulita
Angeles de la Cruz testified that they know Aleli to be their cousin because
his (Tomas) father and her (Paulitas) mother, told them so. And one Jose
Carreon would testify seeing Aleli in 1948 in Franciscos house in Caloocan,
the same Francisco who used to court Genoveva before the war.
82. In all, no evidence whatsoever was presented of the execution of the
Francisco Angeles-Genoveva Mercado marriage contract; when and
where their marriage was solemnized; the identity of the solemnizing
officer; the persons present, and like significant details.
83. While perhaps not determinative of the issue of the existence of marriage
between Francisco and Genoveva, we can even go to the extent of saying
that Aleli has not even presented a witness to testify that her putative
parents really held themselves out to the public as man-and-wife.
84. Clearly, therefore, the CA erred in crediting Aleli with the legal
presumption of legitimacy which, as above explained, should flow from a
lawful marriage between Francisco and Genevova. To reiterate, absent
such a marriage, as here, there is no presumption of legitimacy and,
therefore, there was really nothing for Belen to rebut.
85. Parenthetically, for all her unyielding stance that her mother and Francisco
Angeles were married in 1938, Aleli never, thru the years, even question
what would necessarily be a bigamous Francisco-Belen Sagad marriage.
Ironical as it may seem, Aleli herself undermined her very own case.
86. As it were, she made certain judicial admission negating her own assertion
as well as the appellate court’s conclusion - that Francisco was legally
married to Genoveva.
87. As may be recalled, Aleli had declared that her mother Genoveva died
in 1988, implying, quite clearly, that when Francisco contracted marriage
with Belen S. Angeles in 1948, Genoveva and Francisco were
already spouses.
88. Now, then, if, as Aleli maintained despite utter lack of evidence, that
Genoveva Mercado and Francisco were married in 1938, it follows that the
marriage of Francisco to Belen Angeles in 1948, or prior to Genoveva’s
death, would necessarily have to be bigamous, hence void, in which case
Belen could not be, as Aleli alleged in her petition for letters of
administration, a surviving spouse of the decedent.
89. We can concede, because Article 172 of the Family Code appears to say so,
that the legitimate filiation of a child can be established by any of the modes
therein defined even without direct evidence of the marriage of his/her
supposed parents. Said Article reads:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
1. The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgments; or
2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
1. The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
2. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
90. Here, Aleli presented, in support of her claim of legitimacy, a copy of her
Birth Certificate dated November 23, 1939 issued by the Civil Registrar of
the City of Manila.
91. However, the Birth Certificate presented was not signed by Francisco
against whom legitimate filiation is asserted. Not even by Genoveva. It
was signed by the attending physician, one Rebecca De Guzman, who
certified to having attended the birth of a child.
92. Such certificate, albeit considered a public record of a private document is,
under Section 23, Rule 132 of the RoC, evidence only of the fact which
gave rise to its execution: the fact of birth of a child.
93. Jurisprudence teaches that a birth certificate, to be considered as
validating proof of paternity and as an instrument of recognition, must
be signed by the father and mother jointly, or by the mother alone if
the father refuses.
94. In a very real sense, the appellate court regarded such certificate as defining
proof of filiation, and not just filiation but of legitimate filiation, by
inferring from it that Francisco and Genoveva are legally married.
95. In the apt words of Belen, the appellate court, out of a Birth Certificate
signed by a physician who merely certified having attended the birth of
a child who was born alive at 3:50 P.M. , created a marriage that of
Francisco and Genoveva, and filiation (that said child) is the daughter of
Francisco
96. It cannot be over-emphasized that the legitimate filiation of a child is a
matter fixed by law itself. It cannot, as the decision under review seems
to suggest, be made dependent on the declaration of the attending
physician or midwife, or that of the mother of the newborn child.
97. For then, an unwed mother, with or without the participation of a doctor or
midwife, could veritably invest legitimate status to her offspring through the
simple expedient of writing the putative fathers name in the appropriate
space in the birth certificate.
98. Just like her Birth Certificate, Aleli can hardly derive comfort from her
marriage contract to Atty. Maglaya and from her student and government
records which indicated or purported to show that Francisco Angeles is her
father. The same holds true for her wedding pictures which showed
Francisco giving Aleli’s hands in marriage.
99. These papers or documents, unsigned as they are by Francisco or the
execution of which he had no part, are not sufficient evidence of filiation or
recognition. And needless to stress, they cannot support a finding of the
legitimate union of Francisco and Genoveva.
100. If on the foregoing score alone, this Court could very well end this
disposition were it not for another compelling consideration which Belen
has raised and which we presently take judicially notice of:
1. Aleli, during the pendency of the proceedings at the trial court,
filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for the annulment of the
decision of the RTC Caloocan granting the petition of spouses Francisco
Angeles and petitioner Belen S. Angeles for the adoption of Concesa A.
Yamat and two others.
2. The CA dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 47832 on the ground, inter alia, that
herein Aleli is not, contrary to her claim, a legitimate daughter of
Francisco, nor a child of a lawful wedlock between Francisco M. Angeles
and Genoveva Y. Mercado.
3. Significantly, such decision was effectively affirmed by this Court and
Aleli’s MR was denied with finality. Following the rule on conclusiveness
of judgment, herein respondent is precluded from claiming that she is the
legitimate daughter of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado.
101. Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of adminis-
trator of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred
over the next of kin of the decedent. (Sec. 6(b), Rule 78, Rules of Court)
102. When the law speaks of next of kin, the reference is to those who are
entitled, under the statute of distribution, to the decedents property;
one whose relationship is such that he is entitled to share in the estate
as distributed, or, in short, an heir.
103. In resolving, therefore, the issue of whether an applicant for letters of
administration is a next of kin or an heir of the decedent, the probate
 court perforce has to determine and pass upon the issue of filiation. A
separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits.
104. Upon this consideration, the trial court acted within bounds when it looked
into and pass upon the claimed relationship of Aleli to the late Francisco
Angeles.
 TAN v. GEDORIO JR. (Salve)
March 14, 2008 | Chico-Nazario, J. | Preference in regular administrator
PETITIONER: Vilma C. Tan, et al.
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Francisco C. Gedorio Jr, et al.
SUMMARY: Gerardo Tan died without a will. Rogelio et al and Vilma et al both
claimed to be the legitimate heirs of Gerardo Tan, thus both asked to be administra-
tor of Tan’s estate. Atty. Clinton Nuevo (Nuevo), as court-appointed commissioner,
issued directives to Vilma, in her capacity as de facto administratrix: to deposit all
money or cash at hand of Gerardo Tan, proceeds of sugarcane harvest, and financial
report. Vilma has not complied any of these. RTC issued an Order appointing
Romualdo as special administrator of Gerardo’s Estate, such was opposed by Vilma
et al because Vilma was allegedly next of kin of the deceased. Vilma et al rely on the
doctrine that generally, it is the nearest of kin, whose interest is more preponderant,
who is preferred in the choice of administrator of the decedents estate. The order of
preference Vilma et al speak of is found in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.
WoN Vilma should be appointed as special administratix because she was allegedly
next of kind of the deceased – NO, because the preference relied upon only applies
to appointment of regular administrator. The appointment of special administrator
lies entirely in the discretion of the court, and is not appealable. Not being appeala-
ble, the only remedy against the appointment of a special administrator is Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which was what Vilma et al filed with the Court
of Appeals. In this case, there was no grave abuse of discretion. Assuming for the
sake of argument that petitioner Vilma is indeed better suited for the job as special
administratrix, as opposed to Romualdo, who was actually appointed by the court as
special administrator of Gerardos estate, the latters appointment, at best, would con-
stitute a mere error of judgment and would certainly not be grave abuse of discretion.
DOCTRINE: The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the
next of kin refers to the appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special
administrator, as the appointment of the latter lies entirely in the discretion of
the court, and is not appealable
The appointment of a special administrator is justified only when there is delay in
granting letters, testamentary (in case the decedent leaves behind a will) or adminis-
trative (in the event that the decedent leaves behind no will, as in the Petition at bar)
occasioned by any cause.
The principal object of the appointment of a temporary administrator is to preserve
the estate until it can pass into the hands of a person fully authorized to administer it
for the benefit of creditors and heirs.
FACTS:
1. Gerardo Tan died with no will. Rogelio Lim Suga (Rogelio) et al who are claim-
ing to be the children of Gerardo Tan, filed with the RTC a Petition for the issu-
ance of letters of administration.
2. Vilma C. Tan claiming to be legitimate heirs of Gerardo Tan, filed an Opposi-
tion to the Petition.
3. Rogelio et al moved for the appointment of a special administrator, asserting the
need for a special administrator to take possession and charge of Gerardos estate
until the Petition can be resolved by the RTC or until the appointment of a regu-
lar administrator. They prayed that their attorney-in- fact, Romualdo D. Lim
(Romualdo), be appointed as the special administrator.
4. Tan et al filed an Opposition to private respondents Motion for Appointment,
arguing that none of the private respondents can be appointed as the special ad-
ministrator since they are not residing in the country. Tan et al contend further
that Romualdo does not have the same familiarity, experience or competence as
that of their co- petitioner Vilma C. Tan who was already acting as de facto ad-
ministratrix of his estate since his death.
5. Atty. Clinton Nuevo (Nuevo), as court-appointed commissioner, issued direc-
tives to Vilma, in her capacity as de facto administratrix: to deposit all money or
cash at hand of Gerardo Tan, proceeds of sugarcane harvest, and financial re-
port. Vilma has not complied any of these.
6. RTC issued an Order appointing Romualdo as special administrator of Gerar-
do’s Estate
7. Vilma et al filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order, claiming
that petitioner Vilma should be the one appointed as special administratix as she
was allegedly next of kin of the deceased.
8. CA denied the petition.
ISSUE/s:
8. WoN Vilma should be appointed as special administratix because she was al-
legedly next of kind of the deceased – NO, because the preference relied upon
only applies to appointment of regular administrator.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is DE-
NIED. The Decision dated 29 July 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
79335 affirming the Order dated 17 July 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Ormoc City, in SP. PROC. No. 4014-0 denying reconsideration of its Order dated 12
June 2003, whereby it appointed Romualdo D. Lim as special administrator of the
estate of Gerardo Tan, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners..
RATIO:
105. Vilma et al rely on the doctrine that generally, it is the nearest of kin, whose
interest is more preponderant, who is preferred in the choice of administra-
 tor of the decedents estate.
106. Vilma et al claim to have lived for a long time and continue to reside on
Gerardos estate, while Rogelio et al are not even in the Philippines, having
long established residence abroad.
107. Vilma et al additionally claim that petitioner Vilma has been acting as the
administratrix of the estate since Gerardos death on 14 October 2000 and is
thus well steeped in the actual management and operation of the estate
(which essentially consists of agricultural landholdings).
108. The order of preference Vilma et al speak of is found in Section 6, Rule 78
of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.If no executor
is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse
the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall
be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or
both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving hus-
band or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and
willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or
the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband
or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the
person to apply for administration or to request that administration be grant-
ed to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal
creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be
granted to such other person as the court may select.
109. However, this Court has consistently ruled that the order of preference in
the appointment of a regular administrator as provided in the afore-quoted
provision does not apply to the selection of a special administrator.
110. The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next
of kin refers to the appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a spe-
cial administrator, as the appointment of the latter lies entirely in the
discretion of the court, and is not appealable
111. Not being appealable, the only remedy against the appointment of a special
administrator is Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which was
what Vilma et al filed with the Court of Appeals
112. Certiorari, however, requires nothing less than grave abuse of discretion, a
term which implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discre-
tion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive du-
ty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law.
113. In this case, there was no grave abuse of discretion. Assuming for the sake
of argument that petitioner Vilma is indeed better suited for the job as spe-
cial administratrix, as opposed to Romualdo, who was actually appointed by
the court as special administrator of Gerardos estate, the latters appoint-
ment, at best, would constitute a mere error of judgment and would certain-
ly not be grave abuse of discretion.
114. It is immaterial the fact that Rogelio et al reside abroad, for the same cannot
be said as regards their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo, who is, after all, the
person appointed by the RTC as special administrator. It is undisputed that
Romualdo resides in the country and can, thus, personally administer
Gerardos estate.
115. If petitioners really desire to avail themselves of the order of preference
provided in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, so that petitioner Vil-
ma as the supposed next of kin of the late Gerardo may take over admin-
istration of Gerardos estate, they should already pursue the appointment of a
regular administrator and put to an end the delay which necessitated the ap-
pointment of a special administrator.
116. The appointment of a special administrator is justified only when there is
delay in granting letters, testamentary (in case the decedent leaves behind a
will) or administrative (in the event that the decedent leaves behind no will,
as in the Petition at bar) occasioned by any cause.
117. The principal object of the appointment of a temporary administrator is to
preserve the estate until it can pass into the hands of a person fully author-
ized to administer it for the benefit of creditors and heirs.
118. In the case at bar, Rogelop et al were constrained to move for the appoint-
ment of a special administrator due to the delay caused by the failure of pe-
titioner Vilma to comply with the directives of the court-appointed commis-
sioner. It would certainly be unjust if Vilma were still appointed special
administratix, when the necessity of appointing one has been brought about
by her defiance of the lawful orders of the RTC or its appointed officials.
119. Vilma et al submit the defense that petitioner Vilma was unable to comply
with the directives of the RTC to deposit with the court the income of
Gerardos estate and to provide an accounting thereof because of the fact that
Gerardos estate had no income. This defense is clearly specious and insuffi-
cient justification for Vilmas non-compliance. If the estate truly did not
have any income, Vilma et al should have simply filed a manifestation to
that effect, instead of continuing to disregard the courts orders.
 10 GONZALES v. AGUINALDO (APASAN)
September, 28, 1990 | Padilla, J. | Proper removal of executor or administrator
PETITIONER: full name of first party, et al.
RESPONDENTS: full name of first party, et al.
SUMMARY: An intestate proceeding was filed before the RTC involving the
estate of Doña Ramona Gonzales Vda. De Favis (Doña Ramona). The RTC
appointed petitioner Beatriz Gonzales (Gonzales) and Teresa Olbes (Olbes) as
co-administrators of the estate (both of them are children of Doña Ramona).
While Gonzales was in the US accompanying her ailing husband, Olbes filed a
motion to remove the former as co-administrator on the ground that she is
uncapable to discharge her duties and she had committed acts and omissions
detrimental to the interest of the estate and heirs. Judge Aguinaldo, the presiding
judge, granted the motion and hinged its decision on the absence of Gonzales in
the state which makes her incapable of performing her duties. Gonzales filed an
MR but it was denied. Hence this petition.
Issue is WoN Judge Aguinaldo erred in removing Gonzales as co-administrator.
The Court held in the affirmative. (see doctrine)
In the present case, the RTC did not base the removal of the petitioner as co-
administratrix on any of the causes specified in Olbes’ motion for relief of the
petitioner. Neither did it dwell on, nor determine the validity of the charges
brought against petitioner by respondent Olbes. The court based the removal of
the Gonzales on the fact that in the administration of the estate, conflicts and
misunderstandings have existed between the latter and respondent Olbes which
allegedly have prejudiced the estate, and the added circumstance that Gonzales
had been absent from the country since October 1984, and up to 15 January
1985, the date of the questioned order. (relate to doctrine no. 3)
Furthermore, the SC failed to find hard facts showing that the conflict and
disharmony between the two (2) co-administratrices were unjustly caused by
Gonzales, or that the latter was guilty of incompetence in the fulfillment of her
duties, or prevented the management of the estate according to the dictates of
prudence, or any other act or omission showing that her continuance as co-
administratrix of the estate materially endangers the interests of the estate.
(relate to doctrine nos. 1, 2, 3, and 5)
In her (Gonzales) motion for reconsideration of the Order dated 15 January
1985, she explained to the court a quo that her absence from the country was
due to the fact that she had to accompany her ailing husband to the United
States for medical treatment. It appears too that Gonzales's absence from the
country was known to Olbes, and that the latter and Gonzales had continually
maintained correspondence with each other with respect to the administration of
the estate during the petitioner's absence from the country. (relate to doctrine
No. 4)
The above facts, we note, show that Gonzales had never abandoned her role as
co-administratrix of the estate nor had she been remiss in the fullfilment of her
duties.
DOCTRINE:
1. Administrators have such an interest in the execution of their trust as
entitle them to protection from removal without just cause.
2. While it is conceded that the court is invested with ample discretion in
the removal of an administrator, it however must have some fact
legally before it in order to justify a removal.
3. Certainly, it is desirable that the administration of the deceased's estate
be marked with harmonious relations between co-administrators. BUT
for mere disagreements between such joint fiduciaries, without
misconduct, one's removal is NOT favored.
4. Temporary absence in the state does not disqualify one to be an
administrator of the estate
5. Removal of an administrator does not lie on the whims, caprices and
dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate, nor on the belief of
the court that it would result in orderly and efficient administration
FACTS:
1. Special Proceedings No. 021, pending before the RTC, is an intestate
proceeding involving the estate of the deceased Doña Ramona Gonzales
Vda. de Favis (Doña Ramona). Doña Ramona is survived by her four (4)
children who are her only heirs, namely, Asterio Favis, Beatriz F. Gonzales,
Teresa F. Olbes, and Cecilia Favis-Gomez.
2. On 25 October 1983, the RTC appointed petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales
(Gonzales) and private respondent Teresa Olbes (Olbes) as co-
administratices of the estate.
3. On 11 November 1984, while Gonzales was in the United States
accompanying her ailing husband who was receiving medical treatment in
that country, Olbes filed a motion to remove Beatriz F. Gonzales as co-
administratrix, on the ground that she is incapable or unsuitable to discharge
the trust and had committed acts and omissions detrimental to the interest of
the estate and the heirs.
a. Copy of said motion was served upon Gonzales' then counsel of
record, Atty. Manuel Castro who, since 2 June 1984, had been
 suspended by the Supreme Court from the practice of law
throughout the Philippines.
4. After the filing of such motion, respondent Judge Zoilo Aguinaldo (Judge
Aguinaldo) issued an Order dated 4 December 1984 which required
Gonzales and the other parties to file their opposition, if any, thereto. Only
Asterio Favis (Favis) opposed the removal of Gonzales as co-administratrix,
as the latter was still in the United States attending to her ailing husband.
5. In an Order dated 15 January 1985, Judge Aguinaldo cancelled the letters of
administration granted to Gonzales and retained Olbes as the administratrix
of the estate of the late Doña Ramona. The Court, in explaining its action,
stated:
. . . In appointing them, the court was of the opinion that it would be to the best
interest of the estate if two administrators who are the children of the deceased
would jointly administer the same. Unfortunately, as events have shown, the two
administrators have not seen eye to eye with each other and most of the time they
have been at loggerheads with each other to the prejudice of the estate. Beatriz F.
Gonzales has been absent from the country since October, 1984 as she is in the
United States as stated in the motion and opposition of Asterio Favis dated
December 11, 1984, and she has not returned even up to this date so that Teresa F.
Olbes has been left alone to administer the estate. Under these circumstances, and in
order that the estate will be administered in an orderly and efficient manner, the
court believes that there should be now only one administrator of the estate.
6. Gonzales moved to reconsider the Order of 15 January 1985 (fact no. 5).
Her motion was opposed separately by Olbes and another co-heir Cecilia
Gomez.
a. In her manifestation and opposition to petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, Cecilia Gomez stated that it would be pointless to
re-appoint Gonzales as co-administratrix of Olbes, as the former
would be leaving soon for the United States to attend to unfinished
business. Moreover, Gonzales expressed satisfaction with the
manner Olbes had been managing and administering the estate.
7. Judge Aguinaldo denied the MR. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
1. WoN Judge Aguinaldo erred in removing Gonzales as co-administrator of
the estate of Doña Ramona – YES, the removal was improper because mere
disagreements between joint administrators, without misconduct, is not a
just cause for removal of one of the administrators. Also, temporary absence
in the state is not a sufficient ground to disqualify an administrator of the
estate.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order of the court a
quo dated 15 January 1985 removing petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales as co-
administratrix in Special Proceedings No. 021, entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate
Estate of Ramona Gonzales Vda. de Favis" and the Order of the same Court dated 15
May 1985 denying reconsideration of said Order, are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioner is ordered reinstated as co-administratrix of said estate.
RATIO:
1. Gonzales contends that Judge Aguinaldo’s Order dated 15 January 1985
should be nullified on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, as her
removal was not shown to be anchored on any of the grounds provided
under Section 2, Rule 82, Rules of Court, which states:
Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or
administrator. Proceedings upon death, resignation or removal — If an
executor or administrator neglects to render his account and settle the
estate according to law, or to perform an order or judgment of the court, or
a duty expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes insane,
or otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may
remove him, or in its discretion, may permit him to resign. . . .
2. While appellate courts (SC in this case) are generally disinclined to interfere
with the action taken by the probate court in the matter of removal of an
administrator, we find, in the case at bar, sufficient cause to reverse the
order of the probate court removing petitioner as co-administratrix of the
estate.
3. The rule is that if no executor is named in the will, or the named executor or
executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person
dies intestate, the court must appoint an administrator of the estate of the
deceased who shall act as representative not only of the court appointing
him but also of the heirs and the creditors of the estate. In the exercise of its
discretion, the probate court may appoint one, two or more co-
administrators to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times
to have different interests represented.
4. In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased
person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said
estate of the one to be appointed as administrator. This is the same
 consideration which Section 6 of Rule 78 20 takes into account in
establishing the order of preference in the appointment of administrators for
the estate. The underlying assumption behind this rule is that those who
will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy, economical administration of the
estate, or, on the other hand, suffer the consequences of waste,
improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most
influential motive to administer the estate correctly.
5. Administrators have such an interest in the execution of their trust as
entitle them to protection from removal without just cause. Hence,
Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court provides the legal and specific
causes authorizing the court to remove an administrator.
6. While it is conceded that the court is invested with ample discretion in
the removal of an administrator, it however must have some fact legally
before it in order to justify a removal. There must be evidence of an act or
omission on the part of the administrator not conformable to or in disregard
of the rules or the orders of the court, which it deems sufficient or
substantial to warrant the removal of the administrator. In making such a
determination, the court must exercise good judgment, guided by law
and precedents.
7. In the present case, the RTC did not base the removal of the petitioner as
co-administratrix on any of the causes specified in Olbes’ motion for relief
of the petitioner. Neither did it dwell on, nor determine the validity of the
charges brought against petitioner by respondent Olbes. The court based the
removal of the Gonzales on the fact that in the administration of the estate,
conflicts and misunderstandings have existed between the latter and
respondent Olbes which allegedly have prejudiced the estate, and the added
circumstance that Gonzales had been absent from the country since October
20
Section 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor is named in the will,
or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the
court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if
competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them,
be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after
the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some
other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if may be granted to one or more
of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as
the court may select.
1984, and up to 15 January 1985, the date of the questioned order.
8. Certainly, it is desirable that the administration of the deceased's estate
be marked with harmonious relations between co-administrators. BUT
for mere disagreements between such joint fiduciaries, without
misconduct, one's removal is NOT favored. Conflicts of opinion and
judgment naturally, and, perhaps inevitably, occur between persons with
different interests in the same estate. Such conflicts, if unresolved by the
co-administrators, can be resolved by the probate court to the best
interest of the estate and its heirs.
9. We, like Gonzales, find of material importance the fact that the court a
quo failed to find hard facts showing that the conflict and disharmony
between the two (2) co-administratrices were unjustly caused by
Gonzales, or that the latter was guilty of incompetence in the
fulfillment of her duties, or prevented the management of the estate
according to the dictates of prudence, or any other act or omission
showing that her continuance as co-administratrix of the estate
materially endangers the interests of the estate. Gonzales is as interested
as Olbes and the other heirs in that the properties of the estate be duly
administered and conserved for the benefit of the heirs; and there is as yet
no ground to believe that she has prejudiced or is out to prejudice said estate
to warrant the probate court into removing Gonzales as co-administratrix.
10. Respondent Judge Aguinaldo removed Gonzales as co-administratrix of the
estate also on the ground that she had been absent from the country since
October 1984 and had not returned as of 15 January 1985, the date of the
questioned order, leaving Olbes alone to administer the estate.
11. In her (Gonzales) motion for reconsideration of the Order dated 15 January
1985, she explained to the court a quo that her absence from the country
was due to the fact that she had to accompany her ailing husband to the
United States for medical treatment. It appears too that Gonzales's
absence from the country was known to Olbes, and that the latter and
Gonzales had continually maintained correspondence with each other
with respect to the administration of the estate during the petitioner's
absence from the country. As a matter of fact, Gonzales, while in the
United States, sent Olbes a letter addressed to the Land Bank of the
Philippines dated 14 November 1984, and duly authenticated by the
Philippine Consulate in San Francisco, authorizing her (Olbes) to receive,
and collect the interests accruing from the Land Bank bonds belonging to
the estate, and to use them for the payment of accounts necessary for the
 operation of the administration.
12. The above facts, we note, show that Gonzales had never abandoned her
role as co-administratrix of the estate nor had she been remiss in the
fullfilment of her duties. Suffice it to state, temporary absence in the
state does not disqualify one to be an administrator of the estate. Thus,
as held in re Mc Knight's Will, a temporary residence outside of the state,
maintained for the benefit of the health of the executors' family, is not such
a removal from the state as to necessitate his removal as executor.
. . . It seems quite clear that a temporary absence from the state on account of ill
health, or on account of business or for purposes of travel or pleasure, would not
necessarily establish the fact that an executor "has removed" from the estate, within
the intent of the statute. The learned surrogate was evidently satisfied that the
sojourn of these executors in New Jersey was nothing more than a departure from
the state for the benefit of relatives, not designed to constitute a permanent change
of abode, and contemplating a return to New York as soon as the purpose of their
absence should be accomplished. In this view, I am inclined to think that he was
right in refusing to hold that he was constrained to revoke the letters by the
provisions of the Code to which I have referred. I therefore advise an affirmance of
the order.
13. Finally, it seems that the court a quo seeks refuge in the fact that two (2) of
the other three (3) heirs of the estate of the deceased (Teresa Olbes and
Cecilia Favis Gomez) have opposed the retention or re-appointment of
petitioner as co-administratrix of the estate. Suffice it to state that the
removal of an administrator does not lie on the whims, caprices and
dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate, nor on the belief of
the court that it would result in orderly and efficient administration.
In re William's Adm'r., the court held:
A county court having appointed a stranger administrator as expressly authorized by
Ky. St. 3897, after the relatives of decedent had lost their right of precedence, could
not remove the appointee merely because of the request of relatives and the belief
upon the part of the court that the best interest of deceased would be thereby
subserved, since the administrator had such an interest as entitled him to protection
from removal without cause.
14. As the appointment of Gonzales was valid, and no satisfactory cause for her
removal was shown, the court a quo gravely abused its discretion in
removing her. Stated differently, petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales was
removed without just cause. Her removal was therefore improper.
 011 TAYAG v. TAYAG-GALLOR (Arcenas)
March 24, 2008| Tinga, C. J. | Appointment and Removal of Executors, Administra-
tors and Special Administrators
PETITIONER/S: VICTORIA C. TAYAG
RESPONDENT/S: FELICIDAD A. TAYAG-GALLOR,
SUMMARY: Ismael Tayag (Decedent) died intestate, leaving behind 2 real properties and a
motor vehicle, all in possession of Victoria Tayag (Victoria), which she later sold preparatory
to the settlement of the estate. Felicidad Tayag-Gallor (Felicidad) filed a petition for the issu-
ance of letters of administration over the estate of the Decedent, alleging that she is one of the
3 illegitimate children of Decedent with Ester Angeles and that Victoria and the Decedent
never had a child together. According to Felicidad, Victoria promised to give Felicidad et al
Php 100,000 each as their share but only gave half of the promised amount. Also, Felicidad
alleged that Victoria caused the annotation in an affidavit declaring the properties as parapher-
nal properties of Victoria, disposing of the properties to Felicidad et al’s prejudice. Opposing
the petition, Victoria filed a motion alleging that she bought the properties with her own mon-
ey and that she never intended to sell the same. Victoria also alleged that she and the Decedent
have an adopted daughter who is now living in the United States. Finaly, Victoria prays for the
dismissal of Felicidad’s petition for lack of cause of action. RTC denied Victoria’s motion and
her MR. CA upheld the denial of the motion. CA ruled that the allegation that Felicidad is an
illegitimate child suffices for a cause of action, without need to state that she had been
recognized and acknowledged as such. Hence, this petition to the SC. The issue in this case is
whether Felicidad’s petition for the issuance of letters of administration sufficiently states a
cause of action considering that she merely alleged therein that she is an illegitimate child of
the decedent, without stating that she had been acknowledged or recognized as such by the
latter. The court held in the affirmative. Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition
for the issuance of letters of administration must be filed by an interested person. the Court
defined an interested party as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or
one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. This interest, furthermore, must be
material and direct, not merely indirect or contingent. Hence, The right of Felicidad to
maintain such a suit is dependent on whether she is entitled to successional rights as an
illegitimate child of the decedent which, in turn, may be established through voluntary or
compulsory recognition. Felicidad had not been given the opportunity to present evidence to
show whether she had been voluntarily recognized and acknowledged by her deceased father
because of Victoria’s opposition to her petition and motion for hearing on affirmative
defenses. The CA was, therefore, correct in allowing the proceedings to continue, ruling that,
Felicidad still has the duty to prove the allegation (that she is an illegitimate child of the
decedent), just as Victoria has the right to disprove it, in the course of the settlement
proceedings.
DOCTRINE: Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for the issuance of letters
of administration must be filed by an interested person. The right of petitoienr to maintain
such a suit is dependent on whether he or she is entitled to successional rights as an
illegitimate child of the decedent which, in turn, may be established through voluntary or
compulsory recognition.
FACTS:
1. Jan 15 ’01 – Felicidad A. Tayag-Gallor (Felicidad) filed a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration over the estate of Ismael Tayag (Decedent).
a. Tayag-Gallor alleged that she is one of the three (3) illegitimate
children of the Decedent and Ester C. Angeles (Ester).
b. The decedent was married to petitioner Victoria Tayag (Victoria), but
the two allegedly did not have any children of their own.
2. Sept 7 ’00 – Decedent died intestate, leaving behind two (2) real properties both
of which are in the possession of Victoria, and a motor vehicle which the
Victoria sold on 10 October 2000 preparatory to the settlement of the decedents
estate.
a. Victoria allegedly promised to give Felicidad and her
brothers P100,000.00 each as their share in the proceeds of the sale.
b. However, Victoria only gave each of them half the amount she
promised.
3. Felicidad further averred that Victoria has caused the annotation of 5 September
1984 affidavit executed by Decedent declaring the properties to be the
paraphernal properties of Victoria.
a. Victoria allegedly intends to dispose of these properties to the Felicidad
et al’s prejudice.
4. Victoria opposed the petition, asserting that she purchased the properties using
her own money.
a. She claimed that she and Decedent got married in Las
Vegas, Nevada, USA on 25 October 1973, and that they have an
adopted daughter, Carmela Tayag (Carmela), who is presently residing
in the USA.
b. She denied that she was selling the properties.
c. Victoria prayed for the dismissal of the suit because Felicidad failed to
state a cause of action.
5. In a motion, Victoria reiterated her sole ownership of the properties and
presented the transfer certificates of title thereof in her name.
a. She also averred that it is necessary to allege that Felicidad was
acknowledged and recognized by Decedent as his illegitimate child.
b. There being no such allegation, the action becomes one to compel
recognition which cannot be brought after the death of the putative
father. To prevent further encroachment upon the courts time, Victoria
moved for a hearing on her affirmative defenses.
6. RTC RULING: The Motion was denied and MR was also denied.
7. CA RULING: upheld the denial of motion and directed the trial court to proceed
with the case with dispatch.
a. CA ruled that the allegation that Felicidad is an illegitimate child
suffices for a cause of action, without need to state that she had been
recognized and acknowledged as such.
 b. However, Felicidad still has to prove her allegation and,
correspondingly, Victoria has the right to refute the allegation in the
course of the settlement proceedings.
c. CA denied the MR
8. VICTORIA’S PETITION TO SC: asserts that Felicidad should not be allowed
to prove her filiation in the settlement of Decedent’s estate.
a. If, following the case of Uyguanco v. Court of Appeals, the claim of
filiation may no longer be proved in an action for recognition, with
more reason that it should not be allowed to be proved in an action for
the settlement of the decedents estate.
b. Thus, Felicidad may no longer maintain an action to prove that she is
the illegitimate child of the decedent after the latters death.
ISSUE/s:
1. whether Felicidad’s petition for the issuance of letters of administration
sufficiently states a cause of action considering that she merely alleged therein
that she is an illegitimate child of the decedent, without stating that she had been
acknowledged or recognized as such by the latter – YES. Felicidad had not been
given the opportunity to present evidence to show whether she had been
voluntarily recognized and acknowledged by her deceased father because of
Victoria’s opposition to her petition and motion for hearing on affirmative
defenses. SC held that the allegation that Felicidad is an illegitimate child of the
decedent suffices even without further stating that she has been so recognized or
acknowledged.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 29 May 2006 and its Resolution dated 28 August 2006 are
AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
1. Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration must be filed by an interested person.
a. In Saguinsin v. Lindayag, the Court defined an interested party as one
who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has
a claim against the estate, such as a creditor.
b. This interest, furthermore, must be material and direct, not merely
indirect or contingent.
2. Hence, where the right of the person filing a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration is dependent on a fact which has not been
established or worse, can no longer be established, such contingent interest
does not make her an interested party.
3. Here lies the complication in the case which the appellate court had not
discussed, although its disposition of the case is correct.
Determining successional rights of an illegitimate child
4. Essentially, the petition for the issuance of letters of administration is a suit for
the settlement of the intestate estate of Ismael Tayag. The right of Felicidad to
maintain such a suit is dependent on whether she is entitled to successional
rights as an illegitimate child of the decedent which, in turn, may be
established through voluntary or compulsory recognition.
a. Voluntary recognition must be express such as that in a record of birth
appearing in the civil register, a final judgment, a public instrument or
private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.
i. The voluntary recognition of an illegitimate child by his or
her parent needs no further court action and is, therefore,
not subject to the limitation that the action for recognition
be brought during the lifetime of the putative parent.
b. Judicial or compulsory recognition, on the other hand, may be
demanded by the illegitimate child of his parents and must be brought
during the lifetime of the presumed parents.
5. Victoria alleges that by Decedent;s death, Felicidad’s illegitimate filiation and
her interest in the estate, which the Rules require to be material and direct, may
no longer be established.
6. SC RULING: That Victoria overlooks the fact that Felicidad’s successional
rights may be established not just by a judicial action to compel recognition but
also by proof that she had been voluntarily acknowledged and recognized as an
illegitimate child.
7. In Uyguangco v. Court of Appeals:21
a. Graciano was not able to present any evidence during presentation of
evidence to establish his illegitimate filiation with the Decedent. The
Court, applying the provisions of the Family Code which had then
already taken effect, ruled that since Graciano was claiming illegitimate
filiation under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family
Code, i.e., open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child, the action was already barred by the death of the
alleged father.
8. IN THIS CASE, Felicidad had not been given the opportunity to present
evidence to show whether she had been voluntarily recognized and
acknowledged by her deceased father because of Victoria’s opposition to her
petition and motion for hearing on affirmative defenses.
a. There is, as yet, no way to determine if her petition is actually one to
compel recognition which had already been foreclosed by the death of
21
Graciano Uyguangco, claiming to be an illegitimate child of the decedent, filed a complaint for partition
against the latters wife and legitimate children. However, an admission was elicited from him in the
course of his presentation of evidence at the trial that he had none of the documents mentioned in Article
278 of the 1950 Civil Code to show that he was the illegitimate son of the decedent. The wife and
legitimate children of the decedent thereupon moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that he
could no longer prove his alleged filiation under the applicable provision of the Civil Code
 her father, or whether indeed she has a material and direct interest to
maintain the suit by reason of the decedents voluntary acknowledgment
or recognition of her illegitimate filiation.
9. SC held that the allegation that Felicidad is an illegitimate child of the
decedent suffices even without further stating that she has been so
recognized or acknowledged. A motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to
state a cause of action in the complaint hypothetically admits the truth of the
facts alleged therein.
a. Assuming the fact alleged to be true, i.e., that Felicidad is the decedents
illegitimate child, her interest in the estate as such would definitely be
material and direct.
10. The CA was, therefore, correct in allowing the proceedings to continue, ruling
that, Felicidad still has the duty to prove the allegation (that she is an illegitimate
child of the decedent), just as Victoria has the right to disprove it, in the course
of the settlement proceedings.
 12 Hilado v. Court of Appeals (Linds)
May 8, 2009 | Tinga, J. | Spec Pro
PETITIONER: Alfredo Hilado, Lopez Sugar Corporation, First Farmers
Holding Corporation
RESPONDENTS: The Honorable Court Of Appeals, The Honorable Amor A.
Reyes, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court Of Manila, May 8, 2009 Branch
21 And Administratrix Julita Campos Benedicto,
SUMMARY: Benedicto, a renowned sugar magnate, died intestate, survived by
his wife Julita and only daughter Iska (short for Francisca). At the time of his
death, there were 2 pending civil cases both in the RTC of Bacolod; the plaintiff
in the first case was Hilado, and in the second case, Lopez Sugar and First
Farmers). Julita filed with the RTC Manila a petition for letters of
administration, and the RTC granted it. Julita submitted an inventory of the
estate, and included as among the liabilities of the estate the 2 pending claims.
Alfred, Lopez, and First Farmers (Petitioners) filed a motion praying that they
be furnished copies of all pleadings and papers in the RTC Manila.
Petitioners also moved to set the deadline for the inventory of the estate.
They are also assailing Julita’s appointment and inventory. RTC Manila
denied their motion. Certiorari was filed before the CA. CA dismissed it.
The issue: whether the denial of the “intervention” by the Petitioners was
erroneous. TAKE NOTE OF THE BOLD PART IN THE FACTS. THOSE
ARE THE RELIEFS SOUGHT.
DOCTRINE: Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from
intervening in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that the
legal interest required of an intervenor must be actual and material, direct and
immediate, and not simply contingent and expectant.
Even if it were declared that petitioners have no right to intervene in accordance
with Rule 19, it would not necessarily mean the disallowance of the reliefs they
had sought before the RTC since the right to intervene is not one of those
reliefs.
Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the
intestate proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent than mandating
the service of court processes and pleadings upon them. In either case, the
interest of the creditor in seeing to it that the assets are being preserved
and disposed of in accordance with the rules will be duly satisfied.
Acknowledging their right to access the records, rather than entitling them to the
service of every court order or pleading no matter how relevant to their
individual claim, will be less cumbersome on the intestate court, the
administrator and the heirs of the decedent, while providing a viable means by
which the interests of the creditors in the estate are preserved.
As to the other reliefs, the SC did not grant them. Rules 88 and 82 provide the
proper remedy of one who was a contingent claim against the estate and those
who are challenging the competence of the administrator, respectively.
Will retain Petitioner/Respondents. Multiple parties.
FACTS:
21. The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15
May 2000.
22. He was survived by his wife, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto
(administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-
Paulino.
23. At the time of his death, there were two pending civil cases against
Benedicto involving the petitioners.
a. The first, Civil Case No. 95-9137, was then pending with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with
petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of the plaintiffs therein.
b. The second, Civil Case No. 11178, was then pending with the RTC
of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioners Lopez Sugar
Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation as one of the
plaintiffs therein.
24. On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the
RTC of Manila a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her
favor, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court.
25. The petition was raffled to Branch 21, presided by respondent Judge Amor
A. Reyes. Said petition acknowledged the value of the assets of the
decedent to be P5 Million, net of liabilities.
26. On 2 August 2000, the Manila RTC issued an order appointing private
respondent as administrator of the estate of her deceased husband, and
issuing letters of administration in her favor.
27. In January 2001, private respondent submitted an Inventory of the Estate,
Lists of Personal and Real Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her
deceased husband.
28. In the List of Liabilities attached to the inventory, private respondent
included as among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two pending claims
then being litigated before the Bacolod City courts.
29. Private respondent stated that the amounts of liability corresponding to the
 two cases as P136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No. 95-9137 and
P35,198,697.40 for Civil Case No. 11178.
30. Thereafter, the Manila RTC required private respondent to submit a
complete and updated inventory and appraisal report pertaining to the
estate.
31. On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a
Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, 22 praying that they be
furnished with copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate
proceedings. Private respondent opposed the manifestation/motion,
disputing the personality of petitioners to intervene in the intestate
proceedings of her husband.
32. Even before the Manila RTC acted on the manifestation/motion, petitioners
filed an omnibus motion praying that the Manila RTC set a deadline for the
submission by private respondent of the required inventory of the decedents
estate.
33. Petitioners also filed other pleadings or motions with the Manila RTC,
alleging lapses on the part of private respondent in her administration of the
estate, and assailing the inventory that had been submitted thus far as
unverified, incomplete and inaccurate.
34. The Manila RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on the
ground that petitioners are not interested parties within the contemplation of
the Rules of Court to intervene in the intestate proceedings.
35. A petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of Appeals. The petition
argued in general that petitioners had the right to intervene in the intestate
proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the latter being the defendant in the civil
cases they lodged with the Bacolod RTC.
36. CA dismissed. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/s:
Whether the denial of intervention as ruled by the lower courts is erroneous. No.
Rule 19 of the Rules of Court allow such intervention as these Rules equally
apply to special proceedings.
Whether the reliefs sought may be granted. The SC only given the relief of
having access to the records of the case.
RULING: Petition denied.
RATIO:
25. The Court of Appeals chose to view the matter from a perspective solely
informed by the rule on intervention. We can readily agree with the Court
of Appeals on that point. Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Reliefs sought
22
Out of an abundant caution
Procedure requires that an intervenor has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court x x x While the language
of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from
intervening in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held
that the legal interest required of an intervenor must be actual and
material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and
expectant.
26. it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of Civil
Procedure necessarily comes into operation in special proceedings. The
settlement of estates of deceased persons fall within the rules of special
proceedings under the Rules of Court, not the Rules on Civil Procedure.
Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that [i]n the absence of special
provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as
practicable, applicable to special proceedings.
27. Even if it were declared that petitioners have no right to intervene in
accordance with Rule 19, it would not necessarily mean the
disallowance of the reliefs they had sought before the RTC since the
right to intervene is not one of those reliefs.
28. Petitioners place heavy reliance on our ruling in Dinglasan v. Ang Chia, and
it does provide us with guidance on how to proceed.
29. It is not clear whether the claim-in-intervention filed by Dinglasan
conformed to an action-in-intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure,
but we can partake of the spirit behind such pronouncement. Indeed, a few
years later, the Court, citing Dinglasan, stated: [t]he rulings of this court
have always been to the effect that in the special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person, persons not heirs,
intervening therein to protect their interests are allowed to do so to
protect the same, but not for a decision on their action.
30. In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a
creditor or any person interested in the estate, the right to participate in
every aspect of the testate or intestate proceedings, but instead provides for
specific instances when such persons may accordingly act in those
proceedings, we deem that while there is no general right to intervene on
the part of the petitioners, they may be allowed to seek certain prayers
or reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly provided for under the
Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest
in the estate, and there is no other modality under the Rules by which
such interests can be protected. It is under this standard that we assess the
three prayers sought by petitioners.
31. The first is that petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and
 orders issued in connection with the intestate proceedings, as well as inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased
the pleadings filed by the administrator of the estate. There is no within three (3) months from appointment, while Section 8 of Rule 85
questioning as to the utility of such relief for the petitioners. They would be requires the administrator to render an account of his administration within
duly alerted of the developments in the intestate proceedings, including the
one (1) year from receipt of the letters testamentary or of administration.
status of the assets of the estate. Such a running account would allow them
to pursue the appropriate remedies should their interests be compromised, We do not doubt that there are reliefs available to compel an
such as the right, under Section 6, Rule 87, to complain to the intestate court administrator to perform either duty, but a person whose claim against
if property of the estate concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently conveyed. the estate is still contingent is not the party entitled to do so. Still, even
32. At the same time, the fact that petitioners interests remain inchoate and if the administrator did delay in the performance of these duties in the
contingent counterbalances their ability to participate in the intestate context of dissipating the assets of the estate, there are protections enforced
proceedings. We are mindful of respondents submission that if the Court and available under Rule 88 to protect the interests of those with contingent
were to entitle petitioners with service of all processes and pleadings of the
claims against the estate.
intestate court, then anybody claiming to be a creditor, whether contingent
or otherwise, would have the right to be furnished such pleadings, no matter
36. Concerning complaints against the general competence of the administrator,
how wanting of merit the claim may be. Indeed, to impose a precedent that
would mandate the service of all court processes and pleadings to anybody the proper remedy is to seek the removal of the administrator in
posing a claim to the estate, much less contingent claims, would unduly accordance with Section 2, Rule 82. While the provision is silent as to
complicate and burden the intestate proceedings, and would ultimately who may seek with the court the removal of the administrator, we do not
offend the guiding principle of speedy and orderly disposition of cases. doubt that a creditor, even a contingent one, would have the personality to
33. RELIEF:Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records seek such relief. After all, the interest of the creditor in the estate relates to
of the intestate proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent than
the preservation of sufficient assets to answer for the debt, and the general
mandating the service of court processes and pleadings upon them. In either
case, the interest of the creditor in seeing to it that the assets are being competence or good faith of the administrator is necessary to fulfill such
preserved and disposed of in accordance with the rules will be duly purpose.
satisfied. Acknowledging their right to access the records, rather than
entitling them to the service of every court order or pleading no matter how
relevant to their individual claim, will be less cumbersome on the intestate
court, the administrator and the heirs of the decedent, while providing a
viable means by which the interests of the creditors in the estate are
preserved.
34. We now turn to the remaining reliefs sought by petitioners; that a
deadline be set for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a
verified and complete inventory of the estate, and upon submission thereof:
the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue be required
to assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same; and that the
intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the administratrix of her
verified annual account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her
examination under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and
other parties interested in the collation, preservation and disposition of the
estate. We cannot grant said reliefs.

35. Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true
 013 CORONA v. CA (Buenaventura)
August 30, 1982 | Melencio-Herrera, J. | Appointment of administrator
PETITIONER: Rowena F. Corona
RESPONDENTS: CA and Romarico Vitug
SUMMARY:
Dolores Vitug died in New York, leaving two Wills: one, a holographic Will
which excluded her husband, respondent Romarico G. Vitug, as one of her
heirs, and the other, a formal Will which expressly disinherited him "for reason
of his improper and immoral conduct amounting to concubinage, which is a
ground for legal separation under Philippine Law"; bequeathed her properties in
equal shares to her sisters and her nieces Rowena F. Corona and Jennifer F.
Way; and appointed Rowena as her Executrix.
Rowena filed a petition for the probate of the Wills before the CFI of Rizal, and
for the appointment of Nenita P. Alonte as Administrator because she (Rowena)
is presently employed in the United Nations in New York City.
the Probate Court appointed Nenita P. Alonte as Special Administratrix, upon a
P100,000.00 bond.
Romarico Vitug, filed an "Opposition and Motion" and prayed that the Petition
for Probate be denied and that the two Wills be disallowed on the ground that
they were procured through undue and improper pressure and influence.
Romarico further prayed for his appointment as Special Administrator because
the Special Administratrix appointed is not related to the heirs and has no
interest to be protected. Oppositions to probate with almost Identical arguments
and prayers were also filed by the brothers and sisters of Dolores.
the Probate Court set aside its Order appointing Nenita as Special
Administratrix, and appointed instead the surviving husband, Romarico as
Special Administrator with a bond of P200,000.00, essentially for the reasons
that under Section 6, Rule 78, of the Rules of Court, the surviving spouse is first
in the order of preference for appointment as Administrator as he has an interest
in the estate; that the disinheritance of the surviving spouse is not among the
grounds of disqualification for appointment as Administrator; that the next of
kin is appointed only where the surviving spouse is not competent or is
unwilling to serve besides the fact that the Executrix appointed, is not the next
of kin but merely a niece.
The issue is whether or not Nenita should be appointed as administrator and the
SC held that she should. Objections to Nenita's appointment on grounds of
impracticality and lack of kinship are over-shadowed by the fact that justice
and equity demand that the side of the deceased wife and the faction of the
surviving husband be represented in the management of the decedent's estate.
DOCTRINE:
The executrix's choice of Special Administrator, considering her own inability
to serve and the wide latitude of discretion given her by the testatrix in her Will,
is entitled to the highest consideration
FACTS:
1. On November 10, 1980, Dolores Luchangco Vitug died in New York,
U.S.A., leaving two Wills: one, a holographic Will dated October 3, 1980,
which excluded her husband, respondent Romarico G. Vitug, as one of her
heirs, and the other, a formal Will sworn to on October 24, 1980, or about
three weeks thereafter, which expressly disinherited her husband Romarico
"for reason of his improper and immoral conduct amounting to
concubinage, which is a ground for legal separation under Philippine Law";
bequeathed her properties in equal shares to her sisters Exaltacion L.
Allarde, Vicenta L. Faustino and Gloria L. Teoxon, and her nieces Rowena
F. Corona and Jennifer F. Way; and appointed Rowena F. Corona, herein
petitioner, as her Executrix.
2. Rowena filed a petition for the probate of the Wills before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, and for the appointment of Nenita P. Alonte as
Administrator because she (Rowena) is presently employed in the United
Nations in New York City.
3. On December 2, 1980, upon Rowena's urgent Motion, the Probate Court
appointed Nenita P. Alonte as Special Administratrix, upon a P100,000.00
bond.
4. On December 12, 1980, the surviving husband, Romarico Vitug, filed an
"Opposition and Motion" and prayed that the Petition for Probate be denied
and that the two Wills be disallowed on the ground that they were procured
through undue and improper pressure and influence, having been executed
at a time when the decedent was seriously ill and under the medical care of
Dr. Antonio P. Corona, Rowena's husband, and that the holographic Will
impaired his legitime. Romarico further prayed for his appointment as
Special Administrator because the Special Administratrix appointed is not
related to the heirs and has no interest to be protected, besides, the surviving
spouse is qualified to administer.
5. Oppositions to probate with almost Identical arguments and prayers were
also filed by the brothers and sisters of Dolores
6. On December 18, 1980, Nenita P. Alonte posted her bond and took her oath
of office before a Notary Public.
 7. the Probate Court set aside its Order of December 2, 1980 appointing
Nenita as Special Administratrix, and appointed instead the surviving
husband, Romarico as Special Administrator with a bond of P200,000.00,
essentially for the reasons that under Section 6, Rule 78, of the Rules of
Court, the surviving spouse is first in the order of preference for
appointment as Administrator as he has an interest in the estate; that the
disinheritance of the surviving spouse is not among the grounds of
disqualification for appointment as Administrator; that the next of kin is
appointed only where the surviving spouse is not competent or is unwilling
to serve besides the fact that the Executrix appointed, is not the next of kin
but merely a niece, and that the decedent's estate is nothing more than half
of the unliquidated conjugal partnership property.
8. Rowena filed an MR and it was denied. She then resorted to a Petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals to annul, for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion,but the CA found no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Probate Court and dismissed the Petition.
ISSUES:
1. WoN Nenita should be appointed as administrator. – YES. Rowena’s choice
of Special Administrator, is entitled to the highest consideration.
made by the decedent cannot affect the appointment of a Special
Administrator.
3. This Court, in resolving to give due course to the Petition taking into
account the allegations, arguments and issues raised by the parties, is of the
considered opinion that petitioner's nominee, Nenita F. Alonte, should be
appointed as co-Special Administrator. The executrix's choice of Special
Administrator, considering her own inability to serve and the wide latitude
of discretion given her by the testatrix in her Will, is entitled to the highest
consideration. Objections to Nenita's appointment on grounds of
impracticality and lack of kinship are over-shadowed by the fact that
justice and equity demand that the side of the deceased wife and the
faction of the surviving husband be represented in the management of
the decedent's estate.
4. En passant, it is apropos to remind the Special Administrators that while
they may have respective interests to protect, they are officers of the Court
subject to the supervision and control of the Probate Court and are expected
to work for the best interests of the entire estate, its smooth administration,
and its earliest settlement.

RULING: WHEREFORE, modifying the judgment under review, the Court of

First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI, is hereby ordered, in Special Proceedings No.
9398 pending before it, to appoint Nenita F. Alonte as co-Special Administrator,
properly bonded, who shall act as such jointly with the other Special Administrator
on all matters affecting the estate. No costs.

RATIO:
1. Petitioner stresses that the order of preference laid down in the Rules should
not be followed where the surviving spouse is expressly disinherited,
opposes probate, and clearly possesses an adverse interest to the estate
which would disqualify him from the trust.
2. The three sets of Oppositors, all respondents herein, in the Comments which
they respectively filed, essentially claimed lack of grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Appellate Court in upholding the appointment of the
surviving husband as Special Administrator; that certiorari is improper and
unavailing as the appointment of a Special Administrator is discretionary
with the Court and is unappealable; that co-administratorship is impractical
and unsound and as between the surviving husband, who was responsible
for the accumulation of the estate by his acumen and who must be deemed
to have a beneficial interest in the entire estate, and a stranger, respondent
Court had made the correct choice; and that the legality of the disinheritance
 014 Suntay v. Suntay (CELAJE)
G.R. No. 183053 | October 10, 2012 | Perez, J. | Co-administration of an estate
PETITIONER: Emilio A.M. Suntay III
RESPONDENTS: Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay
SUMMARY: This case pertained to the estate of Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay.
When Cristina died, her legitimate grandchild, respondent Isabel, filed a petition
for the issuance of letters of administrator over Cristina's estate. Cristina's wid-
ower, Emilio I, contested the petition, and then nominated petitioner Emilio III
as administrator instead. Initially, the SC ruled that both should be co-
administrator. However, Isabel filed a MR (which is this case). Issue: W/N peti-
tioner Emilio III and respondent Isabel should be co-administrators. No.
Emilio III was shown to be an incompetent administrator. He had deliberately
omitted properties in the inventory he was obligated to file, which properties of
Cristina he knew existed and which he claims to be knowledgeable about. His
inaction when Federico excluded Cristina’s other compulsory heirs, herein
Isabel and her siblings, from the list of heirs also shows that Emilio III was
incompetent. Also, because of the extreme animosity between Emilio III and
Isabel, it becomes highly impractical, nay, improbable, for the two to work as
co-administrators of their grandmother’s estate. It would be detrimental to the
decedent’s estate to appoint a co-administrator (Emilio III) who has shown
some kind or hostility to those, such as herein respondent Isabel, immediately
interested in the said estate.
DOCTRINE: As an exception, the rules allow for the appointment of co-
administrators for an estate. However, one of the co-administrators may be re-
lieved of his duties if it is shown that he was incompetent in administrating the
estate.
FACTS:
19. This is a motion for reconsideration of an earlier decision by the SC. In the
earlier decision, the SC ruled that petitioner Emilio III and respondent
Isabel were co-administrators of Cristina's estate. This MR is questioning
the co-administrator, and respondent Isabel is praying that she should be the
only administrator of Cristina's estate.
20. The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on 4 June
1990. Cristina was survived by her spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico)
and 5 grandchildren: 3 legitimate grandchildren, including herein
respondent, Isabel; and 2 illegitimate grandchildren, including petitioner
Emilio III.
21. All are by Federico’s and Cristina’s only child, Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio I),
who predeceased his parents.
22. The illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita, were both reared
from infancy by the spouses Federico and Cristina. Their legitimate
grandchildren, Isabel and her siblings, Margarita and Emilio II, lived with
their mother, also named Isabel Cojuangco, following the separation of
Isabel’s parents, Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco.
23. Isabel’s parents, along with her paternal grandparents, were involved in domestic relations
cases, including a case for parricide filed by Isabel Cojuangco against Emilio I. Emilio I was
eventually acquitted. In retaliation, Emilio I filed a complaint for legal separation against his
wife, charging her among others with infidelity. The trial court declared as null and void and of
no effect the marriage of Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco on the finding that: Emilio had an
unsound mind (schizophrenia) at the time of marriage, thus marriage was void.
24. On 27 September 1993, more than three years after Cristina’s death,
Federico adopted his illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.
25. On 26 October 1995, respondent Isabel, filed before the (RTC), Malolos,
Bulacan, a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over
Cristina’s estate docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95.
26. Federico filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabel’s petition for letters of
administration. This was denied. Undaunted by the setback, Federico
nominated Emilio III to administer the decedent’s estate on his behalf in the
event letters of administration issues to Federico. Consequently, Emilio III
filed an Opposition-In-Intervention, echoing the allegations in his
grandfather’s opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III,
was better equipped than respondent to administer and manage the estate of
the decedent, Cristina.
27. On 13 November 2000, Federico died. Almost a year thereafter or on 9 November
2001, the trial court rendered a decision appointing Emilio III as administrator of decedent
Cristina’s intestate estate. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision
of the RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III, and appointed
respondent Isabel as administratrix of the subject estate.
28. Initially, the SC reversed and set aside the ruling of the appellate court. The
SC decided to include Emilio III as co-administrator of Cristina’s estate,
giving weight to his interest in Federico’s estate. In ruling for co-
administration between Emilio III and Isabel, the SC considered that:
a. 1. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and her husband,
Federico, who both acknowledged him as their grandchild;
b. 3. Cristina’s properties, forming part of her estate, are still commingled with those
 of her husband, Federico, because her share in the conjugal partnership remains
undetermined and unliquidated; and
c. 4. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in the
distribution of the latter’s estate as a direct heir, one degree from Federico, and not
simply in representation of his deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I.
29. In this motion for reconsideration, Isabel pleads for total affirmance of the
Court of Appeals’ Decision in favor of her sole administratorship based on
her status as a legitimate grandchild of Cristina, whose estate she seeks to
administer.
ISSUES:
3. W/N Emilio III appointment as co-administrator of Cristina's estate with Is-
abel should be sustained. No because it has ben shown that he was remiss in
his duties such as failing to file a complete inventory of Cristina's properties
as well as acquiescing to some of Federico's questionable acts such as ex-
cluding Isabel and the other heirs from Cristina's estate.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. Our Decision in G.R. No. 183053 dated 16 June 2010 is MODIFIED.
Letters of Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay
shall solely issue to respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment of a bond to
be set by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special
Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos,
Bulacan is likewise directed to settle the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-
Suntay with dispatch. No costs.
RATIO:
19. We reconsider our decision of 16 June 2010.
20. The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a
decedent is laid down in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.
21. The rule lists a sequence to be observed, an order of preference, in the
appointment of an administrator. This order of preference, which
categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the
creditors in the appointment of an administrator, has been reinforced in
jurisprudence.8
22. The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator over
the estate of a decedent is the prospective administrator’s interest in the
estate. This is the same consideration which Section 6, Rule 78 takes into
account in establishing the order of preference in the appointment of
administrator for the estate.
23. The rationale behind the rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a
wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate, or, in the
alternative, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or
mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to
administer the estate correctly. In all, given that the rule speaks of an order
of preference, the person to be appointed administrator of a decedent’s
estate must demonstrate not only an interest in the estate, but an interest
therein greater than any other candidate.
24. It is to this requirement of observation of the order of preference in the
appointment of administrator of a decedent’s estate, that the appointment of
co-administrators has been allowed, but as an exception. We again refer to
Section 6(a) of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court which specifically states that
letters of administration may be issued to both the surviving spouse and the
next of kin.
25. In a number of cases, we have sanctioned the appointment of more than one
administrator for the benefit of the estate and those interested therein. Under
certain circumstances and for various reasons well-settled in Philippine and
American jurisprudence, we have upheld the appointment of co-
administrators: (1) to have the benefits of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have
different interests represented; (2) where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or
factions be represented in the management of the estate of the deceased; (3) where the estate is
large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle; (4) to have all interested
persons satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for the best interests of the estate;
and when a person entitled to the administration of an estate desires to have another competent
person associated with him in the office.18
26. In our Decision under consideration, we zeroed in on Emilio III’s
demonstrable interest in the estate and glossed over the order of preference
set forth in the Rules (SC said this was wrong). The collected teaching is
that mere demonstration of interest in the estate to be settled does not ipso
facto entitle an interested person to co-administration thereof.
27. Contrary to the assumption made in the original Decision that Emilio III’s
demonstrable interest in the estate makes him a suitable co-administrator
thereof, the evidence reveals that Emilio III has turned out to be an
unsuitable administrator of the estate.
28. Respondent Isabel points out that after Emilio III’s appointment as
administrator of the subject estate in 2001, he has not looked after the
welfare of the subject estate and has actually acted to the damage and
prejudice thereof as evidenced by the following:
a. 1. Emilio III, despite several orders from the probate court for a complete inventory,
omitted, in the partial inventories he filed, properties of the estate including several
 parcels of land, cash, bank deposits, jewelry, shares of stock, motor vehicles, and
other personal properties, contrary to Section 1,36 paragraph a, Rule 81 of the Rules
of Court.
b. 2. Emilio III did not take action on both occasions against Federico’s settlement of
the decedent’s estate which adjudicated to himself a number of properties properly
belonging to said estate (whether wholly or partially), and which contained a
declaration that the decedent did not leave any descendants or heirs, except for
Federico, entitled to succeed to her estate.
c. 3. The inventory Emilio III submitted did not include several properties of the
decedent;
d. 4. That properties belonging to the decedent have found their way to different
individuals or persons; several properties to Federico Suntay himself; and
e. 5. While some properties have found their way to Emilio III, by reason of falsified
documents;38
29. Emilio III refutes Isabel’s imputations that he was lackadaisical in assuming
and performing the functions of administrator of Cristina’s estate:
a. 2. The delay in Emilio III’s filing of an inventory was due to Isabel’s vociferous
objections to Emilio III’s attempts to act as administrator while the RTC decision
was under appeal to the Court of Appeals;
b. 3. The complained partial inventory is only initiatory, inherent in the nature thereof,
and one of the first steps in the lengthy process of settlement of a decedent’s estate,
such that it cannot constitute a complete and total listing of the decedent’s
properties;
30. While we can subscribe to Emilio III’s counsel’s explanation for the blamed
delay in the filing of an inventory and his exposition on the nature thereof,
partial as opposed to complete, in the course of the settlement of a
decedent’s estate, we do not find any clarification on Isabel’s accusation
that Emilio III had deliberately omitted properties in the inventory, which
properties of Cristina he knew existed and which he claims to be
knowledgeable about.
Isabel have a deep aversion for each other.
34. To our mind, it becomes highly impractical, nay, improbable, for the two to
work as co-administrators of their grandmother’s estate. More importantly,
it appears detrimental to the decedent’s estate to appoint a co-administrator
(Emilio III) who has shown an adverse interest of some kind or hostility to
those, such as herein respondent Isabel, immediately interested in the said
estate.
35. Bearing in mind that the issuance of letters of administration is simply a
preliminary order to facilitate the settlement of a decedent’s estate, we here
point out that Emilio III is not without remedies to protect his interests in
the estate of the decedent.
36. In Hilado v. Court of Appeals, we mapped out as among the allowable
participation of "any interested persons" or "any persons interested in the
estate" in either testate or intestate proceedings:
a. 4. Section 6 of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested in the estate of the
deceased "to complain to the court of the concealment, embezzlement, or
conveyance of any asset of the decedent, or of evidence of the decedent’s title or
interest therein;"
b. 5. Section 10 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the time and place of the
examination and allowance of the Administrator’s account "to persons interested;"
c. 6. Section 7(b) of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice "to the persons
interested" before it may hear and grant a petition seeking the disposition or
encumbrance of the properties of the estate; and
d. 7. Section 1, Rule 90, which allows "any person interested in the estate" to petition
for an order for the distribution of the residue of the estate of the decedent, after all
obligations are either satisfied or provided for.44
37. In addition to the foregoing, Emilio III may likewise avail of the remedy
found in Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court.

31. The general denial made by Emilio III does not erase his unsuitability as
administrator rooted in his failure to "make and return x x x a true and
complete inventory" which became proven fact when he actually filed
partial inventories before the probate court and by his inaction on two
occasions of Federico’s exclusion of Cristina’s other compulsory heirs,
herein Isabel and her siblings, from the list of heirs.
32. The foregoing circumstances of Emilio III’s omission and inaction become
even more significant and speak volume of his unsuitability as administrator
as it demonstrates his interest adverse to those immediately interested in the
estate of the decedent, Cristina.
33. In this case, palpable from the evidence on record, the pleadings, and the
protracted litigation, is the inescapable fact that Emilio III and respondent
 001 LEE V. RTC (CRUZ)
April 22, 2005 | Corona, J. | Rule 80
PETITIONER: Jose C. Lee and Alma Aggabao, in their capacities as President
and Corporate Secretary, respectively, of Philippine International Life Insurance
Company, and Filipino Loan Assistance Group
RESPONDENTS: Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 85 presided by
Judge Pedro M. Areola, Branch Clerk of Court Janice Y. Antero, Deputy
Sheriffs Adenauer G. Rivera and Pedro L. Borja, all of the RTC of Quezon City
Branch 85, Ma. Divina Enderes claiming to be Special Administratix, and other
persons/public officers acting for and in their behalf
SUMMARY: This case began with a petition for letters of administration of the
intestate estate of Dr. Ortaez filed 25 years ago. Forming part of the inventory of
the estate were 2,029 shares of stock in Philinterlife. During the pendency of
these proceedings, Juliana, Jose and Rafael, the surviving legitimate spouse and
legitimate children of the decedent respectively, executed an extrajudicial set-
tlement of the estate, partitioning it (including the Philinterlife shares of stock)
among themselves. Thereafter, Juliana and Jose sold the 2,029 shares to the
FLAG. In the meantime, Ortaez-Enderes, one of the illegitimate children of the
decedent, was appointed as special administratrix of the 2,029 Philinterlife
shares of stock. Jose filed an omnibus motion seeking the approval of the sale of
the shares of stock to FLAG and the release of Ortaez-Enderes as special admin-
istratrix, the trial court denied said motion. The intestate court declared the ex-
trajudicial settlement made by Juliana, Jose and Rafael partially void ab ini-
tio insofar as the transfer of the Philinterlife shares was concerned. The decision
holds confirmation that only the Special Administratrix, Ortaez-Enderes,
has the power to exercise all the rights appurtenant to the said shares, in-
cluding the right to vote and to receive dividends; and directing acknowl-
edgement and to allow Ortaez-Enderes to exercise all the rights on the
shares and to refrain from resorting to any action which may tend (to) di-
rectly or indirectly impede, obstruct or bar the free exercise thereof under
pain of contempt. However, Lee and Aggabao was able to frustrate efforts of
Ortaez-Enderes for the execution of the court’s decision. Instead of complying,
Lee and Aggabao a motion to suspend execution/period of compliance by rea-
son of supervening events. The issue in this case is whether or not Lee and Ag-
gabao are guilty of indirect contempt. The Sc ruled in the affirmative. Lee and
Aggabao attempt to raise issues already laid to rest by a final and executory
judgment of no less than the highest tribunal of the land constitutes a disrespect-
ful and insolent defiance of the authority of this Court and impedes the speedy
administration of justice. Lee and Aggabao are claiming that the revocation of
the appointment of Ortaez-Enderes as special administratrix was evidently is a
supervening event which should suspend execution/period of compliance. How-
ever, the SC found that the revocation of her appointment as special administra-
trix was made by the intestate court before the decision of this Court was prom-
ulgated on February 23, 2004 and before it became final and executory on July
9, 2004. Therefore, the revocation of the appointment of Ortaez-Enderes as
special administratrix was evidently not a supervening event. The execution
should not be suspended for that reason. The February 23, 2004 ruling categori-
cally stated that the estate of Dr. Ortaez was the lawful owner of 2,029 Phil-
interlife shares. As lawful owner of the Philinterlife shares, the estate can exer-
cise all the rights of ownership, including the right to vote the shares. If, by vot-
ing the shares, the estate is able to elect its own representatives who succeed in
attaining management control of Philinterlife, then let it be as such would be a
legitimate consequence of the February 23, 2004 decision.
DOCTRINE: Sec. 2. Powers and duties of special administrator. - Such special
administrator shall take possession and charge of goods, chattels, rights, credits,
and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the executor or
administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may commence and
maintain suits as administrator. He may sell only such perishable and other
property as the court orders sold. A special administrator shall not be liable to
pay any debts of the deceased unless so ordered by the court.
FACTS:
1. For resolution is Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes (Ortaez-Enderes) omnibus mo-
tion to cite Jose C. Lee (Lee) and Alma Aggabao (Aggabao) in indirect con-
tempt of Court and for the disbarment and/or imposition of disciplinary
sanctions on Lee and Aggabao’s counsel for their refusal to comply with the
final and executory decision of this Court dated February 23, 2004.
2. This case began with a petition for letters of administration of the intestate
estate of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez filed 25 years ago on September 24, 1980.
a. Forming part of the inventory of the estate were 2,029 shares of
stock in Philippine International Life Insurance Company (Phil-
interlife).
b. During the pendency of these proceedings, Juliana, Jose and Rafael
(all surnamed Ortaez), the surviving legitimate spouse and legiti-
mate children of the decedent respectively, executed an extrajudi-
cial settlement of the estate, partitioning it (including the Philinter-
life shares of stock) among themselves.
c. Thereafter, Juliana and Jose sold the 2,029 shares to the Filipino
Loan Assistance Group (FLAG).
3. However, Ortaez-Enderes, one of the illegitimate children of the decedent,
was in the meantime appointed as special administratrix of the 2,029 Phil-
interlife shares of stock.
4. When Jose Ortaez filed an omnibus motion seeking the approval of the sale
of the shares of stock to FLAG and the release of Ortaez-Enderes as special
administratrix, the trial court denied said motion.
5. The intestate court declared the extrajudicial settlement made by Juliana,
Jose and Rafael partially void ab initio insofar as the transfer of the Phil-
interlife shares was concerned. These orders were later upheld by the CA
and SC.
6. The intestate court granted the motion for execution filed by Ortaez-
Enderes
a. Confirming the nullity of the sale of the 2,029 Philinterlife shares
in the name of the Estate of Dr. Ortaez to FLAG.
b. Commanding the President and the Corporate Secretary of
Philinterlife to reinstate in the stock and transfer book of
Philinterlife the 2,029 Philinterlife shares of stock in the name of
the Estate of Dr. Ortaez as the owner thereof without prejudice to
other claims for violation of pre-emptive rights pertaining to the
said 2,029 Philinterlife shares;
c. Directing the President and the Corporate Secretary of Philinterlife
to issue stock certificates in the name of the Estate of Dr. Ortaez
as the owner thereof without prejudice to other claims for
violation of pre-emptive rights pertaining to the said 2,029
Philinterlife shares;
d. Confirming that only the Special Administratrix, Ortaez-Enderes,
has the power to exercise all the rights appurtenant to the said
shares, including the right to vote and to receive dividends;
e. Directing acknowledgement and to allow Ortaez-Enderes to
exercise all the rights on the shares and to refrain from resorting to
any action which may tend (to) directly or indirectly impede,
obstruct or bar the free exercise thereof under pain of contempt.
f. The President, Corporate Secretary, any responsible officer/s of
Philinterlife, or any other person or persons claiming to represent
it or otherwise, are hereby directed to comply with this Order
within 3 days from receipt under pain of contempt.
g. The Deputy Sheriffs Adenauer Rivera and Pedro Borja are hereby
directed to implement the writ of execution with dispatch to
forestall any/or further damage to the Estate.
7. However, the writ of execution was not enforced due to the resistance of
Lee and Aggabao by filing before the CA a petition for certiorari question-
ing the order of execution which was dismissed outright. Lee and Aggabao
then elevated the case to the SC.
8. On Feb 23, 2004, the 3rd division of the SC denied the petition for certiotari
and ordered the execution of the trial court’s order (Fact#6)
9. Lee and Aggabao filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration and referral
of this case to the en banc allegedly in view of the conflicting rulings of two
divisions of the Court.
10. The Court denied the motion for lack of merit merely reiterating the same
arguments earlier raised and does not present any substantial reason not
previously invoked nor any matter not already considered and passed upon
by the Court.
11. Thus on July 9, 2004, the February 23, 2004 decision became final and ex-
ecutory, and was recorded in the book of entries of judgments.
12. An alias writ of execution was issued by the intestate court (the court of
origin). In said writ, the deputy sheriffs were ordered to enforce orders of
the intestate court.
13. Instead of complying with the writ, Lee and Aggabao a motion to suspend
execution/period of compliance by reason of supervening events, raising the
following arguments:
a. the intestate court had already revoked the appointment of private
respondent as special administratrix;
b. there was a need to lay down the legal procedure in the implemen-
tation of the writ and
c. there must be a declaration that the price per share of the 2,029
shares was only P1,000 which was its book value at the time the
shares were sold in 1989 and 1991.
14. Ortaez-Enderes went back to this Court and filed this omnibus motion as-
serting that Lee and Aggabao made a travesty of the final and executory de-
cisions of the Lower Courts and this Honorable Court when they refused to
comply with the Alias Writ of Execution issued by the Lower Court
ISSUE/s:
1. WoN Lee and Aggabao are guilty of indirect contempt. – YES, Lee and
Aggabao attempt to raise issues already laid to rest by a final and executory
judgment of no less than the highest tribunal of the land constitutes a
disrespectful and insolent defiance of the authority of this Court and
impedes the speedy administration of justice
RULING: WHEREFORE, petitioners Jose C. Lee and Alma Aggabao, president
and corporate secretary, respectively, of petitioner Philippine International Life In-
surance Company, are hereby found GUILTY of INDIRECT CONTEMPT for which
the maximum FINE of P30,000 is hereby imposed on each of them, payable in full
within five days from receipt of this resolution. They are furthermore given a final
non-extendible period of five days from receipt of this resolution within which to
comply within our decision and orders as aforementioned. Petitioners are hereby
warned not to file any more pleadings in connection herewith. Failure to comply
with our decision, orders and P30,000 fine within the five-day period will subject
them to imprisonment till full compliance.
In view hereof, petitioners counsel, Atty. Teodorico Fernandez, is likewise
strongly warned to refrain from any further attempts to make a mockery of our judi-
cial processes. SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
1. Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court outlines the procedural requisites
before the accused may be punished for indirect contempt:
a. the filing of a written charge and
b. an opportunity to be heard by himself or counsel.
2. What is important is that the alleged contemner be granted an opportunity to
meet the charges against him and to be heard in his defense. Lee and Ag-
gabao were given this opportunity; they in fact filed their Opposition.
3. Lee and Aggabao assert that private respondent engaged in forum-shopping
because the latter had previously filed a similar motion in the intestate
court.
a. The argument has no merit. The charge for indirect contempt must
be filed before the court against which the indirect contempt was
committed. Section 5, Rule 71 states:
SEC. 5. Where charge to be filed. Where the charge for indirect
contempt has been committed against a Regional Trial Court or a
court of equivalent or higher rank, or against an officer appointed
by it, the charge may be filed with such court. xxx
4. Hence, the charge for indirect contempt for disobedience to our February
23, 2004 decision was correctly brought to the SC.
5. Igot v. Court of Appeals: In whatever context it may arise, contempt of
court involves the doing of an act, or the failure to do an act, in such a man-
ner as to create an affront to the court and the sovereign dignity with which
it is clothed. As a matter of practical judicial administration, jurisdiction has
been felt to properly rest in only one tribunal at a time with respect to a giv-
en controversy. Only the court which rendered the order commanding the
doing of a certain act is vested with the right to determine whether or not
the order has been complied with, or whether a sufficient reason has been
given for noncompliance, and, therefore, whether a contempt has been
committed. It is a well-established rule that the power to determine the ex-
istence of contempt of court rests exclusively with the court contemned.
6. The rationale for the general rule ... is that, contempt proceedings are sui
generis and are triable only by the court against whose authority the con-
tempts are charged; the power to punish for contempt exists for the purpose
of enabling a court to compel due decorum and respect in its presence and
due obedience to its judgments, orders and processes and in order that a
court may compel obedience to its orders, it must have the right to inquire
whether there has been any disobedience thereof, for to submit the question
of disobedience to another tribunal would operate to deprive the proceeding
of half its efficiency.
7. The Ortaez-Enderes alleges that the following acts of the Lee and Aggabao
constituted indirect contempt under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court:
a. for failure to comply with the alias writ of execution served upon
them and
b. their act of filing a patently baseless motion (to suspend execu-
tion/period of compliance by reason of supervening events) which
was obviously intended to defeat the implementation of the final
and executory decision of this Court.
8. On the other hand, Lee and Aggabao allege that the immediate execution of
the subject decision would be inequitable and should be suspended pending
an order of clarification of certain matters. According to them, the certifi-
cates of the shares of stock were turned over to the intestate court and not to
Ortaez-Enderes because her appointment as special administratrix had al-
ready been revoked by the court.
9. Lee and Aggabao obstinate refusal to abide by this Courts February 23,
2004 decision demonstrates a contumacious attitude which this Court can-
not countenance. This contumacy becomes all the more glaring because of
the strongly worded admonition in the SC decision that Lee and Aggabao
and all parties claiming rights under them are hereby warned not to further
delay the execution of the Orders of the intestate court.
10. The decision includes directives to:
a. to refrain from resorting to any action which may tend (to)
directly or indirectly impede, obstruct or bar the free exercise
thereof under pain of contempt.
b. to comply with this Order within three (3) days from receipt
hereof under pain of contempt.
c. The Deputy Sheriffs Adenauer Rivera and Pedro Borja are
hereby directed to implement the writ of execution with
dispatch to forestall any/or further damage to the Estate.
11. Clearly, Lee and Aggabao defiant non-compliance with these directives, as
proved by the sheriffs report constituted indirect contempt.
a. Sheriff Borja went to the Philenterlife (sic) Office to check wheth-
er there was already compliance with the Alias Writ of Execution,
one of their staff told Sheriff Borja that Mr. Jose Lee wanted to
talk with Sheriff Borja over the Telephone. In their telephone con-
versation, Mr. Jose Lee told Sheriff Borja that he had already con-
sulted his lawyer regarding the matter.
12. Lee and Aggabao act of filing their motion to suspend execution/period of
compliance by reason of supervening events also showed their continuing,
stubborn resistance to this Courts judgment.
a. Indeed, one of the exceptions to the principle of immutability of fi-
nal judgments is the existence of supervening events. Supervening
events refer to facts which transpire after judgment has become fi-
nal and executory or to new circumstances which develop after the
judgment has acquired finality.
13. Ortaez-Enderes alleges that the revocation of her appointment as special
administratrix was made by the intestate court before the decision of this
Court was promulgated on February 23, 2004 and before it became final
 and executory on July 9, 2004. Therefore, the revocation of the appoint-
ment of Ortaez-Enderes as special administratrix was evidently not a
supervening event.
14. Furthermore, this issue had already been raised in Lee and Aggabao’s mo-
tion for reconsideration of this Courts February 23, 2004 decision and
passed upon by the Court in its resolution denying the motion for lack of
merit.
15. Lee and Aggabao insist that there must be an order laying down the le-
gal procedure for the implementation of the writ, which implementa-
tion did not include taking over the management of Philinterlife and
obtaining possession of office premises.
a. The SC disagrees. The execution should not be suspended for that
reason.
16. Our February 23, 2004 ruling categorically stated that the estate of Dr.
Ortaez was the lawful owner of 2,029 Philinterlife shares. As lawful owner
of the Philinterlife shares, the estate can exercise all the rights of ownership,
including the right to vote the shares. If, by voting the shares, the estate is
able to elect its own representatives who succeed in attaining management
control of Philinterlife, then let it be as such would be a legitimate conse-
quence of our February 23, 2004 decision.
17. In the February 23, 2004 decision, Lee and Aggabao, with the rest of the
FLAG-controlled directors and stockholders, increased the authorized capi-
tal stock of Philinterlife, diluting in the process the 2,029 shares of the es-
tate representing 50.725% of Philinterlife.
a. this was obviously calculated to make it difficult for the estate to
reassume its controlling interest in Philinterlife.
b. Thus, considering the nullity of the sale of the 2,029 shares to
FLAG, the increase in Philinterlifes authorized capital stock was
void ab initio. Consequently, any approval by the Securities and
Exchange Commission of this increase would be void ab initio.
18. Moreover, the directives to Lee and Aggabao as president and corporate
secretary, respectively, of Philinterlife, were sufficiently clear and needed
absolutely no clarification in order to exact their compliance thereto. Since
the nullity of the sale of the 2,029 Philinterlife shares to FLAG had been
confirmed, they were ordered to:
a. reinstate the shares in the name of the estate in the stock and trans-
fer book;
b. issue stock certificates in the name of the estate;
c. acknowledge and allow the special administratrix to exercise all
the rights appurtenant to the shares;
d. refrain from resorting to any action which may tend to directly or
indirectly impede, obstruct or bar the free exercise of these rights
and
e. comply with the order within three days from receipt.
19. The first two directives were undoubtedly covered by the duties and func-
tions of the corporate secretary and president of a corporation. The next two
ordered them not to resist the writ and the last directive provided a period
for their compliance. Given the foregoing, there was never any need to clar-
ify the procedure for the implementation of the writ.
20. Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court: Indirect contempt to be punished
after charge and hearing. After a charge in writing has been filed, and an
opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period
as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person
guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order or judg-
ment of a court xxx
(c ) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or pro-
ceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt xxx
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, ob-
struct, or degrade the administration of justice;
21. Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the Court by acting in op-
position to its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a willful
disregard or disobedience of the courts orders, but such conduct as tends to
bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute
or in some manner to impede the due administration of justice .
22. This Court has thus repeatedly declared that the power to punish for con-
tempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of order in
judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and man-
dates of the court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice
23. Lee and Aggabao attempt to raise issues already laid to rest by a final and
executory judgment of no less than the highest tribunal of the land consti-
tutes a disrespectful and insolent defiance of the authority of this Court and
impedes the speedy administration of justice.This controversy has been
pending for 25 long years already.
24. Well-settled is the principle that a decision that has acquired finality be-
comes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any re-
spect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of
fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by
the highest court of the land.
25. The only exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors,
the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party,
void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of
the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.
26. This case does not fall under any of the recognized exceptions. Moreover,
the immutability of the February 23, 2004 decision is all the more empha-
sized in this case since it is this Court, the highest Court of the land and fi-
nal arbiter of all legal controversies, that promulgated it. Thus, Lee and Ag-
gabao are bound by the finality of our decision and cannot, under the guise
 of a phony motion to suspend execution/period of compliance by reason of
supervening events, reopen a case already decided with finality. Nor should
they be permitted to litigate anew questions or issues already laid to rest.
27. The fact is that virtually the same issues have been elevated to this Court no
less than three times.
a. Private respondent obtained a writ of execution in 2000 but her at-
tempt to enforce the writ was unsuccessful.
b. After our February 23, 2004 decision became final and executory,
she obtained an alias writ of execution on October 1, 2004 but the
Lee and Aggabao again managed to frustrate her efforts to execute
the decision and torpedo its enforcement.
28. Section 7, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court penalizes indirect contempt as fol-
lows: If the respondent is adjudged guilty of indirect contempt committed
against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, he
may be punished by a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or impris-
onment not exceeding six (6) months or both. xxx
29. Lee and Aggabao, for their defiance and resistance to the October 1, 2004
alias writ of execution enforcing this Courts February 23, 2004 decision
resulting in the frustration of its execution are hereby adjudged guilty of
indirect contempt.
30. Finally, with regard to the administrative charge against Lee and Aggabao
counsel, Atty. Teodorico Fernandez, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 1,
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, this Court resolves to refer it to the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation.
 002 HEIRS OF CASTILLO vs. LACUATA-GABRIEL (DAGUMAN)
November 11, 2005 | Callejo, Sr., J. | Appointment of Special Administrator
PETITIONER: Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo, namely Bena Jean, Daniel,
Melchor, Present: Michael and Danibel, all surnamed Castillo
RESPONDENTS: Dolores Lacuata-Gabriel
SUMMARY:
Crisanta, wife of Lorenzo, died. Her mother, Crisanta Santiago, commenced an
intestate proceeding and alleged that her daughter died intestate and that her
estate was being managed by her wastrel and incompetent son-in-law, Lorenzo.
She thus prayed that her son, Mariano, be appointed the administrator. The
court, however, appointed Lorenzo. Later on, Lorenzo and Crisanta’s marriage
was declared void for being bigamous so the court appointed Mariano as
administrator. Thereafter, one Belinda Castillo, claiming to be the only
legitimate child of Lorenzo and Crisanta, filed a motion for intervention. Shortly
thereafter, Roberto, the legally adopted son of Crisanta Y. Gabriel, filed before
the RTC of Malabon City a petition for probate of an alleged will and for the
issuance of letters testamentary in his favor. He alleged that he discovered his
mother's will in which he was instituted as the sole heir of the testatrix, and
designated as alternate executor for the named executor therein, Francisco, a
brother of Crisanta, who had predeceased the latter. Belinda Castillo died and
her heirs filed a Motion praying that they be substituted as party-litigants in lieu
of their late mother. When Belinda died, the intestate proceeding filed by
Crisanta’s mother was dismissed so now there is no administrator. Later on,
Roberto also died. His widow, Dolores L. Gabriel, thus filed a "Manifestation
and Motion" where she informed the probate court of her husband's death and
prayed that she be admitted as substitute in place of her late husband, and be
appointed as administratrix of the estate of Crisanta. The lower court appointed
Dolores as special administratrix upon a bond. This appointment was questioned
by the heirs of Castillo. ISSUE: WoN the lower court erred in appointing
Dolores as the special administratrix—NO. The appointment of a special admin-
istrator lies entirely in the discretion of the court, and Dolores’s appointment is
proper. RULING: The appointment of a special administrator lies entirely in
the discretion of the court. The order of preference in the appointment of a
regular administrator under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court does not
apply to the selection of a special administrator. In the issuance of such
appointment, which is but temporary and subsists only until a regular
administrator is appointed, the court determines who is entitled to the
administration of the estate of the decedent. In this case, Roberto, the legally
adopted son of Crisanta, survived Crisanta's death. Thus, when Crisanta died,
her estate passed on to her surviving adopted son Roberto. And when Roberto
himself died, pursuant to the law on succession, his own estate which he
inherited from Crisanta passed on to his surviving widow, Dolores. While it is
true that Dolores is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir of Crisanta and is
considered a third person to the estate of the latter, nonetheless, Dolores is
undeniably entitled to the administration of the said estate because she is an heir
of her husband Roberto, whose estate is the former estate of his adopting mother
Crisanta.
DOCTRINE:
A special administrator is a representative of a decedent appointed by the pro-
bate court to care for and preserve his estate until an executor or general admin-
istrator is appointed. When appointed, a special administrator is regarded not as
a representative of the agent of the parties suggesting the appointment, but as
the administrator in charge of the estate, and, in fact, as an officer of the court.
As such officer, he is subject to the supervision and control of the probate court
and is expected to work for the best interests of the entire estate, especially its
smooth administration and earliest settlement. The principal object of appoint-
ment of temporary administrator is to preserve the estate until it can pass into
hands of person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors and
heirs.
The basis for appointing a special administrator under the Rules is broad enough
to include any cause or reason for the delay in granting letters testamentary
or of administration as where a contest as to the will is being carried on in
the same or in another court, or where there is an appeal pending as to the
proceeding on the removal of an executor or administrator, or in cases
where the parties cannot agree among themselves. Likewise, when from any
cause general administration cannot be immediately granted, a special
administrator may be appointed to collect and preserve the property of the
deceased (Section 1, Rule 80 of the Revised Rules of Court).
FACTS:
1. On January 25, 1989, Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel, the wife of Lorenzo Almora-
die, died in Malabon City. She left behind a sizable inheritance consisting
mostly of real estate and shares of stock.
2. A little over a month after Crisanta’s death, her mother, Crisanta Santiago,
commenced an intestate proceeding before the RTC of Malabon. She al-
leged that her daughter died intestate leaving an estate with an estimated net
value of 1.5M and that such estate was being managed by her wastrel and
incompetent son-in-law, Lorenzo, and by two other equally incompetent
persons (did not mention who). She thus prayed that the letters of admin-
istration be issued to her son, Mariano Yanga, Jr, who is also the brother of
the deceased. She further prayed that she be awarded her share of the estate
of her daughter.
3. The RTC, however, appointed Lorenzo as the administrator.
4. In the meantime, the marriage between Crisanta and Lorenzo was declared
 void for being bigamous. The RTC then removed Lorenzo as administrator
and appointed Mariano, Jr. in his stead.
5. On October 16, 1989, Belinda Castillo, claiming to be the only legitimate
child of Lorenzo and Crisanta, filed a motion for intervention. The resolu-
tion of this issue however was held in abeyance due to some incidents (did
not mention what incidents in particular).
6. On November 3 of the same year, Roberto Y. Gabriel, the legally adopted
son of Crisanta filed before the RTC of Malabon a petition for the probate
of an alleged will, and for the issuance of letters of testamentary in his fa-
vor. He alleged that he discovered his mother’s will on October 25, 1989 in
which he was instituted as the sole heir, and designated as alternate executor
for the designated executor, Francisco Yanga, a brother of Crisanta who had
predeceased the latter.
7. On June 2, 1990, Belinda Castillo died.
8. The two special proceedings (the intestate proceeding filed by the mother
and the one filed by Roberto, the adoptive son) were consolidated, and the
intestate proceeding filed by the mother was dismissed. Roberto was ap-
pointed as the special administrator of his mother’s estate.
9. Mariano questioned the dismissal via a petition for certiorari, but this was
dismissed by the CA.
10. Meanwhile, the heirs of Belinda, all surnamed Castillo, filed a motion pray-
ing that they be substituted as party-litigants in lieu of their deceased moth-
er.
11. On April 16, 2001, Roberto died. His widow, Dolores, filed a manifestation
and motion informing the court of her husband’s death. She prayed that she
be admitted as substitute of her husband, and be appointed as the adminis-
tratrix of the estate of Crisanta. She alleged that she had a bachelors degree
in law and had worked for several years in a law office.
12. The heirs of Belinda opposed Dolores’s manifestation and motuon. They
averred that Dolores was not Crisanta’s next of kin, let alone the lawful
wife of the Roberto.
13. Bena Jean, one of the children of Belinda, filed a motion for appointment as
administrator of the estate of Crisanta. This was opposed by Dolores.
Dolores claimed that Bena Jean has not proven her kinship with Crisanta
nor has she shown any particular qualification to act as administratrix.
14. The lower court appointed Dolores as special administratrix upon a bond of
P200,000. The probate court merely noted the motion for substitution field
by the heirs of Belinda, stating that they were mere strangers to the case and
that their cause could better be ventilated in a separate proceeding. The
court stated that:
a. Dolores L. Gabriel has amply proven her kinship with petitioner
Roberto Y. Gabriel, and therefore her kinship, by operation of law,
with decedent Crisanta Y. Gabriel. In the probate proceedings, this
Court has the power to determine questions as to who are the heirs
of the decedent , the recognition of a natural child , the validity of
disinheritance effected by the testator and the status of a woman
who claims to be the lawful wife of the decedent…. And even as-
suming that movant Dolores’s relationship was not proven, the
stringent rules regarding the order of preference in the appointment
of an Administrator does not find application in the instant case for
what is at stake here is the appointment of a Special Administrator
as such position was vacated by the death of the previously ap-
pointed Special Administrator. The reason for the relaxation of
the rules regarding the appointment of a Special Administrator
is the nature of its position, being merely temporary and will
subsist only until a regular administrator or executor is ap-
pointed.
15. Belinda’s heirs filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied. They
then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for TRO against
Dolores and the probate court. They pray that Bena Jean be appointed as the
regular administratrix of Crisanta.
16. The CA dismissed the heirs’ petition, so the heirs elevated the case with the
SC wherein they argue that since Dolores does not have any right to inherit
from their grandmother/mother of Crisanta, Dolores thus is not qualified to
be appointed as administratrix of the estate; in contrast, they are Crisanta’s
only compulsory heirs. They insist that Roberto was just a nephew of the
decedent and not a legally adopted son as he claimed to be. Even assuming
that he was the adoptive son, the fact that Roberto is not naturally related to
the decedent by blood in the direct descending line makes it unfair to ap-
point her as the special administratrix. Citing jurisprudence, the heirs of
Castillo explain that the principal consideration in the appointment of ad-
ministrator of a deceased persons estate is the applicant’s interest therein. In
fact, this is the same consideration which Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of
Court takes into account in establishing the order of preference in the ap-
pointment of such administrators. The heirs of Castillo insists that the un-
derlying assumption behind this rule is that those who will reap the benefit
of a wise, speedy, economical administration of the estate, or suffer the con-
sequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest in-
terest and most influential motive to administer the estate correctly.
ISSUES:
1. WoN the lower court erred in appointing Dolores as the special administra-
trix—NO. The appointment of a special administrator lies entirely in the
discretion of the court, and Dolores’s appointment is proper.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. SP No. 70645, dated October 30, 2003, and its Reso-
lution of March 26, 2004 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.
RATIO: to include any cause or reason for delay in granting letters testamentary or
1. The ruling of the CA is correct. The appointment of a special administra- of administration as where a contest as to the will is being carried on in the
tor lies entirely in the discretion of the court. The order of preference in same or in another court, or where there is an appeal pending as to the pro-
the appointment of a regular administrator under Section 6, Rule 78 of ceeding on the removal of an executor or administrator, or in cases where
the Rules of Court does not apply to the selection of a special adminis- the parties cannot agree among themselves.
trator. In the issuance of such appointment, which is but temporary 5. It also cannot be said that the appointment of Dolores is whimsical. This is
and subsists only until a regular administrator is appointed, the court because the deceased Crisanta left an alleged will wherein she designated
determines who is entitled to the administration of the estate of the de- her adopted son, Roberto, as the sole heir of all her properties. However,
cedent. Thus, the preference of Dolores is with sufficient reason, since the pending probate of the will, Roberto died leaving Dolores as his sole heir.
facts of the case show that Roberto, the legally adopted son of Crisanta, Thus, Dolores has much stake in Crisanta’s estate in case the latters will is
survived Crisanta’s death. When Crisanta died, her estate passed on to her allowed probate. It needs to be emphasized that in the appointment of a
surviving adopted son Roberto. When Roberto himself later died, pursuant special administrator (which is but temporary and subsists only until a
to the law on succession, his own estate which he inherited from Crisanta regular administrator is appointed), the probate court does not deter-
passed on to his surviving widow, Dolores. While it is true that Dolores is mine the shares in the decedents estate, but merely appoints who is en-
neither a compulsory nor a legal heir of Crisanta and is considered a third titled to administer the estate. The issue of heirship is one to be deter-
person to the estate of the latter, nonetheless, Dolores is undeniably entitled mined in the decree of distribution, and the findings of the court on the
to the administration of the said estate because she is an heir of her husband relationship of the parties in the administration as to be the basis of dis-
Roberto, whose estate is the former estate of his adopting mother Crisanta. tribution. Thus, the preference of Dolores is sound, that is, not whimsical,
2. A special administrator is a representative of a decedent appointed by or contrary to reason, justice, equity or legal principle.
the probate court to care for and preserve his estate until an executor 6. Furthermore, the heir’s strenuous invocation of Section 6, Rule 78 of the
or general administrator is appointed. When appointed, a special ad- Rules of Court is misplaced. The rule refers to the appointment of regu-
ministrator is regarded not as a representative of the agent of the par- lar administrators of estates; Section 1, Rule 80, on the other hand, ap-
ties suggesting the appointment, but as the administrator in charge of plies to the appointment of a special administrator. It has long been set-
the estate, and, in fact, as an officer of the court. As such officer, he is tled that the appointment of special administrators is not governed by
subject to the supervision and control of the probate court and is ex- the rules regarding the appointment of regular administrators
pected to work for the best interests of the entire estate, especially its
smooth administration and earliest settlement. The principal object of
appointment of temporary administrator is to preserve the estate until
it can pass into hands of person fully authorized to administer it for the
benefit of creditors and heirs.
3. In many instances, the appointment of administrators for the estates of de-
cedents frequently become involved in protracted litigations, thereby expos-
ing such estates to great waste and losses unless an authorized agent to col-
lect the debts and preserve the assets in the interim is appointed. The occa-
sion for such an appointment, likewise, arises where, for some cause, such
as a pendency of a suit concerning the proof of the will, regular administra-
tion is delayed.
4. The new rule under Sec. 1 of Rule 80 broadened the basis for the appoint-
ment of an administrator, and such appointment is not allowed when there is
delay in granting letters testamentary or administration by any cause. Nev-
ertheless, the discretion to appoint a special administrator or not lies in
the probate court. This discretion, however, must be sound, that is, not
whimsical, or contrary to reason, justice, equity or legal principle. The
basis for appointing a special administrator under the Rules is broad enough
 003 Ancheta v. Dalaygon (DAYU)
June 8, 2006 | Austria-Martinez, J. | Powers and Duties of Executors, Administrators,
and Special Executors
FACTS:
PETITIONER: Alonzo Q. Ancheta
RESPONDENTS: Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-
Nazario, JJ.; Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon
SUMMARY: Spouses Audrey and Richard were American citizens who have
resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle.
Audrey died. She left a will wherein she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard
consisting of Audrey’s conjugal share in real estate improvements at Forbes Park
[Makati Property], current account with cash balance and shares of stock in A/G
Interiors. After her death, Richard married Dalaygon. Eventually, Richard died
and left a will wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to Dalaygon, except for
his shares in A/G, which he left to Kyle. Atty. Ancheta, as ancillary
administrator of Audrey’s will, filed a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as
heirs of Audrey and a project of partition of Audrey’s estate. The motion and
project of partition were granted. Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator of
Richard’s will also filed a project of partition, leaving 2/5 of Richard’s undivided
interest in the Makati property to Dalaygon, while 3/5 to the three children (2
kids with Dalaygon + Kyle). Dalaygon opposed on the ground that under the law
of the State of Maryland, where Richard was a native of, a legacy passes to the
legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property subject to the legacy.
Issue is w/n decree of distribution of Atty. Ancheta may still be annulled and w/n
Atty. Ancheta committed fraud—SC said yes, it may be annulled, and yes, Atty.
Ancheta committed fraud. A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased
person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees, which, if
erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it becomes final, its
binding effect is like any other judgment in rem.
However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be
set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud.
In this case, Atty. Ancheta’s defense is that he acted in good faith and is not
aware of the laws of Maryland. Moreover, it is more equitable to follow
Philippine laws—which includes the children as heirs. SC says that failure to
proficiently manage the distribution of Audrey’s estate according to the terms of
her will and as dictated by the applicable law (Maryland law) amounted to
extrinsic fraud, as he was duty-bound as part of his fiduciary duties to introduce
into evidence the pertinent laws of Maryland.
DOCTRINE:
While such breach of duty admittedly cannot be considered extrinsic fraud under
ordinary circumstances, the fiduciary nature of the Atty. Ancheta’s position, as
well as the resultant frustration of the decedent’s last will, combine to create a
circumstance that is tantamount to extrinsic fraud.
89. Spouses Audrey O’Neill and W. Richard Guersey were American citizen
who have resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted
daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle).
90. July 29, 1979—Audrey died, leaving a will. She bequeathed her entired
estate to Richard, who was also designated as executor. The will was
admitted to probate before the Orphans Court of Baltimore, Maryland,
USA—named James Phillips as executor due to Richard’s renunciation of
his appointment. Court also named Atty. Ancheta (petitioner) of the Quasha
Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices as ancillary administrator.
91. 1981—Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon (respondent): they
have 2 children, Kimberly and Kevin.
92. Oct. 12, 1982—the CFI of Rizal, Branch 25, Pasig also admitted Audrey’s
will to probate, in Spec. Pro. No. 9625.
93. As administrator of Audrey’s estate in the Philippines, Atty. Ancheta filed
an inventory and appraisal of the following properties: (1) Audrey’s
conjugal share in real estate with improvements located at 28 Pili Ave.
Forbes Park [Makati Property]; (2) current account in Audrey’s name with
a cash balance of P12,417.97; (3) and 64,444 shares of stock in A/G
Interiors, Inc.
94. July 20, 1984—Richard died leaving a will. He bequeathed his entire
estate to Dalaygon, save for his rights and interest over the A/G
Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle.
95. Richard’s will was also admitted to probate by Orphans Court of Ann
Arundel, Maryland, USA and James Phillips was likewise appointed as
executor, who in turn designated Atty. William Quasha or any member of
the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices as ancillary
administrator.
96. Richard’s will was then submitted for probate before the RTC of Makati,
Branch 138, docketed Spec. Pro. no. M-888. Atty. Quasha was appointed as
ancillary administrator.
97. Oct. 19, 1987—Atty. Ancheta filed in Spec. Pro No. 9625, a motion to
declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey.
98. Oct. 23—filed a project of partition of Audrey’s estate, with Richard being
apportioned the undivided interest in the Makati property, 48.333 shares in
A/G Interiors, Inc., and P9,313.48 from the Citibank current account; and
Kyle, the undivided interest in the Makati property, 16,111 shares in A/G
Interiors, Inc., and P3,104.49 in cash.
99. Motion and project of partition was granted and approved by trial court, and
issued order directing Register of Deeds of Makati to cancel TCT No.
 69792 in the name of Richard and to issue a new title in the joint names of
the Estate of W. Richard Guersey (undivided interest) and Kyle (undivided
interest); directing the Secretary of A/G Interiors, Inc. to transfer 48.333
shares to the Estate of Richard and 16.111 shares to Kyle; and directing the
Citibank to release the amount of P12,417.97 to the ancillary administrator
for distribution to the heirs.
100. Register of Deeds of Makati issued TCT No. 155823 in names of Estate of
Richard and Kyle.
101. Meanwhile, ancillary administrator in Spec. Pro. No. M-888 filed a project
of partition wherein 2/5 of Richard’s undivided interest in the Makati
property was allocated to Dalaygon, while 3/5 allocated to Richard’s 3
children.
102. This was opposed by Dalaygon on the ground that under the law of the
State of Maryland, a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the
testator in the property subject of the legacy. Since Richard left his entire
estate to Dalaygon, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors,
Inc, shares, then his entire undivided interest in the Makati property should
be given to Dalaygon.
103. Trial court found merit in Dalaygon’s opposition. Disapproved the project
of partition of Makati property. Also adjudicated Richard’s entire undivided
interest in the Makati property to Dalaygon.
104. Oct. 20, 1993—Dalaygon filed with CA an amended complaint for
annulment of trial court orders issued in Spec. Pro. No. 9625. Dalaygon
contended that Atty. Ancheta willfully breached his fiduciary duty when he
disregarded the laws of the State of Maryland on the distribution of
Audrey’s estate in accordance with her will.
105. Dalaygon argued that since Audrey devised her entire estate to Richard,
then the Makati property should be wholly adjudicated to him, and not
merely. And since Richard left his entire estate, except for his rights and
interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. to Dalaygon, then the entire Makati
property should now pertain to Dalaygon.
106. Atty. Ancheta filed answer denying Dalaygon’s allegations. He contends
that he acted in good faith in submitting the project of partition in Spec. Pro.
No. 9625 because he had no knowledge of the Maryland’s laws on testate
and intestate succession. He alleged that he believed that it is to the best
interests of the surviving children that Philippine law be applied as they
would receive their just shares. Also, that the orders sought to be annulled
are already final and executory; hence, cannot be set aside.
107. March 18, 1999—CA rendeder assailed decision annulling trial court’s
orders in Spec. Pro. No. 9625.
ISSUE/s:
10. WoN decree of distribution may still be annulled—YES, in exceptional
cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of
jurisdiction or fraud.
11. WoN Atty. Ancheta—as ancillary administrator having acted in good
faith—did not commit fraud, either extrinsic or intrinsic, in the performance
of his duties as ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate in the Phil. and
that no fraud was employed by him in procurding said orders—NO, While
such breach of duty admittedly cannot be considered extrinsic fraud under
ordinary circumstances, the fiduciary nature of the Atty. Ancheta’s position,
as well as the resultant frustration of the decedent’s last will, combine to
create a circumstance that is tantamount to extrinsic fraud.
RULING: Wherefore, the petition is denied. Petitioner is ADMONISHED to be
more circumspect in the performance of his duties as an official of the court.
RATIO:
123. Atty. Ancheta contends that he acted in good faith in performing his duties
as an ancillary administrator. That at the time of the filing of the project of
partition, he was not aware of the relevant laws of Maryland, such that the
partition was made in accordance with Philippine laws. He also imputes
knowledge on the part of Dalaygon with regard to the terms of Aubrey’s
will, stating that as early as 1984, he already apprised Dalaygon of the
contents of the will and how the estate will be divided.
124. Dalaygon argues that Atty. Ancheta’s breach of his fiduciary duty amounted
to extrinsic fraud. That Atty. Ancheta was duty-bound to follow the express
terms of Aubrey’s will, and his denial of knowledge of Maryland laws
cannot stand because Atty. Ancheta is a senior partner in a prestigious law
firm and it was his duty to know the relevant laws. She also states that she
wasn’t able to file any opposition to the project of partition because she was
not a party there, and she learned of the provision of Aubrey’s will
bequeathing entire estate to Richard only after Atty. Ancheta filed a project
of partition in Spec. Pro. No. M-888 for the settlement of Richard’s estate.
Issue 1
125. A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to
the land of the estate in the distributees, which, if erroneous may be
corrected by a timely appeal.
126. Once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem.
However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate
may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud.
127. In Ramon v. Ortuzar, Court ruled that a party interested in probate
proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when he is left out by
reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or
inadvertence not imputable to negligence.
128. Petition for annulment was filed before the CA before the issuance of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; hence, applicable law is Batas Pambansa
 Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.
129. An annulment of judgment filed under BP 129 may be based on the ground
that a judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or that the judgment was
obtained by extrinsic fraud. For fraud to become a basis for annulment, it
has to be extrinsic or actual, and must be brought within 4 yrs from
discovery of the fraud.
130. In the present case, Dalaygon alleged extrinsic fraud as basis for annulment
of RTC orders. CA found merit in Dalaygon’s cause and found that Atty.
Ancheta’s failure to follow terms of Audrey’s will, despite his declaration
of good faith, amounted to extrinsic fraud. CA ruled that under Art. 16 of
CC, national law of Audrey is applicable. Hence, Atty. Ancheta should have
distributed Audrey’s estate in accordance with the terms of her will. CA
also found that Atty. Ancheta was prompted to distribute Audrey’s estate in
accordance with Phil. laws in order to equally benefit Audrey and Richard’s
adopted daughter, Kyle.
131. Atty. Ancheta contends that Dalaygon’s cause of action had already
prescribed because as early as 1984, Dalaygon was already well aware of
the terms of Audrey’s will and the complaint was filed only in 1993.
Dalaygon justified her lack of immediate action by saying that she had no
opportunity to question Atty. Ancheta’s acts since she was not a party to
Spec. Pro. No. 9625, and it was only after Atty. Ancheta filed the project of
partition in Spec. Pro No. M-888, reducing her inheritance in the estate of
Richard, that she was prompted to seek another counsel to protect her
interest.
132. The prescriptive period for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud
commences to run from the discovery of fraud/fraudulent act/s.
Dalaygon’s knowledge of the terms of Audrey’s will is immaterial since it
is not the fraud complained of. Rather it is Atty. Ancheta’s failure to
introduce in evidence the pertinent law of Maryland that is the fraudulent
act, or in this case, omission, alleged to have been committed aginst
Dalaygon, and therefore, the 4-year period should be counted from the time
of Dalaygon’s discovery.
133. Records bear the fact that filing of the project of partition of Richard’s
estate, the opposition thereto, and the order of the trial court disallowing the
project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888 were all done in 1991.
Since the action for annulment was filed in 1993, clearly, the same has not
yet prescribed.
134. Fraud takes on different shapes and faces. The overriding consideration
when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the
prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.
135. Atty. Ancheta is the ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate. As such, he
occupies a position of the highest trust and confidence, and he is required to
exercise reasonable diligence and act in entire good faith in the performance
of that trust. Although he is not a guarantor or insurer of the safety of the
estate nor is he expected to be infallible, yet the same degree of prudence,
care and judgment which a person of a fair average capacity and ability
exercises in similar transactions of his own, serves as the standard by which
his conduct is to be judged.
136. Atty. Ancheta’s failure to proficienty manage the distribution of Audrey’s
estate according to the terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable
law amounted to extrinsic fraud.
Issue 2 [Important Part]
137. It is undisputed that Audrey was an American citizen domiciled in
Maryland. During the reprobate of her will in Spec. Pro. No. 9625, it was
shown that at the time of Audrey’s death she was residing in the Philippines
but is domiciled in Maryland. Her Last Will was executed and probated
before the Orphan’s Court in Baltimore, Maryland.
138. Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audrey’s will, especially
with regard as to who are her heirs, is governed by her national law (Law of
Maryland), as provided in Art. 16 of Civil Code.23
139. Art. 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that capacity to succeed is
governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
140. While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our
courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them; however, Atty.
Ancheta, as ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate, was duty-bound to
introduce in evidence the pertinent law of Maryland.
141. Atty. Ancheta admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence the law of the
Maryland on Estates and Trusts, and merely relied on the presumption that
such law is the same as the Philippine law on wills and succession. Thus,
trial court peremptorily applied Philippine laws and totally disregarded the
terms of Audrey’s will. The obvious result was that there was no fair
submission of the case before the trial court or a judicious appreciation of
the evidence presented.
142. He insists that his application of Phil. laws was made in good faith. The
Court cannot accept Atty. Ancheta’s protestation. How can he honestly
presume that Phil. laws apply when as early as the reprobate of Audrey’s
will before the trial court in 1982, it was already brought to fore that Audrey
was a U.S. citizen, domiciled in Maryland.
143. Atty. Ancheta is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm, with a big legal
staff and a large library. He had all the legal resources to determine the
23
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situat-
ed.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regu-
lated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
 applicable law. It was incumbent upon him to exercise his functions as
ancillary administrator with reasonable diligence, and to discharge the trust
reposed on him faithfully. Unfortunately, he failed to perform his fiduciary
duties.
144. Moreover, whether his omission was intentional or not, the fact remains that
the trial court failed to consider said law when it issued RTC Orders
declaring Richard and Kyle as Audrey’s heirs, and distributing Audrey’s
estate according to the project of partition submitted by Atty. Ancheta. This
eventually prejudiced Dalaygon and deprived her of her full successional
right to the Makati property.
145. CA aptly noted that Atty. Ancheta was remiss in his responsibilities as
ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate. CA likewise observed that
distributions made by him was prompted by his concern over Kyle, whom
he believed should equally benefit from the Makati property.
146. [Important pls read] The CA correctly stated, which the Court adopts,
thus: “defendant lost sight of the fact that his primary responsibility as
ancillary administrator was to distribute the subject estate in accordance
with the will of Audrey. Considering the principle established under Art.
16, as well as the citizenship and the avowed domicile of the decedent, it
goes without saying that Atty. Ancheta was also duty-bound to prove the
pertinent laws of Maryland. It would seem that the eventual distribution of
the estate was prompted by his concern that the subject realty equally
benefit adopted daughter, Kyle. Well-intentioned though, his actions
appears to have breached his duties and responsibilities as ancillary
administrator of the subject estate. While such breach of duty admittedly
cannot be considered extrinsic fraud under ordinary circumstances, the
fiduciary nature of the Atty. Ancheta’s position, as well as the resultant
frustration of the decedent’s last will, combine to create a circumstance that
is tantamount to extrinsic fraud. His omission to prove the national laws of
decedent and to follow latter’s last will, in sum, resulted in the procurement
of the subject orders without a fair submission of the real issues involved in
the case.
147. This is not a simple case of error of judgment or grave abuse of discretion,
but a total disregard of the law as a result of Atty. Ancheta’s abject failure
to discharge his fiduciary duties. It does not rest upon his pleasure which
law should be made applicable under the circumstance. His onus is clear.
Dalaygon was thus excluded from enjoying full rights to the Makati
property through no fault or negligence of her own. She was in no position
to analyze the legal implications of Atty. Ancheta’s omission and it was
belatedly that she realized the adverse consequence of the same.
148. In Audrey’s will, she devised to Richard her entire estate. All these
properties passed on to Richard upon Audrey’s death. Meanwhile, Richard
in his will bequeathed his entire estate to Dalaygon, except for his rights
and interest over the A/G Interiors shares, which he left to Kyle. When
Richard subsequently died, the entire Makati property should have then
passed on to Dalaygon. This, of course, assumes the proposition that the law
of Maryland which allows a legacy to pass to the legatee the entire estate of
the testator in the property which is the subject of the legacy, was
sufficiently proven in Spec. Pro. No. 9625. Nevertheless, the Court may
take judicial notice thereof in view of Bohanan v. Bohanan—therein, Court
took judicial notice of Nevada law despite failure to prove the same.
149. In this case, given that the pertinent law of Maryland has been brought to
record before the CA, and the trial court in Spec. Pro No. M-888
appropriately took note of the same in disapproving the proposed project of
partition of Richard’s estate, not to mention that Atty. Ancheta or any other
interested person for that matter, does not dispute the existence or validity
of said law, then Audrey’s and Richard’s estate should be distributed
according to their respective wills, and not according to the project of
partition submitted by Atty. Ancheta.
150. Consequently, entire Makati property belongs to Dalaygon.
151. Honorable as it seems, Atty. Ancheta’s motive in equitably distributing
Audrey’s estate cannot prevail over Audrey’s and Richard’s wishes.
152. As stated in Bellis v. Bellis: “whatever public policy or good customs may
be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend
the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically
chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the
decedent’s national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general
ones.”
NOT IMPORTANT:
153. Court notes fact that Audrey and Richard Guersey were American citizens
who owned real property in the Philippines, although records do not show
when and how the Guersey’s acquired the Makati property.
154. As is now stands, Art. XII, Sec. 7-8 of 1986 Constitution explicitly
prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private lands or to
lands of the public domain, except only be way of legal succession or if the
acquisition was made by a former natural-born citizen.
155. In any case, Court has ruled that if land is invalidly transferred to alien who
subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in
original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is
rendered valid.
156. Since Makati property has already passed on to Dalaygon who is a Filipino,
then whatever flaw that attended the acquisition by the Guersey’s of the
Makati property is not inconsequential, as the objective of the constitutional
provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.
 004 RIOFERIO v. CA (Escalona)
January 13, 2004 | Tinga, J. | Legal standing of heirs due to absence of an
administrator
PETITIONER: Teodora A. Rioferio, Veronica O. Evangelista, Alberto
Orfinada, and Rowena Ungos
RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals, Esperanca Orfinada, Lourdes Orfinada,
Alfonso Orfinada, Nancy Orfinada, Alfonso James Orfinada, Christopher
Orfinada, and Angelo Orfinada
FACTS:
SUMMARY: Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will leaving several
personal and real properties. He also left a widow, respondent Esperanza P.
Orfinada, whom he had seven children who are the herein respondents.
Also, the decedent also left his paramour and their children. They are petitioner
Teodora Riofero and co-petitioners Veronica, Alberto and Rowena. Respondents
Alfonso James and Lourdes (legitimate children of the deceased) discovered that
petitioner Teodora and her children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Es-
tate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of
the decedent located in Dagupan City.
Respondent Alfonso filed a Petition for Letters of Administration. Respondents
filed a Complaint for the Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial Settlement of
Estate. Petitioners raised the affirmative defense that respondents are not the real
parties-in-interest but rather the Estate of Alfonso O. Orfinada, Jr. in view of the
pendency of the administration proceedings.
The issue is WoN the respondents have legal standing to file suit.
The SC ruled that the respondents have legal standing. The SC discussed that the
general rule is that heirs do not have legal standing to file suit because the
administrator should be the one to file suits on behalf of the estate of the
deceased. But the SC also discussed certain exceptions to this rule (see doctrine).
This case falling under the third exception, the respondents have legal standing
to file the suit, which in this case is the petition for letters of administration and
annulment/rescission of extra judicial settlement of estate of a deceased person
with quitclaim. The SC ended by saying that it would be unfair for the heirs not
represented and pursue the rights and interests of the deceased based on the three
exceptions, hence allowing them the legal standing.
DOCTRINE: There are three exceptions to when the heirs do not have legal
standing to file a suit to protect the rights and interests of the deceased.
(1) If the executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit;
(2) When the administrator is alleged to have participated in the act complained
of and he is made a party defendant. Evidently, the necessity for the heirs to seek
judicial relief to recover property of the estate is as compelling when there is no
appointed administrator, if not more, as where there is an appointed administra-
tor but he is either disinclined to bring suit or is one of the guilty parties himself.
(3) When there is no administrator appointed during the administration proceed-
ings.
18. Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will in Angeles City leaving several
personal and real properties located in Angeles City, Dagupan City and Ka-
lookan City. He also left a widow, respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom
he married on July 11, 1960 and with whom he had seven children who are
the herein respondents, namely: Lourdes P. Orfinada, Alfonso Clyde P.
Orfinada, Nancy P. Orfinada-Happenden, Alfonso James P. Orfinada,
Christopher P. Orfinada, Alfonso Mike P. Orfinada (deceased) and Angelo
P. Orfinada.
19. Apart from the respondents, the demise of the decedent left in mourning his
paramour and their children. They are petitioner Teodora Riofero, who be-
came a part of his life when he entered into an extra-marital relationship
with her during the subsistence of his marriage to Esperanza sometime in
1965, and co-petitioners Veronica, Alberto and Rowena.
20. Respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes Orfinada discovered that petition-
er Teodora Rioferio and her children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement
of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim involving the properties of
the estate of the decedent located in Dagupan City and that accordingly, the
Registry of Deeds in Dagupan issued Certificates of Titles Nos. 63983,
63984 and 63985 in favor of petitioners Teodora Rioferio, Veronica Orfina-
da-Evangelista, Alberto Orfinada and Rowena Orfinada-Ungos. Respond-
ents also found out that petitioners were able to obtain a loan
of P700,000.00 from the Rural Bank of Mangaldan Inc. by executing a Real
Estate Mortgage over the properties subject of the extra-judicial settlement.
21. On December 1, 1995, respondent Alfonso Clyde P. Orfinada III filed
a Petition for Letters of Administration docketed as S.P. Case No. 5118 be-
fore the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, praying that letters of admin-
istration encompassing the estate of Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. be issued to
him.
22. On December 4, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint for the Annul-
ment/Rescission of Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Per-
son with Quitclaim, Real Estate Mortgage and Cancellation of Transfer
Certificate of Titles with Nos. 63983, 63985 and 63984 and Other Related
Documents with Damages against petitioners, the Rural Bank of Man-
 galdan, Inc. and the Register of Deeds of Dagupan City before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 42, Dagupan City.
23. Petitioners filed their Answer to the aforesaid complaint interposing the de-
fense that the property subject of the contested deed of extra-judicial settle-
ment pertained to the properties originally belonging to the parents of Teo-
dora Riofero and that the titles thereof were delivered to her as an advance
inheritance but the decedent had managed to register them in his
name. Petitioners also raised the affirmative defense that respondents
are not the real parties-in-interest but rather the Estate of Alfonso O.
Orfinada, Jr. in view of the pendency of the administration proceed-
ings.
24. The lower court denied the motion in its Order, on the ground that re-
spondents, as heirs, are the real parties-in-interest especially in the ab-
sence of an administrator who is yet to be appointed in S.P. Case No.
5118. Petitioners moved for its reconsideration but the motion was
likewise denied.
25. This prompted petitioners to file before the Court of Appeals their Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court docketed as CA G.R.
S.P. No. 42053. Petitioners averred that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the assailed order, which denied the dismissal of the
case on the ground that the proper party to file the complaint for the annul-
ment of the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased is the estate
of the decedent and not the respondents.
26. The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision dated January 31,
1997, stating that it discerned no grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction by the public respondent judge when he de-
nied petitioners motion to set affirmative defenses for hearing in view of its
discretionary nature.
27. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners but it was de-
nied. Hence, the petition before this Court.
ISSUES:
3. WoN the heirs have legal standing to prosecute the rights belonging to the
deceased subsequent to the commencement of the administration
proceedings – YES. This case falls squarely on the third exception of when
heirs have legal standing to file suits to protect the rights and interests of the
deceased.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The assailed deci-
sion and resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
Minor procedural issue on lack of preliminary hearing on an affirmative defense
1. Petitioners vehemently fault the lower court for denying their motion to set
the case for preliminary hearing on their affirmative defense that the proper
party to bring the action is the estate of the decedent and not the respond-
ents. It must be stressed that the holding of a preliminary hearing on an af-
firmative defense lies in the discretion of the court. This is clear from the
Rules of Court, thus:
a. SEC. 5. Pleadings grounds as affirmative defenses - Any of the
grounds for dismissal provided for in this rule, except improper
venue, may be pleaded as an affirmative defense, and a preliminary
hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been
filed.
2. Certainly, the incorporation of the word “may” in the provision is clearly
indicative of the optional character of the preliminary hearing. The word
denotes discretion and cannot be construed as having a mandatory ef-
fect. Subsequently, the electivity of the proceeding was firmed up beyond
cavil by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure with the inclusion of the phrase
in the discretion of the Court, apart from the retention of the word may in
Section 6, in Rule 16 thereof.
Main issue on legal standing of the heirs
3. Just as no blame of abuse of discretion can be laid on the lower courts door-
step for not hearing petitioners affirmative defense, it cannot likewise be
faulted for recognizing the legal standing of the respondents as heirs to
bring the suit.
4. Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt
have legal personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in
accordance with the provision of Article 777 of the New Civil Code that
(t)he rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of
the decedent. The provision in turn is the foundation of the principle that the
property, rights and obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of
a person are transmitted through his death to another or others by his will or
by operation of law.
5. Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the
heirs may still bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been ap-
pointed. This is the proper modality despite the total lack of advertence to
the heirs in the rules on party representation, namely Section 3, Rule 3 and
Section 2, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. In fact, in the case of Gochan v.
Young, this Court recognized the legal standing of the heirs to represent
the rights and properties of the decedent under administration pending
the appointment of an administrator.
6. The above-quoted rules, while permitting an executor or administrator to
represent or to bring suits on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the
 heirs from representing the deceased. These rules are easily applicable to
cases in which an administrator has already been appointed. But no
rule categorically addresses the situation in which special proceedings
for the settlement of an estate have already been instituted, yet no ad-
ministrator has been appointed. In such instances, the heirs cannot be ex-
pected to wait for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to
see if the administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect
the rights and the interests of the deceased; and in the meantime do nothing
while the rights and the properties of the decedent are violated or dissipated.
7. Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognizes two
exceptions:
a. (1) If the executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring
suit; and
b. (2) When the administrator is alleged to have participated in the act
complained of and he is made a party defendant. Evidently, the ne-
cessity for the heirs to seek judicial relief to recover property of the
estate is as compelling when there is no appointed administrator, if
not more, as where there is an appointed administrator but he is ei-
ther disinclined to bring suit or is one of the guilty parties himself.
8. All told, therefore, the rule that the heirs have no legal standing to sue for
the recovery of property of the estate during the pendency of admin-
istration proceedings has three exceptions, the third being when there is
no appointed administrator such as in this case.
9. As the appellate court did not commit an error of law in upholding the order
of the lower court, recourse to this Court is not warranted.
 SILVERIO JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Eleazar)
September 16, 2009 | Velasco, J. | Powers and duties of executors, administrators
PETITIONERS: RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR.
RESPONDENTS: COURT OF APPEALS (Fifth Division) and NELIA S.
SILVERIO-DEE
SUMMARY: Beatriz Silverio died. Her surviving spouse, Ricardo Silverio, Sr.,
filed an intestate proceeding for the settlement of her estate. In November 2004,
during the pendency of the case in RTC of Makati City, Ricardo Silverio, Jr.
filed a petition to remove Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as the administrator of the
estate. Edmundo S. Silverio also filed an opposition for the removal of Ricardo
C. Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate and for the appointment of a new
administrator. RTC granted the petition and removed Silverio Sr. as
administrator of the estate, while appointing Silverio Jr. as the new
administrator. The Motion for Reconsideration was denied. In 2005, Ricardo
Silverio Jr. filed an Urgent Motion for an Order Prohibiting Any Person to
Occupy/Stay/Use RealEstate Properties Involved in the Intestate Estate of the
Late Beatriz Silverio, without Authority from this HonorableCourt. On May 31,
2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order affirming its Order dated January 3,
2005 and denying privaterespondent’s motion for reconsideration. In the
Omnibus Order, the RTC also authorized Ricardo Silverio, Jr. to, upon receipt of
the order, immediately exercise his duties as administrator of the subject estate.
The Omnibus Order also directed Nelia S. Silverio-Dee to vacate the property at
No. 3, Intsia, Forbes Park, Makati City within fifteen (15) days from receipt of
the order. Silverio-Dee received a copy of the said Order on June 8, 2005. The
issue in this case is WoN the authority given by Silverio to Nelia Silverio-Dy
was null and void – YES, since the possession of estate property can only be
given to a purported heir by virtue of an Order from this Court (see Sec. 1 Rule
90, supra; and Sec. 2 Rule 84, Revised Rules of Court). The Executor or
Administrator shall have the right to the possession and management of the real
as well as the personal estate of the deceased only when it is necessary for the
payment of the debts and expenses of administration (See Sec. 3 Rule 84,
Revised Rules of Court). With this in mind, it is without an iota of doubt that the
possession by Nelia S. Silverio-Dee of the property in question has absolutely no
legal basis considering that her occupancy cannot pay the debts and expenses of
administration, not to mention the fact that it will also disturb the right of the
new Administrator to possess and manage the property for the purpose of
settling the estate’s legitimate obligations.
DOCTRINE: The Executor or Administrator shall have the right to the
possession and management of the real as well as the personal estate of the
deceased only when it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of
administration
FACTS:
1. The instant controversy stemmed from the settlement of estate of the
deceased Beatriz Silverio. After her death, her surviving spouse, Ricardo
Silverio, Sr., filed an intestate proceeding for the settlement of her estate.
The case was docketed as SP. PROC. NO. M-2629 pending before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 57 (RTC).
2. On November 16, 2004, during the pendency of the case, Ricardo Silverio,
Jr. filed a petition to remove Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as the administrator of
the subject estate.
3. On November 22, 2004, Edmundo S. Silverio also filed a
comment/opposition for the removal of Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as
administrator of the estate and for the appointment of a new administrator.
4. On January 3, 2005, the RTC issued an Order granting the petition and
removing Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate, while
appointing Ricardo Silverio, Jr. as the new administrator.
5. On January 26, 2005, Nelia S. Silverio-Dee filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order dated January 3, 2005, as well as all other
related orders.
6. On February 4, 2005, Ricardo Silverio Jr. filed an Urgent Motion for an
Order Prohibiting Any Person to Occupy/Stay/Use Real Estate Properties
Involved in the Intestate Estate of the Late Beatriz Silverio, Without
Authority from this Honorable Court.
7. Then, on May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order affirming its
Order dated January 3, 2005 and denying private respondent’s motion for
reconsideration. In the Omnibus Order, the RTC also authorized Ricardo
Silverio, Jr. to, upon receipt of the order, immediately exercise his duties as
administrator of the subject estate. The Omnibus Order also directed Nelia
S. Silverio-Dee to vacate the property at No. 3, Intsia, Forbes Park, Makati
City within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order.
8. Nelia Silverio-Dee received a copy of the Omnibus Order dated May 31,
2005 on June 8, 2005.
9. On June 16, 2005, private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration
dated June 15, 20055 of the Omnibus Order. This was later denied by the
RTC in an Order dated December 12, 2005, which was received by private
respondent on December 22, 2005.
10. Notably, the RTC in its Order dated December 12, 20056 also recalled its
previous order granting Ricardo Silverio, Jr. with letters of administration
over the intestate estate of Beatriz Silverio and reinstating Ricardo Silverio,
Sr. as the administrator.
11. From the Order dated December 12, 2005, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a
motion for reconsideration which was denied by the RTC in an Order dated
October 31, 2006. In the same order, the RTC also allowed the sale of
various properties of the intestate estate of the late Beatriz Silverio to
 partially settle estate taxes, penalties, interests and other charges due
thereon. Among the properties authorized to be sold was the one located at
No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City.
12. Meanwhile, on January 6, 2006, Nelia Silverio-Dee filed a Notice of Appeal
dated January 5, 20068 from the Order dated December 12, 2005 while the
Record on Appeal dated January 20, 20069 was filed on January 23, 2006.
13. Thereafter, on October 23, 2006, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a Motion to
Dismiss Appeal and for Issuance of a Writ of Execution10 against the
appeal of Nelia Silverio-Dee on the ground that the Record on Appeal was
filed ten (10) days beyond the reglementary period pursuant to Section 3,
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
14. Thus, on April 2, 2007, the RTC issued an Order11 denying the appeal on
the ground that it was not perfected within the reglementary period. The
RTC further issued a writ of execution for the enforcement of the Order
dated May 31, 2005 against private respondent to vacate the premises of the
property located at No. 3, Intsia, Forbes Park, Makati City. The writ of
execution was later issued on April 17, 200712 and a Notice to Vacate13
was issued on April 19, 2007 ordering private respondent to leave the
premises of the subject property within ten (10) days.
15. Consequently, private respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition (With Prayer for TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction) dated
May 2, 200714 with the CA.
16. On May 4, 2007, the CA issued the assailed Resolution granting the prayer
for the issuance of a TRO. In issuing the TRO, the CA ruled that the Notice
of Appeal was filed within the reglementary period provided by the Rules of
Court applying the "fresh rule period" enunciated by this Court in Neypes v.
Court of Appeals15 as reiterated in Sumaway v. Union Bank.16
17. Afterwards, on July 6, 2007, the CA issued the assailed decision granting
the petition of private respondent. The dispositive portion reads:
a. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is
GRANTED and GIVEN DUE COURSE. Accordingly, the Order,
dated April 2, 2007, the writ of execution, dated April 17, 2007,
and the Notice to Vacate, dated April 19, 2007, are ANNULLED
AND SET ASIDE. Further, the court a quo is hereby directed to
give due course to the appeal of Nelia S. Silverio-Dee.
18. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/s
- WoN the authority given by Silverio to Nelia Silverio-Dy was null and void
– YES, since the possession of estate property can only be given to a
purported heir by virtue of an Order from this Court (see Sec. 1 Rule 90,
supra; and Sec. 2 Rule 84, Revised Rules of Court).
RULING: WHEREFORE, the May 4, 2007 Resolution and July 6, 2007 Decision of
the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 98764 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Thus, the
Decision dated April 2, 2007 of the RTC denying due course to the appeal of Nelia
Silverio-Dee; the Writ of Execution dated April 17, 2007; and the Notice to Vacate
dated April 19, 2007 are hereby REINSTATED.
RATIO:
36. The alleged authority given by SILVERIO, SR. for Nelia S. Silverio-Dee to
occupy the property dated May 4, 2004, assuming it is not even antedated as
alleged by SILVERIO, JR., is null and void since the possession of estate
property can only be given to a purported heir by virtue of an Order from
this Court (see Sec. 1 Rule 90, supra; and Sec. 2 Rule 84, Revised Rules of
Court).
37. In fact, the Executor or Administrator shall have the right to the possession
and management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased
only when it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of
administration (See Sec. 3 Rule 84, Revised Rules of Court).
38. With this in mind, it is without an iota of doubt that the possession by Nelia
S. Silverio-Dee of the property in question has absolutely no legal basis
considering that her occupancy cannot pay the debts and expenses of
administration, not to mention the fact that it will also disturb the right of
the new Administrator to possess and manage the property for the purpose
of settling the estate’s legitimate obligations.
39. In the belated Memorandum of Nelia Silverio-Dee, she enclosed a statement
of the expenses she incurred pertaining to the house renovation covering the
period from May 26, 2004 to February 28, 2005 in the total amount of
Php12,434,749.55, which supports this Court’s conclusion that she is
already the final distributee of the property. Repairs of such magnitude
require notice, hearing of the parties and approval of the Court under the
Rules. Without following this process, the acts of Nelia Silverio-Dee are
absolutely without legal sanction.
40. To our mind, the court a quo’s ruling clearly constitutes a final
determination of the rights of the petitioner as the appealing party. As such,
the Omnibus Order, dated May 31, 2002 (the predecessor of the Order dated
December 12, 2002) is a final order; hence, the same may be appealed, for
the said matter is clearly declared by the rules as appealable and the
proscription does not apply.
41. An interlocutory order, as opposed to a final order, was defined in Tan v.
Republic:
a. A final order is one that disposes of the subject matter in its
entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving
nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been
determined by the court, while an interlocutory order is one which
does not dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be
decided upon.
42. Additionally, it is only after a judgment has been rendered in the case that the heirs upon order of the Court. Similarly, under Rule 90, Sec. 1 of the
the ground for the appeal of the interlocutory order may be included in the Rules of Court, the properties of the estate shall only be distributed after the
appeal of the judgment itself. The interlocutory order generally cannot be payment of the debts, funeral charges, and other expenses against the estate,
appealed separately from the judgment. It is only when such interlocutory except when authorized by the Court.
order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse 46. Verily, once an action for the settlement of an estate is filed with the court,
of discretion that certiorari under Rule 65 may be resorted to. the properties included therein are under the control of the intestate court.
43. In the instant case, Nelia Silverio-Dee appealed the May 31, 2005 Order of And not even the administrator may take possession of any property that is
the RTC on the ground that it ordered her to vacate the premises of the part of the estate without the prior authority of the Court.
property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. On that 47. In the instant case, the purported authority of Nelia Silverio-Dee, which she
aspect the order is not a final determination of the case or of the issue of allegedly secured from Ricardo Silverio, Sr., was never approved by the
distribution of the shares of the heirs in the estate or their rights therein. It probate court. She, therefore, never had any real interest in the specific
must be borne in mind that until the estate is partitioned, each heir only has property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. As such,
an inchoate right to the properties of the estate, such that no heir may lay the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC must be considered as interlocutory
claim on a particular property. In Alejandrino v. Court of Appeals, we and, therefore, not subject to an appeal.
succinctly ruled: 48. Thus, private respondent employed the wrong mode of appeal by filing a
a. Art. 1078 of the Civil Code provides that where there are two or Notice of Appeal with the RTC. Hence, for employing the improper mode
more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before partition, of appeal, the case should have been dismissed.
owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of the 49. The implication of such improper appeal is that the notice of appeal did not
debts of the deceased. Under a co-ownership, the ownership of an toll the reglementary period for the filing of a petition for certiorari under
undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. Each co- Rule 65, the proper remedy in the instant case. This means that private
owner of property which is held pro indiviso exercises his rights respondent has now lost her remedy of appeal from the May 31, 2005 Order
over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no of the RTC.
other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co- 50. Therefore, there is no longer any need to consider the other issues raised in
owners. The underlying rationale is that until a division is made, the petition.
the respective share of each cannot be determined and every co-
owner exercises, together with his co-participants, joint ownership
over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment
of the same.
44. Although the right of an heir over the property of the decedent is inchoate as
long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned, the law allows a
co-owner to exercise rights of ownership over such inchoate right. Thus, the
Civil Code provides:
a. Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part
and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may
be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership.
45. Additionally, the above provision must be viewed in the context that the
subject property is part of an estate and subject to intestate proceedings
before the courts. It is, thus, relevant to note that in Rule 84, Sec. 2 of the
Rules of Court, the administrator may only deliver properties of the estate to
 st
006 DE RAMA v. PALILEO (Fordan) file their said claims within 6 months was duly published where the 1 notice
Feb. 26, 1965 | Barbera, J. | Claims against the estate appeared in the Aug. 13, 1958 issue of the Manila Chronicle.
2. On Jan. 27, 1959, the administrator filed an inventory of the estate, showing
In Re: Intestate Estate of Beatriz C. De Rama assets P139,596.77 and liabilities of P33,012.95.
PETITIONERS-APPELLANT: Angelo O. De Rama 3. The period provided in the published notice expired without anybody filing
CLAIMANT-APPELLEE: Cherie Palileo any claim against the deceased, the administrator, upon order of the CFI,
submitted a final account of the estate and a project of partition, which were
SUMMARY: In the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased Beatriz Cosio approved on May 12, 1960.
de Rama, a notice to all persons with money claims against the deceased to file 4. On June 7, 1961, Cherie Palileo petitioned the CFI for permission to file a
claim in the proceeding, alleging that:
their claims within 6 months was duly published in the Manila Chronicle. The peri-
od expired without anybody filing any claim against the deceased, the administra- a. on the decision of the CA, promulgated on May 6, 1961, she obtained a
tor, upon order of the CFI, submitted a final account of the estate and a project of money judgment against the deceased Beatriz C. de Rama;
partition, which were approved. Thereafter, Cherie Palileo petitioned the CFI for b. although the lower court decided in her favor the question of ownership
permission to file a claim in the proceeding claiming that she only obtained a and possession of a real property involved in the case, it was only the CA
money judgment against de Rama from the decision of the CA, promulgated on that granted money judgment, when the case was decided on appeal.
May 6, 1961. The administrator opposed this petition but the CFI allowed her to 5. The administrator opposed this petition on the ground that the claim was
filed beyond the period provided in the notice to creditors.
file her claim within 1 month from receipt of said order, appearing that no final
decree of distribution has yet been entered in the case. Hene, the current appeal. 6. By order of Aug. 8, 1961, the CFI sustained Palileo and allowed her to file her
claim within 1 month from receipt of said order, appearing that no final de-
The issue is whether or not Palilelo can still claim from the estate of De Rama. YES. cree of distribution has yet been entered in the case.
It is clear from Sec. 2, Rule 87 (now Rule 86) of the ROC that the period prescribed 7. Hence, the current appeal by the administrator on the issue of when money
in the notice to creditors is not exclusive; that money claims against the estate claims against a deceased person may be filed in the proceeding for the set-
may be allowed any time before an order of distribution is entered, at the discre- tlement of the estate of such deceased person.

tion of the court, for cause and upon such terms as are equitable. This extension
ISSUE: Whether or not Palilelo can still claim from the estate of De Rama. – YES,
of the period shall not exceed one month, from the issuance of the order authoriz-
ing such extension. It is not controverted in the instant case that no order of dis- since Sec. 2, Rule 87 (now 86) of the ROC provides that claims against the estate
tribution of the estate has as yet been made. may be allowed any time before an order of distribution is entered, at the discre-
tion of the court, for cause and upon such terms as are equitable.
DOCTRINE: Sec. 2, Rule 87 (now Rule 86). Time within which claims shall be
filed.—In the notice provided in section 1, the court, shall state the time for the RULING: Finding no reversible error in the order appealed from, the same is hereby
filing of claims against the estate, which shall not be more than twelve nor less affirmed, with costs, against the administrator. So ordered.

than six months after the date of the first publication of the notice. However, at
any time before an order of distribution is entered, on application of a creditor RATIO:
who has failed to file his claim within the time previously limited, the court may, 1. Sec. 2, Rule 87 of the old Rules of Court (now Rule 86) provides:
“SEC 2. Time within which claims shall be filed.—In the notice provided in
for cause shown and on such terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be filed
section 1, the court, shall state the time for the filing of claims against the es-
within a time not exceeding one month. tate, which shall not be more than twelve nor less than six months after the
date of the first publication of the notice. However, at any time before an or-
FACTS: der of distribution is entered, on application of a creditor who has failed to
1. In connection with the proceeding for the settlement of the intestate estate file his claim within the time previously limited, the court may, for cause
of the deceased Beatriz Cosio de Rama and pursuant to the order of the CFI shown and on such terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be filed within
a time not exceeding one month.”
of Rizal, a notice to all persons with money claims against the deceased to
2. It is clear from the foregoing that the period prescribed in the notice to
creditors is not exclusive; that money claims against the estate may be al-
lowed any time before an order of distribution is entered, at the discretion
of the court, for cause and upon such terms as are equitable. This exten-
sion of the period shall not exceed one month, from the issuance of the or-
der authorizing such extension.
3. It is not controverted in the instant case that no order of distribution of the
estate has as yet been made.
4. However, the Administrator charges that the CFI committed an abuse of dis-
cretion in issuing the disputed order without sufficient ground or cause
therefor.
5. The petition of Palileo for permission to file a claim in the proceeding was
based on the fact that the award of damages in her favor against the de-
ceased Beatriz C. de Rama was contained in the decision of the CA which was
promulgated on May 6, 1961 or after the 6-month period provided in the no-
tice to creditors had already elapsed. It is her contention that she could not
have filed a money claim against the estate before the promulgation of said
decision because although the CFI in that case upheld her right to the own-
ership and possession of the building subject thereof, no damages were ad-
judged in her favor.
6. Considering this argument, the CFI found it sufficient to justify the relaxation
of the rule and extension of the period within which to file her claim.
7. In the circumstances, the action taken by the CFI cannot be considered an
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to justify its
reversal by this court.
 07 MANALANSAN v. CASTANEDA (GALINDEZ)
June 27, 1978 | Concepcion Jr., J. | Enforcement of a Mortgage Lien
PETITIONER: Sps. Benito Manalansan and Ines Vitug-Manalansan
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Mariano Castaneda, Jr.; Adoracion Vda. De Danan
(for herself and as administratrix of the Estate of Dominador Danan)
SUMMARY: Sps. Danan took out a loan from Sps. Manalansan in the amount
of P62k and mortgaged their fishpond and residential lot as security. Sps. Danan
failed to pay hence Sps. Malanasan instituted an action for foreclosure.
Judgment was rendered in favor of Sps. Manalansan.
When the sheriff was about to levy upon the properties, Adoracion opposed
such and filed a motion to set aside the writ, arguing that the properties are in
custodia legis and that the judgment should be presented as a money claim in
the the Intestate Estate of Dominador Danan pursuant to Sec. 5 Rule 86 since
Dominador died on November 1970, while the case was pending before the CA
and intestate proceedings have already been instituted.
Respondent Judge Castaneda issued an order directing the sheriff to desist from
enforcing the writ, and later ordered that the writ be set aside.
ISSUE: WoN respondent Judge Castaneda abused his discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in delegating the execution of a judgment to the probate
court who has no jurisdiction to enforce a lien on property – YES.
Sec. 7 Rule 86 does not confer jurisdiction upon the probate court, of limited
jurisdiction, to enforce a mortgage lien. Nor can it be relied upon as sufficient
ground to delegate the execution of the judgment of foreclosure to the probate
court. [See doctrine]
While the redemption is subject to the approval of the probate court, the
exercise of the right is discretionary upon the said executor or administrator and
may not be ordered by the probate court upon its own motion.
The action filed here is for the foreclosure of mortgage. Under Sec. 1, Rule 87
of the Revised Rules of Court, it is an action which survives. Being so, the
judgment rendered therein may be enforced by a writ of execution.
DOCTRINE: As stated, the rule merely reserves a right to the executor or
administrator of an estate to redeem a mortgaged or pledged property of a
decedent which the mortgage or pledgee has opted to foreclose, instead of filing
a money claim with the probate court, under said Section 7 of Rule 86.
FACTS:
11. On June 22, 1962. Spouses Dominador and Adoracion (Sps. Danan)
constituted a mortgage over their fishpond and residential lot situated in
Pampanga in favor of herein petitioners Sps. Manalansan to guarantee the
payment of P62k+ within 1 year + interest.
12. Sps. Danan failed to pay, hence an action for foreclosure was instituted with
the CFI of Pampanga.
13. Judgment was rendered in favor of Sps. Manalansan and Sps. Danan were
ordered to pay the loan, moral damages and attorney’s fees. In the event that
they couldn’t pay in the period stated, the properties mortgaged shall be
sold at public auction.
14. Sps. Danan appealed to the CA which modified the judgment by
eliminating the portion ordering the Sps. Danan to pay moral damages.
15. Dissatisfied, Sps. Danan filed a petition for review with the SC but was
denied.
16. The records of the case were remanded to the court below and upon
application, a writ of execution was issued. But when the sheriff was about
to levy upon the properties, private respondent Adoracion opposed such and
filed a motion to set aside the writ of execution for the reasons that the
properties are in custodia legis and that the judgment should be presented as
a money claim in the Intestate Estate of Dominador Danan pursuant to
Sec. 5 Rule 86 since Dominador died on November 1970, while the case
was pending before the CA and intestate proceedings have already been
instituted.
17. Upon acting on the motion, respondent Judge Castaneda issued an order
directing the sheriff to desist from enforcing the writ of execution and set
the incident for hearing on May 1975.
18. After hearing, Judge issued an order setting aside the writ of execution.
19. Sps. Manalansan filed an MR but was denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUE/s:
13. WoN respondent Judge Castaneda abused his discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction in delegating the execution of a judgment to the probate court
who has no jurisdiction to enforce a lien on property – YES. Sec. 7 Rule 86
does not confer jurisdiction upon the probate court, of limited jurisdiction,
to enforce a mortgage lien. Nor can it be relied upon as sufficient ground to
delegate the execution of the judgment of foreclosure to the probate court.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the orders of the respondent
Judge dated November 4, 1975 and March 31, 1976 are hereby annulled and set
aside the case is remanded to the court below for the execution of the judgment.
Costs against the private respondent Adoracion Danan.
 concerned. It merely indicates against whom the writ of execution
RATIO: is to be enforced when the losing party dies after the entry of
14. Sec. 7 Rule 86 does not confer jurisdiction upon the probate court, of judgment or order. Nothing therein, nor in the entire Rule 39, to
limited jurisdiction, to enforce a mortgage lien. our mind, even as much as intimates that a writ of execution issued
15. Nor can it be relied upon as sufficient ground to delegate the execution of after a party dies, which death occurs before entry of the judgment,
the judgment of foreclosure to the probate court. is a nullity. The writ may yet be enforced against his executor or
16. As stated, the rule merely reserves a right to the executor or administrator of administrator, if there be any, or his successors-in-interest.
an estate to redeem a mortgaged or pledged property of a decedent
which the mortgage or pledgee has opted to foreclose, instead of filing a
money claim with the probate court, under said Section 7 of Rule 86.
17. While the redemption is subject to the approval of the probate court, the
exercise of the right is discretionary upon the said executor or administrator
and may not be ordered by the probate court upon its own motion.
18. The action filed here is for the foreclosure of mortgage. Under Sec. 1, Rule
87 of the Revised Rules of Court, it is an action which survives. Being so,
the judgment rendered therein may be enforced by a writ of execution.
19. Testamentaria de Don Amadeo v. Canlas: An action to enforce a lien on
property may be prosecuted by the interested person against the executor or
administrator independently of the testate or intestate proceedings "for the
reason that such claims cannot in any just sense be considered claims
against the estate, but the right to subject specific property to the claim
arises from the contract of the debtor whereby ha has during life set aside
certain property for its payment, and such property does not, except in so far
as its value may exceed the debt, belong to the estate.
20. Since the mortgaged property in question does not belong to the estate of
the late Salvador Danan, according to the foregoing rule, the conclusion is
reasonable that the probate court has no jurisdiction over the property in
question, and that the respondent Judge had abused his discretion in
delegating the execution of the judgment to the probate court.
21. The fact that the defendant Salvador Danan died before, and not after the
decision of the Court of Appeal became final and executory will not nullify
the writ of execution already issued.
22. Miranda v. Abbas: Judgment was rendered two months before the death of
the defendant. Since neither the defendant nor his heirs after his death
appealed from the judgment, the writ or execution was issued as a matter of
course. The death of the defendant was communicated to the trial court six
months after the decision had become final. The successors of the decedent
contended that the writ of execution issued was void because contrary to
Section 7, Rule 39, the defendant died before, not after, the entry of
judgment. The Court rejected the theory, saying:
a. We cannot accept this argument. The provision (Section 7 of Rule
39) relied upon by the petitioners cannot be so construed as to
invalidate the writ of execution already issued in so far as service
thereof upon the heirs or successors-in-interest of the defendant is
 008 OLAVE v. CANLAS (Gonzales)
February 28, 1962 | Bautista Angelo, J. | Claims against the estate
PETITIONER: Testamentaria De Don Amedeo Matute Olave
RESPONDENT: Paterno R. Canlas, et al.
SUMMARY: Olave was a defendant in a civil case. He engaged the services of
Atty. Canlas and agreed to pay attorney’s fees in an amount equivalent to 20% of the
market value of the property in litigation payable upon the termination of the case.
Atty. Canlas filed a motion in the civil case praying that his claim for attorney’s fees
be established as a charging lien. The civil case court granted the motion and ordered
that the claim is established on the P100,000 deposit with the court and all other
properties involved in the case. Olave died before the attorney fees had been fully
paid. When Atty. Canlas sought the payment of the balance of P85,000, the adminis-
trator of the estate of Olave opposed, arguing that the civil case has no jurisdiction
since money claims should have been filed with the probate court. Issue: Having
Amadeo Matute Olave died before the attorney's fees he agreed to pay to his coun-
sel Canlas had been fully paid and after the claim of the latter for attorney's fees had
been established as a charging lien in the ordinary civil case, which court shall enter-
tain the payment of the balance of said claim? Is it the court in the ordinary case or
the probate court that takes cognizance of the estate of the deceased? Court in the
ordinary case. An action to recover real or personal property from the estate, or to
enforce a lien thereon, may be prosecuted by the interested person against the execu-
tor or administrator independently of the testate or intestate proceedings
DOCTRINE: A probate court, being of limited jurisdiction, has no authority to en-
force a lien unless conferred by a statute.
FACTS:
22. Amadeo Matute Olave died in the City of Manila and testamentary proceed-
ings were instituted before CFI Manila for the probate of his will and the set-
tlement of his estate.
23. During his lifetime, Matute was made party defendant in Civil Case No.
14208 (civil case as opposed to the “probate case”) of the same court and to
defend him he engaged the services of Atty. Paterno R. Canlas. Matute
and Canlas entered into an agreement whereby the former agreed to pay the
latter as attorney's fees an amount equivalent to 20 % of the market value of
ISSUE:
the property in litigation payable upon the final termination of the case. The
1. Having Amadeo Matute Olave died before the attorney's fees he agreed to
case was dismissed on the ground of res judicata. Plaintiffs appealed the case
to the Supreme Court where the case was compromised and the appeal was
eventually withdrawn.
24. Atty. Canlas filed in the civil case a motion praying that his claim for attor-
ney's fees for the services be established as a charging lien. The court granted
the motion stating that Atty. Canlas' claim for attorney's fees is thereby estab-
lished "on the P100,000.00 balance of the deposit still with the clerk of Court
of this Court and on all the other properties, real and personal, involved in
this case." The court also ordered the lien to be annotated on the titles of all
the real properties involved in the case.
25. Atty. Canlas filed in the same civil case an urgent motion praying that the
amount of P85,000.00 that remained deposited with the clerk of court be or-
dered delivered to him in full settlement of his attorney's fees stating therein
that he almost completed rendering the professional services he agreed to
render to Matute inasmuch as he had already filed the brief in his behalf in
the case then pending before the Supreme Court.
26. It was at this instance that the administrator of the estate of Matute filed an
opposition contending that the CFI taking cognizance of the civil case had no
jurisdiction to act thereon because, the motion involving a money claim, the
same shall be submitted to the probate court which is the one authorized by
law to settle claims against estates of deceased persons.
27. In the meantime, the court acting in the civil case granted
Atty. Canlas authority to withdraw partial payments from said deposit total-
ling around P50,000.00. Then, it issued an order holding that it had authority
to entertain Canlas' claim for attorney's fees.
28. To nullify this order, the administrator of the estate has interposed the present
petition for certiorari alleging abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.
29. It is not disputed that respondent court in the civil case issued an order creat-
ing a charging lien for the attorney's fees of Atty. Canlas not only the
P100,000.00 balance of deposit remaining with the clerk of court but also on
all other properties, real and personal, involved in said case. Atty. Canlas was
able to secure from the court on several occasions several partial payments on
account of his claim for attorney's fees which up to the time of this incident
amounted to around P50,000.00. It was only when he filed an urgent motion
for the payment to him of the balance of P85,000.00 remaining in possession
of the clerk of court in full payment of his attorney's fees in the belief that his
right to it has already been finally determined that the administrator of the es-
tate of the late Amadeo Matute Olave filed an opposition thereto alleging
lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court and claiming that, it involving
money claim, the same should be submitted to the probate court which under
the law has jurisdiction to act on claims against the estate.
pay to his counsel Canlas had been fully paid and after the claim of the latter
for attorney's fees had been established as a charging lien in the ordinary civil
case, which court shall entertain the payment of the balance of said claim? Is
it the court in the ordinary case or the probate court that takes cognizance of
the estate of the deceased? - Court in the ordinary case. An action to recover
 real or personal property from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, may be
prosecuted by the interested person against the executor or administrator in-
dependently of the testate or intestate proceedings
RULING: Petition denied.
RATIO:
8. It is the court taking cognizance of Civil Case No. 14208 in view of the pro-
visions of Section 7, Rule 87 and Section 1, Rule 88, of the Rules of Court,
which we quote:
a. "SEC. 7. Mortgage debt due from estate. — A creditor holding a
claim against the deceased secured by mortgage or other collateral
security, may abandon the security and prosecute his claim in the
manner provided in this rule, and share in the general distribution of
the assets of the estate; or he may foreclose his mortgage or realize
upon his security, by ordinary action in court, making the executor
or administrator a party defendant, and if there is a judgment for a
deficiency, after the sale of the mortgaged premises, or the property
pledged, in the foreclosure or other proceeding to realize upon the
security, he may claim his deficiency judgment in the manner pro-
vided in the preceding section; or he may rely upon his mortgage or
other security alone, and foreclose the same at any time within the
period of the statute of limitations, and in that event he shall not be
admitted as a creditor, and shall receive no share in the distribution
of the other assets of the estate; but nothing herein contained shall
prohibit the executor or administrator from redeeming the property
mortgaged or pledged, by paying the debt for which it is held as se-
curity, under the direction of the court, if the court shall adjudge it to
be for the best interest of the estate that such redemption shall be
made."
b. "SECTION 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought
against executor or administrator. — No action upon a claim for the
recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced
against the executor or administrator; but actions to recover real or
personal property from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and
actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real
or personal, may be commenced against him."
9. It is clear that a creditor holding a claim against the deceased secured by
mortgage or other collateral security may foreclose his mortgage or realize
upon his security by ordinary action in court making the executor or adminis-
trator a party defendant, and need not file his claim before the probate court
to share in the general distribution of the assets of the estate. Under the same
theory, an action to recover real or personal property from the estate, or
to enforce a lien thereon, may be prosecuted by the interested person
against the executor or administrator independently of the testate or in-
testate proceedings. And it cannot be gainsaid that a charging
lien established on the property in litigation to secure the payment of the at-
torney's fees of Atty.Canlas partake of the nature of a collateral security or of
a lien of real or personal property within the meaning of the provisions of our
rules.
10. The reason behind the rule which exempts money claims covered by a
mortgage or other collateral security or lien from the jurisdiction of
probate courts appears well-stated in the American authorities as follows:
a. "According to the weight of authority, a creditor whose claim is se-
cured by mortgage, pledge, or any specific lien need not present his
claim for allowance in order to preserve his right to subject the
property covered by the lien to the satisfaction of his claim, for the
reason that such claims cannot in any just sense he considered
claims against the estate, but the right to subject specific property to
the claim arises from the contract of the debtor whereby he has dur-
ing life set aside certain property for its payment, and such property
does not, except in so far as its value may exceed the debt, belong to
the estate, and the instrument being of record or the property being
in the possession of the creditor is notice to all the world of the con-
tract."
11. Our conclusion is also supported by the principle that a probate court, being
of limited jurisdiction, has no authority to enforce a lien unless conferred
by a statute. The statutory jurisdiction of a probate court is exclusive, and
since the lien referred to in Section 1, Rule 88 is not among those mentioned
in Section 5, Rule 87, it is reasonable to assume that all money claims se-
cured with a lien are outside the jurisdiction of the probate court.
 009 Director of Lands v Ababa (Gustilo)
February 27, 1979| Makasiar, J. | Claims against the Estate
PETITIONER: Director of Lands
RESPONDENTS: Silveretre Ababa, et al
SUMMARY: The adverse claimant, Atty. Alberto B. Fernandez (Atty Fernandez) was
retained as counsel by petitioner, Maximo Abarquez (M. Abarquez), in a Civil Case of the CFI
of Cebu, entitled "Maximo Abarquez vs. Agripina Abarquez", for the annulment of a contract
of sale with right of repurchase and for the recovery of the land which was the subject matter
thereof. The CFI of Cebu rendered a decision on May 29, 1961 adverse to M. Abarquez and so
he appealed to the Court of Appeals.Litigating as a pauper in the lower court and engaging the
services of his lawyer on a contingent basis, M. Abarquez, liable to compensate his lawyer
whom he also retained for his appeal executed a document on June 10, 1961 in the Cebuano-
Visayan dialect whereby he obliged himself to give to his lawyer one-half (1/2) of whatever he
might recover from Lots 5600 and 5602 should the appeal prosper. The real Property sought to
be recovered in the Civil Case was actually the share of M. Abarquez in Lots 5600 and 5602,
which were part of the estate of his deceased parents and which were partitioned the heirs
which included M. Abarquez and his elder sister Agripina Abarquez (A. Abarquez), the
defendant in said civil case. This partition was made pursuant to a project of partition
approved by the Court which provided am other that Lots Nos. 5600 and 5602 were to be
divided into three equal Parts, one third of which shall be given to M. Abarquez. However, A.
Abarquez said that the share of her brother was hers stating that the latter executed an
instrument of pacto de retro prior to the partition conveying to her any or all rights in the
estate of their parents. M. Abarquez discovered later that the claim of his sister over his share
was based on an instrument he believed all along to be a mere acknowledgment of the receipt
of P700.00 which his sister gave to him as a consideration for the care of their father during
the latter's illness and never an instrument of pacto de retro. Hence, he instituted an action to
annul the alleged instrument of pacto de retro.
The CFI ruled in favor of A. Abarquez but the CA reversed the decision of the CFI and
annulled the dead of pacto de retro. The case having been resolved and title having been
issued to M. Abarquez, Atty. Fernandez waited for M. Abarquez to comply with ha obligation
under the document executed by him by delivering the one-half (½) portion of the said parcels
of land. M. Abarquez refused to comply with his obligation and instead offered to sell the
whole parcels of land to petitioner-spouses Juan Larrazabal and Marta C. de Larrazabal
(Spouses Larrazabal). Upon being informed of the intention of M. Abarquez, Atty. Fernandez
immediately took stops to protect his interest by filing with the trial court a motion to annotate
attorney's lien on the TCT and by notifying the prospective buyers of his claim over the one-
half portion of the parcels of land.
Realizing later that the motion to annotate attorney's lien was a wrong remedy, as it was not
within the purview of Section 37, rule 138 of the Revised Rule of Court, but before the same
was resolved by the trial court, Atty. Fernandez made an affidavit of adverse claim with the
Register of Deeds of Cebu. By virtue of the petition of the affidavit the adverse claim for one-
half (½) of the lots was annotated on TCT. This adverse claim on the new TCT became the
subject of cancellation proceedings filed by Spouses Larrazabal with the CFI of Cebu. Atty.
Fernandez filed his opposition to the petition for cancellation and the trial court ruled in favor
of Atty. Fernandez. Petitioner-spouses Larrazabal decided to appeal the order of dismissal to
this Court and correspondingly filed the notice of appeal with the trial court.
The issue is WoN the registration of Atty. Fernandez of the adverse claim is valid?- Yes
The Court held that the contract for a contingent fee, being valid, vested in Atty Fernandez an
interest or right over the lots in question to the extent of one-half thereof. Said interest became
vested in Atty. Fernandez after the case was won on appeal because only then did the
assignment of the one-half (½) portion of the lots in question became effective and binding.
So that when he filed his affidavit of adverse claim his interest was already an existing one.
There was therefore a valid interest in the lots to be registered in favor of Atty. Fernandez
adverse to M.Abarquez. The one-half (½) interest of Atty. Fernandez in the lots in question
should therefore be respected. Indeed, he has a better right than petitioner-spouses,
Larrazabal. They purchased their two-thirds (2/3) interest in the lots in question with the
knowledge of the adverse claim of Atty. Fernandez. The adverse claim was annotated on the
old transfer certificate of title and was later annotated on the new transfer certificate of title
issued to them.
DOCTRINE: The annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest
of a person over a piece of real property where the registration of such interest or right is
otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act, and serves as a notice and warning to
third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an interest on the same or a
better right than the registered owner thereof.
FACTS:
1. The adverse claimant, Atty. Alberto B. Fernandez (Atty Fernandez) was
retained as counsel by petitioner, Maximo Abarquez (M. Abarquez), in a
Civil Case of the CFI of Cebu, entitled "Maximo Abarquez vs. Agripina
Abarquez", for the annulment of a contract of sale with right of repurchase
and for the recovery of the land which was the subject matter thereof. The
CFI of Cebu rendered a decision on May 29, 1961 adverse to M. Abarquez
and so he appealed to the Court of Appeals.
2. Litigating as a pauper in the lower court and engaging the services of his
lawyer on a contingent basis, M. Abarquez, liable to compensate his lawyer
whom he also retained for his appeal executed a document on June 10, 1961
in the Cebuano-Visayan dialect whereby he obliged himself to give to his
lawyer one-half (1/2) of whatever he might recover from Lots 5600 and
5602 should the appeal prosper. The contents of the document are as
follows (see end of digest).
3. The real Property sought to be recovered in the Civil Case was actually the
share of M. Abarquez in Lots 5600 and 5602, which were part of the estate
of his deceased parents and which were partitioned the heirs which included
M. Abarquez and his elder sister Agripina Abarquez (A. Abarquez), the
defendant in said civil case.
4. This partition was made pursuant to a project of partition approved by the
Court which provided am other that Lots Nos. 5600 and 5602 were to be
divided into three equal Parts, one third of which shall be given to M.
Abarquez. However, A. Abarquez said that the share of her brother was hers
stating that the latter executed an instrument of pacto de retro prior to the
partition conveying to her any or all rights in the estate of their parents. M.
 Abarquez discovered later that the claim of his sister over his share was
based on an instrument he believed all along to be a mere acknowledgment
of the receipt of P700.00 which his sister gave to him as a consideration for
the care of their father during the latter's illness and never an instrument of
pacto de retro. Hence, he instituted an action to annul the alleged instrument
of pacto de retro.
5. The CFI ruled in favor of A. Abarquez but the CA reversed the decision of
the CFI and annulled the dead of pacto de retro. A. Abarquez filed a motion
for reconsideration but the same was denied in a resolution. The Decision
became final and executory.
6. Subsequently, a TCT was issued in the name of M. Abarquez, married to
Anastacia Cabigas, over his adjudged share in Lots Nos. 5600 and 5602
containing an area of 4,085 square meters.
7. The case having been resolved and title having been issued to M. Abarquez,
Atty. Fernandez waited for M. Abarquez to comply with ha obligation
under the document executed by him by delivering the one-half (½) portion
of the said parcels of land. M. Abarquez refused to comply with his
obligation and instead offered to sell the whole parcels of land to petitioner-
spouses Juan Larrazabal and Marta C. de Larrazabal (Spouses Larrazabal).
Upon being informed of the intention of M. Abarquez, Atty. Fernandez
immediately took stops to protect his interest by filing with the trial court a
motion to annotate attorney's lien on the TCT and by notifying the
prospective buyers of his claim over the one-half portion of the parcels of
land.
8. Realizing later that the motion to annotate attorney's lien was a wrong
remedy, as it was not within the purview of Section 37, rule 138 of the
Revised Rule of Court, but before the same was resolved by the trial court,
Atty. Fernandez made an affidavit of adverse claim with the Register of
Deeds of Cebu. By virtue of the petition of the affidavit the adverse claim
for one-half (½) of the lots was annotated on TCT.
9. Notwithstanding the annotation of the adverse claim, M. Abarquez and
Anastacia Cabigas conveyed by deed of absolute sale two-thirds (2/3) of the
lands spouses Larrazabal. When the new transfer certificate of title was
issued, the annotation of adverse claim on the TCT necessarily had to
appear on the new transfer certificate of title. This adverse claim on the new
TCT became the subject of cancellation proceedings filed by petitioner-
spouses with the CFI of Cebu.
10. Atty. Fernandez filed his opposition to the petition for cancellation and the
trial court ruled in favor of Atty. Fernandez. Petitioner-spouses Larrazabal
decided to appeal the order of dismissal to this Court and correspondingly
filed the notice of appeal with the trial court. Spouses Larrazabal filed the
appeal bond and subsequently filed the record on appeal. The records of the
case were forwarded to this Court through the Land Registration
Commission of Manila and were received by this Court.
ISSUE/s:
1. WoN the registration of Atty. Fernandez of the adverse claim is valid?- Yes
because such annotation is protect the interest over a piece of real property
2. WoN the contract for a contingent fee is valid?- Yes because in this case the
transfer takes effect after the finality of judgment
RULING: Wherefore, THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT DENYING
THE PETITION FOR THE CANCELLATION OF THE ADVERSE CLAIM
SHOULD BE, AS IT IS HEREBY AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS AGAINST
PETITIONER-APPELLANTS JUAN LARRAZABAL AND MARTA C. DE
LARRAZABAL.
RATIO:
Validity of Registration of Adverse Claim
1. In resolving now the issue of the validity or nullity for the registration of the
adverse claim, Section 110 of the Land Registration Act (Act 496) should
be considered. Under the section, an adverse claim may be registered
only by: “Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land
adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the
registration, if no other provision is made in this Act for registering the
same.”
2. The contract for a contingent fee, being valid, vested in Atty Fernandez an
interest or right over the lots in question to the extent of one-half thereof.
Said interest became vested in Atty. Fernandez after the case was won
on appeal because only then did the assignment of the one-half (½)
portion of the lots in question became effective and binding. So that
when he filed his affidavit of adverse claim his interest was already an
existing one. There was therefore a valid interest in the lots to be
registered in favor of Atty. Fernandez adverse to M.Abarquez.
3. Moreover, the interest or claim of Atty. Fernandez in the lots in question
arose long after the original petition which took place many years ago. And,
there is no other provision of the Land Registration Act under which
the interest or claim may be registered except as an adverse claim
under Section 110 thereof. The interest or claim cannot be registered as
an attorney's charging lien. The lower court was correct in denying the
motion to annotate the attomey's lien. A charging lien under Section 37,
Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited only to money judgments
and not to judgments for the annulment of a contract or for delivery of real
property as in the instant case.
4. Therefore, as an interest in registered land, the only adequate remedy open
to Atty. Fernandez is to register such interest as an adverse claim.
Consequently, there being a substantial compliance with Section 110 of
Act 496, the registration of the adverse claim is held to be valid. Being
 valid, its registration should not be cancelled because as WE have
already stated, "it is only when such claim is found unmeritorious that
the registration thereof may be cancelled.
5. The one-half (½) interest of Atty. Fernandez in the lots in question should
therefore be respected. Indeed, he has a better right than petitioner-
spouses, Larrazabal. They purchased their two-thirds (2/3) interest in
the lots in question with the knowledge of the adverse claim of Atty.
Fernandez. The adverse claim was annotated on the old transfer
certificate of title and was later annotated on the new transfer
certificate of title issued to them.
6. The annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the
interest of a person over a piece of real property where the registration
of such interest or right is otherwise provided for by the Land
Registration Act, and serves as a notice and warning to third parties
dealing with said property that someone is claiming an interest on the
same or a better right than the registered owner thereof. Having
purchased the property with the knowledge of the adverse claim, they
are therefore in bad faith. Consequently, they are estopped from
questioning the validity of the adverse claim.
Contract for Contingent Fee
7. Spouses Larrazabal contend that a contract for a contingent fee violates
Article 1491 because it involves an assignment of a property subject of
litigation. That article provides: Article 1491.The following persons cannot
acquire by purchase even at a public or judicial auction, either in person or
through the petition of another. 5)Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys..the
property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court
within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective
functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and
shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be
the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their
profession.
8. The Court states that such contention is without merit since Article 1491
prohibits only the sale or assignment between the lawyer and his client, of
property which is the subject of litigation. In other words, for the
prohibition to operate, the sale or of the property must take place during the
pendency of the litigation involving the property.
9. A contract for a contingent fee is not covered by Article 1491 because the
transfer or assignment of the property in litigation takes effect only after the
finality of a favorable judgment. In the instant case, the attorney's fees of
Atty. Fernandez, consisting of one-half (1/2) of whatever Maximo
Abarquez might recover from his share in the lots in question, is contingent
upon the success of the appeal. Hence, the payment of the attorney's fees,
that is, the transfer or assignment of one-half (1/2) of the property in
litigation will take place only if the appeal prospers. Therefore, the transfer
actually takes effect after the finality of a favorable judgment rendered on
appeal and not during the pendency of the litigation involving the property
in question. Consequently, the contract for a contingent fee is not covered
by Article 1491.
10. Contracts of this nature are permitted because they redound to the benefit of
the poor client and the lawyer "especially in cases where the client has
meritorious cause of action, but no means with which to pay for legal
services unless he can, with the sanction of law, make a contract for a
contingent fee to be paid out of the proceeds of the litigation.”
11. Finally, a contingent fee contract is always subject to the supervision of the
courts with respect to the stipulated amount and may be reduced or
nullified. So that in the event that there is any undue influence or fraud in
the execution of the contract or that the fee is excessive, the client is not
without remedy because the court will amply protect him. In the present
case, there is no iota of proof to show that Atty. Fernandez had exerted any
undue influence or had perpetrated fraud on, or had in any manner taken
advantage of his client, M. Abarquez. And, the compensation of one-half of
the lots in question is not excessive nor unconscionable considering the
contingent nature of the attorney's fees.
AGREEMENT KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That I, MAXIMO ABARQUEZ, Plaintiff in Case No. R-6573 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
make known through this agreement that for the services rendered by Atty. Alberto B. Fernandez who is
my lawyer in this case, if the appeal is won up to the Supreme Court, I Promise and will guarantee that I
win give to said lawyer one-half (1/2) of what I may recover from the estate of my father in Lots No. 5600
and 5602 which are located at Bulacao Pardo, City of Cebu. That with respect to any money which may be
adjudged to me from Agripina Abarquez, except 'Attorney's Fees', the same shall pertain to me and not to
said lawyer.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have caused my right thumbmark to be affixed hereto this 10th of June,
1961, at the City of Cebu. THUMBMARK MAXIMO ABARQUEZ
 010 Alipio v. CA (Hilario)
September 29, 2000 | Mendoza, J. | Settlement of Estate, debts owed by CPG
ALIPIOS: PURITA ALIPIO
JARINGS: COURT OF APPEALS, ROMEO G. JARING, REPRESENT-
ED BY ATTY IN FACT RAMON G. JARING
SUMMARY: JARING subleased his fishpond to spouses ALIPIO and spouses
MANUEL. The sublessees weren’t able to pay the remaining balance of P50k,
despite repeated demands, so JARING filed a case for collection of sum of mon-
ey before the RTC. ALIPIO filed a motion to dismiss, saying that her husband
passed away 10 months ago so any claims JARING might have against them
must be prosecuted as a claim against the estate of the deceased. The RTC de-
nied her motion to dismiss, and rendered judgement in favor of JARING, order-
ing ALIPIO and the MANUELS to pay. ALIPIO appealed before the CA, how-
ever CA denied her appeal too. So she went before the SC, clarifying that she
was only seeking dismissal of the case against her and her husband, claiming
that this should be prosecuted as a money claim against his estate. Issue: WoN a
creditor can sue the surviving spouse for the collection of a debt which is
owed by the conjugal partnership of gains—NO, the proper remedy for the
creditor is to file a claim in the settlement of estate of the decedent.
Under the law, the Alipios' obligation (and also that of the Manuels) is
one which is chargeable against their conjugal partnership. Under Art.
161(1) of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for ¾ of all
debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the
same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership.
When Purita’s husband died, their conjugal partnership was automati-
cally dissolved and debts chargeable against it are to be paid in the set-
tlement of estate proceedings in accordance with Rule 73, §2. JARING
cannot short-circuit this procedure by lumping his claim against the
Alipios with those against the Manuels considering that, aside from
ALIPIO's lack of authority to represent their conjugal estate, the
inventory of the Alipios' conjugal property is necessary before any
claim chargeable against it can be paid
DOCTRINE: After the death of either of the spouses, no complaint for the col-
lection of indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal partnership can be
brought against the surviving spouse. Instead, the claim must be made in the
proceedings for the liquidation and settlement of the conjugal property.
FACTS:
1. Romeo Jaring subleased the fishpond he was leasing to the Alipio Spouses
and the Manuel Spouses for P485k, payable in two installments of 300k
then 185k. All four of them signed the sublease contract.
2. Both spouses were able to pay the first installment, but left a balance of
P50k for the second installment. Despite demand, the sublesse spouses still
failed to comply with their obligation.
3. This brough Jaring to sue the Alipios and the Manuels.
4. Purita Alipio moved to dismiss the case on the ground that her husband had
passed away. She based her action on Rule 3, §21 of the 1964 Rules of
Court which then provided that "when the action is for recovery of money,
debt or interest thereon, and the defendant dies before final judgment in the
Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner
especially provided in these rules."
a. This provision has been amended so that now Rule 3, §20 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: When the action is for the
recovery of money arising from contract, express or implied, and
the defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court in
which the action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not
be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of
final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff
therein shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in these
Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased per-
son.
5. Trial Court denied her motion to dismiss since she was herself a party to the
sublease contract.
6. Purita Alipio appealed to the CA however they denied her appeal, saying
that “The rule that an action for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon
must be dismissed when the defendant dies before final judgment in the re-
gional trial court, does not apply where there are other defendants against
whom the action should be maintained.”
7. Alipio now comes before the SC, saying that she was only seeking dismis-
sal of the case against her and her husband, claiming that this should be
prosecuted as a money claim against his estate.
ISSUE/S: WoN a creditor can sue the surviving spouse for the collection of a
debt which is owed by the conjugal partnership of gains—NO, the proper rem-
edy for the creditor is to file a claim in the settlement of estate of the decedent.
RULING: The SC reversed the CA.
RATIO:
1. This case thus falls outside of the ambit of Rule 3, §21 which deals with
dismissals of collection suits because of the death of the defendant during
the pendency of the case and the subsequent procedure to be undertaken by
the plaintiff, i.e., the filing of claim in the proceeding for the settlement of
the decedent's estate. As already noted, Rule 3, §20 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure now provides that the case will be allowed to continue until
entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff
therein will then be enforced in the manner especially provided in the Rules
for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person.
2. Under the law, the Alipios' obligation (and also that of the Manuels) is one
which is chargeable against their conjugal partnership. Under Art. 161(1) of
the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for ¾ of all debts and obli-
gations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partner-
ship, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cas-
es where she may legally bind the partnership.
3. When Purita’s husband died, their conjugal partnership was automatically
dissolved and debts chargeable against it are to be paid in the settlement of
estate proceedings in accordance with Rule 73, §2 which states:
vised Rules of Court, he may apply in court for letters of administration
in his capacity as a principal creditor of the deceased . . . if after thirty
(30) days from his death, ALIPIO failed to apply for administration or
request that administration be granted to some other person.
7. From the foregoing, it is clear that JARING cannot maintain the pre-
sent suit against ALIPIO. Rather, his remedy is to file a claim against
the Alipios in the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of ALIP-
IO's husband or, if none has been commenced, he can file a petition ei-
ther for the issuance of letters of administration or for the allowance of
will, depending on whether ALIPIO's husband died intestate or testate.
8. JARING cannot short-circuit this procedure by lumping his claim
against the Alipios with those against the Manuels considering that,
aside from ALIPIO's lack of authority to represent their conjugal es-
tate, the inventory of the Alipios' conjugal property is necessary before
any claim chargeable against it can be paid. Needless to say, such pow-
er exclusively pertains to the court having jurisdiction over the settle-
ment of the decedent's estate and not to any other court.

Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage. ¾ When the

marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the
community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liqui-
dated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceed-
ings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses have died, the conju-
gal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate pro-
ceedings of either.

4. After the death of either of the spouses, no complaint for the collection of
indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal partnership can be brought
against the surviving spouse. Instead, the claim must be made in the pro-
ceedings for the liquidation and settlement of the conjugal property.
5. The reason for this is that upon the death of one spouse, the powers of
administration of the surviving spouse ceases and is passed to the ad-
ministrator appointed by the court having jurisdiction over the settle-
ment of estate proceedings. Indeed, the surviving spouse is not even a
de facto administrator such that conveyances made by him of any
property belonging to the partnership prior to the liquidation of the
mass of conjugal partnership property is void.
6. In many cases as in the instant one, even after the death of one of the
spouses, there is no liquidation of the conjugal partnership. This does
not mean, however, that the conjugal partnership continues. And JAR-
ING cannot be said to have no remedy. Under Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the Re-
 Stronghold Insurance Company Inc, v. Republic-Asahi Glass (HORTALEZA) 1. On May 24, 1989 Republic Asahi Glass corporation entered into a contract
June, 22, 2006 | Panganiban, C.J. | Claims against the estate A. Statue of non-claims with JDS construction owned by Jose D. Santos worth Php 5,300,000 for
construction of Drainage and Roadways for its compound in Barrio Pinag-
PETITIONER: Stronghold Insurance Company Inc, buhatan, Pasig City.
RESPONDENTS: Republic-Asahi Glass Corporation 2. It was to be completed within 240 days beginning May 8, 1989
SUMMARY: Republic Asahi Glass corporation (ASAHI) contracted to JDS construc- 3. JDS executed a performance bond of Php 795,000.00 as Stronghold Insur-
tion inc (JDS) owned by Jose D. Santos Jr (Jose) for Drainage and roadways work for ance Inc., as surety.
its Compound in Pasig City. The Contract was priced at P5.3 million. Stronghold In- 4. A downpayment of Php 795,000.00 was given to JDS from Asahi Glass
surance Inc (Stronghold) Acted as surety guaranteeing not more than P795 thou- 5. Several times prior to November of 1989, Asahi’s engineers called the at-
sand. The Contract had a completion date of not more than 240 days. tention of JDS to the alleged alarmingly slow pace of the construction,
which resulted in the fear that the construction will not be finished within
Asahi complained of the Alarmingly slow progress of construction to JDS. After con- the stipulated 240-day period. However, said reminders went unheeded
cerns were unheeded to no avail, fearing the non-completion of the project within 6. On November 24, 1989, dissatisfied with the progress of the work under-
the time frame they rescinded the contract with JDS. Asahi also then filed a com- taken by JDS, Republic -Asahi extrajudicially rescinded the contract pursu-
plaint against JDS and Stronghold because of JDS negligence it costed them addi- ant to Article XIII of said contract, and wrote a letter to JDS informing the
tional expenses of around P3,256,874.00 and having to hire another contractor. latter of such rescission. Such rescission, according to Article XV of the con-
tract shall not be construed as a waiver of right to recover damages from
The year before service, it was found that Jose died. Stronghold now claims that JDS and the latter's sureties.
because of the death of Jose its obligations as a surety was extinguished. 7. Asahi claims that JDS's failure to comply with the provisions of the con-
tract, which resulted in the said contract's rescission, it had to hire another
WoN the death of Jose extinguished the claims against Stronghold as surety? contractor to finish the project, for which it incurred an additional expense
NO,Section 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the prosecution of of three million two hundred fifty six thousand, eight hundred seventy four
money claims arising from a contract against the estate of a deceased debtor. pesos (P3,256,874.00).
Evidently, those claims are not actually extinguished. What is extinguished is only 8. Asahi filed claims on JDS and SICI, jointly and severally, payment of
the obligee's action or suit filed before the court, which is not then acting as a P750,000.00 as damages in accordance with the performance bond; exem-
probate court. In the present case, whatever monetary liabilities or obligations Jose plary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 and attorney's fees in the
had under his contracts with Asahi were not intransmissible by their nature, by amount of at least P100,000.00.
stipulation, or by provision of law. Hence, his death did not result in the extin- 9. Upon, the Sheriffs Return dated June 14, 1991though service to Stronghold
guishment of those obligations or liabilities, which merely passed on to his estate. was successful, Jose died the year before and JDS was not located in its of-
Death is not a defense that he or his estate can set up to wipe out the obligations fice anymore
under the performance bond. Consequently, Stronghold as surety cannot use his 10. On August 16, 1991, the lower court issued an order dismissing the com-
death to escape its monetary obligation under its performance bond. plaint of Asahi against JDS and SICI, on the ground that the claim against
JDS did not survive the death of its sole proprietor, Jose D. Santos, Jr.
DOCTRINE: Section 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the prosecu-
tion of money claims arising from a contract against the estate of a deceased debt- 11. The CA ruled that SICI's obligation under the surety agreement was not ex-
or. Evidently, those claims are not actually extinguished. What is extinguished is tinguished by the death of Jose D. Santos, Jr. Consequently, Republic-Asahi
only the obligee's action or suit filed before the court, which is not then acting as a could still go after SICI for the bond.
probate court. 12. The appellate court also found that the lower court had erred in pronounc-
ing that the performance of the Contract in question had become impossi-

ble by respondent's act of rescission. The Contract was rescinded because
FACTS:
 of the dissatisfaction of respondent with the slow pace of work and pursu- 5. Under the law and jurisprudence, Asahi may sue, separately or together,
ant to Article XIII of its Contract with JDS. the principal debtor (JOSE) and the petitioner (STRONGHOLD) herein, in
ISSUE: view of the solidary nature of their liability.
1. WoN the death of Jose extinguished the claims against Stronghold as 6. The death of the principal debtor will not work to convert, decrease or nul-
surety? NO, Section 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court expressly allows lify the substantive right of the solidary creditor. Evidently, despite the
the prosecution of money claims arising from a contract against the es- death of the principal debtor, respondent may still sue petitioner alone, in
tate of a deceased debtor. Evidently, those claims are not actually extin- accordance with the solidary nature of the latter's liability under the per-
guished. What is extinguished is only the obligee's action or suit filed be- formance bond.
fore the court, which is not then acting as a probate court. In the present
case, whatever monetary liabilities or obligations Jose had under his con- (Additional Note) this is the contract of surety executed between the three parties
tracts with Asahi were not intransmissible by their nature, by stipulation,
or by provision of law. Hence, his death did not result in the extinguish- 1. The liability of petitioner is contractual in nature, because it executed a
ment of those obligations or liabilities, which merely passed on to his es- performance bond worded as follows:
tate. Death is not a defense that he or his estate can set up to wipe out a. "KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
the obligations under the performance bond. Consequently, Stronghold b. "That we, JDS CONSTRUCTION of 208-A San Buena Building, con-
as surety cannot use his death to escape its monetary obligation under its tractor, of Shaw Blvd., Pasig, MM Philippines, as principal and the
performance bond. STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. a corporation duly or-
ganized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philip-
RULING: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Ap- pines with head office at Makati, as Surety, are held and firmly
peals AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. bound unto the REPUBLIC ASAHI GLASS CORPORATION and to
any individual, firm, partnership, corporation or association sup-
RATIO: plying the principal with labor or materials in the penal sum of
1. As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the debtor does not SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY FIVE THOUSAND (P795,000.00), Philip-
extinguish the obligation. Obligations are transmissible to the heirs, except pine Currency, for the payment of which sum, well and truly to be
when the transmission is prevented by the law, the stipulations of the par- made, we bind ourselves, our heirs, executors, administrators,
ties, or the nature of the obligation. Only obligations that are personal or successors and assigns, jointly and severally, firmly by these pre-
are identified with the persons themselves are extinguished by death. sents.
2. Section 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the prosecu-
tion of money claims arising from a contract against the estate of a de-
ceased debtor. Evidently, those claims are not actually extinguished.
What is extinguished is only the obligee's action or suit filed before the
court, which is not then acting as a probate court.
3. In the present case, whatever monetary liabilities or obligations Santos had
under his contracts with respondent were not intransmissible by their na-
ture, by stipulation, or by provision of law.
4. Hence, his death did not result in the extinguishment of those obligations
or liabilities, which merely passed on to his estate. Death is not a defense
that he or his estate can set up to wipe out the obligations under the per-
formance bond. Consequently, petitioner as surety cannot use his death to
escape its monetary obligation under its performance bond.
 012 GABRIEL vs. BILON (LAGUILLES)
Feb. 7, 2007 | Azcuna, J.| Claims against the estate
PETITIONER: Melencio Gabriel represented by surviving spouse, Flordeliza
V. Gabriel
RESPONDENTS: Nelson Bilon, Angel Brazil, and Ernesto Pagaygay
SUMMARY: Bilon et al filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against
petitioner Gabriel. Bilon et al alleged that they were regular drivers of Gabriel
under a boundary system, and that Gabriel just told them to not drive anymore.
Gabriel claimed that he does not even remember if Bilon et al were his
employees, but he is certain that he did not dismiss any of his employees. The
LA ruled that the dismissal of Bilon et al were illegal, and ordered Gabriel to
pay them 1.3 million. Incidentally, Gabriel passed away. Through counsel,
Gabriel appealed the LA’s decision to the NLRC, and the latter promulgated its
first decision which dismissed the case for lack of employer-employee
relationship. Bilon et al filed an MR. The NLRC promulgated its second
decision which dismissed the MR and directed the complainants to pursue their
claim against the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Gabriel. The
issue in this case is WoN the employees’ claims should be pursued against the
estate of Gabriel.
The Court held in the affirmative. With regard to the monetary claim, the same
shall be governed by Sec. 20, Rule 3 in relation to Sec. 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules
of Court. According to these rules, a favorable judgment obtained by the
plaintiff after the defendant’s death should be enforced against the estate of the
deceased person.
DOCTRINE: A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff after the
defendant’s death should be enforced against the estate of the deceased person.
FACTS:
6. Respondents Nelson Bilon, Angel Brazil, and Ernesto Pagaygay, filed their
separate complaints for illegal dismissal and separation pay against
petitioner Melencio Gabriel with the NLRC. The complaint was amended,
impleading as party respondent Bacoor Transport Service Cooperative, as
both parties are members of the cooperative.
7. The employees alleged the following:
a. That they were regular drivers of Gabriel Jeepney under a
boundary system of P400 a day, plying Baclaran to Divisoria via
Tondo.
b. That they were requires to pay additional P55 a day for police
protection, washing, deposit, and garage fees.
c. That there was no law providing the operator to require the drivers
to pay the aforementioned.
d. That Gabriel told them not to drive anymore, and when they went
to the garage to work the next day, they were not given a unit to
drive.
8. Petitioner Gabriel alleged the following:
a. He does not remember if the respondents were even his employees.
Certain, however, is the fact that neither the respondents nor other
drivers who worked for him were ever dismissed by him; and that
some of his former drivers just stopped reporting for work;
b. That he made sure that none of the jeepneys would stay idle even
for a day hence, it had been his practice to establish a pool of
drivers. Had respondents manifested their desire to drive his units,
it would have been immaterial whether they were his former
drivers or not.
c. While he was penalized in connection with similar complaints by
other drivers in a previous case, it was not because his culpability
was established, but due to technicalities involving overshit and
negligence on his part by not participating in any stage of the
investigation;
d. That respondents’ claim that certain amounts were deducted from
their day’s earnings is preposterous. Indeed, there were times when
deductions were made from the day’s earnings of some drivers, but
such were installment payments for the amount previously
advanced to them (like for accidents or traffic violations).
9. On the other hand, Bacoor Transport declared that it should not be made a
party to the case because it has nothing to do with the employment of its
member-drivers; that the matter is between the operator and the drivers – all
these could be inferred from the Management Agreement between Bacoor
Transport and its operators; that the amount allegedly deducted from
respondents were matters that the cooperative was not aware of.
10. The Labor Arbiter ruled that the dismissal of respondents was illegal and
ordered Gabriel to pay them 1.3 million representing back wages and
separation pay.
11. Incidentally, Garbriel passed away. A copy of the LA’s decision was
delivered personally to his house. According to respondents, Gabriel’s
surviving spouse, Flordeliza Gabriel, refused to receive the same.
Nevertheless, a copy was left with her and her daughter but they both
refused to sign and acknowledge receipt of the decision.
12. The LA’s decision was subsequently served by registered mail at Gabriel’s
residence and was received. Counsel for Gabriel filed an entry of
appearance with motion to dismiss the case for the reason that Gabriel
passed away.
 13. Gabriel appealed the LA’s decision to the NLRC. Respondent employees according to these rules, the money claims of respondent employees must
filed a motion to dismiss Gabriel’s appeal on the ground that the surety be filed against the estate of petitioner Melencio Gabriel.
bond is defective and the appeal was filed out of time.
14. The NLRC promulgated its first decision which dismissed the case for lack
of employer-employee relationship.
15. Respondent employees filed a motion for reconsideration and claimed that
the decision did not discuss the issue of the timeliness of the appeal.
16. The NLRC promulgated its second decision which dismissed the motion for
reconsideration and directed the complainants to pursue their claim
against the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
Melencio Gabriel.
17. On appeal to the CA, the latter reversed the decisions of the NLRC on the
ground that the death of Gabriel’s death did not ipso facto negate the
recovery of the money claim against the latter. Hence this petition.

ISSUE/s:
2. WoN the respondent employees’ claim should be pursued in Gabriel’s
estate proceedings – YES, because according to the Rules of Court, a
favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff after the defendant’s death
should be enforced against the estate of the deceased person.

RULING: Wherefore, the petition is denied.

RATIO:
1. The Court agrees with the CA that an employer-employee relationship
existed between Gabriel and Bilon, et al. Citing National Labor Union v.
Dinglasan, the Court ruled that the relationship between jeepney
owners/operators and jeepney drivers under the boundary system is that of
employer-employee relationship.
2. The jeepney owner exercises supervision and control over the drivers. The
fact that the drivers do not receive fixed wages but get only that in excess of
the boundary is not sufficient to withdraw the relationship between them
from that of employer and employee.
3. The Court also agrees with the CA that the employees were illegally
dismissed and were not accorded due process. Gabriel failed to show that
the cause for termination falls under any of the grounds enumerated in Art.
282 of the Labor Code.
4. With regard to the monetary claim, the same shall be governed by Sec. 20,
Rule 31 in relation to Sec. 5 of Rule 86 2 of the Rules of Court. Thus,
enforced in the manner provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased
person.
2
Sec. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred; exceptions. – All claims for
1
Sec. 20. Action on contractual money claims. – When the action is for recovery of money arising from money against the decedent arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due,
contract, express or implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court in which or contingent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the
the action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action
continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants.
 013 UNION BANK v. SANTIBAEZ (Marcos)
Feb. 23, 2005 | Callejo, J. | Statute of Non-Claims
PETITIONER: Union Bank of the Philippines
RESPONDENTS: Edmund Santibaez and Florence Santibaez Ariola
SUMMARY: FCCC and Efraim entered into a loan agreement. The amount was
intended for the purchase of a Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel
Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory
note in favor of FCCC. FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan argument. It
was intended to pay the balance of the purchase price of another unit of Ford
6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories, and one unit
Howard Rotamotor Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim and his son, Edmund,
executed a promissory note for the said amount in favor of the FCCC. Aside
from this, they also signed a Continuing Guaranty Agreement for the loan.
Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Edmund, as one of the heirs, was
appointed as the special administrator of the estate of the decedent. During the
pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister
Florence Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement, wherein they agreed to divide
themselves and take possession of the tractors, and at the same time to assume
the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC. FCCC assigned all its assets and
liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank. Union Bank sent demand letters
to Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the same and refused to pay. Union Bank
then filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim, Edmund,
and Florence before the RTC of Makati City. The complaint was narrowed down
to Florence since summons intended to Edmund was not served. The RTC
dismissed the case, and such was affirmed by the CA. Union Bank now files a
petition with the SC. The issue in this case is WoN Florence should be held
liable for the debt entered by Efraim and Edmund– NO, because Union Bank
should have filed a claim in the probate proceedings instead. The joint agreement
executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves,
is invalid, specially so since at the time of its execution, there was already a
pending proceeding for the probate of their late fathers holographic will covering
the said tractors. There can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the
will has been probated. The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the
decedent. The petitioner, purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibaez,
should have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in accordance with
Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court.
DOCTRINE: The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the
probate court is mandatory.
FACTS:
108. The First Countryside Credit Corporation and Efraim M. Santibaez entered
into a loan agreement in the amount of P128,000. The amount was intended
for the payment of the purchase price of one unit Ford 6600 Agricultural
All-Purpose Diesel Tractor.
109. In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in
favor of FCCC payable in 5 equal annual amortizations.
110. FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan argument, this time in the
amount of P123,156.00. It was intended to pay the balance of the purchase
price of another unit of Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor,
with accessories, and one unit Howard Rotamotor Model AR 60K.
111. Again, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note for the said
amount in favor of the FCCC.
112. Aside from this, they also signed a Continuing Guaranty Agreement for the
loan.
113. Sometime in Feb. 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will.
114. Subsequently, testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo
City.
115. Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed as the special administrator of
the estate of the decedent.
116. During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs,
Edmund and his sister Florence Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement,
wherein they agreed to divide themselves and take possession of the 3
tractors: 2 tractors for Edmund and 1 tractor for Florence. Each of them was
to assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC.
117. FCCC assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage
Bank by a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities.
118. Union Bank sent demand letters to Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the
same and refused to pay.
119. Union Bank then filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of
Efraim, Edmund, and Florence before the RTC of Makati City.
120. Summons were issued against both, but the one intended for Edmund was
not served since he was in the US and there was no information on his
address or the date of his return to the Philippines.
121. Accordingly, the complaint was narrowed down to Florence.
122. Florence filed her Answer and alleged that the loan documents did not bind
her since she was not a party thereto. Also the joint agreement signed by her
and her brother was not approved by the probate court, it was null and void.
123. The case was unloaded and re-raffled to the RTC. Consequently, trial on the
merits ensued and a decision was subsequently rendered by the court
dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.
124. The petitioner appealed from the RTC decision and elevated its case to the
CA.
ISSUE/s:
 12. WoN Florence should be held liable for the debt entered by Efraim and
Edmund– NO, because Union Bank should have filed a claim in the probate
proceedings instead.
RULING: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED.
The assailed Court of Appeals Decision is AFFIRMED. No costs.
RATIO:
157. Union Bank claims that the obligations of the deceased were transmitted to
the heirs as provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code; there was thus no
need for the probate court to approve the joint agreement where the heirs
partitioned the tractors owned by the deceased and assumed the obligations
related thereto. Since respondent Florence S. Ariola signed the joint
agreement without any condition, she is now estopped.
158. In her comment to the petition, Florence maintains that Union Bank is
trying to recover a sum of money from the deceased Efraim Santibaez; thus
the claim should have been filed with the probate court. She points out that
at the time of the execution of the joint agreement there was already an
existing probate proceedings of which the petitioner knew about. However,
to avoid a claim in the probate court which might delay payment of the
obligation, the petitioner opted to require them to execute the said
agreement.
159. She asserts that even if the agreement was voluntarily executed by her and
her brother Edmund, it should still have been subjected to the approval of
the court as it may prejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties.
Furthermore, she had not waived any rights, as she even stated in her
answer in the court a quo that the claim should be filed with the probate
court. Thus, the petitioner could not invoke or claim that she is in estoppel.
160. At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction
to determine all the properties of the deceased, to determine whether they
should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered. The said court is primarily concerned with the administration,
liquidation and distribution of the estate.
161. The rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the
will has been probated.
162. This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the
same properties embraced in the will.
163. In the present case, the deceased, Efraim Santibaez, left a holographic will
which contained, inter alia, the provision which reads as follows:
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be
discovered later after my demise, shall be distributed in the
proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in
favor of Edmund and Florence, my children.
164. We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted is an all-
encompassing provision embracing all the properties left by the decedent
which might have escaped his mind at that time he was making his will, and
other properties he may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the three (3)
subject tractors.
165. This being so, any partition involving the said tractors among the heirs
is not valid. The joint agreement executed by Edmund and Florence,
partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid, specially so since
at the time of its execution, there was already a pending proceeding for
the probate of their late fathers holographic will covering the said
tractors.
166. It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired
jurisdiction over all the properties of the deceased, including the three (3)
tractors. To dispose of them in any way without the probate courts approval
is tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction which the Court cannot allow.
167. Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees
or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a
sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction.
168. Thus, in executing any joint agreement which appears to be in the nature of
an extra-judicial partition, as in the case at bar, court approval is imperative,
and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over that part of
the estate.
169. Moreover, it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to determine the
identity of the heirs of the decedent. In the instant case, there is no showing
that the signatories in the joint agreement were the only heirs of the
decedent. When it was executed, the probate of the will was still pending
before the court and the latter had yet to determine who the heirs of the
decedent were. Thus, for Edmund and respondent Florence S. Ariola to
adjudicate unto themselves the three (3) tractors was a premature act, and
prejudicial to the other possible heirs and creditors who may have a valid
claim against the estate of the deceased.
170. The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The
petitioner, purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibaez, should
have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in accordance
with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court.24
24
Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed barred; exceptions. All claims for
money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due,
or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for mon-
ey against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred
forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator
may bring against the claimants. Where an executor or administrator commences an action, or prosecutes
an action already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the
claims he has against the decedent, instead of presenting them independently to the court as herein provid-
ed, and mutual claims may be set off against each other in such action; and if final judgment is rendered in
favor of the defendant, the amount so determined shall be considered the true balance against the estate, as
 171. The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate court
is mandatory.
172. Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold private
respondent Florence S. Ariola accountable for any liability incurred by her
late father. The documentary evidence presented, particularly the
promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed
and signed only by the late Efraim Santibaez and his son Edmund. As the
petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most, it
may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said
promissory notes and continuing guaranty, of course, subject to any
defenses Edmund may have as against the petitioner.
173. (Not related na sa topic but just in case sir asks) Union Bank doesn not have
personality to file the complaint since it did not sufficiently show it was a
successor-in-interest of the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the
FCCC assigned its assets and liabilities.

though the claim had been presented directly before the court in the administration proceedings. Claims
not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their present value.
 HILADO V CA (ARMAND)
May 8, 2009 | Tinga, J. | Intervention in Intestate Proceedings
PETITIONER: Alfredo Hilado et al.
RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals and Administratix Julita Campos Benedicto
SUMMARY: Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000. He was survived
by his wife, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto, and his only daughter,
Francisca. At the time of his death, there were two pending civil cases against him
involving the petitioners. The first, was then pending with the RTC of Bacolod City,
with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of the plaintiffs therein. The second, was then
pending with the RTC of Bacolod City, with petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation and
First Farmers Holding Corporation as one of the plaintiffs therein. Julita Campos
Benedicto filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the issuance of letters of ad-
ministration in her favor. Petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a Manifesta-
tion/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, praying that they be furnished with copies of all
processes and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings. Julita Benedicto opposed
the manifestation/motion, disputing the personality of petitioners to intervene in the
intestate proceedings of her husband. The issue is WoN the lower courts erred in
denying them the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of the estate of
Roberto Benedicto – NO. The merits of petitioners claims against Benedicto are to
be settled in the civil cases where they were raised, and not in the intestate proceed-
ings. In the event the claims for damages of petitioners are granted, they would have
the right to enforce the judgment against the estate. While the language of Section 1,
Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from intervening in the intestate
proceedings, case law has consistently held that the legal interest required of an
intervenor must be actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply
contingent and expectant. It appears that the claims against Benedicto were based
on tort, as they arose from his actions in connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and
Traders Royal Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class
of claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required under Rule 86. These
actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of the decedent and may be
commenced against the administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87.
DOCTRINE: The Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a creditor or any
person interested in the estate, the right to participate in every aspect of the testate or
intestate proceedings, but instead provides for specific instances when such persons
may accordingly act in those proceedings, the Court deemed that while there is no
general right to intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be allowed to seek
certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly provided for under the
Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in the estate,
and there is no other modality under the Rules by which such interests can be protect-
ed.
FACTS:
66. Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000. He was survived by
his wife, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto, and his only daugh-
ter, Francisca.
67. At the time of his death, there were two pending civil cases against him in-
volving the petitioners. The first, was then pending with the RTC
of Bacolod City, with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of the plaintiffs
therein. The second, was then pending with the RTC of Bacolod City, with
petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation
as one of the plaintiffs therein.
68. On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the
RTC of Manila a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her
favor.
69. On 2 August 2000, the Manila RTC issued an order appointing private re-
spondent as administrator of the estate of her deceased husband, and issuing
letters of administration in her favor.
70. In January 2001, private respondent submitted an Inventory of the Estate,
Lists of Personal and Real Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her de-
ceased husband. In the List of Liabilities attached to the inventory, private
respondent included as among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two
pending claims then being litigated before the Bacolod City courts.
71. On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a Manifesta-
tion/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, praying that they be furnished with cop-
ies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings.
72. Julita Benedicto opposed the manifestation/motion, disputing the personali-
ty of petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings of her husband.
73. On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the manifesta-
tion/motion, on the ground that petitioners are not interested parties within
the contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the intestate pro-
ceedings.
74. After the Manila RTC had denied petitioners motion for reconsideration, a
petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of Appeals. The petition ar-
gued in general that petitioners had the right to intervene in the intestate
proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the latter being the defendant in the civil
cases they lodged with the Bacolod RTC.
75. The CA denied their petition. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE/s:
9. WoN the lower courts erred in denying them the right to intervene in
the intestate proceedings of the estate of Roberto Benedicto – NO. The
merits of petitioners claims against Benedicto are to be settled in the civil
cases where they were raised, and not in the intestate proceedings. In the
event the claims for damages of petitioners are granted, they would have the
right to enforce the judgment against the estate.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification that
petitioners, as persons interested in the intestate estate of Roberto Benedicto, are
entitled to such notices and rights as provided for such interested persons in the
Rules on Settlement of Estates of Deceased Persons under the Rules on Special
Proceedings.
RATIO:
120. The CA chose to view the matter from a perspective solely informed by the
rule on intervention. We can readily agree with the Court of Appeals on that
point. Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires
that an intervenor has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated
as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property
in the custody of the court x x x While the language of Section 1, Rule 19
does not literally preclude petitioners from intervening in the intestate
proceedings, case law has consistently held that the legal interest required
of an intervenor must be actual and material, direct and immediate, and not
simply contingent and expectant.
121. Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules
of Civil Procedure necessarily comes into operation in special proceedings.
The settlement of estates of deceased persons fall within the rules of special
proceedings under the Rules of Court, not the Rules on Civil Procedure.
Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that [i]n the absence of special
provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as
practicable, applicable to special proceedings.
122. We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72,
intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a
decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The definition of
intervention under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate contingent
claims.
123. In several instances, the Rules on Special Proceedings entitle any interested
persons or any persons interested in the estate to participate in varying
capacities in the testate or intestate proceedings. Petitioners cite these
provisions before us, namely: (1) Section 1, Rule 79, which recognizes the
right of any person interested to oppose the issuance of letters testamentary
and to file a petition for administration; (2) Section 3, Rule 79, which
mandates the giving of notice of hearing on the petition for letters of
administration to the known heirs, creditors, and to any other persons
believed to have interest in the estate; (3) Section 1, Rule 76, which allows
a person interested in the estate to petition for the allowance of a will,
among others. (case named 7 provisions)
124. It appears that the claims against Benedicto were based on tort, as they
arose from his actions in connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders
Royal Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class
of claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required under Rule 86.
These actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of the decedent and
may be commenced against the administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule
87. Indeed, the records indicate that the intestate estate of Benedicto, as
represented by its administrator, was successfully impleaded in Civil Case
No. 11178, whereas the other civil case was already pending review before
this Court at the time of Benedictos death.
125. Evidently, the merits of petitioners claims against Benedicto are to be
settled in the civil cases where they were raised, and not in the intestate
proceedings. In the event the claims for damages of petitioners are granted,
they would have the right to enforce the judgment against the estate.
126. Petitioners interests in the estate of Benedicto may be inchoate interests, but
they are viable interests nonetheless. We are mindful that the Rules of
Special Proceedings allows not just creditors, but also any person interested
or persons interested in the estate various specified capacities to protect
their respective interests in the estate. Anybody with a contingent claim
based on a pending action for quasi-delict against a decedent may be
reasonably concerned that by the time judgment is rendered in their favor,
the estate of the decedent would have already been distributed, or
diminished to the extent that the judgment could no longer be enforced
against it.
127. The Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a creditor or any person
interested in the estate, the right to participate in every aspect of the testate
or intestate proceedings, but instead provides for specific instances when
such persons may accordingly act in those proceedings, the Court deemed
that while there is no general right to intervene on the part of the petitioners,
they may be allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate
court not explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief
sought is necessary to protect their interest in the estate, and there is no oth-
er modality under the Rules by which such interests can be protected. It is
under this standard that we assess the three prayers sought by petitioners.
128. The first is that petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and
orders issued in connection with the intestate proceedings, as well as the
pleadings filed by the administrator of the estate. There is no questioning as
to the utility of such relief for the petitioners. They would be duly alerted of
the developments in the intestate proceedings, including the status of the
assets of the estate. Such a running account would allow them to pursue the
appropriate remedies should their interests be compromised, such as the
right, under Section 6, Rule 87, to complain to the intestate court if property
of the estate concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently conveyed.
129. At the same time, the fact that petitioners interests remain inchoate and
contingent counterbalances their ability to participate in the intestate
proceedings. We are mindful of respondents submission that if the Court
were to entitle petitioners with service of all processes and pleadings of the
 intestate court, then anybody claiming to be a creditor, whether contingent
or otherwise, would have the right to be furnished such pleadings, no matter
how wanting of merit the claim may be. Indeed, to impose a precedent that
would mandate the service of all court processes and pleadings to anybody
posing a claim to the estate, much less contingent claims, would unduly
complicate and burden the intestate proceedings, and would ultimately
offend the guiding principle of speedy and orderly disposition of cases.
130. Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the
intestate proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent than mandating
the service of court processes and pleadings upon them. In either case, the
interest of the creditor in seeing to it that the assets are being preserved and
disposed of in accordance with the rules will be duly satisfied.
Acknowledging their right to access the records, rather than entitling them
to the service of every court order or pleading no matter how relevant to
their individual claim, will be less cumbersome on the intestate court, the
administrator and the heirs of the decedent, while providing a viable means
by which the interests of the creditors in the estate are preserved.
131. The court also denied petitioners request; that a deadline be set for the
submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete
inventory of the estate, and upon submission thereof: the inheritance tax
appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue be required to assist in the
appraisal of the fair market value of the same; and that the intestate court set
a deadline for the submission by the administratrix of her verified annual
account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her examination
under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and other parties
interested in the collation, preservation and disposition of the estate.
 015 DOMINGO v. GARLITOS (CRUZ reuploaded by MERILLES)
June 29 1963 | Labrador, J. | Claims against the estate
21. In Melecio R. Domingo vs. Hon. Judge S. C. Moscoso, SC declared as final
PETITIONER: Melecio R. Domingo, as Commissioner of Internal Revenue
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Lorenzo C. Garlitos, in his capacity as Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Leyte, and Simeona K. Price SIMEONA K.
PRICE, as administratrix of the Intestate Estate of the late Walter Scott Price
SUMMARY: In Melecio R. Domingo vs. Hon. Judge S. C. Moscoso, SC de-
clared as final and executory the order for the payment by the estate of Walter
Scott Price of the estate and inheritance taxes, charges and penalties amounting
to P40,058.55. Petition for execution for this was sought for but was denied
because Government is indebted to the estate pursuant to the note by President
Carlos Garcia to Director of Lands to pay the administratix of Walter’s estate at
P369, 140 and to an extract of page 765 of Republic Act No. 2700 appropriating
the sum of P262,200.00 for the payment to the Leyte Cadastral Survey, Inc.,
represented by the administratrix. The issue in this case is the procedure by
which to settle claims or indebtedness against the estate of a deceased person.
The SC ruled that the government may not execute its claims on Walter’s estate.
The ordinary procedure by which to settle claims or indebtedness against the
estate of a deceased person, as an inheritance tax, is for the claimant to present a
claim before the probate court so that said court may order the administrator to
pay the amount thereof. Another ground for denying the petition of the provin-
cial fiscal is the fact that the court having jurisdiction of the estate had found
that the claim of the estate against the Government has been recognized and an
amount of P262,200 has already been appropriated for the purpose by a corre-
sponding law (Rep. Act No. 2700). Both the claim of the Government for inher-
itance taxes and the claim of the intestate for services rendered have already
become overdue and demandable as well as fully liquidated. Compensation,
therefore, takes place by operation of law. Thus, CIR has no clear right to exe-
cute the judgment for taxes against the estate of the deceased Walter Scott
Price. Furthermore, the petition for certiorari and mandamus is not the proper
remedy for the petitioner. Appeal is the remedy
DOCTRINE: The ordinary procedure by which to settle claims or indebtedness
against the estate of a deceased person, as an inheritance tax, is for the claimant
to present a claim before the probate court so that said court may order the
administrator to pay the amount thereof.
FACTS:
20. This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus against the Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Leyte, Hon. Lorenzo C. Garlitos, presiding, seeking to
annul certain orders of the court and for an order in this Court directing the
respondent court below to execute the judgment in favor of the Government
against the estate of Walter Scott Price for internal revenue taxes.
and executory the order for the payment by the estate of Walter Scott Price
the estate and inheritance taxes, charges and penalties amounting to
P40,058.55, issued by the Court of First Instance of Leyte in special
proceedings No. 14 entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the Late
Walter Scott Price."
a. In order to enforce the claims against the estate the fiscal
presented a petition, to the court below for the execution of the
judgment.
b. The petition was denied by the court which held that the execution
is not justifiable as the Government is indebted to the estate under
administration in the amount of P262,200.
c. The orders of the court are as follows:
i. "Atty. Benedicto submitted a copy of the contract
between Mrs. Simeona K. Price, Administratrix of the
estate of her late husband Walter Scott Price and Director
Zoilo Castrillo of the Bureau of Lands dated September
19, 1956 and the note of Pres. Carlos P. Garcia, to
Director Castrillo directing the latter to pay to Mrs. Price
the sum of P368,140.00, and an extract of page 765 of
Republic Act No. 2700 appropriating the sum of
P262,200.00 for the payment to the Leyte Cadastral
Survey, Inc., represented by the administratrix Simeona
K. Price, as directed in the above note of the President.
ii. Considering these facts, the Court orders that the payment
of inheritance taxes in the sum of P40,058.55 due the
Collector of Internal Revenue as ordered paid by this
Court on July 5, 1960 in accordance with the order
promulgated in Melecio R. Domingo vs. Hon. Judge S. C.
Moscoso, be deducted from the amount of P262,200.00
due and payable to the administratrix Price, in this estate,
the balance to be paid by the Government to her without
further delay.
d. the payment of the claim of the Collector of Internal Revenue be
deferred until the Government shall have paid its accounts to the
administratrix herein amounting to P262,200.00.
i. It may not be amiss to repeat that it is only fair for the
Government. as a debtor, to pay its accounts to its citi-
zens-creditors before it can insist in the prompt payment
of the latter's account to it, specially taking into consider-
ation that the amount due the Government draws interests
 while the credit due to the present estate does not accrue
any interest."
ISSUE/s:
7. WoN claims or indebtedness against the estate of a deceased person, as an
inheritance tax, be done before the probate court – YES, so that said court
may order the administrator to pay the amount thereof.
RULING: The petition is, therefore, dismissed, without costs.
RATIO:
The petition to set aside the above orders of the court below and for the execution of
the claims of the Government against the estate must be denied for lack of merit.
23. The ordinary procedure by which to settle claims or indebtedness
against the estate of a deceased person, as an inheritance tax, is for the
claimant to present a claim before the probate court so that said court
may order the administrator to pay the amount thereof.
a. Aldamiz vs. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Mindoro: a writ
of execution is not the proper procedure allowed by the Rules of
Court for the payment of debts and expenses of administration.
The proper procedure is for the court to order the sale of personal
estate or the sale or mortgage of real property of the deceased and
all debts or expenses of administration should be paid out of the
proceeds of the sale or mortgage.
i. The order for the sale or mortgage should be issued upon
motion of the administrator and with the written notice to
all the heirs, legatees and devisees residing in the
Philippines, according to Rule 89, section 3, and Rule 90,
section 2. And when sale or mortgage of real estate is to
be made, the regulations contained in Rule 90, section 7,
should be complied with.
ii. Execution may issue only where the devisees, legatees or
heirs have entered into possession of their respective por-
tions in the estate prior to settlement and payment of the
debts and expenses of administration and it is later ascer-
tained that there are such debts and expenses to be paid,
in which case 'the court having jurisdiction of the estate
may, by order for that purpose, after hearing, settle the
amount of their several liabilities, and order how much
and in what manner each person shall contribute, and
may issue execution if circumstances require' And this is
not the instant case."
b. The legal basis for such a procedure is the fact that in the testate or
intestate proceedings to settle the estate of a deceased person, the
properties belonging to the estate are under the jurisdiction of the
court and such jurisdiction continues until said properties have
been distributed among the heirs entitled thereto.
c. During the pendency of the proceedings all the estate is
in custodia legis and the proper procedure is not to allow the sher-
iff, in case of a court judgment, to seize the properties but to ask
the court for an order to require the administrator to pay the
amount due from the estate and required to be paid.
24. Another ground for denying the petition of the provincial fiscal is the fact
that the court having jurisdiction of the estate had found that the claim of
the estate against the Government has been recognized and an amount of
P262,200 has already been appropriated for the purpose by a correspond-
ing law (Rep. Act No. 2700).
a. both the claim of the Government for inheritance taxes and the
claim of the intestate for services rendered have already become
overdue and demandable as well as fully liquidated.
b. Compensation, therefore, takes place by operation of law, in ac-
cordance with the provisions of Articles 1279 and 1290 of the
Civil Code, and both debts are extinguished to the concurrent
amount
"Art. 1200. When all the requisites mentioned in article 1279 are
present, compensation takes effect by operation of law, and extin-
guishes both debts to the concurrent amount, even though the
creditors and debtors are not aware of the compensation."
25. It is clear, therefore, that the CIR has no clear right to execute the judgment
for taxes against the estate of the deceased Walter Scott Price.
26. Furthermore, the petition for certiorari and mandamus is not the proper
remedy for the petitioner. Appeal is the remedy
 016 NACAR v. NISTAL (PELIÑO)
December 8, 1982 | Gutierrez, Jr., J. | Rule 87, Section 1
PETITIONER: Nicanor Nacar
RESPONDENTS: Claudio A. Nistal as Municipal Judge of Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;
Provincial Sheriff of Agusan del Sur, Ildefonso Japitana and Antonio Doloricon
SUMMARY: Japitana filed a complaint entitled “Claim Against the Estate of the Late
Isabelo Nacar with Preliminary Attachment” in the MTC. The complaint states that
Nicanor was about to remove and dispose the property, with intent to defraud Japitana for
the indebtedness of P2,791. Judge Nistal issued the order commanding the sheriff to
attach the 7 heads, but only 4 were attached. Nicanor filed a MTD. Japitana filed an
opposition and Doloricon filed an intervention. MTC denied the MTD, so Nicanor went
to the SC, where SC issued preliminary mandatory injunction. The issue in this case is
whether or not the filing of Japitana of the civil case to recover indebtedness incurred by
the deceased is correct. The SC held in the negative. There is no cause of action against
Nicanor because the debt was incurred by Isabelo. Assuming that Japitana had a legal
right to the carabaos which were in Nicanor’s possession, the proper procedure would not
be to file an action for the recovery of the outstanding debts of the late Isabelo against his
stepfather, with Nicanor as defendant. Moreover, according to the concurring opinion, the
caption and the body of the complaint in the Civil Case No. 65, the claim of Japitana was
not against Nicanor, but against Isabelo’s estate. It is a claim for money arising from
unpaid indebtedness granted on various dates. Isabelo died before the said complaint was
filed. It doesn’t appear that any proceeding has been filed to settle his estate. Under these
facts, the filing of an ordinary action to recover said claim is not allowed in any court.
Even if the settlement proceedings had been taken to settle the estate of Isabelo, the suit to
recover the claim of Japitana may not be filed against the administrator or executor of his
estate, as provided for in Sec. 1 Rule 87 of the ROC: “No action upon a claim for the
recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or
administrator…”
DOCTRINE: Sec. 1 Rule 87 of the ROC: “No action upon a claim for the recovery of
money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or
administrator…”
**The main decision talked about cause of action and MTD, but the concurring opinion seems to be more in line with
SPECPRO. The summary box and doctrine focuses on the ratio given by the concurring opinion. READ CONCUR-
RING.**
FACTS:
125. This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with preliminary
injunction to annul an order of Judge Nistal directing the attachment of 7
carabaos, to effect the return of 4 carabaos seized under the questioned order
and to stop the judge from further proceeding with the civil case.
126. Ildefonso Japitana (Japitana) filed a complaint25 entitled “Claim Against the
25
TITLE: Ildefonso Japitan, Plaintiff v. Nicanor Nacar, Defednant; FOR: Claim against the estate fo the late Isabelo
Nacar with Preliminary Attachment. (1) That at various dates since 1968, Nicanor incurred indebtedness to Japitana in the
total sum of P2,791, which amount had long been overdue for payment, and which Nicanor up to this date has not been
able to pay despite repeated demands. (2) Isabelo died last April 1970 leaving personal property consisting of 7 heads of
carabaos now in the possession of Nicanor. (3) Japitana filed a claim against the estate of Isabelo to recover the P2,791.99
Estate of the Late Isabelo Nacar with Preliminary Attachment”.
a. There was also an allegation that Nicanor was about to remove and dispose
the property, with intent to defraud the Japitana.
127. On the basis of the Complaint, and considering that Japitana had given security
or the bond, Judge Nistal issued the order commanding the provincial sheriff to
attach the 7 heads of cattle in Nicanor Nistal’s possession (Nicanor), but only 4
were attached because 3 were slaughtered during the wake of Isabelo.
128. Nicanor filed a motion to dismiss, to dissolve writ of preliminary attachment,
and to order the return of the carabaos.
a. Japitana filed an opposition to the MTD, while intervenor Antonio
Doloricon filed a complaint-in-intervention asserting that he was the owner
of the attached carabaos and that the certificates of ownership of large
cattle were in his name.
b. Judge Nistal denied the MTD, so Nicanor went to the SC.
129. In a resolution dated 12 January 1971, the SC, upon posting of a 1k bond,
directed the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction.
a. So Judge Nistal and Japitana were enjoined from further enforcing the writ
of attachment and to return the seized carabaos.
b. Judge Nistal was also restrained from further proceeding with the civil
case.
ISSUE/s:
13. WON the filing of Japitana of the civil case to recover indebtedness incurred by
the deceased is correct. - NO, the filing of an ordinary action to recover said
claim is not allowed in any court. Even if the settlement proceedings had been
taken to settle the estate of Isabelo, the suit to recover the claim of Japitana may
not be filed against the administrator or executor of his estate, as provided for in
Sec. 1 Rule 87 of the ROC.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The preliminary
mandatory injunction issued on 13 January 1971 is made PERMANENT and the cash
bond filed by Nacar in connection is ordered RETURNED to him.
RATIO:
On the
1. Nicanor, in his MTD, raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction and absence of a
cause of action.
a. He averred that there was no cause of action against him since the
indebtedness referred to in the complaint was Isabelo’s and not his.
b. He also stated that a municipal court has no jurisdiction to entertain an
action involving a claim filed against the estate of a deceased person.
2. Judge Nistal tried to avoid the consequences of the issues raised in the MTD by
starting that although the title of the complaint styled it as a claim against the
(4) That Nicanor is about to remove and dispose the abovementioned property with intent to defraud Japitana. (5) Japi-
tana is willing to put up a bond for the issuance of a preliminary attachment in the amount fixed by the court, not exceed-
ing P2,791. Prayer: Writ of attachment be issued; after hearing, pay P2,791 with legal interest + costs of suit.
 estate of Isabelo, the allegations showed that the nature of the action was really
for the recovery of an indebtedness in the amount of P2,791.99.
3. SC: The rule cited by the judge is correctly stated but it is hardly relevant to the
contents of the complaint filed by Japitana.
a. It is patent from the portions of the complaint earlier cited that the
allegations are not only vague and ambiguous but downright misleading.
b. (see footnote for contents of complaint) The 2nd par. of the body of the
complaint states that Nicanor, at various dates since 1968, incurred debts to
Doloricon in the sum of P2,791, yet in the subsequent paragraphs, it could
be gathered that the debts were actually incurred by Isabelo, who died
several months before the filing of the complaint.
c. The complaint which Judge Nistal reads as one for the collection of a sum
of money and all the paragraphs, of which are incidentally unnumbered,
expressly states as a material averment: xxx that plaintiff herein file a claim
against the estate of the late Isabelo Nacar to recover the aformenetioned
sum of P2,791 xxx”
4. Based on the circumstances, Japitana has no cause of action against Nicanor.
a. Mathay v. Consolidated Bank and Trust Co: cause of action is an act or
omission of one party in violation of the legal right of the other; its
essential elements are: (1) existence of a legal right of the plaintiff; (2)
correlative duty in the defendant, and (3) act or omission of the defendant
in violation of the plaintiff’s right with consequential injury or damage to
the plaintiff for which he may maintain an action for the recovery,
damages, or other appropriate relief.
b. Although Japitana may have a legal right to recover an indebtedness due
him, Nicanor has no correlative legal duty to pay the debt for the simple
reason that there is nothing in the complaint to show that he incurred the
debt or had anything to do with the creation of the liability. As far as the
debt is concerned, there is no allegation showing that Nicanor had acted in
violation of Japitana’s rights with consequential injury or damage to the
latter as would create a cause of action against the former.
5. Japitana also filed the case to recover 7 heads of carabaos allegedly belonging
to Isabelo which Japitana wanted to recover from the possession of Nicanor to
answer for the outstanding debt of Isabelo.
a. This matter is only ancilliary to the main action; the ancilliary matter does
not cure a fatal defect in the complaint for the main action is for the
recovery of an outstanding debt of Isabelo due Japitana, a cause of action
about which Nicanor has nothing to do.
b. The fatal defect was noticed by Judge Nistal when it advised Japitana to
amend his complaint to conform with his evidence and from the court’s
admission that it was inclined to dismiss the case were it not for the
complaint-in-intervention of Doloricon. Doloricon filed his complaint-in-
intervention on the ground that the 4 carabaos, subject of the writ of
attachment, were actually his carabaos. Thus, Judge Nistal, in the order
denying Nicanor’s MTD, to dissolve the writ of preliminary attachment and
to order the return of the carabaos.
6. Judge Nistal’s decision for not dismissing the case is contrary to the precedents.
a. Mathay v. Consolidated Bank and Trust Co: Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the ROC
states that a MTD may be made on the ground that the complaint states no
cause of action, and such ground explicitly requires that the sufficiency of
the complaint must be tested exclusively on the basis of the complaint itself
and no other should be considered when the ground for MTD is that the
complaint states no cause of action.
b. It was error for Judge Nistal not to dismiss the case simply because
Doloricon filed the complaint-for-intervention alleging that he owned the
carabaos.
7. Assuming that Japitana had a legal right to the carabaos which were in
Nicanor’s possession, the proper procedure would not be to file an action
for the recovery of the outstanding debts of the late Isabelo against his
stepfather, with Nicanor as defendant.
a. Maspil v. Romero: appropriate actions for the enforcement or defense of
rights must be taken in accordance with procedural rules and cannot be left
to the whims or caprices of litigants. It cannot even be left to the
untrammeled discretion of the courts of justice without sacrificing
uniformity and equality in the application and effectivity thereof.
8. Thus, the denial of the MTD and the issuance of the writ of attachment based on
the allegations of the complaint are improper.
Vasquez, Concurring:
1. The error in this case was pursuing the claim in an ordinary action, and for the
judge, in entertaining it.
2. The caption and the body of the complaint in the Civil Case No. 65, the claim of
Japitana was not against Nicanor, but against Isabelo’s estate.
a. It is a claim for money arising from unpaid indebtedness granted on various
dates.
b. Isabelo died before the said complaint was filed. It doesn’t appear that any
proceeding has been filed to settle his estate.
3. Under these facts, the filing of an ordinary action to recover said claim is
not allowed in any court. Even if the settlement proceedings had been taken
to settle the estate of Isabelo, the suit to recover the claim of Japitana may
not be filed against the administrator or executor of his estate, as provided
for in Sec. 1 Rule 87 of the ROC: “No action upon a claim for the recovery
of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor
or administrator…”
4. The claim of Japitana, being one arising from a contract, may be pursued only
by filing the same in the administration proceedings that may be taken to settle
the estate of Isabelo. If such proceeding is instituted and the subject claim is not
filed within the prescribed period, it shall be deemed barred forever. Even if
the action were commenced during Isabelo’s lifetime, it will be dismissed and
the claim prosecuted in the proper administration proceedings.
5. It would seem that the main purpose of filing the Civil Case was to attach the 7
carabaos owned by Isabelo. A case had to be filed in order to justify the
issuance of a writ of attachment, unfortunately such remedy may not be
allowed. The carabaos, if really owned by Isabelo, pertained to his estate. The
claim of Japitana may only be satisfied by a voluntary act on the part of the
heirs of Isabelo, or pursued in the appropriate settlement proceedings. A
municipal court may not entertain such a proceeding, it not being vested, under
the law then in force, with probate jurisdiction.
 017 SALIGUMBA V. PALANOG (EMAR)
DEC 4, 2008 | CARPIO | Statute of Non-claims
PETITIONERS: Generoso, Ernesto, heirs of Sps Valeria and Eliser Sr, all
surnamed Saligumba.
RESPONDENT: Monica Palanog
SUMMARY: Sps Monica and Avelino Palanog filed a complaint for Quieting of
Title against Sps. Valeria and Eliseo Sr. Saligumba. In a hearing, only the counsel
for Sps. Palanog appeared so there was an order resetting the hearing and
directing Sps. Saligumba to secure the services of another counsel who should be
ready on the set day of hearing. The order sent to Eliseo Sr. was returned to the
court unserved with the notation “Party Deceased” while the order sent to
Valeria was returned with the notation “Party in Manila”. The hearing ensued
wherein Sps. Saligumba were deemed to have waived the presentation of their
evidence. 1987: RTC declared Sps. Palanog as owners of the land and ordering
Sps. Saligumba to vacate. A motion for the issuance of a writ of execution of the
said decision was filed but the TC, in 1997, ruled that since more than 5y had
elapsed after the date of its finality, the decision could no longer be executed by
mere motion. Monica, now a widow, filed a Complaint seeking to revive and
enforce the Decision. TC ordered the revival of the case. The petitioners, heirs of
Sps. Saligumbas raised the case before the SC; contending that the 1987 RTC
Decision is null and void since there was no proper substitution of the deceased
Sps. Saligumba despite the TCs knowledge that the deceased Sps.
Saligumba were no longer represented by counsel. They argue that they were
deprived of due process and justice was not duly served on them. ISSUE: WON
execution of judgment can be issued against the Saligumbas who claim that they
are not bound by the 1987 RTC Decision – YES. An action for quieting of title
with damages which is an action involving real property; an action that survives
pursuant to Sec. 1, R87 as the claim is not extinguished by the death of a
party. In case of death of a party, and upon proper notice, it is the duty of the
court to order the legal representative or heir of the deceased to appear for the
deceased. Although the TC was informally notified via the unserved notices
stating, “Party Deceased”; it is not the proper notice contemplated by the rule
(Ratio 5). TC could not be expected to know or take judicial notice of the
death of a party without the proper manifestation from counsel. Sec. 16, R3
states that it is the duty of counsel for the deceased to inform the court of the
death of his client. The Saligumbas’ counsel, Atty. Miralles’ failure to comply
with his duty under the rule (footnote 2) to inform the court of the death of his
client [See Ratios 13-16] and the non-substitution of such party will not invalidate
the proceedings and the judgment thereon if the action survives the death of such
party. The decision rendered shall bind the party’s successor-in-interest.
DOCTRINE: An action for quieting of title with damages, an action involving
real property, is an action that survives pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 as the claim
is not extinguished by the death of a party.
FACTS:
1. 28 Feb 1977 : Sps. Monica and Avelino Palanog, filed a complaint for Quieting
of Title against Sps. Valeria and Eliseo Sr. Saligumba;
a. Praying that they be declared the true and rightful owners of the land before
RTC, Branch 3, Kalibo, Aklan (RTC-Branch 3). [Civil Case No. 2570.]
b. Alleging that:
i. They have been in actual, open, adverse and continuous possession as
owners for more than 50y of a land in Solido, Nabas, Aklan.
ii. Sps. Saligumba prevented them from entering and residing on the subject
premises and had destroyed the barbed wires enclosing the land.
2. 22 Sept: In the pre-trial, Sps. Saligumba’s counsel, Atty. Edilberto Miralles,
moved for the appointment of a commissioner to delimit the land in question.
Aklan Deputy Sheriff Rizalino Go, was appointed commissioner and was
directed to submit his report and sketch within 30d. during the delimitation were
Sps. Palanog, Sps. Saligumba and their son, Ernesto.
3. After submission of the Report, Sps. Palanog were granted 10d to amend their
complaint to conform with the report.
4. 1 Jun 1984 hearing: Only the counsel for Sps. Palanog appeared. TC:
a. Reset the hearing to 15 Aug 1984 and
b. Directed Sps. Saligumba to secure the services of another counsel who
should be ready on that date.
5. The order sent to Eliseo Sr. was returned to the court unserved with the notation
Party Deceased while the order sent to defendant Valeria was returned with the
notation Party in Manila.
6. 15 Aug 1984: TC order:
a. Suspended Sps. Palanog’s direct examination.
b. Set the continuation of the hearing on 25 Oct 1984.
c. Declared that Atty. Miralles, who had not withdrawn as counsel for Sps.
Saligumba despite his appointment as MCTC judge, would be held
responsible for the case of Sps. Saligumba until he formally withdrew as
counsel with Sps. Saligumba’s consent.
7. A copy of this order was sent to Valeria but the same was
returned unserved with the notation Party in Manila.
8. The hearing set on 25 Oct 1984 was reset to 25 Jan 1985 and TC directed that a
copy of this order be sent to Eliseo Jr. at COA, PNB, Manila.
9. 25 Jan 1985: Presentation of evidence for Sps. Palanog resumed on despite the
motion of Atty. Miralles for postponement on the ground that his client was
sick. The exhibits were admitted and plaintiffs Sps. Palanog rested their case.
Reception of evidence for the defendants Sps. Saligumba was scheduled on 3, 4,
and 5 Jun.
10. 3 Jun: Only Sps. Palanog and counsel appeared. Sps. Saligumba were deemed to
have waived the presentation of their evidence.
11. 3 Aug 1987: After a lapse of more than 2y, TC considered the case submitted for
decision.
12. 7 Aug: RTC-Branch 3 rendered:
 a. Judgment in Civil Case No. 2570 declaring Sps. Palanog the lawful owners
of the subject land and ordering Sps. Saligumba, their agents,
representatives and all persons acting in privity with them to vacate the
premises and restore possession to Sps. Palanog
b. A separate Order dated , directed that a copy of the courts decision be
furnished plaintiff Monica and defendant Valeria.
13. A motion for the issuance of a writ of execution of the said decision was filed
14. 8 May 1997: TC ruled that since more than 5y had elapsed after the date of its
finality, the decision could no longer be executed by mere motion.
15. 9 May: Monica, now a widow, filed a Complaint seeking to revive and enforce
the Decision dated 7 Aug 1987 in Civil Case No. 2570:
a. Claiming she has not been barred by the statute of limitations.
b. Impleading Petitioners Generoso and Ernesto Saligumba, heirs of Sps.
Saligumba, as defendants.
c. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 5288 before the RTC-Branch 5.
16. Generoso, for himself and in representation of his brother seaman brother
Ernesto who was out of the country, engaged the services of
PAO, Kalibo, Aklan which filed a motion for time to allow them to file a
responsive pleading.
17. Generoso filed his Answer alleging that:
a. Respondent had no cause of action;
b. Sps. Saligumba died while Civil Case No. 2570 was pending and no order of
substitution was issued and hence, the trial was null and void; and
c. The court did not acquire jurisdiction over the heirs of the Sps.
Saligumba and therefore, the judgment was not binding on them.
18. 19 Dec: TC granted respondents motion to implead additional defendants”
Eliseo Jr. and Eduardo Saligumba, who are also heirs of Sps. Saligumba.
19. 1 Oct 1999: Heirs of Sps Saligumba were declared in default for failure to file
any responsive pleading.
TC Ruling
20. 24 May 2000: RTC-Branch 5 rendered a decision in favor of Monica; ordering
the revival of judgment in Civil Case No. 2570; and ruled that
a. The non-substitution of the deceased spouses did not have any legal
significance. The land subject of Civil Case No. 2570 was the exclusive
property Valeria who inherited it from her deceased parents.
b. Death of Valeria’s husband, Eliseo Sr., did not change the complexion of the
ownership of the property that would require his substitution.
c. Sps. Saligumba children [petitioners in this case], had no right to the
property while Valeria was still alive.
d. When defendant Valeria died, her lawyer, Atty. Miralles, did not inform the
court of the death of his client.
e. Non-substitution of the deceased defendant was solely due to the negligence
of counsel.
f. Ernesto Saligumba could not feign ignorance of Civil Case No. 2570 as he
was present during the delimitation of the subject land.
g. Decision in Civil Case No. 2570 could not be the subject of a collateral
attack. There must be a direct action for the annulment of the said decision.
21. The Saligumbas elevated the matter directly to the SC. Hence, the present petrev
of the Decision dated 24 May 2000 of the RTC, Branch 5, Kalibo, Aklan (RTC-
Branch 5) in Civil Case No. 5288 for Revival of Judgment. The case is an
offshoot of the action for Quieting of Title with Damages in Civil Case No.
2570.
22. This case is an action for revival of judgment and the judgment sought to be
revived in this case is the decision in the action for quieting of title with
damages in Civil Case No. 2570; and not one for annulment of judgment.
23. The Saligumbas contend that the RTC-Branch 3 Decision of 7 Aug 1987 in
Civil Case No. 2570 is null and void since there was no proper substitution of
the deceased Sps. Saligumba despite the TCs knowledge that the deceased Sps.
Saligumba were no longer represented by counsel. They argue that they were
deprived of due process and justice was not duly served on them.26
ISSUE: WON execution of judgment can be issued against The Saligumbas who
claim that they are not bound by the RTC-Branch 3 Decision dated 7 Aug 1987 in
Civil Case No. 2570 – YES.
RULING: PETITION DENIED. 24 May 2000 RTC, Branch 5, Kalibo, Aklan
Decision in Civil Case No. 5288 AFFIRMED. Costs against The Saligumbas.
RATIO:
26
The Saligumbas:
a. Argue that TC acknowledged the fact of death of Sps. Saligumba but justified the validity of the
decision rendered in that case despite lack of substitution because of the negligence or fault of
their counsel.
b. Contend that The duty of counsel for the deceased Sps. Saligumba to inform the court of the
death of his clients and to furnish the name and address of the executor, administrator, heir or
legal representative of the decedent under Rule 3 presupposes adequate or active representation
by counsel. However, the relation of attorney and client was already terminated by the
appointment of counsel on record, Atty. Miralles, as MCTC judge even before the deaths of the
Sps. Saligumba were known.
c. Invoke the Order of 1 Jun 1984 directing the Sps. Saligumba to secure the services of another
lawyer to replace Atty. Miralles.
d. Raise the registered mail containing that order was returned to the TC with the notation
that Eliseo Sr. was deceased
e. Question the decision in Civil Case No. 2570 as being void and of no legal effect because their
parents were not duly represented by counsel of record.
f. Argue that they have never taken part in the proceedings in Civil Case No. 2570 nor did they
voluntarily appear or participate in the case and t is unfair to bind them in a decision rendered
against their deceased parents. Therefore, being a void judgment, it has no legal nor binding
effect on The Saligumbas.
1. An action for revival of judgment is a procedural means of securing the
execution of a previous judgment which has become dormant after the passage
of 5y without it being executed upon motion of the prevailing party.
2. It is not intended to re-open any issue affecting the merits of the judgment
debtors case nor the propriety or correctness of the first judgment. An action for
revival of judgment is a new and independent action (distinct from recovery or
reconstitution case), wherein the cause of action is the decision itself and not
the merits of the action upon which the judgment sought to be enforced is
rendered.
3. Revival of judgment is premised on the assumption that the decision to be
revived, either by motion or by independent action, is already final
and executory.
4. RTC-Branch 3 Decision dated 7 Aug 1987 in Civil Case No. 2570 had been
rendered final and executory by the lapse of time with no MR nor appeal
having been filed. Although it may be revived and its execution may be had, the
issue now before us is whether or not execution of judgment can be issued
against The Saligumbas who claim that they are not bound by the RTC-Branch 3
Decision dated 7 Aug 1987 in Civil Case No. 2570.
5. Civil Case No. 2570 is an action for quieting of title with damages which is an
action involving real property. It is an action that survives pursuant to Sec. 1,
R87 as the claim is not extinguished by the death of a party. And when
a party dies in an action that survives, Sec. 17 of R3, Revised RoC provides for
the procedure, thus:
Sec. 17. Death of Party. - After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall
order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the
deceased, within a period of 30d, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to
appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal
representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall
immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in
procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of
the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an
executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. (Emphasis
supplied)
6. Thus, in case of death of a party, and upon proper notice, it is the duty of the
court to order the legal representative or heir of the deceased to appear for
the deceased.
7. Here, the TC, after receiving an informal notice of death by the mere notation in
the envelopes, failed to order the appearance of the legal representative or heir
of the deceased. There was no court order for deceased’s legal representative or
heir to appear, nor did any such legal representative ever appear in court to be
substituted for the deceased. Neither did the respondent ever procure the
appointment of such legal representative, nor did the heirs ever ask to be
substituted.
8. Eliseo Sr. died on 18 Feb 1984 while Valeria died on 2 Feb 1985. No motion
for the substitution of the spouses was filed nor an order issued for the
substitution of the deceased Sps. Saligumba in Civil Case No. 2570.
Atty. Miralles and Eliseo Jr., despite notices sent to them to appear, never
confirmed the death of Eliseo Sr. and Valeria. The record is bereft of any
evidence proving the death of the spouses, except the mere notations in the
envelopes enclosing the TCs orders which were returned unserved.
9. Sec. 17: The duty of the court to order the legal representative or heir to appear
arises only upon proper notice. The notation Party-Deceased on
the unserved notices could not be the proper notice contemplated by the rule. As
the TC could not be expected to know or take judicial notice of the death of
a party without the proper manifestation from counsel, the TC was within its
jurisdiction to proceed as it did with the case. Moreover, there is no showing that
the courts proceedings were tainted with irregularities.
10. The plaintiff or his attorney or representative could not be expected to
know of the death of the defendant if the attorney for the deceased
defendant did not notify the plaintiff or his attorney of such death as
required by the rules. The judge cannot be blamed for sending copies of the
orders and notices to defendants spouses in the absence of proof of death or
manifestation to that effect from counsel.
11. Sec. 16, R327 states that it is the duty of counsel for the deceased to inform the
court of the death of his client. The failure of counsel to comply with his duty
under Sec. 16 to inform the court of the death of his client and the non-
substitution of such party will not invalidate the proceedings and the judgment
thereon if the action survives the death of such party. The decision rendered
shall bind the party’s successor-in-interest.
12. The rules operate on the presumption that the attorney for the deceased party is
in a better position than the attorney for the adverse party to know about the
death of his client and to inform the court of the name and address of his legal
representative.
13. Atty. Miralles continued to represent the deceased spouses even after their
demise. Acting on their behalf, Atty. Miralles even asked for postponement of
the hearings and did not even confirm the death of his clients nor his
appointment as MCTC judge. These negate The Saligumbas contention that
Atty. Miralles ceased to be Sps. Saligumba’s counsel.
14. Atty. Miralles remained the counsel of the Sps. Saligumba despite the alleged
appointment as judge. Records show that when Civil Case No. 2570 was called
for trial on 25 Oct 1984, Atty. Miralles appeared and moved for a postponement.
The 25 Oct 1984 Order reads: Upon petition of Judge Miralles who is still the counsel on
record of this case and who is held responsible for anything that will happen in this case, postpone
the hearing of this case to JAN 25, 1985 AT 8:30 in the morning. x x
15. TC issued an Order dated 1 Jun 1984 directing the defendants to secure the
services of another counsel. This order was sent to Eliseo Sr. by registered mail
27
SEC. 16. Duty of attorney upon death, incapacity or incompetency of party. - Whenever a party to a
pending case dies, becomes incapacitated or incompetent, it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the
court promptly of such death, incapacity or incompetency, and to give the name and residence of his
executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representative
 but the same was returned with the notation Party-Deceased while the notice to 21. It was only the Answer filed by petitioner Generoso in Civil Case No. 5288 that
Valeria was returned with the notation Party in Manila. Eliseo Sr. died on 18 confirmed the dates when the Sps. Saligumba died and named their children.
Feb 1984. When Atty. Miralles appeared in court on 25 Oct 1984, he did not 22. Consequently, Atty. Miralles was responsible for the conduct of the case since
affirm nor inform the court of the death of his client. There was no formal he had not been properly relieved as counsel of record. His acts bind his clients
substitution. and the latter’s successors-in-interest.
16. TC issued an order resetting the hearing to 25 Jan 1985 and directed that a copy 23. In this case for revival of judgment, petitioners have not shown much interest.
of the order be furnished Eliseo Jr. at COA, PNB, Manila by registered a. Eliseo Jr. and Eduardo Saligumba were declared in default for failure to file
mail. When the case was called on 25 Jan 1985, Atty. Miralles sought for their answer.
another postponement on the ground that his client was sick and under medical b. Ernesto Saligumba was out of the country working as a seaman.
treatment in Manila. Again, there was no manifestation from counsel about c. Only Generoso filed an Answer to the complaint.
the death of Eliseo Sr. TC issued an Order dated 25 Jan 1985 setting the d. Petition filed in this Court was signed only by Generoso as someone signed
reception of evidence for the defendants on 3, 4, and 5 Jun 1985. A copy of this on behalf of petitioner Ernesto Saligumba without the latters authority to do
order was sent to Eliseo Jr. by registered mail. Nonetheless, as the TC in Civil so.
Case No. 5288 declared, the non-substitution of EliseoSaligumba, Sr. did not
have any legal significance as the land subject of Civil Case No. 2570 was the
exclusive property of Valeria who inherited it from her deceased parents.
17. When Valeria died on 2 Feb 1985, Atty. Miralles AGAIN did not inform the
TC of the death of Valeria. There was no formal substitution nor submission
of proof of death of Valeria. Atty. Miralles was remiss in his duty under Sec.
16, R3. The counsel of record is obligated to protect his clients interest until he
is released from his professional relationship with his client. For its part, the
court could recognize no other representation on behalf of the client except such
counsel of record until a formal substitution of attorney is effected.
18. An attorney must make an application to the court to withdraw as counsel, for
the relation does not terminate formally until there is a withdrawal of record; at
least, so far as the opposite party is concerned, the relation otherwise continues
until the end of the litigation. Unless properly relieved, the counsel is
responsible for the conduct of the case. Until his withdrawal shall have been
approved, the lawyer remains counsel of record who is expected by his client as
well as by the court to do what the interests of his client require. He must still
appear on the date of hearing for the attorney-client relation does not terminate
formally until there is a withdrawal of record.
19. Saligumbas should have questioned immediately the validity of the proceedings
absent any formal substitution. Yet, despite the courts alleged lack of
jurisdiction over the persons of The Saligumbas, The Saligumbas never
bothered to challenge the same, and in fact allowed the proceedings to go on
until the TC rendered its decision. There was no MR, appeal or even an action
to annul the judgment in Civil Case No. 2570.
20. The Saligumbas could not feign ignorance of the case since during
the pendency of Civil Case No. 2570.
a. Ernesto, son of the deceased spouses, was among the persons present during
the delimitation of the land in question before the Commissioner held on 5
Nov 1977.
b. Eliseo Jr. was furnished a copy of the TC’s orders and notices.
 Sarsaba v. Vda de Te (Sarmiento)
July 30, 2009 | Peralta J. |
PETITIONER: ATTY. ROGELIO E. SARSABA,
RESPONDENTS: FE VDA. DE TE
SUMMARY:
Respondent Fe Vda. de Te, represented by her attorney-in-fact, Faustino
Castañeda, filed with the RTC, a Complaint for recovery of motor vehicle, dam-
ages with prayer for the delivery of the truck pendente lite against petitioner
(Atty. Sarsaba), Sereno, Lavarez and the NLRC of Davao City.Respondent al-
leged, among others, that: (1) she is the wife of the late Pedro Te, the registered
owner of the truck, as evidenced by the Official Receipt and Certificate of Regis-
tration.Petitioner Sarsaba alleges that that there was no showing that the heirs
have filed an intestate estate proceedings of the estate of Pedro Te, or that re-
spondent was duly authorized by her co-heirs to file the case; and that the truck
was already sold to Gasing by one Jesus Matias, who bought the same from the
Spouses Te. Corollarily, Gasing was already the lawful owner of the truck when
it was levied on execution and, later on, sold at public auction.Petitioner Sarsaba
filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss the Case on the following grounds: (1) lack
of jurisdiction over one of the principal defendants; and (2) to discharge re-
spondent's attorney-in-fact for lack of legal personality to sue.It appeared that the
respondent, Fe Vda. de Te, died on April 12, 2005. Respondent, through her
lawyer, argues that respondent's death did not render functus officio her right to
sue since her attorney-in-fact, Faustino Castañeda, had long testified on the
complaint for and on her behalf and, accordingly, submitted documentary exhib-
its in support of the complaint. What is the legal effect of death of the plaintiff
during the pendency of the case? When a party to a pending action dies and the
claim is not extinguished, the Rules of Court require a substitution of the de-
ceased. In such cases, a counsel is obliged to inform the court of the death of his
client and give the name and address of the latter's legal representative. The rule
on substitution of parties is governed by Section 16, 46 Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended. The rule on substitution by heirs is not a matter
of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process. The rule on substitution was
crafted to protect every party's right to due process It was designed to ensure that
the deceased party would continue to be properly represented in the suit through
his heirs or the duly appointed legal representative of his estate. In the case be-
fore Us, it appears that respondent's counsel did not make any manifestation be-
fore the RTC as to her death. In fact, he had actively participated in the proceed-
ings. Neither had he shown any proof that he had been retained by respondent's
legal representative or any one who succeeded her.
DOCTRINE: Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court enumerates the actions
that survived and may be filed against the decedent's representatives as follows:
(1) actions to recover real or personal property or an interest thereon
(2) actions to enforce liens thereon, and
(3) actions to recover damages for an injury to a person or a property.
FACTS:
1. A Decision was rendered in NLRC entitled, Patricio Sereno v. Teodoro
Gasing/Truck Operator, finding Sereno to have been illegally dismissed and
ordering Gasing to pay him his monetary claims in the amount of
P43,606.47.
a. After the Writ of Execution was returned unsatisfied, Labor Arbi-
ter Newton R. Sancho issued an Alias Writ of Execution directing
Fulgencio R. Lavarez, Sheriff II of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), to satisfy the judgment award.
b. Lavarez, accompanied by Sereno and his counsel, petitioner Atty.
Rogelio E. Sarsaba, levied a Fuso Truck bearing License Plate No.
LBR-514, which at that time was in the possession of Gasing.
c. the truck was sold at public auction, with Sereno appearing as the
highest bidder.
2. Meanwhile, respondent Fe Vda. de Te, represented by her attorney-in-fact,
Faustino Castaeda, filed with the RTC, a Complaint for recovery of motor
vehicle, damages with prayer for the delivery of the truck pendente lite
against petitioner Sarsaba, Sereno, Lavarez and the NLRC of Davao City
3. Respondent alleged that:
a. (1) she is the wife of the late Pedro Te, the registered owner of the
truck, as evidenced by the Official Receipt and Certificate of Reg-
istration;
b. (2) Gasing merely rented the truck from her;
c. (3) Lavarez erroneously assumed that Gasing owned the truck be-
cause he was, at the time of the taking, in possession of the same;
and
d. (4) since neither she nor her husband were parties to the labor case
between Sereno and Gasing, she should not be made to answer for
the judgment award, much less be deprived of the truck as a con-
sequence of the levy in execution.
4. Petitioner Atty. Sarsaba filed a Motion to Dismiss on the following
grounds:
 a. (1) respondent has no legal personality to sue, having no real inter-
ests over the property subject of the instant complaint;
b. (2) the allegations in the complaint do not sufficiently state that the
respondent has cause of action;
c. (3) the allegations in the complaint do not contain sufficient cause
of action as against him; and
d. (4) the complaint is not accompanied by an Affidavit of Merit and
Bond that would entitle the respondent to the delivery of the tuck
pendente lite.
5. the RTC issued an Order denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss for lack of
merit.
6. In his Answer, petitioner denied the material allegations in the complaint.
Specifically, he cited as affirmative defenses that: respondent had no legal
personality to sue, as she had no interest over the motor vehicle; that there
was no showing that the heirs have filed an intestate estate proceedings of
the estate of Pedro Te, or that respondent was duly authorized by her co-
heirs to file the case; and that the truck was already sold to Gasing on
March 11, 1986 by one Jesus Matias, who bought the same from the Spous-
es Te. Corollarily, Gasing was already the lawful owner of the truck when it
was levied on execution and, later on, sold at public auction
7. Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss the Case on the following
grounds:
a. (1) lack of jurisdiction over one of the principal defendants; and
b. (2) to discharge respondent's attorney-in-fact for lack of legal per-
sonality to sue.
8. It appeared that Fe Vda de Te died on April 12, 2005.
9. Respondent, through her lawyer, Atty. William G. Carpentero, filed an Op-
position, contending that the failure to serve summons upon Sereno is not a
ground for dismissing the complaint, because the other defendants have al-
ready submitted their respective responsive pleadings. He also contended
that the defendants, including herein petitioner, had previously filed sepa-
rate motions to dismiss the complaint, which the RTC denied for lack of
merit.
a. Moreover, respondent's death did not render functus officio her
right to sue since her attorney-in-fact, Faustino Castañeda, had
long testified on the complaint on March 13, 1998 for and on her
behalf and, accordingly, submitted documentary exhibits in sup-
port of the complaint.
10. RTC denied the motion to dismiss of petitioner
11. Hence, petitioner directly sought recourse from the Court via the present pe-
tition involving pure questions of law, which he claimed were resolved by
the RTC contrary to law, rules and existing jurisprudence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case should be dismissed for all the defendants due
to failure to acquire on the person of the defendant Sereno before the death of
the complainant.—NO.
RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The Order
dated March 22, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Digos, Davao del Sur
in Civil Case No. 3488, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
RATIO:
1. Verily, the issues raised by herein petitioner are questions of law, as their
resolution rest solely on what the law provides given the set of circumstanc-
es availing.
a. The first issue involves the jurisdiction of the court over the person
of one of the defendants, who was not served with summons on
account of his death.
b. The second issue, on the other hand, pertains to the legal effect of
death of the plaintiff during the pendency of the case.
2. Notably, the petition was filed directly from the RTC which issued the Or-
der in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. The question before Us then
is: whether or not petitioner correctly availed of the mode of appeal under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
3. In the present case, petitioner submits pure questions of law involving the
effect of non-service of summons following the death of the person to
whom it should be served, and the effect of the death of the complainant
during the pendency of the case.
a. We deem it best to rule on these issues, not only for the benefit of
the bench and bar, but in order to prevent further delay in the trial
of the case.
b. Resultantly, our relaxation of the policy of strict observance of the
judicial hierarchy of courts is warranted.
4. Anent the first issue, petitioner argues that, since Sereno died before
summons was served on him, the RTC should have dismissed the com-
 plaint against all the defendants and that the same should be filed
against his estate
a. The Sheriff's Return of Service dated May 19, 1997 states that
Sereno could not be served with copy of the summons, together
with a copy of the complaint, because he was already dead.
b. In view of Sereno's death, petitioner asks that the complaint should
be dismissed, not only against Sereno, but as to all the defendants,
considering that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the per-
son of Sereno.
5. Jurisdiction over a party is acquired by service of summons by the sheriff,
his deputy or other proper court officer, either personally by handing a copy
thereof to the defendant or by substituted service.
a. On the other hand, summons is a writ by which the defendant is
notified of the action brought against him. Service of such writ is
the means by which the court may acquire jurisdiction over his
person.
6. Records show that petitioner had filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds
of lack of legal personality of respondent;
a. the allegations in the complaint did not sufficiently state that re-
spondent has a cause of action or a cause of action against the de-
fendants;
b. and, the complaint was not accompanied by an affidavit of merit
and bond.
7. The RTC denied the motion and held therein that, on the basis of the allega-
tions of fact in the complaint, it can render a valid judgment.
a. Petitioner, subsequently, filed his answer by denying all the mate-
rial allegations of the complaint.
b. And by way of special and affirmative defenses, he reiterated that
respondent had no legal personality to sue as she had no real inter-
est over the property and that while the truck was still registered in
Pedro Te's name, the same was already sold to Gasing.
8. Significantly, a motion to dismiss may be filed within the time for but be-
fore the filing of an answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim.
a. Among the grounds mentioned is the court's lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the defending party.
9. In the case before Us, petitioner raises the issue of lack of jurisdiction over
the person of Sereno, not in his Motion to Dismiss or in his Answer but on-
ly in his Omnibus Motion to Dismiss. Having failed to invoke this ground at
the proper time, that is, in a motion to dismiss, petitioner cannot raise it now
for the first time on appeal.
10. In fine, We cannot countenance petitioner's argument that the complaint
against the other defendants should have been dismissed, considering that
the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the person of Sereno.
a. The court's failure to acquire jurisdiction over one's person is a de-
fense which is personal to the person claiming it.
b. Obviously, it is now impossible for Sereno to invoke the same
in view of his death.
c. Neither can petitioner invoke such ground, on behalf of Sereno, so
as to reap the benefit of having the case dismissed against all of the
defendants.
11. Failure to serve summons on Sereno's person will not be a cause for the
dismissal of the complaint against the other defendants, considering that
they have been served with copies of the summons and complaints and have
long submitted their respective responsive pleadings.
a. In fact, the other defendants in the complaint were given the
chance to raise all possible defenses and objections personal to
them in their respective motions to dismiss and their subsequent
answers.
12. We agree with the RTC in its Order when it resolved the issue in this wise:
a. As correctly pointed by defendants, the Honorable Court has not
acquired jurisdiction over the person of Patricio Sereno since there
was indeed no valid service of summons insofar as Patricio Sereno
is concerned. Patricio Sereno died before the summons, together
with a copy of the complaint and its annexes, could be served upon
him.
b. However, the failure to effect service of summons unto Patricio
Sereno, one of the defendants herein does not render the action
DISMISSIBLE, considering that the three (3) other defendants,
namely, Atty. Rogelio E. Sarsaba, Fulgencio Lavares and the
NLRC, were validly served with summons and the case with re-
spect to the answering defendants may still proceed independently.
Be it recalled that the three (3) answering defendants have previ-
ously filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint which was denied
by the Court.
c. Hence, only the case against Patricio Sereno will be DISMISSED
and the same may be filed as a claim against the estate of Patricio
Sereno, but the case with respect to the three (3) other accused will
proceed.
IMPORTANT:
13. Anent the second issue, petitioner moves that respondent's attorney-in-fact,
Faustino Castaeda, be discharged as he has no more legal personality to sue
on behalf of Fe Vda. de Te, who passed away on April 12, 2005, during the
pendency of the case before the RTC.
14. When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not extinguished, the
Rules of Court require a substitution of the deceased. Section 1, Rule 87 of
the Rules of Court enumerates the actions that survived and may be filed
against the decedent's representatives as follows:
a. (1) actions to recover real or personal property or an interest there-
on,
b. (2) actions to enforce liens thereon, and
c. (3) actions to recover damages for an injury to a person or a prop-
erty.
d. In such cases, a counsel is obliged to inform the court of the death
of his client and give the name and address of the latter's legal rep-
resentative.
15. The rule on substitution of parties is governed by Section 16,[46] Rule 3 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
a. Strictly speaking, the rule on substitution by heirs is not a matter of
jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process. The rule on substitu-
tion was crafted to protect every party's right to due process. It was
designed to ensure that the deceased party would continue to be
properly represented in the suit through his heirs or the duly ap-
pointed legal representative of his estate. Moreover, non-
compliance with the Rules results in the denial of the right to due
process for the heirs who, though not duly notified of the proceed-
ings, would be substantially affected by the decision rendered
therein.
b. Thus, it is only when there is a denial of due process, as when the
deceased is not represented by any legal representative or heir, that
the court nullifies the trial proceedings and the resulting judgment
therein.
16. In the case before Us, it appears that respondent's counsel did not make any
manifestation before the RTC as to her death. In fact, he had actively partic-
ipated in the proceedings. Neither had he shown any proof that he had been
retained by respondent's legal representative or any one who succeeded her
a. However, such failure of counsel would not lead Us to invalidate
the proceedings that have long taken place before the RTC. The
Court has repeatedly declared that failure of the counsel to comply
with his duty to inform the court of the death of his client, such
that no substitution is effected, will not invalidate the proceedings
and the judgment rendered thereon if the action survives the death
of such party.
b. The trial court's jurisdiction over the case subsists despite the death
of the party.
17. Anent the claim of petitioner that the special power of attorney dated March
4, 1997 executed by respondent in favor of Faustino has become functus of-
ficio and that the agency constituted between them has been extinguished
upon the death of respondent, corollarily, he had no more personality to ap-
pear and prosecute the case on her behalf.
18. Agency is extinguished by the death of the principal. The only exception
where the agency shall remain in full force and effect even after the death of
the principal is when if it has been constituted in the common interest of the
latter and of the agent, or in the interest of a third person who has accepted
the stipulation in his favor
a. A perusal of the special power of attorney leads us to conclude that
it was constituted for the benefit solely of the principal or for re-
spondent Fe Vda. de Te.
b. Nowhere can we infer from the stipulations therein that it was cre-
ated for the common interest of respondent and her attorney-in-
fact. Neither was there any mention that it was to benefit a third
person who has accepted the stipulation in his favor.
c. On this ground, We agree with petitioner.
d. However, We do not believe that such ground would cause the
dismissal of the complaint. For as We have said, Civil Case No.
3488, which is an action for the recovery of a personal property, a
motor vehicle, is an action that survives pursuant to Section 1,
Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. As such, it is not extinguished by
the death of a party.
19. It bears stressing that when this case was initiated/filed by the Attorney-in-
fact, the plaintiff was still very much alive
20. Records reveal that the Attorney-in-fact has testified long before in behalf
of the said plaintiff and more particularly during the state when the plaintiff
was vehemently opposing the dismissal of the complainant. Subsequently
thereto, he even offered documentary evidence in support of the complaint,
and this court admitted the same. When this case was initiated, jurisdiction
was vested upon this Court to try and hear the same to the end. Well-settled
 is the rule to the point of being elementary that once jurisdiction is acquired
by this Court, it attaches until the case is decided.

21. Thus, the proper remedy here is the Substitution of Heirs and not the dis-
missal of this case which would work injustice to the plaintiff.
a. SEC. 16, RULE 3 provides for the substitution of the plaintiff who
dies pending hearing of the case by his/her legal heirs. As to
whether or not the heirs will still continue to engage the services of
the Attorney-in-fact is another matter, which lies within the sole
discretion of the heirs.
 001 PAREDES v. MOYA (SIAPNO)
Dec. 26, 1974 | Fernandez, J. | Topic
PETITIONER: Severino Paredes and Victorio Ignacio
RESPONDENTS: The Hon. Kose L. Moya (Judge of CFI Manila Branch IX)
and Carmencita Navarro_Administratix
SUMMARY: Petitioner Parades commenced a suit in CFI-Manila for the col-
lection of separation and overtime pays against his employer, Kuntze. Decision
was rendered against August, thus, he appealed in the CA. Pending appeal, Au-
gust died, so petitioner was notified of the death. Carmencita, the administratix
of the estate, substituted Kuntze as a party. CA dismissed the appeal. Motion for
execution was filed by Paredes. Provincial Sheriff levied on the 2 properties of
deceased. Paredes was the highest bidder; certificate of sale was annotated at the
back of the TCT. Despite the Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution and pend-
ing resolution, petitioner sold the lands to co-petitioner Ignacio. CFI issued an
order to set aside the Writ of Execution in and the Sheriff's Sale and Public Auc-
tion of the property, without prejudice to the filing of the judgment as a claim in
the proceedings for settlement of the estate of the deceased. Issue W/N it was
proper for Paredes to have the money judgment executed against the properties
of Kuntze? NO. The proper remedy of Paredes should have been to file his
claim in the administration proceedings of the estate of the deceased where Mrs.
Kuntze is the administratrix. If the defendant dies after final judgment has
been rendered by the CFI, as in the case at bar, the action survives. The
appeal should proceed with the deceased defendant being substituted by his le-
gal representative. The judgment against the deceased Kuntze became final and
executory. It was error on the part of Paredes to have the money judgment in his
favor executed against the properties of the deceased Kuntze. The proper reme-
dy of Paredes should have been to file his claim in the administration proceed-
ings of the estate of the deceased defendant Kuntze where private respondent is
the administratrix, to wit:
Sec. 5, Rule 86: All claims for money against the decedent, arising from con-
tract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all
claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent
and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed (before the probate
court) within the time limited in the notice (to the creditors); otherwise they are
barred forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action
that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants.
No writ of execution should issue against the properties of the deceased. During
the pendency of the testate/intestate proceedings all the estate is in custodia legis
and the proper procedure is not to allow the sheriff, in the case of court judg-
ment, to seize the properties but to ask the court for an order to require the ad-
ministrator to pay the amount due from the estate and required to be paid
DOCTRINE: If the defendant dies after final judgment has been rendered by
the CFI the action survives. The appeal should proceed with the deceased
defendant being substituted by his legal representative. The proper remedy
should be to file claims in the administration proceedings of the estate of the
deceased.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Severino Parades commenced a suit in CFI-Manila for the
collection of separation and overtime pays against his employer, August
Kuntze.
2. A decision was rendered against the defendant Kuntze, from which
judgment, he appealed to the CA.
3. While the case was pending appeal in the said Court, Kuntze died.
4. Accordingly, plaintiff Parades (now petitioner) was duly notified.
5. Thereafter, Carmencita D. Navarro Kuntze, administratrix of the estate of
the deceased, was substituted in his place as party in the appealed case.
6. CA dismissed the appeal for Kunte’s failure to file the printed record on
appeal, and so the record of the case was ordered remanded respondent
court
7. A motion for execution was filed by Parades. The Sheriff levied on the
properties of deceased Kuntze (now substituted by the Administratrix of the
estate of the Deceased, consisting of two (2) lots.
8. In the auction sale Paredes being the highest bidder, acquired said lot for the
total sum of P17,296.16, as per certificate of sale which was duly annotated
in the back of the TCT.
9. However, in spite of a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution filed by the
Administratix and still pending resolution, Parades sold the property he
acquired in execution sale in favor of his co-petitioner, Victorio Ignacio.
10. CFI issued an order setting aside the Writ of Execution and the Sheriff's
Sale and Public Auction of the property covered by the TCT, without
prejudice to the filing of the judgment as a claim in the proceedings for
settlement of the estate of the deceased.
ISSUE/s: WON Writ of Execution was proper – NO, the proper remedy of Paredes
should have been to file his claim in the administration proceedings of the estate of
the deceased where Mrs. Kuntze is the administratrix.
RULING: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the order of the Lower Court
nullifying its Order of Execution of August 18, 1973, the levy on execution dated
August 22, 1973, and the auction sale of October 2, 1973, is hereby affirmed and the
petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED, "without prejudice to the filing of the
judgment (in favor of Paredes) as a claim in the proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased (Kuntze)." Without costs.

RATIO:
1. We hold that in the case of a money claim, where the defendant dies during
the pendency of his appeal from the judgment rendered against him, the
appeal should not be dismissed; it should continue, but the deceased
defendant should be substituted by his legal representative, namely, the
executor or administrator of the estate.
2. If the judgment of the lower court is affirmed, the plaintiff must afterwards
go to the probate court for an order directing the executor or administrator
to satisfy the judgment.
3. The CFI that originally rendered the judgment has no power to order its
execution and a levy on the properties of the deceased because the same are
already in custodia legis in the probate court where administration
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased defendant are
already pending.
4. Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, provides:
When the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, and the
defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be
dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in these rules.
5. Conversely, if the defendant dies after final judgment has been rendered
by the CFI, as in the case at bar, the action survives. And as already
above stated, the appeal should proceed with the deceased defendant
being substituted by his legal representative.
6. This would prevent a useless repetition of presenting (anew) before the
probate court the evidence already presented in the CFI on the validity of
the claim.
7. Consequently, contrary to respondents' claim, the judgment against the
deceased Kuntze became final and executory; it was not arrested by his
death on July 19, 1973
8. But it was error on the part of the plaintiff Paredes, to have the money
judgment in his favor executed against the properties of the deceased
Kuntze.
9. The proper remedy of plaintiff Paredes should have been to file his claim
in the administration proceedings of the estate of the deceased defendant
Kuntze where private respondent is the administratrix.
10. Judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed at the time limited
in the notice (to creditors) before the court where the administration
proceeding involving the estate of the deceased Kuntze are pending. Section
5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court provides:
All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express
or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral
expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent and judgment for money
against the decedent, must be filed (before the probate court) within the time
limited in the notice (to the creditors); otherwise they are barred forever, except
that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or
administrator may bring against the claimants. (1st sentence, Section 5, Rule 86 of
the Rules of Court)
11. Consequently, the CFI, correctly nullified its order of execution and the
corresponding levy on execution and the public auction sale
12. The judgment for money against the deceased stands in the same footing as:
All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or
implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for
funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, (1st
sentence, Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court), Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court),
although the validity of the money claim covered by a judgment against the
decedent which has already become final and executory can no longer be
litigated in the court where administration proceedings for the settlement of
the properties of the deceased are still pending, unlike the other money
claims whose validity may yet be challenged by the executor or
administrator.
13. Aldamiz vs. Judge of the CFI of Mindoro: The writ of execution was not the
proper procedure for the payment of debts and expenses of the
administration. The proper procedure is for the court to order the
administratrix to make the payment; and if there is no sufficient cash on
hand, to order the sale of the properties and out of the proceeds to pay the
debts and expenses of the administration. a writ of execution is not the
proper procedure allowed by the Rules of Court for the payment of debts
and expenses of administration. The proper procedure is for the court to
order the sale of personal estate or the sale or mortgage of real property of
the deceased and all debts or expenses of administration should be paid out
of the proceeds of the sale or mortgage. The order for the sale or mortgage
should be issued upon motion of the administrator and with the written
notice to all the heirs, legatees and devisees residing in the Philippines,
according to Rule 89, section 3, and Rule 90, section 2. And when sale or
mortgage of real estate is to be made, the regulations contained in Rule 90,
section 7, should be complied with.
14. Execution may issue only where the devisees, legatees or heirs have entered
into possession of their respective portions in the estate prior to settlement
and payment of the debts and expenses of administration and it is later
ascertained that there are such debts and expenses to be paid, in which case
"the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for that purpose,
after hearing, settle the amount of their several liabilities, and order how
much and in what manner each person shall contribute, and may issue
execution if circumstances require" (Rule 39, section 6; see also Rule 74,
section 4; Emphasis ours). And this is not the instant case.
15. We hold that the same rule must be applied. No writ of execution should
issue against the properties of the deceased. The claim for satisfaction of the
 money judgment should be presented in the probate court for payment by
the administrator.
16. The legal basis for such a procedure is the fact that in the testate or intestate
proceedings to settle the estate of a deceased person, the properties
belonging to the estate are under the jurisdiction of the court and such
jurisdiction continues until said properties have been distributed among the
heirs entitled thereto. During the pendency of the proceedings all the estate
is in custodia legis and the proper procedure is not to allow the sheriff, in
the case of court judgment, to seize the properties but to ask the court for an
order to require the administrator to pay the amount due from the estate and
required to be paid." (Domingo vs. Garlitos, et al., June 29, 1963,8 SCRA,
443, 446)
17. In this jurisdiction, a void judgment or order is in legal effect no judgment
or order. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained.
Being worthless, it neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under
it and all claims flowing from it are void. (Chavez vs. Court of Appeals)
18. Our decision in this case against the Paredes binds his co-petitioner Ignacio
not only because the order of execution and the public auction sale in
question are null and void, but also because petitioner Ignacio cannot be
considered as a purchaser in good faith, for Ignacio purchased the "Right of
Execution Sale" of Paredes over the property in question on October 10,
1973 when, at that time, the respondent administratrix of the estate of
Kuntze had already filed on September 6, 1973 a motion to quash the Writ
of Execution and auction sale; as a matter of fact the validity of said writ of
execution was still up for respondent court's resolution on October 14, 1973
after the parties shall have submitted memoranda on the question raised in
the aforesaid motion as required by the respondent court in its order of
September 29, 1973.
 002 EVANGELISTA v. LA PROVEEDORA (TIMBOL)
March 31, 1971 | Makalintal, J. | Claims that survive death
PETITIONER: Hollanda A.S. Evangelista, as Special Administratrix of the
Estate of the late Manuel Abad Santos
RESPONDENTS: La Proveedora, Inc., Hon. Andres Aguila (CFI Pampanga),
Hon. Marcelo Mendiola (Ex-Oficio Provincial Sheriff), and Edgardo Zabat
(Senior Deputy Provincial Sheriff)
SUMMARY: Manuel Abad Santos, the judgment debtor died in Angeles City.
3 months later, the CFI of Pampanga issued a writ of execution, thus, a parcel of
land and the house situated thereon, owned by the deceased were levied. In the
meantime an intestate proceeding for the settlement of the deceased estate was
filed in the CFI of Pampanga, wherein Evangelista was appointed as Special
Administratrix. Even prior to her appointment, Evangelista informed the
Provincial Sheriff of the death of the judgment debtor and demanded that he
desist from proceeding with the sale. Such was denied, and the property was
eventually sold to La Proveedora, Inc. Hence this petition.
Whether or not the writ of execution and the subsequent auction is null and
void.
The SC held in the affirmative. Since the death of Manuel Santos preceded the
date of execution, the judgment against him should be presented as a claim
against the estate. Only when the judgment debtor dies after such levy can the
property be sold.
DOCTRINE: The cut-off date is the date of actual levy of execution. If the
judgment debtor dies after such levy, the property levied upon may be sold; If
before, the money judgment must be presented as a claim against the estate,
although of course the same need no longer be proved, the judgment itself being
conclusive. But the judgment creditor will share the estate with other creditors,
subject only to such preferences as are provided by law
FACTS:
22. Manual Abad Santos, the judgment debtor, died in the City of Angeles
23. Subsequently, CFI Pampanga issued a writ of execution, pursuant to which
Zabat, the Provincial Sheriff levied on a parcel of land and on the house
situated thereon, both owned by the deceased and covered by TCT No.
22937-M
a. The auction was scheduled for November 23, 1970
24. In the meantime, an intestate proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
Manuel Santos was filed in the CFI of Pampanga
a. Hollanda A.S. Evangelista, was appointed special administratrix of
the intestate
25. Even prior to her appointment, having been notified of the writ of execution
and the scheduled auction sale of the proeprtis levied upon, Evangelista
informed Zabath of the death of the jdugmetn debtor and demanded that he
desist from proceeding with the sale
a. This was followed by an urgent motion in court that the writ of
execution be recalled, but the motion was denied and the sale was
carried out, wherein La Proveedora, Inc. was the highest bidder
ISSUE/s:
27. WoN the writ of execution and the subsequent auction is null and void –
YES. Since in this case the death of Manuel Santos preceded the levy of
execution on his properties, the judgment against him should be presented
as a claim against his estate, and the sale at auction carried out by the sheriff
is null and void
RULING: WHEREFORE, the questioned writ of execution and all proceedings
which took place by virtue thereof, including the sale itself and its registration, if it
has been registered, are ordered set aside and cancelled. Costs against respondent La
Proveedora, Inc.
RATIO:
28. The provisions of the Rules of Court on the matter at hand are clear
a. Section 7 of Rule 39: “Execution in case of death of party. –
Where a party dies after the entry of the judgment or order,
execution thereon may issue, or one already issued may be
enforced in the following cases:
i. (c) In case of the death of the judgment debtor after
execution is actually levied upon any of his property, the
same may be sold for the satisfaction thereof, and the
officer making the sale shall account to the corresponding
executor or administrator for any surplus in his hands.”
29. Note that the property levied upon in case the judgment debtor dies
after the entry of judgment, as in this case, may be sold for the
satisfaction of the judgment in case death occurs “after execution is
actually levied”
30. On the other hand, Sec. 5 of Rule 86 provides that a judgment for
money against the decedent must be filed with the court in the
proceeding for the settlement of the estate
31. In other words, the cut-off date is the date of actual levy of execution
a. If the judgment debtor dies after such levy, the property levied
upon may be sold;
 b. If before, the money judgment must be presented as a claim
against the estate, although of course the same need no longer
be proved, the judgment itself being conclusive
c. But the judgment creditor will share the estate with other
creditors, subject only to such preferences as are provided by
law
32. Since in this case the death of Manuel Santos preceded the levy of
execution on his properties, the judgment against him should be
presented as a claim against his estate, and the sale at auction carried
out by the sheriff is null and void

003 PY ENG CHONG v. HERRERA (CHIQUI)
March 25, 1976 | Antonio, J. | Claims the survive death
PETITIONER: Py Eng Chong
RESPONDENT: Hon. A. Melencio Herrera, in her capacity as Judge of the CFI
of Manila, and Julia So De Chiat & Sons
SUMMARY: Py Eng Chong secured a writ of execution against the Uy Chiat
spouses but it was returned unsatisfied by the sheriff. Upon motion, RTC issued a
First Alias Writ of Execution (unsatisfied) then a Second Alias Writ of Execution
to levy on the properties of the general partnership of “Julia So De Chiat and
Sons”. Said partnership filed a motion to lift the levy arguing that the Uy Chiat
spouses have ceased to be members. Py Eng Chong opposed saying that this was a
simulate sale. Thereafter, the partnership , the partnership filed a motion and mani-
festation stating that since the judgment is only a money claim and the debtor,
Eduardo Uy Chiat, died “before final judgment has been rendered” in the case, the
court had no jurisdiction to issue the writ of execution against said deceased Edu-
ardo. RTC ruled in their favor. MR was denied. By way of certiorari, the case was
brought to the SC. W/N the Second Alias Writ of Execution should be enforced –
NO, Py Eng Chong should file his claim in the proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of said deceased. The respondent court was correct in recalling the Se-
cond Alias Writ of Execution. Eduardo Uy Chiat having died on March 30, 1968,
prior to the levy which was made by the Provincial Sheriff of Negros Occidental
on June 23, 1969, the judgment in favor of Py Eng Chong, being one for a sum of
money, may no longer be enforced by means of the said writ of execution, but
must be filed in the proper estate proceedings. Rule 86 Sec 5 requires that for the
purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or ad-
ministrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and
to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed (doctrine). Had
the levy been made before the death of the judgment debtor, the sale on execution
could have been carried to completion in accordance with Section 7 (c) of Rule 39
which provides that in case the judgment debtor dies after execution is actually
levied upon any of his property, the same may be sold for the satisfaction of the
judgment. However, as observed by respondent court, such is not the case here.
Even though there is no such proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the de-
ceased Eduardo Uy Chiat, the Rules of Court provide remedies for Py Eng Chong.
DOCTRINE: The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of
the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributees,
legatees, or heirs. “The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposi-
tion of claims against the decedent’s estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate
as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.”
FACTS: (Note: Sorry I cannot find the provisions mentioned because this was a
1970s case L )
11. The present proceedings stemmed from the writ of execution issued pursu-
ant to the judgment of the CFI of Manila, wherein the defendants-spouses
Eduardo Uy Chiat and Cecilia G. Uy Chiat (Uy Chiat Spouses) were or-
dered to pay, “jointly and severally”, to petitioner Py Eng Chong the sum of
P23,796.00, with interest at the rate of 12% per annum, plus 10% thereof as
attorney’s fees, and the costs of suit.
12. Pursuant to said judgment, Py Eng Chong secured a writ of execution dated
September 28, 1967, but it was returned unsatisfied by the Provincial Sher-
iff of Negros Occidental.
13. On December 9, 1967, upon motion of Py Eng Chong, the RTC issued a
First Alias Writ of Execution directing the Sheriff of the City of Manila to
levy on the goods and chattels of Eduardo Uy Chiat and Cecilia G. Uy Chi-
at, jointly and severally, especially their participation in the general partner-
ship of “Julia So De Chiat and Sons”, but this was likewise returned unsat-
isfied.
14. A Second Alias Writ of Execution was also issued on May 10, 1969 to levy
on the same properties.
15. On June 23, 1969, the Provincial Sheriff of Negros Occidental levied upon
the rights, interests and participation of Eduardo Uy Chiat and Cecilia G.
Uy Chiat over the twelve (12) parcels of land registered in the name of the
general partnership Julia So De Chiat & Sons.
16. On July 22, 1969, partnership Julia So De Chiat & Sons filed an Urgent
Motion to Lift Levy on Execution alleging, inter alia, that the properties
levied upon by the Sheriff belong exclusively to them and that judgment
debtors Uy Chiat Spouses have ceased to be members of the partnership,
having sold all their rights and participation therein to Julia So De Chiat,
mother of judgment debtor Eduardo Uy Chiat.
17. On July 29, 1969, Py Eng Chong filed his opposition to said urgent motion,
alleging, among others, that the deed of sale dated June 25, 1966 adverted
to in the urgent motion and allegedly executed by the judgment debtors in
favor of the mother of Eduardo Uy Chiat, Julia So De Chiat, is a simulated
sale “which the court has considered as such, and, therefore, is not a legal
obstacle to the continuance of the levy”; and that, since Julia So De Chiat &
Sons is merely a third- party claimant and is not one of the parties in the
case, said respondent cannot legally intervene in the action, in consonance
with the doctrine laid down in Queblar v. Garduño.
 18. On August 20, 1969, the partnership filed a motion and manifestation stat-
ing that since the judgment is only a money claim and the debtor, Eduardo
Uy Chiat, died “before final judgment has been rendered” in the case, the
court had no jurisdiction to issue the writ of execution against said deceased
Eduardo.
a. This motion was opposed by Py Eng Chong who invited the atten-
tion of respondent Judge to the fact that the judgment in the case
had long become final and executory before Eduardo Uy Chiat
died on March 30, 1968, and that the judgment debt which is
sought to be enforced by the Second Alias Writ of Execution can
still be executed against the successors- in-interest of Eduardo Uy
Chiat.
19. Respondent Judge, after hearing, issued an Order granting the motion to lift
the levy on execution filed by the respondent partnership by ordering the
recall of the Second Alias Writ of Execution
a. It said that “Eduardo Uy Chiat died on March 30, 1968, hence, a
writ of execution against him can no longer be enforced.”
b. It also mentioned that the judgment against the defendants Eduardo
Uy Chiat and Cecilia G. Uy Chiat, is “really against the conjugal
partnership of the defendant-spouses.”
20. On September 16, 1969, Py Eng Chong filed a motion for reconsideration
of the aforementioned order, questioning the procedure adopted by said the
Judge and alleging that the respondent Julia So De Chiat & Sons is merely a
third-party claimant and should avail of the remedies provided for in Sec-
tion 17, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, and that the order of Sep-
tember 1, 1969 is null and void ab initio because it modified the final judg-
ment of said court. This motion for reconsideration was denied in the order
issued by respondent Judge.
21. SC issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction restraining respondent Judge, purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the execu-
respondent Julia So De Chiat & Sons and the Provincial Sheriff of Negros tor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to exam-
Occidental from enforcing the order dated September 1, 1969. ine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which
ISSUE/s:
W/N the Second Alias Writ of Execution should be enforced – NO, Py Eng
Chong should file his claim in the proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of said deceased.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the recall of the Second Alias Writ of Execution is de-
clared valid and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by this Court on January
15, 1970 is hereby dissolved. Costs against petitioner.
RATIO:
9. Whether or not the motion of the third-party claimant to recall the writ of
execution was in substantial compliance with the requirements of Section
17, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and whether the statement of the respond-
ent court in its order that the judgment “is against the conjugal property * *
*” is an amendment or modification of a final judgment are issues of minor
import.
10. The basic reason of the respondent court in recalling the writ of execu-
tion was that the judgment being for money and the judgment debtor
having died prior to the levy, the judgment creditor should file his
claim in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of said deceased
pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 86.
11. The respondent court was correct in recalling the Second Alias Writ of Exe-
cution. Eduardo Uy Chiat having died on March 30, 1968, prior to the levy
which was made by the Provincial Sheriff of Negros Occidental on June 23,
1969, the judgment in favor of Py Eng Chong, being one for a sum of mon-
ey, may no longer be enforced by means of the said writ of execution, but
must be filed in the proper estate proceedings.
12. This is in consonance with the rule laid down in Section 5 of Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court:
a. “SEC. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred; excep-
tions.—All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or
implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral ex-
penses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money
against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise
they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any
action that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants.”
13. The above-quoted provision is mandatory. This requirement is for the
should be allowed.
14. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the
affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the dis-
tributees, legatees, or heirs. “The law strictly requires the prompt
presentation and disposition of claims against the decedent’s estate in
order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its
debts and distribute the residue.”
15. Had the levy been made before the death of the judgment debtor, the sale on
execution could have been carried to completion in accordance with Section
7 (c) of Rule 39 which provides that in case the judgment debtor dies after
execution is actually levied upon any of his property, the same may be sold
for the satisfaction of the judgment. However, as observed by respondent
court, such is not the case here.
16. Py Eng Chong, however, contends that he could not present his claim in
the proper estate proceedings because no such proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased Eduardo Uy Chiat have been
instituted. The infirmity of this argument is evident from the fact that the
Rules of Court amply provides remedy for Py Eng Chong. He may initiate
proceedings under Section 1 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court if Eduardo Uy
Chiat died testate, or under Section 6 (b) of Rule 78 if he died intestate.
17. In Sikat v. Vda. De Villanueva, this court stated that if a creditor, having
knowledge, of the death of his debtor and the fact that no administrator
has been appointed, permits more than three (3) years to elapse without
asking for the appointment of an administrator or instituting the intestate
proceedings in the competent court for the settlement of the latter’s es-
tate, he is guilty of laches and his claim prescribes. “To hold otherwise
would be to permit a creditor having knowledge of the debtor’s death to
keep the latter’s estate in suspense indefinitely, by not instituting either
estate or intestate proceedings in order to preset his claim, to the preju-
dice of the heirs and legatees.”
18. With respect to the claim of Py Eng Chong that the respondent court arbi-
trarily amended or modified a final and executory judgment, We note that
the statement in the order of September 1, 1969 that the judgment “is really
a judgment against the conjugal partnership * * *” is merely an expression
of opinion which cannot in any way amend or modify the final judgment in
Civil Case No. 65733. It cannot be construed otherwise, as it is well-settled
that a final judgment or order can no longer be altered or amended, and the
court loses jurisdiction over it, save to order its execution.
19. Finally, on Py Eng Chong’s contention that the partnership has not availed
of the remedies provided for in Section 17, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of
Court, it must be noted that the aforecited rule does not require that the title
of ownership of the claimant be produced, an affidavit of his title thereto
being all that is necessary to be presented with his claim.
20. The partnership’s motion was under oath, supported by two public instru-
ments—the Deed of Sale executed by Eduardo S. Uy Chiat as vendor, and
Julio So de Chiat & Sons as vendee, duly acknowledged before Notary Pub-
lic Raymundo M. Lozada, Jr., and the Amended Articles of Partnership of
Julia So de Chiat & Sons —stating the factual basis of the partnerhip’s
claim of title over the real properties that were being levied upon. Such re-
quirement was undoubtedly substantially complied with by the submission
of said pleading with the attached documents.
 004 De dela Cruzv. CA (Valle)
28 Feb 1979 | De Castro, J. | Claims that survive death
PETITIONER: Amanda L. Vda. De Dela Cruz et al
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Ca, Marcelo Abaga, Margarita D. Jose, Martina D.
Jose, Quirino D. Jose, Teofilo D. Jose, et al
SUMMARY:.
Jose is a tenant of the Vda De dela cruz’s hacienda. An action for ejectment and
collection of unpaid rentals was filed by the Vda against Jose. The court in the
ejectment case rendered a decision against Jose and ordered them to pay. On
Vda’s motion, the court issued an order of execution. The conjugal properties of
Jose and his wife were sold at public auction to Vda as highest bidder. The heirs
of Hose filed a motion to substitute deceased and set aside as null and void the
decisions, orders, writ of execution and sale at public auction. The heirs raised
the question of validity of the decision on the ground that despite the awareness
of the death of Jose, no substitution was ordered before the decision was
rendered.
The issue in this case is Whether or not there should have been substitution in
the trial when it was on going. The SC held that there should be as substitution is
mandatory and a matter of due process. Jose died before the rendition of
judgment which the judge of the Court of Agrarian Relations was aware of. Yet
no substitution was done. The SC cited cases that in cases of death of a party and
due notice is given, it is the duty of the court to order the legal representative to
appear before him. But, here, since no legal representative appeared since there
was no substitution, the continuance of the proceeding during pendency amounts
to lack of jurisdiction. The court never acquired jurisdiction over Jose and even
assuming that jurisdiction was acquired, it was impaired on the death of the
protestee pending the proceedings.
DOCTRINE:
Substitution is a mandatory requirement in actions surving the deceased.
The need for substitution is based on the right of a party to due process.
Summing up then the previous ruling of this Court in the aforecited cases, and
noting that Rule 3, Sec. 17, Revised Rules of Court uses the word “shall” one
infers that substitution is indeed a mandatory requirement in actions surviving
the deceased. It has been held that in “statutes relating to procedure . . . every act
which is jurisdictional, or of the essence of the proceedings, or is prescribed for
the protection or benefit of the party affected, is mandatory.
FACTS:
130. Vda. De Dela Cruz et al (Vda) filed an action for ejectment and collection
of unpaid rentals against Feliz Jose and 114 other tenants. The complaint
alleged that Jose is a tenant over 4.5ha of Vda’s hacienda in Pangasinan.
They pay a fized rental of 850 kilos of palay per hectuare per agricultural
year. He failed to pay in full the rentals despite the demands. Jose also
refused to vacate the landholding and pay his obligation.
131. The court in the ejectment case rendered decision against Jose and ordered
them to pay 6,432 kilos of palay. Some of Jose’s co-defendants brought
thec ase to the SC. But this was dismissed due to failure to file their brief.
132. On Vda’s motion, the court issued an order of execution. To satisfy the
award for damages, the conjugal properties of Jose and his wife were sold at
public auction. A certificate of sale was issued in favor of Vda as highest
bidder.
133. The heirs of Jose filed a motion to substitute the deceased and to set aside as
null and void the decisions, orers, writ of execution, and sale at public
auction. The TC allowed the substitution but denied the motion to set aside.
The MR was also denied.
134. The heirs of Jose appelaed to the CA, raising question of the validity of the
TC’s decision on the ground that despite its awareness of the death of Jose,
no substitution was ordeded before decision was rendered (the decision that
was executed on).
135. The CA found the appeal meritorious. Vda appealed to the SC.
ISSUE/s:
14. WoN the heirs of Jose should have been substituted in the trial when it was
on going – YES, because substitution is a matter of due process and
mandatory in actions surviving the deceased (Jose).
RULING: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, We hereby affirm the decision of the
Court of Appeals. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
174. Jose died before the termination of the trial. Whether defendant died before
or after termination of trial is not all that important because one thing is
certain; that he died before the rendition of judgment. This fact was known
to the judge of the Court of Agrarian Relations (the one who decided on the
earlier case). Yet no substitution of the deceased was ordered by the trial
court, disregarading provisions of Rule 3, sec 17 of the ROC.
175. In Caseñas v. Rosales, in case of death of a party and due notice is given to
the TC, it is the duty of the court to order the legal representative of the
deceased to appear for him.
176. Considering the complaint is one for ejectment, the ruling in the case is
indeed applicable to the present case, where the action or claim is not
extinguished on account of Sec 9, Ra 1199 (this is now RA 6389, Code of
Agrarian Reforms) which provides in effect that in case of death or
 permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessee, the leasehold shall continue
between the lessor and the persons enumerated in said Section which
include the descendants of the deceased.
177. But it is noted that no legal representative was ever summoned to appear; no
legal representative was substituted, and that no one procured the
appointment of such legal representative. As a result, the “continuance of a
proceeding during the pendency of which a party thereto dies, without
such having been validly substituted in accordance with the rules,
amounts to lack of jurisdiction.”
178. In Ferreria v. Gonzales, the court set aside the decision of the Court of
Agrarian Relations because no valid substitution was effected,
consequently, “the court never acquired jurisdiction over appellant for the
purpose of making the decision binding upon her either personally or as a
legal representative.”
179. Even assuming that in this case, jurisdiction was acquired over Jose, it was
impared on the death of the protestee pending the proceedings below such
that unless and until a legal representative is for him duly anmed and within
the jurisdiction of the TC, no adjudication in the case should have been
accorded any validity or binding effect on any party, in representation of the
deceased, without trenching upon due process.
180. The need for substitution is based on the right of due process. summing up
then the previous ruling of the Court in the afore-cited cases, and noting that
Rule 3, Sec. 17, Revised Rules of Court uses the word “shall”, one infers
that substitution is indeed a mandatory requirement in actions surviving the
deceased. It has been held that in “statutes relating to procedure . . . every
act which is jurisdictional, or of the essence of the proceedings,or is
prescribed for the protection or benefit of the party affected, is mandatory.”
181. In any case, substitution should be ordered even after judgment has been
rendered since proceedings may still be taken as was done in this case – like
an execution; and legal representative must appear to protect the interests of
the deceased and in all such proceedings.
 005 BELTRAN v. BORROMEO (VICENCIO)
Feb. 28, 1966 | Makalintal, J. | Contingent Claim
PETITIONER: Testate Estate of Vito Borromeo, Deceased; Dr. Patrici Beltran
Special Administrator; Atty. Florencio Albino
RESPONDENTS: Tomas Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo
SUMMARY: Jose Junquera was appointed special administrator of the testate estate
of deceased Vito Borromeo. Teofilo and Crispin Borromeo, who were oppositors of
the probate of the will, moved for Junquera’s removal on the groun that he failed to
file an inventory. This motion was granted and Junquera appealed. In the meantime,
the TC appointed Dr. Patricio Beltran as special administrator in the interim of the
appeal. Beltran, w/o authority of the Court, then cabled Atty. Albino as his lawyer in
the appealed case. Subsequently, Atty. Albino filed a motion in the TC praying that
his fees fixed at P4,000 be paid to him. The TC ordered partial execution and di-
rected Beltran to pay Atty. Albino from the funds of the estate. Tomas et al., the in-
stituted heirs of the estate, appealed this.
Issue: WoN the funds of the estate under administration is liable for Atty. Albino’s
attorney’s fees – NO. Beltran’s interests were personal to him. Beltran enaged Atty.
Albino to defend him although his position as special administrator was not in issue.
He was not even a party to the appeal which was for removal of Junquera as special
administrator upon motion of Crispin and Teofilo who was already represented by
counsels. (Read Doctrine).
DOCTRINE: The rule is that for attorney's fees for services rendered to an adminis-
trator to be chargeable against the estate such services must have been so rendered to
assist him in the execution of his trust.
Even then, it has been held that the attorney cannot hold the estate directly liable for
his fees; such fees are allowed to the executor or administrator and not to the attor-
ney. The liability for the payment rests on the executor or administrator, but if the
fees paid are beneficial to the estate and reasonable, he is entitled to reimbursement
from the estate.
FACTS:
76. In special proceeding No. 916-R of the CFI of Cebu, Jose H. Junquera
was appointed special administrator of the testate estate of the deceased
Vito Borromeo.
77. Teofilo Borromeo and Crispin Borromeo, who were oppositors to the
probate of the will, moved for Junquera's removal on January 2, 1953 on the
ground that he had failed and refused to file an inventory of the estate.
78. After hearing the motion was granted by the court in an order dated June 9,
1953, from which order Junquera appealed to the CA, which thereafter
certified the appeal to Us (the SC).
79. On September 23, 1953 the TC appointed Dr. Patricio Beltran special
administrator “in the interim that the order for the removal (of Junquera) is
on appeal.”
80. On February 19, 1955 Beltran, without specific authority from the court,
cabled Attorney Florencio L. Albino in Manila appointing him as his
lawyer in the appealed case, particularly in connection with the hearing
scheduled in the CA. Albino appeared before said court and filed a written
memorandum in behalf of Beltran.
81. On August 22, 1956 Attorney Albino filed a motion in the lower court
praying that his fees be fixed at P4,000.00 and that Beltran, as special
administrator, be ordered to pay the same to him.
82. Junquera opposed the motion, but it was granted nevertheless in the court's
order of March 26, 1957.
83. It was then that the instituted heirs — Tomas L. Borromeo, Amelia
Borromeo and Fortunato Borromeo — took a hand in the incident by
appealing from said order, although the appeal of Fortunato was not
allowed because it was filed out of time.
84. On March 4, 1958, upon motion of Attorney Albino, the lower court
ordered partial execution of the order of March 26, 1957, and directed
Beltran to pay the movant the sum of P2,000.00 from the funds of the estate
under administration. The order was forthwith carried out.
85. Appellants (Tomas, Amelia, & Fortunato) ask that the award of attorney's
fees be set aside; that the partial payment of P2,000.00 be declared null and
void; and that the movant-appellee Atty. Albino be ordered to return the
same to the estate.
ISSUE/s:
10. WoN the funds of the estate under administration is liable for Atty. Albino’s
attorney’s fees – NO. Beltran’s interests were personal to him. There is no
showing that Atty. Albino’s employment as lawyer had to do with Beltran’s
performance of his duties
RULING: Wherefore, the order appealed from dated March 26, 1957, is hereby set
aside; the order of March 4, 1958, is annulled; and the movant-appellee, Attorney
Florencio L. Albino, is ordered to pay back to the present administrator of the Estate
of Vito Borromeo the sum of P2,000.00, without prejudice to any claim for attorney's
fees which he may have against Dr. Patricio Beltran personally.
RATIO:
132. Tomas et al.’s position is well founded. The estate should not be saddled
with the payment of Atty. Albino's fees.
133. Beltran engaged Atty. Albino to defend him although his position as special
administrator was not in issue. He was not even a party in that appeal. The
order appealed from was for the removal of Junquera as special
administrator, upon motion of Crispin Borromeo and Teofilo Borromeo,
and not the order appointing Beltran as special administrator "in the
interim".
134. There was no need for him to appear or put up any defense for himself at
the hearing in the CA nor in behalf of the movants-appellees Crispin
Borromeo and Teofilo Borromeo, who were already being represented by
two reputable lawyers, namely, Attorneys Miguel Cuenco and Numeriano
Estenzo.
135. If Beltran had any interest at all in the outcome of that appeal it was entirely
personal to him.
136. The rule is that for attorney's fees for services rendered to an
administrator to be chargeable against the estate such services must
have been so rendered to assist him in the execution of his trust.
137. Even then, it has been held that the attorney cannot "hold the estate
directly liable for his fees; such fees are allowed to the executor or
administrator and not to the attorney. The liability for the payment
rests on the executor or administrator, but if the fees paid are beneficial
to the estate and reasonable, he is entitled to reimbursement from the
estate." (Uy Tioco vs. Imperial and Panis).
138. There is no showing that Atty. Albino’s employment as lawyer had to
do with Beltran’s performance of his duties; if anything, the transcript
of the record below (consisting of his own testimony) quoted in Tomas
et al.’s brief discloses certain actuations of Beltran as special
administrator that were in violation of his trust and prejudicial to the
estate.
139. One other point deserves to be noted in connection with the payment to the
movant-appellee of the sum of P2,000.00. Such payment was authorized ten
months after the appeal had been taken, with the approval of the record on
appeal and appeal bond, from the order of March 26, 1957, which fixed the
fees of movant-appellee at P4,000.00. No special reasons were given by the
court for the partial execution pending appeal, and there is no law to justify
it.
 006 LIWANAG v. CA (Salve)
August 14, 1965 | Concepcion, J. | Contingent claim
PETITIONER: Gliceria C. Liwanag
RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals, Manuel Agregado
SUMMARY: Gliceria is the special administratrix of Pio. Agregado filed a foreclo-
sure of real estate mortgage of Pio against Gliceria as administratrix. Gliceria argued
that Agregado’s complaint should be dismissed because the creditor cannot sue her,
as the special administratrix. Motion was denied. CA denied as well. Hence, this
appeal by Gliceria. WoN Agregado can file against Gliceria as special administratrix
– YES, because the rules of court do not prohibit making the special administratrix a
defendant in a suit against the estate. Such is also one of the remedies of the creditor
as provided by the Rules of Court, Sec. 7, Rule 86: (2) foreclose his mortgage or
realize upon his security by an action in court, making the executor or administrator
a party defendant, and if there is a deficiency after the sale of the mortgaged proper-
ty, he may prove the same in the testate or intestate proceedings.
DOCTRINE: The Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit making the special ad-
ministratrix a defendant in a suit against the estate. Otherwise, creditors would find
the adverse effects of the statute of limitations running against them in cases where
the appointment of a regular administrator is delayed.
FACTS:
1. Gliceria C. Liwanag is the special administratrix of the estate of Pio D. Liwanag,
the settlement of which is the subject of Special Proceeding No. 46599
2. Manuel Agregado commenced against her as such special administratrix, Civil
Case No. 50897 of the same court, for the foreclosure of a real estate mortgage
constituted in his favor by said Pio D. Liwanag, during his lifetime.
3. Gliceria moved to dismiss Agregado’s complaint, upon the ground that as spe-
cial administratrix she cannot be sued by a creditor of the deceased. Motion was
denied.
4. Gliceria filed a case to the CA against CFI judge and Agregado to annul said
order by writ of certiorari and enjoin said Judge from entertaining said Case No.
50897.
5. Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary injunction directing CFI Judge to
refrain from proceeding with the trial of that case, until further orders. CA de-
nied the writ prayed for.
6. Hence this appeal by Gliceria, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 81 of the (old) Rules
of Court, "a special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the de-
ceased", and that, accordingly, Agregado has no cause of action against her as a
special administratrix.
ISSUE/s:
11. WoN Agregado can file against Gliceria as special administratrix – YES, be-
cause the rules of court do not prohibit making the special administratrix a de-
fendant in a suit against the estate. Such is also one of the remedies of the credi-
tor as provided by the Rules of Court, Sec. 7, Rule 86: (2) foreclose his mort-
gage or realize upon his security by an action in court, making the executor or
administrator a party defendant, and if there is a deficiency after the sale of the
mortgaged property, he may prove the same in the testate or intestate proceed-
ings.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs
against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
RATIO:
140. Inasmuch, however, as the alleged absence of a cause of action does not affect
CA’s jurisdiction to hear Case No. 50897, it follows that the denial of Gliceria’s
motion to dismiss the same, even if it were erroneous, is reviewable, not by writ
of certiorari, but by appeal, after the rendition of judgment on the merits.
141. Moreover, the theory that a mortgagee cannot bring an action for foreclosure
against the special administrator of the estate of a deceased person has already
been rejected by this Court. It was already decided in a case involving the same
estate of Pio Liwanag.
142. "Section 7 of Rule 86 of the New Rules of Court provides that a creditor holding
a claim against the deceased, secured by a mortgage or other collateral security,
may pursue any of these remedies: (1) abandon his security and prosecute his
claim in the testate or intestate proceeding and share in the general distribution
of the assets of the estate; (2) foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security
by an action in court, making the executor or administrator a party defendant,
and if there is a deficiency after the sale of the mortgaged property, he may
prove the same in the testate or intestate proceedings; and (3) rely exclusively
upon his mortgage and foreclose it any time within the ordinary period of limita-
tions, and if he relies exclusively upon the mortgage, he shall not . . . share in the
distribution of the assets.
143. The Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit making the special administratrix a
defendant in a suit against the estate. Otherwise, creditors would find the ad-
verse effects of the statute of limitations running against them in cases where the
appointment of a regular administrator is delayed.
144. So that if We are now to deny the present action on this technical ground alone,
and the appointment of a regular administrator will be delayed, the very purpose
for which the mortgage was constituted will be defeated."
007 SANTOS v. MANARANG (APASAN)
March, 19, 1914 | Trent, J. | Action against the executors and administrators

PETITIONER: Isidro Santos
RESPONDENTS: Leandra Manarang (administratrix)
SUMMARY: Don Lucas de Ocampo (Don Lucas) died leaving a last will and
testatment. In the fourth clause of this will, it provides that he declares the
existence of his contracted debts and that it is his desire that those debts be paid
by his wife and executors in accordance with the agreement with the creditors.
Among the debts are the claims of plaintiff in this case, Isidro Santos amounting
to P5,000 and P2,454. The will was duly probated and a committee was
appointed to take cognizance of the claims presented against the estate. The
committee submitted its report on June 27, 1908. Subsequently, on July 14,
1908, Santos presented a petition to the court asking that the committee be
reconvene to pass upon his claim. It was denied by the Court. Santos then filed
his claim against Manarang, the administratrix of the estate. It was also denied
by the court. Hence this appeal.
Issue No. 1: WoN the court erred in denying his petition to reconvene the
committee proceedings – No. At the outset, it must be noted that his claim was
already belatedly filed. Nonetheless, the law provides for a saving provision
which allows a 6-month period (after the previous time limitation) for the
presentation of the belated claim. Extension may also be granted within the
sound discretion of the court. In the present case the time previously limited was
six months from July 23, 1907. This allowed Santos until January 23, 1908, to
present his claims to the committee. But Santos only filed his claim on July 14,
1908. The court also did not consider giving the extension since the court held
that Santos was negligent in not properly informing himself with regard to the
laws applicable to the allowance of claims against the estate.
Issue No. 2: WoN the court erred in denying his petition or claim against the
administrator – No. The law is explicit on this one that “No action or suit shall
be commenced or prosecute against the executor or administrator upon a claim
against the estate to recover a debt due from the state; but actions to recover the
seizing and possession of real estate and personal chattels claimed by the estate
may be commenced against him”. Furthermore, the will of the testator described
his claim as a debt. No further construction should be allowed in view of the
intention of the testator to treat it as a simple debt. Therefore, the present action
was improperly instituted against the administratrix. The claim should have
been against the estate which must be filed before a committee.
DOCTRINE: No action or suit shall be commenced or prosecute against the
executor or administrator upon a claim against the estate to recover a debt due
from the state; but actions to recover the seizing and possession of real estate
and personal chattels claimed by the estate may be commenced against him. The
claim must be against the estate which should be filed before the proper
committee.
FACTS:
1. Don Lucas de Ocampo (Don Lucas) died on November 18, 1906, possessed
of certain real and personal property which, by his last will and testament
dated July 26, 1906, he left to his three children. The fourth clause of this
will reads as follows:
I also declare that I have contracted the debts detailed below, and it is my desire that
they may be religiously paid by my wife and executors in the form and at the time
agreed upon with my creditors.
2. Among the debts mentioned in the list referred to are two in favor of the
plaintiff, Isidro Santos (Santos); one due on April 14, 1907, for P5,000, and
various other described as falling due at different dates (the dates are not
given) amounting to the sum of P2,454.
3. The will was duly probated and a committee was regularly appointed to
hear and determine such claims against the estate as might be presented.
This committee submitted its report to the court on June 27, 1908.
4. On July 14, 1908, Santos presented a petition to the court asking that the
committee be required to reconvene and pass upon his claims against the
estate which were recognized in the will of testator. This petition was
denied by the court, and on November 21, 1910, Santos instituted the
present proceedings against the administratrix of the estate to recover the
sums mentioned in the will as due him. Relief was denied in the court
below, and now appeals to this court.
ISSUE/s:
1. WoN the lower court erred in denying his petition asking the committee to
reconvene and consider his claim – No, his claim was presented beyond the
6 month period allowed by law for belated claims.
2. WoN the lower court erred in denying his petition asking the administratrix
to be compelled in paying him the amounts mentioned in the will as debts
due him – No, because it must be presented before the committee, and not
before the administratrix.
RULING: SC affirmed the lower courts decision. Pwede rin wherefore.

RATIO:
First Issue
1. CONTENTION OF SANTOS: In his petition of July 14, 1909, asking that
the committee be reconvened to consider his claims, Santos states that his
failure to present the said claims to the committee was due to his belief that
it was unnecessary to do so because of the fact that the testator, in his will,
expressly recognized them and directed that they should be paid. The
inference is that had his claims not been mentioned in the will he would
have presented to the committee as a matter of course; that he was held to
believe by this express mention of his claims in the will that it would be
unnecessary to present them to the committee; and that he did not become
aware of the necessity of presenting them to the committee until after the
committee had made its final report.
2. Under these facts and circumstances, did the court err in refusing to
reconvene the committee for the purpose of considering plaintiff's claim?
The first step towards the solution of this question is to determine whether
plaintiff's claims were such as a committee appointed to hear claims against
an estate is, by law, authorized to pass upon (determine first whether under
the law, the committee is authorized to hear such claim).
3. Section 746 et seq., with reference to the presentation of contingent
claims to the committee after the expiration of the time allowed for the
presentation of claims not contingent (the provision allows for
presentation of contingent claims after the expiration of the period for the
presentation of NON-contingent claims). Do Santos’ claims fall within
any of these sections (was it a contingent claim)? They are described in
the will as debts (in general). There is nothing in the will to indicate that
any or all of them are contingent claims, claims for the possession of or
title to real property, damages for injury to person or property, real or
personal, or for the possession of specified articles of personal property.
Nor is it asserted by Santos that they do. The conclusion is that they
were claims proper to be considered by the committee.
4. This being true, the next point to determine is, when and under what
circumstances may the committee be recalled to consider belated claims?
Section 689 provides:
That court shall allow such time as the circumstances of the case require for the
creditors to present their claims the committee for examination and allowance; but
not, in the first instance, more than twelve months, or less than six months; and the
time allowed shall be stated in the commission. The court may extend the time as
circumstances require, but not so that the whole time shall exceed eighteen months.
5. It cannot be questioned that thus section (Sec. 689) supersedes the
ordinary limitation of actions provided for in chapter 3 of the Code.
The object of the law in fixing a definite period within which claims
must be presented is to insure the speedy settling of the affairs of a
deceased person and the early delivery of the property of the estate in
the hands of the persons entitled to receive it.
6. Due possibly to the comparative shortness of the period of limitation
applying to such claims as compared with the ordinary statute of
limitations, the statute of nonclaims has not the finality of the ordinary
statute of limitations. It may be safely said that a saving provision, more
or less liberal, is annexed to the statute of nonclaims in every jurisdiction
where is found. In this country its saving clause is found in section 690,
which reads as follows:
On application of a creditor who has failed to present his claim, if made within
six months after the time previously limited, or, if a committee fails to give the
notice required by this chapter, and such application is made before the final
settlement of the estate, the court may, for cause shown, and on such terms as are
equitable, renew the commission and allow further time, not exceeding one month,
for the committee to examine such claim, in which case it shall personally notify
the parties of the time and place of hearing, and as soon as may be make the return
of their doings to the court.
7. If the committee fails to give the notice required, that is a sufficient cause
for reconvening it for further consideration of claims which may not have
been presented before its final report was submitted to the court. But, as
stated above, this is not the case made by the plaintiff, as the committee did
give the notice required by law. Where the proper notice has been given,
the right to have the committee recalled for the consideration of a
belated claim appears to rest first upon the condition that it is
presented within six months after the time previously limited for the
presentation of claims (it must be presented within six months AFTER
the supposed date of presentation. So in effect, the law also allows certain
period for the filing of belated claims).
8. In the present case the time previously limited was six months from July
23, 1907. This allowed Santos until January 23, 1908, to present his
claims to the committee. An extension of this time under section 690
rested in the discretion of the court.
9. Plaintiff's petition was not presented until July 14, 1909. The bar of the
statute of nonclaims is a conclusive under these circumstances as the bar of
the ordinary statute of limitations would be.
10. It is generally held that claims are not barred as to property not
included in the inventory. (Waughop vs. Bartlett, 165 III., 124; Estate of
Reyes, 17 Phil. Rep., 188.) So also, as indicated by this court in the case
last cited, fraud would undoubtedly have the same effect.
 a. These exceptions to the operation of the statute are, of course,
founded upon the highest principles of equity. But what is the
plea of the plaintiff in this case? Simply this: That he was laboring
under a mistake of law — a mistake which could easily have been
corrected had he sought to inform himself; a lack of information as
to the law governing the allowance of claims against estate of the
deceased persons which, by proper diligence, could have been
remedied in ample to present the claims to the committee. Plaintiff
finally discovered his mistake and now seeks to assert his right
when they have been lost through his own
negligence. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. We conclude that
the learned trial court made no error in refusing to reconvene
the committee for the purpose of considering plaintiff's claims
against the estate.
Second Issue
11. CONTENTION OF SANTOS: In his second assignment of error Santos
insists that the court erred in dismissing his petition filed on November 21,
1910, wherein he asks that the administratrix be compelled to pay over to
him the amounts mentioned in the will as debts due him. We concede all
that is implied in the maxim, dicat testor et erit lex. But the law imposes
certain restrictions upon the testator, not only as to the disposition of
his estate, but also as to the manner in which he may make such
disposition. It may be safely asserted that no respectable authority can
be found which holds that the will of the testator may override positive
provisions of law and imperative requirements of public policy. (Page
on Wills, sec. 461.)
12. Conceding for the moment that it was the testator's desire in the present case
that the debts listed by him in his will should be paid without referring them
to a committee appointed by the court, can such a provision be enforced?
May the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to the settlement
of claims against an estate by a committee appointed by the court be
superseded by the contents of a will?
13. It is evident from the brief outline of the sections referred to above that the
Code of Civil Procedure has established a system for the allowance of
claims against the estates of decedents. Those are at least two restrictions
imposed by law upon the power of the testator to dispose of his property,
and which pro tanto restrict the maxim that "the will of the testator law: (1)
His estate is liable for all legal obligations incurred by him; and (2) he
cannot dispose of or encumber the legal portion due his heirs by force of
law. The former (debts) take precedence over the latter (legitimes). (Sec.
640, Code Civ, Proc.) In case his estate is sufficient they must be paid. (Sec,
734, id.) In case the estate is insolvent they must be paid in the order named
in section 735. It is hardly necessary to say that a provision in an insolvent's
will that a certain debt be paid would not entitle it to preference over other
debts. But, if the express mention of a debt in the will requires the
administrator to pay it without reference to the committee, what assurance
is there, in the case of an insolvent estate, that it will not take precedence
over preferred debts?
14. If it is unnecessary to present such claim to the committee, the source of
nonclaims is not applicable. It is not barred until from four to ten years,
according to its classification in chapter 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
establishing questions upon actions. Under such circumstances, when then
the legal portion is determined? If, in the meantime the estate has been
distributed, what security have the differences against the interruption of
their possession? Is the administrator required to pay the amount stipulated
in the will regardless of its correctness? And, if not, what authority has he to
vise the claim? Section 706 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that
an executor may, with the approval of the court, compound with a
debtor of deceased for a debt due the estate, But he is nowhere
permitted or directed to deal with a creditor of the estate (hence a claim
against the estate for a debt due should not be filed against an
administrator or executor). On the contrary, he is the advocate of the
estate before an impartial committee with quasi-judicial power to
determine the amount of the claims against the estate, and, in certain
cases, to equitably adjust the amounts due. The administrator,
representing the debtor estate, and the creditor appear before this body
as parties litigant and, if either is dissatisfied with its decision, an
appeal to the court is their remedy. To allow the administrator to
examine and approve a claim against the estate would put him in the
dual role of a claimant and a judge. The law in this jurisdiction has
been so framed that this may not occur.
15. The state cannot afford to allow the performance of its obligations to be
directed by the will of an individual. There is but one instance in which the
settlement of the estate according to the probate procedure provided in the
Code of Civil Procedure may be dispense with, and it applies only
to intestate estates. (Sec. 596, Code Civ. Proc.) A partial exemption from
the lawful procedure is also contained in section 644, when the executor or
 administrator is the sole residuary legatee. Even in such case, and although
the testator directs that no bond be given, the executor is required to give a
bond for the payment of the debts of the testator. The facts of the present
case do not bring it within either of this sections. We conclude that the
claims against the estate in the case at bar were enforceable only when
the prescribed legal procedure was followed.
16. But we are not disposed to rest our conclusion upon this phase of the case
entirely upon legal grounds. On the contrary we are strongly of the opinion
that the application of the maxim, "The will of the testator is the law of the
case," but strengthens our position so far as the present case is concerned.
17. It will ordinarily be presumed in construing a will that the testator is
acquainted with the rules of law, and that he intended to comply with
them accordingly. If two constructions of a will or a part thereof are
possible, and one of these constructions is consistent with the law, and the
other is inconsistent, the presumption that the testator intended to comply
with the law will compel that construction which is consistent with the law
to be adopted. (Page on Wills, sec. 465.)
18. Aside from this legal presumption, which we believe should apply in the
present case as against any construction of the will tending to show an
intention of the testator that the ordinary legal method of probating claims
should be dispensed with, it must be remembered that the testator knows
that the execution of his will in no way affects his control over his property.
19. The direction in the will for the executor to pay all just debts does not
mean that he shall pay them without probate. There is nothing in the will
to indicate that the testator intended that his estate should be administered in
any other than the regular way under the statute, which requires "all
demands against the estates of the deceased persons," "all such demands as
may be exhibited," etc. The statute provides the very means for ascertaining
whether the claims against the estate or just debts. (Kaufman vs. Redwine,
97 Ark., 546.)
20. The petition of the plaintiff filed on November 21, 1910, wherein he
asks that the administratrix be compelled to pay over to him the
amounts mentioned in the will as debts due him appears to be nothing
more nor less than a complaint instituting an action against the
administratrix for the recovery of the sum of money. Obviously, the
plaintiff is NOT seeking possession of or title to real property or
specific articles of personal property.
21. When a committee is appointed as herein provided, no action or suit shall
be commenced or prosecute against the executor or administrator upon
a claim against the estate to recover a debt due from the state; but
actions to recover the seizing and possession of real estate and personal
chattels claimed by the estate may be commenced against him. (Sec. 699,
Code Civ. Proc.)
22. The sum of money prayed for in the complaint must be due the plaintiff
either as a debt of a legacy. If it is a debt, the action was erroneously
instituted against the administratrix. Is it a legacy? Was it the intention
of the testator to leave the plaintiff a legacy of P7,454? We have already
touched upon this question. Plaintiff's claim is described by the testator
as a debt. It must be presumed that he used this expression in its ordinary
and common acceptation; that is, a legal liability existing in favor of the
plaintiff at the time the will was made, and demandable and payable in legal
tender. Had the testator desired to leave a legacy to the plaintiff, he would
have done so in appropriate language instead of including it in a statement
of what he owed the plaintiff. The decedent's purpose in listing his debts in
his will is set forth in the fourth clause of the will, quoted above. There is
nothing contained in that clause which indicates, even remotely, a desire to
pay his creditors more than was legally due them.
23. These considerations clearly refute the suggestion that the testator intended
to leave plaintiff anything by way of legacy. His claim against the estate
having been a simple debt, the present action was improperly instituted
against the administratrix. (Sec. 699, Code Civ. Proc.)
 008 VERA v. NAVARRO (Arcenas)
October 18, 1977 | Castro, C. J. | Contingent Claim
PETITIONER/S: MISAEL P. VERA, as Commissioner of Internal Revenue
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Judge Pedro C. Navarro, judge of CFI Rizal (Branch V);
Magdalena Abanto And Camilo Eribal, as voluntary residual heirs of the estate of
the deceased elsie m. gaches; Delia P. Medina, as attorney-in-fact of said heirs;
Bienvenido A. Tan, Sr., as executor of the estate of elsie m. gaches; Philippine Na-
tional Bank; Philippine Banking Corporation; The Overseas Bank of Manila; And
Banco Filipino Savings And Mortgage Bank
SUMMARY: Elsie Gaches (Gaches) died childless, however, leaving a will dispos-
ing of her estate consisting of PH and US properties to Camilo and Magdalena (PH
properties) and Bess Lauer (US properties) and inheritance money to her driver, la-
vandero and gardener respectively. Judge Tan became the executor of the estate and
Atty Medina (represents Camilo and Magdalena) asked for authority to make ad-
vancements of their inheritance (monthly allowance) and to pay for attorney’s fees.
CIR filed proof of claim for deficiency income taxes, inheritance tax and estate tax.
Judge Tan and Atty Medina assured the probate court that the estate was very liquid
and that the claims of the government (re:taxes) would be protected. So Judge Na-
varro (probate court) issued an order for the partial distribution of the estate and oth-
er conditions such that the executor is discharged from any and all responsibilities
pertaining to the estate, that Camilo and Magdalena as voluntary heirs are responsi-
ble for all taxes due to the government arising out of transaction of properties and
that Bess Lauer shall be responsible for all US taxes pertaining to her share. In lieu
of this decision, CIR issued warrants of garnishment against the estate deposited with
various banks, which the probate court lifted. PNB filed a motion to deposit with CFI
the money deposited with the banks in view of the conflicting claims of CIR and
heirs. Judge Navarro denied the motion, even threatened bank officials who refuse to
implement orders of probate court Note, Atty Medina was able to withdraw 2 million
from PNB. CIR filed a MR of the order (of Judge Navarro re: lifting warrant).
Hence, CIR filed with SC this petition to claim deficiency taxes against the estate.
CIR alleges that distributive shares of the heirs can only be paid AFTER full pay-
ment of death taxes (income tax payable during lifetime of decedent should be paid
fist). According to Atty Medina they have funds to pay said deficiency (deposited
money in banks and shares of stock), specifically time deposits with Overseas that
were supposed to cover the estate tax. But according to CIR, the endorsed time de-
posit certificates were rejected because the same could not be converted into cash at
the time (Overseas undergoing financial difficulty and could not continue bank oper-
ations). From the facts it would appear that Judge Navarro committed GADALEJ in
issuing its orders (authorizing the advancements) in violation of Section 103 of
NIRC which states that only when estate tax has been paid will the judge authorize
the executor to deliver the distribute shares to the heirs. Issue before the court (rele-
vant to our topic) is whether Camilo and Magdaleno be required to pay first the in-
heritance tax before the probate court may authorize the delivery of the hereditary
share pertaining to each of them? YES. NIRC lacks any provision that’s similar to
Section 103 with regard to authority of a probate court to allow distribution of an
estate PRIOR to complete liquidation of inheritance tax. The cloud of vagueness in
the NIRC is not entirely unreachable by virtue of Section 1, Rule 90 of the ROC (see
doctrine). The circumstances provided were not present in this case; hence, SC held
that the taxes due were not adequately provided for as there was no showing probate
court determined the correctness of the tax claims, nor did they determine whether
the market value of the preserved properties could satisfy the same.
DOCTRINE:Rule 90, Section 1: the distribution of a decedent's assets may only be
ordered under any of the following three circumstances:
1. when the inheritance tax, among others, is paid;
2. when a sufficient bond is given to meet the payment of the tax and all the oth-
er options of the nature enumerated in the above-cited provision; or
3. when the payment of the said tax and all the other obligations mentioned in
the said Rule has been provided for
FACTS:
1. Elsie M. Gaches (GACHES) died childless but left a last will and testate-
ment disposing of her estate as follows: (IN THE PH)
a. To my driver, Pacito Trocio – Php 10,000
b. To my lavandero, Vicente Jerodias – Php 1,000
c. To my gardener – Php 500
d. Balance of estate in the PH divided in half – half to Camilo Eribal
and half to Miss Magdalena Abanto
e. To Miss Consuelo Tan – office table and chair (in the library of
Gaches’ house) and carpet (to be selected by her)
f. FOR PROPERTIES IN US – furs, jewelry and stocks to my sister
Bess Lauer, widow, and resident of San Francisco, California.
2. March 11, 1966 – Judge Tan (executor of the estate of GACHES) filed with
CFI Pasig a petition for probate of the will where he was appointed executor
without a bond.
a. Judge Tan informed CIR through that the testate estate’s worth
was about Php 10 million and was assessed estate and inheritance
taxes of about Php 9.5 million.
b. Atty Medina (lawyer of the heirs Camilo and Magdalena) filed
with probate court a motion praying that the executor be given au-
thority to give a monthly allowance to Camilo and Magdalena
from May 1966 until the receipt of recommended advancement of
inheritance of Php 100,000 each, which was granted by the probate
court.
 3. CIR filed with probate court a proof of claim for the sum of Php 192, 364 as
income tax for 1965 and 1% monthly interest due from GACHES.
4. Judge Tan later filed with probate court a motion praying for authority to
make additional advance payments to Camilo, Magdalena, Bess Lauer, and
Attys. Medina and Bienvenido Tan, claiming that the estate was very liquid
and that any claim against the estate and government will be protected be-
cause over Php 7 million worth of shares will remain. Court granted.
5. CIR is claiming the sum of Php 1, 398, 436.3 (estate tax) and Php 7,
140,060.69 (inheritance tax) as according to investigation, the value of the
estate is Php 10, 212, 899.2, which assessment was disputed by Judge Tan.
a. CIR filed a proof of claim for death taxes
b. Also submitted a motion praying for revocation of all orders grant-
ing payment of advance inheritance, allowance and fees, for the
appointment of co-administrator of the estate without prior notice
to the CIR and for non-disbursement of funds of the etate without
prior notice to CIR.
c. Records do not disclose if probate court disposed of the motion,
but its denial can be implied because the court authorized the con-
version of the amount of Php 75,000 (amount which was to cover
the attorney’s fees of Atty Medina)
6. With probate court’s approval, Judge Tan paid (partially) BIR estate tax and
inheritance tax based on a tax return filed by Atty Medina with BIR.
7. (IMPT) Judge Navarro issued an order for the partial distribution28 of
3m and other conditions as follows:
a. Executor is discharged from any and all responsibilities to es-
tate
b. Camilo and Magdalena shall be responsible for all taxes of any
nature due the govt arising out of transaction of the properties
of the estate and govt can register its tax lien
c. Bess Lauer shall be responsible for all US taxes to her share
8. CIR was informed about the issued warrants of garnishment against the
funds of the estate deposited with the Philippine National Manial, the Over-
seas Bank of Manila, and Philippine Banking Corporation based on sections
315-330 of the NIRC.
9. Atty Medina filed with probate court a petition for the discharge of the writs
of punishment issued by CIR. Then Judge Navaroo (CFI RIZAL) lifted the
warrants.
10. PNB filed a motion to deposit with the CFI the money left with the bank in
view of the conflicting claims of the parties. Judge Navarro denied the mo-
tion threatening the bank officials who refuse to implement its orders. But,
28
Submit Amended final accounting;That the government can be paid because the estate has sufficient
assets at current market value of 8m
Atty Medina was able to withdraw Php 2 million form PNB. A copy of the
order was received by CIR.
11. CIR filed a MR of the orders of probate court. CIR also filed with the SC
the instant petition for certiorari, mandamus, prohibition and injunction
against Judge Navarro’s orders to claim the deficiency estate and inher-
itance taxes and penalty (amounting to Php 4,353, 972.87) and claiming the
following:
a. Distributive shares of the heirs can only be paid AFTER full pay-
ment of death taxes. (income tax payable during lifetime of
decdedent should be paid first)
b. While partial distribution may be allowd, a bond must be filed with
distributes to secure payment of transfer taxes. But later changed
its position saying that shares may be distributed as long as pay-
ment of taxes due may be “provided for”
c. Executor of estate can be discharged without payment of estate and
inheritance taxes if payment of the same can be provided for
d. That Judge Navarro has authority to dissolve the writs of garnish-
ment furnished by the CIR as the assets were in custodia legis.
12. PROPOSAL: Atty Medina asked for authorization to to pay the tax by using
the funds of the estate deposited in the banks (PNB, PBC, Banco Filipino,
Mortgage Bank and Bank of Manila) and to sell the shares of stock – grant-
ed the withdrawal but only from PBC and Overseas Bank of Manila in the
form of cashier’s check payable to CIR for payment of estate tax.
a. OSG filed a manifestation with SC conforming to the offer of Atty
Medina’s compromise but with a condition that the cash in the
banks of the estate and proceeds from the sale of the sahres of
stock be turned over to the CIR
13. TIME DEPOSITS WITH OVERSEAS: Atty Medina filed a petition to SC
to declare Overseas Bank of Manila in contempt for allowing the renewal of
the time deposit for another year, without court authority, and that they be
held liable for whatever penalties or surcharges be imposed for the late
payment of the estate tax.
a. it was Judge Tan who extended the maturity date of the deposits
because the certificate of the time deposits which were endorsed to
CIR in payment of the unpaid estate tax were REJECTED AS
PAYMENT by the CIR since the certificates of time deposit at that
time cannot be converted into cash, so CIR resolved to hold on to
the time deposits until such time they can convert the same – ergo,
Judge Tan had to extend it. Overseas cannot be faulted because it
was already in a state of insolvency and there are also other cases
already filed stating that the time depsit was an unrecorded transac-
tion and Overseas is prohibited from doing business by CB due to
its financial condition.
 b. Judge Tan asserts the extension was done in good faith and under a
gentleman’s agreement with bank officials that the deposit could
be withdrawn in advance.
14. So, the heirs agreed to pay the deficiency estate tax but they paid under pro-
test. Atty Medina was authorized to collect the money to pay.
a. Atty Medina filed a motion to declare in contempt LEPANTO
CONSOLIDATED MINING for refusing to turn over the divi-
dends payable to the testate estate, unless CIR first lifts the gar-
nishment on said dividends. So, the Court suspended the writs ef-
fective until Atty Medina fully pays the deficiency tax.
15. CIR sent Atty Medina another demand letter for payment of estate tax plus
penalties corresponding to the share of Bess Lauer and income tax
a. Atty Medina said those demands were erroneous because the time
deposits covered those already and endorsed to CIR and that they
(Camilo and Magdalen, his clients) were not responsible and only
Bess Lauer was solely responsible for the same.
16. From the facts it would appear that Judge Navarro committed GADA-
LEJ in issuing its orders (authorizing the advancements) in violation of
Section 103 of NIRC which states that only when estate tax has been
paid will the judge authorize the executor to deliver the distribute
shares to the heirs.
ISSUE/s:
1. Should Camilo and Magdaleno be required to pay first the inheritance tax
before the probate court may authorize the delivery of the hereditary share
pertaining to each of them? YES. Section 1 of Rule 90 provides that the distri-
bution of a decedent's assets may only be ordered under any of the three circum-
stances stated in the provision.
2. Are the Camilo and Magdaleno who are citizens and residents of the Philippines
liable for the payment of the Philippine inheritance tax corresponding to the he-
reditary share of Bess Lauer who is a US citizen said share of the latter consist-
ing of personal (cash deposits and, shares) properties? No. NIRC does not sup-
ply that the inheritance tax, as a rule, was meant to be the joint and solidary lia-
bility of the heirs of a decedent. Section 95(c) of NIRC indicates that the general
presumption must be otherwise.
RULING: Atty Delia P. Medina is to deliver the remaining assets of the estate to the
voluntary heirs in the proportions adjudicated in the will and to submit a report of
compliance
RATIO:
Distribution of estate in lieu of prior obligation to pay estate taxes
4. NIRC lacks any provision that’s similar to Section 103 with regard to authority
of a probate court to allow distribution of an estate PRIOR to complete liquida-
tion of inheritance tax. The cloud of vagueness in the NIRC is not entirely un-
reachable. Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court erases this hiatus in Section
1. (See end of digest)
5. Under the provisions of the rule, the distribution of a decedent's assets may
only be ordered under any of the following three circumstances
a. when the inheritance tax, among others, is paid;
b. when a sufficient bond is given to meet the payment of the tax and
all the other options of the nature enumerated in the above-cited
provision; or
c. when the payment of the said tax and all the other obligations men-
tioned in the said Rule has been provided for
6. None of these three cases insofar as the satisfaction of the when tax due from the
estate is concerned, were present when the questioned orders were issued in the
case at bar.
7. Although the Judge Navarro did make a condition in its order of June 5, 1967
that the distribution of the estate shall be trusted to Atty. Medina for the pay-
ment of whatever taxes may be due to the government from the estate and the
heirs, SC cannot say that the payment of the tax due was adequately provided
for.
a. The June 5 Order was a complete distribution of the estate hence the
probate court virtually withdrew its custodial jurisdiction over the es-
tate.
b. No evidence showing probate court made an attempt to determine the
correctness of tax claims and the market value of preserved properties
to satisfy said claims.
c. No evidence showing sufficient bond has been filed to meet outstand-
ing tax obligations
Filipino voluntary heirs not liable to US heir’s tax liabilities
1. SC held that liability of Camilo and Magdalena to pay inheritance tax of
Bess Lauer’s taxes must be negated.
2. Inheritance tax is an imposition created by law on the privilege to receive
property.
3. NIRC does not supply that the inheritance tax, as a rule, was meant to be the
joint and solidary liability of the heirs of a decedent. Section 95(c) of NIRC
indicates that the general presumption must be otherwise29
29
The inheritance tax imposed by Section 86 shall, in the absence of contrary disposition by the predeces-
sor, be charged to the account of each bene ciary, in proportion to the value of the bene t received, and in
accordance with the scale xed for the class or group to which he pertains: Provided, That in cases where
the heirs divide extrajudicially the property left to them by their predecessor or otherwise convey, sell,
transfer, mortgage, or encumber the same without paying the estate or inheritance taxes within the period
prescribed in the preceding subsections (a) and (b), they shall be solidarily liable for the payment of the
said taxes to the extent of the estate they have received."
 a.That by providing specific instnaces when heirs may be held soli-
darily liable for inheritance taxes is a clear indication that the pay-
ment of the same is an individual responsibility to the extent of
benefits received of each.
On the time deposits (not really relevant)
1. The effect of the time deposit certificates to the CIR cannot be held to ex-
tinguish the estate’s liability for estate tax. CIR expressly gave notice that
BIR cannot accept the certificates as payment of the deficiency estate tax
because they could not be converted to cash.
a. Secondly, the certificate is a mercantile document and essentially a
promissory note. Then, under Article 1249 of CC, the use of this
medium shall only produce effect of payment when the same has
been encashed, or the instrument is impaired through own fault of
creditor.
2. Atty Medina, Camilo or Magdalena did not try to collect the value of the
certificate from Overseas Bank hence the value of the certificates (700k)
remains outstanding.

FULL RULING
The amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS is hereby awarded to Manuel M. Paredes as
legal fee for his services, the same to be Paid by the respondent (2) The contempt charges against the
officials of the Philippine National Bank and the Overseas Bank of Manila, Judge Bienvenido Tan, Sr.,
and Lepanto Consolidated Co. are hereby ordered dismissed; (3) The authority given to Delia P. Medina
in the resolution of the court to pay the death and income taxes, including delinquency penalties, claimed
by the State and, for that, to withdraw all cash deposits in various banks and sell such properties of the
estate as my be necessary, is hereby terminated; and (4) The writs of preliminary injunction issued by the
Court pursuant to its resolutions dated July 10 and 17, 1967 are hereby dissolved.

SECTION 1, RULE 90 ROC

Section 1. When order for distribution of residue made. — When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses
of administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in ac-
cordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or administrator, or of a
person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the
persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled, and such
persons may demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any person
having the same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs
of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be beard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has been made or
provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, condi-
tioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.
 Barredo v. Court of Appeals (Linds)
Nov. 28, 1962 | Reyes, J.B.L., J. | Period claims against the estate should be filed Petitioners – Heirs of late Faustino Barredo
Respondents – Administrator of the estate
FACTS:
PETITIONER: Barredo, et. al.
37. The present appeal by the heirs of the late Fausto Barredo involves a tardy
claim to collect the face value of a promissory note for P20,000.00 plus
RESPONDENTS: CA, et. al.
12% interest per annum from 21 December 1949, the date of its maturity,
plus attorney's fees and costs in the sum of P2,000.00, from the intestate
SUMMARY: A promissory note secured by a mortgage was executed in favor
estate of the late Charles A. McDonough, represented herein by the
of Fausto over the leasehold rights of McDonough (McDo), represented by
administrator, W. I. Douglas.
Administrator Douglas. The mortgage covers 4 houses in Rizal owned by Factor
38. The promissory note was secured by a mortgage executed on 31 December
which McDo constructed on the leased land. The lease is for 10 years, but the
1940 in favor of Fausto Barredo over the leasehold rights of McDonough on
parties extended it. These proceedings were all annotated at the back of the
the greater portion of a parcel of registered land located at Dongalo
TCT. Upon Fausto’s death, through an extrajudicial partition, the heirs
Parañaque, Rizal, owned by Constantino Factor, and over four (4) houses
adjudicated to themselves his secured credit, together with the said TCT. The
which McDonough had constructed on the leased land.
annotation in the TCT was then cancelled when Manuel (one of Fausto’s heirs),
39. The lease contract between Factor and McDonough provided for a term of
was ordered to appeal before an officer of a Japanese Army which commanded
10 years from 1 September 1936; but on December 1940, the parties
him to bring all the pertinent documents relating to the mortgage executed with
extended the term up to 31 August 1961.
McDo whose properties, because of his enemy citizenship, was appropriated by
40. The original lease, the extension of its term, and the mortgage were all
the “invader”. Manuel was paid and was asked to sign a certification stating
inscribed at the back of certificate of title of the land.
such fact as well as the cancellation of the annotation. McDo died. A special
41. Upon Fausto Barredo's death on 8 October 1942, his heirs, in a deed of
proceeding was initated. It was published and notice to creditors were sent. The
extrajudicial partition, adjudicated unto themselves the secured credit of the
Heirs of Fausto filed their belated claim. It was opposed by the administrator of
deceased, and had the same recorded on the aforesaid certificate of title.
McDo’s estate. Hence, this case.
42. This annotation was, however, cancelled when one day in August 1944
Manuel H. Barredo was ordered to appeal before an officer of the Japanese
The issue is whether the belated claim should prosper. No. The probate court
Imperial Army at the Army and Navy Club and was commanded to bring
previously fixed the period for filing claims at six (6) months reckoned from the
with him all the documents pertaining to the mortgage executed by the late
date of first publication, and the said notice to creditors was first published on
McDonough whose private properties, because of his enemy citizenship,
23 August 1945. The present claim was filed on 22 October 1947. There is no
were, in the words of the Court of Appeals, "appropriated by the triumphant
doubt, therefore, that the claim was filed outside of the period previously fixed.
invader".
But a tardy claim may be allowed, at the discretion of the court, upon showing
43. Manuel H. Barredo was paid P20,000.00 in Japanese war notes by the
of cause for failure to present said claim on time. the probate court's discretion
occupation authorities and made to sign, as he did sign, a certification
in allowing a claim after the regular period for filing claims but before entry of
stating "that in consideration of P20,000.00 which I have received today, I
an order of distribution presupposes not only claim for apparent merit but also
am requested the Register of Deeds to cancel the mortgage of these
that cause existed to justify the tardiness in filing the claim. Here, the Heirs
properties"; and, as requested, the cancellation was inscribed at the back of
alleged as excuse for their tardiness the recent recovery of the papers of the late
the title.
Fausto Barredo from the possession of his lawyer who is now deceased. This
44. Charles McDonough died on 15 March 1945.
ground insufficient, due to the availability, and knowledge by the petitioners, of
45. Thereupon, Special Proceedings No. 70173 of the Court of First Instance of
the annotation at the back of the certificate of title of the mortgage embodying
Manila, captioned "In re: Intestate Estate of Charles A. McDonough", was
the instant claim, as well as the payment of P20,000.00 made by the Japanese
instituted.
military authorities.
46. Pursue a court order of 17 August 1945, the administrator caused to be
published in the "Philippine Progress" for three consecutive weeks, on 23
DOCTRINE: Belated claims against the estate may be allowed, provided there
and 30 August 1945 and 6 September 1945, a notice to creditors requiring
is an explanation satisfactory to the court.
them to their claims with the clerk of court within 6 months reckoned from
 the date of its first publication and expiring 23 February 1946. a. The one-month period specified in this section is the time granted
47. On 22 October 1947, the heirs of Fausto Barredo filed their belated claim claimants, and the same is to begin from the order authorizing the
against the estate of McDonough. This claim was opposed by the filing of the claims. It does not mean that the extension of one
administrator. After hearing the lower court allowed the claim, but the month starts from the expiration of the original period fixed by the
Court of Appeals reversed the order of allowance; hence, the Barredo heirs court for the presentation of claims.
appealed to this Court. 41. However, the probate court's discretion in allowing a claim after the regular
period for filing claims but before entry of an order of distribution
ISSUE/s: presupposes not only claim for apparent merit but also that cause existed to
Whether the belated claim should be allowed. No. justify the tardiness in filing the claim. Here, petitioners alleged as excuse
for their tardiness the recent recovery of the papers of the late Fausto
RULING: Petition denied. Barredo from the possession of his lawyer who is now deceased. This
ground insufficient, due to the availability, and knowledge by the
RATIO: petitioners, of the annotation at the back of the certificate of title of the
37. It is pertinent to state before discussing the argumentation of counsel that in mortgage embodying the instant claim, as well as the payment of
view of the burning and destruction of the buildings which were the subject P20,000.00 made by the Japanese military authorities.
of the mortgage, the petitioners manifested their wish to abandon their 42. The order of the trial court allowing the late claim without justification,
security and prosecute the claim against the estate as for a simple because under Section 2, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, said court has no
money debt, and that when the Barredo heirs filed their claim, no order authority to admit a belated claim for no cause or for an insufficient cause.
of distribution had entered in the proceedings. 43. In view of the conclusions thus arrived at, it becomes unnecessary to
38. SEC. 2. Time within which claims shall be filed. — In the notice provided discuss whether the payment by the Japanese was intended as a discharge of
in section 1, the court shall state the time for the filing of claims against the the promissory note. Suffice it to say that there is no other cogent
estate, which shall not be more than twelve nor less than six months after explanation for the payment made to the mortgagees, who were not the
the date of the first publication of the notice. However, at any time before owners of the encumbered property.
an order of distribution is entered, on application of a creditor who has
failed to file his claim within the time previously limited, the court may, for
cause shown and on such terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be
filed within a time not exceeding one month.
39. The probate court previously fixed the period for filing claims at six (6)
months reckoned from the date of first publication, and the said notice to
creditors was first published on 23 August 1945. The present claim was
filed on 22 October 1947. There is no doubt, therefore, that the claim was
filed outside of the period previously fixed. But a tardy claim may be
allowed, at the discretion of the court, upon showing of cause for failure to
present said claim on time.
40. The respondent administrator, relying on the case of the Estate of Howard J.
Edmands, 87 Phil. 405, argues that the one-month period for filing late
claims mentioned in Section 2, Rule 87, of the Rules of Court30 should be
counted from the expiration of the regular six-month period, but this
pronouncement was but an obiter dictum that did not resolve the issue
involved in said case. The true ruling appears in the case of Paulin vs.
Aquino, L-11267, March 20, 1958, wherein the controverted one month
period was clarified as follows:

30
 010 PAULIN vs. AQUINO (Buenaventura) claims, not from the expiration of the original period fixed in the court's
March 20, 1958 | Labrador, J. | Rule 87, Section 2 order for the presentation of claims.

