Civpro3

platinum tours and travel v jose panlilio

f:

-platinum filed a complaint for a sum of money against pan asiatic travel corpo (PATC) before rtc branch
62 of makati

-rtc decided in favor of platinum. writ of execution issued whereby manila polo club propriety
membership in the name of galvez was levied

-private respo panlilio filed a motion to intervene on the ground that galve had executed in his favor a
chattel mortgage over his shares in the manila polo club before rtc branch 146. rtc denied this motion

This Court has to deny the motion because (1) a decision had already been rendered in this case and
that the only matters at issue is the propriety of the execution; (2) it will only delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties; and, (3) the Intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in
a separate action.

-panlilio filed a collection case against galvez = raffled to branch 146

-panlilio again attempted to interven in the platinum vs patc case This Court has to deny the motion
because (1) a decision had already been rendered in this case and that the only matters at issue is the
propriety of the execution; (2) it will only delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original
parties; and, (3) the Intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate action.

-judge of 146 granted the motion for consolidation on condition that Judge Roberto Diokno of Branch 62
would not object thereto. Judge Diokno later issued an order, dated July 23, 1996, allowing the
consolidation of the two cases and setting for hearing Panlilio’s application for a writ of preliminary
attachment.

-94-1634 = platinum v patc/ 96-365 = collection case against galvez

-Platinum, as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 94-1634, moved to reconsider the July 23, 1996 order of Judge
Diokno but its motion was denied.

On January 31, 1997, Platinum filed a petition for certiorari at the Court of Appeals assailing, among
others, the July 23, 1996 order of Judge Diokno allowing the consolidation of Civil Case No. 96-365 and
Civil Case No. 94-1634.

In a decision dated January 15, 1998, the Court of Appeals annulled the assailed order but left it to Judge
Diokno to decide whether to return Civil Case No. 96-365 to Judge Tensuan in Branch 146, or to keep it
in his docket and decide it as a separate case.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Platinum filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals, praying that
Civil Case No. 96-365 be returned to Branch 146 or re-raffled to another RTC Branch of Makati.
However, the motion was denied by the Court of Appeals on April 2, 1998.
In the instant petition, Platinum insists that the Makati RTC, Branch 62, has no jurisdiction to try Civil
Case No. 96-365. It argues that, when Judge Diokno’s July 23, 1996 order allowing the consolidation of
the two cases was annulled and set aside, RTC Branch 62’s basis for acquiring jurisdiction over Civil Case
No. 96-365 was likewise extinguished.

held:

Jurisdiction is the power and authority of the court to hear, try and decide a case. 6 In general,
jurisdiction may either be over the nature of the action, over the subject matter, over the person of the
defendants or over the issues framed in the pleadings.

Jurisdiction over the nature of the action and subject matter is conferred by law. It is determined by the
allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or
some of the claims asserted therein. 7 Jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff is acquired from the
time he files his complaint; while jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired by his
voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority, or by the coercive power of legal
processes exerted over his person.

Since jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine a particular case, it does not depend upon the
regularity of the exercise by the court of that power or on the correctness of its decisions.

In the case at bar, there is no doubt that Panlilio’s collection case docketed as Civil Case No. 96-365 falls
within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati, Branch 62. The fact that the Court of Appeals subsequently
annulled Judge Diokno’s order granting the consolidation of Civil Case No. 96-365 and Civil Case No. 94-
1634, did not affect the jurisdiction of the court which issued the said order.

"Jurisdiction" should be distinguished from the "exercise of jurisdiction." Jurisdiction refers to the
authority to decide a case, not the orders or the decision rendered therein. Accordingly, where a court
has jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, as in the instant case, the decision on all
questions arising from the case is but an exercise of such jurisdiction. Any error that the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is merely an error of judgment which does not affect its
authority to decide the case, much less divest the court of the jurisdiction over the case.

We find no reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals when it left to Judge Diokno of Branch 62
the discretion on whether to return Civil Case No. 96-365 to Branch 146 or to decide the same as a
separate case in his own sala.

Jurisdiction v venue

davao light v ca/ tesorero

f:

-dl filed a complaint for damagees against tesorero before the rtc of cebu

-tesorero filed a motion to dismiss because of improper venue. argued that cebu is the place of business
of davao light but its main office is at davao where it should be filed

-case was dismissed by rtc

-dl mr denied

-pet. for rev. denied by ca

-pet. to sc.

ISSUE:

Distinguish venue from jurisdiction.

Held:

Venue and jurisdiction are entirely distinct matters. Jurisdiction may not be conferred by consent or
waiver upon a court which otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of an action;
but the venue of an action as fixed by statute may be changed by the consent of the parties and an
objection that the plaintiff brought his suit in the wrong county may be waived by the failure of the
defendant to make a timely objection. In either case, the court may render a valid judgment. Rules as to
jurisdiction can never be left to the consent or agreement of the parties, whether or not a prohibition
exists against their alteration.

As held by this Court in Young Auto Supply Co. v. CA, in the Regional Trial Courts, all personal actions are
commenced and tried in the province or city where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or
may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.

It cannot be disputed that petitioners principal office is in Cebu City, per its amended articles of
incorporation and by-laws.

An action for damages being a personal action, venue is determined pursuant to Rule 4, section 2 of the
Rules of Court, to wit:

Venue of personal actions.All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of
the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in
the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.

Private respondent is not a party to any of the contracts presented before us. He is a complete stranger
to the covenants executed between petitioner and NAPOCOR, despite his protestations that he is privy
thereto, on the rather flimsy ground that he is a member of the public for whose benefit the electric
generating equipment subject of the contracts were leased or acquired.
We are likewise not persuaded by his argument that the allegation or representation made by petitioner
in either the complaints or answers it filed in several civil cases that its residence is in Davao City should
estop it from filing the damage suit before the Cebu courts. Besides there is no showing that private
respondent is a party in those civil cases or that he relied on such representation by petitioner
G.R. No. 145022 September 23, 2005
ARMAND NOCUM and THE PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, INC., Petitioners, vs. LUCIO TAN, Respondent.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Doctrine: Jurisdiction vs Venue; Venue can be waived in civil cases

FACTS: Lucio Tan filed a complaint against reporter Armand Nocum, Capt. Florendo Umali, ALPAP and Inquirer with
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, seeking moral and exemplary damages for the alleged malicious and defamatory
imputations contained in a news article. INQUIRER and NOCUM alleged that the venue was improperly laid, among
many others. It appeared that the complaint failed to state the residence of the complainant at the time of the alleged
commission of the offense and the place where the libelous article was printed and first published.

RTC dismissed the complaint without prejudice on the ground of improper venue. Aggrieved, Lucio Tan filed
an Omnibus Motion seeking reconsideration of the dismissal and admission of the amended complaint. In par. 2.01.1 of
the amended complaint, it is alleged that "This article was printed and first published in the City of Makati", and in par.
2.04.1, that "This caricature was printed and first published in the City of Makati"

RTC admitted the amended complaint and deemed set aside the previous order of dismissal stating that the
mistake or deficiency in the original complaint appears now to have been cured in the Amended Complaint. Also, there
is no substantial amendment, but only formal, in the Amended Complaint which would affect the defendants’ defenses
and their Answers.

