AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR BASE OPENING: A JOINT PERSPECTIVE

by

Joseph A. Zahn, Lt Col, USAF

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

23 February 2007

Distribution A: Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

 DISCLAIMER

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect

the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In accordance

with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States

government and is not to be reproduced or published without the permission of the Air War

College Nonresident Studies Directorate.

ii
 Contents

Certificate………………………………………………………………………………....ii

Contents…………………………………………………………………………………..iii

Illustrations……………………………………………………………………………….iv

Blue Dart.………………………………………………………………………………....v

Introduction………………………………………………………………………………..1

History of Modern Base Opening…………………………………………………………2

Airbase Access During World War II and Korea…………………………………4

Airlift Control Elements and the Vietnam Era……………………………………5

Air Mobility Operations Group (AMOG) Concept and Practice............................7

Contingency Basing Access - Tallil Case Study.....................................................9

TALCE Swan Song - South Asia Tsunami Relief.................................................12

Current Airbase Opening Construct……………………………………………………...14

Airbase Opening - Filling the Seams……………………………………………..15

Contingency Response Groups………………………….………………………………..17

CRG Mission and Desired Effects………………………………………………..17

CRG Core Capabilities…………………………………………………………....18

CRG Sequence of Operations…………………………………………………….19

Joint Task Force – Port Opening...………….……………………………………….……21

JTF-PO Mission and Desired Effects......................................................................22

JTF-PO Capabilities and Characteristics.................................................................23

JTF-PO Sequence of Operations………………………………………………….24

Future Base Opening Challenges…………………………………………………………26

Meeting Today’s Challenges – CRG and JTF-PO Issues………………………...26

Future Base Opening – Potential Long Term Solutions………………………….27

Conclusions……………………………………………………………………………….31

Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………...32

iii
 Illustrations

Page

Figure 1. Operation Iraqi Freedom Base Opening Locations……………………..…………….11

Figure 2. Operation Unified Assistance (OUA) Devastation…………………………………...12

Figure 3. Tanker Airlift Control Element (TALCE) supporting OUA……………………….....13

Figure 4. Expeditionary Airbase Operating Enabling Concept………..………..........................16

Figure 5. Joint Task Force-Port Opening (JTF-PO) Organization…………………….......…….25

Figure 6. Joint Task Force-Port Opening Sequence of Operations………………………….…..26

iv
 Blue Dart

Have you heard the one about the most powerful military in the world unable to project its

capability because air bases were unavailable? Fortunately, the answer is no! The United States

military, whether in support of contingency or humanitarian efforts, has been able to gain access

to airfields and bases to accomplish its mission. Whether well organized and executed or simply

ad hoc and adequate, air base opening has been successful. However, since the end of the Cold

War, the Department of Defense (DOD) finds itself in an age of ever-decreasing overseas

military presences that is “permanent” in nature and must dramatically improve its ability to

“create” global basing access.

History has proven there is no cookie cutter approach to air base opening operations. This

research first provides a historical glimpse of modern air base opening from the limited use of

non-improved airstrips in World War II and Korea through the complex joint operations

witnessed during the current Global War on Terror then introduces and analyzes current DOD

efforts to professionalize the art of air base opening. Finally, the author argues the development

of a next generation global basing access capability is paramount and should be explored to

ensure continuous access to even more challenging environments to come.

To be successful in future global air base access requires well-trained warriors versed in the

full spectrum of air base opening. These professionals must be able to fill the gaps or “seams”

created in the ever-evolving joint and coalition environment that is airbase opening. The AF has

laid the foundation for base opening success by creating the Contingency Response Group

(CRG) Concept.

The CRG is the AF’s first responders for opening bases with its primary mission to provide

seamless transition from airfield seizure to air base opening to force employment and

v
sustainment in concert with follow-on force modules and theater-assigned mobility forces across

the full spectrum of air base operations. Ultimately, the CRGs are light, lean and agile units

composed of versatile personnel who are both warfighters and functional experts. Although still

in its infancy, these elite teams have performed admirably and validated the need for a single air

base opening organization.

In their short existence, the CRGs have proven their worth, successfully supporting

numerous contingency operations in OIF and OEF as well as direct support for humanitarian

efforts in response to earthquake-devastated Pakistan and the hurricane ravaged US Gulf Coast.

As the AF strives to fulfill its CRG airbase access capability, USTRANSCOM has initiated a

joint Aerial Port of Debarkation (APOD) opening initiative. This joint endeavor combines the

AF CRG skills with Army movement control capability to streamline APOD access. The birth of

the Joint Task Force-Port Opening (JTF-PO) concept is a logical step to streamline cargo and

troop movement in support of worldwide operations.

Both the CRG and the JTF-PO are on track to meet future airbase opening requirements for

the Combatant Commanders (COCOMs); however, there are still numerous shortfalls to bring

these organizations to fruition. Senior mobility leadership must make CRG and JTF-PO

manning, equipping and training a top priority. Additionally, dedicated experts in the base

opening mission must strive to create more robust and unique interoperability’s, especially with

regard to tangibles such as material handling equipment and communications. Finally, initiatives

to streamline operations as well as reduce the already huge footprint concerns (current JTF-PO

airlift requirement is 17 C-17s) are paramount to future successes.

The capabilities of the CRG and JTF-PO are critical to future base opening; however,

USTRANSCOM must make efforts to reduce service parochialisms and avoid mission creep.

vi
The short-term solution is to improve operations between these units through more robust joint

training and development of cooperative tactics, technique and procedures. However, there is a

long-term solution which will vastly improve the base opening concept and provide the

COCOMs a more flexible, tailorable, and responsive capability. The DOD should merge the

various base opening units into Joint Contingency Response Groups (JCRGs).

To best utilize the expertise of the joint force and address numerous deficiencies and

redundancies, the CRGs and JTF-POs should be fully integrated. Additionally, USTRANSCOM

can greatly improve mobility and logistics support to the warfighter by incorporating the next

logical step, theater distribution. The Defense Logistics Agency is developing a Deployable

Distribution Center (DDC) Concept to meet the COCOM’s material distribution support across

the full range of contingency operations. The integration of the DDC into the JCRG construct

will significantly enhance operations providing the warfighter “the right items, at the right place,

in the right quantities, at the right time.” Although arguably difficult to attain in today’s

challenging fiscally limited environment, moving to a truly joint base opening organization will

pay great dividends for future US military operations.

vii
 Introduction

The United States (US) is the world’s hegemonic leader in nearly all phases of measurable

power. Whether intentionally pursued or simply the result of recent historical events, the United

States finds itself out front and appears willing to accept this role. In most aspects, with increased

communications technology and overarching globalization, America is adequately postured to

assume these political, diplomatic, economic, and informational responsibilities. Even militarily,

revolutions and evolutions in technology allow the US to provide a global reach, global strike

capability second to none. Simply stated, the current environment adequately provides the

critical link necessary between the US and the world, global access. Or does it?