PETITIONER: Teodoro S. Paulin

RESPONDENTS: Matilde V. Aquino
SUMMARY: Appeal from an order of the CFI of Rizal denying a petition of
Teodoro S. Paulin for a period of one month within which to file his claim against
the estate of the deceased Alfredo Aquino, Sr. The court made a finding that the
administratrix (Matilde) had fraudulently omitted certain assets amounting to around
P320,000 and a parcel of land about 24 hectares in her original inventory. The issue
is WoN the period to file claims can be extended. SC said YES, it is sufficient
justification for allowing claimants to have the period of filing claims extended
DOCTRINE:
The one-month period, specified in Section 2 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court,
should, however, begin from the order authorizing the filing of the claims, not from
the expiration of the original period fixed in the court's order for the presentation of
claims.

Note: This is the whole case based on E-SCRA

FACTS:
1. Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dated July 29,
1955 denying a petition of Teodoro S. Paulin for a period of one month
within which to file his claim against the estate of the deceased Alfredo
Aquino, Sr.
2. The court made a finding that the administratrix (Matilde) had fraudulently
omitted certain assets amounting to around P320,000 and a parcel of land
about 24 hectares in her original inventory.

ISSUES:
1. WoN the act of Matilde is enough to allow extension of the period to file
claims. – YES. The period begins from the order authorizing the filing of
claims.

RULING: Order appealed from is reversed, and Teodoro S. Paulin is granted one
month from receipt of this order within which to formulate and file his claim in the
court below. Costs against the administratrix.

RATIO:

1. This is sufficient justification for allowing claimants to have the period of

filing claims extended (In re Estate of Reyes, 17 Phil., 188).
2. The one-month period, specified in Section 2 of Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court, should, however, begin from the order authorizing the filing of the
 011 Laserna v. Altavas (CELAJE)
G.R. No. L-45793 | October 9, 1939 | Laurel, J. | A claim only needs to be
adjudicated once
PETITIONER: Testate estate of the deceased Jose Laserna Paro y Tupaz.
ARISTONA LASERNA, heir-appellant,
RESPONDENTS: JOSE ALTAVAS, creditor-appellee.
SUMMARY: There were 2 cases involved here. The first one (attorney's fees
case), civil case No. 2961/G.R. No. 40038, was a collection case initiated by
herein respondent Jose Altavas against herein petitioner Jose Laserna Paro to
recover the sum of P4,500 attorney's fees. Both the lower and the SC ruled that
Jose Laserna Paro was liable to Jose Altavas. However, during the pendency of
the appeal to the SC of the attorney's fees case, Jose Laserna Paro died. Thus,
Jose Laserna Paro's will was probated in the second case, civil case No. 3109
(probate case), in which case, herein petitioner Aristona Laserna was named as
the executrix and administratrix of the estate of Jose Laserna Paro.
Administratrix Aristona was also substituted in the attorney's fees case. After
the SC ruled in favor of respondent Jose Altavas in the first case (attorney's fees
case), the case was remanded to the lower courts for execution. An order of ex-
ecution and sale was already issued against the properties of Jose Laserna Paro
in the first case, but for some unexplainable reason, Jose Altavas moved for the
suspension of the sale in the (first case/attorney's fee) case.
However, later on, this time in the second and herein case (probate case), re-
spondent Jose Altavas filed a motion praying that administratrix Aristona
should pay the P4,500 attorney's fees adjudicated to Jose Altavas in the first
(attorney's fees case) and if petitioner Aristona fails to do so, the property under
administration should be sold. The lower court, in the second case (probate
case), granted the motion for execution. Herein petitioner Aristona Laserna now
claims that the claim of Jose Altavas in the second case is now barred because
of the latter's failure to present it before the committee on claims and appraisal
in the second case. Issue: W/N the claim of Jose Altavas is barred because of
the latter's failure to present it before the committee on claims and appraisal.
No.
The claim of respondent Jose Altavas (in the probate case), need not have to be
presented before the committee on claims and appraisal principally because that
claim has already been adjudicated by final pronouncement by this Court in
G.R. No. 40038 (attorney's case). To countenance petitioner Aristona's theory
would be to convert a claim duly passed upon and determined not only by the
CFI but by the SC into a contested claim, once again, in the language of the trial
court, "giving the committee on claims more power than the courts of justice"
and "obliging a creditor whose claim had already been passed upon by the Court
to submit himself to the committee on claims and to pass over again through the
needless process of presenting his evidence which he had already done."
DOCTRINE: A claim by a creditor against the estate/deceased which was al-
ready approved and adjudicated in another case need not be adjudicated again if
it is filed in the testamentary proceedings of the deceased.
FACTS:
30. In another case (first case/attorney's fees case), civil case No. 2961, CFI of
Capiz, herein respondent-appellee Jose Altavas, instituted an action against
Jose Laserna Paro y Tupaz to recover the sum of P4,500 as attorney's fees.
The CFI of Capiz rendered judgment in favor of herein respondent Jose
Altavas.
31. From this judgment the herein petitioner Jose Laserna Paro y Tupaz
appealed to the SC in G.R. No. 40038 (still the attorney's fees case). During
the pendency of the appeal but after the filing by herein petitioner Jose
Laserna Paro y Tupaz of the corresponding brief, Jose Laserna Paro y
Tupaz died, leaving a will.
32. This will was probated in civil case No. 3109 (second case/probate case)
33. The Supreme Court was notified by Jose Laserna Paro's attorney in G.R.
No. 40038 (attorney's fees case) of the death of Jose Laserna Paro. Upon
motion of said attorney, the deceased Jose Laserna Paro was substituted
by herein petitioner-administratrix Aristona Laserna in the first case
(attorney's fees case) because Aristona Laserna was already appointed
by the court as executrix and administratrix of the estate of the late Jose
Laserna Paro y Tupaz in the testamentary proceedings No. 3109 of the CFI
of Capiz (second case/probate case).
34. On March 20, 1934 the Supreme Court (in the attorney's fees case) rendered
its decision affirming the judgment of the lower court in the attorney's fees
case.
35. Upon the return of the record to the lower court for execution (still in the
attorney's fees case), it appears that herein respondent Jose Altavas filed a
motion praying that the administratrix herein petitioner Aristona Laserna be
ordered to pay the P4,500 attorney's fees adjudicated to him, by the lower
court and confirmed by the Supreme Court.
36. The lower court (in the attorney's fees case), on July 8, 1934, granted the
motion and issued an order giving Aristona Laserna, administratrix of the
estate of the late Jose Laserna y Tupaz, thirty days within which to effect
payment of the sum of P4,500 and the costs amounting to P127.38.
37. As Aristona failed to effectuate the payment ordered within the time fixed,
an order of execution was issued against the property of Jose Laserna Paro y
 Tupaz, and the sheriff in compliance therewith, sold the properties under
administration which appear to have been previously attached by the
claimant Altavas upon the original institution of the (attorney's fees) action
brought by the latter for the recovery of the attorney's fees hereinabove
mentioned.
38. Subsequently, however, and for reasons that do not clearly appear from the
record, respondent Altavas himself moved for the suspension of the sale by
the sheriff and, without any opposition on the part of the administratrix
Aristona, the sale was set aside (in the attorney's fees case).
39. Such was the status of the case with reference to the adjudicated claim of
Jose Altavas when, subsequently, he filed in the second case (probate case)
a motion praying that the administratrix be ordered to pay the sum of
P4,500, and, in case of failure, that the said administratrix be ordered to sell
the property under administration and to apply the proceeds thereof to the
payment of the sum adjudged in his favor.
40. It is in pursuance of this motion that the lower court (in the probate case),
on December 31, 1935, issued the following order which is the subject of
appeal in this petition:
a. In view of the foregoing, the Court hereby orders the administratrix Aristona
Laserna to pay Jose Altavas within ten (10) days after receipt of this order, the sum
of P4,500, adjudged to him by virtue of the decision of the Supreme Court dated
March 20, 1934, in civil case No. 2961 (attorney's fees case), plus costs amounting
to P127.38.
b. The administratrix is further ordered that, in case she does not have sufficient funds,
she submit within ten days to this Court, a petition to sell at public auction, all the
property belonging to the deceased or such part of the same as may be sufficient to
cover the sums due Jose Altavas.
ISSUES:
4. W/N the claim of Jose Altavas is barred because of the latter's failure to
present it before the committee on claims and appraisal in the second case.
No, because to do so would be to convert a claim duly passed upon and
already determined by SC (in the first case) into a contested claim again.
RULING: Our conclusion is that the order appealed from must be, as the same is
hereby, affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
RATIO:
38. We are of the opinion and so hold that, upon the facts and circumstances of
the present case, the claim of Jose Altavas (in the second case/probate
case), although it did not survive the deceased, need not have to be
presented before the committee on claims and appraisal (in the second
case/probate case) principally because that claim is already an
adjudicated claim by final pronouncement by this Court in G.R. No.
40038 (attorney's case).
39. To countenance petitioner Aristona's theory would be to convert a claim
duly passed upon and determined not only by the CFI but by this Court into
a contested claim, once again, in the language of the trial court, "giving the
committee on claims more power than the courts of justice" and "obliging a
creditor whose claim had already been passed upon by the Court to submit
himself to the committee on claims and to pass over again through the
needless process of presenting his evidence which he had already done."
40. It does not appear that the claim of Jose Altavas has been satisfied. Neither
is it possible that the decision in favor of Altavas has lapsed by the
expiration of the five-year period.
41. On the contrary, the situation is obviously the contrary. It also appears that
the substitution of the deceased Jose Laserna Paro in civil case No. 2961,
for the recovery of attorney's fees, was effected at the instance of herein
petitioner-appellant, Aristona Laserna.
42. She Aristona had an opportunity to contest that claim, and when her
contention was overruled she did not impugn the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.
43. Neither does it appear that during the pendency of the appeal in the
Supreme Court (of the attorney's fees case) Aristona moved for the
statement or suspension of the proceedings because of the provisions of
sections 119, 700 and 703 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
44. Under the circumstances it is unjust to defeat the claim of the Jose Altavas
and to hold that it has been barred by the statute of nonclaim.
 012 DE RAMA v. PALILEO (Fordan edited by Cruz)
Feb. 26, 1965 | Barbera, J. | Rule 90
In Re: Intestate Estate of Beatriz C. De Rama
PETITIONERS-APPELLANT: Angelo O. De Rama
CLAIMANT-APPELLEE: Cherie Palileo
SUMMARY: In the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased Beatriz Cosio
de Rama, a notice to all persons with money claims against the deceased to file their
claims within 6 months was duly published in the Manila Chronicle. The period ex-
pired without anybody filing any claim against the deceased, the administrator, upon
order of the CFI, submitted a final account of the estate and a project of partition,
which were approved. Thereafter, Cherie Palileo petitioned the CFI for permission to
file a claim in the proceeding claiming that she only obtained a money judgment
against de Rama from the decision of the CA, promulgated on May 6, 1961. The
administrator opposed this petition but the CFI allowed her to file her claim within 1
month from receipt of said order, appearing that no final decree of distribution has
yet been entered in the case. Hene, the current appeal.
The issue is whether or not Palilelo can still claim from the estate of De Rama.
The SC ruled in the affirmative since Sec. 2, Rule 87 (now 86) of the ROC provides
that claims against the estate may be allowed any time before an order of distribution
is entered, at the discretion of the court, for cause and upon such terms as are equita-
ble.
W/N the lower court acted with abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when it allowed Palileo to file her claim within 1 month from re-
ceipt of the CA decision. The Sc ruled in the negative. It is not controverted in the
instant case that no order of distribution of the estate has as yet been made. Pal-
ileo could not have filed a money claim against the estate before the promulgation of
said decision because although the CFI in that case upheld her right to the ownership
and possession of the building subject thereof, no damages were adjudged in her
favor. the CFI found it sufficient to justify the relaxation of the rule and extension of
the period within which to file her claim.
DOCTRINE: Sec. 2, Rule 87 (now Rule 86). Time within which claims shall be
filed.—In the notice provided in section 1, the court, shall state the time for the filing
of claims against the estate, which shall not be more than twelve nor less than six
months after the date of the first publication of the notice. However, at any time be-
fore an order of distribution is entered, on application of a creditor who has failed to
file his claim within the time previously limited, the court may, for cause shown
and on such terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be filed within a time not
exceeding one month.
FACTS:
86. In connection with the proceeding for the settlement of the intestate estate of
the deceased Beatriz Cosio de Rama and pursuant to the order of the CFI of
Rizal, a notice to all persons with money claims against the deceased to file
their said claims within 6 months was duly published where the 1st notice ap-
peared in the Aug. 13, 1958 issue of the Manila Chronicle.
87. On Jan. 27, 1959, the administrator filed an inventory of the estate, showing
assets P139,596.77 and liabilities of P33,012.95.
88. The period provided in the published notice expired without anybody filing
any claim against the deceased, the administrator, upon order of the CFI,
submitted a final account of the estate and a project of partition, which were
approved on May 12, 1960.
89. On June 7, 1961, Cherie Palileo petitioned the CFI for permission to file a
claim in the proceeding, alleging that:
a. on the decision of the CA, promulgated on May 6, 1961, she obtained a
money judgment against the deceased Beatriz C. de Rama;
b. although the lower court decided in her favor the question of ownership
and possession of a real property involved in the case, it was only the CA
that granted money judgment, when the case was decided on appeal.
90. The administrator opposed this petition on the ground that the claim was filed
beyond the period provided in the notice to creditors.
91. By order of Aug. 8, 1961, the CFI sustained Palileo and allowed her to file
her claim within 1 month from receipt of said order, appearing that no final
decree of distribution has yet been entered in the case.
92. Hence, the current appeal by the administrator on the issue of when money
claims against a deceased person may be filed in the proceeding for the set-
tlement of the estate of such deceased person.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Palilelo can still claim from the estate of De Rama. – YES,
since Sec. 2, Rule 87 (now 86) of the ROC provides that claims against the
estate may be allowed any time before an order of distribution is entered,
at the discretion of the court, for cause and upon such terms as are equi-
table.
2. W/N the lower court acted with abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it allowed Palileo to file her claim within 1
month from receipt of the CA decision – NO, the CFI found it sufficient to
justify the relaxation of the rule and extension of the period within which
to file her claim
RULING: Finding no reversible error in the order appealed from, the same is hereby
affirmed, with costs, against the administrator. So ordered.
RATIO:
145. Sec. 2, Rule 87 of the old Rules of Court (now Rule 86) provides:
“SEC 2. Time within which claims shall be filed.—In the notice provided in
section 1, the court, shall state the time for the filing of claims against the es-
tate, which shall not be more than twelve nor less than six months after the
date of the first publication of the notice. However, at any time before an or-
der of distribution is entered, on application of a creditor who has failed to file
his claim within the time previously limited, the court may, for cause shown
and on such terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be filed within a time
not exceeding one month.”
146. It is clear from the foregoing that the period prescribed in the notice to cred-
itors is not exclusive; that money claims against the estate may be allowed
any time before an order of distribution is entered, at the discretion of the
court, for cause and upon such terms as are equitable. This extension of the
period shall not exceed one month, from the issuance of the order authorizing
such extension.
147. It is not controverted in the instant case that no order of distribution of
the estate has as yet been made.
148. However, the Administrator charges that the CFI committed an abuse of
discretion in issuing the disputed order without sufficient ground or cause
therefor.
149. The petition of Palileo for permission to file a claim in the proceeding was
based on the fact that the award of damages in her favor against the deceased
Beatriz C. de Rama was contained in the decision of the CA which was
promulgated on May 6, 1961 or after the 6-month period provided in the no-
tice to creditors had already elapsed. It is her contention that she could not
have filed a money claim against the estate before the promulgation of said
decision because although the CFI in that case upheld her right to the owner-
ship and possession of the building subject thereof, no damages were ad-
judged in her favor.
150. Considering this argument, the CFI found it sufficient to justify the relaxa-
tion of the rule and extension of the period within which to file her claim.
151. In the circumstances, the action taken by the CFI cannot be considered an
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to justify its
reversal by this court.
 013 VELAYO vs. PATRICIO (DAGUMAN)
March 24, 1927 | Ostrand, J. | Contingent Claim
PETITIONER: Mariano Velayo
RESPONDENTS: Claro Patricio
SUMMARY:
Josefa Patricio filed a case against Claro Patricio, her father, for the recovery of
her inheritance from her mother. Josefa then employed Velayo so that the latter
could represent her in the inheritance case. They agreed that Velayo would be
paid 50% of the value of the property which shall be recovered from the inher-
itance. Unfortunately, Josefa died while the case was pending. Hence, Velayo
filed a motion asking that Josefa’s minor children be substituted in lieu of Jose-
fa. This motion was granted. Josefa’s minors then won the case and they were
awarded P22,454.90. Thereafter, the guardianship of the minors changed, and
Claro was now the guardian. Velayo then filed a petition in the guardianship
proceedings, asking that he be paid his contingent fees. Claro opposed stating
that the minors are not bound by the contract that their mother entered into. IS-
SUE: WON Josefa’s minor children are bound by the contract entered into by
their mother—NO. RULING: The children were not parties to the contract and
neither they, nor their guardian, appear to have had any knowledge of its exist-
ence. Instead of substituting the minors for Josefa, Velayo should have followed
the procedure prescribed by Sec. 119 of the Code of Civil Procedure and ap-
plied for the appointment of an administrator of the estate who could then, with
the consent of the probate court, have continued the pending action. Velayo
should have proceeded against the estate of Josefa. Velayo could have recov-
ered his fees upon a quantum merit; however, doing so at this point would vir-
tually deprive the minors of their day in court and would constitute an irregu-
larity, which an appellate court, called upon to correctly interpret the law, can-
not countenance.
DOCTRINE:
When claiming contingent fees, the procedure that should be followed is that
prescribed under Sec. 119 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
FACTS:
17. Josefa Patricio hired Mariano Velayo, a lawyer, to represent her in an action
which she brought against her father, Claro Patricio for the recovery of her
inheritance from her mother Cecilia, which said inheritance was under the
administration and control of Claro Patricio. The employment of Velayo
was evidence by a written contract which provided for the payment to him
of a fee of 50 percent of the value of the property
18. While the case for recovery of inheritance was pending, Josefa died so Ve-
layo filed a motion asking that Josefa’s children, Pablo, Gerundia, Carmen,
Rosa, and Rosario (all minors), be substituted. The motion was granted and
a guardian ad litem was appointed.
19. The CFI eventually rendered a decision on the case, ruling in favor of the
minors, and granting them P12,868 with legal interest from the date of fil-
ing of the complaint.
20. On appeal, the amount was raised to P22,454.69.
21. Sometime in March or April of 1926, Claro Patricio (the father) was ap-
pointed as the guardian of the minors.
22. On July 21, Velayo filed a petition in the guardianship proceedings praying
for the payment of his fees. He argued that under his contract with Josefa,
he was entitled to the sum o P11,227,34 as fees for his service.
23. The guardian opposed on the ground that the minors were not bound by the
contract of their deceased mother and that the claim should have been pre-
sented to the committee on claims against the estate of the deceased.
24. The lower court ruled that the contract with Josefa was unconscionable, but
allowed Velayo a fee of P7,000.
25. Both Velayo and the guardian appealed. Velayo argues that the children of
Josefa are bound by the contract, and that no evidence was presented to
show that the contract was unconscionable.
ISSUES:
2. WoN Velayo should be paid 50% of the value of the property—NO. The
children were not parties to the contract and neither they, nor their guardian,
appear to have had any knowledge of its existence.
RULING: WHEREFORE, The order appealed from is therefore reversed and the
petition denied without costs in this instance. So ordered.
RATIO:
7. The contract between Velayo and Josefa is not binding upon the minors.
Furthermore, Velayo should have proceeded against the estate of Josefa.
8. The children were not parties to the contract and neither they, nor their
guardian, appear to have had any knowledge of its existence.
9. Instead of substituting the minors for Josefa, Velayo should have followed
the procedure prescribed by Sec. 119 of the Code of Civil Procedure and
applied for the appointment of an administrator of the estate who could
then, with the consent of the probate court, have continued the pending ac-
tion.
10. Inasmuch as the action resulted to the benefit of the minors, Velayo may,
perhaps, recover from them, or their estate, a reasonable compensation for
his services upon a quantum meruit. However, since Velayo proceeded with
the case, insisting that the minors are bound by the contract between him
and their mother, the question of the value of his services has not been put
properly in issue. As a consequence, Claro had no choice but to interpose
the defense that the contract was not binding, and the SC ruled that this was
fully justified. In these circumstances, to award compensation on a quantum
meruit would virtually deprive the minors of their day in court and would
constitute an irregularity, which an appellate court, called upon to correctly
interpret the law, cannot countenance.
 014 Chan v. CA (DAYU)
Feb. 27, 20014 | Quisumbing, J. | Contingent Claim
PETITIONER: Sui Man Hui Chan; Gonzalo Co
RESPONDENTS: CA; Oscar D. Medalla
SUMMARY: Ramon Chan [lessee] and Napoleon Medalla [lessor] entered into
a contract of lease over a hotel building for a period of 10 years. Ramon Chan
would use it as a restaurant named “Cypress Inn”. Ramon Chan died and left his
wife (Sui Man Hui Chan [Chan]) and Gonzalo Co (his general manager).
Napoelon died and left Oscar Medalla [Medalla] who succeeded him as owner
and lessor. Chan took over the operations and Co continued to transact with
Medalla as general manager and agent. Chan and Co failed to pay monthly
rentals due on the leased premises. Medalla asked them to (1) settle unpaid
rentals; (2) pay unpaid real estate taxes pursuant to Lease Contract; and (3)
vacate the leased premises. Eventually, Chan and Co vacated the premises but
didn’t pay rentals and realty taxes. Therefore, Medalla filed civil case. They
claim that they are not real parties-in-interest because they were not party to the
original contract between Ramon Chan and Napoleon Medalla. More
importantly, they assert that any claim for unpaid rentals should be made against
the estate of Ramon Chan pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86. RTC denied Chan and
Co’s MTC and MR. Chan and Co elevated the matter to the CA; CA affirmed
RTC. Issue is w/n CA was correct in affirming RTC decision. SC said YES.
They are real parties-in-interest: Chan is an heir of Ramon Chan and together
with Co was a successor-in-interest to the restaurant. Both continued to operate
the business after the death of Ramon. Thus, they are real parties-in-interest in
the case though they are not signatories to the Lease Contract, which in its terms
and conditions explicitly provided for the transmission of the rights of the lessor
and of the lessee to their respective heirs and successors. Moreover, Ramon
estate isn’t liable because the unpaid rentals sought were for the period
April 1993 to December 1998, well after Ramon Chan’s death (Aug. 5, 1989)
DOCTRINE:
Ramon Chan, the original lessee, died on Aug. 5, 1989. In other words, as the
unpaid rentals did not accrue during the lifetime of Ramon Chan, but well after
his death, his estate might not be held liable for them. Hence, there is no
indubitable basis to apply Sec. 5, Rule 86.
FACTS:
136. March 30, 1999—Oscar Medalla filed a complaint before RTC
Mandaluyong for collection of sum of money arising from breach of
contract of lease and damages against Sui Man Hui Chan and Gonzalo Co.
137. Nov. 14, 1988—Napoleon C. Medalla [lessor] and Ramon Chan [lessee]
entered into a Lease Contract over a hotel building located at No. 29
Abanao St., Baguio City. Ramon Chan would use the leased premises as a
restaurant named Cypress Inn.
138. Parties agreed on the ff:
a. Period of lease shall be for 10 yrs or from 15 July 1988-1998
b. Payment of the realty taxes due to the government on the leased
premises shall be for the account of the Lessee
c. Agreement is binding upon the heirs and/or successors-in-interest
of the Lessor and the Lessee.
139. Gonzalo Co [Co] was employed by Ramon Chan as general manager of
Cypress Inn and acted as his agent in all his dealings with Napoleon
Medalla.
140. Aug. 5, 1989—Ramon Chan died and was survived by his wife, Sui Man
Hui Chan [Chan], who continued to operate the restaurant.
141. July 17, 1996—Napoleon Medalla died. His heir Oscar Medalla [Medalla],
succeeded him as owner and lessor of the leased premises.
142. The contact was neither amended nor terminated after the death of the
original parties, but was continued by their respective successors-in-interest
pursuant to the terms.
143. Chan and Co (in his capacity as agent and general manager) continued to
deal with Medalla in all transactions pertaining to the contract.
144. Chan and Co failed to pay monthy rentals due on the leased premises on
various occasions. Despite several Statements of Accounts sent by Medalla,
they failed to pay but continued to use and occupy the leased premises.
145. Feb. 26, 1997—Medalla sent letter addressed to Ramon Chan, indicating
that (1) contract of lease would expire on July 15, 1998; and (2) he was not
amenable to a renewal of said contract after its expiration.
146. Medalla sent demand letters to Chan and Co, but they still failed to pay the
unpaid rentals. He also found out that they had not paid the realty taxes due
on the leased premises since 1991 (P610,019.11).
147. Medalla asked them to settle the unpaid rentals, pay the unpaid real estate
taxes, and vacate the leased premises.
148. Jan 1999—Chan and Co vacated the premises but without paying their
unpaid rentals and realty taxes.
149. March 1999—Aggrieved by their refusal to pay amount due
(P4,147,901.80), Medalla instituted civil case.
150. In their answer, Chan and Co denied owing Medalla the amounts he
claimed. Alleged that Ramon Chan had paid all the rentals due up to March
15, 1998. Also, they need not pay any balance owing on the rentals as they
were required to pay 2 months advance rentals upon the signing of the
contract and make a guarantee deposit (P220,000). As for unpaid realty
taxes, they alleged that Medalla was responsible as owner of the leased
premises notwithstanding any contrary stipulations in the contract.
151. July 19, 1999—Chan and Co filed Supplemental Answer with MTD
 alleging that they were neither parties nor privies to the Contract of Lease;
hence, they are not the real parties-in-interest.
152. Medalla filed a Reply and Opposition, praying for the denial of the MTD
for having been belatedly filed in direct contravention of Sec. 1, Rule 16.
Alleged that Chan and Co are clearly real parties-in-interest. He pointed to
their continuous dealing with him in all transactions relating to the contract
after the death of Ramon Chan and even after the expiration of the contract.
153. Jan. 11, 2000—RTC denied Chan and Co’s MTD. Pointed out that they
continued to transact business with Medalla after death of Ramon Chan as
shown by the communications between the parties. Also declared Medalla’s
acquiescence to Chan and Co’s continued occupation and enjoyment of the
leased premises and Chan and Co’s recognition of the Medalla’s ownership
of the premises reflected an oral agreement between the parties to continue
the Lease Contract.
154. Chan and Co moved for reconsideration on ground that any claim should be
filed against the estate of Ramon Chan in an estate proceeding pursuant to
Sec. 5, Rule 86 since Ramon Chan’s estate is the real party-in-interest.
155. Court denied motion and declared Sec. 5, Rule 86 inapplicable in this case.
Pointed out that the unpaid rentals being claimed were those for the period
April 1993-Dec. 1998. These were incurred by Chan and Co and not by the
late Ramon Chan.
156. Chan and Co elevated matter to CA thru special civil action of certiorari.
CA affirmed RTC orders.
ISSUE/s:
15. WoN CA committed serious error in law in affirming the RTC orders
denying Chan and Co’s MTD and the subsequent MR—No, they are real
parties-in-interest, and Sec. 5, Rule 86 does not apply.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.
RATIO:
182. Chan and Co argue that CA erred in affirming RTC order because they are
not the real parties-in-interest and hence, were improperly impleaded in the
complaint.
183. They insist that they were neither parties nor were they privy to the Contract
of Lease between late Ramon Chan and Napoleon Medalla.
184. They vigorously assert that any claim for unpaid rentals should be made
against the estate of Ramon Chan pusuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86.
185. We find for Medalla.
Motion to Dismiss [Not Important]
186. Chan and Co’s MTD was filed after an answer had already been filed. This
alone warranted an outright dismissal of the motion for having been filed in
contravention of Sec. 1, Rule 16—MTD shall be filed within the time for
but before filing the answer to the complaint/pleading asserting a claim.
187. Here, they filed their supplemental answer with MTC almost 2 months after
filing their answer.
Special Civil Action for Certiorari [ Not Important]
188. Grant/denial of MTC is an interlocutory order, and it cannot be the proper
subject of a special civil action for certiorari. The proper remedy is to
appeal after a decision has been rendered.
189. A writ of certiorari is not intended to correct every controversial
interlocutory ruling; it is resorted to only to correct a grave abuse of
discretion or a whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.
190. Function of a petition for certiorari is limited to keeping an inferior court
within the bounds of its jurisdiction and to relieve persons from arbitrary
acts, acts which courts or judges have no power or authority in law to
perform. Certiorari is not designed to correct erroneous findings and
conclusions made by the court.
Real parties-in-interest [somewhat IMPT]
191. We find no merit to Chan and Co’s contention that they are not real parties-
in-interest since they are not parties nor signatories to the contract and
hence should not have been impleaded as defendants.
192. It is undeniable that Chan is an heir of Ramon Chan and, together with
petitioner Co, was a successor-in-interest to the restaurant business of the
late Ramon Chan.
193. Both continued to operate the business after the death of Ramon. Thus, they
are real parties-in-interest in the case filed notwithstanding that they are not
signatories to the Contract of Lease.
194. A lease contract is not essentially personal in character. Thus, the rights and
obligations therein are transmissible to the heirs. The general rule, therefore,
is that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-
interest except when the rights and obligations arising therefrom are not
transmissible by (1) their nature, (2) stipulation or (3) provision of law.
195. In the subject Contract of Lease, not only were there no stipulations prohib-
iting any transmission of rights, but its very terms and conditions explicitly
provided for the transmission of the rights of the lessor and of the lessee to
their respective heirs and successors.
196. The contract is the law between the parties. The death of a party does not
excuse nonperformance of a contract, which involves a property right, and
the rights and obligations thereunder pass to the successors or representa-
tives of the deceased. Similarly, nonperformance is not excused by the death
of the party when the other party has a property interest in the subject matter
of the contract.
[IMPT, DISCUSSION OF SEC. 5, RULE 86]
197. Finally, as to Chan and Co’s contention that any claim should have been
filed before the estate proceeding of Ramon Chan, the trial court found that
the unpaid rentals sought were for the period April 1993 to December 1998.
198. Note that Ramon Chan, the original lessee, died on August 5, 1989. In other
words, as the unpaid rentals did not accrue during the lifetime of Ramon
Chan, but well after his death, his estate might not be held liable for them.
Hence, there is no indubitable basis to apply Sec. 5, Rule 86.
 015 ROMUALDEZ v. TIGLAO (Fordan)
July 24, 1981 | Abad Santos, J. | Action against Executor or Administrator
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEES: Paz G. Romualdez, Belen A. Gueco, assisted by her
husband, Jose Tinsay, and Catalina A. Gueco, assisted by her husband Jose Sio-
pongco
DEFENDANTS: Antonio P. Tiglao, Ernesto Tiglao, Bernardo Tiglao, and Juana
Tiglao
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Estate of Felisa Tiglao
SUMMARY: Romualdez, et. al sued the Tiglaos (wherein Felisa was a guarantor)
for the payment of unpaid rentals for the lease of a hacienda and its sugar quota. The
CFI of Riazl rendered judgment in favor of Romualdez, et. al. However, the judg-
ment remained unsatisfied. Almost 10 years later, Romualdez, et. al filed a civil case
against the Tiglaos in order to revive the earlier judgment. Since Felisa already died,
her estate represented by special administratrix was made the defendant in said civil
case. In her MTD, Answer, and another MTD, administratrix questioned the jurisdic-
tion of the CFI of Rizal to entertain the suit to revive judgment while invoking Sec.
1, Rule 87 of the ROC. However, the CFI of Rizal rendered a decision in favor of
Romualdez, et. al. Hence, the current appeal. The Estate of Felisa Tiglao argues that
the present action is one for the recovery of a sum of money so that it is barred by
Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the ROC and that the remedy of the appellees is to present their
claim in Special Proceeding of the CFI of Rizal.
The issue is whether or not the civil case filed by Romualdez, et. al against the Estate
of Felisa Tiglao for the revival of judgment is proper. YES. SC held that the original
judgment which was rendered on May 31, 1960, has become stale because of its non-
execution after the lapse of 5 years. Accordingly, it cannot be presented against the
Estate of Felisa Tiglao unless it is first revived by action. This is precisely why
Romualdez, et. al have instituted the second suit whose object is not to make the
Estate of Felisa Tiglao pay the sums of money adjudged in the first judgment but
merely to keep alive said judgment so that the sums therein awarded can be present-
ed as claims against the estate in Special Proceeding of the CFI of Rizal.
DOCTRINE: As a general rule, “no action upon a claim for the recovery of money
or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator”
because the creditor’s remedy is to file the proper claim in the proceeding for the
settlement of the deceased debtor’s estate within the period fixed in the Statute of
Non-claims. But the instant case, because of the singular circumstances recounted
above, is an exception to that general rule. (taken from the concurring opinion)
FACTS:
93. On Mar. 15, 1960, Paz G. Romualdez and others (Romualdez, et. al) sued An-
tonio Tiglao, together with Felisa Tiglao and others (guarantors), for the pay-
ment of unpaid rentals for the lease of a hacienda and its sugar quota.
94. On May 31, 1960, the CFI of Rizal rendered a decision in favor of
Romualdez, et. al and ordered Antonio, Felisa, and others to pay jointly and
severally the sum of P22,767.17 representing the unpaid rentals on the sugar
quota, P5,000 as liquidated damages and P1,000 as attorney’s fees plus costs.
However, the judgment was not satisfied, notwithstanding, a writ of execution
to enforce it.
95. On May 18, 1970, Paz G. Romualdez, et al. filed civil case in the CFI of Rizal
against Antonio and his guarantors in order to revive the earlier judgment.
96. When the suit to revive judgment was filed, Felisa had died and her estate was
being settled in Special Proceeding of the CFI of Rizal. Accordingly, her es-
tate represented by the Special Administratrix Maningning Tiglao-Naguiat
(administratrix) was made the defendant.
97. In her Motion To Dismiss (MTD), Answer, and still another MTD, the admin-
istratrix questioned the jurisdiction of the CFI of Rizal to entertain the suit to
revive judgment. She invoked Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the ROC that, “No action
upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be
commenced against the executor or administrator; x x x.”
98. However, the CFI of Rizal rendered a decision in favor of Romualdez, et. al
ordering the revival of the earlier judgment against Antonio, Felisa, and oth-
ers.
99. Hence, the current appeal. The Estate of Felisa Tiglao argues that the present
action is one for the recovery of a sum of money so that it is barred by Sec. 1,
Rule 87 of the ROC and that the remedy of the appellees is to present their
claim in Special Proceeding of the CFI of Rizal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the civil case filed by Romualdez, et. al against the Estate of
Felisa Tiglao for the revival of judgment is proper. – YES, since it is only to revive
and stall the prescription of the judgment and not a claim against the administrator of
the estate.
RULING: Finding no error in the judgment insofar as the Estate of Felisa Tiglao is
concerned, its appeal is hereby dismissed with costs against the Estate of Felisa Tig-
lao.
RATIO:
152. SC held that the original judgment which was rendered on May 31,
1960, has become stale because of its non-execution after the lapse of 5
years. (Sec. 631, Rule 39 of the ROC)
31
Sec. 6, Rule 39: Execution by motion or by independent action. – A final and executory judgment or
order may be executed on motion within 5 years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time,
 153. Accordingly, it cannot be presented against the Estate of Felisa Tiglao 4. But the instant case, because of the singular circumstances recounted
unless it is first revived by action. This is precisely why Romualdez, et. al above, is an exception to that general rule.
have instituted the second suit whose object is not to make the Estate of 5. At any rate, the judgment creditors filed on Aug. 20, 1971 in the testate pro-
Felisa Tiglao pay the sums of money adjudged in the first judgment but ceeding already mentioned the corresponding claim.
merely to keep alive said judgment so that the sums therein awarded can 6. The lower court’s judgment in this case, which is being assailed on appeal, is
be presented as claims against the estate in Special Proceeding of the CFI simply a confirmation of that claim which was based on 1960 judgment. The
of Rizal. confirmation was necessary to forestall extinctive prescription of the judg-
ment.
J. Aquino – Concurring Opinion
1. It is a fact that when the 10-year period for enforcing the judgment, dat-
ed May 31, 1960, against the Tiglaos was about to expire, there was as yet
no notice to creditors in Special Proceeding and no regular administrator
had been appointed. Hence, the judgment creditors could not file a claim
against the testate estate for the amount of the unsatisfied judgment.
2. The judgment creditors had no alternative but to file an action for revival of
judgment to prevent its extinguishment by prescription.
3. It is true that, as a general rule, “no action upon a claim for the recovery
of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the ex-
ecutor or administrator” because the creditor’s remedy is to file the
proper claim in the proceeding for the settlement of the deceased debt-
or’s estate within the period fixed in the Statute of Non-claims (Secs. 232
and 533, Rule 86 and Sec. 134, Rule 87, ROC).

and before it is barred by statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judg-
ment may also be enforced by motion within 5 years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action
before it is barred by the statute of limitations.
32
Sec. 2, Rule 86: Time within which claims shall be filed. — In the notice provided in the preceding
section, the court shall estate the time for the filing of claims against the estate, which shall not be more
than twelve (12) not less than six (6) months after the date of the first publication of the notice. However,
at any time before an order of distribution is entered, on application of a creditor who has failed to file his
claim within the previously limited, the court may, for cause shown and on such terms as are equitable,
allow such claim to be filed within a time not exceeding one (1) month.
33
Sec. 5, Rule 86: Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred; exceptions. — All
claims for money against the decent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due,
not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expense for the last sickness of the decedent,
and judgment for money against the decent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise
they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor
or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an executor or administrator commences an
action, or prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set
forth by answer the claims he has against the decedent, instead of presenting them independently to the
court as herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off against each other in such action; and if final
judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so determined shall be considered the true
balance against the estate, as though the claim had been presented directly before the court in the admin-
istration proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their present value.
34
Sec. 1, Rule 87: Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator. —
No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against
the executor or administrator; but to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the
estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real
or personal, may be commenced against him.
 016 BAYOT v. ZURBITO (Escalona)
February 28, 1919 | Street, J. | Actions by or against Executor or Administrator
PETITIONER: Patrocinio Bayot, as administratix of the intestate estate of
Francisco Ma. Bayot
RESPONDENTS: Lucas Zurbito, as administrator of the intestate estate of Gas-
par Zurbito
SUMMARY: Gaspar Zurbito was the manager of the cattle ranch of Francisco
Bayot. Bayot allegedly became indebted to Zurbito during this time. Bayot
passed away and Zurbito, while alive, instituted a claim against the estate of
Bayot. The courts disallowed the claim due to lack of merit. During this claim,
Zurbito passed away, and was succeeded by his son, Lucas. Patrocinio filed a
counterclaim against the estate of Zurbito for the off-set of debts when the claim
against the Bayot estate had proceeded. The committee that heard these claims
concluded that it had no jurisdiction to allow the claim in favor of the Bayot
estate. Patrocinio did not file a formal appeal to the CFI, but since Lucas did,
Patrocinio set out in her answer the same counterclaim and asked for judgment
in her favor. The CFI ruled that since Patrocinio was not able to file a formal
appeal, then a judgment could not be given in her favor and the counterclaim
was dismissed. Hence, the appeal to the SC.
The relevant issue is WoN the denial of Patrocinio’s claim in the committee
hearing and CFI became a bar to Patrocinio’s current counterclaim to the SC.
The SC held that first, not all the requisites of res judicata are present to bar the
present action. Secondly, and more importantly, Sec. 701 of the Code of Civil
Procedure in allowing the administrator to commence or continue the action
brought by the decedent during his lifetime, supersedes Sec. 696, where it states
that claims in favor of the estate and against a creditor who presents a claim for
allowance against the estate shall be barred, unless so presented by the executor
or administrator as an off-set. Lucas was arguing that Patrocinio is barred from
presenting the claim against the Zurbito estate since the claim of Patrocinio was
not embodied as an off-set. But the SC denied Lucas’ argument, stating that Sec.
701 must supersede Sec. 696 in favor of benevolence. Thus, Patrocinio is
allowed to institute an independent action for the off-set of debts through the
answer that she filed with the CFI, even if the claim was not embodied as an off-
set. Ultimately, the claim of Patrocinio is NOT barred.
DOCTRINE: The executor or administrator has the right, not only to continue
the prosecution of an action already begun, but also to institute an action upon a
cause which accrued in the lifetime of the deceased but which had not been
made the subject of action by him. This supposes that the cause of action sur-
vived to the estate.
FACTS:
28. The plaintiff Patrocinio Bayot, is the administratrix of the estate of her de-
ceased father, Francisco Ma. Bayot, formerly a merchant in Masbate, who
died intestate many years ago. The defendant, Lucas Zurbito, is the admin-
istrator of the estate of his father, Gaspar Zurbito, who also died several
years ago, but subsequent to the death of Francisco Bayot. The claim sued
on his this case consists of a debt for P9,694.52, with interest from August
9, 1907. It is alleged to consist of the balance of an account current, as
shown upon the books of Francisco Bayot, resulting from mercantile opera-
tions sustained between the latter and Gaspar Zurbito, during a period of
several years prior to the death of Bayot. The claim in question in this suit
was presented by the plaintiff to the committee in the estate of Gaspar Zur-
bito and was allowed by the committee as a just debt, but upon appeal to the
Court of First Instance it was held that the action could not be maintained
inasmuch as the plaintiff had previously exhibited this debt by way of set-
off against another claim presentee by Zurbito against the estate of the
plaintiff's intestate.
29. In this connection it appears that on April 8, 1907, Gaspar Zurbito pre-
sented a claim for P53,602.76 to the committee actin in the estate of
Francisco Bayot. According to Zurbito, Bayot had become indebted to
Zurbito's father while the former was acting as manager or administra-
tor of a cattle ranch belonging to the latter. Said claim was disallowed by
the committee on claims of the Bayot estate as being wholly without any
merit whatever. An appeal was promptly taken by Zurbito to the Court of
First Instance, which court also disallowed the claim, and upon appeal to
the Supreme Court the judgment of the Court of First Instance was af-
firmed. (Zurbito vs. Bayot, R. G. No. 6567). Meanwhile Gaspar Zurbito,
the original proponent of the claim above mentioned, had died and had
been succeeded by the defendant, Lucas Zurbito, in the character of his
administrator.
30. When the claim of Gaspar Zurbito was presented to the committee in the es-
tate of Francisco Bayot, as above stated, the present plaintiff, as administra-
trix of Bayot, denied liability and asked that judgment be given in favor of
the estate of Francisco Bayot upon the indebtedness which is the subject of
the present action. The committee, however, considered that, inasmuch as
the Zurbito claim was disallowed, it had no jurisdiction to allow the claim
in favor of the Bayot estate. The committee accordingly made the follow-
ing report:
 a. With regard to the counterclaim of the administratrix Doña Patro-
cinio Bayot, this commission understands that it is not authorized
by law to take jurisdiction of this counterclaim after the claim pre-
sented by Don Gaspar Zurbito has been disallowed. Therefore, it is
sent to the Court of First Instance of this subprovince of Masbate
for determination.
31. As already stated, an appeal was taken in behalf of Gaspar Zurbito from the
action of the committee in rejecting his claim, but no formal appeal was
taken in behalf of the administratrix of Francisco Bayot. However, in
the Court of First Instance, the administratrix set out in her answer
this same indebtedness and asked for judgment thereon. The trial court
considered that the action taken by the committee was effect a disallowance
of the debt and that by failing to appeal the administratrix had placed
herself in a position where judgment could not be given in her favor.
The counterclaim was accordingly dismissed, and the administratrix
brought the matter by cross-appeal to this court in the same cause in which
the appeal of Zurbito was prosecuted.
ISSUES:
4. WoN the committee on claims in the estate of Francisco Bayot had
jurisdiction to rule on the claim of Patrocinio – YES. Just because the claim
of a creditor is found to be unmeritorious, does not mean that the alleged
debtor cannot claim and provide evidence for the off-set of debts through a
counterclaim.
5. WoN the denial of Patrocinio’s claim in the committee hearing and CFI
became a bar to Patrocinio’s current counterclaim to the SC – NO. Not all
the requisites of res judicata are present. The requisite of adjudicating on the
merits of the case is not present. The dismissal of a case for want of
jurisdiction does not dispose of the case based on its merits. Moreover, the
failure of the administrator to bring the offset through appeal does not bar
her from instituting an independent action.
RULING: The judgment is accordingly reversed, and the cause is remanded to the
court of origin with directions to proceed to a trial of the cause on the merits.
RATIO:
First Issue
10. The first observation to be made upon the case as thus presented is that the
committee on claims in the estate of Francisco Bayot was in error in assum-
ing that it had no authority to allow the claim which was exhibited by the
administratrix by way of set-off. The provision upon which the committee
based its action is found in the last clause of section 696 of the Code of Civ-
il Procedure, which declares that "the committee shall have no jurisdiction
over claims in favor of the estate, except as offsets to claims presented
against the estate." From this provision the committee evidently inferred
that if the principal claim is not allowed the authority to allow the set-
off falls to the ground. This cannot be accepted as a correct interpreta-
tion of that provision. A creditor who presents a claim against an estate
submits himself to the jurisdiction of the committee, and the circumstance
that his claim is found to be without merit in no wise defeats the au-
thority of the committee to allow the set-off against him.
11. In Stars vs. Sterns (30 Vt., 213), the plaintiff exhibited a demand against an
estate; and the administrator exhibited notes in offset to them. Upon trial in
the court where the case went by appeal nothing was found due the
plaintiff upon his demand, yet it was held that the estate was entitled to
a judgment upon the offset exhibited by the administrator.
12. In Bliss vs. Little (63 Vt., 86), it was insisted that it is only when there is a
valid claim against the estate that the administrator is bound to exhibit
claims in favor of the estate. This contention was rejected, the court ob-
serving that if the argument in question was sound, it would necessarily
follow that an administrator would in no case be bound to exhibit
claims of an estate in offset until the validity of the creditor's demand
was established, which clearly is not the meaning of the statute. These
decisions are instructive, inasmuch as they have reference to the very provi-
sion of the Vermont Statutes from which section 696 of our Code of Civil
Procedure has been taken.
Second Issue
13. The next point to be considered is whether the disallowance of the present
claim by the committee in the estate of Francisco Bayot and the final dispo-
sition made of the matter upon appeal to this Court operate as a bar to the
present action. Upon this point it is very plain that the decision in that
case does not exhibit the requisites essential to create the bar of res ju-
dicata. As was said in Hughes vs. United States (4 Wall., 232; 18 L. ed.,
303); "in order that in judgment may constitute a bar to another suit, it must
be rendered in a proceeding between the same parties, or their privies, and
the point of controversy must be the same in both case, and must be deter-
mined on the merits." In accordance with this doctrine, it was held in
Smith vs. McNeal (109 U.S., 426; 27 L. ed., 986), that a judgment dismiss-
ing a cause for want of jurisdiction does not conclude the plaintiff's right of
action.
14. The action of the committee on claims in the estate of Francisco Bayot was
expressly based upon the idea that the jurisdiction of the committee to allow
the set-off in favor of said estate was destroyed by the disallowance of the
 principal claim presented by Zurbito against the Bayot estate; and the Court
of First Instance merely held, as this court also held, that the claim could
not be allowed in the Court of First Instance because no appeal had been
taken. In neither tribunal was any consideration paid to the merits of
the claim; and not court has ever passed upon this point.
15. But is said that the action of the committee in disallowing the claim for
want of jurisdiction was misconceived and that the committee ought to have
considered the claim on its merits and given judgment in favor of the Bayot
estate if the facts had been found to support the claim. From this it is ar-
gued that the action of the committee has the same effect as if the claim
had been considered on its merits. In our opinion this suggestion is not
well founded. Not only does there appear to be no authority in support
of the proposition that a judgment dismissing a case for want of juris-
diction will have the effect of a judgment upon the merits, if it be shown
that the tribunal did in fact have jurisdiction; but on the contrary the
authorities show that a person who relies on a former judgment as a
conclusive adjudication of any controversy must take the prior judg-
ment for what it appears to be on its face; and if it is not a judgment on
the merits, it does not conclude the right of action.
16. This point came under consideration in Wanzer vs. Self (30 Ohio St., 378),
where the judgment relied upon as res judicata contained the reservation
"without prejudice." It was argued that the insertion of these words in the
judgment was erroneous and unwarranted and that as the case had been in
fact tried upon the merits the judgment must be considered as a conclusive
bar to another action. Said the court:
17. The actual judgment rendered does not appear to be one that is conclusive
of the merits of the case. To give it the effect of such a judgment would not
only create that which does not exist, but might work a great wrong to the
plaintiff by finally determining a just cause of action which the court did not
adjudge against him, and by misleading him to acquiescence in a judgment
from which he would have appealed had it been regarded as conclusive . . .
The judgment is an entirety, and if it has any validity, it must stand as ren-
dered . . . Upon that judgment the party must stand, and, being without prej-
udice to a future action, it is not a bar to the action to which it was pleaded
(30 Ohio St., 381, 382).
18. What has been said shows that the former proceeding has created n tech-
nical bar to the maintenance of the present action. But a further obstacle is
supposed to be found in section 696 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The
first paragraph of this section makes it the duty of an administrator to exhib-
it all claims in favor of this decedent as an offset against any claim present
by a creditor of the estate. The first part of the second paragraph of the same
section reads as follows:
a. Claims in favor of the estate and against a creditor who presents a
claim for allowance against the estate shall be barred, unless so
presented by the executor or administrator as an offset.
19. This provision undoubtedly means not only that the executor or administra-
tor should present any claim in favor of the estate as offset where a creditor
present a claim against the estate but that he should prosecute it with effect.
In other words the statute clearly intends that the sole remedy of the execu-
tor or administrator shall be in that proceeding. From this it would appear to
follow as a necessary consequence that, by failing to appeal from the ac-
tion of the committee disallowing the claim now sued on, the plaintiff
herein has lost all remedy, and cannot now maintain an independent
action. This idea seems to be implicit in the opinion written by Justice Mo-
reland in Zurbito vs. Bayot [supra]. Nevertheless, what was really decided
in that case is that, by failing to appeal from the action of the committee, the
plaintiff was precluded from relying on this claim as an offset in the Court
of First Instance in that proceeding. The court was not called upon to decide
whether an independent action could be maintained. Now that we are called
upon to decide this point, it is necessary to take account of another provi-
sion of law the effect of which has not been so far considered.
20. Section 696 of the Code of Civil Procedure, part of which is quoted above,
is contained in Chapter XXXVIII of said Code. The final section of this
same Chapter, in the part here material to be noted, reads as follows:
a. SEC. 701. An executor or Administrator may sue. — Nothing in
this chapter shall prevent an executor or administrator from com-
mencing and prosecuting an action commenced by the deceased in
his lifetime, for the recovery of a debt or claim, to final judgment, .
..
21. Upon examination of the language of this provision, it will be seen that the
word "commencing" is interpolated in a rather awkward manner into a
statement, which deals principally with the continued prosecution of actions
already begun by the deceased in his lifetime. Nevertheless, the meaning of
the entire provision is clear; and it evidently recognize the right of an
executor or administrator, not only to continue the prosecution of an
action already begun, but also to institute an action upon a cause which
accrued in the lifetime of the deceased but which had not been made
the subject of action by him. This of course supposes that the cause of
action is such as to have survived to the estate. (Section 703, Code of
Civ. Proc.) In other words, it is apparent that there is an ellipsis in the text
of section 701 after the word "commencing" in the second line, and the full
meaning of the provision can only be brought out when this ellipsis is ap-
plied by a process of construction, somewhat as follows:
a. Nothing in this chapter shall prevent an executor or administrator
from commencing and prosecuting an action, or from prosecuting
 an action already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, for set in the former proceeding; and inasmuch as the judgment entered in
the recovery of a debt or claim to final judgment. that proceeding cannot, for reasons already stated, be considered binding
22. No other interpretation could be adopted which would give any effect what- as res judicata, the result is that the plaintiff is entitled to be heard on the
ever to the word "commencing," as used in section 701; and that this is its merits in this action.
true meaning is proved by comparing said section with section 2443 of the
Statutes of Vermont (1894), from which section 701 was copies almost ver-
batim by the author of the Code of Civil Procedure. This section, as it exists
in the Vermont Statutes, reads as follows:
a. Nothing in this chapter shall prevent an executor or administrator
from commencing and prosecuting an action by attachment, or
otherwise, or from prosecuting an action commenced by the de-
ceased in his lifetime, for the recovery of a debt or claim to final
judgment.
23. The obvious explanation of the ellipsis noted in section 701 is that the eye
of the copyist skipped from the word "prosecuting," at the end of the second
line as the section is printed in the Vermont Statutes, to the same word at
the end of the next line. Fortunately the error is not such as to destroy the
sense of the provisions.
24. It is thus seen that section 701 supplies general authority for the institu-
tion of an action by an executor or administrator upon any claim, in the
nature of a debt, which accrued in the lifetime of the decedent; and the
exception made in the opening words of section 701 is such as to give abso-
lute precedence to the rule therein expressed over anything to the contrary
in section 696 or any other part of chapter 38. In other words the provisions
of section 701 necessarily overrule so much of section 696 as purports
to bar absolutely all claims in favor of an estate which are not made ef-
fective as offsets. Of course the provisions that the executor or administra-
tor shall present all claims in favor of the decedent as offsets to hostile
claims presented against the estate is unaffected by this decision, but it re-
main in force as a directory provisions only.
25. The propriety of this conclusion in supported by consideration of the fact
that so much of section 696 as purports to operate as an absolute bar is of a
highly penal nature. It tends to the destruction of rights and takes away from
the executor or administrator a privilege which the law concedes to all other
litigants, namely, the right to elect between presenting a claim as an offset
and making it the subject of an independent proceeding, that is to say, in
those cases where the claim in question constitutes an independent cause of
action. This provision should therefore be interpreted in the mildest
possible sense: and in case of conflict between sections 696 and 701, it is
the duty of the court to apply the more benevolent provision. This con-
sideration is of course entirely apart from the express reservation made in
the opening words of section 701.
26. Our conclusion is that the claim on which this action is based is not
barred by the failure of the plaintiff to prosecute it with effect as an off-
 LIWANAG vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Eleazar)
August 14, 1965 | Concepcion, J. | Claim against estate
PETITIONERS: GLICERIA C. LIWANAG, Special Administratrix of the
Estate of PIO D. LIWANAG
RESPONDENTS: HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JESUS DE VEYRA,
as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MANUEL AGREGADO
SUMMARY: Liwanag is the special administratix of the estate of Pio Liwanag.
Respondent, Agregado commenced against Liwanag, as such special
administratix, a case for the foreclosure of a REM constituted by Pio Liwanag
during his lifetime. Petitioner Liwanag moved to dismiss the case against her on
the ground that she cannot be sued by the creditor of the deceased as she is
merely a special administratix. The issue in this case is WoN a special
administratix can be made a party-defendant to a claim of a decedent’s creditor –
YES because the Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit making the special
administratrix a defendant in a suit against the estate. Otherwise, creditors would
find the adverse effects of the statute of limitations running against them in cases
where the appointment of a regular administrator is delayed.
DOCTRINE: A creditor holding a claim against the deceased, secured by a
mortgage or other collateral security, may pursue any of these remedies: (1)
abandon his security and prosecute his claim and share in the general distribution
of the assets of the estate; (2) foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his
security by an action in court, making the executor or administrator a party
defendant, and if there is a deficiency after the sale of the mortgaged property,
he may prove the same in the testate or intestate proceedings; and (3) rely
exclusively upon his mortgage and foreclose it any time within the ordinary
period of limitations, and if he relies exclusively upon the mortgage, he shall
not...share in the distribution of the assets.
The Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit making the special administratrix a
defendant in a suit against the estate.
FACTS:
19. Petitioner Gliceria C. Liwanag is the special administratrix of the estate of
Pio D. Liwanag, the settlement of which is the subject of Special
Proceeding No. 46599 of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
20. On January 9, 1962 respondent Manuel Agregado commenced against her
as such special administratrix, Civil Case No. 50897 of the same court, for
the foreclosure of a real estate mortgage constituted in his favor by said Pio
D. Liwanag during his lifetime.
21. On July 18, 1962, here petitioner, Liwanag, moved to dismiss Agregado's
complaint, upon the ground that as special administratrix she cannot be sued
by a creditor of the deceased. In an order dated August 1, 1962, respondent,
Hon. Jesus de Veyra, as Judge of said court, denied the motion, whereupon
petitioner filed case CA-G.R. No. 31168-R of the Court of Appeals against
respondent Judge and Agregado, to annul said order by writ of certiorari and
enjoin said Judge from entertaining said Case No. 50897.
22. Upon petitioner's motion, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary
injunction directing respondent Judge to refrain from proceeding with the
trial of that case, until further orders.
23. However, subsequently, or on December 3, 1962, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision denying the writ prayed for and dissolving said writ of
preliminary injunction, with costs against the petitioner. Hence this appeal
taken by petitioner
ISSUE/s
WoN a special administratix may be made a party-defendant to a claim of a creditor
of the decedent? – YES, the adminstratix can be made a defendant in a foreclosure
case because the Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit making the special
administratrix a defendant in a suit against the estate. Otherwise, creditors would
find the adverse effects of the statute of limitations running against them in cases
where the appointment of a regular administrator is delayed.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs
against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
RATIO:
51. In as much, however, as the alleged absence of a cause of action does not
affect respondent's jurisdiction to hear Case No. 50897, it follows that the
denial of petitioner's motion to the same, even if it were erroneous, is
reviewable, not by writ of certiorari, but by appeal, after the rendition of
judgment on the merits.
52. Moreover, the theory that a mortgagee cannot bring an action for
foreclosure against the special administrator of the estate of a deceased
person has already been rejected by this Court.
53. In Liwanag vs. Hon. Luis B. Reyes, G.R. No. L-19159 (September 29,
1964), involving the same petitioner herein, the same estate of the deceased
Pio D. Liwanag, a similar action for foreclosure, although of another
mortgage and an identical motion to dismiss and issue, we expressed
ourselves as follows:
a. The defendant Gliceria Liwanag filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint for foreclosure, on the theory that she may not be sued
as special administratrix. x x x xxx xxx
b. Section 7 of Rule 86 of the New Rules of Court provides that a
creditor holding a claim against the deceased, secured by a
 mortgage or other collateral security, may pursue any of these
remedies: (1) abandon his security and prosecute his claim and
share in the general distribution of the assets of the estate; (2)
foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security by an action in
court, making the executor or administrator a party defendant, and
if there is a deficiency after the sale of the mortgaged property, he
may prove the same in the testate or intestate proceedings; and (3)
rely exclusively upon his mortgage and foreclose it any time within
the ordinary period of limitations, and if he relies exclusively upon
the mortgage, he shall not...share in the distribution of the assets.
c. Obviously, the herein respondent has chosen the second remedy,
having filed his action for foreclosure against the administratrix of
the property.
54. Now the question arises as to whether the petitioner herein can be sued as
special administratrix. The Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit making
the special administratrix a defendant in a suit against the estate.
55. Otherwise, creditors would find the adverse effects of the statute of
limitations running against them in cases where the appointment of a
regular administrator is delayed.
56. So that if We are not to deny the present action on this technical ground
alone, and the appointment of a regular administrator will be delayed, the
very purpose for which the mortgage was constituted will be defeated.
018 PASTOR v. CA (GALINDEZ lifted some from Gustilo’s digest)
June 24, 1983 | Plana, J. | Rule 88
PETITIONER: Sps. Alvaro Pastor, Jr. and Ma. Elena Achaval de Pastor
RESPONDENTS: CA, Juan Reyes, Lewellyn Barlito Quemada
FACTS:
SUMMARY: Alvaro Pastor, Sr. (Pastor Sr.), a Spanish subject, died in Cebu
City, survived by his Spanish wife Sofia Bossio (Sofia B.) their two legitimate
children Alvaro Pastor, Jr. (PASTOR, JR.) and Sofia Pastor de Midgely
(SOFIA), and an illegitimate child, not natural, by the name of Lewellyn Barlito
Quemada (Quemada). QUEMADA filed a petition for the probate and
allowance of an alleged holographic will of PASTOR, SR. with the CFI of
Cebu. For two years after remand of the case to the PROBATE COURT,
QUEMADA filed pleading after pleading asking for payment of his legacy and
seizure of the properties subject of said legacy. Assailed by the petitioners in
these proceedings is the validity of the Order of execution and garnishment as
well as the Orders subsequently issued allegedly to implement the Probate
Order declaring that the Probate Order of 1972 indeed resolved the issues of
ownership and intrinsic validity of the will, and reiterating the Order of
Execution.
The issue is WoN the ordered payment of the legacy is violative of the rule
requiring prior liquidation of the estate?- YES because there was no prior
liquidation of estate of deceased.
The Court held that without a final, authoritative adjudication of the issue as to
what properties compose the estate of PASTOR, SR. in the face of conflicting
claims made by heirs and a non-heir (MA. ELENA ACHAVAL DE PASTOR)
involving properties not in the name of the decedent, and in the absence of a
resolution on the intrinsic validity of the will here in question, there was no
basis for the Probate Court to hold such in its Probate Order of 1972. Therefore,
the Order of Execution of August 20, 1980 and the subsequent implementing
orders for the payment of QUEMADA's legacy, in alleged implementation of
the dispositive part of the Probate Order of December 5, 1972, must fall for lack
of basis.
The assailed order of execution was unauthorized, having been issued
purportedly under Rule 88, Section 6. The above provision clearly authorizes
execution to enforce payment of debts of estate. A legacy is not a debt of the
estate; indeed, legatees are among those against whom execution is authorized
to be issued.
DOCTRINE: It is within a court's competence to order the execution of a final
judgment; but to order the execution of a final order (which is not even meant to
be executed) by reading into it terms that are not there and in utter disregard of
existing rules and law, is manifest grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack
of jurisdiction.
1. Alvaro (Pastor Sr., Spanish) died in Cebu, survived by his Spanish wife
Sofia who passed away a few months after him, their two legitimate
children Alvaro (Pastor Jr.) and Sofia Pastor de Midgely (Sofia), and an
illegitimate (not natural) child named Lewellyn Quemada (Quemada).
2. Pastor Jr. is Filipino, naturalized in 1936. Sofia is Spanish while Quemada
is Filipino by his mother’s citizenship.
3. Quemada filed a petition for the probate and allowance of an alleged
holographic will of Pastor Sr. with the CFI of Cebu (Probate Court). The
will contained only ONE testamentary disposition: legacy in favor of
Quemada consisting of 30% of Pastor Sr.’s 42% share in the operation by
Atlas of mining claims in Cebu.
4. The probate court appointed Quemada as special administrator. He assumed
office after filing a bond.
5. Quemada as special administrator instituted against Pastor Jr. and his wife
an action for reconveyance of alleged properties of the estate including the
properties subject of the legacy and which were in the names of Sps. Pastor
Jr. who claimed to be owners in their own rights, not by inheritance.
6. Pastor Jr. and Sofia filed an opposition to Quemada’s petition for probate
and the order appointing the latter as special administrator.
7. On December 5, 1972, the probate court issued an order allowing the will to
probate. The order was affirmed by the CA. On petrev, the SC dismissed
the petition and remanded the same to the probate court after denying
reconsideration.
8. Two years after remand to probate court, Quemada filed several pleadings
asking for payment of his legacy and seizure of properties subject of the
legacy.
9. Pastor Jr. Sps. opposed these on the ground of pendency of a reconveyance
suit with another branch of the CFI. The pleadings remained unacted upon
by the probate court.
10. While the reconveyance suit was pending, the probate court issued the now
assailed Order of Execution and Garnishment resolving the question of
ownership of the royalties payable by Atlas and ruling in effect that the
legacy to Quemada was not inofficious.
11. The probate court directed Atlas to remit directly to Quemada the 42%
royalties due decedent’s estate of which Quemada was authorized to retain
75% for himself as legatee and deposit 25% with a reputable banking
institution for payment of the estate taxes and other obligations of the estate.
 The 33% share of PASTOR, JR. and/or his assignees was ordered garnished purportedly under Rule 88, Section 6 of the Rules of Court which reads:
to answer for the accumulated legacy of QUEMADA from the time of a. Sec. 6. Court to fix contributive shares where devisees, legatees, or
PASTOR, SR.'s death, which amounted to over two million pesos. heirs have been in possession. — Where devisees, legatees, or
12. The order being "immediately executory", QUEMADA succeeded in heirs have entered into possession of portions of the estate before
obtaining a Writ of Execution and Garnishment on September 4, 1980, and the debts and expenses have been settled and paid and have
in serving the same on ATLAS on the same day. become liable to contribute for the payment of such debts and
13. Pastor Jr. and wife filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition expenses, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order
but was denied as it was still premature because the MR of the questioned for that purpose, after hearing, settle the amount of their several
Order was still pending determination by the probate court. liabilities, and order how much and in what manner each person
14. CA denied the MR as well, hence this petition. shall contribute, and may issue execution as circumstances require.
5. The above provision clearly authorizes execution to enforce payment of
ISSUE/s: debts of estate. A legacy is not a debt of the estate; indeed, legatees are
1. WoN the ordered payment of the legacy is violative of the rule requiring among those against whom execution is authorized to be issued.
prior liquidation of the estate?- YES because there was no prior liquidation 6. It is within a court's competence to order the execution of a final judgment;
of estate of deceased but to order the execution of a final order (which is not even meant to be
executed) by reading into it terms that are not there and in utter disregard of
RULING: WHEREFORE, the decision of the CA is reversed. The Order of existing rules and law, is manifest grave abuse of discretion tantamount to
execution issued by the probate Court dated August 20, 1980, as well as all the lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, the rule that certiorari may not be
Orders issued subsequent thereto in alleged implementation of the Probate Order invoked to defeat the right of a prevailing party to the execution of a valid
dated December 5, 1972, particularly the Orders dated November 11, 1980 and and final judgment, is inapplicable. For when an order of execution is
December 17, 1980, are hereby set aside; and this case is remanded to the issued with grave abuse of discretion or is at variance with the judgment
appropriate Regional Trial Court for proper proceedings. sought to be enforced (PVTA vs. Honorable Gonzales, 92 SCRA 172),
certiorari will lie to abate the order of execution.
RATIO:
1. Without a final, authoritative adjudication of the issue as to what properties
compose the estate of PASTOR, SR. in the face of conflicting claims made
by heirs and a non-heir (MA. ELENA ACHAVAL DE PASTOR) involving
properties not in the name of the decedent, and in the absence of a
resolution on the intrinsic validity of the will here in question, there was no
basis for the Probate Court to hold in its Probate Order of 1972, which it did
not, that private respondent is entitled to the payment of the questioned
legacy. Therefore, the Order of Execution of August 20, 1980 and the
subsequent implementing orders for the payment of QUEMADA's legacy,
in alleged implementation of the dispositive part of the Probate Order of
December 5, 1972, must fall for lack of basis.
2. The ordered payment of legacy would be violative of the rule requiring
prior liquidation of the estate of the deceased, i.e., the determination of the
assets of the estate and payment of all debts and expenses, before
apportionment and distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees.
3. Neither has the estate tax been paid on the estate of PASTOR, SR. Payment
therefore of the legacy to QUEMADA would collide with the provision of
the National Internal Revenue Code requiring payment of estate tax before
delivery to any beneficiary of his distributive share of the estate
4. The assailed order of execution was unauthorized, having been issued
 001 MENDOILA v. MENDIOLA (Gonzales)
November 27, 1906 | Willard, J. | Distribution, partition, termination of estate pro-
ceedings
PETITIONER: Justiano Mendiola
RESPONDENT: Claudia Mediola
SUMMARY: Mariano Lamberto died, surviving him are his widow, Claudia, and
his mother, Silveria, as his only heirs. In his will, he stated all his properties had been
acquired during the marriage and belonged to the conjugal partnership. He left two-
thirds of the estate to his mother, and the one third to Justiniano, his stepson. Volun-
tary proceedings were then commenced for the settlement of the estate. Pending
such, Claudia, Silveria and Justiniano made an agreement to divide the property
among themselves and abandon the proceedings. Claudia undertook to pay the debts
and pay Silveria P2,400 and Justiniano P1,200. Fifteen years later, Justiano filed a
petition for the probate of Mariano’s will. Claudia opposed on the ground that the
estate had been settled already and the a partition of the property had been made. CFI
granted the petition. The issue is WoN the partition is valid – YES. *Doctrine* The
contract made by the parties in this case states expressly that they abandoned the
voluntary proceedings.
DOCTRINE: Where the parties in fact signed an agreement of partition was in the
fact made in accordance with that agreement, all proceedings in court for the settle-
ment of the estate of the deceased person were ended. The rights of the parties to the
property involved could no longer be discussed nor determined in that proceeding.
FACTS:
30. Mariano Lamberto died in Tacloban in the Province of Leyte on the 9th day
of April, 1889, leaving surviving him his widow, Claudia, and his mother,
Silveria Melendres, as his only heirs.
31. In his will he stated that all the property of which he died possessed had
been acquired during his marriage with the Claudia and belonged to the
conjugal partnership. He left two-thirds of his estate to Silveria and an in-
terest in the other third to Justiniano, his stepson, the son of Claudia.
32. Voluntary proceedings were commenced in the CFI Leyte for a settlement
of the estate.
33. While such proceedings were pending, Claudia, Silveria and Justiniano
made an agreement which appears in a notarial document by which they
abandoned the proceeding in the CFI, settled the estate and divided the
property among themselves. By the terms of this agreement, Claudia took
possession of all the property, agreeing to pay the debts, and agreed, to, and
did, pay in the act of execution of the document to Silveria 2,400 pesos, and
to Justiniano 1,200 pesos. Ever since that time Claudia has been in posses-
sion of the property and has paid all the debts of the deceased and on the
conjugal partnership. It will be noticed that she was in her own right the
owner of one-half of the property, subject to the payment of such debts.
34. Nearly fifteen years after this settlement, Justiniano and Juliana Lamberto,
the daughter of Silveria (sister of the deceased), presented a petition to the
CFI Leyte asking that the will of Mariano be proved and allowed and that
an administrator be appointed to administer the estate of the deceased.
35. Claudia opposed the probate of the will on the ground that the estate had
been completely settled and a partition of the property belonging thereto
had been made fifteen years before.
36. The court below granted the prayer of the petition and appointed in admin-
istrator. From this order Claudia has appealed.
ISSUE:
13. WoN the partition is valid – YES. Where the parties in fact signed an
agreement of partition was in the fact made in accordance with that agree-
ment, all proceedings in court for the settlement of the estate of the de-
ceased person were ended. The rights of the parties to the property involved
could no longer be discussed nor determined in that proceeding.
RULING: The judgment of the court below is reversed and the case remanded to
that court with instructions to dismiss the petition, with costs to the appellant, Clau-
dia Mendiola. No costs will be allowed to either party in this court.
RATIO:
14. Nearly all the evidence in the case and nearly all of the opinion of the court
below is devoted to a consideration of the validity of the partition made in
1889. That was practically the only question discussed and determined by
the court below, Justiano claiming that this partition had been obtained by
fraud and misrepresentations on the part of Claudia as to the value of the
property left by her husband and as to the debts existing against his estate.
15. We do not find it necessary to consider the evidence adduced on the ques-
tion of fraud, nor the findings made by the court below in relation thereto,
for we are of the opinion that when it appeared to that court that there had
been partition of the property made by heirs, all of whom were of age, that
he should have dismissed the proceedings, leaving the parties of litigate the
question as to the validity of that contract of partition in an ordinary action
brought for that purpose.
16. The proceeding commenced in the Court of First Instance of Leyte in 1889
was a voluntary proceeding. Article 1030 of the Spanish Law of Civil Pro-
cedure provided as follows:
a. "The interested parties may at any stage of the voluntary probate
proceedings, terminate them and adopt such measures as they may
deem proper.
 b. "For this purpose, beside the heirs and legatees, the creditors who to appear to the court below that such a contract of partition had in fact been
may have instituted the action and the surviving member of the signed by the petitioners of their grantors, the court should have dismissed
marriage community shall be considered as interested parties. the petition.
c. "If they pray for such termination by common consent the judge
shall order the proceedings terminated and shall place the property
at the disposition of the heirs."
17. The contract made by the parties in this case states expressly that they aban-
doned the voluntary proceedings.
18. The contract contains, moreover the following clause:
a. "Seventh. As a consequence of the foregoing clause, Silveria
Melendres and Justiniano Lamberto do hereby solemnly de-
clare themselves to be entirely satisfied with their share of the
state and waive whatever right they may have to the property
of the estate, and by these presents undertake in the most solemn
manner not to make any claim in future in respect to the said prop-
erty, and hereby convey to Claudia Mendiola whatever property,
interest, or rights they may have in the estate of the deceased, she,
in turn, agreeing to pay all the debts of the estate as well as all the
legacies and bequeathments provided for in the will of the de-
ceased."
19. When neither minors nor creditors were interested in the settlement of an
estate, no action of the court was necessary, in accordance with the law ex-
isting here in prior to American occupation. Everything was in the hands of
the heirs and legatees and they could dispose of the property as they saw fit.
Article 1058 of the Civil Code is as follows:
a. "Should the testator not have made any division, nor intrusted this
power to another, if the heirs should be of age should have the free
administration of their property, they may distribute the estate in
the manner they may see fit."
20. Where the parties in fact signed an agreement of partition was in the fact
made in accordance with that agreement, all proceedings in court for the set-
tlement of the estate of the deceased person were ended. The rights of the
parties to the property involved could no longer be discussed nor deter-
mined in that proceeding.
21. If it were claimed that the partition was brought about by fraud or that it
was void for any other reason, such claims necessarily had to be presented
in an ordinary action brought for the purpose of setting aside the partition.
22. Limiting ourselves to this precise case, we hold that where prior to the
adoption of the present Code of Civil Procedure a contract of partition has
in fact been made by all the persons interested in the estate of a deceased
person, such persons interested being of full age and capacity to contract, no
further proceedings can be had for the judicial settlement and administration
of that property until the contract of partition has been set aside in an ordi-
nary action brought for the purpose, and that in this case, when it was made
 002 Gustilo Jerez v. Nietes (Gustilo)
December 27, 1969 | Fernando, J. | Interest in Intervention
PETITIONER: Lucrecia Jerez, et al
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Emigdio Nietes, Judge of CFI of Iloilo, et al SUMMARY: Nicolas
Jalandoni (N Jalandoni) died on October 3, 1960. Before the end of that month, a special
proceeding for the settlement of his estate was filed before the sala of Judge Nietes, Lucrecia
Jerez (Jerez), his widow, being appointed as administratrix. A project of partition and final
accounting was submitted on June 14, 1966, resulting in an order from Judge Nietes dated
June 15, 1966, approving the same. On June 29, 1966, respondent Lucilo Jalandoni (L.
Jalandoni), alleging that he is an acknowledged natural child of the late N. Jalandoni, and
respondent Victoria Jalandoni de Gorriceta (V. Gorriceta), alleging that she is an illegitimate
daughter, sought to be allowed to intervene on the ground that they were preterited in the
project of partition which they would have Judge Nietes reject for being contrary to law. An
order of Judge Nietes allowing intervention and reopening the proceedings to permit the
movants, now private respondents (L Jalandoni et al), "to present whatever evidence they may
have to show their right to participate in the estate of the deceased." After a motion for
reconsideration, filed by Jerez et al, was denied, the matter was elevated to the Court of
Appeals on a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction. As set forth at
the opening of this decision, the Court of Appeals in a resolution denied such petition to annul
and set aside the order of Judge Nietes. The basis for such resolution, was explained: "that the
determination of a prima facie interest in an estate to justify reopening proceedings for the
settlement thereof is primarily addressed to the sound discretion and judgment of the probate
court.” The issue is WoN the respondents (L Jalandoni & V. Gorriceta) should have been
allowed to intervene?-Yes HOWEVER Judge Nietes acted too soon such that there must be
proof beyond allegations in such motion to show the interest of the respondents.
The Court held that it is thus understandable why the resolution of the Court of Appeals
upholding the power of Judge Nietes to reopen the proceedings and allow intervention is not
vulnerable to attack. It was within his competence to do so. The question remains, however,
whether he did so in the appropriate manner. It is not the existence of the power but the mode
of its exercise that is open to question. In that sense, the appealed resolution bears further
scrutiny. However, Judge Nietes however acted too soon. The verified motion on the part of
private respondents did not suffice to call into play the power of Judge Nietes to allow
intervention. There must be proof beyond allegations in such motion to show the interest of
the private movants. In the absence thereof, the action taken by Judge Nietes could be
considered premature. As was stated by us in an opinion penned Nietes by Justice Sanchez:
"No one may quibble over the existence of the court's discretion on whether to admit or reject
intervention. But such discretion is not unlimited.”
DOCTRINE: The Court held that rather than require any party who can allege a grievance
that his interest was not recognized in a testate or intestate proceeding to file a separate and
independent action, he may within the reglementary period secure the relief that is his due by a
reopening of the case even after a project of partition and final accounting had been approved.
Such a view finds support in the doctrine of liberality as to pleas for intervention so
consistently followed and adhered to by this Court. However, there must be proof beyond
allegations in such motion to show the interest of the private movants.
FACTS:
1. Nicolas Jalandoni (N. Jalandoni) died on October 3, 1960. Before the end of
that month, on October 27, a special proceeding for the settlement of his
estate was filed before the sala of Judge Nietes, Lucrecia Jerez (Jerez), his
widow, being appointed as administratrix.
2. A project of partition and final accounting was submitted on June 14, 1966,
resulting in an order from Judge Nietes dated June 15, 1966, approving the
same. On June 29, 1966, respondent Lucilo Jalandoni (L. Jalandoni),
alleging that he is an acknowledged natural child of the late N. Jalandoni,
and respondent Victoria Jalandoni de Gorriceta (V. Gorriceta), alleging that
she is an illegitimate daughter, sought to be allowed to intervene on the
ground that they were preterited in the project of partition which they would
have Judge Nietes reject for being contrary to law.
3. On July 8, 1966 an order of Judge Nietes allowing intervention and
reopening the proceedings to permit the movants, now private respondents
(L Jalandoni et al), "to present whatever evidence they may have to show
their right to participate in the estate of the deceased." After a motion for
reconsideration, filed by Jerez et al, was denied, the matter was elevated to
the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction.
4. As set forth at the opening of this decision, the Court of Appeals in a
resolution denied such petition to annul and set aside the order of Judge
Nietes. The basis for such resolution, was explained: "that the
determination of a prima facie interest in an estate to justify reopening
proceedings for the settlement thereof is primarily addressed to the
sound discretion and judgment of the probate court; that, while no
supporting documents are appended to the motion to reopen tending to
show the personality to intervene, the said motion is nevertheless
verified upon oaths of the claimants of interest and the probate court
has authority to require the submission of at least a prima facie
showing of said interest; that the motion to reopen was filed on June 29,
1966 before the order closing the proceedings of June 15, 1966 had
achieved finality and during the reglementary period within which the court
still had jurisdiction over the case and retained full power to amend and
control its process and orders so as to make them comfortable to law and
justice; that, because the closure order aforesaid had not yet become final,
the requirements of Rule 38 respecting relief from judgment do not apply
and, hence, the failure of the motion to reopen to allege any of the grounds
therein stated is not fatal; that the better practice in case of the appearance
of alleged preterited heirs is to secure relief by reopening the proceedings
by a proper motion within the reglementary period, it being desirable that
all aspects of a controversy be ventilated in the same proceeding and thus
avoid multiplicity of suits.”
5. Evidently, an ordinary division of three Justices did not suffice for a
decision on such petition for certiorari and prohibition resulting in a
creation of a division of five. Two Justices dissented from the aforesaid
resolution. The dissent is premised on the following considerations: "We
 should not let L. Jalandoni (alleged acknowledged natural son) and V.
Gorriceta (alleged illegitimate daughter) to come in first and identify
themselves later, because the better policy according to jurisprudence is to
require them first to produce prima facie evidence of such a civil status
before opening the door and letting them in. Under Section 2, Rule 12,
Revised, 'a person may, before or during a trial, be permitted by the court,
in its discretion, to intervene in an action, if he has legal interest in the
matter in litigation.' The possibility of interlopers getting in for a share in
the estate cannot be totally discounted specially considering that the present
intestate proceedings had been pending for the last six (6) years without a
motion to intervene having been filed by the present claimants in spite of
the notice of publication and the in rem character of the intestate
proceedings. According to their residence certificate, the claimants are
residents of Iloilo City. The procedure adopted by the lower court is more
conducive to prejudice and unnecessary loss of time, effort and expense
than the method suggested by jurisprudence of requiring first a prima facie
evidence of status before letting them come in to intervene. Hence, the
order of July 30, 1966 sought to be nullified under the present petition
insofar as it reconsidered the approval of the project of partition and the first
accounting is unjustified, as practically putting the cart before the horse
instead of the horse before the cart. Moreover, the claims can be asserted in
a separate action against the legitimate children to whom the share of the
deceased N. Jalandoni was adjudicated.”
ISSUE/s:
WoN the respondents (L Jalandoni & V. Gorriceta) should have been
allowed to intervene?- Yes HOWEVER Judge Nietes acted too soon such
that there must be proof beyond allegations in such motion to show the
interest of the respondents
RULING: WHEREFORE, the resolution of September 21, 1966 of the Court of
Appeals is hereby modified in the sense that respondent Judge, Honorable Emigdio
V. Nietes of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Judicial District, Branch I, or
whoever may be acting in his place, is directed to require private respondents Lucilo
Jalandoni and Victoria Jalandoni de Gorriceta to present evidence to justify their
right to intervene in Special Proceeding No. 1562 re Intestate Estate of Nicolas H.
Jalandoni pending before such sala. In the event that they could so justify such a
right, the lower court on the basis of such evidence is to proceed conformably to law.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
RATIO:
1. The Court held that the challenged resolution cannot be reversed insofar as
it recognized the power of Judge Nietes to reopen the proceedings and
allow intervention. While it is undeniable that the question presented has
not been definitely passed upon before, still an indication of how such an
issue should be resolved is to be found in this. thus: "The only instance that
we can think of in which a party interested in a probate proceeding may
have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of
circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not
imputable to negligence. Even then, the better practice to secure relief is
reopening of the same case by proper motion within the reglementary
period, instead of an independent action the effect of which, if successful,
would be, as in the instant case, for another court or judge to throw out a
decision or order already final and executed and reshuffle properties long
ago distributed and disposed of.”
2. The Court held that rather than require any party who can allege a
grievance that his interest was not recognized in a testate or intestate
proceeding to file a separate and independent action, he may within the
reglementary period secure the relief that is his due by a reopening of
the case even after a project of partition and final accounting had been
approved. Such a view finds support in the doctrine of liberality as to
pleas for intervention so consistently followed and adhered to by this
Court.
3. It is thus understandable why the resolution of the Court of Appeals
upholding the power of Judge Nietes to reopen the proceedings and allow
intervention is not vulnerable to attack. It was within his competence to do
so. The question remains, however, whether he did so in the appropriate
manner. It is not the existence of the power but the mode of its exercise that
is open to question. In that sense, the appealed resolution bears further
scrutiny.
4. It is indisputable that after the project of partition and final accounting was
submitted by the counsel for Jerez, as administratrix, on June 14, 1966,
Judge Nietes approved the same and declared closed and terminated the
intestacy the next day, June 15, 1966. Subsequently, on a verified petition
by private respondents, filed on June 29, 1966, based on the assertion made
that they should have had a share in the estate as illegitimate children but
that they were omitted in the aforesaid project of partition, they sought to be
allowed to intervene and "to have the project of partition rejected for being
contrary to law." Such a pleading, without more, resulted in the
questioned order of July 30, 1966, reopening the proceedings and
reconsidering the approval of the project of partition and final
accounting, to enable the private respondents "to present whatever
evidence they may have to show their right to participate in the estate
of the deceased." Although the recognition of their right to intervene
appeared to be tentative and conditional, it cannot be denied that they
were given a standing sufficient to set aside the project of partition.
5. Judge Nietes however acted too soon. The verified motion on the part of
private respondents did not suffice to call into play the power of Judge
Nietes to allow intervention. There must be proof beyond allegations in
such motion to show the interest of the private movants. In the absence
thereof, the action taken by Judge Nietes could be considered
premature. As was stated by us in an opinion penned Nietes by Justice
Sanchez: "No one may quibble over the existence of the court's
discretion on whether to admit or reject intervention. But such
discretion is not unlimited.”
 003 Ramos v. Ortuzar (Hilario)
August 29, 1951 | Tuason, J. | Distribution, Partition, and Termination of Estate Pro-
ceedings
PETITIONER: Martina Ramos.
RESPONDENTS Caridad Ortuzar
SUMMARY: Percy Hill was an American and retired officer of the Philippine
Constabulary. He cohabited with Martina Ramos in Munoz, Nueva Ecija and
had two kids together: Richard and Marvin Hill. After some time, he got mar-
ried to an American Woman, Helen Livingstone, and they had three kids togeth-
er, and they all live in the US. Helen died and after that Percy married Caridad
Ortuzar, and together they had one daughter. Percy died and proceedings for the
settlement of his estate were commenced, and Caridad Ortuzar was appointed
administratrix. In Percy A. Hill's intestate proceedings, Richard and Marvin Hill
intervened, or sought to intervene, on the allegation that they were the de-
ceased's legitimate sons entitled to share in the inheritance. Before intervention
was allowed, the Hill brothers were required to establish their right and interest
in the estate, and to this end formal hearing was held. There was a civil case
FACTS:
filed to establish their filiation, and the court declared them natural children of
the deceased (even if they prayed to be acknowledged as legitimate children).
After the hearing, the petition to intervene was denied, whereupon the would be
intervenors took steps to appeal was disapproved BECAUSE IT WAS FILED
OUT OF TIME. There being no other matters to attend to the administratrix
submitted a final accounting and a project of partition by order of the court, both
were in due time approved, the partition was carried out, and the expediente was
closed.
Issue 1: WON the civil case declaring the Hill brothers natural children is res
adjudicata— YES, RES JUDICATA APPLIES. Since they filed out of time,
that was final because they already had their chance to intervene and have
their day in court.
2. WON since there were no allegations that the Hill brothers were acknowl-
edged natural children, they could not under the pleadings be declared natural
children—YES, the RTC went out of its way in doing so. Even if the Hill
brothers had amended their allegations to adapt them to the evidence,
amendment in this case would hardly do away with the unfairness of grant-
ing them a relief on a theory not put in issue by the pleadings.
It is a clear mistake, contrary to the evidence of record, to say that Richard Hill
and Marvin Hill were not able to participate in the settlement proceedings. They
were the ones who set the court in motion by filing the motion for intervention,
and they were active parties to the point of attempting to appeal albeit their at-
tempt was frustrated by the tardiness with which the record on appeal was pre-
sented. Had they been pronounced as heirs, whether as legitimate or
acknowledged natural children, the order would have bound to other heirs
and they, Richard and Marvin Hill, would have received their correspond-
ing shares in the distribution. Repudiation of the decision or order now that
they have lost, on the tenuous ground that they were only witnesses, is both un-
fair and contrary to the principles of orderly procedure, estoppel, laches and
prescription and the expressed policy of putting an end at the earliest possible
date of litigation, especially probate cases. If we are to assume that Richard
hill and Marvin Hill did not formally intervene, still they would be con-
cluded by the result of the proceedings, not only as to their civil status but
as the distribution of the estate as well
DOCTRINE: rule of law that applied and how the court applied it
1. Percy Hill was an American and retired officer of the Philippine Constabu-
lary. He cohabited with Martina Ramos in Munoz, Nueva Ecija and had two
kids together: Richard and Marvin Hill.
2. After some time, he got married to an American Woman, Helen Living-
stone, and they had three kids together, and they all live in the US.
3. Helen died and after that Percy married Caridad Ortuzar, and together
they had one daughter.
4. Percy died and proceedings for the settlement of his estate were com-
menced, and Caridad Ortuzar was appointed administratrix.
5. In Percy A. Hill's intestate proceedings, Richard and Marvin Hill intervened,
or sought to intervene, on the allegation that they were the deceased's le-
gitimate sons entitled to share in the inheritance.
6. Before intervention was allowed, the Hill brothers were required to estab-
lish their right and interest in the estate, and to this end formal hearing
was held.
7. There was a civil case filed to establish their filiation, and the court de-
clared them natural children of the deceased (even if they prayed to be
acknowledged as legitimate children).
8. After the hearing, the petition to intervene was denied, whereupon the
would be intervenors took steps to appeal was disapproved. There being
no other matters to attend to the administratrix submitted a final account-
ing and a project of partition by order of the court, both were in due time
 approved, the partition was carried out, and the expediente was closed. 2. If we are to assume that Richard hill and Marvin Hill did not formally
9. By order of the court, the administratrix on April 2, 1940 submitted an ac- intervene, still they would be concluded by the result of the proceed-
counting and a project of partition, and both of these having been ap- ings, not only as to their civil status but as the distribution of the estate
proved, distribution of the estate was made accordingly and the estate was as well. As this Court has held in Manolo vs. Paredes, 47 Phil. 938, "The
closed. On March 27, 1947, the declared heirs and distributes (Caridad Or- proceeding for probate in one in rem and the court acquires jurisdic-
tuzar, her daughter and the deceased's children by Helen Livingstone) sold tion over all persons interested, through the publication of the notice
six tracts of land left by Hill to Maximo Bustos for P120,000 (this is the sale prescribed by sec. 630 C.P.C.; and any order that may be entered therein
is binding against all of them." (See also in re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil.
the trial court will annul later).
156.) "A final order of distribution of the estate of a deceased person
10. Martina Ramos opposed, and she filed an action to annul the judicial parti-
vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees." (Santos vs.
tion of the deceased’s estate and the sale to Maximo Bustos. She claims that
Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres, 45, Phil. 895.) There is no rea-
she is Percy’s lawful wife.
son why, by analogy, these salutary doctrines should not be apply to in-
11. The court found that Martina Ramos had not been married to Percy A. Hill
testate proceedings.
but that Richard Hill and Marvin Hill were Percy A. Hill's acknowledged
3. The only instance that we can think of in which a party interested in a pro-
natural children, and that the purchase by Maximo Bustos was mala fide
bate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out
and null and void. The court then alloted undivided portions of the estate,
by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inad-
including the lands bought by Maximo Bustos, among the plaintiffs Richard
vertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better practice to se-
and Marvin Hill and Percy A. Hill's children by his first and second wives,
cure relief is reopening of the same case by proper motion within the regle-
and awarded to the plaintiffs damages in the amount of P35,000.
mentary period, instead of an independent action of the effect of which if
12. Both parties appeal.
successful, would be, as in the instant case, for another court or judge to
throw out a decision or order already final and executed and reshuffle prop-
ISSUE/s:
erties long ago distributed and disposed of.
1. WON the civil case declaring the Hill brothers natural children is res adju-
4. The exceptions do not apply here because they had their day in court,
dicata—
anyway.
WON since there were no allegations that the Hill brothers were acknowl-
edged natural children, they could not under the pleadings be declared natu-
ral children—YES,
RULING: SC affirmed the lower courts decision. Pwede rin wherefore.

RATIO:
1. It is a clear mistake, contrary to the evidence of record, to say that Richard
Hill and Marvin Hill were not able to participate in the settlement proceed-
ings. They were the ones who set the court in motion by filing the motion
for intervention, and they were active parties to the point of attempting to
appeal albeit their attempt was frustrated by the tardiness with which the
record on appeal was presented. Had they been pronounced as heirs,
whether as legitimate or acknowledged natural children, the order
would have bound to other heirs and they, Richard and Marvin Hill,
would have received their corresponding shares in the distribution. Re-
pudiation of the decision or order now that they have lost, on the tenuous
ground that they were only witnesses, is both unfair and contrary to the
principles of orderly procedure, estoppel, laches and prescription and the
expressed policy of putting an end at the earliest possible date of litigation,
especially probate cases.
 006 DE RAMA v. PALILEO (Fordan edited by Hortaleza)
Feb. 26, 1965 | Barbera, J. | Distribution, Partition and Termination of Estate Pro- DOCTRINE: ( BEFORE DISTRIBUTION) It is clear from the foregoing that the period
ceedings prescribed in the notice to creditors is not exclusive; that money claims against
the estate may be allowed any time before an order of distribution is entered, at
In Re: Intestate Estate of Beatriz C. De Rama the discretion of the court, for cause and upon such terms as are equitable.
PETITIONERS-APPELLANT: Angelo O. De Rama
CLAIMANT-APPELLEE: Cherie Palileo DOCTRINE 2: Sec. 2, Rule 87 (now Rule 86). Time within which claims shall be
filed.—In the notice provided in section 1, the court, shall state the time for the
SUMMARY: In the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased Beatriz Cosio filing of claims against the estate, which shall not be more than twelve nor less
de Rama, a notice to all persons with money claims against the deceased to file than six months after the date of the first publication of the notice. However, at
their claims within 6 months was duly published in the Manila Chronicle. The peri- any time before an order of distribution is entered, on application of a creditor
od expired without anybody filing any claim against the deceased, the administra- who has failed to file his claim within the time previously limited, the court may,
tor, upon order of the CFI, submitted a final account of the estate and a project of for cause shown and on such terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be filed
partition, which were approved. Thereafter, Cherie Palileo petitioned the CFI for within a time not exceeding one month.
permission to file a claim in the proceeding claiming that she only obtained a
money judgment against de Rama from the decision of the CA, promulgated on FACTS:
May 6, 1961. The administrator opposed this petition but the CFI allowed her to 1. In connection with the proceeding for the settlement of the intestate estate
file her claim within 1 month from receipt of said order, appearing that no final of the deceased Beatriz Cosio de Rama and pursuant to the order of the CFI
decree of distribution has yet been entered in the case. Hene, the current appeal. of Rizal, a notice to all persons with money claims against the deceased to
file their said claims within 6 months was duly published where the 1 notice
st

The issue in this case is whether Palileo a claimant can still claim beyond the pre- appeared in the Aug. 13, 1958 issue of the Manila Chronicle.
scriptive period provided to the notice of creditors? YES, It is clear from the fore- 2. On Jan. 27, 1959, the administrator filed an inventory of the estate, showing
going that the period prescribed in the notice to creditors is not exclusive; that assets P139,596.77 and liabilities of P33,012.95.
money claims against the estate may be allowed any time before an order of 3. The period provided in the published notice expired without anybody filing
distribution is entered, at the discretion of the court, for cause and upon such any claim against the deceased, the administrator, upon order of the CFI,
terms as are equitable. submitted a final account of the estate and a project of partition, which were
(additionally not in the case, to tie up the connection with this case and the topic approved on May 12, 1960.
35
Read in cognizance with Rule 90 Sec 1. ) my own words “partition will not be al- 4. On June 7, 1961, Cherie Palileo petitioned the CFI for permission to file a
lowed until obligations of the estate has been provided for” claim in the proceeding, alleging that:
a. on the decision of the CA, promulgated on May 6, 1961, she obtained a
money judgment against the deceased Beatriz C. de Rama;
35
Section 1. When order for distribution of reside made. — When the debts, funer-
al charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and inher-
itance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in
the court, on the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person inter- ordinary cases.
ested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the
estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above men-
parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their tioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them,
respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person having give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said
the same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are obligations within such time as the court directs.
the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as the distributive shares to which each
 b. although the lower court decided in her favor the question of ownership 3. It is not controverted in the instant case that no order of distribution of the
and possession of a real property involved in the case, it was only the CA estate has as yet been made.
that granted money judgment, when the case was decided on appeal. 4. However, the Administrator charges that the CFI committed an abuse of dis-
5. The administrator opposed this petition on the ground that the claim was cretion in issuing the disputed order without sufficient ground or cause
filed beyond the period provided in the notice to creditors. therefor.
6. By order of Aug. 8, 1961, the CFI sustained Palileo and allowed her to file her 5. The petition of Palileo for permission to file a claim in the proceeding was
claim within 1 month from receipt of said order, appearing that no final de- based on the fact that the award of damages in her favor against the de-
cree of distribution has yet been entered in the case. ceased Beatriz C. de Rama was contained in the decision of the CA which was
7. Hence, the current appeal by the administrator on the issue of when money promulgated on May 6, 1961 or after the 6-month period provided in the no-
claims against a deceased person may be filed in the proceeding for the set- tice to creditors had already elapsed. It is her contention that she could not
tlement of the estate of such deceased person. have filed a money claim against the estate before the promulgation of said
decision because although the CFI in that case upheld her right to the own-
ISSUE: Whether or not Palilelo can still claim from the estate of De Rama. – YES, ership and possession of the building subject thereof, no damages were ad-
since Sec. 2, Rule 87 (now 86) of the ROC provides that claims against the estate judged in her favor.
may be allowed any time before an order of distribution is entered, at the discre- 6. Considering this argument, the CFI found it sufficient to justify the relaxation
tion of the court, for cause and upon such terms as are equitable. of the rule and extension of the period within which to file her claim.
7. In the circumstances, the action taken by the CFI cannot be considered an
(BEFORE DISTRIBUTION) It is clear from the foregoing that the period prescribed in abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to justify its
the notice to creditors is not exclusive; that money claims against the estate may be reversal by this court.
allowed any time before an order of distribution is entered, at the discretion of the
court, for cause and upon such terms as are equitable.

RULING: Finding no reversible error in the order appealed from, the same is hereby
affirmed, with costs, against the administrator. So ordered.

RATIO:
1. Sec. 2, Rule 87 of the old Rules of Court (now Rule 86) provides:
“SEC 2. Time within which claims shall be filed.—In the notice provided in
section 1, the court, shall state the time for the filing of claims against the es-
tate, which shall not be more than twelve nor less than six months after the
date of the first publication of the notice. However, at any time before an or-
der of distribution is entered, on application of a creditor who has failed to
file his claim within the time previously limited, the court may, for cause
shown and on such terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be filed within
a time not exceeding one month.”
2. It is clear from the foregoing that the period prescribed in the notice to
creditors is not exclusive; that money claims against the estate may be al-
lowed any time before an order of distribution is entered, at the discretion
of the court, for cause and upon such terms as are equitable. This exten-
sion of the period shall not exceed one month, from the issuance of the or-
der authorizing such extension.
 005 PACIOLES vs. CHUATOCO-CHING (LAGUILLES)
August 9, 2005| Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. | Distribution, Partition, and Termination of
Estate Proceedings
FACTS:
PETITIONER: Emilio Pacioles
RESPONDENTS: Miguela Chuatoco-Ching
SUMMARY: Miguelita died intestate, leaving interests in certain businesses.
Her husband Emilio filed a verified petition for the settlement of Miguelita’s
estate. Miguelita’s mother, Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, filed an opposition on the
ground that Miguelita’s estate is composed of paraphernal properties. She
alleged that she has direct and material interest in the estate because she gave
half of her inherited properties to Miguelita on condition that both of them
would undertake whatever business endeavor they decided to do in the capacity
of business partners. Emilio filed with the intestate court an omnibus motion
praying that an order be issued directing the payment of estate taxes, partition,
and distribution of estate. Miguela opposed this on the ground that the partition
and distribution of the estate is premature, considering that there is yet no
determination whether the properties specified in the inventory are conjugal,
paraphernal, or owned in a join venture. The court denied Emilio’s prayer for
partition and distribution, holding that it is indeed premature. Hence this
petition. The issue is WoN the intestate court can hear and pass upon questions
of ownership involving properties claimed to be part of the decedent’s estate.
The SC held that yes, as a general rule, intestate courts may pass upon issues of
ownership but only for purposes of determining whether or not to include
certain properties in the inventory. But such exception is inapplicable in this
case because the inventory was not disputed, and Miguela expressly adopted the
inventory prepared by Emilio. Second, Emmanuel did not submit his own
inventory. His mandate as co-administrator, is to submit within 3 months after
his appointment a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate
of the deceased which have come into his possession or knowledge. He could
have submitted an inventory excluding therefrom those properties which
Miguela considered to be hers. Obviously, Miguela’s purpose here was not to
obtain from the intestate court a ruling of what properties should or should not
be included in the inventory. She wanted to secure from the court a final
determination of her claim of ownership over properties comprising the bulk of
Miguelita’s estate.
DOCTRINE: The key consideration in the exception that an intestate court may
pass upon issues of ownership is that the purpose of the intestate or probate
court in hearing and passing upon questions of ownership is merely to
determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory.
18. Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties with an estimated value of
P10.5 million, stock investments worth P500k, bank deposits amounting to
P6.4 million, and interests in certain businesses. She was survived by her
husband Emilio, the petitioner, and their two minor children.
19. Emilio filed with the RTC a verified petition for the settlement of
Miguelita’s estate. He prayed that letters of administration be issued in his
name, and that the net residue of the estate be divided among the
compulsory heirs.
20. Miguelita’s mother, Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, the respondent, filed an
opposition, specifically to Emilio’s prayer for the issuance of letters of
administration on the grounds that Emilio is incompetent and that the bulk
of Miguelita’s estate is composed of paraphernal properties.
21. Emilio moved to strike out Miguela’s opposition, alleging that the latter has
no direct and material interest in the estate, she not being a compulsory heir,
and that he, being the surviving spouse, has the preferential right to be
appointed as administrator.
22. Miguela countered that she has direct and material interest in the estate
because she gave half of her inherited properties to Miguelita on condition
that both of them would undertake whatever business endeavor they
decided to, in the capacity of business partners.
23. Miguela nominated his son Emmanuel as special administrator, and the
intestate court issued an order appointing Emilio and Emmanuel as joint
regular administrators.
24. Notice to creditors was published. However, no claims were filed against
the estate within the period set by the ROC. Thereafter, Emilio submitted to
the intestate court an inventory of Miguelita’s estate. Emmanuel did not
submit an inventory.
25. The intestate court then declared Emilio and his two minor children as the
only compulsory heirs of Miguelita. Emilio then filed with the intestate
court an omnibus motion praying that an order be issued directing the
payment of estate taxes, partition and distribution of the estate, and payment
of attorney’s fees.
26. Miguela opposed this motion on the ground that the partition and
distribution of the estate is premature and precipitate, considering that
there is yet no determination whether the properties specified in the
inventory are conjugal, paraphernal, or owned in a joint venture.
27. Miguela claimed that she owns the bulk of Miguelita’s estate as an heir and
co-owner.
28. The court denied Emilio’s prayer for partition and distribution holding that
it is indeed premature, thus, a hearing on oppositors claim is necessary to
 determine whether the properties listed in the amended complaint are
entirely conjugal or the paraphernal properties of the deceased, or a co-
ownership between the oppositor and Miguela in their partnership venture.
ISSUE/s:
5. WoN the the intestate court can hear and pass upon questions of ownership
involving properties claimed to be part of the decedent’s estate – YES, but
only for purposes of determining which properties to include in the
inventory. BUT, that exception is inapplicable to this case because they key
consideration is the purpose of the intestate or probate court in hearing and
passing upon questions of ownership, which is merely to determine whether
or not a property should be included in the inventory. The facts of this case
show that such was not the purpose because 1) the inventory was not
disputed; 2) Miguela’s representative, his son Emmanuel, did not even
submit an inventory.
RULING: The instant petition is GRANTED.
RATIO:
1. The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an
intestate or a probate court relates only to matters having to do with
the settlement of the estate and probate of will of deceased persons but
does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that
arise during the proceedings.
2. A well-recognized exception to this rule is the principle that an intestate
or a probate court may hear and pass upon questions of ownership
when its purpose is to determine whether or not a property should be
included in the inventory. In such situations, the adjudication is merely
incidental and provisional.
3. The CA relied heavily on this principle in sustaining the jurisdiction of the
intestate court to conduct a hearing on Miguela’s claim. Such reliance is
misplaced. Under the mentioned principle, the key consideration is that
the purpose of the intestate or probate court in hearing and passing
upon questions of ownership is merely to determine whether or not a
property should be included in the inventory. The facts of the case show
that such was not the purpose of the intestate court.
4. First, the inventory was not disputed, and Miguela expressly adopted
the inventory prepared by Emilio.
5. Second, Emmanuel, Miguela’s son, did not submit his own inventory.
His mandate as co-administrator, is to submit within 3 months after his
appointment a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal
estate of the deceased which have come into his possession or
knowledge. He could have submitted an inventory excluding therefrom
those properties which Miguela considered to be hers.
6. Obviously, Miguela’s purpose here was not to obtain from the intestate
court a ruling of what properties should or should not be included in
the inventory. She wanted to secure from the court a final
determination of her claim of ownership over properties comprising the
bulk of Miguelita’s estate.
7. The purpose of the hearing set by the intestate court was actually to
determine the propriety of Miguela’s claim. If it is true that Miguela
owns the bulk of the properties, then it means that she has a material and
direct interest in the estate, and hebce, she should be given her day in court.
8. The Court cannot be deluded by Miguela’s ingenious attempt to secure a
proceeding for the purpose of resolving her blanket claim against the estate.
9. Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its
jurisdiction. Its proper course should have been to maintain a hands-off
stance on the matter.
10. When a question arises as to ownership of property alleged to be a part of
the estate of the deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be
his property not by any right of inheritance, such question cannot be
determined in the course of an intestate or probate proceedings. The
intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions,
which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction.
11. Hence, Miguela’s recourse is to file a separate action with a court of general
jurisdiction. The intestate court is not the appropriate forum for the
resolution of her adverse claim.
12. Even assuming that the intestate court merely intended to make a
provisional determination of the issue of ownership, still, Miguela’s claim
cannot prosper. It bears stressing that the bulk of Miguelita’s estate,
comprises real estates covered by the Torrens System which are registered
either in the name of Miguelita alone or with Emilio. As such, they are
considered as the owners of the properties until their title is nullified or
modified in an ordinary action.
13. Miguela could not even specify which of the properties listed in Emilio’s
inventory belong to her. Neither could she present any document to prove
her claim of ownership.
 006 HEIRS OF DORONIO v. HEIRS OF DORONIO (Marcos)
Dec. 27, 2007 | Reyes, J. | Distribution, Partition, and Termination of Estate
Proceedings
PETITIONER: The Heirs of Marcelino Doronio namely: Regina and Flora
RESPONDENTS: The Heirs of Fortunato Doronio namely: Trinidad Rosalina,
Moding, Florentina, and Aniceta.
SUMMARY: Spouses Simeon and Cornelia Doronio, who are both deceased,
were the original owners of a parcel of land covered by OCT No. 352. A private
deed of donation propter nuptias was executed by Spouses Simeon Doronio in
favor of their son Marcelino Doronio and the latter's wife. The property
described in the deed of donation is the one covered by OCT No. 352. However,
there is a significant discrepancy with respect to the identity of the owner of
adjacent property at the eastern side. Based on OCT No. 352, the adjacent
owners are Zacarias Najorda and Alejandro Najorda, whereas based on the deed
of donation, the owner of the adjacent property is Fortunato Doronio (another
son of Sps. Simeon Doronio). Furthermore, said deed of donation remained a
private document as it was never notarized. The Marcelino and Fortunato heirs
have been occupying the subject land for several decades although having
different theories regarding its ownership. According to the Marcelino heirs,
they are the owners based on the private deed of donation propter nuptias, while
the Fortunato heirs contend that only half of the property was actually
incorporated in the said deed of donation because it stated that Fortunato
Doronio is the owner of the adjacent property at the eastern side. The Marcelino
heirs filed before the RTC of Urdaneta Pangasinan a Petition for the
Registration of the Private Deed of Donation. No one interposed an objection to
the petition therefore it was eventually granted. The Fortunato heirs filed a
petition before the RTC for the reconsideration of the decision of the RTC that
ordered the registration of the subject deed of donation. The petition was
dismissed on the ground that the decision in the previous petition case had
already become final as it was not appealed. The Fortunato heirs filed an action
for reconveyance and damages with prayer for preliminary injunction against
the Marcelino heirs. The RTC ruled in favor of the Marcelino heirs, however the
CA reversed the RTC decision. The CA ruled that the donation of the entire
property in favor of the Marcelino spouses (predecessor) is invalid on the
ground that it impairs the legitime of Fortunato Doronio. WoN the issue on
impairment of legitime may be resolved and passed upon in an action for
reconveyance – NO. The issue regarding the impairment of legitime of
Fortunato Doronio must be resolved in an action for the settlement of estates of
spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante. An action for reconveyance with
damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of
a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent,
partake of the nature of a special proceeding. Special proceedings require the
application of special rules as provided for in the Rules of Court. (see doctrine)
DOCTRINE: Under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to
advancement made or alleged to have been made by the deceased to any heir
may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings, and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the
person raising the questions and on the heir. While it may be true that the Rules
used the word "may," it is nevertheless clear that the same provision
contemplates a probate court when it speaks of the "court having jurisdiction of
the estate proceedings."
FACTS:
26. Spouses Simeon and Cornelia Doronio, who are both deceased, were the
original owners of a parcel of land located at Barangay Cabalitaan, Asingan,
Pangasinan covered by Original Certifcate of Title (OCT) No. 352. (the
description of the land was in Spanish but it basically states that the
adjacent owners are Zacarias Najorda and Alejandro Najorda)
27. The spouses had children but the records fail to disclose their number. It is
clear, however, that Marcelino Doronio and Fortunato Doronio, now both
deceased, were among them and that the parties in this case are their heirs.
28. Petitioners are the heirs of Marcelino Doronio (Marcelino heirs), while
respondents are the heirs of Fortunato Doronio (Fortunato heirs).
29. On April 24, 1919, a private deed of donation propter nuptias was executed
by spouses Simeon Doronio in favor of Marcelino Doronio and the latter's
wife, Veronica Pico.
30. One of the properties subject of said deed of donation is the one that it
described as follows:
Fourth — A piece of residential land located in the barrio of Cabalitian but
we did not measure it, the area is bounded on the north by Gabriel
Bernardino; on the east by Fortunato Doronio; on the south by Geminiano
Mendoza and on the west by a road to Villasis. Constructed on said land is a
house of light materials — also a part of the dowry. Value . . . 200.00.
31. It appears that the property described in the deed of donation is the one
covered by OCT No. 352.
32. However, there is a significant discrepancy with respect to the identity of
the owner of adjacent property at the eastern side.
33. Based on OCT No. 352, the adjacent owners are Zacarias Najorda and
Alejandro Najorda, whereas based on the deed of donation, the owner of the
adjacent property is Fortunato Doronio. Furthermore, said deed of donation
remained a private document as it was never notarized.
34. Both parties (Marcelino and Fortunato heirs) have been occupying the
subject land for several decades although having different theories
 regarding its ownership.
35. According to the Marcelino heirs, they are the owners based on the private
deed of donation propter nuptias, while the Fortunato heirs contend that
only half of the property was actually incorporated in the said deed of
donation because it stated that Fortunato Doronio, instead of Zacarias
Najorda and Alejandro Najorda, is the owner of the adjacent property at the
eastern side.
36. The Marcelino heirs filed before the RTC of Urdaneta Pangasinan a Petition
for the Registration of the Private Deed of Donation. The Fortunato heirs
was not named in the said petition.
37. No one interposed an objection to the petition therefore it was eventually
granted.
38. This then led the registration of the deed, which cancelled OCT 352 and a
new TCT was issued in the names of Marcelino and Veronica Doronio.
39. The Fortunato heirs filed a petition before the RTC for the reconsideration
of the decision of the RTC that ordered the registration of the subject deed
of donation. It was prayed that the registration be declared null and that the
TCT be cancelled.
40. The petition was dismissed on the ground that the decision in the previous
petition case had already become final as it was not appealed.
41. Determined to remain in their possessed property, the Fortunato heirs filed
an action for reconveyance and damages with prayer for preliminary
injunction against the Marcelino heirs.
42. They contended that the subject land is different from what was donated as
the descriptions of the property under OCT No. 352 and under the private
deed of donation were different. They posited that spouses Simeon Doronio
and Cornelia Gante intended to donate only one-half of the property.
43. The RTC ruled in favor of the Marcelino heirs, however the CA reversed
the RTC decision.
44. It held that the intention to donate half of the disputed property to the
Marcelinos can be gleaned from the disparity of technical descriptions
appearing in the title (OCT No. 352) of spouses Simeon Doronio and
Cornelia Gante and in the deed of donation propter nuptias.
45. The CA likewise ruled that the donation of the entire property in favor of
the Marcelino spouses (predecessor) is invalid on the ground that it impairs
the legitime of Fortunato Doronio.
ISSUE/s:
33. WoN the issue on impairment of legitime may be resolved and passed upon
in an action for reconveyance – NO. The issue regarding the impairment of
legitime of Fortunato Doronio must be resolved in an action for the
settlement of estates of spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. A new one is entered:
(1) Declaring the private deed of donation propter nuptias in favor of
petitioners’ predecessors NULL AND VOID; and
(2) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan to:
(a) CANCEL Transfer Certi cate of Title No. 44481 in the
names of Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico; and
(b) RESTORE Original Certi cate of Title No. 352 in the
names of its original owners, spouses Simeon Doronio and
Cornelia Gante.
SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
34. The Marcelino heirs are correct in alleging that the issue regarding the
impairment of legitime of Fortunato Doronio must be resolved in an action
for the settlement of estates of spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia
Gante.
35. It may not be passed upon in an action for reconveyance and damages.
36. A probate court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is the best forum
to ventilate and adjudge the issue of impairment of legitime as well as other
related matters involving the settlement of estate.
37. An action for reconveyance with damages is a civil action, whereas matters
relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as
advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a
special proceeding. Special proceedings require the application of special
rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.
38. An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil
action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased
person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of
the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the
application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.
39. Matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the
decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in the
exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
40. Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to
advancement made or alleged to have been made by the deceased to
any heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction
of the estate proceedings, and the final order of the court thereon shall
be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir.
41. While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may," it is
nevertheless clear that the same provision contemplates a probate court
when it speaks of the "court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings."
42. Citing Natcher v. CA, the SC held that the Regional Trial Court in the
 instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to
render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real
property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case
No. 71075 for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is not,
to our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said question.
43. However, the controversy between the parties is yet to be fully settled. The
issues as to who truly are the present owners of the property and what is the
extent of their ownership remain unresolved. The same may be properly
threshed out in the settlement of the estates of the registered owners of the
property, namely: spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante.
44. The SC therefore reverses the appealed Decision.
 TIMBOL V CANO (ARMAND)
April 29, 1961 | Labrador, J. | Administrator cannot be lessee
PETITIONER: In the matter of the Inestate Estate of the deceased Mercedes Cano,
Floranto TImbol
RESPONDENTS: Jose Cano
SUMMARY: The intestate Mercedes Cano died in August, 1945, leaving as her only
heir her son Florante C. Timbol then only 11 years old. On September 27, 1946, Jose
Cano, brother of the intestate, was appointed administrator. On April 13, 1951 Jose
Cano, filed a petition, thru his counsel Atty. Filemon Cajator, also an uncle of the
minor Florante C. Timbol, proposing that the agricultural lands of the intestate be
leased to the administrator Jose Cano for an annual rental of P4,000, this rental to be
used for the maintenance of the minor and the payment of land taxes and dues to the
government. The court subsequently approved the reduction of the annual rental from
P4k to P2.4k and the conversion of the 30 hectares of the agricultural lands into a
subdivision. On April 2, 1957, a project of partition was approved designating
Florante Timbol as the sole and exclusive heir of all the properties of the intestate. He
was appointed administrator in place of Jose Cano and presented a motion alleging
among other things (a) that the area destined for the projected subdivision be in-
creased from 30 hectares to 41.9233 hectares and (b) that the plan submitted be ap-
proved. The motions were approved but the approval was immediately thereafter set
aside to give opportunity to the former administrator and lessee Jose Cano to formu-
late his objections to the motions. Cano’s objections are (1) that the enlargement of
the subdivision would reduce the land leased to him and would deprive his tenants of
their landholdings, and (2) that he is in possession under express authority of the
court, under a valid contract, and may not be deprived of his leasehold summarily
upon a simple petition. The court granted the motions of the administrator overruling
the objections of Jose Cano and ruled that under the Civil Code, executors and ad-
ministrators cannot acquire by purchase the property of the estate under administra-
tion and are also disqualified to become the lessee of the things under their admin-
istration. The issue is WoN Jose Cano can be declared as the lessee of the proper-
ties under his administration – NO. The lease of the agricultural lands of the estate
to the appellant Cano, who was the administrator at the time the lease was granted, is
null and void not only because it is immoral but also because the lease by the admin-
istrator to himself is prohibited by law.
DOCTRINE: The lease of the agricultural lands of the estate to the administrator at
the time the lease was granted, is null and void not only because it is immoral but also
because the lease by the administrator to himself is prohibited by law.
ISSUE/s:
FACTS: (THIS DIGEST IS PRETTY MUCH THE WHOLE CASE)
100. The intestate Mercedes Cano died in August, 1945, leaving as her only heir
her son Florante C. Timbol then only 11 years old. On September 27, 1946,
Jose Cano, brother of the intestate, was appointed administrator. On April
13, 1951 Jose Cano, filed a petition, thru his counsel Atty. Filemon Cajator,
also an uncle of the minor Florante C. Timbol, proposing that the
agricultural lands of the intestate be leased to the administrator Jose Cano
for an annual rental of P4,000, this rental to be used for the maintenance of
the minor and the payment of land taxes and dues to the government.
101. On January 14, 1956 the court, upon motion of the administrator and the
conformity of the minor heir and his uncles, approved the reduction of the
annual rental of the agricultural lands of the intestate leased to the adminis-
trator from P4,000 to P2,400 and the conversion of 30 hectares of the agri-
cultural lands into a subdivision.
102. On April 2, 1957, upon motion of the administrator, a project of partition
was approved, designating Florante C. Timbol the sole and exclusive heir of
all the properties of the intestate.
103. On June 6, 1957 Florante C. Timbol was appointed administrator in place of
Jose Cano and on January 6, 1958 he presented a motion, which he modi-
fied in a subsequent one of January 8, 1958, alleging among other things (a)
that the area destined for the projected subdivision be increased from 30
hectares to 41.9233 hectares and (b) that the plan submitted be approved.
The motions were approved but the approval was immediately thereafter set
aside to give opportunity to the former administrator and lessee Jose Cano
to formulate his objections to the motions. Cano's objections are (1) that the
enlargement of the subdivision would reduce the land leased to him and
would deprive his tenants of their landholdings, and (2) that he is in posses-
sion under express authority of the court, under a valid contract, and may
not be deprived of his leasehold summarily upon a simple petition.
104. The court granted the motions of the administrator, overruling the objec-
tions of Jose Cano, in the order now subject of appeal, which reads:
The said contract of lease is on all forms illegal. Under article 1646 of the Civil Code of the Philip-
pines, — a new provision, — "the persons disqualified to buy referred to in articles 1490 and 1491,
are also disqualified to become lessee of the things mentioned therein," and under article 1491 (3) o
the same Code, executors and administrators cannot acquire by purchase the property of the estate
under administration.
If, as already stated, Florante C. Timbol was only pointed administrator on June 6, 1957 and the said
contract of lease having been executed on July 9, 1956, the same fall within the prohibition provided
by law. However, Jose C. Cano avers that this Court, in the instant proceedings, cannot pass upon
the legality of the aforesaid lease contract, but in its general jurisdiction. There is no need for the
court to declare such contract illegal and, therefore, null and void as the law so expressly provides.
105. The lower court granted Flornate C Timbol’s petitions and approved the
amended plan for subdivision and overruled Jose Cano’s motion for recon-
sideration.
12. WoN Jose Cano can be declared as the lessee of the properties under
his administration – NO. The lease of the agricultural lands of the estate to
the appellant Cano, who was the administrator at the time the lease was
granted, is null and void not only because it is immoral but also because the
lease by the administrator to himself is prohibited by law.
RULING: The court order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
appellant.
RATIO:
154. In the first assignment of error appellant claims that the consideration of the
motions of the administrator July 6 and 8, 1958, without due notice to him,
who is lessee is a violation of the Rules of Court. This objection lost its
force when the court, motu proprio set aside it first order of approval and
furnished copy of the motion to appellant and gave him all the opportunity
to present his objections thereto.
155. In the second and third assignments of error appellant argues that the court
below, as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to deprive the appellant of his
rights under the lease, because these rights may be annulled or modified on-
ly by a court of general jurisdiction. The above arguments are without mer-
it. In probate proceedings the court orders the probate of the will of the de-
cedent (Rule 80, See. 5); grants letters of administration to the party best en-
titled thereto or to any qualified applicant (Id., Sec. 6); supervises and con-
trols all acts of administration; hears and approves claims against the estate
of the deceased (Rule 87, See. 13); orders payment of lawful debts (Rule
89, Sec. 14); authorizes sale, mortgage or any encumbrance of real estate
(Rule 90, Sec. 2); directs the delivery of the estate to those entitled thereto
(Rule 91, See. 1). It has been held that the court acts as a trustee, and as
such trustee, should jealously guard the estate and see that it is wisely and
economically administered, not dissipated. (Tambunting vs. San Jose)
156. Even the contract of lease under which the appellant holds the agricultural
lands of the intestate and which he now seeks to protect, was obtained with
the court's approval. If the probate court has the right to approve the lease,
so may it order its revocation, or the reduction of the subject of the lease.
The matter of giving the property to a lessee is an act of administration, also
subject to the approval of the court. Of course, if the court abuses its discre-
tion in the approval of the contracts or acts of the administrator, its orders
may be subject to appeal and may be reversed on appeal; but not because
the court may make an error may it be said that it lacks jurisdiction to con-
trol acts of administration of the administrator.
157. In the fourth assignment of error, appellant argues that the effect of the re-
duction of the area under lease would be to deprive the tenants of appellant
of their landholdings. In the first place, the tenants know ought to know that
the lands leased are lands under administration, subject to be sold, divided
or finally delivered to the heir, according to the progress of the administra-
tion of the lands of the intestate. The order appealed from does not have the
effect of immediately depriving them of their landholdings; the order does
not state so, it only states that the lands leased shall be reduced and subdi-
vided. If they refuse to leave their landholdings, the administrator will cer-
tainly proceed as the law provides. But in the meanwhile, the lessee cannot
allege the rights of his tenants as an excuse for refusing the reduction or-
dered by the court.
158. In the fifth assignment of error, appellant claims that his rights as lessee
would be prejudiced because the land leased would be reduced without a
corresponding reduction in the rentals. This would be a matter to be litigate
between the administrator and himself before the probate court. But the fact
of the prejudice alone cannot bar reduction of the land leased, because such
reduction is necessary to raise funds with which to pay and liquidate the
debts of the estate under administration.
159. The sixth assignment of error merits no attention on our part; it is appellant
himself who, as administrator since 1945, has delayed the settlement of the
estate.
160. In the seventh assignment of error, appellant argues that since the project of
partition had already been approved and had become final, the lower court
has lost jurisdiction to appoint a new administrator or to authorize the en-
largement of the land to be converted into a subdivision. This assignment of
error needs but a passing mention. The probate court loses jurisdiction of
an estate under administration only after the payment of all the debts
the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same.
In the case at bar, the debts had not yet been paid, and the estate had
not yet been delivered to the heirs as such heir.
161. We have taken pains to answer all the arguments adduced by the appellant
on this appeal. But all said arguments are squarely laid to naught by the dec-
laration of the court that the lease of the agricultural lands of the estate
to the appellant Cano, who was the administrator at the time the lease
was granted, is null and void not only because it is immoral but also be-
cause the lease by the administrator to himself is prohibited by law.(See
Arts. 1646 and 1491, Civil Code of the Philippines). And in view of the
declaration of the court below that the lease is null and void, which declara-
tion we hereby affirm, it would seem proper for the administrator under the
direction of the court, to take steps to get back the lands leased from the ap-
pellant herein, or so much thereof as is needed in the course of administra-
tion.
 008 REYES v. RTC (MERILLES)
August 11, 2008 | Brion, J. | Remedy of excluded heir
PETITIONER: Oscar C. Reyes
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Regional Trial Court of Makati 142, Zenith Insurance
Corporation, and Rodrigo C. Reyes
SUMMARY: Spouses Pedro and Anastacia had shares of stocks with Zenith
Insurance. Their sons, Oscar and Rodrigo, likewise owned shares in Zenith.
When the spouses died, the estate of Pedro was judicially settled, however the
estate of Anastacia was not. Anastacia had 136,598 shares which was allegedly
not distributed to the heirs.
Zenith and Rodrigo field a derivative suit with the SEC (then transferred to the
RTC acting as a special commercial court) against Oscar. Oscar filed a Motion
to Declare Complaint as Nuisance or Harassment Suit and alleged that the RTC
special commercial court was without jurisdiction because the case is not a bona
fide derivative suit as it is in the nature of a petition for the settlement of estate
of Anastacia which is outside its jurisdiction. The RTC denied the motion,
which the CA affirmed.
The issue before the SC is whether the trial court sitting as a special commercial
court, has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Rodrigos complaint? No. More
than the mattes of injury and redress what Rodrigo clearly aims to accomplish
through his allegations of illegal acquisition by Oscar is the distribution of
Anastacia’s shareholdings without a prior settlement of her estate— an objective
that, by law and jurisprudence, cannot be done.
The RTC acting as a special commercial court, has no jurisdiction to settle,
partition, and distribute the estate of a deceased.
DOCTRINE: In summary, whether as an individual or as a derivative suit, the
RTC sitting as special commercial court has no jurisdiction to hear Rodrigos
complaint since what is involved is the determination and distribution of
successional rights to the shareholdings of Anastacia Reyes. Rodrigos proper
remedy, under the circumstances, is to institute a special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased Anastacia Reyes, a move that is not
foreclosed by the dismissal of his present complaint.
FACTS:
(NOTE: This case is in the book, please refer to page 180)
1. Oscar and Rodrigo Reyes are two of the four children of spouses Pedro and
Anastacia Reyes
2. Oscar, Rodrigo, Pedro, and Anastacia each owned shares of stock of Zenith
Insurance Corp.
3. Pedro and Anastacia died. Pedros estate was judicially partitioned among
his heirs, however no similar settlement appear to have been made with
Anastacia’s estate
a. Anastacia owned 136,598 shares of Zenith
b. Oscar owned 8,715,637 shares
c. Rodrigo owned 4,250 shares
4. On May 9, 2000, Zenith and Rodrigo filed a complaint with the SEC against
Oscar.
a. The complaint stated that it is a derivative suit initiated and filed
by the complainant Rodrigo C. Reyes to obtain an accounting of
the funds and assets of ZENITH INSURANCE
CORPORATION which are now or formerly in the control,
custody, and/or possession of Oscar
b. AND to determine the shares of stock of deceased spouses
Pedro and Anastacia Reyes that were arbitrarily and fraudulently
appropriated [by Oscar] for himself [and] which were not collated
and taken into account in the partition, distribution, and/or
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouses, for which he
should be ordered to account for all the income from the time he
took these shares of stock, and should now deliver to his brothers
and sisters their just and respective shares
5. Oscar denied the charges.
a. He asserted, as defense, that he purchased the subject shares with
his own funds from the unissued stocks of Zenith,
b. and that the suit is not a bona fidederivative suit because the
requisites therefor have not been complied with.
c. He thus questioned the SECs jurisdiction to entertain the complaint
because it pertains to the settlement of the estate of Anastacia
Reyes.
6. Wjem RA 8799 took effect, the SECs exclusive and original jurisdiction
over cases enumerated in Section 5 of PD No. 902-A was transferred to the
RTC designated as a special commercial court.
a. The records of Rodrigos SEC case were thus turned over to the
RTC, Branch 142, Makati
7. Oscar filed a Motion to Declare Complaint as Nuisance or Harassment Suit.
a. He claimed that the complaint is a mere nuisance or harassment
suit and should, according to the Interim Rules of Procedure for
Intra-Corporate Controversies, be dismissed;
b. and that it is not a bona fide derivative suit as it partakes of the
nature of a petition for the settlement of estate of the deceased
Anastacia that is outside the jurisdiction of a special commercial
 court.
8. The RTC denied the Motion of Oscar.
9. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC order. The MR filed was likewise
denied.
10. Hence, Oscar comes before the SC on appeal through petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUE/s:
1. Whether the trial court, sitting as a special commercial court, has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of Rodrigos complaint
RULING: WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition and REVERSE the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 26, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 74970. The
complaint before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 142, Makati, docketed as Civil
Case No. 00-1553, is ordered DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
RATIO:
1. To resolve the issue, we rely on the judicial principle that jurisdiction over
the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the
allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled
to all or some of the claims asserted therein.
2. PD No. 902-A enumerates the ages over which the SEC (now RTC acting
as special commercials ourt) exercises exclusive jurisdiction:
3. The allegations set forth in Rodrigos complaint principally invoke Section
5, paragraphs (a) and (b) as basis for the exercise of RTCs special court
jurisdiction
a. SECTION 5. In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative
functions of the Securities and Exchange Commission over
corporations, partnership, and other forms of associations
registered with it as expressly granted under existing laws and
decrees, it shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases involving:
i. a) Devices or schemes employed by or any acts of the
board of directors, business associates, its officers or
partners, amounting to fraud and misrepresentation
which may be detrimental to the interest of the public
and/or of the stockholders, partners, members of
associations or organizations registered with the
Commission.
ii. b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or
partnership relations, between and among stockholders,
members, or associates; between any or all of them and
the corporation, partnership or association of which they
are stockholders, members, or associates, respectively;
and between such corporation, partnership or association
and the State insofar as it concerns their individual
franchise or right to exist as such entity;
4. The rule is that a complaint must contain a plain, concise, and direct
statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action and
must specify the relief sought
5. Section 5, Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that in all
averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or
mistake must be stated with particularity
6. Allegations of deceit, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentation, and
threats are largely conclusions of law that, without supporting statements of
the facts to which the allegations of fraud refer, do not sufficiently state an
effective cause of action
7. The late Justice Jose Feria, a noted authority in Remedial Law, declared that
fraud and mistake are required to be averred with particularity in order to
enable the opposing party to controvert the particular facts allegedly
constituting such fraud or mistake.
8. Tested against these standards, we find that the charges of fraud against
Oscar were not properly supported by the required factual allegations.
a. While the complaint contained allegations of fraud purportedly
committed by him, these allegations are not particular enough to
bring the controversy within the special commercial courts
jurisdiction; they are not statements of ultimate facts, but are mere
conclusions of law: how and why the alleged appropriation of
shares can be characterized as illegal and fraudulent were not
explained nor elaborated on.
9. Not every allegation of fraud done in a corporate setting or perpetrated by
corporate officers will bring the case within the special commercial courts
jurisdiction.
a. To fall within this jurisdiction, there must be sufficient nexus
showing that the corporations nature, structure, or powers were
used to facilitate the fraudulent device or scheme.
10. The complaint presented a reverse situation. No corporate power or office
was alleged to have facilitated the transfer of the shares; rather, Oscar, as an
individual and without reference to his corporate personality, was alleged to
have transferred the shares of Anastacia to his name, allowing him to
become the majority and controlling stockholder of Zenith, and eventually,
the corporations President.
11. In ordinary cases, the failure to specifically allege the fraudulent acts does
not constitute a ground for dismissal since such defect can be cured by a bill
of particulars. In cases governed by the Interim Rules of Procedure on Intra-
Corporate Controversies, however, a bill of particulars is a prohibited
pleading.
a. It is essential, therefore, for the complaint to show on its face what
 are claimed to be the fraudulent corporate acts if the complainant
wishes to invoke the courts special commercial jurisdiction.
12. The SC notes that twice in the course of this case, Rodrigo had been given
the opportunity to study the propriety of amending or withdrawing the
complaint, but he consistently refused.
13. The courts function in resolving issues of jurisdiction is limited to the
review of the allegations of the complaint and, on the basis of these
allegations, to the determination of whether they are of such nature and
subject that they fall within the terms of the law defining the courts
jurisdiction.
14. The SC cannot read into the complaint any specifically alleged corporate
fraud that will call for the exercise of the courts special commercial
jurisdiction. Thus, we cannot affirm the RTCs assumption of jurisdiction
over Rodrigos complaint on the basis of Section 5(a) of P.D. No. 902-A
15. The SC also answers the question: Is there an intra-corporate relationship
between the parties that would characterize the case as an intra-corporate
dispute?
16. We point out at the outset that while Rodrigo holds shares of stock in
Zenith, he holds them in two capacities: in his own right with respect to the
4,250 shares registered in his name, and as one of the heirs of Anastacia
Reyes with respect to the 136,598 shares registered in her name.
a. What is material in resolving the issues of this case under the
allegations of the complaint is Rodrigos interest as an heir since
the subject matter of the present controversy centers on the shares
of stocks belonging to Anastacia, not on Rodrigos personally-
owned shares nor on his personality as shareholder owning these
shares.
17. Article 777 of the Civil Code declares that the successional rights are
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. Accordingly, upon
Anastacias death, her children acquired legal title to her estate (which title
includes her shareholdings in Zenith), and they are, prior to the estates
partition, deemed co-owners thereof
18. This status as co-owners, however, does not immediately and necessarily
make them stockholders of the corporation. Unless and until there is
compliance with Section 63 of the Corporation Code on the manner of
transferring shares, the heirs do not become registered stockholders of the
corporation.
19. Simply stated, the transfer of title by means of succession, though effective
and valid between the parties involved (i.e., between the decedents estate
and her heirs), does not bind the corporation and third parties. The transfer
must be registered in the books of the corporation to make the transferee-
heir a stockholder entitled to recognition as such both by the corporation
and by third parties
20. The SC’s examination of the complaint yields the conclusion that, more
than anything else, the complaint is about the protection and enforcement of
successional rights.
a. The controversy it presents is purely civil rather than corporate,
although it is denominated as a complaint for accounting of all
corporate funds and assets.
21. The derivative suit for accounting of the funds and assets of the corporation
which are in the control, custody, and/or possession of Oscar does not
constitute a separate cause of action but is, as correctly claimed by Oscar,
only an incident to the action for determination of the shares of stock of
deceased spouses
22. Another significant indicator that points us to the real nature of the
complaint are Rodrigos repeated claims of illegal and fraudulent transfers of
Anastacias shares by Oscar to the prejudice of the other heirs of the
decedent; he cited these allegedly fraudulent acts as basis for his demand
for the collation and distribution of Anastacias shares to the heirs.
a. These claims tell us unequivocally that the present controversy
arose from the parties relationship as heirs of Anastacia and not as
shareholders of Zenith.
23. More than the matters of injury and redress, what Rodrigo clearly aims to
accomplish through his allegations of illegal acquisition by Oscar is the
distribution of Anastacias shareholdings without a prior settlement of her
estate an objective that, by law and established jurisprudence, cannot be
done.
a. The RTC of Makati, acting as a special commercial court, has no
jurisdiction to settle, partition, and distribute the estate of a
deceased.
24. An accounting of the funds and assets of Zenith to determine the extent and
value of Anastacias shareholdings will be undertaken by a probate court and
not by a special commercial court is completely consistent with the probate
courts limited jurisdiction.
a. It has the power to enforce an accounting as a necessary means to
its authority to determine the properties included in the inventory
of the estate to be administered, divided up, and distributed.
25. In summary, whether as an individual or as a derivative suit, the RTC sitting
as special commercial court has no jurisdiction to hear Rodrigos complaint
since what is involved is the determination and distribution of successional
rights to the shareholdings of Anastacia Reyes. Rodrigos proper remedy,
under the circumstances, is to institute a special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased Anastacia Reyes, a move that is not
foreclosed by the dismissal of his present complaint.
 009 QUASHA v. LCN (PELIÑO)
August 26, 2008 | Chico-Nazario, J. | Distribution, Partition, and Termination of Es-
tate Procedings
PETITIONERS: Quasha Ancheta Peña and Nolasco Law Office for its own behalf, and
representing the Heirs of Raymond Triviere
RESPONDENT: LCN Construction Corp.
SUMMARY: Raymond Triviere died. Proceedings for the settlement of his intestate
estate were instituted by his widow before the RTC. Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha of
QLO represented the widow and children and were appointed as administrators of the
estate. As administrators, they incurred expenses for the payment of obligations and for
administration and preservation of the estate, as well as litigation expenses. The adminis-
trators filed before the RTC a Motion for Payment of their litigation expenses. But the
RTC denied on the ground of failure to submit accounting of the assets and liabilities.
But Atty. Quasha died. So Atty. Zapata from QLO took over in behalf of Atty. Quasha to
help Atty. Syquia. Atty. Zapata and Atty. Syquia filed a second Motion for Payment for
their own behalf and for their respective clients. LCN, as the only remaining claimant
against the estate filed its Comment/Opposition. LCN countered that the RTC had al-
ready resolved the issue of payment of litigation expenses. They also aver that the ad-
ministrators and the heirs had earlier agreed to fix the former’s fees at only 5% of the
gross estate, based on which, per the computation of LCN, the administrators were even
overpaid P55k. Its claims are still outstanding and chargeable against the estate, so no
distribution should be allowed until they have been paid; especially considering that as of
August 25, 2002, the claim of LCN against the estate amounted to P6,016,570.65 as
against the remaining assets of the estate totaling to P4,738,558.63, rendering the estate
insolvent. RTC issued its order taking note that “the widow and the heirs, after all the
years, have not received their respective share in the estate…” RTC declared that there
was no more need for accounting of the assets and liabilities of the estate considering
that the estate has no more assets except for the money deposited with Union Bank. RTC
granted the 2nd Motion for Payment, but reduced the sums to be paid. LCN filed a MR,
but was denied. LCN sought recourse to the CA. CA partly ruled in favor of LCN. CA
revoked the P450k share and P150k share awarded by the RTC to the children and wid-
ow, respectively, on the basis that Sec. 1 of Rule 91 of the ROC proscribes the distribu-
tion of the residue of the estate until all its obligations have been paid and conceded that
the administrators were entitled to their fees. QLO filed a MR but was denied. Hence,
this petition. The main issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the
award in favor of the heirs is already a distribution of the residue of the estate. The SC
held in the negative. A perusal of the Order of the RTC would immediately reveal that it
was not yet distributing the residue of the estate. While the awards in favor of the chil-
dren and widow made in the RTC Order was not yet a distribution of the residue of the
estate, given that there was still a pending claim against the estate, still, they did consti-
tute a partial and advance distribution of the estate. Virtually, the children and widow
were already being awarded shares in the estate, although not all of its obligations had
been paid or provided for. The 2nd par. of Sec. 1 of Rule 90 allows the distribution of the
estate prior to the payment of the obligations mentioned therein, provided that "the dis-
tributees, or any of them, gives a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for
the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs." Although it is
within the discretion of the RTC whether or not to permit the advance distribution of the
estate, its exercise of such discretion should be qualified by the following: (1) only part
of the estate that is not affected by any pending controversy or appeal may be the subject
of advance distribution (Sec. 2, Rule 109); and (2) the distributees must post a bond,
fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of outstanding obligations of the estate
(par. 2 of Sec. 1, Rule 90). There is no showing that the RTC, in awarding to the peti-
tioner children and widow their shares in the estate prior to the settlement of all its obli-
gations, complied with these two requirements or, at the very least, took the same into
consideration. Its Order is completely silent on these matters. It justified its grant of the
award in a single sentence which stated that the children and widow had not yet received
their respective shares from the estate after all these years.
DOCTRINE: Although it is within the discretion of the RTC whether or not to permit
the advance distribution of the estate, its exercise of such discretion should be qualified
by the following: (1) only part of the estate that is not affected by any pending controver-
sy or appeal may be the subject of advance distribution (Sec. 2, Rule 109); and (2) the
distributees must post a bond, fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of out-
standing obligations of the estate (par. 2 of Sec. 1, Rule 90).
FACTS:
1. Raymond Trievere passed away on December 14, 1987.
2. On January 13, 1988, proceedings for the settlement of his intestate estate
were instituted by his widow, Amy Consuelo Triviere before the RTC of
Makati Br. 63 of the NCR.
3. Atty. Enrique Syquia (Syquia) and Atty. William Quasha (Quasha) of the
Quasha Law Office (QLO), representing the widow and children of the late
Raymond Trievere, respectively, were appointed administrators of the estate
in April 1988.
a. As administrators, Syquia and Quasha incurred expenses for the pay-
ment of real estate taxes, security services, and the preservation and
administration of the estate, as well as litigation expenses.
4. February 1995, Syquia and Quasha filed before the RTC a Motion for Pay-
ment of their litigation expenses.
a. RTC denied the Motion for Payment on the ground of failure to submit
an accounting of the assets and liabilities of the estate under administra-
tion.
5. In 1996, Atty. Quasha also passed away. And Atty. Redentor Zapata (Zapa-
ta), also of the QLO, took over as the counsel of the Triviere children and
continued to help Atty. Syquia in the settlement of the estate.
6. On September 6, 2002, Syquia and Zapata filed another Motion for Pay-
ment, for their own behalf and for their respective clients, presenting the
following allegations:
a. That the instant Petition was filed on January 13, 1988; and Atty. Enrique P. Syquia was
appointed Administrator by the Order of this Honorable Court dated April 12, 1988, and
discharged his duties starting April 22, 1988, after properly posting his administrator's
bond up to this date, or more than fourteen (14) years later. Previously, there was the co-
administrator Atty. William H. Quasha, but he has already passed away.
 b. That, together with Co-administrator Atty. William H. Quasha, they have performed dili-
gently and conscientiously their duties as Co-administrators, having paid the required Es-
tate tax and settled the various claims against the Estate, totaling approximately 20
claims, and the only remaining claim is the unmeritorious claim of LCN Construction
Corp. (LCN), now pending before this Honorable Court;
c. That for all their work since April 22, 1988, up to July 1992, or for 4 years, they were on-
ly given the amount of P20,000.00 each on November 28, 1988; and another P50,00.00
each on October 1991; and the amount of P100,000.00 each on July 1992; or a total of
P170,000.00 to cover their administration fees, counsel fees and expenses;
d. That through their work, they were able to settle all the testate (sic) claims except the re-
maining baseless claim of LCN and were able to dismiss 2 foreign claims, and were also
able to increase the monetary value of the estate from roughly over P1Million to the pre-
sent P4,738,558.63 as of August 25, 2002 and maturing on September 27, 2002; and the
money has always been with the Philippine National Bank, as per the Order of this Hon-
orable Court;
e. That since July 1992, when the co-administrators were paid P100,000.00 each, nothing
has been paid to either Administrator Syquia or his client, the widow Consuelo Triviere;
nor to the Quasha Law Offices or their clients, the children of the deceased Raymond
Triviere;
f. That as this Honorable Court will notice, Administrator Syquia has always been present
during the hearings held for the many years of this case; and the Quasha Law Offices has
always been represented by its counsel, Atty. Redentor C. Zapata; and after all these
years, their clients have not been given a part of their share in the estate;
g. That Administrator Syquia, who is a lawyer, is entitled to additional Administrator's fees
since, as provided in Section 7, Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court: ". . . where the es-
tate is large, and the settlement has been attended with great difficulty, and has required a
high degree of capacity on the part of the executor or administrator, a greater sum may be
allowed. . ." In addition, Atty. Zapata has also been present in all the years of this case. In
addition, they have spent for all the costs of litigation especially the transcripts, as out-of-
pocket expenses.
h. That considering all the foregoing, especially the fact that neither the Administrator or his
client, the widow; and the Quasha Law Offices or their clients, the children of the de-
ceased, have received any money for more than ten (10) years now, they respectfully
move that the amount of P1Million be taken from the Estate funds, to be divided as fol-
lows: a) P450,000.00 as share of the children of the deceased who are represented by the
Quasha Ancheta Peña & Nolasco Law Offices; b) P200,000.00 as attorney's fees and liti-
gation expenses for the Quasha Ancheta Peña & Nolasco Law Offices; c) P150,000.00 as
share for the widow of the deceased, Amy Consuelo Triviere; and d) P200,000.00 for the
administrator Syquia, who is also the counsel of the widow; and for litigation costs and
expenses.
7. LCN, as the only remaining claimant against the intestate estate of Ray-
mond Triviere in Special Proceedings case, filed its Comment
on/Opposition to the aforequoted Motion on October 2, 2002.
a. LCN countered that the RTC had already resolved the issue of payment
of litigation expenses when it denied the first Motion for Payment filed
by Syquia and Quasha for failure of the administrators to submit an ac-
counting of the assets and expenses of the estate as required.
b. They also aver that the administrators and the heirs had earlier agreed
to fix the former’s fees at only 5% of the gross estate, based on which,
per the computation of LCN, the administrators were even overpaid
P55k.
c. Further, contrary to what was stated in the 2nd Motion for Payment, Sec.
7 of Rule 85 of the ROC was inapplicable since the administrators
failed to establish that the estate was large, or that its settlement was at-
tended with great difficulty, or required a high degree of capacity on
the part of the administrators.
d. Its claims are still outstanding and chargeable against the estate, so no
distribution should be allowed until they have been paid; especially
considering that as of August 25, 2002, the claim of LCN against the
estate amounted to P6,016,570.65 as against the remaining assets of the
estate totaling to P4,738,558.63, rendering the estate insolvent.
8. RTC issued its order taking note that “the widow and the heirs, after all the
years, have not received their respective share in the estate…”
a. RTC declared that there was no more need for accounting of the assets
and liabilities of the estate considering that the estate has no more as-
sets except for the money deposited with Union Bank.
b. As to the payment of fees of Syquia and Quasha Law Office, both the
co-administrator and counsel of the deceased are entitlted to the pay-
ment for the services they have rendered and accomplished for the es-
tate and the heirs of the deceased as they have over a decade now spent
so much time, labor and skill to accomplish the task assigned to them;
and the last time the administrators obtained their fees was in 1992.
c. RTC granted the 2nd Motion for Payment, but reduced the sums to be
paid.36
9. LCN filed a MR on July 2, 2003, but was denied on October 29, 2003.
10. On May 13, 2004, LCN sought recourse to the CA through a petition for
certiorari, raising the following arguments:
a. The administrator's claim for attorney's fees, aside from being prohibit-
ed under paragraph 3, Section 7 of Rule 85 is, together with administra-
tion and litigation expenses, in the nature of a claim against the estate
which should be ventilated and resolved pursuant to Section 8 of Rule
86;
b. The awards violate Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, as there
still exists its (LCN's) unpaid claim in the sum of P6,016,570.65; and
c. The alleged deliberate failure of the co-administrators to submit an ac-
counting of the assets and liabilities of the estate does not warrant the
Court's favorable action on the motion for payment.
11. CA partly ruled in favor of LCN:37
a. They conceded that Atty. Syquia and the Quasha Law Office, as the
administrators of the estate, were entitled to the administrator’s fees
36
a) P450,000.00 as share of the children of the deceased who are represented by the Quasha, Ancheta, Pena, Nolasco
Law Offices; b) P100,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses for said law firm; c) P150,000.00 as share for the
widow of the deceased Amy Consuelo Triviere; and d) P100,000.00 for the Co-administrator Atty. Enrique P. Syquia and
for litigation costs and expenses.
37
Shares awarded to the heirs were deleted, and the atty’s fees awarded in favor of the co-administrators are likewise
deleted.
 and litigation expenses, they could not claim from the funds of the es-
tate, on the basis of Sec. 7, Rule 85 of the ROC, the award of expenses
and fees in favor of executors and administrators is subject to the quali-
fication that where the executor or administrator is a lawyer, he shall
not charge against the estate any professional fees for legal services
rendered by him; that the atty’s fees should be borne by the clients (the
widow and the heirs).
b. Revoked the P450k share and P150k share awarded by the RTC to the
children and widow, respectively, on the basis that Sec. 1 of Rule 91 of
the ROC proscribes the distribution of the residue of the estate until all
its obligations have been paid.
c. But the CA did not agree with LCN’s position that administraor’s
claims against the estate should have been presented and resolved in
accordance with Sec. 8 of Rule 86 of the ROC. Claims against the es-
tate that require presentation under Rule 86 refer to “debts or demands
of a pecuniary nature which could have been enforced against the dece-
dent during his lifetime and which could have been reduced to simple
judgment and among which are those founded on contracts."
d. CA also found the failure of the administrators to render an accounting
excusable on the basis of Sec. 8, Rule 85 of ROC.
12. QLO filed a MR on the May 11, 2006 Decision, but in a resolution of Sep-
tember 22, 2006, were denied, reasoning out:
a. In sum, private respondents did not earlier dispute [herein respondent
LCN's] claim in its petition that the law firm and its lawyers served as
coadministrators of the estate of the late Triviere. It is thus quite absurd
for the said law firm to now dispute in the motion for reconsideration
its being a coadministrator of the estate.
b. [Herein petitioners], through counsel, likewise appear to be adopting in
their motion for reconsideration a stance conflicting with their earlier
theory submitted to this Court. Notably, the memorandum for [petition-
er] heirs states that the claim for attorney's fees is supported by the facts
and law. To support such allegation, they contend that Section 7 (3) of
Rule 85 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure finds no application to the
instant case since "what is being charged are not professional fees for
legal services rendered but payment for administration of the Estate
which has been under the care and management of the co-
administrators for the past fourteen (14) years." Their allegation, there-
fore, in their motion for reconsideration that Section 7 (3) of Rule 85 is
"merely seeking payment for legal services rendered to the estate and
for litigation expenses" deserves scant consideration.
13. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/s:
1. WON CA erred in ruling that the award in favor of the heirs is already a
distribution of the residue of the estate. - NO,
2. WON CA erred in nullifying the award of atty’s fees in favor of the co-
administrators. - YES, since they rendered legal services.
RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari
is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The decision and resolution of the CA are AF-
FIRMED, with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1) Quasha Law Office is entitled to atty’s fees of P100k, for legal services
rendered for the Triviere children in the settlement of the estate of their de-
ceased father, the same to be paid by the Triviere children in the manner
herein discussed;
2) Attys. Syquia and Quasha are entitled to the payment of their corresponding
administrators’fees, to be determined by the RTC handling the special pro-
ceedings case, Br. 63 of the RTC of Makati, the same to be chargeable to
the estate of Triviere.
RATIO:
On whether CA erred in ruling that the award in favor of the heirs is already a dis-
tribution of the residue of the estate
1. The CA modified the June 12, 2003 Order of the RTC by deleting the
awards of P450k and P150k in favor of the children and widow of Raymond
Triviere, respectively. CA adopted the position of LCN that the claim of
LCN was an obligation of the estate which was yet unpaid and, under Sec.
1, Rule 90, barred the distribution of the residue of the estate.
2. QLO insists that the awards in favor of the children heirs and the widow is
not a distribution of the residue of the estate, thus, rendering Sec. 1, Rule
9038 inapplicable.
a. They argue that the the June 12, 2003 Order of the RTC should not be
construed as a final order of distribution. The Order granting the 2nd
Motion for Payment is a mere interlocutory order that does not end the
estate proceedings. Only an order of distribution directing the delivery
of the residue of the estate to the proper distributees brings the intestate
proceedings to a close and, consequently, puts an end to the administra-
tion and relieves the administrator of his duties.
38
Section 1. When order for distribution of residue made. — When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of admin-
istration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have
been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after
hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the propor-
tions, or parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their respective shares from the
executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the court
as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under
the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for,
unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs.
 3. SC: A perusal of the Order of the RTC would immediately reveal that it was
not yet distributing the residue of the estate. The said Order grants the pay-
ment of certain amounts from the funds of the estate to the children and
widow, considering that they have not received their respective shares for
more than a decade. Out of the reported P4,738,558.63 value of the estate,
the children and widow were being awarded by the RTC their shares in the
collective amount of P600k. Evidently, the remaining portion of the estate
still needs to be settled. The intestate proceedings were not yet concluded,
and the RTC still had to hear and rule on the pending claim of LCN against
the estate of Raymond Triviere and only thereafter can it distribute the resi-
due of the estate, if any, to his heirs.
a. While the awards in favor of the children and widow made in the RTC
Order was not yet a distribution of the residue of the estate, given that
there was still a pending claim against the estate, still, they did consti-
tute a partial and advance distribution of the estate. Virtually, the chil-
dren and widow were already being awarded shares in the estate, alt-
hough not all of its obligations had been paid or provided for.
b. Sec. 2 of Rule 109 expressly recognizes advance distribution of the es-
tate.39
c. The 2nd par. of Sec. 1 of Rule 90 allows the distribution of the estate
prior to the payment of the obligations mentioned therein, provided that
"the distributees, or any of them, gives a bond, in a sum to be fixed by
the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such
time as the court directs."
d. Although it is within the discretion of the RTC whether or not to permit
the advance distribution of the estate, its exercise of such discretion
should be qualified by the following: (1) only part of the estate that is
not affected by any pending controversy or appeal may be the subject
of advance distribution (Sec. 2, Rule 109); and (2) the distributees must
post a bond, fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of out-
standing obligations of the estate (par. 2 of Sec. 1, Rule 90).
e. There is no showing that the RTC, in awarding to the petitioner chil-
dren and widow their shares in the estate prior to the settlement of all
its obligations, complied with these two requirements or, at the very
least, took the same into consideration. Its Order is completely silent on
these matters. It justified its grant of the award in a single sentence
which stated that the children and widow had not yet received their re-
spective shares from the estate after all these years.
39
Section 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. — Notwithstanding a pending controversy or appeal in pro-
ceedings to settle the estate of a decedent, the court may, in its discretion and upon such terms as it may deem proper and
just, permit that such part of the estate as may not be affected by the controversy or appeal be distributed among the heirs
or legatees, upon compliance with the conditions set forth in Rule 90 of these rules.
f. Taking into account that the claim of LCN against the estate of the late
Raymond Triviere allegedly amounted to P6,016,570.65, already in ex-
cess of the P4,738,558.63 reported total value of the estate, the RTC
should have been more prudent in approving the advance distribution of
the same.
4. The SC also said that the Dael v. IAC case being invoked by QLO, where
the SC sustained an Order granting the partial distribution of an estate, is
not on all fours with this case.
a. In the Dael case, eh estate has sufficient assets and it did not appear
that there were unpaid obligations. No similar determination on suffi-
ciency of assets or absence of outstanding obligations was made by the
RTC in this case.
b. Also, the Court in that case, actually cautioned that partial distribution
pending final termination of the testate or intestate proceeding should,
as much as possible, be discouraged by the courts, and except in ex-
treme cases, such form of advances should not be countenanced. Rea-
son: courts should guard with utmost zeal and jealousy the estate of the
decedent to the end that the creditors be adequately protected and all
the rightful heirs be assured of their shares in the inheritance.
On whether CA erred in nullifying award of atty’s fees
1. QLO: They are entitled to the award of atty’s fees and the 3rd par. of Sec. 7
of Rule 8540 is inapplicable to it.
a. In the pleadings filed by QLO before the CA, it referred to itself as a
co-administrator of the estate.
b. In the comment submitted to the CA by Atty. Doronila, a member-
lawyer assigned by QLO to the case, it stated: The 12 June 2003 Order
granted the Motion for Payment filed by Co- Administrator and counsel
Atty. Enrique P. Syquia and the counsel Atty. Cirilo E. Doronila and
Co-Administrator for the children of the late Raymond Triviere. . . . .
c. In the same pleading, it would also claim to be the “co-administrator
and counsel for the heirs of Raymond Triviere”.
d. The Memorandum it submitted to the CA on behalf of its clients, the
children of Raymond, QLO alleged, in essence that the co-
administrator was Atty. Syquia and the undersigned counsel. And that
Atty. Syquia as co-administrator and counsel for Amy Triviere, and the
undersigned counsel, co-administrator fo the children of Raymond
Triviere.
40
Section 7. What expenses and fees allowed executor or administrator. Not to charge for services as attorney. Compen-
sation provided by will controls unless renounced.
xxx
When the executor or administrator is an attorney, he shall not charge against the estate any professional fees for legal
services rendered by him.
 e. QLO asserts that it is not within the purview of Sec. 7, Rule 85 since it
is not an appointed administrator of the estate. When Atty. Quasha
passed away, Atty. Syquia was left as the sole administrator of the es-
tate. The person of Atty. Quasha was distinct from QLO; and the ap-
pointment of Atty. Quasha as administrator of the estate did not extend
to his law office. Neither could QLO be deemed to have substituted
Atty. Quasha as administrator upon the latter's death for the same
would be in violation of the rules on the appointment and substitution
of estate administrators, particularly, Sec. 2, Rule 82. Hence, when
Atty. Quasha died, QLO merely helped in the settlement of the estate as
counsel for the children.
f. In its Memorandum before the, however, QLO argues that "what is be-
ing charged are not professional fees for legal services rendered but
payment for administration of the Estate which has been under the care
and management of the co-administrators for the past fourteen (14)
years." On the other hand, in the Motion for Payment filed with the
RTC, QLO prayed for P200k as "attorney's fees and litigation expens-
es". Being lumped together, and absent evidence to the contrary, the
P200k for attorney's fees and litigation expenses prayed for by QLO
can be logically and reasonably presumed to be in connection with cas-
es handled by said law office on behalf of the estate.
g. Quasha is seeking atty’s fees as compensation for the legal services it
rendered in these cases, as well as reimbursement of the litigation ex-
penses it incurred therein.
2. SC: the sudden change in theory of QLO is disfavored by the Court. They
initially asserted itself as co-administrator, and then denied that it substitut-
ed Atty. Quasha. But this rule admits of exceptions: in the interest of justice
and with the sound discretion of the appellate court, a party may change his
legal theory on appeal, only when the factual bases thereof would not re-
quire presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to
enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new theory.
a. SC finds it necessary to exercise leniency on the rule against changing
of theory on appeal, consistent with the rules of fair play and in the in-
terest of justice.
b. Quasha presented conflicting arguments with respect to whether or not
it was co-administrator of the estate. Nothing in the records, however,
reveals that any one of the lawyers of QLO was indeed a substitute ad-
ministrator for Atty. Quasha upon his death.
c. The court has jurisdiction to appoint an administrator of an estate by
granting letters of administration to a person not otherwise disqualified
or incompetent to serve as such, following the procedure laid down in
Sec. 6, Rule 78. Corollary thereto, Sec. 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court
provides in clear and unequivocal terms the modes for replacing an
administrator of an estate upon the death of an administrator.41
d. The records of the case are wanting in evidence that QLO or any of its
lawyers substituted Atty. Quasha as co-administrator of the estate.
None of the documents attached pertain to the issuance of letters of
administration to QLO or any of its lawyers at any time after the de-
mise of Atty. Quasha in 1996. SC is thus inclined to give credence to
QLO’s contention that while it rendered legal services for the settle-
ment of the estate of Raymond Triviere since the time of Atty. Quasha's
death in 1996, it did not serve as co-administrator thereof, granting that
it was never even issued letters of administration.
e. However, while QLO, serving as counsel of the Triviere children
from the time of death of Atty. Quasha in 1996, is entitled to attor-
ney's fees and litigation expenses of P100k as prayed for in the Mo-
tion for Payment, and as awarded by the RTC in its 12 June 2003
Order, the same may be collected from the shares of the Triviere
children, upon final distribution of the estate, in consideration of
the fact that the QLO, indeed, served as counsel (not anymore as
co-administrator), representing and performing legal services for
the Triviere children in the settlement of the estate of their de-
ceased father.
3. LCN prays that as the contractor of the house (which the decedent caused to
be built and is now part of the estate) with a preferred claim thereon, it
should already be awarded P2,500,000.00, representing one half (1/2) of the
proceeds from the sale of said house.
a. SC: they shall not take cognizance of and rule on the matter considering
that, precisely, the merits of the claim of LCN against the estate are still
pending the proper determination by the RTC in the intestate proceed-
ings below.
41
Section 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or administrator. Proceedings upon death, resignation,
or removal..... When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed the remaining executor or administrator
may administer the trust alone, unless thecourt grants letters to someone to act with him. If there is no remaining executor
or administrator, administration may be granted to any suitable person.
 010 SILVERIO JR V. CA (EMAR) 1.
Sept 16, 2009 | Velasco Jr. | Distribution and Partition of Estate Proceedings 2.
PETITIONER: Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr.
RESPONDENTS: CA and Nelia Silverio-Dee
SUMMARY: Nelia was occupying the Forbes Park property, which is a 3.
part of Beatriz’ estate. When Beatriz died, her surviving husband, Ricardo
Silverio Sr. (Sr.), filed an intestate proceeding for the settlement of her 4.
estate. Ricardo Jr. (Jr.) and Edmundo filed a petition to remove Sr. as
administrator. RTC removed Sr and appointed Jr as new administrator.
Nelia filed an MR. Jr. filed a motion for prohibition to use the properties 5.
involved in the instestate estate without court authority. RTC affirmed its
order, denied Nelia’s MR and directed her to vacate the property (May 31
6.
order). Nelia filed an MR which was denied. RTC reinstated Sr. as
7.
administrator. Jr. filed an MR. RTC denied the MR and allowed the sale of
properties in the estate, including the Forbes Park Property. Nelia filed an
appeal. Jr. filed a motion to dismiss of the appeal for being filed out of 8.
time. RTC denied the appeal for being filed out of time and issued the writ
of execution of the May 31 order directing Nelia to vacate the Forbes Park
property. Nelia elevated the case to the CA which granted her petition;
annulling the writ of execution and notice to vacate. ISSUE: WON the
May 31, 2005 order is final and appealable – (1) on the final
determination of the rights of the Ricardo as the appealing party – YES. 9.
(2) on the aspect that it ordered her to vacate the premises of the 10.
Forbes Park property - NO. The order is not a final determination of the 11.
case or of the issue of distribution of the shares of the heirs in the estate
or their rights therein. (Doctrine) The underlying rationale is that until a
division is made, the respective share of each cannot be determined and
every co-owner exercises, together with his co-participants, joint 12.
ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and 13.
enjoyment of the same. Here, purported authority of Nelia, which she 14.
allegedly secured from Sr., was never approved by the probate court.
Nelia, therefore, never had any real interest in the Forbes Park property.
As such, the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC must be considered as
interlocutory and, therefore, not subject to an appeal.
15.
DOCTRINE: Until the estate is partitioned, each heir only has an inchoate
right to the properties of the estate, such that no heir may lay claim on a
particular property. 16.
Decedent – Beatriz
Surviving Spouse - Ricardo Sr.
Disputed property - No. 3 Intsia, Forbes Park, Makati (Forbes Park Property) 17.
Nelia Silverio-Dee – occupant of the Forbes Park Property before distribution
FACTS:
The case stemmed from the settlement of estate of the deceased Beatriz Silverio.
After Beatriz’ death, surviving spouse, Ricardo, Sr., filed an intestate proceeding
for the settlement of her estate entitled In Re: Estate of the Late Beatriz, Ricardo
Sr. v. Ricardo Jr., et al. pending before Makati RTC.
Nov 16, 2004: Ricardo Jr. filed a petition to remove Ricardo Sr. as
administrator.
Nov 22: Edmundo S. Silverio also filed for
a. Ricardo Sr.’ removal as administrator of the estate and
b. Appointment of a new administrator.
Jan 3, 2005: RTC granted the petition
a. Removed Ricardo Sr. as administrator
b. Appointing Ricardo Jr. as new administrator.
Jan 26: Nelia filed an MR.
Feb 4: Ricardo Jr. filed an Urgent Motion for Prohibition of Any Person to
Occupy/Stay/Use Real Estate Properties Involved in the Intestate Estate of the
Late Beatriz Silverio, without authority of the Court.
May 31: RTC omnibus order
a. Affirmed its Order.
b. Denied Nelia’s MR.
c. Authorized Ricardo Jr. to, upon receipt of the order, immediately exercise
his duties as administrator of the subject estate.
d. Directed Nelia to vacate the Forbes Park property within 15d from notice.
Jun 8: Nelia received a copy of the Order.
Jun 16: Nelia filed a MR dated Jun 15, 2005
Dec 12: Nelia’s MR was denied. RTC:
a. recalled its previous order granting Ricardo Jr. with letters of
administration
b. reinstated Ricardo Sr. as administrator
Dec 22: Order of denial was received by Nelia.
Ricardo Jr. filed an MR
Oct 31, 2006: RTC
a. Denied the MR and
b. Allowed the sale of various properties of the intestate estate to partially
settle estate taxes, penalties, interests and other charges. Among the
properties authorized to be sold was the Forbes Park property.
Nelia filed a:
a. Jan 6: of Appeal dated Jan 5, 2006 for the Dec 12, 2005 order and
b. Jan 23: a Record on Appeal dated Jan 20, 2006.
Oct 23: Ricardo Jr. filed a Motion to Dismiss Nelia’s Appeal and for Issuance of
a Writ of Execution against the appeal of Nelia on the ground that the Record on
Appeal was filed 10d beyond the reglementary period pursuant to Sec 3, R41.
Apr 2, 2007: RTC:
a. Denied the appeal on the ground that it was not perfected within the
reglementary period.
 b. Issued a writ of execution for the enforcement of the Order dated May 31,
2005 against Nelia to vacate the Forbes Park property.
18. Apr 17: Writ of execution was later issued
19. Apr 19: Notice to Vacate was issued, ordering Nelia to leave the premises of the
subject property within 10d.
20. May 2, 2007: Nelia filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
with Prayer for TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
a. Apuyan v. Haldeman: Order denying a MR may be appealed as such order
is the final order which disposes of the case
21. May 4: CA granted the prayer for the issuance of a TRO.
a. Notice of Appeal was filed within the reglementary period provided by the
RoC applying the fresh rule period (Neypes; Sumaway).
22. Jul 6: CA issued the assailed decision42 granting Nelia’s petition.
23. Silverio Jr. filed this PetRev on Certiorari under R65 seeking the reversal of
CA’s:
a. May 4, 2007 Resolution granting Nelia’s prayer for TRO issuance of a
TRO against Judge Quilala
b. Jul 6, 2007 Decision (Footnote 1; annulled the writ of execution and notice
to vacate)
ISSUE: WON the May 31, 2005 order is final and appealable
1. on the rights of the Ricardo as the appealing party – YES. The lower court
finally ruled that the possession of estate property can only be given to a
purported heir by virtue of an Order from the court.
2. on the aspect that it ordered her to vacate the premises of the Forbes Park
property – NO. The order is not a final determination of the case or of the
issue of distribution of the shares of the heirs in the estate or their rights
therein. Until the estate is partitioned, each heir only has an inchoate right to
the properties of the estate, such that no heir may lay claim on a particular
property
RULING: CA Resolution and Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. RTC
Decision denying due course to Nelia’s appeal; Writ of Execution; and the Notice to
Vacate are REINSTATED.
RATIO: This petition is meritorious.
1. CA ruled it was a final order:
a. Dec 12, 2005 Order is an offshoot of the May 31, 2005 Omnibus Order.
b. In the Omnibus Order, RTC ruled that Nelia, as Beatriz’ heir had no right to
use and occupy the property in question despite authority given to her by Sr:
42
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED and GIVEN DUE
COURSE. Accordingly, the Order, dated Apr 2, 2007, the writ of execution, dated Apr 17, 2007, and
the Notice to Vacate, dated Apr 19, 2007, are ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. Further, the court a quo
is directed to give due course to the appeal of Nelia
i. Nelia cannot occupy the Forbes Park property admittedly belonging to the
conjugal estate and subject to their proceedings without authority of the
Court.
ii. Nelia uses and maintains the property in the concept of a distributee. Under
her perception (as manifested in her memorandum), Sec 1 R90 is violated.
iii. Forbes Park property cannot be occupied or appropriated by, nor
distributed to Nelia, since no distribution shall be allowed until the
payment of the obligations mentioned in the aforestated Rule is made.
iv. The property may even be sold to pay the taxes and/or other obligations
owned by the estate, which will be difficult to do if she is allowed to stay in
the property.
v. The alleged authority given by SR. for Nelia to occupy it, assuming it is not
even antedated as alleged by JR., is null and void since the possession of
estate property can only be given to a purported heir by virtue of an
Order from this Court (Sec. 1 R90, supra; and Sec. 2 R84).
vi. Executor/Administrator shall have the right to the possession and
management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased only
when it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of
administration (See Sec. 3 R84)
vii. Nelia’s possession of the property has absolutely no legal basis considering
that her occupancy cannot pay the debts and expenses of administration, not
to mention the fact that it will also disturb the right of the new Administrator
to possess and manage the property for the purpose of settling the estates
legitimate obligations.
2. Nelia enclosed in her belated Memorandum of Nelia a statement of the expenses
she incurred on the house renovation in the amount of P12m which supports
CA’s conclusion that she is already the final distributee of the property. Repairs
of such magnitude require notice, hearing of the parties and approval of the
Court under the Rules. Without following this, the acts of Nelia are without
legal sanction.
3. CA ruling constitutes a final determination of the rights of the Ricardo as
the appealing party. As such, May 31 Order (predecessor of the Order
dated Dec 12, 2002) is a final order; hence, the same may be appealed, for
the said matter is clearly declared by the rules as appealable and the
proscription does not apply.
4. Tan v. Republic: Interlocutory v. Final order: A final order is one that disposes
of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or
action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has
been determined by the court, while an interlocutory order is one which does
not dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be decided
upon. It is only after a judgment has been rendered in the case that the ground
for the appeal of the interlocutory order may be included in the appeal of the
judgment itself. The interlocutory order generally cannot be appealed separately
from the judgment. It is only when such interlocutory order was rendered
 without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion that 14. Nelia, therefore, never had any real interest in the Forbes Park property. As
certiorari under R65 may be resorted to. such, the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC must be considered as interlocutory
IMPORTANT PART: and, therefore, not subject to an appeal
5. Here, Nelia appealed the May 31, 2005 Order on the ground that it ordered her 15. Nelia employed the wrong mode of appeal by filing a Notice of Appeal with the
to vacate the Forbes Park property. RTC. Hence, for employing the improper mode of appeal, the case should have
6. On that aspect the order is NOT a final determination of the case or of the issue been dismissed.
of distribution of the shares of the heirs in the estate or their rights therein. 16. Implication of such improper appeal is that the notice of appeal did not toll the
7. Until the estate is partitioned, each heir only has an inchoate right to the reglementary period for the filing of a petition for certiorari, R65, the proper
properties of the estate, such that no heir may lay claim on a particular property. remedy in the instant case.
8. In Alejandrino v. CA: Art. 1078, Civil Code: Where there are 2 or more heirs, 17. Nelia has now lost her remedy of appeal from the May 31, 2005 Order of the
the whole estate of the decedent is, before partition, owned in common by such RTC.
heirs, subject to the payment of the debts of the deceased. Under a co-
ownership, the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different
persons. Each co-owner of property which is held pro indiviso exercises his
rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no other
limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners. The
underlying rationale is that until a division is made, the respective share of
each cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises, together with his
co-participants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition
to his use and enjoyment of the same.
9. Although the right of an heir over the property of the decedent is inchoate as
long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned, the law allows a co-
owner to exercise rights of ownership over such inchoate right. Civil Code: Art.
493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when
personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage,
with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
(Emphasis supplied.)
10. This Article must be viewed in the context that the subject property is part of an
estate and subject to intestate proceedings before the courts. It is, thus, relevant
to note that in R84, Sec. 2, the administrator may only deliver properties of the
estate to the heirs upon order of the Court.
11. Under R90, Sec. 1 RoC, the properties of the estate shall only be distributed
after the payment of the debts, funeral charges, and other expenses against the
estate, except when authorized by the Court.
12. Once an action for the settlement of an estate is filed with the court, the
properties included therein are under the control of the intestate court. And not
even the administrator may take possession of any property that is part of the
estate without the prior authority of the Court.
13. Here, purported authority of Nelia, which she allegedly secured from Sr., was
never approved by the probate court.
 011 DIVINAGRACIA v. ROVIRA (Sarmiento)
August 10, 1976 | Aquino J. | Filiation
PETITIONER: SALUD DIVINAGRACIA, EMILIA DIVINAGRACIA,
DOLORES DIVINAGRACIA, ROSARIO DIVINAGRACIA AND JUANITA
DIVINAGRACIA, PETITIONERS,
RESPONDENTS: JUDGE VALERIO V. ROVIRA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH IV, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, ILOILO
CITY, AND CAMILO DIVINAGRACIA, RESPONDENTS.
SUMMARY:
Feliciano Divinagracia died. He was survived by his wife, Salud and their four
daughters named Emilia, Dolores, Rosario, and Juanita. Emilia Divinagracia
qualified as administratrix. she submitted to the court a final accounting
andproject of partition with a prayer for the closure of the proceeding. Judge
Castrense C. Velosoin his order of April 17, 1971 approved the final accounting
and project of partition and declaredthe proceeding "closed and terminated, sub-
ject to the condition that the heirs shall assume allthe outstanding obligations of
the estate". The partition was duly registered. On June 8, 1971 or after the order
closing the intestate proceeding had become final, Camilo Divinagracia filed a
motion to reopen it and to set aside the order of closure. He alleged that hewas
an illegitimate child of the decedent; and that hecame to know of the intestate
proceeding only when he was transferred as a governmentemployee from Mas-
bate to Iloilo a few days before June 8. He prayed for the determination of his
share in the decedent's estate. ISSUE: W/N an intestate proceeding, which
had already been closed, can still be reopened so as to allow a spurious child
to present evidence on his filiation and to claim his share in thedecedent's
estate. SC held NO. The order closing it was already final and executory. The
motion to reopen it was not filed within the thirty-day reglementary period
counted from the date the order of closure was served on theadministratrix. The
closure order could not be disturbed anymore. Moreover, the order for the reo-
pening of the intestate proceeding was predicated on the false assumption that
there had been no liquidation of the conjugal partnership and no declaration of
heirs. The truth is that the project of partition and distribution, with final ac-
counting, which was submitted by the administratrix and approved by the pro-
bate court, contained a liquidation of the conjugal partnership and a statement as
to who were the decedent's heirs and what were their respective hereditary
shares.The probate court further erred in entertaining Camilo Divinagracia's mo-
tion to reopen theintestate proceeding. It erred because that motion involved the
determination of his status as the decedent's spurious child. That question falls
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Iloilo. The rule prohibiting the splitting of a cause of action (Sec. 4,
Rule 2, Rules of Court) is not violated by the holding that the action to establish-
plaintiff's filiation as an illegitimate child should be filed in the Juvenile and
Domestic RelationsCourt and cannot be joined to the action of the illegitimate
child for partition and recovery of hishereditary share in his putative father's
estate, which is cognizable by the Court of FirstInstance.The so-called spurious
children, or illegitimate children other than natural children, commonlyknown as
bastards include adulterous children or those born out of wedlock to a married
woman cohabiting with a man other than her husband or to a married woman
cohabiting with awoman other than his wife. They are entitled to support and
successional rights (Art. 287, CivilCode). But their filiation must be duly proven
(Art. 887). In case there is no evidence on the voluntary recognition of the spuri-
ous child, then his filiationmay be established by means of the circumstances or
grounds for compulsory recognition. Inthe instant case, Camilo Divinagracia did
not disclose whether he has any evidence of voluntary recognition of his filia-
tion. There is no allegation in his motion that would sustain hisclaim for compul-
sory acknowledgment of his filiation.
DOCTRINE: Article 285. The action for the recognition of natural children
may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the
following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the
latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment
of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of
which nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the
child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of
the document
FACTS:
1. The question in this case is whether an intestate proceeding, which had al-
ready been closed, can still be reopened so as to allow a spurious child to
present evidence on his filiation and to claim his share in the decedent's
estate.
2. Feliciano Divinagracia died in Iloilo City on February 1, 1964. He was sur-
vived by his wife, Salud Bretaña, and their four daughters named Emilia,
Dolores, Rosario and Juanita.
a. The notice of his death was published in two local periodicals and
in the Manila Times.
3. Two days after his death, a petition was filed in the Court of First Instance
of Iloilo for the settlement of his estate (Spec. Proc. No. 1752).
a. The order setting the petition for hearing was published on April
22 and 29 and May 6, 1964 in the Yuhum, an English and Ilongo
weekly circulating in Iloilo City and Western Visayas.
4. Emilia Divinagracia qualified as administratrix on May 22, 1964.
a. She administered the estate for seven years. She paid the estate and
inheritance taxes.
b. In April, 1971 she submitted to the court a final accounting and
project of partition with a prayer for the closure of the proceeding.
5. That pleading, which was signed by the widow and her four daughters, con-
tains, aside from the accounting,
a. (1) an inventory of the assets of the decedent' s estate as of De-
cember 31, 1970 (par. 3);
b. (2) a declaration as to who were the heirs of the decedent and their
respective shares in the estate (par. 4);
c. (3) a statement that the five heirs (the widow and four daughters)
had received their res-pective shares, each consisting of a one-fifth
proindiviso participa-tion in the decedent' s estate (pars. 5 and 6),
and
d. (4) an assumption by the heirs of the obligations of the estate (par.
8).
6. Judge Castrense C. Veloso in his order of April 17, 1971 approved the final
accounting and project of partition and declared the proceeding "closed and
terminated, subject to the condition that the heirs shall assume all the out-
standing obligations of the estate".
a. The partition was duly registered.
7. On June 8, 1971 or after the order closing the intestate proceeding had be-
come final, Camilo Divinagracia filed a motion to reopen it and to set
aside the order of closure.
a. He alleged that he was an illegitimate child of the decedent;
b. that he was born on November 9, 1930, and that he came to know
of the intestate pro-ceeding only when he was transferred as a gov-
ernment employee from Masbate to Iloilo a few days before June
8.
c. He prayed for the determination of his share in the decedent's es-
tate.
8. The administratrix in her opposition to the motion contended that the pro-
ceeding could no longer be reopened;
a. that its expediente had already been archived; that there is no alle-
gation in the motion that Camilo's filiation was acknowledged by
the decedent,
b. and that the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Iloilo has
exclusive original jurisdiction to entertain Camilo's action for ac-
knowledgment,
9. The motion remained unresolved for more than four years. Judge Veloso
did not act on it before he retired in the early part of 1975.
a. The case was re-raffled to respondent Judge Valerio V. Rovira
who issued the questioned order dated October 18, 1975 reopening
the intestate proceeding.
10. The probate court set aside its prior order of closure because it assumed that
there was no liquidation of the conjugal partnership of the spouses Feliciano
Divinagracia and Salud Bretaña, that there was no declaration of heirs, and
that an interested party, who was left out in the partition, should be allowed
to secure relief in the intestate proceeding by filing the proper motion with-
in the reglementary period.
11. The probate court in its questioned order directed the admi-nistratrix to
submit a complete liquidation of the conjugal partnership and an inventory
of the decedent's estate after the payment of its debts. It further directed that
the liquidation and the inventory should be set for hearing with notice to
movant Camilo Divinagracia.
a. Thereafter, another hearing should be held to determine the dece-
dent's heirs.
b. At that hearing, Camilo could present evidence to prove his claim
that he was an "acknowledged spurious child of the deceased".
12. The lower court denied the administratrix's motion for re-consideration of
its order reopening the intestate proceeding.
13. She filed on January 31, 1976 the instant petition for certiorari and prohibi-
tion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the period to file a re-opening of the probate decision in
order to establish filiation has prescribed—YES.
RULING: In view of the foregoing considerations, the probate court's order of Oc-
tober 18, 1975, reopening the intestate proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
Feliciano Divinagracia, is set aside. Costs against private respondent.
RATIO:
1. We hold that the probate court erred in reopening the intestate pro-
ceeding, a proceeding in rem of which Camilo Divinagracia is deemed
to have had constructive notice
a. The order closing it was already final and executory.
b. The motion to reopen it was not filed within the thirty-day
regle-mentary period counted from the date the order of closure
was served on the administratrix. The closure order could not be
dis-turbed anymore
2. Moreover, the order for the reopening of the intestate pro-ceeding was pred-
icated on the false assumption that there had been no liquidation of the con-
jugal partnership and no declaration of heirs.
a. The truth is that the project of partition and distribution, with final
accounting, which was submitted by the administratrix and ap-
proved by the probate court, contained a liquidation of the conjugal
partner-ship and a statement as to who were the decedent's heirs
and what were their respective hereditary shares.
b. That project of partition was a substantial compliance with articles
179 et sequentia of the Civil Code.
3. The probate court further erred in entertaining Camilo Divinagracia's mo-
tion to reopen the intestate proceeding. It erred because that motion in-
volved the determination of his status as the decedent's spurious child. That
question falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Iloilo.
a. Republic Act No. 4834, which took effect on June 18, 1966, pro-
vides:
i. "SECTION 1. The Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court. - There shall be a Juvenile and Domestic
Rela-tions Court in the Province of Iloilo, for which a
judge who shall possess the same qualifications, enjoy the
same privileges and receive the same salary as judges of
courts of first instance, shall be appointed by the Presi-
dent of the Philippines, with the consent of the Commis-
sion on Appointments.
ii. "Provisions of the Judiciary Act to the contrary notwith-
standing, the court shall have exclusive ori-ginal jurisdic-
tion to hear and decide the following cases after the effec-
tivity of this Act:
iii. "(b) Cases involving custody, guardianship, adoption, pa-
ternity and acknowledgment;
iv. "If any question involving any of the above matters (seven
classes of cases) should arise as an incident in any case
pending in the ordinary courts, said incident shall be de-
termined in the main case."
4. The instant case is similar to the Paterno case, and Bartolome vs. Bar-
tolome, where it was held that cases involving paternity and acknowledg-
ment fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Juvenile and Do-
mestic Relations Court.
a. The Paterno and Bartolome cases involve provisions of the Charter of Manila (in-
serted by Republic Act No. 1401 in Republic Act No. 409), which created its Juve-
nile and Domestic Relations Court. Those provisions are similar to the provisions of
Republic Act No. 4834 which created the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Iloilo.
b. It was clarified in the Paterno case that the rule prohibiting the splitting of a cause
of action (Sec. 4, Rule 2, Rules of Court) is not violated by the holding that the ac-
tion to establish plaintiff's filiation as an illegitimate child should be filed in the Ju-
venile and Domestic Relations Court and cannot be joined to the action of the ille-
gitimate child for partition and recovery of his hereditary share in his putative fa-
ther's estate, which is cognizable by the Court of First Instance.
5. It is true that under the aforequoted section 1 of Republic Act No. 4834
a case involving paternity and acknowledgment may be ventilated as an
incident in the intestate or testate proceeding.
a. But that legal provision presupposes that such an administra-
tion proceeding is pending or existing and has not been termi-
nated.
b. There is a rule that the remedy of a natural child, who has not been
voluntarily acknowledged (Art. 278, Civil Code) but who can justi-
fiably compel recognition, is either
i. (a) a separate action against his parent to compel recogni-
tion, or, if the parent is dead, against all the potential heirs
who would be prejudiced by his re-cognition together
with an action for the enforcement of his rights against his
parent or the latter's heirs;
ii. or (b) he may intervene in the administration proceeding
for the settlement of his deceased parent's estate and there
 ask for recognition and at the same time enforce his he- grounds for compulsory recognition pres-cribed in the aforementioned arti-
reditary rights cles 283 and 284

6. This rule, which may be applied to the spurious child's action to establish
his filiation and assert his hereditary rights, is good in provinces where there
are no Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts and where the administra-
tion proceeding has not been instituted or is already closed.
7. In this connection, a review of the rules governing the filiation of a spurious
child may be useful in ascertaining the remedy open to Camilo Divinagra-
cia.
13. The prescriptive period for filing the action for compulsory recognition
in the case of natural children, as provided for in article 28543 of the
Civil Code, applies to spurious children
14. In the instant case, Camilo Divinagracia did not disclose whether he has any
evidence of voluntary recognition of his filiation. There is no allegation in
his motion that would sustain his claim for compulsory acknowledgment of
his filiation.

