proclamation in July 10, 1931 that it occupied territories in Eastern
[01] Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, Denmark v. Norway
1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53 |September 5, 1933| Treaties | AJ
Denmark: M. de Scavenius, Danish Minister at The Hague, M. K. Steglich-Petersen,
Advocate at the Supreme Court of Denmark, as Agents
Norway: M. Jens Bull, Counsellor of Legation, as Agent, and by MM. Arne Sunde ,
Per Rygh, Advocates at the Supreme Court of Norway, as Agents and Counsel
Recit-Ready:
Denmark filed a suit against Norway before the PCIJ on the ground that Norway
published a proclamation in July 10, 1931 that Norway occupied territories in
Eastern Greenland. Denmark argue that it has been enjoying sovereignty over
Greenland for a long time and that Norway has acknowledged it by treaty or
otherwise.
The Court ruled that Denmark was able to establish its intention to act as sovereign
and display of such authority over Greenland. In a long line of conventions and
treaties, there’s a stipulation which there’s a willingness on the part of the
contracting States which Denmark has contracted with to admit her right to
exclude Greenland. In accepting these bilateral and multilateral agreements as
binding upon herself, Norway reaffirmed that she recognized the whole of
Greenland as Danish; and thereby she has debarred herself from contesting Danish
sovereignty over the whole of Greenland.
Also, M. Ilhen of Norway declared in 1919 that Norway would not obstruct the
Danish plans in regard to Greenland. The Court considers this declaration sufficient
to bind the Norwegian government.
Doctrine:
While treaties are generally in written form, there are writers who hold that even an
oral agreement can be binding. (From Bernas, see Ihlen Declaration below)
FACTS:
1. Denmark filed a suit against Norway before the Permanent Court of
International Justice (PCIJ) on the ground that Norway published a
1
aka Eirik Raudes Land (Carlsberg Fjord on the South and Bessel Fjord on the North)
Greenland1.
a. Denmark contends that the Norwegian occupation is invalid
because Greenland is subject to Danish sovereignty.
2. Danish Government advances 2 propositions:
a. The sovereignty which Denmark enjoys over Greenland has
existed for a long time, and has not been contested by any
Power.
b. That Norway has by treaty or otherwise recognized Danish
sovereignty over Greenland as a whole and cannot now dispute
it.
3. Norwegian government argue that Denmark possessed no sovereignty
over the area which Norway occupied on July 10th, 1931, and that at the
time of the occupation the area was terra nullius.2
ISSUE: W/N Denmark has a valid title of sovereignty over Eastern Greenland. YES
RULING: The Court is satisfied that Denmark has succeeded in establishing her
contention that at the critical date, July 10th, 1931, she possessed a valid title to
the sovereignty over all Greenland. Thus, any steps taken in this connection by
the Norwegian Government, were illegal and invalid.
RATIO:
1. The date at which such Danish sovereignty must have existed in order to
render the Norwegian occupation invalid is the date at which the
occupation took place - July 10th, 1931.
2. IMPT: A claim to sovereignty is not based upon a particular act or title
such as a treaty of cession but upon continued display of authority,
which has 2 elements:
a. the intention and will to act as sovereign
b. some actual exercise or display of such authority.
Denmark’s 1st proposition and her intention to act as sovereign:
1. 900 A. D. - Greenland was discovered and was colonized by Eric the Red,
an inhabitant of Iceland of Norwegian origin. Two settlements appeared
2
land that is legally deemed to be unoccupied
 and became tributary to the kingdom of Norway in the 13th century, but
later disappeared.
2. 1380 - the kingdoms of Norway and Denmark were united under the same
Crown. The King of Denmark and Norway displayed authority to an extent
sufficient to give his country a valid claim to sovereignty from the
founding of the colonies by Hans Egede in 1721 up to 1814.
3. 1814 - Denmark signed the Peace Treaty of Kiel, after a war that broke
out between Denmark and Sweden and her allies.
a. In the treaty, the Kingdom of Norway, excluding Greenland, the
Faeroe Isles and Iceland, was seceded to Sweden. The treaty did
not affect the King of Denmark’s possession over Greenland.
4. Denmark stress that in a long line commercial conventions, a stipulation
has been inserted that the convention shall not apply to Greenland, like
“Article 6 of the Treaty of 1826 with the USA : The present Convention shall
not apply to the Northern possessions of His Majesty the King of Denmark,
that is to say Iceland, the Færö Islands and Greenland...."
a. The multilateral treaties show a willingness on the part of the
contracting States with which Denmark has contracted to admit
her right to exclude Greenland.
b. PCIJ says: To the extent that these treaties constitute evidence
of recognition of her sovereignty over Greenland in general,
Denmark is entitled to rely upon them. These treaties may also
be regarded as demonstrating sufficiently Denmark's will and
intention to exercise sovereignty over Greenland.
nd
Denmark’s 2 proposition and her exercise of authority:
5. Even from 1921 to 1931, Denmark possessed sovereignty over all
Greenland and exercised her sovereign rights through:
a. enforcement by legislation of a state trade monopoly, the
granting of trading, mining, and other concessions granted for
erection of telegraph lines, fixing limits on territorial waters, the
exercise of governmental functions and administration, and the
making of numerous treaties in the terms of which Danish rights
over Greenland were explicit.
3
The reply given by M. Ihlen, the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Danish Minister
on July 22nd, 1919
6. There are various bilateral agreements concluded by Norway with
Denmark, and various multilateral agreements to which both Denmark
and Norway were contracting Parties, in which Greenland has been
described as a Danish colony or as forming part of Denmark or in which
Denmark has been allowed to exclude Greenland from the operation of
the agreement. By ratifying such agreements, it is followed that Norway
recognized whole of Greenland as part of Denmark. Examples of the
treaties:
a. Commercial Treaty between Denmark and the United Kingdoms
of Sweden and Norway, which made reference to the Treaty of
Kiel.
b. Universal Postal Conventions of 1920, 1924 and 1929: “the Faroe
Isles and Greenland, as being part of Denmark”
c. Treaty of 1826
2. In accepting these bilateral and multilateral agreements as binding upon
herself, Norway reaffirmed that she recognized the whole of Greenland
as Danish; and thereby she has debarred herself from contesting Danish
sovereignty over the whole of Greenland.
The Ihlen3 Declaration
1. This declaration by M. Ihlen has been relied on by Counsel for Denmark
as a recognition of an existing Danish sovereignty in Greenland. But, the
Court is unable to accept this point of view.
2. Nevertheless, even if not constituting a definitive recognition of Danish
sovereignty, it constitute an engagement obliging Norway to refrain from
occupying any part of Greenland.
3. What Denmark desired to obtain from Norway was that Norway should
not obstruct the Danish plans in regard to Greenland. Minister Ihlen said
"I told the Danish Minister today that the Norwegian Government would
not make any difficulty in the settlement of this question."4
4. The Court considers this declaration sufficient to bind the Norwegian
government. A reply given by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on behalf
of his Government in response to a request by the diplomatic
representative of a foreign Power, is binding upon the country to which
the Minister belongs.
4
Bernas cited this so IMPT!
 3. In  order  to  found  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court,  the  Application  relied  on 
[2] Australia v France & New Zealand v France  Article  36,  paragraph  1,  and  Article  37  of  the  Statute  of  the  Court  and 
Article  17  of  the  General  Act  for  the  Pacific  Settlement  of  International 
I.C.J. 1974 I.C.J. 253, 457 | December 20, 1974 | Unilateral Acts | Abi  Disputes  done  at  Geneva  on  26  September  1928,  and,  in the alternative, 
Petitioner:   on Article 36, paragraphs 2 and 5, of the Statute of the Court. 
Respondents:  4. No  pleadings  were  filed  by  the  French  Government,  and  it  was  not 
  represented  at  the  oral  proceedings;  no  formal  submissions  were 
Recit-Ready:    therefore made by that Government.  
On  9  May  1973,  Australia  and  New  Zealand  each  instituted  proceedings  against  5. BACKGROUND  FACTS:  Since  French  Government  raised  the  issue  of 
France concerning tests of nuclear weapons which France proposed to carry out in  Jurisdiction,  the  ICJ  decided  to  hear  Preliminary  issues  before  issue  of 
the atmosphere in the South Pacific region.   illegality  of  Nuclear  Testing.  Before  the  case  could  be  completed  the 
  following events happened: 
Before  the  case  could  be  completed,  France  announced  it  had completed the test  a. A  note  from  the  French  Embassy  was  sent  to  the  New Zealand 
and  did  not  plan  any  further  test.  So  France  moved  for  the  dismissal  of  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs:  "It  should . . . be pointed out that the 
application  stating  that  the  International  Court  of  Justice  to  have  no  jurisdiction  decision  taken  by  the  Office  of  the  President  of  the  French 
and refrained from appearing at the public hearings or filing any pleadings.   Republic to have the opening of the nuclear test series preceded 
  by  a  press  communique  represents  a  departure  from  the 
  practice  of  previous  years.  xxx  France,  at  the  point  which  has 
Doctrine:  been  reached  in  the  execution  of  its  programme  of  defence  by 
  nuclear  means,  will  be  in  a  position  to  move  to  the  stage  of 
Declaration  made  through  unilateral  acts  may  have  the  effect  of  creating  legal  underground  firings  as  soon  as  the  test  series  planned  for  this 
obligations.  In  this  case,  the  statement  made  by  the  President  of  France  must  be  summer is completed 
held  to  constitute  an  engagement  of  the  State  in regard to the circumstances and  b. the  French  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  addressing  the  United 
intention  with  which  they  were  made.  Therefore,  these  statement  made  by  the  Nations  General  Assembly,  said  that  they  will  continue  their 
France are relevant and legally binding.   nuclear testing underground. 
  c. the  Minister  of  Defence  held  a  press  conference  during  which 
Consequently,  Australia  and  New Zealand lost the object their action consequently  he  stated  twice,  in  almost  identical  terms,  that  there  would  not 
the case must be dismissed.   be  any  atmospheric  tests  in  1975  and  that France was ready to 
  proceed to underground tests.  

ISSUES:  
FACTS: 
1. May  declaration  made  through  unilateral  act  has effect of creating legal 
1. Prior  to  the  filing  of  the  Application  instituting  proceedings  in  this  case,  obligations? Yes 
the  French  Government  had  carried  out  atmospheric  tests  of  nuclear  2. Whether the ICJ lost its jurisdiction due to these declarations? Yes 
devices  at  its  Centre  d'experimentations  du  Pacifique  in  the  territory  of 
French Polynesia  Note:  The  purpose  of  the  case  of  New  Zealand  and  Australia  was  to  stop  from 
2. By  a  letter,  received  in  the  Registry  of  the  Court  the  same  day,  the  doing Nuclear Testing for the reason that it was illegal 
Ambassador  of  New  Zealand  to  the  Netherlands  transmitted  to  the 
Registrar  an  Application  instituting  proceedings  against  France,  in   
respect  of  a dispute concerning the legality of atmospheric nuclear tests 
conducted by the French Government in the South Pacific region​.   
 6. As was observed above, to have legal effect, there was no need for these 
  statements  to  be addressed to a particular State, ​nor was acceptance by 
any  other  State required. ​The general nature and characteristics of these 
RATIO:  statements  are  decisive  for  the  evaluation  of  the  legal implications, and 
it  is  to  the  interpretation  of  the  statements  that  the  Court  must  now 
1.  It  is  well  recognized  that  declarations  made  by  way  of  unilateral  acts,  proceed.  
concerning  legal  or  factual  situations,  may  have  the  effect  of  creating  7. The  Court  is  entitled  to  presume,  at  the  outset,  that  these  statements 
legal  obligations.  When  it  is  the  intention  of  the  State  making  the  were  not  made  in  vacuo,  but  in  relation  to the tests which constitute the 
declaration  that  it  should  become  bound  according  to  its  terms,  that  very  object  of  the  present  proceedings,  although  France  has  not 
intention  confers  on  ​the declaration the character of a legal undertaking,  appeared in the case. 
the  State  being  thenceforth  legally  required  to  follow  a  course  of  8. In  announcing  that  the  1974  series  of  atmospheric  tests  would  be  the 
conduct  consistent  with  the  declaration.  An  undertaking  of  this  kind,  if  last, the French Government conveyed to the world at large, including the 
given  publicly,  and  with  an  intent  to  be  bound,  even  though  not  made  Applicant,  its  intention  effectively  to  terminate  these tests. It was bound 
within the context of international negotiations, is binding.   to  assume  that  other  States  might  take  note  of  these  statements  and 
2. In  these  circumstances,  nothing  in  the  nature  of  a  quid  pro quo, nor any  rely on their being effective. 
subsequent  acceptance of the declaration, nor even any reply or reaction  9.   The  Court  finds  that  the  unilateral  undertaking  resulting  from  these 
from  other  States,  is  required  for  the  declaration  to  take  effect,  since  statements  cannot  be  interpreted  as  having  been  made  in  implicit 
such  a  requirement  would  be  inconsistent  with  the  strictly  unilateral  reliance  on an arbitrary power of reconsideration. The Court finds further 
nature  of  the  juridical  act  by  which the pronouncement by the State was  that  the  French  Government  has  undertaken  an  obligation  the  precise 
made.  nature  and  limits  of  which  must  be  understood  in  accordance  with  the 
3. One  of  the  basic  ​principles  governing  the  creation  and  performance  of  actual terms in which they have been publicly expressed.  
legal  obligations,  whatever  their  source,  is  the  principle  of  good  faith​.  10.  Thus  the  Court  faces  a  situation  in  which  the  objective of the Applicant 
Trust  and  confidence  are  inherent  in  international  co-operation,  in  has  in  effect  been  accomplished,  inasmuch  as  the  Court  finds  that 
particular  in  an  age  when  this  co-operation  in  many  fields  is  becoming  France  has  undertaken  the  obligation  to  hold  no  further  nuclear  tests in 
increasingly  essential. Just as the very rule of pacta sunt servanda in the  the atmosphere in the South Pacific. 
law  of  treaties  is  based on good faith, so also is the binding character of  11. The  Court,  as  a  court  of  law,  is  called  upon  to  resolve  existing  disputes 
an  international  obligation  assumed  by  unilateral  declaration.  ​Thus  between  States.  Thus  the  existence of a dispute is the primary condition 
interested  States  may  take  cognizance  of  unilateral  declarations  and  for  the  Court  to  exercise  its  judicial  function;  it  is  not  sufficient  for  one 
place  confidence  in  them,  and  are  entitled  to  require  that  the  obligation  party  to  assert  that  there  is  a  dispute,  since  "whether  there  exists  an 
thus created be respected.  international dispute is a matter for objective determination" by the Court 
4. Of  the  statements  by  the  French  Government  now  before  the  Court,  the  (Interpretation  of  Peace  Treaties  with  Bulgaria,  Hungary  and  Romania 
most  essential  are  clearly  those  made  by  the  President  of  the Republic.  (First  Phase),  Advisory  Opinion,  I.C.J.  Reports  1950,  p.  74).  The  dispute 
There  can  be  no  doubt,  in  view  of  his  functions,  that  his  public  brought  before  it  must  therefore  continue  to  exist  at  the  time  when  the 
communications  or  statements,  oral  or  written,  as  Head  of  State,  are  in  Court  makes  its  decision.  It  must  not  fail  to  take  cognizance  of  a 
international  relations  acts  of  the  French  State.  XXX  Thus,  in  whatever  situation  in  which  the  dispute  has  disappeared  because  the  final 
form  these  statements  were  expressed,  they  must  be  held  to constitute  objective  which  the  Applicant  has  maintained  throughout  has  been 
an  engagement  of  the  State,  having  regard  to  their  intention  and  to  the  achieved  by  other  means.  If  the  declarations  of  France  concerning  the 
circumstances in which they were made.   effective  cessation  of  the  nuclear  tests  have  the  significance  described 
5. The  unilateral  statements  of  the  French  authorities  were  made  outside  by  the  Court,  that  is  to  say  if  they  have caused the dispute to disappear, 
the  Court,  publicly  and  erga  omnes,  even  if  some  of  them  were  all the necessary consequences must be drawn from this finding. 
communicated to the Government of New Zealand. 
12. Once  the  Court  has  found  that  a  State  has  entered  into  a  commitment 
concerning  its  future  conduct  it  is  not  the  Court's  function  to 
contemplate that it will not comply with it.  
 only be authorized to proceed to the appointment of a third member if it were
[03] INTERPRETATION OF PEACE TREATIES WITH BULGARIA, HUNGARY AND
possible to constitute a Commission in conformity with the Treaty provisions.
ROMANIA

ICJ Reports | July 18, 1950 | Advisory Opinion | Irish FACTS:

Petitioner:
1. This is an advisory opinion with the second phase of the question
Respondents:
concerning the Interpretation of Peace Treaties signed with Bulgaria,
Hungary, and Romania.
Recit-Ready: The General Assembly of the UN submitted to the International Court
2. On a Resolution on October 22, 1949, the General Assembly of the United
of Justice 4 questions (see below). In an Opinion given by the Court, it answered the
Nations (UN) submitted to the International Court of Justice for advisory
first 2 questions that the diplomatic exchanges disclosed the existence of disputes
opinion the following 4 questions:
subject to the Treaty provisions for the settlement of disputes and that the
I. Do the diplomatic exchanges between Bulgaria, Hungary and
Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania were under obligation to appoint
Romania, and certain Allied and Associated Powers signatories
their representatives to the Treaty Commissions. 30 days after the Opinion, the
to the Treaties of Peace, on the implementation of Article 2 of the
Secretary-General of the UN had not received information that any of the 3
Treaties with Bulgaria and Hungary and Article 3 of the Treaty
Governments of the countries concerned had appointed its representative to the
with Romania, disclose disputes subject to the provisions fir the
Treaty Commissions.
settlement of disputes contained in Article 36 of the Treaty of
Peace with Bulgaria, Article 40 of the Treaty of Peace with
WoN the provision empowering the Secretary-General to appoint the third member
Hungary, and Article 38 of the Treaty of Peace with Romania?
of the Commission applies to the present case, in which one of the parties refuses
to appoint its own representative to the Commission – NO.
In the event of an affirmative reply to question I:
Doctrine: The Secretary-General’s power to appoint a third member is derived solely
II. Are the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania
from the agreement of the parties, as expressed in the dispute clause of the treaties.
obligated to carry out the provisions of the articles in question I,
By its very nature such clause was to be strictly construed and could be applied only
including the provisions for the appointment of their
in the case expressly provided thereby. The case contemplated in the Treaties was
representatives to the Treaty Commissions?
the failure of the parties to agree upon the selection of the third member and not the
case at hand, where there is a complete refusal of cooperation by refusing to appoint
In the event of an affirmative reply to question II and if, within 30 days
its own Commissioner.
from the date when the court delivers its opinion, the Governments
concerned have not notified the Secretary-General that they have
A change in the normal sequence of appointments is only justified when if it is
appointed their representatives to the Treaty Commissions, and the
shown by the attitude of the parties that they desired to reverse the process in
Secretary-General has so advised the International Court of Justice:
accordance with the terms of the Treaties. This was not the situation in this case.
Here, the appointment of the third member by the Secretary-General would result
III. If one party fails to appoint a representative to a Treaty
only in the constitution of a 2-member Commission, not the kind of Commission for
Commission under the Treaties of Peace with Bulgaria, Hungary
which the Treaties had provided.
and Romania where that party is obligated to appoint a
representative to the Treaty Commission, is the Secretary-
The decisions of a 2-member Commission would not have the same degree of moral
General of the UN authorized to appoint the 3rd member of the
authority as those of a 3-member Commission. Hence, the Secretary-General would
Commission upon the request of the other party to a dispute
according to the provisions of the respective Treaties?
 In the event of an affirmative reply to question III:
IV. Would a Treaty Commission composed of a representative of
one party and a third member appointed by the Secretary-General
of the UN constitute a Commission, within the meaning of the
relevant Treaty articles, competent to make a definitive and
binding decision in settlement of a dispute?
3. March 30, 1950: The Court answered the first question by saying that
diplomatic exchanges between Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, and
certain Allied and Associated Powers signatories to the Treaties of Peace
disclosed the existence of disputes subject to the Treaty provisions for
the settlement of disputes. It then answered the second question that the
Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania were under obligation to
appoint their representatives to the Treaty Commissions.
4. May 1, 1950: The Secretary-General of the UN had not received
information that any of the 3 Governments of the countries concerned had
appointed its representative to the Treaty Commissions within 30 days of
the Court’s Advisory Opinion.
5. June 27 & 28, 1950: Court heard oral statements submitted by the
Government of the US and UK.
ISSUES: WoN the provision empowering the Secretary-General to appoint the third
member of the Commission applies to the present case, in which one of the parties
refuses to appoint its own representative to the Commission – NO.
RATIO:
1. The Secretary-General’s power to appoint a third member is derived solely
from the agreement of the parties, as expressed in the dispute clause of
the treaties. By its very nature such clause was to be strictly construed
and could be applied only in the case expressly provided thereby.
2. The case contemplated in the Treaties was the failure of the parties to
agree upon the selection of the third member and not the case at hand,
where there is a complete refusal of cooperation by refusing to appoint
its own Commissioner.
3. The text of the Treaties intends that the appointment of both the national
Commissioners should precede that of the third member. This results
from the sequence of the events contemplated by the article:
i. appointment of a national Commissioner by each party
ii. selection of a third member by mutual agreement of the
parties
iii. failing such agreement within a month, his appointment
by the Secretary-General
4. This normal order is followed in arbitration, and in the absence of any
express provision to the contrary, there is no reason to suppose that the
parties wished to depart from it.
5. A change in the normal sequence of appointments is only justified when
if it is shown by the attitude of the parties that they desired to reverse the
process in accordance with the terms of the Treaties.
6. This was not the situation in this case. Here, the appointment of the third
member by the Secretary-General would result only in the constitution of
a 2-member Commission, not the kind of Commission for which the
Treaties had provided.
7. The decisions of a 2-member Commission would not have the same
degree of moral authority as those of a 3-member Commission.
8. Hence, the Secretary-General would only be authorized to proceed to the
appointment of a third member if it were possible to constitute a
Commission in conformity with the Treaty provisions.
9. The refusal of the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania to
appoint their representative to the Treaty Commissions after the Court
had declared its Opinion is a refusal to fulfill a Treaty obligation which is
an international responsibility.
10. Nevertheless, such refusal does not alter the conditions contemplated in
the Treaties for the exercise of the Secretary-General’s power of
appointment.
11. One could not remedy the breach of a Treaty obligation by creating a
Commission which was not the kind of Commission contemplated by the
Treaties (2-member Commission). It was the Court's duty to interpret
Treaties, not to revise them.
12. An arbitration commission may make a valid decision although the
original number of its members, as fixed by the arbitration agreement, is
later reduced by a withdrawal of one of the commissioners. This does not
permit, by analogy, the case at bar where the Secretary-General appoints
a third member in circumstances other than those contemplated in the
Treaties, because this raises the question of the initial validity of the
constitution of the Commission.
13. Thus, the Court answered NO to the 3rd question and consequently it was
not necessary for the Court to consider the 4th question.
 Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.1 Consequently, the UN General
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Assembly requested the ICJ to give an Advisory Opinion on the following
Crime of Genocide (Advisory Opinion) questions:

General List No. 12 | May 28, 1951 | Treaties – Consent of States | ACP Bantolo
I. Can the reserving State be regarded as being a party to the Convention
Advisory Opinion by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) while still maintaining its reservation if the reservation is objected to by one
or more of the parties to the Convention but not by others?
Recit-Ready: The ICJ was asked by the UN General Assembly to give an Advisory II. If the answer to Question I is in the affirmative, what is the effect of the
Opinion to determine (1) which States can make valid reservations to the reservation as between the reserving State and:
Convention, (2) what kind of objections are valid, and (3) the legal effects of such a. The parties which object to the reservation?
objections. b. Those which accept it?
III. What would be the legal effect as regards the answer to Question I if an
As regards the questions of WHO can make valid reservations and the LEGAL objection to a reservation is made:
EFFECTS of such reservation, the ICJ answered that even a non-signatory State a. By a signatory which has not yet ratified?
can make an objection to the Convention despite not being a signatory. Although b. By a State entitled to sign or accede but which has not yet done
the non-signatory state only has a “provisional status” which is second to signatory so?
states whose reservations in contrast are amply safeguarded, the non-signatory
The procedure on notice was complied with and written statements were deposited
state can make a reservation which is considered indicative of the “eventual attitude
within the prescribed time limits by the following organizations:
of the signatory State when it becomes a party to the Convention.”

As regards WHAT kind of reservations may be made, the ICJ answered that “it is (1) The Organization of American States;
(2) The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;
the compatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of the Convention that
must furnish the criterion for the attitude of a State in making the reservation on (3) The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan;
(4) The USA;
accession as well as for the appraisal by a State in objecting to the reservation.”
(5) The UK of Great Britain and Northern Ireland;
Thus, reference to the raison d’être or purpose of the Convention must be made.
(6) The UN Secretary-General;
Accordingly, it is “to condemn and punish genocide as ‘a crime under international
(7) Israel;
law’ ... which shocks the conscience of mankind and results in great losses to
(8) The International Labour Organization;
humanity ... .” Moreover, the ICJ made a categorical pronouncement that any State
entitled to be a party to the Convention CANNOT make an objection by virtue of its (9) Poland;
(10) Czechoslovakia;
“sovereignty”.
(11) The Netherlands;
Doctrine: (12) The People’s Republic of Romania;
§ The Convention on the Prevention & Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (13) The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic;
does not deal with the private interests of the State. It deals with the (14) The People’s Republic of Bulgaria;
(15) The Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic; and
preservation of an element of international order.
§ Sovereignty as a defense cannot be sustained if it “could lead to a complete (16) The Republic of the Philippines.
disregard of the object and purpose of the Convention.”
§ Signatory-States who have not ratified the Convention only obtain a ISSUES: (1-4: Preliminary; 5-7: Substantive)
“provisional status” which are secondary to the favorable treatment
accorded to signatory-States who have ratified the Convention. 1. Whether “the making of an objection to a reservation made by a State to
the Convention ... constitutes a dispute.” (NO)
2. Whether "only States which are parties to the Convention are entitled to
FACTS: On 16 Nov. 1950, “some States” in the UN General Assembly objected to interpret it or seek an interpretation of it." (NO)
a reservation made by “States” to the Convention on the Prevention &

1
I looked this up on Wiki. The States who made the reservation are the following: (1) Malaysia Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom);
(opposed by Netherlands, UK); (2) the Philippines (opposed by Norway); (3) Rwanda (opposed (6) Vietnam (reservation opposed by UK); and (7) Yemen (opposed by UK).
by UK); (4) Singapore (reservation opposed by UK); (5) USA (opposed by Denmark, Estonia,
1
 3. Whether "there exists no dispute in the present case and that,
consequently, the effect of Article IX is to deprive the Court, not only of
any contentious jurisdiction, but also of any power to give an Advisory
Opinion." (NO)
4. Whether "a contracting State which has made a reservation can, while still
maintaining it, be regarded as being a party to the Convention." (YES)
5. "[W]hat kind of reservations can be made and what kind of objections may
be taken to them."
6. Whether "any State entitled to become a party to the Genocide
Convention may do so while making any reservation it chooses by virtue
of its sovereignty." (NO)
7. Whether a non-signatory State can make an objection to the Convention.
(YES)
RATIO: (chronological discussion)
1. Whether “the making of an objection to a reservation made by a
State to the Convention ... constitutes a dispute.” (NO)
§ The object of this request for an Opinion is to guide the United Nations in
respect of its own action. It is indeed beyond dispute that the General
Assembly, which drafted and adopted the Genocide Convention, and the
Secretary-General, who is the depositary of the instruments of ratification
and accession, have an interest in knowing the legal effects of
reservations to that Convention and more particularly the legal effects of
objections to such reservations.
2. Whether “only States which are parties to the Convention are
entitled to interpret it or seek an interpretation of it.” (NO)
§ In these circumstances, there can be no doubt that the precise
determination of the conditions for participation in the Convention
constitutes a permanent interest of direct concern to the United Nations
which has not disappeared with the entry into force of the Convention.
§ Moreover, the power of the General Assembly to request an Advisory
Opinion from the Court in no way impairs the inherent right of States
parties to the Convention in the matter of its interpretation. This right is
independent of the General Assembly's power and is exercisable in a
parallel direction.
§ Furthermore, States which are parties to the Convention enjoy the faculty
of referring the matter to the Court in the manner provided in Article IX of
the Convention.
2
3. Whether “there exists no dispute in the present case and that,
consequently, the effect of Article IX is to deprive the Court, not only
of any contentious jurisdiction, but also of any power to give an
Advisory Opinion.” (NO)
§ The existence of a procedure for the settlement of disputes, such as that
provided by Article IX, does not in itself exclude the Court's advisory
jurisdiction, for Article 96 of the Charter confers upon the General
Assembly and the Security Council in general terms the right to request
this Court to give an Advisory Opinion "on any legal question".
§ Further, Article IX, before it can be applied, presupposes the status of
"contracting parties"; consequently, it cannot be invoked against a request
for an Opinion the very object of which is to determine, in relation to
reservations and objections thereto, the conditions in which a State can
become a party. (emphasis supplied)
4. Whether “a contracting State which has made a reservation can,
while still maintaining it, be regarded as being a party to the
Convention.” (YES)
§ GR: It is well established that in its treaty relations a State cannot be
bound without its consent, and that consequently no reservation can be
effective against any State without its agreement thereto.
§ XPN: It is also a generally recognized principle that a multilateral
convention is the result of an agreement freely concluded upon its clauses
and that consequently none of the contracting parties is entitled to
frustrate or impair, by means of unilateral decisions or particular
agreements, the purpose and raison d’être of the convention.
§ To this principle was linked the notion of the integrity of the convention as
adopted, a notion which in its traditional concept involved the proposition
that no reservation was valid unless it was accepted by all the contracting
parties without exception, as would have been the case if it had been
stated during the negotiations.
§ This concept, which is directly inspired by the notion of contract, is of
undisputed value as a principle.
o It must also be pointed out that although the Genocide
Convention was finally approved unanimously, it is nevertheless
the result of a series of majority votes. The majority principle,
while facilitating the conclusion of multilateral conventions, may
also make it necessary for certain States to make reservations.
o In this state of international practice, it could certainly not be
inferred from the absence of an article providing for reservations
in a multilateral convention that the contracting States are
prohibited from making certain reservations. Account should also
 be taken of the fact that the absence of such an article or even
the decision not to insert such an article can be explained by the
desire not to invite a multiplicity of reservations.
o In this connection, the following passage may be quoted from the
comments on the draft Convention prepared by the Secretary-
General : “.... (1) It would seem that reservations of a general
scope have no place in a convention of this kind which does
not deal with the private interests of a State, but with the
preservation of an element of international order .... ;”
(emphasis supplied)
5. “[W]hat kind of reservations can be made and what kind of
objections may be taken to them.”
§ The solution of these problems must be found in the special
characteristics of the Genocide Convention. The origins of the Convention
show that it was the intention of the United Nations to condemn and
punish genocide as "a crime under international law" involving a denial of
the right of existence of entire human groups, a denial which shocks the
conscience of mankind and results in great losses to humanity, and which
is contrary to moral law and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations
(Resolution 96 (1) of the General Assembly, December 11th 1946).
o The first consequence arising from this conception is that the
principles underlying the Convention are principles which are
recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even without
any conventional obligation.
o A second consequence is the universal character both of the
condemnation of genocide and of the Cooperation required "in
order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge."
§ The Genocide Convention was therefore intended by the General
Assembly and by the contracting parties to be definitely universal in
scope. It was in fact approved on December 9, 1948, by a resolution which
was unanimously adopted by fifty-six States.
§ In such a convention the contracting States do not have any interests of
their own; they merely have, one and all, a common interest, namely, the
accomplishment of those high purposes which are the raison d'être of the
convention.
o Consequently, in a convention of this type one cannot speak of
individual advantages or disadvantages to States, or of the
maintenance of a perfect contractual balance between rights and
duties.
o The object and purpose of the Genocide Convention imply that it
was the intention of the General Assembly and of the States
3
which adopted it that as many States as possible should
participate. The complete exclusion from the Convention of one
or more States would not only restrict the scope of its application,
but would detract from the authority of the moral and
humanitarian principles which are its basis.
§ It follows that it is the compatibility of a reservation with the object
and purpose of the Convention that must furnish the criterion for the
attitude of a State in making the reservation on accession as well as
for the appraisal by a State in objecting to the reservation. (emphasis
supplied)
o Any other view would lead either to the acceptance of
reservations which frustrate the purposes which the General
Assembly and the contracting parties had in mind, or to
recognition that the parties to the Convention have the power of
excluding from it the author of a reservation, even a minor one,
which may be quite compatible with those purposes.
6. Whether “any State entitled to become a party to the Genocide
Convention may do so while making any reservation it chooses by
virtue of its sovereignty.” (NO)
§ The Court cannot share this view. It is obvious that so extreme an
application of the idea of State sovereignty could lead to a complete
disregard of the object and purpose of the Convention.
It results from the foregoing considerations that Question 1, on account of its
abstract character, cannot be given an absolute answer. The appraisal of a
reservation and the effect of objections that might be made to it depend upon
the particular circumstances of each individual case.
7. Whether a non-signatory State can make an objection to the
Convention. (YES)
§ [T]he Court considers that signature constitutes a first step to participation
in the Convention.
§ It is evident that without ratification, signature does not make the signatory
State a party to the Convention; nevertheless, it establishes a
provisional status in favour of that State. This status may decrease in
value and importance after the Convention enters into force. But, both
before and after the entry into force, this status would justify more
favourable treatment being meted out to signatory States in respect of
objections than to States which have neither signed nor acceded.
(emphasis supplied)
 § Pending ratification, the provisional status created by signature confers Question 1 only upon ratification. Until that moment it merely serves as a notice
upon the signatory a right to formulate as a precautionary measure to the other State of the eventual attitude of the signatory State;
objections which have themselves a provisional character. These would (b) that an objection to a reservation made by a State which is entitled to sign
disappear if the signature were not followed by ratification, or they would or accede but which has not yet done so, is without legal effect.
become effective on ratification.
§ Until this ratification is made, the objection of a signatory State can
therefore not have an immediate legal effect in regard to the reserving
State. It would merely express and proclaim the eventual attitude of the
signatory State when it becomes a party to the Convention.
§ The legal interest of a signatory State in objecting to a reservation
would thus be amply safeguarded. (emphasis supplied)
o The reserving State would be given notice that as soon as the
constitutional or other processes, which cause the lapse of time
before ratification, have been completed, it would be confronted
with a valid objection which carries full legal effect and
consequently, it would have to decide, when the objection is
stated, whether it wishes to maintain or withdraw its reservation.
o In the event of no ratification occurring, the notice would merely
have been in vain.
DISPOSITION:
For these reasons,
THE COURT IF OF OPINION
In so far as concerns the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, in the event of a State ratifying or acceding to the
Convention subject to a reservation made either on ratification or on accession,
or on signature followed by ratification,
On Question I :
by seven votes to five,
that a State which has made and maintained a reservation which has been
objected to by one or more of the parties to the Convention but not by others,
can be regarded as being a party to the Convention if the reservation is
compatible with the object and purpose of the Convention; otherwise, that State
cannot be regarded as being a party to the Convention.
On Question II:
by seven votes to five,
(a) that if a party to the Convention objects to a reservation which it considers
to be incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention, it can in fact
consider that the reserving State is not a party to the Convention;
(b) that if, on the other hand, a party accepts the reservation as being compatible
with the object and purpose of the Convention, it can in fact consider that the
reserving State is a party to the Convention;
On Question III:
by seven votes to five,
(a) that an objection to a reservation made by a signatory State which has not
yet ratified the Convention can have the legal effect indicated in the reply to
4
 (1) The  continued  presence  of  South  Africa  in  Namibia  is  illegal  and 
[5] LEGAL CONSEQUENCES FOR STATES OF THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF  South  Africa  is  under  obligation  to  withdraw its administration from 
SOUTH AFRICA IN NAMIBIA (SOUTH WEST AFRICA) NOTWITHSTANDING  Namibia; 
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 276 (1970)  (2) That  States  Members  of  the  United  Nations  are  under  obligation  to 
recognize  the  illegality  of  South  Africa's  presence  in  Namibia,  the 
Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971 | 21 June 1971 | Sources of International Law |  invalidity  of  its  acts,  and  to  refrain  from  any  acts  and  in  particular 
Francis Beltrán  any  dealings  with  the  Government  of  South  Africa  implying 
  recognition  of  the  legality  of,  or  lending  support  to,  such  presence 
Recit-Ready:    and administration; and 
1. After  the  end of the First World War, South Africa was given by the League  (3) That  it  is  incumbent  upon  States  which  are  not  Members  of  the 
of  Nations  the  Mandate  over  South  West  Africa  (Namibia).  The  United  Nations  to give assistance, within the scope of subparagraph 
obligations  of  South  Africa  as  Mandatory  is  to  civilize  South  West  Africa  (2)  above,  in  the  action  which  has  been  taken by the United Nations 
and  annually  and  when  necessary,  submit reports concerning the territory  with regard to Namibia. 
to the League of Nations.  3. After  the  end  of  the  First World War, the control of the German colony of 
2. When  the  League  of Nations was dismantled, the United Nations replaced  South  West  Africa  (Namibia)  is  transferred  to  South  Africa  as  a  League 
its former function as supervisor of the Mandate System.   of Nations Mandate. 
3. South  Africa  requested  from  the  UN  the  incorporation  of  the territory, but  4. The  mandate  system  was  intended  to  grant the tutelage of peoples “​not 
the  UN  did  not  accede.  South  Africa  then  stopped  sending  supervisory  yet  able  to  stand  by  themselves​”,  to  the  guidance  of “​advanced nations​”. 
reports  to  the  UN  and  maintained  that  it  no  longer  had  any  obligation  The  latter  would  become  Mandatories  on  behalf  of  the  League  of 
under  the  Mandate  as  the  League  of  Nations  is  no  more  and  thus  the  Nations until such a time the former are “​able to stand by themselves​”.  
Mandate had lapsed.   5. South  Africa’s  acceptance  of  the  mandate  came  with  it  the  assumption 
4. The  Court  provides  that  South  Africa  had  materially  breached  the  of  obligations  not  only  in  a  moral  but  also  of  a  legal  and  binding 
Mandate  agreement,  which  is  in  force  as  a  Treaty  or  a  Covenant.  Under  character;  and  as  corollary  to  this  trust,  South  Africa  was  to  give 
the  VCLT  material  breach  of  a  Treaty is a ground for its repudiation – and  “​securities​”  in  the  form  of  legal  accountability.  The  Mandatory  was  to 
thus  the Court found that South Africa’s Mandate is no longer existing and  give annual reports in reference to the territory it was in charge of. 
its continued occupation of South West Africa is illegal.  6. Contrary  therefore  to  the  position  of  South  Africa,  the  Mandate  did  not 
Doctrine:  give  rise  to  annexation  but  of  a  trust  relationship.  The  purpose  of  such 
1. Treaties  will  continue  to  be  in  effect  notwithstanding  the  demise  of  the  “​sacred trust of civilization​” is the development of the non-self-governing 
International  Organization  that  helped  facilitate  its  formation  and  territories. 
conclusion (?)  7. Despite  the  demise  of  the  League  of  Nations,  the  Mandate  system 
  continues in effect as evidenced by resolution by the Assembly providing 
for  its  continuation,  and  provisions  in the UN Charter to the same effect. 
The obligations of the Mandatory remain unimpeded and the supervisory 
FACTS:  functions of the League of Nations is now to be exercised by the UN. 
8. The  Government of South Africa proposed to the UN the incorporation of 
1. The  UN  Secretary  General  transmitted  to  the  President  of  the  ICJ  a  the  territory,  which  the  UN  denied  and  instead recommended that South 
request  for  an  advisory  opinion  to  the  following  query:  “What  are  the  West  Africa  be  placed  under  the  ​international  trusteeship  system  of  the 
legal  consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa  UN.  
in Namibia, notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970)”?  9. The  Government  of  South  Africa  then  halted  the  submission  of  special 
2. The Court reached the following conclusions:  reports  to  the  UN  “in  the  interest  of  efficient  administration.”  South 
Africa  was  then  of  the position that the demise of the League of Nations 
meant  that  the  Mandate  had  lapsed  and  that  they  are  no  longer subject 
 to  any  legal  obligation  as  regards  South  West  Africa.  South  Africa  5. The Court thus finds South Africa’s occupation illegal, and therefore they 
maintained  its  occupation  under  the  justification  of:  (a)  conquest;  (b)  have the obligation to put an end to it and withdraw its administration 
long  occupation;  (c)  continuation of the sacred trust; and (d) because its  from the Territory of Namibia. By maintaining the present illegal 
administration  is  beneficial  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  territory  and  is  situation, and occupying the Territory without title, South Africa incurs 
desired by them.  international responsibilities arising from a continuing violation of an 
10. The  UN  called  upon  South  Africa  to  perform  its  obligations  under  the  international obligation. It also remains accountable for any violations of 
Mandate.  The  UN  finally  called  upon  all  States  administering  Mandate  its international obligations, or of the rights of the people of Namibia. 
territories  to  submit  trusteeship  agreements.  All  States  except  South  The fact that South Africa no longer has any title to administer the 
Africa  either  placed  their  territories  under  the  trusteeship  agreement  or  Territory does not release it from its obligations and responsibilities 
gave them independence.  under international law towards other States in respect of the exercise of 
11. The  UN  conducted  negotiations  with  South  Africa  not  insisting  on  the  its powers in relation to this Territory. Physical control of a territory, and 
conclusion  of  a  trusteeship  agreement  but  instead  a  system  of  not sovereignty or legitimacy of title, is the basis of State liability for acts 
supervision  “not  exceeding  that  which  is  applied  under  the  Mandate  affecting other States.  
system”. South Africa still refused and further negotiations bore no fruit. 