Dissatisfied, petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. Two petitions for certiorari were filed, one filed by
petitioners and the other by defendants .The two petitions were consolidated. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Hence, this PETREV filed by the petitioners. Petitioners argue that since the original complaint only contained the office
address of respondent and not the latter’s actual residence or the place where the allegedly offending news reports
were printed and first published, the original complaint, by reason of the deficiencies in its allegations, failed to confer
jurisdiction on the lower court.

ISSUE: WON THE LOWER COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE CIVIL CASE UPON THE FILING OF
THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

HELD: YES. It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter
comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of action. Here, the RTC acquired
jurisdiction over the case when the case was filed before it. From the allegations thereof, respondent’s cause of action
is for damages arising from libel, the jurisdiction of which is vested with the RTC. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that it is the RTC that is specifically designated to try a libel case.

Petitioners are confusing jurisdiction with venue. The Hon. Florenz D. Regalado, differentiated jurisdiction and
venue as follows: (a) Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a case; venue is the place where the
case is to be heard or tried; (b) Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue, of procedural law; (c)
Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the court and the subject matter; venue, a relation between plaintiff
and defendant, or petitioner and respondent; and, (d) Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot be conferred by
the parties; venue may be conferred by the act or agreement of the parties.

Here, the additional allegations in the Amended Complaint that the article and the caricature were printed and
first published in the City of Makati referred only to the question of venue and not jurisdiction. These additional
allegations would neither confer jurisdiction on the RTC nor would respondent’s failure to include the same in the
original complaint divest the lower court of its jurisdiction over the case. Respondent’s failure to allege these allegations
gave the lower court the power, upon motion by a party, to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue was not
properly laid. The term "jurisdiction" in Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as referring to the place where actions
for libel shall be filed or "venue." The amendment was merely to establish the proper venue for the action. It is a well-
established rule that venue has nothing to do with jurisdiction, except in criminal actions. Assuming that venue were
properly laid in the court where the action was instituted, that would be procedural, not a jurisdictional impediment.
 The dismissal of the complaint by the lower court was proper considering that the complaint, indeed, on its
face, failed to allege neither the residence of the complainant nor the place where the libelous article was printed and
first published. Nevertheless, before the finality of the dismissal, the same may still be amended. In so doing, the court
acted properly and without any grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE: WON VENUE MAY BE WAIVED IN CIVIL CASES

HELD: YES. It is elementary that objections to venue in CIVIL ACTIONS arising from libel may be waived since they
do not involve a question of jurisdiction. The laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive, relating as it does
to jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject matter. Venue relates to trial and not to jurisdiction. It
is a procedural, not a jurisdictional, matter. It relates to the place of trial or geographical location in which an action or
proceeding should be brought and not to the jurisdiction of the court. It is meant to provide convenience to the parties,
rather than restrict their access to the courts as it relates to the place of trial. In contrast, in criminal actions, it is
fundamental that venue is jurisdictional it being an essential element of jurisdiction.

Petitioners’ argument that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the case because respondent failed to allege
the place where the libelous articles were printed and first published would have been tenable if the case filed were a
criminal case. The failure of the original complaint to contain such information would be fatal because this fact involves
the issue of venue which goes into the territorial jurisdiction of the court. This is not to be because the case before us
is a civil action where venue is not jurisdictional.

CA’s DECISION AFFIRMED.

Error of jurisdiction v error of judgment

filomena soneja v ca 2nd div and ramon saura

f:

-soneja leased a property from saura

-lease expired but soneja remained in the premises w/out payment

-soneja failed to pay the rental in arrears. thus complaint for ejectment

-mtc ruled in favor of saura

-soneja appealed before rtc. saura then filed a motion for execution where a property owned by soneja
was levied upon

-soneja filed a motion to lift the levy insisting that said property is a family home which is exempt from
execution

-rtc denied such motion for her failure to file a required memorandum

-pet rev under rule 42

-petitioner also filed a Rule 65 petition with the CA, challenging the RTC's denial of her motion for
reconsideration with respect to the levy on her property

-both were dismissed

-petition to sc via rule 65

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject
thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification
of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46

i: The sole issue is whether the CA acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in upholding the RTC's decision denying petitioner's motion to lift or revoke the levy on her
property argued to be a family home.

h:

- Petitioner maintains that the levied property is a family home acquired and constituted as their
family's residence in 1950. She also claims that her temporary sojourn in respondent's apartment unit in
Manila, following her husband's demise, should not be construed as having terminated the nature of the
property as a family home, pursuant to the provisions of the Family Code. Moreover, petitioner's
married son also stayed in the said family residence while she was temporarily staying in Manila

- Settled is the rule that a petition for certiorari is proper to correct only errors of jurisdiction committed
by respondent court, tribunal or administrative agency.18 Public respondent acts without jurisdiction if
it does not have the legal power to determine the case, or in excess of jurisdiction if it oversteps its
authority as determined by law. Grave abuse of discretion is committed when respondent acts in a
capricious, whimsical, arbitrary, or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction.19 In a petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the court is narrow in scope as it is
limited to resolving only cases of jurisdiction

- Here, petitioner argues that the CA gravely abused its discretion in affirming the denial of petitioner's
motion to lift or revoke levy without even passing upon the substantive issue on the propriety of levying
her family home

- The contention must fall. The appellate court, in its assailed resolution, amply explained the reason for
the affirmance of the RTC's decision:

-motion to lift the levy was set for hearing, neither soneja or her counsel appeared. was asked to file a
reply, did not file any

-Defendant failed to substantiate her claim that the levied property is a family home.
-The RTC also found, through Filomena's own admission, that she had not been actually residing in the
levied property but in the apartment unit she had leased from respondent, and that it was her married
son who was occupying the said property in her stead.

-All these support our view that no abuse of discretion has been committed by public respondent in
sustaining the RTC's decision. A determination of the merits of petitioner's contention would reveal that
whatever mistake may have been committed in the appraisal of the case - although we do not see any -
would, at best, constitute merely errors of judgment and not errors of jurisdiction. The proper recourse
should have been an appeal, not a petition for certiorari .

-Petitioner should have zealously raised the matter during the appeals proceeding before the RTC. Sadly,
she allowed the case to be dismissed following her failure to file the required memorandum. Still, she
could have insisted on the resolution of the said issue in her Petition for Review had she not allowed the
decision of the CA to lapse without filing a motion for reconsideration. Petitioner therefore has nobody
to blame but herself.

dismissed for lack of merit

donato v ca + 20 people

f:

-donato filed a complaint for forcible entry and unlawful detainer against 43 named defendants and “all
unknown occupants” of the subject property.

-donat alleged that they were under an oral lease contract. these people stopped paying rents hence the
current action

-only 20 of the respondents filed an answered alleging their rights under the urban land reform law

-mtc ruled in favor of the 20 respondents as guaranteed by the urban land reform law and against those
who did not file any answer

-donato appealed to the rtc which sustained mtc decision

-donat pet rev to ca which was denied because a) the certification of non-forum shopping was signed by
petitioner’s counsel and not by petitioner himself, in violation of Revised Circular No. 28-91

-donato filed a mr attaching then the duly authenticated original of the certification of non-forum
shopping signed by petitioner.