8. The so-called spurious children, or illegitimate children other than natural

children, commonly known as bastards, include adulterous children or those
born out of wedlock to a married woman cohabiting with a man other than
her husband or to a married man cohabiting with a woman other than his
wife. They are entitled to support and successional rights (Art. 287, Civil
Code). But their filiation must be duly proven (Ibid, Art. 887).

9. How should their filiation be proven? Article 289 of the Civil Code allows
the investigation of the paternity or maternity of spurious children under the
circumstances specified in articles 283 and 284 of the Civil Code.
a. The implication is that the rules on compulsory recognition of nat-
ural children are applicable to spurious children

10. Spurious children should not be in a better position than natural children.
The rules on proof of filiation of natural children or the rules on voluntary
and compulsory acknowledgment for natural children may be applied to
spurious children
a. That does not mean that spurious children should be
acknow-ledged, as that term is used with respect to natural chil-
dren. 43
Article 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only
b. What is simply meant is that the grounds or instances for the
during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
ack-nowledgment of natural children are utilized to establish the
filiation of spurious children
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the
latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of
11. A spurious child may prove his filiation by means of a record of birth, a
his majority;
will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. These
are the modes of voluntary recognition of natural children (Art. 278, Civil
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of
Code).
which nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the
child.
12. In case there is no evidence on the voluntary recognition of the spurious
child, then his filiation may be established by means of the circumstances or
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the
document
 GUILAS v. JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PAMPANGA (SIAPNO)
Jan,. 31, 1972 | Makasiar, J. |
PETITIONER: Juanita Lopez Guilas.
RESPONDENTS: Judge of First Instance of Pampanga and Alejandro Lopez
SUMMARY: Jacinta executed a will instituting her husband Alejandro as her sole
heir and executor. Juanita Lopez was declared legally adopted daughter and legal heir
of the spouses Jacinta and Alejandro. Doña Jacinta did not execute another will or
codicil so as to include Juanita Lopez as one of her heirs. In a Testate Proceeding, the
will was admitted to probate and the surviving husband, Alejandro, was appointed
executor. Nevertheless, Alejandro and Juanita executed a project partition, approved
by the lower court. Juanita filed a separate ordinary action to set aside and annul the
project of partition, on the ground of lesion, perpetration and fraud, and pray that
Alejandro submit a statement of accounts of all the crops and to deliver to Juanita the
lots allocated to her. Meanwhile, in the Testate Proceedings, Juanita filed a petition
praying that Alejandro Lopez be directed to deliver to her the actual possession of
said lots and its produce. Alejandro opposed the separate petition alleging the tes-
tate proceedings had already been closed and terminated; and that he ceased as
a consequence to be the executor of the estate of the deceased and that Juanita
Lopez is guilty of laches and negligence in filing the petition of the delivery of her
share 4 years after such closure of the estate. Issue : WON the project partition ap-
proved by the TC ordering it closed and terminated terminated the Probate proceed-
ing. SC held No. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administra-
tion only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the
heirs entitled to receive the same. The finality of the approval of the project of parti-
tion by itself alone does not terminate the probate proceeding. As long as the order of
the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings
cannot be deemed closed and terminated because a judicial partition is not final and
conclusive and does not prevent the heir from bringing an action to obtain his share,
provided the prescriptive period has not elapsed. The better practice, for the heir who
has not received his share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in the
same probate or administration proceedings, or for re-opening of the probate or ad-
ministrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an independ-
ent action, which would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a
decision or order of the probate on intestate court already final and executed and re-
shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of. Sec. 1 of Rule 90 of the Re-
vised Rules of Court of 1964 as, which secures for the heirs or legatees the right to
"demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or
any other person having the same in his possession", re-states the doctrines. In the
case at bar, the motion filed by petitioner for the delivery of her share was filed on
July 20, 1964, which is just more than 3 years from August 28, 1961 when the
amended project of partition was approve and within 5 years from April 23, 1960
when the original project of partition was approved. Clearly, her right to claim the
two lots allocated to her under the project of partition had not yet expired. The posi-
tion of Juanita should be sustained and the writs prayed for granted.
DOCTRINE: The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration
only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs
entitled to receive the same.
FACTS:
106. Jacinta Limson de Lopez was married to Alejandro Lopez y Siongco. They
had no children.
107. On April 28, 1936, Jacinta executed a will instituting her husband Alejandro
as her sole heir and executor.
108. On October 26, 1953, herein petitioner Juanita Lopez, then single and now
married to Federico Guilas, was declared legally adopted daughter and legal
heir of the spouses Jacinta and Alejandro.
109. Afterwhich, the testatrix Doña Jacinta did not execute another will or codi-
cil so as to include Juanita Lopez as one of her heirs.
110. TESTATE PROCEEDINGS: In an order dated March 5, 1959 in Testate
Proceedings No. 1426, the will was admitted to probate and the surviving
husband, Alejandro Lopez, was appointed executor without bond by CFI
Pampanga.
111. Nevertheless, in a project of partition executed by both Alejandro Lopez
and Juanita Lopez Guilas approved on April 23, 1960, the right of Juanita
Lopez to inherit from Jacinta was recognized and Lots Nos. 3368 and 3441
(Jacinta's paraphernal property, both situated in Bacolor Pampanga were
adjudicated to Juanita Lopez-Guilas as her share free from all liens,
encumbrances and charges, with the executor Alejandro, binding himself to
free the said two parcels from such liens, encumbrances and charges. The
rest of the estate of the deceased consisting of 28 other parcels of lands as
well as personal properties including a 1953 Buick car valued at P2,500.00
were allotted to Don Alejandro who assumed all the mortgage liens on the
estate.
112. CIVIL CASE (SEPARATE ORDINARY ACTION TO SET ASSIDE
PROJECT PARTITION): On April 10, 1964, herein petitioner Juanita
Lopez-Guilas filed a separate ordinary action to set aside and annul the pro-
ject of partition, on the ground of lesion, perpetration and fraud, and pray
further that Alejandro Lopez be ordered to submit a statement of accounts
of all the crops and to deliver immediately to Juanita the lots allocated to
her.
113. TESTATE PROCEEDINGS: Juanita filed a petition dated July 20, 1964
praying that Alejandro Lopez be directed to deliver to her the actual posses-
sion of said lots and its produce. Alejandro opposed the separate petition
 alleging the testate proceedings had already been closed and terminat-
ed; and that he ceased as a consequence to be the executor of the estate
of the deceased; and that Juanita Lopez is guilty of laches and negligence
in filing the petition of the delivery of her share 4 years after such closure of
the estate when she could have filed a petition for relief of judgment within
sixty (60) days from December 15, 1960 under Rule 38 of the old Rules of
Court citing Austria vs. Heirs of Antonio Ventenilla, 1956
114. Juanita contends that the actual delivery and distribution of the hereditary
shares to the heirs, and not the order of the court declaring as closed and
terminated the proceedings, determines the termination of the probate
proceedings (citing Intestate estate of the deceased Mercedes Cano, Timbol
vs. Cano, 1961, where it was ruled that "the probate court loses jurisdiction
of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the taxes, and
after the remaining estate is delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the
same; that the executor Alejandro is estopped from opposing her petition
because he was the one who prepared, filed and secured court approval of,
the aforesaid project of partition, which she seeks to be implemented; that
she is not guilty of laches, because when she filed on July 20, 1964, her
petition for the delivery of her share allocated to her under the project of
partition, less than 3 years had elapsed from August 28, 1961 when the
amended project of partition was approved, which is within the 5-year
period for the execution of judgment by motion
115. The parties have agreed to suspend action or resolution upon the said peti-
tion for the delivery of shares until after the civil action aforementioned has
been finally settled and decided.
116. In an order dated September 8, 1966, the lower court denied the motion for
reconsideration of the order dated April 27, 1966, and directed Fericsons
Inc. and the Ideal Rice Mills to deliver to Alejandro or his representative the
229 cavans and 46 kilos and 325 and 1/2 cavans and 23 kilos of palay
respectively deposited with the said rice mills upon the filing by Alejandro
of a bond in the amount of P12,000.00 duly approved by the court. Hence,
this petition for certiorari and mandamus.
ISSUE/s:
13. WON the project partition approved by the TC “ ordering it closed and ter-
minated” terminated the Probate proceeding – No. The probate court loses
jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all
the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive
the same.
RULING: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Granting the writs prayed for;
2. Setting aside the orders of the respondent court dated October 2, 1964 and April
27, 1966, as null and void; and, without prejudice to the continuance of Civil Case
No. 2539, which, by reason of this decision, involves no longer Lots 3368 and 3441
of the Bacolor Cadastre, .
3. Directing: (a) the Register of Deeds of Pampanga to cancel TCT No. 26638-R
covering the aforesaid lots Nos. 3368 and 3441 of the Bacolor Cadastre and to issue
anew Transfer Certificate of Title covering the said two lots in the name of herein
petitioner Juanita Lopez Guilas; and (b) the respondent Alejandro Lopez
(1) to deliver to herein petitioner Juanita Lopez Guilas the
possession of lots Nos. 3368 and 3441;
(2) to deliver and/or pay to herein, petitioner all the rents, crops or
income collected by him from said lots Nos. 3368 and 3441 from
April 23, 1960 until the possession of the two aforementioned lots
is actually delivered to her, or their value based on the current
market price; and
(3) to pay the costs.
RATIO:
1. The position of petitioner Juanita Lopez-Guilas should be sustained and the
writs prayed for granted.
2. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration
only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate
delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. T
3. he finality of the approval of the project of partition by itself alone does not
terminate the probate proceeding (Timbol vs. Cano, 1961; Siguiong vs.
Tecson).
4. As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied
with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated
because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent
the heir from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the
prescriptive period therefor has not elapsed.
5. The better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share, is
to demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate or
administration proceedings, or for re-opening of the probate or
administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an
independent action, which would be tried by another court or Judge which
may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate on intestate court
already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and
disposed of
6. Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964 as worded,
which secures for the heirs or legatees the right to "demand and recover
their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other
person having the same in his possession", re-states the aforecited doctrines.
7. The case of Austria vs. Heirs of Ventenilla (99 Phil. 1068) does not control
the present controversy; because the motion filed therein for the removal of
the administratrix and the appointment of a new administrator in her place
 was rejected by the court on the ground of laches as it was filed after the
lapse of about 38 years from October 5, 1910 when the court issued an
order settling and deciding the issues raised by the motion (L-10018,
September 19, 1956, 99 Phil., 1069-1070).
8. In the case at bar, the motion filed by petitioner for the delivery of her share
was filed on July 20, 1964, which is just more than 3 years from August 28,
1961 when the amended project of partition was approve and within 5 years
from April 23, 1960 when the original project of partition was approved.
Clearly, her right to claim the two lots allocated to her under the project of
partition had not yet expired. And in the light of Section 1 of Rule 90 of the
Revised Rules of Court of 1964 and the jurisprudence above cited, the order
dated December 15, 1960 of the probate court closing and terminating the
probate case did not legally terminate the testate proceedings, for her share
under the project of partition has not been delivered to her.
9. While it is true that the order dated October 2, 1964 by agreement of the
parties suspended resolution of her petition for the delivery of her shares
until after the decision in the civil action for the annulment of the project of
partition (Civil Case 2539) she filed on April 10, 1964; the said order lost
its validity and efficacy when the herein petitioner filed on June 11, 1965 an
amended complaint in said Civil Case 2539 wherein she recognized the
partial legality and validity of the said project of partition insofar as the
allocation in her favor of lots Nos. 3368 and 3441 in the delivery of which
she has been insisting all along (pp. 106-107, rec.)
 013 HEIRS OF FRAN v. SALAS (TIMBOL)
June 25, 1992 | Davide, J. | Remedy of excluded heir or heir who did not receive his
share
FACTS:
PETITIONER: Heirs of late Jesus Fran and Carmen Mejia Rodriguez
RESPONDENTS: Bernardo LL. Salas, Concepcion Mejia Espina, and Maria
Mejia Gandiongco
SUMMARY: Remedios Tiosejo died with neither descendats nor ascendants.
She left a will leaving Jesus Fran as the executor. Thus, Fran filed a petition for
probate with the CFI of Cebu. The Sisters of Remedios filed a manifestation
requesting for time to review the will in order to prepare their opposition.
However, instead of filing an opposition, the Sisters filed a Withdrawal of
Opposition to the Allowance of the Will. Thereafter, the court issued an order
allowing the probate of the will. Notices were sent, and no claims were filed
against the estate. After which, Fran submitted an inventory and a Project for
Partition was submitted. Subsequently, the court approved the Project of
Partition and decreeing the proceedings as closed. The Sisters then filed an
Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration to question the decision of the court and
asked the court to declare the proceedings still open and to admit their
opposition to the allowance of the will.
The issue before the court is whether the Sisters still have a remedy.
The Supreme Court held in the negative. In instances where the heir did not
receive their share, they may still take the following courses of action: (1)
Petition for Relief from judgment; (2) Direct or collateral action; and (3)
Independent Civil Action. In this case, the Sisters failed to file their opposition
within the time to file a petition for relief from judgment, and they failed to
avail of the other two. Thus, settled is the rule that a decree of probate is
conclusive as to its due execution and cannot be impugned except by fraud in
any separated or independent proceeding. Also, final judgments are entitled to
respect and should not be disturbed.
DOCTRINE: In Our jurisdiction, the following courses of action are open to an
aggrieved party to set aside or attack the validity of a final judgment:
• Petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court which must be
filed within sixty (60) days after learning of the decision, but not more
than six (6) months after such decision is entered;
• By direct action, via a special civil action for certiorari, or by collateral
attack, assuming that the decision is void for want of jurisdiction;
• By an independent civil action under Article 1114 of the Civil Code,
assuming that the decision was obtained through fraud and Rule 38 can
not be applied.
46. Remedios M. Vda. De Tisejo, a widow, died on 10 July 1972 in Cebu City
with neither descedants nor ascendants
a. She left real and personal properties located in Cebu, Ormoc, Purto
Bello, Merida, and Leyte
b. She executed a last will and testament wherein she bequeathed to
her collateral relatives all her properties, and designated Rosario
Tan or, upon the latter’s death, Jesus Fran, as executor to serve
without bond
47. Jesus Fran, filed a petition with the CFI of Cebu for the probate of
Remedios’ last will and testament
a. The Court appointed Jesus Fran as special administrator
48. Concepcion and Maria (SISTERS) of the deceased, filed a manifestation
alleging that they needed time to study the petition because some heirs who
are entitled to receive their respective shares have been intentionally
omitted therein, and praying that they be given ample time to file their
opposition, after which the hearing be reset to another date
a. Instead of an opposition, they filed a “Withdrawal of Opposition
to the Allowance of Probate of the Will” wherein they expressly
manifested, with their “full knowledge and consent that they have
no objection of the allowance of the will of the late Remedios
Mejia Vda. de Tiosejo,” and that they have “no objection to the
issuance of letters of testamentary in favor of Jesus Fran.”
49. The probate court rendered a decision admitting to probate the will of the
testatrix, Remedios, and appointing Fran as executor thereof
50. The requisite notice to creditors was issued, but despite the expiration of the
period therein fixed, no claim was presented against the estate
51. Fran filed an Inventory of the Estate; copies thereof were furnished each of
the SISTERS
a. Subsequently, a Project of Partition based on the dispositions made
in the will and signed by all the devisees and legatees, with the
exception of Luis Fran, Remedios Mejia, and Concept Espina
(respondent), was submitted by the executor for the court’s
approval
b. After the hearing on the Project of Partition, the court issued its
Order approving the same, declaring the properties therein as the
only heirs entitled to the estate of Remedios Tiosejo, directing the
administrator to deliver to the said parties their respective shares
and decreeing the proceedings closed
52. Sisters filed with the new Branch VIII an Omnibus MR of the probate
 judgment and the Order of partition. In said motion, they ask the court to
declare the proceedings still open and admit their opposition to the
allowance of the will. They allege that:
a. They were not furnished with the copy of the will
b. The will is a forgery
c. They were not notified of any resolution or order on their
manifestation requesting time within which to file their opposition,
or of the order authorizing the clerk of court to receive the
evidence for the Heirs, or of the order closing the proceedinsgs
d. The reception of evidence by the clerk of court was void per the
ruling in Lim Tanhu v.Ramulate
e. The project of partition contains no notice of hearing and they
were not notified thereof
f. Fran signed the project of partition as administrator and not as
executor, thereby proving that the decedent died intestate
g. Fran did not submit any accounting as required by law; and
h. Fran never distributed the estate to the devisees and legatees
53. Fran refuted all the protestations of the Sisters. Among other reasons, he
stresses therein that:
a. The Sisters are in estoppel to question the will because they filed
their Withdrawal Of Opposition To The Allowance of Will which
states that after thoroughly studying the petition, to which was
attached a copy of the English translation of the will, they have no
objection to its allowance; the order directing the clerk of court to
receive the evidence was dictated in open court in the presence of
private respondents; Maria M. Gandiongco signed the Project of
Partition and Concepcion M. Espina submitted a certification
stating therein that she received the notice of hearing therefor and
has no objection to its approval;
b. Except for some properties, either covered by a usufruct under the
will or agreed upon by the parties to be held in common by reason
of its special circumstance, there was an actual distribution of the
estate in accordance with the Project of Partition; insofar as the
Sisters are concerned, they not only received their respective
shares, they even purchased the shares of the other devisees. To
top it all, the Sisters’ children, namely Rodrigo M. Gandiongco, Jr.
and Victor Espina, mortgaged their respective shares in favor of a
bank.
54. Notwithstanding Fran’s objections, Judge Salas issued an Order setting for
hearing the said Omnibus MR so that the witnesses and the exhibits may be
properly ventilated
55. The Sisters not only amplify in great detail the grounds raised in their
Omnibus MR, they also squarely raise for the first time the following
issues:
a. Probate court never acquired jurisdiction
b. They were deprived of the opportunity to examine the will
c. Even assuming the probate judge could validly delegate the
reception of evidence to the Clerk of Court, the proceeding before
the latter would still be void as he failed to take an oath of office
before entering upon his duties as commissioner
d. Maria Gandiongco was defrauded into signing the Project of
Partition and Concepcion M. Espina, her certification, when
they were misled by Fran into believing that the Agreement of
Partition to be submitted to the court is the Extra Judicial
Partition they signed
ISSUE/s:
8. WoN the Sisters still have a remedy – NO. In instances where the heir did
not receive their share, they may still take the following courses of action:
(1) Petition for Relief from judgment; (2) Direct or collateral action; and (3)
Independent Civil Action. In this case, the Sisters failed to file their
opposition within the time to file a petition for relief from judgment, and
they failed to avail of the other two. Thus, settled is the rule that a decree of
probate is conclusive as to its due execution and cannot be impugned except
by fraud in any separated or independent proceeding. Also, final judgments
are entitled to respect and should not be disturbed.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the instant petition and supplemental petitions are
GRANTED. The Order of respondent Judge of 2 June 1980 and all other orders
issued by him in Sp. Proc. No. 3309-R, as well as all other proceedings had therein
in connection with or in relation to the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, are
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
RATIO:
45. The availability of the will since 18 September 1972 for their examination
renders completely baseless the Sisters’ claim of fraud on Fran's part in
securing the withdrawal of their opposition to the probate of the will.
46. If indeed such withdrawal was conditioned upon Fran's promise that the
Sisters would be shown the will during the trial, why weren't the appropriate
steps taken by the latter to confront Fran about this promise before
certifications of conformity to the project of partition were filed?
47. Granting for the sake of argument that the non-fulfillment of said promise
constitutes fraud, such fraud is not of the kind which provides sufficient
 justification for a motion for reconsideration or a petition for relief from
judgment under Rule 37 and Rule 38, respectively, of the Rules of Court, or
even a separate action for annulment of judgment.
a. It is settled that for fraud to be invested with such sufficiency, it
must be extrinsic or collateral to the matters involved in the issues
raised during the trial which resulted in such judgment.
48. In Our jurisdiction, the following courses of action are open to an
aggrieved party to set aside or attack the validity of a final judgment:
a. (1) Petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court
which must be filed within sixty (60) days after learning of the
decision, but not more than six (6) months after such decision
is entered;
b. (2) By direct action, via a special civil action for certiorari, or
by collateral attack, assuming that the decision is void for want
of jurisdiction;
c. (3) By an independent civil action under Article 1114 of the
Civil Code, assuming that the decision was obtained through
fraud and Rule 38 can not be applied.
49. It is not difficult to see that the Sisters had lost their right to file a petition
for relief from judgment, it appearing that their omnibus motion for
reconsideration was filed exactly six (6) years, ten (10) months and twenty-
two (22) days after the rendition of the decision, and six (6) years, one (1)
month and thirteen (13) days after the court issued the order approving the
Project of Partition, to which they voluntarily expressed their conformity
through their respective certifications, and closing the testate proceedings.
50. The Sisters did not avail of the other two (2) modes of attack.
51. The probate judgment of 13 November 1972, long final and
undisturbed by any attempt to unsettle it, had inevitably passed beyond
the reach of the court below to annul or set the same aside, by mere
motion, on the ground that the will is a forgery
52. Settled is the rule that the decree of probate is conclusive with respect
to the due execution of the will and it cannot be impugned on any of the
grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any separate or
independent action or proceeding.
53. We wish also to advert to the related doctrine which holds that final
judgments are entitled to respect and should not be disturbed; otherwise,
there would be a wavering of trust in the courts.
a. In Lee Bun Ting vs. Aligaen, this Court had the occasion to state
the rationale of this doctrine, thus:
b. "Reasons of public policy, judicial orderliness, economy and
judicial time and the interests of litigants, as well as the peace and
order of society, all require that stability be accorded the solemn
and final judgments of the courts or tribunals of competent
jurisdiction."
54. This is so even if the decision is incorrect or, in criminal cases, the penalty
imposed is erroneous.
55. Equally baseless and unmeritorious is the Sisters’ contention that the order
approving the Project of Partition and closing the proceedings is null and
void because the Project of Partition did not contain a notice of hearing and
that they were not notified of the hearing thereon.
56. In truth, in her own certification dated 5 September 1973, private
respondent Concepcion M. Espina admitted that she "received a copy of the
Project of Partition and the Notice of Hearing in the above- entitled
proceeding, and that she has no objection to the approval of the said Project
of Partition."
57. The notice of hearing she referred to is the Notice of Hearing For Approval
of Project of Partition issued on 6 August 1973 by the Clerk of Court.
Espina was lying through her teeth when she claimed otherwise.
58. The non-distribution of the estate, which is vigorously denied by the Heirs
of Fran, is not a ground for the re-opening of the testate proceedings.
59. A seasonable motion for execution should have been filed. In De Jesus
vs. Daza, this Court ruled that if the executor or administrator has
possession of the share to be delivered, the probate court would have
jurisdiction within the same estate proceeding to order him to transfer
that possession to the person entitled thereto.
60. This is authorized under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court. However,
if no motion for execution is filed within the reglementary period, a separate
action for the recovery of the shares would be in order.
a. As We see it, the attack of 10 September 1973 on the Order was
just a clever ploy to give a semblance of strength and substance to
the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration by depicting therein a
probate court committing a series of fatal, substantive and
procedural blunders, which We find to be imaginary, if not
deliberately fabricated.
Lack of Jurisdiction in granting the Omnibus MR
1. We do not hesitate to rule that the respondent Judge committed grave
 abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he granted the exists sufficient justification to grant the latter complete
Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and thereafter set aside the probate opportunity to thresh out his case in court.
judgment of 13 November 1972 in Sp. Proc. No. 3309-R, declared the 3. The alternative claim that the proceedings before the Clerk of Court were
subject will of the testatrix a forgery, nullified the testamentary
likewise void because said official did not take an oath is likewise
dispositions therein and ordered the conversion of the testate proceedings
into one of intestacy. untenable.
a. a. The Clerk of Court acted as such when he performed the
2. It is not disputed that the Sisters filed on the date of the initial delegated task of receiving evidence. It was not necessary for him
hearing of the petition their "Withdrawal of Opposition To to take an oath for that purpose; he was bound by his
Allowance of Probate (sic) Will" wherein they unequivocally state that oath of office as a Clerk of Court
they have no objection to the allowance of the will.
3. For all legal intents and purposes, they became proponents of the same.
After the probate court rendered its decision on 13 November 1972, and
there having been no claim presented despite publication of notice to
creditors, Fran submitted a Project of Partition which Maria M. Vda. de
Gandiongco voluntarily signed and to which Espina expressed her
conformity through a certification filed with the probate court.
4. Assuming for the sake of argument that the Sisters did not receive a formal
notice of the decision as they claim in their Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration, these acts nevertheless constitute indubitable
proof of their prior actual knowledge of the same

Reception of Evidence by Clerk of Court allowed and need not take another oath
1. No provision of law or principle of public policy prohibits a court from
authorizing its clerk of court to receive the evidence of a party litigant.
2. After all, the reception of evidence by the clerk of court constitutes but a
ministerial task — the taking down of the testimony of the witnesses and
the marking of the pieces of documentary evidence, if any, adduced by the
party present.
a. This task of receiving evidence precludes, on the part of the
clerk of court, the exercise of judicial discretion usually called for
when the other party who is present objects to questions
propounded and to the admission of the documentary evidence
proffered.
b. More importantly, the duty to render judgment on the merits of the
case still rests with the judge who is obliged to personally and
directly prepare the decision based upon the evidence reported.
But where the proceedings before the clerk of court and the
concomitant result thereof, i.e., the judgment rendered by the
court based on the evidence presented in such limited proceedings,
prejudice the substantial rights of the aggrieved party, then there
 014 SOLIVIO v. CA (PELIÑO edited by Chiqui)
February 12, 1990 | Medialdea, J. | When estate court loses jurisdiction
PETITIONER: Celedonia Solivio
RESPONDENTS: The Honorable Court of Appeals and Concordia Javellana
Villanueva
FACTS:
SUMMARY: Esteban died without any ascendants nor descendants, and was
survived only by Celedonia, his maternal aunt, and Concordia, his paternal aunt.
Esteban, on several occasions relayed that he would like to place his estate in a
foundation, named after his mother, that would help poor but deserving students
obtain a college education, but he died without setting it up. Celedonia and
Concordia agreed to carry out Esteban’s plan, and pursuant to this, Celedonia
took care of the proceedings by applying as the administrator. She was declared
as the sole heir in RTC Br. 23. After the payment of taxes and obligations, she
transferred the properties to the foundation. Concordia filed a MR of the court’s
order declaring Celedonia as the sole heir of Esteban because she was claiming
that she was also an heir, but the motion was denied because of tardiness. Instead
of an appeal, she filed 1 yr and 2 mos later in RTC Br. 26 for partition, recovery
of possession, ownership, and damages. RTC Br. 26 ruled in favor of Concordia.
On Concordia’s motion, RTC Br. 26 ordered the execution of its judgment
pending appeal and required Celedonia to submit an inventory and accounting of
the estate. In Celedonia’s MR, she averred that the properties had already been
transferred to and in possession of the foundation; trial court denied her MR.
Celedonia perfected an appeal to the CA, but the CA affirmed the decision of
RTC Br. 26 in toto. Hence, this petition. The main issue in this case is whether
or not Br. 26 had jurisdiction to entertain the case for partition and recovery of
Concordia’s share of Esteban’s estate even while the probate proceedings in Br.
23 were still pending. The SC held in the negative. It is the order of distribution
directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the persons entitled thereto
that brings to a close the intestate proceedings, puts an end to the administration,
and thus far relieves the administrator from his duties. The order declaring
Celedonia as the sole heir of Esteban’s estate did not toll the end of the
proceedings, since the last paragraph of the order directed the administratrix to
“hurry up the settlement of the estate.” As long as the order of the distribution of
the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed
closed and terminated. In view of the pendency of the probate proceedings,
Concordia’s motion to set aside the order declaring Celedonia as the sole heir
and to have herself declared as a co-heir and to recover her share was properly
filed in the probate case. Her remedy when the court denied her motion was to
elevate the denial to the CA by way of a review on certiorari. The separate action
(partition) was improperly filed for it is the probate court that has exclusive
jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate.
DOCTRINE: It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue
of the estate to the persons entitled thereto that brings to a close the intestate
proceedings, puts an end to the administration, and thus far relieves the
administrator from his duties.
157. Esteban Javellana, Jr. (Esteban) was the author of the 1st post-war Filipino
nove, “Without Seeing the Dawn”.
a. He died a bachelor, with no ascendants, descendants, brothers, sisters,
nephews, or nieces.
b. His only surviving relatives are: (1) Celedonia Solivio (Celedonia) his
maternal aunt (spinster sister of his mother) and (2) Concordia
Javellana-Villanueva, the sister of his deceased father.
158. Esteban’s mother (Salustia) and Celedonia took care of Esteban.
159. When Salustia got married to Esteban’s father, she brought paraphernal
properties into the marriage which she inherited from her mother, but there
was no conjugal property acquired during her marriage with Esteban’s
father since their marriage was short-lived.
160. When Salustia died, she left all her properties to Esteban, including a house
and lot in IloIlo City where she, Celedonia, and Esteban lived.
a. The properties were subsequently transferred to Esteban.
161. During his lifetime, Esteban had more than once expressed to Celedonia
and some close friends that he plans to place his estate in a foundation to
honor his mother and to help poor but deserving students obtain a college
education, but he died of a heart attack without being able to set it up.
a. 2 weeks after the funeral, Celedonia and Concordia were deciding what
to do with Esteban’s properties.
b. Celedonia told Concordia of Esteban’s desire to place the estate in a
foundation to be named after his mother.
c. Concordia agreed to carry out this plan and this fact was admitted
by her in the “Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider the Order”
162. Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the
proceedings leading to the formation of the foundation, Celedonia, in
good faith and upon counsel’s advice, filed on 8 March 198, Spl.
Proceeding No. 2540 for her appointment as special administratrix of
the estate of Esteban.
a. She later filed an amended petition praying that letters of admin be
issued ot her, she be declared the sole heir, that after payment of all
claims and rendition of inventory and accounting, the estate be
adjudicated to her.
b. After due publication and hearing of the petition, as well as the
amended one, she was declared sole heir of Esteban’s estate and her
 reasons for doing so were:
i. Properties of the estate had come from her sister, Salustia;
ii. She is Esteban’s nearest relative on his mother’s side;
iii. With her as sole heir, the disposition of the properties of the
estate to fund the foundation would be facilitated.
163. RTC Br. 2344 declared Celedonia as the sole heir of Esteban.
a. She sold the properties to pay taxes and other obligations, and
established the foundation in Salustia’s name, which was registered in
the SEC.
164. On 7 August 1978, Concordia filed a MR of the court’s order declaring
Celedonia as the sole heir of Esteban because she was claiming that she
was also an heir, but the motion was denied because of tardiness.
a. Instead of an appeal, she filed 1 yr and 2 mos later in RTC Br. 26
for partition, recovery of possession, ownership, and damages.
b. RTC Br. 26 ruled in favor of Concordia.
c. On Concordia’s motion, RTC Br. 26 ordered the execution of its
judgment pending appeal and required Celedonia to submit an
inventory and accounting of the estate.
d. In Celedonia’s MR, she averred that the properties had already been
transferred to and in possession of the foundation; trial court denied her
MR.
165. Celedonia perfected an appeal to the CA, but the CA affirmed the decision
of RTC Br. 26 in toto.
166. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/s:
5. WON Br. 26 had jurisdiction to entertain the case for partition and
recovery of Concordia’s share of Esteban’s estate even while the
probate proceedings in Br. 23 were still pending. - NO, the order
declaring Celedonia as the sole heir of Esteban’s estate did not toll the
end of the proceedings
6. WON Concordia was prevented from intervening in the probate
proceedings through extrinsic fraud. - NO, she knew of the special
proceedings and probate proceedings are in rem and publication was done.
7. WON Esteban’s properties were subject to reserva truncal in favor of
Celedonia. - NO, Esteban was not an ascendant, but the descendant of the
origin.
8. WON Concordia may recover her share of the estate after she had agreed to
place it in the foundation and notwithstanding the fact that the foundation
has been formed and the properties have already been transferred to it. -
NO, she already agreed to it, thus, must honor it.
44
It was previously CFI, but during the case, naging RTC na yung CFI.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The decision of
the trial court and CA are hereby SET ASIDE. Concordia is declared an heair of the
late Esteban, entitled to ½ of his estate. However, conformably with the agreement
between her and her co-heir, Celedonia, the entire estate of Esteban should be
conveyed to the foundation of which both Celedonia and Concordia shall be trustees,
and each shall be entitled to nominate an equal number of trustees to constitute the
Board of Trustees of the foundation which shall administer the same for the purposes
set forth in its charter. Celedonia, as administratrix of the estate, shall submit to the
probate court an inventory and accounting of the estate of the deceased preparatory
to terminating the proceedings therein.
RATIO:
On whether Br. 26 had jurisdiction to entertain Concordia’s petition despite the
pending probate proceedings in Br. 23
8. SC found that Br. 26 lacked jurisdiction in entertaining Concordia’s
action for partition and recovery while the probate proceedings are still
pending in Br. 23, there being yet no orders for the submission and
approval of the administratrix’s inventory and accounting, distributing
the residue of the estate to the heir, and terminating the proceedings.
9. It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the
estate to the persons entitled thereto that brings to a close the intestate
proceedings, puts an end to the administration, and thus far relieves the
administrator from his duties.
10. The order declaring Celedonia as the sole heir of Esteban’s estate did
not toll the end of the proceedings, since the last paragraph of the order
directed the administratrix to “hurry up the settlement of the estate.”45
11. In view of the pendency of the probate proceedinsg, Concordia’s
motion to set aside the order declaring Celedonia as the sole heir and to
45
2. As regards the second incident [Motion for Declaration of Miss Celedonia Solivio as Sole Heir, dated March 7,
1978], it appears from the record that despite the notices posted and the publication of these proceedings as required by
law, no other heirs came out to interpose any opposition to the instant proceeding. It further appears that herein
Administratrix is the only claimant-heir to the estate of the late Esteban Javellana who died on February 26, 1977.
During the hearing of the motion for declaration as heir on March 17, 1978, it was established that the late Esteban
Javellana died single, without any known issue, and without any surviving parents. His nearest relative is the herein
Administratrix, an elder [sic] sister of his late mother who reared him and with whom he had always been living with
[sic] during his lifetime.
xxxxxxxxx
2. Miss Celedonia Solivio, Administratrix of this estate, is hereby declared as the sole and legal heir of the late Esteban S.
Javellana, who died intestate on February 26, 1977 at La Paz, Iloilo City.
The Administratrix is hereby instructed to hurry up with the settlement of this estate so that it can be terminated. (pp, 14-
16, Record)
 have herself declared as a co-heir and to recover her share was
properly filed in the probate case.
a. Her remedy when the court denied her motion was to elevate the
denial to the CA by way of a review on certiorari, but instead, she
filed after more than a year, a separate action for the same purpose in
Br. 26.
12. The separate action was improperly filed for it is the probate court that
has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the
estate.
a. The probate court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to make
distribution, has power to determine the proportion or parts to which
each is entitled. The power to determine the legality or illegality of the
testamentary provision is inherent in the jurisdiction of the court
making a just and legal distribution of the inheritance. To hold that a
separate and independent action is necessary would be contrary to the
general tendency of the jurisprudence of avoiding multiplicity of suits
and is expensive, dilatory, and impractical.
b. A judicial declaration that a certain person is the only heir of the
decedent is exclusively within the range of the administratrix
proceedings and cannot properly be made an independent action; a
separate action for declaration of heirs is not proper.
13. A court should not interfere with probate proceedings pending in a co-equal
court.
a. Guilas v. Judge of the CFI of Pampanga: The probate court loses
jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the
payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the
heirs entitiled to receive the same. The finality of the approval of
the project of partition by itself alone does not terminate the
probate proceeding.
b. As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been
complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed
and terminated; because a judicial partition is not final and
conclusive and does not prevent the heirs from bringing an action
to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period therefore has
not elapsed.
c. The better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his
share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in the same
probate or administration proceedings, or for reopening of the
probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed,
and not through an independent action, which would be tried by
another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order
of the probate or intestate court already final and executed and re-
shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of.
14. Difference between the Litam v. Rivera case and Guilas case:
a. Litam: despite pendency of special proceedings for settlement of
intestate estate of the deceased, the plaintiffs filed a civil action where
they claimed that they were the children by a previous marriage, the
trial court declared that they were not children of the deceased, but on
appeal, the SC ruled that the declarations were improper because it is
within the exclusive competence of the court in the special proceedings
in which it is not as yet, in issue, and will not be, ordinarily, in issue
until the presentation of the project of partition.
b. Guilas: Estate proceedings had already been closed and terminated for
over 3 yrs, the action for annulment of project of partition was allowed.
c. In this case: estate proceedings are still pending, but nonetheless,
Concordia had lost her right to have herself declared as co-heir in said
proceedings, SC has opted to proceed to discuss the merits of her claim
in the interest of justice.
15. The orders of RTC Br. 26 setting aside the probate proceedings on the
ground of extrinsic fraud and declaring Concordia a co-heir, ordering
partition of the estate and requiring Celedonia to submit an inventory were
improper since these lie within the exclusive competence of the probate
court.
On the issue of extrinsic fraud
3. Extrinsic fraud - any act or conduct of the prevailing party which prevented
a fair submission of the controversy.
4. In this case, extrinsic fraud claim is not warranted since: (a) Concordia was
not unaware of the special proceedings intended to be filed by Celedonia.
Concordia was not prevented from intervening in the proceedings, rather,
she stayed away by choice. She also knew that the estate came exclusively
from Esteban’s mother; (b) Probate proceedings are in rem. Notice of time
and place of hearing of petition are required to be published (Rule 76, Sec.
3 in rel. to Sec. 3, Rule 79 of ROC). There was publication in “Bagong
Kasanag” and this is considered as constructive notice.
On the issue of reserva troncal
2. The claim of Celedonia that the property is reserva troncal has no merit.
Esteban was not an ascendant of his mother, but the descendant. Therefore,
he did not hold his inheritance subject to a reservation in favor of his aunt,
who is his relative within the 3rd degree on his mother’s side.
On Concordia’s ½ share
2. Concordia agreed to deliver the estate of Esteban to the foundation in an
agreement which she ratified and confirmed in her “Motion to Reopen
and/or Reconsider Order dated April 3, 1978”; she is bound by that
agreement.
a. It is true that she did not waive her inheritance in favor of Celedonia,
 but she did agree to place all of Esteban’s estate in the foundation.
b. Since what she made was a judicial admission, no further evidence is
needed to prove the agreement. This agreement was also never
impugned. Her husband also confirmed the agreement, but endeavored
to dilute it by alleging that his wife didn’t intend to give all, but only
half of her share.
c. Records show that the foundation “Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana
Foundation” was established and duly registered in the SEC. Having
agreed to contribute her share of Esteban’s estate to the foundation,
Concordia is obligated to honor her commitment as Celedonia has
honored hers.
 015 Nuñal v. CA (Valle)
6 April 1993 | Campos, Jr., J. | Distribution, Partition
PETITIONER: Luisa Lyon Nuñal, represented by Albert Nuñal and Anita
Nuñal Hormigos
RESPONDENTS: CA and Emma Lyon de Leon in her behalf and as guardian
ad litem of minors Helen Sabarre and Kenny Sabarre, Eduardo guzman,
Mercedes lyon Taupan, Wilfredo Guzman, Mally Lyon Encarnacion, and Dora
Lyon Delas Peñas
SUMMARY:
A case for partition of the property of Luisa Lyon, who is here represented by
her Heirs, has been filed in the trial court. After trial and hearing, the court
rendered a decision in favor of the Luisa Heirs and ordered the partition of the
property.This order of partition was affirmed by the CA and remanded to the
court of origin for partition. This decision for partition had become final and
executory.
But Mary Lyon, the sister of Luisa, filed a motion to wuash the order of
execution. She claims that since she wasn’t made a party to the partition case,
her rights, interests, ownership, and participation should not be affected by the
decision.
The issue is whether or not the court may order the inclusion of Mary as a co-
heir.
The court said NO. The decision on the partition case had long been final and
executory. The remedy of Mary is to file an independent suit against the parties
and the heirs so that their claims be proven.
DOCTRINE: In Manning International v. NLRC, nothing ismore settled in the
law than that when a final judgment becomes executory. It thereby becomes
immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification meant to correct what is pereceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law. The only exemption are correction of
clericial errors or the making of so called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no
prejudice to any party, and where the judgment is void.
FACTS:
167. The case originated from Civil Case NO. 872 filed by Emma Lyon De Leon
(Emma) in her behalf as guardian ad litem of the minors Helen Sabarre etc
against Luisa Lyon Nuñal (Luisa) now deceased and represented by her
heirs (Luisa heirs) for partition and accounting for a parcel of land in
Isabela, Basilan City.
168. The parcel of land was formerly owned by Frank Lyon and May Lyon
deceased parents of Luisa. Luisa heirs claimed that the land has been in
possession of Luisa since 1946 and that she made no accounting of the
income derived therefrom, despite demands made by the Luisa Heirs.
169. After trial and hearing, the CFI rendered a decision in favor of the Luisa
Heirs and ordered the partition but dismissed the heirs’ complaint for
accounting.
170. The order for partition was affirmed in toto by the CA. The case was
remanded to the court of origin for the partition. An order for the issuance
of a writ of execution was issued by the court a quo.
171. Mary Lyon, the daughter of Frank Lyon and May Lyon, assisted by counsel
filed a motion to quash the order of execution with preliminary injunction.
She contends that not being a party to the above cases, her rights, interests
and ownership and participation over the land should not be affected by a
judgment in the said case; that the order for execution is unenforceable as to
her share, right, ownership, and participation is concerned, said share not
having been brought within the jurisdiction of the court.
172. The TC issued an order revoking the appointment of the three
commissioners and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution.
a. Issued an order appointing a Board of Commissioners to effect the
partition.
b. Dissmissed the motion to quash orer of execution by Mary Lyon
and directed the partition of the property.
173. The Commissioners manifested that in view of the fact that the name of
Mary Lyon also appears in the TCT, she could be construed as one of the
heirs. A ruling from the TC was then sought.
174. The TC issued an order directing the counsel of Emma to furnish the court
within 5 days all the names of the heirs entitled to share in the partition.
175. The TC issued the assailed order directing the inclusion of Mary as co-
owner of the property. An MR was filed by the heirs but was denied. The
CA rendered its decision dismissing the appeal of the heirs. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE/s:
16. WoN the TC may order the inclusion of Mary as co-heir entitled to
participate in the partition of the property considering that she was neither a
party plaintiff nor a party defendant in the case for partition and accounting.
– NO, because the decision on the partition has already become final and
executory. The remedy of Mary is to file an independent suit.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated January 9,
1987 of the Trial Court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The decision of the trial court dated December 17, 1974 in Civil
Case No. 872 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
199. The heirs contend that the decision on the partition of theland among them
has long become final and executory. Hence, the TC has no jurisdiction to
issue the questioned order.
200. In Manning International v. NLRC, nothing ismore settled in the law than
that when a final judgment becomes executory. It thereby becomes
immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification meant to correct what is pereceived to be
an erroneous conclusion of fact or law. The only exemption are correction
of clericial errors or the making of so called nunc pro tunc entries which
cause no prejudice to any party, and where the judgment is void.
201. Here, the case has become final and executory. Thus upon finality, the
trual judge lost his jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, any
modification that he would make such as the inclusion of Mary would be in
excess of his authority.
202. The remedy of Mary is to file an independent suit against the parties
and all other heirs for her share in the subject property, in order that
all the parties in interest can prove their Claims.
 016 LAND BANK v. HEREDEROS (VICENCIO)
June 11, 2018 | Gesmundo, J. | Rule 90
PETITIONER: Land Bank of the Philippines
RESPONDENT: Herederos de Ciriaco Chunaco Distileria, Inc.
SUMMARY: Herederos was the owner of several parcels of land. On Nov. 2001, he voluntar-
ily offered for sale the subject lots to the Republic of the PH under the Comperehensive Agrar-
ian Reform Program (CARP). Land Bank, by virtue of its mandate under the RA 6657, came
up with the CARP compensation for the lands and offered it to Heredoros. Herederos rejected
the P975k offer. He insisted on a total of P4.4M. Hence, 12 cases for preliminary administra-
tive determination of just compensation were conducted by the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator of Albay (PARAD). On April 12, 2004, Land Bank filed a petition for Judicial
Determination of Just Compensation before the Special Agrarian Court (SAC). It argued that
PARAD did not consider the formula set forth by the Department of Agrarian Reform. The
PARAD then issued an order declaring the previous 2004 decision as final and executory.
Land Bank filed for a petition for certiorari before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adju-
dication Board (DARAB). The DARAB denied such saying petition for determination of just
compensation in the RTC-SAC was filed beyond the fifteen (15)-day reglamentary period
under Section 11, Rule XIII of the DARAB Rules, claiming 24 days had lapsed before it was
filed. The CA affirmed saying the fresh 15 period under the Neypes case is not applicable in
administrative proceedings.
WoN a fresh fifteen (15)-day period is available to commence an action in the SAC, notwith-
standing any rule to the contrary, after denial of a MR of the DARAB under the CARP Law –
NO. Section 57 of R.A. No. 6657 clearly vests on the RTC-SAC the original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners. The
DAR has no authority to qualify or undo the RTC-SAC's jurisdiction over the determination of
just compensation under R.A. No. 6657. (Read doctrine). In this case, Herederos voluntarily
offered for sale its 12 parcels of land in November 2001. Accordingly, the 10-year prescriptive
period began at that moment because Herederos knew that its lands would be covered by the
CARP. Thus, the petition for judicial determination of just compensation filed on April 12,
2004 before the RTC-SAC, which was even tolled by the proceedings before the PARAD, was
squarely and timely filed within the 10-year prescriptive period. As the fifteen 15-day regle-
mentary period under Section 11, Rule XIII of the DARAB Rules had been set aside, it is now
immaterial to determine whether a fresh fifteen 15-day issue.
DOCTRINE: The proper prescriptive period to file a petition for judicial determination of just
compensation under R.A. No. 6657 is ten (10) years pursuant to Article 1144 (2) of the Civil
Code. Considering that payment of just compensation is an obligation created by law, it is
only proper that the ten (10)-year period start from the time the landowner receives the notice
of coverage under the CARP.
In addition, any interruption or delay caused by the government, like proceedings in the DAR,
should toll the running of the prescriptive period. The statute of limitations has been devised to
operate against those who slept on their rights, but not against those desirous to act but cannot
do so for causes beyond their control.
FACTS:
117. Herederos De Ciriaco Chunaco Distileria, Inc. (Respondent) was the
owner of several parcels of land with an aggregate area of 22.587 hectares
situated at Barangay Masarawag, Guinobatan, Albay.
118. These lands are covered by twelve (12) Transfer Certificate of Titles (TCT).
119. In November 2001, Herederos voluntarily offered for sale the subject lots to
the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
120. Land Bank of the Philippines (petitioner), by virtue of its mandate under
RA No. 6657 (CARP Law), came up with the CARP compensation for the
subject lands and offered the same to Heredoros in the amount of
P957,991.30. Upon receipt of the valuation of the properties, Herederos re-
jected the offered compensation.
121. Hence, twelve (12) cases for preliminary administrative determination
of just compensation covering the said parcels of land were conducted by
the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Albay, Branch 1 (PARAD).
122. During trial, Land Bank insisted that the compensation of the subject lands
should only be P957,991.30. On the other hand, Herederos countered that
the subject lands were worth P195,410.07 per hectare.
123. On Feb. 17, 2004, the PARAD ruled in favor of Herederos and held that the
just compensation for the subject lands should be P195,410.07 per hectare,
or a total of P4,455,349.00. (Note: the dates are important)
124. The said decision was received by Land Bank on February 24, 2004. After
thirteen (13) days, or on March 9, 2004, Land Bank filed a Motion for Re-
consideration before the PARAD.
125. In its Resolution dated April 1, 2004, the PARAD denied Land Bank's MR.
The said resolution was received by Land Bank on April 6, 2004.
126. On April 12, 2004, Land Bank filed a Petition for Judicial Determination
of Just Compensation before the RTC of Legaspi City, Branch, acting as
Special Agrarian Court (SAC).
127. It argued that the PARAD erroneously arrived at the amount for the just
compensation without considering the formula set forth by the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR).
128. On July 27, 2004, the PARAD issued an Order declaring that the Feb. 17,
2004 decision was final and executory. On September 10, 2004, a Writ of
Execution was issued by the PARAD.
129. On October 12, 2004, Land Bank filed a petition for certiorari before
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) as-
sailing the July 27, 2004 order and September 10, 2004 writ of execution of
the PARAD. Land Bank also argued that the petition for certiorari was the
valid remedy before the DARAB as it was stated in its Rules of Procedure
(Rules).
130. In its Resolution dated July 7, 2005, the DARAB denied the petition for
lack of merit. It held that the petition for determination of just compen-
 sation in the RTC-SAC was filed beyond the fifteen (15)-day reglamen-
tary period under Section 11, Rule XIII of the DARAB Rules.
131. The DARAB opined that the said petition was filed out of time because a
total of twenty-four (24) days had lapsed before it was filed, hence, the
PARAD decision on the just compensation already became final and execu-
tory.
132. Land Bank filed an MR but was denied. Land Bank then filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA.
133. The CA denied the petition. It held that the February 17, 2004 decision of
the PARAD already attained finality because the petition for judicial deter-
mination of just compensation was belatedly filed in the RTC-SAC, beyond
the 15-day reglementary period.
134. It added that the fresh fifteen (15)-day period under Neypes v. Court of
Appeals is not applicable in administrative proceedings.
135. The CA also held that the determination of just compensation by the PAR-
AD was proper because the latter's determination was not limited to the fac-
tors enumerated in DAR Administrative Order 05, series of 1998, and it
could properly consider other factors.
136. Land Bank argues that:
(1) when it received the February 17, 2004 PARAD decision on Feb-
ruary 24, 2004, it timely filed a MR thereof, on March 9, 2004;
(2) when it received the April 1, 2004 resolution of the PARAD deny-
ing its motion for reconsideration on April 6, 2004, it had a fresh
fifteen (15)-day period within which to file the petition for judicial
determination of just compensation before the RTC-SAC;
(3) from the moment that the petition was filed in the RTC-SAC, the
PARAD lost its jurisdiction over the determination of just compen-
sation;
(4) and the PARAD cannot anymore enforce or execute its February
17, 2004 decision.
137. In its Comment, Herederos argues that:
(1) the February 17, 2004 decision of the PARAD had become final
and executory because the petition for judicial determination of
just compensation was belatedly filed in the RTC-SAC under Sec-
tion 11 of the DARAB Rules;
(2) when Land Bank received the said decision on February 24, 2004,
it took Land Bank thirteen (13) days, or on March 9, 2004, to file a
motion for reconsideration;
(3) when the said motion was denied, Land Bank only had two (2)
days left to file the petition for judicial determination of just com-
pensation but failed to do so;
(4) the fresh fifteen-day period does not apply in administrative pro-
ceedings as stated in Pajolino v. Tajala;
(5) and Land Bank is guilty of forum shopping for filing a petition for
judicial determination of just compensation even though the PAR-
AD decision was already final and executory.
138. In its Reply, Land Bank reiterated that:
(1) it had a fresh 15-day reglementary period after its motion for re-
consideration was denied by the PARAD, hence, the petition for
judicial determination of just compensation before the RTC-SAC
was timely filed;
(2) the RTC-SAC's original and exclusive jurisdiction for determina-
tion of just compensation under R.A. No. 6657 must be acknowl-
edged; and the February 17, 2004 decision of the PARAD cannot
be executed.
ISSUE/s:
14. WoN a fresh fifteen (15)-day period is available to commence an action in
the SAC, notwithstanding any rule to the contrary, after denial of a MR of
the DARAB under the CARP Law – NO. The DAR has no authority to
qualify or undo the RTC-SAC's jurisdiction over the determination of just
compensation under R.A. No. 6657. The 15-day reglementary period under
Section 11, Rule XIII of the DARAB Rules cannot be sustained.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The April 26, 2013 Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98113 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Albay, Branch 1 shall not
enforce its February 17, 2004 Decision until after the finality of the judicial determi-
nation of just compensation.
RATIO:
The petition for judicial determination of just compensation was timely filed
162. The valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial func-
tion which cannot be vested in administrative agencies. The executive de-
partment or the legislature may make the initial determination, but when a
party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private
property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no
statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination
shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be precluded
from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation.
163. Accordingly, R.A. No. 6657 vests Special Agrarian Courts original and
exclusive jurisdiction in the determination of just compensation under
the said law, to wit:
SECTION 56. Special Agrarian Court. - The Supreme Court shall designate
at least one (1) branch of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) within each prov-
ince to act as a Special Agrarian Court.
 The Supreme Court may designate more branches to constitute such addi-
tional Special Agrarian Courts as may be necessary to cope with the number
of agrarian cases in each province. In the designation, the Supreme Court
shall give preference to the Regional Trial Courts which have been assigned
to handle agrarian cases or whose presiding judges were former judges of the
defunct Court of Agrarian Relations.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) judges assigned to said courts shall exer-
cise said special jurisdiction in addition to the regular jurisdiction of their re-
spective courts.
The Special Agrarian Courts shall have the powers and prerogatives inher-
ent in or belonging to the Regional Trial Courts.
SECTION 57. Special Jurisdiction. - The Special Agrarian Courts shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determina-
tion of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all crimi-
nal offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings
before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act
164. Fittingly, as the taking of property under R.A. No. 6657 is an exercise of the
power of eminent domain by the State, the valuation of property or determi-
nation of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings is essentially a
judicial function, which is vested with the courts and not with administra-
tive agencies.
165. Nevertheless, the DARAB Rules restrict the period wherein a party may
avail of the judicial determination of just compensation before the
RTC-SAC. Section 11 of the DARAB Rules states the remedy and the pe-
riod to assail the preliminary determination of just compensation by PAR-
AD, to wit:
SECTION 11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment
of Just Compensation. - The decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation
and preliminary detemination and payment of just compensation shall not be
appealable to the Board but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial
Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled to only one
motion for reconsideration.
166. The conflict between R.A. No. 6657 and the DARAB Rules, however, is
not of first impression.
167. In the recent case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Dalauta, the 15-day
prescriptive period under Section 11 of the DARAB Rules was struck down
because it undermined and unnecessarily impeded the original and exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the RTC-SAC to determine just compensation under
Section 57 of R.A. No. 6656.
168. Further, it finally settled once and for all the period within which to file a
petition for judicial determination of just compensation before the RTC-
SAC.
169. In Dalauta, the preliminary determination of just compensation was re-
ferred to the PARAD. In its resolution dated December 4, 1995, the PAR-
AD affirmed the valuation of the petitioner therein. On February 28, 2000,
or four (4) years and three (3) months later, the respondent filed a petition
for judicial determination of just compensation before the RTC-SAC. One
of the issues that had to be resolved by the Court was whether a petition for
judicial determination of just compensation in the RTC-SAC proscribes if
not filed within the 15-day period under the DARAB Rules. The Court
ruled:
a) Since the determination of just compensation is a judicial function, the Court
must abandon its ruling in Veterans Bank, Martinez and Soriano that a peti-
tion for determination of just compensation before the SAC shall be proscribed
and adjudged dismissible if not filed within the 15-day period prescribed under
the DARAB Rules.
b) As earlier cited, in Section 57 of R.A. No. 6657, Congress expressly granted
the RTC, acting as SAC, the original and exclusive jurisdiction over all pe-
titions for the determination of just compensation to landowners. Only the
legislature can recall that power. The DAR has no authority to qualify or
undo that.
c) The Court's pronouncement in Veterans Bank, Martinez, Soriano, and Lim-
kaichong, reconciling the power of the DAR and the SAC essentially barring
any petition to the SAC for having been filed beyond the 15-day period provid-
ed in Section 11, Rule XIII of the DARAB Rules of Procedure, cannot be sus-
tained. The DAR regulation simply has no statutory basis.
d) In this case, Dalauta received the Notice of Coverage on February 7, 1994. He
then filed a petition for determination of just compensation on February 28,
2000. Clearly, the filing date was well within the ten-year prescriptive period
under Article 1141.
170. Indeed, Section 57 of R.A. No. 6657 clearly vests on the RTC-SAC the
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determina-
tion of just compensation to landowners.
171. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to con-
vert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction
would be contrary to Section 57 and therefore would be void.
172. The DAR has no authority to qualify or undo the RTC-SAC's jurisdic-
tion over the determination of just compensation under R.A. No. 6657.
Thus, the 15-day reglementary period under Section 11, Rule XIII of
the DARAB Rules cannot be sustained.
173. The RTC-SAC cannot simply be reduced to an appellate court which re-
views administrative decisions of the DAR within a short period to appeal.
174. It was also determined in Dalauta that the proper prescriptive period to
file a petition for judicial determination of just compensation under
R.A. No. 6657 is ten (10) years pursuant to Article 1144 (2) of the Civil
Code.
175. Considering that payment of just compensation is an obligation created
by law, it is only proper that the ten (10)-year period start from the
time the landowner receives the notice of coverage under the CARP.
 176. In addition, any interruption or delay caused by the government, like
proceedings in the DAR, should toll the running of the prescriptive pe-
riod. The statute of limitations has been devised to operate against
those who slept on their rights, but not against those desirous to act but
cannot do so for causes beyond their control.
177. In this case, Herederos voluntarily offered for sale its twelve (12) parcels of
land in November 2001. Accordingly, the 10-year prescriptive period began
at that moment because Herederos knew that its lands would be covered by
the CARP.
178. Thus, the petition for judicial determination of just compensation filed on
April 12, 2004 before the RTC-SAC, which was even tolled by the proceed-
ings before the PARAD, was squarely and timely filed within the 10-year
prescriptive period.
179. Consequently, as the fifteen (15)-day reglementary period under Section
11, Rule XIII of the DARAB Rules had been set aside, it is now imma-
terial to determine whether a fresh fifteen (15)-day period should be
given to a party when the PARAD denies its motion for reconsideration
to file a petition for judicial determination of just compensation.
180. To recapitulate, the correct period to file a petition for judicial deter-
mination of just compensation under R.A. No. 6657 before the RTC-
SAC is ten (10) years pursuant to Article 1144 (2) of the Civil Code.

When the petition was filed before the RTC-SAC, the proceedings before the PARAD
had been completed
181. It was also stated in Dalauta that a landowner should withdraw his case
with the DAR before filing his petition before the RTC-SAC and manifest
the fact of withdrawal by alleging it in the petition itself. Failure to do so
would be a ground for a motion to suspend judicial proceedings until the
administrative proceedings are terminated.
182. Here, when the PARAD denied its MR on the preliminary determination of
just compensation, Land Bank did not anymore appeal before the DARAB.
Instead, it timely filed a petition for judicial determination of just compen-
sation before the RTC-SAC. Thus, the administrative proceedings on the
determination of just compensation were terminated.
183. It was only when the PARAD ordered the execution of its decision and is-
sued the writ of execution, even though there was a timely petition for judi-
cial determination of just compensation before the RTC-SAC, that Land
Bank sought refuge from the DARAB. Evidently, Land Bank's cause of ac-
tion is essentially to stop the enforcement of the decision of the PARAD be-
cause of a pending petition before the RTC-SAC.
184. In fine, the PARAD cannot enforce its February 17, 2004 decision because
there is still a pending judicial determination of just compensation before
the courts. It is only when the said judicial determination attains finality that
the award of just compensation may be executed.
 VALARAO v. PASCUAL (Salve)
November 26, 2002 | Bellsillo, J. | Appeals
PETITIONER: Gloriosa V. Valarao
RESPONDENTS: Conrado C. Pascual and Manuel C. Diaz
SUMMARY: Felicidad Pascual died alone leaving inheritance to her collateral rela-
tives. Her estate is disputed by 5 groups of heirs. Valarao, niece, initiated a special
proceedings for issuance of letters of administration. Conrado Pascual, brother, filed
with the same probate court a petition for probate of an alleged holographic will.
Valarao and Diaz were appointed as joint administrators of the estate of Felicidad C.
Pascual. The Court denied probate of the alleged holographic will of the decedent
and giving due course to the intestate settlement of the estate. Thus, Pascual ap-
pealed. Valarao opposed the request of Diaz to be a special administrator on the
ground that he had allegedly neglected his previous assignment as co-administrator
of the estate. Probate court issued an Order appointing Valarao as special administra-
trix. Diaz moved for reconsideration of his rejection as special co- administrator of
the estate. He contested the allegation of Valarao that he had been remiss in his du-
ties as co-administrator. Valarao reiterated the alleged uncooperative conduct of Diaz
in discharging his tasks as co-administrator, and at the same time moved that he and
his group of sympathetic heirs be compelled to surrender to her as special adminis-
tratrix the books and records of a corporation where the estate owned substantial
interests. The probate court denied the motion for reconsideration and ordered Diaz
and all the heirs to respect the authority of Valarao as special administratrix, espe-
cially by furnishing her with copies of documents pertinent to the properties com-
prising the estate. Pascual moved for MR. Pascual also filed for supplemental peti-
tion for certiorari in CA. Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision reversing and
setting aside the Order of 7 June 2000 of RTC-Br. 260, Paranaque City, appointing
Valarao as lone special administratrix. WoN Pascual’s notice of appeal disallowing
probate removes the jurisdiction of the probate court over the special proceeding –
NO, This is because the appeal is one where multiple appeals are allowed and a rec-
ord on appeal is required. In this mode of appeal, the probate court loses jurisdiction
only over the subject matter of the appeal but retains jurisdiction over the special
proceeding from which the appeal was taken for purposes of further remedies which
the parties may avail of, including the appointment of a special administrator. WoN
Pascual can disobey the reasonable exercise of the authority of a special administra-
tor on the dubious ground that the order appointing Valarao as special administratrix
had not in the meantime become final and executory because of a pending motion for
reconsideration filed by them – NO, because or an interlocutory order is not instantly
appealable and therefore there is no period nor action to suspend or interrupt by a
motion for reconsideration; it is even well settled that a special civil action for certio-
rari does not suspend the immediate enforceability of an interlocutory order absent a
temporary restraining order or an injunction. In the same manner, the appointment of
a special administrator being an interlocutory order is not interrupted by a motion for
reconsideration and thus must be obeyed as the proceedings in the probate court pro-
gress
DOCTRINE: In this mode of appeal, the probate court loses jurisdiction only over
the subject matter of the appeal but retains jurisdiction over the special proceeding
from which the appeal was taken for purposes of further remedies which the parties
may avail of, including the appointment of a special administrator.
An interlocutory order is not instantly appealable and therefore there is no period nor
action to suspend or interrupt by a motion for reconsideration; it is even well settled
that a special civil action for certiorari does not suspend the immediate enforceability
of an interlocutory order absent a temporary restraining order or an injunction.
FACTS:
1. FELICIDAD C. PASCUAL died at seventy-one (71) years, femme sole, leaving
a substantial inheritance for her querulous collateral relatives who all appear
disagreeable to any sensible partition of their windfall. (the words, wow)
2. To divide the disputed estate are five (5) groups of legal heirs which include
respondents Conrado C. Pascual, a brother of the deceased, and Manuel C. Diaz,
a nephew, son of her sister Carmen P. Diaz, and petitioner Gloriosa V. Valarao
who is the decedent's niece.
3. Gloriosa V. Valarao initiated before the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City
special proceedings docketed as SP No. 98-061 for the issuance of letters of ad-
ministration in her favor over the estate of Felicidad C. Pascual.
4. Conrado C. Pascual and some of his co-heirs, including Diaz, filed with the
same probate court a petition for probate, docketed as SP No. 98-0124, of an al-
leged holographic will of Felicidad C. Pascual. The two (2) special proceedings
were consolidated.
5. Valarao and Diaz were appointed as joint administrators of the estate of Felicid-
ad C. Pascual.
6. On 8 February 2000, RTC-Br. 260 of Paraaque City rendered a Decision which
dismissed SP No. 98-0124, denying probate of the alleged holographic will of
the decedent and giving due course to the intestate settlement of the estate. Thus,
Pascual appealed.
7. Valarao moved in the probate court for her appointment as special administratrix
of the estate. On 9 May 2000 Diaz also asked for his designation as special co-
administrator of the estate alongside Valarao. On 10 May 2000 the motions were
heard wherein Valarao opposed the request of Diaz on the ground that he had al-
legedly neglected his previous assignment as co-administrator of the estate.
8. Probate court issued an Order appointing Valarao as special administratrix.
9. Diaz moved for reconsideration of his rejection as special co- administrator of
 the estate. He contested the allegation of Valarao that he had been remiss in his
duties as co-administrator.
10. He cited as examples of his services the collection of rentals for properties in-
cluded in the estate, the payment of estate taxes and the deposit of about
P4,000,000.00 in a joint bank account held in trust for the estate by him and
Valarao as co-administrators.
11. Valarao reiterated the alleged uncooperative conduct of Diaz in discharging his
tasks as co-administrator, and at the same time moved that he and his group of
sympathetic heirs be compelled to surrender to her as special administratrix the
books and records of a corporation where the estate owned substantial interests.
12. The probate court denied the motion for reconsideration and ordered Diaz and
all the heirs to respect the authority of Valarao as special administratrix, espe-
cially by furnishing her with copies of documents pertinent to the properties
comprising the estate.
13. Pascual and Diaz along with other heirs moved for reconsideration of the 11
September 2000 Order on the ground that petitioner Valarao as special adminis-
tratrix was not authorized to dispossess the heirs of their rightful custody of
properties in the absence of proof that the same properties were being dissipated
by them, and that the possessory right of Valarao as special administratrix had
already been exercised by her "constructively" when the heirs on her side took
possession of the estate supposedly in her behalf.
14. Pascual filed their supplemental petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 61193
seeking permanent injunction against the enforcement of the Orders of 7 June
2000 and 11 September 2000 also as they mandated the turn over of documents
to petitioner Valarao.
15. Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision reversing and setting aside the Order
of 7 June 2000 of RTC-Br. 260, Paranaque City, appointing Valarao as lone
special administratrix although the fallo of the CA Decision was silent on
whether the probate court should also appoint Diaz as special co-administrator
of the estate of Felicidad C. Pascual.
16. Valarao claims that the probate court did not commit grave abuse of discretion
when it rejected the application of Diaz for appointment as special co-
administrator of the estate because of his indubitable uncooperative attitude to-
wards effective administration of the estate. She also argues that diverse inter-
ests among different groups of heirs do not give each of them the absolute right
to secure the appointment of a co-administrator from within their ranks since it
remains the discretion of the probate court to designate the administrators of an
estate. She further asserts that as special administratrix of the estate she possess-
es the authority to demand the surrender of documents pertinent to the estate in-
sofar as necessary to fulfill her mandate.
ISSUE/s:
1. WoN Pascual’s notice of appeal disallowing probate removes the jurisdiction of
the probate court over the special proceeding – NO, This is because the appeal is
one where multiple appeals are allowed and a record on appeal is required. In
this mode of appeal, the probate court loses jurisdiction only over the subject
matter of the appeal but retains jurisdiction over the special proceeding from
which the appeal was taken for purposes of further remedies which the parties
may avail of, including the appointment of a special administrator.
2. WoN Pascual can disobey the reasonable exercise of the authority of a special
administrator on the dubious ground that the order appointing Valarao as special
administratrix had not in the meantime become final and executory because of a
pending motion for reconsideration filed by them – NO, because or an interlocu-
tory order is not instantly appealable and therefore there is no period nor action
to suspend or interrupt by a motion for reconsideration; it is even well settled
that a special civil action for certiorari does not suspend the immediate enforce-
ability of an interlocutory order absent a temporary restraining order or an in-
junction. In the same manner, the appointment of a special administrator being
an interlocutory order is not interrupted by a motion for reconsideration and thus
must be obeyed as the proceedings in the probate court progress
RULING: WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is GRANTED. The De-
cision of the Court of Appeals dated 28 September 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 61193,
"Conrado C. Pascual and Manuel P. Diaz v. The Hon. RTC of Paraaque City,
Branch 260, and Gloriosa V. Valarao," is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders
dated 7 June 2000 and 11 September 2000 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 260,
of Paraaque City, rejecting the application of respondent Manuel C. Diaz as special
co-administrator of the estate of Felicidad C. Pascual and ordering respondents Con-
rado C. Pascual and Manuel C. Diaz and all other heirs who may have in their pos-
session or custody papers, records, certificates of titles over parcels of land, etc., per-
taining to properties of the estate of the late Felicidad C. Pascual to turn over such
papers, records and titles to petitioner Gloriosa V. Valarao as special administratrix
thereof, are REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. No costs.
RATIO:
185. To begin with, the probate court had ample jurisdiction to appoint Valarao as
special administratrix and to assist her in the discharge of her functions, even af-
ter Pascual had filed a notice of appeal from the Decision disallowing probate of
the holographic will of Felicidad C. Pascual.
186. This is because the appeal is one where multiple appeals are allowed and a rec-
ord on appeal is required.
187. In this mode of appeal, the probate court loses jurisdiction only over the subject
matter of the appeal but retains jurisdiction over the special proceeding from
which the appeal was taken for purposes of further remedies which the parties
may avail of, including the appointment of a special administrator.
188. Moreover, there is nothing whimsical nor capricious in the action of the probate
court not to appoint Diaz as special co-administrator since the Orders of 7 June
 2000 and 11 September 2000 clearly stipulate the grounds for the rejection.
189. We also rule that the probate court in issuing the Order of 11 September 2000
did not err in commanding respondents to turn over all documents pertinent to
the estate under special administration and in enforcing such order by means of
contempt of court. The powers of a special administrator are plainly delineated
in Sec. 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, vesting upon him the authority to "take
possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits and estate of the de-
ceased and preserve the same for the executor or administrator afterwards ap-
pointed x x x x"
190. Moreover, Pascual cannot deprive the special administratrix of access to and
custody of essential documents by arguing that their possession thereof allegedly
in behalf of petitioner is already the equivalent of "constructive possession"
which constitutes full compliance with the possessory powers of petitioner as
special administratrix under Sec. 2 of Rule 80.
191. The right of possession whether characterized as actual or constructive invaria-
bly empowers the special administrator with the discretion at any time to exer-
cise dominion or control over the properties and documents comprising the es-
tate.
192. In any event, as we have held in De Guzman v. Guadiz, the partisan possession
exercised by litigants over properties of the estate differs greatly from the neu-
tral possession of a special administrator under the Rules of Court. Quite obvi-
ously, with this distinction, the possession of portions of the estate by respond-
ents as heirs necessarily excludes the possessory right over the same properties
inherent in the mandate of a special administrator.
193. When taken together, the words "possession" and "charge" serve to highlight the
fact that a special administrator must be able to subject the properties of the es-
tate to his control and management when in his good judgment such action is
needed.
194. Finally, Pascual cannot disobey the reasonable exercise of the authority of a
special administrator on the dubious ground that the order appointing Valarao as
special administratrix had not in the meantime become final and executory be-
cause of a pending motion for reconsideration filed by them.
195. The fallacy of this reasoning is apparent, for an interlocutory order is not instant-
ly appealable and therefore there is no period nor action to suspend or interrupt
by a motion for reconsideration; it is even well settled that a special civil action
for certiorari does not suspend the immediate enforceability of an interlocutory
order absent a temporary restraining order or an injunction
196. In the same manner, the appointment of a special administrator being an inter-
locutory order is not interrupted by a motion for reconsideration and thus must
be obeyed as the proceedings in the probate court progress
 001 RCBC v. HI-TRI DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND
BAKUNAWA (APASAN)
June, 13, 2012 | Sereno, J. | Escheat pursuant to RA No. 3936
PETITIONER: Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
RESPONDENTS: Hi-Tri Development Corporation and Luz R. Bakunawa
SUMMARY: The Spouses Bakunawa are registered owners of 6 parcels of
land. Sometime in 1990, a certain Teresita Millan (Millan), through her
representative, Jerry Montemayor (Montemayor), offered to buy said lots for
6.7million, with the promise that she will take care of clearing whatever
preliminary obstacles (case only mentioned that the lots were sequestered by the
PCGG so perhaps this was one of the obstacles) there maybe to effect a
completion of the sale. The Spouses Bakunawa delivered to Millan the owner’s
copies of TCTs and in turn, Millan made a downpayment of 1M. However,
Millan failed to clear the obstacles and as a result, the Spouses Bakunawa
rescinded the sale and offered to return the downpayment. to Millan but the
latter refused to accept. Consequently, the Spouses Bakunawa, through their
company Hi-Tri Development Corporation (Hi-Tri) took out a Manager’s Check
from RCBC payable to Rosmil Realty and Development Corporation, a
company of Millan. Thereafter, the Spouses Bakunawa filed a complaint before
the RTC against Millan and Montemayor and the check serves as one of their
basis to claim the return of their TCTs and for Millan to accept the return of the
downpayment. The Spouses Bakunawa, upon advice of their counsel, retained
custody of RCBC Manager's Check and refrained from canceling or negotiating
it. Conflict arose when during the pendency of the civil case, RCBC reported
the credit of 1M (value of the check) in favor of Rosmil to the Bureau of
Treasury as among its “unclaimed balances”. Subsequently, the OSG filed with
the RTC an action for escheat. In the meantime, there was a compromise
agreement between the Spouses Bacunawa and Millan in the amount of 3M
including the value of the downpayment of 1M. But during negotiations and
evidently prior to said settlement, Manuel Bakunawa, through Hi-Tri inquired
from RCBC the availability of the 1M under the RCBC Manager's Check. Hi-
Tri and Spouses Bakunawa were however dismayed when they were informed
that the amount was already subject of the escheat proceedings before the RTC.
So the Spouses Bakunawa sent a letter to RCBC which essentially says that
their account should have remained active because the presentation of the check
was never made and they were also not notified prior to the issuance of the
Sworn Statement of “unclaimed balances”. Consequently, the RTC in the
escheat proceedings ruled that the account should be escheated in favor of the
Republic. But the CA reversed due to jurisdictional errors with regard to notice
to the Spouses Bakunawa and Hi-Tri. Hence this petition by RCBC.
First Issue: Whether the Decision and Order of the RTC were void for failure to
send separate notices to respondents by personal service – NO. (proceed to
doctrine no. 1) In the present case, CA committed reversible error when it ruled
that the issuance of individual notices upon respondents was a jurisdictional
requirement, and that failure to effect personal service on them rendered the
Decision and the Order of the RTC void for want of jurisdiction.
Second Issue: Whether RCBC had the obligation to notify respondents
immediately before it filed its Sworn Statement with the Treasurer – YES.
(proceed to doctrine no. 2) In the present case, the CA was correct when it ruled
that the bank's failure to notify respondents (Hi-Tri and/or Spouses Bakunawa)
deprived them of an opportunity to intervene in the escheat proceedings and to
present evidence to substantiate their claim, in violation of their right to due
process.
Third Issue: Whether or not the allocated funds may be escheated in favor of the
Republic – NO. (proceed to doctrine no. 3) In the present case, the SC have
already settled that respondents retained ownership of the funds. As it is obvious
from their foregoing actions that they have not abandoned their claim over the
fund, the SC ruled that the allocated deposit, subject of the Manager's Check,
should be excluded from the escheat proceedings.
DOCTRINE:
1. Escheat proceedings are actions in rem, whereby an action is brought
against the thing itself instead of the person. Thus, an action may be
instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon the
depositors or other claimants. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of
the court over the res. Consequently, a judgment of escheat is
conclusive upon persons notified by advertisement, as publication is
considered a general and constructive notice to all persons interested.
2. The notification is meant to inform them that their deposit could be
escheated if left unclaimed. Accordingly, before filing a sworn
statement, banks and other similar institutions are under obligation to
communicate with owners of dormant accounts. The purpose of this
initial notice is for a bank to determine whether an inactive account has
indeed been unclaimed, abandoned, forgotten, or left without an owner.
If the depositor simply does not wish to touch the funds in the
meantime, but still asserts ownership and dominion over the dormant
account, then the bank is no longer obligated to include the account in
its sworn statement.
3. Escheat is not a proceeding to penalize depositors for failing to deposit
to or withdraw from their accounts. It is a proceeding whereby the state
compels the surrender to it of unclaimed deposit balances when there is
 substantial ground for a belief that they have been abandoned,
forgotten, or without an owner.
FACTS:
1. Luz Bakunawa and her husband Manuel, now deceased (Spouses
Bakunawa) are registered owners of six (6) parcels of land covered by TCT
Nos. 324985 and 324986 of the Quezon City Register of Deeds, and TCT
Nos. 103724, 98827, 98828 and 98829 of the Marikina Register of Deeds.
These lots were sequestered by the Presidential Commission on Good
Government.
2. Sometime in 1990, a certain Teresita Millan (Millan), through her
representative, Jerry Montemayor (Montemayor), offered to buy said lots
for P6,724,085.71, with the promise that she will take care of clearing
whatever preliminary obstacles there maybe to effect a “completion of the
sale”.
3. The Spouses Bakunawa gave to Millan the Owner's Copies of said TCTs
and in turn, Millan made a downpayment of P1,019,514.29 for the intended
purchase. However, for one reason or another, Millan was not able to clear
said obstacles. As a result, the Spouses Bakunawa rescinded the sale and
offered to return to Millan her downpayment of P1,019,514.29. However,
Millan refused to accept back the P1,019,514.29 downpayment.
4. Consequently, the Spouses Bakunawa, through their company, the Hi-Tri
Development Corporation (Hi-Tri) took out on October 28, 1991, a
Manager's Check from RCBC-Ermita in the amount of P1,019,514.29,
payable to Millan's company Rosmil Realty and Development Corporation
(Rosmil) c/o Teresita Millan and used this as one of their basis for a
complaint against Millan and Montemayor which they filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 99, docketed as Civil Case
No. Q-91-10719 in 1991, praying that:
a. That the defendants Teresita Millan and Jerry Montemayor may be
ordered to return to plaintiffs spouses the Owners' Copies of
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 324985, 324986, 103724,
98827, 98828 and 98829;
b. That the defendant Teresita Millan be correspondingly ordered to
receive the amount of One Million Nineteen Thousand Five
Hundred Fourteen Pesos and Twenty Nine Centavos
(P1,019,514.29);
c. That the defendants be ordered to pay to plaintiffs spouses moral
damages in the amount of P2,000,000.00; and
d. That the defendants be ordered to pay plaintiffs attorney's fees in
the amount of P50,000.00.
5. Being part and parcel of said complaint, and consistent with their prayer in
the civil case that "Teresita Millan be correspondingly ordered to receive
the amount of P1,019,514.29”, the Spouses Bakunawa, upon advice of their
counsel, retained custody of RCBC Manager's Check and refrained from
canceling or negotiating it.
a. All throughout the proceedings in the civil case, especially during
negotiations for a possible settlement of the case, Millan was
informed that the Manager's Check was available for her
withdrawal, she being the payee.
6. On January 31, 2003, during the pendency of the civil case and without the
knowledge of Hi-Tri and Spouses Bakunawa, RCBC reported the
P1,019,514.29 credit existing in favor of Rosmil to the Bureau of
Treasury as among its "unclaimed balances" as of January 31, 2003.
Allegedly, a copy of the Sworn Statement executed by Florentino N.
Mendoza, Manager and Head of RCBC's Asset Management, Disbursement
& Sundry Department ("AMDSD") was posted within the premises of
RCBC-Ermita.
7. On December 14, 2006, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed with the RTC the action below for Escheat.
8. On April 30, 2008, the Spouses Bakunawa settled amicably their dispute
with Rosmil and Millan (pertaining to the first civil case). Instead of only
the amount of P1,019,514.29, Spouses Bakunawa agreed to pay Rosmil and
Millan the amount of P3,000,000.00, which is inclusive of the amount of
P1,019,514.29. But during negotiations and evidently prior to said
settlement, Manuel Bakunawa, through Hi-Tri inquired from RCBC-
Ermita the availability of the P1,019,514.29 under the RCBC
Manager's Check. Hi-Tri and Spouses Bakunawa were however
dismayed when they were informed that the amount was already
subject of the escheat proceedings before the RTC.
9. On April 17, 2008, Manuel Bakunawa, through Hi-Tri wrote RCBC (please
see last part of digest for the letter and read the bold parts).
10. RTC RULING: the trial court rendered its assailed Decision declaring the
deposits, credits, and unclaimed balances subject of the escheat
proceedings escheated to the Republic. Among those included in the order
 of forfeiture was the amount of P1,019,514.29 held by RCBC as allocated
funds intended for the payment of the Manager's Check issued in favor of
Rosmil.
11. CA RULING: Reversed the RTC.
a. According to the appellate court, RCBC failed to prove that the
latter had communicated with the purchaser of the Manager's
Check (Hi-Tri and/or Spouses Bakunawa) or the designated
payee (Rosmil) immediately before the bank filed its Sworn
Statement on the dormant accounts held therein. The CA ruled
that the bank's failure to notify respondents (Hi-Tri and/or
Spouses Bakunawa) deprived them of an opportunity to
intervene in the escheat proceedings and to present evidence to
substantiate their claim, in violation of their right to due
process.
b. Furthermore, the CA pronounced that the Makati City RTC
Clerk of Court failed to issue individual notices directed to all
persons claiming interest in the unclaimed balances, as well as
to require them to appear after publication and show cause
why the unclaimed balances should not be deposited with the
Treasurer of the Philippines. It explained that the jurisdictional
requirement of individual notice by personal service was distinct
from the requirement of notice by publication. Consequently, the
CA held that the Decision and Order of the RTC were void for
want of jurisdiction.
12. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/s:
1. Whether the Decision and Order of the RTC were void for failure to send
separate notices to respondents by personal service – NO, this is not a
jurisdictional requirement because escheat proceedings are actions in rem
and therefore an action may be instituted and carried to judgment without
personal service upon the depositors or other claimants.
2. Whether RCBC had the obligation to notify respondents immediately before
it filed its Sworn Statement with the Treasurer – YES, notification is meant
to inform them that their deposit could be escheated if left unclaimed.
Accordingly, before filing a sworn statement, banks and other similar
institutions are under obligation to communicate with owners of dormant
accounts. The purpose of this initial notice is for a bank to determine
whether an inactive account has indeed been unclaimed, abandoned,
forgotten, or left without an owner.
3. Whether or not the allocated funds may be escheated in favor of the
Republic – the facts of the case show that respondents never intended to
abandon their account and consequently, their account should be excluded
from the escheat proceedings.
RULING: Petition is DENIED and CA decision is AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE
1. CONTENTION OF RCBC: RCBC assails the CA judgment insofar as
they ruled that notice by personal service upon respondents is a
jurisdictional requirement in escheat proceedings. RCBC contends that
respondents were not the owners of the unclaimed balances and were thus
not entitled to notice from the RTC Clerk of Court. It hinges its claim on the
theory that the funds represented by the Manager's Check were deemed
transferred to the credit of the payee (Rosmil or Millan) or holder upon its
issuance.
2. Please see last part of digest to see the highlighted parts of the pertinent
provisions of RA NO. 3936 which the SC quoted for the discussions
below.
3. MANNER OF SERVICE: Hence, insofar as banks are concerned, service
of processes is made by delivery of a copy of the complaint and
summons upon the president, cashier, or managing officer of the
defendant bank. On the other hand, as to depositors or other claimants of
the unclaimed balances, service is made by publication of a copy of the
summons in a newspaper of general circulation in the locality where the
institution is situated.
4. NECESSITY OF NOTICE: A notice about the forthcoming escheat
proceedings must also be issued and published, directing and requiring all
persons who may claim any interest in the unclaimed balances to appear
before the court and show cause why the dormant accounts should not be
deposited with the Treasurer.
5. Accordingly, the CA committed reversible error when it ruled that the
issuance of individual notices upon respondents was a jurisdictional
requirement, and that failure to effect personal service on them rendered the
Decision and the Order of the RTC void for want of jurisdiction. Escheat
proceedings are actions in rem, whereby an action is brought against the
thing itself instead of the person. Thus, an action may be instituted and
carried to judgment without personal service upon the depositors or
 other claimants. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over
the res. Consequently, a judgment of escheat is conclusive upon persons
notified by advertisement, as publication is considered a general and
constructive notice to all persons interested.
SECOND ISSUE
6. Act No. 3936, as amended, outlines the proper procedure to be followed by
banks and other similar institutions in filing a sworn statement with the
Treasurer concerning dormant accounts:
Sec. 2. Immediately after the taking effect of this Act and within the month of
January of every odd year, all banks, building and loan associations, and trust
corporations shall forward to the Treasurer of the Philippines a statement,
under oath, of their respective managing officers, of all credits and deposits held
by them in favor of persons known to be dead, or who have not made further
deposits or withdrawals during the preceding ten years or more, arranged in
alphabetical order according to the names of creditors and depositors, and showing:
(a) The names and last known place of residence or post office addresses of the
persons in whose favor such unclaimed balances stand;
(b) The amount and the date of the outstanding unclaimed balance and whether the
same is in money or in security, and if the latter, the nature of the same;
(c) The date when the person in whose favor the unclaimed balance stands died, if
known, or the date when he made his last deposit or withdrawal; and
(d) The interest due on such unclaimed balance, if any, and the amount thereof.
A copy of the above sworn statement shall be posted in a conspicuous place
in the premises of the bank, building and loan association, or trust corporation
concerned for at least sixty days from the date of filing thereof: Provided,
That immediately before filing the above sworn statement, the bank, building
and loan association, and trust corporation shall communicate with the person in
whose favor the unclaimed balance stands at his last known place of residence
or post office address.
7. As seen in the afore-quoted provision, the law sets a detailed system for
notifying depositors of unclaimed balances. This notification is meant to
inform them that their deposit could be escheated if left unclaimed.
Accordingly, before filing a sworn statement, banks and other similar
institutions are under obligation to communicate with owners of
dormant accounts. The purpose of this initial notice is for a bank to
determine whether an inactive account has indeed been unclaimed,
abandoned, forgotten, or left without an owner. If the depositor simply
does not wish to touch the funds in the meantime, but still asserts
ownership and dominion over the dormant account, then the bank is no
longer obligated to include the account in its sworn statement. It is not
the intent of the law to force depositors into unnecessary litigation and
defense of their rights, as the state is only interested in escheating
balances that have been abandoned and left without an owner.
8. In case the bank complies with the provisions of the law and the unclaimed
balances are eventually escheated to the Republic, the bank "shall not
thereafter be liable to any person for the same and any action which may be
brought by any person against in any bank . . . for unclaimed balances so
deposited . . . shall be defended by the Solicitor General without cost to
such bank." Otherwise, should it fail to comply with the legally outlined
procedure to the prejudice of the depositor, the bank may not raise the
defense provided under Section 5 of Act No. 3936, as amended.
9. CONTENTIONS OF RCBC: Petitioner asserts that the CA committed a
reversible error when it required RCBC to send prior notices to respondents
about the forthcoming escheat proceedings involving the funds allocated for
the payment of the Manager's Check. It explains that, pursuant to the law,
only those "whose favor such unclaimed balances stand" are entitled to
receive notices. Petitioner argues that, since the funds represented by the
Manager's Check were deemed transferred to the credit of the payee upon
issuance of the check, the proper party entitled to the notices was the payee
— Rosmil — and not respondents. Petitioner then contends that, in any
event, it is not liable for failing to send a separate notice to the payee,
because it did not have the address of Rosmil. Petitioner avers that it was
not under any obligation to record the address of the payee of a Manager's
Check.
10. CONTENTIONS OF RESPONDENTS: In contrast, respondents Hi-Tri
and Bakunawa allege that they have a legal interest in the fund allocated for
the payment of the Manager's Check. They reason that, since the funds were
part of the Compromise Agreement between respondents and Rosmil in a
separate civil case, the approval and eventual execution of the agreement
effectively reverted the fund to the credit of respondents. Respondents
further posit that their ownership of the funds was evidenced by their
continued custody of the Manager's Check (as advised by their counsel).
11. There are checks of a special type called manager's or cashier's checks.
These are bills of exchange drawn by the bank's manager or cashier, in the
name of the bank, against the bank itself. Nevertheless, the mere issuance
 of a manager's check does not ipso facto work as an automatic transfer
of funds to the account of the payee (as opposed to the contention of
RCBC).
12. RCBC acknowledges that the Manager's Check was procured by
respondents, and that the amount to be paid for the check would be sourced
from the deposit account of Hi-Tri. When Rosmil did not accept the
Manager's Check offered by respondents, the latter retained custody of
the instrument instead of cancelling it. As the Manager's Check neither
went to the hands of Rosmil nor was it further negotiated to other
persons, the instrument remained undelivered (no effective delivery
and thus revocable). RCBC does not dispute the fact that respondents
retained custody of the instrument.
THIRD ISSUE
13. We emphasize that escheat is not a proceeding to penalize depositors for
failing to deposit to or withdraw from their accounts. It is a proceeding
whereby the state compels the surrender to it of unclaimed deposit
balances when there is substantial ground for a belief that they have
been abandoned, forgotten, or without an owner.
14. After a careful review of the RTC records, we find that it is no longer
necessary to remand the case for hearing to determine whether the claim of
respondents was valid. There was no contention that they were the
procurers of the Manager's Check. It is undisputed that there was no
effective delivery of the check, rendering the instrument incomplete. In
addition, we have already settled that respondents retained ownership
of the funds. As it is obvious from their foregoing actions that they have
not abandoned their claim over the fund, we rule that the allocated
deposit, subject of the Manager's Check, should be excluded from the
escheat proceedings. We reiterate our pronouncement that the objective of
escheat proceedings is state forfeiture of unclaimed balances. We further
note that there is nothing in the records that would show that the OSG
appealed the assailed CA judgments. We take this failure to appeal as an
indication of disinterest in pursuing the escheat proceedings in favor of the
Republic.
LETTER TO RCBC
"We understand that the deposit corresponding to the amount of Php1,019,514.29 stated in the
Manager's Check is currently the subject of escheat proceedings pending before Branch 150 of
the Makati Regional Trial Court. Please note that it was our impression that the deposit would
be taken from Hi-Tri's RCBC bank account once an order to debit is issued upon the
payee's (Millan) presentation of the Manager's Check. Since the payee rejected the
negotiated Manager's Check, presentation of the Manager's Check was never made.
Consequently, the deposit that was supposed to be allocated for the payment of the Manager's
Check was supposed to remain part of the Corporation's (Hi-Tri) RCBC bank account,
which, thereafter, continued to be actively maintained and operated. For this reason, We
hereby demand your confirmation that the amount of Php1,019,514.29 continues to form part
of the funds in the Corporation's RCBC bank account, since pay-out of said amount was never
ordered. We wish to point out that if there was any attempt on the part of RCBC to
consider the amount indicated in the Manager's Check separate from the Corporation's
bank account, RCBC would have issued a statement to that effect, and repeatedly
reminded the Corporation that the deposit would be considered dormant absent any
fund movement. Since the Corporation (Hi-Tri) never received any statements of account
from RCBC to that effect, and more importantly, never received any single letter from
RCBC noting the absence of fund movement and advising the Corporation that the deposit
would be treated as dormant."
PERTINENT PROVISION OF ACT NO. 3936 (RATIO NO. 2)
Sec. 3. Whenever the Solicitor General shall be informed of
such unclaimed balances, heshall commence an action or actions in
the name of the People of the Republic of the Philippinesin the Court
of First Instance of the province or city where the bank, building and
loan association or trust corporation is located, in which shall be joined
as parties the bank, building and loan association or trust
corporation and all such creditors or depositors. All or any of such
creditors or depositors or banks, building and loan association or trust
corporations may be included in one action.Service of process in such
action or actions shall be made by delivery of a copy of the complaint
and summons to the president, cashier, or managing officer of each
defendant bank, building and loan association or trust corporation
and by publication of a copy of such summons in a newspaper of
general circulation, either in English, in Filipino, or in a local dialect,
published in the locality where the bank, building and loan association
or trust corporation is situated, if there be any, and in case there is none,
in the City of Manila, at such time as the court may order. Upon the
trial, thecourt must hear all parties who have appeared therein,
and if it be determined that such unclaimed balances in any
defendant bank, building and loan association or trust corporation are
unclaimed as hereinbefore stated, then the court shall render
judgment in favor of the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, declaring that said unclaimed balances have escheated to
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and commanding
said bank, building and loan association or trust corporation to forthwith
deposit the same with the Treasurer of the Philippines to credit of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines to be used as the
National Assembly may direct.
At the time of issuing summons in the action above provided
for, the clerk of court shall also issue a notice signed by him, giving
the title and number of said action, and referring to the complaint
therein, and directed to all persons, other than those named as
defendants therein, claiming any interest in any unclaimed balance
mentioned in said complaint, and requiring them to appear within
sixty days after the publication or first publication, if there are
several, of such summons,and show cause, if they have any, why the
unclaimed balances involved in said action should not be deposited
with the Treasurer of the Philippines as in this Act provided
and notifying them that if they do not appear and show cause, the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines will apply to the
court for the relief demanded in the complaint. A copy of said notice
shall be attached to, and published with the copy of, said summons
required to be published as above, and at the end of the copy of such
notice so published, there shall be a statement of the date of publication,
or first publication, if there are several, of said summons and
notice. Any person interested may appear in said action and become
a party thereto. Upon the publication or the completion of the
publication, if there are several, of the summons and notice, and the
service of the summons on the defendant banks, building and loan
associations or trust corporations, the court shall have full and
complete jurisdiction in the Republic of the Philippines over the
said unclaimed balances and over the persons having or claiming
any interest in the said unclaimed balances, or any of them, and
shall have full and complete jurisdiction to hear and determine the
issues herein, and render the appropriate judgment thereon.
 Republic v. Court of Appeals (Linds)
Jan. 31, 2002 | Bellosillo, J. | Escheat
PETITIONER: Republic of the Philippines
RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals, Amanda Solano, Romeo Solano
SUMMARY: Amanda has been the all around personal domestic helper of
Hankins, a French widow. In recognition of her service, Hankins executed a
deed of donation in her favor relating to the 2 properties subject to this case.
Solano alleged that she misplaced the deeds. While these were missing, the
Republic initiated escheat proceedings relating to the 2 properties. Solano’s
husband and a certain Gaudencio intervened, but was denied by the trial court
and eventually declared the properties escheated in favor of Pasay City.
Subsequently, Solano filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the CA
alleging that the properties were donated to her and in the alternative, Pasay
City is not the proper beneficiary. OSG opposed, alleging lack of jurisdiction
and prescription. CA granted the petition; MR of Republic was denied. On
certiorari before the SC, the OSG argued that the grounds for annulment are
only lack of jurisdiction and intrinsic fraud, which are not present in this case.
In addition, the claim of Solano is initiated 7 years after the escheat judgment.
The issue is whether Solano is an interested party entitled to claim/oppose the
escheat, and whether the same is barred by prescription. Yes to both.
An interested party is any person alleging to have a direct right or interest in
the property sought to be escheated is likewise an interested party and may
appear and oppose the petition for escheat. Solano falls under this definition.
However, the escheat judgment was handed down by the lower court as early as
27 June 1989 but it was only on 28 January 1997, more or less seven (7) years
after, when private respondent decided to contest the escheat judgment in the
guise of a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals.
Obviously, private respondent's belated assertion of her right over the escheated
properties militates against recovery.
The certificates of title covering the subject properties were in the name of the
decedent indicating that no transfer of ownership involving the disputed
properties was ever made by the deceased during her lifetime. In the absence
therefore of any clear and convincing proof showing that the subject lands had
been conveyed by Hankins to private respondent Solano, the same still
remained, at least before the escheat, part of the estate of the decedent and the
lower court was right not to assume otherwise. The Court of Appeals therefore
cannot perfunctorily presuppose that the subject properties were no longer part
of the decedent's estate at the time the lower court handed down its decision on
the strength of a belated allegation that the same had previously been disposed
of by the owner.
DOCTRINE: An interested party is any person alleging to have a direct right
or interest in the property sought to be escheated is likewise an interested party
and may appear and oppose the petition for escheat.
A judgment in escheat proceedings when rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive against all persons with actual or constructive notice,
but not against those who are not parties or privies thereto.
FACTS:
48. For more than three (3) decades (from 1952 to 1985) private respondent
Amada Solano served as the all-around personal domestic helper of the late
Elizabeth Hankins, a widow and a French national.
49. During Ms. Hankins' lifetime and most especially during the waning years
of her life, respondent Solano was her faithful girl Friday and a constant
companion since no close relative was available to tend to her needs.
50. In recognition of Solano's faithful and dedicated service, Ms. Hankins
executed in her favor two (2) deeds of donation involving two (2) parcels of
land covered by TCT Nos. 7807 and 7808 of the Registry of Deeds.
51. Private respondent Amanda Solano alleged that she misplaced the deeds of
donation and were nowhere to be found.
52. While the deeds of donation were missing, the Republic filed a petition for
the escheat of the estate of Elizabeth Hankins before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City.
53. During the proceedings, a motion for intervention was filed by Romeo
Solano, spouse of private respondent, and one Gaudencio Regosa, but on 24
June 1987 the motion was denied by the trial court for the reason that "they
miserably failed to show valid claim or right to the properties in question."
54. Since it was established that there were no known heirs and persons entitled
to the properties of decedent Hankins, the lower court escheated the estate
of the decedent in favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines.
55. By virtue of the decision of the trial court, the Registry of Deeds of Pasay
City cancelled TCT Nos. 7807 and 7808 and issued new ones, TCT Nos.
129551 and 129552, both in the name of Pasay City.
56. In the meantime, private respondent Amanda Solano claimed that she
accidentally found the deeds of donation she had been looking for a long
time. In view of this development, respondent Amada Solano filed on 28
January 1997 a petition before the Court of Appeals for the annulment of
the lower court's decision, anchored on two grounds:
a. Subject properties were donated, could not be escheated;
 b. Assuming that it could be escheated, Pasay City could not be the
proper beneficiary as the Rules say the escheat should be in favor
of the Republic.
57. OSG opposed the annulment, alleging lack of jurisdiction and prescription.
58. The CA gave due course to the petition for annulment.
59. CA granted the annulment; MR of Republic was denied.
60. Hence, this petition.
61. The Republic anchors the current petition on the ground of grave abuse of
the CA since it argues that there are only two grounds to annul a judgment:
(1) lack of jurisdiction; and (2) extrinsic fraud; and that the present
opposition to the escheat is already barred for having been initiated 7 years
after judgment of the escheat.
ISSUE: Does herein private respondent Amanda Solano, not being an heir but
allegedly a donee, have the personality to be a claimant within the purview of Sec. 4,
Rule 91, of the Revised Rules of Court? Yes. She falls under the definition of an
interested party: “any person alleging to have a direct right or interest in the property
sought to be escheated is likewise an interested party and may appear and oppose the
petition for escheat.” But, the opposition being claimed after 7 years, militates
against her recovery.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of
the Court of Appeals dated 12 November 1998 giving due course to the petition for
annulment of judgment, and its Resolution dated 4 May 2000 denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration, are SET ASIDE. The decision of the RTC-Br. 114, Pasay
City, dated 27 June 1989, is REINSTATED.
RATIO:
1. Escheat is a proceeding, unlike that of succession or assignment, whereby
the state, by virtue of its sovereignty, steps in and claims the real or
personal property of a person who dies intestate leaving no heir. In the
absence of a lawful owner, a property is claimed by the state to forestall an
open "invitation to self-service by the first comers." Since escheat is one of
the incidents of sovereignty, the state may, and usually does, prescribe the
conditions and limits the time within which a claim to such property may be
made. The procedure by which the escheated property may be recovered is
generally prescribed by statue, and a time limit is imposed within which
such action must be brought.
2. In this jurisdiction, a claimant to an escheated property must file his claim
"within five (5) years from the date of such judgment, such person shall
have possession of and title to the same, or if sold, the municipality or city
shall be accountable to him for the proceeds, after deducting the estate; but
a claim not made shall be barred forever." The 5-year period is not a device
capriciously conjured by the state to defraud any claimant; on the contrary,
it is decidedly prescribed to encourage would-be claimants to be punctilious
in asserting their claims, otherwise they may lose them forever in a final
judgment.
3. Incidentally, the question may be asked: Does herein private respondent,
not being an heir but allegedly a donee, have the personality to be a
claimant within the purview of Sec. 4, Rule 91, of the Revised Rules of
Court? In this regard, we agree with the Solicitor General on his
observation:
a. In a special proceeding for escheat under sections 750 and 751 the
petitioner is not the sole and exclusive interested party. Any person
alleging to have a direct right or interest in the property sought to
be escheated is likewise an interested party and may appear and
oppose the petition for escheat. In the present case, the Colegio de
San Jose, Inc. and Carlos Young appeared alleging to have a
material interest in the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan; the former
because it claims to be the exclusive owner of the hacienda, and
the latter because he claims to be the lessee thereof under a
contract legally entered with the former
4. In the instant petition, the escheat judgment was handed down by the lower
court as early as 27 June 1989 but it was only on 28 January 1997, more or
less seven (7) years after, when private respondent decided to contest the
escheat judgment in the guise of a petition for annulment of judgment
before the Court of Appeals. Obviously, private respondent's belated
assertion of her right over the escheated properties militates against
recovery.
5. A judgment in escheat proceedings when rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive against all persons with actual or constructive
notice, but not against those who are not parties or privies thereto. As held
in Hamilton v. Brown, "a judgment of escheat was held conclusive upon
persons notified by advertisement to all persons interested. Absolute lack on
the part of petitioners of any dishonest intent to deprive the appellee of any
right, or in any way injure him, constitutes due process of law, proper notice
having been observed." With the lapse of the 5-year period therefore,
private respondent Amanda Solano has irretrievably lost her right to claim
and the supposed "discovery of the deeds of donation" is not enough
justification to nullify the escheat judgment which has long attained finality.
6. In the mind of this Court the subject properties were owned by the decedent
during the time that the escheat proceedings were being conducted and the
lower court was not divested of its jurisdiction to escheat them in favor of
Pasay City notwithstanding an allegation that they had been previously
donated. We recall that a motion for intervention was earlier denied by the
escheat court for failure to show "valid claim or right to the properties in
question." Where a person comes into an escheat proceeding as a claimant,
the burden is on such intervenor to establish his title to the property and his
right to intervene. A fortiori, the certificates of title covering the subject
properties were in the name of the decedent indicating that no transfer of
ownership involving the disputed properties was ever made by the deceased
during her lifetime. In the absence therefore of any clear and convincing
proof showing that the subject lands had been conveyed by Hankins to
private respondent Solano, the same still remained, at least before the
escheat, part of the estate of the decedent and the lower court was right not
to assume otherwise. The Court of Appeals therefore cannot perfunctorily
presuppose that the subject properties were no longer part of the decedent's
estate at the time the lower court handed down its decision on the strength
of a belated allegation that the same had previously been disposed of by the
owner. It is settled that courts decide only after a close scrutiny of every
piece of evidence and analyze each case with deliberate precision and
unadulterated thoroughness, the judgment not being diluted by speculations,
conjectures and unsubstantiated assertions.
 003 ADLAWAN v. ADLAWAN(Arcenas) (DECEDENT) and located at Barrio Lipata, Municipality of Minglanilla,
January 20, 2006 | Ynares-Santiago, J. | Ejectment Cebu.
2. ARNELITO alleged in the complaint that he is an acknowledged illegiti-
mate child of the DECEDENT, and that he is the sole heir. So, he executed
PETITIONER/S: Arnelito Adlawan
an affidavit adjudicating to himself Lot 7226 and the house.
RESPONDENTS: Emeterio M. Adlawan and Narcisa M. Adlawan
3. That out of ARNELITO’s respect and generosity to EMETERIO (59 y/o)
and NARCISO (70 y/o) (as the siblings of Decedent), Arnelito granted their
SUMMARY: The subject of this case is a house and lot under the name of DECE-
plea and allowed them to occupy the property provided they would vacate
DENT DOMINADOR. Since Dominador’s parents wanted to renovate but could not
should ARNELITO need the property.
obtain a loan, they simulated a sale to Dominador for him to get a loan since he was
4. January 1999 – ARNELITO verbally requested the SIBLINGS to vacate the
the only college graduate using the lot as collateral. Since, then the ADLAWANS
house and lot but they refused.
(Dominador and his siblings) have resided therein. When Dominador died, he was
5. So, the SIBLINGS filed an action for quieting of title with the RTC.
survived by his wife, GRACIANA. Ten years later, Graciana also died, and she was
a. After the last demand letter to vacate went unheeded, Arnelito filed
survived by her relatives by consanguinity. During Dominador and Graciana’s life-
the ejectment case.
time, they did not disturb the Sibling’s possession.
6. The SIBLINGS denied that they begged to allow them to stay and stressed
they occupied the house and lot since birth and that the lot was originally
ACTION: Arnelito is alleging that he is the acknowledged illegimate child of
registered in the name of their deceased father, Ramon Adlawan and the
Dominador and the sole heir and so executed an affidavit adjudicating to himself the
ancestral house was owned by Ramon and their mother, Oligia Mañacap
house and lot. Arnelito is alleging that he only allowed the siblings (Emeterio and
Adlawan (SPOUSES ADLAWAN)
Narcisa) to stay because they pleaded with Arnelito, with the condition that they
a. That they were 9 children and they all lived on the property.
vacate the property when he needed the property. When they refused to leave,
b. That Arnelito was a stranger who never had possession.
Arnelito filed an unlawful detainer case against them. In turn, the Siblings filed an
c. That SPOUSES ADLAWAN neeed money to renovate the
action for quieting of title. MTC dismissed the ejectment case. RTC reversed hold-
house but were not qualified to get a loan. So they simulated a
ing that the title of DECEDENT could not be collaterally attacked. CA set aside RTC
deed of sale transferring the property in the name of DECE-
ruling and dismissed the ejectment suit since he was co-owners with the legal heirs
DENT DOMINADOR as the only one who had college educa-
who survived the wife of DECEDENT DOMINADOR; hence, has no authority to
tion, for him to get the loan using the lot as collateral.
bring the suit alone (reinstate MTC ruling). Ergo, this petition.
d. That DECEDENT DOMINADOR and his wife, GRACIANA,
never disturbed the SIBLING’S possession of the property intil
Issue is w/n ARNELITO can validly maintain the instant case for ejectment. Sc held
they died respectively.
NO. Arnelito failed to show that he has the requisite personality and authority to file
7. MTC RULING: dismissed the ejectment case holding that ARNELITO’s
the ejectment suit. Arnelito’s action (based on the language of his complaint alleging
filiation and settlement of estate are conditions precedent to accrual of his
that he is the sole heir and so absolute owner) operates as a complete repudiation of
action for ejectment.
the existence of co-ownership and not in representation or recognition of the same
a. Since DECEDENT was survived by his wife, her legal heirs are al-
based on the language used in his complaint. Hence, if the action is for the benefit of
so entitled to their share in the lot.
the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for himself and not for the co-
8. RTC RULING: reversed MTC holding that the title of DECEDENT cannot
ownership, the action will not prosper.
be collaterally attacked.
a. Ordered the SIBLINGS to convey possession to ARNELITO
DOCTRINE: Petitioner has no authority to institute ejectment case as sole owner of
b. Pay compensation for use and occupation (500/month)
subject property co-owned with other heirs.
c. Granted ARNELITO’s motion for execution pending appeal (op-
posed by alleged nephew and nieces of DECEDENT’s WIFE)
FACTS: d. RTC denied motion for leave to intervene – because lost jurisdic-
1. ARNELITO filed an ejectment suit from the parties’ dispute over Lot 7226 tion due to petition by ARNELITO to CA
and the house built on the land, covered by TCT No. 8842, registered in the
name of the deceased Dominador Adlawan who died on May 28 1987
 9. CA RULING: set aside RTC ruling and reinstated MTC ruling i.e. dis-
missed the ejectment case, rationating that ARNELITO and HEIRS OF
WIFE GRACIANA are co-owners of the lot.
a. ARNELITO cannot eject the SIBLINGS via unlawful detainer
filed in his own name as sole owner of the property.
10. MR was denied; hence, this petition.
ISSUE/S: W/N ARNELITO can validly maintain the instant case for ejectment –
NO. Arnelito failed to show that he has the requisite personality and authority to file
the ejectment suit. Arnelito’s action operates as a complete repudiation of the exist-
ence of co-ownership and not in representation or recognition of the same based on
the language used in his complaint. Hence, if the action is for the benefit of the plain-
tiff alone, such that he claims possession for himself and not for the co-ownership,
the action will not prosper
RULING: Petition denied. Decision of CA reinstating MTC’s ruling (which dis-
missed the ejectment case) is AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
1. SC noted that the RTC lost sight of the theory of succession invoked by
ARNELITO by ruling on the validity of the sale transferring to DECE-
DENT DOMINADOR and ARNELITO as acknowledged illegitimate son
who inherited such lot. Because by ruling as such, it would end up proving
that ARNELITO is not the sole owner of the lot because DECEDENT is
survived not only by ARNELITO but also the WIFE who died 10 years af-
ter DECEDENT DOMINADOR.
2. Since DECEDENT died intestate, WIFE and ARNELITO became co-
owners of the lot and the death of the wife did not make ARNELITO the
sole owner as the WIFE’s share passed to her relatives by consanguinity,
not to ARNELITO with whome she had no blood relations.
3. Hence, CA was correct that ARNELITO has no authority to institute
the ejectment suit as sole owner of the lot.
a. Arnelito’s contention based on Art. 487 does not hold.
b. Article 487 provides that “any one of the co-owners mamy bring
an action in ejectment. This covers all kinds of actions for the re-
covery of possession (accion interdictal = forcible entry and un-
lawful detainer; accion publiciana = recovery of possession; accion
de reivindicacion = recovery of ownership).
c. A co-owner may bring such action without the necessity of
joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit
is presumed to have been filed to benefit his co-owners.
4. However, Prof. Arturo Tolentino explains – If the action is for the benefit
of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for himself and not
for the co-ownership, the action will not prosper.
5. Baloloy v. Hular – party filed a complaint for quieting of title claiming exl-
cusive ownership but evidence showed that he has co-owners. Court held
that dismissal was warranted since there was no proof other co-owners had
waived their rights over the subject property or conveyed the same to the
one filing the complaint
a. Under Section 7 of Rule 3 of ROC – such party is mandated to im-
plead his siblings (as co-owners), as parties, which such complain-
ant failed to do in the case of Baloloy. Also, the Republic of the
PH was an indispensable party as defendant because it sought the
nullification of OCT issued as Free Patent.
6. APPLICATION IN THIS CASE: Arnelito brought the unlawful detainer
suit in his name alone and for his own benefit to the exclusion of the heirs
of the WIFE as he even executed an affidavit of self-adjudication over the
lot. Hence, Arnelito cannot validly maintain the present acion considering
he does not recognize the co-ownership that flows from his theory of suc-
cession to DECEDENT’s property.
a. The contention that such ejectment would benefit him and the heirs
of the wife is untenable. Arnelito filed the suit in order to acquire
possession and recover damages wherein only he alone will gain
possession of the lot and benefit from said proceeds of award of
damages.
7. Also, in default of the heirs of the WIFE, whom Arnelito pointed out as fic-
titious heirs, the State shall inherit the WIFE’s share and thus become co-
owners with Arnelito entitled to possession and enjoyment of the property.
8. Arnelito’s action operates as a complete repudiation of the existence of co-
ownership and not in representation or recognition of the same based on the
language used in his complaint alleging that “he is the only son (illegiti-
mate) and sole heir of DECEDENT” and being the sole heir, became the
absolute owner of the aforementioned house and lot.”
9. SC held that the not less than four-decade actual physical possession of
the SIBLINGS of the ancestral house and lot deserves to be respected
since Arnelito failed to show that he has the requisite personality and
authority to file the ejectment suit.
 004 SSS v. COA (Buenaventura)
July 11, 2002| Bellosillo, J. | Trust Fund
PETITIONER: Social Security System
RESPONDENTS: Commission on Audit
SUMMARY: SSS and ACCESS entered into a Collective Negotiation Agree-
ment (CNA) that provides P5,000 contract signing bonus. DBM declared the
CNA illegal and the SSS Corporate Auditor disallowed fund releases for such.
ACCESS appealed the disallowance to COA, and it affirmed the disallowance
ruling that there was no legal basis for the signing bonus since RA 7658 had
repealed the authority of the SSC to fix the compensation of its personnel. A
petition for certiorari was then filed in the name of SSS and not by ACCESS.
SSS argues that a signing bonus may be granted because the SSC has the power
to fix the compensation of its personnel under its charter (RA 1161)
COA asserts that RA 1161 was repealed by RA 6758 in connection to the au-
thority to fix compensation.
The issue is WoN the charter of SSS authorizes SSC to fix the compensation of
its employees is still effective, SC held NO, it has been repealed by RA 6758.
RA 6758 modified, if not repealed, Sec. 3, par. (c), of RA 1161 as amended, at
least insofar as it concerned the authority of SSC to fix the compensation of SSS
employees and officers. This means that whatever salaries and other financial
and non-financial inducements that the SSC was minded to fix for them, the
compensation must comply with the terms of RA 6758. The signing bonus in
question did not qualify under Secs. 12 and 17 of RA 6758
The Court also reiterated that the SSS contributions are trust fund held be the
government.
DOCTRINE:
The funds contributed to the Social Security System by compulsion of law as
funds belonging to the members which were merely held in trust by the
government, and resolutely imposed the duty upon the trustee to desist from any
and all acts which would diminish the property rights of owners and
beneficiaries of the trust fund
FACTS:
1. This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 praying that this Court assess
against the workers’ social security fund the amount of P5,000.00 as
contract signing bonus of each official and employee of the SSS. The
gratuity emanated from the collective negotiation agreement (CNA)
executed on 10 July 1996 between the Social Security Commission (SSC)
in behalf of the SSS and the Alert and Concerned Employees for Better SSS
(ACCESS), the sole and exclusive negotiating agent for employees of the
SSS. Management shall grant each official and employee of the SYSTEM
the amount of P5,000.00 as contract signing bonus.
2. To fund this undertaking, the SSC allocated P15,000,000.00 in the budget
appropriation.
3. Department of Budget and Management (DBM) declared as illegal the
contract signing bonus which the CNA authorized to be distributed among
the personnel of the SSS. The SSS Corporate Auditor disallowed fund
releases for the signing bonus since it was "an allowance in the form of
additional compensation prohibited by the Constitution."
4. ACCESS appealed the disallowance to COA. COA affirmed the
disallowance and ruled that the grant of the signing bonus was improper.It
held that the provision on the signing bonus in the CNA had no legal basis
since Sec. 16 of RA 7658 had repealed the authority of the SSC to fix the
compensation of its personnel.
5. Hence the instant petition was filed in the name of the Social Security Sys-
tem and not by ACCESS through its legal staff
6. Petitioner SSS argues that a signing bonus may be granted upon the
conclusion of negotiations leading to the execution of a CNA where it is
specifically authorized by law and that in the case at bar such legal authority
is found in Sec. 3, par. (c), of RA 1161 as amended (Charter of the SSS)
which allows the SSC to fix the compensation of its personnel. On the other
hand, respondent COA asserts that the authority of the SSC to fix the
compensation of its personnel has been repealed by Secs. 12 and 16 of RA
6758 and is therefore no longer effective.
ISSUES:
1. WoN ACESS can file a case in the name of SSS – NO, there must be SSC
authorization to approve the action of SSS to sue in court.
2. WoN the charter of SSS authorizes SSC to fix the compensation of its em-
ployees is still effective- NO, it has been repealed by RA 6758
RULING: WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64, 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, is DISMISSED. The Decision No. 2001-123 of the
Commission on Audit and the Notice of Disallowance No. 97-002-0101 (96) of the
Social Security System Corporate Auditor prohibiting the payment of P5,000.00
signing bonus to each employee and officer of the Social Security System as
stipulated in Art. XIII of the Collective Negotiation Agreement and as approved in
Resolution No. 593 of the Social Security Commission are AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
1. The instant petition is fatally defective. It was filed in the name of the SSS
although no directive from the SSC authorized the instant suit and only the
officer-in-charge in behalf of petitioner executed the purported directive.
2.
Clearly, this is irregular since under The Social Security Act of 1997, it is
the SSC as a collegiate body which has the power to approve, confirm, pass
upon or review the action of the SSS to sue in court. Moreover, the
appearance of the internal legal staff of the SSS as counsel in the present
proceedings is similarly questionable because under both RA 1161 and RA
8282 it is the Department of Justice (DoJ) that has the authority to act as
counsel of the SSS.
3. These procedural deficiencies are serious matters which this Court cannot
take lightly and simply ignore since the SSS is in reality confessing
judgment to charge expenditure against the trust fund under its
custodianship.
4. Indeed we find no merit in the claim that the employees and officers of SSS
are entitled to the signing bonus provided for in the CNA. In the first place,
the process of collective negotiations in the public sector does not
encompass terms and conditions of employment requiring the appropriation
of public funds.
5. SSS however argues that the charter of SSS authorizes the SSC to fix the
compensation of its employees and officers so that in reality the signing
bonus is merely the fruit of the exercise of such fundamental power. On this
issue, we have to explain the relevant amendments to the SSS charter in
relation to the passage of RA 6758 (1989) entitled "An Act Prescribing a
Revised Compensation and Position Classification in the Government and
for other Purposes."
6. When the signing bonus was bestowed upon each employee and officer of
the SSS, the governing charter of the SSS was RA 1161, the SSC was
empowered to "appoint an actuary, and such other personnel as may be
deemed necessary" and to "fix their compensation."
7. Congress passed RA 6758, it provided for the consolidation of allowances
and compensation in the prescribed standardized salary rates except certain
specified allowances and such other additional compensation as may be
determined by the Department of Budget and Management. The law also
repealed "[a]ll laws, decrees, executive orders, corporate charters, and other
issuances or parts thereof, that exempt agencies from the coverage of the
System, or that authorize and fix position classification, salaries, pay rates
or allowances of specified positions, or groups of officials and employees or
of agencies, which are inconsistent with the System, including the proviso
under Section 2 and Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 985."
8. While RA 6758 intended to do away with multiple allowances and other
incentive packages and the resulting differences in compensation among
government personnel, the statute clearly did not revoke existing benefits
being enjoyed by incumbents of government positions at the time of the
passage of RA 6758 by virtue of Secs. 12 and 17 thereof.
9. We have no doubt that RA 6758 modified, if not repealed, Sec. 3, par. (c),
of RA 1161 as amended, at least insofar as it concerned the authority of SSC
to fix the compensation of SSS employees and officers. This means that
whatever salaries and other financial and non-financial inducements that the
SSC was minded to fix for them, the compensation must comply with the
terms of RA 6758. The signing bonus in question did not qualify under
Secs. 12 and 17 of RA 6758. It was non-existent as of 1 July 1989 as it
accrued only in 1996 when the CNA was entered into by and between SSC
and ACCESS. The signing bonus therefore could not have been included in
the salutary provisions of the statute nor would it be legal to disburse to the
intended recipients.
10. This Court has been very consistent in characterizing the funds being
administered by SSS as a trust fund for the welfare and benefit of workers
and employees in the private sector. In United Christian Missionary v.
Social Security Commission we were unequivocal in declaring the funds
contributed to the Social Security System by compulsion of law as funds
belonging to the members which were merely held in trust by the
government, and resolutely imposed the duty upon the trustee to desist from
any and all acts which would diminish the property rights of owners and
beneficiaries of the trust fund. Consistent with this declaration, it would
indeed be very reasonable to construe the authority of the SSC to provide
for the compensation of SSS personnel in accordance with the established
rules governing the remuneration of trustees -
x x x x the modern rule is to give the trustee a reasonable
remuneration for his skill and industry x x x x In deciding what is a
reasonable compensation for a trustee the court will consider the
amount of income and capital received and disbursed, the pay
customarily given to agents or servants for similar work, the
success or failure of the work of the trustee, any unusual skill
which the trustee had and used, the amount of risk and
responsibility, the time consumed, the character of the work done
(whether routine or of unusual difficulty) and any other factors
which prove the worth of the trustee’s services to the cestuis x x x
x The court has power to make extraordinary compensation
allowances, but will not do so unless the trustee can prove that he
has performed work beyond the ordinary duties of his office and
has engaged in especially arduous work.
11. On the basis of the foregoing pronouncement, we do not find the signing
bonus to be a truly reasonable compensation.
 005 Lorenzo v. Posadas (CELAJE)
G.R. No. L-43082 | June 18, 1937 | Laurel, J. | Discretion of the court to appoint a
trustee for the properties left by will of the decedent
PETITIONER: PABLO LORENZO, as trustee of the estate of Thomas Hanley, deceased
RESPONDENTS: JUAN POSADAS, JR., Collector of Internal Revenue
SUMMARY: Thomas Hanley died. He bequeathed his properties to his nephew Matthew
Henley, subject to the condition that for the first 10 years after his death, the properties
cannot be disposed or sold. Upon probate of his will, the lower court deemed it necessary
to appoint trustees for the management of the properties of the decedent. P.J. Moore was
the first appointed trustee, but he resigned and thus plaintiff Lorenzo then became the
trustee of the properties. One of the issues of the case was whether or not inheritance tax
should have been paid when the property was delivered by the executors of the will to the
first trustee, Moore. The SC said yes. The law requires the payment of inheritance tax
when the property is delivered to the beneficiary, and the SC said that the delivery to the
trustee, Moore, in this case, constituted delivery to the beneficiary.
DOCTRINE: The probate court can certainly exercise sound judgment in appointing a
trustee to carry into effect the provisions of the will. It is true that the word "trust" is not
mentioned or used in the will but the intention to create one is clear. No particular or
technical words are required to create a testamentary trust. To constitute a valid
testamentary trust there must be a concurrence of three circumstances: (1) Sufficient
words to raise a trust; (2) a definite subject; (3) a certain or ascertain object; statutes in
some jurisdictions expressly or in effect so providing. There is no doubt that the testator
intended to create a trust. He ordered in his will that certain of his properties be kept
together undisposed during a fixed period, for a stated purpose, to a specified beneficiary,
his nephew Matthew.
FACTS:
41. On October 4, 1932, the plaintiff Pablo Lorenzo, in his capacity as trustee
of the estate of Thomas Hanley, deceased, brought this action in the CFI of
Zamboanga against the defendant, Juan Posadas, Jr., then the Collector of
Internal Revenue, for the refund of the amount of P2,052.74, paid by the
plaintiff as inheritance tax on the estate of the deceased, and for the
collection of interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum, computed
from September 15, 1932, the date when the aforesaid tax was [paid under
protest.
42. The defendant Posadas set up a counterclaim for P1,191.27 alleged to be
interest due on the tax in question and which was not included in the
original assessment. From the decision of the CFI of Zamboanga dismissing
both the plaintiff's complaint and the defendant's counterclaim, both parties
appealed to this court.
43. It appears that on May 27, 1922, one Thomas Hanley died in Zamboanga,
Zamboanga, leaving a will and considerable amount of real and personal
properties. On June 14, 1922, proceedings for the probate of his will and the
settlement and distribution of his estate were begun in the CFI of
Zamboanga. The will was admitted to probate. Said will provides, among
other things, as follows:
a. 4. I direct that any money left by me be given to my nephew Matthew Hanley.
b. 5. I direct that all real estate owned by me at the time of my death be not sold or
otherwise disposed of for a period of ten (10) years after my death, and that the
same be handled and managed by the executors, and proceeds thereof to be given to
my nephew, Matthew Hanley, at Castlemore, Ballaghaderine, County of
Rosecommon, Ireland, and that he be directed that the same be used only for the
education of my brother's children and their descendants.
c. 6. I direct that ten (10) years after my death my property be given to the above
mentioned Matthew Hanley to be disposed of in the way he thinks most
advantageous.
d. 8. I state at this time I have one brother living, named Malachi Hanley, and that my
nephew, Matthew Hanley, is a son of my said brother, Malachi Hanley.
44. The CFI of Zamboanga considered it proper for the best interests of the
estate to appoint a trustee to administer the real properties which, under the
will, were to pass to Matthew Hanley ten years after the two executors
named in the will, was, on March 8, 1924, appointed trustee.
45. Moore took his oath of office and gave bond on March 10, 1924. He acted
as trustee until February 29, 1932, when he resigned and the plaintiff
Lorenzo herein was appointed in his stead.
46. During the incumbency of the plaintiff Lorenzo as trustee, the defendant
Collector of Internal Revenue, alleging that the estate left by the deceased at
the time of his death consisted of realty valued at P27,920 and personalty
valued at P1,465, and allowing a deduction of P480.81, assessed against the
estate an inheritance tax in the amount of P1,434.24 which, together with
the penalties for delinquency in payment consisting of a 1 per cent monthly
interest from July 1, 1931 to the date of payment and a surcharge of 25 per
cent on the tax, amounted to P2,052.74.
47. On March 15, 1932, the defendant Collector filed a motion in the
testamentary proceedings pending before the CFI of Zamboanga (Special
proceedings No. 302) praying that the trustee, plaintiff Lorenzo, be ordered
to pay to the Government the said sum of P2,052.74. The motion was
granted.
 48. On September 15, 1932, the plaintiff Lorenzo paid said amount under
protest, notifying the defendant Collector at the same time that unless the
amount was promptly refunded suit would be brought for its recovery. The
defendant Collector overruled the plaintiff Lorenzo's protest and refused to
refund the said amount, hence this case.
ISSUES:
5. W/N there been delinquency in the payment of the inheritance tax? Yes, the
inheritance tax should have been paid when then property was delivered to
the original trustee, Moore, by the executors of the will.
RULING: The judgment of the lower court is accordingly modified, with costs
against the plaintiff in both instances. So ordered.
RATIO:
45. The defendant Collector maintains that it was the duty of the executor to
pay the inheritance tax before the delivery of the decedent's property to the
trustee.
46. Stated otherwise, the defendant Collector contends that delivery to the
(original) trustee, Moore, was delivery to the cestui que trust, the
beneficiary in this case, within the meaning of the first paragraph of
subsection (b) of section 1544 of the Revised Administrative Code. This
contention is well taken and is sustained.
47. The appointment of P. J. M. Moore as trustee was made by the trial court in
conformity with the wishes of the testator as expressed in his will. It is true
that the word "trust" is not mentioned or used in the will but the
intention to create one is clear. No particular or technical words are
required to create a testamentary trust.
48. The words "trust" and "trustee", though apt for the purpose, are not
necessary. In fact, the use of these two words is not conclusive on the
question that a trust is created. "To create a trust by will the testator must
indicate in the will his intention so to do by using language sufficient to
separate the legal from the equitable estate, and with sufficient certainty
designate the beneficiaries, their interest in the trust, the purpose or object
of the trust, and the property or subject matter thereof.
49. Stated otherwise, to constitute a valid testamentary trust there must be a
concurrence of three circumstances: (1) Sufficient words to raise a trust; (2)
a definite subject; (3) a certain or ascertain object; statutes in some
jurisdictions expressly or in effect so providing."
50. There is no doubt that the testator intended to create a trust. He ordered in
his will that certain of his properties be kept together undisposed during a
fixed period, for a stated purpose.
51. The probate court certainly exercised sound judgment in appointment
a trustee to carry into effect the provisions of the will.
52. P. J. M. Moore became trustee on March 10, 1924. On that date trust estate
vested in him. The mere fact that the estate of the deceased was placed in
trust did not remove it from the operation of our inheritance tax laws or
exempt it from the payment of the inheritance tax.
53. The corresponding inheritance tax should have been paid on or before
March 10, 1924, to escape the penalties of the laws. This is so for the reason
already stated that the delivery of the estate to the trustee was in
esse delivery of the same estate to the cestui que trust, the beneficiary in
this case. A trustee is but an instrument or agent for the cestui que trust.
54. When Moore accepted the trust and took possession of the trust estate he
thereby admitted that the estate belonged not to him but to his cestui que
trust. He did not acquire any beneficial interest in the estate. He took such
legal estate only as the proper execution of the trust required and, his estate
ceased upon the fulfillment of the testator's wishes. The estate then vested
absolutely in the beneficiary.
55. The highest considerations of public policy also justify the conclusion we
have reached. Were we to hold that the payment of the tax could be
postponed or delayed by the creation of a trust of the type at hand, the result
would be plainly disastrous.
56. Testators may provide, as Thomas Hanley has provided, that their estates be
not delivered to their beneficiaries until after the lapse of a certain period of
time. In the case at bar, the period is ten years. In other cases, the trust may
last for fifty years, or for a longer period.
57. The collection of the tax would then be left to the will of a private
individual. The mere suggestion of this result is a sufficient warning against
the acceptance of the essential to the very existence of government.
58. The obligation to pay taxes rests not upon the privileges enjoyed by, or the
protection afforded to, a citizen by the government but upon the necessity of
money for the support of the state. For this reason, no one is allowed to
object to or resist the payment of taxes solely because no personal benefit to
him can be pointed out.
 006 SALINAS v. TUASON (Cruz)
March 2, 1931 | Johnson, J. | Trustees
PETITIONER: Ana Callejon Salinas, et al.,
RESPONDENTS: Felisa Roman Tuason and Jose Moreno Roman
SUMMARY: The heirs of Francisco Callejon Salinas, who died in Spain in
1911 are claiming P30,000 from the heirs of Lahaba, Tuason and Roman, which
was the proceeds from the sale of two parcels of land situated in Nueva Ecija.
The said lands were administered by Lahaba, also a Spaniard, resident of the
Philippine Islands.On November 24, 1918, Lahaba sold said parcels of land for
P30,000, but failed and refused to account for that sum to Callejon Salinas or
his heirs. The P30,000 passed to Tuason and Roman by way of inheritance from
Lahaba, who likewise refused to account to the heirs of Callejon Salinas the
P30,000. The Issues in this case are 1) Whether or not the lower court acting on
its general jurisdiction has the power and authority to hear the case; 2)Whether
or not the initial payment effected by Moreno Lahaba constitute res judicata;
and 3) Whether or not the present action has prescribed. The SC ruled in favor
of the heirs of Callejon Salinas. 1)The lower court has jurisdiction. The amount
of P30,000 which the the heirs of Callejon Salinas are seeking to recover is not
a claim against the estate of Lahaba. It is not an indebtedness of Moreno Lahaba
or his estate. Said amount represents the price of trust property administered by
him, of which he and his heirs failed and refused to account. The only appropri-
ate manner to recover said trust property, in view of the trustee's failure and
refusal to account for it, is by an action in court, and the lower court acted cor-
rectly in taking jurisdiction of the case. 2) Res Judicata, in this case, only ap-
plies to the P2500, the amount claimed by the consul to the intestate proceeding
of Lahaba, which claim was allowed and paid and delivered to the heirs of
Callejon Salinas. However, Res judicata does not apply to the unpaid P30,000
as claimed in this action. 3) There is absolutely no evidence to show that the
heirs of Salinas failed to demand from time to time from Lahaba and his heirs
all the trust property in his or their possession belonging to Callejon Salinas. As
soon as they secured positive knowledge of the existence of said amount as trust
property belonging to their predecessor, they commenced this action for the
recovery thereof. Moreover, As a general rule, a trust estate is exempt from the
operation of the statute of limitations. A trustee, however, may acquire the trust
estate by prescription provided there is repudiation of the trust. The repudiation
must be clear, open and unequivocal. Under the facts, the defense of prescrip-
tion is not available to the Tuason and Roman. There was no open, clear and
unequivocal repudiation of the trust by Lahaba. Neither was there any
knowledge on the part of Callejon Salinas and his heirs of any such repudiation.
On the contrary, there was concealment and misappropriation on the part of
Lahaba of the property entrusted to his administration and care.
DOCTRINE: As a general rule, a trust estate is exempt from the operation
of the statute of limitations. A trustee, however, may acquire the trust estate by
prescription provided there is repudiation of the trust and this fact is known to
the cestui que trust. The repudiation must be clear, open and unequivocal. In
that case the statute will commence to run from and after said repudiation and
the knowledge thereof by the cestui. Furthermore, prescription in order to be
available as a defense, the trustee must prove that there was a direct repudiation
of the trust and that the cestui que trust or beneficiary had knowledge thereof.
FACTS:
56. This action was for recovering the sum of P30,000 with interest at 10 per
cent from November 24, 1918.
57. The Ana Callejon Salinas, et al., (heirs of Salinas) were residents of the
Kingdom of Spain, represented in this action by the Consul General of
Spain in the Philippine Islands.
58. Francisco Callejon Salinas was a former resident of the Philippine Islands,
died in Spain on May 31, 1911. The record does not disclose the date when
he left the Islands.
59. In 1900 he appointed Teodosio Pintado y Fernandez as his attorney in fact
to administer his properties here, with express authority to delegate his
powers as such attorney, or to appoint his successor.
a. On April 24, 1905, Teodosio Pintado y Fernandez appointed Laha-
ba as attorney in fact or agent for Callejon Salinas.
60. Lahaba administered the properties of Callejon Salinas and rendered ac-
counts of his administration from April 24, 1905 up to the time of the death
of his principal in 1911. His last letter to his principal is dated June 31st
(30th), 1911. From July, 1911 up to the time of his death in 1920, Lahaba
had not rendered any report of his administration in spite of inquiries made
by the heirs of Callejon Salinas. Among the properties administered by him
were included the two parcels of land in question.
61. Sometime before the death of Lahaba, the Spanish Consul in the Philippine
Islands, Vicente Palmaroli, at the request of the heirs of Callejon Salinas,
made inquiries from Lahaba about the properties administered by him.
62. Prior thereto said heirs had made direct inquiries from Lahaba but received
no reply whatsoever.
63. Lahaba told the Spanish Consul that he had only P2,500 in his possession
belonging to his principal, which he was ready to deliver to the consul upon
his production of written authority from said heirs to receive the same in
their behalf.
64. Pending the receipt of said authority, Lahaba died.
65. So the consul presented a claim for P2,500 to the commissioners in the in-
testate proceedings of the deceased Moreno Lahaba. Said claim was al-
lowed and paid and delivered to the said heirs of Francisco Callejon Salinas.
66. After the receipt of said amount the heirs of Callejon Salinas requested the
Spanish Consul to make further inquiries about other properties under the
administration of Lahaba.
a. The Spanish Consul, with the assistance of attorney Eduardo
Gutierrez Repide, found that on November 24, 1918, Lahaba had
sold in the name of Francisco Callejon Salinas the two parcels of
land in question to Tomas Ortiz Luis for P30,000.
b. According to the deed of sale the whole price was paid in cash; but
according to the evidence, only the sum of P5,000 was paid at the
time of the sale, and the balance was paid in annual installments of
P5,000.
c. Five days after the sale, Luis executed a mortgage on said lands in
favor of Lahaba for P25,000 to secure the unpaid balance of the
price of said lands.
67. When Lahaba died on May 2, 1920, a balance of P20,000 of said mortgage
was still unpaid. Said amount was entered in the inventory of his estate as
conjugal property, and in the settlement of that estate it passed to the heirs
of Lahaba, Tuason and Roman. Said mortgage credit was paid to them long
before the commencement of this action.
68. The heirs of Salinas alleged:
a. that they were the heirs of Francisco Callejon Salinas, who died in
Spain in 1911;
b. that the amount of P30,000 which they claimed from the Felisa
Roman Tuason (Tuason) and Jose Moreno Roman (Roman) was
the proceeds from the sale of two parcels of land situated in San
Antonio, Province of Nueva Ecija;
c. that said lands belonged to their predecessor Francisco Callejon
Salinas, who had been a resident of the Philippine Islands;
d. that said lands were administered by Jose Moreno Lahaba (Laha-
ba), also a Spaniard, resident of the Philippine Islands, who died in
Manila on May 2, 1920;
e. that on November 24, 1918, Lahaba sold said parcels of land for
P30,000, but failed and refused to account for that sum to his prin-
cipal or the heirs of the latter;
f. that said sum passed by way of inheritance to the heirs of Laha-
ba,Tuason and Roman;
g. that Tuason and Roman, likewise refused to account the P30,000.
69. The Tuason and Roman demurred to the complaint on the grounds of
a. lack of jurisdiction,
b. res judicata and
c. prescription.
70. The demurrer was overruled, whereupon Tuason and Roman filed an an-
swer denying generally and specifically each and every allegation of the
complaint, and also containing the following special defenses:
a. That the court did not have jurisdiction of the subject matter;
b. that the heirs of Salinas claim was res judicata;
c. that the action has prescribed;
d. that the deceased Lahaba, as agent or representative of deceased
Salinas, had accounted to his principal for the proceeds from the
sale of the lands in question, resulting from said accounting a bal-
ance of P2,500 in favor of his principal;
e. that said amount was paid to the heirs of his principal; and
f. that Lahaba had spent P16,000 for clearing said lands and for the
survey and registration thereof.
g. The defendants prayed that they be absolved from the complaint
with costs against the plaintiffs.
71. After hearing the evidence Judge Simplicio del Rosario decided in favor of
the heirs of Salinas and ordered Tuason and Roman to pay P30,000 after
deducting the expenses incurred by Lahaba amounting to P3, 491.60
72. From that judgment both parties appealed.
73. The heirs of Salinas are questioning the deduction of expenses to the
amount awarded in their favor; non imposition of legal interest; and that the
order should have included payments of costs and damages by reason of
Tuason and Roman’s misappropriation of the proceeds of the sale of lands
74. Tuason and Roman claims that The court had no jurisdiction over the sub-
ject matter of the litigation; that the claim of P2,500 constitute res judicata ;
that the present action has prescribed; that Lahaba was not indebted to
plaintiffs for more than P2,500; and that the demurred should have not been
overruled
ISSUE/s:
WoN the lower court acting on its general jurisdiction has the power and
authority to hear the case – Yes because the action was not a claim of
indebtedness against Lahaba and his estate. The P30,000 represents the
price of trust property administered by him, of which he and his heirs
failed and refused to account which may be recovered in an action in
court.
WoN the initial payment effected by Moreno Lahaba constitute res judicata –
No, It does not constitute res judicata as regards the unpaid claim
WoN the present action has prescribed – No, There is absolutely no evidence to
show that the heirs of Salinas failed to demand from time to time from Lah-
aba and his heirs all the trust property in his or their possession belonging to
Callejon Salinas.
RULING: The judgment appealed from is in accordance with the facts and the law,
and the same should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the defendants-
appellants. So ordered.
RATIO:
The lower Court has jurisdiction
61. The Tuason and Roman contend that the lower court did not have jurisdic-
tion of the subject matter of this action. Their theory is that the heirs’ of Sa-
linas claim for P30,000 is a claim against the estate of Lahaba, and said
claim not having been presented before the commissioners of said estate, is
now barred, and the lower court did not have jurisdiction to take cognizance
of an action for the recovery of said amount.
62. This contention cannot be sustained. The amount of P30,000 which the hirs
of Salinas are seeking to recover is not a claim against the estate of Lahaba.
It is not an indebtedness of Lahaba or his estate.
63. The P30,000 represents the price of trust property administered by
him, of which he and his heirs failed and refused to account. The only
appropriate manner to recover said trust property, in view of the trustee's
failure and refusal to account for it, is by an action in court, and the
lower court acted correctly in taking jurisdiction of the case.
Res Judicata
64. Tuason and Roman contend that the payment to the heirs of Callejon Salin-
as of the sum of P2,500 constitutes res judicata. It does constitute res judi-
cata as to that amount only, but not as to the amount of P30,000 claimed in
this action.
Prescription
65. there is absolutely no evidence in the record to show that the heirs of Salin-
as failed to demand from time to time from Lahaba and his heirs all the trust
property in his or their possession belonging to Callejon Salinas.
66. As a matter of fact, the heirs of Salinas, through the Spanish Consul Gen-
eral, time and again requested Lahaba and his heirs to return to them all of
said trust property, but Lahaba and his heirs denied and concealed the exist-
ence of the P30,000 in question.
67. As soon as the heirs of Salinas secured positive knowledge of the existence
of said amount as trust property belonging to their predecessor, they com-
menced this action for the recovery thereof.
68. As a general rule, a trust estate is exempt from the operation of the statute
of limitations.
a. A trustee, however, may acquire the trust estate by prescription
provided there is repudiation of the trust and this fact is known to
the cestui que trust.
i. The repudiation must be clear, open and unequivocal. In
that case the statute will commence to run from and after
said repudiation and the knowledge thereof by the cestui.
ii. Furthermore, prescription in order to be available as a de-
fense, the trustee must prove that there was a direct repu-
diation of the trust and that the cestui que trust or benefi-
ciary had knowledge thereof.
69. Under the facts, the defense of prescription is not available to the Tuason
and Roman. There was no open, clear and unequivocal repudiation of the
trust by Lahaba.
70. Neither was there any knowledge on the part of Callejon Salinas and his
heirs of any such repudiation.
71. On the contrary, there was concealment and misappropriation on the part of
Lahaba of the property entrusted to his administration and care.
SEC. 294. (2) Repudiation of Trust and Assertion of Adverse Claim — (a) In General. — In the case of an
express trust limitations do not start to run in favor of the trustee until the trust is repudiated. A doctrine,
the validity of which has been questioned, applying to all express trusts, regardless of the manner in which
the trust was created, is that if the trustee openly repudiates the trust and asserts an adverse claim to the
trust property, these facts being known to the cestui que trust, the statute begins to run in the trustee's
favor, although not until then, and even though the trust is a resulting one, or a trust ex maleficio, . . . . And
the general rule above stated applies in favor of persons who become trustees by construction of law, and
in case of a voluntary constructive trust. As the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense to be al-
leged and proved, it is incumbent upon the trustee to show that there was a direct repudiation of the trust
and that the cestui que trust had knowledge thereof. Every intendment and presumption is against a repu-
diation.
SEC. 295. (b) Necessity for Notice — But a trustee's repudiation of an express trust, or a trust subject to
the rule governing express trusts, and his assertion of an adverse interest will not be sufficient to start the
statute of limitations in motion, unless knowledge or notice of such repudiation and claim is brought home
to the cestui que trust, and the statute begins to run when and only when the cestui que trust acquires the
knowledge or receives the notice.
SEC. 296. (c) Character and Circumstances of Repudiation and Notice — To set the statute in motion the
trustee's repudiation and adverse claim, whether by acts or words — repudiation may be proved by cir-
cumstances — must be clear, open and unequivocal, and must be so clearly and fully made known to
the cestui que trust as to make it incumbent upon him to assert his equitable rights. Mere failure of the
trustee to respond to repeated inquiries addressed to him by the cestui que trust is not enough. To consti-
tute a repudiation there must be something said or done by the trustee in open contravention of the terms
of the trust, and of such character that the relations of the parties will become and continue hostile.
 007 Alamayri v. Pabale (Daguman)
April 30, 2008 | Chico-Nazario, J. | Guardianship
PETITIONER: Lolita Alamayri
RESPONDENTS: Rommel, Elmer, Erwin and Amanda (Pabale
Siblings)
SUMMARY: Almayri petitions the court for the setting aside of
the CA decision. Sesnando Fernando, representing S.M. Fernando
Realty Corp filed an action for Specific Performance with Damag-
es (Civil Case) against Nelly Nave who owns a parcel of land
which the former alleged was the subject of a 'Kasunduan ng Pag-
bibilihan'. However, Nave allegedly reneged on their agreement
when she refused to accept the partial payment of Fernando. The
said lot was instead sold to the Pabale siblings. Subsequently, the
civil proceedings were suspended by virtue of a guardianship pro-
ceedings. In June 1988, Nave was declared therein to be incompe-
tent. The lower court declared the nullity of the two sale agree-
ments on the ground that Nave was found incompetent since 1980.
The Pabale siblings intervened. The Court of Appeals granted the
appeals of both Fernando and the Pabale siblings and upheld the
validity of the Deed of Sale executed by Nelly Nave dated Febru-
ary 20, 1984. Hence this petition. Alamayri alleged that since Nave
was judicially determined to be an incompetent, all contracts that
she subsequently entered into should be declared null and void.
Issue: Whether or not the declaration of incompetency consti-
tutes res judicata? No. There was no identity of parties and
issues between the special proceeding on the guardianship of
Nave and the civil case. The decision on the former on her incom-
petency should not therefore bar by conclusiveness of judgement
the finding in the latter case (civil case) that Nave was competent
and had capacity when she entered into the contract of sale over the
subject lot in favor of the Pabale siblings. Herein, the Court ex-
pounded on the difference between the two rules on res judicata,
namely; 1) bar by previous judgment, and 2) conclusiveness of
judgement. Bar by previous judgement means that the judgement
in the first case will bar the second case due to the identity of par-
ties, subject-matter, and cause of action. While a bar by virtue
of conclusiveness of judgement bars the re-litigation in a second
case of a fact or question already settled in a previous case. Hence,
even if there is identity of parties, but no identity of causes of ac-
tion, the first judgement can be conclusive only as to the those mat-
ters actually controverted and determined and not as to matters
merely involved
DOCTRINE
There being no identity of parties and issues between SP. PROC.
No. 146-86-C and Civil Case No. 675-84-C, the 22 June 1988 De-
cision in the former on Nave’s incompetency by the year 1986
should not bar, by conclusiveness of judgment, a finding in the lat-
ter case that Nave still had capacity and was competent when she
executed on 20 February 1984 the Deed of Sale over the subject
property in favor of the Pabale siblings. Therefore, the Court of
Appeals did not commit any error when it upheld the validity of the
20 February 1984 Deed of Sale
FACTS:
1. Sesinado Fernando, representing SM Fernando, filed a
complaint for Specific Performance against Nave, owner of a
parcel of land. It was alleged that they entered into a contract to
sell involving the land but Nave reneged on their agreement
when she refused to accept the tender of payment.
2. Nave filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that she already
sold the property to the Pabales in good faith after the
complaint was filed but before she received a copy thereof.
3. In addition, Fernado has no cause of action because he was
suing on behalf of SM Fernando, which is not a party to the
alleged contract to sell.
4. The Pabales filed for a Motion to Intervene, claining that they
are now the landowners of the subject property.
5. Trial Court denied the Motion to Dismiss.
6. Nave filed for a Motion to Amend Answer with Counterclaim
and Crossclaim: She prayed that her husband, Atty. Gesmundo
be impleaded as co-defendant. She also included as defense
(undue influence and fraud) because she was made to appear as
a widow when in fact she was married.
7. The Trial Court admitted Nave’s Motion.
8. Nave added as a defense the fact of her incapacity to contract
foe being mentally deficient based on the psychological
evaluation report of Dra. Panlasigui, clinical psychologist on
December 02, 1985.
9. Trial Court denied the defense.
10. Nave filed an MR but it was suspended because a Petition for
Guardianship was filed by her husband, and a decision was
rendered in the guardianship proceedings on June 22, 1988.
11. Based on the Psychiatric Evaluation Report, Nave is found an
incompetent within the purview of Rule 92 of the Revised
Rules of Court, a person who, by reason of age, disease, weak
mind and deteriorating mental process cannot without outside
aid take care of herself and mange her properties, becoming
thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation, said condition
having become sever since the year 1980.
12. She and her estate are hereby palced under guardianship. Atty.
Paner is appointed as her regular guardian without need of
bond, until further orders from this Court.
13. Upon taking oath as regular guardian, Atty Paner is ordered to
participate actively in the pending cases of Nave with the end
of protecting her interests from prejudicial sales of her real
properties, from the overpayment in the foreclosure made by
Ms. Gilda Ong, and in recovering her lost jewelries and monies
and other personal effects.
14. Nave died on December 02, 1992. Atty Gesmunod became the
sole heir, he executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication.
15. The Pabeles filed an Opposition. They claim they were not
made party to the guardianship proceedings. Hence, not bound
by the decision. The validity of the deed of sale was not raised
in the guardianship case.
16. Alamayri, to whom the said property was donated by Atty
Gesmundo, filed a Motion for Substititution in the latter’s
stead.
17. Atty Gesmundo filed a Manifestation that he already revoked
the donation on March 05, 1997.
18. The Trial Court recognized Alamayri as the owner of the land
on December 02, 1997.
19. The CA set aside the Trial Court’s decision and upheld the
validity of the Deed of Sale on Feb. 20, 1984.
ISSUE/s:
1.] W/N NOTICE WAS GIVEN TO PABALE, THEREBY BINDING
THEM – NO. As a rule: creditors [of minor/incompetent] – not neces-
sarily be identified and notified Presence – not essential to the pro-
ceedings, only insist that the minor/incompetent – is capacitated to en-
ter into contract & obligated to comply. However, it cannot be pre-
sumed – that the Pabales – were given notice and actually took part in
the SP because they are not relatives/nor the one’s caring
2] W/N NAVI WAS INCOMPETENT WHEN SHE EXECUTED A
DEED OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE PABALES – NO. A finding
that she was incompetent in 1986 – does not automatically mean she
was so in 1984. The significance of the 2-year gap cannot be gainsaid.
Nave’s mental condition in 1986 – may vastly differ from that of 1984
– given the intervening period
RULING: Wherefore, the order is set aside. Rule in favor of the
Pabales
RATIO:
NO IDENTITY OF PARTIES
 1. Atty Gesmundo – filed the SP for the appointment of a guardi-
an over the person and estate of his late wife Nave alleging her
incompetence
2. A Guardian may be appointed by the RTC over the person and
estate of a:
A] minor or
B] incompetent
1] "suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or
2] who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and
dumb who are unable to read and write,
3] those who are of unsound mind, even though they
have lucid intervals, and
4] persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of
age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot,
without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their
property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploi-
tation
3. Rule 93 ROC – governs the proceedings for the appointment of a
guardian
• Petition for Appointment of a Guardian – special proceeding, without
the usual parties in an ordinary civil case [ e.g. petitioner and respond-
ent)
4. SP PROC No. 146-86-C title: In re: Guardianship of Nelly S. Nave
for Incompetency, Verdasto Gesmundo y Banayo, petitioner, with no
named Respondents.
5.Section 2 and 3, R93 require that the petition contain the names, ag-
es, and residences of
1] relatives of the supposed minor or incompetent and
2] those having him in their care
so that those residing within the same province as the minor or in-
competent – can be notified of the time and place of the hearing of the
petition
6.Bbjectives of RTC for hearing – to determine:
1] whether a person is indeed a minor or an incompetent – who
has no capacity to care for himself and/or his properties
2] who is most qualified to be appointed as his guardian
7. There is an assumption that people who best could help the trial
court settle such issues would be those who are closest to and most
familiar with the supposed minor or incompetent, namely:
1] his relatives living within the same province and/or
2] persons caring for him
ISSUE NO. 1.
1. As a rule: creditors [of minor/incompetent] – not necessarily be
identified and notified
2. Presence – not essential to the proceedings, only insist that
the minor/incompetent – is capacitated to enter into con-
tract & obligated to comply
3. However, it cannot be presumed – that the Pabales – were giv-
en notice and actually took part in the SP because they are not
relatives/nor the one’s caring
4. Although the rules allow the RTC to give other gen or specific
notices of hearings – it was not established that the RTC did so
5. Alamayri – alleged that Jose Pabale, the Pabales father attend-
ed hearings [but] the orders cannot confirm if:
1] he was the father or
2] if he was, if he was authorized by her children
6. Alamayri – was not allowed to submit and mark additional evi-
dence to prove that Jose Pabale was the Pabales father because she
submitted additional evidence [after] the promulgation of the CA’s
decision
7. Also even if the evidence is admitted it cannot bind the Pabales
because notice to their father is NOT NOTICE TO THEM
• Since it was not established that the Pabale[s] participated in SP,
any finding – should not bind them in Civil Case
NO IDENTITY OF ISSUES – BETWEEN SP & CIVIL CASE
In SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C – main issue – whether Nave was incom-
petent at the time of filing of the petition with the RTC in 1986, thus,
requiring the appointment of a guardian over her person and estate
In the cross-claim of Nave and Atty. Gesmundo against the Pabale sib- 9. There is no basis for the declaration of Alamayri on the decla-
lings in Civil Case No. 675-84-C – issue – whether Nave was an in- ration of the RTC in its Decision dated 22 June 1988 in SP.
competent when she executed a Deed of Sale of the subject property in PROC. No. 146-86-C on Nave’s condition "having become se-
favor of the Pabale siblings on 20 February 1984, hence, rendering the vere since the year 1980
said sale void. 10. Dr. Ramos & Dr. Maaba [April 20 1987] – never stated when
Nave began to suffer said mental condition
ISSUE NO. 2 11. Alamayri – did not establish that Nave was mentally incapaci-
1. A finding that she was incompetent in 1986 – does not auto- tated when she executed the Feb 20 84 DOS in favor of the
matically mean she was so in 1984. The significance of the 2- Pabales– so as to render the deed void
year gap cannot be gainsaid
2. Nave’s mental condition in 1986 – may vastly differ from that
of 1984 – given the intervening period
3. In Carillo v. Jaojoco – Court – despite the fact that the seller
was declared mentally incapacitated by the trial court only
nine days after the execution of the contract of sale, it does not
prove that she was so when she executed the contract
4. Capacity to act – supposed to attach to a person who has not
previously been declared incapable. It is presumed to continue
so long as the contrary be not proved --- that is, that at the mo-
ment of his acting he was incapable, crazy, insane, or out of his
mind
5. The burden of proving incapacity to enter into contractual rela-
tions – rests upon the person who alleges it. If no sufficient
proof to this effect is presented, capacity – will be presumed
6. Nave was examined and diagnosed by doctors to be mentally
incapacitated only in 1986, when the RTC started hearing SP.
PROC. No. 146-86-C, she was not judicially declared an in-
competent until June 22 1988 – when a Decision in said case
was rendered by the RTC, resulting in the appointment of Atty.
Leonardo C. Paner as her guardian
7. Prior to 1986, Nave is still presumed to be capacitated and
competent to enter into contracts such as the Deed of Sale over
the subject property, which she executed in favor of the Pabale
siblings on February 20 1984
8. The burden of proving otherwise falls upon Alamayri, which
she dismally failed to do, having relied entirely on the June 22
1988 Decision of the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C
 008 Bonifacia P. Vancil v. Helen G. Belmes (DAYU) Notwithstanding that there is no statutory requirement, courts should not appoint
June 19, 2001 | Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. | Guardianship persons as guardians who are not within the jurisdiction of our courts for they
will find it difficult to protect the wards.
PETITIONER: Bonifacia P. Vancil
RESPONDENTS: Helen G. Belmes

SUMMARY: Bonifacia is the mother of Reeder. Reeder had 2 kids with Helen,
his common-law wife—Valerie and Vincent. Reeder died, so Bonifacia
commenced guardianship proceedings over the persons and properties of the
kids (Valerie was 6 and Vincent was 2 at the time). Bonifacia was eventually
appointed guardian, but Helen—as the natural mother—submitted an opposition
praying for Bonifacia’s removal and her appointment instead. RTC was in favor
of Bonifacia; however, the CA ruled in favor of Helen, stating that parents are
the ipso facto guardian of minor children and that other persons may only be
named if there is good reason. Bonifacia filed a petition for review with the SC.