This paper will address one access arena where the nature of the global strategic

environment is forcing the US, specifically the Department of Defense (DOD), to reevaluate and

modify its current operational situation, access to overseas air bases. To accomplish this goal,

this research will first provide the reader a historical perspective to the nature of base opening

efforts covering the spectrum of modern US military operations from Vietnam and the Global

War on Terror (GWOT) to humanitarian relief efforts following catastrophes such as the South

Asian Tsunami and US Gulf Coast Hurricanes. Second, this author will provide a thorough

analysis of the current parochial Air Force base opening organization, the Contingency Response

Group (CRG), as well as US Transportation Command’s (USTRANSCOM) joint initiative, the

Joint Task Force-Port Opening (JTF-PO) concept. The analysis will explore the organization’s

mission, desired effects, capabilities and characteristics, and employment sequence of operations.

Additionally, this project will compare and contrast the two units, citing known similarities and

divergence. Next, the author delves into current and future challenges, issues, and opportunities

spanning the gamut of base opening operations. From force structure and bed-down requirements

to joint interoperability, expeditionary feasibility, and user integration, this paper identifies

numerous improvement opportunities. Finally, this research argues the development of a next

generation global basing access capability is paramount and should be explored to ensure

continuous access to even more challenging base opening environments to come.

With reduced overseas basing, the DOD is creating expeditionary base opening forces to

ensure the capability to respond to the full range of military requirements including natural

disasters, humanitarian relief, and contingency operations. This research will argue the CRGs

and JTF-POs, when fully organized, trained, and equipped, will meet these current challenges

and ideally, must integrate with other DOD entities to develop a more comprehensive joint base

opening asset to present to the Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs). The DOD needs to

continue to think outside the box and develop the next generation of base opening forces capable

of even faster, more expeditionary response with greater partnerships and interoperability with

joint and coalition forces as well as interagency and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

 History of Modern Base Opening

The modern US Military has a storied past of expeditionary operations. Even during the

height of the Cold War, with the forces of capitalism and communism jockeying for positions of

advantage around the globe and forward basing presence spanning every potential major theater

of operations, the largest portion of the US fighting force remained stationed in the contiguous

United States (CONUS). Forward presence, however, which has varied in size and location since

World War II, has provided a crucial piece of the expeditionary operational pie. It has ensured

access to regions where the US military instrument of power is required. Whether the force is

humanitarian or contingency in nature, the mobility community has delivered through overseas

basing access. The breakup of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact has drastically changed this

valuable capability.

The end of the Cold War was significant with regard to global access for two overarching

reasons. First, the reduction in the threat of a major conventional land campaign in Europe and

Asia coupled with the overarching elimination of the potential for a global thermo-nuclear war

saw a drastic reduction in defense spending. In fact, the ten-year span from 1985 to 1995, the US

defense budget decreased by nearly 40 percent.1 Additionally, this same period witnessed a

significant reduction in US military overseas personnel strength from over 600,000 to less than

370,000 troops.2 Second, while defense budgets and forward assigned personnel declined, the

number of smaller scale conflicts throughout the world increased dramatically. Coupled with

1
Rodney L. Croslen, “Retooling Global Mobility and Froward Presence: solving the challenges of opening air
bases,” Air Force Journal of Logistics, Summer, 2005, p. 2, available at
http://findartcles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_2_29/ai_n15863402/print
2
Ibid.

this, the number of major overseas bases downsized from 39 to 13 forward operating locations.

This limited forward presence and more operational requirements meant increased deployments

for a smaller force.3 The above-mentioned changes have propelled the US military into the

rapidly mobile yet expeditionary reliant force of today, one even more dependant on global

access to meet its calling. Arguably, history demonstrates the challenges of global access are

nothing new.

Air Base Access during World War II and Korea

As much as Airmen would like to believe they have always been the mainstay of military

transportation might, World War II was primarily a sealift mobility operation. Although an

extensive worldwide airlift network was in development, airlift had not yet evolved to the point it

could deliver the massive quantities of lift required to meet the volumes of personnel and

equipment needed. Fortunately, the chronological events of the war did not dictate rapid

movement of forces, which allowed a more methodical build up using sealift. Troop and

merchant marine ships were available to deliver cargo and passengers to major seaports for

onward movement by primarily land haul methods. The few aerial ports of embarkation or

debarkation were commercial or civilian airfields augmented for military operations as needed.

To this point in history, no formal unit or mission was devoted to air base opening.4 Only minor

advancements materialized for the next major US contingency operation, Korea.

Again, during the Korean War, sealift delivered the bulk of the war fighting requirements.

Strategic airlift, although improving in range and capacity by technological advancements such

as the C-97, C-119, and C-124, was still restricted to relatively short resupply missions from

3
Ibid.

4
Major Robert C. Bruno, “Planting the Seeds of Rapid Global Mobility: The Roots if Airlift Control Elements in

the United States Air Force,” Air Mobility Symposium, 1947 to the Twenty-First Century, 19-20 Sept. 1997, 115.

mainland Japan to limited locations on the peninsula. The operations were still extremely slow

and required adequate infrastructure, including long-hardened runways with established support,

for mission accomplishment.5 Fortunately, as advancements in lift technology progressed, so to

did the development of doctrine to support the concept of opening airbases outside existing

permanent infrastructure.

Rapid troop movement and resupply requirements coupled with poor logistical planning

forced mobility leadership to explore new methods of delivery platforms and support

infrastructure. Following the recommendations of an early 1950s Rand corporation study, the

DOD began development and procurement of next generation airlift. The C-141 Starlifter greatly

improved strategic airlift capabilities from CONUS allowing forces to bypass numerous en route

bases.6 Even more significant, DOD acquired the C-130 Hercules, which provided a tactical air-

land delivery system to complement the already existing airdrop mission. The ability to perform

resupply operations away from mainstream prepared surfaces had arrived and with it generated

the requirement for new and innovative airlift support. Providing access in austere, unimproved

locations meant creating an organization trained to sustain this much-needed capability.7 This

was the birth of the air base opening concept.