-CA denied ruling that “petitioner’s subsequent compliance did not cure the defect in the instant
petition.”
-donato now petitions to the sc alleging grave abuse of discretion (65)

I:

H:

Petitioner submits that a relaxation of the rigid rules of technical procedure is called for in view of the
attendant circumstances showing that the objectives of the rule on certification of non-forum shopping
and the rule requiring material portions of the record be attached to the petition have not been
glaringly violated and, more importantly, the petition is meritorious.

The proper recourse of an aggrieved party from a decision of the CA is a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, if the error, subject of the recourse, is one of jurisdiction,
or the act complained of was perpetrated by a court with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, the proper remedy available to the aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the said Rules. As enunciated by the Court in Fortich vs. Corona:19cräläwvirtualibräry

Anent the first issue, in order to determine whether the recourse of petitioners is proper or not, it is
necessary to draw a line between an error of judgment and an error of jurisdiction. An error of judgment
is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only
by an appeal. On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued
by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. This error is correctible only by the
extraordinary writ of certiorari.20

Inasmuch as the present petition principally assails the dismissal of the petition on ground of procedural
flaws involving the jurisdiction of the court a quo to entertain the petition, it falls within the ambit of a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

At the time the instant petition for certiorari was filed, i.e., on July 17, 1997, the prevailing rule is the
newly promulgated 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. However, considering that the CA Resolution being
assailed was rendered on March 21, 1997, the applicable rule is the three-month reglementary period,
established by jurisprudence.21 Petitioner received notice of the assailed CA Resolution dismissing his
petition for review on April 4, 1997. He filed his motion reconsideration on April 17, 1997, using up only
thirteen days of the 90-day period. Petitioner received the CA Resolution denying his motion on July 3,
1997 and fourteen days later, or on July 17, 1997, he filed a motion for 30-day extension of time to file a
petition for review which was granted by us; and petitioner duly filed his petition on August 15, 1997,
which is well-within the period of extension granted to him.
-non-forum shopping. donato was in another country at that time and under circumstances which would
render him physically impossible to sign the cert of nfs within the reglementary period

-Truly, in dismissing the petition for review, the CA had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction in putting a premium on technicalities at the expense of a just resolution of the
case.

-case remanded

CaseDig: Republic vs G Holdings, Inc.

G.R. No. 141241, 22 November 2005
FACTS:

On October 2, 1992, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the APT as its
trustee, and "G" Holdings culminated in the execution of a purchase and sale
agreement. Under the agreement, the Republic undertook to sell and deliver 90% of the
entire issued and outstanding shares of MMC, as well as its company notes, to "G"
Holdings in consideration of the purchase price of ₱673,161,280. It also provided for a
down payment of ₱98,704,000 with the balance divided into four tranches payable in
installment over a period of ten years.

Subsequently, a disagreement on the matter of when the installment payments should

commence arose between the parties. The Republic claimed that it should be on the
seventh month from the signing of the agreement while "G" Holdings insisted that it
should begin seven months after the fulfillment of the closing conditions.

Unable to settle the issue, "G" Holdings filed a complaint for specific performance and
damages with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 49, against the Republic to
compel it to close the sale in accordance with the purchase and sale agreement. RTC
ordered the plaintiff to pay the balance simultaneously with the delivery of the Deed of
Transfer and actual delivery of the shares and notes.

-No other judicial remedy was resorted to until July 2, 1999 when the Republic, through the APT, filed a
petition for annulment of judgment with the CA. It claimed that the decision should be annulled on the
ground of abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court. It
characterized the fashion by which the trial court handled the case as highly aberrant and peculiar
because the court a quo promulgated its decision prior to the submission of the Republic’s formal offer
of evidence and without ruling on the admissibility of the evidence offered by "G" Holdings.

-alleged fraud = ca -no extrinsic fraud because "G" Holdings had no participation in the failure of the
Solicitor General to properly appeal the decision of the trial court. Neither was there any connivance
between "G" Holdings’ and the Republic’s counsels in the commission of the error.
-The appellate court also held that the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, as
well as over the person of the parties. Hence, whatever error the trial court committed in the exercise of
its jurisdiction was merely an error of judgment, not an error of jurisdiction. As an error of judgment, it
was correctable by appeal. Unfortunately, appeal could no longer be availed of by the Republic.

-The appellate court further declared that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
court a quo when it decided the case before its receipt of the Republic’s formal offer of evidence. The
evidence of both parties was already in the possession of the court and painstakingly considered before
the decision was arrived at. Thus, if at all, the trial court perpetrated an "irregularity" which should have
been the subject of an appeal. But no appeal was perfected and the decision of the trial court thus
attained finality.

i: won there was grave abuse of discretion amount to lack or excess or jurs

h:

-no. A petition for annulment of judgment is an extraordinary action.9 By virtue of its exceptional
character, the action is restricted exclusively to the grounds specified in the rules,10 namely, (1)
extrinsic fraud and (2) lack of jurisdiction.11 The rationale for the restriction is to prevent the
extraordinary action from being used by a losing party to make a complete farce of a duly promulgated
decision that has long become final and executory.12 The remedy may not be invoked where the party
has availed himself of the remedy of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedy
and lost, or where he has failed to avail himself of those remedies through his own fault or
negligence.13

Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim.14 Where the court has
jurisdiction over the defendant and over the subject matter of the case, its decision will not be voided
on the ground of absence of jurisdiction.

-In a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, the petitioner must show not
merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of jurisdiction.15 Thus, the concept of
lack of jurisdiction as a ground to annul a judgment does not embrace abuse of discretion.

Second, by claiming grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, the Republic actually
concedes and presupposes the jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance of the case. Hence, the
Republic effectively admits that the two grounds for which lack of jurisdiction may be validly invoked to
seek the annulment of a judgment – want of jurisdiction over the parties and want of jurisdiction over
the subject matter – do not exist. It only assails the manner in which the trial court formulated its
judgment in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction is distinct from the exercise thereof. We amply explained the distinction between the two in
Tolentino v. Leviste,16 thus:

Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of
jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, and not the decision rendered therein. Where
there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the decision on all other questions arising in
the case is but an exercise of the jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in the exercise
of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.

-no grave abuse of discretion - evidence presented were properly marked, offered and admitted" during
the pre-trial. further both parties admit during pre-trial that the sole issue is one of law.

-no extrinsic fraud -y fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of
the trial of the case, whereby the unsuccessful party is prevented from fully proving his case, by fraud or
deception practiced on him by his opponent.21 Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party
from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters
pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured.22 The overriding
consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant
prevented a party from having his day in court.

-republic was not able to prove that g committed such

-petition denied

-04-
MANCHESTER DEVT. CORP. v. CA
G.R. No. L-75919 | 07 MAY 1987
MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET. AL., vs COURT OF APPEALS, CITYLAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
petitioners STEPHEN ROXAS, ANDREW LUISON, GRACE LUISON and JOSE
DE MAISIP,
respondents
Petition to review CA decision
Justice Gancayco
 FACTS  Present case is an action for torts and damages and specific performance with prayer for temporary
restraining order, etc. ---i.e., petitioner MDC filed a complaint for specific performance against City
Land to compel the latter to execute a Deed of Sale in favor of the former.