Issue: W/N Helen should be guardian—YES. The SC first emphasized that this
ruling is only for the guardianship of Vincent, since Valerie is no longer a minor.
Afterwhich, it explained that Helen has a preferential right over Bonifacia
because she is the mother of the child. In effect, the right is an inherent one.
Moreover, even if Bonifacia claims that she is more qualified, this is of no merit,
since she, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental
authority only in case of death, absence, or unsuitability of Helen. Considering
that Helen is very much alive and has exercised continuously parental authority
over Vincent, Bonifacia has to prove, in asserting her right to be the minor’s
guardian, Helen’s unsuitability—she did not give any evidence. Even if Helen is
unfit, Bonifacia still cannot be guardian because she is an American citizen
based in Colorado, US. She will not be able to perform the responsibilities and
obligations required of a guardian. Notwithstanding that there is no statutory
requirement, courts should not appoint persons as guardians who are not within
the jurisdiction of our courts for they will find it difficult to protect the wards.
DOCTRINE:
The right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural
rights incident to parenthood, a right supported by law and sound public policy.
The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or decisions of the
courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship.
In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue
exercising parental authority. Only in case of the parents’ death, absence or
unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving
grandparent.
FACTS:
176. Bonifacia Vancil is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy serviceman of
the US who died in the US on Dec. 22, 1986.
177. During Reeder’s lifetime, he had 2 children—Valerie and Vincent—by his
common-law wife, Helen Belmes.
178. May 1987—Bonifacia commenced before RTC Cebu a guardianship pro-
ceeding over persons and properties of Valerie (6 y/o) and Vincent (2 y/o).
179. It is claimed in the petition that the minors are residents of Cebu and have
an estate consisting of proceeds from Reeder’s death pension benefits with
probable value of P100,000.
180. July 15, 1987—Bonifacia was appointed legal and judicial guardian over
persons and estate of Valerie and Vincent.
181. Aug. 13, 1987—Helen (natural mother of kids) submitted an opposition to
the guardianship proceedings saying that she had already filed a similar pe-
tition for guardianship before RTC Pagadian.
182. June 27, 1988—Helen followed her opposition with Motion for Removal of
Guardianship and Appointment of a New One, asserting that (1) she is the
natural mother in actual custody of and exercising parental authority over
the minors at Maralag, Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur where they are per-
manently residing; (2) petition was filed under improper venue; (3) and at
the time of the petition, Bonifacio was a resident of Colorado, US, being a
naturalized American citizen.
183. Oct. 12, 1988—Trial court rejected and denied Helen’s motion to re-
move/disqualify Bonifacia and instead ordered Bonifacia to enter the office
and perform her duties as guardian upon posting of P50,000 bond.
184. Subsequent attempt for reconsideration was dismissed.
 185. CA: reversed RTC (oct. 12) order—“Stress should be made that our Civil
Code considers parents, the father, or in the absence, the mother, as natural
guardian of her minor children. Sec. 7 of Rule 93 of Revised Rules of
Court confirms the designation of the parents as ipso facto guardian of
their minor children without need of a court appointment and only for
good reason may another person be named. Ironically, for the petitioner,
there is nothing on record of any reason at all why Helen, the biological
mother, should be deprived of her legal rights as natural guardian of her mi-
nor children. To give away such privilege from Helen would be an abdica-
tion and grave violation of the very basic fundamental tenets in civil law
and the constitution on family solidarity.”
186. March 10, 1998—Bonifacia filed with SC a petition for review on certiora-
ri.
ISSUE/s:
17. WoN Helen should be the guardian of minor Vincent—YES,
RULING: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed, with
MODIFICATION in the sense that Valerie, who has attained the age of majority,
will no longer be under the guardianship of Helen.
RATIO:
203. Note: At the outset, let it be stressed that in “Manifestation/Motion” dated
Sept. 15, 1998, Helen stated that Valerie turned 18 on Sept. 2, 1998, as
shown by her birth certificate.
204. Helen prayed that this case be dismissed with respect to Valerie, she being
no longer a proper subject of guardianship proceedings.
205. Considering that Valerie is already of major age, this petition has become
moot with repect to her.
206. Being the natural mother of the minor, Helen has the preferential right over
that of Bonifacia to be guardian. This ruling finds support in Art. 211 of the
Family Code.46 Helen has the corresponding natural and legal right to Vin-
cent’s custody.
207. In Sagala-Eslao v. CA: ‘the right of parents to the custody of their minor
children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood,’ a right support-
ed by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is
not created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the na-
ture of the parental relationship.
46
Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their
common children. In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial
order to the contrary. xxx."
208. Bonifacia contends that she is more qualified as guardian of Vincent. How-
ever, her claim to be guardian can only be realized by way of substitute pa-
rental authority pursuant to Art. 214 of the Family Code.47
209. In Santos, Sr. v. CA: The law vests on the father and mother joint parental
authority over the persons of their common children. In case of absence or
death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising pa-
rental authority. Only in case of the parents’ death, absence or unsuita-
bility may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving
grandparent.
210. Bonifacia, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental au-
thority only in case of death, absence, or unsuitability of Helen.
211. Considering that Helen is very much alive and has exercised continuously
parental authority over Vincent, Bonifacia has to prove, in asserting her
right to be the minor’s guardian, Helen’s unsuitability.
212. Bonifacia has no proffered convinving evidence showing that Helen is not
suited to be the guardian of Vincent. Bonifacia merely insists that Helen is
morally unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that Helen’s live-in partner
raped Valerie several times. But Valerie, being now of major age, is no
longer a subject of this guardianship proceeding.
213. Even assuming that Helen is unfit, Bonifacia still can’t qualify as substitute
guardian. She is an American citizen and resident of Colorado. She will not
be able to perform the responsibilities and obligations required of a guardi-
an.
214. In fact, she admitted in her petition the difficulty of discharging the duties
of a guardian by an expatriate, like her. To be sure, she wll merely delegate
those duties to someone else who may not also qualify as a guardian.
215. Moreover, Bonifacia has not controverted Helen’s allegation that she has
not set food in the Philippines since 1987. Besides, Bonifacia’s old age and
her conviction of libel by RTC Cebu filed by Danilo Deen will give her a
second thought of staying here. Her coming back to this country just to ful-
fill the duties of guardian to Vincent for only 2 years is not certain.
216. Notwithstanding that there is no statutory requirement, courts should not
appoint persons as guardians who are not within the jurisdiction of our
courts for they will find it difficult to protect the wards.
47
"Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be
exercised by the surviving grandparent. xxx."
 GUALBERTO vs. GUALBERTO (Eleazar)
June 28, 2005 | Panganiban, J. | Guardianship
G.R. No. 154994
PETITIONERS: JOYCELYN PABLO-GUALBERTO
RESPONDENTS: CRISANTO RAFAELITO GUALBERTO V
G.R. No. 156254
PETITIONERS: CRISANTO RAFAELITO G. GUALBERTO V
RESPONDENTS: COURT OF APPEALS; Hon. HELEN B. RICAFORT,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court Paraaque City, Branch 260; and
JOYCELYN D. PABLO-GUALBERTO
SUMMARY: Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed before the RTC a petition
for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Joycelyn with an ancillary prayer for
custody pendente lite of their almost 4-year old son, Rafaello, whom her wife
took away with her from their conjugal home and his school when she left him.
The RTC granted the ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite, since the wife
failed to appear despite notice. A house helper of the spouses testified that the
mother does not care for the child as she very often goes out of the house and
even saw her slapping the child. Another witness testified that after surveillance
he found out that the wife is having lesbian relations. According to the Court of
Appeal The judge issued the assailed order reversing her previous order, and this
time awarded the custody of the child to the mother. Finding that the reason
stated by Crisanto not to be a compelling reason as provided in Art 213 of the
Family Code. The issue in this case is (In GR 156254) WoN Respondent Court
commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to or in excess of jurisdiction when,
in its August 30, 2002 Decision, it ordered respondent court/Judge 'to consider,
hear and resolve the motion to lift award of custody pendente lite of the child to
Crisanto – NO there can be no question that a court of competent jurisdiction is
vested with the authority to resolve even unassigned issues. It can do so when
such a step is indispensable or necessary to a just resolution of issues raised in a
particular pleading or when the unassigned issues are inextricably linked or
germane to those that have been pleaded. This truism applies with more force
when the relief granted has been specifically prayed for, as in this case and the
award of temporary custody, as the term implies, is provisional and subject to
change as circumstances may warrant. In this connection, there is no need for a
lengthy discussion of the alleged finality of the April 3, 2002 RTC Order
granting Crisanto temporary custody of his son. For that matter, even the award
of child custody after a judgment on a marriage annulment is not permanent; it
may be reexamined and adjusted if and when the parent who was given custody
becomes unfit. WoN it is (In GR 154994) Art. 211 or 213 that would govern in
this case? – Art. 213, the Court held that the use of shall in the Civil Code and
the observations made by the Code Commission underscore the mandatory
character of the word. It prohibits in no uncertain terms the separation of a
mother and her child below seven years, unless such a separation is grounded
upon compelling reasons as determined by a court. Explicit in the Motion to
Dismiss filed by Joycelyn before the RTC is her ancillary prayer for the court to
lift and set aside its April 3, 2002 Order awarding to Crisanto custody pendente
lite of their minor son. Indeed, the necessary consequence of granting her
Motion to Dismiss would have been the setting aside of the Order awarding
Crisanto provisional custody of the child. Besides, even if the Motion to Dismiss
was denied -- as indeed it was -- the trial court, in its discretion and if warranted,
could still have granted the ancillary prayer as an alternative relief.
DOCTRINE: The general rule that children under seven years of age shall not
be separated from their mother finds its raison detre in the basic need of minor
children for their mothers loving care
Even the award of child custody after a judgment on a marriage annulment is not
permanent; it may be reexamined and adjusted if and when the parent who was
given custody becomes unfit
FACTS:
24. On March 12, 2002, Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City a petition for declaration of nullity
of his marriage to Joycelyn D. Pablo Gualberto, with an ancillary prayer for
custody pendente lite of their almost 4-year-old son, minor Rafaello (the
child, for brevity), whom Joycelyn allegedly took away with her from the
conjugal home and his school (Infant Toddlers Discovery Center in
Paraaque City) when she decided to abandon Crisanto sometime in early
February 2002.
25. On April 2, 2002, RTC Judge Helen B. Ricafort heard the ancillary prayer
of Crisanto for custody pendente lite. Because Joycelyn allegedly failed to
appear despite notice, Crisanto, a certain Col. Renato Santos, and Ms.
Cherry Batistel, testified before the Judge; documentary evidence was also
presented. On April 3, 2002, the Judge awarded custody pendente lite of the
child to Crisanto. The Order partly read:
a. Crisanto Rafaelito Gualberto V testified. He stated that Joycelyn
took their minor child with her to Caminawit, San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro.
b. At that time, the minor was enrolled at B.F. Homes, Parañaque
City. Despite efforts exerted by him, he has failed to see his child.
c. Joycelyn and the child are at present staying with the former’s
step-father at the latters residence at Caminawit, San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro.
26. Renato Santos, President of United Security Logistic testified that he was
commissioned by Crisanto to conduct surveillance on Joycelyn and came up
 with the conclusion that she is having lesbian relations with one Noreen
Gay Cuidadano in Cebu City.
27. The findings of Renato Santos were corroborated by Cherry Batistel, a
house helper of the spouses who stated that the mother does not care for the
child as she very often goes out of the house and on one occasion, she saw
Joycelyn slapping the child.
28. Art. 211 of the Family Code provides as follows:
a. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority
over the persons of their children. In the case of disagreement, the
fathers decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the
contrary.
29. The authority of the father and mother over their children is exercised
jointly. This recognition, however, does not place her in exactly the same
place as the father; her authority is subordinated to that of the father.
30. In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the sole and foremost
consideration is the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the
child, taking into account the respective resources and social and moral
situations of the contending parties.
31. The Lower Court believes that Joycelyn had no reason to take the child with
her. Moreover, per Sheriff returns, she is not with him at Caminawit, San
Jose, Occidental Mindoro.
a. WHEREFORE, pendente lite, the Court hereby awards custody of
the minor, Crisanto Rafaello P. Gualberto X to his father, Crisanto
Rafaelito G. Gualberto V.
32. On April 16, 2002, the hearing of Joycelyn’s motion to lift the award of
custody pendente lite of the child to Crisanto was set but the former did not
allegedly present any evidence to support her motion. However, on May 17,
2002, the Judge allegedly issued the assailed Order reversing her Order of
April 3, 2002 and this time awarding custody of the child to Joycelyn. The
entire text of the Order is herein reproduced, to wit:
a. Submitted is Crisanto’s Motion to Resolve Prayer for
Custody Pendente Lite and Joycelyn’s Motion to Dismiss and the
respective Oppositions thereto.
b. Joycelyn, in her Motion to Dismiss, makes issue of the fact that the
person referred to in the caption of the Petition is one JOCELYN
Pablo Gualberto and not Joycelyn Pablo Gualberto. Joycelyn
knows she is the person referred to in the Complaint. As a matter
of fact, the body of the Complaint states her name correctly. The
law is intended to facilitate and promote the administration of
justice, not to hinder or delay it. Litigation should be practicable
and convenient. The error in the name of Joycelyn does not involve
public policy and has not prejudiced her.
c. This case was filed on March 12, 2002. Several attempts were
made to serve summons on Joycelyn as shown by the Sheriffs
returns. It appears that on the 4th attempt on March 21, 2002, both
Ma. Daisy and Ronnie Nolasco, Joycelyn’s mother and stepfather,
respectively, read the contents of the documents presented after
which they returned the same.
d. The Court believes that on that day, summons was duly served and
this Court acquired jurisdiction over Joycelyn.
e. The filing of Joycelyns annulment case on March 26, 2002 was an
after thought, perforce the Motion to Dismiss should be denied.
f. The child subject of this Petition, Crisanto Rafaello P. Gualberto is
barely four years old. Under Article 213 of the Family Code, he
shall not be separated from his mother unless the Court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise. The Court finds the reason
stated by Crisanto not to be compelling reasons. The father should
however be entitled to spend time with the minor. These do not
appear compelling reasons to deprive him of the company of his
child.
g. When Joycelyn appeared before this Court, she stated that she has
no objection to the father visiting the child even everyday provided
it is in Mindoro.
h. The Court hereby grants the mother, Joycelyn, the custody of
Crisanto Rafaello P. Gualberto, with the right of Crisanto to have
the child with him every other weekend.
i. WHEREFORE:
1. The Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED;
2. Custody pendente lite is hereby given to the
mother Joycelyn Pablo Gualberto with the right
of the father, Crisanto, to have him every other
week-end.
3. Parties are admonished not to use any other
agencies of the government like the CIDG to
interfere in this case and to harass the parties.
33. In a Petition for Certiorari before the CA, Crisanto charged the Regional
Trial Court (Branch 260) of Paraaque City with grave abuse of discretion
for issuing its aforequoted May 17, 2002 Order. He alleged that this Order
superseded, without any factual or legal basis, the still valid and subsisting
April 3, 2002 Order awarding him custody pendente lite of his minor son;
and that it violated Section 14 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
34. Partly in Crisantos favor, the CA ruled that grave abuse of discretion had
been committed by the trial court in reversing the latter courts previous
Order dated April 3, 2002, by issuing the assailed May 17, 2002 Order. The
appellate court explained that the only incident to resolve was Joycelyns
Motion to Dismiss, not the issuance of the earlier Order. According to the
CA, the prior Order awarding provisional custody to the father should
prevail, not only because it was issued after a hearing, but also because the
 trial court did not resolve the correct incident in the later Order.
35. Nonetheless, the CA stressed that the trial court judge was not precluded
from considering and resolving Joycelyns Motion to lift the award of
custody pendente lite to Crisanto, as that Motion had yet to be properly
considered and ruled upon. However, it directed that the child be turned
over to him until the issue was resolved.
ISSUE/s
- Did Respondent Court commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to or in
excess of jurisdiction when, in its August 30, 2002 Decision, it ordered
respondent court/Judge 'to consider, hear and resolve the motion to lift
award of custody pendente lite of the child to petitioner – NO, there can be
no question that a court of competent jurisdiction is vested with the
authority to resolve even unassigned issues. It can do so when such a step is
indispensable or necessary to a just resolution of issues raised in a particular
pleading or when the unassigned issues are inextricably linked or germane
to those that have been pleaded. This truism applies with more force when
the relief granted has been specifically prayed for, as in this case.
- WoN it is Art. 211 or 213 that would govern in this case? – Art. 213, the
Court held that the use of shall in Article 363 of the Civil Code and the
observations made by the Code Commission underscore the mandatory
character of the word. It prohibits in no uncertain terms the separation of a
mother and her child below seven years, unless such a separation is
grounded upon compelling reasons as determined by a court.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the Petition in GR No. 154994 is GRANTED. The
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and the May 17,
2002 Regional Trial Court Order REINSTATED. The Petition in GR No. 156254 is
DISMISSED. Costs against Petitioner Crisanto Rafaelito Gualberto V.
RATIO:
First Issue:
Grave Abuse of Discretion
1. Crisanto submits that the CA gravely abused its discretion when it ordered
the trial court judge to consider, hear and resolve the motion to lift the
award of custody pendente lite without any proper motion by Joycelyn and
after the April 3, 2002 Order of the trial court had become final and execu-
tory. The CA is also charged with grave abuse of discretion for denying his
Motion for Partial Reconsideration without stating the reasons for the deni-
al, allegedly in contravention of Section 1 of Rule 36 of the Rules of Court.
2. To begin with, grave abuse of discretion is committed when an act is 1)
done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence; or 2) executed
whimsically or arbitrarily in a manner so patent and so gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined. What constitutes grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and
arbitrary exercise of judgment as that which is equivalent, in the eyes of the
law, to lack of jurisdiction.
3. On the basis of these criteria, we hold that the CA did not commit grave
abuse of discretion.
4. First, there can be no question that a court of competent jurisdiction is vest-
ed with the authority to resolve even unassigned issues. It can do so when
such a step is indispensable or necessary to a just resolution of issues raised
in a particular pleading or when the unassigned issues are inextricably
linked or germane to those that have been pleaded. This truism applies with
more force when the relief granted has been specifically prayed for, as in
this case.
5. Explicit in the Motion to Dismiss filed by Joycelyn before the RTC is her
ancillary prayer for the court to lift and set aside its April 3, 2002 Order
awarding to Crisanto custody pendente lite of their minor son. Indeed, the
necessary consequence of granting her Motion to Dismiss would have been
the setting aside of the Order awarding Crisanto provisional custody of the
child. Besides, even if the Motion to Dismiss was denied -- as indeed it was
-- the trial court, in its discretion and if warranted, could still have granted
the ancillary prayer as an alternative relief.
6. Parenthetically, Joycelyns Motion need not have been verified because of
the provisional nature of the April 3, 2002 Order. Under Rule 38 of the
Rules of Court, verification is required only when relief is sought from a fi-
nal and executory Order. Accordingly, the court may set aside its own or-
ders even without a proper motion, whenever such action is warranted by
the Rules and to prevent a miscarriage of justice.
7. Second, the requirement in Section 1 of Rule 36 (for judges to state clearly
and distinctly the reasons for their dispositions) refers only to decisions and
final orders on the merits, not to those resolving incidental matters. The
provision reads:
8. SECTION 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. A judgment or final
order determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and
directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of court.
9. Here, the declaration of the nullity of marriage is the subject of the main
case, in which the issue of custody pendente lite is an incident. That custody
and support of common children may be ruled upon by the court while the
action is pending is provided in Article 49 of the Family Code, which we
quote:
10. Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate
provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall pro-
vide for the support of the spouses and the custody and support of their
common children.
11. Clearly then, the requirement cited by Crisanto is inapplicable. In any event,
in its questioned Resolution, the CA clearly stated that it could not find any
cogent reason to reconsider and set aside the assailed portion of its August
30, 2002 Decision.
12. Third, the award of temporary custody, as the term implies, is provisional
and subject to change as circumstances may warrant. In this connection,
there is no need for a lengthy discussion of the alleged finality of the April
3, 2002 RTC Order granting Crisanto temporary custody of his son. For that
matter, even the award of child custody after a judgment on a marriage an-
nulment is not permanent; it may be reexamined and adjusted if and when
the parent who was given custody becomes unfit.
Second Issue:
Custody of a Minor Child
57. Article 213 of the Family Code provides:
a. ART. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority
shall be exercised by the parent designated by the court. The court
shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the
choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent
chosen is unfit.
b. No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the
mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise.
58. This Court has held that when the parents are separated, legally or
otherwise, the foregoing provision governs the custody of their child.
Article 213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of the Civil Code, which
reads:
a. Art. 363. In all questions on the care, custody, education and
property of children, the latters welfare shall be paramount. No
mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age,
unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure.
59. The general rule that children under seven years of age shall not be
separated from their mother finds its raison detre in the basic need of minor
children for their mothers loving care. In explaining the rationale for Article
363 of the Civil Code, the Code Commission stressed thus:
a. The general rule is recommended in order to avoid a tragedy where
a mother has seen her baby torn away from her. No man can sound
the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender
age.
b. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for compelling reasons
for the good of the child: those cases must indeed be rare, if the
mothers heart is not to be unduly hurt. If she has erred, as in cases
of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the (relative) divorce
decree will ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her. Moreover,
her moral dereliction will not have any effect upon the baby who is
as yet unable to understand the situation.
60. A similar provision is embodied in Article 8 of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No. 603). Article 17 of the same Code is
even more explicit in providing for the childs custody under various
circumstances, specifically in case the parents are separated. It clearly
mandates that no child under five years of age shall be separated from his
mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to do so. The provision is
reproduced in its entirety as follows:
a. Art. 17. Joint Parental Authority. The father and the mother shall
exercise jointly just and reasonable parental authority and
responsibility over their legitimate or adopted children. In case of
disagreement, the fathers decision shall prevail unless there is a
judicial order to the contrary.
b. In case of the absence or death of either parent, the present or
surviving parent shall continue to exercise parental authority over
such children, unless in case of the surviving parents remarriage,
the court for justifiable reasons, appoints another person as
guardian.
c. In case of separation of his parents, no child under five years of
age shall be separated from his mother, unless the court finds
compelling reasons to do so.
61. The above mandates reverberate in Articles 211, 212 and 213 of the Family
Code. It is unmistakable from the language of these provisions that Article
211was derived from the first sentence of the aforequoted Article 17;
Article 212 from the second sentence; and Article 213, save for a few
additions, from the third sentence. It should be noted that the Family Code
has reverted to the Civil Code provision mandating that a child
below seven years should not be separated from the mother.
62. In Lacson v. San Jose-Lacson, the Court held that the use of shall in Article
363 of the Civil Code and the observations made by the Code Commission
underscore the mandatory character of the word. Holding in that case that it
was a mistake to deprive the mother of custody of her two children, both
then below the age of seven, the Court stressed:
63. Article 363 prohibits in no uncertain terms the separation of a mother and
her child below seven years, unless such a separation is grounded upon
compelling reasons as determined by a court.
64. In like manner, the word shall in Article 213 of the Family Code and
Section 6 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court has been held to connote a
 mandatory character. Article 213 and Rule 99 similarly contemplate a parental care.
situation in which the parents of the minor are married to each other, but are 71. As we have ruled that Joycelyn has the right to keep her minor son in her
separated by virtue of either a decree of legal separation or a de facto custody, the writ of habeas corpus and the preliminary mandatory injunction
separation. In the present case, the parents are living separately as a matter prayed for by Crisanto have no leg to stand on. A writ of habeas corpus may
of fact. be issued only when the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
65. The Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that in all actions person entitled thereto, a situation that does not apply here.
concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare 72. On the other hand, the ancillary remedy of preliminary mandatory
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, injunction cannot be granted, because Crisantos right to custody has not
the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. been proven to be clear and unmistakable. Unlike an ordinary preliminary
66. The principle of best interest of the child pervades Philippine cases injunction, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is more cautiously
involving adoption, guardianship, support, personal status, minors in regarded, since the latter requires the performance of a particular act that
conflict with the law, and child custody. In these cases, it has long been tends to go beyond the maintenance of the status quo. Besides, such an
recognized that in choosing the parent to whom custody is given, the injunction would serve no purpose, now that the case has been decided on
welfare of the minors should always be the paramount consideration. Courts its merits.
are mandated to take into account all relevant circumstances that would
have a bearing on the childrens well-being and development. Aside from the
material resources and the moral and social situations of each parent, other
factors may also be considered to ascertain which one has the capability to
attend to the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the
children. Among these factors are the previous care and devotion shown by
each of the parents; their religious background, moral uprightness, home
environment and time availability; as well as the childrens emotional and
educational needs
67. As pointed out earlier, there is express statutory recognition that, as a
general rule, a mother is to be preferred in awarding custody of children
under the age of seven. The caveat in Article 213 of the Family Code cannot
be ignored, except when the court finds cause to order otherwise.
68. The so-called tender-age presumption under Article 213 of the Family Code
may be overcome only by compelling evidence of the mother’s unfitness.
The mother has been declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in
one or more of the following instances: neglect, abandonment,
unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction,
maltreatment of the child, insanity or affliction with a communicable
disease.
69. Here, Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian relations as the
compelling reason to deprive Joycelyn of custody. It has indeed been held
that under certain circumstances, the mothers immoral conduct may
constitute a compelling reason to deprive her of custody.
70. But sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect
or incompetence. Not even the fact that a mother is a prostitute or has been
unfaithful to her husband would render her unfit to have custody of her
minor child. To deprive the wife of custody, the husband must clearly
establish that her moral lapses have had an adverse effect on the welfare of
the child or have distracted the offending spouse from exercising proper
 010 REPUBLIC v. CAPOTE (Escalona)
February 2, 2007 | Corona, J. | Petition for change of name
PETITIONER: Republic of the Philippines
RESPONDENTS: Trinidad R.A. Capote
SUMMARY: Trinidad Capote filed a petition for change of name of her ward
from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores and to effect the change of
name on Giovanni’s birth certificate. The trial court allowed the petition after
finding that it was sufficient in form and substance. Publication of the petition
was made in a newspaper of general circulation for three consecutive weeks with
the order of the court to serve the petition to the OSG. There was no contest on
the petition so the trial court granted the change of name. The OSG appeals on
the basis that the proceedings were not sufficiently adversarial.
The relevant issue is WoN the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial.
The SC ruled that the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial. This is because
publication and service of the petition to the OSG were deemed to constitute the
proceedings as adversarial. Due to this, publication was deemed to notify all
interested parties and the whole world to be bound by the judgment. Since the
OSG was given legal warning and the opportunity to contest the proceedings, the
proceedings were considered to be adversarial. On the minor substantive issue,
an illegitimate child shall bear the name of the mother as based on the Family
Code, unless legitimated. Giovanni is entitled to a change of name because he
was never recognized as the child of the father, while the mother always
recognized him as her child. The SC also noted that it is in the interest of the
court to grant the petition so that it would ease the process of Capote’s son to
join her in the United States.
DOCTRINE: Once notice of the petition through publication and service of a
copy of the petition to the other party is made, all interested parties are deemed
notified and the whole world considered bound by the judgment therein. This
means that all the requirements to make a proceeding adversarial are satisfied
when all interested parties are afforded the opportunity to contest the petition.
FACTS:
32. Respondent Trinidad R. A. Capote filed a petition for change of name of her
ward from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores on September 9,
1998.
33. Capote prayed for an order directing the local civil registrar to effect the
change of name on Giovanni’s birth certificate. Having found respondents
petition sufficient in form and substance, the trial court gave due course to
the petition. Publication of the petition in a newspaper of general circulation
in the province of Southern Leyte once a week for three consecutive weeks
was likewise ordered. The trial court also directed that the local civil regis-
trar be notified and that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) be sent a
copy of the petition and order.
34. Since there was no opposition to the petition, respondent moved for leave of
court to present her evidence ex parte before a court-appointed commis-
sioner. The OSG, acting through the Provincial Prosecutor, did not object;
hence, the lower court granted the motion.
35. After the reception of evidence, the trial court rendered a decision ordering
the change of name from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores.
36. From this decision, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the
OSG, filed an appeal with a lone assignment of error: the court a
quo erred in granting the petition in a summary proceeding.
37. Ruling that the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial in nature as re-
quired, the CA affirmed the RTC decision ordering the change of name.
38. In this petition, the Republic contends that the CA erred in affirming the tri-
al court’s decision, which granted the petition for change of name despite
the non-joinder of indispensable parties. The Republic cites Republic of the
Philippines v. Labrador and claims that the purported parents and all
other persons who may be adversely affected by the child’s change of
name should have been made respondents to make the proceeding ad-
versarial.
ISSUES:
6. WoN the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial – YES. Because notice
through publication and service to the other party was made.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the January 13,
2003 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66128 AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
27. The Supreme Court denied the petition.
28. The subject of rights must have a fixed symbol for individualization, which
serves to distinguish him from all others; this symbol is his
name. Understandably, therefore, no person can change his name or sur-
name without judicial authority. This is a reasonable requirement for those
seeking such change because a persons name necessarily affects his identity,
interests and interactions. The State must be involved in the process and de-
cision to change the name of any of its citizens.
29. The Rules of Court provides the requirements and procedure for change of
name. Here, the appropriate remedy is covered by Rule 103, a separate
and distinct proceeding from Rule 108 on mere cancellation and correc-
 tion of entries in the civil registry (usually dealing only with innocuous or
clerical errors thereon).
30. The issue of non-joinder of alleged indispensable parties in the action be-
fore the court a quo is intertwined with the nature of the proceedings there.
The point is whether the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial.
31. Summary proceedings do not extensively address the issues of a case since
the reason for their conduct is expediency. This, according to petitioner, is
not sufficient to deal with substantial or contentious issues allegedly result-
ing from a change of name, meaning, legitimacy as well
as successional rights. Such issues are ventilated only in adversarial pro-
ceedings wherein all interested parties are impleadedand due process is ob-
served.
32. When Giovanni was born in 1982 (prior to the enactment and effectivity of
the Family Code of the Philippines), the pertinent provision of the Civil
Code then as regards his use of a surname, read:
a. Art. 366. A natural child acknowledged by both parents
shall principally use the surname of the father. If recog-
nized by only one of the parents, a natural child shall
employ the surname of the recognizing parent.
33. Based on this provision, Giovanni should have carried his mothers surname
from birth. The records do not reveal any act or intention on the part of
Giovannis putative father to actually recognize him. Meanwhile, according
to the Family Code which repealed, among others, Article 366 of the Civil
Code:
a. Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the sur-
name and shall be under the parental authority of their
mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity
with this Code.
34. Our ruling in the recent case of In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or
Correction/Cancellation of Entry in Civil Registry of Julian
Lin Carulasan Wang is enlightening:
a. Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and
legitimated children shall principally use the surname of
the father. The Family Code gives legitimate children the
right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother,
while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their
mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in
which case they may bear the fathers surname.
35. Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recog-
nized by the father bears only a given name and his mother surname,
and does not have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized ille-
gitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the illegit-
imate child is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or
acknowledged by the father in a public document or private handwritten in-
strument that he bears both his mothers surname as his middle name and his
fathers surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child
or an acknowledged child.
36. The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a persons
name to his identity, his status in relation to his parents and
his successional rights as a legitimate or illegitimate child. For sure, these
matters should not be taken lightly as to deprive those who may, in any
way, be affected by the right to present evidence in favor of or against such
change.
37. The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovannis petition. Giovanni availed
of the proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court, and complied with all the procedural requirements. After
hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court affirmed) that the evi-
dence presented during the hearing of Giovannis petition sufficiently estab-
lished that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to
change his name as he was never recognized by his father while his
mother has always recognized him as her child. A change of name will
erase the impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also
to his best interest as it will facilitate his mothers intended petition to
have him join her in the United States. This Court will not stand in the
way of the reunification of mother and son.
38. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the cases cited by the Republic in support of
its position deal with cancellation or correction of entries in the civil regis-
try, a proceeding separate and distinct from the special proceedings for
change of name. Those cases deal with the application and interpretation of
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court while this case was correctly filed under
Rule 103. Thus, the cases cited by the Republic are irrelevant and have no
bearing on respondents case. While the OSG is correct in its stance that
the proceedings for change of name should be adversarial, the OSG
cannot void the proceedings in the trial court on account of its own
failure to participate therein. As the CA correctly ruled:
a. The OSG is correct in stating that a petition for change of
name must be heard in an adversarial proceeding. Unlike
petitions for the cancellation or correction of clerical er-
rors in entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court, a petition for change of name under Rule
103 cannot be decided through a summary proceeding.
There is no doubt that this petition does not fall under
Rule 108 for it is not alleged that the entry in the civil reg-
istry suffers from clerical or typographical errors. The re-
lief sought clearly goes beyond correcting erroneous en-
tries in the civil registry, although by granting the peti-
tion, the result is the same in that a corresponding change
in the entry is also required to reflect the change in
 name. In this regard, Capote complied with the re-
quirement for an adversarial proceeding by posting in
a newspaper of general circulation notice of the filing
of the petition. The lower court also furnished the
OSG a copy thereof. Despite the notice, no one came
forward to oppose the petition including the OSG. The
fact that no one opposed the petition did not deprive
the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same nor does
it make the proceeding less adversarial in nature. The
lower court is still expected to exercise its judgment to de-
termine whether the petition is meritorious or not and not
merely accept as true the arguments propounded. Consid-
ering that the OSG neither opposed the petition nor the
motion to present its evidence ex parte when it had the
opportunity to do so, it cannot now complain that the pro-
ceedings in the lower court were not adversarial enough.
39. A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given le-
gal warning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to
contest it. Capote gave notice of the petition through publication as re-
quired by the rules. With this, all interested parties were deemed notified
and the whole world considered bound by the judgment therein. In addition,
the trial court gave due notice to the OSG by serving a copy of the petition
on it. Thus, all the requirements to make a proceeding adversarial were sat-
isfied when all interested parties, including petitioner as represented by the
OSG, were afforded the opportunity to contest the petition.
 011 Re: FINAL REPORT ON JUDICIAL AUDIT (Fordan)
Oct. 19, 2007 | Tinga, J. | Change of name and correction of entries in civil registry
Re: Final Report On The Judicial Audit Conducted at the Regional Trial Court, Br.
67, Paniqui, Tarlac
SUMMARY: Judicial audit and physical inventory of cases were conducted at the
RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67, which was then presided by retired Judge Sotero.
The following were the audit observations: (a) there was no special proceeding case
records presented but upon inquiry from Saguyod, the latter averred that mostly of
these cases are for Petitions for Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry and most-
ly are already decided and there are only few pending; (b) findings also reveal that
the date of filing indicated in the docket books and the date of decision was so near
that it will be highly improbable that the required publication will be complied with;
(c) almost all of the petitions are pro-forma and notarized by Saguyod as ex-officio
notary public and there are even unsigned, unverified and not notarized petitions
granted by the Court; (d) almost all of them have no hearings conducted that it will
be improbable if not possible that the court orders be published in a newspaper of
general circulation as required by the Rules of Court; (e) there are 86 petitions where
the date of filing were simultaneous or ahead of the date of the alleged hear-
ing/decision and 58 petitions were found to have either no court action or no further
action for a considerable length of time. The following were the joint explanations of
Judge Sotero and Saguyod: (a) As to the petitions for correction of entry/ies without
hearing and publication – almost all of these petitions may be covered by RA No.
9048 (Clerical Error Law) which authorizes city or municipal civil registrars to cor-
rect clerical or typographical errors in an entry and/or change the first name or nick-
name in the civil registry without need for a judicial order. The petitions were filed
before the trial court because there was no incumbent Local Civil Registrar and the
OIC-Civil Registrar could not act on these petitions under RA No. 9048. In resolving
these petitions which are summary and non-adversarial in nature, the trial court
adopted the procedure in civil cases where the defendant is declared in default and
the court renders judgment based on the pleadings filed by plaintiff and grants such
relief as may be warranted, following Sec. 3, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The trial court adopted this procedure to expedite the resolution of said petitions to
afford the court more time to devote to the resolution of criminal and civil cases that
required more attention. (b) As to the 86 petitions that were resolved on the same
date as the date of filing or date of hearing — these petitions were for correction of
entry/ies and involved innocuous errors that may be subject of administrative correc-
tions under RA No. 9048. The trial court resolved these petitions with dispatch to
accommodate the petitioners' need to have their civil registry documents immediate-
ly corrected to conform with their passport applications, applications to take board
examinations and petitions to travel abroad. Judge Sotero was more lenient in such
instances since in his view no substantial prejudice would ensue. In any event, he
resolved to adopt, henceforth, a stricter policy in cases where no publication is re-
quired, by imposing a 10 day period for posting of the petition after its filing and
seeing to it that the petition is set for hearing only after it is so posted. The OCA, in
its Memorandum, deemed the explanation bereft of merit or deserving of scant con-
sideration and recommended that Judge Sotero be fined for gross ignorance of the
law and gross inefficiency of P100K, to be deducted from his retirement benefits,
and that P50K be withheld from such benefits pending the outcome of the financial
audit.
The issue is whether or not corrections of entries in civil registry can be done without
hearing and publication. NO. Arts. 376 and 412 of the New Civil Code are the sub-
stantive laws covering the alteration or correction of entries in the civil registry. Civil
registry records are public documents and are accepted as prima facie evidence of the
facts contained therein, which is why prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9048,
changes or corrections thereof could be made only upon judicial authorization. Rules
103 and 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provide the procedure for such alterations
in the civil registry. The procedure for change of name under Rule 103 is a proceed-
ing in rem and as such strict compliance with all jurisdictional requirements, particu-
larly on publication, is essential in order to vest the court with jurisdiction. The rea-
son for this is that a change of name is a matter of public interest. Petitions for can-
cellation or correction of entries in the civil registry are governed by Rule 108. This
rule covers petitions for corrections of clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous na-
ture, as well as petitions which seek to effect substantial changes or corrections in
entries for as long as all the procedural requirements in said rule are followed. In
Republic v. Bautista, citing Republic v. Valencia, it was declared that the proceed-
ings under Rule 108 may either be summary or adversarial in nature. If the correction
sought to be made in the civil registry is clerical, the procedure to be adopted is
summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a
party, it is deemed substantial and the procedure to be adopted is adversarial. The
procedure under Rule 108 becomes the appropriate adversarial proceeding to effect
substantial changes in the registry only if the procedural requirements therein are
complied with.
DOCTRINE: Petitions for change of name and correction of entries in the civil reg-
istry are actions in rem, the decision on the petition being binding not only on the
parties thereto but on the whole world. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially
through publication. Publication gives notice to the whole world that the proceeding
has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of
any sort against the right sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice
that brings in the whole world as a party to the case and vests the court with jurisdic-
tion to hear and decide it.
FACTS:
139. This administrative matter arose from the judicial audit and physical inven-
tory of cases conducted on 20-24 June 2005 at the RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac,
Branch 67, then presided by Judge Cesar M. Sotero (Judge Sotero) who com-
pulsorily retired on 23 Feb. 2006.
140. As of audit date, the RTC had a total caseload of 523 cases consisting of
309 criminal cases and 214 civil cases, including 33 unaccounted land regis-
tration cases (LRC) cases.
141. The following are the audit observations:
• that there was no special proceeding case records presented
Ø Upon inquiry, Clerk of Court Paulino Saguyod (Saguyod) averred that mostly
of these cases are for Petitions for Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry
and mostly are already decided and there are only few pending.
• Saguyod gave the audit team 4 folder copies of decisions in special proceedings
cases
Ø Initial findings reveal that the date of filing indicated in the docket books and
the date of decision was so near that it will be highly improbable that the re-
quired publication will be complied with. Hence, the audit team demanded for
the production of 608 case records of special proceedings cases
• In the copies of decisions presented, common in the 2nd paragraph of the pro-forma
decisions, are statements that “finding the petition to be sufficient in form and sub-
stance, the same was set for hearing on . . .. On said date and time, the petition
was announced in open court. Nobody interposed any objection. Accordingly, the
counsel for petitioner presented documentary evidence to prove jurisdictional
facts ([Exh.] "A" and series). Thereafter, he moved and was allowed to adduce
further evidence before the Clerk of Court and at [sic] the presence of the Assis-
tant Provincial Prosecutor who appeared in behalf of the State."
• It was also observed that almost all of the petitions are pro-forma and notarized by
Saguyod as ex-officio notary public. There are even unsigned, unverified and not
notarized petitions granted by the Court.
• Further, almost all of them have no hearings conducted that it will be improbable
if not possible that the court orders be published in a newspaper of general circula-
tion as required by the Rules of Court. The docketing of cases was not also in se-
quence as to its date of filing.
• Moreover, there are 86 petitions where the date of filing were simultaneous or
ahead of the date of the alleged hearing/decision and 58 petitions were found to
have either no court action or no further action for a considerable length of time.
• Also, 9 petitions have similar docket numbers and 3 cases with the same docket
number while 179 cases records were not presented to the audit team.
• The docket book for special proceedings cases merely indicated the title of the
case and the date it was filed with a notation "decided." There is no docket book
shown for LRC cases.
4. The the Audit Team recommended in its Memorandum that Judge Sotero and
Saguyod be directed to explain the discrepancies noted within 10 days from
notice and the following were the joint explanation of Judge Sotero and Sa-
guyod:
a. As to the petitions for correction of entry/ies without hearing and publica-
tion —
• Judge Sotero and Clerk of Court Saguyod explained that almost all of
these petitions may be covered by Republic Act (RA) No. 9048 (Cleri-
cal Error Law) which authorizes city or municipal civil registrars to
correct clerical or typographical errors in an entry and/or change the
first name or nickname in the civil registry without need for a judicial
order. The petitions were filed before the trial court because there was
no incumbent Local Civil Registrar and the OIC-Civil Registrar could
not act on these petitions under RA No. 9048.
• Since RA No. 9048 allows corrections of entries without hearing and
publication for as long as the necessary documents are submitted, the
trial court considered the same procedure as applicable to the petitions
for correction of entries filed before it. The Clerk of Court still held ex
parte hearings to receive the evidence.
• In resolving these petitions which are summary and non-adversarial in
nature, the trial court adopted the procedure in civil cases where the
defendant is declared in default and the court renders judgment based
on the pleadings filed by plaintiff and grants such relief as may be war-
ranted, following Sec. 3, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of Court. The tri-
al court adopted this procedure to expedite the resolution of said peti-
tions to afford the court more time to devote to the resolution of crimi-
nal and civil cases that required more attention.
b. As to the 86 petitions that were resolved on the same date as the date of
filing or date of hearing —
• These petitions were for correction of entry/ies and involved innocu-
ous errors that may be subject of administrative corrections under RA
No. 9048. The trial court resolved these petitions with dispatch to ac-
commodate the petitioners' need to have their civil registry documents
immediately corrected to conform with their passport applications, ap-
plications to take board examinations and petitions to travel abroad.
• The petitioners discovered the errors after they submitted the required
documents and yet they were given a limited period to secure the cor-
rection of the erroneous entries. If the corrected documents were not
submitted on time, the applications of the petitioners would be denied
and the denials would mean lost opportunities, particularly for the ap-
plicants for overseas contract work and applicants to take board exam-
inations.
• Judge Sotero was more lenient in such instances since in his view no
substantial prejudice would ensue. In any event, he resolved to adopt,
henceforth, a stricter policy in cases where no publication is required,
by imposing a 10 day period for posting of the petition after its filing
and seeing to it that the petition is set for hearing only after it is so
posted.
5. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), in its Memorandum, deemed
the explanation bereft of merit or deserving of scant consideration.
 a. The OCA noted that the petitions for change of name and/or correction of entries
in the civil registry are special proceedings governed either by Rules 103 or 108 of
the Revised Rules of Court. Sec. 348, Rule 103 specifically provides when the or-
der for hearing of such petitions shall be issued and what the order should contain
while Sec. 449, Rule 108 similarly requires the issuance of an order of hearing and
the publication of the order in petitions for correction of entries in the civil regis-
try.
b. The provisions of the Rules of Court on publication of the order of hearing should
have been strictly observed as publication is a jurisdictional requirement.
c. Hence, the OCA remarked, it is appalling that Judge Sotero and Clerk of Court
Saguyod favorably acted on the petitions even though they were only pro-forma
and notarized by Saguyod as an ex officio notary public and still others were un-
signed, unverified or unnotarized.
d. Some 86 petitions were found to bear dates of filing which are the same as or
ahead of the date of the alleged hearing/decision, clearly belying the claim of
Judge Sotero that hearings on these petitions were conducted or that they were re-
ferred to the Clerk of Court for presentation of evidence ex parte.
e. Said practices, according to the OCA, constitute a mockery of established proce-
dure under the Rules of Court, especially since nothing in RA No. 9048 or its Im-
plementing Rules and Regulations would justify the procedure that Judge Sotero
and Clerk of Court Saguyod adopted.
f. What RA No. 9048 mandates is the administrative proceeding for change of
name/correction of entry in the civil registry which has no application to a petition
for change of name or correction of entry filed in court.
g. Thus, the OCA went on to say, Judge Sotero's ratiocination for adopting the pro-
cedure under RA No. 9048 or for treating the petitions in the same manner as ordi-
nary cases where the defendant is declared in default displays a deplorable lack of
grasp or total ignorance of the Rules of Civil Procedure, notwithstanding his claim
that he did so for the purpose of expediting the resolution of the petitions.
6. Thus, The OCA recommended that Judge Sotero be fined for gross igno-
rance of the law and gross inefficiency of P100K, to be deducted from his
retirement benefits, and that P50K be withheld from such benefits pending
the outcome of the financial audit.
7. As to Saguyod, the OCA recommended that he be directed to submit a re-
port of the actions taken on the civil and criminal cases then pending before
the RTC which Judge Sotero was directed to either decide with dispatch or
immediately act upon, which were all done by Saguyod.
48
SEC. 3. Order for hearing. — If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the court, by an
order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, and shall direct
that a copy of the order be published before the hearing at least once a week for three (3) successive weeks
in some newspaper of general circulation published in the province, as the court shall deem best. The date
set for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to an election or within four (4) months after
the last publication of the notice.
49
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. — Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, x the
time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the person
named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) con-
secutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
ISSUE: Whether or not corrections of entries in civil registry can be done with-
out hearing and publication. – NO, correction of entries in the civil registry are
actions in rem, the decision on the petition being binding not only on the parties
thereto but on the whole world. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially
through publication.
RULING: The Court finds retired Judge Cesar M. Sotero of the RTC of Paniqui,
Tarlac, Branch 67, GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and FINES him P40,000
to be deducted from P100,000 withheld from him pursuant to the Court's Resolution.
The remainder of the withheld amount is ordered released to him.
RATIO:
197. Arts. 37650 and 41251 of the New Civil Code are the substantive laws cover-
ing the alteration or correction of entries in the civil registry. Civil registry
records are public documents and are accepted as prima facie evidence of the
facts contained therein, which is why prior to the enactment of R.A. No.
9048, changes or corrections thereof could be made only upon judicial author-
ization.
198. Rules 103 and 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provide the procedure for
such alterations in the civil registry.
199. The procedure for change of name under Rule 103 is a proceeding in rem
and as such strict compliance with all jurisdictional requirements, particularly
on publication, is essential in order to vest the court with jurisdiction. The
reason for this is that a change of name is a matter of public interest.
200. Petitions for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry are
governed by Rule 108. This rule covers petitions for corrections of clerical er-
rors of a harmless or innocuous nature, as well as petitions which seek to ef-
fect substantial changes or corrections in entries for as long as all the proce-
dural requirements in said rule are followed.
201. In Republic v. Bautista, citing Republic v. Valencia, it was declared that the
proceedings under Rule 108 may either be summary or adversarial in nature.
If the correction sought to be made in the civil registry is clerical, the proce-
dure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citi-
zenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial and the procedure to
be adopted is adversarial. The procedure under Rule 108 becomes the appro-
priate adversarial proceeding to effect substantial changes in the registry only
if the procedural requirements therein are complied with.
202. RA No. 9048, enacted in 2001, substantially amended Arts. 376 and 412 of
the New Civil Code, to wit: SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typo-
graphical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname.—No entry in a civil register
shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typo-
50
Art. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
51
Art. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without a judicial order.
 graphical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or cedural requirements laid down in Rules 103 and 108 still have to be com-
changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in ac- plied with.
cordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations. 211. In the case at hand, Judge Sotero should have applied the procedure pre-
203. Thus, under this new law, clerical or typographical errors and change of scribed in Rules 103 and 108 in resolving the petitions before him, not the
first name or nickname may be corrected or effected by the concerned city or procedure prescribed in RA No. 9048 or the procedure provided in Sec. 3,
municipal registrar or consul general, without need of any judicial order. Rule 9 which applies in civil cases where the defendant is declared in default.
204. At first glance, the seeming effect of the amendment is to remove from the 212. Petitions for change of name and correction of entries in the civil registry
ambit of Rule 108 the correction of clerical or typographical errors or change are actions in rem, the decision on the petition being binding not only on the
of entries in the civil register and to make Rule 108 apply only to substantial parties thereto but on the whole world. An in rem proceeding is validated es-
changes and corrections to entries in the civil register. sentially through publication. Publication gives notice to the whole world that
205. Hence, SC clarified in Republic v. Benemerito that the obvious effect of RA the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded
No. 9048 is merely to make possible the administrative correction of clerical to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established. It
or typographical errors in entries and the administrative change of first name is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party to
or nickname in the civil register, leaving to Rule 108 the correction of sub- the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.
stantial changes in the civil registry in appropriate adversarial proceedings.
206. The authority or jurisdiction of the trial courts over petitions for correction
of entries and change of first name or nickname was never taken up at the de-
liberations. In contrast, it is quite clear from the deliberations that the local
civil registrar is given the authority to act on such petitions filed before his of-
fice, yet there was nary a mention or even insinuation that such petitions can
no longer be filed with the regular courts. In fact, it was clarified that the
grounds upon which the administrative process before the local civil registrar
may be availed of are limited under the law; hence, outside of such limited
grounds, the judicial process should be availed of.
207. Indeed, there was no intent on the part of the lawmakers to remove the au-
thority of the trial courts to make judicial corrections of entries in the civil
registry. It can thus be concluded that the local civil registrar has primary, not
exclusive, jurisdiction over such petitions for correction of clerical errors and
change of first name or nickname, with RA No. 9048 prescribing the proce-
dure that the petitioner and local civil registrar should follow.
208. Since RA No. 9048 refers specifically to the administrative summary pro-
ceeding before the local civil registrar it would be inappropriate to apply the
same procedure to petitions for the correction of entries in the civil registry
before the courts.
209. The promulgation of rules of procedure for courts of justice is the exclusive
domain of the Supreme Court. Moreover, as observed by the OCA, there is
nothing in RA No. 9048 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations that
warrants the adoption of the procedure set therein for petitions before the
courts even for the purpose of expediting the resolution of said petitions.
Thus, there should be recourse to the procedure prescribed for the courts as if
RA No. 9048 were not enacted at all.
210. In other words, the procedure provided in the Revised Rules of Court for
such petitions remains binding and should be followed by the courts. The pro-
 REPUBLIC v. CAGANDAHAN (GALINDEZ)
September 12, 2008 | Quisumbing, J. | Rule 103
PETITIONER: Republic of the Philippines
RESPONDENTS: Jennifer Cagandahan
SUMMARY: Cagandahan was registered as female in his Certificate of Live
Birth but while growing up, Cagandahan developed secondary male
characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia.
Cagandahan has no breast or menstrual development. Thus, Cagandahan filed a
Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate before the RTC in
Siniloan, Laguna.
Dr. Michael Sionzon of UP PGH was presented as witness and he explained that
genetically, Cagandahan is female but because her body secretes male
hormones, the female organs did not develop normally and she has two sex
organs – male and female.
RTC granted Cagandahan’s petition, and the OSG sought for the reversal of the
ruling.
ISSUE: WoN the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the
birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male,
on the ground of her medical condition known as CAH, and her name from
"Jennifer" to "Jeff," under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court. – NO.
Considering the consequence that Cagandahan's change of name merely
recognizes his preferred gender, the Court finds merit in Cagandahan's change
of name.
For Cagandahan’s change of name under Rule 103, the Court has held that a
change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised
in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow. The
trial court's grant of Cagandahan's change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies
a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence
that Cagandahan's change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, the
Court finds merit in Cagandahan's change of name. Such a change will conform
with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.
DOCTRINE: A change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial
discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the
consequences that will follow.
FACTS:
1. This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising
purely questions of law and seeking a reversal of the Decision dated
January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan,
Laguna, which granted the Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth
Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered the following
changes of entries in Cagandahan’s birth certificate: (1) the name "Jennifer
Cagandahan" changed to "Jeff Cagandahan" and (2) gender from "female"
to "male."
2. On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for
Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate before the RTC, Branch 33 of
Siniloan, Laguna.
3. Alleged that:
a. She was born on January 13, 1981
b. Registered as female in the Certificate of Live Birth
c. While growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics
and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH)
which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both
male and female characteristics
d. Was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years
e. At age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that
she has small ovaries.
f. At age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had
minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or
menstrual development.
g. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in
mind and emotion, she has become a male person.
h. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her
gender be changed from female to male and her first name be
changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
4. The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three
(3) consecutive weeks and was posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff
of the court.
5. The Solicitor General entered his appearance and authorized the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.
6. Testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry,
University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon
issued a medical certificate stating that Cagandahan’s condition is known as
CAH
a. He explained that genetically Cagandahan is female but because
her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not
develop normally and she has two sex organs – female and male.
b. He testified that this condition is very rare, that respondent’s uterus
 is not fully developed because of lack of female hormones, and
that she has no monthly period.
c. He further testified that respondent’s condition is permanent and
recommended the change of gender because Cagandahan has made
up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender
change would be advantageous to her.
7. RTC granted Cagandahan’s petition. It was medically proven that
Cagandahan’s body produces male hormones, and first his body as well as
his action and feelings are that of a male. He has chosen to be male. He is a
normal person and wants to be acknowledged and identified as a male.
8. OSG seeks the reversal of the ruling.
ISSUE/s:
1. WoN the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth
certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male,
on the ground of her medical condition known as CAH, and her name from
"Jennifer" to "Jeff," under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court. – NO.
Considering the consequence that Cagandahan's change of name merely
recognizes his preferred gender, the Court finds merit in Cagandahan's
change of name.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the Republic's petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, is
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
RATIO:
2. OSG contends that Cagandahan’s petition is fatally defective for non-
compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because:
a. Local civil registrar was not impleaded
b. Failed to state that Cagandahan is a bona fide resident of the
province where the petition was filed for at least three (3) years
prior to the date of such filing as mandated under Section 2(b),
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
c. Rule 108 does not allow change of sex or gender in the birth
certificate and respondent's claimed medical condition known as
CAH does not make her a male.
3. Cagandahan counters that:
a. Although the Local Civil Registrar of Pakil, Laguna was not
formally named a party in the Petition for Correction of Birth
Certificate, nonetheless the Local Civil Registrar was furnished a
copy of the Petition, the Order to publish on December 16, 2003
and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the
proceedings
b. Cagandahan is actually a male person and hence his birth
certificate has to be corrected to reflect his true sex/gender
c. Change of sex or gender is allowed under Rule 108
d. Cagandahan substantially complied with the requirements of Rules
103 and 108 of the Rules of Court
4. [See end of digest for Rules 103 and 108]
Local civil registrar should be impleaded; Substantial compliance
5. Section 3, Rule 108 provides that the civil registrar and all persons who
have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made
parties to the proceedings. Likewise, the local civil registrar is required to
be made a party in a proceeding for the correction of name in the civil
registry. He is an indispensable party without whom no final determination
of the case can be had.
6. Unless all possible indispensable parties were duly notified of the
proceedings, the same shall be considered as falling much too short of the
requirements of the rules
7. However, Cagandahan invokes Section 6, Rule 1which states that courts
shall construe the Rules liberally to promote their objectives of securing to
the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of the matters brought
before it.
8. The Court agrees that there is substantial compliance with Rule 108 when
Cagandahan furnished a copy of the petition to the local civil registrar.
RA 9048
9. The determination of a person's sex appearing in his birth certificate is a
legal issue and the court must look to the statutes.
10. Art. 412 of NCC: No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected
without a judicial order.
11. Together with Art. 376 of the NCC, Art. 412 was amended by RA 9048 in
so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or
change of such matters can now be made through administrative
proceedings and without the need for a judicial order.
12. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to
substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.
13. Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of
sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change
for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
14. Entries envisaged under Art. 412 of the NCC and correctable under Rule
108 are those provided in Arts. 407 and 408 of the NCC52.
52
Art. 407: Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the
civil register.
Art. 408: The following shall be entered in the civil register:
 15. The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the
Civil Code include even those that occur after birth
CAH
16. Cagandahan undoubtedly has CAH. This causes early or inappropriate
appearance of male characteristics.
17. A person like Cagandahan with this condition produces too much androgen,
a male hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH
usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the urethral opening at the base, an
ambiguous genitalia often appearing more male than female; (2) normal
internal structures of the female reproductive tract such as the ovaries,
uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some features start to
appear male, such as deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure to
menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with
CAH.
18. CAH is one of many conditions that involve intersex anatomy.
19. INTERSEXUALITY53: applies to human beings who cannot be classified
as either male or female.
20. An intersex individual is considered as suffering from a "disorder" which is
almost always recommended to be treated, whether by surgery and/or by
taking lifetime medication in order to mold the individual as neatly as
possible into the category of either male or female.
21. The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be
classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by
mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid
classification.
22. Cagandahan here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken
unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And
accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male.
23. Cagandahan could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking
lifelong medication to force his body into the categorical mold of a female
but he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due
course in respondent's development to reveal more fully his male
characteristics.
24. In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on
respondent concerning a matter so innately private as one's sexuality and
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of
natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14)
judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
53
Wikipedia: intersexuality "is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromo-
somes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor
female. An organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and female sexes.
lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical
treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH.
25. Neither will the Court force Cagandahan to undergo treatment and to take
medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly
currently knows this gender of the human species.
26. Cagandahan is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him
belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to
him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take
along the path of his sexual development and maturation.
27. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an "incompetent" and in the
absence of evidence to show that classifying Cagandahan as a male will
harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under
the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the Cagandahan's position
and his personal judgment of being a male.
28. In so ruling the Court does no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of
nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. In
other words, we respect respondent's congenital condition and his mature
decision to be a male.
Rule 103
29. As for Cagandahan’s change of name under Rule 103, the Court has held
that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be
exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will
follow.
30. The trial court's grant of Cagandahan's change of name from Jennifer to Jeff
implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name.
31. Considering the consequence that Cagandahan's change of name merely
recognizes his preferred gender, the Court finds merit in Cagandahan's
change of name.
32. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth
certificate from female to male.
 013 REPUBLIC v. BENEMERITO (Gonzales)
March 15, 2004 | Vitug, J. | Change of Name
PETITIONERS: Republic and The Local Civil Registrar, Guimba, Nueva Ecija
RESPONDENT: Petronio L. Benemerito
SUMMARY: Petronio Benemerito filed a petition before the RTC asking for the
correction of certain entries in the record of birth of his son, Joven Lee Benemerito.
The entries sought to be corrected included (1) a change of father’s name from Peter
Laurente Benemerito to Petronio L. Benemerito, and (2) the date of marriage of
Joven Lee’s parents from 01 September 1989 to 25 January 1998. The order of hear-
ing was published in Pulso ng Bayan, a newspaper of general circulation for three
consecutive weeks. RTC granted the petition. The Republic argues that the changes
sought are substantial and not innocuous, and an adversarial proceeding is necessary
where indispensable parties such as the wife of Benemerito and the grandparents of
the child should have been notified. The issues are (1) WoN the changes sought are
substantial and not merely clerical – SUBSTANTIAL. In order to effect the desired
changes, it would be essential to establish that Peter Laurente Benemerito, the person
named as being the father of Joven Lee, and Petronio L. Benemerito, herein respond-
ent, refer to the same person. Also, the intended correction of the date of marriage of
the parents of Joven Lee from 01 September 1989, appearing in his certificate of
birth, to 25 January 1998, would, in effect, change the status of the child, Joven Lee
from being the legitimate son to being instead the legitimated child. The changes in
the entry in the Certificate of Live Birth of Joven Lee S. Benemerito can possibly
affect successional and other rights of persons related to either or both Benemerito
and his wife, as well as that of Joven Lee himself, are simply too substantial. (2)
WoN an adversarial proceeding is necessary – YES. The changes in the entry in the
Certificate of Live Birth are simply too substantial to be dealt with in summary, in-
stead of the regular adversarial, proceedings, where all interested parties are im-
pleaded, or at least notified, and allowed to be heard before the proposed changes in
the birth certificate are effected.
DOCTRINE: A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or
writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled
or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent. On the other hand, substantial or
contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all
interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed.
A case does not amount to an adversarial proceeding simply because an opportunity
to contest the petition is afforded by the publication of the petition in a newspaper of
general circulation.
FACTS:
37. Petronio L. Benemerito filed a verified petition before the RTC Nueva Ecija
asking for the correction of certain entries in the record of birth of his son,
Joven Lee Benemerito, on file with the Local Civil Registrar of Guimba,
Nueva Ecija. The entries sought to be corrected included —
a. A change of the father's name from Peter Laurente Benemerito to
Petronio L. Benemerito; and
b. the date of marriage of Joven Lee's parents, Edna V. Sicat and
Petronio L. Benemerito appearing therein from 01 September 1989
to 25 January 1998.
38. A notice of hearing was issued by the trial court directing that the notice be
published for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation.
The order was published in "Pulso ng Bayan," a newspaper of general circu-
lation for three (3) consecutive weeks.
39. Benemerito testified that he and Edna V. Sicat were married on 25 January
1998. Prior to their marriage, they had been living together as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage and during the cohabitation, a son, Joven
Lee Benemerito, was born to them. He was surprised to later discover that his
name was erroneously recorded in the birth certificate of his son as Peter
Laurente Benemerito instead of his correct name Petronio Laurente Be-
nemerito, and that the date of his marriage with Edna V. Sicat appearing in
the birth certificate of Joven Lee as 01 September 1989 instead of 25 January
1998.
40. RTC granted the petition.
41. The Republic appealed the decision to the CA, contending that the petition
should not have been granted since indispensable parties themselves were not
notified of the proceedings and that substantial changes, such as the date of
marriage of parents, name of the father, or filiation of the child and whether
legitimate or illegitimate, could only be threshed out in adversarial proceed-
ings.
42. CA affirmed the RTC decision.
a. "In the present case, the opportunity to contest the petition was af-
forded to all concerned parties through the publication of the peti-
tion in 'Pulso ng Bayan,' a newspaper of general circulation. Copies
of the Order were furnished to the Office of the Solicitor General,
the National Census and Statistics Office, the Provincial Prosecutor,
and the Office of the Local Registrar of Guimba, Nueva Ecija. The
Public Prosecutor appeared for the State but did not interpose any
objection to the petition. Decidedly, what the trial court conducted
amounted to an adversarial proceeding.
b. "The correction of the spelling of petitioner's name from Peter Lau-
rente Benemerito to Petronio Laurente Benemerito is an innocuous
alteration.
 c. "The change of the date of marriage from September 1, 1989 to re-
flect the actual date of marriage as January 25, 1998, is likewise in-
nocuous. Its legal effect is merely to change the status of the child
from legitimate to legitimated not illegitimate, as the child is the
natural child of both his parents who were not incapacitated to mar-
ry each other at the time of the child's birth."
43. The Republic now asserts that the changes sought by Benemerito are sub-
stantial and not innocuous. Claiming that an adversarial proceeding is essen-
tial to fully ventilate the allegations of the petition, the Republic argues that
indispensable parties, including the wife of Benemerito or the grandparents
of the child, should have themselves been notified or been made parties to the
proceedings to shed light on the supposed discrepancies or errors found in the
birth certificate of Joven Lee Benemerito.
ISSUE:
12. WoN the changes sought are substantial and not merely clerical
– SUBSTANTIAL. The changes in the entry in the Certificate
of Live Birth of Joven Lee S. Benemerito can possibly affect
successional and other rights of persons related to either or
both Benemerito and his wife, as well as that of Joven Lee
himself, are simply too substantial.
13. WoN an adversarial proceeding is necessary – YES. The
changes in the entry in the Certificate of Live Birth are simply
too substantial to be dealt with in summary, instead of the regu-
lar adversarial, proceedings, where all interested parties are
impleaded, or at least notified, and allowed to be heard before
the proposed changes in the birth certificate are effected.
RULING: The appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, without preju-
dice on the part of respondent to initiate the appropriate adversarial proceedings such
as may be minded. No costs.
RATIO:
14. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Article 412 of the
Civil Code, states the procedure by which an entry in the civil
register may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding there
contemplated may generally be used only to correct clerical,
spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil
registry.
15. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to
the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a
mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a
correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstate-
ment of the occupation of the parent.
16. On the other hand, substantial or contentious alterations may be
allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested
parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed.
17. The "corrections" sought to be made by Benemerito in the birth
certificate of Joven Lee could hardly qualify as just clerical er-
rors. In order to effect the desired changes, it would be essen-
tial to establish that Peter Laurente Benemerito, the person
named as being the father of Joven Lee, and Petronio L. Be-
nemerito, herein respondent, refer to the same person.
18. The intended correction of the date of marriage of the parents
of Joven Lee from 01 September 1989, appearing in his certifi-
cate of birth, to 25 January 1998, would, in effect, change the
status of the child, Joven Lee, born on 01 June 1990 at a time
when he and his wife were not as yet legally married, from be-
ing the legitimate son of Peter Laurente Benemerito to being
instead the legitimated child of Petronio L. Benemerito and a
certain Peter Laurente Benemerito.
19. The changes in the entry in the Certificate of Live Birth of
Joven Lee S. Benemerito, which can possibly affect succes-
sional and other rights of persons related to either or both
Benemerito and his wife, as well as that of Joven Lee him-
self, are simply too substantial to be dealt with in summary,
instead of the regular adversarial, proceedings, where all
interested parties are impleaded, or at least notified, and al-
lowed to be heard before the proposed changes in the birth
certificate are effected.
20. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides that interested parties
may avail themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding
to correct substantial errors and to establish the true facts in the
civil registry. A case does not amount to an adversarial pro-
ceeding simply because an opportunity to contest the peti-
tion is afforded by the publication of the petition in a news-
 paper of general circulation. The corresponding petition
should also implead as respondents the civil registrar and all
other persons who may have or may claim to have any interest
that would be affected thereby.
21. Apparently, the proceedings conducted by the trial court in the
instant case fell much too short of the requirements. Nowhere
in the records would it appear that all possible indispensable
parties were duly notified of the proceedings.
22. Parenthetically, the recent enactment of Republic Act 9048,
otherwise also known as "An Act Authorizing the City or Mu-
nicipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General to Correct a
Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change of
First Name or Nickname in the Civil Register Without Need of
Judicial Order," only empowers the City or Municipal Civil
Registrar or the Consul General to correct clerical or typo-
graphical errors and to allow a change in the first name or
nickname in an entry in the civil registry without further need
of a judicial order. The obvious effect of Republic Act 9048 is
merely to make possible the administrative correction of cleri-
cal or typographical errors or change of first name or nickname
in entries in the civil register, leaving to Rule 108 the correc-
tion of substantial changes in the civil registry in appropriate
adversarial proceedings.
 014 Silverio v Republic (GUSTILO)
October 22, 2007 | Corona, J. | Change of Name
PETITIONER: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio
RESPONDENTS:Republic of the Philippines
SUMMARY: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio (Silverio) filed a petition for the
change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 8. The petition impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respond-
ent. Silverio alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the
spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His
name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live
birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male."He further alleged that he is
a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female"
and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped
in a man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent
psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His at-
tempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he
underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter exam-
ined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the
Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that Silverio had in fact under-
gone the procedure. From then on, Silverio lived as a female and was in fact engaged
to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from
"Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female. The Trial Court
rendered a decision in favor of Silverio. The Republic of the Philippines (Republic),
thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. It alleged that
there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex
alteration. The CA rendered a decision in favor of the Republic.
The issue is WoN the change of Silverio’s name and sex in his birth certificate is
allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules
of Court and RA 9048?- NO
The Court held that Silverio’s first name was not within that court’s primary jurisdic-
tion as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned,
assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper
remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in
the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Ma-
nila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use
of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all. To correct simply means
"to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change means "to
replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that
serves as a substitute." The birth certificate of Silverio contained no error. All entries
therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No
correction is necessary.
DOCTRINE: RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power
and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or mu-
nicipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore,
jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged
with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law
is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of
Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of
the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of
name is first filed and subsequently denied. It likewise lays down the corre-
sponding venue, form and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings
regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not ju-
dicial.
FACTS:
15. On November 26, 2002, Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio (Silverio) filed a
petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition impleaded the civil reg-
istrar of Manila as respondent.
16. Silverio alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the
spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962.
His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate
of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male."
17. He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male
but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself
with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he consulted sev-
eral doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination,
hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself
to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reas-
signment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr.
Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philip-
pines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that Silverio had in fact under-
gone the procedure.
18. From then on, Silverio lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be mar-
ried. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from
"Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."
19. An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s
Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three
consecutive weeks. Copies of the order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila. During trial, petitione Silverio
testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American
fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
20. The Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of Silverio. The Republic of
the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the
Court of Appeals. It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries
 in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. The CA rendered a decision
in favor of the Republic. Silverio moved for reconsideration but it was denied.
ISSUE/s:
15. WoN the change of Silverio’s name and sex in his birth certificate is al-
lowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of
the Rules of Court and RA 9048?- NO because change of name does not al-
ter one’s legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not sanction a change
of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding con-
fusion, changing Silverio’s first name for his declared purpose may only
create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
RATIO:
7. The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for
purposes of identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions
for change of name are controlled by statutes. In this connection, Article 376 of
the Civil Code provides: ART. 376. “No person can change his name or sur-
name without judicial authority.”
8. This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law).
In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides: SECTION 1. Authority to Correct
Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. – No
entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order,
except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname
which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil reg-
istrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its im-
plementing rules and regulations.
9. RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and
authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or mu-
nicipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law, there-
fore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primari-
ly lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and
effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of
Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of En-
tries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an admin-
istrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently de-
nied. It likewise lays down the corresponding venue, form and procedure.
In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name
are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
10. RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may
be allowed: SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. –
The petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the
following cases: (1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridic-
ulous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2)
The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by
the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in
the community; or (3) The change will avoid confusion.
11. Silverio’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex
reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex
he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a
change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048
does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassign-
ment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing Silverio’s first name for
his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil regis-
try and the public interest.
12. Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper
or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addi-
tion, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might
suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
13. In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of
Silverio’s first name was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the
petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, as-
suming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the
proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048.
It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office
of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More
importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does
not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly
dismissed Silverio’s petition in so far as the change of his first name was con-
cerned.
14. The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a le-
gal issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412
of the Civil Code provides: ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be
changed or corrected without a judicial order.
15. Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by
RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correc-
tion or change of such matters can now be made through administrative pro-
ceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed
from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such er-
rors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in en-
tries in the civil register.
16. Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the per-
formance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in
the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or
misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to
the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other
existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must in- 22. While Silverio may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance
volve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of en-
17. Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change try as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for
of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.
change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of 23. To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of
Court. first name and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry,
18. The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable un- where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must
der Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature in-
of the Civil Code: ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the tends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privi-
civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register; ART. 408. The fol- lege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has
lowing shall be entered in the civil register: (1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the con-
deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declar- ferment of that privilege.
ing marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) ac- 24. Silverio pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happi-
knowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recov- ness, contentment and [the] realization of their dreams." No argument about
ery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orienta-
(15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name. tion do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social con-
19. The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the vention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the reme-
Civil Code include even those that occur after birth. However, no reasonable in- dies Silverio seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by
terpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correc- the legislature, not by the courts.
tion on the ground of sex reassignment. To correct simply means "to make or
set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change means "to
replace something with something else of the same kind or with something
that serves as a substitute." The birth certificate of Silverio contained no
error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name
and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
20. There is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassign-
ment and its effects. This is fatal to Silverio’s cause. Under the Civil Regis-
ter Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed
at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually
done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the
genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing
sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of
his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.
21. When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common
and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words
"sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concern-
ing the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in
their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the con-
trary. Thus, the words "male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not
include persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words
that are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are
presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the con-
trary.
 Republic of the Philippines v. Kho (HORTALEZA)
June, 29, 2007 | Carpio-Morales, J. | Correction of Entries in Civil Registry
PETITIONER: Republic of The Philippines
RESPONDENTS: Carlito I. Kho, Michael Kho, Mercy Nona Kho-fortun, Heddy
Moira Kho-serrano, Kevin Dogmoc Kho (Minor), And Kelly Dogmoc Kho (Minor),
SUMMARY: Carlito Kho, and his siblings applied to the RTC of Butuan City, for
the correction of their Birth Certificates, mainly for all the respondents, the correc-
tion of their Mothers citizenship from Chinese to Filipino. And also the deletion of
the marriage date of their parents as they were never legally married.
Also for Carlito the changes to the birth certificates of his children to correct the
marriage date from corrected from April 27, 1989 to January 21, 2000, the date ap-
pearing in their marriage certificate, as when his children were born he was still mar-
ried. Additionally the deletion of John from his birth record and from his marriage
certificate the name of his father from John Kho to Juan Kho and the citizenship of
Juan to Chinese from Filipino.
All the petitions of Carlito and also his siblings, were allowed.
the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) \ contends that, since the changes that
were made in the corrections of the civil registry and change of name was substantial
it should have been adversarial, and his father and wife Marival should have been
notified.
the issue is WoN the father Juan Kho and wife Marival should have been impleaded
before allowing the changes and failure to do so results in a void judgement? NO,
the compliance with section 4 of Rule 10854 is deemed enough even if the juris-
dictional requirement of 103 Was not complied with. The notice and publica-
tion is deemed to have been enough to complay with the change of name, correc-
tion of entries in the civil registry. Addtionally the change of name of Maribel to
Marivel, is simply clerical or typogrphical error and can be corrected through sum-
marry proceedings.
DOCTRINE: Compliance with section 4 of Rule 108 is deemed enough even if the
jurisdictional requirement of Rule 103 Was not complied with. The notice and publi-
cation is deemed to have been enough to comply with the change of name and cor-
54
Section 4. Notice and publication. — Upon the filing of the petition, the court
shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause rea-
sonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court the first name of their mother be rectified from Maribel to Marivel.
shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
rection of entries in the civil registry.
FACTS:
1. This case is about correction of civil registry entries of the birth certificate
of Carlito I. Kho, Michael Kho, Mercy Nona Kho-fortun, Heddy Moira
Kho-serrano who are all siblings and their application the RTC of Butuan to
change their mother citizenship from Chinese to Filipino, and that their par-
ents were never legally married.
2. Additionally, Kevin Dogmoc Kho (Minor), And Kelly Dogmoc Kho (Mi-
nor) children of Carlito Kho, for the correction of their birth certificate to
show the true date of January 21,2000 to show the marriage of Carlito and
wife Marival.
3. Carlito Kho also petitions for the deletion of his second name John in his
birth record, and that his father’s citizenship be changed from Filipino to
Chinese, and his fathers name from John Kho to Juan Kho in his marriage
certificate.
4. On the scheduled date of the hearing only the Kho’s counsel appeared and
the office of the Office of The Solicitor General (OSG) did not and hearing
was reset.
5. On September 14, 2001, the OSG entered its appearance with an authoriza-
tion to the city prosecutor of Butuan City to appear in the case and render
assistance to OSG.
6. On January 31, 2002, respondents presented documentary evidence show-
ing compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of the petition. They al-
so presented testimonial evidence consisting of the testimonies of Carlito
and his mother, Epifania. During the same hearing, an additional correction
in the birth certificates of Carlitos children was requested to the effect that
 7. By Decision of September 4, 2002, the trial court directed the local civil
registrar of Butuan City to correct the entries in the record of birth of Car-
lito, as follows:
(1) change the citizenship of his mother from Chinese to Filipino;
(2) delete John from his name; and
(3) delete the word married opposite the date of marriage of his
parents. The last correction was ordered to be effected likewise in
the birth certificates of respondents Michael, Mercy Nona, and
Heddy Moira.
8. Additionally, the trial court ordered the correction of the birth certificates of
the minor children of Carlito to reflect the date of marriage of Carlito and
Marivel Dogmoc (Marivel) as January 21, 2000, instead of April 27, 1989,
and the name Maribel as Marivel.
9. With respect to the marriage certificate of Carlito and Marivel, the correc-
tions ordered pertained to the alteration of the name of Carlitos father from
John Kho to Juan Kho and the latters citizenship from Filipino to Chinese.
10. Republic of the Philippines, appealed the RTC Decision to the CA, faulting
the trial court in granting the petition for correction of entries in the subject
documents despite the failure of respondents to implead the minors mother,
Marivel, as an indispensable party and to offer sufficient evidence to war-
rant the corrections with regard to the questioned married status of Carlito
and his siblings parents, and the latters citizenship.
11. Also faulting the court for allowing the change of name of Carlito John Kho
to Carlito Kho without complying with the jurisdictional requirements of
Rule 103.
ISSUE/s:
1. The issue is WoN the father Juan Kho and wife Marival should have been
impleaded before allowing the changes and failure to do so results in a void
judgement? NO, the compliance with section 4 of Rule 108 is deemed
enough even if the jurisdictional requirement of 103 Was not complied
with. The notice and publication is deemed to have been enough to
comply with the change of name, correction of entries in the civil regis-
try. Additionally the change of name of Maribel to Marivel, is simply cleri-
cal or typographical error and can be corrected through summary proceed-
ings against a thing and not against a person. The decision on the peti-
RULING: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED.
RATIO:(bear with me as the court held almost a paragraph each for each mat-
ter brought up as a decision)
1. The enactment in March 2001 of Republic Act No. 9048, otherwise known
as AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL REG-
ISTRAR OR THE CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT A CLERICAL
OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF
FIRST NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTER WITHOUT
NEED OF JUDICIAL ORDER, has been considered to lend legislative af-
firmation to the judicial precedence that substantial corrections to the civil
status of persons recorded in the civil registry may be effected through the
filing of a petition under Rule 108
2. Thus, this Court in Republic v. Benemerito observed that the obvious effect
of Republic Act No. 9048 is to make possible the administrative correction
of clerical or typographical errors or change of first name or nickname in
entries in the civil register, leaving to Rule 108 the correction of substantial
changes in the civil registry in appropriate adversarial proceedings.
3. When all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are thus followed, the
appropriate adversary proceeding necessary to effect substantial corrections
to the entries of the civil register is satisfied.
1. The pertinent provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
read:SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry
in the civil registrar is sought, the civil registrar and all persons
who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby
shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the
court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of
the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the
persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order
to be published once in a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or
claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correc-
tion is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the peti-
tion, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his op-
position thereto.
4. In a case decided by the courts entitled Barco v. CA “held that the publi-
cation of the order of hearing under Section 4 of Rule 108 cured the
failure to implead an indispensable party.”
1. Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action
tion binds not only the parties thereto but the whole world. An in
rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. Publi-
cation is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its
object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an ob-
jection of any sort against the right sought to be established. It is
the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a
party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and
decide it.
5. With respect to the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel, their certificate 11. The correction of the mothers citizenship from Chinese to Filipino as ap-
of marriage shows that indeed they were married on January 21, 2000, not pearing in Carlitos birth record was also proper. Of note is the fact that dur-
on April 27, 1989. Explaining the error, Carlito declared that the date April ing the cross examination by the city prosecutor of Epifania, he did not
27, 1989 was supplied by his helper, adding that he was not married to deem fit to question her citizenship. Such failure to oppose the correction
Marivel at the time his sons were born because his previous marriage was prayed for, which certainly was not respondents fault, does not in any way
annulled only in 1999. Given the evidence presented by respondents, the change the adversarial nature of the proceedings.
CA observed that the minors were illegitimate at birth, hence, the correction 12. Also significant to note is that the birth certificates of Carlitos siblings uni-
would bring about no change at all in the nature of their filiation. formly stated the citizenship of Epifania as Filipino. To disallow the correc-
6. With respect to Carlitos mother, it bears noting that she declared at the wit- tion in Carlitos birth record of his mothers citizenship would perpetuate an
ness stand that she was not married to Juan Kho who died in 1959. Again, inconsistency in the natal circumstances of the siblings who are unquestion-
that testimony was not challenged by the city prosecutor. ably born of the same mother and father
7. The documentary evidence supporting the deletion from Carlitos and his 13. the correction of the name of Carlitos wife from Maribel to Marivel. The
siblings birth certificates of the entry Married opposite the date of marriage mistake is clearly clerical or typographical, which is not only visible to the
of their parents, moreover, consisted of a certification issued on November eyes, but is also obvious to the understanding considering that the name re-
24, 1973 by St. Joseph (Butuan City) Parish priest Eugene van Vught stat- flected in the marriage certificate of Carlito and his wife is Marivel.
ing that Juan Kho and Epifania had been living together as common aw 14. In a case the court said that “The change of name from Beatriz
couple since 1935 but have never contracted marriage legally. A certifica- Labayo/Beatriz Labayu to Emperatriz Labayo was also held to be a mere
tion from the office of the city registrar, which was appended to respondents innocuous alteration, which can be granted through a summary proceeding
Amended Petition, likewise stated that it has no record of marriage between and thus holds the same for John Kho to Juan Kho.
Juan Kho and Epifania. Under the circumstances, the deletion of the
word Married opposite the date of marriage of parents is warranted.
8. With respect to the correction in Carlitos birth certificate of his name from
Carlito John to Carlito, the same was properly granted under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court. As correctly pointed out by the CA, the cancellation or
correction of entries involving changes of name falls under letter o of the
following provision of Section 2 of Rule 108:
1. Section 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good
and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be
cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) le-
gal separation; (e) judgments of annulment of marriage; (f) judg-
ments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitima-
tions; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j)
naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil
interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
9. Hence, while the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 103 (which governs
petitions for change of name) were not complied with, observance of the
provisions of Rule 108 suffices to effect the correction sought for.
10. More importantly, Carlitos official transcript of record from the Urious Col-
lege in Butuan City, certificate of eligibility from the Civil Service Com-
mission, and voter registration record satisfactorily show that he has been
known by his first name only. No prejudice is thus likely to arise from
the dropping of the second name.
 016 KILOSBAYAN vs. ERMITA (LAGUILLES)
July 3, 2007| Azcuna, J. | RA 9048
PETITIONER: AMA Computer College, Inc.
RESPONDENTS: Ely Garcia and Ma. Teresa Balla
SUMMARY: Kilosbayan alleges that Ermita announced an appointment in
favor of Ong as Associate of the SC to fill up the vacancy in the SC. Kilosbayan
claims that Ong is a Chinese citizen, and that this fact is plain and incontestable,
and that his own birth says that he is a Chinese citizen. Kilosbayan claims that
as long as Ong’s birth certificate is not changed by a judicial order, the JBC is
bound by what is stated in his birth certificate. They also claim that Ong’s birth
certificate prevails over his new Identification Certificate issued by the Bureau
of Immigration and over the opinion of the Secretrary of Justice saying that he
is a natural-born Filipino. The issue in this case is whether or not the subsequent
recognition of Ong’s natural-born status by the BI and DOJ can amend the final
decision of the trial court that Ong is naturalized along with his father.
The Court held in the negative. no substantial change or correction in an
entry in a civil register can be made without a judicial order, and, under
the law, a change in citizenship status is a substantial change. Changes
which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in character
and should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the
issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who may be affected by the
entries are notified or represented and evidence is submitted to prove the
allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted.
DOCTRINE: RA 9048 provides that a summary administrative proceeding to
correct clerical or typographical errors in a birth certificate cannot apply to a
change in nationality. Substantial corrections to the nationality or
citizenship of persons recorded in the civil registry should, therefore, be
effected through a petition filed in court under Rule 108.
FACTS:
29. Petitioners Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation are
people’s and/or non-governmental organizations engaged in public and
civic causes aimed at protecting the people’s rights to self-governance and
justice.
30. Respondent Executive Secretary Ermita is the head of the Office of the
President and is in charge of releasing presidential appointments including
those of SC Justices.
31. Respondent Gregory Ong is allegedly the party whose appointment would
fill up the vacancy in the SC.
32. Kilosbayan alleges that Ermita, in representation of the Office of the
President, announced an appointment in favor of Gregory Ong as Associate
Justice of the SC to fill up the vacancy created by the retirement of AJ
Romeo Callejo.
33. The major daily publications reported that Ermita stated that the
appointment is “still there except that the validation of the issue is being
done by the JBC.”
34. Kilosbayan contends that the appointment extended to Ong is
unconstitutional, arbitrary, whimsical, and issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
35. Kilosbayan claims that Ong is a Chinese citizen, that this fact is plain and
incontestable, and that his own birth certificate indicates his Chinese
citizenship. According to petitioners, the birth certificate reveals that at the
time of Ong’s birth, his father was Chinese and his mother was also
Chinese.
36. Petitioners maintain that even if it were granted that 11 years after Ong’s
birth his father was finally granted Filipino citizenship by naturalization,
that, by itself, would not make Ong a natural-born Filipino citizen.
37. Petitioners also assert that under the Civil Code, books making up the civil
register and all documents relating thereto shall be prima facie evidence of
the facts therein indicated. Therefore, the entry in Ong’s birth certificate
indicating his nationality as Chinese is prima facie evidence of the fact that
Ong’s citizenship at birth is Chinese.
38. Also, the Civil Code provides that no entry in the civil register shall be
changed or corrected without a judicial order. Thus, as long as Ong’s birth
certificate is not changed by a judicial order, the JBC is bound by what is
stated in his birth certificate.
39. According to petitioners, Ong’s birth certificate prevails over his new
Identification Certificate issued by the Bureau of Immigration stating that
he is a natural-born Filipino and over the opinion of then Secretary of
Justice Teofisto Guingona that he is a natural-born Filipino.
40. Petitioners maintain that the DOJ does not have the power or authority to
alter entries in a birth certificate; that Ong’s old Identification Certificate
did not declare that he is a natural-born Filipino.
41. Petitioners then filed an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a TRO to
prevent and restrain Ermita from releasing the appointment of Ong, and to
prevent and restrain Ong from assuming the office and discharging the
functions of AJ of the SC.
42. Ermita filed a Comment stating that the appointment of Ong was made by
the President pursuant to the powers vested by the Constitution. Ermita also
added that the President appointed Ong from among the list of nominees
who were duly screened by the JBC. He further stated that the appointment,
however, was not released, but instead, referred to JBC for validation of
Ong’s citizenship. To date, the JBC has not received the referral.
 43. Ong maintains that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen and that petitioners
have no standing to file the suit.
44. Ong traces his ancestral lines to Maria Santos of Malolos, who was
allegedly a Filipino citizen who married Chan Kin, a Chinese citizen; that
these two had a son, Juan Santos, and that Chan Kin died in China as a
result of which Maria Santos reverted to her Filipino citizenship. That time,
Juan was a minor and that he also became a Filipino citizen. That Ong’s
mother, Dy Guiok Santos, is the daughter of the spouses Juan Santos and Sy
Siok Hian, a Chinese citizen.
45. Therefore, Ong claims that his mother was a Filipino citizen at birth.
ISSUE/s:
6. WoN the subsequent recognition of Ong’s natural status by the BI and DOJ
can amend the final decision of the trial court that Ong is naturalized along
with his father – NO, because substantial corrections to the nationality or
citizenship of persons recorded in the civil registry should, therefore, be
effected through a petition filed in court under Rule 108.
RULING: The petition is GRANTED as one of injunction directed against
respondent Gregory S. Ong, who is hereby ENJOINED from accepting an
appointment to the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court or assuming
the position and discharging the functions of that office, until he shall have
successfully completed all necessary steps, through the appropriate adversarial
proceedings in court, to show that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen and correct the
records of his birth and citizenship.
19. It is clear, therefore, that from the records of the Court, Ong is a naturalized
Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born
status by the BI and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the
trial court stating that Ong and his mother were naturalized along with
his father.
20. Furthermore, as Kilosbayan correctly submit, no substantial change or
correction in an entry in a civil register can be made without a judicial
order, and, under the law, a change in citizenship status is a substantial
change.
21. Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial
in character and should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon
the nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who may
be affected by the entries are notified or represented and evidence is
submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the
contrary admitted.
22. RA 9048 provides that a summary administrative proceeding to correct
clerical or typographical errors in a birth certificate cannot apply to a
change in nationality. Substantial corrections to the nationality or
citizenship of persons recorded in the civil registry should, therefore, be
effected through a petition filed in court under Rule 108.
23. The series of events and long string of alleged changes in the nationalities
of Ong’s ancestors, by various births, marriages and deaths, all entail
factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial proceedings
so as to correct the existing on his birth and citizenship.

RATIO:
14. Petitioners have standing to file the suit simply as people’s organizations
and taxpayers since the matter involves an issue of utmost and far-reaching
Constitutional importance.
15. In Ong’s petition to be admitted to the Philippine Bar, he alleged that he is
qualified to be admitted to the Philippine Bar because, among others, he is a
Filipino citizen. As part of his evidence, in support of his petition, he
submitted his birth certificate and the naturalization papers of his father.
16. His birth certificate states that he was a Chinese citizen at birth and that his
mother, Dy Guiok Santos, was a Chinese citizen and his father, Eugenio
Ong Han Seng, was also a Chinese citizen.
17. The Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant also wrote Ong a letter
stating that he has to submit a certified clear copy of his birth certificate and
a certification of non-appeal re his citizenship from the OSG. Ong complied
with these requirements.
18. It was on the basis of these allegations under oath and the submitted
evidence of naturalization that the SC allowed Ong to take the oath as a
lawyer.
 017 REPUBLIC v. COSETENG-MAGPAYO (Marcos)
Feb. 2, 2011 | Carpio Morales, J. | Change of Name
PETITIONER: Republic of the Philippines
RESPONDENTS: Julian Edward Coseteng Magpayo (a.k.a. Julian Ed-
ward Emerson Marquez-Lim Coseteng)
SUMMARY: Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo (Julian) is the
son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim Co-
seteng. However, he claims that his parents were never legally married,
therefore he filed with the RTC of Quezon City a Petition to change his
name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. (removing the
Magpayo). No opposition to the petition having been filed, an order of
general default was entered by the trial court which then allowed re-
spondent to present evidence ex parte. By Decision, the trial court
granted the petition and directed the Civil Registrar of Makati City to:
1. Delete the entry "March 26, 1972" in Item 24 for "DATE
FACTS:
AND
PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF PARTIES" [in herein respondent's
Certificate of live Birth];
2. Correct the entry "MAGPAYO" in the space for the Last
Name of the [respondent] to "COSETENG";
3. Delete the entry "COSETENG" in the space for Middle
Name of the [respondent]; and
4. Delete the entry "Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr." in the
space for FATHER of the [respondent] . . .
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a motion for reconsider-
ation but it was denied by the trial court hence, it, thru the OSG, lodged
the present petition for review to the Court. The Republic contends that
the deletion of the entry on the date and place of marriage of Julian’s
parents from his birth certificate has the effect of changing his civil sta-
tus from legitimate to illegitimate, hence, any change in civil status of a
person must be effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding.
The Republic adds that by ordering the deletion of Julian's parents'
date of marriage and the name of his father from the entries in his birth
certificate, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction. WoN the deletion of
the surname or the change of name amounted to the changing his
civil status – YES, because it involved substantial and controversial
alterations. The change being sought in Julian's petition goes so far as
to affect his legal status in relation to his parents. It seeks to change his
legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Since Jullian’s desired change affects
his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, Rule 108 applies. Rule 108
clearly directs that a petition which concerns one's civil status should
be filed in the civil registry in which the entry is sought to be can-
celled or corrected — that of Makati in the present case, and "all per-
sons who have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby" should be made parties to the proceeding.
DOCTRINE: Changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to
illegitimate are substantial and controversial alterations which can only
be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings.
Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns one's civil status
should be filed in the civil registry in which the entry is sought to be
cancelled or corrected and all persons who have or claim any inter-
est which would be affected thereby" should be made parties to the
proceeding.
1. Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo (Julian) is the son of
Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim Co-
seteng.
2. Julian’s certificate of live birth shows that his parents contracted
marriage on March 26, 1972
3. However, he claims that his parents were never legally married,
therefore he filed with the RTC of Quezon City a Petition to change
his name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. (re-
moving the Magpayo)
4. In support of his petition, Julian submitted a certification from the
National Statistics Office stating that his mother Anna Dominique
"does not appear in [its] National Indices of Marriage." He also sub-
mitted his academic records from elementary up to college showing
that he carried the surname "Coseteng," and the birth certificate of
his child where "Coseteng" appears as his surname. In the 1998,
2001 and 2004 Elections, he ran and was elected as Councilor of
Quezon City's 3rd District using the name "JULIAN M.L. CO-
SETENG.
5. No opposition to the petition having been filed, an order of general
default was entered by the trial court which then allowed respond-
ent to present evidence ex parte.
6. By Decision of January 8, 2009, the trial court granted the petition
and directed the Civil Registrar of Makati City to:
1. Delete the entry "March 26, 1972" in Item 24 for "DATE AND
 PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF PARTIES" [in herein respondent's
Certificate of live Birth];
2. Correct the entry "MAGPAYO" in the space for the Last Name of
the [respondent] to "COSETENG";
3. Delete the entry "COSETENG" in the space for Middle Name
of the [respondent]; and
4. Delete the entry "Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr." in the space
for FATHER of the [respondent] . . .
7. The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a motion for recon-
sideration but it was denied by the trial court hence, it, thru the
OSG, lodged the present petition for review to the Court on pure
question of law
8. The Republic contends that the deletion of the entry on the date and
place of marriage of Julian’s parents from his birth certificate has
the effect of changing his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate,
hence, any change in civil status of a person must be effected
through an appropriate adversary proceeding.
9. The Republic adds that by ordering the deletion of Julian's parents'
date of marriage and the name of his father from the entries in his
birth certificate, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction
ISSUE/s: WoN the deletion of the surname or the change of name amount-
ed to the changing his civil status – YES, because it involved substantial
and controversial alterations.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions,
GRANTED. The January 8, 2009 Decision of Branch 77 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City in SP Proc. No. Q-0863058 is NULLIFIED.
RATIO:
1. A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF
NAME) using valid and meritorious grounds including
(a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult
to write or pronounce;
(b) when the change results as a legal consequence such as legiti-
mation;
(c) when the change will avoid confusion;
(d) when one has continuously used and been known since child-
hood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage;
(e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former
alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and
(f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no show-
ing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or
that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
2. Julian's reason for changing his name cannot be considered as one
of, or analogous to, recognized grounds, however.
3. The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of
the Philippines. In Alfon, the Court allowed the therein petitioner, Es-
trella Alfon, to use the name that she had been known since child-
hood in order to avoid confusion. Alfon did not deny her legitimacy.
Avoidance of confusion was justification enough to allow her to do
so.
4. In the present case, however, respondent denies his legitimacy.
5. The change being sought in Julian's petition goes so far as to affect
his legal status in relation to his parents. It seeks to change his legit-
imacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not suffice to
grant respondent's supplication.
6. Labayo-Rowe v. Republic categorically holds that "changes which
may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate . . . are sub-
stantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after
appropriate adversary proceedings . . ."
7. Since Jullian’s desired change affects his civil status from legitimate
to illegitimate, Rule 108 applies.
8. Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns one's civil
status should be filed in the civil registry in which the entry is
sought to be cancelled or corrected — that of Makati in the pre-
sent case, and "all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected thereby" should be made parties to the pro-
ceeding.
9. As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed
not in Makati where his birth certificate was registered but in
Quezon City. And as the above- mentioned title of the petition filed
by respondent before the RTC shows, neither the civil registrar of
Makati nor his father and mother were made parties thereto.
10. Aside from improper venue, he failed to implead the civil regis-
trar of Makati and all affected parties as respondents in the
case.
11. In the cases of Barco and Kho, the mandatory directive under Sec-
tion 3 of Rule 108 to implead the civil registrar and the parties who
would naturally and legally be affected by the grant of a petition for
correction or cancellation of entries.
12. Non-impleading, however, as party-respondent of one who is inad-
vertently left out or is not established to be known by the petitioner
to be affected by the grant of the petition or actually participates in
the proceeding is notified through publication.
13. IN FINE, when a petition for cancellation or correction of an en-
try in the civil register involves substantial and controversial al-
terations including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity
or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with
the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated.
 018 ONDE v OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR (ARMAND)
September 10, 2014 | Villarama, J. | Change of Name
PETITIONER: Francler P. Onde
RESPONDENTS: Office of the Local Civil Registration of Las Pinas City
SUMMARY: Onde filed a petition for correction of entries in his certificate of live
birth before the RTC and named respondent Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las
Piñas City as sole respondent. He prayed that the following entries on his birth certif-
icate be corrected as follows: 1) on the Entry pertaining to the Date and Place of Mar-
riage of Parents, from “December 23, 1983, Bicol” to “Not Married”; 2) First Name
Of Mother, from “Tely” to “Matilde”; and, 3) First Name, from “Franc Ler” to
“Francler). RTC dismissed his petition, noting that the first correction (the date and
place of marriage of parents) are substantial corrections, while the other corrections
maybe made before the City Civil Registry under RA 9048. Francler moved to recon-
sider, but the RTC denied it, hence he filed a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 to assail the ruling of the RTC. The SC agreed with the RTC that the first
name of petitioner and his mother as appearing in his birth certificate can be corrected
by the city civil registrar under R.A. No. 9048. The SC also agree with the RTC in
ruling that correcting the entry on petitioner’s birth certificate that his parents were
married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to “not married” is a substantial correction
requiring adversarial proceedings. The SC denied the petition and affirmed the RTC
in dismissing the petition for correction of entries.
DOCTRINE: In Eleosida, we cited Section 3, and Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court, as the procedural requirements laid down by the Court to make
the proceedings under Rule 108 adversary. In Republic v. Uy, we have similarly ruled
that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register
involves substantial and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship,
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with
the requirements of the Rules of Court is mandated. Thus, in his new petition,
petitioner should at least implead his father and mother as parties since the substantial
correction he is seeking will also affect them.
1. Onde filed a petition for correction of entries in his certificate of live birth
before the R TC and named respondent Office of the Local Civil Registrar
of Las Pinas City as sole respondent. Onde alleged that he is the illegitimate
child of his parents Guillermo A. Onde and Matilde DC Pakingan, but his
birth certificate stated that his parents were married. His birth certificate
also stated that his mother's first name is Tely and that his first name is
Franc Ler. He prayed that the following entries on his birth certificate be
corrected as follows:
ISSUE:
Entry From To
Date and place of December 23, 1983 Not married
marriage
First name of mother Tely Matilde
His first name Franc Ler Francler
2. In its Order dated October 7, 2010, the RTC dismissed the petition for
correction of entries on the ground thatit is insufficient in form and
substance. It ruled that the proceedings must be adversarial since the first
correction is substantial in nature and would affect Onde’s status as a
legitimate child. It was further held that the correction in the first name of
Onde and his mother can be done by the city civil registrar under Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9048, entitled An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal
Civil Registrar or the ConsulGeneral to Correct a Clerical or Typographical
Error in an Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil
Registrar Without Need of a Judicial Order, Amending for this Purpose
Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
3. In its Order dated March 1, 2011,the RTC denied Onde’s motion for
reconsideration, as it found no proof that Onde’s parents were not married
on December 23, 1983.
4. Essentially, the petition raises four issues: (1) whether the RTC erred in
ruling that the correction on the first name of Onde and his mother can be
done by the city civil registrar under R.A. No. 9048; (2) whether the RTC
erred in ruling that correcting the entry on Onde’s birth certificate that his
parents were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to "not married" is
substantial in nature requiring adversarial proceedings; (3) whether the RTC
erred in dismissing the petition for correction of entries; and (4) whether the
RTC erred in ruling that there is no proof that Onde’s parents were not
married on December 23, 1983.
5. Onde argues that Rule 108 ofthe Rules of Court allows a substantial
correction of entries in the civil registry, stating that in Eleosida v. Local
Civil Registrar of Quezon City,3 the case cited by the RTC, we have
actually ruled that substantial changes in the civil registry are now allowed
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. He likewise adds that proof that his
parents were not married will be presented during the trial, not during the
filing of the petition for correction of entries.
6. In its comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the
RTC correctly dismissed the petition for correction of entries. It points out
that the first names of Onde and his mother can be corrected thru
administrative proceedings under R.A. No. 9048. Such correction of the
entry on Onde’s birth certificate that his parents were married on December
23, 1983 in Bicol to "not married" is a substantial correction affecting his
legitimacy. Hence, it must be dealt with in adversarial proceedings where
all interested parties are impleaded.
1. WoN the RTC erred in ruling that the correction on the first name of Onde
and his mother can be done by the city civil registrar under R.A. No. 9048; -
NO. Indeed, under Section 15 of R.A. No. 9048, clerical or
typographical errors on entries in a civil register can be corrected and
 changes of first name can be done by the concerned city civil registrar
without need of a judicial order
2. WoN the RTC erred in ruling that correcting the entry on Onde’s birth
certificate that his parents were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to
"not married" is substantial in nature requiring adversarial proceedings; -
NO. Said correction is substantial as it will affect his legitimacy and
convert him from a legitimate child to an illegitimate one.
3. WoN the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for correction of entries –
NO. Onde no longer contested the RTC ruling that the correction he
sought on his and his mother’s first name can be done by the city civil
registrar.
1. WoN the RTC erred in ruling that there is no proof that Onde’s parents
were not married on December 23, 1983. - It is no longer necessary to
dwell on the last issue as petitioner will have his opportunity to prove
his claim that his parents were not married on December 23, 1983 when
he files the new petition for the purpose.
RULING: WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Orders dated
October 7, 2010 and March 1, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 201, Las
Pifias City, in Special Proceedings Case No. 10-0043. The dismissal ordered by the
Regional Trial Court is, however, declared to be without prejudice.
RATIO:
2. On the first issue, we agree with the RTC that the first name of petitioner
and his mother as appearing in his birth certificate can be corrected by the
city civil registrar under R.A. No. 9048. We note that petitioner no longer
contested the RTC’s ruling on this point. Indeed, under Section 15 of R.A.
No. 9048, clerical or typographical errors on entries in a civil register can be
corrected and changes of first name can be done by the concerned city civil
registrar without need of a judicial order. Aforesaid Section 1, as amended
by R.A. No. 10172, now reads:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of
First Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or
correctedwithout a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and
change of first name or nickname, the day and month in the dateof birth or sex of a
person where it is patently clear that there was a clerical or typographical error or
mistake in the entry, which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or
municipalcivil registraror consul general in accordance with the provisions of this
Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
3. In Silverio v. Republic, we held that under R.A. No. 9048, jurisdiction over
applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with
administrative officers. The intent and effect of said law is to exclude the
change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and
108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the
Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of
name is first filed and subsequently denied. The remedy and the
proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in
nature, not judicial. In Republic v. Cagandahan, we said that under R.A.No.
9048, the correction of clerical or typographical errors can now be made
through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial
order. The law removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules ofCourt
the correction of clerical or typographical errors. Thus petitioner can avail
of this administrative remedy for the correction of his and his mother’s first
name.
4. On the second issue, we also agree with the RTC in ruling that correcting
the entry on petitioner’s birth certificate that his parents were married on
December 23, 1983 in Bicol to "not married" is a substantial correction
requiring adversarial proceedings. Said correction is substantial as it will
affect his legitimacy and convert him from a legitimate child to an
illegitimate one. In Republic v. Uy, we held that corrections of entries in the
civil register including those on citizenship, legitimacyof paternity or
filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, involve substantial alterations.
Substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of
the appropriate adversary proceedings.
5. On the third issue, we likewise affirm the RTC in dismissing the petition for
correction of entries. As mentioned, petitioner no longer contested the RTC
ruling that the correction he sought on his and his mother’s first name can
be done by the city civil registrar. Under the circumstances, we are
constrained to deny his prayer that the petition for correction of entries
before the RTC bereinstated since the same petition includes the correction
he sought on his and his mother’s first name.
6. We clarify, however, that the RTC’s dismissal is without prejudice. As we
said, petitioner can avail of the administrative remedy for the correction of
his and his mother’s first name. He can also file a new petition before the
RTC to correct the alleged erroneous entry on his birth certificate that his
parents were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol. This substantial
correction is allowed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. As we reiterated
in Eleosida v. Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City:
x x x This is our ruling in Republic vs. Valenciawhere we held that even substantial
errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established under Rule 108
[of the Rules of Court] provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the
appropriate adversary proceeding. x x x
It is true in the case at bar that the changes sought to be made by petitioner are not merely
clerical or harmless errors but substantial ones as they would affect the status of the
marriage between petitioner and Carlos Borbon, as well as the legitimacy of their son,
Charles Christian. Changes of such nature, however, are now allowed under Rule 108 in
accordance with our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia provided that the appropriate
procedural requirements are complied with. x x x
 7. We also stress that a petition seeking a substantial correction of an entry in
a civil register must implead as parties to the proceedings not only the local
civil registrar, as petitioner did in the dismissed petition for correction of
entries, but also all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected by the correction. This is required by Section 3, Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the
civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby
shall be made parties to the proceeding.
8. In Eleosida, we cited Section 3, and Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court, as the procedural requirements laid down by the Court to
make the proceedings under Rule 108 adversary. In Republic v. Uy, we have
similarly ruled that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry
in the civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations,
including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or
legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of the
Rules of Court is mandated. Thus, in his new petition, petitioner should at
least implead his father and mother as parties since the substantial
correction he is seeking will also affect them.
9. In view of the foregoing discussion, it is no longer necessary to dwell on the
last issue as petitioner will have his opportunity to prove his claim that his
parents were not married on December 23, 1983 when he files the new
petition for the purpose.
 019 REPUBLIC v. SALI (MERILLES)
April 03, 2017 | Peralta, J. | Correction of Entries
PETITIONER: Republic of the Philippines
RESPONDENTS: Lorena Omapas Sali
SUMMARY: Lorena Sali seeks the correction of the entries recording her birth
with the Civil Registrar through a Verified Petition under Rule 108. She alleges
that instead of the name LORENA, “DOROTHY” was placed. She likewise
alleges that the date of birth reflected in the records (June 24, 1968), is
incorrect, her birth being on April 24, 1968. The RTC granted her petition. The
OSG appealed alleging that the petition did not contain any of Sali’s aliases.
The issue in this case is WON Rule 108 is the appropriate remedy, thereby
dispensing the requirement of stating the aliases in the petition - PARTIALLY
TRUE. Sali was correct in using Rule 108 for the case only involves correction
of entries in the civil registry. However, it must be noted that at the time of
application, RA 9048 was already in effect. Therefore, the local city or
municipal civil registrar or consul general has the primary jurisdiction to
entertain the petition. It is only when such petition is denied that a petitioner
may either appeal to the civil registrar general or file the appropriate petition
with the proper court. RTC did not have jurisdiction over the case. As for the
correction of date of birth, as the OSG did not appeal the same, the ruling
stands.
DOCTRINE: In this case, the petition, insofar as it prayed for the change of
Sali's first name, was not within the RTC's primary jurisdiction. It was improper
because the remedy should have been administrative, i.e., filing of the petition
with the local civil registrar concerned. For failure to exhaust administrative
remedies, the RTC should have dismissed the petition to correct Sali's first
name.
FACTS:
1. Lorena Omapas Sali filed a Verified Petition, dated November 26, 2008, for
Correction of Entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court before the RTC
2. Sali is the daughter of Spouses Omapas and Albay. She was born on April
24, 1968 in Baybay Leyte.
3. A copy of the Baptismal Certificate issued by the Parish of the Sacred
Heart, Sta. Mesa, Manila
4. However, in the recording of the acts of her birth, the personnel of the Local
Civil Registrar of Baybay, Leyte, thru inadvertence and mistake,
erroneously entered in the records the following:
a. Firstly, the first name of the petitioner as "DOROTHY" instead of
"LORENA" and
b. Secondly, the date of birth of the petitioner as "June 24, 1968"
instead of "April 24, 1968.”
5. Sali has been using the name Lorena A. Omapas and her date of birth as
April 24 for as long as she could remember and is known to the general
community in general as such
6. To sustain her claims, she presented her Certificate of Marriage with
Morsalyn Sale, and a photocopy of the Postal Identity Card
7. The Trial Cost issued the decision in favor of Sale
8. On March 24, 2010, the Republic through the OSG, appealed the RC
Decision for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court a quo because the
title of the petition and the order setting the petition for hearing did not
contain Sali's aliases.
9. CA denied the appeal uling that:
a. the records are bereft of any indication that Sali is known by a
name other than "Lorena," hence, it would be absurd to compel her
to indicate any other alias that she does not have;
b. Sali not only complied with the mandatory requirements for an
appropriate adversarial proceeding under Rule 108 of the Rules but
also gave the Republic an opportunity to timely contest the
purported defective petition; and
c. the change in the first name of Sali will certainly avoid further
confusion as to her identity and there is no showing that it was
sought for a fraudulent purpose or that it would prejudice public
interest.
ISSUE/s:
1. WoN Rule 108 is applicable, thereby dispensing with the requirement of
stating the aliases in the title of the petition - PARTIALLY CORRECT. Sali
was correct in using Rule 108 for the case only involves correction of
entries in the civil registry. However, it must be noted that at the time of
application, RA 9048 was already in effect.
RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
The February 11, 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CV No. 03442,
which affirmed in toto the February 23, 2010 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14,
Baybay City, Leyte, is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The Petition for Correction
of Entry in the Certificate of Live Birth of Dorothy A. Omapas with respect to her first name
is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to its filing with the local civil registrar
concerned.
RATIO:
1. Sali's petition is not for a change of name as contemplated under Rule 103
 of the Rules but for correction of entries under Rule 108. a. Sec. 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the
2. What she seeks is the correction of clerical errors which were committed in civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have
the recording of her name and birth date. or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be
3. This Court has held that not all alterations allowed in one's name are made parties to the proceeding.
confined under Rule 103 and that corrections for clerical errors may be set b. Sec. 4. Notice and publication. - Upon the filing of the petition, the
right under Rule 108. court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of
4. The evidence presented by Sali show that, since birth, she has been using the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the
the name "Lorena." Thus, it is apparent that she never had any intention to persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order
change her name. to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
5. What she seeks is simply the removal of the clerical fault or error in her first newspaper of general circulation in the province.
name, and to set aright the same to conform to the name she grew up with. c. Sec. 5. Opposition. - The civil registrar and any person having or
6. Nevertheless, at the time Sali's petition was filed, R.A. No. 9048 was claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or
already in effect. correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of
7. Section 1 of said law states: the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file
a. SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error his opposition thereto.
and Change of First Name or Nickname. - No entry in a civil 14. The Republic did not question the petition to correct Sali's birth date from
register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, "June 24, 1968" to "April 24, 1968." In fact, it did not contest the CA ruling
except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first that the requirements for an appropriate adversarial proceeding were
name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the satisfactorily complied with.
concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing
rules and regulations.
8. The petition for change of first name may be allowed, among other grounds,
if the new first name has been habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he or she has been publicly known by that first name in the
community.
9. The local city or municipal civil registrar or consul general has the primary
jurisdiction to entertain the petition.
10. It is only when such petition is denied that a petitioner may either appeal to
the civil registrar general or file the appropriate petition with the proper
court.
11. In this case, the petition, insofar as it prayed for the change of Sali's first
name, was not within the RTC's primary jurisdiction. It was improper
because the remedy should have been administrative, i.e., filing of the
petition with the local civil registrar concerned. For failure to exhaust
administrative remedies, the RTC should have dismissed the petition to
correct Sali's first name.
12. On the other hand, anent Sali's petition to correct her birth date from "June
24, 1968" to "April 24, 1968," R.A. No. 9048 is inapplicable. It was only on
August 15, 2012 that R.A. No. 10172 was signed into law amending R.A.
No. 9048
13. Considering that Sali filed her petition in 2008, Rule 10815 is the
appropriate remedy in seeking to correct her date of birth in the civil
registry. Under the Rules, the following must be observed
 020 IN RE: WANG (PELIÑO)
March 30, 2005 | Tinga, J. | Change of name
In re: Petition for Change of Name and/or Correction/Cancellation of Entry in Civil
Registrry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang also known as Julian Lin Wang, to be
amended/corrected as Julian lin Wang
PETITIONER: Julian Lin Wang, duly represented by his mother Anna Lisa Wang
RESPONDENT: Cebu City Civil Registrar, duly represented by the Registrar Oscar B.
Molo
SUMMARY: Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, represented by his mother, Anna, filed a peti-
tion for change of name and/or correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry.
They wanted to drop the middle name “Carulasan” on the basis of the following: (1) the
family wants to move to Singapore and the children will study there, (2) in Singapore,
middle or maiden names are not carried in the person’s name, so Julian might be discrim-
inated against if they let him keep the middle name; (3) Julian’s sister doesn’t have a
middle name; and (4) Singapore’s Mandarin language doesn’t have the letter “R”, so if
ever, they pronounce it as “L”. The RTC denied the petition on the basis that the grounds
given are not those contemplated by law and that the change sought was for the onven-
ience of the child; they also cited Art. 174 of the Family Code. They filed a MR, but was
denied. Hence, this petition. The issue in this case is whether or not dropping the middle
name of a minor child is contrary to Art. 174 of the Family Code. The SC held in the
affirmative. A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute, in-
tended to protect the individual from being confused with others. (2) It is obligatory in
certain respects, for nobody can be without a name. (3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or im-
mutable, at least at the start, and may be changed only for good cause and by judicial
proceedings. (4) It is outside the commerce of man, and, therefore, inalienable and in-
transmissible by act inter vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is imprescriptible. The citation
above does not make any reference to middle names, but it doesn’t mean that middle
names have no practical or legal significance. Middle names serve to identify maternal
lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him from others who may
have the same given name and surname as he has. Our laws on the use of surnames state
that legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
The Family Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father
and the mother, while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, unless
their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the father’s surname.
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father
bears only a given name and his mother’s surname, and does not have a middle name.
The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is
only when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents
or acknowledged by the father in a public document or private handwritten instrument
that he bears both his mother's surname as his middle name and his father's surname as
his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged illegitimate
child. Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such individuals
requires that the middle name be indicated in the certificate. The registered name of a
legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given or proper-
name, a middle name, and a surname.
DOCTRINE: Middle names serve to identify maternal lineage or filiation of a person as
well as further distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and sur-
name as he has.
FACTS:
1. “I will not blot out his name out of the book of life. – Revelation 3:5”
2. 22 September 2002: Julian Lin Carulasan Wang (Julian), a minor, repre-
sented by his mother Anna Lisa Wang (Anna) filed a petition dated 19 Sep-
tember 2002 for change of name and/or correction/cancellarion of entry in
the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.
a. Julian, through Anna, sought to drop his middle name and have his reg-
istered name changed from “Julian Lin Carulasan Wang” to “Julian Lin
Wang”.
b. The petition was docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. 11458 CEB
and raffled to the RTC of Cebu, Br. 87.
3. RTC established the following facts:
a. Julian was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna and
Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other.
b. When his parents got married on September 22, 1998, they executed a
deed of legitimation of their son so that the child’s name was changed
from “Julian Lin Carulasan” to “Julian Lin Carulasan Wang”.
c. The parents of Julian plan to stay in Singapore for a long time because
they will let him study there together with his sister, Wang Mei Jas-
mine, born in Singapore.
d. Since Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother
are not carried in a person’s name, they anticipate that Julian will be
discriminated against because of his current registered name which car-
ries a middle name.
e. Julian and his sister might also be asking whether they are brother and
sister since they have different surnames. Carulasan sounds funny in
Singapore’s Mandarin language since they do not have the letter “R”
but if there is, they pronounce it as “L”. It is for these reasons that they
wanted to change the name to “Julian Lin Wang”.
4. 30 April 2003, the RTC rendered a decision denying the petition.
a. It found that the reason given for the change of name sought in the peti-
tion—that is, that Julian may be discriminated against when he studies
in Singapore because of his middle name—did not fall within the
grounds recognized by law.
b. It also said that the change sought is merely for the convenience of the
child. Since the State has an interest in the name of a person, names
cannot be changed to suit the convenience of the bearers.
c. Under Art. 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have the right
to bear the surnames of the father and mother, and there is no reason
 why this right should now be taken from Julian, considering that he is
still a minor.
d. The RTC also added that when Julian reaches the age of majority, he
could then decide whether he will change his name by dropping his
middle name.
5. Julian, represented by Anna, filed a MR of the decision, but was denied.
a. RTC maintained that the Singaporean practice of not carrying a middle
name does not justify the dropping of the middle name of a legitimate
Filipino child who intends to study there.
b. The dropping of the middle name would be tantamount to giving due
recognition to or application of the laws of Singapore instead of PH
law, which is controlling.
c. That the change of name would not prejudice public interest or would
not be for a fraudulent purpose would not suffice to grant the petition if
the reason for the change of name is itself not reasonable.
6. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE/s:
1. WON dropping the middle name of a minor child is contrary to Art. 174 of
the Family Code. – YES, Middle names serve to identify maternal lineage
or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him from others who
may have the same given name and surname as he has. The Family Code
gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother,
while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father
recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the father’s surname.
RULING: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review on
Certiorari is DENIED.
RATIO:
On whether dropping the middle name of a minor child is contrary to the Family
Code
1. Julian: With globalization and mixed marriages, there is a need for the SC
to rule on the matter of dropping of family name for a child to adjust to his
new environment, for consistency and harmony among siblings, taking into
consideration “the best interest of the child”.
a. It is argued that convenience of the child is a valid reason for changing
the name as long as it will not prejudice the State and others.
b. The middle name “Carulasan” will cause Julian undue embarrassment
and the difficulty in writing or pronouncing it will be an obstacle to his
social acceptance and integration in the Singaporean community.
c. It was error for the RTC to have denied the petition for change of name
until he had reached the age of majority for thim to decide the name to
use, contrary to previous cases decided by the SC that allowed a minor
to petition for change of name.
d. Julian also cited 3 cases to further his claims in the petition: Oshita v.
Republic,55 Calderon v. Republic,56 and Alfon v. Republic.57
2. OSG: (they were required to file a Comment) Under Art. 174 of the Family
Code, legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of their father
and mother, and such right cannot be denied by the mere expedient of drop-
ping the same.
a. There is also no showing that the dropping of the middle name “Caru-
lasan” is in the best interest of Julian, since mere convenience is not
sufficient to support a petition for change of name and/or cancellation
of entry.
b. Julian had not shown any compelling reason to justify the change of
name or the dropping of the middle name, for that matter.
c. The allegation that the continued use of the middle name may result in
confusion and difficulty is allegedly more imaginary than real.
d. Dropping of the child’s middle name could only trigger much deeper
inquiries regarding the true parentage of Julian.
e. While Julian has a sister named Jasmine Wei Wang, there is no confu-
sion since both use the surname of their father, Wang. Even assuming
that it is customary in Singapore to drop the middle name, it has also
not been shown that the use of such middle name is actually proscribed
by Singaporean law.
3. SC: Affirms the decision of the trial court.
a. The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities
for the purposes of identification, and that a change of name is a privi-
lege and not a right, so that before a person can be authorized to change
his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he
55
Petitioner therein, a legitimate daughter of a Filipino mother, Buena Bartolome, and a Japanese father, Kishimatsu
Oshita, sought to change her name from Antonina B. Oshita to Antonina Bartolome. The Court granted her petition based
on the following considerations: she had elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; her other
siblings who had also elected Philippine citizenship have been using their mother's surname; she was embarrassed to bear
a Japanese surname there still being ill feeling against the Japanese due to the last World War; and there was no showing
that the change of name was motivated by a fraudulent purpose or that it will prejudice public interest.
56
The Court allowed petitioner Gertrudes Josefina del Prado, an illegitimate minor child acting through her mother who
filed the petition in her behalf, to change her name to Gertudes Josefina Calderon, taking the surname of her stepfather,
Romeo C. Calderon, her mother's husband. The Court held that a petition for change of name of an infant should be
granted where to do is clearly for the best interest of the child. The Court took into consideration the opportunity provided
for the minor petitioner to eliminate the stigma of illegitimacy which she would carry if she continued to use the surname
of her illegitimate father. The Court pronounced that justice dictates that every person be allowed to avail of any oppor-
tunity to improve his social standing as long as doing so he does not cause prejudice or injury to the interests of the State
or of other people.
57
Petitioner therein, the legitimate daughter of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon, sought to change her name from
Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte (her name as registered in the Local Civil Registry) to Estrella S. Alfon (the
name she had been using since childhood, in her school records and in her voter's registration). The trial court denied her
petition but this Court overturned the denial, ruling that while Article 364 of the Civil Code states that she, as a legitimate
child, should principally use the surname of her father, there is no legal obstacle for her to choose to use the surname of
her mother to which she is entitled. In addition, the Court found that there was ample justification to grant her petition, i
.e., to avoid confusion.
 must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which
may justify such change, otherwise it would be denied.
b. The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be prop-
er and reasonable cause for which the change is sought. To justify a
request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some prop-
er or compelling reason but also that he will be prejudiced by the
use of his true and official name.
c. Grounds for change of name, held to be valid:
i. When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable, or extremely diffi-
cult to write or pronounce,
ii. When the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitima-
tion;
iii. When the change will avoid confusion;
iv. When one has continuously used and been known since child-
hood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parent-
age;
v. a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of
former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing
anybody; and
vi. when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no
showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudu-
lent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice
public interest.
d. In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of
proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the court.
i. Evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court and
not all the best evidence available.
ii. What is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallow-
ance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency
and propriety of the justifications advanced in support thereof,
mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and
with the sole prerogative for making such determination being
lodged in the courts.
e. The petition is unlike other petitions since it does not seek the change
of name and adopt another, but it seeks to drop the middle name alto-
gether. None on the requests for changing or dropping of the middle
name. The SC said that the law does not allow dropping the middle
name from the registered name.
f. Based on Republic v. CA, the legal significance of a person’s name is
that:
i. A man's name is the designation by which he is known and
called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It
is defined as the word or combination of words by which a per-
son is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label
or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at
large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him.
Names are used merely as one method of indicating the identity
of persons; they are descriptive of persons for identification,
since, the identity is the essential thing and it has frequently been
held that, when identity is certain, a variance in, or misspelling
of, the name is immaterial.
ii. The names of individuals usually have two parts: the given name
or proper name, and the surname or family name. The given or
proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or
baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The name or
family name is that which identifies the family to which he be-
longs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may
be freely selected by the parents for the child; but the surname to
which the child is entitled is fixed by law.
iii. A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is ab-
solute, intended to protect the individual from being confused
with others. (2) It is obligatory in certain respects, for nobody
can be without a name. (3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or immuta-
ble, at least at the start, and may be changed only for good cause
and by judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside the commerce of
man, and, therefore, inalienable and intransmissible by act inter
vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is imprescriptible.
g. The citation above does not make any reference to middle names, but it
doesn’t mean that middle names have no practical or legal significance.
i. Middle names serve to identify maternal lineage or filiation
of a person as well as further distinguish him from others
who may have the same given name and surname as he has.
h. Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated
children shall principally use the surname of the father.
i. The Family Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the
surnames of the father and the mother, while illegitimate chil-
dren shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father
recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the fa-
ther’s surname.
ii. Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not
recognized by the father bears only a given name and his moth-
er’s surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of the
unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such.
It is only when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the subse-
quent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a
public document or private handwritten instrument that he bears
both his mother's surname as his middle name and his father's
surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated
 child or an acknowledged illegitimate child. yet understand and appreciate the value of the change of his name and
iii. Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights
such individuals requires that the middle name be indicated in under our laws.
the certificate. The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated
and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given or prop-
ername, a middle name, and a surname.
i. Weighing Julian’s reason of convenience for the change of his name
against the standards set in the cases he cites to support his contention
would show that his justification is amorphous, to say the least, and
could not warrant favorable action on his petition.
j. The factual antecedents and unique circumstances of the cited cases are
not at all analogous to the case at bar. The instant case is clearly distin-
guishable from the cases of Oshita and Alfon, where the petitioners
were already of age when they filed their petitions for change of name.
Being of age, they are considered to have exercised their discretion and
judgment, fully knowing the effects of their decision to change their
surnames. It can also be unmistakably observed that the reason for the
grant of the petitions for change of name in these two cases was the
presence of reasonable or compelling grounds therefore. The Court, in
Oshita, recognized the tangible animosity most Filipinos had during
that time against the Japanese as a result of World War II, in addition to
the fact of therein petitioner's election of Philippine citizenship. In Al-
fon, the Court granted the petition since the petitioner had been known
since childhood by a name different from her registered name and she
had not used her registered name in her school records and voter's reg-
istration records; thus, denying the petition would only result to confu-
sion. S
i. Calderon, on the other hand, granted the petition for change of
name filed by a mother in behalf of her illegitimate minor child.
Petitioner cites this case to buttress his argument that he does not
have to reach the age of majority to petition for change of name.
However, it is manifest in Calderon that the Court, in granting
the petition for change of name, gave paramount consideration to
the best interests of the minor petitioner therein.
k. In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by Julian for the dropping
his middle name is convenience. However, how such change of name
would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and conven-
ient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle
name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper
and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name.
l. In addition, Julian is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation
on which his petition for change of name is based, it is best that the
matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion
when he reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may not
 021 REPUBLIC V. UY (EMAR)
12 Aug 2013 | Peralta | Adversarial Proceedings - Correction of Entries
PETITIONER: Republic
RESPONDENT: Dr. Norma S. Lugsanay Uy
SUMMARY: Uy sought the correction of the first name, surname and citizenship
in her birth cert to reflect the name which she has been known for since
childhood, including her legal documents such as passport and school and
professional records. She likewise relied on the birth certs of her full blood
siblings who bear the surname “Lugsanay” instead of “Sy” and citizenship of
“Filipino” instead of “Chinese”. Uy impleaded only the Local Civil Registrar as
respondent in the petition but she complied with the publication requirement.
RTC allowed the correction and CA affirmed. The issue in this case is WON the
changes are merely clerical; thus, there is no need for an adversarial proceeding
(or WON Uy’s failure to implead other indispensable parties was cured upon
publication) – NO. The changes are substantial as they touch on Uy’s filiation
and citizenship; thus, she has to notify not only the Local Civil Registrar but also
her parents and siblings as the persons who have interest and are affected by the
changes or corrections Uy wanted to make. When a petition for cancellation or
correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial
alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or
legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with R108 requirements (such as all
persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected shall be made
parties) is mandated. (Doctrine 2)
DOCTRINE: 1: Substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the
true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves
of the appropriate adversary proceeding.
2: Summons must be served not for the purpose of vesting the courts with
jurisdiction but to comply with the requirements of fair play and due process
to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest.
FACTS:
1. Mar 8, 2004: Uy filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in her Certificate of
Live Birth. Impleaded as respondent is the Local Civil Registrar of Ginoog City.
2. Uy alleges that:
a. she was born on Feb 8, 1952
b. her Certificate of Live Birth shows that her full name is “Anita Sy” when in
fact she is allegedly known to her family and friends as “Norma S.
Lugsanay.”
c. The following bear the name “Norma S. Lugsanay”: Uy’s:
i. school records,
ii. Professional Regulation Commission Board of Medicine Certificate, and
iii. Passport
d. she is an illegitimate child considering that her parents were never married,
so she had to follow her mother’s surname.
e. She is a Filipino; not Chinese, and all her siblings are Lugsanays and
Filipinos.
f. She earlier filed a petition for correction of entries with the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Ginoog to effect the corrections on her name and
citizenship which was supposedly granted but NSO records did not bear such
changes.
3. May 13: RTC:
a. Ruled that the petition is sufficient in form and substance;
b. Set the case for hearing;
c. Directed the Order to be published in a newspaper of general circulation
(NPGC) in Gingoog and Misamis Oriental at least 1x a week for 3
consecutive weeks at Uy’s expense,
d. Directed that the order and petition be furnished the OSG and the City
Prosecutor’s Office for their information and guidance.
4. Uy complied with the publication requirement.
5. June 28: RTC issued an Order (Annex A) in Uy’s favor.
6. RTC Order:
a. concluded that Uy’s petition would neither prejudice the government nor
any third party.
b. held that the names “Norma Sy Lugsanay” and “Anita Sy” refer to the same
person, especially since the Local Civil Registrar of Ginoog has effected the
correction. Considering that Uy continuously used and has been known since
childhood as “Norma Sy Lugsanay” and as a Filipino, RTC granted the
petition to avoid confusion.
7. Feb 18, 2011: CA affirmed in toto. Holding that:
a. Uy’s failure to implead other indispensable parties was cured upon the
publication of the Order setting the case for hearing in a NPGC for 3
consecutive weeks and by serving a copy of the notice to the Local Civil
Registrar, the OSG and the City Prosecutor’s Office.
b. As to WON the petition is a collateral attack on respondent’s filiation: CA
ruled in favor of respondent, considering that her parents were not legally
married and that her siblings’ birth certs uniformly state that their surname is
Lugsanay and their citizenship is Filipino.
8. Jul 27: CA Resolution denied Republic’s MR.
9. Republic filed the present PetRev assailing the CA decision and resolution.
ISSUES:
1. WON the errors are clerical – NO. They are SUBSTANTIAL since they touch
on respondent’s filiation and citizenship. The change of her surname from “Sy”
to “Lugsanay” changes her filiation from legitimate to illegitimate.
2. WON it is enough to have only the Local Civil Registrar of Ginoog impleaded
as respondent in the petition – NO.
RULING: Petition GRANTED. CA Decision and Resolution are SET ASIDE.
RTC Order granting the Petition for Correction of Entry of Certificate of Live Birth
Uy filed is NULLIFIED.
RATIO:
1. Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry is governed by R108.
(See annex B for pertinent sections of R108).
2. The changes are NOT mere clerical; but SUBSTANTIAL as they touch on Uy’s
filiation and citizenship. In changing her:
a. Surname from “Sy” (father’s surname) to “Lugsanay” (mother’s surname),
she changes her status from legitimate to illegitimate;
b. Citizenship from Chinese to Filipino, it affects her rights and obligations in
this country.
3. Republic v. Valencia: Even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected
and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail
themselves of the APPROPRIATE ADVERSARY PROCEEDING. If the
subject matter of a petition is not for correction of clerical errors of a harmless
and innocuous nature, but involves nationality or citizenship, which is
substantial and controverted, affirmative relief CANNOT be granted in a
summary proceeding.
4. A right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as
the appropriate remedy is used. Even substantial errors in a civil registry may be
corrected and the true facts established PROVIDED the parties aggrieved by the
error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding58.
5. CA relied on (the INAPPLICABLE RULINGS of) Republic v. Kho, Alba v. CA,
and Barco v. CA that the failure to implead indispensable parties was cured by
the publication of the notice of hearing pursuant to the provisions of R108, RoC.
a. Republic v. Kho: Republic appealed a decision granting the petition for
correction of entries despite failure to implead the minor’s mother as an
indispensable party. SC did not strictly apply the provisions of R108,
because it was highly improbable that the mother was unaware of the
proceedings to correct the entries in her children’s birth certs especially
since the notices, TC orders and decision were all sent to the residence she
shared with them.
b. Alba v. CA: Although the notice to the petitioner’s mother was returned
unserved; SC held that since petition for correction of entries is a
proceeding in rem, acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner is not required and absence of personal service was cured by
the TC’s compliance with R108 requiring notice by publication.
58
one having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which
the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to
contest it. Excludes an adoption proceeding. (Black’s Law Dictionary)
c. Barco v. CA: Petitioner in a petition for correction CANNOT be presumed to
be aware of all the parties whose interests may be affected by the granting of
a petition. Petitioner exerted earnest effort to comply with R108. Thus,
publication of notice of hearing was considered to have cured the failure
to implead indispensable parties.
6. In the current case, only the Local Civil Registrar of Ginoog was impleaded
as respondent in the petition below but the RTC granted her petition and
allowed the correction sought, which CA affirmed in toto .
SC DOES NOT AGREE with the RTC and the CA
7. SC has already addressed the same issue in different case laws (Annex C).
8. Uy’s birth cert shows that:
a. Her full name is Anita Sy,
b. She is a Chinese citizen and
c. She is a legitimate child of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay.
9. She seeks the correction of her first name and surname;
a. her status from “legitimate” à “illegitimate” and
b. her citizenship from “Chinese” à “Filipino.”
10. Thus, Uy should have impleaded and notified not only the Local Civil
Registrar but also her parents and siblings as the persons who have interest
and are affected by the changes or corrections respondent wanted to make.
11. The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a NPGC and notice thereof
was served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings
taken.
12. Secs 4-5, R108 shows that the Rules mandate 2 sets of notices to different
potential oppositors:
a. One to persons named in the petition and
b. One to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may
be considered interested or affected parties.
13. Summons must be served not for the purpose of vesting the courts with
jurisdiction but to comply with the requirements of fair play and due process
to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he
so chooses.
14. Although there are cases where the SC held that the failure to implead and notify
interested parties may be cured by the publication of the notice of hearing,
earnest efforts were made by petitioners in bringing to court all possible
interested parties. Such failure was also excused where the interested parties
themselves initiated the corrections proceedings; when there is no actual or
presumptive awareness of the existence of the interested parties; or when a party
is inadvertently left out.
15. When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register
involves substantial and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship,
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict
compliance with R108 is mandated. If the entries in the civil register could be
corrected or changed through mere summary proceedings and not through
 appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are
notified or represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would be set open,
the consequence of which might be detrimental and far reaching.
ANNEX A: RTC Order
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. THE
CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF GINOOG, or any person acting in his behalf is di-
rected and ordered to effect the correction or change of the entries in the Certificate
of Live Birth of petitioner’s name and citizenship so that the entries would be:
a) As to petitioner’s name:
First Name : NORMA
Middle Name : SY
Last Name : LUGSANAY
b) As to petitioner’s nationality/citizenship: FILIPINO
ANNEX B: R108 Pertinent Sections
SEC. 3. Parties.―When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register
is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication.―Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall,
by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable
notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also
cause the order to be published once a week for 3 consecutive weeks in a NPGC in
the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition.―The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within 15d
from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his
opposition thereto.
is the appropriate remedy, the petition still failed because of improper venue and
failure to implead the Civil Registrar of Makati City and all affected parties as
respondents in the case.
Ceruila v. Delantar: Ceruilas filed a petition for the cancellation and annulment of
the birth cert of respondent on the ground it was made as an instrument of the
crime of simulation of birth and, therefore, invalid and spurious, and it falsified all
material entries therein. RTC set the case for hearing with a directive that the same
be published and that any person who is interested in the petition may interpose his
comment or opposition on or before the scheduled hearing. Summons was likewise
sent to the Civil Register of Manila. After which, the TC granted the petition and
nullified respondent’s birth cert. Few months after, respondent filed a petition for the
annulment of judgment claiming that she and her guardian were not notified of the
petition and the TC’s decision, hence, the latter was issued without jurisdiction and
in violation of her right to due process. The Court annulled the TC’s decision for
failure to comply with the requirements of R108, especially the non-impleading of
respondent herself whose birth cert was nullified.
Labayo-Rowe v. Republic: Petitioner filed a petition for the correction of entries in
the birth certs of her children, specifically to change her name from Beatriz V.
Labayu/Beatriz Labayo to Emperatriz Labayo, her civil status from “married” to
“single,” and the date and place of marriage from “1953-Bulan” to “No marriage.”
The Court modified the TC’s decision by nullifying the portion thereof which directs
the change of petitioner’s civil status as well as the filiation of her child, because it
was the OSG only that was made respondent and the proceedings taken was
summary in nature which is short of what is required in cases where substantial
alterations are sought.

ANNEX C: Applicable case laws

Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo: Claiming that his parents were never legally
married, respondent filed a petition to change his name from “Julian Edward
Emerson Coseteng Magpayo,” the name appearing in his birth cert to “Julian Edward
Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng.” The notice setting the petition for hearing was
published and there being no opposition thereto, TC issued an order of general
default and eventually granted respondent’s petition deleting the entry on the date
and place of marriage of parties; correcting his surname from “Magpayo” to
“Coseteng”; deleting the entry “Coseteng” for middle name; and deleting the entry
“Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr.” in the space for his father. OSG, assailed the RTC
decision on the grounds that the corrections made on respondent’s birth cert had the
effect of changing the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate and must only be
effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding. SC nullified the RTC
decision for respondent’s failure to comply strictly with the procedure laid down in
R108. Aside from the wrong remedy availed of by respondent as he filed a petition
for Change of Name under R103, assuming that he filed a petition under R108 which
 022 CHUA v. REPUBLIC (Sarmiento)
November 20, 2017 | Velasco, J. | Change of name
PETITIONER: Eric Sibayan Chua
FACTS:
RESPONDENTS: Republic of the Philippines
SUMMARY: Eric filed a petition for change of surname from "Kiat" to "Chua."
after his birth, his father Cheong allegedly secured a favorable judgment allow-
ing him (Cheong) to change his surname from "Kiat" to "Chua." Thus, Eric
adopted the new surname of his father, "Chua," and had been using the name
"Eric Sibayan Chua" in all of his credentials. Eric likewise averred in his petition
that he is known in their community as "Eric Chua" instead of "Eric Kiat." Eric
testified that he was not able to secure a copy of his father's birth certificate since
the latter was born in China; that his mother Melania told him that his father
Cheong changed his surname from "Kiat" to "Chua;" and that his Certificate of
Live Birth is the only document where his surname appears as "Kiat." Offered in
evidence were his Certificate of Baptism, Voter Certification, Police Clearance,
National Bureau of Investigation Clearance, Passport, High School Diploma, and
the Certificates of Live Birth of his children, which all state Eric's name to be
"Eric Sibayan Chua."Melania also testified in support of the petition, claiming
that Cheong used the surname "Kiat" in China, but used "Chua" in the Philip-
pines; that "Chua" is the surname Cheong used when they married; that it was
her uncle who erroneously caused the registration of Eric's name as "Eric Kiat;"
and that when Eric was 16, Cheong, who was already weak, returned to China
and contacted them no longer. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a valid ground
for a change of name. SC held that there is a valid change of name. In Republic
v. Coseteng-Magpayo, the Court enumerated several recognized grounds that
can be invoked by a person desirous of changing his name, viz:(a) when the
name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;(b)
when the change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when
the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been
known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage;
(e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all
in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for
a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
The purpose in this case is to avoid confusion. As Eric has established, he is
known in his community as "Eric Chua," rather than "Eric Kiat." Moreover, all
of his credentials exhibited before the Court, referred to him as Chua. Thus, to
compel him to use the name "Eric Kiat" at this point would inevitably lead to
confusion. It would result in an alteration of all of his official documents
DOCTRINE: Change of name to avoid confusion requires that the petitioner be
known in the community in such name sought to be secured.
1. Eric filed a petition for change of surname from "Kiat" to "Chua." In his pe-
tition, Eric alleged that he was born on November 8, 1973 to a Chinese fa-
ther named "Cheong Kiat" (Cheong) and a Filipino mother named "Melania
Sibayan" (Melania).
2. However, after his birth, his father Cheong allegedly secured a favorable
judgment allowing him (Cheong) to change his surname from "Kiat" to
"Chua."
a. Thus, Eric adopted the new surname of his father, "Chua," and had
been using the name "Eric Sibayan Chua" in all of his credentials.
Eric likewise averred in his petition that he is known in their com-
munity as "Eric Chua" instead of "Eric Kiat."
3. Trial ensued on May 21, 2013.
a. Eric testified that he was not able to secure a copy of his father's
birth certificate since the latter was born in China; that his mother
Melania told him that his father Cheong changed his surname from
"Kiat" to "Chua;" and that his Certificate of Live Birth is the only
document where his surname appears as "Kiat."
b. Offered in evidence were his Certificate of Baptism, Voter Certifi-
cation, Police Clearance, National Bureau of Investigation Clear-
ance, Passport, High School Diploma, and the Certificates of Live
Birth of his children, which all state Eric's name to be "Eric
Sibayan Chua."
4. Melania also testified in support of the petition, claiming that Cheong used
the surname "Kiat" in China, but used "Chua" in the Philippines; that
"Chua" is the surname Cheong used when they married; that it was her un-
cle who erroneously caused the registration of Eric's name as "Eric Kiat;"
and that when Eric was 16, Cheong, who was already weak, returned to
China and contacted them no longer
a. The asseveration that Eric is known in their community as "Eric
Chua" was corroborated by his neighbor, Avelino Fernandez.
5. RTC: allowed the change of name as it is nothing more than a straightening
of the records.
 6. CA: reverse the decision of the RTC stating that Eric failed to establish a
compelling ground for changing his name.
a. The CA deemed that there was no proof offered tending to estab-
lish that Eric's father, Cheong, was able to secure a court judgment
allowing him to officially change his surname from "Kiat" to
"Chua." Eric and Melania's testimonies were seen as mere allega-
tions that do not satisfy the requisite quantum of evidence to estab-
lish such fact.
b. There was then no basis for Eric's adoption of the surname "Chua."
c. The appellate court likewise held that no proof was offered to
show that Eric will be prejudiced by his use of his registered name.
d. Thus, since Eric's evidence fell short of preponderant, his petition
for change of name must necessarily be dismissed, so the CA
ruled.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court erred in disallowing petitioner from
officialy changing his name—YES. The purpose of the change of name is to avoid
confusion, which is a valid reason.
RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
The November 7, 2016 Decision and May 19, 2017 Resolution of the Court of Ap-
peals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 102624 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The January 22, 2014 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) - Branch 34,
Balaoan, La Union, in Special Proceeding Case No. 907 is hereby REINSTATED.
RATIO:
1. The petition is meritorious.
2. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, there is legal and factual basis for granting
Eric's petition for change of name. To recall, his petition is not only an-
chored on his father's alleged change of surname from "Kiat" to "Chua," but
also on the fact that he (Eric) had been using the surname "Chua" in all of
his credentials.
a. Thus, it may be that Eric and Melania's testimonies are not pre-
ponderant proof of Cheong's change of surname, but this should
not foreclose the possibility of granting the petition on a different
ground.
3. In Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo, the Court enumerated several recog-
nized grounds that can be invoked by a person desirous of changing his
name, viz:
(a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely diffi-
cult to write or pronounce;
(b) when the change results as a legal consequence such as legiti-
mation;
(c) when the change will avoid confusion;
(d) when one has continuously used and been known since child-
hood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage;
(e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of for-
mer alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody;
and
(f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no show-
ing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or
that the change of name would prejudice public interest
4. Avoidance of confusion was invoked in Alfon v. Republic. The same cir-
cumstances are attendant in the case at bar.
a. As Eric has established, he is known in his community as "Eric
Chua," rather than "Eric Kiat." Moreover, all of his credentials ex-
hibited before the Court, other than his Certificate of Live Birth,
bear the name "Eric Chua." Guilty of reiteration, Eric's Certificate
of Baptism, Voter Certification, Police Clearance, National Bureau
of Investigation Clearance, Passport, and High School Diploma all
reflect his surname to be "Chua."
b. Thus, to compel him to use the name "Eric Kiat" at this point
would inevitably lead to confusion. It would result in an alteration
of all of his official documents, save for his Certificate of Live
Birth. His children, too, will correspondingly be compelled to have
their records changed. For even their own Certificates of Live
Birth state that their father's surname is "Chua."
c. To deny this petition would then have ramifications not only to Er-
ic's identity in his community, but also to that of his children.
5. The imperatives of avoiding confusion dictate that the instant petition be
granted. Additionally, public respondent failed to demonstrate that allowing
petitioner to change his surname will prejudice the State, strengthening Our
resolve to grant the sought-after relief.
 001 GO v. DIMAGIBA (TIMBOL)
June 21, 2005 | Panganiban, J. | Writ of Habeas Corpus (BP 22)
PETITIONER: Susan Go and the People of the Philippines
RESPONDENTS: Fernando L. Dimagiba
SUMMARY: DIMAGIBA issued 13 checks to Go, which when presented to
the bank for encashment were dishonored for the reason of “account closed”.
DIMAGIBA was subsequently prosecuted and convicted for the 13 cases,
meting a penalty of imprisonment AND civil indemnity. Because no appeal
was brought with the CA from the RTC, the MTCC issued an order directing
the arrest and writ of execution to enforce his civil liability. DIMAGIBA filed a
MR, arguing that that the order should be recalled and the decision modified
because the penalty should be fine only, instead of imprisonment also. The
MTCC denied the MR, and DIMAGIBA was arrested and imprisoned for the
service of his sentence. Thus, DIMAGIBA filed with the RTC a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus, which the RTC granted based on Vaca v. CA and the
SC-AC No. 12-2000 allegedly required a penalty of fine only instead of
imprisonment also for BP 22 violations. Hence this petition
Whether or not the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus is valid.
The SC held in the negative. The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention in which individuals are deprived of liberty. It
may not be availed of when the person in custody is under a judicial process or
by virtue of a valid judgment. However, as a postconviction remedy, it may be
allowed when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding xxx (3) the imposed
penalty has been excessive, thus voiding the sentence as to such excess. The
case at bar, thus not apply to such instance, because as clarified in SC-AC No.
13-2001, SC-AC No. 12-2000, only established a rule of preference in
imposing the penalties for BP 22 violations. It did not delete imprisonment as a
penalty, but left the discretion with the Court based on the circumstances of the
case as to whether or not imprisonment should also be a penalty. As to issue of
retroactivity, although it may favor DIMAGIBA, the same is improper. First,
SC-AC No. 12-2000 is not a penal law, thus, the rule on retroactivity does not
apply, and second, SC-AC No. 12-2000, merely provides for a rule on
preference, and does not confer any rights.
DOCTRINE: The writ may not be availed of when the person in custody is
under a judicial process or by virtue of a valid judgment. However, as a post-
conviction remedy, it may be allowed when, as a consequence of a judicial
proceeding, any of the following exceptional circumstances is attendant: (1)
there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of
a person; (2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (3) the
imposed penalty has been excessive, thus voiding the sentence as to such
excess.
SC-AC No. 12-2000, as clarified by SC-AC No. 13-2001, established a rule of
preference in imposing the above penalties. When the circumstances of the case
clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence,
the imposition of a fine alone may be considered as the preferred penalty. The
determination of the circumstances that warrant the imposition of a fine rests
upon the trial judge only. Should the judge deem that imprisonment is
appropriate, such penalty may be imposed.
FACTS:
75. Fernando L. Dimagiba (DIMAGIBA) issued to Susan Go (GO) 13 checks
which, when presented to the drawee bank for encashment or payment on
the due dates, were dishonored for the reason “account closed”
76. DIMAGIBA was subsequently prosecuted for 13 counts of violation of BP
22 before MTCC in Baguio City
a. After a joint trial, MTCC convicted DIMAGIBA in the 13 cases
b. "WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisition, this Court finds the evidence
of the prosecution to have established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt of the offenses charged and imposes upon the accused the penalty of 3
months imprisonment for each count (13 counts) and to indemnify the offended
party the amount of One Million Two Hundred Ninety Five Thousand Pesos
(₱1,295,000.00) with legal interest per annum commencing from 1996 after the
checks were dishonored by reason ‘ACCOUNT CLOSED’ on December 13, 1995,
to pay attorney’s fees of ₱15,000.00 and to pay the costs."
77. On appeal, the RTC denied and sustained the conviction
a. There being no further appeal to the CA, the RTC issued a
Certificate of Finality of the Decision
78. Thus, the MTCC issued an order directing the arrest of DIMAGIBA for the
service of his sentence as a result of his conviction and a Writ of Execution
to enforce his civil liability
79. DIMAGIBA, thereafter, filed a MR of the MTCC Order and prayed for the
recall of the order and the modification of the final decision arguing that the
penalty fine only, instead of imprisonment also, should have been
imposed on him
a. Same arguments were raised in the Motion for Partial Quashal writ
of Execution
80. MTCC denied the MR and directed the issuance of the Warrant of Arrest
against DIMAGIBA
 a. He was arrested and imprisoned for the service of his sentence
81. Thus, DIMAGIBA filed with the RTC a Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus
82. The RTC issued an order directing the immediate release of DIMAGIBA
from confinement and requiring him to pay a fine of P100,000 in lieu of
imprisonment
a. In justifying its modification, the RTC invoked Vaca v. CA and
Supreme Court Administrative Circular (SC-AC) No. 12-2000,
which allegedly required the imposition of a fine only instead of
imprisonment also for BP 22 violations, if the accused was not a
recidivist or a habitual delinquent
b. The RTC held that this rule should be retroactively applied in favor
of DIMAGIBA since he was (1) first time offender and an
employer of at least 200 workers who would be displaced as a
result of his imprisonment; and (2) the civil liability had already
been satisfied through the levy of his properties
83. Hence this petition
ISSUE/s:
9. WoN the Petition for Habeas Corpus was validly granted – NO. The case at
bar, thus not apply to such instance, because as clarified in SC-AC No. 13-
2001, SC-AC No. 12-2000, only established a rule of preference in
imposing the penalties for BP 22 violations. It did not delete imprisonment
as a penalty, but left the discretion with the Court based on the
circumstances of the case as to whether or not imprisonment should also be
a penalty. Hence, there is no imposition of excessive penalty
RULING: WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Orders
NULLIFIED. Respondent’s Petition for habeas corpus is hereby DENIED. Let this
case be REMANDED to MTCC of Baguio City for the re-arrest of respondent and
the completion of his sentence.
RATIO:
72. The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention in which individuals are deprived of liberty. It was devised as
a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint; or, more specifically, to obtain immediate relief for those who
may have been illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause
and thus deliver them from unlawful custody. It is therefore a writ of
inquiry intended to test the circumstances under which a person is
detained
73. The writ may not be availed of when the person in custody is under a
judicial process or by virtue of a valid judgment.
a. However, as a postconviction remedy, it may be allowed when, as
a consequence of a judicial proceeding, any of the following
exceptional circumstances is attendant: (1) there has been a
deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a
person; (2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or
(3) the imposed penalty has been excessive, thus voiding the
sentence as to such excess.
74. In the present case, the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was anchored on
the ruling in Vaca and on SC-AC No. 12-2000, which allegedly prescribed
the imposition of a fine, not imprisonment, for convictions under BP 22.
a. DIMAGIBA sought the retroactive effect of those rulings, thereby
effectively challenging the penalty imposed on him for being
excessive.
b. From his allegations, the Petition appeared sufficient in form to
support the issuance of the writ.
75. We believe that his resort to this extraordinary remedy was a
procedural infirmity.
a. The remedy should have been an appeal of the MTCC Order
denying his Motions, in which he should have prayed that the
execution of the judgment be stayed.
b. But he effectively misused the action he had chosen, obviously
with the intent of finding a favorable court.
c. His Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was clearly an attempt
to reopen a case that had already become final and executory.
d. Such an action deplorably amounted to forum shopping.
DIMAGIBA should have resorted to the proper, available
remedy instead of instituting a different action in another
forum.
76. The following alternative penalties are imposable under BP 22: (1)
imprisonment of not less than 30 days, but not more than one year; (2) a
fine of not less or more than double the amount of the check, a fine that
shall in no case exceed ₱200,000; or (3) both such fine and imprisonment,
at the discretion of the court.
77. SC-AC No. 12-2000, as clarified by SC-AC No. 13-2001, established a rule
of preference in imposing the above penalties. When the circumstances of
the case clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of
negligence, the imposition of a fine alone may be considered as the
preferred penalty. The determination of the circumstances that warrant the
 imposition of a fine rests upon the trial judge only. Should the judge deem City. Eventually, the Decision attained finality. Hence, RTC Branch 5 did
that imprisonment is appropriate, such penalty may be imposed. not have the jurisdiction to modify the lawful judgment in the guise of
a. SCAC No. 122000 did not delete the alternative penalty of granting a writ of habeas corpus.
imprisonment. The competence to amend the law belongs to
the legislature, not to this Court
78. The issue of retroactivity of SCAC No. 122000 was settled in De Joya v.
Jail Warden of Batangas City
a. First. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law;
hence, Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable. The
circular applies only to those cases pending as of the date of its
effectivity and not to cases already terminated by final judgment.
b. Second. As explained by the Court in SC Admin. Circular No. 13-
2001, SC Admin. Circular No. 122000 merely lays down a rule
of preference in the application of the penalties for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22. It does not amend B.P. Blg. 22, nor defeat the
legislative intent behind the law. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000
merely urges the courts to take into account not only the purpose of
the law but also the circumstances of the accused whether he acted
in good faith or on a clear mistake of fact without taint of
negligence and such other circumstance which the trial court or
the appellate court believes relevant to the penalty to be imposed.
79. Because the Circular merely lays down a rule of preference, it serves only
as a guideline for the trial courts. Thus, it is addressed to the judges, who
are directed to consider the factual circumstances of each case prior to
imposing the appropriate penalty. In other words, the Administrative
Circular does not confer any new right in favor of the accused, much
less those convicted by final judgment.
80. The competence to determine the proper penalty belongs to the court
rendering the decision against the accused. That decision is subject only to
appeal on grounds of errors of fact or law, or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Another trial court may not
encroach upon this authority. Indeed, SC-AC No. 12-2000 necessarily
requires a review of all factual circumstances of each case. Such a review
can no longer be done if the judgment has become final and executory.
81. In the present case, the MTCC of Baguio City had full knowledge of all
relevant circumstances from which respondent’s conviction and sentence
were based. The penalty imposed was well within the confines of the law.
Upon appeal, the conviction was sustained by RTC Branch 4 of Baguio
 002 GUMABON v. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS (CHIQUI)
January 30, 1971 | Fernando, J. | Habeas Corpus
PETITIONER: Mario Gumabon, Blas Bagolbagol, Gaudencio Agapito, Epifanio
Padua, and Paterno Palmares
RESPONDENT: The Director of the Bureau of Prisons
SUMMARY: Gumabon and others were sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua for
the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson and kidnap-
ping. In People v. Hernandez (1956), the SC has decided that there is no complex
crime of rebellion with multiple murder and other offenses punishable with reclu-
sion perpetua. Subsequently, in People v. Lava (1960), the SC expressly reaf-
firmed the Hernadez doctrine. Gumabon and the others asserted that their constitu-
tional right of equal protection is violated because the case of Hernandez should be
applied to their case, and that since judicial decisions form part of our laws, it
should have a retroactive effect. Gumabon and the others filed a writ of habeas
corpus. W/N Gumabon and the others should be released via habeas corpus –
YES, the writ does lie when a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to ex-
ist. The court that rendered the judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction and
habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of the detention. SC
decided that their right to equal protection was violated given that the only
distinction lying in the finality of the conviction of one being before the
Hernandez ruling and this one is that a person duly sentenced for the same crime
would be made to suffer different penalties. This would render their right
nugatory. Also, the Civil Code provides that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the Constitution, as well as legislation, form part of our legal system.
DOCTRINE: Once a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the
court that rendered the judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction and habeas
corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of the detention.
FACTS:
1. Mario Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced on May 5, 1953 to
suffer reclusion perpetua for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple
murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping.
2. Gaudencio Agapito, Paterno Palmares and Epifanio Padua, likewise pleaded
guilty to the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder and other of-
fenses, and were similarly made to suffer the same penalty in decisions ren-
dered, as to the first two, on March 8, 1954 and, as to the third, on Decem-
ber 15, 1955.
3. Last, Bias Bagolbagol, stood trial also for the complex crime of rebellion
with multiple murder and other offenses and on January 12, 1954 penalized
with reclusion perpetua. Each of the petitioners has been since then impris-
oned by virtue of the above convictions.
4. Subsequently, in People v. Hernandez (1956), this Court ruled that the in-
formation against the accused in that case for rebellion complexed with
murder, arson and robbery was not warranted under Article 134 of the Re-
vised Penal Code, there being no such complex offense.
5. In the recently-decided case of People vs. Lava (1960), we expressly reaf-
firmed the ruling in the Hernandez case rejecting the plea of the Solicitor
General for the abandonment of such doctrine. It is the contention of each
of the petitioners that he has served, in the light of the above, more than the
maximum penalty that could have been imposed upon him. He is thus enti-
tled to freedom, his continued detention being illegal.
6. The fear that the Pomeroy ruling (here the SC decided in the negative with
regard to habeas corpus) stands as an obstacle to their release on a habeas
corpus proceeding prompted Gumabon, to ask that it be appraised anew
and, if necessary, discarded. We can resolve the present petition without
doing so. The plea in that case was unconvincing, there being a failure to
invoke the contentions now pressed vigorously by their counsel, Atty. Jose
W. Diokno, as to the existence of a denial of a constitutional right that
would suffice to raise a serious jurisdictional question and the retroactive
effect to be given a judicial decision favorable to one already sentenced to
59
a final judgment under Art. 22 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE/s:
2. W/N Gumabon and the others should be released via habeas corpus – YES,
the writ does lie when a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to
exist, the court that rendered the judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction
and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of the
detention.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is granted, and it is ordered
that petitioners be forthwith set at liberty.
RATIO:
59
“Retroactive effect of penal laws.—Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the
person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in rule5 of article 62 of this
Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the
convict is serving the same.”
SC’s discussion of Habeas Corpus Violation of their Constitutional Right of Equal Protection

1. The fundamental issue, to repeat, is the availability of the writ of habeas 7. Where, however, the detention complained of finds its origin in what has
corpus under the circumstances disclosed. Its latitudinarian scope to assure been judicially ordained, the range of inquiry in a habeas corpus proceed-
that illegality of restraint and detention be avoided is one of the truisms of ing is considerably narrowed. For if “the person alleged to be restrained
the law. It is not known as the writ of liberty for nothing. The writ imposes of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a
on judges the grave responsibility of ascertaining whether there is any legal court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record,
justification for a deprivation of physical freedom. and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render
2. Unless there be such a showing, the confinement must thereby cease. If the judgment, or make the order,” the writ does not lie.
there be a valid sentence it cannot, even for a moment, be extended beyond
8. One such principle is the requirement that there be a finding of
the period provided for by law. Any deviation from the legal norms call for
jurisdictional defect. As summarized by Justice Bradley: “The only ground
the termination of the imprisonment.
3. In Villavicencio v. Lukban, the remedy came in handy to challenge the va- on which this court, or any court, without some special statute authorizing
lidity of the order of the then respondent Mayor of Manila who, for the best it, will give relief on habeas corpus to a prisoner under conviction and
of reasons but without legal justification, ordered the transportation of more sentence of another court is the want of jurisdiction in such court over the
than 150 inmates of houses of ill-repute to Davao. After referring to the writ person or the cause, or some other matter rendering its proceedings void.”
of habeas corpus as having been devised and existing “as a speedy and ef- 9. There is the fundamental exception though, that must ever be kept in
fectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint” the opinion of mind. Once a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the
Justice Malcolm continued: “The essential object and purpose of the writ of court that rendered the judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction and
habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distin- habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of the
guished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is detention.
illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.” 10. Gumabon and the others precisely assert a deprivation of a constitutional
4. It is to Justice Malcolm likewise in Conde v. Rivera to whom is traceable the right, namely, the denial of equal protection. According to their petition:
doctrine, one that broadens the field of the operation of the writ, that a “In the case at bar, the petitioners were convicted by Courts of First
disregard of the constitutional right to speedy trial ousts the court of Instance for the very same rebellion for which Hernandez, Geronimo, and
jurisdiction and entitles the accused if “restrained of his liberty, by habeas others were convicted. The law under which they were convicted is the
corpus to obtain his freedom.” very same law under which the latter were convicted. It had not and has
5. Chief Justice Marshall put the matter thus: “The writ of habeas corpus is a not been changed. For the same crime, committed under the same law,
high prerogative writ, known to the common law, the great object of which how can we, in conscience, allow petitioners to suffer life imprisonment,
is the liberation of those who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause.” while others can suffer only prision mayor?”
6. The passing of the years has only served to confirm its primacy as a weap- a. They would thus stress that, contrary to the mandate of equal
on in the cause of liberty. Only the other year, Justice Fortas spoke for the protection, people similarly situated were not similarly dealt with.
United States Supreme Court thus: “The writ of habeas corpus is the fun- What is required under this constitutional guarantee is the uni-
damental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary form operation of legal norms so that all persons under similar
and lawless state action. * * * The scope and flexibility of the writ—its circumstances would be accorded the same treatment both in the
capacity to reach all manner of illegal detention—its ability to cut through privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed
barriers of form and procedural mazes—have always been emphasized and 11. The continued incarceration after the twelve-year period when such is the
jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers. The very nature of the writ maximum length of imprisonment in accordance with our controlling
demands that it be administered with the initiative and flexibility essential doctrine, when others similarly convicted have been freed, is fraught with
to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and cor- implications at war with equal protection. That is not to give it life. On the
rected.” contrary, it would render it nugatory. Otherwise, what would happen is
that for an identical offense, the only distinction lying in the finality of the
 conviction of one being before the Hernandez ruling and the other after, a
person duly sentenced for the same crime would be made to suffer
different penalties.
12. Moreover, as noted in the petition before us, after our ruling in People v.
Lava, petitioners who were mere followers would be made to languish in
jail for perhaps the rest of their natural lives when the leaders had been
duly considered as having paid their penalty to society, and freed. Such a
deplorable result is to be avoided.

Retroactive application of Article 22 of the RPC

13. Gumabon likewise would rely on Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code
which requires that penal judgment be given a retroactive effect.
14. While reference in the above provision is made not to judicial decisions but
to legislative acts, Gumabon entertain the view that it would be merely an
exaltation of the literal to deny its application to a case like the present.
Such a belief has a firmer foundation. As was previously noted, the Civil
Code provides that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
Constitution, as well as legislation, form part of our legal system.
15. It being undeniable that if the Hernandez ruling were to be given a
retroactive effect petitioners had served the full term for which they could
have been legally committed, is habeas corpus the appropriate remedy?
The answer cannot be in doubt. As far back as 1910 the prevailing doctrine
was announced in Cruz v. Director of Prisons. Thus: “The courts uniformly
hold that where a sentence imposes a punishment in excess of the power
of the court to impose, such sentence is void as to the excess, and some of
the courts hold that the sentence is void in toto; but the weight of authori-
ty sustains the proposition that such a sentence is void only as to the ex-
cess imposed in case the parts are separable, the rule being that the peti-
tioner is not entitled to his discharge on a writ of habeas corpus unless he
has served out so much of the sentence as was valid.”
16. Directo v. Director of Prisons states that the only means of giving retroac-
tive effect to a penal provision favorable to the accused * * * is the writ of
habeas corpus. While the above decision speaks of a trial judge losing ju-
risdiction over the case, insofar as the remedy of habeas corpus is con-
cerned, the emphatic affirmation that it is the only means of benefiting the
accused by the retroactive character of a favorable decision holds true.
Gumabon clearly have thus successfully sustained the burden of justifying
their release.
 003 In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Engr. Ashraf
Kunting (Valle)
19 April 2006 | Azcuna, J. | Habeas Corpus
In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Engineer Ashraf
Kunring
SUMMARY:
Kunting was arrested in Malaysia for violation of the Malaysian Internal
Security Act. He was turned over to the PNP-IG pursuant to warrants of arrest
issued by the RTC of Basilan. Kunting was charged with 4 counts of Kidnapping
for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention. PNP-IG informed the branch Clerk in
the RTC Basilan for temporary custody of Kunting since it was unsafe for
Kunting to be transferred to Basilan. PNP-IG cite reports that the Abu Sayyaf
Group plan on recovering Kunting and that there is big possibility that he may be
recovered due to the inadequate security in Basilan. The RTC Basilan granted
the temporary custody but later ordered the PNP-IG to turn over Kunting to
them. PNP-IG later requested that the venue of the trial be transferred to Pasig
City. Kunting, by counsel, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He alleged
that his detention was illegal as his detention was classified as “for safekeeping
purposes only.”
The issue is whether or not the petition for habeas corpus will prosper. The SC
held that it cannot. (see doctrine) Here, Kunting’s detention was authorized by
the RTC by virtue of the warrants of arrest. Kunting also cannot be released
because sec 4 Rule 102 says, “Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize
the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the
Philippines…” Here, Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for
Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention.
DOCTRINE:
The writ has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person and
if found illegal, the court orders the release of the detainee. If however, the
detention is proben lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings will terminate.
Once the person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his
detention by a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
FACTS:
187. Kunting was arrested in Malaysia for violation of the Malaysian Internal
Security Act. The Royal Malaysian Police in Kuala Lumpur turned over
Kunting to the PNP-IG and Task Force Salinglahi pursuant to warrants of
his arrest issued by the RTC of Isabela, Basialn. Kunting was charged with
4 counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention with the
RTC.
188. Kunting was immediately flown to the Philippines and brought to the PNP-
IG at Camp Crame for booking and custodial investigation.
189. Atty. Guillermo Danipog Jr., Police Superintendent and Chief of the Legal
Affairs of the PNP-IG informed the branch clerk of court of the RTC that
Kunting was already in their custody. He requested for Kunting’s temporary
detention at Camp Crame due to high security risks involved and prayed for
the issuance of a corresponding commitment order.
190. Emilio Enriquez, Acting Clerk of the RTC, allowed that Kunting be
temporarily detained at Camp Crame but considering the high security risk,
that Kunting be brought to Isabela, Basilan as soon as the necessary security
escort can be provided for the transfer.
191. The RTC issued an order directing Danipog to immediately turn over
Kunting to the trial court since Kunting filed an Urgent Motion for
Reinvestigation.
192. PNP-IG director Arturo Lomibao wrote to the Chief state prosecutor, Zuño,
requesting for representation and a motion to be filed for the transfer of the
venue from Basilan to Pasig city because:
a. Several intelligence reports state that utmost effort will be exerted
by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) to recover Kunting
b. There is a big possibility that Kunting may be recovred by the
ASG if he will be detained in Basilan due to inadequate security
facility
193. The RTC rendered a decision against Kunting’s co-accused, finding 17 of
the accused guilty of the crimes charged. The RTC also issued an order
denying Kunting’s Motion to set case for Preliminary Investigation since
the PNP-IG has not turned over Kunting. It reiterated its order, directing the
PNP-IG to turn over Kunting.
194. In a letter, Rafanan, Police Chief Superintendent, reiterated the request of
Zuño to facilitate the transfer of the venue. He added that if Kunting be
transferred to Basilan, he could be one of the escapees in a jail break that
recently occurred. PNP-IG filed with the RTC a Motion to Defer
Implementation of the Order citing that the existence of a pending motion
for the transfer of venue to Pasig City which was filed by the DOJ before
this court.
195. Kunting, by counsel, filed this petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus. Kunting stated that he has been restrained of his libery by the PNP-
IG. He alleged that he was never informed of his charges until he requested
his family to research in Zamboanga City. It was discovered in the RTC of
Basilan that his name appeared in the list of accussed. He asserted that he
never particiapated in the kidnapping, so he promptly filed an Urgent
Motion for Reinvestiation. He was aware that the PNP-IG’s motion to
transfer venue. Having no other information on his case, he filed a Motion
 to Set case for Preliminary Investigation. He stated that since no action was
taken by the TC or the DOJ, he filed this petition to put an end to his illegal
detention classified in the recods as “for safekeeping purposes only.”

ISSUE/s:
18. WoN the petition for habeas corpus can prosper– NO because since he was
charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and serious illegal
detention and the RTC Basilan has authorized his detention in Camp
Crame.

RULING: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for habeas corpus is hereby

dismissed.