ISSUES:   

1. WON  the  demise  of  the  League  of  Nations  meant  that  South  Africa’s 
Mandate  had  lapsed  and  that  they  are  no  longer  subject  to  any  legal 
obligation as regards South West Africa. 
- NO 

RATIO: 
1. According to the Court, the Mandate is an International Agreement 
having the character of a Treaty or Convention.  
2. The rules laid down by the VCLT provides that termination of a treaty is 
justified ONLY if it is due to a material breach – being (a) a repudiation 
of the treaty not sanctioned by the present Convention; and (b) the 
violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object 
or purpose of the treaty. 
3. General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) determines that both forms of 
material breach had occurred in this case. By stressing that South Africa 
"has disavowed the Mandate", the General Assembly declared in fact 
that it had repudiated it. The resolution in question is therefore to be 
viewed as the exercise of the right to terminate a relationship in case of 
a deliberate and persistent violation of obligations which destroys the 
very object and purpose of that relationship. 
4. General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI), after declaring the termination 
of the Mandate, added in "that South Africa has no other right to 
administer the Territory". The Court confirmed the validity of the 
resolution as the lapse of the Mandate comes with it the lapse of the 
authority of the Mandatory.  
  
GOLDWATER v. CARTER  Justice Powell​ (​ cited in Bernas book):​ JUSTICIABLE BUT NOT RIPE FOR JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 
444 US. 996 | Dec. 13, 1979 | Termination of a treaty | Reina   The Judicial Branch should not decide issues affecting the allocation of power between 
the President and Congress until the political branches reach a constitutional impasse. 
Petitioner: Barry Goldwater et al. 
Otherwise, the Court would encourage small groups, or even individual Members, of 
Respondent: James Earl Carter, President of the United States, et al. 
Congress to seek judicial resolution of issues before the normal political process has the 
 
opportunity to resolve the conflict. 
Recit-Ready:   
 
A  few  Members  of  Congress  claim  that  President  Carter’s  action  in  terminating  the  treaty 
No constitutional provision explicitly confers upon the President the power to terminate 
with  Taiwan  has  deprived  Congress  of  their  constitutional  role  with  respect  to  a  change  in 
treaties. Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution authorizes the President to make treaties 
the  supreme  law  of  the  land.  The  issue  in  this  case  is  whether  the  president can terminate 
with the advice and consent of the Senate. Article VI provides that treaties shall be a part 
the  defense  treaty  with  Taiwan  without  congressional  approval.  This  question  was  left 
of the supreme law of the land. These provisions add support to the view that the text of 
UNANSWERED as the Court ruled that the matter was not yet ripe for judicial review. 
the Constitution does not unquestionably commit the power to terminate treaties to the 
 
President alone. 
Doctrine: 
 
(This was what Fr. Bernas quoted in his book) 
The present case involves neither review of the President's activities as Commander in 
The Judicial Branch should not decide issues affecting the allocation of power between the 
Chief nor impermissible interference in the field of foreign affairs. Such a case would arise 
President and Congress until the political branches reach a constitutional impasse. 
if the Court was asked to decide, for example, whether a treaty required the President to 
Otherwise, the Court would encourage small groups, or even individual Members, of 
order troops into a foreign country. But "it is error to suppose that every case or 
Congress to seek judicial resolution of issues before the normal political process has the 
controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance." 
opportunity to resolve the conflict. 
 
If the Congress, by appropriate formal action, had challenged the President's authority to 
FACTS:  terminate the treaty with Taiwan, the resulting uncertainty could have serious 
consequences for our country. In that situation, it would be the duty of this Court to resolve 
1. A  few  Members  of  Congress,  including  petitioner  Barry  Goldwater,  claim  that  the issue. 
President  James  Earl  Carter’s  action  in  terminating  the  treaty  with  Taiwan  has   
deprived  Congress  of their constitutional role with respect to a change in the supreme  The Court has recognized that, in the area of foreign policy, Congress may leave the 
law of the land.  President with wide discretion that otherwise might run afoul of the nondelegation 
2. Congress has taken no official action.  doctrine. As stated in that case, "the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a 
3. Although  the  Senate  has  considered  a  resolution  declaring  that  Senate  approval  is  representative of the Nation. He makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; 
necessary  for  the  termination  of  any  mutual  defense  treaty,  no  final  vote  has  been  but he alone negotiates." Resolution of this case would interfere with neither the 
taken on the resolution.  President's ability to negotiate treaties nor his duty to execute their provisions. 
 
ISSUE:  Justice Rehnquist: Q ​ UESTION IS POLITICAL AND NONJUSTICIABLE 
The basic question presented by the petitioners in this case is "political," and therefore 
Whether  or  not  President  Carter  can  terminate  the  defense  treaty  with  Taiwan  without  nonjusticiable because it involves the authority of the President in the conduct of our 
approval from Congress.  country's foreign relations and the extent to which the Senate or the Congress is 
authorized to negate the action of the President. 
RATIO:   
NO DECISION WAS REACHED except to say that the matter was not yet ripe for judicial  While the Constitution is express as to the manner in which the Senate shall participate in 
review.   the ratification of a treaty, it is silent as to that body's participation in the abrogation of a 
  treaty. 
(The whole case just discussed the different opinions of the Justices so pls bear with me   
huhu) 
Since the political nature of the questions presented should have precluded the lower 
courts from considering or deciding the merits of the controversy, the prior proceedings in 
the federal courts must be vacated, and the complaint dismissed. 
 
Congress has initiated the termination of treaties by directing or requiring the President to 
give notice of termination, without any prior presidential request. Congress has annulled 
treaties without any presidential notice. It has conferred on the President the power to 
terminate a particular treaty, and it has enacted statutes practically nullifying the domestic 
effects of a treaty and thus caused the President to carry out termination. 
 
As the US political history demonstrates, treaty creation and termination are complex 
phenomena rooted in the dynamic relationship between the two political branches of our 
government. The Court thus should decline the invitation to set in concrete a particular 
constitutionally acceptable arrangement by which the President and Congress are to share 
treaty termination. 
 
Justice Blackmun: ​JUSTICIABLE 
The time factor and its importance are illusory; if the President does not have the power to 
terminate the treaty (a substantial issue that we should address only after briefing and oral 
argument), the notice of intention to terminate surely has no legal effect. It is also 
indefensible, without further study, to pass on the issue of justiciability or on the issues of 
standing or ripeness. While I therefore join in the grant of the petition for certiorari, I would 
set the case for oral argument and give it the plenary consideration it so obviously 
deserves. 
 
Justice Brennan: ​JUSTICIABLE 
Properly understood, the political question doctrine restrains courts from reviewing an 
exercise of foreign policy judgment by the coordinate political branch to which authority to 
make that judgment has been "constitutionally committed." 
 
But the doctrine does not pertain when a court is faced with the antecedent question 
whether a particular branch has been constitutionally designated as the repository of 
political decision-making power. The issue of decision-making authority must be resolved 
as a matter of constitutional law, not political discretion; accordingly, it falls within the 
competence of the courts. 
 
Abrogation of the defense treaty with Taiwan was a necessary incident to Executive 
recognition of the Peking Government, because the defense treaty was predicated upon 
the now-abandoned view that the Taiwan Government was the only legitimate political 
authority in China. Our cases firmly establish that the Constitution commits to the 
President alone the power to recognize, and withdraw recognition from, foreign regimes. 
 
 [8] Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project Case (Hungary v. Slovakia)
ICJ Report 1997 | Sept. 25, 1997 | Treaty | Dee
Parties: Republic of Hungary and Slovak Republic (Submission for
International Court of Justice’s Judgment)
! Danube river for the development of water resources, energy, transport,
Recit-Ready:
The Republic of Hungary and Slovak Republic entered into a Treaty (1997
Treaty) concerning the construction and operation of the Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros System of Locks. However, in 1989, as a result of intense criticism
the Project had in Hungary, the Hungarian Government decided to suspend the
works at Nagymaros. The Slovak Government decided to begin with its
alternative solutions. To justify its conduct, Hungary relied essentially on a
"state of ecological necessity". Hungary detailed the principal ecological
dangers which would have been caused by this system. The Court ruled that
Hungary was not entitled to suspend and abandon the works on Nagymaros
Project and Slovak Government was not entitled to proceed to its alternative
solution. Hungary’s notification to Slovak Government did not put an end to the
treaty. Although both Hungary and Czechoslovakia failed to comply with their
obligations under the 1977 Treaty, this reciprocal wrongful conduct did not
bring the Treaty to an end nor justify its termination. It would be otherwise, of
course, if the parties decided to terminate the Treaty by mutual consent.
! Nagymaros until 31 October 1989, and, in addition, suspended the works at
Doctrine:
What is required in the present case by the rule pacta sunt servanda is that the
Parties find an agreed solution within the cooperative context of the Treaty.
"Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed
by them in good faith." This latter element implies that, in this case, it is the
purpose of the Treaty, and the intentions of the parties in concluding it, which
should prevail over its literal application. The principle of good faith obliges the
Parties to apply it in a reasonable way and in such a manner that its purpose
can be realized.
FACTS: (Disclaimer: The case has 81 pages. Pls don’t just rely on this digest. There are a lot of
other issues mentioned in the case. Pls look at it too ☺ )
1. The present case arose out of the signature, on 16 September 1977, by the
Hungarian People's Republic and the Czechoslovak People's Republic, of a
treaty concerning the construction and operation of the Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros System of Locks (hereinafter called the "1977 Treaty").
2. The 1977 Treaty entered into force on 30 June 1978. It provides for the
construction and operation of a System of Locks by the parties as a "joint
investment". The barrage system was designed to attain the broad
utilization of the natural resources of the Bratislava-Budapest section of the
agriculture and other sectors of the national economy of the Contracting
Parties.
3. The joint investment was thus essentially aimed at the production of
hydroelectricity, the improvement of navigation on the relevant section of
the Danube and the protection of the areas along the banks against
flooding.
4. Article 1, paragraph 1, of the 1977 Treaty describes the principal works to be
constructed in pursuance of the Project. It provided for the building of two
series of locks, one at Gabcikovo (in Czechoslovak territory) and the other at
Nagymaros (in Hungarian territory), to constitute "a single and indivisible
operational system of works"
5. However, as a result of intense criticism which the Project had generated in
Hungary, the Hungarian Government decided on 13 May 1989 to suspend
the works at Nagymaros pending the completion of various studies which
the competent authorities were to finish before 31 July 1989. On 21 July
1989, the Hungarian Government extended the suspension of the works at
Dunakiliti until the same date. Lastly, on 27 October 1989, Hungary decided
to abandon the works at Nagymaros and to maintain the status quo at
Dunakiliti.
6. During this period, negotiations were being held between the parties.
Czechoslovakia also started investigating alternative solutions.
7. On 23 July 1991, the Slovak Government decided to begin, in September
1991, construction to put the Gabcikovo Project into operation by the
provisional solution". That decision was endorsed by the Federal
Czechoslovak Government on 25 July. Work on Variant C began in
November 1991. Discussions continued between the two parties but to no
avail, and, on 19 May 1992, the Hungarian Government transmitted to the
Czechoslovak Government a Note Verbale terminating the 1977 Treaty with
effect from 25 May 1992. On 15 October 1992, Czechoslovakia began work
to enable the Danube to be closed and, starting on 23 October, proceeded to
the damming of the river.
8. Throughout the proceedings, Hungary contended that, although it did
suspend or abandon certain works, on the contrary, it never suspended the
application of the 1977 Treaty itself. To justify its conduct, it relied
essentially on a "state of ecological necessity". Hungary detailed the
principal ecological dangers which would have been caused by this system.
Hungary also accused Czechoslovakia of having violated various provisions
of the 1977 Treaty from before 1989 in particular Articles 15 and 19 relating,
respectively, to water quality and nature protection - in refusing to take
account of the now evident ecological dangers and insisting that the works
be continued, notably at Nagymaros.
9. Slovakia, for its part, denied that the basis for suspending or abandoning the
performance of a treaty obligation can be found outside the law of treaties.
It acknowledged that the 1969 Vienna Convention could not be applied as
such to the 1977 Treaty, but at the same time stressed that a number of its
provisions are a reflection of pre-existing rules of customary international
law and specified that this is, in particular, the case with the provisions of
Part V relating to invalidity, termination and suspension of the operation of
treaties.
10. In the course of the proceedings, Slovakia argued at length that the state of
necessity upon which Hungary relied did not constitute a reason for the
suspension of a treaty obligation recognized by the law of treaties. At the
same time, it cast doubt upon whether "ecological necessity" or "ecological
risk" could, in relation to the law of State responsibility, constitute a
circumstance precluding the wrongfulness of an act. In any event, Slovakia
denied that there had been any kind of "ecological state of necessity" in this
case either in 1989 or subsequently. It invoked the authority of various
scientific studies when it claimed that Hungary had given an exaggeratedly
pessimistic description of the situation.
! act must not have "contributed to the occurrence of the state of necessity".
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Republic of Hungary was entitled to suspend and subsequently
abandon, in 1989, the works on the Nagymaros Project and on the part of
the Gabcikovo Project for which the Treaty attributed responsibility to the
Republic of Hungary. (NO)
2. Whether the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic was entitled to proceed, in
November 1991, to the 'provisional solution.’ (NO)
3. Whether Hungary's notification of 19 May 1992 brought the 1977 Treaty to
an end (NO)
RATIO:
1. Hungary was not entitled to suspend and subsequently abandon, in 1989,
the works on the Nagymaros Project and on the part of the Gabcikovo
Project for which the 1977 Treaty and related instruments attributed
responsibility to it.
!
The existence of a state of necessity must be evaluated in the light of the criteria
laid down by the International Law Commission in Article 33 of the Draft Articles
on the International Responsibility of States. The "state of necessity" is "the
situation of a State whose sole means of safeguarding an essential interest
threatened by a grave and imminent peril is to adopt conduct not in conformity
with what is required of it by an international obligation to another State"
!
The Court considers that the state of necessity is a ground recognized by
customary international law for precluding the wrongfulness of an act not in
conformity with an international obligaion. It observes moreover that such
ground for precluding wrongfulness can only be accepted on an exceptional
basis. The state of necessity can only be invoked under certain strictly defined
conditions which must be cumulatively satisfied; and the State concerned is not
the sole judge of whether those conditions have been met.
!
In the present case, the following basic conditions set forth in Draft Article 33 are
relevant: it must have been occasioned by an "essential interest" of the State
which is the author of the act conficting with one of its international obligations;
that interest must have been threatened by a "grave and imminent peril"; the act
being challenged must have been the "only means" of safeguarding that interest;
that act must not have "seriously impaired an essential interest" of the State
towards which the obligation existed; and the State which is the author of that
Those conditions reflect customary international law.
!
The Court considers, however, that, serious though these uncertainties might
have been they could not, alone, establish the objective existence of a "peril" in
the sense of a component element of a state of necessity. The word "peril"
certainly evokes the idea of "risk": that is precisely what distinguishes "peril" from
material damage. But a state of necessity could not exist without a "peril" duly
established at the relevant point in time: the mere apprehension of a Possible
"peril" could not suffice in that respect. It could moreover hardly be otherwise.
when the "peril" constituting the state of necessity has at the same time to be
"grave" and "imminent". "Imminence" is synonymous with "immediacy" or
"proximity" and goes far beyond the concept of "possibility". The Hungarian
argument on the state of necessity could not convince the Court unless it was at
least proven that a real, "grave" and "imminent" "peril" existed in 1989 and that the
measures taken by Hungary were the only possible response to it.
! considers that the diversion of the Danube carried out by Czechoslovakia was not
2. Czechoslovakia, in putting Variant C into operation, was not applying the 1977
Treaty but, on the contrary, violated certain of its express provisions, and, in so
doing, committed an internationally wrongful act.
With a view to justifying those actions, Slovakia invoked what it described as "the
principle of approximate application.” "lt is a sound principle of law that whenever
a legal instrument of continuing validity cannot be applied literally owing to the
conduct of one of the parties, it must, without allowing that party to take
advantage of its own conduct, be applied in a way approximating most closely to
its primary object. In the view of the Court, Variant C does not meet that cardinal
condition with regard to the 1977 Treaty.
! of the view, however, that although it has found that both Hungary and
A wrongful act or offence is frequently preceded by preparatory actions which are
not to be confused with the act or offence itself. It is as well to distinguish
between the actual commission of a wrongful act (whether instantaneous or
continuous) and the conduct prior to that act which is of a preparatory character
and which "does not qualify as a wrongful act"
! and the integrity of the rule pacta sunt servanda if it were to conclude that a
Slovakia also maintained that it was acting under a duty to mitigate damages
when it carried out Variant C. It stated that "It is a general principle of
international law that a party injured by the non-performance of another contract
party must seek to mitigate the damage he has sustained." It would follow from
such a principle that an injured State which has failed to take the necessary
measures to limit the damage sustained would not be entitled to claim
compensation for that damage which could have been avoided. While this
principle might thus provide a basis for the calculation of damages, it could not,
on the other hand, justify an otherwise wrongful act.
! both States ratified that Convention only after the Treaty's conclusion.
Slovakia stated that "Variant C could be presented as a justified countermeasure
to Hungary's illegal acts". In order to be justifiable, a countermeasure must meet
certain conditions: Firstly, it must be taken in response to a previous
international wrongful act of another State and must be directed against that
State. Although not primarily presented as a countermeasure, it is clear that
Variant C was a response to Hungary's suspension and abandonment of works
and that it was directed against that State; and it is equally clear, in the Court's
view, that Hungary's actions were internationally wrongful. Secondly, the injured
State must have called upon the State committing the wrongful act to
discontinue its wrongful conduct or to make reparation for it. It is clear from the
facts of the case that Czechoslovakia requested Hungary to resume the
performance of its treaty obligations on many occasions. The Court thus
a lawful countermeasure because it was not proportionate. It is therefore not
required to pass upon one other condition for the lawfulness of a
countermeasure, namely that its purpose must be to induce the wrongdoing
State to comply with its obligations under international law, and that the measure
must therefore be reversible.
!
3. The notification of termination by Hungary of 19 May 1992 did not have the
legal effect of terminating the 1977 Treaty and related instruments.
Hungary maintained that by their conduct both parties had repudiated the Treaty
and that a bilateral treaty repudiated by both parties cannot survive. The Court is
Czechoslovakia failed to comply with their obligations under the 1977 Treaty, this
reciprocal wrongful conduct did not bring the Treaty to an end nor justify its
termination.
!
The Court would set a precedent with disturbing implications for treaty relations
treaty in force between States, which the parties have implemented in
considerable measure and at great cost over a period of years, might be
unilaterally set aside on grounds of reciprocal non-compliance. It would be
otherwise, of course, if the parties decided to terminate the Treaty by mutual
consent. But in this case, while Hungary purported to terminate the Treaty,
Czechoslovakia consistently resisted this act and declared it to be without legal
effect.
!
The Vienna Convention is not directly applicable to the 1977 Treaty inasmuch as
Consequently only those rules which are declaratory of customary law are
applicable to the 1977 Treaty. The 1977 Treaty does not contain any provision
regarding its termination. Nor is there any indication that the parties intended to
admit the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal. On the contrary, the Treaty
establishes a long-standing and durable régime of joint investment and joint
operation. Consequently, the parties not having agreed otherwise, the Treaty
could be terminated only on the limited grounds enumerated in the Vienna
Convention.
 !
Even if a state of necessity is found to exist, it is not a ground for the termination
of a treaty. It may only be invoked to exonerate from its responsibility a State
which has failed to implement a treaty. Even if found justified, it does not
terminate a Treaty. On the principle of the impossibility of performance as
reflected in Article 61 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Hungary's
interpretation of the wording is, however, not in conformity with the terms of that
Article, nor with the intentions of the Diplomatic Conference which adopted the
Convention. Article 61 requires the "permanent disappearance or destruction of
an object indispensable for the execution" of the treaty to justify the termination
of a treaty on grounds of impossibility of performance. Although it was
recognized that such situations could lead to a preclusion of the wrongfulness of
non-performance by a party of its treaty obligations, the participating States were
not prepared to consider such situations to be a ground for terminating or
suspending a treaty, and preferred to limit themselves to a narrower concept.
What is required in the present case by the rule pacta sunt servanda, as reflected
in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention of 1969 on the Law of Treaties, is that the
Parties find an agreed solution within the cooperative context of the Treaty.
!
Article 26 combines two elements, which are of equal importance. It provides
that "Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed
by them in good faith." This latter element, in the Court's view, implies that, in this
case, it is the purpose of the Treaty, and the intentions of the parties in
concluding it, which should prevail over its literal application. The principle of
good faith obliges the Parties to apply it in a reasonable way and in such a
manner that its purpose can be realized.
 [242 P. 2d 617] SEI FUJII v STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Doctrine: In order to determine, when a treaty is self-executing – the intent of the
signatory parties as shown by the language of the instrument must be taken into
242 P. 2d 617 | April 17, 1952 | Sources of International Law / Treaty– UN
consideration. If, the instrument is uncertain the circumstances of its execution
Charter | DE JESUS
should be taken into consideration.
Petitioner: SEI FUJII
Respondents: THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA For a self-executing treaty provision to be operative without the aid of implementing
legislation then it must appear that “the framers of the treaty intended to prescribe
a rule that, standing alone, would be enforceable in courts.”
Recit-Ready: Sei Fujii, an alien Japanese ineligible to citizenship under U.S.
naturalization laws appeals the judgment which declared that the land purchased
by him in 1948 had escheated/reverted to the ownership of the State pursuant to
the California Alien Land Law. The California Alien Land law prohibits persons who
are ineligible to US citizenship to own real property. These persons ineligible to
citizenship under federal naturalization laws are: the Japanese and small no. of
residents of other races.