 Petitioner also alleged that respondent City Land forfeited their tender of payment for a certain
transaction thereby causing damages amounting to P78,750,000.00
o Said amount was alleged in the BODY of the complaint but was not reiterated in the PRAYER.

 Petitioner paid a docket fee of P410.00 based on the allegation that their action is primarily for
specific performance and is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

 The Court ruled that there is an under-assessment of docket fees, and thus ordered petitioner to
amend its complaint.

 With leave of court petitioner complied and lowered the amount of claim for damages to P10M,
which was again not state in the PRAYER (but stated in the BODY).

NOTE: The designation and prayer of the present case clearly show that it is an action for damages and
specific performance. Hence the docket fee should be assessed by considering the amount of
damages as alleged in the original complaint.
ISSUE

Whether jurisdiction is acquired when correct docket fee has not been paid.
HELD

No. Motion for reconsideration is DENIED FOR LACK OF MERIT.

 As setted in the Magaspi case: “a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee
RATIO

regardless of the actual date of filing in court.”

 The Court held that in the present case, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by the
payment of P410.00 as docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the complaint vest jurisdiction
upon the Court.
 For all legal purposes, there is no original complaint that was duly filed which could be amended.
 The order admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent proceedings and actions taken by
the trial court are null and void.
 CA was correct in ruling that the basis of assessment of the docket fee should be the amount of
damages sought in the original complain and not in the amended complaint.

 Henceforth, all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of
damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said
damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to
comply with this requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from
record.

 The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An
amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less
the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading.

Sun Insurance v Asuncion Digest

G.R. Nos. 79937-38 February 13, 1989

Facts:

Petitioner Sun Insurance (or SIOL) files a complaint for the annulment of a decision on the consignation
of fire insurance policy. Subsequently, the Private Respondent (PR) files a complaint for the refund of
premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment in a civil case against SIOL. In addition,
PR also claims for damages, attorney’s fees, litigation costs, etc., however, the prayer did not state the
amount of damages sought although from the body of the complaint it can be inferred to be in amount
of P 50 million. Hence, PR originally paid only PhP 210.00 in docket fees.The complaint underwent a
number of amendments to make way for subsequent re-assessments of the amount of damages sought
as well as the corresponding docket fees. The respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the
rules by paying the additional docket fees as required.

Issue: Did the Court acquire jurisdiction over the case even if private respondent did not pay the correct
or sufficient docket fees?

YES.

It was held that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the
payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or
nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the
docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglamentary period. Same rule goes for permissive counterclaims, third party
claims and similar pleadings.

In herein case, obviously, there was the intent on the part of PR to defraud the government of the
docket fee due not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the second
amended complaint. However, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that,
unlike in Manchester, the private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by
paying the additional docket fees as required.

Where a trial court acquires jurisdiction in like manner, but subsequently, the judgment awards a claim
not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the
additional filing fee shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of
Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
 PROTON PILIPINAS CORPORATION et al. v. BANQUE NATIONALE DE
PARIS

460 SCRA 260 (2005), THIRD DIVISION

Petitioner Proton Pilipinas Corporation (Proton) availed credit facilities of respondent

Banque Nationale De Paris (BNP). In order to assure payment, co-petitioners Automotive
Corporation, Asea One Corporation and Autocorp Group executed a corporate guarantee.

Proton failed to comply with his obligation to BNP. Thereafter, BNP demanded the
payment of Proton‘s obligation to its co-petitioners pursuant to corporate guarantee. But
the same remained unheeded. BNP then filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) against Proton et al. The clerk of court assessed the docket fee. Proton et al. filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the court cannot exercise jurisdiction over the
case because BNP did not properly pay the docket fees. The RTC denied the motion to
dismiss. On appeal, the Court of Appeals denied the motion of Proton et al. Hence this
present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court does not acquire jurisdiction when there is an improper payment
of docket fees

HELD:

The Court rules that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory
pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the
initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow
payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period. It also stated that where the trial
court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and
payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not
specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the
court, the additional filing fee therefore shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be
the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien
and assess and collect the additional fee.

Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even its non-
payment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee
is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, more so when the party involved
demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment. Thus, when insufficient
filing fees were initially paid by the plaintiffs and there was no intention to defraud the
government, the Manchester rule does not apply.

In the case at bar, BNP merely relied on the assessment made by the clerk of court which
turned out to be incorrect. Under the circumstances, the clerk of court has the
responsibility of reassessing what respondent must pay within the prescriptive period,
failing which the complaint merits dismissal.

xxxxxxxxxxxxxx

True, in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,37 this Court held

that the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fees,38 hence, it concluded that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case.

It bears emphasis, however, that the ruling in Manchester was clarified in Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion39 when this Court held that in the former
there was clearly an effort to defraud the government in avoiding to pay the correct
docket fees, whereas in the latter the plaintiff demonstrated his willingness to abide by
paying the additional fees as required.

The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the present case. The pattern
and the intent to defraud the government of the docket fee due it is obvious not only in
the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the second amended
complaint.

However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional docket fee until the case
was decided by this Court on May 7, 1987. Thus, in Manchester, due to the fraud
committed on the government, this Court held that the court a quo did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case and that the amended complaint could not
have been admitted inasmuch as the original complaint was null and void.

In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering
that, unlike Manchester, private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by
the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required. The promulgation of the
decision in Manchester must have had that sobering influence on private respondent
who thus paid the additional docket fee as ordered by the respondent court. It triggered
his change of stance by manifesting his willingness to pay such additional docket fee as
may be ordered.

Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee that was paid is still insufficient
considering the total amount of the claim. This is a matter which the clerk of court of
the lower court and/or his duly authorized docket clerk or clerk in charge should
determine and, thereafter, if any amount is found due, he must require the private
respondent to pay the same.

Thus, the Court rules as follows:

1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the
payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.

2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar
pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed
therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time
but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate
pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment
awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for
determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on
the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized
deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.40 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied) ςrαlαωlιb rα rÿ

Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement,
even its non-payment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of
the case, as long as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period, more so when the party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the
rules prescribing such payment. Thus, when insufficient filing fees were initially
paid by the plaintiffs and there was no intention to defraud the government,
the Manchester rule does not apply.

xxxxxxxxxxxxx

In the case at bar, respondent merely relied on the assessment made by the clerk of
court which turned out to be incorrect. Under the circumstances, the clerk of court has
the responsibility of reassessing what respondent must pay within the prescriptive
period, failing which the complaint merits dismissal.

tokio marine insurance co. v jorge valdez

f:

-valdez filed a complaint for damages against tokio insurance for non-payment of his commissions and
bonuses

-valdez also filed a motion for authority to litigate as indigent plaintiff which would exempt him from
paying the docket fees

-said motion was granted

-tokio filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for non-payment of docket fees

-tokio argued that valdez is not an indigent and as such is not exempt from paying docket fees because
courts acquire jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee

-tokio argued that respondent's ex parte motion to litigate as an indigent is defective since it was not
accompanied or supported by the affidavits of his children, the immediate members of his family
i:

-won rtc acquired jurisdiction

h:

-yes. courts acquire jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee.3 As we
held in Magaspi v. Ramolete,4 the correct docket fees must be paid before courts can act on a petition
or complaint. The exception to the rule on payment of docket fees is provided in Section 21, Rule 3 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

SEC. 21. Indigent party. - A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense as an indigent
if the court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied that the party is one who has no
money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his
family.

Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful fees and of
transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may order to be furnished him. The amount of the
docket and other lawful fees which the indigent was exempted from paying shall be a lien on any
judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides.

Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is rendered by
the trial court. If the court should determine after hearing that the party declared as an indigent is in
fact a person with sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be
assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court,
execution shall issue or the payment thereof, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may
impose.

-The guidelines for determining whether a party qualifies as an indigent litigant are provided for in
Section 19, Rule 141,5 of the Revised Rules of Court, which reads:

SEC. 19. Indigent litigants exempt from payment of legal fees. - INDIGENT LITIGANT (A) WHOSE GROSS
INCOME AND THAT OF THEIR IMMEDIATE FAMILY DO NOT EXCEED AN AMOUNT DOUBLE THE MONTHLY
MINIMUM WAGE OF AN EMPLOYEE AND (B) WHO DO NOT OWN REAL PROPERTY WITH A FAIR MARKET
VALUE AS STATED IN THE CURRENT TAX DECLARATION OF MORE THAN THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P300,000.00) SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM THE PAYMENT OF LEGAL FEES.

The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent unless the
court otherwise provides.
To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an affidavit that he and his
immediate family do not earn a gross income abovementioned nor they own any real property with the
fair value aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of
the litigant's affidavit. The current tax declaration, if any, shall be attached to the litigant's affidavit.

Any falsity in the affidavit of the litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient cause to dismiss the
complaint or action or to strike out the pleading of that party, without prejudice to whatever criminal
liability may have been incurred.

-In the instant cases, petitioners maintain that respondent's ex parte motion to litigate as an indigent is
defective since it was not accompanied or supported by the affidavits of his children, the immediate
members of his family. The argument lacks merit. Section 19 clearly states that it is the litigant alone
who shall execute the affidavit. The Rule does not require that all members of the litigant's immediate
family must likewise execute sworn statements in support of the petition. Expressio unius est exclusio
alterius.

-as such, valdez was considered as an indigent litigant who is exempt from payment of docket fees
hence rtc properly acquired jurisdiction

LU v. LU YM
G.R. No. 153690 / AUG 4, 2009 / NACHURA, J. / CIVPRO-JURISDICTION OF RTC / RPNICOLAS

NATURE: Motion for Reconsideration

PETITIONERS: David Lu

RESPONDENTS: Paterno Lu Ym, Sr. et al.

SUMMARY. In this case, the Lu Ym father and sons moved to reconsider the decision of the
Court in 2008 that the complaint filed by David et al. was incapable of pecuniary estimation.
The father and sons point out that the case filed by David et al. allege the real value of the
shares, based on underlying real estate values worth P1,087,055,105. The Court resolved
that it was indeed capable of pecuniary estimation and that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case filed by David et al. since they did not pay the correct docket fees.
DOCTRINE. A court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of the
prescribed fees. Hence, without payment of the correct docket fees, the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the action filed by David, et al.

FACTS.

 On August 14, 2000, David Lu, Rosa Go, Silvano Ludo and CL Corporation filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu
City a complaint against Paterno Lu Ym, Sr., Paterno Lu Ym, Jr., Victor Lu Ym, John Lu Ym, Kelly Lu Ym, and Ludo & Luym
Development Corporation (LLDC) for Declaration of Nullity of Share Issue, Receivership and Dissolution.
 The plaintiffs, shareholders of LLDC, claimed that the Lu Ym father and sons, as members of the Board of Directors, caused
the issuance to the latter of 600,000 of the corporation’s unsubscribed and unissued shares for less than their actual value.
They then prayed for the dissolution of the corporation and the appointment of a receiver during the pendency of the
action.
 The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint but were denied and placed LLDC under receivership.
 Defendants Lu Ym father and sons elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari but was still
denied. They re-filed the petition and was granted.
 The Lu Ym father and sons then filed with the trial court a motion to lift the order of receivership over LLDC. Before the
matter could be heard, David instituted a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA on the issue of the motion to
lift order of receivership.
 On February 27, 2003, the CA granted the petition and ruled that the proceedings on the receivership could not proceed
without the parties amending their pleadings. The Lu Ym father and sons thus filed a petition for review with this Court.
 On March 31, 2003, the plaintiffs therein filed a Motion to Admit Complaint to Conform to the Interim Rules Governing
IntraCorporate Controversies, which was admitted by the trial court.
 On January 23, 2004, the Lu Ym father and sons inquired from the Clerk of Court as to the amount of docket fees paid by
David, et al. John Lu Ym further inquired from the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) on the correctness of the amount
paid by David, et al. The OCA informed John Lu Ym that a query on the matter of docket fees should be addressed to the
trial court and not to the OCA.
 On March 1, 2004, the RTC decided the case on the merits. It annulled the issuance of LLDC’s 600,000 shares of stock to
the Lu Ym father and sons. It also ordered the dissolution of LLDC and the liquidation of its assets, and created a
management committee to take over LLDC. The Lu Ym father and sons appealed to the CA.
 In our August 26, 2008 Decision, we declared that the subject matter of the complaint filed by David, et al., was one
incapable of pecuniary estimation. Movants beg us to reconsider this position, pointing out that the case filed below by
David, et al., had for its objective the nullification of the issuance of 600,000 shares of stock of LLDC. The complaint itself
contained the allegation that the “real value of these shares, based on underlying real estate values, was One Billion Eighty
Seven Million Fifty Five Thousand One Hundred Five Pesos (P1,087,055,105).”
 Upon deeper reflection, we find that the movants’ claim has merit. The 600,000 shares of stock were, indeed, properties in
litigation. They were the subject matter of the complaint, and the relief prayed for entailed the nullification of the transfer
thereof and their return to LLDC.
 Thus, to the extent of the damage or injury they allegedly have suffered from this sale of the shares of stock, the action
they filed can be characterized as one capable of pecuniary estimation. The shares of stock have a definite value, which was
declared by plaintiffs themselves in their complaint. Accordingly, the docket fees should have been computed based on
this amount. This is clear from the following version of Rule 141, Section 7, which was in effect at the time the complaint
was filed.

ISSUES & RATIO.

1. WON the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the action filed by David– NO.
We have earlier held that a court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of the prescribed fees. Hence,
without payment of the correct docket fees, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the action filed by David, et al.
We also stated in our Decision that the earlier rule in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals has been
relaxed. Subsequent decisions now uniformly hold that when insufficient filing fees are initially paid by the plaintiffs and
there is no intention to defraud the government, the Manchester rule does not apply.