RATIO:
217. Under Sec 1, Rule 102, the writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his
liberty or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
person entitled thereto. The writ has one objective: to inquire into the cause
of detention of a person and if found illegal, the court orders the release of
the detainee. If however, the detention is proben lawful, then the habeas
corpus proceedings will terminate.
218. In this case, Kunting’s detention by the PNP-IG was under process issued
by the RTC. He was arrested by virtue of the alias order of arrest of the
Judge in the RTC Basilan. His temporary detention in Camp Crame was
thus authorized by the trial court.
219. Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and
Serious Illegal detention. In sec 4 Rule 102, a writ is not allowed since it
says, “Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a
person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines…”
220. In accordance with that rule, the writ cannot be issued and Kunting cannot
be discharged since he has been charged with a. criminal offense.
221. Once the person detained is duly charged in court, he may no londer
question his detention by a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus.
 004 SO v. TACLA (VICENCIO)
Oct. 19, 2010 | Nachura, J. | Writ of Habeas Corpus
PETITIONER: David E. So
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Esteban Tacla, Jr., RTC of Mandaluyong City, Br. 208,
and Dr. Bernardo A. Vicente, National Center for Mental Health
SUMMARY: Ma. Elena Guisande is accused of Qualified Theft (a non-bailable
offense) in a criminal case pending before Judge Tacla. Prior to the criminal
proceedings, she was confined in Makati Medical Center for Bipolar Mood
Disorder. Even when her personal physciatrist certified that she was “not ready
for discharge,” upon moiton of the prosecution, Judge Tacla ordered Guisande’s
referral to National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) for an independent
forensic assessment of Guisande’s mental health to determine if she would be
able to stand arraignment and undergo trial for Qualified Theft. So alleged that
Guisande was under a life-threatening situation while being confined at the
NCMH and and filed this petition for the writes of habeas corpus and amparo on
behalf of his daughter, Guisande. The CA ordered the transfer of Guisande to St.
Clare’s Medical Center and closed the Habeas corpus proceeding. During the
pendency of the proceedings, due to a Motion to Withdraw, the criminal case
was dismissed. The OSG in behalf of Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente, filed a
manifestation praying for the dismissal of the writs which were based on such
criminal case for being moot and academic.
Issue: WoN the writs of habeas corpus and amparo should be dismissed for
mootness due to the dismissal of the criminal case – YES. (Read Doctrine).
Nowhere in the transcript of the CA proceedings is there an affirmation of So’s
claim that the confinement of accused Guisande at the NCMH was illegal.
Neither were the respective acts performed by respondents Judge Tacla and Dr.
Vicente in ascertaining the mental condition of accused Guisande to withstand
trial declared unlawful. On the contrary, the NCMH, a well-reputed government
forensic facility, albeit not held in high regard by petitioner So’s and accused
Guisande’s family, had assessed Guisande fit for trial.
DOCTRINE: The Rules on the Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo are clear;
the act or omission or the threatened act or omission complained of -
confinement and custody for habeas corpus and violations of, or threat to violate,
a person’s life, liberty, and security for amparo cases - should be illegal or
unlawful.
FACTS:
196. Petitioner David E. So (So) filed the petition for the writs of habeas corpus
and amparo on behalf of his daughter, Ma. Elena So Guisande
(Guisande), accused of Qualified Theft in the criminal case pending before
Judge Tacla.
197. Petitioner So alleged, among others, that Guisande was under a life-
threatening situation while confined at the National Center for Mental
Health (NCMH), the government hospital ordered by the RTC
Mandaluyong City to ascertain the actual psychological state of Guisande,
who was being charged with a non-bailable offense.
198. Prior to the institution of the criminal proceedings before the RTC,
Guisande was committed by So for psychiatric treatment and care at the
Makati Medical Center (MMC). Thus, the return of the warrant for the
arrest of Guisande, issued by Judge Tacla, stated that the former was
confined at MMC for Bipolar Mood Disorder and that she was "not ready
for discharge," as certified by her personal psychiatrist, Dr. Ma. Cecilia
Tan.
199. Acting on the prosecution’s Urgent Motion to Refer Accused’s Illness to a
Government Hospital, Judge Tacla ordered Guisande’s referral to the
NCMH for an independent forensic assessment of Guisande’s mental health
to determine if she would be able to stand arraignment and undergo trial for
Qualified Theft.
200. Subsequently, Judge Tacla, upon motion of the NCMH, ordered that
accused Guisande be physically brought to the NCMH, with NCMH Chief
Dr. Vicente to have temporary legal custody of the accused, and thereafter,
Judge Tacla would issue the corresponding order of confinement of
Guisande in a regular jail facility upon the NCMH’s determination that she
was ready for trial.
201. Accused Guisande was confined at the NCMH Payward, Pavilion 6-I-E,
instead of Pavilion 35, Forensic Psychiatric Section, where female court
case patients are usually confined at the NCMH. In connection therewith,
Dr. Vicente issued a special Memorandum on November 9, 2009,
reiterating existing hospital policies on the handling of court case patients
undergoing evaluation procedures to foreclose any possibility of
malingering on the patient’s part, specifically patients accused of a non-
bailable crime.
202. Eventually, claiming "life-threatening" circumstances surrounding her
confinement at the NCMH which supposedly worsened her mental
condition and violated her constitutional rights against solitary detention
and assistance of counsel, accused Guisande and her father simultaneously,
albeit separately, filed a Motion for Relief from Solitary Confinement
before the RTC Mandaluyong City, and the present petition in G.R. No.
190108 for the issuance of the writs of habeas corpus and amparo.
203. On the Motion for Relief, Judge Tacla granted such but subject it to the
condition that only the accused’s counsel and physician are allowed to visit.
204. On the petition for habeas corpus and amparo, the Court ruled: G.R. No.
190108 (So v. Tacla). Acting on the Petition for Writs of Habeas Corpus
 and Amparo, the Court Resolved to
a. ISSUE a JOINT WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND AMPARO
b. REFER the petition to the Court of Appeals, Manila, for (i) IMMEDIATE
RAFFLE among the Members of the said Court; (ii) HEARING on
December 3, 2009, Thursday, at 10:00 a.m.; and (iii) DECISION within
ten (10) days after its submission for decision
205. On December 3, 2009, the NCMH submitted its Evaluation Report to the
RTC Mandaluyong City:
a. Based on a series of mental status examinations and observations
at our center, she is found not manifesting signs and symptoms of
psychosis at the present time. Neither a manic episode nor a severe
depressive episode was manifested during her confinement at our
center, despite voluntarily not taking her medication is. Although
she is complaining of mood symptoms, these are not severe
enough to impair her fitness to stand trial.
b. Ms. Guisande does have sufficient understanding of the nature and
objective of the court proceedings and the possible consequences
of her cases. She is likewise capable of communicating with her
counsels. She is therefore deemed COMPETENT to stand the
rigors of court trial.
206. On even date, pursuant to the directive of this Court, the CA’s Special
Seventeenth Division held a hearing. Thereafter, Justice Normandie B.
Pizarro (Justice Pizarro), to whom the petition was raffled, disposed:
a. Director Nestor M. Mantaring of NBI is politely DIRECTED to cause the
transfer from NCMH to the St. Clare’s Medical Center of the subject
Accused, Ma. Elena So-Guisande, and to provide two (2) or three (3)
security personnel to the Accused after making the proper coordination
with the RTC, Branch 208. Director Mantaring is to submit a one (1) page
compliance on the matter within three (3) days from receipt of this
Resolution – furnishing Judge Tacla, Jr. a copy thereof.
b. WHEREFORE, the foregoing considering considered, this petition for
Habeas Corpus and Amparo is considered CLOSE and TERMINATED.
207. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. During the pendency of these
consolidated cases, various events occurred which ultimately led to the
incident before this Court, i.e., a Manifestation and filed by the OSG on
behalf of public respondents, Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente, to wit:
a. On February 4, 2010, acting on the City Prosecutor’s January 25,
2010 Motion to Withdraw Information, public respondent Judge
ordered the dismissal of Criminal Case No. MC019-12281. Hence,
their Urgent Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) before this Honorable Court has been rendered moot and
academic.
b. Furthermore, in view of the dismissal of Criminal Case No.
MC019-12281 from which the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
and Writ of Amparo (docketed before the Supreme Court as G.R.
No. 190108 and Court of Appeals as CA-G.R. SP No. 00039) and
the Petition for Review (docketed as G.R. No. 190473) stemmed
from, these cases and pending incidents thereon should be
dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic.
208. Petitioner So filed a Comment refuting the OSG’s motion to dismiss G.R.
Nos. 190108 and 190473. Through counsel, and using strong words, he
vehemently opposed the dismissal of the petitions because they had filed
criminal complaints and an administrative case against respondents Judge
Tacla and Dr. Vicente, as well as the NCMH and an attending doctor
thereat, for purported violations of accused Guisande’s rights during her
confinement at the NCMH.
209. Adding to the flurry of cases, petitioner So filed a Verified Petition to cite
Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente in contempt before the CA for their supposed
submission of an altered and falsified document, which was attached to, and
formed an integral part of, their Consolidated Return of the Writ.
210. Posthaste, and even without us requiring the OSG to file one, it filed a
Motion to Admit Reply with its Reply to the Comment of petitioner So
attached thereto. The OSG clarified and denied outright petitioner So’s
allegation in the Comment that the criminal case for Qualified Theft against
accused Guisande was a prevarication and concoction of private
complainant and that Judge Tacla had conspired to falsely accuse petitioner
So’s daughter, Guisande.
211. In all, the OSG reiterated that GR. Nos. 190108 and 190473 had been
rendered moot and academic with the dismissal of the criminal case for
Qualified Theft against Guisande.
ISSUE/s:
19. WoN the writs of habeas corpus and amparo should be dismissed for
mootness – YES, because the confinement of the accused and the acts of the
respondents were not declared to be illegal.
RULING: WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisition, the petitions in
G.R. Nos. 190108 and 190473 for the Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo, and
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are DENIED for being moot
and academic. No costs.
RATIO:
222. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the petition for the writs of habeas
corpus and amparo was based on the criminal case for Qualified Theft
against petitioner So’s daughter, Guisande. To recall, petitioner So claimed
that the conditions and circumstances of his daughter’s, accused
Guisande’s, confinement at the NCMH was "life threatening"; although
Guisande was accused of a non-bailable offense, the NCMH could not
adequately treat Guisande’s mental condition.
 223. Thus, to balance the conflicting right of an accused to medical treatment
and the right of the prosecution to subject to court processes an accused
charged with a non-bailable offense, the CA directed the transfer of
Guisande from the NCMH to St. Clare’s Medical Center, while noting that
because of the peculiarities of this case, there was a deviation from the
regular course of procedure, since accused Guisande should have been
confined in jail because she was charged with a non-bailable offense.
224. Notably, nowhere in the transcript of the CA hearing on December 3,
2009, nor in the Order recited in open court by Justice Pizarro, is there
an affirmation of petitioner So’s claim that the confinement of accused
Guisande at the NCMH was illegal.
225. Neither were the respective acts performed by respondents Judge Tacla and
Dr. Vicente in ascertaining the mental condition of accused Guisande to
withstand trial declared unlawful. On the contrary, the NCMH, a well-
reputed government forensic facility, albeit not held in high regard by
petitioner So’s and accused Guisande’s family, had assessed Guisande fit
for trial.
226. The Rules on the Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo are clear; the act or
omission or the threatened act or omission complained of - confinement and
custody for habeas corpus and violations of, or threat to violate, a person’s
life, liberty, and security for amparo cases - should be illegal or unlawful.60
227. In the recent Nurhida Juhuri Ampatuan v. Judge Virgilio V. Macaraig, the
SC intoned:
a. The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is
that the individual seeking such relief is illegally deprived of his
freedom of movement or place under some form of illegal
restraint. If an individual’s liberty is restrainted via some legal
process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. Fundamentally, in
order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint
of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary
deprivation of freedom of action.
60
Rule 102 of the Rules of Court on Habeas Corpus provides: Sec. 1. To what habe-
as corpus extends. – Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of ha-
beas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto.
While the Rule on the Writ of Amparo states: Section 1. Petition. – The petition for a
writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
b. In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine
whether or not a particular person is legally held. A prime
specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact,
is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal
restraint of liberty. The writ of habeas corpus was devised and
exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom. xxx The essential object and purpose of the writ
of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary
restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person
therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will
preclude freedom of action is sufficient.
c. In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must
first inquire into whether the petitioner is being restrained of his
liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause
of detention will proceed only where such restraint exists. If the
alleged cause is thereafter found to be unlawful, then the writ
should be granted and the petitioner discharged. Needless to state,
if otherwise, again the writ will be refused.
d. While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter
of course or as a mere perfunctory operation on the filing of the
petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it must
be clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima
facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the court is
satisfied that a person is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty
will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents
are not detaining or restraining the applicant of the person in
whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed.
228. In the cases at bar, the question before the CA was correctly limited to
which hospital, the NCMH or a medical facility of accused’s own choosing,
accused Guisande should be referred for treatment of a supposed mental
condition.
229. In addition, we note that it was procedurally proper for the RTC to ask the
NCMH for a separate opinion on accused’s mental fitness to be arraigned
and stand trial. Be that as it may, the CA allowed the transfer of accused to
St. Clare’s Medical Center under the custody of Dr. Rene Yat, who was
required periodically to report on his evaluation, every fifteen (15) days, to
the RTC Mandaluyong City, although in the same breath, the CA also
ordered the continuation of the arraignment and trial of the accused for
Qualified Theft before the same trial court.
230. In other words, Guisande remained in custody of the law to answer for the
non-bailable criminal charge against her, and was simply allowed to pursue
medical treatment in the hospital and from a doctor of her choice.
231. Certainly, with the dismissal of the non-bailable case against accused
 Guisande, she is no longer under peril to be confined in a jail facility, much
less at the NCMH. Effectively, accused Guisande’s person, and treatment of
any medical and mental malady she may or may not have, can no longer be
subjected to the lawful processes of the RTC Mandaluyong City.
232. In short, the cases have now been rendered moot and academic which, in
the often cited David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, is defined as "one that ceases to
present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value."
 MARTINEZ v. MENDOZA (Salve)
August 17, 2006 | Panganiban, CJ. | Habeas Corpus
PETITIONER: Ma. Estrelita D. Martinez
RESPONDENTS: Director General Leandro Mendoza et al
SUMMARY: Michael Martinez was allegedly abducted while waking along Magno-
lia Street on his way to his mother’s house. Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group (CIDG) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) presented before the media a
certain Phillip Medel, Jr., who allegedly executed a statement confessing to his par-
ticipation in the killing of Dorothy Jones, a.k.a. Nida Blanca and named Michael
Martinez as the alleged mastermind in her killing. Estrelita et al (mother and wife of
Michael) et al filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Regional Trial Court against
CIDG officers. Estrelita et al presented Phillip Medel, Jr. who insisted that he saw
Michael Martinez inside a room at the CIDG where he was brought before midnight
of November 19, 2001 or the wee hours of November 20, 2001, that Sr. Supts. Ver-
zosa and Espina were also in said room and that the latter even boxed Michael in the
stomach. RTC directed CIDG to produce Michael’s body. CA reversed and relied on
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties that CIDG has no
motive to abduct Michael as he was a vital witness to Nida Blanca’s case. WoN the
CA erred in reversing the trial court and dismissing the Petition for habeas corpus. –
NO, because there is insufficient evidence to convince that Michael is in the custody
of CIDG. Considering that Mendoza et al have persistently denied having Michael in
their custody, and absent any decisive proof to rebut their denial, the Court is con-
strained to affirm the CA’s dismissal of the Petition for habeas corpus. At the outset,
it must be stressed that petitioner’s anchor for the present case is the disappearance
of Michael. The matter of his alleged detention is, at best, merely consequential to
his disappearance.
DOCTRINE: Habeas corpus generally applies to "all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty or by which the rightful cus-
tody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto."
This Court has ruled that this remedy has one objective -- to inquire into the cause of
detention of a person.
If the inquiry reveals that the detention is illegal, the court orders the release of the
person. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceed-
ings terminate.
FACTS:
142. Michael Martinez was allegedly abducted and taken away by 7 persons around
7:30 in the morning of November 19, 2001 while he was walking along Magno-
lia Street, on his way to his mother's house.
143. The abduction was reported by Martinez’s wife and mother (Estrelita Martinez
et al) to the Barangay, the Parañaque Police and the Anti-Kidnapping Task
Force at Camp Crame.
144. Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) presented before the media a certain Phillip Medel, Jr., who alleg-
edly executed a statement confessing to his participation in the killing of Doro-
thy Jones, a.k.a. Nida Blanca and named Michael Martinez as the alleged mas-
termind in her killing.
145. Medel narrated that he saw Michael Martinez at the CIDG at Camp Crame and
he even described the clothes Michael was then wearing, which were the same
clothes worn by him when he was abducted.
146. Estrelita et al filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 78, Quezon City against respondents PNP Director General Leandro
Mendoza; Chief Superintendent Nestorio Gualberto, Sr., Chief of the CIDG; Sen-
ior Superintendent Leonardo Espina, Sr. and Senior Superintendent Jesus Ver-
soza of the CIDG and members of Task Force Marsha, which is investigating the
Nida Blanca murder case, for them to produce before said court the person of
Michael Martinez or to justify the continued detention of his liberty.
147. Mendoza et al submitted a RETURN wherein they vehemently and categorically
denied any participation or involvement in the alleged abduction or disappear-
ance of Michael Martinez as the latter was never confined and detained by
them or in their custody at any given time. Thus, prayed for the dismissal of the
petition for habeas corpus.
148. Estrelita et al presented Phillip Medel, Jr. who insisted that he saw Michael
Martinez inside a room at the CIDG where he was brought before midnight of
November 19, 2001 or the wee hours of November 20, 2001, that Sr. Supts.
Verzosa and Espina were also in said room and that the latter even boxed Mi-
chael in the stomach.
149. RTC directed Mendoza et al to produce the body of Michael Martinez.
150. The CA agreed with the OSG that Medel’s credibility was highly suspect.
151. The CA relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duties. It held that, "[a]s aptly pointed out by Mendoza et al, ‘the CIDG itself is
equally concerned with the safety of Michael Martinez relative to the final
resolution of the Nida Blanca slay. For he is definitely a vital witness to his case.
The PNP-CIDG has no motive whatsoever to abduct him as it never did.
ISSUE/s:
1. WoN the CA erred in reversing the trial court and dismissing the Petition for ha- ance, we exhort the NBI and the National Anti-Kidnapping Task Force (NAKTAF)
beas corpus. – NO, because there is insufficient evidence to convince that Michael is to continue their investigation into the matter, so that all persons responsible
in the custody of CIDG. can be prosecuted for whatever crime they have committed.

RULING: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. No costs in this instance.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Commission on Human Rights and the
Department of Interior and Local Government for appropriate action.

RATIO:
213. At the outset, it must be stressed that petitioner’s anchor for the present case
is the disappearance of Michael. The matter of his alleged detention is, at best,
merely consequential to his disappearance.
214. Ostensibly, his disappearance has been established. However, the grant of re-
lief in a habeas corpus proceeding is not predicated on the disappearance of a
person, but on his illegal detention.
215. Habeas corpus generally applies to "all cases of illegal confinement or deten-
tion by which any person is deprived of his liberty or by which the rightful cus-
tody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto."
216. This Court has ruled that this remedy has one objective -- to inquire into the
cause of detention of a person.
217. If the inquiry reveals that the detention is illegal, the court orders the release of
the person. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus
proceedings terminate.
218. Habeas corpus may not be used as a means of obtaining evidence on the

whereabouts of a person, or as a means of finding out who has specifically ab-
ducted or caused the disappearance of a certain person.
219. When forcible taking and disappearance -- not arrest and detention -- have
been alleged, the proper remedy is not habeas corpus proceedings, but crimi-
nal investigation and proceedings.
220. Much as this Court would want to resolve these disappearances speedily -- as
in the present case, when it is interested in determining who are responsible
for the disappearance and detention of Michael (if, indeed, he is being de-
tained) -- it would not want to step beyond its reach and encroach on the du-
ties of other duly established agencies. (which are the PNP and the NBI)
221. Unfortunately, Martinez’s evidence is insufficient to convince the Court that
they have Michael in their custody.
222. Considering that Mendoza et al have persistently denied having Michael in
their custody, and absent any decisive proof to rebut their denial, the Court is
constrained to affirm the CA’s dismissal of the Petition for habeas corpus.
223. In view of the established fact of Michael’s suspiciously felonious disappear-
 006 THORNTON v. THORNTON (APASAN)
August, 16, 2004 | Corona, J. | CA’s jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in
cases involving custody of minors
PETITIONER: In the matter of application for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus Richard Brian Thornton for an in behalf of the minor child Sequeira
Jennifer Delle Francisco Thornton
RESPONDENTS: Adelfa Francisco Thornton
SUMMARY: Petitioner Richard Brian Thornton, an American, and respondent
Adelfa Thornton (Adelfa), a Filipino, were married in 1998 in the Philippines. A
year later, Adelfa gave birth to Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco Thornton
(Jennifer). However, after three years, Adelfa grew restless and bored as a plain
housewife. She wanted to return to her old job as a “guest relations officer” in a
nightclub with the freedom to go out with her friends. Richard admonished
Adelfa about her irresponsibility but she continued her carefree ways. Adelfa
left the family home with Jennifer without notifying Richard. She only told the
servants that she was bringing Jennifer to Basilan Province. This prompted
Richard to file a petition for habeas corpus in the Family Court in Makati City
but this was dismissed due to the allegation that the child was in Basilan (not
enforceable since RTC is limited to its territorial jurisdiction). Richard went to
Basilan but his efforts to find Adelfa and Jennider were futile. So he filed
another petition for habeas corpus before the Court of Appeals but the latter
dismissed on ground of lack of jurisdiction stating that family courts have the
exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus by virtue of the
Family Courts Act of 1997 which impliedly repeal the scope of its jurisdiction
under RA 7902 and BP 129.
Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas
corpus in cases involving custody of minors in the light of the provision in RA
8369 giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions –
YES. First, the court ruled that there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its
jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.
Moreover, considering the best interests of the child, the Court disagrees with
the CA's reasoning because it will result in an iniquitous situation, leaving
individuals like petitioner without legal recourse in obtaining custody of their
children. Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are
looking for would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family courts
whose writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial jurisdictions.
Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place to another, which seems to
be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be left without legal
remedy.
Second, a literal interpretation of the word "exclusive" will result in grave
injustice and negate the policy "to protect the rights and promote the welfare of
children" under the Constitution and the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child.
DOCTRINE: Nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of
habeas corpus involving the custody of minors. Thus, the Court of Appeals and
Supreme Court have concurrent jurisdiction with family courts in habeas corpus
cases where the custody of minors is involved.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Richard Brian Thornton (Richard), an American, and respondent
Adelfa Thornton (Adelfa), a Filipino, were married on August 28, 1998 in
the Catholic Evangelical Church at United Nations Avenue, Manila. A year
later, Adelfa gave birth to a baby girl whom they named Sequeira Jennifer
Delle Francisco Thornton (Jennifer).
2. However, after three years, Adelfa grew restless and bored as a plain
housewife. She wanted to return to her old job as a "guest relations officer"
in a nightclub, with the freedom to go out with her friends. In fact,
whenever Richard was out of the country, Adelfa was also often out with
her friends, leaving her daughter in the care of the househelp.
3. Richard admonished Adelfa about her irresponsibility but she continued her
carefree ways. On December 7, 2001, Adelfa left the family home with her
daughter without notifying her husband. She told the servants that she was
bringing Jennifer to Purok Marikit, Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan Province.
4. Richard filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in
Makati City but this was dismissed, presumably because of the allegation
that the child was in Basilan. He then went to Basilan to ascertain the
whereabouts of Adelfa and their daughter. However, he did not find them
there and the barangay office of Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan, issued a
certification that Adelfa was no longer residing there.
5. Richard gave up his search when he got hold of Adelfa's cellular phone
bills showing calls from different places such as Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Metro
Manila and other provinces. He then filed another petition for habeas
corpus, this time in the Court of Appeals which could issue a writ of habeas
corpus enforceable in the entire country.
6. However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground
that it did not have jurisdiction over the case. It ruled that since RA 8369
(The Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts exclusive original
jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902
(An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals) and Batas
Pambansa 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980). (see last page
 for the decision)
7. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas
corpus in cases involving custody of minors in the light of the provision
in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such
petitions – YES, nothing in the said law revoked its jurisdiction and the best
interests of the child must be considered in giving more avenues for the
petitioner to avail of the writ of habeas corpus.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The petition for
habeas corpus in CA-G.R.-SP-No. 70501 is hereby REINSTATED and
REMANDED to the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division.
RATIO:
2. COMMENT OF OSG: In his comment, the Solicitor General points out
that Section 20 of the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas
Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors (A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, effective
May 15, 2003) has rendered the issue moot. Section 20 of the rule provides
that a petition for habeas corpus may be filed in the Supreme Court, 4 Court
of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.
3. The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is
nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas
corpus involving the custody of minors.
4. CONTENTION OF CA: The Court of Appeals opines that RA
8369 impliedly repealed RA 7902 and BP 129 since, by giving family
courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases, the lawmakers
intended it to be the sole court which can issue writs of habeas corpus. To
the court a quo, the word "exclusive" apparently cannot be construed any
other way.
5. We disagree with the CA's reasoning because it will result in an
iniquitous situation, leaving individuals like petitioner without legal
recourse in obtaining custody of their children. Individuals who do not
know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be helpless
since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs are
enforceable only in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a
minor is being transferred from one place to another, which seems to be the
case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be left without legal
remedy. This lack of recourse could not have been the intention of the
lawmakers when they passed the Family Courts Act of 1997.
6. The primordial consideration is the welfare and best interests of the
child. We rule therefore that RA 8369did not divest the Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases
involving the custody of minors.
7. In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the
adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and
Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. Section 20 of the
rule provides that:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. — A verified
petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors
shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable
within its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.
xxx xxx xxx
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court,
Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted,
the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ
may be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court
within the region where the petitioner resides or where the minor
may be found for hearing and decision on the merits.
8. From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and
Supreme Court have concurrent jurisdiction with family courts in
habeas corpus cases where the custody of minors is involved.
DISCUSSION ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (NOT IMPT)
9. Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used
in more than one sense. Sometimes, what the legislature actually had in
mind is not accurately reflected in the language of a statute, and its literal
interpretation may render it meaningless, lead to absurdity, injustice or
contradiction. In the case at bar, a literal interpretation of the word
"exclusive" will result in grave injustice and negate the policy "to
protect the rights and promote the welfare of children"under the
Constitution and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child. This mandate must prevail over legal technicalities and serve as the
guiding principle in construing the provisions of RA 8369.
10. Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory construction that implied repeals
are not favored:
The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof
must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule
is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare leqibus est optimus
interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought into
 accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The
fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the
existing laws on the subject and not have enacted conflicting statutes.
Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all
efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws
on the subject."
11. The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of
habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. Further, it cannot be said
that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 and BP 129 are absolutely
incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the
custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read in
harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 — that family courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions
for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue.
CA’s assailed decision
the same competence, then the jurisdiction of the former is not exclusive but
concurrent — and such an interpretation is contrary to the simple and clear wording
of RA 8369.
Petitioner argues that unless this Court assumes jurisdiction over a petition
for habeas corpus involving custody of minors, a respondent can easily evade the
service of a writ of habeas corpus on him or her by just moving out of the region
over which the Regional Trial Court issuing the writ has territorial jurisdiction. That
may be so but then jurisdiction is conferred by law. In the absence of a law
conferring such jurisdiction in this Court, it cannot exercise it even if it is demanded
by expediency or necessity.
Whether RA 8369 is a good or unwise law is not within the authority of this
Court — or any court for that matter — to determine. The enactment of a law on
jurisdiction is within the exclusive domain of the legislature. When there is a
perceived defect in the law, the remedy is not to be sought from the courts but only
from the legislature.
||| (Thornton v. Thornton, G.R. No. 154598, [August 16, 2004], 480 PHIL 224-235)

Under Sec. 9(1), BP 129 (1981) the Intermediate Appellate Court (now
Court of Appeals) has jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus whether or not in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This conferment of jurisdiction was re-stated in Sec.
1, RA 7902 (1995), an act expanding the jurisdiction of this Court. This jurisdiction
finds its procedural expression in Sec. 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.

In 1997, RA 8369 otherwise known as Family Courts Act was enacted. It

provides:
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Court. — The Family Courts shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
b. Petition for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation
to the latter.

The vital question is, did RA 8369 impliedly repeal BP 129 and RA
7902 insofar as the jurisdiction of this Court to issue writ of habeas corpus in custody
of minor cases is concerned? The simple answer is, yes, it did, because there is no
other meaning of the word "exclusive" than to constitute the Family Court as the sole
court which can issue said writ. If a court other than the Family Court also possesses

007 CAMARA v. PAGAYATAN (Arcenas)
April 2, 2007| Carpio, J. | Habeas Corpus
PETITIONER/S: In The Matter Of The Application For Issuance Of Writ Of Habeas Corpus
In Behalf Of Leticia Lourdes A. Camara, Asst. Vice President Of Land Bank Of The Philip-
pines, Represented By Her Son, Mark Darwin Camara
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Ernesto P. Pagayatan, In His Capacity As Presiding Judge, Rtc San
Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46, And All Other Persons Acting On His Behalf
SUMMARY: RTC Judge Pagayatan ordered LBP to deposit the preliminary com-
pensation as determined by the PARAD, in cash and bonds, in the total amount Php
71,634,027.30 with the LBP Manila. LBP questioned this order which was dis-
missed, even on appeal. Pending the MR, Josefina Lubrica (assignee of Federico
Suntay in the original agrarian case), filed a petition with RTC to hold Leticia Cama-
ra Teresita Tengco (employees of LBP) for indirect contempt for non-compliance
with the deposit order. Judge Pagayatan held them guilty and issued a warrant for
their arrest, only Leticia was detained. LBP complied by depositing in its Manila
office the amount in cash and in bond payable to the Clerk of Court and moved to
release Leticia, but the RTC denied, and ordered LBP to change it to be payable to
Lubrica. LBP complied but RTC still denied release because the deposit was not
made in a form readily withdrawable. Hence, Mark Darwin (Leticia’s son) filed a
petition for habeas corpus for the release from detention of his mother. The issue is
w/n Judge Pagaytan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction for refusing to release Leticia Camara. The court ruled in the
affirmative. The order detaining Leticia until LBP complies with such order is an act
of grave abuse of Judge Pagayatan’s contempt powers, amounting to lack or excess
of his jurisdiction.
Note that under Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, a writ of habeas corpus
does not lie if it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, and that the court or
judge had jurisdiction to issue the process. Mark Darwin Camara does not question
the trial court’s jurisdiction to issue the Order of 9 February 2007 citing Camara and
Tengco in contempt of court because what he assails Judge Pagayatan’s refusal to
release Camara from detention despite LBP’s deposit with its head office on 14 Feb-
ruary 2007 of the full amount of the preliminary compensation provided in respond-
ent judge’s 4 March 2005 Order. The office of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire
into the legality of deprivation of liberty, which is not the issue in this case since the
true issue is whether or not Judge Pagyatan acted with grave abuse of discretion
amount to lac or in exess of jurisdiction.
On the GADALEJ issue: Nothing in the 4 March 2005 Order requires that the depos-
it be "placed in the name of Josefina S. Lubrica as payee, in a form that is readily
withdrawable," and merely ordered LBP to deposit the preliminary compensation as
determined by the PARAD, in cash and bonds, in the total amount of Php
71,634,027.30 with the LBP, Manila. The Order is silent in whose name the de-
posit should be made but also because the branch clerk of court is under Judge
Pagayatan’s control.
DOCTRINE: A writ of habeas corpus does not lie if it appears that the person al-
leged to be restrained of his liberty is in custody of an officer under process issued
by a court or judge and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process.
FACTS:
1. 4 March 2005 – Judge Pagayatan issued an Order in Civil Case No. R-1390
(Civil Case) ordering LBP to "deposit the preliminary compensation as de-
termined by the PARAD, in cash and bonds, in the total amount Php
71,634,027.30 with the LBP Manila (Deposit Order)
a. LBP questioned the order in a petition for certiorari in the CA -
dismissed the appeal.
b. LBP sought reconsideration. Pending LBP’s motion, Josefina
Lubrica (Lubrica), filed a petition in the trial court to hold liable
for indirect contempt Leticia and Teresita V. Tengco (Tengco),
head of LBP’s Bonds Servicing Department, for LBP’s non-
compliance with the ‘Deposit Order’
c. RULING – Camara and Tengco guilty of indirect contempt and
ordered their arrest "until they comply with the order to deposit;
overruled LBP’s contempt objection as premature.
2. February 9 2007 – Judge Pagayatan issued a warrant of arrest arising from a
contempt citation against Camara and Tengco for LBP’s failure to deposit
the liminary compensation in Civil Case No. R-1390 as provided under the
trial court’s Order dated 4 March 2007 (idk why it’s 2007, but it may be re-
ferring to the march 4 ’05 order)
3. February 12 2007 – The authorities arrested Camara and detained her at the
Provincial Jail, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Tengco eluded arrest.
4. 14 February 2007 – LBP filed with the trial court a Compliance, indicating
that as of that date, it had deposited in its head office in Manila the amount
of ₱71,634,027.30 in cash under the account of Land Bank "in trust for,"
and in bond payable to, "The Clerk of Court, RTC Branch 46, San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, in the Matter of Agrarian Case No. 1390."
a. LBP submitted a copy of a manager’s check for the cash deposit
payable to the CoC
b. Hence, LBP moved for the release of Camara from detention and
for the quashal of the arrest warrant.
c. On 15 February 2007, LBP sought clarification from the trial court
on whose name the cash and bond deposit should be made.
5. RTC HEARING: during the hearing to determine LBP’s compliance, the
trial court suggested that LBP change the account and payee’s name for the
cash and bond deposit to "Office of Clerk of Court, RTC San Jose Occi-
dental Mindoro, for the account of Josefina S. Lubrica, as assignee of
 Federico Suntay, in the matter of Agrarian Case No. 1390." LBP complied
and made the corresponding change on the same day.
6. February 21, 2007 – Judge Pagayatan later found LBP’s Compliance insuf-
ficient because the deposit was not made "in such form that the Lubrica may
immediately withdraw the same without any difficulty and so ordered that
they be in a form that is readily withdrawable by Lubrica. RTC also ordered
Leticia will remain detained until LBP complies.
7. Mark Darwin Camara (Mark) filed a petition for the issuance of the writ of
habeas corpus for the release from detention of Leticia Lourdes A. Camara
(Leticia) Assistant Vice-President and Head of the Land Compensation Di-
vision of the LBP
a. Also, LBP, Camara, and Tengco filed with CA a petition for the
writs of certiorari and mandamus to set aside the RTC orders and
prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunc-
tion to secure Camara’s release from detention pending the resolu-
tion of the petition.
8. 27 February 2007 – Leticia filed this petition before the SC.
9. 1 March 2007 – CA in CA G.R. SP No. 98032 issued a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction ordering Judge Pagayatan to release Leticia from de-
tention.
10. March 2 2007 – After receiving the CA’s writ in the afternoon, Judge
Pagyatan ordered Camara’s release on the same day. Judge Pagayatan re-
ceived the writ of habeas corpus on 2 March 2007.
11. SC issued the writ on 2 March 2007, directing Judge Pagayatan to bring
Leticia to the SC on 5 March 2007 during which we also heard the parties in
oral arguments.
ISSUE/S: w/n Judge Pagaytan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or in excess of jurisdiction for refusing to release Leticia Camara – YES. The
order detaining Leticia until LBP complies with such order is an act of grave abuse
of Judge Pagayatan’s contempt powers, amounting to lack or excess of his jurisdic-
tion.
RULING: WHEREFORE, we RESOLVED to GRANT the petition. Respondent
Judge Ernesto Pagayatan is ORDERED to desist from detaining again Lourdes A.
Camara for the same cause.
RATIO:
1. Under Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, a writ of habeas corpus
does not lie "[i]f it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of
his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court
or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process.
2. Mark Darwin Camara does not question the trial court’s jurisdiction to issue
the Order of 9 February 2007 citing Camara and Tengco in contempt of
court because what he assails Judge Pagayatan’s refusal to release Ca-
mara from detention despite LBP’s deposit with its head office on 14
February 2007 of the full amount of the preliminary compensation
provided in respondent judge’s 4 March 2005 Order.
3. The office of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of dep-
rivation of liberty, which is not the issue in this case since the true issue is
whether or not Judge Pagyatan acted with grave abuse of discretion amount
to lac or in exess of jurisdiciotn.
4. Sc held that Judge Pagayatan’s order, detaining Leticia until LBP complies
with such order is an act of grave abuse of Judge Pagayatan’s contempt
powers, amounting to lack or excess of his jurisdiction.
5. Nothing in the 4 March 2005 Order requires that the deposit be
"placed in the name of Josefina S. Lubrica as payee, in a form that is
readily withdrawable." What Judge Pagayatan ordered LBP to do, which
LBP did, was to "deposit the preliminary compensation as determined by
the PARAD, in cash and bonds, in the total amount of Php 71,634,027.30
with the LBP, Manila."
a. That the cash deposit was made under its account in trust for, and
the bond made payable to, Judge Pagayatan’s clerk of court is not a
contumacious disregard of the 4 March 2005 Order not only be-
cause that Order is silent in whose name the deposit should be
made but also because the branch clerk of court is under Judge
Pagayatan’s control.
b. If LBP’s supposed transgression is in not placing the cash deposit
under the account of, and the bond made payable to, Lubrica, re-
spondent judge could have readily remedied the problem by direct-
ing LBP to turn over the manager’s check and LBP bond to the
branch clerk of court for disposal of the check’s proceeds and the
bond to Lubrica, subject to Lubrica’s compliance with regulations
of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) on the release of
payment to claimants under Republic Act No. 6657.
6. Indeed, LBP went out of its way to further accommodate respondent judge
when, following the latter’s suggestion during the hearing of 19 February
2007, LBP changed the account name for the cash deposit and the payee’s
name for the bond deposit to the Office of Clerk of Court, for the account of
Josefina S. Lubrica, as assignee of Federico Suntay.
7. The facts of this case highlight Judge Pagyatan’s failure to appreciate, in
full measure, the nature of his power to cite litigants in contempt of court. It
is a drastic and extraordinary attribute of courts, to be exercised in the inter-
est of justice and only when there is clear and contumacious refusal to obey
orders.
8. If a bona fide misunderstanding of the terms of an order does not justify the
immediate institution of contempt proceedings, with more reason that it
should not serve as basis to prolong a litigant’s detention under a prior con-
 tempt citation when, as here, there has been an attempt to comply with the
order.
9. Thus, we find the detention of Camara unlawful. To ensure that Camara
will not be detained again for the same cause, we deem it necessary to order
respondent judge to desist from doing so, irrespective of the outcome of CA
G.R. SP No. 98032 in the Court of Appeals. This ruling is without prejudice
to Camara’s availment of administrative reliefs.
 Morales v. Enrile (Linds)
April 26, 1983 | Concepcion, Jr., J. | Habeas Corpus
PETITIONER: In The Matter Of The Petition For Habeas Corpus Of Horacio
Morales, Jr.
RESPONDENTS: Min. Enrile, Gen. Ver, Col. Kintanar
x- - - - - - - - - - -x
PETITIONER: In The Matter Of The Petition For Habeas Corpus Of Antonio
Moncupa, Jr.
RESPONDENTS: Min. Enrile, Gen. Ver, Col. Kintanar
SUMMARY: Morales and Moncapo were arrested while they were riding
together in a car in Quezon City by the elements of Task Force Makabansa of
the AFP. Since their arrest, they have been in detention. Morales and Moncapo
separately filed a petition for the writ of habes corpus. Subsquently, they were
charged with rebellion before CFI Rizal filed by the fiscal of QC. Trial has not
yet been terminated; in that sense their continued detention is still justified.
In their petition, they allege that they were arrested without any warrant; that the
constitutional rights of counsel, to remain silent, speedy and public trial, and
bail, were violated. They also aver that they were tortured, and that they did not
have the opportunity to present their defense before the fiscal. Acting on such
plea, the SC in a resolution en banc appointed the fiscal to conduct
reinvestigation and to act as commissioner of the Court and receive evidence of
the charges made by the petitioners regarding the alleged torture, violation of
constitutional rights especially the right to counsel. The report was then
submitted before the SC.
The issue is whether the petition for the writ of habeas corpus should be
granted. No.
The torture charges were not passed upon by the Court. The SC said they should
be heard in proper bodies listed in pertinent presidential proclamations.
Their arrest was valid. petitioners were already under surveillance on suspicion
of committing rebellion. From the results of the said surveillance, the evidence
then at hand, and the documents seized from them at the time of their arrest, it
would appear that they had committed or were actually committing the offense
of rebellion.
After arrest, the suspects should be delivered to the proper judicial authorities
within specified times; otherwise, they are entitled to a release through a
petition for habeas corpus, and the officers may be held liable for delay in the
delivery of detained persons.
The writ of habeas corpus has often been referred to as the great writ of liberty.
It is the most expeditious way of securing the release of one who has been
illegally detained. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended,
but not the writ itself. Under the judicial power of review and by constitutional
mandate, in all petitions for habeas corpus the court must inquire into every
phase and aspect of petitioner's detention from the moment petitioner was taken
into custody up to the moment the court passes upon the merits of the petition.
Only after such a scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the due process clause
of our Constitution has in fact been satisfied.
Normally, rebellion being a non-capital offense is bailable. But because the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus remains suspended (by Marcos’
presidential proclamations) "with respect to persons at present detained as
well as other who may hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of
insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit
such crimes, and for all other crimes and offenses committed by them in
furtherance of or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in
connection therewith," the natural consequence is that the right to bail for
the commission of anyone of the said offenses is also suspended. To hold
otherwise would defeat the very purpose of the suspension. Therefore, where
the offense for which the detainee was arrested is anyone of the said offenses he
has no right to bail even after the charges are filed in court.
DOCTRINE: When the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended, the
right to bail is also suspended; to hold otherwise would be to defeat the very
purpose of the writ.
Habeas corpus cannot be suspended; only the privilege can be. The privilege of
habeas corpus is an order coming from the court to immediately release the
prisoner if the court finds out that the detention is without legal cause or
authority.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ is to enable the State to hold in
preventive imprisonment pending investigation and trial those persons who
plot against it and commit acts that endanger the State's very existence. For
this measure of self-defense to be effective, the right to bail must also be
deemed suspended with respect to these offenses.
Morales and Moncupa – “Petitioners,” collectively.
FACTS:
 62. Petitioners were arrested on April 21, 1982 at about 9:45 a.m. while they
were riding together in a motor vehicle on Laong-Laan Street, Quezon City,
by elements of Task Force Makabansa of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.
63. Since their arrest, they have been under detention.
64. Petitioner Morales filed his petition for habeas corpus with this Court on
July 9, 1982, while petitioner Moncupa filed his on July 19, 1982.
65. On July 20, 1982 petitioners, together with several others, were charged
with rebellion (Art. 134, Revised Penal Code) before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal in Criminal Case No. Q-21091 filed by the City Fiscal of
Quezon City.
66. The trial of the case has yet to be terminated. The continued detention of
petitioners to answer for the offense charged is therefore legal.
67. Petitioners allege that they were arrested without any warrant of arrest; that
their constitutional rights were violated, among them the right to counsel,
the right to remain silent, the right to a speedy and public trial, and the right
to bail.
68. They also air the charge that they were subjected to maltreatment and
torture; that they did not have the opportunity to present their defense
before the inquest fiscal and therefore asked this Court to order the
reinvestigation of the charges against them.
69. Acting on such plea, this Court in a resolution en banc dated July 22, 1982
ordered the City Fiscal of Quezon City to conduct such reinvestigation and
at the same time appointed him "to act as commissioner of this Court and
receive evidence of the charges made by petitioners before this Court of
alleged torture and violation of their constitutional rights, particularly the
right to counsel."
70. On September 28, 1982, the City Fiscal submitted his report on the
reinvestigation affirming the existence of a prima facie case for rebellion
against petitioners and several others.
71. And on February 8, 1983 he submitted to this Court the transcript of the
notes taken at the reception of the evidence on the charges of petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether the petition for habeas corpus should be granted.
RULING: Petition is denied.
RATIO:
7. If petitioners had been arrested in a communist country, they would have no
rights to speak of. However, the Philippines is a republican state.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates
from them. We have a Constitution framed by a constitutional convention
and duly ratified by the people. We subscribe to the rule of law. We believe
in human rights and we protect and defend them. Petitioners are entitled
to the full enjoyment of all the rights granted to them by law. And this
Court stands as the guarantor of those rights.
8. The 1973 Constitution provides that no person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession
obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.
9. After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins a
confrontation arises which at best may be termed unequal. The detainee is
brought to an army camp or police headquarters and there questioned and
cross-examined not only by one but as many investigators as may be
necessary to break down his morale. He finds himself in a strange and un
familiar surrounding, and every person he meets he considers hostile to him.
The investigators are well-trained and seasoned in their work. They employ
all the methods and means that experience and study has taught them to
extract the truth, or what may pass for it, out of the detainee. Most detainees
are unlettered and are not aware of their constitutional rights. And even if
they were, the intimidating and coercive presence of the officers of the law
in such an atmosphere overwhelms them into silence. Section 20 of the Bill
of Rights seeks to remedy this imbalance.
10. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to
inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of
arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain
silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used
against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with
his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means-
by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the
responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished.
No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of
counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or
appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by
anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver
shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement
obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in
evidence.
11. Indeed, therefore, petitioners were arrested without a warrant. However,
months before their arrest, petitioners were already under surveillance on
suspicion of committing rebellion. From the results of the said surveillance,
the evidence then at hand, and the documents seized from them at the time
of their arrest, it would appear that they had committed or were actually
committing the offense of rebellion. Their arrest without a warrant for
 the said offense is therefore clearly justified.
12.

Re: Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus

13. The writ of habeas corpus has often been referred to as the great writ of
liberty. It is the most expeditious way of securing the release of one who
has been illegally detained. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may
be suspended, but not the writ itself.
14. Under the judicial power of review and by constitutional mandate, in all
petitions for habeas corpus the court must inquire into every phase and
aspect of petitioner's detention from the moment petitioner was taken into
custody up to the moment the court passes upon the merits of the petition.
Only after such a scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the due process
clause of our Constitution has in fact been satisfied.
15. The submission that a person may be detained indefinitely without any
charges and the courts cannot inquire into the legality of the restraint goes
against the spirit and letter of the Constitution and does violence to the basic
precepts of human rights and a democratic society.
16. Normally, rebellion being a non-capital offense is bailable. But because the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus remains suspended "with respect
to persons at present detained as well as other who may hereafter be
similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and for all
other crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance of or on
the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith,"
the natural consequence is that the right to bail for the commission of
anyone of the said offenses is also suspended. To hold otherwise would
defeat the very purpose of the suspension. Therefore, where the offense for
which the detainee was arrested is anyone of the said offenses he has no
right to bail even after the charges are filed in court.
17. Just as an individual has right to self-defense when his life is
endangered, so does the State. The suspension of the privilege of the writ
is to enable the State to hold in preventive imprisonment pending
investigation and trial those persons who plot against it and commit
acts that endanger the State's very existence. For this measure of self-
defense to be effective, the right to bail must also be deemed suspended
with respect to these offenses.
 009 CRUZ vs. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS (Buenaventura)
November 3, 1910 | Trent, J. | habeas corpus
PETITIONER: Juan M. Cruz
RESPONDENTS: The Director of Prisons
SUMMARY: Petition praying for a writ of habeas corpus was filed om behalf
of Cruz. Cruz is imprisoned in Bilibid and has allegedly served out his sentence
and is being kept by the warden without authority of law. Cruz is now
undergoing in Bilibid Prison the sentences imposed upon him by the CFI of
Manila, one of three years' imprisonment and a fine of P1,000 for the crime of
conspiracy against the Government, and the other of two year's imprisonment
and a fine of P4,000, for the crime of sedition; that the imprisonment imposed in
the two cases, without counting the subsidiary imprisonment, is five years; that
Cruz having commenced to serve these sentences on the 15th of November,
1905, the same will expire on the 15th of November, 1910; that for good
conduct, the five years' imprisonment expired on the 4th of June, 1910. that
Cruz is now serving the subsidiary imprisonment on account of his failure to
pay the P1,00 fine which will expire about the 9th of July, 1911, at the rate of
P2.50 a day.
The issue is WoN CFI was correct in condemning Cruz to subsidiary imprison-
ment. SC held NO, Act No. 1732 was not yet in effect during the time that Cruz
was imprisoned and it cannot have a retroactive effect.
Cruz has served out, according to the return of the respondent to the order to
show cause, the entire part of the sentences which the court below had power to
impose, and adhering to the rule that that part of the sentences imposed by the
court below in excess of its jurisdiction is void, Cruz is entitled to his release.
DOCTRINE: The courts uniformly hold that where a sentence imposes a
punishment in excess of the power of the court to impose, such sentence is void
as to the excess, the rule being that Cruz is not entitled to his discharge on a writ
of habeas corpus unless he has served out so much of the sentence as was valid.
FACTS:
1. A petition on behalf of Juan M. Cruz, praying that a writ of habeas
corpus issue directed to the warden of Bilibid Prison, requiring him to bring
the body of Cruz into court. The petition states that Juan M. Cruz is
imprisoned and restrained of his personal liberty in Bilibid Prison in the city
of Manila by the warden without authority of law.
2. Cruz was allegedly tried, convicted, and sentenced by CFI of Manila in
criminal cases Nos. 1489 and 966, he being sentenced in the first case to
imprisonment for a term of three years, to pay a fine of P1,000, and to the
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in the
payment of the fine, and in the second case to a term of two years'
imprisonment and to pay a fine of $2,000 United States currency; that this
last case was appealed to the Supreme Court and affirmed, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case the fine was not paid; that Cruz having
extinguished these sentences is now entitled to his liberty.
3. An order was issued requiring the warden of Bilibid Prison to show cause, if
any existed, why the writ should not issue. On the return day thereof the
said warden made return thereto in substance as follows:
4. That Cruz is now undergoing in Bilibid Prison the sentences imposed upon
him by the CFI of Manila, one of three years' imprisonment and a fine of
P1,000 for the crime of conspiracy against the Government, and the other
of two year's imprisonment and a fine of P4,000, for the crime of sedition;
that the imprisonment imposed in the two cases, without counting the
subsidiary imprisonment, is five years; that Cruz having commenced to
serve these sentences on the 15th of November, 1905, the same will
expire on the 15th of November, 1910; that for good conduct, under the
provisions of Act No. 1533 (Cruz was not allowed the full time for good
conduct under this Act on account of certain violations of prison
regulations), the five years' imprisonment expired on the 4th of June,
1910; that Cruz is now serving the subsidiary imprisonment on account of
his failure to pay the P1,00 fine in case No. 1489, which subsidiary
imprisonment will expire about the 9th of July, 1911, at the rate of P2.50 a
day.
ISSUE:
1. WoN CFI was correct in condemning Cruz to subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency in the payment of the P1,000 fine.
RULING: It is, therefore, ordered that Cruz be discharged from custody and that the
costs of these proceedings be adjudged de oficio.
RATIO:
1. In this case Cruz was tried and convicted for having violated the provisions
of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission. Act No. 1732 (which went
into effect on November 1, 1907) provides that when a fine is imposed as a
whole, or as any part of the punishment for any criminal offense made
punishable by any Act or Acts of the Philippine Commission, the court shall
also sentence the guilty person to subsidiary imprisonment until the fine is
satisfied; provided that such subsidiary imprisonment shall not, in any
case, exceed one year; but in case the court imposes both a fine and
imprisonment the subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed one-third of
the term of imprisonment imposed by such sentence. The penalty of three
years' imprisonment and a fine of P1,000 having been imposed upon Cruz
long before this Act (No. 1732) went into effect, its provisions are not
 applicable to the question under considerations, as such Act, being a penal
statute, can not have a retroactive effect for the reason that such effect
would not be beneficial to Cruz.
2. Prior to the passage of Act No. 1732, CFI had no authority to impose
subsidiary imprisonment for failure to pay fines in cases of conviction for
violations of the Acts of the Philippine Commission, and such errors when
committed have been corrected by this court in those cases which were
appealed.
3. CFI did not have power to sentence Cruz to subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency in the payment of the fine imposed. It is therefore clear
that that part of the judgment is void.
4. The courts uniformly hold that where a sentence imposes a punishment in
excess of the power of the court to impose, such sentence is void as to the
excess, and some of the courts hold that the sentence is void in toto; but
the weight of authority sustains the proposition that such a sentence is
void only as to the excess imposed in case the parts are separable, the rule
being that Cruz is not entitled to his discharge on a writ of habeas corpus
unless he has served out so much of the sentence as was valid.
5. Cruz has served out, according to the return of the respondent to the order
to show cause, the entire part of the sentences which the court below had
power to impose, and adhering to the rule that that part of the sentences
imposed by the court below in excess of its jurisdiction is void, Cruz is
entitled to his release.
 010 Eugenio v. Velez(CELAJE)
G.R. No. 85140 | May 17, 1990 | Padilla, J. | Habeas Corpus
PETITIONER: TOMAS EUGENIO, SR
RESPONDENTS: HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City, CRISANTA VARGAS-
SANCHEZ, FELIX VARGAS, ERNESTO VARGAS, NATIVIDAD VARGAS-
CAGAPE, NENITA VARGAS-CADENAS, LUDIVINA VARGAS-DE LOS
SANTOS and NARCISA VARGAS-BENTULAN
SUMMARY: Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of Vitaliana Vargas
(Vitaliana for brevity), her full blood brothers and sisters, herein private
respondents (Vargases', for brevity) filed on 27 September 1988, a petition for
habeas corpus before the RTC of Misamis Oriental (Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro
City) alleging that Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in
1987 and confined by herein petitioner in his palacial residence in Jasaan,
Misamis Oriental. When respondent Vargases finally learned of Vitaliana's
death, they amended the habeas corpus petition by turning the petition into an
issue regarding who has custody over the dead body. Petitioner Eugenio claims
the RTC lost jurisdiction over the petition as granting the writ of habeas corpus
is now a moot issue.
Issue: W/N a habeas corpus petition can be amended and turned into a case
regarding rightful custody of the dead body. Yes. (See Doctrine) Amendments
to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally allowed in furtherance
of justice in order that every case may so far as possible be determined on its real
facts and in order to expedite the trial of cases or prevent circuity of action and
unnecessary expense, unless there are circumstances such as inexcusable delay
or the taking of the adverse party by surprise or the like, which justify a refusal
of permission to amend. As correctly alleged by respondents Vargases, the writ
of habeas corpus as a remedy became moot and academic due to the death of the
person allegedly restrained of liberty, but the issue of custody remained, which
the court a quo had to resolve.
DOCTRINE After the fact of Vitaliana's death was made known to the
respondents in the habeas corpus proceedings, amendment of the petition for
habeas corpus, not dismissal, was proper to avoid multiplicity of suits.
FACTS:
49. Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of (Vitaliana Vargas Vitaliana for
brevity), her full blood brothers and sisters, herein private respondents
(Vargases') filed on 27 September 1988, a petition for habeas corpus before
the RTC of Misamis Oriental (Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City) alleging
that Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and
confined by herein petitioner Eugenio in his palacial residence in Jasaan,
Misamis Oriental. Despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana was allegedly
deprived of her liberty without any legal authority. At the time the petition
was filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single, and
living with petitioner Tomas Eugenio.
50. The respondent court in an order dated 28 September 1988 issued the writ
of habeas corpus, but the writ was returned unsatisfied. Petitioner refused to
surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August 1988) to the
respondent sheriff, reasoning that a corpse cannot be the subject of habeas
corpus proceedings; besides, according to petitioner, he had already
obtained a burial permit from the Undersecretary of the Department of
Health, authorizing the burial at the palace quadrangle of the Philippine
Benevolent Christian Missionary, Inc. (PBCM), a registered religious sect,
of which he (petitioner) is the Supreme President and Founder.
51. Petitioner Eugenio also alleged that Vitaliana died of heart failure due to
toxemia of pregnancy in his residence on 28 August 1988. As her common
law husband, petitioner Eugenio claimed legal custody of her body.
52. Petitioner Eugenio (as respondent in the habeas corpus proceedings) filed
an urgent motion to dismiss the petition therein, claiming lack of
jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action under sec. 1(b) of Rule
16 in relation to sec. 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court.1 A special proceeding
for habeas corpus, petitioner Eugenio argued, is not applicable to a dead
person but extends only to all cases of illegal confinement or detention of a
live person.
53. Before resolving the motion to dismiss, private respondents Vargases (as
petitioners below) were granted leave to amend their petition. 2
54. Claiming to have knowledge of the death of Vitaliana only on 28 September
1988 (or after the filing of the habeas corpus petition), private respondents
(Vargases') alleged that petitioner Tomas Eugenia who is not in any way
related to Vitaliana was wrongfully interfering with their (Vargases') duty to
bury her. Invoking Arts. 305 and 308 of the Civil Code, 3 the Vargases
contended that, as the next of kin in the Philippines, they are the legal
custodians of the dead body of their sister Vitaliana. The motion to dismiss
was eventually denied.
55. The lower court's decision stated:
 a. . . . . By a mere reading of the petition the court observed that the allegations in the
original petition as well as in the two amended petitions show that Vitaliana Vargas
has been restrained of her liberty and if she were dead then relief was prayed for the
custody and burial of said dead person. The amendments to the petition were but
elaborations but the ultimate facts remained the same, hence, this court strongly
finds that this court has ample jurisdiction to entertain and sit on this case as an
action for custody and burial of the dead body because the body of the petition
controls and is binding and since this case was raffled to this court to the exclusion
of all other courts, it is the primary duty of this court to decide and dispose of this
case. . . . . 10
56. Satisfied with its jurisdiction, the respondent court ruled that the order of preference to give
support under Art. 294 was used as the basis of the award. Since there was no surviving
spouse, ascendants or descendants, the brothers and sisters were preferred over petitioner
Eugenio who was merely a common law spouse, the latter being himself legally married to
another woman. 11
ISSUES:
6. W/N the lower court retained jurisdiction over the case by treating it as an
action for custody of a dead body, without the respondent Vargases having
to file a separate civil action for such relief, and without the Court first
dismissing the original petition for habeas corpus. Yes, after the fact of
Vitaliana's death was made known to the respondents Vargases in the
habeas corpus proceedings, amendment of the petition for habeas corpus,
not dismissal, was proper to avoid multiplicity of suits.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Both
petitions are hereby DISMISSED. No Costs.
RATIO:
59. Section 19, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides for the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts over civil cases. Under Sec. 2, Rule
102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus may be granted by a
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court).
60. It is an elementary rule of procedure that what controls is not the caption of
the complaint or petition; but the allegations therein determine the nature of
the action, and even without the prayer for a specific remedy, proper relief
may nevertheless be granted by the court if the facts alleged in the
complaint and the evidence introduced so warrant. 13
61. When the petition for habeas corpus was filed before the court a quo, it was
not certain whether Vitaliana was dead or alive. While habeas corpus is a
writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfunctory
operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is exercised in its
issuance, and such facts must be made to appear to the judge to whom the
petition is presented as, in his judgment, prima facie entitle the petitioner to
the writ.
62. While the court may refuse to grant the writ if the petition is insufficient in
form and substance, the writ should issue if the petition complies with the
legal requirements and its averments make a prima facie case for relief.
63. However, a judge who is asked to issue a writ of habeas corpus need not be
very critical in looking into the petition for very clear grounds for the
exercise of this jurisdiction. The latter's power to make full inquiry into the
cause of commitment or detention will enable him to correct any errors or
defects in the petition. 15
64. After the fact of Vitaliana's death was made known to the petitioners in
the habeas corpus proceedings, amendment of the petition for habeas
corpus, not dismissal, was proper to avoid multiplicity of suits.
Amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally
allowed in furtherance of justice in order that every case may so far as
possible be determined on its real facts and in order to expedite the trial of
cases or prevent circuity of action and unnecessary expense, unless there are
circumstances such as inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse party
by surprise or the like, which justify a refusal of permission to amend. 18 As
correctly alleged by respondents, the writ of habeas corpus as a remedy
became moot and academic due to the death of the person allegedly
restrained of liberty, but the issue of custody remained, which the court a
quo had to resolve.
65. Petitioner is not the spouse contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code. Indeed, Philippine
Law does not recognize common law marriages.
66. Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving brothers and
sisters (the Vargases). Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
a. Sec. 1103. Persons charged with duty of burial. — The immediate duty of burying
the body of a deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense
thereof, shall devolve upon the persons hereinbelow specified:
b. xxx (b) If the deceased was an unmarried man or woman, or a child, and left
any kin, the duty of burial shall devolve upon the nearest of kin of the deceased, if
they be adults and within the Philippines and in possession of sufficient means to
defray the necessary expenses.
 011 SOMBONG V. CA (CRUZ)
January 31, 1996 | Hermosisima Jr., J. | Habeas Corpus
PETITIONER: Johanna Sombong
RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals and Marietta Neri Alviar, Lilibeth Neri
and all persons holding the subject child Arabela Sombong in their custody
SUMMARY: Johanna is the mother of Arabella who was born on April 23,
1987 in Taguig CIty. Sometime in November, 1987, Arabella, then only six
months old, was brought to the Sir John Clinic in Kalookan City, for relief of
coughing fits and for treatment of colds. Johanna did not have enough money to
pay the hospital bill in the amount of P300.00. Arabella could not be dis-
charged. Johanna testified that she visited Arabella at the clinic only after two
years, in 1989. This time, she did not go beyond berating the spouses Ty for
their refusal to give Arabella to her. Three years thereafter, in 1992, she again
resurfaced to lay claim to her child. Her pleas allegedly fell on deaf ears. Johan-
na filed a petition with the RTC of Quezon City for the issuance of a Writ of
Habeas Corpus against the spouses Ty. The petition was denied due course and
summarily dismissed, without prejudice, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction,
the alleged detention having been perpetrated in Kalookan City. Johanna, there-
after, filed a criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Ka-
lookan City against the spouses Ty. Dr. Ty, in her counter-affidavit, admitted
that petitioner's child, Arabella, had for some time been in her custody. Arabella
was discharged from the clinic in April, 1989, and was, in the presence of her
clinic staff, turned over to someone who was properly identified to be the child's
guardian.Facing arrest, Dra. Ty disclosed the possibility that the child, Arabella,
may be found at No. 23 Jesus Street, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City.
The agents of the NBCI went to said address and there found a female child
who answered to the name of Cristina Grace Neri.|||Cristina, had been living
with Marietta Neri Alviar since 1988. When she was just a baby, Cristina was
abandoned by her parents at the Sir John Clinic. Taking pity on the baby, Alviar
and her mother, Maura Salacup Neri, decided to take care of her. The baby was
baptized.The issue in this case is WoN the petition for habeas corpus of Som-
bong should be granted. The Sc ruled in the negative. The evidence in this
case does not support a finding that the child, Cristina, is in truth and in fact her
child, Arabella; neither is there sufficient evidence to support the finding that
private respondents' custody of Cristina is so illegal as to warrant the grant of a
Writ of Habeas Corpus. Habeas Corpus may be resorted to in cases where "the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto."
Thus, although the Writ of Habeas Corpus ought not to be issued if the restraint
is voluntary, the Court have held time and again that the said writ is the proper
legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the
latter be in the custody of a third person of her own free will.
DOCTRINE: the grant of the writ of habeas corpus will all depend on the con-
currence of the following requisites: (1) that the petitioner has the right of cus-
tody over the minor; (2) that the rightful custody of the minor is being withheld
from the petitioner by the respondent; and (3) that it is to the best interest of the
minor concerned to be in the custody of petitioner and not that of the respond-
ent.
FACTS:
1. Johanna Sombong is the mother of Arabella O. Sombong who was born on
April 23, 1987 in Signal Village, Taguig, Metro Manila. Some time in
November, 1987, Arabella, then only six months old, was brought to the Sir
John Clinic in Kaloocan City, for relief of coughing fits and for treatment of
colds.
2. Johanna did not have enough money to pay the hospital bill in the amount
of P300.00. Arabella could not be discharged, then, because of the failure to
pay the bill.
3. Johanna surprisingly gave testimony to the effect that she allegedly paid the
Marietta Neri Alviar, Lilibeth Neri and all persons holding the subject child
by installments of P1,700.00, knowing for a fact that the sum payable was
only P300.00.
4. Despite such alleged payments, the owners of the clinic, Dra. Carmen Ty
and her husband, Mr. Vicente Ty, allegedly refused to turn over Arabella to
her.
5. Johanna claims that the reason for such a refusal was that she refused to go
out on a date with Mr. Ty, who had been courting her. This allegedly gave
Dra. Ty a reason to be jealous of her, making it difficult for everyone all
around.
6. On the other hand and in contrast to her foregoing allegations, Johanna tes-
tified that she visited Arabella at the clinic only after two years, in 1989.
This time, she did not go beyond berating the spouses Ty for their refusal to
give Arabella to her.
7. Three years thereafter, in 1992, Johanna again resurfaced to lay claim to her
child. Her pleas allegedly fell on deaf ears.
8. Consequently, Johanna filed a petition with the RTC of Quezon City for the
issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus against the spouses Ty.
9. She alleged therein that Arabella was being unlawfully detained and im-
prisoned at No. 121, First Avenue, Grace Park, Kalookan City.
a. The petition was denied due course and summarily dis-
missed, without prejudice, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the
alleged detention having been perpetrated in Kalookan City.
10. Johanna, thereafter, filed a criminal complaint with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Kalookan City against the spouses Ty. Dr. Ty, in her counter-
affidavit, admitted that Johanna's child, Arabella, had for some time been in
her custody. Arabella was discharged from the clinic in April, 1989, and
 was, in the presence of her clinic staff, turned over to someone who was
properly identified to be the child's guardian.
11. In the face of the refusal of the spouses Ty to turn over Arabella to her, she
had sought the help of Barangay Captains Alfonso and Bautista of Kaloo-
kan City, Mayor Asistio of the same city, and even Congresswoman Hor-
tensia L. Starke of Negros Occidental. Their efforts to help availed her
nothing.
12. On September 4, 1992, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Kalookan City,
on the basis of Johanna's complaint, filed an information against the spouses
Ty for Kidnapping and Illegal Detention of a Minor before the RTC of Ka-
lookan City.
13. On September 16, 1992, an order for the arrest of the spouses Ty was issued
in the criminal case. Facing arrest, Dra. Ty disclosed the possibility that the
child, Arabella, may be found at No. 23 Jesus Street, San Francisco del
Monte, Quezon City.
14. The agents of the NBI went to said address and there found a female child
who answered to the name of Cristina Grace Neri. Quite significantly, the
evidence disclosed that the child, Cristina, had been living with Marietta
Neri Alviar since 1988.
15. When she was just a baby, Cristina was abandoned by her parents at the Sir
John Clinic. On April 18, 1988, Dr. Fe Mallonga, a dentist at the Sir John
Clinic and niece of both Dra. Ty and Alviar, called the latter up to discuss
the possibility of turning over to her care one of the several abandoned ba-
bies at the said clinic.
16. Alviar was told that this baby whose name was unknown had long been
abandoned by her parents and appeared to be very small, very thin, and full
of scabies. Taking pity on the baby, Alviar and her mother, Maura Salacup
Neri, decided to take care of her. This baby was baptized at the Good Sa-
maritan Church on April 30, 1988.
17. Her Certificate of Baptism indicates her name to be Cristina Grace S. Neri;
her birthday to be April 30, 1987; her birthplace to be Quezon City; and her
foster father and foster mother to be Cicero Neri and Maura Salacup, re-
spectively.
18. Alviar was invited by the NBI for questioning in the presence of Dra. Ty
and petitioner. Cristina was also brought along by Alviar. At that confronta-
tion, Dra. Ty could not be sure that Cristina was indeed Johanna's child, Ar-
abella. Neither could Johanna with all certainty say that Cristina was her
long lost daughter.
19. Johanna filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus with
the RTC of Quezon City. The trial court rendered a decision granting the
Petition for Habeas Corpus and ordering Alviar to immediately deliver the
person of Cristina Grace Neri to the petitioner, the court having found Cris-
tina to be the Johanna's long lost child, Arabella.
20. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court,
ruling as it did thatnthe lower court erred in sweepingly concluding that pe-
titioner's child Arabella Sombong and respondents' foster child Cristina Ne-
ri are one and the same person to warrant the issuance of the writ.
21. This prompted the petitioner to file this petition.
ISSUE/s:
1. WoN petition for habeas corpus of Sombong should be granted – NO.
The evidence in this case does not support a finding that the child, Cristina,
is in truth and in fact her child, Arabella; neither is there sufficient evidence
to support the finding that private respondents' custody of Cristina is so
illegal as to warrant the grant of a Writ of Habeas Corpus
RULING: The SC affirmed the CA’s decision in toto
RATIO:
1. While we sympathize with the plight of Johanna who has been separated
from her daughter for more than eight years, the Court cannot grant her the
relief she is seeking, because the evidence in this case does not support a
finding that the child, Cristina, is in truth and in fact her child, Arabella;
neither is there sufficient evidence to support the finding that Alviar's cus-
tody of Cristina is so illegal as to warrant the grant of a Writ of Habeas
Corpus.
2. In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether
or not a particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an appli-
cation for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not
merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. "The writ of habeas
corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense
of personal freedom.
3. Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus,
the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involun-
tary deprivation of freedom of action. This is the basic requisite under the
first part of Section 1, Rule 102, of the Revised Rules of Court, which pro-
vides that "except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ
of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or deten-
tion by which any person is deprived of his liberty."
4. In the second part of the same provision, however, Habeas Corpus may be
resorted to in cases where "the rightful custody of any person is withheld
from the person entitled thereto." Thus, although the writ of Habeas Cor-
pus ought not to be issued if the restraint is voluntary, we have held time
and again that the said writ is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to
regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a
third person of her own free will.
 5. It may even be said that in custody cases involving minors, the question of
illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for
the availability of the writ as a remedy; rather, the writ of habeas corpus is
prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody over a child.
6. In passing on the writ in a child custody case, the court deals with a matter
of an equitable nature. Not bound by any mere legal right of parent or
guardian, the court gives his or her claim to the custody of the child due
weight as a claim founded on human nature and considered generally equi-
table and just.
7. Therefore, these cases are decided, not on the legal right of the petitioner to
be relieved from unlawful imprisonment or detention, as in the case of
adults, but on the court's view of the best interests of those whose welfare
requires that they be in custody of one person or another. Hence, the court is
not bound to deliver a child into the custody of any claimant or of any per-
son, but should, in the consideration of the facts, leave it in such custody as
its welfare at the time appears to require. In short, the child's welfare is the
supreme consideration.
8. Considering that the child's welfare is an all-important factor in custody
cases, the Child and Youth Welfare Code unequivocally provides that in all
questions regarding the care and custody, among others, of the child, his
welfare shall be the paramount consideration.
9. In the same vein, the Family Code authorizes the courts to, if the welfare of
the child so demands, deprive the parents concerned of parental authority
over the child or adopt such measures as may be proper under the circum-
stances.
10. The grant of the writ will depend on the following requisites:
a. that the petitioner has the right of custody over the minor;
b. that the rightful custody of the minor is being withheld from the
petitioner by the respondent; and
c. that it is to the best interest of the minor concerned to be in the cus-
tody of petitioner and not that of the respondent.
11. Not all of these requisites exist in this case. The dismissal of this petition is
thus warranted.
As to the question of identity.
12. Johanna does not have the right of custody over the minor Cristina because,
by the evidence disclosed before the court a quo, Cristina has not been
shown to be her daughter, Arabella.
13. The evidence adduced before the trial court does not warrant the conclusion
that Arabella is the same person as Cristina. It will be remembered that,
in habeas corpus proceedings, the question of identity is relevant and mate-
rial, subject to the usual presumptions including those as to identity of per-
son.
14. Evidence must necessarily be adduced to prove that two persons, initially
thought of to be distinct and separate from each other, are indeed one and
the same. The process is both logical and analytical.
15. The process of constructing an inference of identity thus consists usually in
adding together a number of circumstances, each of which by itself might
be a feature of many objects, but all of which together make it more proba-
ble that they co-exist in a single object only. Each additional circumstance
reduces the chances of there being more than one object so associated.
16. In the instant case, the testimonial and circumstantial proof establishes the
individual and separate existence of petitioner's child, Arabella, from that of
Aliviar’s foster child, Cristina.
17. Dr. Trono, who is Johanna's own witness, testified in court that, together
with Arabella, there were several babies left in the clinic and so she could
not be certain whether it was Arabella or some other baby that was given to
private respondents. Petitioner's own evidence shows that, after the con-
finement of Arabella in the clinic in 1987, she saw her daughter again only
in 1989 when she visited the clinic. This corroborates the testimony of peti-
tioner's own witness, Dra. Ty, that Arabella was physically confined in the
clinic from November, 1987 to April, 1989. This testimony tallies with her
assertion in her counter-affidavit to the effect that Arabella was in the cus-
tody of the hospital until April, 1989. All this, when juxtaposed with the
unwavering declaration of private respondents that they obtained custody of
Cristina in April, 1988 and had her baptized at the Good Samaritan Church
on April 30, 1988, leads to the conclusion that Cristina is not Arabella.
Private respondent not unlawfully withholding custody.
18. Since we hold that Johanna has not been established by evidence to be enti-
tled to the custody of the minor Cristina on account of mistaken identity, it
cannot be said that private respondents are unlawfully withholding from pe-
titioner the rightful custody over Cristina. At this juncture, we need not in-
quire into the validity of the mode by which private respondents acquired
custodial rights over the minor, Cristina. This matter is not ripe for adjudi-
cation in this instant petition for habeas corpus.
Private respondents have the interest of Cristina at heart.
19. We find that private respondents are financially, physically and spiritually
in a better position to take case of the child, Cristina. They have the best in-
terest of Cristina at heart.
20. On the other hand, it is not to the best interest of the minor, Cristina, to be
placed in the custody of Johanna, had the petitioner's custody rights over
Cristina been established.
 a. She has no stable job, and she had been separated from a man pre-
viously married to another woman. She also confessed that she
planned to go abroad and leave her other child Johannes to the care
of the nuns. The child Arabella Sombong wherever she is certainly
does not face a bright prospect with Johanna.
Thus Habeas Corpus does not lie to afford petitioner the relief she seeks.
012 Sayo v. Chief of Police of Manila (Daguman)
May 12, 1948 | Feria, J. | Habeas Corpus
PETITIONER: Melencio Sayo et.al.
RESPONDENTS: Chief of Police and the Officer in Charge of
Municipal Jail, both of City of Manila
SUMMARY: Sayo et.al filed a Criminal Case against the Chief of
Police et.al. for the delay in the delivery of detained persons pursu-
ant to art. 125 of the RPC. They claim that they were arrested for
Robbery (without a search warrant but arrest was valid) but was
not delivered to the proper judicial authorities within 6 hours under
art. 125. The CoP et.al. argued that Sayo were delivered to the
proper judicial authorities within 6 hours for they filed a complaint
at the fiscal’s office but was not acted upon by the fiscal. WoN
CoP are guilty for delay in the delivery of detained persons? No,
but Sayo should be released.
The judicial authority mentioned in section 125 of the Revised Pe-
nal Code cannot be construed to include the fiscal of the City of
Manila or any other city, because they cannot issue a warrant of
arrest or of commitment or temporary confinement of a person sur-
rendered to legalize the detention of a person arrested without war-
rant.
FACTS: (Facts very short)
To consider the city fiscal as the judicial authority referred to in article
125 of the Revised Penal Code, would be to authorize the detention of a
person arrested without warrant for a period longer than that permitted by
law without any process issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. The
city fiscal, may not, after due investigation, find sufficient ground for
filing an information or prosecuting the person arrested and release him,
after the latter had been illegally detained for days or weeks without any
process issued by a court or judge
A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person without
a warrant upon complaint of the offended party or any other per-
son, except in those cases expressly authorized by law. What he or
the complainant may do in such case is to file a complaint with the
city fiscal of Manila, or directly with the justice of the peace courts
in municipalities and other political subdivisions. If the City Fiscal
has no authority, and he has not, to order the arrest even if he finds,
after due investigation, that there is a probability that a crime has
been committed and the accused is guilty thereof, a fortiori a police
officer has no authority to arrest and detain a person.
In this case, however the Court does not make any pronouncement
as to the responsibility of the Respondent officers who intervened
in the detention of the petitioners, for the policeman Dumlao may
have acted in good faith
DOCTRINE:
We are of the opinion that the words "judicial authority", as used in
said article, mean the courts of justices or judges of said courts
vested with judicial power to order the temporary detention or con-
finement of a person charged with having committed a public of-
fense, that is, "the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may
be established by law"
1. Upon complaint of Bernardino Malinao, charging the petitioners
with having committed the crime of robbery, Benjamin Dumlao, a
policeman of the City of Manila, arrested the petitioners on April 2,
1948, and presented a complaint against them with the fiscal's of-
fice of Manila. Until April 7, 1948, when the petition for habeas cor-
 pusfiled with this Court was heard, the petitioners were still de- to legalize the detention of a person arrested without warrant. For
tained or under arrest, and the city fiscal had not yet released or the purpose of determining the criminal liability of an officer detain-
filed against them an information with the proper courts justice. ing a person for more than six hours prescribed by the Revised Pe-
2. This case has not been decided before this time because there was nal Code, the means of communication as well as the hour of ar-
not a sufficient number of Justices to form a quorum in Manila, and rested and other circumstances, such as the time of surrender and
it had to be transferred to the Supreme Court acting in division in the material possibility for the fiscal to make the investigation and
Baguio for deliberation and decision. SC has not until now an official file in time the necessary information, must be taken into consider-
information as to the action taken by the office of the city fiscal on ation.
the complaint filed by the Dumlao against the petitioners. 3. Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the penalties
3. provided in the next proceeding article shall be imposed upon the
ISSUE/s: public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some le-
The principal question to be determined in the present case in order to gal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial
decide whether or not the petitioners are being illegally restrained of authorities within the period of six hours."
their liberty, is the following: Is the city fiscal of manila a judicial au- 4. Taking into consideration the history of the provisions of the above
thority within the meaning of the provisions of article 125 of the Re- quoted article, the precept of our Constitution guaranteeing indi-
vised Penal Code? YES. They are illegally restrained.No. City Fiscal vidual liberty, and the provisions of Rules of Court regarding arrest
is not a judicial authority within the meaning of art. 125 of the RPC and habeas corpus, we are of the opinion that the words "judicial
authority", as used in said article, mean the courts of justices or
RULING: Petitioners are illegally restrained and ordered for their release. judges of said courts vested with judicial power to order the tempo-
rary detention or confinement of a person charged with having
RATIO: committed a public offense, that is, "the Supreme Court and such
1. Petitioners’ release is ordered. Article 125 of the Revised Penal inferior courts as may be established by law". (Section 1, Article VIII
Code provides that "the penalties provided in the next proceeding of the Constitution.)
article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who 5. Our conclusion is confirmed by section 17, Rule 109 of the Rules of
shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliv- court, which, referring to the duty of an officer after arrest without
er such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of warrant, provides that "a person making arrest for legal ground
six hours." The surrender or delivery to the judicial authority of a shall, without unnecessary delay, and within the time prescribed in
person arrested without warrant by a peace officer, does not con- the Revised Penal Code, take the person arrested to the proper
sist in a physical delivery, but in making an accusation or charge or court or judge for such action for they may deem proper to take;"
filing of an information against the person arrested with the corre- and by section 11 of Rule 108, which reads that "after the arrest by
sponding court or judge, whereby the latter acquires jurisdiction to the defendant and his delivery to the Court, he shall be informed of
issue an order of release or of commitment of the prisoner, because the complaint or information filed against him. He shall also in-
the arresting officer cannot transfer to the judge and the latter does formed of the substance of the testimony and evidence presented
not assume the physical custody of the person arrested. against him, and, if he desires to testify or to present witnesses or
2. The judicial authority mentioned in section 125 of the Revised Penal evidence in his favor, he may be allowed to do so. The testimony of
Code cannot be construed to include the fiscal of the City of Manila the witnesses need not be reduced to writing but that of the de-
or any other city, because they cannot issue a warrant of arrest or fendant shall be taken in writing and subscribed by him.
of commitment or temporary confinement of a person surrendered
 6. And it is further corroborated by the provisions of section 1 and 4,
Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. According to the provision of said
section, "a writ of habeas corpus shall extend any person to all cases
of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is illegally
deprived of his liberty"; and "if it appears that the person alleged to
be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under pro-
cess issued by a court or judge, or by virtue of a judgement or order
of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to
issue the process, render judgment, or make the order, the writ
shall not be allowed. "Which a contrario sensu means that, other-
wise, the writ shall be allowed and the person detained shall be re-
leased.

“If the city fiscal does not file the information within said period of
time and the arresting officer continues holding the prisoner beyond
the six-hour period, the fiscal will not be responsible for violation of
said article 125, because he is not the one who arrested and illegally
detained the person arrested, unless he has ordered or induced the ar-
resting officer to hold and not release the prisoner after the expiration
of said period.” (Separate Opinion)
 013 Bengzon v. Ocampo (DAYU) corpus proceeding—YES, phrase "for the safekeeping of the person
Sept. 27, 1949 | Feria, J. | Habeas Corpus imprisoned or restrained" can not be construed to mean temporary release
on bail.
PETITIONER: Jose P. Bengzon
RESPONDENTS: Buenaventura Ocampo and Mariano Chan (alias Ong Lian RULING: Judge Ocampo acted in excess of the jurisdiction of the court in releasing
Cho) the defendant on bail during the pendency of the habeas corpus proceeding, and
therefore the order complained of is set aside with costs against the respondent
SUMMARY: Mariano Chan was ordered to be deported by the Bureau of Mariano Chan.
Immigration for operating a prostitution house. Pending the execution of the
order, Chan filed for a petition for writ of habeas corpus. While the HC RATIO:
proceeding was pending, Judge Ocampo ordered Chan’s provision release uder 233. The only legal provision which has some bearing on the question is section
certain conditions. 12, Rule 102:
234. "Hearing on return. Adjourments. — When the writ is returned before one
Issue is w/n Judge acted in excess of jurisdiction in granting the temporary judge, at a time when the court is in session, he may forthwith adjourn the
release, YES. case into the court, there to be heard and determined. The court or judge
before whom the writ is returned or adjourned must immediately proceed
See doctrine for ratio. to hear and examine the return, and such other matters as are properly
submitted for consideration, unless for good cause shown the hearing is
DOCTRINE: adjourned, in which event the court or judge shall make such order for the
The judge in a habeas corpus proceeding must immediately proceed to hear and safekeeping of the person imprisoned or restrained as the nature of the
decide the case, unless for good cause shown the hearing is adjourned, in which case requires. . . ."
event the court or judge shall make such order for the safekeeping of the person 235. The judge in a habeas corpus proceeding must immediately proceed to
imprisoned or restrained as the nature of the case requires. The phrase "for the
hear and decide the case, unless for good cause shown the hearing is ad-
safekeeping of the person imprisoned or restrained" cannot be construed to mean
journed, in which event the court or judge shall make such order for the
temporary release on bail, because a person arrested or detained cannot be re-
leased on bail unless that right is granted by law. The word "safekeeping" means safekeeping of the person imprisoned or restrained as the nature of the
"the act or state of keeping or being kept in safety;" and a person arrested is not case requires.
safely kept if released on bail. 236. It is obvious that the phrase "for the safekeeping of the person imprisoned
or restrained" can not be construed to mean temporary release on bail,
because a person arrested or detained can not be released on bail unless
FACTS:
212. Mariano Chan (alias Ong Lian Cho) was ordered by Bureau of Immigration that right is granted expressly by law, as the right of defendants in criminal
to be deported for having maintained a prostitution house. cases to be released on bail under certain condition, as well as the right of
213. Pending execution of the order of deportation, Chan filed petition for a a person, whose release has been ordered by judgment in a habeas corpus
writ of habeas corpus with the CFI Manila presided over by Judge Ocampo. proceeding, to be temporarily released on bail if appeal is taken by the of-
214. During pendency of habeas corpus proceeding, Judge Ocampo ordered the ficer or person detaining, granted by section 20 of Rule 41, Rules of Court.
provisional release of Chan under the condition that he should file a bond 237. "Safekeeping" according to the dictionaries means "the act or state of
of P10,000 and report to the Bureau of Immigration on Monday, Wednes- keeping or being kept in safety." A person arrested is not safely kept if re-
day, and Saturday of every week. leased on bail.
215.

ISSUE/s:
20. WoN Judge Ocampo acted in excess of the court’s jurisdiction in granting
the petition for temporary release on bail during the pendency of the habeas
 ANDAL vs. PEOPLE (Eleazar)
May 26, 1999 | Per Curiam | Habeas Corpus
PETITIONERS: JURRY ANDAL, RICARDO ANDAL and EDWIN
MENDOZA
RESPONDENTS: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BATANGAS BR. 05, LEMERY, THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF
CORRECTIONS, and THE HONORABLE, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,
in their official capacities
SUMMARY: Petitioners convicted of rape with homicide seek a writ of habeas
corpus on the basis of a claim of mistrial and/or that the decision if the RTC was
void. The petitioners argue that the trial court was ousted of jurisdiction to try
their case since the pre-trial identification of the accused was made without the
assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver from the accused. The issue in
this case is WoN a writ of habeas corpus should be granted? The SC said no. The
extraordinary writ of habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to inquire into
questions of violation of the petitioners’ constitutional rights and that this court
has jurisdiction to entertain this review. The jurisdiction of this court has been
expanded to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government. In this case findings show that there was no
violation of the constitutional rights of the accused and a resultant deprivation of
liberty or due process of law. The accused were sentenced to the supreme
penalty of death as a result of a valid jurisdiction, after a fair and equitable trial.
The factual milieu does not show a mistrial or a violation of the constitutional
rights of the accused. As ruled by this Court, in its decision of September 25,
1997. "the constitutional infirmity cannot affect the conclusion since accused-
appellants did not make any confessions or admissions in regard to the crime
charged. Further the earring recovered from Jury Andal was not obtained in the
course of the investigation itself, but obtained through a search incident to a
lawful arrest." The Court has held in a long line of cases, that "any illegality
attendant during the arrest is deemed cured when the accused voluntarily
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court by entering their plea."
DOCTRINE: The extraordinary writ of habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy
to inquire into questions of violation of the petitioners’ constitutional rights and
that this court has jurisdiction to entertain this review. The jurisdiction of this
court has been expanded to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government.
FACTS:
36. The power of judicial review is an aspect of judicial power that allows this
Court every opportunity to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on
appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
37. The case before us is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Jurry
Andal, Ricardo Andal and Edwin Mendoza, all convicted of rape with
homicide In Criminal Case No. 148-94 and 149-94, Regional Trial Court,
Batangas, Branch 05, Lemery, affirmed by this Court in a decision en
banc promulgated on September 25, 1997, and a resolution promulgated on
February 17, 1998.
38. They are scheduled for execution on June 16, 17, and 18, 1999.
Petitioners seek a writ of habeas corpus on the basis of a claim of
mistrial and or that the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Batangas,
Branch 05, Lemery, was void. They pray for a temporary restraining order
to stay their execution and/or a preliminary injunction enjoining their
execution.
39. The petitioners rely on the argument that the trial court was "ousted" of
jurisdiction to try their case since the pre-trial identification of the accused
was made without the assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver from
the accused. The petitioners cite the case of Olaguer v. Military
Commission No. 342, wherein in a separate opinion, Justice Claudio
Teehankee stated that "Once a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown
to exist, the court that rendered the judgment is deemed ousted of its
jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the
legality of the detention."
ISSUE/s
• W/N a writ of habeas corpus should be granted? – NO, the accused were
sentenced to the supreme penalty of death as a result of a valid jurisdiction,
after a fair and equitable trial.
RULING: IN VIEW WHEREFORE, we hereby resolve to DENY the petition for
habeas corpus, and declare valid the judgment rendered by the trial court and
affirmed by this Court. This resolution is final.
RATIO:
73. We agree with petitioners that the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus is
the appropriate remedy to inquire into questions of violation of the
petitioners' constitutional rights and that this Court has jurisdiction to
entertain this review. Indeed, under the Constitution, the jurisdiction of this
Court has been expanded "to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
74. And under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court, it is provided 83. The death penalty is what the law prescribes in cases involving rape with
that "Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas homicide.
corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which 84. We agree with the accused that they should be afforded every opportunity to
any person is deprive of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any prove their innocence, especially in cases involving the death penalty; in
person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." this case, the Court can state categorically that every opportunity was
75. He may also avail himself of the writ where as a consequence of a judicial provided the accused. However painful the decision may be in this case, we
proceeding (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting have conscientiously reviewed the case.
in the restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the 85. Four (4) Justices of the Court maintain their position as to the
sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 in so far as it prescribes the
void as to such excess. death penalty for certain heinous crimes; nevertheless, they submit to the
76. However, in this case, we find that there was no violation of the ruling of the majority to the effect that the law is constitutional and that the
constitutional rights of the accused and a resultant deprivation of death penalty may be imposed in proper cases as the one at bar.
liberty or due process of law.
77. In fact, the petition may be viewed as an attempt at a second motion for
reconsideration of a final decision of the Court, disguised as one for habeas
corpus. The accused were sentenced to the supreme penalty of death as a
result of a valid accusation, trial, and judgment by a court of competent
jurisdiction, after a fair and equitable trial.
78. The factual milieu does not show a mistrial or a violation of the
constitutional rights of the accused. As ruled by this Court, in its decision of
September 25, 1997. "the constitutional infirmity cannot affect the
conclusion since accused-appellants did not make any confessions or
admissions in regard to the crime charged. Further the earring recovered
from Jury Andal was not obtained in the course of the investigation itself,
but obtained through a search incident to a lawful arrest."
79. The Court has held in a long line of cases, that "any illegality attendant
during the arrest is deemed cured when the accused voluntarily submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the court by entering their plea."
80. The trial court therefore had jurisdiction to try the case. The Court
subsequently affirmed the decision based on a careful consideration of the
evidence presented both by the prosecution and the defense. The absence of
the testimony of Rufino Andal due to the failure of the defense counsel to
present him as a witness will not make the judgment of the lower court
invalid or void. The case was decided on the evidence presented, which this
Court considered sufficient to support the judgment of conviction.
81. The issue of "DNA tests" as a more accurate and authoritative means of
identification than eye-witness identification need not be belabored. The
accused were all properly and duly identified by the prosecution's principal
witness. Olimpio Corrales, a brother in law of accused Jurry and Ricardo
Andal. DNA testing proposed by petitioners to have an objective and
scientific basis of identification of "semen samples to compare with those
taken from the vagina of the victim" are thus unnecessary or are forgotten
evidence too late to consider now.
82. The trial court imposed and this Court affirmed the correct sentence.
 015 MADRIÑAN v. MADRIÑAN (Escalona)
July 12, 2007 | Corona, J. | Habeas Corpus - Jurisdiction
42.
PETITIONER: Felipe N. Madriñan
RESPONDENTS: Francisca R. Madriñan
SUMMARY: Felipe and Francisca got married and resided in Parañaque City.
They had 3 sons and 1 daughter. A quarrel erupted leading Felipe to leave their
conjugal home with their 3 sons. Francisca tried to fix the relationship with the
help of her parents and in-laws and Lupong Tagapamayapa, but proved futile. 43.
Francisca then filed a petition for habeas corpus for their 3 sons in the Court of
Appeals, alleging that Felipe’s acts deprived their children of education and their
mother’s care. She then prayed for Felipe to appear and produce their sons.
Felipe responded by alleging that Francisca was unfit to take care of their
children because she was a habitual drunkard and neglected her duties as their
mother. The relevant issue that Felipe raised was WoN the CA had jurisdiction
to issue the writ of habeas corpus and not the family courts as based on RA
8369.
The SC held that RA 8369 did not divest the CA or SC of their jurisdiction of
issuing writs of habeas corpus, and leads them to have concurrent jurisdiction
with family courts. This was affirmed by AM No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on
Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors
where Sec. 20 states that the petition may likewise be filed with the CA or SC 44.
alongside family courts. Clearly, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the
case.
DOCTRINE: The Court of Appeals and Supreme Court have concurrent juris-
diction with Family Courts in cases involving the issuance of a writ of Habeas
Corpus.
45.
FACTS:
39. Petitioner Felipe N. Madriñan and respondent Francisca R. Madriñan were lip and Francis Angelo who were at that time aged six and four, respective-
married on July 7, 1993 in Parañaque City. They resided in San Agustin Vil-
lage, Brgy. Moonwalk, Parañaque City. who was then eight years old, the court ruled that his custody should be
40. Their union was blessed with three sons and a daughter: Ronnick, born on determined by the proper family court in a special proceeding on custody
January 30, 1994; Phillip, born on November 19, 1996; Francis Angelo, of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
born on May 12, 1998 and Krizia Ann, born on December 12, 2000. 46.
41. After a bitter quarrel on May 18, 2002, petitioner allegedly left their conju-
gal abode and took their three sons with him to Ligao City, Albay and sub-
sequently to Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Respondent sought the help of her parents ISSUES:
and parents-in-law to patch things up between her and petitioner to no
avail. She then brought the matter to the Lupong Tagapamayapa in their
barangay but this too proved futile.
Thus respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus of Ronnick, Phillip and
Francis Angelo in the Court of Appeals, alleging that petitioner’s act of
leaving the conjugal dwelling and going to Albay and then to Laguna dis-
rupted the education of their children and deprived them of their mother’s
care. She prayed that petitioner be ordered to appear and produce their
sons before the court and to explain why they should not be returned to
her custody.
On September 3, 2002, petitioner filed his memorandum alleging that re-
spondent was unfit to take custody of their three sons because she was
habitually drunk, frequently went home late at night or in the wee hours of
the morning, spent much of her time at a beer house and neglected her
duties as a mother. He claimed that, after their squabble on May 18, 2002,
it was respondent who left, taking their daughter with her. It was only then
that he went to Sta. Rosa, Laguna where he worked as a tricycle driver. He
submitted a certification from the principal of the Dila Elementary School
in Sta. Rosa, Laguna that Ronnick and Phillip were enrolled there. He also
questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals claiming that under
Section 5(b) of RA 8369 (otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act of
1997") family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide
the petition for habeas corpus filed by respondent.
For her part, respondent averred that she did not leave their home on May
18, 2002 but was driven out by petitioner. She alleged that it was petition-
er who was an alcoholic, gambler and drug addict. Petitioner’s alcoholism
and drug addiction impaired his mental faculties, causing him to commit
acts of violence against her and their children. The situation was aggravat-
ed by the fact that their home was adjacent to that of her in-laws who fre-
quently meddled in their personal problems.
On October 21, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision asserting
its authority to take cognizance of the petition and ruling that, under Arti-
cle 213 of the Family Code, respondent was entitled to the custody of Phil-
ly, subject to the visitation rights of petitioner. With respect to Ronnick
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but
it was denied. Hence, this recourse.
 7. WoN the CA has jurisdiction over the petition for Habeas Corpus and not 44. The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over petitions for habeas cor-
the Family Courts – YES. Because the writs of Habeas Corpus awarded by pus was further affirmed by A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC (April 22, 2004) in Re:
Family Courts based on RA 8369 are considered as ancillary to petitions for Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Cus-
custody. In this case, the original petition is for Habeas Corpus and RA tody of Minors:
8369 did not divest the CA or SC of its jurisdiction to issue writs of Habeas 45. In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the
Corpus. adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and
Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. Section 20 of the
RULING: The petition is hereby DENIED.
rule provides that:
a. Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. – A verified petition
RATIO:
for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be
filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its
40. Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the peti-
judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.
tion for habeas corpus and insists that jurisdiction over the case is lodged
b. The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court
in the family courts under RA 8369. He invokes Section 5(b) of RA 8369:
of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the
a. Section 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. – The Family Courts shall
writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ
have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the follow-
may be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court
ing cases:
within the region where the petitioner resides or where the minor
i. Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, habeas
may be found for hearing and decision on the merits.
corpus in relation to the latter;
46. From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and Su-
41. The SC ruled that the Petitioner is wrong.
preme Court have concurrent jurisdiction with family courts in habeas
42. In Thornton v. Thornton, this Court resolved the issue of the Court of Ap-
corpus cases where the custody of minors is involved.
peals’ jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody
47. We note that after petitioner moved out of their Parañaque residence on
of minors in the light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclu-
May 18, 2002, he twice transferred his sons to provinces covered by differ-
sive original jurisdiction over such petitions:
ent judicial regions. This situation is what the Thornton interpretation of
a. The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since
RA 8369’s provision on jurisdiction precisely addressed:
there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue
a. [The reasoning that by giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction
writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.
over habeas corpus cases, the lawmakers intended them to be the
b. We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Ap-
sole courts which can issue writs of habeas corpus] will result in
peals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas
an iniquitous situation, leaving individuals like [respondent] with-
corpus cases involving the custody of minors.
out legal recourse in obtaining custody of their children. Individu-
43. The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdic-
als who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking
tion of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas
for would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family
corpus relating to the custody of minors. Further, it cannot be said that the
courts whose writs are enforceable only in their respective terri-
provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 [An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the
torial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one
Court of Appeals] and BP 129 [The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980]
place to another, which seems to be the case here, the petition-
are absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of
er in a habeas corpuscase will be left without legal remedy. This
Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cas-
lack of recourse could not have been the intention of the law-
es involving the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must
makers when they passed [RA 8369].
be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 – that family courts have
48. Moreover, a careful reading of Section 5(b) of RA 8369 reveals that family
concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court
courts are vested with original exclusive jurisdiction in custody cases, not
in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue.
in habeas corpus cases. Writs of habeas corpus which may be issued exclu-
 sively by family courts under Section 5(b) of RA 8369 pertain to
the ancillary remedy that may be availed of in conjunction with a petition
for custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. In other words,
the issuance of the writ is merely ancillary to the custody case pending be-
fore the family court. The writ must be issued by the same court to avoid
splitting of jurisdiction, conflicting decisions, interference by a co-equal
court and judicial instability.
49. The rule therefore is: when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or
judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to
carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer. Once a court
acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, it does so to the ex-
clusion of all other courts, including related incidents and ancillary matters.
 016 ALEJANO v. CABUAY (Fordan)
Aug. 25, 2005 | Carpio, J. | Habeas Corpus
PETITIONERS: In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Capt. Gary
Alejano, PN (Marines), Capt. Nicanor Faeldon, PN (Marines), Capt. Gerardo Gam-
bala, PA, LT. SG James Layug, PN, Capt. Milo Maestrecampo, PA, LT. SG Antonio
Trillanes IV, PN, Homobono Adaza, and Roberto Rafael (Roel) Pulido
RESPONDENTS: Gen. Pedro Cabuay (Chief of the Intelligence Service of the
AFP), Gen. Narciso Abaya (Chief of Staff of the AFP), Sec. Angelo Reyes (Sec. of
National Defense), and Sec. Roilo Golez (National Security Adviser)
SUMMARY: On July 27, 2003, some 321 armed soldiers entered and took control
of the Oakwood. The soldiers disarmed the security officers of Oakwood and planted
explosive devices in its immediate surroundings. The junior officers publicly re-
nounced their support for the administration and called for the resignation of Pres.
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet members. In the evening, the soldiers
voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after several negotiations with government
emissaries. The soldiers later defused the explosive devices they had earlier planted.
Gen. Abaya issued a directive to all the Major Service Commanders to turn over
custody of 10 junior officers to the ISAFP Detention Center. Then, the government
prosecutors filed an Information for coup d’etat with the RTC of Makati against the
soldiers involved in the Oakwood incident. Detainees’ lawyers filed a petition for
habeas corpus with the SC and on the following day, the latter issued a Resolution
directing respondents to make a return of the writ and to appear and produce the per-
sons of the detainees before the CA on the scheduled date for hearing and further
proceedings. The CA rendered its decision dismissing the petition since it is bereft of
merit. The detainees are already charged of coup d’etat before the RTC of Makati
and habeas corpus is unavailing in this case as the detainees’ confinement is under a
valid indictment.
The issue is whether or not petition for habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy that
the detainees may seek. NO. In a habeas corpus petition, the order to present an in-
dividual before the court is a preliminary step in the hearing of the petition. The re-
spondent must produce the person and explain the cause of his detention. However,
this order is not a ruling on the propriety of the remedy or on the substantive matters
covered by the remedy. Thus, the SC’s order to the CA to conduct a factual hearing
was not an affirmation of the propriety of the remedy of habeas corpus. The duty to
hear the petition for habeas corpus necessarily includes the determination of the pro-
priety of the remedy. If a court finds the alleged cause of the detention unlawful, then
it should issue the writ and release the detainees. In this case, after hearing, the CA
found that habeas corpus is inapplicable. After actively participating in the hearing
before the CA, detainees are estopped from claiming that the CA had no jurisdiction
to inquire into the merits of their petition. The CA correctly ruled that the remedy of
habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to address the detainees’ lawyers complaint
against the regulations and conditions in the ISAFP Detention Center. *doctrine 1*
Nonetheless, case law has expanded the writ’s application to circumstances where
there is deprivation of a person’s constitutional rights. The writ is available where a
person continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional free-
doms, where there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely invol-
untary but are also unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid
has later become arbitrary. However, a mere allegation of a violation of one’s consti-
tutional right is not sufficient. *doctrine 2*
DOCTRINE: (1) The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the
cause of detention of a person. The purpose of the writ is to determine whether a
person is being illegally deprived of his liberty. If the inquiry reveals that the deten-
tion is illegal, the court orders the release of the person. If, however, the detention is
proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate. The use of habeas
corpus is thus very limited. It is not a writ of error. Neither can it substitute for an
appeal.
(2) The courts will extend the scope of the writ only if any of the following circum-
stances is present:
a. there is a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the unlawful restraint of
a person;
b. the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or
c. an excessive penalty is imposed and such sentence is void as to the excess.
Whatever situation the petitioner invokes, the threshold remains high. The violation
of constitutional right must be sufficient to void the entire proceedings.
FACTS:
152. Early morning of July 27, 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the now
detained junior officers, entered and took control of the Oakwood Premier
61
Luxury Apartments (Oakwood) .
153. The soldiers disarmed the security officers of Oakwood and planted explo-
sive devices in its immediate surroundings. The junior officers publicly re-
nounced their support for the administration and called for the resignation
of Pres. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet members.
154. Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to
the authorities after several negotiations with government emissaries. The
soldiers later defused the explosive devices they had earlier planted. The
soldiers then returned to their barracks.
155. On July 31, 2003, Gen. Abaya (Chief of Staff of the AFP) issued a directive
to all the Major Service Commanders to turn over custody of 10 junior offic-
ers to the Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP) Detention Center. The
61
An upscale apartment complex located in the business district of Makati City
 transfer took place while military and civilian authorities were investigating remedy to address the detainees’ lawyers complaint against the regulations and con-
the soldiers’ involvement in the Oakwood incident. ditions in the ISAFP Detention Center.
156. On Aug. 1 2003, government prosecutors filed an Information for coup
d’etat with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 61, against the soldiers involved in RULING: The SC dismiss the petition and affirm the decision of the CA.
the Oakwood incident. The government prosecutors accused the soldiers of
coup d’etat under Article 134-A of the RPC, as amended. RATIO:
157. On Aug. 2, 2003, Gen. Abaya issued a directive to all Major Service Com- On the issue of habeas corpus [IMPORTANT]
224. The detainees’ lawyers claim that SC’s Aug. 12, 2003 Order granted the pe-
manders to take into custody the military personnel under their command
tition and the it remanded the case to the CA only for a factual hearing. Thus,
who took part in the Oakwood incident except the detained junior officers
they argue that the Order had already foreclosed any question on the propriety
who were to remain under the custody of ISAFP.
and merits of their petition.
158. On Aug. 11, 2003, petitioners (Detainees’ lawyers) filed a petition for ha- 225. SC held that detainees’ lawyers’ claim is baseless.
beas corpus with the SC and on the following day, the latter issued a Resolu- 226. A plain reading of the Aug. 12, 2003 Order shows that SC referred to the
tion directing respondents to make a return of the writ and to appear and CA the duty to inquire into the cause of the junior officers’ detention. Had it
produce the persons of the detainees before the CA on the scheduled date ruled for the detainees’ release, the SC would not have referred the hearing of
for hearing and further proceedings. the petition to the CA.
159. On the same date, the detainees and their other co-accused filed with the 227. In a habeas corpus petition, the order to present an individual before the
RTC of Makati City a Motion for Preliminary Investigation, which the trial court is a preliminary step in the hearing of the petition. The respondent must
court granted. produce the person and explain the cause of his detention. However, this or-
160. On Aug. 18, 2003, respondents submitted their Return of the Writ and An- der is not a ruling on the propriety of the remedy or on the substantive matters
swer to the petition and produced the detainees before the CA during the covered by the remedy. Thus, the SC’s order to the CA to conduct a factual
scheduled hearing. hearing was not an affirmation of the propriety of the remedy of habeas cor-
161. On Sept. 17, 2003, the CA rendered its decision dismissing the petition. pus.
a. The petition is bereft of merit since the detainees are already charged of coup 228. The duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus necessarily includes the de-
d’etat before the RTC of Makati. Habeas corpus is unavailing in this case as the termination of the propriety of the remedy. If a court finds the alleged cause
detainees’ confinement is under a valid indictment. of the detention unlawful, then it should issue the writ and release the detain-
b. It recognized that habeas corpus may also be the appropriate remedy to assail ees.
the legality of detention if there is a deprivation of a constitutional right. Howev- 229. In this case, after hearing, the CA found that habeas corpus is inapplicable.
er, the constitutional rights alleged to have been violated in this case do not di- After actively participating in the hearing before the CA, detainees are es-
rectly affect the detainees’ liberty. The regulation of the detainees’ right to con- topped from claiming that the CA had no jurisdiction to inquire into the mer-
fer with their counsels is reasonable under the circumstances. its of their petition.
c. While the opening and reading of Trillanes’ letter is an abhorrent violation of his 230. The CA correctly ruled that the remedy of habeas corpus is not the proper
right to privacy of communication, this does not justify the issuance of a writ of remedy to address the detainees’ lawyers complaint against the regulations
habeas corpus. The violation does not amount to illegal restraint, which is the and conditions in the ISAFP Detention Center.
proper subject of habeas corpus proceedings. 231. The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the
d. Nonetheless, it ordered Gen. Cabuay, who was in charge of implementing the cause of detention of a person. The purpose of the writ is to determine
regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center, to adhere to his commitment made in whether a person is being illegally deprived of his liberty. If the inquiry
court regarding visiting hours and the detainees’ right to exercise for 2 hours a reveals that the detention is illegal, the court orders the release of the
day. person. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas cor-
162. Hence, the current petition. pus proceedings terminate. The use of habeas corpus is thus very limited.
It is not a writ of error. Neither can it substitute for an appeal.
ISSUES: Whether or not petition for habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy 232. Nonetheless, case law has expanded the writ’s application to circumstances
that the detainees may seek. – NO, the remedy of habeas corpus is not the proper where there is deprivation of a person’s constitutional rights. The writ is
available where a person continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of
 his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the of the detention officer to adopt and implement reasonable measures to secure
restraints are not merely involuntary but are also unnecessary, and where a the safety of the detainee and prevent his escape.
deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary. 237. True, Sec. 4(b)63 of RA 7438 makes it an offense to prohibit a lawyer from
233. However, a mere allegation of a violation of one’s constitutional right is not visiting a detainee client “at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the
sufficient. The courts will extend the scope of the writ only if any of the night.” However, the last paragraph makes the express qualification that
following circumstances is present: “notwithstanding” the provisions of Sec. 4(b), the detention officer has the
a. there is a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the unlawful power to undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure
restraint of a person; the safety of the detainee and prevent his escape. The last paragraph pre-
b. the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or scribes a clear standard. The regulations governing a detainee’s confinement
c. an excessive penalty is imposed and such sentence is void as to the ex- must be “reasonable measures x x x to secure his safety and prevent his es-
cess. cape.” Thus, the regulations must be reasonably connected to the govern-
Whatever situation the petitioner invokes, the threshold remains high. The ment’s objective of securing the safety and preventing the escape of the de-
violation of constitutional right must be sufficient to void the entire pro- tainee. The law grants the detention officer the authority to “undertake such
reasonable measures” or regulations.
ceedings.
238. In this case, the visiting hours accorded to the detainees’ lawyers are rea-
sonably connected to the legitimate purpose of securing the safety and pre-
On the issue of right to counsel, punishment, and right of privacy of communication:
venting the escape of all detainees. While they may not visit the detainees any
234. The detainees’ lawyers admit that they do not question the legality of the
time they want, the fact that the detainees still have face-to-face meetings
detention of the detainees. Neither do they dispute the lawful indictment of
with their lawyers on a daily basis clearly shows that there is no impairment
the detainees for criminal and military offenses. What they bewail is the regu-
of detainees’ right to counsel.
lation adopted by Gen. Cabuay in the ISAFP Detention Center preventing
239. Detainees’ lawyers as counsels could visit their clients between 8AM and
them as detainees’ lawyers from seeing the detainees—their clients—any time
5PM with a lunch break at 12PM. The visiting hours are regular business
of the day or night. The regulation allegedly curtails the detainees’ right to
hours, the same hours when lawyers normally entertain clients in their law of-
counsel and violates Republic Act No. 7438 (RA 7438)62. They claim that the
fices. Clearly, the visiting hours pass the standard of reasonableness.
regulated visits made it difficult for them to prepare for the important hear-
240. Moreover, in urgent cases, detainees’ lawyers could always seek permission
ings before the Senate and the Feliciano Commission.
from the ISAFP officials to confer with their clients beyond the visiting hours.
235. Detainees’ lawyers also point out that the officials of the ISAFP Detention
The scheduled visiting hours provide reasonable access to the detainees, giv-
Center violated the detainees’ right to privacy of communication when the
ing them sufficient time to confer with the detainees. The detainees’ right to
ISAFP officials opened and read the personal letters of Trillanes and Capt.
counsel is not undermined by the scheduled visits. Even in the hearings before
Milo Maestrecampo (Maestrecampo). They further claim that the ISAFP offi-
the Senate and the Feliciano Commission, they were given time to confer with
cials violated the detainees’ right against cruel and unusual punishment when
the detainees, a fact that they themselves admit. Thus, at no point were the de-
the ISAFP officials prevented the detainees from having contact with their
tainees denied their right to counsel.
visitors. Moreover, the ISAFP officials boarded up with iron bars and ply-
wood slabs the iron grills of the detention cells, limiting the already poor light
B. Punishment
and ventilation in the detainees’ cells.

A. Right to counsel
236. Pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confine-
ment. However, the fact that the detainees are confined makes their rights
more limited than those of the public. RA 7438, which specifies the rights of
detainees and the duties of detention officers, expressly recognizes the power
62
An Act Defining Certain Rights of the Person Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation, as
well as the Duties of the Arresting, Detaining, and Investigating Officers and Providing Penalties for
Violations Thereof.
63
Section 4. Penalty Clause.—a) x x x
b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any member of the immediate family of a
person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation, or any medical doctor or priest or religious
minister or by his counsel, from visiting and conferring privately chosen by him or by any member of his
immediate family with him, or from examining and treating him, or from ministering to his spiritual
needs, at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
not less than four (4) years nor more than six (6) years, and a fine of four thousand pesos (P4,000.00).
The provisions of the above Section notwithstanding, any security officer with custodial responsibility
over any detainee or prisoner may undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure his
safety and prevent his escape.
 241. Detainees’ lawyers further argue that the bars separating the detainees from
their visitors and the boarding of the iron grills in their cells with plywood
amount to unusual and excessive punishment.
242. This argument fails to impress us. Bell v. Wolfish pointed out that while a
detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance
with due process of law, detention inevitably interferes with a detainee’s de-
sire to live comfortably. The fact that the restrictions inherent in detention in-
trude into the detainees’ desire to live comfortably does not convert those re-
strictions into punishment. It is when the restrictions are arbitrary and pur-
poseless that courts will infer intent to punish. Courts will also infer intent to
punish even if the restriction seems to be related rationally to the alternative
purpose if the restriction appears excessive in relation to that purpose. Jail of-
ficials are thus not required to use the least restrictive security measure. They
must only refrain from implementing a restriction that appears excessive to
the purpose it serves.
243. An action constitutes a punishment when (1) that action causes the inmate
to suffer some harm or “disability,” and (2) the purpose of the action is to
punish the inmate. Punishment also requires that the harm or disability be sig-
nificantly greater than, or be independent of, the inherent discomforts of con-
finement.
244. In this case, SC cannot infer punishment from the separation of the detain-
ees from their visitors by iron bars, which is merely a limitation on contact
visits. The iron bars separating the detainees from their visitors prevent direct
physical contact but still allow the detainees to have visual, verbal, non-verbal
and limited physical contact with their visitors. The arrangement is not unduly
restrictive.
245. In fact, it is not even a strict non-contact visitation regulation like in Block
v. Rutherford. The limitation on the detainees’ physical contacts with visitors
is a reasonable, non-punitive response to valid security concerns. The board-
ing of the iron grills is for the furtherance of security within the ISAFP Deten-
tion Center. This measure intends to fortify the individual cells and to prevent
the detainees from passing on contraband and weapons from one cell to an-
other. The boarded grills ensure security and prevent disorder and crime with-
in the facility. The diminished illumination and ventilation are but discom-
forts inherent in the fact of detention, and do not constitute punishments on
the detainees.
C. Right to privacy of communications
246. American cases recognize that the unmonitored use of pre-trial detainees’
non-privileged mail poses a genuine threat to jail security. Hence, when a de-
tainee places his letter in an envelope for non-privileged mail, the detainee
knowingly exposes his letter to possible inspection by jail officials.
247. A pre-trial detainee has no reasonable expectation of privacy for his incom-
ing mail. However, incoming mail from lawyers of inmates enjoys limited
protection such that prison officials can open and inspect the mail for contra-
band but could not read the contents without violating the inmates’ right to
correspond with his lawyer. The inspection of privileged mail is limited to
physical contraband and not to verbal contraband.
248. Thus, SC do not agree with the CA that the opening and reading of the de-
tainees’ letters in the present case violated the detainees’ right to privacy of
communication. The letters were not in a sealed envelope. The inspection of
the folded letters is a valid measure as it serves the same purpose as the open-
ing of sealed letters for the inspection of contraband. The letters alleged to
have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not confidential letters between
the detainees and their lawyers. The detainee’s lawyer who received the let-
ters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting as the de-
tainees’ personal courier and not as their counsel when he received the letters
for mailing.
249. In the present case, since the letters were not confidential communication
between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention
Center could read the letters. If the letters are marked confidential communi-
cation between the detainees and their lawyers, the detention officials should
not read the letters but only open the envelopes for inspection in the presence
of the detainees.
250. That a law is required before an executive officer could intrude on a citi-
zen’s privacy rights is a guarantee that is available only to the public at large
but not to persons who are detained or imprisoned. The right to privacy of
those detained is subject to Sec. 4 of RA 7438, as well as to the limitations
inherent in lawful detention or imprisonment. By the very fact of their deten-
tion, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a diminished expecta-
tion of privacy rights.
 LAGMAN v. MEDIALDEA (GALINDEZ)
July 4, 2017 | Del Castillo, J. | Habeas Corpus
PETITIONER: Edcel Lagman et al, Eufemia Campos et al, Norkaya Mohamad
et al.
RESPONDENTS: Salvador Medialdea et al.
SUMMARY: The President issued a proclamation declaring a state of martial
law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of
Mindanao. This was brought about by the terrorism of the Abu Sayyaf Group
and the Maute group in Marawi.
The Maute terrorist group took over a hospital in Marawi City; established
several checkpoints within the city; burned down certain government and
private facilities and inflicted casualties on the part of Government forces; and
started flying the flag of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in several
areas, thereby indicating a removal of allegiance from the Philippine
Government and their capability to deprive the duly constituted authorities – the
President, foremost – of their powers and prerogatives.
The President submitted this written report to the Congress within the time
required by the Constitution. The Senate found it sound and issued a Resolution
in full support to the martial law proclamation and finding the proclamation in
accordance with law. It found "no compelling reason to revoke the same".
3 petitions were filed: Lagman group, Cullamat group and the Mohamad group.
The OSG filed its consolidated comment to the petitions.
ISSUE (this is the one most related to specpro and not consti; case is super long
but full of consti issues) WoN the petitions are the “appropriate proceeding”
covered by par. 3, sec. 18 of the Constitution sufficient to invoke the mode of
review required by the Court – YES. The framers of the Constitution added the
safeguard under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII on top of the
expanded jurisdiction of this Court.
The jurisdiction of the Court under Sec. 18, Art. VII is sui generis. A plain
reading of the afore-quoted Section 18, Article VII reveals that it specifically
grants authority to the Court to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus.
It could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution that the
phrase "in an appropriate proceeding" would refer to a Petition for Certiorari
pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5 of Article VIII.
The standard of review in a petition for certiorari is whether the respondent has
committed any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in the performance of his or her functions.
Thus, it is not the proper tool to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation nor suspension. It must be emphasized that under Section 18,
Article VII, the Court is tasked to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the President's exercise of emergency powers.
DOCTRINE: A proceeding "[i]n its general acceptation, [is] the form in which
actions are to be brought and defended, the manner of intervening in suits, of
conducting them, the mode of deciding them, of opposing judgments, and of
executing."
In fine, the phrase "in an appropriate proceeding" appearing on the third
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII refers to any action initiated by a citizen for
the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of
the Chief Executive's emergency powers, as in these cases. It could be
denominated as a complaint, a petition, or a matter to be resolved by the Court.
FACTS:
1. Effective May 23, 2017 and for a period not exceeding 60 days, Pres.
Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of
Mindanao.
2. A written report on the factual basis of said proclamation was submitted to
Congress, within the timeline imposed by the Constitution.
3. The President explained that on May 23, 2017, a government operation to
capture the high-ranking officers of the Abu Sayyaf Group and the Maute
Group was conducted.
4. The Maute terrorist group took over a hospital in Marawi City; established
several checkpoints within the city; burned down certain government and
private facilities and inflicted casualties on the part of Government forces;
and started flying the flag of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in
several areas, thereby indicating a removal of allegiance from the Philippine
Government and their capability to deprive the duly constituted authorities
– the President, foremost – of their powers and prerogatives.
 5. In addition to the Report, representatives from the Executive Department,
the military and police authorities conducted briefings with the Senate and
the House of Representatives relative to the declaration of martial law.
6. After the submission of the Report and briefings, Senate issued a Resolution
in full support to the martial law proclamation and finding the proclamation
in accordance with law. It found "no compelling reason to revoke the
same".
7. These are consolidated petitions by the groups of Lagman, Cullamat and
Mohamad (3 petitions).
8. The OSG filed a consolidated comment as required by the Court.
ISSUE/s:
1. [MOST RELATED TO SPECPRO AND NOT CONSTI] WoN the petitions
are the “appropriate proceeding” covered by par. 3, sec. 18 of the
Constitution sufficient to invoke the mode of review required by the Court –
YES. The framers of the Constitution added the safeguard under the third
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII on top of the expanded jurisdiction of
this Court.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS sufficient factual bases for the issuance
of Proclamation No. 216 and DECLARES it as CONSTITUTIONAL. Accordingly,
the consolidated Petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
RATIO:
1. Art. VII Sec. 18 of the Constitution provides:
a. The SC may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any
citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the
extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within
thirty days from its filing.
2. Lagman et al. theorized that the jurisdiction of the Court under said
provision is sui generis. The Court agrees.
Jurisdiction must be specifically conferred by law.
3. A plain reading of the afore-quoted Section 18, Article VII reveals that it
specifically grants authority to the Court to determine the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
“In an appropriate proceeding” does not refer to a petition for certiorari filed under
Section 1 or 5 of Article VIII
4. It could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution that
the phrase "in an appropriate proceeding" would refer to a Petition for
Certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5 of Article VIII.
5. The standard of review in a petition for certiorari is whether the respondent
has committed any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in the performance of his or her functions.
6. Thus, it is not the proper tool to review the sufficiency of the factual basis
of the proclamation nor suspension. It must be emphasized that under
Section 18, Article VII, the Court is tasked to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the President's exercise of emergency powers.
7. Put differently, if this Court applies the standard of review used in a petition
for certiorari, the same would emasculate its constitutional task under
Section 18, Article VII.
To interpret “appropriate proceeding” as filed under Sec. 1 of Art. VIII would be
contrary to the intent of the Constitution
8. The framers of the Constitution added the safeguard under the third
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII on top of the expanded jurisdiction of
this Court.
Jurisdiction of the Court is not restricted to those enumerated in Secs. 1 and 5 of Art.
VIII
9. The jurisdiction of this Court is not restricted to those enumerated in
Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII. For instance, its jurisdiction to be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
the President or Vice-President can be found in the last paragraph of
Section 4, Article VII.
10. The power of the Court to review on certiorari the decision, order, or ruling
of the Commission on Elections and Commission on Audit can be found in
Section 7, Article IX(A).
Unique features of the third paragraph of Sec. 18, Art. VII make it sui generis
11. Under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII, a petition filed
pursuant therewith will follow a different rule on standing as any citizen
may file it.
12. Said provision of the Constitution also limits the issue to the sufficiency of
the factual basis of the exercise by the Chief Executive of his emergency
powers.
13. The usual period for filing pleadings in Petition for Certiorari is likewise
not applicable under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII
considering the limited period within which this Court has to promulgate its
decision.
14. A proceeding "[i]n its general acceptation, [is] the form in which actions are
to be brought and defended, the manner of intervening in suits, of
conducting them, the mode of deciding them, of opposing judgments, and
of executing."
15. In fine, the phrase "in an appropriate proceeding" appearing on the third
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII refers to any action initiated by a
citizen for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the exercise of the Chief Executive's emergency powers, as in these cases. It
could be denominated as a complaint, a petition, or a matter to be resolved
by the Court.
 018 RAZON JR. v. TAGITIS (Gonzales)
December 3, 2009 | Brion, J. | Writ of amparo
PETITIONERS: Gen. Avelino Razon, Jr., PNP Chief et al.
RESPONDENTS: Mary Jean B. Tagitis, represented by Atty. Felipe Arcilla, Jr.
SUMMARY: Mrs. Tagitis filed a Petition for Writ of Amparo with the CA follow-
ing the disappearance of his husband. His husband was last seen in Jolo, Sulu. CA
immediately issued the writ of amparo and set the case for hearing. Mrs. Tagitis
pointed to two sources of information as her bases for her allegation that Tagistis had
been placed under government custody. The first was Col. Ancanan, who occupied a
high position in the military and who allegedly mentioned that Tagitis was in good
hands. The more specific and productive source of information was Col. Kasim,
whom Mrs. Tagitis, together with her witness, met in Camp Katitipan in Davao City.
The CA issued a decision confirming the enforced disappearance of Engineer Tagitis
and extended the writ to Tagitis and his family. The issue is WoN the writ of amparo
should be extended to Engineer Tagitis – YES. Col. Kasim's disclosure, made in an
unguarded moment, unequivocally point to some government complicity in the dis-
appearance.
DOCTRINE: The Amparo petitioner needs only to properly comply with the sub-
stance and form requirements of a Writ of Amparo petition, and prove the allegations
by substantial evidence. Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the respondents
must then respond and prove their defenses based on the standard of diligence re-
quired. The rebuttable case, of course, must show that an enforced disappearance
took place under circumstances showing a violation of the victim's constitutional
rights to life, liberty or security, and the failure on the part of the investigating au-
thorities to appropriately respond.
FACTS:
44. Engineer Morced N. Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank
and the Senior Honorary Counselor for the Islamic Develop-
ment Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, was last seen in
Jolo, Sulu. Together with Arsimin Kunnong, an IDB scholar,
Tagitis arrived in Jolo by boat in the early morning of Octo-
ber 31, 2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They im-
mediately checked-in at ASY Pension House. Tagitis asked
Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for his return trip. When
Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis was no longer
around.
45. Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP pro-
fessor of Muslim studies and Tagitis' fellow student counse-
lor at the IDB, reported Tagitis' disappearance to the Jolo Po-
lice Station.
46. More than a month later, respondent (Tagitis’ wife) filed a
Petition for the Writ of Amparo with the CA.
a. A couple of burly men believed to be police intelli-
gence operatives, forcibly took Engr. Tagitis and
boarded the latter on a motor vehicle then sped away.
b. Kunnong including his friends, exerted efforts in try-
ing to locate the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and
when he reported the matter to the police authorities
in Jolo, he was immediately given a ready answer that
Engr. Tagitis could have been abducted by the Abu
Sayyaf group
c. According to reliable information, Engr. Tagitis is in
the custody of police intelligence operatives, specifi-
cally with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being
held against his will in an earnest attempt of the po-
lice to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with the dif-
ferent terrorist groups;
d. Instead of helping the [respondent], she [sic] was told
of an intriguing tale by the police that her husband
was not missing but was with another woman having
good time somewhere, which is a clear indication of
the [petitioners'] refusal to help
47. The CA immediately issued the Writ of Amparo, set the case
for hearing, and directed the petitioners to file their verified
return
48. In their verified Return, the petitioners denied any involve-
ment in or knowledge of Tagitis' alleged abduction. That, In
spite of our exhaustive efforts, the whereabouts of Engr. Ta-
gitis cannot be determined but our office is continuously in-
tensifying the conduct of information gathering, monitoring
and coordination for the immediate solution of the case.
49. Since the disappearance of Tagistis was practically admitted
and taking note of favorable actions so far taken on the dis-
 appearance, the CA directed Gen. Goltiao to form TASK
FORCE TAGITIS.
50. In the hearing, TASK FORCE TAGITIS submitted an intelli-
gence report from PSL Pingay, the Chief of Police of the Jolo
Police Station, stating a possible motive for Tagitis' disap-
pearance. The report was based on the sworn affidavit of Prof
Matli: [Based] on reliable information from the Office of
Muslim Affairs in Manila, Tagitis has reportedly taken and
carried away . . . more or less P5,000,000.00, which [was] in-
tended for the . . . IDB Scholarship Fund.
51. The CA issued an ALARM WARNING that Task Force Ta-
gitis did not appear to be exerting extraordinary efforts: It
was only as late as January 28, 2008, after the hearing, that
GEN. GOLTIAO and COL. AJIRIM had requested for clear
photographs when it should have been standard operating
procedure in kidnappings or disappearances for dissemina-
tion to all parts of the country and to neighboring countries.
Testimonies for the Respondent
52. The respondent testified that a friend from Zamboanga hold-
ing a high position in the military told her that her husband
"[was] in good hands". She went to Camp Katitipan in Davao
City where she met Col. Kasim who read a "highly confiden-
tial report" and informed her that her husband was abducted
because "he is under custodial investigation" for being a liai-
son for "J.I. or Jema'ah Islamiah".
53. Respondent’s narrative report concerning her meeting with
Col. Ancanan:
a. We had private conversation with Col. Ancanan.
b. Col. Ancanan assured me that my husband is alive
and he's last looked [sic] in Talipapao, Jolo, Sulu. I
called up Col. Ancanan several times begging to tell
me the exact location of my husband and who held
him but he refused.
54. The respondent also narrated her encounter with Col. Kasim:
a. Mr. Salvador called me up informing me up inform-
ing me that I am to go to Camp Katitipan to meet Col.
Kasim for he has an urgent, confidential information
to reveal.
b. It is said that Engr. Tagitis is carrying boxes of medi-
cines for the injured terrorists as a supplier.
55. Mrs. Talbin testified that she was with the respondent when
she went to Zamboanga to see Col. Ancanan, and to Davao
City at Camp Katitipan to meet Col. Kasim.
Testimonies for the Petitioner
56. Prof. Matli submitted a new affidavit retracting the state-
ments he made in his affidavit. He never told PS Supt. Pin-
gay, or made any accusation, that Tagitis took away money
entrusted to him. Prof. Matli confirmed, however, that that he
had received an e-mail report from that the IDB was seeking
assistance of the office in locating the funds of IDB scholars
deposited in Tagitis' personal account.
57. Col. Kasim testified that the information he gave the re-
spondent was given to him by his informant, who was a "ci-
vilian asset", through a letter which he considered as "unoffi-
cial". He testified further that he destroyed the letter right af-
ter he read it to the respondent and her companions because
“it was not important to him— and also because the infor-
mation it contained had no importance in relation with the
abduction of Tagitis.
58. Col. Pante denied that his office conducted any surveillance
on Tagitis prior to the latter's disappearance.
59. The CA issued its decision confirming that the disappearance
of Tagitis was an "enforced disappearance" under the United
Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearances. When military intelligence
pinpointed the investigative arm of the PNP (CIDG) to be in-
volved in the abduction, the missing-person case qualified as
an enforced disappearance. The CA greatly relied on the "raw
report" from Col. Kasim's asset, pointing to the CIDG's in-
volvement in Tagitis' abduction. It also labeled as "suspect"
Col. Kasim's subsequent and belated retraction of his state-
ment that the military, the police, or the CIDG was involved
in the abduction of Tagitis.
 60. Based on these considerations, the CA thus extended the privilege of the
writ to Tagitis and his family.
ISSUES:
23. WoN the writ of amparo should be extended to Engineer Ta-
gitis – YES. Col. Kasim's disclosure, made in an unguarded
moment, unequivocally point to some government complicity
in the disappearance.
RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petitioners' petition for review
on certiorari for lack of merit, and AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 7, 2008
under the following terms:
a. Recognition that the disappearance of Engineer Tagitis is an enforced disappearance covered by the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo;
b. Without any specific pronouncement on exact authorship and responsibility, declaring the govern-
ment (through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG) and Colonel Julasirim Kasim accountable for the enforced
disappearance of Engineer Tagitis;
c. Confirmation of the validity of the Writ of Amparo the Court of Appeals issued;
d. Holding the PNP, through the PNP Chief, and the PNP-CIDG, through its Chief, directly responsible
for the disclosure of material facts known to the government and to their offices regarding the disap-
pearance of Engineer Tagitis, and for the conduct of proper investigations using extraordinary dili-
gence, with the obligation to show investigation results acceptable to this Court;
e. Ordering Colonel Kasim impleaded in this case and holding him accountable with the obligation to
disclose information known to him and to his "assets" f. Referring this case back to the Court of Ap-
peals for appropriate proceedings directed at the monitoring of the PNP and PNP-CIDG investigations,
actions and the validation of their results; the PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall initially present to the
Court of Appeals a plan of action for further investigation, periodically reporting their results to the
Court of Appeals for consideration and action;
g. Requiring the Court of Appeals to submit to this Court a quarterly report with its recommendations,
copy furnished the incumbent PNP and PNP-CIDG Chiefs as petitioners and the respondent, with the
first report due at the end of the first quarter counted from the finality of this Decision;
h. The PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall have one (1) full year to undertake their investigations; the Court
of Appeals shall submit its full report for the consideration of this Court at the end of the 4th quarter
counted from the finality of this Decision; TDEASC
The dismissal of the Amparo petition with respect to General Alexander Yano, Commanding General,
Philippine Army, and General Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terrorism Task Force Comet, Zamboanga
City, is hereby AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
Sufficiency in Form and Substance
1. In questioning the sufficiency in form and substance of the
Amparo petition, the petitioners contend that the petition vio-
lated Section 5(c), (d), and (e) of the Amparo Rule. Specifi-
cally, the petitioners allege that the respondent failed to:
2. The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5 (c)
to be complete in every detail in stating the threatened or ac-
tual violation of a victim's rights. As in any other initiatory
pleading, the pleader must of course state the ultimate
facts. In an Amparo petition, however, this requirement must
be read in light of the nature and purpose of the proceeding,
which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner may
not be able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly
disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest
him or her, or where the victim is detained, because these in-
formation may purposely be hidden or covered up by those
who caused the disappearance.
3. The test in reading the petition should be to determine
whether it contains the details available to the petitioner un-
der the circumstances, while presenting a cause of action
showing a violation of the victim's rights to life, liberty and
security through State or private party action. The petition
should likewise be read in its totality.
4. In the present case, the petition amply recites the circum-
stances under which Tagitis suddenly dropped out of sight af-
ter engaging in normal activities, and thereafter was nowhere
to be found despite efforts to locate him. The petition alleged,
too, that according to reliable information, police operatives
were the perpetrators of the abduction. It also clearly alleged
how Tagitis' rights to life, liberty and security were violated
when he was "forcibly taken and boarded on a motor vehicle
by a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence
operatives", and then taken "into custody by the respondents'
police intelligence operatives since October 30, 2007, specif-
ically by the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, . . . held against
his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and
connect [him] with different terrorist groups."
5. These allegations, in our view, properly pleaded ultimate
facts within the pleader's knowledge about Tagitis' disap-
pearance, the participation by agents of the State in this dis-
appearance, the failure of the State to release Tagitis or to
provide sufficient information about his whereabouts, as well
as the actual violation of his right to liberty.
6. If a defect can at all be attributed to the petition, this defect is
its lack of supporting affidavit, as required by Section 5 (c) of
the Amparo Rule.
7. Where, as in this case, the petitioner has substantially com-
plied with the requirement by submitting a verified petition
sufficiently detailing the facts relied upon, the strict need for
the sworn statement that an affidavit represents is essentially
fulfilled. The failure to attach the required affidavits was ful-
ly cured when the respondent and her witness personally tes-
tified in the CA hearings to swear to and flesh out the allega-
tions of the petition.
8. Section 5 (d) of the Amparo Rule requires that prior investi-
gation of an alleged disappearance must have been made,
specifying the manner and results of the investigation. Effec-
tively, this requirement seeks to establish at the earliest op-
portunity the level of diligence the public authorities under-
took in relation with the reported disappearance.
9. We reject the petitioners' argument that the respondent's peti-
tion did not comply with the Section 5 (d) requirements of
the Amparo Rule, as the petition specifies that Kunnong and
his companions immediately reported Tagitis' disappearance
to the police authorities in Jolo, Suluas soon as they were
relatively certain that he indeed had disappeared. The police,
however, gave them the "ready answer" that Tagitis could
have been abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group or other anti-
government groups. The respondent also alleged that she
filed a "complaint" with the PNP Police Station in Cotobato *
and in Jolo, but she was told of "an intriguing tale" by the po-
lice that her husband was having "a good time with another
woman". The disappearance was alleged to have been report-
ed, too, to no less than the Governor of the ARMM, followed
by the respondent's personal inquiries that yielded the factual
bases for her petition.
10. These allegations, to our mind, sufficiently specify that re-
ports have been made to the police authorities, and
that investigations should have followed.
11. Section 5 (e) is in the Amparo Rule to prevent the use of a
petition — that otherwise is not supported by sufficient alle-
gations to constitute a proper cause of action — as a means to
"fish" for evidence.
12. The petitioners contend that the respondent's petition did not
specify what "legally available efforts were taken by the re-
spondent", and that there was an "undue haste" in the filing
of the petition when, instead of cooperating with authorities.
13. Section 5 (e) merely requires that the Amparo petitioner (the
respondent in the present case) allege "the actions and re-
courses taken to determine the fate or whereabouts of the ag-
grieved party and the identity of the person responsible for
the threat, act or omission".
14. Based on these considerations, we rule that the respondent's
petition for the Writ of Amparo is sufficient in form and sub-
stance and that the Court of Appeals had every reason to pro-
ceed with its consideration of the case.
The Desaparecidos
15. The present case is one of first impression in the use and ap-
plication of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in an enforced
disappearance situation.
16. In the mid-1970s, the phenomenon of enforced disappearanc-
es resurfaced, shocking and outraging the world when indi-
viduals, numbering anywhere from 6,000 to 24,000, were re-
ported to have "disappeared" during the military regime in
Argentina. The escalation of the practice saw political activ-
ists secretly arrested, tortured, and killed as part of govern-
ments' counter-insurgency campaigns. As this form of politi-
cal brutality became routine elsewhere in the continent, the
Latin American media standardized the term "disappearance"
to describe the phenomenon. The victims of enforced disap-
pearances were called the "desaparecidos", which literally
means the "disappeared ones".
17. In general, there are three different kinds of "disappearance"
cases:
 a. 1) those of people arrested without witnesses or with-
out positive identification of the arresting agents and
are never found again;
b. 2) those of prisoners who are usually arrested without
an appropriate warrant and held in complete isolation
for weeks or months while their families are unable to
discover their whereabouts and the military authori-
ties deny having them in custody until they eventually
reappear in one detention center or another; and
c. 3) those of victims of "salvaging" who have disap-
peared until their lifeless bodies are later discovered.
18. In the Philippines, enforced disappearances generally fall
within the first two categories, and 855 cases were recorded
during the period of martial law from 1972 until 1986. Cur-
rently, the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or
Involuntary Disappearance reports 619 outstanding cases of
enforced or involuntary disappearances covering the period
December 1, 2007 to November 30, 2008.
Enforced Disappearance Under International Law
Enforced Disappearances Under Philippine Law
19. The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the "writ shall cov-
er extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof". We note that although the writ specifically covers
"enforced disappearances", this concept is neither defined nor
penalized in this jurisdiction.
20. Even without the benefit of directly applicable substantive
laws on extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances,
however, the Supreme Court is not powerless to act under its
own constitutional mandate to promulgate "rules concerning
the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts", since extra-
judicial killings and enforced disappearances, by their nature
and purpose, constitute State or private party violation of the
constitutional rights of individuals to life, liberty and securi-
ty. The Court, through its procedural rules, can set
the procedural standards and thereby directly compel the
public authorities to act on actual or threatened violations of
constitutional rights.
21. Lest this Court intervention be misunderstood, we clarify
once again that we do not rule on any issue of criminal cul-
pability for the extrajudicial killing or enforced disap-
pearance. This is an issue that requires criminal action be-
fore our criminal courts based on our existing penal laws.
22. The burden for the public authorities to discharge in these
situations, under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, is twofold.
The first is to ensure that all efforts
at disclosure and investigation are undertaken under pain of
indirect contempt from this Court. The second is to address
the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved
and his or her liberty and security restored. In these senses,
our orders and directives relative to the writ are continuing
efforts that are not truly terminated until the extrajudicial kill-
ing or enforced disappearance is fully addressed.
23. In 1992, in response to the reality that the insidious practice
of enforced disappearance had become a global phenomenon,
the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappear-
ance (Declaration).
24. Fourteen years after, the UN General Assembly adopted the
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearance (Convention). Article 2 of the
Convention defined enforced disappearance as “the arrest,
detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of lib-
erty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons
acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the
State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation
of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the
disappeared person, which place such a person outside the
protection of the law.”
 25. The Convention is the first universal human rights instrument
to assert that there is a right not to be subject to enforced dis-
appearance and that this right is non-derogable.
Binding Effect of UN Action on the Philippines
26. To date, the Philippines has neither signed nor ratified the
Convention, so that the country is not yet committed to enact
any law penalizing enforced disappearance as a crime. The
absence of a specific penal law, however, is not a stumbling
block for action from this Court.
27. In Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, this Court, in
ruling that the right to security of persons is a guarantee of
the protection of one's right by the government, held that:
Protection includes conducting effective investigations, or-
ganization of the government apparatus to extend protection
to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances
(or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offend-
ers to the bar of justice.
Evidentiary Difficulties Posed by the Unique Nature of an En-
forced Disappearance
28. First, there may be a deliberate concealment of the identities
of the direct perpetrators. In addition, there are usually no
witnesses to the crime; if there are, these witnesses are usual-
ly afraid to speak out publicly or to testify on the disappear-
ance out of fear for their own lives.
29. Second, deliberate concealment of pertinent evidence of the
disappearance is a distinct possibility; the central piece of ev-
idence in an enforced disappearance — i.e., the corpus delic-
ti or the victim's body — is usually concealed to effectively
thwart the start of any investigation or the progress of one
that may have begun. The problem for the victim's family is
the State's virtual monopoly of access to pertinent evidence.
30. Third is the element of denial; in many cases, the State au-
thorities deliberately deny that the enforced disappearance
ever occurred.
Evidence and Burden of Proof in Enforced Disappearances Cases
31. These characteristics — namely, of being summary and the
use of substantial evidence as the required level of proof (in
contrast to the usual preponderance of evidence or proof be-
yond reasonable doubt in court proceedings) — reveal the
clear intent of the framers of the Amparo Rule to have the
equivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially
conducted, in addressing Amparo situations.
32. Thus, in these proceedings, the Amparo petitioner needs only
to properly comply with the substance and form requirements
of a Writ of Amparo petition, and prove the allegations by
substantial evidence. Once a rebuttable case has been proven,
the respondents must then respond and prove their defenses
based on the standard of diligence required. The rebuttable
case, of course, must show that an enforced disappearance
took place under circumstances showing a violation of the
victim's constitutional rights to life, liberty or security, and
the failure on the part of the investigating authorities to ap-
propriately respond.
33. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.
Assessment of the Evidence
34. The threshold question for our resolution is: was there an en-
forced disappearance within the meaning of this term under
the UN Declaration we have cited?
35. The Convention defines enforced disappearance as "the ar-
rest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of
liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of per-
sons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of
the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the depriva-
tion of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts
of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside
the protection of the law." Under this definition, the elements
that constitute enforced disappearance are essentially four-
fold:
 a. (a) arrest, detention, abduction or any form of depri-
vation of liberty;
b. (b) carried out by agents of the State or persons or
groups of persons acting with the authorization, sup-
port or acquiescence of the State;
c. (c) followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deten-
tion, or a concealment of the fate of the disappeared
person; and
d. (d) placement of the disappeared person outside the
protection of the law.
36. We find no direct evidence indicating how the victim actually
disappeared. The direct evidence at hand only shows that Ta-
gitis went out of the ASY Pension House after depositing his
room key with the hotel desk and was never seen nor heard
of again. The undisputed conclusion, however, is that
Tagistis disappeared under mysterious circumstances and
was never seen again.
37. We likewise find no direct evidence showing that operatives
of PNP CIDG Zamboanga abducted or arrested Tagitis. If at
all, only the respondent's allegation that Tagistis was under
CIDG Zamboanga custody stands on record, but it is not sup-
ported by any other evidence.
38. In her direct testimony, the respondent pointed to two sources
of information as her bases for her allegation that Tagistis
had been placed under government custody (in contrast with
CIDG Zamboanga custody). The first was an unnamed friend
in Zamboanga (later identified as Col. Ancanan), who occu-
pied a high position in the military and who allegedly men-
tioned that Tagitis was in good hands. Nothing came out of
this claim, as both the respondent herself and her witness,
Mrs. Talbin, failed to establish that Col. Ancanan gave them
any information that Tagitis was in government custody. Col.
Ancanan, for his part, admitted the meeting with the respond-
ent but denied giving her any information about the disap-
pearance.
39. The more specific and productive source of information
was Col. Kasim, whom the respondent, together with her
witness Mrs. Talbin, met in Camp Katitipan in Davao City.
A: I went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City. Then one mili-
tary officer, Col. Casim, told me that my husband is being
abducted [sic] because he is under custodial investigation be-
cause he is allegedly "parang liason ng J.I.", sir.
A: Jema'ah Islamiah, sir.
Q: Was there any information that was read to you during
one of those visits of yours in that Camp?
A: Col. Casim did not furnish me a copy of his report be-
cause he said those reports are highly confidential, sir.
Q: Was it read to you then even though you were not fur-
nished a copy?
A: Yes, sir. In front of us, my friends.
40. The respondent presented Mrs. Talbin to corroborate her testi-
mony that her husband was abducted and held under custodial
investigation by the PNP-CIDG Zamboanga City.
41. Col. Kasim never denied that he met with the respondent and
her friends, and that he provided them information based on the
input of an unnamed asset. He simply claimed in his testimony
that the "informal letter" he received from his informant in Su-
lu did not indicate that Tagitis was in the custody of the CIDG.
He also stressed that the information he provided the respond-
ent was merely a "raw report" from "barangay intelligence"
that still needed confirmation and "follow up" as to its veraci-
ty.
42. Based on these considerations and the unique evidentiary sit-
uation in enforced disappearance cases, we hold it duly estab-
lished that Col. Kasim informed the respondent and her
friends, based on the informant's letter, that Tagitis, reputedly
a liaison for the JI and who had been under surveillance since
January 2007, was "in good hands" and under custodial in-
 vestigation for complicity with the JI after he was seen talk-
ing to one Omar Patik and a certain "Santos" of Bulacan, a
"Balik Islam" charged with terrorism. For brevity, we shall
call the evidence of what Col. Kasim reported to the respond-
ent to be the "Kasim evidence".
43. Given this evidence, our next step is to decide whether we
can accept this evidence, in lieu of direct evidence, as proof
that the disappearance of Tagitis was due to action with gov-
ernment participation, knowledge or consent and that he was
held for custodial investigation. The Kasim evidence only
implies government intervention through the use of the term
"custodial investigation", and does not at all point to CIDG
Zamboanga as Tagitis' custodian.
44. Strictly speaking, we are faced here with a classic case of
hearsay evidence — i.e., evidence whose probative value is
not based on the personal knowledge of the witnesses (the re-
spondent, Mrs. Talbin and Col. Kasim himself) but on the
knowledge of some other person not on the witness stand (the
informant).
45. The actual disappearance of Tagitis is as murky as his per-
sonal circumstances. While the Amparo petition recited that
he was taken away by "burly men believed to be police intel-
ligence operatives", no evidence whatsoever was introduced
to support this allegation. Thus, the available direct evidence
is that Tagitis was last seen at 12.30 p.m. of October 30, 2007
— the day he arrived in Jolo — and was never seen again.
46. The Kasim evidence assumes critical materiality given the
dearth of direct evidence on the above aspects of the case, as
it supplies the gaps that were never looked into and clari-
fied by police investigation. It is the evidence, too, that colors
a simple missing person report into an enforced disappear-
ance case, as it injects the element of participation by agents
of the State and thus brings into question how the State react-
ed to the disappearance.
47. In sum, none of the reports on record contains any meaning-
ful results or details on the depth and extent of the investiga-
tion made. To be sure, reports of top police officials indicat-
ing the personnel and units they directed to investigate can
never constitute exhaustive and meaningful investigation, or
equal detailed investigative reports of the activities undertak-
en to search for Tagitis. Indisputably, the police authorities
from the very beginning failed to come up to the extraordi-
nary diligence that the Amparo Rule requires.
CONCLUSIONS AND THE AMPARO REMEDY
48. Col. Kasim's disclosure, made in an unguarded moment, un-
equivocally point to some government complicity in the dis-
appearance. The consistent but unfounded denials and the
haphazard investigations cannot but point to this conclusion.
For why would the government and its officials engage in
their chorus of concealment if the intent had not been to deny
what they already knew of the disappearance? Would not an
in-depth and thorough investigation that at least credibly de-
termined the fate of Tagitis be a feather in the government's
cap under the circumstances of the disappearance? From this
perspective, the evidence and developments, particularly the
Kasim evidence, already establish a concrete case of enforced
disappearance that the Amparo Rule covers.
49. Timurtas v. Turkey: Although there was no eyewitness evi-
dence of the apprehension or subsequent detainment, the ap-
plicant presented evidence corroborating his version of
events, including a photocopy of a post-operation report
signed by the commander of gendarme operations in Silopi,
Turkey. The report included a description of Abdulvahap's
arrest and the result of a subsequent interrogation during de-
tention where he was accused of being a leader of the PKK.
On this basis, Turkey was held responsible for Abdulvahap's
enforced disappearance.
50. Following the lead of this Turkish experience — adjusted to
the Philippine legal setting and the Amparo remedy this
Court has established, as applied to the unique facts and de-
velopments of this case — we believe and so hold that the
government in general, through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG,
and in particular, the Chiefs of these organizations together
 with Col. Kasim, should be held fully accountable for the en- sufficiency of their investigative efforts; and submit to this
forced disappearance of Tagitis. Court a quarterly report containing its actions and recom-
51. The PNP and CIDG are accountable because Section 24 mendations, copy furnished the petitioners and the respond-
of Republic Act No. 6975, otherwise known as the "PNP ent, with the first report due at the end of the first quarter
Law", specifies the PNP as the governmental office with the counted from the finality of this Decision.
mandate "to investigate and prevent crimes, effect the arrest
of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist in
their prosecution".
52. Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and
members were the ones who were remiss in their duties when
the government completely failed to exercise the extraordi-
nary diligence that the Amparo Rule requires. We hold these
organizations accountable through their incumbent Chiefs
who, under this Decision, shall carry the personal responsi-
bility of seeing to it that extraordinary diligence, in the man-
ner the Amparo Rule requires, is applied in addressing the en-
forced disappearance of Tagitis.
53. We hold Col. Kasim accountable for his failure to disclose
under oath information relating to the enforced disappear-
ance. For the purpose of this accountability, we order that
Col. Kasim be impleaded as a party to this case. The PNP is
similarly held accountable for the suppression of vital infor-
mation that Col. Kasim could and did not provide, and, as the
entity with direct authority over Col. Kasim, is held with the
same obligation of disclosure that Col. Kasim carries. We
shall deal with Col. Kasim's suppression of evidence under
oath when we finally close this case under the process out-
lined below.
54. To fully enforce the Amparo remedy, we refer this case back
to the CA for appropriate proceedings directed at the moni-
toring of the PNP and the PNP-CIDG investigations and ac-
tions, and the validation of their results through hearings the
CA may deem appropriate to conduct.
55. On behalf of this Court, the CA shall pass upon: the need for
the PNP and the PNP-CIDG to make disclosures of matters
known to them as indicated in this Decision and as further
CA hearings may indicate; the petitioners' submissions; the
 019 NAVIA v PARDICO (GUSTILO)
June 19, 2012| Del Castillo, J. | Writ of Amparo
PETITIONERS: Edgardo Navia, Ruben Dio, and Andrew Buising
RESPONDENTS: Virginia Pardico for and in behalf and in representation of
Benhur Pardico
SUMMARY: March 31, 2008, 8:30 p.m.: A vehicle of Asian Land Strategies Corpo-
ration (Asian Land) arrived at the house of Lolita M. Lapore (Lolita) located at 7A
Lot 9, Block 54, Grand Royale Subdivision, Barangay Lugam, Malolos City. The
arrival of the vehicle awakened Lolita’s son, Enrique Lapore (Bong), and Benhur
Pardico (Ben), who were then both staying in her house. When Lolita went out to
investigate, she saw two uniformed guards disembarking from the vehicle. One of
them immediately asked Lolita where they could find her son Bong. Before Lolita
could answer, the guard saw Bong and told him that he and Ben should go with them
to the security office of Asian Land because a complaint was lodged against them for
theft of electric wires and lamps in the subdivision. Shortly thereafter, Bong, Lolita
and Ben were in the office of the security department of Asian Land also located in
Grand Royale Subdivision. The supervisor of the security guards, petitioner Edgardo
Navia (Navia), also arrived thereat. As to what transpired next, the parties’ respective
versions diverge.
As to Petitioners: Navia et al alleged that they invited Bong and Ben to their office
because they received a report from a certain Mrs. Emphasis, a resident of Grand
Royale Subdivision, that she saw Bong and Ben removing a lamp from a post in said
subdivision. The reported unauthorized taking of the lamp was relayed thru radio to
petitioners Ruben Dio (Dio) and Andrew Buising (Buising), who both work as secu-
rity guards at the Asian Land security department.
Following their department’s standard operating procedure, Dio and Buising entered
the report in their logbook and proceeded to the house of Mrs. Emphasis. It was there
where Dio and Buising were able to confirm who the suspects were. They thus re-
paired to the house of Lolita where Bong and Ben were staying to invite the two sus-
pects to their office. Bong and Ben voluntarily went with them.
Upon Navia’s instructions, Dio and Buising went back to the house of Lolita to make
her sign the logbook as witness that they indeed released Ben from their custody.
Lolita asked Buising to read aloud that entry in the logbook where she was being
asked to sign, to which Buising obliged. Not contented, Lolita put on her reading
glasses and read the entry in the logbook herself before affixing her signature there-
in. After which, the guards left.
As to respondents: According to Virginia, Bong and Ben were not merely invited.
They were unlawfully arrested, shoved into the Asian Land vehicle and brought to
the security office for investigation. Moments after Lolita and Bong reached their
house, Buising arrived and asked Lolita to sign the logbook again. Lolita asked
Buising why she had to sign again when she already twice signed the logbook at the
headquarters. Buising assured her that what she was about to sign only pertains to
Bong’s release.
Since it was dark and she has poor eyesight, Lolita took Buising’s word and signed
the logbook without, again, reading what was written in it. The following morning,
Virginia went to the Asian Land security office to visit her husband Ben, but only to
be told that Navia et al had already released him together with Bong the night before.
She then looked for Ben, asked around, and went to the barangay. Since she could
not still find her husband, Virginia reported the matter to the police. In the course of
the investigation on Ben’s disappearance, it dawned upon Lolita that Navia et al took
advantage of her poor eyesight and naivete.
They made her sign the logbook as a witness that they already released Ben when in
truth and in fact she never witnessed his actual release. The last time she saw Ben
was when she left him in Navia et al’s custody at the security office. Virginia filed a
Petition for Writ of Amparo before the RTC of Malolos City. A Writ of Amparo was
accordingly issued and served on Navia et al on June 27, 2008.
On June 30, 2008, Navia et al filed their Compliance praying for the denial of the
petition for lack of merit. The RTC ruled granting the privilege of the writ of
amparo. Navia et al filed a MR but was denied.
The issue is WoN Virginia is entitled to a Writ of Amparo?- No. The SC held that
in an amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is not enough. It is likewise es-
sential to establish that such disappearance was carried out with the direct or indirect
authorization, support or acquiescence of the government.
This indispensable element of State participation is not present in this case. The peti-
tion does not contain any allegation of State complicity, and none of the evidence
presented tend to show that the government or any of its agents orchestrated Ben’s
disappearance.
In fact, none of its agents, officials, or employees were impleaded or implicated in
Virginia’s amparo petition whether as responsible or accountable persons. Thus, in
the absence of an allegation or proof that the government or its agents had a hand in
Ben’s disappearance or that they failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in investi-
gating his case, the Court will definitely not hold the government or its agents either
as responsible or accountable persons.
DOCTRINE: As thus dissected, it is now clear that for the protective writ of amparo
to issue, allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not
enough. It must also be shown and proved by substantial evidence that the disap-
pearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of,
the State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same
or give information on the fate or whereabouts of said missing persons, with the in-
tention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of
time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by sub-
stantial evidence the indispensable element of government participation.
FACTS:
163. On March 31, 2008, at around 8:30 p.m., a vehicle of Asian Land Strategies
Corporation (Asian Land) arrived at the house of Lolita M. Lapore (Lolita) lo-
cated at 7A Lot 9, Block 54, Grand Royale Subdivision, Barangay Lugam,
Malolos City. The arrival of the vehicle awakened Lolita’s son, Enrique Lapore
(Bong), and Benhur Pardico (Ben), who were then both staying in her house.
When Lolita went out to investigate, she saw two uniformed guards disembark-
ing from the vehicle. One of them immediately asked Lolita where they could
find her son Bong. Before Lolita could answer, the guard saw Bong and told him
that he and Ben should go with them to the security office of Asian Land be-
cause a complaint was lodged against them for theft of electric wires and lamps
in the subdivision.
164. Shortly thereafter, Bong, Lolita and Ben were in the office of the security de-
partment of Asian Land also located in Grand Royale Subdivision. The supervi-
sor of the security guards, petitioner Edgardo Navia (Navia), also arrived there-
at. As to what transpired next, the parties’ respective versions diverge.
165. Version of Petitioners: Navia et al alleged that they invited Bong and Ben to
their office because they received a report from a certain Mrs. Emphasis, a resi-
dent of Grand Royale Subdivision, that she saw Bong and Ben removing a lamp
from a post in said subdivision. The reported unauthorized taking of the lamp
was relayed thru radio to petitioners Ruben Dio (Dio) and Andrew Buising
(Buising), who both work as security guards at the Asian Land security depart-
ment.
166. Following their department’s standard operating procedure, Dio and Buising
entered the report in their logbook and proceeded to the house of Mrs. Empha-
sis. It was there where Dio and Buising were able to confirm who the suspects
were. They thus repaired to the house of Lolita where Bong and Ben were stay-
ing to invite the two suspects to their office. Bong and Ben voluntarily went
with them.
167. At the security office, Dio and Buising interviewed Bong and Ben. The suspects
admitted that they took the lamp but clarified that they were only transferring it
to a post nearer to the house of Lolita. Soon, Navia arrived and Buising in-
formed him that the complainant was not keen in participating in the investiga-
tion.
168. Since there was no complainant, Navia ordered the release of Bong and Ben.
Bong then signed a statement to the effect that the guards released him without
inflicting any harm or injury to him. His mother Lolita also signed the logbook
below an entry which states that she will never again harbor or entertain Ben in
her house. Thereafter, Lolita and Bong left the security office.
169. Ben was left behind as Navia was still talking to him about those who might be
involved in the reported loss of electric wires and lamps within the subdivision.
After a brief discussion though, Navia allowed Ben to leave. Ben also affixed
his signature on the logbook to affirm the statements entered by the guards that
he was released unharmed and without any injury.
170. Upon Navia’s instructions, Dio and Buising went back to the house of Lolita to
make her sign the logbook as witness that they indeed released Ben from their
custody. Lolita asked Buising to read aloud that entry in the logbook where she
was being asked to sign, to which Buising obliged. Not contented, Lolita put on
her reading glasses and read the entry in the logbook herself before affixing her
signature therein. After which, the guards left.
171. Subsequently, Navia et al received an invitation from the Malolos City Police
Station requesting them to appear thereat on April 17, 2008 relative to the com-
plaint of Virginia Pardico (Virginia) about her missing husband Ben. In compli-
ance with the invitation, all three petitioners appeared at the Malolos City Police
Station. However, since Virginia was not present despite having received the
same invitation, the meeting was reset to April 22, 2008.
172. On April 22, 2008, Virginia attended the investigation. Navia et al informed her
that they released Ben and that they have no information as to his present
wherea-
bouts.https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/jun2012/gr_184467
_2012.html - fnt17They assured Virginia though that they will cooperate and
help in the investigation of her missing husband.
173. Version of Respondents (Virginia Pardico): According to Virginia, Bong and
Ben were not merely invited. They were unlawfully arrested, shoved into the
Asian Land vehicle and brought to the security office for investigation. Upon
seeing Ben at the security office, Navia lividly grumbled "Ikaw na naman?" and
slapped him while he was still seated. Ben begged for mercy, but his pleas were
met with a flurry of punches coming from Navia hitting him on different parts of
his body.Navia then took hold of his gun, looked at Bong, and said, "Wala kang
nakita at wala kang narinig, papatayin ko na si Ben.”
174. Bong admitted that he and Ben attempted to take the lamp. He explained that the
area where their house is located is very dark and his father had long been ask-
ing the administrator of Grand Royale Subdivision to install a lamp to illumine
their area.
175. But since nothing happened, he took it upon himself to take a lamp from one of
the posts in the subdivision and transfer it to a post near their house. However,
the lamp Bong got was no longer working. Thus, he reinstalled it on the post
from which he took it and no longer pursued his plan.
176. Later on, Lolita was instructed to sign an entry in the guard’s logbook where she
undertook not to allow Ben to stay in her house anymore. Thereafter, Navia
again asked Lolita to sign the logbook. Upon Lolita’s inquiry as to why she had
to sign again, Navia explained that they needed proof that they released her son
Bong unharmed but that Ben had to stay as the latter’s case will be forwarded to
the barangay.
177. Since she has poor eyesight, Lolita obligingly signed the logbook without read-
ing it and then left with Bong. At that juncture, Ben grabbed Bong and pleaded
not to be left alone. However, since they were afraid of Navia, Lolita and Bong
left the security office at once leaving Ben behind.
178. Moments after Lolita and Bong reached their house, Buising arrived and asked
Lolita to sign the logbook again. Lolita asked Buising why she had to sign again
when she already twice signed the logbook at the headquarters. Buising assured
her that what she was about to sign only pertains to Bong’s release. Since it was
dark and she has poor eyesight, Lolita took Buising’s word and signed the log-
book without, again, reading what was written in it.
179. The following morning, Virginia went to the Asian Land security office to visit
her husband Ben, but only to be told that Navia et al had already released him
together with Bong the night before. She then looked for Ben, asked around, and
went to the barangay. Since she could not still find her husband, Virginia report-
ed the matter to the police. In the course of the investigation on Ben’s disap-
pearance, it dawned upon Lolita that Navia et al took advantage of her poor eye-
sight and naivete.
180. They made her sign the logbook as a witness that they already released Ben
when in truth and in fact she never witnessed his actual release. The last time
she saw Ben was when she left him in Navia et al’s custody at the security
office.
181. Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of her husband, Virginia filed a
Petition for Writ of Amparo before the RTC of Malolos City. Finding the peti-
tion sufficient in form and substance, the amparo court issued an Order dated
June 26, 2008 directing, among others, the issuance of a writ of amparo and the
production of the body of Ben before it on June 30, 2008.
182. A Writ of Amparo was accordingly issued and served on Navia et al on June 27,
2008. On June 30, 2008, Navia et al filed their Compliance praying for the deni-
al of the petition for lack of merit. A summary hearing was thereafter conducted.
Navia et al presented the testimony of Buising, while Virginia submitted the
sworn statements of Lolita and Enrique which the two affirmed on the witness
stand.
183. The RTC ruled granting the privilege of the writ of amparo. Navia et al filed a
MR but was denied.
ISSUE: WoN Virginia is entitled to a Writ of Amparo?- No because the element of
State Participation is not present in this case
RULING: July 24, 2008 Decision of RTC, Branch 20, Malolos City, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Petition for Writ of Amparo filed by Virginia Pardico is DIS-
MISSED.
RATIO:
251. Navia et al essentially assail the sufficiency of the amparo petition. They con-
tend that the writ of amparo is available only in cases where the factual and legal
bases of the violation or threatened violation of the aggrieved party’s right to
life, liberty and security are clear.Navia et al assert that in the case at bench,
Virginia miserably failed to establish all these. First, the petition is wanting on
its face as it failed to state with some degree of specificity the alleged unlawful
act or omission of Navia et al constituting a violation of or a threat to Ben’s right
to life, liberty and security. And second, it cannot be deduced from the evidence
Virginia adduced that Ben is missing; or that Navia et al had a hand in his al-
leged disappearance. On the other hand, the entries in the logbook which bear
the signatures of Ben and Lolita are eloquent proof that Navia et al released Ben
on March 31, 2008 at around 10:30 p.m. Navia et al thus posit that the trial
court erred in issuing the writ and in holding them responsible for Ben’s disap-
pearance.
252. The Court held that Virginia’s Petition for Writ of Amparo is fatally defec-
tive and must perforce be dismissed, but not for the reasons adverted to by
Navia et al.
253. A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated to
arrest the rampant extralegal killings and enforced disappearances in the coun-
try. Its purpose is to provide an expeditious and effective relief "to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation
by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity."
254. Here, Ben’s right to life, liberty and security is firmly settled as the parties do
not dispute his identity as the same person summoned and questioned at Navia
et al’s’ security office on the night of March 31, 2008. Such uncontroverted fact
ipso facto established Ben’s inherent and constitutionally enshrined right to life,
liberty and security. Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights recognizes every human being’s inherent right to life, while Article 9
thereof ordains that everyone has the right to liberty and security.
255. The right to life must be protected by law while the right to liberty and security
cannot be impaired except on grounds provided by and in accordance with law.
This overarching command against deprivation of life, liberty and security with-
out due process of law is also embodied in our fundamental law.
256. Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC provides: “The petition for a writ of amparo
is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is vi-
olated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public of-
ficial or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover ex-
tralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.”
257. While Section 1 provides A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC’s coverage, said Rules does not,
however, define extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. This omission
was intentional as the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court which draft-
ed A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC chose to allow it to evolve through time and jurispru-
dence and through substantive laws as may be promulgated by Congress.
258. The elements of enforced disapperance are: (a) that there be an arrest, de-
tention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty; (b) that it be car-
ried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State
or a political organization; (c) that it be followed by the State or political
organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or
 whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and, (d) that the vidual or entity, still, government involvement in the disappearance re-
intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of mains an indispensable element.
the law for a prolonged period of time. 266. Here, Navia et al are mere security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision in
259. As thus dissected, it is now clear that for the protective writ of amparo to Brgy. Lugam, Malolos City and their principal, the Asian Land, is a private
issue, allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are entity. They do not work for the government and nothing has been present-
not enough. ed that would link or connect them to some covert police, military or gov-
260. It must also be shown and proved by substantial evidence that the disap- ernmental operation. As discussed above, to fall within the ambit of A.M. No.
pearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquies- 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA No. 9851, the disappearance must be attended by
cence of, the State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to some governmental involvement. This hallmark of State participation differenti-
acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or whereabouts of ates an enforced disappearance case from an ordinary case of a missing person.
said missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the protec-
tion of the law for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in
an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the in-
dispensable element of government participation.
261. In the present case, we do not doubt Bong’s testimony that Navia had a menac-
ing attitude towards Ben and that he slapped and inflicted fistic blows upon him.
Given the circumstances and the pugnacious character of Navia at that time, his
threatening statement, "Wala kang nakita at wala kang narinig, papatayin ko na
si Ben," cannot be taken lightly.
262. It unambiguously showed his predisposition at that time. In addition, there is
nothing on record which would support petitioners’ assertion that they released
Ben on the night of March 31, 2008 unscathed from their wrath. Lolita suffi-
ciently explained how she was prodded into affixing her signatures in the log-
book without reading the entries therein. And so far, the information petitioners
volunteered are sketchy at best, like the alleged complaint of Mrs. Emphasis
who was never identified or presented in court and whose complaint was never
reduced in writing.1âwphi1
263. But lest it be overlooked, in an amparo petition, proof of disappearance
alone is not enough. It is likewise essential to establish that such disappear-
ance was carried out with the direct or indirect authorization, support or
acquiescence of the government. This indispensable element of State partic-
ipation is not present in this case. The petition does not contain any allega-
tion of State complicity, and none of the evidence presented tend to show
that the government or any of its agents orchestrated Ben’s disappearance.
264. In fact, none of its agents, officials, or employees were impleaded or impli-
cated in Virginia’s amparo petition whether as responsible or accountable
persons. Thus, in the absence of an allegation or proof that the government
or its agents had a hand in Ben’s disappearance or that they failed to exer-
cise extraordinary diligence in investigating his case, the Court will definite-
ly not hold the government or its agents either as responsible or accounta-
ble persons.
265. We are aware that under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ of amparo
may lie against a private individual or entity. But even if the person sought to
be held accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is a private indi-
 Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo (HORTALEZA)
October, 07, 2008 | Puno, C. J. | Writ Of Amparo
PETITIONER: The Secretary Of National Defense, The Chief Of Staff, Armed
Forces Of The Philippines
RESPONDENTS: Raymond Manalo And Reynaldo Manalo
SUMMARY:
(this is a long and dense case so please read the ratio)
Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo was abducted from their homes and kept in
captivity for 18 months, being expected initially for being members of the National
Peoples Army, by the AFP and specifically the CAFGU.
Aside from being kept in captivity and kept incommunicado, they were subjected to
several forms of torture and were threatened almost on a daily basis.
The Manalo brothers finally having succeeded in their escape, after 18 months of
grueling tortutre in several army bases, such as camp (1) camp (2), filed This case
originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) filed before this Court by herein Manalo Brothers on August 23, 2007 to stop
herein the Secretary of National Defens and/or their officers and agents from depriv-
ing them of their right to liberty and other basic rights.
The issue in this case is the first application of the Writ of Amparo, the Secretary
claiming that WON The Court of Appeals seriously and grievously erred in be-
lieving and giving full faith and credit to the incredible uncorroborated, contra-
dicted, and obviously scripted, rehearsed and self--serving affidavit/testimony of
herein respondent Raymond Manalo? No, the CA did not err, as the evidence
needed in a case of Writ of Amparo is Substantial Evidence, and that the affida-
vit of Raymond, was corroborated by Reynaldo, and several other independent
witnesses, as well as Dr. Molito confirming the claims of Manalo, as to being
tortured and subjected to physical agony.
WoN the Manalo Brother’s may claim Writ Of Amparo even if they are not in
captivity anymore? Yes, Under these circumstances, there is substantial evi-
dence to warrant the conclusion that there is a violation of respondents' right to
security as a guarantee of protection by the government. In sum, we conclude
that respondents' right to security as "freedom from threat" is violated by the
apparent threat to their life, liberty and security of person. Their right to secu-
rity as a guarantee of protection by the government is likewise violated by the
ineffective investigation and protection on the part of the military.
WoN that petitioners furnish respondents all official and unofficial reports of
the investigation undertaken in connection with their case, except those already
in file with the court can be granted? Yes, such cannot be compared to a search
warrant. The production order under the Amparo Rule should not be confused
with a search warrant for law enforcement under Article III, Section 2 of the
1987 Constitution. This Constitutional provision is a protection of the people
from the unreasonable intrusion of the government, not a protection of the gov-
ernment from the demand of the people such as respondents.
Instead, the Amparo production order may be likened to the production of doc-
uments or things under Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure64
DOCTRINE 1: The evidence needed in a case of Writ of Amparo is Substantial
Evidence, and that the affidavit of Raymond, was corroborated by Reynaldo,
and several other independent witnesses, as well as Dr. Molito confirming the
claims of Manalo, as to being tortured and subjected to physical agony.
DOCTRINE 2: there is substantial evidence to warrant the conclusion that
there is a violation of respondents' right to security as a guarantee of protection
by the government. In sum, we conclude that respondents' right to security as
"freedom from threat" is violated by the apparent threat to their life, liberty
and security of person. Their right to security as a guarantee of protection by
the government is likewise violated by the ineffective investigation and protec-
tion on the part of the military.
DOCTRINE 3: The production order under the Amparo Rule should not be
confused with a search warrant for law enforcement under Article III, Section 2
of the 1987 Constitution. This Constitutional provision is a protection of the
people from the unreasonable intrusion of the government, not a protection of
the government from the demand of the people such as respondents.
Instead, the Amparo production order may be likened to the production of doc-
uments or things under Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
FACTS:
1. This is an appeal via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court in relation to Section 191 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, seeking
to reverse and set aside on both questions of fact and law, the Decision
64
Section 1. Motion for production or inspection order.
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an ac-
tion is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and
copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated
documents, papers, books of accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible
things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter
involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control...
 promulgated by the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. AMPARO No. 00001,
entitled "Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo, petitioners, v. The Secre-
tary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philip-
pines, respondents."
2. This case originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) filed before this Court by herein Manalo Brothers
on August 23, 2007 to stop herein the Secretary of National Defense and/or
their officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and
other basic rights.
3. While the 2007 petition was pending the rule on the Writ of Amparo took
effect on october 24, 2007, thus the Manalo Brothers prayed that the peti-
tion be applied as invoking the Writ of Amparo.
4. They prayed that:
1. the petition be considered a Petition for the Writ of Amparo under
Sec. 266 of the Amparo Rule;
2. the Court issue the writ commanding therein respondents to make
a verified return within the period provided by law and containing
the specific matter required by law;
3. they be granted the interim reliefs allowed by the Amparo Rule
and all other reliefs prayed for in the petition but not covered by
the Amparo Rule;
4. the Court, after hearing, render judgment as required in Sec. 187
of the Amparo Rule; and
5. all other just and equitable reliefs
5. The Writ of Amparo was granted and the court ordered that
1. The respondents SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and
AFP CHIEF OF STAFF arenhereby REQUIRED:
1. To furnish to the petitioners and to this Court within five days
from notice of this decision all official and unofficial reports of the
investigation undertaken in connection with their case, except
those already on file herein;
2. To confirm in writing the present places of official assignment
of M/Sgt Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas within five
days from notice of this decision.
3. To cause to be produced to this Court all medical reports, rec-
ords and charts, reports of any treatment given or recommended
and medicines prescribed, if any, to the petitioners, to include a list
of medical and (sic) personnel (military and civilian) who attended
to them from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007 within five
days from notice of this decision.
Factual Antecedents (Facts are really dense, i will just add what i think is relevant)
6. On February 14, 2006, Raymond was sleeping in their house in Buhol na
Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. At past noon, several armed soldiers
wearing white shirts, fatigue pants and army boots, entered their house and
roused him. They asked him if he was Bestre, but his mother, Ester Manalo,
replied that he was Raymond, not Bestre. The armed soldier slapped him on
both cheeks and nudged him in the stomach. He was then handcuffed,
brought to the rear of his house, and forced to the ground face down. He
was kicked on the hip, ordered to stand and face up to the light, then forci-
bly brought near the road. He told his mother to follow him, but three sol-
diers stopped her and told her to stay
7. They were taken by members of the CAFGU as Raymond recognizd them
8. Raymond tried to escape on the third week of captivity but was caught
eventually and then transferred to what he could see as Fort Magsaysay
9. During his captivity he ended up face to face with Gen. Palparan, who
threatened him and subsequently told him to not complain, and tell his fami-
ly to cease from filing a case, joining rallies, and complaining generally to
the government for his treatment
10. There were still several instances and stories, and experiences that the
brothers went through, taking care of other detainees, being forced to join
battles with NPA, and even taking care of poultry for their captors (sum-
mary statement)
11. On june 13,2007 they were brought to Pangasinan presumably to raise poul-
try for a person named Donald (Caigas) it is then where the brothers Manalo
planned their escape.
12. They were paid for their tenure, and saved enough money to buy a cellular
phone, under the guise of texting a lady near their area.
13. In the evening of August 13, 2007, Nonong and his cohorts had a drinking
session. At about 1:00 a.m., Raymond turned up the volume of the radio.
When none of the guards awoke and took notice,
14. Raymond and Reynaldo proceeded towards the highway, leaving behind
their sleeping guards and barking dogs. They boarded a bus bound for Ma-
nila and were thus freed from captivity
15. Reynaldo also executed an affidavit affirming the contents of Raymond's af-
fidavit insofar as they related to matters they witnessed together.
16. Dr. Benito Molino, M.D., corroborated the accounts of respondents Ray-
mond and Reynaldo Manalo. Dr. Molino specialized in forensic medicine
and was connected with the Medical Action Group, an organization han-
dling cases of human rights violations, particularly cases where torture was
involved. He was requested by an NGO to conduct medical examinations
on the respondents after their escape. He first asked them about their ordeal,
then proceeded with the physical examination. His findings showed that the
scars borne by respondents were consistent with their account of physical
injuries inflicted upon them. The examination was conducted on August 15,
2007, two days after respondents' escape, and the results thereof were re-
duced into writing. Dr. Molino took photographs of the scars. He testified
that he followed the Istanbul Protocol in conducting the examination.