Airlift Control Elements and the Vietnam Era

To this point in history, a system of fixed en route locations manned with static command

and control, maintenance and aerial port personnel was sufficient to handle the ebbs and flows of

worldwide airlift traffic. Major operations, both during peacetime and war, still afforded massive

buildup to be accomplished through primary aerial ports, with distribution forward almost

5
Ibid.
6
Ibid., 116.
7
Ibid.

exclusively via rail lines, sea ports, or highway systems. Airlift was usually the secondary mode

of transport, used only for time-sensitive cargo movements.8 The experiences in Vietnam would

change this.

At the onset of the Vietnam conflict, airlift forces operated with oversight of organizations

known as Combat Airlift Support Units (CALSUs). These CALSUs, working from permanent

airfields, contained operations and communications personnel who interfaced with aerial port

and maintenance organizations to support the airlift mission. At forward locations, smaller teams

known as Movement Control Centers (MCCs), operated outlying airfields or landing zones and

controlled the flow. This arrangement of semi-permanent, fixed CALSUs at main hubs, and ad

hoc mobile MCCs provided the genesis for the Airlift Control Element concept.9

The original Tactical Air Command (TAC) CALSUs saw various modifications to its

structure over the course of the next few years. Loadmasters were trained as pathfinders for

assault drops and possessed a broad range of skills to support tactical mobility operations. At the

same time, Military Air Transport Service (MATS), and subsequently Military Airlift Command

(MAC), began qualifying pilots to act as mission commanders for ground mobility support-

teams.10 Although very successful, the capability to support mobility airlift, especially at the

tactical level, remained unstructured and piecemeal. This dilemma received validation following

a late 1962 Vietnam visit by then Air Force Chief of Staff, General Curtis Lemay. In his after

action report, he identified two major problems: inadequate aerial port facilities and a lack of

command, control, and communications (C3). To address these shortcomings, TAC and MAC

partnered to create Airlift Control Centers (ALCCs) consisting of combat control teams, aerial

8
Ibid., 117.
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid., 118.

ports, and an independent airlift control communications function known as Airlift Control

Elements (ALCEs).11

With experience and time, the new ALCEs resolved the C3 difficulties and emerged as the

premier force necessary to support tactical airlift missions operating away from fixed support

structures. By May of 1966, TAC and MAC jointly accepted the ALCE as the primary mobility

base establishing force. As airlift commitments continued to increase sharply, so too did the

requirement for the ALCEs. In fact, ALCEs were instrumental in numerous operations to include

the successful resupply of Khe Sahn and support during the Tet Offensive of 1968. By 1969,

mobility leadership imbedded 18 ALCEs within fixed aerial ports, solidifying the doctrinal

solution to the air support of ground forces basing and resupply.

Over the next two and a half decades, the worldwide structure of fixed locations continually

decreased. The ALCE proved to be the vehicle by which a mobility support presence was

inserted and bolstered, wherever and whenever requirements became known.12 Through

numerous humanitarian and disaster-relief missions, ALCEs were invaluable to mobility

operations abroad culminating in the outstanding support provided during Operations DESERT

SHIELD and DESERT STORM, which proved to be the pinnacle of base opening capability.13

Air Mobility Operations Group (AMOG) Concept and Practice

From the end of the Vietnam conflict until midway through the 1990s, the ALCEs

performed admirably. One sometimes-difficult process to overcome was the command

relationship of these units and their major commands. Specifically, ALCE units for the most part

still fell under the purview of TAC yet most of the aircraft, except numerous C-130 airframes,

11
Ibid., 118-119.
12
Ibid., 119-120.
13
Ibid., 120-122.

were under the MAC umbrella. Additionally, although the ALCE had its own command and

control infrastructure and associated personnel as well as some dedicated aerial port troops, when

called upon to establish a mobility presence, it still required formulation of an ad hoc team to

meet its numerous mission requirements. In April of 1997, as part of an overarching AF service

restructure under Air Mobility Command (AMC), many of these issues were resolved. AMC

streamlined mobility functions, realigning mobility missions under one command. This initiative

consolidated the numerous functions required to operate forward mobility operations under a

single unit, the Air Mobility Operations Group.14

The AMOG formally combined functions necessary to establish robust mobility support

infrastructure at locations where little or no presence exists. At the core of the AMOG was the

Tanker Airlift Control Element (TALCE). This easily pared and tailored unit consisted of

numerous Unit Type Codes (UTCs) merging primary functions of C3, aerial port, and aircraft

maintenance into a cohesive organization capable of rapid response to meet global requirements.

TALCEs established US presence, to include ramp operations, aircraft off and on-load

capability, aircraft maintenance, security, weather and other required support at airfields where

little or no mobility capability existed.15 These units significantly improved the already capable

ALCE mission, proving repeatedly the importance of a unit functionally aligned, equipped, and

trained to meet the rigors of global mobility base operating support. These TALCE units were

put to the test during Operations ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF).

14
Robert de V. Brunkow, Poised for the New Millennium: The Global Reach of the Air Mobility Command A

Chronology, AMC/Historian’s Office, Scott AFB, IL. April 2001, 23.

15
Deployment FAQ, definition found at Joint Doctrine Training Center website,

http://www.jdtc.jfcom.mil/DeploymentFAQ/faqpage1.htm

Contingency Basing Access – Tallil Case Study

During the period between the Vietnam conflict and the current contingencies in Iraq and

Afghanistan, numerous situations requiring mobility basing access and force bed-down necessity

arose. However, for the most part, this period did not require the establishment of robust

capabilities able to support possible long-term operations in less than permissive environments.

The horrific terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 changed this fact for the unforeseeable

future. During OEF and even more so in OIF, the need to seize, assess, and establish forward

airbases became necessary. Although the TALCEs performed admirably during this period,

significant shortfalls in inherent functions became blatantly apparent. Planners quickly realized,

to bring their aggressive base opening requirements to fruition, it would take the coordinated

skills of numerous organizations, including joint and possibly even coalition forces. The opening

of Tallil AB in Southern Iraq is an excellent example from which to study future base opening

operations.16

The events surrounding the planning and execution of opening Tallil AB are complex. The

following is a brief synopsis of the operation, to include the identification of the numerous joint

forces required to work in unison to open an air base in a less than permissive environment.

Ultimately, this research will show as the US and its Allies embarked on the Global War on

Terror (GWOT), no organization ideally suited with the overarching base opening capability

existed.