ISSUES: Fujii questions the validity of the said Alien Law and based his argument
on two main grounds: (1) UN Charter particularly its preamble and articles 1, 55 and
56 of the Charter invalidated and superseded the California Alien Land Law and (2)
Alien Land Law violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
FACTS:
RULING: The Court ruled that the preamble and Art. 1 of the Charter state only
general purposes and objectives of the UN Org and do NOT impose legal obligations
1. Sei Fujii, an alien Japanese ineligible to citizenship under U.S.
on the individual member nations or to create rights in private persons. Therefore,
naturalization laws appeals the judgment which declared that the land
the said provisions relied by Fujii are not self-executing and there is no indication
purchased by him in 1948 had escheated/reverted to the ownership of the
that said provisions were intended to become rules of law for the Court upon the
State pursuant to the California Alien Land Law.
ratification of the UN Charter. While, the language used in Art. 55 and 56 is not the
type of language employed is not the type of language customarily employed in 2. The California Alien Land Law The California Alien Land law prohibits
treaties which have been held to be self-executing and which create rights and persons who are ineligible to US citizenship to own real property. These
duties in individuals. Thus, the provisions of the UN Charter relied on by Fujii are not persons ineligible to citizenship under federal naturalization laws are: the
intended by the framers to supersede existing US domestic legislation and as such Japanese and small no. of residents of other races.
it does NOT operate to invalidate the Alien Land Law. On the second argument, the 3. Fujii based his argument on two grounds. (1) His first contention is that
Court ruled that the Alien Land Law violates the due process and equal protection the California Alien Land Law has been invalidated and superseded by the
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment since it was designed and administered as provisions of the UN Charter. (2) His second argument is that the statutory
an instrument for effectuating racial discrimination and a person ineligible to acquire classification of aliens on the basis statutory classification of aliens on
US citizenship does not automatically establish a lack of loyalty or absence in the the basis of eligibility to citizenship is arbitrary for the reason that
welfare of the country discrimination against an ineligible alien bears no reasonable relationship
to promotion of the safety and welfare of the state.
ISSUES:
1) W/N the provisions UN Charter particularly its preamble and articles 1,
55 and 56 of the Charter invalidated and superseded the California
Alien Land Law. – No, the said provisions are not self-executing
provisions and the framers does not intend such to supersede domestic
US legislation. Therefore, the preamble and Art. 1, 55 and 56 does not
operate to invalidate the Alien Land Law.
2) W/N the Alien Land Law violates the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. – Yes, designed and
administered as an instrument for effectuating racial discrimination and a
person ineligible to acquire US citizenship does not automatically
establish a lack of loyalty or absence in the welfare of the country.
RATIO:
1) W/N the UN Charter provisions particularly its preamble and articles 1,
55 and 56 of the Charter invalidated and superseded the California
Alien Land Law. – (ISSUE RELEVANT TO MODULE 2)
a. The Charter is a treaty and the US Federal Constitution provides
that treaties made under the authority of US are part of the
supreme law of the land and the judges in every state are bound
thereby.
b. But, a treaty does NOT automatically supersede local laws which
are inconsistent with it unless the treaty provisions are self-
executing.
c. In order to determine, when a treaty is self-executing – the intent
of the signatory parties as shown by the language of the
instrument must be taken into consideration. If, the instrument is
uncertain the circumstances of its execution should be taken into
consideration.
d. For a self-executing treaty provision to be operative without the
aid of implementing legislation then it must appear that “the
framers of the treaty intended to prescribe a rule that, standing
alone, would be enforceable in courts.”
e. In this case, Fujii alleged that the preamble, articles 1, 55 and 56
of the Charter are in conflict and invalidated and superseded the
California Alien Land Law.
f. However, the preamble and Art. 1 of the Charter state only
general purposes and objectives of the UN Org and do not
purport to impose legal obligations on the individual member
nations or to create rights in private persons.
g. Therefore, the said provisions relied by Fujii are not self-
executing and there is no indication that said provisions were
intended to become rules of law for the Court of US upon the
ratification of the UN Charter.
h. Likewise, the language used in Art. 55 and 56 is not the type of
language customarily employed in treaties which have been held
to be self-executing and which create rights and duties in
individuals. Since it does not detail the said rules that shall govern
the rights and obligations of individuals.
i. For certain provisions to be effective without the aid of
implementing legislation the framers of the UN Charter must have
employed a language that is clear and definite which manifests
that intention.
j. The provisions in the charter pledging cooperation in promoting
observance of fundamental freedoms lack the mandatory quality
and definiteness which would indicate an intent to create
justiciable rights in private persons immediately upon ratification.
Therefore, they are only considered as a “promise of future
action” by the member nations.
k. Thus, the provisions of the UN Charter relied on by Fujii are not
intended by the framers to supersede existing US domestic
legislation and as such it does NOT operate to invalidate the Alien
Land Law.
2. W/N the Alien Land Law violates the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. (not PIL related
but just in case)
l. Fujii assails the legality of the Alien Land Law on two grounds.
(1) statutory classification of aliens on the basis of eligibility to
citizenship is arbitrary for the reason that discrimination against
an ineligible alien bears no reasonable relationship to promotion
of the safety and welfare of the state. (2) Secondly, he contends
that the effect of the statute, as well as its purpose, is to
discriminate against aliens solely on the basis of race and that
such discrimination is arbitrary and unreasonable
m. The Fourteenth Amendment intends to protect the rights to
acquire, enjoy, own and dispose of property.
n. The California act (Californian Alien Land Law), in the absence
of treaty, withholds all interests in real property from aliens who
 are ineligible to citizenship under federal naturalization laws 1. t. Further, the Court recognized that the real purpose of the Alien
Wherein, the Nationality Code limits the right of naturalization to Land Law was the elimination of competition by alien Japanese
certain designated races or nationalities, EXCLUDING Japanese in farming California land.
and a few racial groups comparatively small in numbers. u. Therefore, the Court ruled that the California Alien Land Law is
o. According to the terms of the said land law, it classifies persons designed and administered as an instrument for effectuating
not on the basis of eligibility to citizenship but on the basis of race racial discrimination. Since there is nothing to indicate that alien
or nationality. “Although Japanese are not singled out by name residents who are racially ineligible for citizenship possess
for discriminatory treatment in the land law, the reference therein characteristics which are dangerous to the legitimate interests of
to federal standards for naturalization which exclude Japanese the state, or that they, as a class, might use the land for purposes
operates automatically to bring about that result.” injurious to public morals, safety or welfare.
p. The Court states that whenever the classification is on the basis v. Thus, the alien land law is invalid as it violates the Fourteenth
of race, it is "immediately suspect" and will be subjected "to the Amendment.
most rigid scrutiny."According to the cases of Korematsu, Oyama
and Perez the presumption of validity is greatly narrowed in
scope, if not entirely dispelled, whenever it is shown, as here, that
legislation actually discriminates against certain persons
because of their race or nationality.
q. The Court ruledargument in favor of the validity of the Alien Land
Law which states that the said law merely puts in effect a
legislative policy of Congress cannot be upheld.
1. Since the Congress has neither declared nor
assumed that landowners ineligible to
citizenship are a danger to the state; and it is
only the Californian State Legislature that
declared or assumed such danger. The
Congress only regulates admission to
citizenship/naturalization and NOT the right to
own a land.
2. Therefore, the use of the federal naturalization
classification are NOT automatically proper for
purposes of state legislation like in the
California Alien Land Law.
r. California state asserts that the purpose of the Alien Land Law is
to restrict the use and ownership of land to persons who are loyal
and have an interest in the welfare of the state.
s. However, the Court ruled that ineligibility to US citizenship does
not automatically establish a lack of loyalty or absence in the
welfare of the country.