DECISION.

The trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the action filed by David. Consequently, all interlocutory matters pending before
this Court, specifically the incidents subject of these three consolidated petitions, must be denied for being moot and academic.

sps go v tong

As a rule, docket fees should be paid upon the filing of the initiatory pleadings. However, for cogent
reasons to be determined by the trial judge, staggered payment thereof within a reasonable period may
be allowed. Unless grave abuse of discretion is demonstrated, the discretion of the trial judge in
granting staggered payment shall not be disturbed.

f:

-sps go purchased a cashier's check in favor of tong with the remarks "final payment/quitclaim"

-tong then deposited said check with the remarks erased

-t"Private respondent’s counsel subsequently wrote the manager of FEBTC Lavezares Branch informing
that the words ‘Final Payment/Quitclaim’ on the check had been ‘inadvertently erased without being
initialed by your bank or the purchaser thereof’ and thus requesting that the check be replaced with
another payable to ‘Johnson Tong-Final Settlement/Quitclaim’ with the same amount, the bank charges
therefor to be paid by his client-private respondent.

"FEBTC did not grant the request of private respondent’s counsel, hence, private respondent filed a
complaint against FEBTC and petitioner Juana and her husband Gregorio Go at the Manila RTC, for sum
of money, damages, and attorney’s fees, subject of the case at bar.

"Answering the Complaint, therein defendants-herein petitioners Juana and her husband and FEBTC
alleged that the erasure of the words ‘Final Payment/Quitclaim’ was intentional on private respondent’s
part, reflective of his intention to collect more from petitioner Juana, hence, the non-issuance of a
replacement check was justified, unless private respondent was sincere in abiding with the ‘terms
agreed upon.’

-tong filed a complaint for sum of money against sps go and febtc far east bank and trust company

-during the pendency of the case, son of sps go filed a criminal complaint agaisnt go for falsification of
the check. dismissed

-tong then filed a supplemental complaint for damages increasing the damages sought to 55M+

-sps go answered that it should be dismissed unless the docket fees be paid for

-rtc then declared that the docket fees for such supplemental complaint be paid on a staggered basis
considering the huge amount, business climate, and the peso crunch prevailing at that time.

-sps. go then ascribes to public respondent grave abuse of discretion because such payment of the
docket fee on a staggered basis was "unprecedented in the annals of the Philippine judicial system. sps
go assert that the supplemental complaint should not be admitted because it was no fully paid

H:
"x x x. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of
the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of
the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee,
the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period."35 (Italics supplied)

Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even its
nonpayment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the
fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period;36 more so when the party involved
demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment.37

While the cause of action of private respondent was supposed to prescribe in four (4) years,38 he was
allowed to pay; and he in fact paid the docket fee in a year’s time.39 We do not see how this period can
be deemed unreasonable. Moreover, on his part there is no showing of any pattern or intent to defraud
the government of the required docket fee. We sustain the CA’s findings absolving respondent judge of
any capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.1âwphi1 Ruled the
appellate court:

"The Sun Insurance Office Ltd. case permits the payment of the prescribed docket fee ‘within a
reasonable period but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or regular period.’ Since the
prescriptive period to file the complaint subject of the present petition which is an action upon an injury
to the right of private respondent, is four years and the scheme of payment of the docket fees in the
amount of ₱252,503.50 given by public respondent called for an implementation thereof within one
year, as in fact private respondent manifested in his Rejoinder that he had fully paid the said amount on
December 12, 2000, then the assailed Orders of November 17, 1999 and April 11, 2000 cannot be said to
have been issued with grave abuse of discretion."40 (Citations omitted)

To be sure, for certiorari to lie against respondent judge, the abuse of discretion committed must be
grave, as when power is exercised arbitrarily or despotically by reason of passion or personal hostility;
and such exercise must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty, or to a
virtual refusal to perform it or to act in contemplation of law.41 These conditions are absolutely wanting
in the present case.

Denied
 Administrative Matter No. 04-2-04-
SC
RESOLUTION

Acting on the Resolution dated September 5, 2006 of the Committee on the Revision of
Rules of Court, the Court Resolved to AMEND Section 21 (i), Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court (A.M. NO. 04-2-04-SC, August 16, 2004), as follows:
xxx xxx xxx

"SEC. 21. Other fees. — The following fees shall also be collected by the clerks of the
Regional Trial Courts or courts of the first level, as the case may be:
(a) . . .
(b) . . .
(c) . . .
(d) . . .
(e) . . .
(f) . . .
(g) . . .
(h) . . .
(i) For petitions for rehabilitation, under the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate
Rehabilitation, the fees payable shall be based on the value of the assets of, or amount of
monetary claims against the debtor, whichever is higher, which must be declared in the
Petition, as follows:
1) FEES PAYABLE. —

From Nov. 11, Nov. 11,

effectivity 2004 2005

to to to Effective
 Nov. 10, Nov. 10, Nov. 11,
Nov. 10, 2004
2005 2006 2006

01. Less than

P12,500.00 P15,000.00 P17,500.00 P20,000.00
P10,000,000.00

02. P10,000,000.00 or more

P25,500.00 P30,000.00 P35,000.00 P40,000.00
but

less than P20,000,000.00

03. P20,000,000.00 or more

P37,500.00 P45,000.00 P52,500.00 P60,000.00
but

less than P30,000,000.00

04. P30,000,000.00 or more

P50,000.00 P60,000.00 P70,000.00 P80,000.00
but

less than P40,000,000.00

05. P40,000,000.00 or more

P62,500.00 P75,000.00 P87,500.00 P100,000.00
but

less than P50,000,000.00

06. P50,000,000.00 or more

P75,000.00 P90,000.00 P105,000.00 P120,000.00
but

less than P60,000,000.00

07. P60,000,000.00 or more

P87,500.00 P105,000.00 P122,500.00 P140,000.00
but
 less than P70,000,000.00

08. P70,000,000.00 or more

P100,000.00 P120,000.00 P140,000.00 P160,000.00
but

less than P80,000,000.00

09. P80,000,000.00 or more

P112,500.00 P135,000.00 P157,500.00 P180,000.00
but

less than P90,000,000.00

10. P90,000,000.00 or more

P125,000.00 P150,000.00 P175,000.00 P200,000.00
but

not more than

P100,000,000.00

11. For each P10,000.00 in P12.50 P15.00 P17.50 P20.00

excess of P100,000,000.00

2) MANNER OF PAYMENT. —
2.1 FEES AMOUNTING TO P100,000.00 OR LESS SHALL BE PAID UPON THE
FILING OF THE PETITION.
2.2 FEES IN EXCESS OF P100,000.00 MAY BE PAID ON STAGGERED BASIS AS
FOLLOWS:
2.2.1 P100,000.00 SHALL BE PAID UPON FILING OF THE PETITION
2.2.2 THE BALANCE SHALL BE PAID IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING
SCHEDULE:
2.2.2.1 25% SHALL BE PAID UPON THE ISSUANCE OF AN ORDER GIVING DUE
COURSE TO THE PETITION;
2.2.2.2 25% SHALL BE PAID UPON THE APPROVAL OF THE REHABILITATION
PLAN; AND
2.2.2.3 THE BALANCE OF 50% SHALL BE INCLUDED AS PART OF THE
PREFERRED PAYABLES TO BE SETTLED IN THE REHABILITATION PLAN.
The value of the assets shall be based on the fair market value of the real properties of
the petitioner stated in the tax declaration or the zonal value thereof fixed by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue, whichever is higher, or, if there is none, the stated value of the
assets in the petition. In case of personal property, the value shall be stated by the
petitioner in the petition.
If during trial, the court finds that the value of the assets is more or the monetary claims
are higher than the amounts stated in the complaint or petition, then it shall order the
payment of additional fees based thereon.
(j) . . .
(k) . . .
xxx xxx xxx

These amendments shall take effect on October 16, 2006 following their publication in a
newspaper of general circulation not later than September 22, 2006.