As planning for the opening of air bases in Iraq began it became apparent there were gaps

between initial base occupation by a seizure force and the establishment of air operations. To fill

this seam, AMC developed the Global Assessment Team (GAT) concept. This highly

16
Lt Col “Critter” Krepps, USAF, AMC Annex Manager Brief for PPLAN 05-06, Deployable AMOG Restructure,
AMC/DA31, 28 Mar 2005, slide 22.

experienced eight-person team would be the initial mobility eyes on the ground to determine

first, if mobility operations could be conducted, and if so, what follow-on forces would best meet

the needs of projected mission beddown. This team, lead by an experienced mobility O-6, would

be composed of experts in security, communications, airfield operations, and civil engineering.17

The initial seizure of Tallil Air Base commenced on 22 March. The plan included imbedding

an AF assessment team, led by Colonel A. Ray Myers, deputy commander, 621st AMOG,

McGuire AFB, within the 3rd Infantry Division (ID) convoy from Kuwait. Once the 3rd ID

secured the field and swept for unexploded munitions, the GAT was cleared to perform their

assessment duties. After a speedy but thorough evaluation of the infrastructure and pavements,

and coordination of continued airfield perimeter-security requirements with the seizure force, the

23rd Special Tactics team began establishment of initial Air Traffic Control (ATC) capability.

The following morning the 621st TALCE began arriving via tactical airlift officially transitioning

from the airfield seizure to the “open the base” phase of operations. Over the course of the next

week, the TALCE received follow-on forces from the 820th Force Protection Group as well as

the 392nd Air Expeditionary Group, to establish an A-10 Forward Operating Base (FOB). Only

nine days after initial airfield seizure, Colonel John Dobbins and his Whiteman AFB reserve A

10s launched their first combat sortie.18 Through lessons learned and after action analysis, senior

mobility leadership determined Tallil base opening was extremely successful and laid the

foundation for an additional seven strategic base opening operations depicted in figure 1.

17
Col. W.J. Tomczak, et al., AMC/A3X, Global Mobility CONOPS in Action – Opening Airbases in Iraq, brief
given at 2003 Airlift Tanker Association Convention, 21 October, 2003, slide 45.
18
Major William J. Demarco, First in! Expeditionary Airbase seizure and Operations, Power Projection Through
Mobility Warriors, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL, June 2004, 48
53.

10

 Bashur Kirkuk
AB

Balad AB

Bushmaster
LZ

H1

Tallil AB

Baghdad

Figure 1.

The GAT and TALCE base-opening benchmark depended heavily on having mobility

experts on the ground. For instance, the assessment team was critical to bridging the often

complex gap between seizure and air base opening phases. Additionally, having an AF senior

airfield authority on site to integrate with land component leadership at the earliest stages of the

operations added enormous value. Of course, leadership also identified opportunities where

improvements were necessary. Mobility warriors learned for future base opening success

challenges such as more robust imbedded security presence, an inherent ATC capability, and

11

increased training in joint force application and doctrine was crucial.19 While integrated process

teams examined the future of base opening, the TALCEs were again called on to provide a

timely mobility presence, but this time the adversary was Mother Nature.

TALCE Swan Song – South Asia Tsunami Relief

It was a Christmas to remember, but not for joyous reasons. On December 26, 2004, a

magnitude 9.0 earthquake struck the Indian Ocean off the western coast of Sumatra. It created a

tsunami that devastated the coastal regions of South and Southeast Asia, killing more than

160,000 people and leaving millions without homes. Immediately after learning of the

catastrophe, US planners, including TALCEs from Travis AFB in California and Anderson AB

in Guam, began setting the stage for the enormous humanitarian relief operations to follow.

The worst devastation that nature can inflict …

Figure 220

19
Croslen, 7-8.

20
“Tsunami Relief Airlift Southeast Asia,” January 2005, Briefing prepared by CSF-536 JFACC Public Affairs,

Hicham AFB, HI, 17 Jan 05.

12

 Within 36 hours, the first TALCEs hit the tarmac in Utaphao, Thailand. Shortly thereafter, a

GAT, led by Colonel Stephen Burgess, 615th AMOG Deputy Group Commander, began critical

on-site airfield assessments throughout the affected region to determine the most suitable

forward distribution locations. In all, hundreds of AMOG troops joined the nearly 18,000 armed

forces personnel who contributed to the distribution of over 15 million tons of relief supplies

(figure 3).21 Major General David Deptula, Joint Forces Air Component Commander for

Combined Support Force 536, praised the contributions of the teams proclaiming “The TALCEs

were critical to maintaining and establishing order on these remote airfields in some pretty

austere conditions. Without them, we couldn’t have accomplished everything we did. They were

worth their weight in gold.”22 Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE validated the importance of

base opening forces capable of flexibility to respond to missions outside the contingency realm.

(Above) U.S. Air Force airmen load

loa
food and water onto an aid flight
fligh
bound for Banda Aceh, ata Halim
Hali Air
Force Base in Jakarta, Indonesia.
Indonesia
(Courtesy AP)
AP
(Right) Members of the Mobility Support
Suppor
Team in Banda Aceh, Indonesia
Indonesi
Help unload supplies bound for victims
UNCLASSIFIED
of the tsunami. (Courtesy AP)
AP

Figure 3

21
Ibid.

22
Major Stacee N. Baco, “Unsung Heroes: TALCE Ops Critical to OUA Success,” Article from PACAF Public

Affairs available at http://www.emilitary.org/article.php?aid=1735.

13
 From a historical viewpoint, the US Air Force has found success as its mission of mobility

support and base opening has progressed. It has been able to transition as technology and

doctrine has evolved from a large forward presence following WWII to the post Cold War

increasingly expeditionary nature. The pre-9/11 world found the AF opening bases in areas with

robust infrastructure and a permissive environment. Much of this theory regarding opening bases

simply is not withstanding the reality test of the post-9/11environment. Forces since 9/11 work in

austere conditions, with little to nothing in terms of usable infrastructure.23 Mobility leadership

has recognized these shortcomings and is developing new capabilities to meet future base

opening challenges.

Headquarters AF is currently developing an Airbase Opening Enabling Concept of

Operations (CONOPS) to better articulate how AF forces deploy and employ to establish global

basing access. In the next chapter, this research will provide a broad-brush discussion of this

overarching CONOPS and the mechanism the AF and joint community currently employs to

meet its airbase opening construct.