1 The California Alien Land law prohibits persons who are ineligible to US citizenship naturalization laws created by the US Congress are: the Japanese and small no. of
to own real property. These persons ineligible to citizenship under federal residents of other races.
 [10] Bayan v. Zamora 
majority  of  the  votes  cast  by  the  people  in  a  national  referendum;  and  (c) 
G.R. Nos. 138570, 138572, 138587, 138680, & 138698 | October 10, 2000 | 
recognized  as  a  treaty  by  the  other  contracting  state.  The  first  two  requirements 
Visiting Forces Agreement; binding effect of executive agreement | Vica 
were  present,  for  the  concurrence  was  handed  down  by  the  Senate  through  its 
Petitioners:  ​BAYAN  (Bagong  Alyansang  Makabayan),  JUNK  VFA  MOVEMENT,  Resolution  No.  18  which  was  compliant  with  the manner of voting as provided by 
BISHOP  TOMAS  MILLAMENA  (Iglesia  Filipina  Independiente),  BISHOP  ELMER  the  Constitution  (16  is  the  minimum,  which  is  2/3  of  the  ALL  the  members  of 
BOLOCAN  (United  Church  of  Christ  of  the  Phil.),  DR.  REYNALDO  LEGASCA,  MD,  Senate,  while  the  actual  vote  was  23).  With  regard  to  the  last  requirement,  the 
KILUSANG  MAMBUBUKID  NG  PILIPINAS,  KILUSANG  MAYO  UNO,  GABRIELA,  Court  is  of  the  firm  view  that  the  phrase  recognized  as  a  treaty  means  that  the 
PROLABOR,  and  the PUBLIC INTEREST LAW CENTER; PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION  other  contracting  party  accepts  or  acknowledges  the  agreement  as  a  treaty.  To 
ASSOCIATION,  INC.(PHILCONSA),  EXEQUIEL  B.  GARCIA,  AMADOGAT  INCIONG,  require  the  other  contracting  state,  the  United  States  of  America  in  this  case,  to 
CAMILO  L.  SABIO,  AND  RAMON  A.  GONZALES;  TEOFISTO  T.  GUINGONA,  JR.,  submit  the  VFA  to the US Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to 
RAUL  S.  ROCO,  and  SERGIO  R.  OSMEÑA  III;  INTEGRATED  BAR  OF  THE  accord  strict  meaning  to  the  phrase.  Moreover,  it  is  inconsequential  whether  the 
PHILIPPINES,  Represented  by its National President, Jose Aguila Grapilon; JOVITO  United  States  treats  the  VFA  only  as  an  executive  agreement  because,  under 
R.  SALONGA,  WIGBERTO  TAÑADA,  ZENAIDA  QUEZON  AVENCEÑA,  ROLANDO  international  law,  an  executive  agreement  is  as  binding  as  a  treaty. To be sure, as 
SIMBULAN,  PABLITO V. SANIDAD, MA. SOCORRO I. DIOKNO, AGAPITO A. AQUINO,  long  as  the  VFA  possesses  the  elements of an agreement under international law, 
JOKER  P.  ARROYO,  FRANCISCO  C.  RIVERA  JR.,  RENE  A.V.  SAGUISAG,  the  said  agreement  is  to  be  taken  equally  as  a  treaty.  Furthermore,  International 
KILOSBAYAN  ,MOVEMENT  OF  ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND  law  continues  to  make  no  distinction  between  treaties and executive agreements: 
NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI)  they are equally binding obligations upon nations. 
Respondents:  EXECUTIVE  SECRETARY  RONALDO  ZAMORA,  FOREIGN  AFFAIRS   
SECRETARY  DOMINGO  SIAZON,  DEFENSE  SECRETARY  ORLANDO  MERCADO,  Doctrine:  
BRIG.  GEN.  ALEXANDER  AGUIRRE,  SENATE  PRESIDENT  MARCELO  FERNAN,  1. In  international  law,  there  is  no  difference  between treaties and executive 
SENATOR  FRANKLIN  DRILON,  SENATOR  BLAS  OPLE,  SENATOR  RODOLFO  agreements  in  their  binding  effect  upon  states  concerned,  as  long  as the 
BIAZON,  and  SENATOR  FRANCISCO  TATAD;  HON.  RONALDO  B.  ZAMORA,  as  negotiating  functionaries  have remained within their powers. International 
Executive  Secretary,  HON. ORLANDO MERCADO, as Secretary of National Defense,  law  continues  to  make  no  distinction  between  treaties  and  executive 
and  HON.  DOMINGO  L.  SIAZON,  JR.,  as  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs;  JOSEPH  E.  agreements: they are equally binding obligations upon nations. 
ESTRADA,  RONALDO  B.  ZAMORA,  DOMINGO  L.  SIAZON,  JR.,  ORLANDO  B.  2. The  Philippines  cannot  readily  plead  the  Constitution  as  a  convenient 
MERCADO,  MARCELO  B.  FERNAN,  FRANKLIN  M.  DRILON,  BLAS  F.  OPLE  and  excuse  for  non-compliance  with  our  obligations,  duties  and 
RODOLFO  G.  BIAZON;  JOSEPH  EJERCITO  ESTRADA,  in  his  capacity  as  President,  responsibilities under international law. 
Republic  of  the  Philippines,  and  HON.  DOMINGO  SIAZON,  in  his  capacity  as  3. The  principle  of  pacta  sunt  servanda  provides  that  every treaty in force is 
Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs;  THE  EXECUTIVE  SECRETARY,  THE  SECRETARY  OF  binding  upon  the  parties  to  it  and  must  be  performed  by  them  in  good 
FOREIGN  AFFAIRS,  THE  SECRETARY  OF  NATIONAL  DEFENSE,  SENATE  faith. 
PRESIDENT  MARCELO  B.  FERNAN,  SENATOR  BLAS  F.  OPLE, SENATOR RODOLFO   
G.  BLAZON,  AND  ALL  OTHER  PERSONS  ACTING  THEIR  CONTROL, SUPERVISION,  A  to  GQs  #12  and  #13:  ​The  instruments  mentioned  in  this  case  are:  1)  RP-US 
DIRECTION,  AND  INSTRUCTION  IN  RELATION  TO  THE  VISITING  FORCES  Military  Bases  Agreement;  2)  Mutual  Defense  Treaty;  3)  RP-US  Treaty  of 
AGREEMENT (VFA)  Friendship,  Cooperation  and  Security  (this  didn’t  materialize);  4)  Exchange  Notes; 
  and  5)  ​Visiting  Forces  Agreement  (please  see  bullet  #4  to  #8  in  the  facts  for  the 
Recit-Ready:   The US and the Philippines entered into a Visiting Forces Agreement  process)  
which  was  approved  by  Pres.  Ramos  and  subsequently  ratified  by  Pres.  Estrada. 
The  required  concurrence  from  the  Senate  was handed through its Resolution No. 
18,  and  the  VFA  officially  entered  into  force  after  an  Exchange  of  Notes  between  FACTS: 
Sec.  Siazon  and  US  Ambassador  Hubbard.  Now,  petitioners  are  arguing  that  the  1. On  March 14, 1947, the RP1 and the US2 forged the ​RP-US Military Bases 
VFA  is  unconstitutional  for  violating  Sec.  25,  Article  18  of  the  1987  Constitution,  Agreement  which  formalized  the  use  of  installations  in  the  Philippine 
which  requires  a  treaty  allowing  foreign  military  bases,  troops,  or  facilities  in  the  territory  by  United  States  military  personnel.  They  also  entered  into  a 
Philippines to be recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State. The SC held  Mutual  Defense  Treaty  on  August  30, 1951. Under the treaty, the parties 
that  it  is  constitutional  because  it  complies  with  all  the  requisites  under  Sec.  25, 
Article  18,  which  are:  (a)  it  must  be  under  a  treaty;  (b)  the  treaty  must  be  duly 
concurred  in  by  the  Senate  and,  when  so  required  by  congress,  ratified  by  a  1
Republic of the Philippines 
2
​United States of America
 agreed  to  respond  to  any  external  armed  attack on their territory, armed  8. The  ​VFA  officially  entered  into  force  after  an  Exchange  of  Notes 
forces, public vessels, and aircraft.   between Sec. Siazon and US Ambassador Hubbard. 
2. RP  and  the  US  negotiated  for  the  extension  of  the  military  bases  9. Now, these consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition assail the 
agreement,  but  the  Philippine  Senate  rejected  the  proposed  RP-US  constitutionality  of  the  VFA  and  impute  to  herein  respondents  grave 
Treaty  of  Friendship,  Cooperation  and  Security  which,  in  effect,  would  abuse of discretion in ratifying the agreement.  
have extended the presence of US military bases in the Philippines.  10. The  respondents’  main  contention  was  that  the  VFA  failed  to  meet  the 
3. With  the  ​expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement​, the periodic  requisites  under  ​Section  25,  Article  XVIII  of  the  1987  Constitution.8  On 
military  exercises  conducted  between  the  two  countries  ​were  held  in  the  other  hand,  the  petitioners  argue  that instead of the aforementioned 
abeyance​.  Notwithstanding,  the  defense  and  security  relationship  provision  of  the  constitution,  it  is  ​Section  21,  Article  VII9  that  governs 
between  the  Philippines  and  the  United  States  of  America  continued  the VFA. 
pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty​.  ISSUE:   
4. The  United States panel3 then met with the Philippine panel4 to exchange  1. W/N the VFA is unconstitutional. ​NO 
notes on "the complementing strategic interests of the United States and   
the  Philippines  in  the  Asia-Pacific  region." ​Both sides discussed, among  RATIO: 
Both Section Section 25, Article XVIII and Section 21, Article VII are applicable. 
other  things,  the  possible  elements  of  the  VFA​.5  The  negotiations  by 
1. Petitioners  argue  that  Section  25,  Article  XVIII  is  applicable  considering 
both  panels  on  the  VFA  led  to  a  consolidated  draft  text,  which  in  turn  that  the  VFA  has for its subject the presence of foreign military troops in 
resulted  to  a  final  series  of  conferences  and  negotiations  that  the  Philippines.  Respondents,  on  the  contrary,  maintain  that  Section  21, 
culminated  on  January 12 and 13, 1998. ​Pres. Ramos then approved the  Article  VII  should  apply  inasmuch  as  the  VFA  is  not  a  basing 
VFA​,  which  was  respectively.  signed  by  Foreign  Affairs  Sec.  Siazon  and  arrangement  but  an  agreement  which  involves  merely  the  temporary 
US Ambassador Hubbard on February 10, 1998.  visits of United States personnel engaged in joint military exercises. 
5. On  October  6,  1998,  ​Pres.  Estrada  ratified  the  VFA  and  he,  acting  2. The  SC  said  that  both  constitutional  provisions  share  some  common 
ground,  for  they  both  embody  phrases  in  the  negative  and  thus,  are 
through  Executive  Sec.  Zamora,  ​officially  transmitted  to  the  Senate  of 
deemed  prohibitory  in  mandate  and  character.  In  particular,  Section  21 
the Philippines the ​Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the President,  opens with the clause "No treaty . . .," and Section 25 contains the phrase 
and  the  VFA​,  for  concurrence  pursuant  to  Section  21,  Article  VII  of  the  "shall  not  be  allowed."  Additionally,  in  both  instances,  the  concurrence 
1987 Constitution.   of  the  Senate  is  indispensable  to  render  the  treaty  or  international 
6. The  Senate,  in  turn,  ​referred  the  VFA  to  its  Committee  on  Foreign  agreement valid and effective. 
Relations6  and  its  Committee  on  National  Defense  and  Security7  for  3. Section  21,  Article  VII  lays  down  the  ​general  rule  ​on  treaties  or 
their joint consideration and recommendation.   international  agreements  and  applies  to  any  form  of  treaty  with  a  wide 
7. Joint  public  hearings  were  held  by  the  two  Committees,  and  they  variety  of  subject  matter,  so  all  treaties  or  international  agreements 
entered  into  by  the Philippines requires the concurrence of the Senate to 
consequently  submitted  Proposed  Senate  Resolution  No.  443 
be valid and effective. 
recommending  the  concurrence  of  the  Senate  to  the  VFA  and  the  4. In contrast, ​Section 25, Article XVIII is a ​special provision that ​applies to 
creation  of  a  Legislative  Oversight  Committee  to  oversee  its  treaties  which  involve  the  presence  of  foreign  military bases, troops or 
implementation.  The  resolution  was  then  approved  by  the  Senate,  by  a  facilities  in  the  Philippines​.  Under  this provision, the concurrence of the 
two-thirds  (2/3)  vote  of  its  members,  and  it  was  then  re-numbered  as 
8
Senate Resolution No. 18.  Section 25, Article XVIII, provides: After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement
between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America concerning
Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the
3
Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the
This was headed by US Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia Pacific  Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a
Kurt Campbell  national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other
4
This was headed by Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino Jr.  contracting State.
5 9
Visiting Forces Agreement  Section 21, Article VII, provides: No treaty or international agreement shall be 
6
This was chaired by Senator Blas F. Ople  valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members 
7
This was chaired by Senator Rodolfo G. Biazon  of the Senate. 
 Senate  is  only  one  of  the  requisites  to  render  compliance  with  the  the  phrase.  Well-entrenched  is  the  principle  that  the  words  used  in  the 
constitutional  requirements  and  to  consider  the  agreement  binding  on  Constitution  are  to  be  given  their  ordinary  meaning  except  where 
the  Philippines.  Section  25,  Article  XVIII  requires:  (a)  it  must  be  under a  technical terms are employed. 
treaty;  (b)  the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, ​when  4. (NOTE:  Important  part;  PIL  part)  Moreover, it is ​inconsequential whether 
so  required  by  Congress,  ratified  by  a  majority  of  the  votes cast by the  the  US  treats  the  VFA  only  as  an  executive  agreement  because,  ​under 
people  in  a  national  referendum;  and  (c)  recognized  as  a  treaty  by  the  international  law,  an  executive  agreement  is  as  binding  as  a  treaty​.  To 
other contracting state. ​(NOTE: The congress in this case did not require  be  sure,  as  long  as  the  VFA  possesses  the  elements  of  an  agreement 
ratification  by  a  majority  of  the  votes  cast  by  the  people  in  a  national  under  international  law,  the  said  agreement  is  to  be  taken  equally  as  a 
referendum)  treaty. 
5. Since  VFA  is  an  agreement which defines the treatment of United States  5. A  ​treaty​,  as  defined  by  the  Vienna  Convention  on  the Law of Treaties, is 
troops  and  personnel  visiting  the  Philippines,  ​Section  25,  Article  XVIII,  "an  ​international  instrument  concluded  between  States  in  written  form 
which  specifically  deals  with  treaties  involving  foreign  military  bases,  and  governed  by  international  law,  ​whether  embodied  in  a  single 
troops,  or  facilities,  should  apply  in  the  instant  case​.  It  is  notable  that  instrument  or  in  two  or  more  related  instruments​,  and  ​whatever  its 
the  Constitution  makes  no  distinction  between  "transient"  and  particular  designation​."  There  are  ​many other terms used for a treaty or 
"permanent"  because  there’s  nothing  in  Section  25,  Article  XVIII  that  international  agreement​,  some  of  which  are:  act,  protocol,  agreement, 
requires  foreign  troops  or  facilities  to  be  stationed  or  placed  compromis  d'  arbitrage,  concordat,  convention, declaration, exchange of 
permanently in the Philippines. It is a rudiment in legal hermeneutics that  notes,  pact,  statute,  charter  and  modus  vivendi.  All  writers,  from  Hugo 
when  no  distinction  is  made  by  law  the  Court  should  not  distinguish.  Grotius  onward,  have  pointed  out  that  the  ​names  or  titles  of 
Furthermore, even if the provision speaks of three things (foreign military  international  agreements  included  under  the  general  term  treaty  have 
bases,  troops  or  facilities) it is still applicable even if a treaty only covers  little  or  no  legal  significance​.  Article  2(2)  of  the  Vienna  Convention 
one.  This  was  confirmed  by  Fr.  Bernas  during  the  deliberations  of  the  provides  that  "the  provisions  of  paragraph  1  regarding  the  use  of  terms 
1986  Constitutional  Commission.  Hence,  whether  the  VFA  covers  only  in  the  present  Convention  are  without  prejudice  to  the  use  of  those 
troops or covers all, the requirement will be the same.  terms,  or  to the meanings which may be given to them in the internal law 
6. To  a  certain  extent  and  in  a  limited  sense,  the  provisions  of Section 21,  of the State." 
Article VII will also find applicability for the sole purpose of determining  6. Thus,  in  international  law,  there  is  ​no  difference  between  treaties  and 
the  number  of  votes  required  to  obtain  the  valid  concurrence  of  the  executive  agreements  in  their  binding effect upon states concerned, as 
Senate.  long  as  the  negotiating  functionaries  have  remained  within  their 
  powers​.  International  law  continues  to  make  no  distinction  between 
All the requirements under Section 25, Article XVIII were complied with.  treaties  and  executive  agreements:  they  are  ​equally  binding obligations 
(NOTE: See bullet #4 in the preceding section for the three requirements)  upon nations​. 
1. There  is  ​no  dispute  as  to  the  presence  of  the  first  two requisites in the  7. The  SC  also  noted  that  ​both  US  and  Philippine  jurisprudence  have 
case  of  the  VFA  (NOTE:  The  concurrence handed by the Senate through  recognized  the  binding  effect  of  executive  agreements  even  without 
Resolution  No.  18  is  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  the  concurrence  of  the  Senate  or  Congress​.  They  also  referred  to  the 
Constitution;  bullet  #7  in  the  facts),  so  the  SC  passed  upon  the  deliberations  of  the  1986  Constitutional  Commission  which  reflects  the 
requirement that the VFA should be recognized as a treaty by the USA​.  drafters’  intention  that  as  far  as  ratification  of  the  other  state  is 
2. Petitioners contend that the phrase "recognized as a treaty," embodied in  concerned,  that  is  entirely  their  concern  under  their  own laws, and that 
Section  25,  Article  XVIII,  means  that the VFA should have the advice and  the  Philippines  will  accept  whatever  they  say.  As  Fr.  Bernas  said,  “If 
consent  of  the  United  States  Senate  pursuant  to  its  own  constitutional  they  say  that  we  have  done  everything  to  make it a treaty, then as far as 
process,  and  that  it  should  not  be  considered  merely  an  executive  we are concerned, we will accept it as a treaty." 
agreement  by  the  United  States.  In  opposition,  respondents  argue  that  8. The  records  reveal  that  the  US  Government,  through  Ambassador 
the  letter  of  US  Ambassador  Hubbard  stating  that  the VFA is binding on  Hubbard,  has  stated  that  they  have  fully  committed  to  living  up  to  the 
the US Government is conclusive, on the point that the VFA is recognized  terms  of  the  VFA.  For  as  long  as  the  USA  accepts  or  acknowledges the 
as  a  treaty by the USA. According to respondents, the VFA, to be binding,  VFA  as  a  treaty,  and  binds  itself  further  to  comply  with  its  obligations 
must only be accepted as a treaty by the US.  under  the  treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of 
3. The SC is of the firm view that the phrase "recognized as a treaty" means  the Constitution. 
that  the  other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement   
as  a  treaty.  To  require  the  US  to  submit  the  VFA  to  the  US  Senate  for 
concurrence  pursuant  to  its  Constitution,  is  to  accord  strict  meaning  to 
The  Philippines  cannot  plead  the  Constitution  as  a  convenient  excuse  for  and  have  been  one  of  the  most  fundamental  principles  of  positive 
non-compliance  with  our  obligations,  duties  and  responsibilities  under  international  law,  supported  by  the  jurisprudence  of  international 
international law.  tribunals.  
1. The  SC  further  explained  that  the  ratification,  by  the  President,  of  the 
VFA  and  the  concurrence  of  the  Senate  should  be  taken  as  a  clear  and 
unequivocal  expression  of  our  nation's  consent  to  be  bound  by  said 
treaty,  with  the  concomitant  duty  to  uphold  the  obligations  and 
responsibilities embodied thereunder. 
2. Ratification  is  generally  held  to  be  an  executive  act  through  which  the 
formal  acceptance  of  the treaty is proclaimed. A State may provide in its 
domestic  legislation  the  process  of  ratification  of  a  treaty.  The  consent 
of  the  State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by ratification when: ​(a) 
the  treaty  provides  for  such  ratification,  (b)  it  is  otherwise  established 
that  the  negotiating  States  agreed  that  ratification  should  be  required, 
(c)  the  representative  of  the  State  has  signed  the  treaty  subject  to 
ratification,  or  (d)  the  intention  of the State to sign the treaty subject to 
ratification  appears  from  the  full  powers  of  its  representative,  or  was 
expressed during the negotiation​.  
3. In  our  jurisdiction,  the  ​power  to  ratify is vested in the President ​and not, 
as commonly believed, in the legislature. The role of the Senate is limited 
only  to  giving  or  withholding  its  consent,  or  concurrence,  to  the 
ratification.  
4. With  the  ratification of the VFA, which is equivalent to final acceptance, 
and  with  the  exchange  of notes between the Philippines and the USA, it 
now  becomes  obligatory  and  incumbent  on  our  part,  under  the 
principles  of  international  law,  to  be  bound  by  the  terms  of  the 
agreement.  
5. It  is  notable that Section 2, Article II of the Constitution, declares that the 
Philippines  adopts  the  generally  accepted  principles of international law 
as  part  of  the  law  of  the  land  and  adheres  to  the  policy  of  peace, 
equality,  justice,  freedom,  cooperation  and  amity  with  all  nations.  As  a 
member  of  the  family  of  nations,  the  ​Philippines  agrees  to be bound by 
generally  accepted  rules  for  the  conduct  of  its  international  relations​. 
As  an  integral  part  of  the  community  of  nations,  the  Philippines  is 
responsible  to  assure  that  the  government,  Constitution  and  laws  will 
carry  out  its  international  obligation.  Hence,  the  Philippines  cannot 
readily  plead  the  Constitution  as  a  convenient  excuse  for 
non-compliance  with  our  obligations,  duties  and  responsibilities  under 
international law. 
6. Furthermore,  Article  13  of  the  Declaration  of Rights and Duties of States 
adopted  by  the  International  Law  Commission  in  1949  provides:  "Every 
State  has  the  duty  to  carry  out  in  good  faith  its  obligations  arising from 
treaties  and  other  sources  of  international  law,  and  it  may  not  invoke 
provisions  in  its  constitution  or  its  laws  as  an  excuse  for  failure  to 
perform  this  duty."  Equally  important  is  Article  26  of  the  Convention 
which  provides  that  "Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it 
and  must  be  performed  by  them  in  good  faith."  This  is  known  as  the 
principle  of  pacta sunt servanda which preserves the sanctity of treaties 

[11] Nicolas v. Romulo
GR No. 175888 | February 11, 2009 | Module 2 Ph Treaty Practice | Kathleen
Petitioner: SUZETTE NICOLAS y SOMBILON
Respondents: ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs;
RAUL GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice;
EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary;
RONALDO PUNO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Interior and Local Government;
SERGIO APOSTOL, in his capacity as Presidential Legal Counsel; and
L/CPL. DANIEL SMITH
Recit-Ready: The case stemmed from the filing of charges and conviction of L/CPL
Daniel Smith, a member of the US Armed Forces. He was convicted of rape. The US,
at its request, was granted custody of Smith pending the proceedings. After
conviction, Smith was temporarily committed to Makati City Jail, as ordered by the
RTC. Subsequently he was transferred to the US Embassy in Manila by virtue of 2
Romulo-Kenney Agreements signed by US Rep. Kenney and DFA Sec. Romulo. Said
agreements were claimed to be in line with the implementation of the VFA between
Ph and US. The issue is whether or not, in light of new US Policy, VFA is
constitutional.
The Court held yes, VFA is still valid and constitutional. The Court held that the VFA
is an implementing agreement of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty which was
concurred in by both Ph and US Senate. It is a treaty binding on both States and
meets the requirement of our Constitution. However, the Romulo-Kenney
Agreements were held to be inconsistent with the VFA because Smith’s detention
must be by Philippine authorities and not with US Embassy.
Doctrine:
1. The VFA is a self-executing Agreement, as that term is defined in Medellin,
because the parties intend its provisions to be enforceable, precisely
because the Agreement is intended to carry out obligations and
undertakings under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty.
2. The VFA is covered by implementing legislation, namely, the Case-Zablocki
Act, USC Sec. 112(b), inasmuch as it is the very purpose and intent of the
US Congress that executive agreements registered under this Act within 60
days from their ratification be immediately implemented.
3. The RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty was advised and consented to by the US
Senate on March 20, 1952. VFA is an implementing agreement of RP-US
Mutual Defense Treaty.
Treaties mentioned in the case and process:
1. VFA – same with Bayan v. Zamora // “Accordingly, as an implementing
agreement of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, it was not necessary to
submit the VFA to the US Senate for advice and consent, but merely to the
US Congress under the Case–Zablocki Act within 60 days of its ratification.
It is for this reason that the US has certified that it recognizes the VFA as a
binding international agreement, i.e., a treaty, and this substantially
complies with the requirements of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of our Constitution”
2. Romulo-Kenney Agreements – entered into by Ph and US Representatives
• Declared as not in accord with VFA
• “Respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs is hereby ordered to
forthwith negotiate with the United States representatives for the
appropriate agreement on detention facilities under Philippine
authorities …, pending which the status quo shall be maintained
until further orders by this Court.”
FACTS:
1. Respondent Lance Corporal (L/CPL) Daniel Smith is a member of the US
Armed Forces. He was charged with the crime of rape committed against
a Filipina, Nicolas (the petitioner).
2. Background of their case: Inside the Subic Bay Freeport Zone, Olongapo
City, respondent Smith and other members of the US Marine Corps and a
certain Soriano, sexually abused and had sexual intercourse with or carnal
knowledge of petitioner, a 22-yr old unmarried woman inside a Starex Van.
• Only Smith was found guilty, other accused were acquitted.
• The trial was transferred from RTC Zambales to RTC Makati for
security reasons.
• The US, at its request, was granted custody of Smith pending the
proceedings.
• After the verdict, the Court included in its decision that Smith
shall serve his sentence in the facilities that shall, thereafter, be
agreed upon by appropriate Philippine and US authorities
• Smith was temporarily committed to Makati City Jail, as ordered
by the Court.
 3. 2 agreements were entered into by Ph and US. Both were signed by US
Rep. Kenney and DFA Sec. Romulo (Acc to Puno’s dissent SoJ Raul
Gonzalez also signed)
• Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December 19, 2006 – Smith will
be returned to US military custody at the US Embassy in Manila
• Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December 22, 2006 – Smith will
be detained at the first floor, Rowe (JUSMAG) Building, U.S.
Embassy Compound in a room of approximately 10 x 12 square
feet.
4. As a result of these agreements, Smith was taken out of Makati City Jail
on Dec. 29
Procedural history: After the decision of RTC, Smith filed a petition for certiorari
with TRO before CA re RTC conviction. Smith was turned over after the
manifestation and submission of Ph-US Agreements. CA dismissed the case for
being moot.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not VFA is void and unconstitutional – NO, constitutional
2. Whether or not the presence of US Armed Forces in Philippine territory
pursuant to the VFA is allowed “under a treaty duly concurred in by the
Senate and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State” – YES
3. Whether or not the Romulo-Kenney Agreements which provide for the
detention of Smith are in accord with VFA – NO
RATIO:
VFA is constitutional
This issue had been raised before, and this Court resolved in favor of the
constitutionality of the VFA. This was in Bayan v. Zamora (Bayan is also a
petitioner in this case)
Against the barriers of res judicata vis-à-vis Bayan, and stare decisis vis-à-vis all
the parties, the reversal of the previous ruling is sought on the ground that the
issue is of primordial importance, involving the sovereignty of the Republic, as well
as a specific mandate of the Constitution.1
Here, the Court discussed the history of the ceding of territory of US to Ph.
Basically, what was initially turned over by US were the islands except certain naval
1 Art. XVIII Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Philippines and
the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities
shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and,
ports and/or military bases and facilities, which the US retained for itself.
Subsequently, US agreed to turn over these bases to Ph; and with the expiration of
the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the territory covered by these bases
were finally ceded to the Philippines. Provision was indicated in 1987 Consti to
prevent recurrence of this. The provision is thus designed to ensure that any
agreement allowing the presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in
Philippine territory shall be equally binding on the Philippines and the foreign
sovereign State involved. (which leads to issue #2)
The presence of US Armed Forces in Philippine territory pursuant to the VFA is
allowed under a treaty concurred in by the Senate and recognized as treaty by US.
First, as held in Bayan v. Zamora, the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine
Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the US as attested and certified by
the duly authorized representative of the US government. The fact that the VFA
was not submitted for advice and consent of the US Senate does not detract from
its status as a binding international agreement or treaty recognized by the said
State. For this is a matter of internal US law.
Notice can be taken of the internationally known practice by the United States of
submitting to its Senate for advice and consent agreements that are policymaking
in nature, whereas those that carry out or further implement these policymaking
agreements are merely submitted to Congress, under the provisions of the so-
called Case-Zablocki Act, within sixty days from ratification.
Second, it has to do with the relation between the VFA and the RP-US Mutual
Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951. This earlier agreement was signed and duly
ratified with the concurrence of both the Philippine Senate and the US Senate.
Clearly, therefore, joint RP-US military exercises for the purpose of developing the
capability to resist an armed attack fall squarely under the provisions of the RP-US
Mutual Defense Treaty. The VFA, which is the instrument agreed upon to provide
for the joint RP-US military exercises, is simply an implementing agreement to the
main RP-US Military Defense Treaty.
Accordingly, as an implementing agreement of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty,
it was not necessary to submit the VFA to the US Senate for advice and consent,
but merely to the US Congress under the Case–Zablocki Act within 60 days of its
when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national
referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State
ratification. It is for this reason that the US has certified that it recognizes the VFA
as a binding international agreement, i.e., a treaty, and this substantially complies
with the requirements of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of our Constitution.
Romulo-Kenney Agreements are declared NOT in accordance with VFA
The VFA being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are required as a matter
of international law to abide by its terms and provisions. Applying, however, the
provisions of VFA, the Court finds that there is a different treatment when it comes
to detention as against custody. Summarized provisions in the VFA follows:
1. The VFA is a self-executing Agreement, as that term is defined in Medellin
itself, because the parties intend its provisions to be enforceable,
precisely because the Agreement is intended to carry out obligations and
undertakings under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty.
2. The VFA is covered by implementing legislation, namely, the Case-
Zablocki Act, USC Sec. 112(b), inasmuch as it is the very purpose and
intent of the US Congress that executive agreements registered under this
Act within 60 days from their ratification be immediately implemented.
3. The RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty was advised and consented to by the
US Senate on March 20, 1952