ISSUE/s:
1. WON The Court of Appeals seriously and grievously erred in believing
and giving full faith and credit to the incredible uncorroborated, con-
tradicted, and obviously scripted, rehearsed and self--serving affida-
vit/testimony of herein respondent Raymond Manalo? No, the CA did
not err, as the evidence needed in a case of Writ of Amparo is Substan-
tial Evidence, and that the affidavit of Raymond, was corroborated by
Reynaldo, and several other independent witnesses, as well as Dr.
Molito confirming the claims of Manalo, as to being tortured and sub-
jected to physical agony proof required, viz:
2. WoN the Manalo Brother’s may claim Writ Of Amparo even if they
are not in captivity anymore? Yes, Under these circumstances, there is
substantial evidence to warrant the conclusion that there is a violation
of respondents' right to security as a guarantee of protection by the
government. In sum, we conclude that respondents' right to security as
"freedom from threat" is violated by the apparent threat to their life,
liberty and security of person. Their right to security as a guarantee of
protection by the government is likewise violated by the ineffective in-
vestigation and protection on the part of the military.
3. WoN that petitioners furnish respondents all official and unofficial re-
ports of the investigation undertaken in connection with their case, ex-
cept those already in file with the court can be granted? Yes, such can-
not be compared to a search warrant. The production order under the
Amparo Rule should not be confused with a search warrant for law en-
forcement under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. This
Constitutional provision is a protection of the people from the unrea-
sonable intrusion of the government, not a protection of the govern-
ment from the demand of the people such as respondents. Instead, the
Amparo production order may be likened to the production of docu-
ments or things under Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Proce-
dure
RULING:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated December 26, 2007 is affirmed.
RATIO:
Issue 1:
1. In delving into the veracity of the evidence, we need to mine and refine the
ore of petitioners' cause of action, to determine whether the evidence pre-
sented is metal-strong to satisfy the degree of proof required.
2. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the following
causes of action, viz:
○ Section 1. Petition . - The petition for a writ of Amparo is a remedy
available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omis-
sion of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity.
○ The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearanc-
es or threats thereof.
○ Sections 17 and 18, on the other hand, provide for the degree of
○ Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. -
The parties shall establish
○ their claims by substantial evidence.
○ Sec. 18. Judgment. - ... If the allegations in the petition are proven
by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the
writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise,
the privilege shall be denied.
3. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a rea-
sonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
4. After careful perusal of the evidence presented, we affirm the findings of
the Court of Appeals that respondents were abducted from their houses in
Sito Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on February
14, 2006 and were continuously detained until they escaped on August 13,
2007. The abduction, detention, torture, and escape of the respondents were
narrated by respondent Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing manner.
His account is dotted with countless candid details of respondents' harrow-
ing experience and tenacious will to escape, captured through his different
senses and etched in his memory. A few examples are the following: "Su-
milip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel."
"(N)ilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di
nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel." "May naiwang mga ba-
kas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang
nililinis ang bakas." "Tumigil ako sa may palaisdaan kung saan ginamit ko
ang bato para tanggalin ang mga kadena." "Tinanong ko sa isang ka-
pit-bahay kung paano ako makakuha ng cell phone; sabi ko gusto kong
i-text ang isang babae na nakatira sa malapit na lugar."
5. We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on re-
spondent Raymond Manalo's affidavit and testimony,
○ Gen. Palparan's participation in the abduction was also established.
At the very least, he was aware of the petitioners' captivity at the
hands of men in uniform assigned to his command. In fact, he or
any other officer tendered no controversion to the firm claim of
Raymond that he (Gen. Palparan) met them in person in a
 safehouse in Bulacan and told them what he wanted them and their
parents to do or not to be doing. Gen. Palparan's direct and person-
al role in the abduction might not have been shown but his
knowledge of the dire situation of the petitioners during their long
captivity at the hands of military personnel under his command be-
spoke of his indubitable command policy that unavoidably encour-
aged and not merely tolerated the abduction of civilians without
due process of law and without probable cause.
6. We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalo's
statements were not corroborated by other independent and credible pieces
of evidence. Raymond's affidavit and testimony were corroborated by
the affidavit of respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and medical
reports prepared by forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of the
scars left by the physical injuries inflicted on respondents, also corroborate
respondents' accounts of the torture they endured while in detention. Re-
spondent Raymond Manalo's familiarity with the facilities in Fort Mag-
saysay such as the "DTU," as shown in his testimony and confirmed by Lt.
Col. Jimenez to be the "Division Training Unit," firms up respondents' story
that they were detained for some time in said military facility.
○ In Ortiz v. Guatemala, a case decided by the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, the Commission considered similar
evidence, among others, in finding that complainant Sister Diana
Ortiz was abducted and tortured by agents of the Guatemalan gov-
ernment. In this case, Sister Ortiz was kidnapped and tortured in
early November 1989. The Commission's findings of fact were
mostly based on the consistent and credible statements, written
and oral, made by Sister Ortiz regarding her ordeal.These
statements were supported by her recognition of portions of the
route they took when she was being driven out of the military in-
stallation where she was detained. She was also examined by a
medical doctor whose findings showed that the 111 circular second
degree burns on her back and abrasions on her cheek coincided
with her account of cigarette burning and torture she suffered while
in detention.
7. With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpe-
trated on the victim during detention, it logically holds that much of the in-
formation and evidence of the ordeal will come from the victims them-
selves, and the veracity of their account will depend on their credibility and
candidness in their written and/or oral statements. Their statements can be
corroborated by other evidence such as physical evidence left by the torture
they suffered or landmarks they can identify in the places where they were
detained. Where powerful military officers are implicated, the hesitation of
witnesses to surface and testify against them comes as no surprise.
Issue 2:
8. There is no question that Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo are no longer in
captivity for the application of the Writ of Amparo, but they are also bla-
tantly “not free” in every sense of the word
9. as their "movements continue to be restricted for fear that people they have
named in their Judicial Affidavits and testified against (in the case of Ray-
mond) are still at large and have not been held accountable in any way.
These people are directly connected to the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and are, thus, in a position to threaten respondents' rights to life, liberty and
security." Respondents claim that they are under threat of being once again
abducted, kept captive or even killed, which constitute a direct violation of
their right to security of person.
10. Those who have been named in the case are still at large and in a position to
threaten respondents' rights to life, liberty and security.” (emphasis sup-
plied) Respondents claim that they are under threat of being once again ab-
ducted, kept captive or even killed, which constitute a direct violation of
their right to security of person.
11. In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in the threat to
their right to life and liberty, and a violation of their right to security
12. The right to security or the right to security of person finds a textual hook
in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution65
13. First, the violation of the right to security as freedom from threat to re-
spondents' life, liberty and security.
14. While respondents were detained, they were threatened that if they escaped,
their families, including them, would be killed. In Raymond's narration, he
was tortured and poured with gasoline after he was caught the first time he
attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay. A call from a certain "Mam,"
who wanted to see him before he was killed, spared him.
15. This time, respondents have finally escaped. The condition of the threat to
be killed has come to pass. It should be stressed that they are now free from
captivity not because they were released by virtue of a lawful order or vol-
untarily freed by their abductors. It ought to be recalled that towards the end
of their ordeal, sometime in June 2007 when respondents were detained in a
camp in Limay, Bataan, respondents' captors even told them that they were
still deciding whether they should be executed.
16. Next, the violation of the right to security as protection by the government.
Apart from the failure of military elements to provide protection to re-
spondents by themselves perpetrating the abduction, detention, and torture,
65
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge.
 they also miserably failed in conducting an effective investigation of re-
spondents' abduction as revealed by the testimony and investigation report
of petitioners' own witness, Lt. Col. Ruben Jimenez, Provost Marshall of the
7th Infantry Division.
17. The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very limited, superfi-
cial, and one -sided. He merely relied on the Sworn Statements of the six
implicated members of the CAFGU and civilians whom he met in the inves-
tigation for the first time. He was present at the investigation when his sub-
ordinate Lingad was taking the sworn statements, but he did not propound a
single question to ascertain the veracity of their statements or their credibil-
ity. He did not call for other witnesses to test the alibis given by the six im-
plicated persons nor for the family or neighbors of the respondents.
18. Secretary of National Defense attested that in a Memorandum Directive
dated October 31, 2007, he issued a policy directive addressed to the AFP
Chief of Staff, that the AFP should adopt rules of action in the event the
writ of Amparo is issued by a competent court against any members of the
AFP, which should essentially include verification of the identity of the ag-
grieved party; recovery and preservation of relevant evidence; identification
of witnesses and securing statements from them; determination of the cause,
manner, location and time of death or disappearance; identification and ap-
prehension of the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance;
and bringing of the suspected offenders before a competent court.
19. Petitioner AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit attesting that
he received the above directive of respondent Secretary of National Defense
and that acting on this directive, he immediately caused to be issued a di-
rective to the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the circum-
stances of the alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of the re-
spondents, and undertook to provide results of the investigations to re-
spondents. To this day, however, almost a year after the policy directive
was issued by petitioner Secretary of National Defense on October 31,
2007, respondents have not been furnished the results of the investigation
which they now seek through the instant petition for a writ of Amparo.
20. Under these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to warrant the con-
clusion that there is a violation of respondents' right to security as a guaran-
tee of protection by the government. In sum, we conclude that respondents'
right to security as "freedom from threat" is violated by the apparent threat
to their life, liberty and security of person. Their right to security as a guar-
antee of protection by the government is likewise violated by the ineffective
investigation and protection on the part of the military.
Issue 3
21. The production order under the Amparo Rule should not be confused with a
search warrant for law enforcement under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution. This Constitutional provision is a protection of the people
from the unreasonable intrusion of the government, not a protection of the
government from the demand of the people such as respondents.
22. Instead, the Amparo production order may be likened to the production of
documents or things under Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Proce-
dure which provides in relevant part, viz:
○ Section 1. Motion for production or inspection order.
○ Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court
in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce
and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on
behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers,
books of accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things,
not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any
matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, cus-
tody or control...
23. In Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. v. Judge Natividad, the respondent
judge, under authority of Rule 27, issued a subpoena duces tecum for the
production and inspection of among others, the books and papers of Materi-
al Distributors (Phil.) Inc. The company questioned the issuance of the sub-
poena on the ground that it violated the search and seizure clause. The
Court struck down the argument and held that the subpoena pertained to a
civil procedure that "cannot be identified or confused with unreasonable
searches prohibited by the Constitution..."
24. Moreover, in his affidavit, petitioner AFP Chief of Staff himself undertook
"to provide results of the investigations conducted or to be conducted by the
concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged disappearance of
the persons in whose favor the Writ of Amparo has been sought for as soon
as the same has been furnished Higher headquarters."
 021 RODRIGUEZ vs. ARROYO (LAGUILLES)
November 15, 2011 | Sereno, J. | Writ of Amparo
PETITIONER: Noriel H. Rodriguez
RESPONDENTS: Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
SUMMARY: Rodriguez was tagged as an enemy of the State under the Oplan
Bantay Laya. He claims that he has been abducted and tortured. Men abducted
him and started punching him inside the car, and was made to confess that he is
a member of the NPA. Days after he was taken to different camps, and was still
forced to confess. Subsequently, he was made to sign a paper stating that he was
a surrenderree and was never beaten up. When he was finally released,
Rodriguez filed before the Court a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition
for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders. The Court
granted the writs after finding that Rodriguez sufficiently alleged that he
had been adbucted and tortured by the members of the 17th Infantry
Battalion of the Philippine Army. Respondents then alleged that Rodriguez
voluntarily surrendered to the military. The CA did not grant the Interim Relief
for temporary protection order, hence this petition.
The issue is WoN the interim relief should be granted – NO.
Interim relief is only available before final judgment. These provisional reliefs
are intended to assist the court before it arrives at a judicious determination of
the amparo petition. Being interim reliefs, they can only be granted before a
final adjudication of the case is made. In any case, it must be underscored that
the privilege of the writ of amparo, once granted, necessarily entails the
protection of the aggrieved party. Thus, since we granted Rodriguez the
privilege of the writ of amparo, there is no need to issue a temporary protection
order independently of the former.
DOCTRINE: A temporary protection order is only available before final judg-
ment.
FACTS:
1. Rodriguez claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State
under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its members targets of extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances.
2. On September 6, 2009 Rodriguez has just reached Barangay Tapel,
Cagayan, on board a tricycle driven by Hermie Antonio Carlos, when four
men forcibly took him and forced him into a car. Inside the car were several
men in civilian clothes, one of whom was holding a .45 caliber pistol.
3. The men tied the hands of Rodriguez, ordered him to lie on his stomach, sat
on his back and started punching him.
4. During the drive, the men forced Rodriguez to confess to being a member
of the NPA, but he remained silent. The car then entered a place that
appeared to be a military camp. There were soldiers all over the area, and
there was a banner with the word “Bravo” written on it. Rodriguez later on
learned that the camp belonged to the 17th Infantry Battalion of the
Philippine Army.
5. Rodriguez was brought to a canteen, where six men confronted him,
ordering him to confess to his membership in the NPA. Due to his
exhaustion, he unintentionally fell asleep. As a result, the men hit him on
the head to wake him up.
6. The men forced Rodriguez into a vehicle, which brought them to Bugey and
Mission. While passing houses along the way, the men asked him if his
contacts lived in those houses. When he failed to answer, a soldier pointed a
gun to his head and threatened to kill him and his family.
7. The next day, soldiers armed with rifles took Rodriguez and made him their
guide on their way to an NPA camp in Birao. Accompanying them was a
man named Harry, who, according to the soldiers, was an NPA member
who had surrendered to the military.
8. On September 17, the soldiers instructed Rodriguez to take a bath. They
gave him a pair of jeans and perfume. While he was having breakfast, the
two soldiers guarding him repeatedly reminded him not to disclose to the
media his experience in the camp and to say instead that he had surrendered
to the military.
9. He was then made to sign a paper stating that he was a surrenderee and was
never beaten up.
10. On the same day, the mother and brother of Rodriguez arrived surrounded
by several men. His mother talked to Lt. Col. Mina. Rodriguez heard one of
the soldiers tell his mother that he had surrendered to the military and had
long been its asset. His brother informed him that the men accompanying
him were from the CHR.
11. A soldier tried to convince Wilma to let Rodriguez stay in the camp for
another two weeks to supposedly prevent the NPA from taking revenge on
him.
12. The soldiers accompanied them to the CHR office, where Rodriguez was
made to sign an affidavit stating that he was neither abducted nor tortured.
Afraid and desperate to return home, he was forced to sign the document.
13. Cruz advised him not to file a case against his abductors because they had
already freed him.
14. Rodriguez reached his house on September 18. Callagan and two soldiers
went inside the house, and took photographs and a video footage thereof.
The soldiers explained that the photos and videos would serve as evidence
of the fact that Rodriguez and his family were able to arrive home safely.
 15. On September 19, Dr. Reginaldo Pamugas, a physician trained by the
International Committee on Torture and Rehabilitation, examined
Rodriguez and issued a Medical Certificate stating that the latter had been a
victim of torture.
16. Rodriguez then filed before the court a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and
Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders,
Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and Personal Properties.
17. The petition was filed against former Presdient Arroyo, Gen. Ibrado, PDG.
Versoza, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Maj. Gen. Ochoa, P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt.
Santos, Col. De Vera, 1st Lt Matutina, Calog, Geroge Palacpac, Cruz,
Pasicolan, and Callagan.
18. The Court granted the respective writs after finding that Rodriguez
sufficiently alleged that he had been abducted, tortured, and later released
by members of the 17th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army.
19. Respondents, through the OSG, filed their Return of the Writ, which was
considered as their comment. They alleged that Rodriguez surrendered to
the military after he had been put under surveillance.
20. The CA rendered its assailed decision in not granting the temporary reliefs
prayed for by Rodriguez.
ISSUE/s:
1. WoN the interim reliefs prayed for by Rodriguez may be granted after the
writs of amparo and habeas data have already been issued in his favor –
NO, because temporary reliefs may only be granted before the writ is
granted.
preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission
of these offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent
punishment of perpetrators by inevitably leading to subsequent
investigation and action.
29. The writ of habes data provides a judicial remedy to protect a person’s right
to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances where
such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to
achieve unlawful ends.
Grant of interim reliefs
30. In the petition, Rodriguez prays for the issuance of a temporary protection
order. It must be understood that this interim relief is only available before
final judgment.
31. These provisional reliefs are intended to assist the court before it arrives at a
judicious determination of the amparo petition. Being interim reliefs, they
can only be granted before a final adjudication of the case is made.
32. In any case, it must be underscored that the privilege of the writ of amparo,
once granted, necessarily entails the protection of the aggrieved party.
33. Thus, since we granted Rodriguez the privilege of the writ of amparo, there
is no need to issue a temporary protection order independently of the
former.

RULING: We AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals.

RATIO:
24. It must be emphasized that the writs of amparo and habeas data were
promulgated to ensure the protection of the people’s right to life, liberty,
and security.
25. The rules on these writs were issued in light of the alarming prevalence of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
26. The writ of amparo is an extraordinary and independent remedy that
provides rapid judicial relief, as it partakes of a summary proceeding that
requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate interim and
permanent reliefs available to the petitioner.
27. It is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of
evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that
will require full and exhaustive proceedings.
28. Rather, it serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the
problem of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. It is
 022 TAPUZ v. DEL ROSARIO (Marcos)
June 17, 2008 | Brion, J. | Habeas Data
PETITIONER: DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ, AURORA TAPUZ-
MADRIAGA, LIBERTY M. ASUNCION, LADYLYN BAMOS MADRIAGA,
EVERLY TAPUZ MADRIAGA, EXCEL TAPUZ, IVAN TAPUZ AND
MARIAN TIMBAS
RESPONDENTS: HONORABLE JUDGE ELMO DEL ROSARIO, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC Br. 5 Kalibo, SHERIFF NELSON DELA
CRUZ, in his capacity as Sheriff of the RTC, THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE stationed in Boracay Island, represented by the PNP STATION
COMMANDER, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CEBU 18th
DIVISION, SPOUSES GREGORIO SANSON & MA. LOURDES T.
SANSON,
SUMMARY: Sps. Sanson filed with the MCTC of Aklan a complaint for
forcible entry and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction against Tapuz et. al. The MCTC, after due
proceedings, rendered a decision in favor of Sps. Sanson. It found prior
possession in Sps. Sanson’s favor. Sps, Sanson filed a motion for demolition.
Tapuz et. al. opposed the motion for demolition but Judge del Rosario of the
RTC nevertheless issued via a Special Order a writ of demolition to be
implemented fifteen (15) days after the Sheriff's written notice to Tapuz et. al. to
voluntarily demolish their house/s to allow Sps. Sanson to effectively take
actual possession of the land. It was against this factual backdrop that Tapuz et.
al. filed the present petition before the SC. The petition contains and prays for
three remedies, namely: a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court; the issuance of a writ of habeas data under the Rule on the Writ
of Habeas Data; and finally, the issuance of the writ of amparo under the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo. The issue is WoN Tapuz et. al. should be granted the
issuance of a writ of habeas data – NO because the petitions are fatally
defective, both in substance, and in form. These allegations obviously lack what
the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a minimum, thus rendering the
petition fatally deficient. Specifically, we see no concrete allegations of
unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to the right to
life, liberty or security. The petition likewise has not alleged, much less
demonstrated, any need for information under the control of police authorities
other than those it has already set forth as integral annexes.
DOCTRINE: Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the
following material allegations of ultimate facts in a petition for the issuance of a
writ of habeas data:
"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;
(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and
how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved
party;
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the
data or information;
(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government
office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the
data or information, if known;
(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating,
rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information
or les kept by the respondent.
In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining
the act complained of; and
(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable.
FACTS:
84. Spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson (Sps. Sanson) filed
with the MCTC of Buruanga-Malay, Aklan a complaint for forcible entry
and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction against the petitioners Daniel Masangkay Tapuz,
Aurora Tapuz-Madriaga, Liberty M. Asuncion, Ladylyn Bamos Madriaga,
Everly Tapuz Madriaga, Excel Tapuz, Ivan Tapuz and Marian Timbas
(Tapuz et.al.) and other John Does numbering about 120.
85. Sps. Sanson allege:
(1) they are the registered owners under TCT No. 35813 of a 1.0093-hectare
parcel of land located at Sitio Pinaungon, Balabag, Boracay, Malay, Aklan
(the "disputed land");
(2) they were the disputed land's prior possessors when Tapuz et. al. —
armed with bolos and carrying suspected firearms and together with
unidenti ed persons numbering 120 — entered the disputed land by force
and intimidation, without their permission and against the objections of the
their security men, and built thereon a nipa and bamboo structure.
 86. Tapuz et. al. denied the material allegations and claimed: attachments.
(1) they are the actual and prior possessors of the disputed land;
(2) on the contrary, Sps. Sanson are the intruders; and RATIO:
(3) Sps. Sanson’s certificate of title to the disputed property is spurious. 82. Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following
They asked for the dismissal of the complaint and interposed a counterclaim material allegations of ultimate facts in a petition for the issuance of a writ
for damages. of habeas data:
87. The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered a decision in favor of Sps.
Sanson. It found prior possession — the key issue in forcible entry cases — "(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;
in Sps. Sanson’s favor
88. Tapuz et. al. appealed to the RTC then presided by Judge Marin, and on (b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it
appeal Judge Marin granted the motion for the issuance of a writ of
affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party;
preliminary mandatory injunction conditioned on the posting of a bond by
Sps. Sanson, through an order dated 26 Feb 2007.
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data
89. The writ — authorizing the immediate implementation of the MCTC
decision — was actually issued by respondent Judge Elmo F. del Rosario on or information;
12 March 2007 after Sps. Sanson had complied with the imposed condition
(posting of the bond). (d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government
90. Tapuz et. al. moved to reconsider the issuance of the writ; the Sps, Sanson, office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data
on the other hand, filed a motion for demolition. or information, if known;
91. Tapuz et. al. opposed the motion for demolition but Judge del Rosario
nevertheless issued via a Special Order a writ of demolition to be (e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification,
implemented fifteen (15) days after the Sheriff's written notice to Tapuz et. suppression or destruction of the database or information or les kept by the
al. to voluntarily demolish their house/s to allow Sps. Sanson to effectively respondent.
take actual possession of the land.
92. Tapuz et. al. thereafter filed on 2 August 2007 with the Court of Appeals, In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the
Cebu City, a Petition for Review 11 (under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of
act complained of; and
Civil Procedure) of the Permanent Mandatory Injunction and Order of
Demolition of the RTC.
(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable.
93. Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff Nelson R. dela Cruz issued the Notice to
Vacate and for Demolition on 19 March 2008.
83. In the petition filed, what was only stated was:
94. It was against this factual backdrop that Tapuz et. al. filed the present
"1. [ . . . ] Similarly, a petition for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is prayed
petition. The petition contains and prays for three remedies, namely: a
for so that the PNP may release the report on the burning of the homes of
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; the
the petitioners and the acts of violence employed against them by the
issuance of a writ of habeas data under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas
private respondents, furnishing the Court and the petitioners with copy of
Data; and finally, the issuance of the writ of amparo under the Rule on the
the same;
Writ of Amparo.
[...]
ISSUE/s:
66. Petitioners apply for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA commanding the
10. WoN Tapuz et. al. should be granted the issuance of a writ of habeas data –
Philippine National Police [PNP] to produce the police report pertaining to
NO because the petitions are fatally defective, both in substance, and in
the burning of the houses of the petitioners in the land in dispute and
form.
likewise the investigation report if an investigation was conducted by the
PNP."
RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the present
petition OUTRIGHT for deficiencies of form and substance patent from its body and
84. These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data
requires as a minimum, thus rendering the petition fatally deficient.
85. Specifically, we see no concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful
violation of the right to privacy related to the right to life, liberty or
security.
86. The petition likewise has not alleged, much less demonstrated, any need for
information under the control of police authorities other than those it has
already set forth as integral annexes.
87. The necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ, based on the
insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure information, has not also
been shown.
88. In sum, the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more
than the "fishing expedition" that this Court — in the course of drafting the
Rule on habeas data — had in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ
of habeas data is not. In these lights, the outright denial of the petition for
the issuance of the writ of habeas data is fully in order.
 023 SAEZ v MACAPAGAL-ARROYO (ARMAND)
September 25, 2012| | Writ Amparo and Writ of Habeas Data
PETITIONER: FRANCIS SAEZ
RESPONDENTS: GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO et al.
SUMMARY: On March 6, 2008, Saez filed with the Court a petition to be granted
the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data with prayers for temporary pro-
tection order, inspection of place and production of documents. In the petition, he
expressed his fear of being abducted and killed; hence, he sought that he be placed in
a sanctuary appointed by the Court. He likewise prayed for the military to cease from
further conducting surveillance and monitoring of his activities and for his name to be
excluded from the order of battle and other government records connecting him to the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). During the hearings, Saez narrated that
starting April 16, 2007, he noticed that he was always being followed by a certain
“Joel,” a former colleague at Bayan Muna. “Joel” pretended peddling pandesal in the
vicinity of Saez‟s store. Three days before Saez was apprehended, “Joel” approached
and informed him of his marital status and current job as a baker in Calapan, Mindoro
Oriental. “Joel” inquired if Saez was still involved with ANAKPAWIS. When asked
by the CA justices during the hearing if Saez had gone home to Calapan after having
filed the petition, he answered in the negative explaining that he was afraid of Pvt.
Osio who was always at the pier. CA denied the petition for WRIT OF AMPARO
because fail to allege how the supposed threat or violation of Saez‟s [right to] life,
liberty and security is committed. Neither is there any narration of any circumstances
attendant to said supposed violation or threat to violate Saez‟s right to life, liberty or
security to warrant entitlement to the privilege of the writs prayed for. Application for
WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is likewise denied because allegations therein do not
comply with the aforestated requirements of Section 6 [Rule on the Writ of Habeas
Data] of the pertinent rule. The petition is bereft of any allegation stating with specif-
ic definiteness as to how Saez‟s right to privacy was violated or threatened to be vio-
lated. The court also dropped Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (then incumbent president) as
a party respondent.The court issued a resolution affirming the decision of CA. Hence,
this peititon. The issue is WoN the Court of Appeals committed reversible error
in dismissing the Petition and dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as
party respondent? No. Saez, however, is not exempted from the burden of proving
by substantial evidence his allegations against the President to make the latter liable
for either acts or omissions violative of rights against life, liberty and security. In the
instant case, Saez merely included the President‟s name as a party respondent
without any attempt at all to show the latter‟s actual involvement in, or knowledge of
the alleged violations. Further, prior to the filing of the petition, there was no request
or demand for any investigation that was brought to the President‟s attention. Thus,
while the President cannot be completely dropped as a respondent in a petition for the
privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data merely on the basis of the
presidential immunity from suit, Saez in this case failed to establish accountability of
the President, as commander-in-chief, under the doctrine of command responsibility.
The Court notes that the petition for issuance of the privilege of the writs of amparo
and habeas data is sufficient as to its contents. However, they are mere allegations,
which the Court cannot accept “hook, line and sinker”, so to speak, and whether
substantial evidence exist to warrant the granting of the petition is a different matter
altogether.
In this case, the petition was mainly anchored on the alleged threats against his life,
liberty and security by reason of his inclusion in the military‟s order of battle, the
surveillance and monitoring activities made on him, and the intimidation exerted
upon him to compel him to be a military asset. While as stated earlier, mere threats
fall within the mantle of protection of the writs of amparo and habeas data, in Saez‟s
case, the restraints and threats allegedly made allegations lack corroborations, are not
supported by independent and credible evidence, and thus stand on nebulous grounds.
DOCTRINE: The liberality accorded to amparo and habeas data cases does not mean
that a claimant is dispensed with the onus of proving his case. "Indeed, even the lib-
eral standard of substantial evidence demands some adequate evidence."
FACTS:
1. On July 21 2007, petitioner Francis Saez, a member of the
ANAKPAWIS party-list organization, was invited by Pvt. Zaldy Osio
and Sgt. Castillo of the Intelligence Unit of the 204th Infantry Brigade,
2nd Division of the Philippine Army, to their camp in Brgy.
Pinagsabangan II, Naujan, Oriental Mindoro.
2. They asked him about his involvement with the Communist Party of
the Philippines (CCP). Out of fear, saez agreed to become an
intelligence asset for the military. At around 5:00 p.m., he was allowed
to go home.
3. Sometime in August 2007, saez claimed that he was asked to retract his
affidavit containing his eyewitness account of the abduction and
murder of Eden Marcellana and Eddie Gumanoy, and to declare that
Major General Jovito Palparan and his men had nothing to do with the
incident.
4. Military officers made him sign a document admitting that he was a
surrenderee and a rebel returnee, and ordered him to infiltrate
GABRIELA, KARAPATAN, PAMANTIK, KASAMA-TK and other
activist groups. Believing that his life was in danger, Saez went to
KARAPATAN for assistance.
5. Thereafter, Saez filed with this Court a petition for the issuance of the
writs of amparo andhabeas data with prayers for a Temporary
Protection Order and an Order for the Inspection of Place and
Production of Documents against GMA et al.
6. Without giving due course to the petition, the Court issued the writs of
amparo and habeas data, and referred the case to the Court of Appeals
(CA) to hear and decide the same.
 7. In their Return of the Writ, GMA et al asserted that there are no persons
assigned in their units by the names of Capt. Lawrence Banaag, Capt.
Rommel Gutierrez and Cpl. Ariel Fontanilla. Moreover, the names and
designations "a certain Capt. Alcaydo;" "a certain First Sergeant;" "a
certain Cpl. James;" "a certain Pfc. Sonny" and "a certain Joel" are
insufficient to specify the particular persons referred to in the petition.
8. GMA et al. Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, Jr.; Capt. Jacob Thaddeus M.
Obligado; Pvt. Rizaldy A. Osio; Pfc. Romanito C. Quintana, Jr.; and
Pfc. Jerico Duquil submitted their respective affidavits.
9. On July 9, 2008, the CA promulgated its Decision, and dismissed the
petition.
10. Aggrieved, Saez filed the present petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, to reverse
and set aside the Decision of the CA.
ISSUE:
1. WoN the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in dismissing the
Petition and dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party
respondent? – NO. CA correctly found that the petition was bereft of
any allegation as to what particular acts or omission of respondents
violated or threatened Saez's right to life, liberty and security.
RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration is DENIED WITH FINALITY.
RATIO:
2. We deny the petition. A careful perusal of the subject petition shows that
the CA correctly found that the petition was bereft of any allegation as to
what particular acts or omission of GMA et al violated or threatened Saez's
right to life, liberty and security.
3. His claim that he was incommunicado lacks credibility as he was given a
cellular phone and allowed to go back to Oriental Mindoro. The CA also
correctly held that Saez failed to present substantial evidence that his right
to life, liberty and security were violated, or how his right to privacy was
threatened by GMA et al.
4. He did not specify the particular documents to be secured, their location or
what particular government office had custody thereof, and who has
possession or control of the same. He merely prayed that GMA et al be
ordered "to produce any documents submitted to any of them in the matter
of any report on the case of FRANCIS SAEZ, including all military
intelligence reports."Saez assails the CA in failing to appreciate that in his
Affidavit and Fact Sheet, he had specifically detailed the violation of his
right to privacy as he was placed in the Order of Battle and promised to
have his record cleared if he would cooperate and become a military asset.
However, despite questions propounded by the CA Associate Justices
during the hearing, he still failed to enlighten the appellate court as to what
actually transpired to enable said court to determine whether his right to
life, liberty or security had actually been violated or threatened. Records
bear out the unsubstantiated claims of Saez which justified the appellate
court's dismissal of the petition.
5. As to Saez's argument that the CA erred in deleting the President as party-
GMA et al, we find the same also to be without merit. The Court has
already made it clear in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo that the President,
during his or her tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in
any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the
Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the
President, the Head of State, if the President can be dragged into court
litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that the
President be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to
enable the President to fully attend to the performance of official duties and
functions.
6. In the present case, the Court notes that the petition for the issuance of the
privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data is sufficient as to its
contents. The Saez made specific allegations relative to his personal
circumstances and those of the respondents. The Saez likewise indicated
particular acts, which are allegedly violative of his rights and the
participation of some of the respondents in their commission.
7. As to the pre-requisite conduct and result of an investigation prior to the
filing of the petition, it was explained that the Saez expected no relief from
the military, which he perceived as his oppressors, hence, his request for
assistance from a human rights organization, then a direct resort to the
court. Anent the documents sought to be the subject of the writ of habeas
data prayed for, the Court finds the requirement of specificity to have been
satisfied.
8. The documents subject of the petition include the order of battle, those
linking the Saez to the CPP and those he signed involuntarily, and military
intelligence reports making references to him. Although the exact locations
and the custodians of the documents were not identified, this does not
render the petition insufficient.
9. Section 6(d) of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data is clear that the
requirement of specificity arises only when the exact locations and
identities of the custodians are known. The Amparo Rule was not
promulgated with the intent to make it a token gesture of concern for
constitutional rights. Thus, despite the lack of certain contents, which the
Rules on the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data generally require, for as
long as their absence under exceptional circumstances can be reasonably
justified, a petition should not be susceptible to outright dismissal.
10. From the foregoing, the Court holds that the allegations stated in the
petition for the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data filed
conform to the rules. However, they are mere allegations, which the Court
cannot accept "hook, line and sinker", so to speak, and whether substantial
 evidence exist to warrant the granting of the petition is a different matter
altogether.
11. In the hearing before the CA, it was claimed that "Joel" once inquired from
the Saez if the latter was still involved with ANAKPAWIS. By itself, such
claim cannot establish with certainty that the Saez was being monitored.
The encounter happened once and the Saez, in his pleadings, nowhere stated
that subsequent to the time he was asked about his involvement with
ANAKPAWIS, he still noticed "Joel" conducting surveillance operations on
him. He alleged that he was brought to the camp of the 204th Infantry
Brigade in Naujan, Oriental Mindoro but was sent home at 5:00 p.m. The
Saez and the respondents have conflicting claims about what transpired
thereafter. Saez insisted that he was brought against his will and was asked
to stay by the respondents in places under the latter’s control. GMA et al, on
the other hand, averred that it was the Saez who voluntarily offered his
service to be a military asset, but was rejected as the former still doubted his
motives and affiliations.
12. Section 19 of both the Rules on the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data is
explicit that questions of fact and law can be raised before the Court in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. As a rule then, the Court is
not bound by the factual findings made by the appellate court which
rendered the judgment in a petition for the issuance of the writs of amparo
and habeas data. Be that as it may, in the instant case, the Court agrees with
the CA that the Saez failed to discharge the burden of proof imposed upon
him by the rules to establish his claims. It cannot be overemphasized that
Section 1 of both the Rules on the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data
expressly include in their coverage even threatened violations against a
person’s right to life, liberty or security. Further, threat and intimidation that
vitiate the free will – although not involving invasion of bodily integrity –
nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to security in the sense of
"freedom from threat".
It must be stressed, however, that such "threat" must find rational basis on
the surrounding circumstances of the case. In this case, the petition was
mainly anchored on the alleged threats against his life, liberty and security
by reason of his inclusion in the military’s order of battle, the surveillance
and monitoring activities made on him, and the intimidation exerted upon
him to compel him to be a military asset. While as stated earlier, mere
threats fall within the mantle of protection of the writs of amparo and
habeas data, in the Saez’s case, the restraints and threats allegedly made
allegations lack corroborations, are not supported by independent and
credible evidence, and thus stand on nebulous grounds.
13. The Court is cognizant of the evidentiary difficulties attendant to a petition
for the issuance of the writs. Unlike, however, the unique nature of cases
involving enforced disappearances or extra-judicial killings that calls for
flexibility in considering the gamut of evidence presented by the parties,
this case sets a different scenario and a significant portion of the Saez’s
testimony could have been easily corroborated. In his Sinumpaang Salaysay
dated March 5, 2008 and the Fact Sheet dated December 9, 200723
executed before the Alliance for the Advancement of People’s Rights-
Southern Tagalog (KARAPATAN-ST), Saez stated that when he was
invited and interrogated at the military camp in Naujan, Oriental Mindoro,
he brought with him his uncle Norberto Roxas, Barangay Captain Mario
Ilagan and two of his bodyguards, and Edwardo Estabillo – five witnesses
who can attest and easily corroborate his statement – but curiously, the Saez
did not present any piece of evidence, whether documentary or testimonial,
to buttress such claim nor did he give any reason for their non-
presentation.This could have made a difference in light of the denials made
by the GMA et al as regards the Saez’s claims.
14. The existence of an order of battle and inclusion of the Saez’s name in it is
another allegation by Saez that does not find support on the evidence
adduced. The Court notes that such allegation was categorically denied by
Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Jr. who, in his Affidavit dated March 31, 2008,
stated that he "does not have knowledge about any Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) ‘order of battle’ which allegedly lists the Saez as a
member of the CPP." This was also denied by Pvt. Osio, who Saez
identified as the one who told him that he was included in the order of
battle. The 2nd Infantry (Jungle Fighter) Division of the Philippine Army
also conducted an investigation pursuant to the directive of AFP Chief of
Staff Gen. Esperon, and it was shown that the persons identified by the Saez
who allegedly committed the acts complained of were not connected or
assigned to the 2nd Infantry Division.
15. Moreover, the evidence showed that the Saez’s mobility was never
curtailed. From the time he was allegedly brought to Batangas in August of
2007 until the time he sought the assistance of KARAPATAN-ST, there
was no restraint upon Saez to go home, as in fact, he went home to Mindoro
on several instances. And while he may have been wary of Pvt. Osio’s
presence at the pier, there was no claim by Saez that he was threatened or
prevented by Pvt. Osio from boarding any vehicle that may transport him
back home. Saez also admitted that he had a mobile phone; hence, he had
unhampered access to communication and can readily seek assistance from
non-governmental organizations and even government agencies.
16. GMA et al. also belied the Saez’s claim that they forced him to become a
military informant and instead, alleged that it was Saez who volunteered to
be one. Thus, in his Sinumpaang Salaysay executed on March 25, 2008,
Pvt. Osio admitted that he actually knew Saez way back in 1998 when they
were still students. He also stated that when he saw Saez again in 2007, the
latter manifested his intention to become a military informant in exchange
for financial and other forms of assistance.
17. Saez also harps on the alleged "monitoring" activities being conducted by a
certain "Joel", e.g., the latter’s alleged act of following him, pretending to
peddle pandesal and asking him about his personal circumstances. Such
allegation by Saez, however, is, at best, a conclusion on his part, a mere
impression that Saez had, based on his personal assessment of the
circumstances. Saez even admitted in his testimony before the CA that
when he had a conversation with "Joel" sometime in July 2007, the latter
merely asked him whether he was still connected with ANAKPAWIS, but
he was not threatened "with anything" and no other incident occurred
between them since then.29 There is clearly nothing on record which shows
that "Joel" committed overt acts that will unequivocally lead to the
conclusion arrived at by the Saez, especially since the alleged acts
committed by "Joel" are susceptible of different interpretations.
18. Given that the totality of the evidence presented by Saez failed to support
his claims, the reliefs prayed for, therefore, cannot be granted. The liberality
accorded to amparo and habeas data cases does not mean that a claimant is
dispensed with the onus of proving his case. "Indeed, even the liberal
standard of substantial evidence demands some adequate evidence."

SALCEDO v. BOLLOZOS (MERILLES)
July 5, 2010 | Brion, J. | Topic
PETITIONER: Ruben Salcedo
RESPONDENTS: Judge Gil. G. Bollozos
SUMMARY: Tanmalack, with other armed men seized property belonging to
Salcedo. Salcedo reported the incident to the Police and Tanmalack was
arrested. A petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus and Writ of Amparo was
filed by the sister of Tanmalack. The presiding judge, Bollozos, issued the writ.
Salcedo now questions the the issuance the writ through an administrative
proceeding against Judge Bollozos. The OCA recommended the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of merit. As to the administrative proceeding - The SC
affirmed the recommendation of the OCA and dismissed the case for only
judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or
deliberate intent to do an injustice will be administratively sanctioned.
The relevant issue in this case is however, the propriety of the issuance of the
writ. To which the SC ruled that Bollozos erred issuing the writ. Had he read
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo more closely, the respondent judge
would have realized that the writ, in its present form, only applies to "extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.” The present case
involves concerns that are purely property and commercial in nature – concerns
that we have previously ruled are not covered by the Writ of Amparo.
DOCTRINE: The writ is intended to address violations of or threats to the
rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy
beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental
to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely
property or commercial.
FACTS:
1. The complaint arose from a verified handwritten petition for the Writ of
Habeas Corpus and the Writ of Amparo filed by Jose Tanmalack, Jr. against
the Police Officers of Police Precinct No. 3, Agora, Lapasan, Cagayan de
Oro City, and Inspector Wylen Rojo.
2. Ruben Salcedo alleged that he is a co-owner of a parcel of land (disputed
property) covered by Original Certificate of Title No. O-740 and registered
in the name of Patricio Salcedo.
3. On January 23, 2008 at around 2:30 p.m., while Ruben was supervising an
on-going construction over the disputed property, Tanmalack and heavily
armed men arrived and forced themselves inside the fenced premises of the
disputed property.
4. Ruben averred that Tanmalack and his companions harassed and threatened
to kill and to harm him and his workers; that Tanmalack uttered defamatory
statements and accused him of land-grabbing; and that Tanmalack and his
companions occupied the property and destroyed building materials such as
G.I. sheets, lumber and other construction materials.
5. Ruben forthwith reported the incident to the nearby police station. The
police promptly responded and arrested Tanmalack and brought him in for
questioning.
6. That same afternoon at around 4:45 p.m., Tanmalack, represented by his
sister, Jocelyn Tanmalack Tan, filed the petition on his behalf while
Tanmalack was detained by the police for employing "self-help in
preventing squatters from putting up improvements in their titled property.”
7. Clerk of Court Atty. Herlie Luis-Requerme narrated the circumstances
surrounding the filing of the petition and how it came to be referred to the
respondent judge’s sala, as follows:
a. In the late afternoon of January 23, 2008, a query was received by the Office
regarding the procedure in filing a petition for a Writ of Amparo. We gave the
information that the established procedure is to assign cases to the different
branches by raffling or in urgent cases, by a special raffle upon proper motions. But
since the office has not received any case of that nature yet, and as the schedule of
raffling will still be in the afternoon of the next day, it will be referred to the
Executive Judge for instruction and or appropriate action;
b. That since the Executive Judge was on leave, I went to consult the 1st Vice
Executive Judge Evelyn Gamotin Nery. Since Judge Nery was busy at that time, I
went to see 2nd Vice Executive Judge Ma. Anita Esguerra-Lucagbo;
c. That I clarified from Judge Lucagbo the procedure to be adopted under the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC);
d. That the issue if any judge can immediately act on the petition was not clearly
stated in the Rule but if the case will be referred to her as the 2nd Vice Executive
Judge, she will be willing to look at the petition;
e. That when I went back at the Office at a little past 5:00 P.M. already, direct from
the chamber of Judge Lucagbo, I found out that a Petition for Writ of Amparo was
filed at around 4:45 P.M. as stamped in the petition
f. That since I was out of the office, the Docket Clerk in charge, Mr. Rudy
Exclamador, referred the case to the Administrative Officer Mary Lyn Charisse
Lagamon;
g. That thinking I was no longer around as the personnel to whom I left the
information that I was going to the sala of 1st Vice Executive Judge Nery was not
able to inform the Admin. Officer of my whereabouts, Mr. Exclamador was
instructed by her to refer the case to you [referring to the respondent judge];
h. That upon learning of the fact, I immediately called Mr. Exclamador and Ms.
Lagamon to explain why they referred the case to your sala without any instruction
from me;
i. That they said that they are of the honest belief that I was no longer around; that the
lawyer was insisting to refer the case immediately to a judge since it is already 5:00
 P.M. and considering the novelty, urgency and importance of the case, and fearing
that no judge will be left to act on the petition if they still discuss what to do, Mr.
Exclamador, with the concurrence of Admin. Officer Lagamon, referred the case to
you since your sala was the nearest to our office, it being adjacent to your court;
j. That there is nobody from this Office who brought the handwritten petition to Judge
Lucagbo nor was there any instruction from her to any of the personnel to have the
petition conform to a form acceptable to the court, such fact was confirmed by
Judge Lucagbo
k. That the office only acted what it deemed best under the circumstances and was not
motivated by any ill motive or malice.
8. The respondent judge (Bollozos) immediately issued a Writ of Amparo
dated January 23, 2008, directing "the police officers of Agora Police
Station 3 or Insp. Wylen Rojo x x x to release immediately upon receipt of
[the] writ but not later than 6:00 P.M. today, petitioner Jose Tanmalack, Jr.,
to the custody of Atty. Francis V. Ku.”
a. He also directed the police officers to file their verified return to
the petition within five (5) working days, together with supporting
affidavits, in conformity with Section 9 of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo.
9. Around 5:30 p.m., the Writ of Amparo was served upon SPO3 Aener O.
Adajar, PNP Chief Investigator. At six o’clock in the evening of that same
day, the police released Tanmalack to the custody of Atty. Francis Ku.
10. Ruben Salcedo now questions the issuance of the Writ of Amparo which he
claims had been unusually issued with haste.
a. The complainant claims that the handwritten petition did not give
any ground to warrant the issuance of the Writ of Amparo;
b. that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion,
bias, and obvious partiality, and in grave disregard of the Rules
and the rule of law when he acted upon and granted the letter-
petition for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo.
c. The complainant also alleges that the respondent judge
"accommodated" the issuance of the Writ of Amparo because he
and Atty. Francis Ku (Tanmalack’s counsel) are members of the
Masonic fraternity.
11. The respondent judge filed his Comment dated March 30, 2009, in
compliance with the directive of the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA). In his defense, he alleged:
a. [W]hen he received the petition from the Office of the Clerk of
Court, he had no option but to exercise his judicial duty without
any bias or partiality, nor did he consider that the petitioner’s
counsel is a fraternal brother (Mason)
b. That it was proper that the petition was not raffled because under
the A.M. any judge of a RTC can issue a writ and that it can be
filed on any day at any time
c. That the issuance of the writ was a matter of great urgency because
the alleged illegal deprivation of liberty was made in the late
afternoon of January 23, 2008, which was a Friday, and that if the
Court would not act on the petition, the detainee would certainly
spend the night in jail
d. That although handwritten, the SC Circular on the Writ of Maparo
only rehires that the same be signed and verified, therefore the
petition was sufficient in form and substance
e. Although the Amparo rules mandate that a judge shall immediately
order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue, he
propounded clarificatory questions on the petitioner’s
representative and their counsel
12. The OCA reported that the complaint is bereft of merit.
a. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, as in the instant case, or of a private
individual or entity. Whereas in other jurisdictions the writ covers
only actual violations, the Philippine version is more protective of
the right to life, liberty and security because it covers both actual
and threatened violations of such rights.
b. This Office agrees with respondent Judge’s observation that
"Rojo’s declaration not anymore to contest the petition and that he
(Rojo) did not arrest nor detain petitioner, but admitted that he
could not release the latter for further evaluation because of the
complaint is an admission that he deprived [or threatened to
deprive] Jose [Dy Tanmalack] of his liberty."
13. Hence, this case before the SC.
ISSUE/s:
1. WoN the writ of amparo should have been granted - NO, the writ is issued
only applies to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof. The present case concerns purely property and commercial nature,
not within the coverage of the writ.
2. WoN the respondent judge could be held administratively liable for the
error he committed - NO, only judicial errors tainted with fraud,
dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice
will be administratively sanctioned.
RULING: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court RESOLVES to
DISMISS the administrative complaint against Judge Gil G. Bollozos, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Cagayan de Oro City, for lack of merit.
RATIO:
1. At the outset, we agree with the complainant that the respondent judge erred
in issuing the Writ of Amparo in Tanmalack’s favor.
 a. Had he read Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo more civil, criminal, or administrative – for any of his official acts, no
closely, the respondent judge would have realized that the writ, in matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith.
its present form, only applies to "extralegal killings and enforced b. Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross
disappearances or threats thereof.” ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice will be
2. The present case involves concerns that are purely property and commercial administratively sanctioned.
in nature – concerns that we have previously ruled are not covered by the c. Settled is the rule that errors committed by a judge in the exercise
Writ of Amparo. of his adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through
3. The writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the administrative proceedings, but should instead be assailed through
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, judicial remedies.
and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address 9. We note, too, that although the respondent judge erred in issuing the Writ of
these extraordinary concerns. Amparo, we find, as the OCA did, that there is no evidence on record that
4. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty supports the complainant’s allegation that the issuance was tainted with
or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those manifest bias and partiality, bad faith, or gross ignorance of the law.
available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these
Rules.
5. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or
commercial.
6. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.
Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo – in line with the
extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its
issuance demands – requires that every petition for the issuance of the writ
must be supported by justifying allegations of fact:
a. The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
b. The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat,
act or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be
described by an assumed appellation;
c. The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such
threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in
supporting affidavits;
d. The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances,
and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner
and conduct of the investigation, together with any report;
e. The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the
threat, act or omission; and
f. The relief prayed for.
7. The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima
facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting
affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to
or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party
was or is being committed.
8. Plainly, the errors attributed to respondent judge pertain to the exercise of
his adjudicative functions.
a. As a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, and
corruption, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not
subject to disciplinary action. He cannot be subjected to liability –
 025 PADOR v. ARCAYAN (PELIÑO)
March 12, 2013 | Sereno, CJ. | Writ of Amparo
PETITIONERS: Spouses Nerio and Soledad Pador and Rey Pador
RESPONDENTS: Brgy. Capt. Bernabe Arcayan, Brgy. Tanod Chief Romeo Pador,
Brgy. Tanods Alberto Alivio, Carmelo Revales, Roberto Alimorin, Winelo Arcayan,
Christopher Alivio, and Bienvenido Arcayan, all of Brgy. Tabunan, Cebu City
SUMMARY: The Padors filed a Verified Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo
in the RTC, on the basis that the brgy. officials conducted a raid of their ampalaya farm to
search for marijuana plants, but found none, and that they were invited to attend a
conference, and they also said that there would be a possibility of more harassment cases,
etc. that would threaten their right to life, liberty, and security, thus would necessitate the
issuance of the writ of amparo. The RTC made the officials to make a Verified
Return/Comment, where the brgy. officials were claiming that they received a report that
there was a marijuana plantation in Sitio Gining, so they commenced a patrol in that area,
and that it was Nerio who was actually making threats. Because of the reports, BC
Arcayan invited Nerio and Rey, considering that the threats towards the brgy. tanods were
serious. RTC denied the privilege of the writ of amparo. Hence, this petition. The issue in
this case is whether or not the RTC committed grave error in denying the privilege of the
writ of amparo. The SC held in the negative. Sec. 1 of the Rule of the Writ of Amparo
provides for the basis, thus, to be entitled to the privilege of the writ, the Padors must
prove by substantial evidence that their rights to life, liberty, and security are being
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission. A closer look shows that the
petition was anchored on the following allegations: (1) that the brgy. officials conducted a
raid on the property of petitioner based on information that the Padors were cultivators of
marijuana; (2) that BC Arcayan sent them invitation letters without stating the purpose of
the invitation; (3) that BC Arcayan refused to receive the Padors’ letter-reply; and (4) that
the Padors anticipate the possibility of more harassment cases, false accusations, and
potential violence from brgy. officals. As to the 1st, the patrol was not done on the
ampalaya farm, but on Sitio Gining. Assuming that it was done in the ampalaya farm, the
SC held that the writ of amparo does not envisage the protection of concerns that are
purely property or commercial in nature. As to the 2nd and 3rd, records are bereft of any
evidence that the Padors were coerced to attend the conference through the use of force or
intimidation. As to the 4th, such is baseless, unfounded, and grounded merely on pure
speculations and conjectures.
DOCTRINE: To be entitled to the privilege of the writ of amparo, the petitioner must
prove by substantial evidence that their rights to life, liberty, and security are being
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission. Moreover, the writ of amparo does
not envisage the protection of concerns that are purely property or commercial in nature.
SC reiterates that the privilege of the writ of amparo is an extraordinary remedy adopted
to address the concerns of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances.
FACTS:
**Will use brgy. officials when referring to the respondents collectively. BT –
barangay tanod; BC – brgy. captain**
216. Petition for review on certiorari
217. On 22 March 2008, Spouses Nerio and Soledad Pador and Rey Pador
(Padors) filed with the RTC a Verified Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Amparo, alleging:
a. That in February 2008, rumors circulated that Nerio was a marijuana
planter in Brgy. Tabunan, Cebu City.
b. On 17 March 2008, BTs Alivio, Revales, and Alimorin raided their
ampalaya farm to search for marijuana plants, but found none.
c. After the raid, Nerio and Rey received invitation letters for a
conference from BC Arcayan.
d. Nerio, Soledad, and Rey referred the invitation letters to their counsel,
who advised them not to attend and, instead, send a letter-reply to BC
Arcayan.
e. When BC Arcayan received the letter-reply, he allegedly read its
contents, got one copy, and refused to sign a receipt of the document.
f. Nerio, Soledad, and Rey concluded that the conduct of the raid, the
sending of the invitation letters, the refusal of BC Arcaya to receive
their letter-reply, as well as the possibility of more harassment cases,
false accusations, and possible violence from the barangay officials,
gravely threatened their right to life, liberty, and security and
necessitated the issuance of a writ of amparo.
218. After examining the contents of the petition and the affidavits, the RTC
issued the writ and directed the brgy. officials to make a verified return.
219. In compliance with the RTC’s directive, the brgy. officials filed their
Verified Return and/or Comment.
a. In their counter-statement of facts, the brgy. officials alleged that on 16
March 2008, BT Winelo received a report regarding the existene of a
marijuana plantation in a place called Sitio Gining in Brgy. Tabunan.
b. BT Winelo then referred the matter to the BT Pador and BC Arcayan
who commenced to organize a patrol.
c. On 17 March 2008, while the brgy. tanods were having a final briefing,
BT Revales left the place to take his breakfast. While he was taking his
breakfast, Nerio, who was riding a motorcycle, stopped and accused BT
Revales of uprooting the marijuana plants. BT Revales denied any
knowledge about the incident, and Nerio, threatened to have him killed.
BT Revales promptly reported this threat to the other brgy. tanods.
d. The brgy. officials recounted that notwithstanding Nerio’s actions, they
proceeded to patrol the area.
e. When they passed by Nerio’s house, Nerio angrily uttered in Cebuano,
“If I will be informed who reported the matter to the police, I will
attack the informant.” BT Revales then asked him, “Who reported
you?” Nerio replied: “I will tell you later once I will be captured by
police authorities. All of us will be dead this afternoon. I want a shoot
out!”
 f.The brgy. officials thereafter commenced their patrol of a place owned
by a certain David Quintana, but their rounds yielded a negative result.
g. Later that evening, while BT Alivio was passing by Nerio’s house,
Nerio threatened to kill him, saying: “I want to kill now!” BT Alivio
then asked him: “Who reported to you so that the truth will come out?”
Nerio then punched his house’s door and said, “I will tell you later
when I will be captured by the police authorities!” BT Alivio then left
the place and reported the matter to BC Arcayan.
h. In response to the reports, BC Arcayan stated that he ordered his
secretary to prepare invitation letters for Nerio and Rey, as the
allegations of threats and intimidation made by Nerio against some of
the brgy. tanods were serious.
i. BC Arcayan explained that he no longer signed a copy of the Nerio,
Soledad, and Rey’s letter-reply, as he had already been given a copy of
it.
220. RTC heard the Petition.
a. On 3 July 2008, it issued the assailed Resolution, finding that the
claims of the Padors were based merely on hearsay, speculations,
surmises, and conjectures, and that the brgy. officials had sufficiently
explained the reason behind the issuance of the letters of invitation.
b. RTC denied the privilege of the writ of amparo.
221. Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE/s:
21. WON the RTC committed grave error in denying the privilege of the writ of
amparo. – NO,
RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is
DENIED. The 3 July 2008 Resolution of the RTC, Br. 17 of Cebu City, in Spec.
Proc. No. 16061-CEB is AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
On whether the RTC committed error in denying the privilege of the writ of amparo
1. Sec. 1 of the Rule of the Writ of Amparo66 provides for the grounds that
may be relied upon in a petition.
a. Thus, to be entitled to the privilege of the writ, the Padors must prove
by substantial evidence that their rights to life, liberty, and security are
being violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission.
2. A closer look at the instant Petition shows that it was anchored on the
following allegations: (1) that the brgy. officials conducted a raid on the
property of petitioner based on information that the Padors were cultivators
66
SEC. 1. Petition. — The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty
and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of
a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
of marijuana; (2) that BC Arcayan sent them invitation letters without
stating the purpose of the invitation; (3) that BC Arcayan refused to receive
the Padors’ letter-reply; and (4) that the Padors anticipate the possibility of
more harassment cases, false accusations, and potential violence from brgy.
officals.
a. All these allegations are insufficient bases for a grant of the privilege of
the writ.
b. On the 1st: the supposed raid on the ampalaya farm was sufficiently
controverted by the brgy. officials.
i. The brgy. officials alleged, and the RTC found, that a roving patrol
was conducted, not on Nerio’s ampalaya farm, but on an area
locally called Sitio Gining, which was beside the lot possessed by
David Quintana.
c. Assuming, however, that the brgy. officials had in fact entered the
ampalaya farm, Rey admitted that they had done so with his
permission, as stated in his affidavit.67
d. Even assuming that the entry was done without the Padors’ permission,
the SC can’t grant the privilege of the writ of amparo based upon a
trespass on the ampalaya farm. Granting that intrusion occurred, it was
merely a violation of the Padors’ property rights.
i. In Tapuz v. Del Rosario, the SC held that the writ of amparo does
not envisage the protection of concerns that are purely property or
commercial in nature.68
e. As to the 2nd and 3rd allegations, BC Arcayan’s act of sending invitation
letters to the Padors and failure to sign the receiving copy of their
letter-reply did not violate or threaten their constitutional right to life,
liberty, or security.
i. Records show that BC Arcayan sufficiently explained the factual
basis for his actions.
ii. Records are bereft of any evidence that the Padors were coerced to
attend the conference through the use of force or intimidation. On
the contrary, they had full freedom to refuse to attend the
conference, as they have in fact done in this case.
f. As to the 4th allegation, such is baseless, unfounded, and grounded
merely on pure speculations and conjectures.
3. The SC reiterates that the privilege of the writ of amparo is an extraordinary
67
5. Around 8:00 a.m., I saw Tabunan barangay tanod Roberto Alimorin. I greeted him good morning. He told me that
there are reports that marijuana plants were grown at our ampalaya farm and that there is already a raid.
6. Being innocent and nothing to hide, I allowed Mr. Alimorin to search the ampalaya farm for marijuana plants.
68
The writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and
enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary
concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and
independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What
it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on
amorphous and uncertain grounds.
remedy adopted to address the concerns of extra-legal killings and
enforced disappearances.
a. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted
judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and
undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for
purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection
and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations.
 026 CANLAS V. NAPICO HOA (EMAR)
June 5, 2008 | Reyes, R.T. | Writ of Amparo
PETITIONERS: Armando Q. Canlas, Miguel D. Capistrano, Marrieta Pia
RESPONDENTS: Napico Homeowners Association, I-XIII, Inc. et al.
SUMMARY: Canlas, Capistrano and Pia were settlers whose houses were
demolished or about to be demolished so they filed a Writ of Amparo before the
SC, hoping that SC’s decision will affect previous SC decisions which affirmed
which finality the demolition. They allege that they were deprived of their liberty,
freedom and/or rights to shelter. The issue is WON there is legal basis for the
issuance of the writ of amparo – NO. (doctrine)
DOCTRINE: Threatened demolition of a dwelling is not a violation of right to
life, liberty and security and, thus, is outside the scope of a Writ of Amparo.
FACTS:
1. May 26, 2008: Canlas, Capistrano and Pia sought the issuance of a Writ of
Amparo; alleging that they were deprived of their liberty, freedom and/or rights
to shelter enshrined and embodied in the Constitution, as the result of these
nefarious activities of both the Private and Public Respondents. This ardent
request filed before the SC is the only solution to this problem via this newly
advocated principles incorporated in the Rules – the "Rule On Writ Of Amparo."
2. Canlas, Capistrano and Pia are settlers in a land situated in Brgy. Manggahan,
Pasig. Their dwellings/houses have either been demolished as of the time of
filing of the petition, or is about to be demolished pursuant to a court judgment.
3. While they attempted to focus on issuance of what they claimed to be fraudulent
and spurious land titles, to wit: Canlas, Capistrano and Pia are desirous to help
the government, the best way they can, to unearth these so-called "syndicates"
clothed with governmental functions, in cahoots with the "squatting
syndicates" - - - - the low so defines. If only to give its proper meanings, the
Government must be the first one to clean its ranks from these unscrupulous
political protégées. If unabated would certainly ruin and/or destroy the efficacy
of the Torrens System of land registration in this Country. It is therefore the
ardent initiatives of the herein Canlas, Capistrano and Pia, by way of the said
prayer for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo, that these unprincipled Land
Officials be summoned to answer their participation in the issuances of
these fraudulent and spurious titles, NOW, in the hands of the Napico HOA
et al. The Courts of Justice, including SC, are likewise being made to
believe that said titles in the possession of the Napico HOA et al were issued
untainted with frauds.
4. The petition seeks is the reversal of SC’s dismissal of petitions in G.R. Nos.
177448, 180768, 177701, 177038, thus: That, Canlas, Capistrano and Pia herein
knew before hand that:
a. There can be no MR for the 2nd or 3rd time to be filed before the SC.
b. This petition should not in any way be treated as such MRs.
5. This petition is only for the possible issuance of the writ of amparo, although it
might affect the previous SC rulings in these cases, G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768,
177701 and 177038. Inherent in the powers of the SC is to modify, reverse
and set aside, even its own previous decision, that cannot be thwarted nor
influenced by any one, but, only on the basis of merits and evidence. This is
the purpose of this petition for the Writ of Amparo.
ISSUE: WON there is legal basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo – NO. The
petitioners’ claim to their dwelling does not constitute right to life, liberty and
security. There is, therefore, no legal basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo.
RULING: Petition DISMISSED.
RATIO:
1. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides: Sec 1. Petition. – The petition for
a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty
and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
2. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof.
3. The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the
court, which in this case was affirmed with finality by this Court in G.R. Nos.
177448, 180768, 177701, 177038, is not included among the enumeration of
rights as stated in the above-quoted Sec 1 for which the remedy of a writ of
amparo is made available. Their claim to their dwelling, assuming they still
have any despite the final and executory judgment adverse to them, does not
constitute right to life, liberty and security. There is, therefore, no legal basis for
the issuance of the writ of amparo.
4. Besides, the factual and legal basis for petitioners’ claim to the land in question
is not alleged in the petition at all. The Court can only surmise that these rights
and interest had already been threshed out and settled in the four cases cited
above. No writ of amparo may be issued unless there is a clear allegation of the
supposed factual and legal basis of the right sought to be protected.
5. Sec 669 of the same rules states that the court shall issue the writ upon the filing
of the petition, only if on its face, the court ought to issue said writ.
6. The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition
which shall not be later than 7d from the date of its issuance.
7. Considering that there is no legal basis for its issuance, as in this case, the writ
will not be issued and the petition will be dismissed outright.
8. This new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by this Court is
intended for the protection of the highest possible rights of any person,
which is his or her right to life, liberty and security. The Court will not spare
69
Sec 6. Issuance of the Writ. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice or judge shall
immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The clerk of court shall issue the
writ under the seal of the court; or in case of urgent necessity, the justice or the judge may issue the writ
under his or her own hand, and may deputize any officer or person to serve it.
any time or effort on its part in order to give priority to petitions of this nature.
However, the Court will also not waste its precious time and effort on matters
not covered by the writ.
 027 LOZADA v. GLORIA ARROYO (Sarmiento)
April 24, 2012 | Sereno, J. | Writ of Amapro
PETITIONER: RODOLFO NOEL LOZADA JR
RESPONDENTS: PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO
SUMMARY: Lozada was issued a subpoena by Senate with regards to the
NBN-ZTE scandal. He did not appear during the hearing and instead flew to
London on official business. Upon his return, he was escorted by several men
and was told by Sec. Atienza that Atienza was talking to ES Recto and
President. Lozada was brought to LSGH where was harassed and threatened by
the police. His brother filed for a writ of amparo. ISSUE: Whether or not the
writ of amaparo should be issued. NO. The court held that the writ should be
denied by the CA because the petitioners failed to meet the threshold of
substantial evidence and that they failed to prove the existence of a continuing
threat. Lozada was not illegally deprived of his liberty from the point when he
disembarked from the aircraft up to the time he was led to the departure area of
the airport, as he voluntarily submitted himself to the custody of respondents.
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that if Lozada had in fact been illegally
restrained, so much so that his right to liberty and security had been violated,
the acts that manifested this restraint had already ceased and has consequently
rendered the grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo moot. Whether or not
Lozada was deprived of his liberty from the point when he was led inside the
vehicle waiting for him at the airport up to the time he was taken to La Salle
Green Hills, petitioners’ assertions that Lozada and his family continue to suffer
various threats from respondents remain unproven. Thus, in amparo actions,
petitioners must establish their claims by substantial evidence, and they cannot
merely rely on the supposed failure of respondents to prove either their defenses
or their exercise of extraordinary diligence. In this case, the totality of the
evidence presented by petitioners fails to meet the requisite evidentiary
threshold, and the privilege of the writ of amparo has already been rendered
moot and academic by the cessation of the restraint to Lozada’s liberty
DOCTRINE: in amparo actions, petitioners must establish their claims by sub-
stantial evidence, and they cannot merely rely on the supposed failure of re-
spondents to prove either their defenses or their exercise of extraordinary dili-
gence.
FACTS:
1. The instant Petition stems from the alleged corruption scandal precipitated
by a transaction between the Philippine government, represented by the
National Broadband Network (NBN), and ZTE Corporation (ZTE), a
Chinese manufacturer of telecommunications equipment.
a. Former National Economic Development Authority (NEDA)
Secretary Romulo Neri (Sec. Neri) sought the services of Lozada
as an unofficial consultant in the ZTE-NBN deal.
b. The latter avers that during the course of his engagement, he
discovered several anomalies in the said transaction involving
certain public officials.
c. These events impelled the Senate of the Philippines Blue Ribbon
Committee (Blue Ribbon Committee) to conduct an investigation
thereon, for which it issued a subpoena directing Lozada to appear
and testify on 30 January 2008.
2. On that date, instead of appearing before the Blue Ribbon Committee,
Lozada left the country for a purported official trip to London, as
announced by then DENR Secretary Lito Atienza (Sec. Atienza).
a. In the Petition, Lozada alleged that his failure to appear at the
scheduled hearing was upon the instructions of then Executive
Assistant Undersecretary Manuel Gaite (Usec. Gaite).
b. Consequently, the Senate issued an Order dated 30 January 2008:
(a) citing Lozada for contempt; (b) ordering his arrest and
detention; and (c) directing the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms to
implement the Order and make a return thereon.
c. While overseas, Lozada asked Sec. Atienza whether the former
could be allowed to go back to the Philippines. Upon the approval
of Sec. Atienza, Lozada informed his family that he was returning
from Hong Kong on 5 February 2008 on board Cathay Pacific
Flight No. 919, bound to arrive in Manila at 4:40 p.m. on the same
day.
d. In the Petition, Lozada claims that, upon disembarking from the
aircraft, several men held his arms and took his bag.
3. Lozada asked if he could go to the comfort room, an opportunity he used to
call up his brother, petitioner Arturo, and inform him of his situation. The
men thereafter led him through the departure area of the airport and into a
car waiting for them. They made him sit alone at the back of the vehicle,
while a man, whom he later discovered to be respondent Valeroso, took the
passenger seat and was always in contact with other individuals.
4. Sec. Atienza then phoned Lozada, assuring the latter that he was with
people from the government, and that the former was going to confer with
“ES and Ma’[a]m.” Lozada surmised that these individuals referred to ES
 Ermita and former President Arroyo, respectively. Sec. Atienza also
purportedly instructed Lozada to pacify his wife, petitioner Violeta, who
was making public statements asking for her husband’s return.
a. The vehicle traversed the South Luzon Expressway and drove
towards the direction of Laguna. Along the way, the men asked
Lozada to draft an antedated letter requesting police protection.
b. The group stopped at The Outback restaurant to meet with certain
individuals, who turned out to be Atty. Antonio Bautista (Atty.
Bautista) and Colonel Paul Mascarinas (Col. Mascarinas) of the
Police Special Protection Office (PSPO). At the restaurant, Lozada
claimed that he was made to fill in the blanks of a prepared
affidavit
c. After the meeting, the men informed Lozada that they were going
to billet him in a hotel for a night, but he suggested that they take
him to La Salle Green Hills instead. The men acquiesced.
5. Upon arriving in La Salle Green Hills, Lozada was met by Violeta and his
sister, Carmen Lozada (Carmen). He observed that the perimeter was
guarded by policemen, purportedly restraining his liberty and threatening
not only his security, but also that of his family and the De La Salle
brothers.
6. On 6 February 2008, at around 10:00 a.m., Col. Mascarinas supposedly
brought Lozada to the office of Atty. Bautista to finalize and sign an
affidavit.
7. At about 1:00 p.m., Violeta filed before this Court a Petition for Habeas
Corpus, docketed as G.R. No. 181342 (the Habeas Corpus case).
8. Arturo likewise filed before this Court a Petition for a Writ of Amparo,
docketed as G.R. No. 181356 (the Amparo case), and prayed for the
issuance of (a) the writ of amparo; (b) a Temporary Protection Order
(TPO); and (c) Inspection and Production Orders as regards documents
related to the authority ordering custody over Lozada, as well as any other
document that would show responsibility for his alleged abduction.
9. At around the same time that Arturo filed the Petition for a Writ of Amparo,
Col. Mascarinas drove Lozada back to La Salle Green Hills. Lozada was
then made to sign a typewritten, antedated letter requesting police
protection. Thereafter, former Presidential Spokesperson Michael Defensor
(Sec. Defensor) supposedly came and requested Lozada to refute reports
that the latter was kidnapped and to deny knowledge of alleged anomalies
in the NBN-ZTE deal. Sec. Defensor then purportedly gave Lozada P50,000
for the latter’s expenses.
10. On 7 February 2008, Lozada decided to hold a press conference and contact
the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms, who served the warrant of arrest on him.
Lozada claimed that after his press conference and testimony in the Senate,
he and his family were since then harassed, stalked and threatened.
a. On the same day, this Court issued a Resolution requiring
respondents in the Habeas Corpus case to comment on the Petition;
issuing a Writ of Amparo; ordering respondents in the Amparo
case to file their verified Return; referring the consolidated
Petitions to the CA; and directing the CA to set the cases for
hearing on 14 February 2008.
b. Accordingly, the court a quo set both cases for hearing on 14
February 2008.
11. On 12 February 2008, respondents filed before the CA a Manifestation and
Motion, praying for the dismissal of the Habeas Corpus case. They asserted
that Lozada was never illegally deprived of his liberty and was, at that time,
no longer in their custody. They likewise averred that, beginning 8 February
2008, Lozada had already been under the supervision of the Senate and,
from then on, had been testifying before it.
12. In their verified Return, respondents claimed that Sec. Atienza had arranged
for the provision of a security team to be assigned to Lozada, who was then
fearful for his safety.
a. In effect, respondents asserted that Lozada had knowledge and
control of the events that took place on 5 February 2008,
voluntarily entrusted himself to their company, and was never
deprived of his liberty.
b. Hence, respondents prayed for the denial of the interim reliefs and
the dismissal of the Petition
13. During the initial hearing on 14 February 2008, Lozada and Violeta ratified
the Petition in the Amparo case to comply with Section 2 of the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo, which imposes an order to be followed by those who can
sue for the writ.
a. The CA also dismissed the Habeas Corpus case in open court for
being moot and academic, as Lozada was physically present and
was not confined or detained by any of the respondents.
b. Considering that petitioners failed to question the dismissal of the
Habeas Corpus case, the said dismissal had lapsed into finality,
leaving only the Amparo case open for disposition.
 c. CA dropped former President Arroyo as a respondent on the
ground that at the time the Petition in the Amparo case was filed,
she was still the incumbent President
14. On 12 September 2008, the CA rendered its Decision denying petitioners
the privilege of the Writ of Amparo and dismissing the Petition.
a. The CA found that petitioners were unable to prove through
substantial evidence that respondents violated, or threatened with
violation, the right to life, liberty and security of Lozada.
ISSUES: Whether or not the writ of amaparo should be granted
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for being moot and
academic. The Court of Appeals’ denial of the privilege of the writ of amparo is
hereby AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
1. The writ of amparo is an independent and summary remedy that provides
rapid judicial relief to protect the people’s right to life, liberty and security.
a. Having been originally intended as a response to the alarming
cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in the
country, it serves both preventive and curative roles to address the
said human rights violations. It is preventive in that it breaks the
expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses, and it
is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of
perpetrators by inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and
action.
2. As it stands, the writ of amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof. Considering that
this remedy is aimed at addressing these serious violations of or threats to
the right to life, liberty and security, it cannot be issued on amorphous and
uncertain grounds, or in cases where the alleged threat has ceased and is no
longer imminent or continuing. Instead, it must be granted judiciously so as
not to dilute the extraordinary and remedial character of the writ, thus:
a. The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to
protect and guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and security of
persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of this
life. It is an extraordinary writ conceptualized and adopted in light
of and in response to the prevalence of extra-legal killings and
enforced disappearances.
b. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted
judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted
and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions
for purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and
protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations
Grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo
A. Alleged violation of or threat to the right to life, liberty and security of
Lozada
1. Sections 17 and 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires the parties to
establish their claims by substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
a. The use of this evidentiary threshold reveals the clear intent of the
framers of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo to have the equivalent
of an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in
addressing amparo situations.
b. In cases where the violation of the right to life, liberty or security
has already ceased, it is necessary for the petitioner in an amparo
action to prove the existence of a continuing threat.
2. In the present case, the totality of the evidence adduced by petitioners failed
to meet the threshold of substantial evidence.
a. Sifting through all the evidence and allegations presented, the crux
of the case boils down to assessing the veracity and credibility of
the parties’ diverging claims as to what actually transpired on 5-6
February 2008.
b. In this regard, this Court is in agreement with the factual findings
of the CA to the extent that Lozada was not illegally deprived of
his liberty from the point when he disembarked from the aircraft
up to the time he was led to the departure area of the airport, as he
voluntarily submitted himself to the custody of respondents:
c. [Lozada] was one of the first few passengers to get off the plane because
he was instructed by Secretary Atienza, th[r]ough a phone call on the night
of 04 February 2008, while he was still in Hong Kong, to proceed directly
to the Bureau of Immigration so that few people would notice him and he
could be facilitated in going out of the airport without any hassle from the
people of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms.Again, [Lozada] stated that he
wanted to get away from the Senate people. [Lozada] even went to the
men’s room of the airport, after he was allegedly “grabbed”, where he
 made a call to his brother Arturo, using his Globe phone, and he was not
prevented from making said call, and was simply advised by the person
who met him at the tube to (sic) “sir, bilisan mo na”. When they proceeded
out of the tube and while walking, [Lozada] heard from the radio track
down, “wag kayo dyan, sir, nandyan yong mga taga Senado”, so they took
a detour and went up to the departure area, did not go out of the normal
arrival area, and proceeded towards the elevator near the Duty Free Shop
and then down towards the tarmac. Since [Lozada] was avoiding the
people from the Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms, said detour
appears to explain why they did not get out at the arrival area, where
[Lozada] could have passed through immigration so that his passport
could be properly stamped.
3. This Court does not find any evidence on record that [Lozada] struggled or
made an outcry for help when he was allegedly “grabbed” or “abducted” at
the airport. [Lozada] even testified that nobody held him, and they were not
hostile to him nor shouted at him.
a. The foregoing statements show that Lozada personally sought the
help of Sec. Atienza to avoid the Senate personnel, and thus knew
that the men who met him at the airport were there to aid him in
such objective. Surely, the actions of Lozada evinced knowledge
and voluntariness, uncharacteristic of someone who claims to have
been forcibly abducted.
b. However, these men’s subsequent acts of directing Lozada to
board the vehicle and driving him around, without disclosing the
exact purpose thereof, appear to be beyond what he had consented
to and requested from Sec. Atienza. These men neither informed
him of where he was being transported nor provided him complete
liberty to contact his family members to assure them of his safety.
c. These acts demonstrated that he lacked absolute control over the
situation, as well as an effective capacity to challenge their
instructions.
4. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that if Lozada had in fact been illegally
restrained, so much so that his right to liberty and security had been
violated, the acts that manifested this restraint had already ceased and has
consequently rendered the grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo moot.
Whether or not Lozada was deprived of his liberty from the point when he
was led inside the vehicle waiting for him at the airport up to the time he
was taken to La Salle Green Hills, petitioners’ assertions that Lozada and
his family continue to suffer various threats from respondents remain
unproven.
5. Finally, petitioners insist that while they were able to sufficiently establish
their case by the required evidentiary standard, respondents failed to
discharge their burden to prove their defenses by substantial evidence and to
show that respondents exercised extraordinary diligence as required by the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo. This Court has squarely passed upon this
contention in Yano v. Sanchez, to wit:
a. The failure to establish that the public official observed
extraordinary diligence in the performance of duty does not result
in the automatic grant of the privilege of the amparo writ. It does
not relieve the petitioner from establishing his or her claim by
substantial evidence.
b. Thus, in amparo actions, petitioners must establish their claims by
substantial evidence, and they cannot merely rely on the supposed
failure of respondents to prove either their defenses or their
exercise of extraordinary diligence. In this case, the totality of the
evidence presented by petitioners fails to meet the requisite
evidentiary threshold, and the privilege of the writ of amparo has
already been rendered moot and academic by the cessation of the
restraint to Lozada’s liberty.
B. Propriety of the privilege of the writ of amparo and its interim reliefs
1. As previously discussed, there is no basis to grant Lozada the privilege of
the writ of amparo, considering that the illegal restraint alleged in this case
had already ceased and there is no imminent or continuing restriction on his
liberty.
2. Further, it appears that Lozada had already filed before the Department of
Justice (DOJ) a Complaint charging respondents with kidnapping and
attempted murder, docketed as I.S. No. 2008-467. In this regard, this
Court’s ruling in Rubrico v. Arroyo is worth considering:
a. First, a criminal complaint for kidnapping and, alternatively, for
arbitrary detention rooted in the same acts and incidents leading to
the filing of the subject amparo petition has been instituted with
the OMB, docketed as OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E. The usual initial
steps to determine the existence of a prima facie case against the
five (5) impleaded individuals suspected to be actually involved in
the detention of Lourdes have been set in motion. It must be
pointed out, though, that the filing of the OMB complaint came
before the effectivity of the Amparo Rule on October 24, 2007.
b. Second, Sec. 22 of the Amparo Rule proscribes the filing of an
 amparo petition should a criminal action have, in the meanwhile,
been commenced. The succeeding Sec. 23, on the other hand,
provides that when the criminal suit is filed subsequent to a
petition for amparo, the petition shall be consolidated with the
criminal action where the Amparo Rule shall nonetheless govern
the disposition of the relief under the Rule. Under the terms of said
Sec. 22, the present petition ought to have been dismissed at the
outset. But as things stand, the outright dismissal of the petition by
force of that section is no longer technically feasible in light of the
interplay of the following factual mix:
i. (1) the Court has, pursuant to Sec. 6 of the Rule, already
issued ex parte the writ of amparo;
ii. (2) the CA, after a summary hearing, has dismissed the
petition, but not on the basis of Sec. 22; and
iii. (3) the complaint in OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E named as
respondents only those believed to be the actual abductors
of Lourdes, while the instant petition impleaded, in
addition, those tasked to investigate the kidnapping and
detention incidents and their superiors at the top. Yet, the
acts and/or omissions subject of the criminal complaint
and the amparo petition are so linked as to call for the
consolidation of both proceedings to obviate the mischief
inherent in a multiplicity-of-suits situation.
5. Thus, if the Complaint filed before the DOJ had already progressed into a
criminal case, then the latter action can more adequately dispose of the
allegations made by petitioners. After all, one of the ultimate objectives of
the writ of amparo as a curative remedy is to facilitate the subsequent
punishment of perpetrators. On the other hand, if there is no actual criminal
case lodged before the courts, then the denial of the Petition is without
prejudice to the filing of the appropriate administrative, civil or criminal
case, if applicable, against those individuals whom Lozada deems to have
unduly restrained his liberty.
6. Finally, with respect to the interim reliefs sought by petitioners, this Court,
in Yano v. Sanchez, declined to grant the prayer for the issuance of a TPO,
as well as Inspection and Production Orders, upon a finding that the
implicated public officials were not accountable for the disappearance
subject of that case. Analogously, it would be incongruous to grant herein
petitioners’ prayer for a TPO and Inspection and Production Orders and at
the same time rule that there no longer exists any imminent or continuing
threat to Lozada’s right to life, liberty and security. Thus, there is no basis
on which a prayer for the issuance of these interim reliefs can be anchored.

3. Given the above perspective and to fully apply the beneficial nature of the
writ of amparo as an inexpensive and effective tool to protect certain rights
violated or threatened to be violated, the Court hereby adjusts to a degree
the literal application of Secs. 22 and 23 of the Amparo Rule to fittingly
address the situation obtaining under the premises. Towards this end, two
things are at once indicated:
a. (1) the consolidation of the probe and fact-finding aspects of the
instant petition with the investigation of the criminal complaint
before the OMB; and
b. (2) the incorporation in the same criminal complaint of the
allegations in this petition bearing on the threats to the right to
security.

4. Withal, the OMB should be furnished copies of the investigation reports to

aid that body in its own investigation and eventual resolution of OMB-P-C-
O7-0602-E. Then, too, the OMB shall be given easy access to all pertinent
documents and evidence, if any, adduced before the CA. Necessarily,
Lourdes, as complainant in OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E, should be allowed, if so
minded, to amend her basic criminal complaint if the consolidation of cases
is to be fully effective.
 028 DE LIMA v. GATDULA (TIMBOL)
February 19, 2013 | Leonen, J. | Writ of Amparo
PETITIONER: Sec. Leila M. De Lima, Dir. Nonnatus R. Rojas, and Deputy
Dir. Reynaldo O. Esmeralda
RESPONDENTS: Magtanggol B. Gatdula
SUMMARY: GATDULA filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo
in the RTC against DOJ Sec. De LIMA et al to cease and desist from framing up
GATDULA for the fake ambush incident by filing bogus charges of Frustrated
Murder. Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo, the judge
issued summons and ordered DE LIMA et al to file an Answer. DE LIMA et al,
however, manifested that a RETURN and not an ANSWER is appropriate for
Amparo cases. The Judge insisted that since no writ is issued, return is not
required, and that the Rules of Summary Procedure apply. The judge proceeded
to conduct a hearing on the main case, even without a Return nor an Answer.
The judge also decided that the memorandum of DE LIMA et al would be filed
in lieu of an answer. RTC granted the issuance of the writ including the interim
reliefs. Hence this petition.
Whether or not the (1) Petition for Review on Certiorari is Proper; (2) Return
and not Answer is the responsive pleading
The SC held in the affirmative. Although the proper mode to assail the decision
of the RTC should have been through an appeal, the Court adopted a policy of
liberally construing its rules in order to promote a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding. Furthermore, the procedural
irregularities in the RTC affected the mode of appeal that DE LIMA used in
elevating the matter to this Court.
[RELEVANT] The confusion of the parties arose due to the procedural
irregularities in the RTC: (1) It is the RETURN that serves as the responsive
pleading for petitions of the issuance of Writs of Amparo. The requirement of
an Answer is contrary to the intention of the court to provide a speedy remedy
to those whose right to life, liberty, and security are violated or are threatened to
be violated. Moreover, the Rules of Summary Procedure do not apply, since it is
proper for MTC and not for RTC, such as the writs. And summary procedure is
for civil and criminal cases, and not for special proceedings. (2) the judge erred
in hearing the main case even before the filing of a RETURN; without such, the
issues would not have been joined; (3) Filing of a memorandum is a prohibited
pleading in the Rule of Writ of Amparo. And (4) the error is in the body itself,
because a judgment that simply grants the “privilege of the writ of amparo”
cannot be executed. The judgment should detail the required acts from the
respondents that will mitigate, if not totally eradicate, the violation of or the
threat to the petitioner's life, liberty or security
DOCTRINE: The insistence of filing of an Answer was inappropriate. It is the
Return that serves as the responsive pleading for petitions of the issuance of
Writs of Amparo. The requirement to file an Answer is contrary to the intention
of the Court to provide a speedy remedy to those whose right to life, liberty and
security are violated or are threatened to be violated
FACTS:
95. Magtanggol B. Gatdula (GATDULA) filed a Petition for Issuance of a Writ
of Amparo in the RTC of Manila
a. The Amparo was directed against DOJ Sec. DE LIMA et al to
cease and desist from framing up GATDULA for the fake ambush
incident by filing bogus charges of Frustrated Murder against
GATDULA in relation to the alleged ambush incident
96. Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo, Judge Pampilo
issued summons and ordered DE LIMA et al to file an ANSWER
a. During the hearing, counsel for DE LIMA et al manifested that a
RETURN, not an ANSWER, is appropriate for AMPARO
CASES
97. In an order, Judge insisted that since no writ has been issued, return is not
the required pleading but answer
a. Judge also noted that the Rules of Court apply suppletorily, and
thus the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure applied, hence
Answer is required
98. The Judge proceeded to conduct a hearing on the main case, even without a
RETURN nor an ANSWER, he ordered the parties to file their respective
memoranda within 5 working days after that hearing
a. Since the period to file an Answer had not yet lapsed by then, the
judge also decided that the memorandum of DE LIMA et al would
be filed in lieu of their answer
99. The RTC rendered a decision granting the issuance of the Writ of Amparo
a. Including the interim reliefs prayed for: temporary protection,
production and inspection orders
100. Because the RTC denied the MR, DE LIMA et al came to the SC assailing
the RTC decision through a Petition for Review on Certiorari via Rule 45,
as enunciated in Sec. 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
101. Hence this petition
ISSUE/s:
11. WoN Petition for Review on Certiorari is Proper – YES. Although the
proper mode to assail the decision of the RTC should have been through an
 appeal, the Court adopted a policy of liberally construing its rules in order
to promote a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding. Furthermore, the procedural irregularities in the RTC affected
the mode of appeal that DE LIMA used in elevating the matter to this Court.
12. WoN Return is the proper responsive pleading – YES. It is the
RETURN that serves as the responsive pleading for petitions of the
issuance of Writs of Amparo. The requirement of an Answer is
contrary to the intention of the court to provide a speedy remedy to
those whose right to life, liberty, and security are violated or are
threatened to be violated
RULING: WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice, as a prophylactic to the
irregularities committed by the trial court judge, and by virtue of its powers under
Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the Constitution, the Court RESOLVES to:
(1) NULLIFY all orders that are subject of this Resolution issued by Judge Silvino
T. Pampilo, Jr. after respondent Gatdula filed the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ
of Amparo;
(2) DIRECT Judge Pampilo to determine within fortyeight (48) hours from his
receipt of this Resolution whether the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is proper on
the basis of the petition and its attached affidavits.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to cause the personal service of this Resolution on
Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. of Branch 26 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila for
his proper guidance together with a WARNING that further deviation or
improvisation from the procedure set in A.M. No. 07912SC shall be meted with
severe consequences.
RATIO:
89. The remedy of the Writ of Amparo is an equitable and extraordinary
remedy to safeguard the right of the people to life, liberty, and security
as enshrined in the 1087 Constitution. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo
was issued as an exercise of the SC’s power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. It
aims to address concerns such as, among others, extrajudicial killings
and enforced disappearances
90. Due to the delicate and urgent nature of these controversies, the procedure
was devised to afford swift but decisive relief.
a. It is initiated through a petition to be filed in the RTC,
Sandiganbayan, CA, or the SC
b. The judge or justice then makes an “immediate” evaluation of the
facts as alleged in the petition and the affidavits submitted “with
the attendant circumstances detailed”
c. After evaluation, the judge has the option to issue the Writ of
Amparo, or immediately dismiss the case
i. Dismissal is proper if the petition and the supporting
affidavits do not show that the petitioner’s right to life,
liberty, or security is under threat or the acts complained
of are not unlawful
ii. On the other hand, the issuance of the writ itself sets in
motion presumptive judicial protection for the petitioner
d. The court compels the respondents to appear before a court of law
to show whether the grounds for more permanent protection and
interim reliefs are necessary
e. The respondents are required to file a Return, after the issuance of
the writ through the clerk of court
i. The Return serves as the responsive pleading to the
petition
ii. Unlike an Answer, the Return has other purposes aside
from identifying the issues in the case
iii. Respondents are also required to detail the actions they
had taken to determine the fate or whereabouts of the
aggrieved party
iv. If the respondents are public officials or employees, they
are also required to state the actions they had taken to:
1. Verify the identity of the aggrieved party;
2. Recover and preserve evidence related to the
death or disappearance of the person identified in
the petition;
3. Identify witnesses and obtain statements
concerning the death or disappearance;
4. Determine the cause, manner, location, and time
of death or disappearance as well as any pattern
or practice that may have brought about the
death or disappearance; and
5. Bring the suspected offenders before a
competent court
v. Clearly, these matters are important to the judge so that
s/he can calibrate the means and methods that will be
required to further the protections, if any, that will be due
 to the petitioner
f. There will be a summary hearing only after the Return is filed to
determine the merits of the petition and whether interim reliefs are
warranted
i. If the Return is not filed, the hearing will be done ex parte
g. After the hearing, the court will render the judgment within 10
days from the time the petition is submitted for decision
i. If the allegations are proven with substantial evidence, the
court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs
as may be proper and appropriate
ii. The judgment should contain measures which the judge
views as an essential for the continued protection of the
petitioner in the Amparo case
iii. These measures must be detailed enough so that the judge
may be able to verify and monitor the actions taken by the
respondents
iv. It is this judgment that could be subject to appeal to the
SC via Rule 45
v. After the measures have served their purpose, the
judgment will be satisfied
vi. In Amparo cases, this is when the threats to the
petitioner’s life, liberty and security cease to exist as
evaluated by the court that renders the judgment
vii. Parenthetically, the case may also be terminated through
consolidation should a subsequent case be filed – either
criminal or civil
viii. Until the full satisfaction of the judgment, the
extraordinary remedy of Amparo allows vigilant judicial
monitoring to ensure the protection of constitutional
rights
91. The decision by the RTC could not be the judgment or final order that is
appealable under Sec. 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
a. “The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby DIRECTED to issue the
Writ of Amparo. Likewise, the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby
DIRECTED to effect the service of the Writ of Amparo in an
expeditious manner upon all concerned, and for this purpose may
call upon the assistance of any military or civilian agency of the
government”
b. This decision pertained to the issuance of the writ under Sec. 6 of
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, not the judgment under Sec. 18
c. The decision is thus an interlocutory order, as suggested by the fact
that temporary protection, production, and inspection orders were
given together with the decision
d. The temporary protection, production and inspection orders are
interim reliefs that may be granted by the court upon filing of the
petition but before final judgment is rendered
92. The confusion of parties arose due to the procedural irregularities in
the RTC
a. First, the insistence of filing of an Answer was inappropriate
i. It is the Return that serves as the responsive pleading
for petitions of the issuance of Writs of Amparo
ii. The requirement to file an Answer is contrary to the
intention of the Court to provide a speedy remedy to
those whose right to life, liberty and security are
violated or are threatened to be violated
iii. In utter disregard of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo,
Judge Pampilo insisted on issuing summons and
requiring an Answer
93. It is clear from the 1991 Revised Rules of Summary Procedure that this type
of summary procedure only applies to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs
a. It is mind boggling how this rule could possibly apply to
proceedings in an RTC
b. Aside from that, this Court limited the application of summary
procedure to certain civil and criminal cases
c. A writ of Amparo is a special proceeding
i. It is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status,
a right or a particular fact.
ii. It is not a civil nor a criminal action, hence the application
of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is seriously
misplaced
94. The second irregularity was the holding of a hearing on the main case
PRIOR to the issuance of the writ and the filing of a Return
a. Without a Return, the issues could not have been properly joined
95. Worse, is the trial court’s third irregularity: it required a
memorandum in lieu of a responsive pleading of DE LIMA
a. The Return in Amparo cases allows the respondents to frame the
 issues subject to a hearing. Hence, it should be done prior to the using the proper procedure at the right time. Procedural rules are
hearing, not after. meant to assist the parties and courts efficiently deal with the
b. A memorandum, on the other hand, is a synthesis of the claims of substantive issues pertaining to a case. When it is the judge himself
the party litigants and is a final pleading usually required before who disregards the rules of procedure, delay and confusion result.
the case is submitted for decision. One cannot substitute for the b. The Petition for Review is not the proper remedy to assail the
other since these submissions have different functions in interlocutory order denominated as "Decision" dated 20 March
facilitating the suit. 2012. A Petition for Certiorari, on the other hand, is prohibited.
c. More importantly, a memorandum is a prohibited pleading under Simply dismissing the present petition, however, will cause grave
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo injustice to the parties involved. It undermines the salutary
96. The fourth irregularity was in the decision itself purposes for which the Rule on the Writ of Amparo were
a. “Accordingly this court GRANTS the privilege of the writ and promulgated.
the interim reliefs prayed for by the petitioner” c. In many instances, the Court adopted a policy of liberally
b. This gives the impression that the decision was the judgment since construing its rules in order to promote a just, speedy and
the phraseology is similar to Sec. 18 of the Rule on the Writ of inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. The rules
Amparo: can be suspended on the following grounds: (1) matters of life,
i. SEC. 18. Judgment. — The court shall render judgment within ten (10) liberty, honor or property, (2) the existence of special or
days from the time the petition is submitted for decision. If the
compelling circumstances, (3) the merits of the case, (4) a cause
allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court
shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied." favored by the suspension of the rules, (5) a lack of any showing
c. The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (6) the
from the actual order called the Writ of Amparo. The privilege other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
includes availment of the entire procedure outlined in A.M. No.
07912SC, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. After examining the
petition and its attached affidavits, the Return and the evidence
presented in the summary hearing, the judgment should detail the
required acts from the respondents that will mitigate, if not totally
eradicate, the violation of or the threat to the petitioner's life,
liberty or security.
d. A judgment which simply grants "the privilege of the writ"
cannot be executed. It is tantamount to a failure of the judge to
intervene and grant judicial succor to the petitioner. Petitions filed
to avail of the privilege of the Writ of Amparo arise out of very
real and concrete circumstances. Judicial responses cannot be as
tragically symbolic or ritualistic as "granting the privilege of
the Writ of Amparo."
97. The procedural irregularities in the RTC affected the mode of appeal that
petitioners used in elevating the matter to this Court.
a. It is the responsibility of counsels for the parties to raise issues
 029 BURGOS v. ESPERON (CHIQUI)
February 4, 2014 | Brion, J. | Special Writs
PETITIONER: Edita T. Burgos
RESPONDENT: Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, Jr., Lt. Gen. Romeo P. Tolentino,
Maj. Gen. Juanito Gomez, Maj. Gen. Delfin Bangit, Lt. Col. Noel Clement, Lt.
Col. Melquiades Feliciano, and Director General Oscar Calderon
PETITIONER: Edita T. Burgos
RESPONDENT: Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, Jr., Lt. Gen. Romeo P. Tolentino,
Maj. Gen. Juanito Gomez, Lt. Col. Melquiades Feliciano, and Lt. Col. Noel
Clement
PETITIONER: Edita T. Burgos
RESPONDENT: Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Gen.
Hermogenes Esperon, Jr., Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, and Director General Avelino
Razon, Jr.
SUMMARY: According to witnesses, Jonas Burgos was abducted in Ever
Gotesco Mall. This case was then referred to by the SC to CHR for factual deter-
mination and recommendation. From the findings of the CHR, Burgos’ constitu-
tional rights to life and security were violated by the government because the ab-
ductors were said to be part of the police and military. SC then issued a writ of
habeas corpus and referred this writ to the CA while holding in abeyance the writ
of Amparo. CA said that the writ of habeas corpus is does not lie because Burgos
is a victim of enforced disappearances. CA recognized that the proper writ is the
writ of Amparo. Lastly, CA held the AFP and PNP accountable. Because of newly
found evidence, Burgos filed an Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela asking the
Court to issue a writ of Amparo on the basis of the newly discovered evidence.
W/N the writ of amparo is proper – YES, the beneficial purpose of the writ has
been served in this case. (doctrine) In the present case, while Jonas remains miss-
ing, the series of calculated directives issued by the Court outlined above and the
extraordinary diligence the CHR demonstrated in its investigations resulted in the
criminal prosecution of the perpetrator. SC emphasizes that while the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo accords the Court a wide latitude in crafting remedies to address
an enforced disappearance, it cannot (without violating the nature of the writ of
Amparo as a summary remedy that provides rapid judicial relief) grant remedies
that would complicate and prolong rather than expedite the investigations already
ongoing.
DOCTRINE: The writ merely embodies the Court’s directives to police agencies
to undertake specified courses of action to address the enforced disappearance of
an individual. The Writ of Amparo serves both a preventive and a curative role. It
is curative as it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators through the
investigation and remedial action that it directs. The focus is on procedural cura-
tive remedies rather than on the tracking of a specific criminal or the resolution of
administrative liabilities.
(Case did not mention anything about habeas data at all but this case was under that
topic so I will focus this on writ of amparo na lang. Also, in this case, SC only re-
solved orders for lower courts and administrative agencies, which I will not include.
This is a hard case to digest L)
FACTS:
1. On June 22, 2010, SC issued a resolution referring the present
case to the CHR as the Court’s directly commissioned agency,
tasked with the continuation of the investigation of Jonas Jo-
seph T. Burgos’ abduction with the obligation to report its fac-
tual findings and recommendations to this Court.
2. This referral was necessary as the investigation by the Philip-
pine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group (PNP-CIDG), by the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) Provost Marshal, and even the initial CHR investigation
had been less than complete. In all of them, there were signifi-
cant lapses in the handling of the investigation. In particular,
we highlighted the PNP-CIDG’s failure to identify the carto-
graphic sketches of two (one male and one female) of the five
abductors of Jonas, based on their interview with the eyewit-
nesses to the abduction.
3. CHR submitted to the SC its report on March 15, 2011
a. Based on the facts developed by evidence obtaining in this case,
the CHR finds that the enforced disappearance of Burgos had
transpired; and that his constitutional rights to life liberty and se-
curity were violated by the Government have been fully deter-
mined.
b. Jeffrey Cabintoy and Elsa Agasang have witnessed the forcible ab-
duction of Jonas Burgos by a group of about 7 men and a woman
from the extension portion of Hapag Kainan Restaurant Ever
Gotesco Mall.
 c. The eyewitnesses mentioned were Jeffrey Cabintoy (Jeffrey) and referring the habeas corpus petition to the CA; (2) holding in
Elsa Agasang (Elsa), who at the time of the abduction were work- abeyance our ruling on the merits of the Amparo aspect of the
ing as busboy and Trainee-Supervisor. case; referring back the same to the CA in order to allow Lt. Harry
d. In his Sinumpaang Salaysay, Jeffrey had a clear recollection of the A. Baliaga, Jr. and the present Amparo respondents to file their
face of HARRY AGAGEN BALIAGA, JR. as one of the principal ab- Comments on the CHR Report; and ordering Lt. Baliaga to be im-
ductors after he was shown by the Team the pictures in the PMA pleaded as a party to the Amparo petition.
Year Book of Batch Sanghaya 2000 and group pictures of men 5. CA held that in the petition for habeas corpus is not the illegal confinement
taken some years thereafter. or detention of Jonas, but his enforced disappearance. Considering that
e. The same group of pictures were shown to detained former 56th Jonas was a victim of enforced disappearance, the present case is beyond
IB Army trooper Edmond M. Dag-uman (Dag-uman), who also the ambit of a petition for habeas corpus. Also, CA concluded that the pre-
positively identified Lt. Harry Baliaga, Jr. Daguman’s Sinumpaang sent case falls within the ambit of the Writ of Amparo. The CA found that
Salaysay states that he came to know Lt. Baliaga as a Company the totality of the evidence supports the petitioner’s allegation that the
Commander in the 56th IB while he was still in the military service military was involved in the enforced disappearance of Jonas. Also, CA held
(with Serial No. 800693, from 1997 to 2002) also with the 56th IB that Lt. Baliaga was responsible and the AFP and the PNP were accounta-
but under 1Lt. Usmalik Tayaban, the Commander of Bravo Com- ble for the enforced disappearance of Jonas.
pany. 6. To date, Respondents have not appealed to this Court, as provided under
f. Most if not all the actual abductors would have been identified Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
had it not been for what is otherwise called as evidentiary difficul- 7. Burgos filed an Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela asking the Court to:
ties shamelessly put up by some police and military elites. (1) order the persons named in the sealed documents to be impleaded, (2)
g. The deliberate refusal of Judge Advocate Roa to provide the CHR issue a writ of Amparo on the basis of the newly discovered evidence (the
with the requested documents does not only defy the Supreme sealed attachment to the motion); and (3) refer the cases to the CA for fur-
Court directive to the AFP but ipso facto created a disputable pre- ther hearing on the newly discovered evidence.
sumption that AFP personnel were responsible for the abduction a. Burgos alleged that she received from a source (who requested to
and that their superiors would be found accountable, if not re- remain anonymous) documentary evidence proving that an intel-
sponsible, for the crime committed. ligence unit of the 7th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army and
h. In saying that the requested document is irrelevant, the Team has 56th Infantry Battalion, operating together, captured Jonas on
deemed that the requested documents and profiles would help April 28, 2007 at Ever Gotesco Mall.
ascertain the true identities of the cartographic sketches of two b. This documentary evidence consists of: (1) After Apprehension
abductors because a certain Virgilio Eustaquio has claimed that Report dated April 30, 2007; (2) Psycho Social Processing Report
one of the intelligence operatives involved in the 2007 ERAP 5 dated April 28, 2007; and (3) Autobiography of Jonas.
case fits the description of his abductor. 8. Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed their com-
i. As regards the PNP CIDG, the positive identification of former ments on the Burgos’ Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela.
56th IB officer Lt. HARRY A. BALIAGA, JR. as one of the principal a. First, Respondents alleged that the documents submitted by Bur-
abductors has effectively crushed the theory of the CIDG witness- gos do not exist in the concerned military units’ respective rec-
es that the NPAs abducted Jonas. Baliaga’s true identity and affili- ords, nor are they in the custody or possession of their respective
ation with the military have been established by overwhelming units.
evidence corroborated by detained former Army trooper Dag- b. Second, they note that none of the documents submitted by the
uman. Burgos were signed; a writ of Amparo cannot be issued and the
4. SC’s July 5, 2011 Resolution investigation cannot progress on the basis of false documents and
a. In light of the new evidence and leads the CHR uncovered, we is- false information.
sued a Resolution: (1) issuing anew a Writ of Habeas Corpus and
 c. Lastly, since the NBI and CHR are conducting their own investiga-
tions of the case, the Burgos’ motion at this point is premature; sought-after missing link that establishes the relevance of the
the proceedings to be conducted by the CA will be at the very
least redundant.
ISSUE/s:
3. W/N the writ of amparo is proper – YES, the beneficial purpose of the writ
has been served in this case.
RULING: Based on the above developments, we now hold that the full extent of the remedies envi-
sioned by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo has been served and exhausted.
Considering the foregoing, the Court RESOLVES to:
1. DENY petitioner Edita Burgos’ Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela;
2. REFER the petitioner’s Urgent Ex P a r te Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, this Resolution and
its covered cases to the Department of Justice for investigation for the purpose of filing the ap-
propriate criminal charges in the proper courts against the proper parties if such action is war-
ranted by the gathered evidence. The referral to the Department of Justice is without prejudice
to the Office of the Ombudsman’s exercise of its primary jurisdiction over the investigation
should the case be determined to be cognizable by the Sandiganbayan;
3. DIRECT the petitioner to furnish the Department of Justice and the National Bureau of Inves-
tigation copies of her Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, together with the sealed
attachments to the Motion, within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution;
4. DIRECT the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court to allow the duly-authorized representatives
of the Com-mission on Human Rights to inspect the requested documents in camera within
five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution. For this purpose, the documents shall be exam-
ined and compared with the cartographic sketches of the two abductors of Jonas Burgos with-
out copying and bringing the documents outside the premises of the Office of the Clerk of
Court of the Supreme Court. The inspection of the documents shall be conducted within office
hours and for a reasonable period of time that would allow the Commission on Human Rights
to comprehensively investigate the lead provided by Virgilio Eustaquio;
5. DIRECT the National Bureau of Investigation to co-ordinate and provide direct investigative
assistance to the Commission on Human Rights as the latter may require, pursuant to the au-
thority granted under the Court’s June 22, 2010 Resolution.
6. REQUIRE the Commission on Human Rights to submit a supplemental investigation report to
the Department of Justice, copy furnished the petitioner, the National Bureau of Investigation,
the incumbent Chiefs of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine National Police
and the Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, and all the re-
spondents, within sixty (60) days from receipt of this Resolution.
7. DECLARE this Writ of Amparo proceeding closed and terminated, without prejudice to the
concerned parties’ compliance with the above directives and subject to the Court’s continuing
jurisdiction to enforce compliance with this Resolution. SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
1. At this point, we emphasize that the sworn affidavit of Eu-
staquio (that attests to the resemblance of one of Jonas’ abduc-
tors to the abductors of the ERAP FIVE) constitutes the
requested documents to the present case. We note that this lead
may help the CHR ascertain the identities of those depicted in
the cartographic sketches as two of Jonas’ abductors, who this
day remained unidentified.
2. In view of the sensitive and confidential nature of the requested
documents, we direct the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court
to allow the duly-authorized representatives of the CHR to in-
spect the requested documents in camera within five (5) days
from receipt of this Resolution. The documents shall be exam-
ined and compared with the cartographic sketches of the two
abductors of Jonas, without copying and without bringing the
documents outside the premises of the Office of the Clerk of
Court of the Supreme Court. The inspection of the documents
shall be within office hours and for a reasonable period of time
sufficient to allow the CHR to comprehensively investigate the
lead provided by Eustaquio.
3. To fully fulfill the objective of the Rule on the Writ of Am-
paro, further investigation using the standard of extraordinary
diligence should be undertaken by the CHR to pursue the lead
provided by Eustaquio. We take judicial notice of the ongoing
investigation being conducted by the Department of Justice
(DOJ), through the NBI, on the disappearance of Jonas. In this
regard, we direct the NBI to coordinate and provide direct in-
vestigative assistance to the CHR as the latter may require,
pursuant to the authority granted.
4. For this purpose, we require the CHR to submit a supplemental investiga-
tion report to the DOJ, copy furnished the petitioner, the NBI, the incum-
bent Chiefs of the AFP, the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and all the respondents
within sixty days (60) days from receipt of this Resolution.
5. We resolve to deny the Burgos’ Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cau-
tela.
6. We note and conclude, based on the developments highlighted above, that
the beneficial purpose of the Writ of Amparo has been served in the pre-
sent case. As we held in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, The writ merely embodies
 the Court’s directives to police agencies to undertake specified courses of Abundanti Cautela, together with the sealed attachments to the Motion,
action to address the enforced disappearance of an individual. The Writ within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution.
of Amparo serves both a preventive and a curative role. It is curative as it 12. As shown above, the beneficial purpose of the Writ of Amparo has been
facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators through the inves- served in the present case with the CA’s final determination of the per-
tigation and remedial action that it directs. The focus is on procedural cu- sons responsible and accountable for the enforced disappearance of Jo-
rative remedies rather than on the tracking of a specific criminal or the nas and the commencement of criminal action against Lt. Baliaga. At this
resolution of administrative liabilities. stage, criminal, investigation and prosecution proceedings are already
7. In the present case, while Jonas remains missing, the series of calculated beyond the reach of the Writ of Amparo proceeding now before us.
directives issued by the Court outlined above and the extraordinary dili- 13. As a final note, we emphasize that our ROLE in a writ of Amparo proceed-
gence the CHR demonstrated in its investigations resulted in the criminal ing is merely to determine whether an enforced disappearance has taken
prosecution of Lt. Baliaga. We take judicial notice of the fact that the Re- place; to determine who is responsible or accountable; and to define and
gional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 216, has already found probable impose the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance.
cause for arbitrary detention against Lt. Baliaga and has ordered his arrest
in connection with Jonas’ disappearance.
8. We also emphasize that the CA in its March 18, 2013 decision already
ruled with finality on the entities responsible and accountable (as these
terms are defined in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis) for the enforced disappearance
of Jonas. The CA found, by substantial evidence, that Lt. Baliaga participat-
ed in the abduction on the basis of Cabintoy’s positive identification that
he was one of the abductors of Jonas who told him not to interfere be-
cause the latter had been under surveillance for drugs. In the same Deci-
sion, the CA also held the AFP and the PNP accountable for having failed to
discharge the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the
enforced disappearance of Jonas
9. We emphasize that while the Rule on the Writ of Amparo accords the
Court a wide latitude in crafting remedies to address an enforced disap-
pearance, it cannot (without violating the nature of the writ of Amparo
as a summary remedy that provides rapid judicial relief) grant remedies
that would complicate and prolong rather than expedite the investiga-
tions already ongoing.
10. We clarify that by denying Burgos’ motion, we do not thereby rule on the
admissibility or the merits of the newly discovered evidence submitted by
the petitioner. We likewise do not foreclose any investigation by the prop-
er investigative and prosecutory agencies of the other entities whose iden-
tities and participation in the enforced disappearance of Jonas may be dis-
closed in future investigations and proceedings.
11. To expedite proceedings, we refer Burgos’ motion, this Resolution and its
covered cases to the DOJ for investigation, for the purpose of filing the ap-
propriate criminal charges in the proper courts against the proper parties,
if warranted, based on the gathered evidence. For this purpose, we Burgos
to furnish the DOJ and the NBI copies of her Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex
 030 Santiago v. Tulfo (Valle)
21 Oct 2015 | Perlas bernabe, J. | Writ of Amparo
PETITIONER: Spouses Rozelle ramond Martin and Claudine Margarte
Santiago
RESPONDENTS: Raffy Tulfo, Ben Tulfo, and Ewrin tulfo
SUMMARY:
When Claudine and Raymart got off the their plane and their baggage was
delayed, they complained to the CebuPac. While they were complaining, they
noticed Ramon Tulfo taking pictures of Claudine with his phone. Raymart
approached the man and they got into a fight with Claudine and a certain Atilano
also in the brawl. The airport police came and broke apart the brawl. Later on,
Ramon’s brothers, the Tulfos, aired on their TV program their comments against
Claudine and Raymart and threatened that they will retaliate. It was because of
this that Claudine and Raymart filed the writ of amparo against the Tulfos.
The issue is whether or not the writ of amparo will propser. NO. Writs of amparo
are confined to extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof and that it must be shown that the disappearance was carried out with the
direct or indirect involvement of the government.
None is in this case. Claudine and Raymart’s petition is based on the threats of
the Tulfos who are private individuals. These threats are not related to
extrajudicial killings or enfored disapperances.
DOCTRINE:
The present Amparo Rule has limited the remedy as a response to extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances, or threats thereof.
"Extrajudicial killings," according to case law, are generally characterized as
"killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or
judicial proceedings," while "enforced disappearances," according to Section 3
(g) of Republic Act No. 9851, "means the arrest, detention, or abduction of
persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a
political organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of
freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with
the intention of removing from the protection of the law for a prolonged period
of time."
In Navia v. Pardico, the Court held that it must be shown and proved by
substantial evidence that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization,
followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of removing them from
the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
FACTS:
222. Spouses Ramond Martin and Claudine Santiago (Spouses Santiago) arrived
at NAIA 3 aboard a CebuPac flight from a vacation with family and friends.
They waited ofr their baggage but they were informed that it was offloaded
and transferred on a different flight. Spouses Santiago lodged a complaint
before CebuPac. As they were complaining, they noticed that someone was
taling pictures of Claudine with his phone. Raymart approached the man
and asked what he was doing. The man, Ramon Tulfo, allegedly punched
and kicked Raymart forcing the latter to fight back. When Claudine saw the
commotion, she approached tulfo and Tulfo allegedly kicked and pushed
her back. Raymart rushed to defend his wife while Atilano joined the brawl.
223. Airport security came to stop the altercation and brought them to the
Airport police Department for investigation.
224. Days after, Raffy, Ben, and Erwin Tulfo (Tulfos) aired on their TV program
comments and expletives against Spouses Santiago and threatened that they
will retaliate. Terrified by this threat, Spouses Santiago filed a petition for
the issuance of a writ of amparo against the Tulfos.
225. Erwin Tulfo filed a Manifestation and Motion to Deny the issuance. This
was opposed by the Spouses Santiago for being a prohibited pleading.
226. The presiding Judge Vargas issued a resolution grantint a TPO. Ben Tuflo
claimed that the statements did not involve any actual threat and that he
merely expressed his strong sentiments. Vargas submitted the case for
resolution but was eventually retired. Judge Singh was designated as acting
presiding judge.
227. The RTC dismissed the petition and ordered the dissolution of the TPO.
ISSUE/s:
 22. WoN the petition will propser – NO, because this case does not involve an
extralegal killing or enfored disappearance and neither is it have any
showing of involvement of the government. The petition was merely
anchored on threats by private individuals.
RULING: WHEREFORE the petition is DENIED.
disappearance, or any threats thereof, in the senses above-described.
246. Their petition is merely anchored on a broad invocation of Tulfos' purported
violation of their right to life and security, carried out by private individuals
without any showing of direct or indirect government participation. Thus, it
is apparent that their amparo petition falls outside the purview of A.M. No.
07-9-12-SC and, perforce, must fail.

RATIO:
238. In Secretary of ND v. Manalo, it was stated that the Writ of Amparo was
intended to address and is confined to cases involving extralegal killings
and/or enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
239. While amparo (which literally means "protection" in Spanish) has been
regarded as a special remedy provided for the enforcement of constitutional
rights, the parameters of protection are not the same in every jurisdiction.
240. In our jurisdiction, the contextual genesis, at least, for the present Amparo
Rule has limited the remedy as a response to extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances, or threats thereof.
241. "Extrajudicial killings," according to case law, are generally characterized
as "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal
safeguards or judicial proceedings," while "enforced disappearances,"
according to Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 9851, "means the arrest,
detention, or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, a State or a political organization followed by a refusal to
acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate
or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time."
242. In Navia v. Pardico, the Court held that it must be shown and proved by
substantial evidence that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political
organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of said missing persons, with the
intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged
period of time.
243. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by
substantial evidence the indispensable element of government participation.
244. Notably, the same requirement of government participation should also
apply to extralegal killings, considering that the writ of amparo was,
according to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, who headed the
Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court that drafted A.M. No. 07-
9-12-SC, intended to "hold public authorities, those who took their oath to
defend the constitution and enforce our laws, to a high standard of official
conduct and hold them accountable to our people.”
245. In this case, it is undisputed that Spouses Santiagos' amparo petition before
the RTC does not allege any case of extrajudicial killing and/or enforced
 031 ROXAS v. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO (VICENCIO)
Sept. 7, 2010 | Perez, J. | Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data
PETITIONER: In The Matter of the Petition For The Writ of Amparo and the
Writ of Habeas Data in Favor of Melissa C. Roxas, Melissa C. Roxas
RESPONDENTS: Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Gilbert Teodoro, Gen. Victor S.
Ibrado, P/Dir. Gen. Jesus Ame Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Delfin N. Bangit, Pc/Supt.
Leon Nilo A. Dela Cruz, Maj. Gen. Ralph Villanueva, Ps/Supt. Rudy Gamido
Lacadin, and Certain Persons who go by the Names Dex, Rc And Rose
SUMMARY: Melissa Roxas is an American citizen of Filipino descent. While
in the US, she enrolled in an exposure program to the Philippines with a group
BAYAN-USA of which she was a member. During the course of her immersion,
petitioner toured various provinces and towns of Central Luzon and, in April of
2009, she volunteered to join members of BAYAN-Tarlac in conducting an
initial health survey in La Paz, Tarlac for a future medical mission. While in the
house of one of the locals, fifteen heavily armed men forcibly opened the door,
barged inside and ordered petitioner and her companions to lie on the ground
face down. She, and her two companions were tied, blindfolded and dragged
towards a van. She was informed that she is being detained for being a member
of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA). She
was interrogated and tortued for five straight days in a jail cell. After her release,
she filed a Petition for the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data. Petitioner
impleaded public officials occupying the uppermost echelons of the military and
police hierarchy as respondents. The lower court and CA granted the writs.
Issue: WoN the writs of amparo and habeas data should be granted – NO.
On the Writ of Amparo: The Doctrine of command responsibility cannot be
applied herein because it imputes individual liability and must be invoked in a
full blown trial, not in a summary amparo proceeding. However, Roxas can still
succeed in impleading public respondents on the grounds of either responsibility
or accountability to the alleged acts. Roxas however, was not able to establish to
such a concrete point that her abductors were actually affiliated, whether
formally or informally, with the military or the police organizations. Neither
does the evidence at hand prove that petitioner was indeed taken to the military
camp Fort Magsaysay to the exclusion of other places. These evidentiary gaps,
in turn, make it virtually impossible to determine whether the abduction and
torture of the petitioner was in fact committed with the acquiescence of the
public respondents. After her release, she was
On the Writ of Habeas Data: The SC ruled that it should not be granted. There is
actually no evidence on record that shows that any of the public respondents had
violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner. The act ascribed by
the CA to the public respondents that would have violated or threatened the right
to privacy of the petitioner, i.e., keeping records of investigations and other
reports about the petitioner’s ties with the CPP-NPA, was not adequately
proven—considering that the origin of such records were virtually unexplained
and its existence, clearly, only inferred by the appellate court from the video and
photograph released by Representatives Palparan and Alcover in their press
conference
DOCTRINE: On Writ of Amparo: While the principal objective of Amparo
proceedings is the initial determination of whether an enforced disappearance,
extralegal killing or threats thereof had transpired—the writ does not, by so
doing, fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be
criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable substantive law.
On Writ of Habeas Data: An indispensable requirement before the privilege of
the writ may be extended is the showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an
actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of
the victim.
FACTS:
228. Melissa Roxas is an American citizen of Filipino descent. While in the
United States, petitioner enrolled in an exposure program to the Philippines
with the group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United States of America
(BAYAN-USA) of which she is a member.
229. During the course of her immersion, petitioner toured various provinces and
towns of Central Luzon and, in April of 2009, she volunteered to join
members of BAYAN-Tarlac in conducting an initial health survey in La Paz,
Tarlac for a future medical mission.
230. In pursuit of her volunteer work, petitioner brought her passport, wallet with
Fifteen Thousand Pesos (₱15,000.00) in cash, journal, digital camera with
memory card, laptop computer, external hard disk, IPOD, wristwatch,
sphygmomanometer, stethoscope and medicines.
231. After doing survey work on 19 May 2009, petitioner and her companions,
Juanito Carabeo (Carabeo) and John Edward Jandoc (Jandoc), decided to
rest in the house of one Mr. Jesus Paolo (Mr. Paolo)
in Sitio Bagong Sikat, Barangay Kapanikian, La Paz, Tarlac.
232. At around 1:30 in the afternoon, however, petitioner, her companions and
Mr. Paolo were startled by the loud sounds of someone banging at the front
door and a voice demanding that they open up.
233. Suddenly, fifteen (15) heavily armed men forcibly opened the door, barged
inside and ordered petitioner and her companions to lie on the ground face
down. The armed men were all in civilian clothes and, with the exception of
their leader, were also wearing bonnets to conceal their faces.
234. Petitioner tried to protest the intrusion, but five (5) of the armed men
ganged up on her and tied her hands. At this juncture, petitioner saw the
other armed men herding Carabeo and Jandoc, already blindfolded and
taped at their mouths, to a nearby blue van. Petitioner started to shout her
name.
235. Against her vigorous resistance, the armed men dragged petitioner towards
the van—bruising her arms, legs and knees. Once inside the van, but before
she can be blindfolded, petitioner was able to see the face of one of the
armed men sitting beside her. The van then sped away.
236. After about an hour of traveling, the van stopped. Petitioner, Carabeo and
Jandoc were ordered to alight. After she was informed that she is being
detained for being a member of the Communist Party of the
Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA), petitioner was separated
from her companions and was escorted to a room that she believed was a
jail cell from the sound of its metal doors.
237. From there, she could hear the sounds of gunfire, the noise of planes taking
off and landing and some construction bustle. She inferred that she was
taken to the military camp of Fort Magsaysay in Laur, Nueva Ecija.
238. What followed was five (5) straight days of interrogation coupled with
torture. The thrust of the interrogations was to convince petitioner to
abandon her communist beliefs in favor of returning to "the fold." The
torture, on the other hand, consisted of taunting, choking, boxing and
suffocating the petitioner.
239. Throughout the entirety of her ordeal, petitioner was made to suffer in
blindfolds even in her sleep. Petitioner was only relieved of her blindfolds
when she was allowed to take a bath, during which she became acquainted
with a woman named "Rose" who bathed her. There were also a few times
when she cheated her blindfold and was able to peek at her surroundings.
240. Despite being deprived of sight, however, petitioner was still able to learn
the names of three of her interrogators who introduced themselves to her as
"Dex," "James" and "RC." "RC" even told petitioner that those who tortured
her came from the "Special Operations Group," and that she was abducted
because her name is included in the "Order of Battle."
241. On 25 May 2009, petitioner was finally released and returned to her uncle’s
house in Quezon City. Before being released, however, the abductors gave
petitioner a cellular phone with a SIM card, a slip of paper containing an e-
mail address with password, a plastic bag containing biscuits and books, the
handcuffs used on her, a blouse and a pair of shoes. Petitioner was also
sternly warned not to report the incident to the group Karapatan or
something untoward will happen to her and her family.
242. Sometime after her release, petitioner continued to receive calls from RC
via the cellular phone given to her. Out of apprehension that she was being
monitored and also fearing for the safety of her family, petitioner threw
away the cellular phone with a SIM card.
243. Seeking sanctuary against the threat of future harm as well as the
suppression of any existing government files or records linking her to the
communist movement, petitioner filed a Petition for the Writs of Amparo
and Habeas Data before this Court on 1 June 2009.
244. Petitioner impleaded public officials occupying the uppermost echelons of
the military and police hierarchy as respondents, on the belief that it was
government agents who were behind her abduction and torture. Petitioner
likewise included in her suit "Rose," "Dex" and "RC.
245. The Amparo and Habeas Data petition prays that:
a. respondents be enjoined from harming or even approaching
petitioner and her family;
b. an order be issued allowing the inspection of detention areas in the
7th Infantry Division, Fort Magsaysay, Laur, Nueva Ecija;
c. respondents be ordered to produce documents relating to any
report on the case of petitioner including, but not limited to,
intelligence report and operation reports of the 7th Infantry
Division, the Special Operations Group of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) and its subsidiaries or branch/es prior to, during
and subsequent to 19 May 2009;
d. respondents be ordered to expunge from the records of the
respondents any document pertinent or connected to Melissa C.
Roxas, Melissa Roxas or any name which sounds the same; and
e. respondents be ordered to return to petitioner her journal, digital
camera with memory card, laptop computer, external hard disk,
IPOD, wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope, medicines
and her ₱15,000.00 cash.
246. In a Resolution, this Court issued the desired writs and referred the case to
the Court of Appeals for hearing, reception of evidence and appropriate ac-
tion. The CA granted the privilege of the Writ of Amparo nad Habeas Data.
247. However, the CA was not convinced that the military or any other person
acting under the acquiescence of the government, were responsible for the
abduction and torture of the petitioner. The appellate court stressed that,
judging by her own statements, the petitioner merely "believed" that the
military was behind her abduction. Thus, the Court of Appeals absolved the
public respondents from any complicity in the abduction and torture of peti-
tioner.
248. The petition was likewise dismissed as against public respondent President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in view of her immunity from suit. The petition-
er’s prayers for the return of her personal belongings were also denied. Peti-
tioner’s prayers for an inspection order and production order also met the
same fate. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE/s:
 1. WoN the writs of amparo and habeas data should be granted – NO. It was
not proven that public respondents were responsible, and there was no con-
crete evidence that public respondents violated the privacy of Roxas.
RULING: HEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS
1.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioner’s prayer for the return of her personal belongings;
2.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioner’s prayer for an inspection of the detention areas
of Fort Magsaysay.
3.) REVERSING the grant of the privilege of habeas data, without prejudice, however, to any
modification that this Court may make on the basis of the investigation reports and
recommendations submitted to it under this decision.
4.) MODIFYING the directive that further investigation must be undertaken, as follows—
a. APPOINTING the Commission on Human Rights as the lead agency tasked with
conducting further investigation regarding the abduction and torture of the
petitioner. Accordingly, the Commission on Human Rights shall, under the norm of
extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take the necessary steps: (a) to identify
the persons described in the cartographic sketches submitted by the petitioner, as
well as their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant to petitioner’s
abduction and torture.
b. DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police, or his
successor, and the incumbent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
or his successor, to extend assistance to the ongoing investigation of the
Commission on Human Rights, including but not limited to furnishing the latter a
copy of its personnel records circa the time of the petitioner’s abduction and torture,
subject to reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution and existing laws.
c. Further DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police, or
his successor, to furnish to this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the petitioner or her
representative, a copy of the reports of its investigations and their recommendations,
other than those that are already part of the records of this case, within ninety (90)
days from receipt of this decision.
d. Further DIRECTING the Commission on Human Rights (a) to furnish to the
Court of Appeals within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision, a copy of the
reports on its investigation and its corresponding recommendations; and (b) to
provide or continue to provide protection to the petitioner during her stay or visit to
the Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be determined by this Court.
5.) REFERRING BACK the instant case to the Court of Appeals for the following purposes:
a. To MONITOR the investigations and actions taken by the PNP, AFP, and the
CHR;
b. To DETERMINE whether, in light of the reports and recommendations of the
CHR, the abduction and torture of the petitioner was committed by persons acting
under any of the public respondents; and on the basis of this determination—
c. To SUBMIT to this Court within ten (10) days from receipt of the report and
recommendation of the Commission on Human Rights—its own report, which shall
include a recommendation either for the DISMISSAL of the petition as against the
public respondents who were found not responsible and/or accountable, or for the
APPROPRIATE REMEDIAL MEASURES, AS MAY BE ALLOWED BY THE
AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA RULES, TO BE UNDERTAKEN as against
those found responsible and/or accountable.
RATIO:
Amparo
247. Petitioner Roxas invokes the doctrine of command responsibility to impli-
cate the high-ranking civilian and military authorities she impleaded as re-
spondents in her amparo petition.
248. It must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of the doctrine of
command responsibility as the justification in impleading the public
respondents in her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if not incorrect.
The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of substantive law that
establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to
implead a party-respondent in an amparo petition.
249. Command responsibility is "an omission mode of individual criminal
liability," whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed
by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators.
250. Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation
of individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or
administrative case rather than in a summary amparo proceeding.
251. The obvious reason lies in the nature of the writ itself: The writ of amparo is
a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the
appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the
court, in order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the
constitutional rights to life, liberty or security. While the principal objective
of its proceedings is the initial determination of whether an enforced
disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof had transpired—the writ
does not, by so doing, fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats,
whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable
substantive law.
252. Secretary of Defense v. Manalo: The remedy provides rapid judicial relief
as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial
evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not
an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable
doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or
administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require
full and exhaustive proceedings.
253. It must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of the doctrine of
command responsibility in an amparo proceeding does not, by any measure,
preclude impleading military or police commanders on the ground that the
complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect
acquiescence. In which case, commanders may be impleaded—not actually
on the basis of command responsibility—but rather on the ground of their
responsibility, or at least accountability.
a. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established
by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by
 action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of
the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to
file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible
parties in the proper courts.
b. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of
remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited
involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the
level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined
above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those
who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced
disappearance.
254. The totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner does not inspire
reasonable conclusion that her abductors were military or police personnel
and that she was detained at Fort Magsaysay.
255. First. The similarity between the circumstances attending a particular case
of abduction with those surrounding previous instances of enforced
disappearances does not, necessarily, carry sufficient weight to prove that
the government orchestrated such abduction. We opine that insofar as the
present case is concerned, the perceived similarity cannot stand as
substantial evidence of the involvement of the government.
256. In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel
circumstances as evidence of military involvement depends largely on the
availability or non-availability of other pieces of evidence that has the
potential of directly proving the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators.
Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be preferred over mere
circumstantial evidence based on patterns and similarity, because the former
indubitably offers greater certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of
the perpetrators. An amparo court cannot simply leave to remote and hazy
inference what it could otherwise clearly and directly ascertain.
257. In the case at bench, petitioner was, in fact, able to include in her Offer of
Exhibits, the cartographic sketches of several of her abductors whose faces
she managed to see. To the mind of this Court, these cartographic sketches
have the undeniable potential of giving the greatest certainty as to the true
identity and affiliation of petitioner’s abductors. Unfortunately for the
petitioner, this potential has not been realized in view of the fact that the
faces described in such sketches remain unidentified, much less have been
shown to be that of any military or police personnel. Bluntly stated, the
abductors were not proven to be part of either the military or the police
chain of command.
258. Second. The claim of the petitioner that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay
was not adequately established by her mere estimate of the time it took to
reach the place where she was detained and by the sounds that she heard
while thereat.
259. Like the CA, We are not inclined to take the estimate and observations of
the petitioner as accurate on its face—not only because they were made
mostly while she was in blindfolds, but also in view of the fact that she was
a mere sojourner in the Philippines, whose familiarity with Fort Magsaysay
and the travel time required to reach it is in itself doubtful. With nothing
else but obscure observations to support it, petitioner’s claim that she was
taken to Fort Magsaysay remains a mere speculation.
Habeas Data
1. Petitioner claimed to be included in the Government’s Order of Battle under
Oplan Bantay Laya which listed political opponents against whom false
criminal charges were filed based on made up and perjured information.
2. The CA granted such saying “the unregulated dissemination of said
unverified video CD or reports of Petitioner’s alleged ties with the CPP-
NPA indiscriminately made available for public consumption without
evidence of its authenticity or veracity certainly violates Petitioner’s right to
privacy which must be protected by this Court.”
3. The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing
the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of
individuals. The writ operates to protect a person’s right to control
information regarding himself, particularly in the instances where such
information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve
unlawful ends.
4. Needless to state, an indispensable requirement before the privilege of the
writ may be extended is the showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an
actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or
security of the victim. This, in the case at bench, the petitioner failed to do.
5. The main problem behind the ruling of the CA is that there is actually no
evidence on record that shows that any of the public respondents had
violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner. The act ascribed
by the CA to the public respondents that would have violated or threatened
the right to privacy of the petitioner, i.e., keeping records of investigations
and other reports about the petitioner’s ties with the CPP-NPA, was not
adequately proven—considering that the origin of such records were
virtually unexplained and its existence, clearly, only inferred by the
appellate court from the video and photograph released by Representatives
Palparan and Alcover in their press conference. No evidence on record even
shows that any of the public respondents had access to such video or
photograph.
6. In view of the above considerations, the directive by the CA enjoining the
public respondents from "distributing or causing the distribution to the
public any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers"
 relative to the petitioner’s "alleged ties with the CPP-NPA," appears to be
devoid of any legal basis. The public respondents cannot be ordered to
refrain from distributing something that, in the first place, it was not proven
to have.
7. Verily, until such time that any of the public respondents were found to be
actually responsible for the abduction and torture of the petitioner, any
inference regarding the existence of reports being kept in violation of the
petitioner’s right to privacy becomes farfetched, and premature.
8. Note: Read the Ruling.
 GAMBOA v. CHAN (Salve)
July 24, 2012 | Sereno, J. | Habeas Data
PETITIONER: Marynette R. Gamboa
RESPONDENTS: P/SSUPT. Marlou C. Chan
SUMMARY: Marynette Gamboa, Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte, was publicly
tagged, through news and print broadcasts, as one of the politicians who keep PAGs
or private army groups by the Zeñarosa Commission. Zeñarosa Commission was
created b A.0. 275 to investigate the existence of PAGs in the country with a view to
eliminate them before May 2010 elections and to dismantle them permanently. Pur-
portedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP– Ilocos Norte forwarded the
information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission, thereby causing her inclu-
sion in the Report’s enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs. Contending that
her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa
filed a Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against Chan et al in their
capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte. WoN Gamboa should be granted the
privilege of the writ of habeas data – NO, because the state interest of dismantling
PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially
when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pur-
suant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be
denied. When the right to privacy finds tension with a competing state objective, the
courts are required to weigh both notions. In these cases, although considered a fun-
damental right, the right to privacy may nevertheless succumb to an opposing or
overriding state interest deemed legitimate and compelling. The Constitution explic-
itly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed groups not recog-
nized by the duly constituted authority. It also provides for the establishment of one
police force that is national in scope and civilian in character, and is controlled and
administered by a national police commission. Taking into account these constitu-
tional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of A.O. 275 articulates a legitimate state aim,
which is to investigate the existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of disman-
tling them permanently. The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intel-
ligence regarding PAGs with the body specifically created for the purpose of investi-
gating the existence of these notorious groups. Moreover, the Zeñarosa Commission
was explicitly authorized to deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the for-
mer’s mandate, and thus had the power to request assistance from the latter.
DOCTRINE: Habeas data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any
person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individu-
al or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data information regard-
ing the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
FACTS:
1. Marynette R. Gamboa (Gamboa) was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte.
2. Police Senior Superintendent (P/SSUPT.) Marlou C. Chan was the Officer-in-
Charge, and Police Superintendent (P/SUPT.) William O. Fang was the Chief of
the Provincial Investigation and Detective Management Branch, both of the
Ilocos Norte Police Provincial Office.
3. Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Administrative Order No.
275 (A.O. 275), "Creating an Independent Commission to Address the Alleged
Existence of Private Armies in the Country."
4. The commission was named Zeñarosa Commission and was formed to investi-
gate the existence of private army groups (PAGs) in the country with a view to
eliminating them before the 10 May 2010 elections and dismantling them per-
manently in the future.
5. Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos
Norte) conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and her aides,
and classified her as someone who keeps a PAG.
6. Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP– Ilocos Norte for-
warded the information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission, thereby
causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of individuals maintaining
PAGs.
7. ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening news program the portion of the Report
naming Gamboa as one of the politicians alleged to be maintaining a PAG.
8. Thus, she was publicly tagged as someone who maintains a PAG on the basis of
the unverified information that the PNP-Ilocos Norte gathered and forwarded
to the Zeñarosa Commission.
9. Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned
and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas da-
ta against Chan et al in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.
10. Chan alleged that they had acted within the bounds of their mandate in con-
ducting the investigation and surveillance of Gamboa.The information stored in
their database supposedly pertained to two criminal cases in which she was
implicated (murder, frustrated murder, direct assault, and indirect assault)
11. Chan asserted that the Petition was incomplete for failing to comply with the
following requisites under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data: (a) the manner
in which the right to privacy was violated or threatened with violation and how
it affected the right to life, liberty or security of Gamboa; (b) the actions and re-
courses she took to secure the data or information; and (c) the location of the
files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge,
in possession or in control of the data or information. They also contended that
the Petition for Writ of Habeas Data, being limited to cases of extrajudicial kill-
ings and enforced disappearances, was not the proper remedy to address the
 alleged besmirching of the reputation of Gamboa protect the public who invest in foreign securities
12. RTC Br. 13 dismissed the Petition on the ground that Gamboa failed to prove 272. Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a competing state ob-
through substantial evidence that the subject information originated from jective, the courts are required to weigh both notions. In these cases, although
Chan, and that they forwarded this database to the Zeñarosa Commission considered a fundamental right, the right to privacy may nevertheless succumb
without the benefit of prior verification. Also Zeñarosa Commission should to an opposing or overriding state interest deemed legitimate and compelling.
have been impleaded as a necessary if not a compulsory party to the Petition.
13. Gamboa argues that although A.O. 275 was a lawful order, fulfilling the man- The Writ of Habeas Data
date to dismantle PAGs in the country should be done in accordance with due 1. The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to
process, such that the gathering and forwarding of unverified information on protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of
her must be considered unlawful. She also reiterates that she was able to pre- an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to

sent sufficient evidence showing that the subject information originated from informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information
Chan. regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being
collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.
ISSUE/s: 2. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted,
16. WoN Gamboa should be granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data – NO, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the
because the state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intru- right to life, liberty or security on the other.
sion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forward- 3. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data reads:
ing by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. 4. Habeas data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person
Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied. whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individ-
RULING: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed ual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data information
Decision in Special Proc. No. 14979 dated 9 September 2010 of the Regional Trial regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
Court, Laoag City, Br. 13, insofar as it denies Gamboa the privilege of the writ of 5. The determination of whether the privilege of the writ of habeas data, being an
habeas data, is AFFIRMED. extraordinary remedy, may be granted in this case entails a delicate balancing
of the alleged intrusion upon the private life of Gamboa and the relevant state
RATIO: interest involved.
The Right to Privacy 6. The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and oth-
267. The right to privacy, as an inherent concept of liberty, has long been recognized
er armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority. It also pro-
as a constitutional right. vides for the establishment of one police force that is national in scope and ci-
268. Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is vilian in character, and is controlled and administered by a national police
a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of commission.
government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state in- 7. Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of
terest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. 275 articulates a legitimate state aim, which is to investigate the existence
269. Privacy is not an absolute right. of PAGs with the ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently.
270. In Sabio v. Gordon, we have held that the right of the people to access infor- 8. To enable the Zeñarosa Commission to achieve its goals, A.O. 275 clothed it
mation on matters of public concern generally prevails over the right to privacy with the powers of an investigative body, including the power to summon wit-
of ordinary financial transactions. In that case, we declared that the right to nesses, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investiga-
privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state interest.
tion and use compulsory processes to produce documents, books, and records.
271. Employing the rational basis relationship test, as laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, A.O. 275 likewise authorized the Zeñarosa Commission to deputize the Armed
there is no infringement of the individual’s right to privacy as the requirement Forces of the Philippines, the National Bureau of Investigation, the Department
to disclosure information is for a valid purpose, in this case, to ensure that the of Justice, the PNP, and any other law enforcement agency to assist the com-
government agencies involved in regulating banking transactions adequately
 mission in the performance of its functions.
9. Meanwhile, the PNP, as the national police force, is empowered by law to (a)
enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the protection of lives and proper-
ties; (b) maintain peace and order and take all necessary steps to ensure public
safety; and (c) investigate and prevent crimes.
10. This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data
contained in the Report listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP. Con-
trary to the ruling of the trial court, however, the forwarding of information by
the PNP to the Zeñarosa Commission was not an unlawful act that violated or
threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or security.
11. The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding
PAGs with the body specifically created for the purpose of investigating the ex-
istence of these notorious groups. Moreover, the Zeñarosa Commission was
explicitly authorized to deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the for-
mer’s mandate, and thus had the power to request assistance from the latter.
12. The fact that the PNP released information to the Zeñarosa Commission with-
out prior communication to Gamboa and without affording her the opportunity
to refute the same cannot be interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to
privacy since that act is an inherent and crucial component of intelligence-
gathering and investigation. Additionally, Gamboa herself admitted that the
PNP had a validation system, which was used to update information on individ-
uals associated with PAGs and to ensure that the data mirrored the situation

on the field. Thus, safeguards were put in place to make sure that the infor-
mation collected maintained its integrity and accuracy.
13. Finally, this Court rules that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial
evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her
and her supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased police surveil-
lance. In this regard, Chan et al sufficiently explained that the investigations
conducted against her were in relation to the criminal cases in which she was
implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which
she failed to overcome.
 033 AGCAOILI v. FARIÑAS (APASAN)
July, 3, 2018 | Tijam, J. | Writ of Amparo
PETITIONER: Pedro S. Agcaoili, Jr., et al. and Maria Imelda Joseda “Imee”
R. Marcos
RESPONDENTS: The Honorable Representative Rodolfo Fariñas, et al.
SUMMARY: House Resolution No. 882 was issued directing the House of
Committee to conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, of the alleged
unauthorized purchased of the Government of Ilocos Norte in violation of RA
NO 7171 and PD 1445 (refer to footnotes). Petitioners (employees of the
government of Ilocos Norte and Governor Imee Marcos) were invited to shed
light on the alleged anomalies. Petitioners refused to appear before the hearing
so they were cited in contempt. This prompted petitioners to file a petition for
Habeas Corpus before the CA. While such petition was pending before the CA,
they also filed the present petition before the Supreme Court to take cognizance
of the petition for Habeas Corpus and in addition for the issuance of a Writ of
Amparo. However, while the petitions were pending, the respondents House
Committee lifted the contempt order and ordered the release of the petitioner.
The CA also issued a resolution in the Habeas Corpus petition considering such
case as closed and terminated on the ground of mootness. Hence,
Issues:
FIRST (HABEAS CORPUS): WoN the issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus is
proper – No, far compelling than the question of mootness is that the element of
illegal deprivation of freedom of movement or illegal restraint is jurisdictional
in petitions for habeas corpus. Consequently, in the absence of confinement and
custody, the courts lack the power to act on the petition for habeas corpus and
the issuance of a writ thereof must be refused
SECOND (AMPARO): WoN the issuance of Writ of Amparo is proper – No
(see doctrine), In this case, the alleged unlawful restraint on petitioners' liberty
has effectively ceased upon their subsequent release from detention. On the
other hand, the apprehension of co-petitioner Marcos that she will be detained
is, at best, merely speculative. In other words, co-petitioner Marcos has failed to
show any clear threat to her right to liberty actionable through a petition for a
writ of Amparo. Here, it appears that petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos even
attended and participated in the subsequent hearings on House Resolution No.
882 without any untoward incident. Petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos thus
failed to establish that their attendance at and participation in the legislative
inquiry as resource persons have seriously violated their right to liberty and
security, for which no other legal recourse or remedy is available. Perforce, the
petition for the issuance of a writ of Amparo must be dismissed.
DOCTRINE: The writ of Amparo cannot be issued in cases where the alleged
threat (to life, liberty, and security) has ceased and is no longer imminent or
continuing.
(NOTE: long case but actually bulk of the ratio part only pertains to other juris-
prudential pronouncements like in the cases of Sec of DND v. Manalo and Tapuz
which are also cases assigned)
FACTS:
Parties (will only refer to them as petitioners and respondents for brevity)
Petitioners – all employees of the Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte and Imee
Marcos as the incumbent Governor
Respondents – House of Representatives
1. On March 14, 2017, House Resolution No. 882 was introduced by
respondent Fariñas, along with Representatives Pablo P. Bondoc and
Aurelio D. Gonzales, Jr., directing House Committee to conduct an inquiry,
in aid of legislation, pertaining to the use by the Provincial Government of
Ilocos Norte of its shares from the excise taxes on locally manufactured
virginia-type cigarettes for a purpose other than that provided for
by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 717170.
2. (NOT IMPT) The "whereas clause" of House Resolution No. 882 states that
the following purchases by the Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte of
vehicles in three separate transactions from the years 2011 to 2012 in the
aggregate amount of P66,450,000.00 were in violation of R.A. No. 7171 as
well as of R.A. No. 9184 and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 144571:
a. Check dated December 1, 2011, "to cash advance the amount
needed for the purchase of 40 units Mini cab for distribution to the
70
AN ACT TO PROMOTE THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FARMER
IN THE VIRGINIA TOBACCO PRODUCING PROVINCES.
71
ORDAINING AND INSTITUTING A GOVERNMENT AUDITING CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
 different barangays of Ilocos Norte as per supporting papers hereto
attached to the amount of ..." EIGHTEEN MILLION SIX
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (PhP18,000,000.00);
b. Check dated May 25, 2012, "to cash advance the amount needed
for the purchase of 5 units Buses as per supporting papers hereto
attached to the amount of ..." FIFTEEN MILLION THREE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (PhP15,300,000.00),which
were all second hand units; and
c. Check dated September 12, 2012, "to cash advance payment of 70
units Foton Mini Truck for distribution to different municipalities
of Ilocos Norte as per supporting papers hereto attached in the
amount of ..." THIRTY TWO MILLION FIVE HUNDRED
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (PhP32,550,000.00).
3. Invitation Letters were individually sent to petitioners for them to attend as
resource persons the initial hearing on House Resolution No. 882 scheduled
on May 2, 2017.
4. In response, petitioners sent letters asking to be excused from the inquiry
pending official instructions from co-petitioner Imee Marcos as head of the
agency (Governor).
5. Because of petitioners' absence at the May 2, 2017 hearing, a subpoena ad
testificandum was issued by co-respondent House Committee on May 3,
2017 directing petitioners to appear and testify under oath at a hearing set
on May 16, 2017. Likewise, an invitation was sent to co-petitioner Marcos
to appear on said hearing.
6. Since the subpoena was received by petitioners only one day prior to the
scheduled hearing, petitioners requested that their appearance be deferred to
a later date to give them time to prepare. In their letters also, petitioners
requested clarification as to what information co-respondent House
Committee seeks to elicit and its relevance to R.A. No. 7171.
a. Co-petitioner Marcos, on the other hand, submitted a letter dated
May 15, 2017 seeking clarification on the legislative objective of
House Resolution No. 882 and its discriminatory application to the
Province of Ilocos Norte to the exclusion of other virginia-type
tobacco producing provinces.
7. Petitioners failed to attend the hearing scheduled on May 16, 2017. As such,
the House Committee issued a Show Cause Order why they should not be
cited in contempt for their refusal without legal excuse to obey summons.
Additionally, petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos were notified of the next
scheduled hearing on May 29, 2017.
8. In response to the Show Cause Order, petitioners reiterated that they
received the notice only one day prior to the scheduled hearing date in
alleged violation of the three-day notice rule under Section 8 of the House
Rules Governing Inquiries.
9. Nevertheless, at the scheduled committee hearing on May 29, 2017, all the
petitioners appeared. It is at this point of the factual narrative where the
parties' respective interpretations of what transpired during the May 29,
2017 begin to differ.
Legislative hearing on May 29, 2017 and the contempt citation
10. VERSION OF PETITIONERS: On one hand, petitioners allege that at the
hearing of May 29, 2017, they were subjected to threats and intimidation.
According to petitioners, they were asked "leading and misleading
questions" and that regardless of their answers, the same were similarly
treated as evasive.
11. VERSION OF RESPONDENTS: On the other hand, respondents aver
that petitioners were evasive in answering questions and simply claimed not
to remember the specifics of the subject transactions. According to
respondents, petitioners requested to be confronted with the original
documents to refresh their memories when they knew beforehand that the
Commission on Audit (COA) to which the original vouchers were
submitted could no longer find the same.
Proceedings before the CA
12. May 30, 2017 – petitioners filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against
respondent House Sergeant-at-Arms Lieutenant General Detabali (Detabali)
before the CA.
13. June 2, 2017 – the CA in its Resolution issued a writ of Habeas
Corpus ordering Detabali to produce the bodies of the petitioners before the
court on June 5, 2017.
14. June 5, 2017 – Detabali again failed to attend. Instead, the Deputy Secretary
General of the House of Representatives appeared to explain that Detabali
accompanied several members of the House of Representatives on a
Northern Luzon trip, thus his inability to attend the scheduled hearing. A
motion to dissolve the writ of Habeas Corpus was also filed on the ground
that the CA had no jurisdiction over the petition.
15. June 6, 2017 – petitioners filed a Motion for Provisional Release based on
petitioners' constitutional right to bail. Detabali, through the OSG, opposed
the motion.
16. June 8, 2017 – Detabali again failed to attend at the hearing.
17. June 9, 2017 – the CA issued a Resolution denying Detabali's motion to
dissolve the writ of Habeas Corpus and granting petitioners' Motion for
Provisional Release upon posting of a bond. Accordingly, the CA issued an
Order of Release upon Bond. Attempts to serve said Resolution and Order
of Release upon Bond to Detabali were made but to no avail.
18. June 20, 2017, the House of Representatives called a special session for the
 continuation of the legislative inquiry. Thereat, a subpoena ad transferred to the Court on the strength ground of mootness as petitioners were
testificandum was issued to compel co-petitioner Marcos to appear at the of the latter's power to promulgate released from detention.
scheduled July 25, 2017 hearing. rules concerning the pleading, practice
The subsequent release of petitioner and dismissal of the Habeas Corpus petition and procedure in all courts and its
by the CA authority to exercise jurisdiction over all
19. July 13, 2017 and while the Habeas Corpus Petition was still pending courts as provided under Sections
before the CA, petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos filed the instant 1 and 5 (5), Article VIII of
Omnibus Petition. the Constitution.
20. During the congressional hearing on July 25, 2017 which petitioners and
co-petitioner Marcos attended, and while the present Omnibus Petition is
pending final resolution by the Supreme Court, respondent House petitioners likewise argue that the ad- respondents argue that petitioners
Committee lifted the contempt order and ordered the release of petitioners. ministrative power of the Court to cannot compel the Court to assume
Consequently, petitioners were released on the same date. Respondent transfer cases from one court to anoth- jurisdiction over the Habeas
House Committee held the continuance of the legislative hearings on er is based on its inherent power to
CorpusPetition pending before the CA
August 9, 2017 and August 23, 2017. protect the judiciary and prevent a mis-
carriage of justice. as assumption of jurisdiction is
21. On August 31, 2017, the CA issued a Resolution in the Habeas
conferred by law.
Corpus Petition considering the case as closed and terminated on the ground
of mootness.
22. Hence, this petition.
For the issuance of a Writ of Amparo (RELEVANT)
ISSUE/s: Petitioners Respondents
1. Whether or not the instant Omnibus Petition which seeks the release of Petitioners contend that their rights to In opposition, respondents maintain
petitioners from detention was rendered moot by their subsequent release liberty and personal security were that the writ of Amparo and writ
violated as they have been detained, of Habeas Corpus are two separate
from detention – YES, the issue became moot upon the release of
while co-petitioner Marcos is remedies which are incompatible and
petitioners because there is no longer illegal deprivation of liberty.
continuously being threatened of therefore cannot co-exist in a single
2. Whether or not the instant Omnibus Petition sufficiently states a cause of
arrest. petition. Further, respondents argue
action for the issuance of a writ of Amparo – NO, petitioners have failed to that the issuance of a writ of Amparo is
establish that their attendance at and participation in the legislative inquiry limited only to cases of extrajudicial
as resource persons have seriously violated their right to liberty and killings and enforced disappearances
security, for which no other legal recourse or remedy is available. which are not extant in the instant
case.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the Omnibus Petition is DISMISSED.

RATIO:
1st ISSUE
ARGUMENTS The release of persons in whose behalf the application for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus was filed renders the petition for the issuance thereof moot and academic
For the assumption of jurisdiction over the habeas corpus petition 1. In Pestaño v. Corvista, it was pronounced that where the subject person had
Petitioners Respondents already been released from the custody complained of, the petition
Insist that the Habeas Corpus Petition Respondents counter that the Omnibus for habeas corpus then still pending was considered already moot and
then pending before the CA can be Petition should be dismissed on the
academic and should be dismissed.
 2. Thus, with the subsequent release of all the petitioners from detention, their
petition for habeas corpus has been rendered moot. The rule is that courts of
justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider questions
where no actual interests are involved and thus, will not determine a moot
question as the resolution thereof will be of no practical value.
3. Far compelling than the question of mootness is that the element of illegal
deprivation of freedom of movement or illegal restraint is jurisdictional in
petitions for habeas corpus. Consequently, in the absence of confinement
and custody, the courts lack the power to act on the petition for habeas
corpus and the issuance of a writ thereof must be refused.
4. Any lingering doubt as to the justiciability of the petition to assume
jurisdiction over the Habeas Corpus Petition before the CA is ultimately
precluded by the CA Resolution considering the petition closed and
terminated. With the termination of the Habeas Corpus Petition before the
CA, petitioners' plea that the same be transferred to this Court, or that the
Court assume jurisdiction thereof must necessarily be denied.
2nd ISSUE (RELEVANT)
The filing of the petition for the issuance of a writ of Amparo before the Supreme
Court while the Habeas Corpus petition before the CA was still pending is
improper (procedural)
3. Even in civil cases pending before the trial courts, the Supreme Court has
no authority to separately and directly intervene through the writ
of Amparo, as elucidated in Tapuz, et al. v. Hon. Judge Del Rosario, et
al., thus:
Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing
directly with the possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence
and harassment, we see no point in separately and directly
intervening through a writ of Amparo in the absence of any
clear prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or security —
the personal concern that the writ is intended to protect — is
immediately in danger or threatened, or that the danger or threat is
continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an application for the
issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a pending case on
appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the co-
existence of the writ with a separately filed criminal case.
4. Thus, while there is no procedural and legal obstacle to the joining of a
petition for habeas corpus and a petition for Amparo, the peculiarity of the
then pendency of the Habeas Corpus petition before the CA renders the
direct resort to this Court for the issuance of a writ
of Amparo inappropriate.
THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO IS CONFINED TO
INSTANCES OF EXTRALEGAL KILLINGS AND ENFORCED
DISAPPEARANCES, OR THREATS THEREOF (substantive)
5. Even if the Court sets aside this procedural faux pas, petitioners and co-
petitioner Marcos failed to show, by prima facie evidence, entitlement to
the issuance of the writ. Much less have they exhibited, by substantial
evidence, meritorious grounds to the grant of the petition.
6. Section 1 of the Rule on the writ of Amparo provides:
a. SECTION 1. Petition. — The petition for a writ of Amparo is a remedy available
to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
7. In the landmark case of Secretary of National Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et
al., the Court categorically pronounced that the Amparo Rule, as it
presently stands, is confined to extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances, or to threats thereof.
8. PRESENT CASE: Here, petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos readily
admit that the instant Omnibus Petition does not cover extralegal
killings or enforced disappearances, or threats thereof. Thus, on this
ground alone, their petition for the issuance of a writ of Amparo is
dismissible.
a. Despite this, petitioners insist that their rights to liberty and
security were violated because of their unlawful detention. On the
other hand, co-petitioner Marcos seeks the protective writ
of Amparo on the ground that her right to liberty and security are
being threatened by the conduct of the legislative inquiry on
House Resolution No. 882. But even these claims of actual and
threatened violations of the right to liberty and security fail to
impress.
9. To reiterate, the writ of Amparo is designed to protect and guarantee the
(1) right to life; (2) right to liberty; and (3) right to security of persons,
free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of life.
10. RIGHT TO LIFE: In Secretary of National Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et
al.,the Court explained the concept of right to life in this wise:
While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 guarantees
essentially the right to be alive — upon which the enjoyment
of all other rights is preconditioned — the right to security of
 person is a guarantee of the secure quality of this life, viz.:"The
life to which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear
that his person and property may be unreasonably violated by
a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance
that the government he established and consented to, will
protect the security of his person and property. The ideal of
security in life and property ...pervades the whole history of
man. It touches every aspect of man's existence." In a broad
sense, the right to security of person "emanates in a person's
legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his
body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the right to
exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and
it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those
things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according
to the nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the
individual."
11. RIGHT TO LIBERTY: The right to liberty, on the other hand, was
defined in the City of Manila, et al. v. Hon. Laguio, Jr., in this manner:
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by
Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right to
be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term
cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint
of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right
of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed
by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are
necessary for the common welfare." x x x
12. RIGHT TO SECURITY: Secretary of National Defense, et al. v. Manalo,
et al., thoroughly expounded on the import of the right to security, thus:
First, the right to security of person is "freedom from
fear." In its "whereas" clauses, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that "a world in which
human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief
and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the
highest aspiration of the common people." Article 3 of the
UDHR provides, viz.:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
xxx xxx xxx
The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the
ICCPR.
In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, "freedom from
fear" is the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty
or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a
reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused
by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to well-
founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can
vary from one person to another with the variation of the
prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or past
experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the Amparo context, it
is more correct to say that the "right to security" is actually
the "freedom from threat." Viewed in this light, the
"threatened with violation" Clause in the latter part of Section
1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to
security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.
Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of
bodily and psychological integrity or security. Article III,
Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a
general rule, ones body cannot be searched or invaded without
a search warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in the context of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute
more than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute
dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical
intrusion. As the degree of physical injury increases, the
danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law,
physical injuries constitute a crime against persons because
they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a
person.
xxx xxx xxx
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of
protection of ones rights by the government.In the context
of the writ of Amparo,this right is built into the guarantees of
the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of
the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as
freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological
integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of
person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the
State guarantees full respect for human rights under Article II,
Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the
chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional
guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is
rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection
to these rights especially when they are under threat.
Protection includes conducting effective investigations,
organization of the government apparatus to extend protection
 to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or legislative inquiry as resource persons have seriously violated their
threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to right to liberty and security, for which no other legal recourse or
the bar of justice. x x x. remedy is available. Perforce, the petition for the issuance of a writ
13. Nevertheless, and by way of caution, the rule is that a writ of Amparo must be dismissed.
of Amparo shall not issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.
Consequently, every petition for the issuance of a writ
of Amparo should be supported by justifying allegations of fact, which
the Court in Tapuz laid down as follows:
a. (a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
b. (b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent
responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is
unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an
assumed appellation;
c. (c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is
committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting
affidavits;
d. (d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names,
personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating
authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the
investigation, together with any report;
e. (e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine
the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of
the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
f. (f) The relief prayed for.
14. Even more telling is the rule that the writ of Amparo cannot be issued in
cases where the alleged threat has ceased and is no longer imminent or
continuing.
15. In this case, the alleged unlawful restraint on petitioners' liberty has
effectively ceased upon their subsequent release from detention. On the
other hand, the apprehension of co-petitioner Marcos that she will be
detained is, at best, merely speculative. In other words, co-petitioner
Marcos has failed to show any clear threat to her right to liberty
actionable through a petition for a writ of Amparo.
16. Here, it appears that petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos even attended
and participated in the subsequent hearings on House Resolution No.
882 without any untoward incident. Petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos
thus failed to establish that their attendance at and participation in the
 P: People of the Ph
R: Sandiganbayan (First Division), Ramon "Bong" B. Revilla, Jr., And Richard A. Cambe
G.R. No. 219162
P: Ramon "Bong" B. Revilla, Jr.,
R: Sandiganbayan (First Division) And People of The Philippines

SUMMARY: Ombudsman filed an information against Revilla, Cambe and Na-

poles for the crime of Plunder under RA 7080 for receiving kickbacks or commis-
sions from Napoles’ NGOs which were funded by Revilla’s PDAF. Their applica-
tion for bail were denied. Subsequently, the Sandiganbayan granted the issuance of
Writ of Preliminary Attachment/Garnishment against the monies and properties of
Revilla to serve as security for the satisfaction of the amount of P224,512,500.00
alleged as ill-gotten wealth. Hence this pettion before the SC.
The issue before the court is w/n SB committed GALAEJ in denying petitioner's
application for admission to bail despite the fact that the evidence on record do not
show a clear and strong evidence of his guilt for the crime of plunder.
SC found that the Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it denied bail to Cambe and Napoles, upon a finding of
strong evidence that they committed the crime of plunder in conspiracy with one
another. Cambe alleged that the SB gravely abused its discretion in relying on the
concept of totality of evidence, which only applies in writ of amparo cases. To sup-
port this argument, Cambe's previous counsel cited Razon, Jr v. Tagitis. But, the
case of Razon should not have been applied in this case. SC specifically held in that
case that the: "unique situations that call for the issuance of the writ of amparo, as
well as the considerations and measures necessary to address these situations, may
not at all be the same as the standard measures and procedures in ordinary court ac-
tions and proceedings." Accordingly, an examination of the entire record — totality
of evidence — is necessary to determine whether there is strong evidence of guilt,
for purposes of granting or denying bail to the accused.