23
Demarco, 6-8.

14

 Current Airbase Opening Construct

The 21st century military instrument of power is no longer simply a capability required to

meet conventional enemies using force on force. Its new adversaries are elusive, transnational

and unconventional, endeavoring to avoid US strengths and employ asymmetric and guerilla

methods and means. Additionally, although not a new concept, as arguably the sole remaining

superpower, the US finds itself at the lead of nearly every level of global crisis response from

humanitarian assistance to disaster relief. In light of these challenges, the US, through the

National Military Strategy (NMS), places increased emphasis on rapid and global force

employment, endurance, and efficiency to achieve strategic, operational and tactical objectives.24

Key enablers underlying these essential traits are the USAF distinctive capabilities of rapid

Global Mobility (GM) and Agile Combat Support (ACS). Global Mobility is uniquely equipped

to provide combatant commanders with the planning, C2, and operations capabilities to enable

rapid, timely, and effective projection, employment, and sustainment of US power in support of

US global interests. In turn, ACS is the ability to create, protect, and sustain air and space forces

across the full range of military operations. To effectively provide the Joint Force Commanders

airbase access and support for sustainment at all levels of operation, the AF developed the

Airbase Opening (ABO) Concept.25

The ABO Concept establishes roles, articulates desired effects and identifies assumptions

and risks spanning the life cycle of airbase operations. The CONOPS provides building blocks

24
National Military Strategy, A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow, Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

Pentagon, Washington DC, 2004.

25
Airbase Opening Enabling Concept, Version 1.0, HQ AF/A5XS, April 2006.

15

from initial planning and airfield seizure to operational utilization and base closure. Figure 4

below is a graphic depiction of the overarching concept spanning the four key stages; airbase

opening, establish the airbase, operate the airbase and close the base. Each phase is extremely

important and integral to the overall success of the base utilization; however, this research will

focus on the first stage - airbase opening.26

Expeditionary Airbase Operating Enabling Concepts

Four Stages of Expeditionary Airbase Life Cycle

Airbase Opening Establish Operate Close

COMMAND &
C2
CONTROL
GENERATE
GENERATE THE
MISSION
PLAN SEIZE* OPEN THE ESTABLISH THE OPERATE THE
OPEN
AIRBASE ESTABLISH
AIRBASE AIRBASE OPERATE CLOSE

Airbase Opening
• Provides a standardized methodology on how forces will plan, coordinate seizure
operations and prepare to open an airbase in an expeditionary environment
* Seizure is normally a joint operation performed by the USA, USMC or SOF
Establish the Airbase
• Describes the build-up of forces and equipment, infrastructure development and requisite
C3 and security measures to bring the airbase to an initial operating capability to support
most missions or weapon systems
Operate the Airbase
• Describes the integration of all preceding capabilities to bring the airbase to a full
operational capability in order to support the designated mission(s) / mission evolutions
Close the Airbase
• Describes airbase closure measures and redeployment efforts to effectively end the
expeditionary airbase lifecycle and return the base to the host nation
* Planning commences during the opening phase

Figure 4

Airbase Opening – Filling the Seam for Success

The ultimate goal of any airbase-opening mission is “to rapidly open an airbase for the JFC

at the time and place of his choosing.”27 This general statement can be expanded to include a

myriad of desired effects ultimately giving each operation its uniqueness. Important details

ranging from the expected follow-on mission (contingency flying operations, humanitarian relief

distribution point, or Aerial Port of Debarkation (APOD)) to level of access and the threat

26
Ibid., 4-5.
27
Ibid., 7.

16

environment (permissive, uncertain or hostile) are critical to successfully task the proper forces

for rapid airbase opening. As in most military operations, success begins with mission planning.

There is no cookie cutter approach to planning a base opening operation. In many cases,

military experts anticipate the need for access and prepare through campaign or operational level

planning. In other cases, a sudden natural disaster or unanticipated world event greatly

compresses the response timeline. Regardless of timeline, this author feels to be successful in

preparing for any global access requirement; well-trained warriors versed in the full spectrum of

airbase opening must accomplish the planning. These professionals must be able to fill the gaps

or “seams” created in the ever-evolving joint and coalition environment that is airbase opening.

The AF has laid the foundation for airbase opening success by creating the Contingency

Response Group concept.

17

 Contingency Response Groups

As discussed earlier in this research, the AF has been relatively successful in its ability to

gain access to basing in arenas where little or no mobility presence exists, albeit at times in a

somewhat ad hoc fashion. The ever-growing expeditionary nature of the US military coupled

with the need to participate in the full spectrum of military operations has driven the need for

improvements in rapid mobility access. Mobility warriors increasingly play integral roles in the

process to secure and protect airfields, rapidly assess and open airbases, and perform initial

airfield operations to ensure smooth transition to subsequent operations, regardless of user. In

early 2003, then Air Force Chief of Staff General John P. Jumper, challenged AMC to develop a

unique organization capable of handling this role. He envisioned a unit similar to the regional

capability he created as Commander of European Command, the 86th CRG.28 In early 2005, his

idea came to fruition as the 621st and 615th AMOGs transformed into Contingency Response

Wings, and with them six CRGs.

CRG Mission and Desired Effects

The Air Force Contingency Response Group CONOPS describes the CRGs as the AF’s first

responders for opening airbases with its primary mission to provide seamless transition for

airfield seizure to airbase opening to force employment and sustainment in concert with follow-

on force modules and theater-assigned mobility forces across the full spectrum of airbase

28
Jumper, Gen, John P. USAF, “Rapidly Deployable Aerospace Power,” Aerospace Power Journal, Winter 1999,
Vol.13, Issue 4, 4.

18

operations.29 They organize, train and equip to provide short-notice tasking response capability

as the Combatant Commander’s first-on-the-scene AF operational and support force.

The CRG is designed with numerous fundamental operating characteristics. First, they must

have the ability to operate in permissive and uncertain environments as well as austere

conditions. Next, they must be able to operate where deployment and redeployment speed is of

the essence. Finally, they must maintain a rapid response capability. They are chartered to

respond in as little as 12 hours from receipt of deployment orders. Ultimately, the CRGs are

light, lean and quick to deploy units composed of versatile personnel who are both warfighters

and functional experts.30 This research will now examine the core capabilities necessary to

achieve the above desired effects and characteristics.

CRG Core Capabilities

The CRG is uniquely structured to provide the capabilities to open an airbase, both from an

operational perspective as well as ensuring primary base operating support. In total, the CRG has

113 personnel spanning 39 AF career fields with the responsibility for numerous broad tasks. On

a macro scale, the primary mission tasks include initial airbase assessment, aerial port operations,

mobile C2, airlift quick-turn maintenance, and numerous base operating support missions.31 The

following is a more detailed list of the core CRG capabilities.

• Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations

• Forward Deployed Command Element and Structure
• Force Protection Operations
• Force Health Protection Operations
• Hazardous Material Certification for Air Shipment
• Airfield Assessment, Survey and Establishment

29
Air Force Contingency Response Group Operational Concept, Version 1.0, HQ/AF XOXS and HQ AMC A35,

Apr 2004, 6-7.