Custody Detention It was not the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting Article
Under Art. V, Sec. 6 of VFA – Criminal Under Art. V, Sec. 10 of VFA – Criminal XVIII, Sec. 25, to require the other contracting State to convert their system to
Jurisdiction Jurisdiction achieve alignment and parity with ours. It was simply required that the treaty be
Custody shall immediately reside with Confinement or detention by recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State. With that, it becomes for
United States military authorities, if Philippine authorities shall be carried
both parties a binding international obligation and the enforcement of that
they so request, from the commission out in facilities agreed on by
of the offense until completion of all appropriate Philippines and United obligation is left to the normal recourse and processes under international law.
judicial proceedings States authorities
Court says this does not violate equal Medellin v. Texas case background: Medellin, a Mexican national, was convicted
protection clause because there is a of capital murder and sentenced to death in Texas for the gang rape and brutal
substantial basis for a different murders of two Houston teenagers. He filed an application for post-conviction
treatment of a member of a foreign relief and claimed that the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Vienna
military armed forces allowed to enter
Convention) accorded him the right to notify the Mexican consulate of his
our territory and all other accused
detention; and because the local law enforcement officers failed to inform him of
Principle: The receiving State can
exercise jurisdiction over the forces of this right, he prayed for the grant of a new trial.
the sending State only to the extent While Medellin’s petition was pending, the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
agreed upon by the parties issued its decision in Avena. The ICJ held that the U.S. violated the Vienna
Convention by failing to inform 51 named Mexican nationals, including Medellin,
Therefore, the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006, which of their Vienna Convention rights. The ICJ ruled that those named individuals were
are agreements on the detention of the accused in the United States Embassy, are entitled to a review and reconsideration of their U.S. state court convictions and
not in accord with the VFA itself because such detention is not “by Philippine sentences. Then President Bush issued a Memorandum stating that the US would
authorities.” Respondents should therefore comply with the VFA and negotiate discharge its international obligations under Avena by having State courts give
with representatives of the United States towards an agreement on detention effect to the decision.
facilities under Philippine authorities as mandated by Art. V, Sec. 10 of the VFA. The SC of the US ruled that neither Avena nor the President’s Memorandum
constitutes directly enforceable federal law that pre-empts state limitations on the
**IMPT!! Because the case is basically assailing the constitutionality of the VFA filing of successive habeas corpus petitions (cases filed by Medellin). It held that
again in light of new US policy treatment. while an international treaty may constitute an international commitment, it is not
The Court addresses the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in binding domestic law unless Congress has enacted statutes implementing it or
Medellin v. Texas , which held that treaties entered into by the United States are unless the treaty itself is “self-executing.” It further held that decisions of the ICJ
not automatically part of their domestic law unless these treaties are self- are not binding domestic law; and that, absent an act of Congress or Constitutional
executing or there is an implementing legislation to make them enforceable.
authority, the U.S. President lacks the power to enforce international treaties or Medellin, the United States had withdrawn in 1985 its advance consent to
decisions of the ICJ. the general compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ.
• Based on the Medellin requirements for a treaty to be binding and
PUNO DISSENTING OPINION enforceable under U.S. domestic law, the MDT suffers the same fate as
• He also dissented in Bayan v. Zamora the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Both the MDT and the
• With Medellin, the case law is now settled that acknowledgement by the Convention were ratified by the U.S. Senate. However, both the MDT and
U.S. President that an agreement is a treaty, even with the concurrence of the Convention contain only the usual ratification and entry into force
the U.S. Senate, is not sufficient to make a treaty enforceable in its provisions found in treaties.
domestic sphere, unless the words of the treaty itself clearly express the
intention to make the treaty self-executory, or unless there is
corresponding legislative enactment providing for its domestic
enforceability. The VFA does not satisfy either of these requirements and
cannot thus be enforced within the U.S
• It must be clear from the text of the VFA itself that the VFA is self-
executory in order that it may be reciprocally enforced.
• The recognition of the President through the former U.S. Ambassador that
the VFA is a treaty is insufficient to make this international obligation
executory in the domestic sphere.
• Congressional act is necessary to transform the international obligations
brought about by the VFA.
• There is an “asymmetry in the legal treatment” of the VFA.

CARPIO DISSENTING OPINION

• Under Medellin, the VFA is indisputably not enforceable as domestic
federal law in the United States. On the other hand, since the Philippine
Senate ratified the VFA, the VFA constitutes domestic law in the
Philippines. This unequal legal status of the VFA violates Section 25,
Article XVIII of the Philippine Constitution, which specifically requires that
a treaty involving the presence of foreign troops in the Philippines must
be equally binding on the Philippines and on the other contracting State.
• The clear intent of the phrase “recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State” is to insure that the treaty has the same legal effect on
the Philippines as on the other contracting State.
• Medellin acknowledges that even if the treaty is not enforceable under
U.S. domestic law, it may still give rise to an obligation under international
law on the part of the United States. The remedy of the other contracting
State in case of breach of the treaty by the United States is to file an action
before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). However, the United States
will have to give its consent to the ICJ’s jurisdiction because, as stated in
 [12] Lim v. Executive Secretary
GR No. 151445 | Date: April 11, 2002 | Treaties; VFA | Esguerra
PETITIONER: Arturo Lim and Paulino Ersando
 renew it created a vacuum in US-Philippine defense relations, that is, until it
RESPONDENTS: Executive Secretary, and Secretary of National Defense
SUMMARY: This case deals with the constitutionality of the deployment of
US troops in Basilan Mindanao for joint exercises with the AFP known as
Balikatan 02-1. The aforementioned exercises involves the simulation of joint
military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty (MTD), a bilateral
defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in
1951. This was contested by Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando as citizens,
lawyers and taxpayers who filed a petition attacking the constitutionality of
the joint exercise. SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, both
party-list organizations, also petitioned that that certain members of their
organization are residents of Zamboanga and Sulu, and hence will be
directly affected by the operations Balikatan 02-1 exercise being conducted
in Mindanao. The issue is whether the Balikatan exercises are valid. The
Court ruled in the affirmative. The Balikatan 02-1 is a mutual anti-terrorism
advising, assisting and training exercise, which falls under intent of the
Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA. It is a legitimate insofar the exercises are
in furtherance of the spirit of the aforementioned treaties and are merely
combat-related activities —as opposed to combat itself.
DOCTRINE: Equal Standing of International Law and Municipal Law— “…
from the perspective of public international law, a treaty is favored over
municipal law pursuant to the principle of pacta sunt servanda. Hence,
"[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith." Further, a party to a treaty is not allowed
to "invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to
perform a treaty."
1 Refer to the Annex A.
2 Note: Prior to the VFA, US troops were already holding joint training exercises in the PH but at a reduced scale. Also, prior to the year 2002, the last “Balikatan” was held in 1995.
3 Some sections included in Annex B.
4 Also included in the Annex C.
Antecedent Facts: (Just to provide the background)
1. The Philippines and the United States entered into a bilateral defense
agreement entered known as the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT, 1951).1 The
lapse of the US-Philippine Bases Agreement in 1992 and the decision not to
was replaced by the Visiting Force Agreement (VFA, 1999). The VFA gives
continued relevance to the MDT with the primary goal of facilitating the
promotion of optimal cooperation between American and Philippine
military forces in the event of an attack by a common foe.2
2. President George W. Bush in reaction to attacks that occurred on September
11, 2001 declared an international anti-terrorism campaign against al-
Qaeda, a Muslim extremist organization headed by Osama bin Laden+.
FACTS: (Super Short)
1. In 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States of America
started arriving in Basilan, Mindanao to take part in “Balikatan 02-1”, the
largest combined training operations involving Filipino which simulates joint
military training maneuvers.
2. On February 7, 2002, the Senate conducted a hearing on the “Balikatan
02-1” exercise. Vice-President Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., who is also the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, presented and subsequently approved the Draft
Terms of Reference (TOR).3
3. At the same time, Assistant Secretary for American Affairs Minerva Jean A.
Falcon and United States Charge d’ Affaires Robert Fitts signed the Agreed
Minutes of the discussion between the Vice-President and Assistant Secretary
Kelly.4
4. Consolidated Petitions:
1. Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed this petition for certiorari
and prohibition, attacking the constitutionality of the “Balikatan
02-1” exercise..
2. SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, both party-list
organizations, aver that certain members of their organization are
residents of Zamboanga and Sulu, and hence will be directly
affected by the operations Balikatan 02-1 exercise being conducted
in Mindanao.
ISSUE/s:
1. Whether "Balikatan 02-1" is covered by the Visiting Forces Agreement – Yes,
using the rules of construction provided by the Vienna Convention.
2. May American troops actually engage in offensive war on Philippine
territory? — NO. (Note: the discussion of Municipal law v. Treaty)
3. Whether the Balikatan 02-1 exercises are valid — YES.
RATIO:
1. The Court noted that the VFA permits United States personnel to engage, on
an impermanent basis, in “activities,” the exact meaning of which was left
undefined. The expression is ambiguous, therefore the SC consulted the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).
a) According to the Vienna Convention, the cardinal rule of
interpretation must involve an examination of the text, which is
presumed to verbalize the parties' intentions. The Convention
likewise dictates what may be used as aids to deduce the
meaning of terms, which it refers to as the context of the treaty,
as well as other elements may be taken into account alongside
the aforesaid context. As explained by a writer on the
Convention.
b) After studied reflection, it appeared farfetched that the ambiguity
surrounding the meaning of the word “activities” arose from
accident. In our view, it was deliberately made that way to give
both parties a certain leeway in negotiation…the VFA gives
legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. It is only logical to
assume that “Balikatan 02- 1,” a “mutual anti-terrorism advising,
assisting and training exercise,” falls under the umbrella of
sanctioned or allowable activities in the context of the
agreement. Both the history and intent of the Mutual Defense
Treaty and the VFA support the conclusion that combat-related
activities—as opposed to combat itself—such as the one subject
of the instant petition, are indeed authorized
2. Both the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement prohibit
foreign troops from engaging in an offensive war on Philippine Territory.
a) All treaties and international agreements to which the
Philippines is a party, must be read in the context of the 1987
Constitution…From the perspective of public international law,
a treaty is favored over municipal law pursuant to the principle
of pacta sunt servanda. Hence, “[e]very treaty in force is binding
upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good
faith.” Further, a party to a treaty is not allowed to “invoke the
provisions of its internal law
b) In Gonzales v. Hechanova: As regards the question whether an
international agreement may be invalidated by our courts,
suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has
clearly settled it in the affirmative… In other words, our
Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only
when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it
runs counter to an act of Congress.
c) The foregoing premises leave us no doubt that US forces are
prohibited from engaging in an offensive war on Philippine
territory.
3. NO GADALEJ in Balikatan 02-1 exercises.
a) From the facts obtaining, we find that the holding of “Balikatan
02-1” joint military exercise has not intruded into that penumbra
of error that would otherwise call for correction on our part. In
other words, respondents in the case at bar have not committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition and the petition-in-intervention are hereby
DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of a new petition sufficient in form
and substance in the proper Regional Trial Court.
Annex A - Mutual Defense Treaty (1951)
“ARTICLE I. “The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United
Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and
justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purpose of the
United Nations.
“ARTICLE II. ‘In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty,
the Parties separately and jointly by self-help and mutual aid will maintain and
develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.
“ARTICLE III. “The Parties, through their Foreign Ministers or their deputies, will
consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty
and whenever in the opinion of either of them the territorial integrity, political
independence or security of either of the Parties is threatened by external
armed attack in the Pacific.
“ARTICLE IV. “Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on
either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and
“ARTICLE V. “For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on either of the
Parties is deemed to include an attack on the metropolitan territory of either of
the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on
its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft used in the Pacific.
“ARTICLE VI. “This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as
affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter
of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the
maintenance of international peace and security.
“ARTICLE VII. “This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and
the Republic of the Philippines in accordance with their respective
constitutional processes and will come into force when instruments of
ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Manila.
“ARTICLE VIII. “This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may
terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other party.
Annex B - Draft Terms of Reference (TOR)
I. POLICY LEVEL
1. The Exercise shall be consistent with the Philippine Constitution and all its
activities shall be in consonance with the laws of the land and the provisions
of the RP-US Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).
2. No permanent US basing and support facilities shall be established.
Temporary structures such as those for troop billeting, classroom instruction
and messing may be set up for use by RP and US Forces during the Exercise.
3. The Exercise shall be implemented jointly by RP and US Exercise Co-
Directors under the authority of the Chief of Staff, AFP. In no instance will US
Forces operate independently during field training exercises (FTX). AFP and
US Unit Commanders will retain command over their respective forces
under the overall authority of the Exercise Co-Directors. RP and US
participants shall comply with operational instructions of the AFP during the
FTX.
4. The Exercise is a mutual counter-terrorism advising, assisting and training
Exercise relative to Philippine efforts against the ASG, and will be conducted
on the Island of Basilan. Further advising, assisting and training exercises shall
be conducted in Malagutay and the Zamboanga area. Related activities in
Cebu will be for support of the Exercise.
5. US exercise participants shall not engage in combat, without prejudice to
their right of self-defense.
II. EXERCISE LEVEL
1. TRAINING
a. The Exercise shall involve the conduct of mutual military assisting, advising
and training of RP and US Forces with the primary objective of enhancing the
operational capabilities of both forces to combat terrorism. 

b. At no time shall US Forces operate independently within RP territory.
Annex C - Agreed Minutes
“Both Secretary Guingona and Assistant Secretary Kelly expressed the belief
that the Exercise shall not in any way contribute to any escalation of other
conflicts in Mindanao, shall not adversely affect the progress of ongoing peace
negotiations between the Government of the Philippines and other parties, and
shall not put at risk the friendly relations between the Philippines and its
neighbors as well as with other states. Secretary Guingona stated that he had in
mind the ongoing peace negotiations with the NDF and the MILF and he
emphasized that it is important to make sure that the Exercise shall not in any
way hinder those negotiations.
“Both Secretary Guingona and Assistant Secretary Kelly stated that they look
forward to the realization of the nearly US$100 million in security assistance
for fiscal years 2001-2002 agreed upon between H.E. President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and H.E. President George W. Bush last November 2001.

[22] Pimentel v Executive Secretary
GR No. 158088 | July 6, 2005 | Treaties | Ma. Hazel Joy M. Faco
Petitioner: SENATOR AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR., REP. ETTA ROSALES,
PHILIPPINE COALITION FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT, TASK FORCE DETAINEES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
FAMILIES OF VICTIMS OF INVOLUNTARY DISAPPEARANCES, BIANCA
HACINTHA R. ROQUE, HARRISON JACOB R. ROQUE, AHMED PAGLINAWAN,
RON P. SALO, LEAVIDES G. DOMINGO, EDGARDO CARLO VISTAN, NOEL
VILLAROMAN, CELESTE CEMBRANO, LIZA ABIERA, JAIME ARROYO,
MARWIL LLASOS, CRISTINA ATENDIDO, ISRAEL FAGELA, and ROMEL
BAGARES,
Respondents: OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, represented by
HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, and the DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
represented by HON. BLAS OPLE
Recit-Ready: This is a petition for mandamus filed by petitioners to compel the
Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit
the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to the
Senate for its concurrence in accordance with Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution. The Rome Statute established the ICC which shall have the power to
exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international
concern and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions. The issue
is Whether the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs have a
ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a
member of the Philippine Mission to the UN even without the signature of the
President. The Court ruled that the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject
to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to
giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is
within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or,
having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. This Court has no
jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his
official duties.
Doctrine: The power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence
of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or
withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the
authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having
secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. This Court has no jurisdiction
over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties.
FACTS:
1. This is a petition for mandamus filed by petitioners to compel the Office of the
Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed
copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to the Senate
for its concurrence in accordance with Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.
2. The Rome Statute established the ICC which shall have the power to exercise
its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern
and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions. Its jurisdiction
covers the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime
of aggression as defined by the Statute. Its provisions, however, require that it be
subject to ratification, acceptance, or approval of the signatory states.
3. It is the theory of the petitioners that it is the duty of the executive department to
transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute to the Senate to allow it to exercise
its discretion with respect to ratification of treaties.
ISSUES: Whether the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs
have a ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute
signed by a member of the Philippine Mission to the UN even without the signature
of the President
RATIO:
1. A petition for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.
2. The President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and
governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter
into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. while the
President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the
Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3
of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him.
Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no treaty or
international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least
two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate."
3. The signing of the treaty and ratification are two separate and distinct steps in
the treaty-making process. The signature is primarily intended as a means of
authenticating the instrument and as a symbol of good faith of the parties. It is
usually performed by the state’s authorized representative in the diplomatic
mission. Ratification, on the other hand, is the formal act by which a state confirms
and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representative. It is
generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the
government.

4. Petitioners' submission that the Philippines is bound under treaty law and
international law to ratify the treaty which it has signed is without basis. The
signature does not signify the final consent of the state to the treaty. It is the
ratification that binds the state to the provisions thereof.