DOCTRINE: Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that: All
persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpet-
ua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by suffi-
034 REVILLA v. SANDIGANBAYAN (Arcenas) cient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right
July 24, 2018| Carpio, J. | Writ of Habeas Data to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas cor-
Note: Only includes relevant facts (but the case has nothing on habeas data L) pus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
PETITIONER/S: Ramon "Bong" B. Revilla, Jr.,
RESPONDENTS: Sandiganbayan (First Division) And People of The Philippines
G.R. No. 218235 FACTS: 5 June 2014 – Ombudsman filed an Information in the Sandiganbayan
P: Richard A. Cambe (SB) charging Revilla, Cambe, and Napoles, among others, with the crime of Plun-
R: Sandiganbayan (First Division), People Of The Philippines, And Office Of The Ombudsman der, defined and penalized under Section 2 of RA 7080 that:
G.R. No. 218266 a. In 2006 to 2010 Revilla (senator) and Cambe (Dirrector of Revil-
P: Janet Lim Napoles
R: Sandiganbayan (First Division), Conchita Carpio Morales, In Her Capacity As Ombudsman, And Peo-
la’s office) conspired with Napoles, Ronald Lim and John Ray-
ple Of The Philippines mund De Asis to accumulate and/or acquire ill-gotten wealth
G.R. No. 218903
 amounting to at least Php224,512,500.00, through a combination
or series of overt criminal acts:
b. Received kickbacks or commissions from Napoles, which consist-
ed the percentage of cost of a project funded from Revilla’s Priori-
ty Development Assistance Fund (PDAF)
c. Revilla endorsed, through Cambe, Napoles NGOs to gov’t agen-
cies but the NGOs turned out to be ghosts or fictious, enabling
Napoles to misappropriate PDAF proceeds for her personal gain.
d. Took advantage of their official position, authority, relationship
and connections
2. Arraignment: Napoles and Cambe pleaded not guilty. Revilla refused to en-
ter any plea so SB entered plea of not guilty
3. SB issued warrants of arrest against the three
a. Revilla voluntarily surrendered to the PNP and filed a Motion to
Elect Detention Facilities Ad Cautelam praying for his detention at
the PNP Custodial Center in Camp Crame.
b. Cambe also voluntarily surrendered to SB and filed an Urgent Mo-
tion to Commit Accused to Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group (CIDG) pending trial of the case.
G.R. Nos. 218232, 218235 and 218266
4. Revilla filed a Petition for Bail Ad Cautelam ; Cambe filed an Application
for Bail; Napoles filed a Joint Petition for Bail together with co-accused
Lim and De Asis.
5. SB conducted bail hearings where prosecution presented 9 witness72 which
presented evidence showing Revilla allocated PDAF in the amount of
P517,000,000.00 covered by 12 Special Allotment Release Orders (SA-
ROs) for livelihood and agricultural projects.
a. Revilla's commissions = 50% of the project cost, Napoles = 25%.
The other 25% was released upon issuance of the SARO. Cambe's
= 5% of the project cost.
b. To make it appear that there were implementations of the projects
for which accused Revilla's PDAFs were intended, the NGOs
submitted liquidation documents such as official receipts, delivery
receipts, accomplishment reports, which were all fake, and lists of
beneficiaries which were just fabricated having only signed by
Napoles' employees, children, household helpers, drivers, and se-
curity guards. The receipts were issued by bogus suppliers which
were likewise owned or controlled by accused Napoles.
72
Commission on Audit (COA) Assistant Commissioner in the Special Services Sector Susan P. Gar-
cia; Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Directors Carmencita N. Delantar and Lorenzo C.
Drapete; the whistleblowers Benhur K. Luy (Luy), Merlina P. Suñas (Suñas), Marina C. Sula (Sula),
and Mary Arlene Joyce B. Baltazar (Baltazar); National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Special Investi-
gator III Joey I. Narciso (Narciso); and Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) Bank Officer II Atty.
Leigh Vhon Santos (Santos).
6. SB thereafter admitted all the documentary exhibits of Revilla, Cambe, and
Napoles except for Exhibits 273 to 277 of Revilla for lack of sponsorship.
Revilla made a tender of excluded exhibits and rested his case. Cambe and
Napoles also rested their case relative to their application for bail.
7. SB denied the separate applications for bail filed by Revilla, Cambe, and
Napoles and held that the prosecution duly established with strong evidence
that Revilla, Cambe, and Napoles, in conspiracy with one another, commit-
ted the crime of plunder; thus, they are not entitled to the constitutional
right to bail. MR also denied. Hence, this petition.
8. Ombudsman, through Special Prosecutor filed an Ex Parte Mation for issu-
ance of Writ of Preliminary Attachment/Garnishment against the monies
and properties of Revilla to serve as security for the satisfaction of the
amount of P224,512,500.00 alleged as ill-gotten wealth, in the event that a
judgment is rendered against him for plunder.
a. considering that the AMLC reported that many investment and
bank accounts of Revilla were "terminated immediately before and
after the PDAF scandal circulated in [the] media," and Revilla
himself publicly confirmed that he closed several bank accounts
when the PDAF scam was exposed.
b. Revilla filed an Opposition arguing that the factual basis for the is-
suance of the writ is yet to be proven, and that the issuance of the
writ would unduly preempt the proceedings in his bail application.
c. the prosecution filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve Ex
Parte Motion for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Attach-
ment/Garnishment, alleging that the safeguarding of Revilla's
properties has become even more necessary after the Sandi-
ganbayan denied Revilla's bail application and ruled that there is
strong evidence of his guilt.
9. SB DECISION ON WRIT OF GARNISHMENT: granted upon finding of
its sufficiency both in form and substance.
a. It held that the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment is
properly anchored on Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 57, and Sections 1
and 2 (b) and (c) of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court.
b. Properties included those under the known aliases or other names
of Revilla and his spouse, Lani Mercado.
c. MR denied.
d. The SB held that the writ of preliminary attachment is not the pen-
alty of forfeiture envisioned under Section 2 of RA 7080, contrary
to Revilla's argument.
e. The SB further elucidated that the issuance of the writ is an ancil-
lary remedy which can be availed of during the pendency of the
criminal case of plunder, and it is not necessary to await the final
resolution of the bail petition before it can be issued.
10. Hence, Revilla filed a petition for certiorari
 nesses and introduce evidence in its own rebuttal. The court is
ISSUE/S: w/n SB committed GALAEJ in denying petitioner's application for ad- to conduct only a summary hearing, or such brief and speedy
mission to bail despite the fact that the evidence on record do not show a clear and method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is
strong evidence of his guilt for the crime of plunder – no. practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing which
is merely to determine the weight of evidence for purposes of
RULING: we DISMISS the petitions for lack of merit and AFFIRM the assailed bail.
Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. 7. The order granting or refusing bail which shall thereafter be issued must
contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution.
RATIO a. The summary of the evidence shows that the evidence presented
1. Judicial discretion, by its very nature, involves the exercise of the judge's during the prior hearing is formally recognized as having been
individual opinion and the law has wisely provided that its exercise be presented and most importantly, considered.
guided by well-known rules which, while allowing the judge rational lati- b. The summary of the evidence is the basis for the judge's exercis-
tude for the operation of his own individual views, prevent them from get- ing his judicial discretion.
ting out of control. c. Only after weighing the pieces of evidence as contained in the
2. Discretion is guided by: summary will the judge formulate his own conclusion as to whether
a. First, the applicable provisions of the Constitution and the stat- the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong based on his dis-
utes; cretion
b. Second by the rules which this Court may promulgate; d. Thus, judicial discretion is not unbridled but must be supported by a
c. Third, by those principles of equity and justice that are deemed finding of the facts relied upon to form an opinion on the issue be-
to be part of the laws of the land. fore the court.
3. The discretion of the court, once exercised, cannot be reviewed e. It must be exercised regularly, legally and within the confines of
by certiorari nor controlled by mandamussave in instances where such procedural due process, that is, after evaluation of the evidence
discretion has been so exercised in an arbitrary or capricious manne submitted by the prosecution. Any order issued in the absence
4. Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that: All per- thereof is not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim, ca-
sons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpet- price, and outright arbitrariness.
ua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable 8. SC found that the Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion amounting
by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied bail to Cambe and Na-
by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privi- poles, upon a finding of strong evidence that they committed the crime of
lege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not plunder in conspiracy with one another.
be required.
5. Whereas, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court emphasizes that offenses pun- Elements of plunder under Section 2 Application
ishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment are non- that the offender is a public officer, Revilla and Cambe were public offic-
bailable when the evidence of guilt is strong73 who acts by himself or in connivance ers at the time material to this case,
6. The grant or denial of bail in an offense punishable by reclusion perpet- with members of his family, relatives Revilla being a member of the Senate
ua, such as plunder, hinges on the issue of whether or not the evidence by affinity or consanguinity, business of the Philippines, and Cambe being
of guilt of the accused is strong. associates, subordinates or other per- Revilla's Chief of Staff/Political Of-
a. This requires the conduct of bail hearings where the prosecu- sons; ficer/Director III as appearing on the
tion has the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt is face of the documents on record. Na-
strong, subject to the right of the defense to cross-examine wit- As provided in Section 2 of RA 7080, poles is a private individual charged in
"[a]ny person who participated with conspiracy with accused Revilla and
the said public officer in the commis- Cambe.
73
Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not baila- sion of an offense contributing to the
ble. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the
crime of plunder shall likewise be
criminal prosecution punished for such offense."
that he amasses, accumulates or ac- This was established by the testimo-
quires ill-gotten wealth through a nies of the witnesses and the docu-
combination or series of overt or crim- ments they testified to which, at this
inal acts described in Section 1 (d) stage of the proceedings, have re-
mained unrebutted, and thus, given full
faith and credence by the Court.
In finding strong evidence of guilt
against Napoles, the Sandiganbayan
considered the AMLC Report, as at-
tested by witness Santos, stating that
Napoles controlled the NGOs, which
were the recipients of Revilla's PDAF
that the aggregate amount or total val- Of the Php224,512,500.00 alleged in
ue of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, the Information to have been plun-
accumulated or acquired is at least 50 dered by accused Revilla and/or
million pesos Cambe, the prosecution has so far
strongly proven the amount of
P103,000,000.00
1. More on second element – The separate and individual acts of accused Revil-
la, Cambe and Napoles convincingly appear to have facilitated the amassing,
accumulation, and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth by accused Revilla.
a. It is immaterial whether or not the prosecution has presented evi-
dence that accused Cambe and Napoles by themselves have likewise
amassed, accumulated, or acquired ill-gotten wealth in the amount
of at least P50 Million each.
b. Evidence discloses that the NGOs were illicitly established for some
dishonest purpose.
i. Their presidents and incorporators either have working or
personal relations to Napoles, or unknown to her, or ficti-
tious.
ii. The addresses of the NGOs were either the location of her
property or that of her employees whom she made presi-
dents, or otherwise inexistent.
iii. The lists of beneficiaries were bogus, and this was con-
firmed by the COA during its own investigation where it
was found that either there were no projects implemented
or there were no such names of beneficiaries that existed.
2. During the bail hearings, both parties were afforded opportunities to offer
their evidence. The prosecution presented nine witnesses and documentary
evidence to prove the strong evidence of guilt of the accused. The defense
likewise introduced evidence in its own rebuttal and cross-examined the wit-
nesses presented by the prosecution. Only after both parties rested their case
that the Sandiganbayan issued its Resolution, which contains the summary of
the prosecution's evidence. The summary of the prosecution's evidence
shows the basis for the Sandiganbayan's discretion to deny bail to Cambe and
Napoles.
Strong evidence of guilt Against revilla
3. Revilla’s participation: as the fund was allocated to his office, he alone could
trigger its release, after accomplishment of the necessary documentary re-
quirements and actually requested its release from then President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (PGMA) or from the DBM accompanied by a list of pro-
jects and endorsement naming a certain implementing agency on the DBM's
menu as project implementor. Then the DBM processed the request, ap-
proved it, and eventually released the SARO. The DBM issued Notice of
Cash Allocation Issued (NCAI) to the Bureau of Treasury. In tranches, the IA
issued checks to the NGOs.
Strong evidence of guilt Against cambe
4. SB considered the PDAF documents and the whistleblowers' testimonies
in finding that Cambe received, for Revilla, the total amount of
P103,000,000.00, in return for Revilla's endorsement of the NGOs of Na-
poles as the recipients of Revilla's PDAF.
5. It gave weight to Luy's summary of rebates and disbursement ledgers
containing Cambe's receipt of money, which Luy obtained from his hard
drive. The Sandiganbayan likewise admitted Narciso as expert witness,
who attested to the integrity of Luy's hard drive and the files in it.
Strong evidence of guilt against Napoles
6. SB considered the AMLC Report, as attested by witness Santos, stating
that Napoles controlled the NGOs, which were the recipients of Revilla's
PDAF.
7. The Sandiganbayan found that the circumstances stated in the AMLC
Report, particularly that the bank accounts of these NGOs were opened
by the named presidents using JLN Corp. IDs, these accounts are tempo-
rary repository of funds, and the withdrawal from these accounts had to
be confirmed first with Napoles, are consistent with the whistleblowers'
testimonies that they were named presidents of Napoles' NGOs and they
withdrew large amounts of cash from the NGOs' bank accounts upon in-
struction of Napoles. The Sandiganbayan also took note of the COA re-
port, as confirmed by the testimony of Garcia, that Revilla's PDAF pro-
jects failed to comply with the law, Napoles' NGOs were fake, no projects
were implemented and the suppliers selected to supply the NGOs were
questionable.
8. Accordingly, there is no basis for the allegation of Cambe that the Sandi-
ganbayan Resolutions were based on mere presumptions and inferences.
On the other hand, the Sandiganbayan considered the entire record of ev-
idence in finding strong evidence of guilt.
9. Cambe further alleged that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in relying on the concept of totality of evidence, which only
 applies in writ of amparo cases. To support this argument, Cambe's
previous counsel cited Razon, Jr v. Tagitis.
10. We specifically held in Razon that the: "unique situations that call for
the issuance of the writ of amparo, as well as the considerations and
measures necessary to address these situations, may not at all be the
same as the standard measures and procedures in ordinary court ac-
tions and proceedings." Thus, the case of Razon should not have
been applied in this case.
11. On the other hand, as we held in People v. Cabral: "[e]ven though there is
a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of accused, if on an examination of
the entire record the presumption is great that accused is guilty of a capi-
tal offense, bail should be refused." Accordingly, an examination of the
entire record — totality of evidence — is necessary to determine
whether there is strong evidence of guilt, for purposes of granting or
denying bail to the accused.

VELASCO, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:

1. I cannot concur with the position that Revilla's withdrawal of his petition in
G.R. No. 218232 amounts to a waiver of his constitutional right to bail.
Waiver of a right by implication cannot be presumed. In criminal cases
where life, liberty and property are all at stake, obviously, the rule on waiv-
er cannot be any less.
2. Jurisprudence illustrates that there are (3) essential elements of a valid
waiver: "(a) existence of a right; (b) the knowledge of the existence thereof;
and, (c) an intention to relinquish such right."
3. Here, while Revilla withdrew his petition in G.R. No. 218232, he made the
following reservation: “petitioner will avail of the remedies available to
him in said proceedings once the insufficiency of the evidence against
him is established.” The absence of the intent to relinquish his right to bail
is clear from Revilla's foregoing statement.
4. On Cambe's Application for Bail -Without the satisfaction of the lower
standard of probable cause, there cannot be a strong evidence of guilt that
could warrant Cambe's continuous detention. Therefore, I submit that, at the
very least, he should be released on bail.
5. Given the hearsay character of the whistleblowers' testimonies, these are
devoid of any intrinsic merit, dismissible as without any probative value.
6. At most, the whistleblowers claimed that money was handed to Cambe.
Yet, there is nothing to prove that Revilla received the said money from
Cambe or that Cambe's alleged receipt of the said money was under his au-
thority or instruction.
 Mamba v. Bueno (Linds)
Feb. 7, 2017 | Reyes, J. | Habeas Data
PETITIONER: Mayor William N. Mamba, Atty. Francisco N. Mamba, Jr.,
Ariel Malana, Narding Aggangan, Jomari Sagalon, Jun Cinabre, Frederick
Baligod, Rommel Encollado, Joseph Tumaliuan, and Randy Dayag
RESPONDENTS: Leomar Bueno
SUMMARY: Emelita, mother of Mayor Mamba, had a canteen which was
robbed allegedly by Bueno. A task force was created to discover the perpetrator.
They went to Bueno’s house when he was still a minor and invited him for
questioning. Petitioners (Emelita, Mamba, and members of the task force) and
Bueno had different accounts as to what happened in the police station.
Petitioners: When they reached the police station, there were no investigating
officers so the investigation cannot proceed. An eyewitness was there
(Raymund). Bueno told Raymund that he would kill him for ratting him out.
They allege that Bueno proposed to Raymund to rob the canteen.
Respondents: Bueno was brought from the police station to Mayor Mamba’s
house. He was then made to board a white van. Inside it, he was threatened by
Malana and beat Bueno with a gun. Haber was also brought in the police station.
They were then tortured and forced them to confess. They were then questioned
by Atty. Mamba regarding the robbery wearing blindfolds. They were released
after 4 days.
Bueno and his mother sought the help of CHR. CHR assisted them in filing a
petition for amparo before the CA, which it granted. Hence, this petition.
The issue is the propriety of the grant of amparo. Proper.
The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief
consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be
crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations or threats of violation
of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or security. In an amparo action, the
parties must establish their respective claims by substantial evidence.
Substantial evidence is that amount of evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It is more than a mere imputation of
wrongdoing or violation that would warrant a finding of liability against the
person charged.
Bueno’s allegations were substantially corroborated by Haber, who testified as
to the truth of Bueno’s allegations, and that they were tortured. It was also
corroborated by the testimony of Dr. Tiangco that Bueno suffered several
injuries and multiple second degree bums. Layus also attested that she saw the
scars incurred by the respondent on his head, arms, and back when she
interviewed him.
Their subsequent release from detention is of no moment. A writ of amparo
may still issue in the respondent's favor notwithstanding that he has
already been released from detention. In such case, the writ of amparo is
issued to facilitate the punishment of those behind the illegal detention
through subsequent investigation and action. The right to security is separate
and distinct from the right to life. The right to life guarantees essentially the
right to be alive - upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is
preconditioned. On the other hand, the right to security is a guarantee of the
secure quality of life, i.e., the life, to which each person has a right, is not a life
lived in fear that his person and property may be unreasonably violated by a
powerful ruler. Instead of effectively addressing the irregularities committed
against the respondent, the petitioners seemingly justify the illegal arrest and
detention and infliction of bodily harm upon the respondent by stating that the
latter is a habitual delinquent and was the one responsible for the robbery of the
canteen.
DOCTRINE: even if [a person] committed a crime, local government officials,
are not at liberty to disregard the respondent's constitutionally guaranteed rights
to life, liberty and security.
FACTS:
72. On June 13, 2009, the canteen owned by Emelita N. Mamba (Emelita) in
Tuao, Cagayan was robbed
73. Emelita is the mother of Mayor Mamba, then Mayor of the Municipality of
Tuao, Cagayan and Atty. Mamba, then a Malacafiang official.
74. The Task Force Lingkod Bayan (Task Force), an agency created by the
Sangguniang Bayan of Tuao to help the local police force in maintaining
peace and order in the municipality, undertook an investigation on the
robbery.
75. Several members of the Task Force, Malana, Aggangan and Sagalon,
together with barangay officials Cinabre and Encollado, went to the. house
of the respondent, then still a minor, to invite him for questioning on his
supposed involvement in the robbery.
76. The respondent and his mother, Maritess Bueno (Maritess ), acceded to the
invitation. Thereupon, the respondent was brought to the Tuao police
station
77. The parties gave different accounts of what happened after the respondent
was brought to the Tuao police station. The parties gave different accounts
of what happened after the respondent was brought to the Tuao police
station.
78. The parties gave different accounts of what happened after the respondent
was brought to the Tuao police station.
79. Petitioners claim that:
a. When they reached the Tuao police station, there were no police
investigators or any representative from the local Social Welfare
and Development (SWD) office and, hence, the investigation could
not proceed.
b. At that time, Raymund Rodriguez (Raymund), allegedly an
eyewitness to the robbery, was at the police station.
c. Raymund pointed to the respondent as among those who robbed
the store; the respondent then told Raymund that he would kill him
for ratting him out.
d. The petitioners allege that prior to the robbery of the canteen, the
respondent approached Raymund and his brother Robin and
proposed to them that they rob the canteen. The latter, however,
declined the offer.
e. Later that night, Raymund saw the respondent and Lorenzo Haber
(Haber) robbing the canteen. Thereafter, Robin reported the
incident to the Task Force.
80. Respondent alleges that:
a. At around 3:00 p.m. of June 14, 2009, Tumaliuan and Dayag, both
members of the Task Force, upon the order of Baligod, then
Municipal Administrator of Tuao, fetched the respondent from the
police station and brought .him to Mayor Mamba's house.
b. Sometime in the evening of even date, the respondent was made to
board a white van driven by Aggangan. Inside the van, he was
beaten with a gun by Malana, who later threatened him that he
would be killed. Thereafter, he was brought back to Mayor
Mamba's house.
c. That same evening, Haber, likewise a minor, was invited by the
barangay captain in his place, accompanied by about 10 barangay
tanods and two police officers, for questioning as regards the
robbery of the canteen. Haber was brought to the police station
where he spent the night.
d. The respondent and Haber were then tortured to force them to
admit to their involvement in the robbery. They were made to roll
on the grass while being kicked and beaten with a cue stick by
Malana; hot wax was poured over their bodies to force them to
admit to the robbery, but they denied any involvement therein.
Thereafter, they were blindfolded and were questioned by Atty.
Mamba regarding the robbery of the canteen. When his blindfold
was taken off, the respondent saw Atty. Mamba sitting nearby.
81. Maritess then sought the assistance of the Regional Office of the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR) in Cagayan as regards the case of the
respondent.
82. On August 25, 2009, the respondent, assisted by the CHR, filed a Petition
for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with the CA.
83. CA granted.
84. The CA opined that the respondent's rights to liberty and security were
undeniably undermined when he was invited by the members of the Task
Force for investigation and was brought to Mayor Mamba's house from the
Tuao police station.29 It further pointed out that notwithstanding that
Mayor Mamba was not in Tuao when the incident happened, he is still
accountable since he· failed to show sufficient action to protect the
respondent's rights; that Mayor Mamba failed to acknowledge the
irregularity of the acts of the members of the Task Force or to identify those
who were responsible for the violation of the respondent's rights. The CA
further ruled that it was incumbent upon Atty. Mamba, being a public
servant, to ensure that the respondent's constitutional rights are not violated.
85. The CA pointed out that the "invitation" extended to the respondent by the
members of the Task Force was in the nature of an arrest as the real purpose
of the same was to make him answer to the heist committed the night
before. The CA ruled that the same amounted to an invalid warrantless
arrest since the circumstances of the case do not fall within the purview of
Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether the grant of the amparo petition is proper. Yes – Bueno proved his
allegations by substantial evidence.
RULING: Petition is denied.
RATIO:
18. The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief
consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be
crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations or threats of
violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or security.
19. Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of law, i.e.,
without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand,
enforced disappearance has been defined by the Court as the arrest,
detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of
the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge
 the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of
the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of
the law.
20. In an amparo action, the parties must establish their respective claims by
substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is that amount of evidence which
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It is
more than a mere imputation of wrongdoing or violation that would warrant
a finding of liability against the person charged.
21. After a thorough review of the records of this case, the Court affirms the
factual findings of the CA, which is largely based on the respondent's
evidence. Verily, the totality of the evidence presented by the respondent
meets the requisite evidentiary threshold. To corroborate his allegations, the
respondent presented the testimony of Haber who, during the hearing
conducted by the CA on October 6, 2009, averred that on June 15, 2009, he
was brought to Mayor Mamba's house where he and the respondent were
tortured. Haber testified that hot wax was dripped onto their bodies
while they were handcuffed; that they were kicked and beaten with a
cue stick and an alcohol container. Thereafter, Haber testified that he
and the respondent were brought to the guardhouse where they were
suffocated by placing plastic bags on their heads. He also testified that a
wire was inserted inside their penises.
22. The respondent's claim was further corroborated by Dr. Tiangco who
testified that on June 18, 2009, she examined the respondent and found that
he suffered several injuries and multiple second degree bums. Layus also
attested that she saw the scars incurred by the respondent on his head, arms,
and back when she interviewed him on July 26, 2009.
23. In contrast, the respective testimonies of the witnesses for the petitioners
merely consisted in denial and the allegation that the respondent was indeed
the one who robbed the canteen. Clearly, against the positive testimony of
the respondent, which was corroborated by his witnesses, the petitioners'
allegations must fail.
24. It is settled that denial is inherently a weak defense. To be believed, it must
be buttressed by a strong evidence of non-culpability; otherwise, such
denial is purely self-serving and without evidentiary value.57 Further, even
if the respondent was indeed guilty of a crime, assuming it to be true, it does
not justify his immediate apprehension, in the guise of an invitation, and the
subsequent acts of torture inflicted on him.
25. What is clear is that the respondent was able to prove by substantial
evidence that he was apprehended by the members of the Task Force,
illegally detained, and tortured. It was further established that Maritess
would not have seen his son if not for the timely intercession of P/Supt.
Buenaobra of the PNP Cagayan Regional Office. The members of the Task
Force apprehended and detained the respondent to make him admit to his
complicity in the heist the night before sans the benefit of legal and judicial
processes.
26. Nevertheless, it is undisputed that the respondent, after four days of
detention, had been released by the members of the Task Force on June 18,
2009. This fact alone, however, does not negate the propriety of the grant of
a writ of amparo.
27. Accordingly, a writ of amparo may still issue in the respondent's favor
notwithstanding that he has already been released from detention. In
such case, the writ of amparo is issued to facilitate the punishment of
those behind the illegal detention through subsequent investigation and
action.
28. The right to security is separate and distinct from the right to life. The right
to life guarantees essentially the right to be alive - upon which the
enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned. On the other hand, the right
to security is a guarantee of the secure quality of life, i.e., the life, to which
each person has a right, is not a life lived in fear that his person and
property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler.
29. Verily, the petitioners failed to point to any specific measures undertaken
by them to effectively investigate the irregularities alleged by the
respondent and to prosecute those who are responsible therefor. Worse, the
illegal detention and torture suffered by the respondent were perpetrated by
the members of the Task Force themselves.
30. Instead of effectively addressing the irregularities committed against the
respondent, the petitioners seemingly justify the illegal arrest and detention
and infliction of bodily harm upon the respondent by stating that the latter is
a habitual delinquent and was the one responsible for the robbery of the
canteen. As stated earlier, even if the respondent committed a crime, the
petitioners, as local government officials, are not at liberty to disregard the
respondent's constitutionally guaranteed rights to life, liberty and security. It
is quite unfortunate that the petitioners, all local government officials, are
the very ones who are infringing on the respondent's fundamental rights to
life, liberty and security.
31. Clearly, there is substantial evidence in this case that would warrant the
conclusion that the respondent's right to security, as a guarantee of
protection by the government, was violated. Accordingly, the CA correctly
issued the writ of amparo in favor of the respondent.

036 CALLO v. MORENTE (Buenaventura)
Sept. 19, 2017 | Carpio, Acting C.J. | Writ of Amparo
PETITIONER: Lorie Marie Tomas Callo
RESPONDENTS: Commissioner Jaime H. Morente (Bureau of Immigra-
tion)
SUMMARY: Danielle Tan Parker is a holder of a PH passport, she is al-
legedly a fugitive from the US named Danielle Nopuente. A summary De-
portation Order was issued against her on the basis that she is an undoc-
umented overstaying alien. She was arrested on the premise that Danielle
Parker and Danielle Nopuente are one and the same, she was detained in
the Immigration Detention facility in Taguig. However, she was not de-
ported because she still had cases for falsification and use of falsified
documents in Davao.
Parker filed a petition for Habeas Corpus and the Bureau of Immigration
produced her body. The Bureau argued that she cannot be released
based on the SDO and her pending criminal case in Davao City.
RTC dismissed petition, CA affirmed.
Callo (out of nowhere legit wala sa facts sino siya) filed a petition for writ
of amparo alleging that Parker is a natural-born Filipino citizen and there
is no reason for her to be detained by the Bureau.
The issue is WoN there is basis to warrant the issuance of the writ of am-
paro- SC held NO, there is no enforced disappearance in this case.
The protective writ of amparo is a judicial remedy to expeditphiously pro-
vide relief to violations of a person's constitutional right to life, liberty, and
security, and more specifically, to address the problem of extralegal kill-
ings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
The Bureau produced the body of Parker upon her filing for a writ of ha-
beas corpus, and there is no intention to remove Parker from the protec-
tion of the law since she is still detained with the Bureau, thus ther is no
enforced disappearance in this case.
There was also no proof that Parker and Nopuente are two different per-
sons.
Further, there was no allegation as to Callo’s relationship with Parker,
thus she has no legal standing to file the case.
DOCTRINE:
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
The petition may be filed by the aggrieved party or by any qualified per-
son or entity in the following order:
a) Any member of the immediate family, namely: the spouse, children and
parents of the aggrieved party;
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party
within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of
those mentioned in the preceding paragraph; or
c) Any concerned citizen, organization, association or institution, if there
is no known member of the immediate family or relative of the aggrieved
party.
The exclusive and successive order mandated by the above-quoted pro-
vision must be followed.
FACTS:
1. Danielle Tan Parker (Parker) is a holder of a Philippine
Passport issued by the DFA on 5 March 2010 and valid un-
til 4 March 2015.
2. On 15 January 2013, Parker was charged for deportation
for being an undesirable, undocumented, and overstaying
alien, in violation of the Philippine Immigration Act of
1940. It was alleged that Danielle Nopuente was a fugitive
from justice in the USA with an outstanding arrest warrant
issued against her. Subsequently, on 24 January 2013, a
Summary Deportation Order (SDO) was issued against
Danielle Nopuente, also known as Isabelita
Nopuente and Danielle Tan Parker, upon verification that
she arrived in the Philippines on 23 March 2011 under the
Balikbayan Program, with an authorized stay of a period of
one year. Parker was not in the list of approved applications
of the DFA for dual citizenship and her American Passport
had been revoked by the US Department of State. Thus, she
was considered an undocumented, undesirable, and over-
staying alien, in violation of the Philippine Immigration
Act of 1940.
3. Parker was arrested in Tagaytay City on the premise that
Danielle Nopuente and Danielle Tan Parker are one and the
same person. She was then taken to the Immigration Deten-
tion Facility in Bicutan, Taguig City. She is still currently
detained in the Immigration Detention Facility as the de-
portation was not carried out due to the fact that Parker is
charged with falsification and use of falsified documents
before MTCC in Davao City.
 4. Parker, filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus before RTC of
Pasig City. The Bureau of Immigration was able to produce
the body of Parker before the RTC. The Bureau of Immi-
gration then alleged that as the SDO had become final and
executory, it served as the legal authority to detain Parker.
The Bureau of Immigration also argued that Parker cannot
be released or deported without the final disposition of her
pending criminal case in Davao City.
5. The RTC dismissed the petition, finding that the detention
of Parker was legal. Parker then appealed the case to CA.
The CA affirmed the RTC and found that Parker failed to
prove that she was a Filipino citizen to warrant judicial in-
tervention through habeas corpus. The CA gave weight to
the Certification dated 20 June 2015 issued by the Office of
the Consular Affairs of the DFA that there is "no available
data" regarding any record/information from the year 1990
onwards of her Philippine Passport. Parker no longer ap-
pealed the denial of the issuance of the writ of habeas cor-
pus and the decision of the CA became final and executory
on 5 January 2016.
6. On 23 March 2017, Callo filed this petition for a writ of
amparo with prayer to issue Interim Reliefs of Immediate
Release of Danielle Tan Parker from Detention. Callo ar-
gues that Parker is a natural-born Filipino citizen and thus,
there is no reason for her to be detained by the Bureau of
Immigration.
ISSUES:
1. WoN there is basis to warrant the issuance of the writ of
amparo- NO, there is no enforced disappearance in this
case.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. SO
ORDERED.
RATIO:
1. Callo seeks the issuance of the writ of amparo and the in-
terim reliefs available under A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC for the
immediate release of Parker. Callo alleges that Parker is a
natural-born Filipino citizen and thus should not have been
detained by the Bureau of Immigration. Moreover, Callo al-
leges that the life of Parker is endangered in the detention
center; and thus a writ of amparo with the interim reliefs
prayed for should be issued by this Court. We disagree.
2. The protective writ of amparo is a judicial remedy to expe-
ditiously provide relief to violations of a person's constitu-
tional right to life, liberty, and security, and more specifi-
cally, to address the problem of extralegal killings and en-
forced disappearances or threats thereof. Section 1 of A.M.
No. 07-9-12-SC provides:
Sec. 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of amparo is a
remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty
and security is violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee,
or of a private individual or entity.
3. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced dis-
appearances or threats thereof.
4. In Navia v. Pardico, this Court clarified that with the en-
actment of RANo. 9851, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo is
now a procedural law anchored, not only on the constitu-
tional right to life, liberty, and security, but also on a con-
crete statutory definition of "enforced or involuntary disap-
pearance." Further, elements constituting enforced disap-
pearance as defined under RA No. 9851 were clearly laid
down by this Court, viz:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any
form of deprivation of liberty; ·
 (b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of, the State or a political
organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organiza-
tion's refusal to acknowledge or give information on
the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the
amparo petition; and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove sub-
ject person from the protection of the law for a pro-
longed period oftime.
5. It is clear that the elements of enforced disappearance
are not attendant in this case. There is also no threat of
such enforced disappearance. While there is indeed a de-
tention carried out by the State through the Bureau of Im-
migration, the third and fourth elements are not present.
There is no refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of free-
dom or refusal to give information on the whereabouts of
Parker because as Callo admits, Parker is detained in the
Immigration Detention Facility of the Bureau of Immigra-
tion. The Bureau of Immigration also does not deny this. In
fact, the Bureau of Immigration had produced the body of
Parker before the RTC in the proceedings for the writ of
habeas corpus previously initiated by Parker herself. Simi-
larly, there is no intention to remove Parker from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. As
the Bureau of Immigration explained, Parker has a pending
criminal case against her in Davao City, which prevents the
Bureau of Immigration from deporting her from the coun-
try.
6. Simply put, we see no enforced or involuntary disappear-
ance, or any threats thereof, that would warrant the issu-
ance of the writ of amparo. For the issuance of the writ, it
is not sufficient that a person's life is endangered. It is
even not sufficient to allege and prove that a person has
disappeared. It has to be shown by the required quan-
tum of proof that the disappearance was carried out by,
or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of
the government or a political organization, and that
there is a refusal to acknowledge the same or to give in-
formation on the fate or whereabouts of the missing
persons. In this case, Parker has not disappeared. Her
detention has been sufficiently justified by the Bureau of
Immigration, given that there is an SDO and a pending
criminal case against her.
7. Callo contends that there is no cause to detain Parker be-
cause Parker, a natural-born Filipino citizen, is a different
person from Danielle Nopuente, the person against whom
the SDO was issued. We disagree.
8. Callo has failed to prove that Danielle Tan Parker and Dan-
ielle Nopuente are two different persons. The Certificate of
Live Birth, which purportedly shows that Parker was born
in the Philippines on 21 March 1975 of Filipino parents,
was only registered on 4 January 2010. There was no ex-
planation given as to why Parker's birth was registered only
after almost 35 years. Moreover, Callo only alleges facts
from the year 2005, allegedly for purposes of brevity. We
do not see any reason why facts surrounding the existence
of Parker should only be presented from 2005, the life and
existence of Parker should have been alleged and proven
since birth. Parker had failed to sufficiently prove that she
is a different person from Danielle Nopuente.
9. Callo contends that Parker's life is endangered in the Immi-
gration I Detention Facility because of the threats against
her by her co-detainees and the living conditions of the fa-
cility which pose health problems for Parker. Unfortunate-
ly, these allegations - even if proven - will not support the
issuance of a writ of amparo. To repeat, the remedy of a
writ of amparo is an extraordinary remedy that is meant to
balance the government's awesome power and to curtail
human rights abuses. The circumstances of Parker, as al-
leged by Callo, do not meet the requirements for the issu-
ance of the writ of amparo.
10. Finally, we note that the petition for the writ of amparo was Moreover, we see no need to address the other issues raised
filed by Callo. However, there was no allegation of her re- by Callo in this petition, specifically, the condition of the
lationship to Parker. Immigration Detention Facility and the treatment of Parker
11. In Boac v. Cadapan, we emphasized the importance of the in said detention center. A petition for the writ of amparo is
exclusive and successive order of who can file a petition for not the proper action to resolve such issues.
a writ of amparo.
12. Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
13. The petition may be filed by the aggrieved party or by any
qualified person or entity in the following order:
(a) Any member of the immediate family, namely: the
spouse, children and parents of the aggrieved party;
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of
the aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity, in default of those men-
tioned in the preceding paragraph; or
(c) Any concerned citizen, organization, association or
institution, if there is no known member of the im-
mediate family or relative of the aggrieved party.
14. The exclusive and successive order mandated by the above-
quoted provision must be followed. The order of priority
is not without reason - "to prevent the indiscriminate
and groundless filing of petitions for amparo which may
even prejudice the right to life, liberty or security of the
aggrieved party."
15. Thus, while "any person" may file a petition for the writ of
habeas corpus, in a petition for the writ of amparo, the or-
der of priority on who can file the petition should be strictly
followed. In this case, there was no allegation nor proof
that Parker had no immediate family members or any as-
cendant, descendant, or collateral relative within the fourth
civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. In fact, no allega-
tion was made on any of the familial relationship of Parker
as only her whereabouts from 2011 were alleged and dis-
cussed. Therefore, based on the order of priority, Callo had
no legal standing to file this petition.
16. Given that there is no basis for the issuance of the writ of
amparo, the interim reliefs sought for are also denied.
 037 Paje v. Casino (CELAJE)
G.R. No. 207257 | February 3, 2015 | Writ of Kalikasan
PETITIONER: Hon. Ramon Jesus P. Paje
RESPONDENTS: Casino Group
SUMMARY: Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority· (SBMA), and Taiwan
Cogeneration Corporation (TCC) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) expressing their intention to build and operate a coal-fired power plant.
TCC eventually assigned its rights to RP Energy. An ECC was eventually issued.
Respondents (Casiño Group) filed before this Court a Petition for Writ of
Kalikasan against RP Energy, SBMA, and Hon. Ramon Jesus P. Paje, in his
capacity as Secretary of the DENR. The Casiño Group alleged, among others,
that the power plant project would cause grave environmental damage; and that it
would adversely affect the health of the residents of the municipalities of Subic,
Zambales, Morong, Hermosa, and the City of Olongapo;
W/N the Casiño Group was able to prove that the construction and
operation of the power plant will cause grave environmental damage. No.
The three witnesses presented by the Casiño Group are not experts on the CFB
technology or on environmental matters. These witnesses even admitted on
cross-examination that they are not competent to testify on the environmental
impact of the subject project. What is wanting in their testimonies is their
technical knowledge of the project design/implementation or some other aspects
of the project, even those not requiring expert knowledge, vis-à-vis the
significant negative environmental impacts which the Casiño Group alleged will
occur. Clearly, the Casiño Group failed to carry the onus of proving the alleged
significant negative environmental impacts of the project. In comparison, RP
Energy presented several experts to refute the allegations of the Casiño Group.
We agree with the appellate court that the alleged statements by these experts
cannot be given weight because they are hearsay evidence. None of these alleged
experts testified before the appellate court to confirm the pertinent contents of the
Final Report.
DOCTRINE: The petitioner in a petition for a writ of kalikasan has the onus of
proving the alleged significant negative environmental impacts of the project.
FACTS:
57. In February 2006, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority· (SBMA), a
government agency organized and established under Republic Act No. (RA)
7227,4 and Taiwan Cogeneration Corporation (TCC) entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) expressing their intention to build a
power plant in Subic Bay which would supply reliable and affordable power
to Subic Bay Industrial Park (SBIP).5 On July 28, 2006, SBMA and TCC
entered into another MOU, whereby TCC undertook to build and operate a
coal-fired power plant.6
58. On April 4, 2007, the SBMA Ecology Center issued SBFZ Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC) No. EC-SBFZ-ECC-69-21-500 in favor of
Taiwan Cogeneration International Corporation (TCIC), a subsidiary of
TCC,9 for the construction, installation, and operation of 2x150-MW
Circulating Fluidized Bed (CFB) Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant at Sitio
Naglatore.10
59. On June 6, 2008, TCC assigned all its rights and interests under the MOU
dated July 28, 2006 to Redondo Peninsula Energy, Inc. (RP Energy),11 a
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines.
60. On December 22, 2008, the DENR, through former Secretary Jose L.
Atienza, Jr., issued an ECC for the proposed 2x150-MW coal-fired power
plant.16
61. Sometime thereafter, RP Energy decided to include additional components
in its proposed coal-fired power plant. RP Energy requested the DENR
Environmental Management Bureau(DENR-EMB) to amend its
ECC.18 This was granted.
62. On August 1, 2011, the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Zambales issued
Resolution No. 2011-149, opposing the establishment of a coal-fired
thermal power plant at Sitio Naglatore, Brgy. Cawag, Subic, Zambales.26
63. On July 20, 2012, respondents (Casiño Group) filed before this Court a
Petition for Writ of Kalikasan against RP Energy, SBMA, and Hon. Ramon
Jesus P. Paje, in his capacity as Secretary of the DENR.28
64. In the Petition, the respondents Casiño Group alleged, among others, that
the power plant project would cause grave environmental damage;32 that it
would adversely affect the health of the residents of the municipalities of
Subic, Zambales, Morong, Hermosa, and the City of Olongapo;33
ISSUES:
67. W/N the Casiño Group was able to prove that the construction and
operation of the power plant will cause grave environmental damage. No.
The three witnesses presented by the Casiño Group are not experts on the
CFB technology or on environmental matters.

RULING: WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to: …. 2.2. The Petition for Writ of
Kalikasan, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 00015, is denied for insufficiency of
evidence;
RATIO:
1. As previously noted, the Casiño Group alleged that the construction and
operation of the power plant shall adversely affect the residents of the
Provinces of Bataan and Zambales, particularly, the Municipalities of
Subic, Morong and Hermosa, and the City of Olongapo, as well as the
sensitive ecological balance of the area. Their claims of ecological damage
may be summarized as follows:
a. 1. Thermal pollution of coastal waters. Due to the discharge of heated water from
the operation of the plant, they claim that the temperature of the affected bodies of
water will rise significantly. This will have adverse effects on aquatic organisms. It
will also cause the depletion of oxygen in the water. RP Energy claims that there
will beno more than a 3°C increase in water temperature but the Casiño Group
claims that a 1°C to 2°C rise can already affect the metabolism and other biological
functions of aquatic organisms such as mortality rate and reproduction.
b. 2. Air pollution due to dust and combustion gases. While the Casiño Group admits
that Circulating Fluidized Bed (CFB) Coal technology, which will be used in the
power plant, is a clean technology because it reduces the emission of toxic gases, it
claims that volatile organic compounds, specifically, polycyclic aromatic
hydrocarbons (PAHs) will also be emitted under the CFB. PAHs are categorized as
pollutants with carcinogenic and mutagenic characteristics. Carbon monoxide, a
poisonous gas, and nitrous oxide, a lethal global warming gas, will also be
produced.
c. 3. Water pollution from toxic coal combustion waste. The waste from coal
combustion or the residues from burning pose serious environmental risk because
they are toxic and may cause cancer and birth defects. Their release to nearby
bodies of water will be a threat to the marine ecosystem of Subic Bay. The project
is located in a flood-prone area and is near three prominent seismic faults as
identified by Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology. The construction
of an ash pond in an area susceptible to flooding and earthquake also undermines
SBMA’s duty to prioritize the preservation of the water quality in Subic Bay.
d. 4. Acid deposition in aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems. The power plant will
release 1,888 tons of nitrous oxides and 886 tons of sulfur dioxide per year. These
oxides are responsible for acid deposition. Acid deposition directly impacts aquatic
ecosystems. It is toxic to fish and other aquatic animals. It will also damage the
forests near Subic Bay as well as the wildlife therein. This will threaten the stability
of the biological diversity of the Subic Bay Freeport which was declared as one of
the ten priority sites among the protected areas in the Philippines and the Subic
Watershed and Forest Reserve. This will also have an adverse effect on tourism.119
2. In its January 30, 2013 Decision, the appellate court ruled that the Casiño
Group failed to prove the above allegations.
3. We agree with the appellate court.
4. Indeed, the three witnesses presented by the Casiño Group are not experts
on the CFB technology or on environmental matters. These witnesses even
admitted on cross-examination that they are not competent to testify on the
environmental impact of the subject project.
5. What is wanting in their testimonies is their technical knowledge of the
project design/implementation or some other aspects of the project,
even those not requiring expert knowledge, vis-à-vis the significant
negative environmental impacts which the Casiño Group alleged will
occur.
6. Clearly, the Casiño Group failed to carry the onus of proving the alleged
significant negative environmental impacts of the project. In comparison,
RP Energy presented several experts to refute the allegations of the Casiño
Group.
7. We agree with the appellate court that the alleged statements by these
experts cannot be given weight because they are hearsay evidence. None of
these alleged experts testified before the appellate court to confirm the
pertinent contents of the Final Report. No reason appears in the records of
this case as to why the Casiño Group failed to present these expert
witnesses.
8. The Casiño Group also relies heavily on a report on the social acceptability
process of the power plant project to bolster its claim that the project will
cause grave environmental damage. We purposely discuss this matter in this
separate subsection for reasons which will be made clear shortly.
9. According to the Casiño Group, from December 7 to 9, 2011, the SBMA
conducted social acceptability policy consultations with different
stakeholders on RP Energy’s proposed 600 MW coal plant project at the
Subic Bay Exhibition and Convention Center.
10. The results thereof are contained in a document prepared by SBMA entitled
“Final Report: Social Acceptability Process for RP Energy, Inc.’s 600-MW
Coal Plant Project” (Final Report). We note that SBMA adopted the Final
Report as a common exhibit with the Casiño Group in the course of the
proceedings before the appellate court.
11. The Final Report stated that there was a clear aversion to the concept of a
coal-fired power plant from the participants. Their concerns included
environmental, health, economic and socio-cultural factors. Pertinent to this
case is the alleged assessment, contained in the Final Report, of the
potential effects of the project by three experts: (1) Dr. Rex Cruz (Dr.
Cruz), Chancellor of the University of the Philippines, Los Baños and a
forest ecology expert, (2) Dr. Visitacion Antonio, a toxicologist, who
 related information as to public health; and (3) Andre Jon Uychiaco, a
marine biologist.
12. We note, however, that these statements, on their face, especially the
observations of Dr. Cruz, raise serious objections to the environmental
soundness of the project, specifically, the EIS thereof.
13. It brings to fore the question of whether the Court can, on its own,
compel the testimonies of these alleged experts in order to shed light on
these matters in view of the right at stake— not just damage to the
environment but the health, well-being and, ultimately, the lives of those
who may be affected by the project.
14. The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases liberally provide the
courts with means and methods to obtain sufficient information in order to
adequately protect or safeguard the right to a healthful and balanced
ecology. In Section 6 (l) of Rule 3 (Pre-Trial), when there is a failure to
settle, the judge shall, among others, determine the necessity of engaging
the services of a qualified expert as a friend of the court (amicus curiae).
15. While, in Section 12141 of Rule 7 (Writ of Kalikasan), a party may avail of
discovery measures: (1) ocular inspection and (2) production or inspection
of documents or things.
16. The liberality of the Rules in gathering and even compelling information,
specifically with regard to the Writ of Kalikasan, is explained in this wise:
a. [T]he writ of kalikasan was refashioned as a tool to bridge the gap between
allegation and proof by providing a remedy for would-be environmental litigants to
compel the production of information within the custody of the government. The
writ would effectively serve as a remedy for the enforcement of the right to
information about the environment. The scope of the fact-finding power could be:
(1) anything related to the issuance, grant of a government permit issued or
information controlled by the government or private entity and (2) [i]nformation
contained in documents such as environmental compliance certificate (ECC) and
other government records. In addition, the [w]rit may also be employed to compel
the production of information, subject to constitutional limitations. This function is
analogous to a discovery measure, and may be availed of upon application for the
142
writ.
17. Clearly, in environmental cases, the power to appoint friends of the court in
order to shed light on matters requiring special technical expertise as well as
the power to order ocular inspections and production of documents or things
evince the main thrust of, and the spirit behind, the Rules to allow the court
sufficient leeway in acquiring the necessary information to rule on the
issues presented for its resolution, to the end that the right to a healthful and
balanced ecology may be adequately protected.
18. To draw a parallel, in the protection of the constitutional rights of an
accused, when life or liberty is at stake, the testimonies of witnesses may be
compelled as an attribute of the Due Process Clause. Here, where the right
to a healthful and balanced ecology of a substantial magnitude is at stake,
should we not tread the path of caution and prudence by compelling the
testimonies of these alleged experts?
19. After due consideration, we find that, based on the statements in the Final
Report, there is no sufficiently compelling reason to compel the testimonies
of these alleged expert witnesses for the following reasons.
20. First, the statements are not sufficiently specific to point to us a flaw (or
flaws) in the study or design/implementation (or some other aspect) of the
project which provides a causal link or, at least, a reasonable connection
between the construction and operation of the project vis-à-vis potential
grave environmental damage. In particular, they do not explain why the
Environmental Management Plan (EMP) contained in the EIS of the project
will not adequately address these concerns.
21. Second, some of the concerns raised in the alleged statements, like acid
rain, warming and acidification of the seawater, and discharge of pollutants
were, as previously discussed, addressed by the evidence presented by RP
Energy before the appellate court. Again, these alleged statements do not
explain why such concerns are not adequately covered by the EMP of RP
Energy.
22. Third, the key observations of Dr. Cruz, while concededly assailing certain
aspects of the EIS, do not clearly and specifically establish how these
omissions have led to the issuance of an ECC that will pose significant
negative environmental impacts once the project is constructed and
becomes operational.
23. Fourth, because the reason for the non-presentation of the alleged expert
witnesses does not appear on record, we cannot assume that their
testimonies are being unduly suppressed.
24. By ruling that we do not find a sufficiently compelling reason to compel the
taking of the testimonies of these alleged expert witnesses in relation to
their serious objections to the power plant project, we do not foreclose the
possibility that their testimonies could later on be presented, in a proper
case, to more directly, specifically and sufficiently assail the environmental
soundness of the project and establish the requisite magnitude of actual or
threatened environmental damage, if indeed present.
25. After all, their sense of civic duty may well prevail upon them to voluntarily
testify, if there are truly sufficient reasons the project, above and beyond
their inadequate claims in the Final Report that the project should not be
pursued. As things now stand, however, we have insufficient bases to
compel their testimonies for the reasons already proffered
038 West Tower Condominium v. First Philippines Industrial Corporation
(Cruz)
June 16, 2015 | Velasco, Jr., J. | Writ of Kalikasan
PETITIONER: West Tower Condominium Corporation, on behalf of the
Residents of West Tower Condominium and in representation of Barangay
Bangkal, and others, including minors and generations yet unborn
RESPONDENTS: First Philippine Indstrial Corporation, First Gen Corporation
and their Respective Board of Directors and Officers, John Does and Richard
Does
SUMMARY: In 2010, a leakage from one of the pipelines operated by FPIC,
was suspected after the residents of West Tower Condominium (West Tower)
started to smell gas within the condominium. It was discovered that fuel leak
from the wall of its Basement 2 What started as a two-drum leak at the initial
stages became a 15-20 drum a day affair. Eventually, the sump pit of the
condominium was ordered shut down by the City of Makati to prevent the
discharge of contaminated water into the drainage system of Barangay Bangkal.
Eventually, the fumes compelled the residents of West Tower to abandon their
units and the condo's power was shut down. FPIC admitted that indeed the
source of the fuel leak is the WOPL, which was already closed since October
24, 2010, but denied liability by placing blame on the construction activities on
the roads surrounding West Tower. West Tower Corp. interposed a Petition for
the Issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan on behalf of the residents of West Tower
and in representation of the surrounding communities in Barangay Bangkal,
Makati City. West Tower Corp. also alleged that it is joined by the civil society
and several people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and public
interest groups who have expressed their intent to join the suit because of the
magnitude of the environmental issues involved. In their petition, petitioners
prayed that FPIC and its board of directors and officers, and First Gen
Corporation (FGC) and its board of directors and officers be directed to:
1)Permanently cease and desist from committing acts of negligence in the
performance of their functions as a common carrier; 2) Continue to check the
structural integrity of the whole 117-kilometer pipeline and to replace the same;
3) Rehabilitate and restore the environment, especially Barangay Bangkal and
West Tower, at least to what it was before the signs of the leak became
manifest; and 4) Open a special trust fund to answer for similar and future
contingencies in the future. The Court issued the Writ of with a Temporary
Environmental Protection Kalikasan Order (TEPO) requiring FPIC, FGC, and
the members of their Boards of Directors to file their respective verified returns.
The issues are 1) WoN West Tower Corp. has the legal capacity to represent the
other petitioners and whether the other petitioners, apart from the residents of
West Tower and Barangay Bangkal, are real parties-in-interest; and 2) WoN a
special trust fund should be opened by respondents to answer for future similar
contingencies. The SC ruled in the affirmative on the first issue. Petitioners who
are affected residents of West Tower, Barangay Bangkal and the Organizations
that indicated their intention to join the petition have the requisite concern to be
real parties-in-interest. In the case at bar, there can be no quibble that the oil
leak from the WOPL affected all the condominium unit owners and residents of
West Tower as, in fact, all had to evacuate their units at the wee hours in the
morning of July 23, 2010, when the condominium's electrical power was shut
down. Until now, the unit owners and residents of West Tower could still not
return to their condominium units. Thus, there is no gainsaying that the
residents of West Tower are real parties-in-interest. Moreover, the organizations
indicated their intention to join the petition and submitted proof of juridical
personality. that the filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan
under Sec. 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases does
not require that a petitioner be directly affected by an environmental disaster.
The rule clearly allows juridical persons to file the petition on behalf of persons
whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or
threatened with violation. For the second issue, the SC ruled in the negative. A
reading of the petition and the motion for partial reconsideration readily reveals
that the prayer is for the creation of a trust fund for similar future contingencies.
Hence, the Court affirms with concurrence the observation of the appellate court
that the prayer is but a claim for damages, which is prohibited by the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases.
DOCTRINE: Sec. 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
does not require that a petitioner be directly affected by an environmental
disaster
FACTS:
1. FPI C operates two pipelines since 1969, White Oil Pipeline
(WOPL) System and Black Oil Pipeline (BOPL) System. The-
se systems transport nearly 60% of the petroleum requirements
of Metro Manila and parts of the provinces of Bulacan, La-
guna, and Rizal.
2. The two pipelines were supposedly designed to provide more
than double the standard safety allowance against leakage, con-
sidering that they are made out of heavy duty steel that can
withstand more than twice the current operating pressure and
are buried at a minimum depth of 1.5 meters, which is deeper
than the US Department of Transportation standard of 0.9 me-
ters.
3. A leakage from one of the pipelines was suspected after the
residents of West Tower Condominium (West Tower) started
 to smell gas within the condominium. A search made within
the condominium premises led to the discovery of a fuel leak
from the wall of its Basement 2.
4. Owing to its inability to control the flow, West Tower's man-
agement reported the matter to the Police Department of Ma-
kati City, which in turn called the city's Bureau of Fire Protec-
tion.
5. What started as a two-drum leak at the initial stages became a
15-20 drum a day affair. Eventually, the sump pit of the con-
dominium was ordered shut down by the City of Makati to
prevent the discharge of contaminated water into the drainage
system of Barangay Bangkal. Eventually, the fumes compelled
the residents of West Tower to abandon their respective units
on and the condo's power was shut down.
6. FPIC initially disowned any leak from its oil pipeline. Thus,
the residents of West Tower shouldered the expenses of haul-
ing the waste water from its basement, which eventually re-
quired the setting up of a treatment plant in the area to separate
fuel from the waste water.
7. The University of the Philippines-National Institute of Geolog-
ical Sciences (UP-NIGS), which the City of Makati invited to
determine the source of the fuel, found a leak in FPIC's WOPL
about 86 meters from West Tower.
8. A day after, FPIC admitted that indeed the source of the fuel
leak is the WOPL, which was already closed but denied liabil-
ity by placing blame on the construction activities on the roads
surrounding West Tower.
9. West Tower Condominium Corporation (West Tower Corp.)
interposed the present Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Kalikasan on behalf of the residents of West Tower and in rep-
resentation of the surrounding communities in Barangay
Bangkal, Makati City.
a. West Tower Corp. also alleged that it is joined by the
civil society and several people's organizations, non-
governmental organizations and public interest groups
who have expressed their intent to join the suit because
of the magnitude of the environmental issues involved.
10. In their petition, petitioners prayed that FPIC and its board of
directors and officers, and First Gen Corporation (FGC) and its
board of directors and officers be directed to:
a. permanently cease and desist from committing acts of
negligence in the performance of their functions as a
common carrier;
b. continue to check the structural integrity of the whole
117-kilometer pipeline and to replace the same;
c. make periodic reports on their findings with regard to
the 117-kilometer pipeline and their replacement of the
same;
d. rehabilitate and restore the environment, especially Ba-
rangay Bangkal and West Tower, at least to what it was
before the signs of the leak became manifest; and
e. to open a special trust fund to answer for similar and fu-
ture contingencies in the future. Furthermore, petition-
ers pray that respondents be prohibited from opening
the pipeline and allowing the use thereof until the same
has been thoroughly checked and replaced, and be tem-
porarily restrained from operating the pipeline until the
final resolution of the case.
11. To bolster their petition, petitioners argued that FPIC's omis-
sion or failure to timely replace. its pipelines and to observe ex-
traordinary diligence caused the petroleum spill in the City of
Makati. Thus, for petitioners, the continued use of the now 4 7-
year old pipeline would not only be a hazard or a threat to the
lives, health, and property of those who live or sojourn in all
the municipalities in which the pipeline is laid, but would also
affect the rights of the generations yet unborn to live in a bal-
anced and "healthful ecology," guaranteed under Section 16,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
12. The Court issued the Writ of Kalikasan2 with a Temporary En-
vironmental Protection Order (TEPO) requiring FPIC, FGC,
and the members of their Boards of Directors to file their re-
spective verified returns. The TEPO enjoined FPIC and FGC
to:
 a. cease and desist from operating the WOPL until further
orders;
b. check the structural integrity of the whole span of the
11 7-kilometer WOPL while implementing sufficient
measures to prevent and avert any untoward incident
that may result from any leak of the pipeline; and
c. make a report thereon within 60 days from receipt
thereof.
13. In compliance with the writ, FPIC directors submitted a Joint
Return praying for the dismissal of the petition and the denial
of the privilege of the Writ of Kalikasan.
a. petitioners had no legal capacity to institute the petition;
b. there is no allegation that the environmental damage af-
fected the inhabitants of two (2) or more cities or prov-
inces; and
c. the continued operation of the pipeline should be al-
lowed in the interest of maintaining adequate petroleum
supply to the public.
14. FPIC and its other directors and officersalso filed a Verified
Return claiming that the petition contains no allegation that re-
spondents FPIC directors and officers acted in such a manner
as to allow the piercing of the corporate veil.
15. Meanwhile, FGC and the members of its Board of Directors
and Officers filed a Joint Compliance submitting the report re-
quired by the Writ of Kalikasan/TEPO. They contended that
they neither own nor operate the pipelines, adding that it is im-
possible for them to report on the structural integrity of the
pipelines, much less to cease and desist from operating them as
they have no capability, power, control or responsibility over
the pipelines.
16. The Court conducted an ocular inspection of the WOPL in the
vicinity of West Tower to determine the veracity of the claim
that there were two (2) additional leaks on FPIC's pipeline. Re-
sults of the ocular inspection belied the claim.
17. In the meantime, petitioners also filed civil and criminal com-
plaints against respondents arising from the same incident or
leakage from the WOPL.
18. Since after the Court's issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan and
the TEPO, FPIC has ceased operations on both the WOPL and
the BOPL. However, the Court, answering a query of the DOE,
clarified and confirmed that what is covered by the Writ of
Kalikasan and TEPO is only the WOPL System of FPIC; thus,
FPIC can resume operation of its BOPL System.
19. On September 28, 2011, respondent FPIC filed an Urgent Mo-
tion for Leave (To Undertake "Bangkal Realignment" Pro-
ject)13 in order to reduce stress on the WOPL System. FPIC
sought to construct a new realigned segment to replace the old
pipe segment under the Magallanes Interchange, which covers
the portion that leaked. Petitioners were directed to file their
comment on FPIC's motion.
20. Report and Recommendation of the Court of Appeals
21. To expedite the resolution of the controversy, the Court re-
manded the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) which was re-
quired to conduct hearings and, thereafter, submit a report and
recommendation within 30 days after the receipt of the parties'
memoranda.
22. The preliminary conference was continued before the CA
wherein the parties made admissions and stipulations of facts
and defined the issues for resolution.
23. CA submitted its Report and Recommendation
a. That the people's organizations, non-governmental or-
ganizations, and public interest groups that indicated
their intention to join the petition and submitted proof
of juridical personality (namely: the Catholic Bishop's
Conference of the Philippines; Kilusang Makabansang
Ekonomiya, Inc.; Women's Business Council of the
Philippines, Inc.; Junior Chambers International Philip-
pines, Inc. - San Juan Chapter; Zonta Club of Makati
Ayala Foundations; and the Consolidated Mansions
Condominium Corporation) be allowed to be formally
impleaded as petitioners.
b. That FPIC be ordered to submit a certification from the
DOE Secretary that the WOPL is already safe for
commercial operation. The certification should take in-
 to consideration the adoption by FPIC of the appropri-
ate leak detection system to be used in monitoring the
entire pipeline's mass input versus mass output. The
certification must also consider the necessity of replac-
ing the pipes with existing patches and sleeves. In case
of failure of FPIC to submit the required certification
from the DOE Secretary within sixty (60) days from
notice of the Supreme Court's approval of this recom-
mendation, the TEPO must be made permanent.
c. That petitioners' prayer for the creation of a special trust
fund to answer for similar contingencies in the future be
denied for lack of sufficient basis.
d. That FGC be not held solidarily liable under the TEPO.
e. That without prejudice to the outcome of the civil and
criminal cases filed, the individual directors and offic-
ers of FPIC and FGC be not held liable in their individ-
ual capacities.
24. The Court issued a Resolution adopting the recommendation of
the CA that FPIC be ordered to secure a certification from the
DOE Secretary before the WOPL may resume its operations.
25. The DOE Secretary is DIRECTED to consult the [DOST] re-
garding the adoption of the appropriate leak detection system
and the necessity of replacing the pipes with existing patches
and sleeves.
26. Petitioners, in a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for
Clarification, emphasized that the CA found FPIC's tests and
maintenance program to be insufficient and inconclusive to es-
tablish the WOPL' s structural integrity for continued commer-
cial operation. Furthermore, they point out that the DOE is bi-
ased and incapable of determining the WOPL's structural integ-
rity.
27. Respondents, for their part, maintain that the DOE has the
technical competence and expertise to assess the structural in-
tegrity of the WOPL and to certify the system's safety for
commercial operation.
28. In compliance with the Court's Resolution, the DOE Secretary
issued a Certification, attesting that the WOPL is safe to re-
sume commercial operations, subject to monitoring or inspec-
tion requirements, and imposing several conditions that FPIC
must comply with.
a. This certification is being issued subject to the condi-
tion that FPIC will submit itself to regular monitoring
and validation by the Oil Industry Management Bureau
(OIMB) of the implementation of its PIMS
b. Further, FPIC shall submit itself to any test or inspec-
tion that the DOE and DOST may deem appropriate for
purposes of monitoring the operations of the WOPL fa-
cility.
29. The Court is fully cognizant of the WOPL' s value in com-
merce and the adverse effects of a prolonged closure thereof.
Nevertheless, there is a need to balance the necessity of the
immediate reopening of the WOPL with the more important
need to ensure that it is sound for continued operation, since
the substances it carries pose a significant hazard to the sur-
rounding population and to the environment.
ISSUE/s:
WoN West Tower Corp. has the legal capacity to represent the other petitioners
and whether the other petitioners, apart from the residents of West Tower
and Barangay Bangkal, are real parties-in-interest – YES, Sec. 1, Rule 7 of
the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases does not require that a
petitioner be directly affected by an environmental disaster
WoN a PEPO should be issued to direct the respondents to perform or to desist
from performing acts in order to protect, preserve, and rehabilitate the
affected environment- FPIC obtain from the DOE a certification that the
WOPL is already safe for commercial operation
WoN a special trust fund should be opened by respondents to answer for future
similar contingencies -No, the prayer of the petitioners is but a claim for
damages, which is prohibited by the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases
WoN FGC and the directors and officers of respondents FPIC and FGC may be
held liable under the environmental protection order – NO, the Court cannot
grant the award of damages to individual petitioners under Rule 7, Sec.
15(e) of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
RULING: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration is
hereby DENIED. The Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for Clarification is PARTLY
GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' recommendations, embodied in its December 21, 2012
Report and Recommendation, are hereby ADOPTED with the MODIFICATIONS
RATIO:
Petitioners who are affected residents of West Tower, Barangay Bangkal and
the Organizations that indicated their intention to join the petition have the
requisite concern to be real parties-in-interest to pursue the instant petition.
1. As defined, a real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit. Generally, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real parties-in-interest.
2. In other words, the action must be brought by the person who, by
substantive law, possesses the right sought to be enforced.
3. In the case at bar, there can be no quibble that the oil leak from
the WOPL affected all the condominium unit owners and resi-
dents of West Tower as, in fact, all had to evacuate their units
at the wee hours in the morning of July 23, 2010, when the
condominium's electrical power was shut down. Until now, the
unit owners and residents of West Tower could still not return
to their condominium units. Thus, there is no gainsaying that
the residents of West Tower are real parties-in-interest.
4. There can also be no denying that West Tower Corp. represents
the common interest of its unit owners and residents, and has
the legal standing to file and pursue the instant petition. While
a condominium corporation has limited powers under RA 4
726, otherwise known as The Condominium Act, it is empow-
ered to pursue actions in behalf of its members. In the instant
case, the condominium corporation .is the management body of
West Tower and deals with everything that may affect some or
all of the condominium unit owners or users.
5. It is of no moment that only five residents of West Tower
signed their acquiescence to the filing of the petition for the is-
suance of the Writ of Kalikasan, as the merits of such petition
is, as aptly put by the CA, not measured by the number of
persons who signified their assent thereto, but on the exist-
ence of a prima facie case of a massive environmental disas-
ter.
6. Moreover, the fact that no board resolution was submitted by
West Tower Corp. authorizing Manuel Dy Chuaunsu, Jr. to
sign the Verification and Certification of Non-forum Shopping
is irrelevant.
a. The records show that petitioners submitted a notarized
Secretary's Certificate attesting that the authority of
Chuaunsu to represent the condominium corporation in
filing the petition is from the resolution of the total
membership of West Tower Corp. issued during their
meeting with the requisite quorum. It is, thus, clear that
it was not the Board of West Tower Corp. which grant-
ed Chuaunsu the authority but the full membership of
the condominium corporation itself.
7. As to the residents of Barangay Bangkal, they are similarly sit-
uated with the unit owners and residents of West Tower and
are real parties-in-interest to the instant case, i.e., if they so
wish to join the petitioners.
8. Organizations indicated their intention to join the petition and
submitted proof of juridical personality
a. Anent the propriety of including the Catholic Bishops'
Conference of the Philippines, Kilusang Makabansang
Ekonomiya, Inc., Women's Business Council of the
Philippines, Inc., Junior Chambers International Philip-
pines, Inc. - San Juan Chapter, Zonta Club of Makati
Ayala Foundations, and the Consolidated Mansions
Condominium Corporation, as petitioners in the case,
the Court already granted their intervention in its Reso-
lution.
9. This is so considering that the filing of a petition for the issu-
ance of a writ of kalikasan under Sec. 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases does not require that a
petitioner be directly affected by an environmental disaster.
The rule clearly allows juridical persons to file the petition on
behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation.
Propriety of Converting the TEPO to PEPO or its Lifting in light
of the DOE Certification of the WOPL's Commercial Viability
10. To recall, petitioners' persistent plea is for the conversion of the
TEPO into a Permanent Environmental Protection Order (PE-
 PO) pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases. For its part, FPIC asserts that regular
testing, as well as the measures that are already in place, will
sufficiently address any concern of oil leaks from the WOPL.
11. The CA, however, observed that all of these tests and measures
are inconclusive and insufficient for purposes of leak detection
and pipeline integrity maintenance. Hence, considering the
necessary caution and level of assurance required to ensure that
the WOPL system is free from leaks and is safe for commercial
operation, the CA recommended that FPIC obtain from the
DOE a certification that the WOPL is already safe for commer-
cial operation.
12. After a perusal of the recommendations of the DOE and the
submissions of the parties, the Court adopts the activities and
measures prescribed in the DOE letter to be complied with by
FPIC as conditions for the resumption of the commercial oper-
ations of the WOPL. The DOE should, therefore, proceed with
the implementation of the tests proposed in the said letter.
a. Thereafter, if it is satisfied that the results warrant the
immediate reopening of the WOPL, the DOE shall is-
sue an order allowing FPIC to resume the operation of
the WOPL.
b. On the other hand, should the probe result in a finding
that the pipeline is no longer safe for continued use and
that its condition is irremediable, or that it already ex-
ceeded its serviceable life, among others, the closure of
the WOPL may be ordered.
13. Justice Leonen, in his dissent, is of the view that the petition
should be denied and the TEPO immediately lifted in light of
the DOE's issuance of a certification attesting to the safety of
the WOPL for continued commercial operations, thereby ren-
dering the instant petition moot and academic, seeking, as it
does, the checking of the pipeline's structural integrity.
a. According to his dissent, the writ of kalikasan issued by
the Court has already served its functions and, there-
fore, is functus officio. Moreover, he argues that direct-
ing the DOE and FPIC to repeat their previous proce-
dures is tantamount to doubting the agency's perfor-
mance of its statutorily-mandated tasks, over which
they have the necessary expertise, and implies that said
DOE certification is improper, a breach, allegedly, of
the principle of separation of powers.
b. He also contends that the majority ordered the repeti-
tion of the procedures and tests already conducted on
the WOPL because of the fear and uncertainty on its
safeness despite the finding of the DOE in favor of its
reopening, taking into consideration the occurrence of
numerous pipeline incidents worldwide. The dissent ar-
gues that the precautionary principle should not be so
strictly applied as to unjustifiably deprive the public of
the benefits of the activity to be inhibited, and to unduly
create other risks.
14. The dissent's contentions that the case is already moot and aca-
demic, that the writ of kalikasan has already served its func-
tion, and that the delay in the lifting of the TEPO may do more
harm than good are anchored on the mistaken premise that the
precautionary principle was applied in order to justify the order
to the DOE and the FPIC for the conduct of the various tests
anew.
15. The following reasons easily debunk these arguments:
a. The precautionary principle is not applicable to the in-
stant case;
b. The DOE certification is not an absolute attestation as
to the WOPL's structural integrity and in fact imposes
several conditions for FPIC's compliance;
c. The DOE itself, in consultation with FPIC and the other
concerned agencies, proposed the activities to be con-
ducted preparatory to the reopening of the pipeline; and
d. There are no conclusive findings yet on the WOPL's
structural integrity.
16. The precautionary principle only applies when the link between
the cause, that is the human activity sought to be inhibited, and
the effect, that is the damage to the environment, cannot be es-
tablished with full scientific certainty.
 17. Here, however, such absence of a link is not an issue. Detecting
the existence of a leak or the presence of defects in the WOPL,
which is the issue in the case at bar, is different from determin-
ing whether the spillage of hazardous materials into the sur-
roundings will cause environmental damage or will harm hu-
man health or that of other organisms. As a matter of fact, the
petroleum leak and the harm that it caused to the environment
and to the residents of the affected areas is not even questioned
by FPIC.
18. It must be stressed that what is in issue in the instant petition is
the WOPL's compliance with pipeline structure standards so as
to make it fit for its purpose, a question of fact that is to be de-
termined on the basis of the evidence presented by the parties
on the WOPL's actual state.
19. And it is only after an extensive determination by the DOE of
the pipeline's actual physical state through its proposed activi-
ties, and not merely through a short-form integrity audit, that
the factual issue on the WOPL's viability can be settled.
20. The issue on the pipeline's structural integrity has not yet been
rendered moot and remains to be subject to this Court's resolu-
tion. Consequently, We cannot say that the DOE's issuance of
the certification adverted to equates to the writ of kalikasan be-
ing functus officio at this point.
Propriety of the Creation of a Special Trust Fund
21. Anent petitioners' prayer for the creation of a special trust fund,
We note that under Sec. 1, Rule 574 of the Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases, a trust fund is limited solely for the
purpose of rehabilitating or restoring the environment.
22. Furthermore, Sec. 15( e ), Rule 775 of the Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases expressly prohibits the grant of dam-
74
SEC. 1. Reliefs in a citizen suit. - If warranted, the court may grant to the plaintiff proper reliefs which shall include the
protection, preservation or rehabilitation of the environment and the payment of attorney's fees, costs of suit and other
litigation expenses. It may also require the violator to submit a program of rehabilitation or restoration of the environ-
ment, the costs of which shall be borne by the violator, or to contribute to a special trust fund for that purpose subject to
the control of the court. (emphasis supplied)
75
Section 15. Judgment. - Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision, the court shall
render judgment granting or denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasan.
The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:
ages to petitioners in a petition for the issuance of a writ of
kalikasan.
23. A reading of the petition and the motion for partial reconsidera-
tion readily reveals that the prayer is for the creation of a trust
fund for similar future contingencies.
24. Hence, the Court affirms with concurrence the observation of
the appellate court that the prayer is but a claim for damages,
which is prohibited by the Rules of Procedure for Environmen-
tal Cases.
Liability of FPIC, FGC and their respective Directors and Officers
25. The Court will refrain from ruling on the finding of the CA that
the individual directors and officers of FPIC and FGC are not
liable due to the explicit rule in the Rules of Procedure for En-
vironmental cases that in a petition for a writ of kalikasan, the
Court cannot grant the award of damages to individual peti-
tioners under Rule 7, Sec. 15(e) of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases.
26. As noted by the CA, the civil case and criminal complaint filed
by petitioners against respondents are the proper proceedings to
ventilate and determine the individual liability of respondents,
if any, on their exercise of corporate powers and the manage-
ment of FPIC relative to the dire environmental impact of the
dumping of petroleum products stemming from the leak in the
WOPL in Barangay Bangkal, Makati City.
xxxx
(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology or to the protection,
preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, except the award of damages to individual petitioners.
 039 Alecha v. Atienza Jr. (Daguman)
September 14, 2016 | Brion, J. | Writ of Kalikasan
PETITIONER: Paulino Alecha et.al.
RESPONDENTS: Jose Atienza Jr-DENR Secretary and Ferrum Pacific
Mining Corporation
SUMMARY: Cebu Ore filed an application for a Mineral Produc-
tion Sharing Agreement in Zamboanga. The latter later assigned its
rightst to 168 FPMC of the mining agreement. Jose Atienza Jr.,
DENR Secretary, granted the assignment to FPMC. 8 months after,
Alecha filed a petition for cancellation of the mining agreement,
alleging FPMC failed to secure the Free and Informed Prior Con-
sent of the Indigenous People.FPIC denied such allegations and
submitted compliance certificates as proof of the FPIC process.
Atienza dismissed the petition because it considered the records
that the DENR had previously received for 168 FPMC’s applica-
tion for the mininig agreement.Atienza alse held that the Certifica-
tion Precondition was the best evidence that 168 FPMC complied
with the FPIC process. FPMC raised procedural arguments to sup-
port the dismissal. The OSG filed a manifestation stating that
Alecha engaged in forum shopping since they also filed with this
Court for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan. The writ petitition and
the present petition pray for the same relief- the cancellation and
revocation of the mining agreement to prevent the irreparable dam-
age to the residents of Zamboanga del Sur. WoN the DENR Secre-
tary gracely abused his discretion when he dismissed the petition
for cancellation of the 186 FPMC mining agreement. NO. In the
present case, the DENR Secretary took judicial notice of the docu-
ments submitted for the approval of the subject mining agreement
which were already in his possession by reason of his office and
were either posted in a conspicuous place, published in a newspa-
per of general circulation, or its contents announced through the
radio. The DENR Secretary merely confirmed the 168 FPMC's al-
legation in its Answer that it had complied with the legal process
laid down by law and obtained the consent of the IPs concerned for
the approval of the mining agreement.
Particularly, the DENR Secretary was able to confirm that the
DENR-MGB endorsed the subject mining agreement to the NCIP;
field-based investigations were conducted; a detailed presentation
of the project was done and the necessary information regarding
the mining application was given to all the tribal leaders of the af-
fected barangays and the ancestral domain representatives; com-
munity consultative assemblies were conducted on various dates; a
memorandum of agreement was executed between 168 FPMC and
the IPs concerned; the NCIP Compliance Certificate was issued
to 168 FPMC as proof that there was free and prior consent
from the indigenous cultural communities affected; the
One Stop Shop Committee of the DENR-MGB-RIX screened
the subject mining application to ensure that the covered areas
do not fall within any reservation or declared protected area.
WoN petitioners committed forum shopping? NO. First, the
petitions involved different causes of action. In particular, a peti-
tion for the issuance of a writ kalikasan is initiated on behalf of
persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is violated, or threatened with violation, and involves
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life,
health, or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinc-
es.
On the other hand, the present petition for certiorari involves the
issues in wanton disregard of due process and in the incidental vio-
lation of IP rights.
Second, Rule 7, Section 17 of the Rules of Procedure for Environ-
mental Cases expressly provides that the filing of a petition for the
issuance of the writ of kalikasan shall not preclude the filing of
separate civil, criminal, or administrative actions.
DOCTRINE:
Rule 7, Section 17 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases expressly provides that the filing of a petition for the issu-
ance of the writ of kalikasan shall not preclude the filing of sepa-
rate civil, criminal, or administrative actions.
 cate Control No. CCRIX-08-09-161(Certification Precondition) as
proof of its compliance with the FPIC process. On December 16,
2009, the DENR Secretary dismissed the petition for cancellation of
the mining agreement.10 In dismissing the petition, the DENR Sec-
retary considered the records that the DENR had previously re-
ceived for 168 FPMC's application for the mining agreement peti-
tion.
5. 168 FPMC points out that the present petition is not the plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law and the
petitioner should have moved for reconsideration of the assailed
decision or filed an appeal with the Office of the President. 168
FPMC also stresses that it had secured the FPIC of the IPs con-
cerned. As added proof, it attached the Memorandum of Agree-
ment (MOA) it executed with the concerned IPs.
FACTS: 6. Lastly, it insists that by filing the present petition, 168 FPMC effec-
1. On December 22, 2003, Cebu Ore and Mineral Resources Corpora- tively violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. The Office of the
tion (Cebu Ore) filed an application for the approval of the Mineral Solicitor General (OSG) filed a comment on behalf of the DENR Sec-
Production Sharing Agreement (subject mining agreement), denom- retary. Like 168 FPMC, the OSG argues that the present petition
inated as ASPA-101-IX, covering an area of about 8,100 hectares lo- should be dismissed for the petitioners' failure to exhaust the ad-
cated in the municipalities of Midsalip and Bayog, Zamboanga del ministrative remedies. It also argues that the DENR Secretary did
Sur.2 Cebu Ore later on assigned to 168 FPMC its rights over the not gravely abuse his discretion in dismissing the petition to cancel
mining agreement. 168 FPMC's mining agreement since it had complied with all the re-
2. On August 21, 2008, public respondent Jose L. Atienza, Jr., then quirements of the law.
DENR Secretary, granted Eight (8) months after, the petitioners filed 7. Subsequently, the OSG filed a manifestation19 stating that the peti-
a petition5 for cancellation of the subject mining agreement with tioners engaged in forum shopping since they also filed with this
the DENR. In their petition,6 they alleged that 168 FPMC failed to Court a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan, docketed as
secure the Free and Prior Informed Consent (FPIC) of the Indigenous G.R. No. 197754. The writ of kalikasan petition and the present peti-
Peoples (IP) concerned for the approval of the mining agreement. tion pray for the same relief - the cancellation and revocation of the
3. They also alleged that the contract area under the mining agree- mineral agreement to prevent irreparable damage and injury to the
ment was located in the volcanic cones of Mt. Sugarloaf Complex, a petitioners and the residents of Midsalip, Zamboanga Del Sur, and
known key biodiversity area and forest reserve, thus rendering it the entire Zamboanga Peninsula.
exempt from any mining application. Lastly, they submitted that the ISSUE/s: 1. WoN petitioners committed forum shopping? NO.
proposed operation would destroy the lives of the Zamboanga Pen- First, the petitions involved different causes of action. In particular, a
insula residents. petition for the issuance of a writ kalikasan is initiated on behalf of
4. In its comment,7 168 FPMC vehemently denied the allegations and persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
insisted that it had observed the FPIC process. It submitted the Na- ecology is violated, or threatened with violation, and involves envi-
tional Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) Compliance Certifi-
ronmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health, or
property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
On the other hand, the present petition for certiorari involves the is-
sues in wanton disregard of due process and in the incidental violation
of IP rights.
Second, Rule 7, Section 17 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases expressly provides that the filing of a petition for the issuance of the
writ of kalikasan shall not preclude the filing of separate civil, criminal, or
administrative actions
2. WoN the DENR Secretary gracely abused his discretion when he
dismissed the petition for cancellation of the 186 FPMC mining
agreement? NO. In the present case, the DENR Secretary took judicial
notice of the documents submitted for the approval of the subject mining
agreement which were already in his possession by reason of his office and
were either posted in a conspicuous place, published in a newspaper of
general circulation, or its contents announced through the radio.
RULING: Judgment in question is denied.
RATIO:
1. It is a settled rule that the special civil action of certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court is available to an aggrieved party only when
there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. Otherwise, the petition will not prosper
even if the alleged ground is grave abuse of discretion.
2. In the present case, it would appear that the petitioners failed to
exhaust all the remedies available to it before resorting to the pre-
sent certiorari petition.
3. First, the petitioners did not file a motion for reconsideration on the
resolution of the DENR Secretary dismissing the petition for cancel-
lation of the mining agreement. The Administrative Code of 198724
that embodies the general administrative procedures provides that
one (1) motion for reconsideration may be filed from the decision of
the administrative agency concerned, i.e., the DENR.
4. Second, the petitioners did not appeal the DENR resolution to the
Office of the President within the 30- day reglementary period, pur-
suant to Section 126 of Administrative Order No. 18,27 series of
1987.

There is no forum shopping. The DENR Secretary did not gravely abused his discretion when he
dismissed the petition for cancellation of the 186 FPMC mining
1. First, the petitions involved different causes of action. In particular, agreement.
a petition for the issuance of a writ kalikasan is initiated on behalf
of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful 1. In the present case, the DENR Secretary took judicial notice of the
ecology is violated, or threatened with violation, and involves envi- documents submitted for the approval of the subject mining
ronmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, agreement which were already in his possession by reason of his of-
health, or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. fice and were either posted in a conspicuous place, published in a
2. On the other hand, the present petition for certiorari involves the newspaper of general circulation, or its contents announced
issues in wanton disregard of due process and in the incidental vio- through the radio. The DENR Secretary merely confirmed the 168
lation of IP rights. FPMC's allegation in its Answer that it had complied with the legal
3. Second, Rule 7, Section 17 of the Rules of Procedure for Environ- process laid down by law and obtained the consent of the IPs con-
mental Cases expressly provides that the filing of a petition for the cerned for the approval of the mining agreement.
issuance of the writ of kalikasan shall not preclude the filing of sep- 2. Particularly, the DENR Secretary was able to confirm that the DENR-
arate civil, criminal, or administrative actions. MGB endorsed the subject mining agreement to the NCIP; field-
based investigations were conducted; a detailed presentation of the
The petitioner had available administrative remedies to question the project was done and the necessary information regarding the min-
DENR decision. ing application was given to all the tribal leaders of the affected ba-
 rangays and the ancestral domain representatives; community con-
sultative assemblies were conducted on various dates; a memoran-
dum of agreement was executed between 168 FPMC and the IPs
concerned; the NCIP Compliance Certificate was issued to 168
FPMC as proof that there was free and prior consent from the in-
digenous cultural communities affected; the
One Stop Shop Committee of the DENR-MGB-RIX screened the
subject mining application to ensure that the covered areas do not
fall within any reservation or declared protected area.
 040 Braga v. Abaya (DAYU)
September 13, 2016 | Brion, J. | Writ of Kalikasan
PETITIONER: Pilar Cañeda Braga, Peter Tiu Laviña, Antonio H. Vergara,
Benjie T. Badal, Diosdado Angelo A. Mahipus, and Samal City Resort Owners
Association, Inc.
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Joseph Emilio A. Abaya, Pre-Qualification, Bids, and
Awards Committee (PBAC), and Philippine Ports Authority (PPA)
SUMMARY: The Sasa Wharf was pegged for privatization under Public-Private
Partnership (PPP) Scheme. Eventually, there is now a Sasa Wharf Expansion
Project. With this, Petitioners filed an Urgent Petition for a Writ of Continuing
Mandamus and/or Writ of Kalikasan because they seek to restrain the
implementation of the project (including the bidding and the award of the
project) since they argue that there was no compliance with the requirements of
Environmental Impact Statement, Environmental Compliance Certificate,
Consultation with affected stakeholders, and that their right to a healthy and
balanced ecology was violated.
Issue: W/N the Urgent Petition is premature? - SC said yes.
For Writ of Continuing Mandamus: Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Law,
identifies the proponent in a PPP project as "the private sector entity which shall
have contractual responsibility for the project." There is yet no project proponent
responsible for the EIS and the ECC until the bidding process has concluded and
the contract has been awarded. Considering that the Project is still in the bidding
stage, the petition for continuing mandamus to compel the respondents to submit
an EIS and secure an ECC is premature. It is also misplaced because the public
respondents DO NOT have the duty to submit the EIS or secure an ECC. Also,
The signing of the finalized contract incorporating the detailed engineering
design is the reckoning point when implementation can begin. This is the start of
the Construction Stage. The Sasa Wharf Modernization Project has not yet
reached the construction stage. The bidding process had not even been
concluded when the present petition was led. Petition is also premature for the
purpose of compelling the respondents to comply with the LGC.
For Writ of Kalikasan: (1) the petition failed to identify the particular threats
from the Project itself. All it does is cite the negative impacts of operating a port
inside a city based on the Synthesis Report. However, these impacts already
exist because the Port of Davao has been operating since 1900. The Project is not
for the creation of a new port but the modernization of an existing one. (2)
Second, the joint publication is titled Managing Impacts of Development in the
Coastal Zone for a reason; it identifies the potential environmental impacts and
proposes mitigation measures to protect the environment. The petition is
misleading because it only identified the risks but neglected to mention the
existence and availability of mitigating measures. (3) , this Court does not have
the technical competence to assess the Project, identify the environmental
threats, and weigh the sufficiency or insufficiency of any proposed mitigation
measures. This specialized competence is lodged in the DENR, who acts through
the EMB in the EIA process. As we have already established, the application of
the EIS System is premature until a proponent is selected. (4) No environmental
risk that threatens to prejudice the inhabitants of two or more cities or
municipalities if we do not restrain the conduct of the bidding process. The
bidding process is not equivalent to the implementation of the project. The
bidding process itself cannot conceivably cause any environmental damage. (5)
premature to conclude that the respondents violated the conditions of Resolution
No. 118—it requires compliance before the implementation of the project.
Again, the project has not yet reached the implementation stage.
DOCTRINE:
The purpose of a writ of continuing mandamus is to compel the respondent to
perform his duties under the law. This remedy is available when any government
agency, instrumentality, or officer unlawfully neglects a specific legal duty in
connection with the enforcement or violation of an environmental law, rule, or
regulation, or a right therein, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or
enjoyment of such right and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. The writ cannot be resorted to when the
respondent is not the person obliged to perform the duty under the law or when
the period for the respondent to perform its legal duty has not yet expired.
Writ of Kalikasan is a remedy to anyone whose constitutional right to a balanced
and healthful ecology is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act
or omission.
FACTS:
249. The Port of Davao is a seaport located in Mindanao. It is composed of sev-
eral ports, all within the Davao gulf, but its base port is the Sasa Wharf lo-
cated at Barangay Sasa, Davao.
250. 2011—Sasa Wharf was pegged for privatization under Public-Private Part-
nership (“PPP”) scheme.
251. 2012—Philippine Ports Authority (“PPA”) commissioned a feasibility study
(“PPA Study”) on the current condition of the Sasa Wharf and its potential
new targets in volume increase expansion. Study was concluded 2012 and
conducted by Science & Vision for Technology, Inc.
252. PPA Study estimated that modernization project would cost 3.5B pesos for
purchase of new equipment and installation of new facilities.
253. However, DOTC commissioned another firm, Hamburg Port Consultants, to 264. Further, petitioners failed to prove the threat of environmental damage of
conduct a second feasibility study, which was concluded in 2013. This has a such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health, or property of inhabitants
projected cost of 18B pesos and requires the expansion of Sasa Wharf by in 2 or more cities or provinces.
27.9 hectares. à Served as one of the primary considerations for the cur-
rent Sasa Wharf expansion project. ISSUE/s:
254. Dec. 21, 2014—Regional Development Council for Region XI endorsed the 23. WoN the Urgent Petition for a Writ of Continuing Mandamus and/or Writ
project through Res. No. 118 subject to the following conditions that have of Kalikasan is premature—YES
to be met before implementation.
255. April 10, 2015—DOTC published invitation to pre-qualify and bid for the RULING: We DENY the petition for its prematurity and lack of merit.
Project
RATIO:
256. March 15, 2016—Petitioners (all stakeholders from Davao City and Samal,
1. Impact Assessment and the EIS System:
Davao del Norted) filed Urgent Petition for a Writ of Continuing Mandamus
2. Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is the process of evaluating and
and/or Writ of Kalikasan.
predicting the likely impacts—including cumulative impacts—of an under-
257. Petitioners allege that (1) DOTC issued notice of public bidding despite
taking on the environment. Its goal is to prevent or mitigate potential harm
noncompliance with Res. No. 118; (2) DOTC did not conduct prior consulta-
to the environment and to protect the welfare of the affected community.
tion and public hearings nor secure the approval of the sanggunian con-
3. The process requires proponents to truthfully and responsibly disclose all
cerned as required under the LGC; (3) the Davao City sanggunian had
relevant information on the project through the EIS.
passed a resolution objecting to the project for its noncompliance with the
4. Projects or undertakings that pose a potential significant impact to the en-
LGC; and (4) the DOTC has not yet obtained an Environmental Compliance
vironment are required to undergo impact assessment in order to secure
Certificate as required under PD 1586.
ECCs.
258. They argue that DOTC’s implementation of the project (one that has a sig-
5. The proponent initiates the application process by filing a comprehensive
nificant impact on the environment) without preparing an Environmental
EIS with the EMB. The EIS should at least have the following: (b) Project
Impact Statement, securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate
Description, (g) Environmental Management Program Plan; (h) Supporting
(ECC), or consulting the affected stakeholders, violated their constitutional
documents; including technical/socio-economic data used/generated; cer-
right to a healthy and balanced ecology.
tificate of zoning viability and municipal land use plan; and proof of consul-
259. Hence, they seek to restrain implementation of the project—including bid-
tation with stakeholders
ding and award—until ECC and compliance with LGC is secured.
6. EIS contains a detailed project description of the nature, configuration, the
260. Respondents via OSG invoke prematurity of petition, arguing that the Pro-
raw materials/natural resources to be used, production system, waste
ject is still in the bidding process; thus, there is still no proponent to im-
generation and control, timelines, and all other related activities of the
plement it.
proposed project.
261. The proponent—not the respondents—has the duty to initiate the Envi-
7. Includes also an Environmental Management Plan (EMP) detailing the pro-
ronmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process and to apply for the issuance
ponent's preventive, mitigating, compensatory, and contingent measures
of the ECC.
to enhance the project's positive impacts and minimize ecological risks.
262. Until the bidding process is concluded, EIA process can’t be undertaken
8. Projects with potentially significant negative environmental impacts are
and it would be premature to impute noncompliance with the Environ-
further required to conduct public consultations so that the environmental
mental Impact Statement System.
concerns of stakeholders are addressed in formulating the EMP.
263. Also, consultation with stakeholders and local government is premature
9. The impact assessment concludes with EMB's approval (in the form of an
because proponent has not yet identified the actual details of the project’s
ECC) or rejection (in the form of a denial letter). The ECC signifies that the
implementation.
proposed project will not cause significant negative impact on the envi-
ronment based on the proponent's representation. It also certifies that the
proponent has complied with the EIS System and has committed to im-
 plement its approved EMP. 23. LGC does not prohibit the agency from acting through a medium such as
10. ECC contains the specific measures and conditions that the proponent the project proponent. In fact, the required consultation under the LGC
must undertake to mitigate the identified environmental impacts. may overlap with the consultation prescribed under the EIS System. Both
11. Duty to Comply with the EIS System rests on the proponent are intended to measure a project's social acceptability and secure the
12. The Sasa Wharf Modernization Project has the potential to significantly af- community's approval before the project's implementation.
fect the quality of the environment, putting it within the purview of the EIS 24. However, the agency is responsible for ensuring that: (1) the concerned
System. LGUs and stakeholders have been thoroughly and truthfully informed of
13. P.D. 1151 and P.D. 1586 requires all agencies and instrumentalities of the the objectives of the program and its ecological impact on the community;
national government, including GOCCs, and private corporations, firms, so that (2) the community, through their sanggunian, can intelligently give
and entities to file the EIS for every proposed project or undertaking that their approval to socially acceptable projects and reject the unacceptable
significantly affects the quality of the environment. ones. These requirements must be complied with before the project is im-
14. However, these provisions are ambiguous when it comes to identifying plemented.
with particularity the responsible party in multilateral and collaborative 25. The BOT Law defines the proponent as the private sector entity with the
projects—IRR of the EIS System simply designates the responsible party as contractual responsibility over the project. The contract to a project is exe-
the proponent. cuted between the concerned agency and the winning bidder within 7 days
15. Ordinarily, the proponent is easy to identify—it is the natural or juridical from the latter's receipt of the notice from the agency that all conditions
person intending to implement the project. But who are the proponents in stated in the Notice of Award have been complied with.
PPP Projects, which are a collaborative effort between the government and 26. Upon the signing of the contract, the winning bidder becomes the project
the private sector? proponent. Within another 7 days from the date of approval or signing of
16. Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Law, identifies the proponent in a PPP pro- the contract by the head of the Agency, the agency will issue a"Notice to
ject as "the private sector entity which shall have contractual responsibil- Commence Implementation" to the proponent. à This does not signal the
ity for the project." start of the implementation stage.
17. Accordingly, there is yet no project proponent responsible for the EIS and 27. Upon receipt of the Notice, the proponent is required to prepare detailed
the ECC until the bidding process has concluded and the contract has been engineering designs and plans based on the prescribed minimum design
awarded. and performance standards and specifications in the bid/tender docu-
18. Considering that the Project is still in the bidding stage, the petition for ments.
continuing mandamus to compel the respondents to submit an EIS and se- 28. The agency shall review the detailed engineering designs in terms of its
cure an ECC is premature. It is also misplaced because the public respond- compliance with the prescribed standards and specifications. If the designs
ents DO NOT have the duty to submit the EIS or secure an ECC. are found acceptable, the agency shall approve them for incorporation in
19. LGC Requires the Lead Agency to Conduct Local Consultation and Secure the contract to be signed by the proponent and the agency.
the Approval of the Concerned Sanggunian prior to the Implementation of 29. The proponent shall construct the project based on the design and perfor-
the Project mance standards and specifications in the detailed engineering design.
20. Issuance of the ECC does not exempt the project from compliance with 30. The signing of the finalized contract incorporating the detailed engineering
other relevant laws. design is the reckoning point when implementation can begin. This is the
21. LGC, in particular, requires the government agency authorizing the project start of the Construction Stage.
to conduct local consultation and secure prior consent for ecologically im- 31. The Sasa Wharf Modernization Project has not yet reached the construc-
pactful projects. tion stage. The bidding process had not even been concluded when the
22. The duty to consult the concerned LGUs and the stakeholders belongs to present petition was led. Petition is also premature for the purpose of
the national government agency or GOCC authorizing or involved in the compelling the respondents to comply with the LGC.
planning and implementation of the project, not the private sector propo- 32. The purpose of a writ of continuing mandamus is to compel the respond-
nent. In this case, this refers to the DOTC. ent to perform his duties under the law. This remedy is available when any
 government agency, instrumentality, or officer unlawfully neglects a specif- 43. First, the petition failed to identify the particular threats from the Project
ic legal duty in connection with the enforcement or violation of an envi- itself. All it does is cite the negative impacts of operating a port inside a
ronmental law, rule, or regulation, or a right therein, or unlawfully ex- city based on the Synthesis Report. However, these impacts already exist
cludes another from the use or enjoyment of such right and there is no because the Port of Davao has been operating since 1900. The Project is
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. not for the creation of a new port but the modernization of an existing
33. The writ cannot be resorted to when the respondent is not the person one. At best, the allegations in support of the application for the writ of
obliged to perform the duty under the law (as is the case under the EIS Sys- kalikasan are hazy and speculative.
tem) or when the period for the respondent to perform its legal duty has 44. Second, the joint publication is titled Managing Impacts of Development in
not yet expired (as is the case with the consultation requirements of the the Coastal Zone for a reason; it identifies the potential environmental im-
LGC). pacts and proposes mitigation measures to protect the environment. The
34. The Petition does not warrant a Writ of Kalikasan petition is misleading because it only identified the risks but neglected to
35. The writ is a remedy to anyone whose constitutional right to a balanced mention the existence and availability of mitigating measures. E
and healthful ecology is violated or threatened with violation by an unlaw- 45. Third, this Court does not have the technical competence to assess the
ful act or omission. Project, identify the environmental threats, and weigh the sufficiency or
36. However, the violation must involve environmental damage of such magni- insufficiency of any proposed mitigation measures. This specialized compe-
tude as to prejudice the life, health, or property of inhabitants in two or tence is lodged in the DENR, who acts through the EMB in the EIA process.
more cities or provinces in order to warrant the issuance of the writ. As we have already established, the application of the EIS System is prema-
37. Petitioners allege that the respondents have begun the process of trans- ture until a proponent is selected.
gressing their right to health and a balanced ecology through the bidding 46. Fourth, we fail to see an environmental risk that threatens to prejudice the
process. inhabitants of two or more cities or municipalities if we do not restrain the
38. Petitioners cite Global Port-Cities: Synthesis Report to identify the four ma- conduct of the bidding process. The bidding process is not equivalent to
jor negative impacts related to port operations: 1) environmental impacts, the implementation of the project. The bidding process itself cannot con-
2) land use impacts, 3) traffic impacts, and 4) other impacts. The synthesis ceivably cause any environmental damage.
report claims that most of these impacts affect the surrounding localities. 47. Finally, it is premature to conclude that the respondents violated the con-
39. They claim that environmental impacts of port operations "are within the ditions of Resolution No. 118—it requires compliance before the imple-
field of air emissions, water quality, soil, waste, biodiversity, noise and mentation of the project. Again, the project has not yet reached the im-
other impacts. These environmental impacts can have severe consequenc- plementation stage.
es for the health of the population of the port city, especially for the poor-
er parts of port cities."
40. The petitioners also cite Managing Impacts of Development in the Coastal
Zone, a joint publication of the DENR, the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources (BFAR), the DILG, and the DENR Coastal Resource Management
Project that identified the effects of coastal construction and reclamation,
including ports and offshore moorings. Saying that:
41. "Coastal construction has been the most widespread of activities affecting
coastal resources" since "Any construction that modifies the shoreline will
invariably change currents, wave action, tidal fuctuations, and the
transport of sediments along the coast" while "Coastal construction that
restricts the circulation of coastal water bodies can also degrade water
quality and coastal ecosystems."
42. These allegations are insufficient to warrant a writ of kalikasan.
 SJS vs. LIM (Eleazar) residents of big neighbourhoods is at stake
November 25, 2014 | Perez, J. | Writ of Kalikasan

PETITIONERS: SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) OFFICERS, NAMELY,

SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, and VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO,
Petitioners,
RESPONDENTS: ALFREDO S. LIM, in his capacity as mayor of the City of
Manila

SUMMARY: The consolidated petitions challenged the validity of Ordinance

No. 8187, an amendment to Ordinance No. 8819 or “The Manila Comprehesive
Land Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance of 2006” to add a medium and heavy
industrial zone. It effectively lifted the prohibition against operators of
businesses from operating in the previously reclassified area from an industrial to
commercial zone under Ordinance No. 8027 whose validity and consitutionality
was upheld by the Court its decision in 2008 (G.R. 156052). The issue in this
case is whether the Ordinance allowing the continued stay of the oil companies
in the depots is invalid and unconstitutional. Yes. In striking down the contrary
provisions of the assailed Ordinance relative to the continued stay of the oil
depots, the SC followed the same line of reasoning used in its 7 March 2007
decision, to wit: “Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted for the purpose of promoting
a sound urban planning, ensuring health, public safety and general welfare of the
residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled to take measures to protect
the residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack
on the Pandacan Terminals. Towards this objective, the Sanggunian reclassified
the area defined in the ordinance from industrial to commercial.

According to the Court, the same public interest that governed their decision in
G.R. 156052 should be applied here. The oil depot remained to be a threat to the
life, security, and safety of the constituents of Manila. It’s stay would clearly
violate the constitutionally protected rights of the residents. The Court declared
Ordinance No. 8187 to be unconstitutional and invalid with respect to the
FACTS:
continued stay of the Pandacan Oil Terminals.
DOCTRINE: The same best interest of the public guides the present decision. In
the absence of any convincing reason to persuade the Court that the life, security
and safety of the inhabitants of Manila are no longer put at risk by the presence
of the oil depots, the SC holds that the Ordinance No. 8187 in relation to the
Pandacan Terminals is invalid and unconstitutional. For, given that the threat
sought to be prevented may strike at one point or another, no matter how remote
it is as perceived by one or some, the SC cannot allow the right to life be
dependent on the unlikelihood of an event. Statistics and theories of probability
have no place in situations where the very life of not just an individual but of
40. On 12 October 2001, a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into by oil
companies (Chevron, Petron and Shell) and Department of Energy for the
creation of a Master Plan to address and minimize the potential risks and
hazards posed by the proximity of communities, business and offices to
Pandacan oil terminals without affecting security and reliability of supply
and distribution of petroleum products.
41. On 20 November 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) enacted
Ordinance No. 8027 which reclassifies the land use of Pandacan, Sta. Ana,
and its adjoining areas from Industrial II to Commercial I.
42. Owners and operators of the businesses affected by the reclassification were
given six (6) months from the date of effectivity to stop the operation of
 their businesses. It was later extended until 30 April 2003.
43. On 4 December 2002, a petition for mandamus was filed before the
Supreme Court (SC) to enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
44. Unknown to the SC, the oil companies filed before the Regional Trial Court
of Manila an action to annul Ordinance No. 8027 with application for writs
of preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction.
The same was issued in favor of Chevron and Shell. Petron, on the other
hand, obtained a status quo on 4 August 2004.
45. On 16 June 2006, Mayor Jose Atienza, Jr. approved Ordinance No. 8119
entitled “An Ordinance Adopting the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan
and Zoning Regulations of 2006 and Providing for the Administration,
Enforcement and Amendment thereto”. This designates Pandacan oil depot
area as a Planned Unit Development/Overlay Zone.
46. On 7 March 2007, the SC granted the petition for mandamus and directed
Mayor Atienza to immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027. It declared that
the objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents of manila from the
catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack on
the Pandacan Terminals.
47. The oil companies filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) on the 7 March
2007 Decision. The SC later resolved that Ordinance No. 8027 is
constitutional and that it was not impliedly repealed by Ordinance No. 8119
as there is no irreconcilable conflict between them.
48. SC later on denied with finality the second MR of the oil companies.
49. On 14 May 2009, during the incumbency of Mayor Alfredo Lim (Mayor
Lim), the SP enacted Ordinance No. 8187. The Industrial Zone under
Ordinance No. 8119 was limited to Light Industrial Zone, Ordinance No.
8187 appended to the list a Medium and a Heavy Industrial Zone where
petroleum refineries and oil depots are expressly allowed.
50. Petitioners Social Justice Society Officers, Mayor Atienza, et.al. filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the validity of Ordinance No.
8187. Their contentions are as follows:
a. It is an invalid exercise of police power because it does not
promote the general welfare of the people
b. It is violative of Section 15 and 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution as well as health and environment related municipal
laws and international conventions and treaties, such as: Clean Air
Act; Environment Code; Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law; Civil
Code provisions on nuisance and human relations; Universal
Declaration of Human Rights; and Convention on the Rights of the
Child
c. The title of Ordinance No. 8187 purports to amend or repeal
Ordinance No. 8119 when it actually intends to repeal Ordinance
No. 8027
51. On the other hand, the respondents Mayor Lim, et.al. and the intervenors oil
companies contend that:
a. The petitioners have no legal standing to sue whether as citizens,
taxpayers or legislators. They further failed to show that they have
suffered any injury or threat of injury as a result of the act
complained of
b. The petition should be dismissed outright for failure to properly
apply the related provisions of the Constitution, the Rules of Court,
and/or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases relative to
the appropriate remedy available
c. The principle of the hierarchy of courts is violated because the SC
only exercises appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the
constitutionality or validity of an ordinance under Section 5,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
d. It is the function of the SP to enact zoning ordinance without prior
referral to the Manila Zoning Board of Adjustment and Appeals;
thus, it may repeal all or part of zoning ordinance sought to be
modified
e. There is a valid exercise of police power
52. On 28 August 2012, the SP enacted Ordinance No. 8283 which essentially
amended the assailed Ordinance to exclude the area where petroleum
refineries and oil depots are located from the Industrial Zone. The same was
vetoed by Mayor Lim.
ISSUE/s
1. WON there are violations of environmental laws – NONE, Notably, the
aforesaid Rules are limited in scope. While, indeed, there are allegations of
violations of environmental laws in the petitions, these only serve as
collateral attacks that would support the other position of the petitioners –
the protection of the right to life, security and safety
2. WON the principle of hierarchy of courts is violated – NO, . The SC held
that it is true that the petitions should have been filed with the RTC, it
having concurrent jurisdiction with the SC over a special civil action for
prohibition, and original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief.
3. WON the petitioners have legal standing to sue – YES, The SC referred to
their Decision dated 7 March 2007 which ruled that the petitioners in that
case have a legal right to seek the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8027
because the subject of the petition concerns a public right, and they, as
residents of Manila, have a direct interest in the implementation of the
ordinances of the city
4. WON Ordinance No. 8187 is unconstitutional in relation to the Pandacan
Terminals – YES, Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted for the purpose of
promoting a sound urban planning, ensuring health, public safety and
general welfare of the residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled to
take measures to protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic
 devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. Towards
this objective, the Sanggunian reclassified the area defined in the ordinance
from industrial to commercial.
RULING: WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, Ordinance No. 8187 is
hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and INVALID with respect to the
continued stay of the Pandacan Oil Terminals.
The incumbent mayor of the City of Manila is hereby ordered to CEASE and
DESIST from enforcing Ordinance No. 8187.1âwphi1 In coordination with the
appropriate government agencies and the parties herein involved, he is further
ordered to oversee the relocation and transfer of the oil terminals out of the Pandacan
area.
As likewise required in G.R. No. 156052, the intervenors Chevron Philippines, Inc.,
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, and Petron Corporation shall, within a non-
extendible period of forty-five (45) days, submit to the Regional Trial Court, Branch
39, Manila an updated comprehensive plan and relocation schedule, which relocation
shall be completed not later than six (6) months from the date the required
documents are submitted. The presiding judge of Branch 39 shall monitor the strict
enforcement of this Decision.
For failure to observe the respect due to the Court, Atty. Luch R. Gempis, Jr.,
Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, is REMINDED of his duties towards the
Court and WARNED that a repetition of an act similar to that here committed shall
be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
Issue 1: WoN there are violations of environemental laws
1. None. The scope of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases is
embodied in Section 2, Part I, Rule I thereof. It states that the Rules shall
govern the procedure in civil, criminal and special civil actions before the
MeTCs, MTCCs, MTCs and MCTCs, and the RTCs involving the
enforcement or violations of environmental and other related laws, rules and
regulations such as but not limited to: R.A. No. 6969, Toxic Substances and
Hazardous Waste Act; R.A. No. 8749, Clean Air Act; Provisions in C.A.
No. 141; and other existing laws that relate to the conservation,
development, preservation, protection and utilization of the environment
and natural resources.
2. Notably, the aforesaid Rules are limited in scope. While, indeed, there are
allegations of violations of environmental laws in the petitions, these only
serve as collateral attacks that would support the other position of the
petitioners – the protection of the right to life, security and safety.
Issue 2: WoN the principle of hierarchy of courts if violated
1. No. The SC held that it is true that the petitions should have been filed with
the RTC, it having concurrent jurisdiction with the SC over a special civil
action for prohibition, and original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory
relief.
2. However, the petitions at bar are of transcendental importance warranting a
relaxation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. This is in accordance with
the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools
designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration
of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice,
must always be eschewed. (Jaworski v. PAGCOR, 464 Phil. 375)
Issue 3: WoN the petitioners have legal standing to sue
1. Yes. The SC referred to their Decision dated 7 March 2007 which ruled that
the petitioners in that case have a legal right to seek the enforcement of
Ordinance No. 8027 because the subject of the petition concerns a public
right, and they, as residents of Manila, have a direct interest in the
implementation of the ordinances of the city.
2. No different are herein petitioners who seek to prohibit the enforcement of
the assailed ordinance, and who deal with the same subject matter that
concerns a public right.
3. In like manner, the preservation of the life, security and safety of the people
is indisputably a right of utmost importance to the public. Certainly, the
petitioners, as residents of Manila, have the required personal interest to
seek relief to protect such right.
Issue 4: WoN Ordinance No. 8187 is unconstitutional in relation to the Pandacan
Terminals
1. Yes. In striking down the contrary provisions of the assailed Ordinance
relative to the continued stay of the oil depots, the SC followed the same
line of reasoning used in its 7 March 2007 decision, to wit:
a. “Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted for the purpose of promoting a
sound urban planning, ensuring health, public safety and general
welfare of the residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled
to take measures to protect the residents of Manila from
catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the
Pandacan Terminals. Towards this objective, the Sanggunian
 reclassified the area defined in the ordinance from industrial to
commercial.
2. The following facts were found by the Committee on Housing,
Resettlement and Urban Development of the City of Manila which
recommended the approval of the ordinance:
a. The depot facilities contained 313.5 million liters of highly
flammable and highly volatile products which include petroleum
gas, liquefied petroleum gas, aviation fuel, diesel, gasoline,
kerosene and fuel oil among others;
b. The depot is open to attack through land, water and air;
c. It is situated in a densely populated place and near Malacañang
Palace; and
d. In case of an explosion or conflagration in the depot, the fire could
spread to the neighboring communities.
3. The Ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and
safety of all the inhabitants of Manila and not just of a particular class. The
depot is perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a representation of western
interests which means that it is a terrorist target. As long as there is such a
target in their midst, the residents of Manila are not safe. It therefore
becomes necessary to remove these terminals to dissipate the threat.”
4. The same best interest of the public guides the present decision. The
Pandacan oil depot remains a terrorist target even if the contents have been
lessened. In the absence of any convincing reason to persuade the Court that
the life, security and safety of the inhabitants of Manila are no longer put at
risk by the presence of the oil depots, the SC holds that the Ordinance No.
8187 in relation to the Pandacan Terminals is invalid and unconstitutional.
5. For, given that the threat sought to be prevented may strike at one point or
another, no matter how remote it is as perceived by one or some, the SC
cannot allow the right to life be dependent on the unlikelihood of an event.
Statistics and theories of probability have no place in situations where the
very life of not just an individual but of residents of big neighbourhoods is
at stake.
 042 SEGOVIA v. CLIMATE CHANGE COMMISSION (Escalona)
March 7, 2017 | Caguioa, J. | Writ of Kalikasan
PETITIONER: Victoria Segovia, et. al.
RESPONDENTS: Climate Change Commission, et. al.
SUMMARY: This is a petition for the issuance of Writs of Kalikasan and con-
tinuing mandamus to compel the implementation of the following environmental
laws and executive issuances - Republic Act No. (RA) 9729 (Climate Change
Act), and RA 8749 (Clean Air Act); Executive Order No. 774 (BO 774); AO
254, s. 2009 (AO 254); and Administrative Order No. 171, s. 2007 (AO 171).
Petitioners contend that respondents' failure to implement the foregoing laws and
executive issuances resulted in the continued degradation of air quality, particu-
larly in Metro Manila, in violation of the petitioners' constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology, and may even be tantamount to deprivation of
life, and of life sources or "land, water, and air" by the government without due
process of law.
Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, assert that petitioners
are not entitled to a writ of kalikasan because they failed to show that the public
respondents are guilty of an unlawful act or omission; state the environmental
law/s violated; show environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice
the life, health or property of inhabitants of two or more cities; and prove that
non- implementation of Road Sharing Principle will cause environmental dam-
age.
The relevant issue is WoN the writ of kalikasan and/or continuing mandamus
should be issued.
The SC ruled that the writ should not be issued. It is well-settled that a party
claiming the privilege for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan has to show that a
law, rule or regulation was violated or would be violated. In this case, apart from
repeated invocation of the constitutional right to health and to a balanced and
healthful ecology and bare allegations that their right was violated, the petition-
ers failed to show that public respondents are guilty of any unlawful act or omis-
sion that constitutes a violation of the petitioners' right to a balanced and health-
ful ecology.
Similarly, the writ of continuing mandamus cannot issue.
Mandamus lies to compel the performance of duties that are purely ministerial in
nature, not those that are discretionary, and the official can only be directed
by mandamus to act but not to act one way or the other. At its core, what the
petitioners are seeking to compel is not the performance of a ministerial act, but
a discretionary act - the manner of implementation of the Road Sharing Princi-
ple. Clearly, petitioners' preferred specific course of action (i.e. the bifurcation of
roads to devote for all-weather sidewalk and bicycling and Filipino-made
transport vehicles) to implement the Road Sharing Principle finds no textual
basis in law or executive issuances for it to be considered an act enjoined by law
as a duty, leading to the necessary conclusion that the continu-
ing mandamus prayed for seeks not the implementation of an environmental law,
rule or regulation, but to control the exercise of discretion of the executive as to
how the principle enunciated in an executive issuance relating to the environ-
ment is best implemented. Hence, the continuing mandamus cannot issue.
DOCTRINE: Requisites for a writ of kalikasan to be issued:
a. There is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right
to a balanced and healthful ecology;
b. The actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or
entity; and
c. The actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an envi-
ronmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life,
health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
FACTS:
47. To address the clamor for a more tangible response to climate change, For-
mer President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued AO 171 which created the
Presidential Task Force on Climate Change (PTFCC) on February 20, 2007.
This body was reorganized through BO 774, which designated the President
as Chairperson, and cabinet secretaries as members of the Task Force. EO
774 expressed what is now referred to by the petitioners as the "Road Shar-
ing Principle." Its Section 9(a) reads:
48. Section 9. Task Group on Fossil Fuels. - (a) To reduce the consumption of
fossil fuels, the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC) shall lead a Task Group to reform the transportation sector. The
new paradigm in the movement of men and things must follow a simple
principle: "Those who have less in wheels must have more in road." For
this purpose, the system shall favor non-motorized locomotion and collec-
tive transportation system (walking, bicycling, and the man-powered mini-
train).
 49. In 2009, AO 254 was issued, mandating the DOTC (as lead agency for the
Task Group on Fossil Fuels or TGFF) to formulate a national Environmen-
tally Sustainable Transport Strategy (EST) for the Philippines. The Road
Sharing Principle is similarly mentioned, thus:
a. SECTION 4. Functions of the TGFF- In addition to the
functions provided in EO 774, the TGFF shall initiate and
pursue the formulation of the National EST Strategy for
the Philippines.
50. Specifically, the TGFF shall perform the following functions:
a. Reform the transport sector to reduce the consumption of fossil
fuels. The new paradigm in the movement of men and things must
follow a simple principle: "Those who have less in wheels must
have more in road." For this purpose, the system shall favor non-
motorized locomotion and collective transportation system (walk-
ing, bicycling, and the manpowered mini-train).
51. Later that same year, Congress passed the Climate Change Act. It created
the Climate Change Commission which absorbed the functions of the
PTFCC and became the lead policy-making body of the government which
shall be tasked to coordinate, monitor and evaluate the programs and action
plans of the government relating to climate change.7
52. Herein petitioners wrote respondents regarding their pleas for implementa-
tion of the Road Sharing Principle, demanding the reform of the road and
transportation system in the whole country within thirty (30) days from re-
ceipt of the said letter - foremost, through the bifurcation of roads and the
reduction of official and government fuel consumption by fifty percent
(50%). Claiming to have not received a response, they filed this petition.
The Petition
53. Petitioners are Carless People of the Philippines, parents, representing
their children, who in turn represent "Children of the Future, and Car-
owners who would rather not have cars if good public transportation
were safe, convenient, accessible, available, and reliable". They claim
that they are entitled to the issuance of the extraordinary writs due to the al-
leged failure and refusal of respondents to perform an act mandated by en-
vironmental laws, and violation of environmental laws resulting in envi-
ronmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health and
property of all Filipinos.
54. These identified violations include:
a. The government's violation of "atmospheric trust" as provided un-
der Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution, and thoughtless ex-
travagance in the midst of acute public want under Article 25 of
the Civil Code for failure to reduce personal and official consump-
tion of fossil fuels by at least fifty percent (50%);
b. DOTC and DPWH's failure to implement the Road Sharing Princi-
ple under EO 774;
c. DA's failure to devote public open spaces along sidewalks, roads
and parking lots to sustainable urban farming as mandated by Sec-
tion 12(b) f EO 774;
d. DILG's failure to coordinate with local government units (LGUs)
to guide them on the Road Sharing Principle under Section 9(g) of
EO 774;
e. DENR's failure to reduce air pollutant emissions; and lastly,
f. DBM's failure to make available Road Users' Tax for purposes
stated in Section 9(e) of EO 774.
55. In gist, petitioners contend that respondents' failure to implement the
foregoing laws and executive issuances resulted in the continued degra-
dation of air quality, particularly in Metro Manila, in violation of the
petitioners' constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology, and
may even be tantamount to deprivation of life, and of life sources or "land,
water, and air" by the government without due process of law. They also
decry the "unequal" protection of laws in the prevailing scheme, claiming
that ninety-eight percent (98%) of Filipinos are discriminated against by the
law when the car-owning two percent (2%) is given almost all of the road
space and while large budgets are allocated for construction and mainte-
nance of roads, hardly any budget is given for sidewalks, bike lanes and
non-motorized transportation systems.
56. Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed
their Comment seeking the outright dismissal of the petition for lack of
standing and failure to adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts. Moreover, respondents argue that petitioners are not entitled to the
reliefs prayed for.
57. Specifically, respondents assert that petitioners are not entitled to a writ
of kalikasan because they failed to show that the public respondents are
guilty of an unlawful act or omission; state the environmental law/s violat-
ed; show environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life,
health or property of inhabitants of two or more cities; and prove that non-
implementation of Road Sharing Principle will cause environmental dam-
age. Respondents likewise assert that petitioners are similarly not entitled to
a Continuing Mandamus because: (a) there is no showing of a direct or per-
sonal injury or a clear legal right to the thing demanded; (b) the writ will not
compel a discretionary act or anything not in a public officer's duty to
do (i.e. the manner by which the Road Sharing Principle will be applied;
and to compel DA to exercise jurisdiction over roadside lands);
and (c) DBM cannot be compelled to make an instant release of funds as the
same requires an appropriation made by law (Article VI, Section 29[1] of
the Constitution) and the use of the Road Users' Tax (more appropriately,
 the Motor Vehicle Users' Charge) requires prior approval of the Road
Board.
58. In any event, respondents denied the specific violations alleged in the peti-
tion, stating that they have taken and continue to take measures to improve
the traffic situation in Philippine roads and to improve the environment
condition - through projects and programs such as: priority tagging of ex-
penditures for climate change adaptation and mitigation, the Integrated
Transport System which is aimed to decongest major thoroughfares, Truck
Ban, Anti-Smoke Belching Campaign, Anti-Colorum, Mobile Bike Service
Programs, and Urban Re-Greening Programs. These projects are individual-
ly and jointly implemented by the public respondents to improve the traffic
condition and mitigate the effects of motorized vehicles on the environ-
ment. Contrary to petitioners' claims, public respondents assert that they
consider the impact of the transport sector on the environment, as shown in
the Philippine National Implementation Plan on Environment Improvement
in the Transport Sector which targets air pollution improvement actions,
greenhouse gases emission mitigation, and updating of noise pollution
standards for the transport sector.
ISSUES:
8. WoN the petition should be denied for failing to adhere to the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts – NO. Because the SC is given the discretion to
determine whether to accept or deny the petition under the RPEC. There is
no violation of the hierarchy if the SC accepts the petition to be reviewed.
9. WoN the writ of kalikasan and/or continuing mandamus should issue – NO.
Because petitioners were not able to causably link any act or omission by
the public officials to the degradation of air quality to the jeopardy of
society.
RULING: Petition is DISMISSED
RATIO:
Procedural Issue
50. Citing Section 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cas-
es (RPEC), respondents argue that the petitioners failed to show that they
Substantive Issue
have the requisite standing to file the petition, being representatives of a ra-
ther amorphous sector of society and without a concrete interest or inju-
ry. Petitioners counter that they filed the suit as citizens, taxpayers, and rep-
resentatives; that the rules on standing had been relaxed following the deci-
sion in Oposa v. Factoran; and that, in any event, legal standing is a proce-
dural technicality which the Court may set aside in its discretion.
51. The Court agrees with the petitioners' position. The RPEC did liberalize the
requirements on standing, allowing the filing of citizen's suit for the en-
forcement of rights and obligations under environmental laws. This has
been confirmed by this Court's rulings in Arigo v. Swift, and International
Service for the Acquisition of Agri-BioTech Applications, Inc. v. Green-
peace Southeast Asia (Philippines). However, it bears noting that there is a
difference between a petition for the issuance of a writ
of kalikasan, wherein it is sufficient that the person filing represents the in-
habitants prejudiced by the environmental damage subject of the writ; and a
petition for the issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus, which is only
available to one who is personally aggrieved by the unlawful act or omis-
sion.
52. Respondents also seek the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the
petitioners failed to adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, reasoning
that since a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan must be filed
with the Supreme Court or with any of the stations of the Court of Ap-
peals, then the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is applicable. Petitioners, on
the other hand, cite the same provision and argue that direct recourse to this
Court is available, and that the provision shows that the remedy to environ-
mental damage should not be limited to the territorial jurisdiction of the
lower courts.
53. The respondents' argument does not persuade. Under the RPEC, the writ
of kalikasan is an extraordinary remedy covering environmental damage of
such magnitude that will prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants
in two or more cities or provinces. It is designed for a narrow but special
purpose: to accord a stronger protection for environmental rights, aiming,
among others, to provide a speedy and effective resolution of a case involv-
ing the violation of one's constitutional right to a healthful and balanced
ecology that transcends political and territorial boundaries, and to address
the potentially exponential nature of large-scale ecological threats. At the
very least, the magnitude of the ecological problems contemplated un-
der the RPEC satisfies at least one of the exceptions to the rule on hier-
archy of courts, as when direct resort is allowed where it is dictated by
public welfare. Given that the RPEC allows direct resort to this
Court, it is ultimately within the Court's discretion whether or not to
accept petitions brought directly before it.
2. We find that the petitioners failed to establish the requisites for the issuance
of the writs prayed for. For a writ of kalikasan to issue, the following requi-
sites must concur:
a. There is an actual or threatened violation of the constitu-
tional right to a balanced and healthful ecology;
 b. The actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful
act or omission of a public official or employee, or private
individual or entity; and
c. The actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to
an environmental damage of such magnitude as to preju-
dice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or
more cities or provinces.
3. It is well-settled that a party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a writ
of kalikasan has to show that a law, rule or regulation was violated or would
be violated.
4. In this case, apart from repeated invocation of the constitutional right to
health and to a balanced and healthful ecology and bare allegations that
their right was violated, the petitioners failed to show that public re-
spondents are guilty of any unlawful act or omission that constitutes a
violation of the petitioners' right to a balanced and healthful ecology.
5. While there can be no disagreement with the general propositions put forth
by the petitioners on the correlation of air quality and public health, peti-
tioners have not been able to show that respondents are guilty of viola-
tion or neglect of environmental laws that causes or contributes to bad
air quality. Notably, apart from bare allegations, petitioners were not able
to show that respondents failed to execute any of the laws petitioners cited.
In fact, apart from adducing expert testimony on the adverse effects of air
pollution on public health, the petitioners did not go beyond mere allegation
in establishing the unlawful acts or omissions on the part of the public re-
spondents that have a causal link or reasonable connection to the actual or
threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology of the magnitude contemplated under the Rules, as required of peti-
tions of this nature.
6. Moreover, the National Air Quality Status Report for 2005-2007
(NAQSR) submitted by the petitioners belies their claim that the DENR
failed to reduce air pollutant emissions - in fact, the NAQSR shows that
the National Ambient Total Suspended Particulates (TSP) value used to
determine air quality has steadily declined from 2004 to 2007, and
while the values still exceed the air quality guideline value, it has re-
mained on this same downward trend until as recently as 2011.
7. On the other hand, public respondents sufficiently showed that they did not
unlawfully refuse to implement or neglect the laws, executive and adminis-
trative orders as claimed by the petitioners. Projects and programs that
seek to improve air quality were undertaken by the respondents, jointly
and in coordination with stakeholders, such as: priority tagging of ex-
penditures for climate change adaptation and mitigation, the Integrat-
ed Transport System which is aimed to decongest major thoroughfares,
Truck Ban, Anti-Smoke Belching Campaign, Anti-Colorum, Mobile
Bike Service Programs, and Urban Re-Greening Programs.
8. In fact, the same NAQSR submitted by the petitioners show that the DENR
was, and is, taking concrete steps to improve national air quality, such as in-
formation campaigns, free emission testing to complement the anti-smoke-
belching program and other programs to reduce emissions from industrial
smokestacks and from open burning of waste. The efforts of local govern-
ments and administrative regions in conjunction with other · executive
agencies and stakeholders are also outlined.
9. Similarly, the writ of continuing mandamus cannot issue.
10. Rule 8, Section 1 of the RPEC lays down the requirements for a petition for
continuing mandamus as follows:
11. SECTION 1. Petition for continuing mandamus - When any agency or in-
strumentality of the government or officer thereof unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust or station in connection with the enforcement or viola-
tion of an environmental law rule or regulation or a right therein, or unlaw-
fully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of such right and there is
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty, attaching thereto supporting evidence,
specifying that the petition concerns an environmental law, rule or regula-
tion, and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to
do an act or series of acts until the judgment is fully satisfied, and to pay
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the malicious neglect to
perform the duties of the respondent, under the law, rules or regulations.
The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping.
12. First, the petitioners failed to prove direct or personal injury arising from
acts attributable to the respondents to be entitled to the writ. While the re-
quirements of standing had been liberalized in environmental cases, the
general rule of real party-in-interest applies to a petition for continu-
ing mandamus.
13. Second, the Road Sharing Principle is precisely as it is denominated - a
principle. It cannot be considered an absolute imposition to encroach upon
the province of public respondents to determine the manner by which this
principle is applied or considered in their policy decisions. Mandamus lies
to compel the performance of duties that are purely ministerial in nature, not
those that are discretionary, and the official can only be directed
by mandamus to act but not to act one way or the other. The duty being en-
joined in mandamus must be one according to the terms provided in the law
itself. Thus, the recognized rule is that, in the performance of an official du-
ty or act involving discretion, the corresponding official can only be di-
rected by mandamus to act, but not to act one way or the other.
14. This Court cannot but note that this is precisely the thrust of the petition - to
compel the respondents to act one way to implement the Road Sharing
Principle - to bifurcate all roads in the country to devote half to sidewalk
and bicycling, and the other to Filipino-made transport - when there is noth-
ing in EO 774, AO 254 and allied issuances that require that specific course
of action in order to implement the same. Their good intentions notwith-
standing, the petitioners cannot supplant the executive department's discre-
tion with their own through this petition for the issuance of writs
of kalikasan and continuing mandamus.
15. In this case, there is no showing of unlawful neglect on the part of the re-
spondents to perform any act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty -
there being nothing in the executive issuances relied upon by the petitioners
that specifically enjoins the bifurcation of roads to implement the Road
Sharing Principle. To the opposite, the respondents were able to show that
they were and are actively implementing projects and programs that seek to
improve air quality.
16. At its core, what the petitioners are seeking to compel is not the perfor-
mance of a ministerial act, but a discretionary act - the manner of imple-
mentation of the Road Sharing Principle. Clearly, petitioners' preferred spe-
cific course of action (i.e. the bifurcation of roads to devote for all-weather
sidewalk and bicycling and Filipino-made transport vehicles) to implement
the Road Sharing Principle finds no textual basis in law or executive issu-
ances for it to be considered an act enjoined by law as a duty, leading to the
necessary conclusion that the continuing mandamus prayed for seeks not
the implementation of an environmental law, rule or regulation, but to con-
trol the exercise of discretion of the executive as to how the principle enun-
ciated in an executive issuance relating to the environment is best imple-
mented. Clearly, the determination of the means to be taken by the execu-
tive in implementing or actualizing any stated legislative or executive poli-
cy relating to the environment requires the use of discretion. Absent a show-
ing that the executive is guilty of "gross abuse of discretion, manifest injus-
tice or palpable excess of authority," the general rule applies that discretion
cannot be checked via this petition for continuing mandamus. Hence, the
continuing mandamus cannot issue.
 043 OSMEÑA v. GARGANERA (Fordan)
Mar. 20, 2018 | Tijam, J. | Writ of kalikasan
PETITIONER: Mayor Tomas R. Osmeña, in his capacity as City Mayor of Cebu,
RESPONDENT: Joel Capili Garganera, for and on his behalf, and in representation
of the People of the Cities of Cebu and Talisay, and the future generations, including
the unborn
SUMMARY: In 1993, the DENR issued an Environmental Compliance Certificate
(ECC) to the Solid Waste Sanitary Landfill Project at Inayawan landfill which then
served as the garbage disposal area of Cebu City. In 2015, the Cebu City Govern-
ment formally closed the Inayawan landfill. On July 2016, it was officially re-opened
subject to the condition that the Cebu City will faithfully comply with all its com-
mitments like the establishment of a new Solid Waste Management System and sub-
ject to regular monitoring by the EMB. However, by Sept. 2016, a Notice of Viola-
tion and Technical Conference was issued by the EMB to Mayor Osmeña, regarding
City Government's operation of the Inayawan Landfill and its violations of the ECC.
Garganera for and on his behalf, and in representation of the People of the Cities of
Cebu and Talisay and the future generations, including the unborn filed a petition for
writ of kalikasan with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Environmental Protec-
tion Order (TEPO) before the CA. He asserted that the continued operation of the
Inayawan landfill causes serious environmental damage which threatens and violates
their right to a balanced and healthful ecology. The CA granted the privilege of the
writ of kalikasan. Hence, the current petition.
The following are the issues and ratio:
1. Whether the 30-day prior notice requirement for citizen suits under RA 9003 and
RA 8749 is needed prior to the filing of the instant petition. NO. The present petition
for writ of kalikasan under the RPEC is a separate and distinct action from RA 9003
and RA 8749. *doctrine 1* Moreover, Sec. 3 , Rule 7 of RPEC allows direct resort to
this Court or with any of the stations of the CA.
2. Whether the CA correctly ruled that the requirements for the grant of the privilege
of the writ of kalikasan were sufficiently established. YES. *doctrine* The gravity of
environmental damage sufficient to grant the writ is, thus, to be decided on a case-to-
case basis. The Court is convinced from the evidence on record that Garganera has
sufficiently established the aforementioned requirements for the grant of the privi-
lege of the writ of kalikasan since the record discloses that the City Government's
resumption of the garbage dumping operations at the Inayawan landfill has raised
serious environmental concerns.
DOCTRINE: 1. A writ of kalikasan is an extraordinary remedy covering environ-
mental damage of such magnitude that will prejudice the life, health or property of
inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
2. Under Sec. 1 of Rule 7 of the RPEC, the following requisites must be present to
avail of this extraordinary remedy:
a. there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced
and healthful ecology;
b. the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or private individual or entity; and
c. the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental dam-
age of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants
in two or more cities or provinces.
FACTS:
184. In 1993, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) is-
sued an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) to the Solid Waste Sani-
tary Landfill Project at Inayawan landfill proposed by the Metro Cebu Devel-
opment Project Office (MCDPO). Thereafter, the Inayawan landfill served as
the garbage disposal area of Cebu City.
185. In 2011, the Cebu City Local Government (City Government) resolved to
close the Inayawan landfill per Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) Resolution and
Executive Order of former Cebu City Mayor Michael Rama (former Mayor
Rama).
186. With the issuance of SP Resolution Nos. 12-0582-2011 and 12-2617-2012,
the Inayawan landfill was partially closed and all wastes from Cebu City were
disposed in a privately operated landfill in Consolacion. It was only in 2015
that Inayawan landill was formally closed.
187. In 2016, however, under the administration of Mayor Osmeña, the City
Government sought to temporarily open the Inayawan landfill, through a let-
ter addressed to Regional Director Engr. William Cuñado (Engr. Cuñado) of
the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR where the latter
invited Mayor Osmeña to a technical conference.
188. Thereafter, another letter was sent to Engr. Cuñado submitting the City
Government's commitments for the establishment of a new Solid Waste
Management System pursuant to the mandate under Republic Act (RA) No.
9003 and accordingly, requested for the issuance of a Notice to Proceed for
the temporary reopening of the Inayawan landfill.
189. In response, Engr. Cuñado informed Mayor Osmeña that although the EMB
had no authority to issue the requested notice, it interposed no objection to
the proposed temporary opening of the Inayawan landfill provided that the
Cebu City will faithfully comply with all its commitments and subject to regu-
lar monitoring by the EMB.
 190. Thus, in July 2016, the Inayawan landfill was officially re-opened. However, RATIO:
on Sept. 2016, a Notice of Violation and Technical Conference was issued by On the issue of notice
the EMB to Mayor Osmeña, regarding City Government's operation of the 273. Mayor Osmeña argues that Garganera brushed aside the 30-day prior notice
Inayawan Landfill and its violations of the ECC. requirement for citizen suits under RA 9003 and RA 8749.
191. The Department of Health (DOH) issued an Inspection Report wherein it 274. SC held that Mayor Osmeña's argument does not persuade.
recommended, among others, the immediate closure of the landfill due to 275. Sec. 576, Rule 2 and Sec. 177, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environ-
the lack of sanitary requirements, environmental, health and community mental Cases (RPEC) are instructive on the matter.
276. Here, the present petition for writ of kalikasan under the RPEC is a separate
safety issues.
and distinct action from RA 9003 and RA 8749.
192. Thus, respondent Joel Capili Garganera (Garganera) for and on his behalf,
277. A writ of kalikasan is an extraordinary remedy covering environmental
and in representation of the People of the Cities of Cebu and Talisay and the
damage of such magnitude that will prejudice the life, health or property of
future generations, including the unborn filed a petition for writ of kalikasan inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. It is designed for a narrow but
with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Environmental Protection Order special purpose: to accord a stronger protection for environmental rights, aim-
(TEPO) before the CA. ing, among others, to provide a speedy and effective resolution of a case in-
Ø He asserted that the continued operation of the Inayawan landfill causes volving the violation of one's constitutional right to a healthful and balanced
serious environmental damage which threatens and violates their right to ecology that transcends political and territorial boundaries, and to address the
a balanced and healthful ecology. potentially exponential nature of large-scale ecological threats.
Ø He also asserted that the Inayawan landfill has already outgrown its use- 278. Moreover, Sec. 378, Rule 7 of RPEC allows direct resort to this Court or
fulness and has become ill-suited for its purpose. with any of the stations of the CA.
Ø He further asserted that its reopening and continued operation violates 279. Given that the writ of kalikasan is an extraordinary remedy and the RPEC
several environmental laws and government regulations, such as: RA allows direct action to this Court and the CA where it is dictated by public
9003; RA 8749 (Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999); RA 9275 (Philippine welfare, this Court is of the view that the prior 30-day notice requirement for
Clean Water Act of 2004); PD No. 856 (Code on Sanitation of the Philip- citizen suits under RA 9003 and RA 8749 is inapplicable. It is ultimately
pines); and DENR AO No. 2003-30 (Implementing Rules and Regulations within the Court's discretion whether or not to accept petitions brought direct-
(IRR) for the Philippine Environmental Impact Statement System). ly before it.
193. The CA, in a Decision, granted the privilege of the writ of kalikasan which
On the issue of the requirements of the grant of the writ
ordered Mayor Osmeña and/or his representatives to permanently cease
and desist from dumping or disposing of garbage or solid waste at the 76
Section 5. Citizen suit. — Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or genera-
Inayawan landfill and to continue to rehabilitate the same. tions yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the
194. The MOR of Mayor Osmeña was also denied. Hence, the current petition. filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of
action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in the
ISSUES: case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper
of a general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of said order.
1. Whether the 30-day prior notice requirement for citizen suits under RA 9003 Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed by their respective provi-
and RA 8749 is needed prior to the filing of the instant petition. sions.
2. Whether the CA correctly ruled that the requirements for the grant of the
privilege of the writ of kalikasan were sufficiently established. 77
Section 1. Nature of the writ. — The writ is a remedy available to a natural or juridical person, entity
authorized by law, people's organization non- governmental organization, or any public interest group
accredited by or registered with any government agency, on behalf of persons whose constitutional right
RULING: The petition is denied. The Decision and Resolution of the CA, which to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omis-
granted the privilege of the writ of kalikasan and ordered Mayor Osmeña, in his ca- sion of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity, involving environmental damage of
pacity as City Mayor of Cebu and/or his representatives, to permanently cease and such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinc-
desist from dumping or disposing of garbage or solid waste at the Inayawan landfill es.
and to continue to rehabilitate the same, are hereby affirmed. 78
Section 3. Where to file. — The petition shall be led with the Supreme Court or with any of the sta-
tions of the Court of Appeals.
280. SC affirm the CA when it ruled that the requirements for the grant of the Ø As to the health impact, the DOH found that the residents, commercial centers,
privilege of the writ of kalikasan were sufficiently established. shanties and scavengers near the dump site are at high risk of acquiring different
281. Under Sec. 1 of Rule 7 of the RPEC, the following requisites must be pre- types of illness due to pollution, considering the current status of the dump site.
sent to avail of this extraordinary remedy: The DOH highly recommended the immediate closure of the Inayawan sanitary
a. there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a landfill. It was further stated that the disposal area is not anymore suitable as a
balanced and healthful ecology; sanitary landfill even if rehabilitated considering its location within the city, the
number of residents and the increasing population of the city, the neighboring
b. the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission
cities and towns, and the expected increase in number of commercial centers,
of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity; and transportation and tourist concerns.
c. the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmen- 285. Prescinding from the above, the EMB, DOH, Mr. Amancio Dongcoy, a rep-
tal damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property resentative from the DENR-EMB, and the Cebu and Talisay residents are all
of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. in agreement as to the need of closing the Inayawan landfill due to the envi-
282. Expectedly, the Rules do not define the exact nature or degree of environ- ronmental violations committed by the City Government in its operation.
mental damage but only that it must be sufficiently grave, in terms of the ter- 286. The Court, while it have the jurisdiction and power to decide cases, is not
ritorial scope of such damage, so as to call for the grant of this extraordinary precluded from utilizing the findings and recommendations of the administra-
remedy. The gravity of environmental damage sufficient to grant the writ is, tive agency on questions that demand "the exercise of sound administrative
thus, to be decided on a case-to- case basis. discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the
283. The Court is convinced from the evidence on record that Garganera has suf- administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.
ficiently established the aforementioned requirements for the grant of the 287. Lastly, as much as this Court recognizes the parties' good intention and
privilege of the writ of kalikasan. sympathize with the dilemma of Mayor Osmeña or the City Government in
284. The record discloses that the City Government's resumption of the garbage looking for its final disposal site, considering the garbage daily disposal of
dumping operations at the Inayawan landfill has raised serious environmental 600 tons generated by the city and its duty to provide basic services and fa-
concerns. cilities of garbage collection and disposal system, the SC agree with the CA
Ø As aptly and extensively discussed by the CA in its Decision based from the EMB that the continued operation of the Inayawan landfill poses a serious and
Compliance Evaluation Report (CER) and the Notice of Violation and Technical pressing danger to the environment that could result in injurious consequenc-
Conference issued by the EMB to Mayor Osmeña. es to the health and lives of the nearby residents, thereby warranting the issu-
Ø Also, the air and water quality impact assessment of the EMB CER made remarks
ance of a writ of kalikasan.
that the air quality poses a threat to nearby surroundings/habitat while the water
quality (leachate) poses threat of water pollution. The report also stated that the
foul odor from the landfill already reached neighboring communities as far as SM
Seaside and UC Mambaling which have disrupted activities causing economic loss
and other activities for improvement particularly for SM Seaside. Further, most of
the conditions stipulated in the ECC were not complied with.
Ø In addition, the EMB's findings particularly as to the air quality is corroborated by
15 affidavits executed by affected residents and/or business owners from Cebu
and Talisay Cities who affirmed smelling a foul odor coming from the Inayawan
landfill, and some even noted the appearance of flies.
Ø Moreover, the DOH Inspection Report observed that the Inayawan landfill had
been in operation for 17 years, which exceeded the 7-year estimated duration
period in the projected design data. This caused the over pile-up of re-
fuse/garbage in the perimeter and boarder of the landfill, having a height slope
distance of approximately 120 meters at the side portion of Fil-Invest Subdivision,
Cogon Pardo Side portion has approximately height of 40 meters and at Inayawan
side portion is approximately from 10-20 meters from the original ground level.
The standard process procedure management was poorly implemented.
044 MOSQUEDA v. PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS (DANNAH)
August 16, 2016 | Bersamin, J. | Writ of Kalikasan (Precautionary Principle)
PETITIONER: Wilfredo Mosqueda et al.
RESPONDENTS: Pilipino Banana Growers et al.
SUMMARY: PS the Writ of Kalikasan was not mentioned at all in the case,
closest thing I can relate it to is the precautionary principle.
The City of Davao enacted Ordinance No. 0309 to impose a ban against aerial
spraying as an agricultural practice by all agricultural entities within Davao
City. Such was approved by Mayor Duterte and was published as required. The
Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and two if
its members filed the petition in the RTC to challenge the constitutionality of
the ordinance. They alleged that the ordinance exemplified the unreasonable
exercise of police power; violated the equal protection clause; amounted to the
confiscation of property without due process of law; and lacked publication
pursuant to Section 511 of Republic Act No. 7160.
The RTC upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance which the CA reversed.
Hence, the matter was brought by Monqueda et al before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: WoN the ordinance is constitutional – NO. It violates the due process
and equal protection clause.
On the discussion of precautionary principle:
Monqueda et al plead that the Court should look at the merits of the ordinance
based on the precautionary principle. They argue that under the precautionary
principle, the City of Davao is justified in enacting Ordinance No. 0309-07 in
order to prevent harm to the environment and human health despite the lack of
scientific certainty. The Court did not sustain the argument. [SEE DOCTRINE]
In this case, the Court cannot see the presence of all the elements. There has
been no scientific study. Although the precautionary principle allows lack of
full scientific certainty in establishing a connection between the serious or
irreversible harm and the human activity, its application is still premised on
empirical studies. Scientific analysis is still a necessary basis for effective
policy choices under the precautionary principle.
DOCTRINE: The precautionary principle shall only be relevant if there is
concurrence of three elements: uncertainty, threat of environmental damage and
serious or irreversible harm.
FACTS:
1. The Sangguniang Panglunsod of Davao enacted Ordinance No. 0309 to
impose a ban against aerial spraying as an agricultural practice by all
agricultural entities within Davao City.
2. Mayor Duterte approved the ordinance which took effect on March 23,
2007 after its publication. Pursuant to Sec. 5, the ban against aerial spraying
would be strictly enforced three months thereafter.
3. The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc. (PBGEA)
and two if its members filed the petition in the RTC to challenge the
constitutionality of the ordinance. They alleged that the ordinance
exemplified the unreasonable exercise of police power; violated the equal
protection clause; amounted to the confiscation of property without due
process of law; and lacked publication pursuant to Section 511 of Republic
Act No. 7160.
4. The RTC granted the prayer for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction, but ultimately ruled hat the ordinance was constitutional.
5. The CA likewise issued a TRO to enjoin the effectivity of the ordinance,
and ruled that the ordinance was void and unconstitutional for being
unreasonable and oppressive.
ISSUE/s:
1. WoN the ordinance is constitutional – NO. It violates the due process and
equal protection clause.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the consolidated petitions for review
on certiorari for their lack of merit; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on January
9, 2009 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 01389-MIN. declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07 UN-
CONSTITUTIONAL; PERMANENTLY ENJOINS respondent City of Davao, and
all persons or entities acting in its behalf or under its authority, from enforcing and
implementing Ordinance No. 0309-07; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs
of suit.
RATIO:
1. Monqueda et al plead that the Court should look at the merits of the
ordinance based on the precautionary principle. They argue that under the
precautionary principle, the City of Davao is justified in enacting Ordinance
No. 0309-07 in order to prevent harm to the environment and human health
despite the lack of scientific certainty.
2. This cannot be sustained. In this jurisdiction, the principle of precaution
appearing in the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (A.M. No. 09-
6-8-SC) involves matters of evidence in cases where there is lack of full
scientific certainty in establishing a causal link between human activity and
 environmental effect. In such an event, the courts may construe a set of facts
as warranting either judicial action or inaction with the goal of preserving
and protecting the environment.
3. The precautionary principle shall only be relevant if there is concurrence of
three elements: uncertainty, threat of environmental damage and serious or
irreversible harm.
4. The Court cannot see the presence of all the elements.
5. There has been no scientific study. Although the precautionary principle
allows lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a connection between
the serious or irreversible harm and the human activity, its application is
still premised on empirical studies. Scientific analysis is still a necessary
basis for effective policy choices under the precautionary principle.
6. Precaution is a risk management principle invoked after scientific inquiry
takes place. This scientific stage is often considered synonymous with risk
assessment.
7. As much as possible, a complete and objective scientific evaluation of the
risk to the environment or health should be conducted and made available to
decision-makers for them to choose the most appropriate course of action.
8. Furthermore, the positive and negative effects of an activity is also
important in the application of the principle. The potential harm resulting
from certain activities should always be judged in view of the potential
benefits they offer, while the positive and negative effects of potential
precautionary measures should be considered.
9. The only study conducted to validate the effects of aerial spraying appears
to be the Summary Report on the Assessment and Fact-Finding Activities
on the Issue of Aerial Spraying in Banana Plantations.
10. Yet, the fact-finding team that generated the report was not a scientific
study that could justify the resort to the precautionary principle. In fact, the
Sangguniang Bayan ignored the findings and conclusions of the fact-finding
team that recommended only a regulation, not a ban, against aerial spraying.
The recommendation was in line with the advocacy of judicious handling
and application of chemical pesticides by the DOH-Center for Health
Development in the Davao Region in view of the scarcity of scientific
studies to support the ban against aerial spraying.
11. The Court should not apply the precautionary approach in sustaining the
ban against aerial spraying if little or nothing is known of the exact or
potential dangers that aerial spraying may bring to the health of the
residents within and near the plantations and to the integrity and balance of
the environment.
12. It is dangerous to quickly presume that the effects of aerial spraying would
be adverse even in the absence of evidence. Accordingly, for lack of
scientific data supporting a ban on aerial spraying, Ordinance No. 0309-07
should be struck down for being unreasonable.
 045 LAHOM v. SIBULO (Gonzales)
July 14, 2013 | Vitug, J. | Adoption
PETITIONER: Isabelita S. Lahom
RESPONDENT: Jose Melvin Sibulo (previously referred to as Dr. Melvin Lahom)
SUMMARY: Isabelita Lahom and her husband adopted Melvin who is Isabelita’s
nephew. Pursuant to the court order granting the petition, the Civil Registrar changed
the name “Jose Melvin Sibulo” to “Jose Melvin Lahom.” After the effectivity of RA
8552, Isabelita filed a petition to rescind the adoption because Melvin was not using
the surname Lahom. RA 8552 law withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the
adoption decree and gave to the adopted child the sole right to sever the legal ties
created by adoption. Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition in view of RA
8552. The issue is May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still be re-
voked or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 – NO. The
action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner after
R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be pursued.
DOCTRINE: The controversy regarding adoption should be resolved in the light of
the law governing at the time the petition was filed.
FACTS:
61. The bliss of marriage and family would be to most less than
complete without children. The realization could have likely
prodded the spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom
to take into their care Isabelita's nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo
and to bring him up as their own. At the tender age of two, Jose
Melvin enjoyed the warmth, love and support of the couple. In
1971, the couple decided to file a petition for adoption. On 05
May 1972, an order granting the petition was issued. The Civil
Registrar of Naga City changed the name "Jose Melvin Sibulo"
to "Jose Melvin Lahom."
62. A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in De-
cember of 1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind
the decree of adoption before the RTC Naga City. In her peti-
tion, she averred —
a. Despite the proddings and pleadings of said spouses,
Melvin refused to change his surname from Sibulo to
Lahom, to the frustrations of Isabelita particularly her
husband until the latter died, and even before his death
he had made known his desire to revoke Melvin’s adop-
tion, but was prevented by Isabelita’s supplication,
however with his further request upon Isabelita to give
to charity whatever properties or interest may pertain to
Melvin in the future.
b. Melvin continued using his surname Sibulo to the utter
disregard of the feelings of Isabelita, and his records
with the Professional Regulation Commission showed
his name as Jose Melvin M. Sibulo originally issued in
1978 until the present, and in all his dealings and activi-
ties in connection with his practice of his profession, he
is Jose Melvin M. Sibulo.
c. Isabelita being a widow, and living alone in this city
with only her household helps to attend to her, has
yearned for the care and show of concern from a son,
but Melvin remained indifferent and would only come
to Naga to see her once a year.
d. For the last three or four years, the medical check-up of
Isabelita in Manila became more frequent in view of a
leg ailment, and those were the times when Isabelita
would need most the care and support from a love one,
but Melvin all the more remained callous and utterly
indifferent towards her
e. Melvin has recently been jealous of Isabelita’s nephews
and nieces whenever they would find time to visit her,
Melvin alleging that they were only motivated by their
desire for some material benefits
f. In view of Melvin’s insensible attitude resulting in a
strained and uncomfortable relationship between him
and Isabelita, the latter has suffered wounded feelings,
knowing that after all Melvin’s only motive to his adop-
tion is his expectancy of his alleged rights over the
properties of Isabelita and her late husband, clearly
 shown by his recent filing of Civil Case for partition ISSUE:
against Isabelita, 56. May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still be
63. Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22 March revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity
1998, R.A. No. 8552, also known as the Domestic Adoption of R.A. No. 8552 – NO. The action for rescission of the
Act, went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner af-
right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption. The law pro- ter R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be
vides: "Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall pursued.
not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However, the
adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in
Article 919 of the Civil Code."
64. Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition, contending RULING: RTC decision affirmed.
principally (a) that the trial court had no jurisdiction and (b)
that the petitioner had no cause of action in view of R.A. No.
RATIO:
8552.
57. A brief background on the law and its origins could provide
65. Isabelita argued that the proscription in R.A. No. 8552 should
some insights on the subject. In ancient times, the Romans
not retroactively apply, i.e., to cases where the ground for re-
undertook adoption to assure male heirs in the family. The
scission of the adoption vested under the regime of then Article
continuity of the adopter's family was the primary purpose of
348 of the Civil Code and Article 192 of the Family Code.
adoption and all matters relating to it basically focused on the
66. RTC held that
rights of the adopter.
a. Section 5(c) of R.A. No. 8369 confers jurisdiction to
58. The Americans came and introduced their own ideas on
this Court, having been designated Family Court in
adoption which, unlike most countries in Europe, made the
A.M. No. 99-11-07 SC.
interests of the child an overriding consideration. In the early
b. "Admittedly, Section 19, Article VI of R.A. No.
part of the century just passed, the rights of children invited
8552 deleted the right of an adopter to rescind an adop-
universal attention as seen from international conventions.
tion earlier granted under the Family Code. Conforma-
59. The Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 on adoption, later
bly, on the face of the petition, indeed there is lack of
modified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code and then
cause of action.
by the Family Code, gave immediate statutory acknowledg-
c. Assuming for the sake of argument, that Isabelita is en-
ment to the rights of the adopted. In 1989, the United Nations
titled to rescind the adoption, said right should have
initiated the Convention of the Rights of the Child. The Phil-
been exercised within the period allowed by the Rules.
ippines, a State Party to the Convention, accepted the princi-
The legal grounds for the petition have been discovered
ple that adoption was impressed with social and moral re-
and known to Isabelita for more than five (5) years, pri-
sponsibility, and that its underlying intent was geared to fa-
or to the filing of the instant petition hence, the action if
vor the adopted child.
any, had already prescribed.
60. R.A. No. 8552 secured these rights and privileges for the
adopted. The new law withdrew the right of an adopter to re-
 scind the adoption decree and gave to the adopted child the
sole right to sever the legal ties created by adoption.
61. Isabelita, however, would insist that R.A. No. 8552 should
not adversely affect her right to annul the adoption decree,
nor deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction to hear the case,
both being vested under the Civil Code and the Family Code,
the laws then in force.
62. The concept of "vested right" is a consequence of the consti-
tutional guaranty of due process that expresses a present fixed
interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected
against arbitrary state action.
63. In Republic vs. Court of Appeals, a petition to adopt Jason
Condat was filed by Zenaida C. Bobiles on 02 February 1988
when the Child and Youth Welfare Code (PD No.
603) allowed an adoption to be sought by either spouse
or both of them. After the trial court had rendered its decision
and while the case was still pending on appeal, the Family
Code of the Philippines , mandating joint adoption by the
husband and wife, took effect. Petitioner Republic argued
that the case should be dismissed for having been filed by
Mrs. Bobiles alone. The Court concluded that the jurisdiction
of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time
of the commencement of the action. The petition to adopt
Jason, having been filed with the court at the time when P.D.
No. 603 was still in effect, the right of Mrs. Bobiles to file the
petition, without being joined by her husband, according to
the Court had become vested.
64. In Republic vs. Miller, spouses Miller, both aliens, sought to
adopt Michael Madayag. On 29 July 1988, the couple filed a
petition to formalize Michael's adoption. At the time the ac-
tion was commenced, P.D. No. 603 allowed aliens to adopt.
After the decree of adoption and while on appeal before the
Court of Appeals, the Family Code was enacted into law on
08 August 1988 disqualifying aliens from adopting Filipino
children. The Republic then prayed for the withdrawal of the
adoption decree. The Supreme Court ruled that the contro-
versy should be resolved in the light of the law governing at
the time the petition was filed.
65. It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that Isa-
belita filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted
in 1975. By then, the new law, had already abrogated and re-
pealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code and
the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. Thus, the
action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been ini-
tiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force,
no longer could be pursued.
66. Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action
to set aside the adoption is subject to the five-year bar rule
under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter
would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the
lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a pre-
scriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the re-
quirements of a vested right entitled to protection.
67. It must also be acknowledged that a person has no vested
right in statutory privileges. While adoption has often been
referred to in the context of a "right," the privilege to adopt is
itself not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right
merely created by statute. It is a privilege that is governed by
the state's determination on what it may deem to be for the
best interest and welfare of the child.
68. It is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred
from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid
reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise ac-
cruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the
grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an
adopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may
freely exclude him from having a share in the disposable por-
tion of his estate.
 046 MUNSAYAC v REYES (GUSTILO)
June 26, 2006 | Per Curiam | Hearing & Reception of Evidence in Adoption Cases
PETITIONER: Grace Munsayac De Villa, et al
RESPONDENTS: Judge Antonio Reyes, et al
SUMMARY: Before the Court are administrative matters which are offshoots of the
disapproval by Executive Judge Antonio Reyes of RTC of Baguio, of the order of
inhibition issued by RTC Judge Ayson of the same city, in a Civil Case entitled Sps.
Malecdan, et al., v. Tadoan, et al., in which the Judge Ayson inhibited himself from
hearing the case. Judge Ayson issued, on the same date, another order in which he
not only delved on the issue of inhibition, but proceeded to ascribe on his colleagues
in Baguio City what to him are acts constituting misconduct, corruption and immo-
rality. Named as erring officials were RTC Judges Caguioa, Esteves, Villanueva,
Borreta, Claravall and Reyes. According to complainant Judge Ayson, respondent
"Judge Caguioa allowed ex-parte hearings of his cases to be presided by a clerk or
stenographer who is not a lawyer and not his clerk of court contrary to Section 9 of
Rule 30 of the Rules of Court, and that commissioner’s fees were also collected in
violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 50-2001 dated August 17, 2001." Judge
Ayson presented as witnesses several individuals whose affidavits served as their
respective direct testimonies of the fact that Court Stenographer Carmen Diaz, in-
stead of Judge Caguioa, presided over an ex-parte hearing of the petition, as shown
in the TSNs of the proceedings. Atty. Cristeta C. Flores, the clerk of Court of Judge
Caguioa, in her Affidavits, disclosed that their court conducts ex-parte hearings over
a menu of cases 3x a week, with the Tuesday and Wednesday hearings being presid-
ed over either by Stenographer Carmen Diaz or Court Interpreter Teodora Paquito,
while she presides over hearings on Thursdays. Atty. Flores cited two (2) adoption
cases where Ms. Paquito presided over the ex-parte hearings, the same practice that
was followed with respect to a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Press-
ing the point, Atty Flores accused Judge Caguioa of having some TSNs falsified to
reflect his being present in the ex-parte hearings.
Judge Caguioa, in his Comment, denied all the inculpatory allegations against him.
More specifically, he stated that he had always assigned his Clerk of Court, Atty.
Flores, to conduct the tri-weekly ex-parte hearings until he had to preside over them
himself, or at least the Tuesday and Wednesday sessions, in response to lawyers’ and
litigants’ complaints about the slow progress of the ex-parte proceedings before his
clerk of court. According to him, he always asked either his stenographer, Carmen
Diaz, or interpreter, Teodora Paquito, to assist him whenever he presided over an ex-
parte hearing, allowing them to make such harmless remarks as "Present your wit-
ness," "Proceed," "Anymore witness, sir," and the like, a practice he does not find
irregular since he was always present during the proceedings.
The issue is Judge Caguiao erred in allowing his court stenographer and/or
interpreter to preside over ex parte hearings and to receive evidence therein?- YES
The SC held that Pursuant to Supreme Court (SC) Circular No. 12 dated October 2,
1986, all RTC Judges are to personally hear all adoption cases and not to delegate to
the clerk of court the reception of evidence therein.
Notwithstanding Judge Caguioa’s denial, ample evidence obtain to show that he had
indeed delegated the reception of evidence in at least two (2) adoption cases to his
court interpreter. We refer to the certified true copies of (a) the TSNs taken on Janu-
ary 31, 2002 in Spec. Proc. No. 28-A, (Re: Petition for adoption, etc., Sps. Danelia
Javier & Julio Javier III, (b) Order issued in Spec. Proc. No. 63-A (In the Matter of
the Petition for Adoption of Eunice C. Balangi, Sps. Francis Aguinaldo & Esther
Bahatan-Aguinaldo, and the TSNs taken on September 12, 2001 in the aforemen-
tioned case. To be sure, these pieces of evidence strongly argue against, if not con-
tradict, Judge Caguioa’s posture that it was he who personally heard the adoption
cases previously mentioned.
DOCTRINE: Pursuant to Supreme Court (SC) Circular No. 12 dated October
2, 1986, all RTC Judges are to personally hear all adoption cases and not to del-
egate to the clerk of court the reception of evidence therein.
FACTS:
195. Before the Court are administrative matters which are offshoots of the dis-
approval by Executive Judge Antonio Reyes of RTC of Baguio, of the order
of inhibition issued by RTC Judge Ayson of the same city, in a Civil Case
entitled Sps. Malecdan, et al., v. Tadoan, et al., in which the Judge Ayson
inhibited himself from hearing the case.
196. Judge Ayson issued, on the same date, another order in which he not only
delved on the issue of inhibition, but proceeded to ascribe on his colleagues
in Baguio City what to him are acts constituting misconduct, corruption and
immorality.
197. Named as erring officials were RTC Judges Caguioa, Esteves, Villanueva,
Borreta, Claravall and Reyes.
198. Judge Ayson’s exposé contained in his Order found its way into the pages
of The Daily Inquirer, among other dailies, and eventually reached the
Court which, then asked the judges mentioned in said order to comment
thereon.
199. Thereafter, Judge Ayson, formalized his complaint against his colleagues
through an Affidavit.
200. Atty. Caluza-Flores, Clerk of Court of Branch 4, joined by filing an admin-
istrative case against the Judge Caguioa of that branch.
201. Through an SC en banc Resolution, CA Associate Justice Jacinto was or-
dered to conduct a formal investigation on the aforementioned charges and
counter-charges and to submit his report and recommendation.
202. Following a marathon of joint hearings, the Investigating Justice submitted
a 72-paged Consolidated Report on the sworn complaints which, upon the
 OCA’s recommendation, were each redocketed as a regular administrative
matter.
203. First as to the Administrative case against Judge Caguioa, Judge Ruben C.
Ayson vs. Judge Amado S. Caguioa for gross misconduct, incompetence and
for allowing collection of commissioner’s fees in ex-parte hearings and al-
lowing ex-parte reception of evidence by non-lawyers/employees of his
court.
204. According to complainant Judge Ayson, respondent "Judge Caguioa
allowed ex-parte hearings of his cases to be presided by a clerk or ste-
nographer who is not a lawyer and not his clerk of court contrary to
Section 9 of Rule 30 of the Rules of Court, and that commissioner’s fees
were also collected in violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 50-2001
dated August 17, 2001."
205. Judge Ayson presented as witnesses several individuals whose affidavits
served as their respective direct testimonies of the fact that Court Stenog-
rapher Carmen Diaz, instead of Judge Caguioa, presided over an ex-parte
hearing of the petition, as shown in the TSNs of the proceedings.
206. Atty. Cristeta C. Flores, the clerk of Court of Judge Caguioa, in her Af-
fidavits, disclosed that their court conducts ex-parte hearings over a
menu of cases 3x a week, with the Tuesday and Wednesday hearings
being presided over either by Stenographer Carmen Diaz or Court In-
terpreter Teodora Paquito, while she presides over hearings on Thurs-
days.
207. According to Atty. Flores, the practice of Judge Caguioa is to direct recep-
tion of ex-parte evidence "before any officer of the Court authorized by the
Presiding Judge" or before the Clerk of Court or any officer delegated … to
receive the same".
208. Atty. Flores cited two (2) adoption cases where Ms. Paquito presided over
the ex-parte hearings, the same practice that was followed with respect to a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Pressing the point, Atty Flo-
res accused Judge Caguioa of having some TSNs falsified to reflect his be-
ing present in the ex-parte hearings.
209. Judge Caguioa, in his Comment, denied all the inculpatory allegations
against him. More specifically, he stated that he had always assigned
his Clerk of Court, Atty. Flores, to conduct the tri-weekly ex-parte
hearings until he had to preside over them himself, or at least the Tues-
day and Wednesday sessions, in response to lawyers’ and litigants’
complaints about the slow progress of the ex-parte proceedings before
his clerk of court.
210. According to him, he always asked either his stenographer, Carmen
Diaz, or interpreter, Teodora Paquito, to assist him whenever he pre-
sided over an ex-parte hearing, allowing them to make such harmless
remarks as "Present your witness," "Proceed," "Anymore witness,
sir," and the like, a practice he does not find irregular since he was al-
ways present during the proceedings.
211. He admitted that there were instances when he left the hearing to attend to
some other matters in his chambers, which is 2 to 3 meters away from the
lawyer’s table, but he made it a point to return thereto. He denied authoriz-
ing non-lawyers to preside over ex-parte hearings and that he also never au-
thorized the collection of commissioner’s fees after learning of a Supreme
Court circular prohibiting such collection.
212. With respect to the cases in which Attys. Doctor and Gorospe appeared,
Jude Caguioa maintained that he was always present when the said cases
were heard ex-parte.
ISSUE/s:
17. Won Judge Caguiao erred in allowing his court stenographer and/or
interpreter to preside over ex parte hearings and to receive evidence
therein?- YES because all RTC judges are to personally hear all adoption
cases and not to delegate to the Clerk of Court the reception of evidence
therein
RULING: Judge Amado S. Caguioa is FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Pe-
sos (P10,000.00) for not strictly adhering to the prescription of Supreme Court Cir-
cular No. 12 dated October 2, 1986 and ADMONISHED and WARNED to stop the
practice of allowing court stenographers and/or interpreters to participate in ex-parte
hearings.
RATIO:
1. Pursuant to Supreme Court (SC) Circular No. 12 dated October 2, 1986,
all RTC Judges are to personally hear all adoption cases and not to dele-
gate to the clerk of court the reception of evidence therein.
2. Notwithstanding Judge Caguioa’s denial, ample evidence obtain to show that
he had indeed delegated the reception of evidence in at least two (2) adoption
cases to his court interpreter.
3. We refer to the certified true copies of (a) the TSNs taken on January 31,
2002 in Spec. Proc. No. 28-A, (Re: Petition for adoption, etc., Sps. Danelia
Javier & Julio Javier III, (b) Order issued in Spec. Proc. No. 63-A (In the
Matter of the Petition for Adoption of Eunice C. Balangi, Sps. Francis
Aguinaldo & Esther Bahatan-Aguinaldo, and the TSNs taken on Septem-
ber 12, 2001 in the aforementioned case.
4. To be sure, these pieces of evidence strongly argue against, if not contra-
dict, Judge Caguioa’s posture that it was he who personally heard the
adoption cases previously mentioned.
5. Like the Investigating Justice, the Court is inclined to give more credence to the
TSNs and the certified true Copy of the Order dated June 21, 2001 as proof of
Judge Caguioa’s failure to strictly adhere to SC Circular No. 12, supra.
6. Unlike, however, with respect to the non-compliance with SC Circular 12,
Judge Ayson’s evidence, vis-à-vis his charge on alleged collection of commis-
sioner’s fees in ex-parte proceedings in violation of another Supreme Court is-
suance, i.e., SC Circular No. 50-2001, is far from persuasive.
7. As explained by Ms. Diaz, in her Affidavit and in another Affidavit she execut-
ed jointly with Mercedes Onato, no fees were collected from the parties, alt-
hough most lawyers voluntarily gave money for the TSNs and for their snacks.
8. Ms. Diaz’ declaration find substantial corroboration from Judge Caguioa’s oth-
er witnesses.
9. But the more important consideration with respect to this particular
charge is that there is absolutely no showing whatsoever that any portion
of the amounts lawyers voluntarily gave ended up in Judge Caguiao’s own
pocket.
10. Similarly, there is no evidence tending to prove that Judge Caguioa acted
with malice or with similar base motivation in allowing some court per-
sonnel to participate or assist him in the ex-parte hearings.
11. If at all, Judge Ayson’s evidence only exposed Judge Caguioa’s lack of circum-
spection in the performance of some of his judicial mandate.
12. While admonition with warning may be in order for Judge Caguioa’s act of
allowing his court stenographer and/or interpreter to participate in ex-parte
hearings, absent any showing to vitiate the bona fides of such act, a heavier
penalty should be meted him for his failure to strictly adhere to the prescription
of Circular No. 12, series of 1986, of this Court.
 In The Matter Of The Adoption Of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia 2. On April 20, 2001, Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or recon-
(HORTALEZA) sideration praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of
March, 31, 2005| Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. | Adoption her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name.
3. On May 28, 2001, the trial court denied Honorato’s motion for reconsidera-
tion holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child
PETITIONER: Honorato B. Catindig
to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name.
SUMMARY:
4. Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate child
Honorato Catindig, in a previous case filed for the adoption of her illegitimate
may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subse-
daughter Stephanie Garcia, and accompanied by the changing of the last name of
quently adopted by her natural father.
Stephanie to Catindig. The courts granted the request
ISSUE/s:
Then, Honorato filed for a motion for clarification/consideration in order for Stepha-
1. WoN the law allows Stephanie to bear as her middle name the last name of
nie to bear Garcia to be her middle name. The Courts denied the request stating that
her mother? Yes, Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it
no law or jurisprudence that allows a child in this situation to bear as their middle
follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a
name the mothers name.
legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right
to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above.
WoN the law allows Stephanie to bear as her middle name the last name of her
This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code
mother? Yes, Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that
and Family Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino
Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child with-
custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately
out discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her
precede the surname of the father.
father and her mother, as discussed above. This is consistent with the intention
of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as earlier dis-
RULING:
cussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODI-
should immediately precede the surname of the father.
FIED in the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mother’s surname
"GARCIA" as her middle name.
DOCTRINE:
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is
RATIO:
entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimi-
1. Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not
nation of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and
to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child.
her mother, as discussed above. This is consistent with the intention of the
It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons
members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as earlier discussed. In
a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and fili-
fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should im-
ation. The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to es-
mediately precede the surname of the father.
tablish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which en-
dows the child with a legitimate status. This was, indeed, confirmed in
FACTS: 1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party to the Convention of the Rights
1. On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a peti- of the Child initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle that
tion to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. adoption is impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its un-
He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, derlying intent is geared to favor the adopted child. Republic Act No. 8552,
1994; that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been otherwise known as the "Domestic Adoption Act of 1998," secures these
using her mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower rights and privileges for the adopted.
and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle 2. One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legiti-
name Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mother’s surname, and that her mate child of the adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189
surname "Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," his surname. Which was grant- of the Family Code and Section 1722 Article V of RA 8552.
ed
3. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie
is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without dis-
crimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her fa-
ther and her mother, as discussed above. This is consistent with the inten-
tion of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as ear-
lier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of
the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.
4. Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie’s continued use of
her mother’s surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her mater-
nal lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Sec-
tion 18, Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee
remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can
well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the fu-
ture.
5. Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together
in the house built by Honorato for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag,
Bulacan. Honorato provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached
to both her mother and father. She calls them "Mama" and "Papa". Indeed,
they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her
mother’s surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued
loving relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her
illegitimacy.
 048 LANDINGIN v. REPUBLIC (LAGUILLES)
June 27, 2006 | Callejo Sr. | Adoption
PETITIONER: Diwata Landingin
RESPONDENTS: Republic of the Philippines
SUMMARY: Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage
filed a petition for the adoption of 3 minors, natural children of Manuel Ramos,
the former’s brother, and Amelia Ramos. She alleged in her petition that when
her brother died, the children were left to their paternal grandmother for their
biological mother went to Italy, re-married there and now has 2 children by her
second marriage and no longer communicates from the time she left up to the
institution of the adoption. After the paternal grandmother passed away, the
minors were being supported by the petitioner and her children abroad and gave
their written consent for their adoption. A Social Worker of the DSWD
submitted a Report recommending for the adoption and narrated that Amelia,
the biological mother was consulted with the adoption plan and after weighing
the benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented. However,
petitioner failed to present the said social worker as witness and offer in
evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Petitioner also
failed to present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent to the
adoption.
The issue is WoN a petition for adoption may be granted without the written
consent of the adoptees’ biological mother – NO.
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended
to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by
interlopers. Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is indispensa-
ble for the validity of a decree of adoption. In this case, Landingin failed to
submit the written consent of Amelia to the adoption. The Court notes that the
social worker was able to interview Amelia. If Amelia was in the PH and the
social worker was able to talk to her, it is incredible that the latter would not
require Amelia to execute a written consent to the adoption of her children.
When Landingin filed her petition, RA 8552 was already in effect. It provides
that if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained, the writ-
ten consent of the guardians would suffice. Hence, Landingin could have ad-
duced the written consent of their legal guardian.
DOCTRINE: The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for
the validity of a decree of adoption.
FACTS:
21. Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen, of Filipino parentage and a resident
of Guam, filed a petition for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos,
Elma Dizon Ramos, and Eugene Dizon Ramos. The minors are natural
children of Manuel Ramos, Landingin’s brother.
22. Landingin alleged that when Manuel died, the children were left to their
paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramoes, their biological mother, and
Amelia (Manuel’s wife), who went to Italy, remarried there, and now has
two children by her second marriage and no longer communicated with the
children;
23. The minors are being financially supported by Landingin, because Maria
passed away and because of this, Landingin wanted to adopt them; The
minors have given their written consent to the adoption; that Landingin is
qualified to adopt as shown by the fact that she is a 57-year-old widow, has
children of her own who are already married, gainfully employed, and have
their own families.
24. She also alleged that she lives alone in Guam where she acquired
citizenship and works as a restaurant server. She came back to the PH to
spend time with the minors. Her children also gave consent to the adoption
of the minors.
25. DSWD conducted a case study. OSG entered its appearance. Since
Landingin was unopposed, she was allowed to present her evidence ex
parte.
26. Landingin testified on her behalf, and the eldest of the adoptees testified on
the written consent executed by her and her siblings.
27. DSWD declared the minors eligible for adoption, and recommended that
they be adopted by their aunt Landingin.
28. OSG appealed on the ground of the lack of written consent of Landingin’s
children and the lack of consent of the minors’ biological mother.
RULING: The petition is DENIED.
ISSUE: WoN a petition for adoption may be granted without the written consent of
the adoptees’ biological mother – NO because the law explicitly provides for the
need to secure the biological parents’ written consent to the adoption, or in their
absence, the legal guardian of the adoptee/s.
RATIO:
34. The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is
intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted
interference by interlopers.
35. Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the
 validity of a decree of adoption. In this case, Landingin failed to submit the
written consent of Amelia to the adoption.
36. The Court notes that the social worker was able to interview Amelia. If
Amelia was in the PH and the social worker was able to talk to her, it is in-
credible that the latter would not require Amelia to execute a written con-
sent to the adoption of her children.
37. Neither did Landingin bother to present Amelia as witness.
38. Landingin nonetheless argues that the written consent of Amelia was no
longer necessary because she left for Italy and never came back. Hence,
Amelia abandoned her children.
39. This must be rejected. When Landingin filed her petition, RA 8552 was al-
ready in effect. It provides that if the written consent of the biological par-
ents cannot be obtained, the written consent of the guardians would suffice.
Hence, Landingin could have adduced the written consent of their legal
guardian.