30
Ibid.,4.

31
Air Mobility Master Plan 2006, HQ AMC/A8XPL, Scott AFB, IL, available at https://private.amc.af.mil. 125.

19

 • Terminal Navigation Aids/Mobile Microwave Landing System (MMLS), Terminal

Control Assessment
• Air Base Ground Defense Survey and Operations
• Weapons System Security
• Intelligence Analysis
• Humanitarian Relief Operations
• Disaster Response
• Bare-base Planning
• Expeditionary Bed-down Operations Contingency Contracting
• Contingency Financial Management
• Fuel Assessment and Management
• Environmental Medical Assessments
• Mounted and Dismounted Area Patrolling
• Utility Capacity and Access Assessment
• Weather Services
• In-transit Visibility (ITV) Service
• Night Vision Goggle Aircraft/Ground Operating Service
• Quick-turn Maintenance Services
• Aircraft Passenger/Cargo Handling Services
• Aircrew/Base Operations services
• Air Traffic Control (ATC) Services32

CRG Sequence of Operations

A CRG, because of the wide array of missions it is tasked to support, must be highly skilled

and flexible to adapt to rapidly changing operational requirements. To aid in this, CRGs should

be equipped with state-of-the-art equipment to facilitate all aspects of its operations from airfield

assessment to redeployment. In addition, many times the CRG may be providing the initial

deployment location leadership and airfield operations tempo. This may include change of

airfield authority and handoff from joint or coalition seizure forces to initial contact and

relationship building with host nation leadership. To assume this critical role, the CRG is

commanded by a senior field grade officer (O-6).33 A typical CRG employment follows.

32
Air Force Contingency Response Group Operational Concept, Version 1.0, HQ/AF XOXS and HQ AMC A35,

Apr 2004, 6-7.

33
Ibid., 7-13.

20

 CRGs are extremely capable and can support varying levels of operations. In most

situations, following extensive mission planning a CRG assessment team (AT) deploys to a

prospective location to determine the overall capability of the potential mission beddown. This

eight-member team consists of the most experienced base opening personnel in flying and

airfield operations, civil engineering, communications, and force protections specialties. The AT

provides the seam between the on-site forces or host nation and remainder of the CRG. If the

location proves to be adequate for the projected operation, the remaining CRG arrives to perform

its litany of mission essential tasks. In most cases, the CRG is not a sustainment force and will

receive augmentation; however, if the planned operation appears to require more than 45 days to

complete, a more robust force, such as an Air Expeditionary Mission Support Group, will be

tasked.34

In the current environment of ever-increasing operations tempos and defense spending in

support of the GWOT, and decreased defense dollars available for modernization and other

transformational initiatives, the AF has made the tough but correct decision to develop the CRG

capabilities. The AF is striving for eight fully manned and equipped CRGs, one each assigned to

US Air Forces, Europe and Pacific Air Forces, as well as three at the two Contingency Response

Wings (CRWs) at McGuire and Travis AFBs.

In their short existence, the AF CRGs have proven their worth, successfully supporting

numerous contingency operations in OIF and OEF as well as direct support for humanitarian

efforts in response to earthquake-devastated Pakistan and the hurricane ravaged US Gulf Coast.

As the AF strives to fulfill its CRG airbase access capability, USTRANSCOM has initiated a

joint APOD opening initiative. The birth of the Joint Task Force-Port Opening concept is a

logical step to streamline cargo and troop movement in support of worldwide operations.

34
Lt Col Joseph A. Zahn, Personal experience as a member of an AF CRG.

21

 Joint Task Force-Port Opening

The JTF-PO concept is not a revolution in base opening operations. In fact, according to the

latest version of the JTF-PO CONOPS, it simply builds upon the existing AF CRG operational

concept.35 It is important to understand, however, why this initiative is being undertaken when

the CRG concept is years from maturation. As with any reasonable concept, its roots are found in

history. The JTF-PO concept is no exception, although it does not have to look very far back.

Recent US military operations in support of Central Command (Pakistani Earthquake),

Pacific Command (Asian Tsunami – Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE) and Northern

Command (Hurricane Katrina), underscored the need to better integrate the deployment and

distribution capabilities of USTRANSCOM and other national providers to support theater

operations. These recent humanitarian and disaster relief operations revealed shortcomings in

capabilities to respond to these events including ad hoc C2, limited connectivity to JFC

command and control centers, minimal airfield/distribution assessment, limited ability for rapid

port clearance, limited in-transit visibility, and minimal movement control over distribution

operations. The JTF-PO concept hopes to leverage AF Air Mobility Command and Army

Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) expertise to eliminate gaps or

shortfalls and provide a ready, joint capability to rapidly open and operate a port and conduct

initial distribution operations. 36

The capabilities required to rapidly establish deployment and distribution networks or

expand existing networks are dispersed among a number of Services in both the active and

35
Joint Task Force-Port Opening (Aerial Port of Debarkation) Concept of Operations, HQ USTRANSCOM Joint
Theater Distribution/Logistics Division, Scott AFB, IL, 19 May 2006, 2.

22

reserve component. Only the AF CRG currently provides assigned forces to support

USTRANSCOM’s requirement for rapid contingency response operations. However, AMC

forces do not possess requisite surface distribution capabilities. Access to these surface

distribution capabilities has historically required a lengthy Request for Forces (RFF) process.

This bureaucracy has delayed or sometimes prevented the timely establishment of an organized

joint network of deployment and distribution nodes and the capabilities to effectively support the

theater of operations.37

JTF-PO Mission and Desired Effects

Simply stated, the mission of the JTF-PO is to “provide a joint expeditionary capability to

rapidly establish and initially operate a port of debarkation and distribution node, facilitating port

throughput in support of COCOM executed contingencies.”38To accomplish this mission the

JTF-PO will add the capabilities of the US Army movement-control unit to the existing CRG to

capitalize on existing techniques and procedures for contingency response and to ease integration

of the separate functions. The end state can be best described using USTRANSCOM’s proposed

four desired effects.

First, the JTF-PO is an enabling force whose capabilities are tailorable to support the rapid

establishment of APODs and their associated distribution nodes. Next, the JTF-PO team will

ensure a synchronized air and surface initial deployable and distribution operation by adding

functionality to coordinate cargo and passenger movement-control activities between previously

stove-piped units. Third, the JTF-PO will establish and operate joint In-transit Visibility (ITV)

and Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) networks to better support the accountability and

36
Ibid., 1.
37
Ibid., 2.
38
Ibid., 3.

23
movement of conveyance means such as containers and 463L pallets, nets, and tie down devices.