5. The power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the
Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its
consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the
President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent
for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty
which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken lightly,
such decision is within the competence of the President alone, which cannot be
encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction
over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official
duties.
 “Soft  law”  does  not  fall  into  any  of  the  categories  of  international  law...It  is, 
[24] Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association v Duque III/DOH 
however,  an  expression  of  non-binding  norms,  principles,  and  practices  that 
influence state behavior.  
GR No. 173034 | 2007 October 9 | PIL | Vince 
Petitioner: ​Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines 
FACTS: 
Respondents: ​Duque III , Department of Health 
 
Instruments/Laws Involved 
Recit-Ready:   
 
● Revised Implementing Rules of the Milk Code (RIRR) 
The  Milk  Code  was  issued  by  former  president  Corazon  Aquino  in  order  to  give 
● Milk Code 
effect  to  the  International  Code  of  Marketing  of  Breastmilk  Substitutes  (ICMBS). 
● International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS) 
From  1982  to  2006,  the  WHA  adopted  several  resolutions  resolutions,  one  of 
● World Health Association (WHA) Resolutions 
which  prohibits  advertisements  for  breastmilk  substitutes.  On  2006,  the  DOH 
issued  the  assailed  RIRR  which  has  a  provision  adopting  the  mentioned  WHA  Events 
Resolution. Hence, this case assailing the constitutionality of the RIRR 
  1. October  1986,  the  Milk  Code  was  issued  by  former  president  Aquino  to 
The  main  issue  in  this  case  is  whether  or  not  the WHA Resolutions are part of the  give effect to the ICMBS. 
law of the land. N ​ O  2. From  1982  to  2006,  the  WHA  adopted  several  resolutions  saying  that 
  breastfeeding  should  be  supported  and  therefore,  nutrition  and  health 
The  WHA  Resolutions  and  the  ICMBS  are  not treaties because they have not been  claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes 
concurred  with  by  the  Senate.  They  are  however  Generally  Accepted  Principles of  3. On  1990,  the  International  Convention  on  the  Rights  of  the  Child  was 
International  Law  (GAPIL).  The  ICMBS has been incorporated into local law via the  ratified by the Philippines 
Milk  Code,  however,  not  all  the  provisions  have  been  adopted.  The  Milk  Code  did  4. On May 2006, the DOH issued the RIRR 
not adopt the prohibition on the advertisements on breastmilk substitutes. Instead,  5. One  of  the  provisions  of  the  RIRR  adopts  a  WHA  Resolution  which 
it only regulates them.   prohibits advertisements and promotions of breastmilk substitutes.  
  6. Petitioners,  representing  its  members  that  are  manufacturers  of 
The  WHA  has  two  powers:  the  power  to  adopt  regulations and the power to make  breastmilk  substitutes,  now  assail  the  constitutionality  of  the  RIRR.  The 
recommendations  to  members.  Regulations  adopted  by  the  WHA  are  binding  on  argue  that  provisions  of  the  RIRR  go  beyond  the  provisions  of  the  Milk 
member  states.  On  the  other  hand,  recommendations  do  not  bind  the  members.  Code. 
These recommendations however carry moral and political weight.  
  ISSUES:   
The  ICMBS  and  RHA  resolutions  come  into  the  ambit  of these recommendations. 
Because  they  are not binding and not part of the law of the land, there is a need for  W/N the RIRR is constitutional. S
​ OME PROVISIONS 
them  to  be  incorporated  by  local  legislation.  The  Milk  Code  already  adopts  the 
ICBM,  however  the  subsequent  WHA  resolutions  have  not.  Therefore,  only  the  W/N  the  pertinent  international  agreements  (ICMBS  and  WHA  Resolutions) 
provisions  of  the  Milk  Code  but  not  those  subsequent  WHA  Resolutions  can  be  entered  into  by  the Philippines are part of the law of the land. ​NOT ALL BECAUSE 
validly implemented by the DOH through the subject RIRR  NOT ALL THE AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN INCORPORATED BY LEGISLATION 
 
Doctrine:  RATIO: 
   
2 ways international law can become local law 
   
In the case at hand, the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered part of the law of 
  Transformation  Incorporation 
the land because there is no law enacted by the legislature.  
International law becomes  By constitutional   
part of the law of the land  declaration, international  Therefore, t​ he DOH had no power to include the provision banning 
Definition  through a constitutional  law is ​deemed to have the  advertisement on breastmilk substitutes in the RIRR​.  
mechanism s ​ uch as local  force of domestic law   
legislation   

Treaties b​ ecause they need  Generally Accepted 

⅔ concurrence of all  Principles of international 
Applied to 
members of the senate to  Law (GAPIL) 
be valid and effective 
 
Application to the Case 
 
The ICMBS and WHA Resolutions a ​ re not treaties​ because there was no 
concurrence of ⅔ of the Senate. However, the ICMBS has been ​transformed into 
local law through the Milk Code​. Hence, it has the force and effect of law in this 
jurisdiction.  
 
The Milk Code is an almost verbatim reproduction of the ICMBS, but it ​did not 
adopt the provision absolutely banning advertising​ of products. Instead, the Milk 
Code merely regulates the same.  
 
The WHA Resolutions adopting the 
ICMBS are not necessarily part of 
the law of the land and are merely 
recommendatory 
 
The World Health Organizations (WHO) is an agency which is allied with the UN . 
The WHA is the body that determines the policies of the WHO. It can adopt 
policies and make recommendations to members. These policies or regulations 
bind member states.  
 
On the other hand, the recommendations it makes to member states are n ​ ot 
binding​, but they carry moral and political weight. Thus, unlike the ICMBS where 
the legislature enacted most of its provisions through the health code, the 
subsequent WHA Resolutions have not been adopted as domestic law 
 
These WHA Resolutions may be called as “​ Soft Law”​, an expression of 
non-binding norms, principles and practices that influence state behavior.  

[16] Abaya vs. Ebdane, Jr.
G.R. No. 167919 | February 14, 2007 | Exchange Notes | Sha
Petitioner: PLARIDEL M. ABAYA, COMMODORE PLARIDEL C. GARCIA (retired)
and PMA Ê59 FOUNDATION, INC., rep. by its President, COMMODORE CARLOS
L. AGUSTIN (retired)
Respondents: HON. SECRETARY HERMOGENES E. EBDANE, JR., in his
capacity as Secretary of the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS and HIGHWAYS,
HON. SECRETARY EMILIA T. BONCODIN, in her capacity as Secretary of the
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET and MANAGEMENT, HON. SECRETARY CESAR V.
PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of the DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, HON.
TREASURER NORMA L. LASALA, in her capacity as Treasurer of the Bureau of
Treasury, and CHINA ROAD and BRIDGE CORPORATION
Recit-Ready: The Government of Japan (thru Japan Bank For International
Cooperation (JBIC)) agreed to lend the PH government 15billion yen for
implementation of Arterial Road Links Development Project. This was done through
exchange notes between Ambassador or Japan and the PH Secretary of Foreign
Affairs. An Approved Budget for the Contract (ABC) was set to P738,710,563.67.
However, the project was awarded to China Road & Bridge Corporation (through
Resolution No. PJHLA-04-012) who submitted a bid for P952 million which
exceeded the ABC. Petitioner’s seek to annul the said resolution on the ground that
it violated RA 9184 which provides that bids exceeding the ABC shall be disqualified.
The respondents contend that such doesn’t apply because the project, financed by
Loan Agreement No. PH-P204 executed between the Philippine Government and
the JBIC, is governed by the latter’s Procurement Guidelines which precludes the
imposition of ceilings on bid prices. Moreover, the public respondents characterize
foreign loan agreements as executive agreements and, as such, should be observed
pursuant to the fundamental principle in international law of pacta sunt servanda.
The issue is WON the Contract Agreement executed by and between the Republic
of the Philippines and the China Road & Bridge Corporation is void ab initio.- NO
1The Exchange of Notes consisted of two documents: (1) a Letter from the Government of Japan,
signed by Ambassador Ara, addressed to then Secretary of Foreign Affairs Siazon, confirming the
understanding reached between the two governments concerning the loans to be extended by the
Government of Japan to the Philippines; and (2) a document denominated as Records of Discussion
Sc held that the terms of the Exchange of Notes dated December 27, 1999 and Loan
Agreement No. PH-P204 would still govern the procurement project.
The Court holds that Loan Agreement No. PH-P204 taken in conjunction with the
Exchange of Notes dated December 27, 1999 between the Japanese Government
and the Philippine Government is an executive agreement.
Loan Agreement No. PH-P204 was executed by and between the JBIC and the
Philippine Government pursuant to the Exchange of Notes executed by and
between Mr. Yoshihisa Ara, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan
to the Philippines, and then Foreign Affairs Secretary Siazon, in behalf of their
respective governments. The Exchange of Notes expressed that the two
governments have reached an understanding concerning Japanese loans to be
extended to the Philippines and that these loans were aimed at promoting our
country’s economic stabilization and development efforts.
Under the circumstances, the JBIC may well be considered an adjunct of the
Japanese Government. Further, Loan Agreement No. PH-P204 is indubitably an
integral part of the Exchange of Notes. It forms part of the Exchange of Notes such
that it cannot be properly taken independent thereof.
Doctrine: Significantly, an exchange of notes is considered a form of an
executive agreement, which becomes binding through executive action
without the need of a vote by the Senate or Congress.
FACTS:
1. Based on the Exchange of Notes1 dated December 27, 1999, the
Government of Japan and the Government of the Philippines have
reached an understanding concerning Japanese loans to be extended to
the Philippines. These loans were aimed at promoting our country’s
economic stabilization and development efforts.
2. Japan Bank For International Cooperation (JBIC) agreed to lend the PH
Government an amount not exceeding Y15,384,000,000 for the
implementation of the Arterial Road Links Development Project (Phase
IV) on the terms and conditions set forth in the Loan Agreement
and in accordance with the relevant laws and regulations of Japan.
3. DPWH caused the publication of the invitation to bid for the
implementation of the project in 2 national newspapers (Manila Times and
Manila Standard on November 22 and 29, and December 5, 2002)
where the salient terms of the loans as set forth by the Government of Japan, through the Japanese
delegation, were reiterated and the said terms were accepted by the Philippine delegation.
 4. Prior to the opening of the respective bid proposals, it was announced that
the Approved Budget for the Contract (ABC) was in the amount of
P738,710,563.67. (basically the max bid amount that should be accepted)
5. After further evaluation of the bids, the contract was awarded to private
respondent China Road & Bridge Corporation (CRBC) with a bid of
P952,564,821.71. The BAC of the DPWH issued the assailed Resolution
No. PJHLA-04-012 dated May 7, 2004 recommending the award in favor
of China Road & Bridge Corporation of the contract
Petitioner’s arguments (skip to public respondent’s arguments if pressed for time cause I think
it’s more important)
6. Seeks to nullify DPWH Resolution No. PJHL-A-04-012. They also seek to
annul the contract of agreement subsequently entered into between the
DPWH and CRBC pursuant to the said resolution on the ground that the
award of the contract to violates Sec 31 of RA 9184.
SEC. 31. Ceiling for Bid Prices.·The ABC shall be the upper limit or
ceiling for the Bid prices. Bid prices that exceed this ceiling shall be
disqualified outright from further participating in the bidding. There shall
be no lower limit to the amount of the award.
7. Resolution No. PJHL-A-04-012 was allegedly issued with grave abuse of
discretion because it recommended the award of the contract to CRBC
whose bid was more than P200 million overpriced based on the ABC.
8. Insists that Loan Agreement No. PH-P204 between the JBIC and the
Philippine Government is neither a treaty, an international nor an
executive agreement that would bar the application of RA 9184. They
point out that to be considered a treaty, an international or an executive
agreement, the parties must be two sovereigns or States whereas in the
case of Loan Agreement No. PH- P204, the parties are the Philippine
Government and the JBIC, a banking agency of Japan, which has a
separate juridical personality from the Japanese Government.
9. They further insist on the applicability of RA 9184 contending that while it
took effect on January 26, 2003 and Loan Agreement No. PH-P204 was
executed prior thereto or on December 28, 1999, the actual procurement
or award of the contract to CRBC was done after the effectivity of RA
9184. Thus, the petition only prays for the annulment of Resolution No.
PJHL-A-04-012 as well as the contract between the DPWH and private
respondent China Road & Bridge Corporation. The petitioners clarify that
they do not pray for the annulment of Loan Agreement No. PH-P204.
2 The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the
prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The
Monetary Board shall, within thirty days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to the
Congress a complete report of its decisions on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the
Public Respondent’s arguments
1. Maintains that the imposition of ceilings or upper limits on bid prices
in RA 9184 does not apply because the project, financed by Loan
Agreement No. PH-P204 executed between the Philippine
Government and the JBIC, is governed by the latter’s Procurement
Guidelines which precludes the imposition of ceilings on bid prices.
2. They likewise aver that Loan Agreement No. PH-P204 is governed by RA
4860, as amended, or the Foreign Borrowings Act. Section 4 thereof
states: “Provided, finally, That the method and procedure in comparison
of bids shall be the subject of agreement between the Philippine
Government and the lending institution”
3. The public respondents characterize foreign loan agreements,
including Loan Agreement No. PH-P204, as executive agreements
and, as such, should be observed pursuant to the fundamental
principle in international law of pacta sunt servanda. They cite Section
202 of Article VII of the Constitution as giving the President the authority
to contract foreign loans.
4. The Constitution recognizes the enforceability of executive agreements in
the same way that it recognizes generally accepted principles of
international law as forming part of the law of the land. This recognition
allegedly buttresses the binding effect of executive agreements to which
the Philippine Government is a signatory. It is pointed out by the public
respondents that executive agreements are essentially contracts
governing the rights and obligations of the parties. A contract, being the
law between the parties, must be faithfully adhered to by them. Guided by
the fundamental rule of pacta sunt servanda, the Philippine Government
bound itself to perform in good faith its duties and obligations under Loan
Agreement No. PH-P204.
5. The public respondents further argue against the applicability of RA 9184
stating that it was signed into law on January 10, 2003. On the other hand,
Loan Agreement No. PHP204 was executed on December 28, 1999,
where the laws then in force on government procurements were PD 1594
and EO 40. EO 403 excluded from its application “any existing and future
government commitments with respect to the bidding and award of
contracts financed partly or wholly with funds from international financing
institutions as well as from bilateral and other similar foreign sources.”
6. Even granting arguendo that Loan Agreement No. PH-P204 were an
ordinary loan contract, still, RA 9184 is inapplicable under the non-
impairment clause of the Constitution.
Private respondents arguments
Government or Government- owned and Controlled Corporations which would have the effect of increasing
the foreign debt, and containing other matters as may be provided by law.
3 no government contract for public service or for furnishing supplies, materials and equipment to the
government or any of its branches should be entered without public bidding
 1. It is also contended by private respondent China Road & Bridge
Corporation that even assuming arguendo that RA 9184 could be applied
retroactively, it is still the terms of Loan Agreement No. PH-P204 which
should govern the procurement of goods and services for the CP I project.
It supports its theory by characterizing the said loan agreement, executed
pursuant to the Exchange of Notes between the Government of Japan
and the Philippine Government, as an executive agreement.
2. Private respondent China Road & Bridge Corporation, like the public
respondents, cites RA 4860 as the basis for the Exchange of Notes and
Loan Agreement No. PH-P204. As an international or executive
agreement, the Exchange of Notes and Loan Agreement No. PH-P204
allegedly created a legally binding obligation on the parties.
ISSUES:
1. WON the Contract Agreement executed by and between the Republic
of the Philippines, through DPWH, and the China Road & Bridge
Corporation, for the implementation of civil works for CP I under
JBIC Loan Agreement is void ab initio.- NO (important)
2. WoN petitioners have standing to file the instant Petition. – YES
RATIO: (skip to number 3 if pressed for time. I included lang the others just in case it’s asked)
1. Issue on locus standi
In the present case, the petitioners are suing as taxpayers. They have sufficiently
demonstrated that, notwithstanding the fact that the CP I project is primarily
financed from loans obtained by the government from the JBIC, nonetheless,
taxpayers’ money would be or is being spent on the project considering that the
Philippine Government is required to allocate a peso-counterpart therefor.
2. Issue on retroactivity of RA 9184
It is not disputed that the Invitation to Prequalify and to Bid for its implementation
was published in two leading national newspapers on November 22, 29 and
December 5, 2002. At the time, the law in effect was EO 40. On the other hand,
RA 9184 took effect two months later or on January 26, 2003. Further, its full
implementation was even delayed as IRR-A was only approved by President
Arroyo on September 18, 2003 and subsequently published on September 23,
2003. The provisions of EO 40 apply to the procurement process.
EO 40 expressly recognizes as an exception to its scope and application those
government commitments with respect to bidding and award of contracts financed
partly or wholly with funds from international financing institutions as well as from
bilateral and other similar foreign sources.
Consequently, in accordance with these applicable laws, the procurement of
goods and services is governed by the corresponding loan agreement
entered into by the government and the JBIC, i.e., Loan Agreement No. PH-
P204. It is clear that the JBIC Procurement Guidelines proscribe the imposition of
ceilings on bid prices.
3. IMPORTANT Even if RA 9184 were to be applied retroactively, the
terms of the Exchange of Notes dated December 27, 1999 and Loan
Agreement No. PH-P204 would still govern the procurement project.
The petitioners, in order to place the procurement process undertaken for the CP
I project within the ambit of RA 9184, vigorously assert that Loan Agreement No.
PH-P204 is neither a treaty, an international agreement nor an executive
agreement. They cite EO No. 459 where the three agreements are defined
a) International agreement- shall refer to a contract or understanding, regardless
of nomenclature, entered into between the Philippines and another government in
written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single
instrument or in two or more related instruments.
b) Treaties- international agreements entered into by the Philippines which require
legislative concurrence after executive ratification. This term may include
compacts like conventions, declarations, covenants and acts.
c) Executive agreements- similar to treaties except that they do not require
legislative concurrence.
The petitioners mainly argue that Loan Agreement No. PH-P204 does not fall
under any of the three categories because to be any of the three, an agreement
had to be one where the parties are the Philippines as a State and another State.
The JBIC, the petitioners maintain, is a Japanese banking agency, which
presumably has a separate juridical personality from the Japanese Government.
The petitioners’ arguments fail to persuade. The Court holds that Loan
Agreement No. PH-P204 taken in conjunction with the Exchange of Notes
dated December 27, 1999 between the Japanese Government and the
Philippine Government is an executive agreement.
Loan Agreement No. PH-P204 was executed by and between the JBIC and the
Philippine Government pursuant to the Exchange of Notes executed by and
between Mr. Yoshihisa Ara, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of
Japan to the Philippines, and then Foreign Affairs Secretary Siazon, in behalf of
their respective governments. The Exchange of Notes expressed that the two
governments have reached an understanding concerning Japanese loans to
be extended to the Philippines and that these loans were aimed at promoting our
country’s economic stabilization and development efforts.
Under the circumstances, the JBIC may well be considered an adjunct of the the executing agency of the projects financed by Loan Agreement No. PH- P204,
Japanese Government. Further, Loan Agreement No. PH-P204 is indubitably rightfully awarded the contract for the implementation of civil works for the CP I
an integral part of the Exchange of Notes. It forms part of the Exchange of project to private respondent China Road & Bridge Corporation.
Notes such that it cannot be properly taken independent thereof.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED.
The term exchange note is defined in the United Nations Treaty Collection as “ a
record of a routine agreement that has many similarities with the private law
contract. The agreement consists of the exchange of two documents, each
of the parties being in the possession of the one signed by the representative
of the other. Under the usual procedure, the accepting State repeats the text
of the offering State to record its assent. The signatories of the letters may be
government Ministers, diplomats or departmental heads. The technique of
exchange of notes is frequently resorted to, either because of its speedy
procedure, or, sometimes, to avoid the process of legislative approval.”