CaseDig: Flores vs. Sumaljag

A.M. No. MTJ-97-1115; June 5, 1998
Posted By: Alaine Joyce on July 24, 2018

FACTS:

This is an administrative case against Judge Antonio C. Sumaljag, Acting Presiding

Judge of Branch 5, Municipal Trial Court of Baybay, Leyte, for gross ignorance of the
law in connection with the preliminary investigation of three criminal cases and arrest
of complainants.

Complainants, member of the Sangguniang Pambarangay of Domingo C. Veloso in

Baybay, Leyte, were charged with three counts of falsification of public document. On
November 25, 1996, Judge Sumaljag conducted a preliminary examination, during
which the complainant, Parmis, and his witness Cala, Jr., testified in each of the
criminal case. Thereafter, Judge Sumaljag ordered the arrest of the complainants. On
December 13, 1996, the respondent judge retired.

Complainants instituted the administrative case against respondent judge claiming

among others that the respondent ordered their arrest without justification of doing so
"in order not to frustrate the ends of justice."

ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of warrants of arrest was justified.

HELD: No, the issuance of the warrants of arrest was not justified.

While before the 1985 revision of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, it was mandatory for
the investigating judge to issue a warrant of arrest of the accused if he found probable
cause, the rule now is that the investigating judge's power to order the arrest of the
accused is limited to instances in which there is a necessity for placing him in custody
"in order not to frustrate the ends of justice." In Mantaring v. Roman, we reprimanded a
judge because it appeared that respondent ordered the issuance of warrant of arrest
solely on the finding of probable cause, totally omitting to consider whether it was
necessary to do so in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.

The jurisdiction that was the Court's at the time of the filing of the administrative
complaint is not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased in
office during the pendency of his case. Considering that respondent judge has retired,
the only appropriate penalty that could be imposed on him, in light of what he failed to
do in this case, is a fine of P5,000.
atty basilio v dinio

f:

-basilio requested stenographic notes from court stenographer dinio

-basilio then advised dinio to remit a portion of the amount received from the TSN

-dinio protested and shouted at atty basilio who was the clerk of court of that branch mentioning that
inuuwi, kuryente etc

h:

-dinio was fined 5k

-Furthermore, the fact that the complainant resigned three (3) months after the filing of the present
complaint cannot, in any way, be an indication of guilt on her part, as the respondent insinuated.
Neither can such resignation have the effect of exonerating the respondent from liability. In the first
place, Atty. Basilio is not the party accused of committing an irregularity in the performance of duty. If
someone should show any sign of guilt, it should be the respondent and not the complaining party.
Secondly, the Court already acquired jurisdiction over the present case upon the filing of the
administrative complaint. Jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost by the resignation of the complaining
party; it continues until the case is terminated

Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice G.R. No. 132601, January 19,

1999
Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of
petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public respondent
Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the
SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the
power of the executive to grant reprieve.

Issue: Whether or not the SC, after the decision in the case becomes final
and executory, still has jurisdiction over the case

Held: The finality of judgment does not mean that the SC has lost all its
powers or the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the SC loses is its
jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has
become final, the SC retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it.

The power to control the execution of the SC’s decision is an essential aspect of
its jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for the
Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one SC and in such lower courts
as may be established by law. The important part of a litigation, whether civil or
criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where supervening events may
change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust
the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforeseen,
supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and
necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make them comform to
law and justice.

The Court also rejected public respondent’s contention that by granting the TRO,
the Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function under Sec.
19, Art. VII of the Constitution. In truth, an accused who has been convicted by
final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in
the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who becomes insane after
his final conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity. The suspension
of such a death sentence is indisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a
usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effects are the same
as the temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict. In the same
vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any timeamend the Death Penalty
Law by reducing the penalty of death to lifeimprisonment. The effect of such an
amendment is like that of commutation of sentence. But the exercise of Congress
of its plenary power to amend laws cannot be considered as a violation of the
power of the President to commute final sentences of conviction. The powers
of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death
convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher
right than the right to life. To contend that only the Executive can protect the
right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-
equal and coordinate powers of the 3 branches of the government.

CaseDig: Asia Int'l. Auctioneers vs

Parayno
G.R. No. 163445, 18 December 2007
Posted by: Vincent Albien V. Arnado on 31 July 2018

FACTS:

Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7227 creating the Subic Special Economic
Zone (SSEZ) and extending a number of economic or tax incentives therein. Section 12
of the law provides:

(a) Within the framework and subject to the mandate and limitations of the Constitution
and the pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code, the [SSEZ] shall be
developed into a self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and investment center
to generate employment opportunities in and around the zone and to attract and
promote productive foreign investments;

(b) The [SSEZ] shall be operated and managed as a separate customs territory ensuring
free flow or movement of goods and capital within, into and exported out of the [SSEZ],
as well as provide incentives such as tax and duty-free importations of raw materials,
capital and equipment. However, exportation or removal of goods from the territory of
the [SSEZ] to the other parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to customs
duties and taxes under the Customs and Tariff Code and other relevant tax laws of the
Philippines;

(c) The provision of existing laws, rules and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding,
no taxes, local and national, shall be imposed within the [SSEZ]. In lieu of paying taxes,
three percent (3%) of the gross income earned by all businesses and enterprise within
the [SSEZ] shall be remitted to the National Government, one percent (1%) each to the
local government units affected by the declaration of the zone in proportion to their
population area, and other factors. In addition, there is hereby established a
development fund of one percent (1%) of the gross income earned by all business and
enterprise within the [SSEZ] to be utilized for the development of municipalities outside
the City of Olongapo and the Municipality of Subic, and other municipalities contiguous
to the base areas.

In case of conflict between national and local laws with respect to tax exemption
privileges in the [SSEZ], the same shall be resolved in favor of the latter;

(d) No exchange control policy shall be applied and free markets for foreign exchange,
gold, securities and future shall be allowed and maintained in the [SSEZ]

On June 3, 2003, then CIR Guillermo L. Parayno, Jr. issued Revenue Memorandum
Circular (RMC) No. 31-2003 setting the "Uniform Guidelines on the Taxation of
Imported Motor Vehicles through the Subic Free Port Zone and Other Freeport Zones
that are Sold at Public Auction.