Finally, the concept hopes to leverage, when necessary, CRG capability to follow and support

joint forcible entry operations ensuring seamless transitions from seizure forces.39

JTF-PO Capabilities and Characteristics

Like the CRG before it, the DOD envisions the JTF-PO will have the capability to respond

to the full range of military operations and employment to meet requirements in austere and

uncertain environments. It will be scalable and modular, uniquely shaped to meet the nature of

the specific operational scenario. The following is an abbreviated list of its capabilities:

• Maintain a Joint Assessment Team (JAT) (air and surface) and JTF-PO element ready to
deploy within 12 hours of notification
• Assess the APOD and supporting distribution network
• Integrate standardized comm and ITV/RFID networks into JFC & theater architectures
• Establish command and control for distribution throughput
• Open and initially operate each APOD with an associated forward distribution node (e.g.,
cargo marshalling or transload location) within 10 kilometers (KM) of airfield ramp area
• Establish initial distribution network from the APOD to one forward distribution node
• Incorporate commercial transportation assets as required to conduct movement operations
• Execute required local contracting for services not inherent in core capabilites
• Establish communications connectivity and reporting with appropriate operations centers,
C2 entities or supporting organizations as prescribed
• Receive arriving passengers and cargo
• Provide movement control and coordinate transportation for onward movement of cargo
and passengers from the APOD to JFC directed locations
• Provide cargo movement from the APOD to a theater forward distribution node
• Establish joint ITV and RFID networks at the APOD and one forward distribution node
consistent with operational requirements, with the goal of 100 percent ITV
• Provide limited (personal and point security) JTF-PO force protection
• Transition JTF-PO operations to follow-on theater sustaining forces, interagency, non
governmental, host nation or contract support within 45-60 days of arrival in theater40

39
Ibid., 2-4.
40
Ibid., 5.

24

 The current JTF-PO force structure will incorporate the 113 person CRG and its core tasks

mentioned in the previous chapter with a surface movement-control unit as well as additional

support personnel as required. See figure 5 for a graphic depiction of a notional JTF-PO.41

JTF-PO (APOD) Organization

Personnel
CDR & Staff 3
JAT 12 (8 Air, 4 Sfc)
JTF-PO CDR Air Element 61
JAT Surface Element 62
(O-6 AF Leader)
(O-6)
Total 138
Air Surface
Scenario dependent
• JAT Capabilities Support Element 60
• Airfield Assessment (ATC, Afld Mgt, SF)
• Surface Distribution Assessment
Jt Ops Ctr
Air Element Leader Surface Element Leader
Support Element Support Element
(O-5) (O-5)

Cargo Movement
C2 / Ops Port Maintenance
Transfer Control

• Air Element Capabilities • Surface Element Capabilities

• Command and Control • Pax/Cargo Clearance
• Aircraft Maintenance Support • Movement Control
• Pax/Cargo Handling • Cargo Transfer
• C4S / ITV • RFID / ITV

Figure 5

JTF-PO Sequence of Operations

The overall sequence of deployment, employment and redeployment will be very similar to

that of the CRG. Ideally, the entire JTF-PO should be collocated at a point of embarkation then

deployed into theater to either a staging base or directly to the area of operation. Similar to other

base opening operations, it will be critical to accomplish robust planning and an assessment of

41
Ibid., A-1.

25

the potential location for feasibility before the arrival of the JTF-PO main body. The five-phase

sequence of operations is below.42

JTF-PO Sequence of Operations

Phase I Phase II Phase III Phase IV Phase V

Preparation Joint Deploy Transition Reconstitution
GCC/JFC Assessment Open
Request Operate
45-60 Days

C-Day

A
JAT JTF-PO JTF-PO
GCC/JFC
Pre-, RIP/TOA RTB
OPCON
C B APOD, or Rotational
Node Redeploy
A
JTF-PO GCC/JFC JTF-PO
Rotational Request Operational
Forces C B

Figure 6

Both the CRG and the JTF-PO are on track to meet future airbase opening requirements for

the COCOMs; however, there are still numerous shortfalls to bring these organizations to full

mission capability. The parent commands of both AF and Army components must make the

manning, equipping and training of the CRGs and JTF-POs a top priority. Additionally, the DOD

must continue to explore the next generation of air basing access to stay ahead of the ever-

changing global environment. In the next chapter, this research will identify and discuss the

challenges and issues facing CRGs, JTF-POs and beyond.

42
Ibid., 8.

26

 Future Base Opening Challenges

One would be hard pressed to argue the requirement for airbase opening and access will

cease or diminish in the near future. On the contrary, based on the current US and coalition

military commitments around the world, be it contingencies, peace keeping or humanitarian

operations, even more robust capabilities may be required. Ensuring the current CRGs and JTF-

POs have the right mix of personnel, equipment, and doctrine to accomplish their missions is the

first important step. Additionally, US popularity around the globe seems to be dwindling at an

alarming rate. It is critical the DOD take action to encourage and facilitate further joint and even

coalition initiatives in hopes of creating more capable, flexible and responsive base opening

forces to meet future challenges.

Meeting Today’s Challenges-CRG and JTF-PO Issues

With the standup of any new mission or organization, there are always limiting factors and

difficulties and the two current base opening forces are no exception. One could write a novel

detailing the requirements and shortfalls that still need to be hammered out before the CRG and

JTF-PO reach their full potential. The following examples are a few of the overarching

challenges AMC, SDDC or TRANSCOM must overcome to ensure future base opening success.

Arguably, the most critical component to any military operation, including base opening, is

force structure. It is imperative that the right mix of personnel, skill sets and experience levels be

compiled for mission success, especially to survive in the extremely complex, volatile, and ever

changing environments where base opening teams operate. The services currently find

27

themselves overwhelmed with manpower shortfalls and are unable to meet CRG and JTF-PO

requirements. For example, in the CRG, one of the most undermanned and over utilized career

fields is security forces. To alleviate the shortfalls, the CRWs are establishing augmentation

plans with host AMC wings and outside organizations such as the 820th Security Forces

Squadron in Georgia to meet their global commitments. Additionally, the inability to fully staff

the medical FFGRL UTCs or permanently assign these medical experts to the CRGs they will

deploy with is creating huge training and mission manning challenges. Under the JTF-PO

umbrella, with commitments in OIF and OEF depleting available personnel, SDDC is only able

to fill one 62-man requirement and is tasking its reserve units to research how the other

requirements will be met.43 These examples highlight major manpower issues facing the entire

DOD. As difficult as it may be, a greater priority must be made to solve the base opening

organizations personnel issues or suffer the consequences of not being able to meet the JFC’s

base opening and access requirements. The next issue this research will address is joint beddown

and interoperability.

Unit cohesion and the ability to “practice like you play” has become a major hurdle for the

integration of the CRGs with the army’s movement-control piece of the JTF-PO. To truly be an

organization capable of jointly integrated base opening and APOD development, the forces need

to coexist. It should be the desire and the plan of AMC and SDDC to improve cohesion, training

and interoperability by bedding the units at the same location. As difficult as this undertaking

may be, the reward to having the entire base opening force cohabitate will reap great benefits.

From daily in-garrison training on equipment and tactics to reduction or elimination of service

43
Military Surface Deployment & Distribution Command (SDDC) Supplement to USTRANSCOM Joint Task
Force-Port Opening (Aerial Port of Debarkation) Draft Concept of Operations, Scott AFB, IL, 08 June 2006.

28

parochialism, integrated beddown will make the JTF-PO a much more cohesive unit when

deployed. Additionally, USTRANSCOM must solve the problems of interoperability.

The ability to communicate on the battlefield is hugely important in today’s complex

warfighting environment. This is true with the CRG and JTF-PO missions as well. The mobility

leadership must leverage existing capabilities such as the AF’s Air Mobility Warfare Center to

create a CRG/JTF-PO “Center of Excellence.” Dedicated experts in the base opening mission

must strive for more robust and unique interpretabilities, especially with regard to equipment.

From heavy machinery such as material handling equipment (MHE) to hand held radios for

communications capability, there is enormous room for improvement. Initiatives to improve and

streamline operations as well as reduce the already huge footprint concerns facing the

deployment of these units are paramount to future successes.

The CRGs and JTF-POs are expeditionary units with requirements to be ready for

deployment within 12 hours of notification. However, the current requirement to deploy a JTF

PO is 17 C-17 aircraft.44 This enormous footprint, although in many cases necessary for mission

accomplishment, is making it very difficult to be a true 911 emergency response force for the

COCOMs. Senior leadership must empower their mobility warriors to develop outside-the-box

solutions to the problems with rapidly deploying these teams. In addition to searching for next

generation equipment mentioned above, mobility leadership should consider the possibility of

pre-positioning CRG and JTF-PO equipment closer to the supported areas of operation. An even

more challenging but potentially useful solution may be to redistribute JTF-POs and CRGs to

specific AORs. For instance, by leaving one unit at their existing locations on each US coast then

relocating the remaining teams under GCC purview, more regionally focused base opening

44
Joint Task Force-Port Opening (Aerial Port of Debarkation) Concept of Operations, HQ USTRANSCOM Joint
Theater Distribution/Logistics Division, Scott AFB, IL, 19 May 2006.

29

teams could be formed. The challenges and issue discussed in previous pages merely scratch the

surface but hope to show with dedication of brave mobility airmen and soldiers, this extremely

important capability of base opening is achievable.

Future Base Opening-Potential Long Term Solutions

The mission and capabilities of both the CRG and JTF-PO are critical to future base opening

however, USTRANSCOM must make efforts to reduce service parochialisms and avoid mission

creep. As mentioned, the short-term solution for these concerns is to improve operations between

these units through more robust joint training and development of cooperative tactics, technique

and procedures (TTP). However, there is a long-term solution which this author feels will vastly

improve the base opening concept and provide the COCOMs a more flexible, tailorable, and

responsive capability in the future. The DOD should merge the various base opening units into

Joint Contingency Response Groups (JCRGs).

The Joint Contingency Response Group idea is not entirely new. During USTRANSCOM’s

development of a more capable APOD opening force, the JTF-PO, then USTRANSCOM Deputy

Commander, LTG Robert Dail, initiated discussion of a fully combined air and ground

capability. Because of fiscal, time, and parochial constraints, the concept never materialized.45

To best utilize the expertise of the joint force as well as correct many of the deficiencies

mentioned in the previous paragraphs, the AF CRG and JTF-PO should be fully integrated into

JCRGs. The combination of these highly skilled professional organizations should not stop there.

The integration of the CRG and JTF-PO ensures base opening from seizure force handoff to

forward movement of troops and cargo to a staging base 10 km from the APOD.

45
Lt Gen, Robert T. Dail, USA, from a brief titled “Joint Theater Logistics-Distribution “Organizational Construct”,
5-7.

30
USTRANSCOM can greatly improve mobility and logistics support to the warfighter by

incorporating the next logical step to the JCRG, theater distribution. The Defense Logistics

Agency (DLA) is developing the Deployable Distribution Center (DDC) Concept with the goal

of meeting the COCOMs material distribution support across the full range of contingency

operations. From initial assessment through the final delivery of valuable support, adding the

DDC capability to the JCRG will leverage DLA competencies. The integration of the DDC into

the JCRG construct will significantly enhance operations providing the warfighter “the right

items, at the right place, in the right quantities, at the right time.” 46

The DOD now operates in an age of ever-decreasing overseas military presence that is

“permanent” in nature and must continue to improve upon its global basing access capability.

Although arguably difficult to attain in today’s challenging fiscally limited environment, moving

to a truly Joint base opening mission could pay great dividends for future US military operations.

From integration of redundant skills to improved interoperability of forces, the opportunities to

streamline operations and ultimately support the warfighter are attainable. USTRANSCOM must

partner with organizations such as DLA to provide guidance and allocate resources, to make

Joint Contingency base opening a reality. The future of base opening is now!

46
The Defense Logistics Agency Deployable Distribution Center Concept of Operations, Draft Version 3.1,
September, 2006, DLA Office of Operations Research and Resource Analysis, i-iv.

31

 Conclusions
The ability to gain access to airfields and bases is not a new concept for the US military.

This paper has provided a historical glimpse of modern air base opening from the limited use of

non-improved airstrips in WWII and Korea through the complex joint operations witnessed

during the current Global War on Terror. Whether well organized and executed or simply ad hoc

and adequate, air base opening has been successful. In an attempt to provide order to an often

complex and disorganized capability, AMC developed the Contingency Response Groups.

Although still in its infancy, these elite teams have performed admirably and validated the need

for a single air base opening organization. Even more recently, USTRANSCOM initiated the

development of a joint unit combining the AF CRG skills with Army movement control

capability to streamline APOD opening. Both the CRG and the JTF-PO are valuable resources

available to the COCOMs to ensure access anywhere the global environment calls.

This paper argues these units can and should be the mainstay of future base opening

operations. The DOD must continuously strive to improve these relevant capabilities with the

proper force structure, modernized equipment, and beddown infrastructure. Ultimately, the ideal

DOD base opening organization should be the combination of all major components into one

distinct capability, the Joint Contingency Response Group.

32

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