Petitioners Asia International Auctioneers, Inc. (AIAI) and Subic Bay Motors
Corporation are corporations organized under Philippine laws with principal place of
business within the SSEZ. They are engaged in the importation of mainly secondhand or
used motor vehicles and heavy transportation or construction equipment which they sell
to the public through auction.

Petitioners filed a complaint before the RTC of Olongapo City, praying for the
nullification of RMC No. 31-2003 for being unconstitutional and an ultra vires act with
Application for a Writ of Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction"6 to enjoin
respondents from implementing the questioned RMCs while the case is pending.

RTC granted the petitioners' application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.

Respondent filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with
prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction to
enjoin the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over the case

ISSUE:

Whether or not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the New Rules is proper where
the issue raised therein has not yet been resolved at the first instance by the Court where
the original action was filed, and, necessarily, without first filing a motion for
reconsideration; and

Which Court- the regular courts of justice established under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or
the Court of Tax Appeals – is the proper court of jurisdiction to hear a case to declare
Revenue Memorandum Circulars unconstitutional and against an existing law where the
challenge does not involve the rate and figures of the imposed taxes?

HELD:

The arguments are unmeritorious.

Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try and decide a
case.23 The issue is so basic that it may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even
on appeal.24 In fact, courts may take cognizance of the issue even if not raised by the
parties themselves.25 There is thus no reason to preclude the CA from ruling on this
issue even if allegedly, the same has not yet been resolved by the trial court.

As to the second issue, petitioners' arguments do not sway. R.A. No. 1125, as amended,
states:

Sec. 7. Jurisdiction.—The Court of Tax Appeals shall exercise exclusive appellate

jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided—

(1) Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed

assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed
in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code
or other laws or part of law administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue; x x x
(emphases supplied)

We have held that RMCs are considered administrative rulings which are issued from
time to time by the CIR. In the case at bar, the assailed revenue regulations and revenue
memorandum circulars are actually rulings or opinions of the CIR on the tax treatment
of motor vehicles sold at public auction within the SSEZ to implement Section 12 of R.A.
No. 7227 which provides that "exportation or removal of goods from the territory of the
[SSEZ] to the other parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to customs duties
and taxes under the Customs and Tariff Code and other relevant tax laws of the
Philippines." They were issued pursuant to the power of the CIR under Section 4 of the
National Internal Revenue Code.

Petitioners' insistence for this Court to rule on the merits of the case would only prove
futile. Having declared the court a quo without jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the instant case, any further disquisition would be obiter dictum.IN VIEW WHEREOF,
the petition is DENIED.
SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL. vs.MAGDALENO
SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO SIBONGHANOY and
LUCIA BAGUIO (CASE DIGEST) G.R. No. L-21450 - -
April 15, 1968
FACTS:

The action at bar, which is a suit for collection of a sum of money in the sum of exactly P 1,908.00, exclusive
of interest filed by Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog against Spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia
Baguio, was originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948. A month prior to
the filing of the complaint, the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. 296) took effect depriving the Court of First
Instance of original jurisdiction over cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, is not more than P
2,000.00 (Secs. 44[c] and 86[b], R.A. 296.)

The case has already been pending now for almost 15 years, and throughout the entire proceeding the
appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until the receipt of the Court of Appeals' adverse decision.

Considering that the Supreme Court has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases in which
jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue, the Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court
along with the records of the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Surety can raise the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time on appeal.

RULING:

The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by
law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case, the
objection may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.

However, considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, We are of the opinion that
the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late hour for the purpose of
annuling everything done heretofore in the case with its active participation.

The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party, it could have
raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the CFI to take cognizance of the present action
by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was within
the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of
the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction
of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the
merits.
It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the CA that it finally woke up to raise the
question of jurisdiction.

A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different
reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel
by laches.

Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

The doctrine of laches or of “stale demands” is based upon grounds of public policy which
requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of
limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or
unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.

It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief
against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question
that same jurisdiction.

The Court frowns upon the “undesirable practice” of a party submitting his case for decision and
then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when
adverse.

Philippine Airlines v. Spouses Kurangking (2002) – Suspended jurisdiction (COLOQUIO)

Movement of case: RTC Marawi (denied order to suspend case) – MR with RTC denied – CA (denied
appeal because of failure to serve a copy of the petition on respondents) – MR with CA denied – went
back to RTC and filed a motion for leave to file a second MR (denied again) – tried to file a motion for
leave to file a second MR again with RTC (denied again) – SC (Rule 45; ruled in favor of PAL and
ordered suspension of case)

FACTS

 In 1997, Spouses Kurangking and Spouses Dianalan returned to Manila from Saudi Arabia, on board
a PAL flight. They claimed that they were unable to retrieve their checked-in luggages therefore in
1998, they filed a case before RTC Marawi, claiming damages from PAL for breach of contract.
o PAL answered at first and invoked the limitations under the Warsaw Convention – but then it
eventually claimed that is suffers from serous business losses due to the Asian economic
crisis and a massive strike by its employees.
 PAL filed a petition for the approval of a rehabilitation plan and the appointment of a receiver before
SEC, because of its financial problem – which was then granted by the SEC.
 o SEC, pursuant to PD 902 declared the suspension of all actions for money claims against
PAL pending before any court/ tribunal.
 PAL invoked the order of SEC suspending all actions against it, before RTC Marawi to suspend the
case filed by Spouses Kurangking and Dianalan. This was however denied by RTC Marawi.
o The denial was appealed by PAL to CA via a petition for certiorari but it was also denied
because of the failure of PAL to serve a copy of the petition on respondents. The MR that it
filed before the CA was denied as well. PAL then filed before RTC Marawi a motion for leave
to file a second MR, but such was denied. It tried to file the same motion again but it was still
denied.
 On the ground that there was no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to it, PAL filed a
petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45) before the SC – arguing that the case filed by the 2 spouses
should have been suspended by RTC Marawi pursuant to the order of the SEC.

Did RTC Marawi err in not suspending the case filed against PAL? — YES, YES, a thousand times
YES.

 Firstly, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 would ordinarily be inappropriate to assail an
interlocutory order, but the SC ignored this technical flaw and proceeded to treat the petition as a
special civil action for certiorari, there being no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
 The respondent-spouses stated that PAL was actually already operation, and if ever, it is the SEC
and not the RTC which has the prerogative to determine the necessity of suspending the
proceedings. The SC found this argument untenable however.
o The SC invoked A.M No. 00-8-10-SC, which was an adoption of the Interim Rules of
Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation and directed to be transferred from the SEC to RTC,
all petitions for rehabilitation. The rules require trial courts to issue a stay order in the
enforcement of all claims against corporations under rehabilitation, which shall be effective
until the dismissal of the petition or the termination of its rehabilitation.
 Since the case filed by the respondent-spouses against PAL is a money claim for damages because
of the missing luggages the law requires such to be suspended pending the rehabilitation
proceedings – also following the ruling in BF Homes v. CA.
o This is to enable the rehabilitation receiver to effectively exercise his/its powers free from any
judicial or extra-judicial interference that might hinder the rescue of the debtor company.