It is stated that “treaties, agreements, conventions, charters, protocols,

declarations, memoranda of understanding, modus vivendi and exchange of
notes” all refer to “international instruments binding at international law.” It
is further explained that “Although these instruments differ from each other by title,
they all have common features and international law has applied basically the
same rules to all these instruments. These rules are the result of long practice
among the States, which have accepted them as binding norms in their mutual
relations. Therefore, they are regarded as international customary law. Since
there was a general desire to codify these customary rules, two international
conventions were negotiated (1969 Vienna Convention and 1986 Vienna
Convention).

Significantly, an exchange of notes is considered a form of an executive

agreement, which becomes binding through executive action without the
need of a vote by the Senate or Congress. The following disquisition by Francis
B. Sayre, former United States High Commissioner to the Philippines, entitled
“The Constitutionality of Trade Agreement Acts” quoted

“Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are

commonly referred to as executive agreements and are no less common in
our scheme of government than are the more formal instruments--treaties and
conventions. They sometimes take the form of exchange of notes and at other
times that of more formal documents denominated “agreements” or “protocol.”

The JBIC Procurements Guidelines, as quoted earlier, forbids any procedure

under which bids above or below a predetermined bid value assessment are
automatically disqualified. Succinctly put, it absolutely prohibits the imposition of
ceilings on bids.

Under the fundamental principle of international law of pacta sunt servanda, which
is, in fact, embodied in Section 4 of RA 9184 as it provides that “[a]ny treaty or
international or executive agreement affecting the subject matter of this Act to
which the Philippine government is a signatory shall be observed,” the DPWH, as
 of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. However,
[17] PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO v. GRP PEACE PANEL this did not materialize because upon motion of petitioners, specifically
those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing, the Court issued
GR No. 183591 | October 14, 2008 | Treaties | Mart a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing.
Petitioner: THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO
2. The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiations beginning
Respondents: GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
in 1996, then in 1997 when the GRP and the MILF signed the agreement
PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN
on General Cessation of Hostilities, and the Framework of Agreement of
Intent in 1998.
Recit-Ready: The Republic and the MILF were scheduled to sign the MOA-
Ancestral Domain aspect of the Tripoli Agreement. However, this did not go as
3. However, towards the end of 1999, the MILF attacked municipalities in
planned because petitioners moved for the Court to issue a TRO enjoining the
Central Mindanao and, in 2000, took control of the town hall of Kauswagan
GRP from signing. In essence, the MOA-AD would partake of a treaty device. The
Lanao del Norte. In response, then President Erap declared an all oout
cases were heard on oral arguments discussing WHETHER BY SIGNING, THE
war against the MILF.
GRP WOULD BE BINDING ITSELF TO CREATE THE BJE AS A SEPARATE
STATE, REVISE THE CONSTITUTION TO CONFORM TO THE MOA, AND TO
4. When President Arroyo took office, the military offensive against the MILF
RECOGNIZE THE CLAIM OF THE MILF FOR ANCESTRAL DOMAIN IN
was suspended and the government sought a resumption of the peace
VIOLATION OF THE IPRA. The Court held in the affirmative. Presently, the MOA-
talks. Eventually, the MILF agreed to discuss the matter and suspended
AD does not conform to the Constitution. It goes beyond it when the MOA-AD
all its military actions.
states that the BJE is essentially a state. The Constitution has no provision for
establishing an associative state, only for autonomous regions. On the aspect of
5. Formal peace talks were held in Tripoli, Libya, the result of which was the
international law, International law gives the people of a state the right to self-
GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement containing the basic principles and agenda
determination, but more often than not, this has been limited to internal self-
on the following aspects: Security, Rehabilitation, and Ancestral Domain.
determination, a people's pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural
A second round of peace talks ended with the signing of the Implementing
development within the framework of an existing state; as opposed to external self-
guidelines on the security aspect of the Tripoli Agreement leading to a
determination which is as the establishment of a sovereign and independent State,
ceasefire. This was followed by the Implementing Guidelines on the
the free association or integration with an independent State or the emergence into
Humanitarian Rehabilitation and Development Aspect. In 2005, several
any other political status freely determined by a people. Even in considering the
talks were held in Kuala Lumpur, eventually leading to the crafting of the
rights of the Indigenous Peoples declared in the DRIP, the DRIP did not obligate
draft MOA-AD in its final form, which was set to be signed on August 5,
States to grant indigenous peoples the near-independent status of an associated
2008.
state. Even if the UN DRIP were considered as part of the law of the land pursuant
to Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, it would not suffice to uphold the validity
6. The OSG summarized the MOA-AD by stating that it contained the
of the MOA-AD so as to render its compliance with other laws unnecessary.
commitment of the parties to pursue peace negotiations, protect and
respect human rights, negotiate with sincerity in the resolution and pacific
settlement of the conflict, and refrain from the use of treat or force to attain
Doctrine: TREATIES HAVE TO BE IN LINE WITH THE DOMESTIC LAWS OF
undue advantage while the peace talks were ongoing.
THE PARTIES, ESPECIALLY THE CONSTITUTION, IN ORDER TO BIND THE
PARTY STATE.
7. OVERVIEW OF THE MOA-AD:

FACTS: The MOA-AD identifies the Parties as the GRP and the MILF. Aside from
the four earlier agreements, the MOA-AD includes also two agreements
1. On August 5, 2008, the Republic and the MILF, were scheduled to sign a between the GRP and the MNLF: The 1976 Tripoli agreement, and the
Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) aspect final peace agreement on the implementation of the 1976 Tripoli
 Agreement, signed in 1996. It also identifies as Terms of Reference (TOR)
the organic act for ARMM, and the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA),
and several international law instruments like the ILO Convention No. 169
concerning Indigenous and Tribal peoples in Independent Countries in
relation to the UN Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples,
and the UN Charter, among others. The final TOR is the generic category
of “Compact rights entrenchment” emanating from the regime of “Territory
under compact” and “Territory under peace agreement” that partakes the
nature of a treaty device.
During the height of the Muslim Empire, early Muslim jurists tended to see
in this dichotomy: Those lands were Islamic held sway, and those lands
where Muslims were persecuted or where Muslim laws were outlawed or
ineffective. Through time, this way of viewing the world became more
complex as the Islamic world became part of the international community
of nations. New terms were added. The “land of compact” and “land of
treaty” referred to secular countries which maintained peaceful and
cooperative relations with Muslim states. “Land of order” referred to
countries which were not bound by treaty with Muslim states, but
maintained freedom of religion for Muslims.
It thus appears that the final TOR simply refers to all other
agreements between the MILF and the GRP that partake of the nature
of a treaty device; treaty defined as “any solemn agreement in writing
that sets out understandings, obligations, and benefits for both parties
which provides for a framework that elaborates the principles declared in
the MOA-AD.
8. THE FOUR STRANDS OF THE MOA-AD.
Concepts and Principles
All Moros and all Indigenous Peoples of Mindanao identify themselves as
the Bangsamoros which it also defines as the natives or original
inhabitants of Mindanao at the time of conquest or colonization.
The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the Bangsamoro homeland, the
ownership is exclusive to the Bangsamoros by virtue of their prior right of
occupation. The parties agreed that ancestral domain does not form part
of the public domain.
Pursuant also to their tradition, the Bangsamoro are acknowledged as
having the right to self-governance. This is rooted on the ancestral
territoriality exercised originally under the suzerain authority of their
sultanates.
The MOA-AD also mentions the Bangsamoro Juriidical Entity (BJE) to
which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain
and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro
Territory
The territory is described as the land mass as well as the maritime,
terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, including the aerial domain and the
atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan
geographic region. More specifically, the core territory is what is presently
the ARMM.
The parties also stipulate that the BJE shall have jurisdiction over all
natural resources within its internal waters, and that the BJE shall also
have territorial waters which it exercises joint jurisdiction with the Central
government. It also provides for the sharing of minerals on the territorial
waters between the Central government and the BJE, in favor of the latter.
Resources
The MOA-AD states that the BJE is free to enter into any economic
cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries and shall have the
option to establish trade missions in those countries. Such relationships
and understandings, however, are not to include aggression against the
GRP. The BJE may also enter into environmental cooperation
agreements.
The external defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of
the Central Government. The Central Government is also bound to "take
necessary steps to ensure the BJE's participation in international
meetings and events" like those of the ASEAN and the specialized
agencies of the UN. The BJE is to be entitled to participate in Philippine
official missions and delegations for the negotiation of border agreements
or protocols for environmental protection and equitable sharing of
incomes and revenues involving the bodies of water adjacent to or
between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain.
With regard to the right of exploring for, producing, and obtaining all
potential sources of energy, petroleum, fossil fuel, mineral oil and natural
gas, the jurisdiction and control thereon is to be vested in the BJE "as the
 party having control within its territorial jurisdiction." This right carries the
proviso that, "in times of national emergency, when public interest so
requires," the Central Government may, for a fixed period and under
reasonable terms as may be agreed upon by both Parties, assume or
direct the operation of such resources.
The BJE may modify or cancel the forest concessions, timber licenses,
contracts or agreements, mining concessions, Mineral Production and
Sharing Agreements (MPSA), Industrial Forest Management Agreements
(IFMA), and other land tenure instruments granted by the Philippine
Government, including those issued by the present ARMM.
Governance
The MOA-AD binds the Parties to invite a multinational third-party to
observe and monitor the implementation of the Comprehensive Compact.
This compact is to embody the "details for the effective enforcement" and
"the mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation" of the
MOA-AD. The MOA-AD explicitly provides that the participation of the
third party shall not in any way affect the status of the relationship between
the Central Government and the BJE.
The MOA-AD describes the relationship of the Central Government and
the BJE as "associative," characterized by shared authority and
responsibility. And it states that the structure of governance is to be based
on executive, legislative, judicial, and administrative institutions with
defined powers and functions in the Comprehensive Compact.
The MOA-AD provides that its provisions requiring "amendments to the
existing legal framework" shall take effect upon signing of the
Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the aforesaid amendments,
with due regard to the non-derogation of prior agreements and within the
stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact.
The BJE is granted the power to build, develop and maintain its own
institutions inclusive of civil service, electoral, financial and banking,
education, legislation, legal, economic, police and internal security force,
1 Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
2 Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing
judicial system and correctional institutions, the details of which shall be
discussed in the negotiation of the comprehensive compact.
ISSUES: W/N THE MOA-AD IS CONSISTENT WITH THE CONSTITUTION AND
LAWS AS PRESENTLY WORDED - NO
RATIO:
The MOA-AD explicitly alluded to the concept of Association, indicating that the
parties actually its provisions with it in mind. An association is formed when two
states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model,
one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the
principal, while maintaining its international status as a state. Free associations
represent a middle ground between integration and independence. In
international practice, the "associated state" arrangement has usually been used
as a transitional device of former colonies on their way to full independence.
Back to the MOA-AD, it contains many provisions which are consistent with the
international legal concept of association, specifically the following: the BJE's
capacity to enter into economic and trade relations with foreign countries, the
commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJE's participation in
meetings and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and the
continuing responsibility of the Central Government over external defense.
Moreover, the BJE's right to participate in Philippine official missions bearing on
negotiation of border agreements, environmental protection, and sharing of
revenues pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands
forming part of the ancestral domain, resembles the right of the governments of
FSM and the Marshall Islands to be consulted by the U.S. government on any
foreign affairs matter affecting them.
The concept of association is not recognized under the Present
Constitution. Not even the ARMM is recognized as having an associative
relationship with the national government. The concept implies powers that
go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or
regional government. Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD’s
provisions already requires amendments of constitutional provisions for its
validity, specifically on Article X, Sections 11 and 152.
common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and
other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
.
The BJE is far more powerful than th autonomous region recognized in the
Constitution. It is a sate in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-determination of a
down in the Montevideo Convention namely: A permanent population, a defined people is normally fulfilled through internal self-determination - a people's pursuit of its political,
economic, social and cultural development within the framework of an existing state. A right to
territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.
external self-determination (which in this case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a
right to unilateral secession) arises in only the most extreme of cases and can be defined as the
Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he creation of the establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an
autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a
cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that people.
only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite
When it comes to indigenous peoples, the UN General Assembly adopted the
shall be included in the autonomous region." Under paragraph 2(c) on
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (DRIP). It recognized the
TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the present geographic area of the
right of IP to self-determination, encompassing the right to autonomy or self-
ARMM and, in addition, the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for
government. Self-government has been understood to be equivalent to internal
inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite are automatically part of the
self-determination. Assuming that the DRIP is a customary international law, the
BJE without need of another plebiscite. That the present components of the
obligations enumerated therein do not strictly require the Republic to grant the
ARMM and the above-mentioned municipalities voted for inclusion therein in
Bangsamoro people, through the instrumentality of the BJE, the particular rights
2001, however, does not render another plebiscite unnecessary under the
and powers provided for in the MOA-AD. Even the more specific provisions of the
Constitution, precisely because what these areas voted for then was their
UN DRIP are general in scope, allowing for flexibility in its application by the
inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE.
different States.
ON THE ASPECT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
There is, for instance, no requirement in the UN DRIP that States now guarantee
indigenous peoples their own police and internal security force. Indeed, Article 8
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution states that the Philippines "adopts the
presupposes that it is the State which will provide protection for indigenous
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land."
peoples against acts like the forced dispossession of their lands - a function that
is normally performed by police officers. If the protection of a right so essential to
International law has long recognized the right to self-determination of "peoples,"
indigenous people's identity is acknowledged to be the responsibility of the State,
understood not merely as the entire population of a State but also a portion
then surely the protection of rights less significant to them as such peoples would
thereof. In considering the question of whether the people of Quebec had a right
also be the duty of States. Nor is there in the UN DRIP an acknowledgement of
to unilaterally secede from Canada, the Canadian Supreme Court in
the right of indigenous peoples to the aerial domain and atmospheric space.
REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC had occasion to acknowledge that
What it upholds, in Article 26 thereof, is the right of indigenous peoples to the
"the right of a people to self-determination is now so widely recognized in
lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or
international conventions that the principle has acquired a status beyond
otherwise used or acquired.
‘convention' and is considered a general principle of international law."

Moreover, the UN DRIP, while upholding the right of indigenous peoples to

Among the conventions referred to are the International Covenant on Civil and
autonomy, does not obligate States to grant indigenous peoples the near-
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
independent status of an associated state.
Rights which state, in Article 1 of both covenants, that all peoples, by virtue of the
right of self-determination, "freely determine their political status and freely
Even if the UN DRIP were considered as part of the law of the land pursuant to
pursue their economic, social, and cultural development."
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, it would not suffice to uphold the validity of
the MOA-AD so as to render its compliance with other laws unnecessary.
The people's right to self-determination should not, however, be understood as
extending to a unilateral right of secession. A distinction should be made
It is, therefore, clear that the MOA-AD contains numerous provisions that cannot
between the right of internal and external self-determination. REFERENCE RE
be reconciled with the Constitution and the laws as presently worded.
SECESSION OF QUEBEC is again instructive:
 [18] BAYAN MUNA v. ROMULO
GR No. 159618 | February 1, 2011 | Sources of IL - Treaties | Menghrajani
Petitioner: BAYAN MUNA, as represented by Rep. SATUR OCAMPO, Rep. CRISPIN
BELTRAN, and Rep. LIZA L. MAZA
Respondents: ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and
BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs
Recit-Ready:
The RP, through Charge d’Affaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute, by
its terms, is “subject to ratification, acceptance or approval” by the signatory
states.
In 2003, via Exchange of Notes with the US government, the RP, finalized the
NSBAA which aimed to protect certain persons of the RP and US from frivolous
and harassment suits that might be brought against them in international
tribunals.
Bayan Muna imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and
ratifying the Agreement and prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at
least declared as without force and effect because of two reasons: the NSBA was
not contracted validly because of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Executive branch and, the NSBA was not submitted to the Senate for concurrence
with the Senate and directly contravenes the Rome Statute.
Doctrine:
Executive agreements may be validly entered into without such concurrence. As
the President wields vast powers and influence, her conduct in the external affairs
of the nation is, as Bayan would put it, “executive altogether.” The right of the
President to enter into or ratify binding executive agreements has been confirmed
by long practice.
The VCLT states that a signatory state is only obliged to refrain from acts which
would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty. The Philippines is only a signatory
to the Rome Statute and not a State-Party for lack of ratification by the Senate.
Thus, it is only obliged to refrain from acts, which would defeat the object and
purpose of the Rome Statute. Any argument obliging the Philippines to follow any
provision in the treaty would be premature. And even assuming that the Philippines
is a State-Party, the Rome Statute still recognizes the primacy of international
agreements entered into between States, even when one of the States is not a
State-Party to the Rome Statute.
FACTS:
1. December 28, 2000 – The Republic of the Philippines [RP] through its
Charge d’Affaires, Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by
its terms, is "subject to ratification, acceptance or approval" by the
signatory states.1
2. May 9, 2003 - Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy
Note No. 0470 to the DFA proposing the terms of the non-surrender
bilateral agreement [NSBA] between the USA and the RP.
3. May 13, 2003 – RP sent the Exchange of Notes No. BFO-028-03 wherein
the RP, represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, agreed with and
accepted the US proposals embodied under the US Embassy Note,
which put in effect the NSBA with the US government.2
4. The NSBA provides as follows:
a. “Persons” are current or former Government officials,
employees (including contractors), or military personnel or
nationals of one Party.
b. Persons of one Party present in the territory of the other shall
not, absent the express consent of the first Party,
i. Be surrendered or transferred by any means to any
international tribunal for any purpose, unless such
tribunal has been established by the UN Security
Council, or
ii. Be surrendered or transferred by any means to any
other entity or third country, or expelled to a third
country, for the purpose of surrender to or transfer to
any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been
established by the UN Security Council.
c. When the [US] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a
person of the Philippines to a third country, the [US] will not
agree to the surrender or transfer of that person by the third
country to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has
been established by the UN Security Council, absent the express
consent of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
[GRP].
d. When the [GRP] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a
person of the [USA] to a third country, the [GRP] will not agree to
the surrender or transfer of that person by the third country to
any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been
established by the UN Security Council, absent the express
consent of the Government of the [US].
e. This Agreement shall remain in force until one year after the
date on which one party notifies the other of its intent to
terminate the Agreement. The provisions of this Agreement
1
Only 92 out of the 139 signatory countries appear to have completed the ratification, approval
and concurrence process. The Philippines is not among the 92.
2
The NSBA aims to protect what it refers to and defines as "persons" of the RP and US from
frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them in international tribunals. It is
reflective of the increasing pace of the strategic security and defense partnership between the
two countries. As of May 2, 2003, similar bilateral agreements have been effected by and
between the US and 33 other countries.
 shall continue to apply with respect to any act occurring, or any
allegation arising, before the effective date of termination.
5. October 28, 2003 - Ambassador Ricciardone informed Solicitor General
Alfredo L. Benipayo that the exchange of diplomatic notes constituted a
legally binding agreement under international law; and that, under US
law, the said agreement did not require the advice and consent of the US
Senate.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the NSBA was contracted validly – YES.
2. Whether or not the NSBA, which has not been submitted to the Senate
for concurrence, contravenes and undermines the Rome Statute and
other treaties – NO.
RATIO:
1. The NSBA was validly contracted and there was no grave abuse of
discretion.
a. Definition of “Exchange of Notes”
i. Falls "into the category of inter-governmental
agreements," (internationally accepted form of
international agreement)
ii. Is a record of a routine agreement, with many
similarities with the private law contract
iii. The agreement consists of the exchange of two
documents, each of the parties being in the possession
of the one signed by the representative of the other
iv. Under the usual procedure, the accepting State repeats
the text of the offering State to record its assent
v. The signatories of the letters may be government
Ministers, diplomats or departmental heads
vi. The technique of exchange of notes is frequently
resorted to, either because of its speedy procedure, or,
sometimes, to avoid the process of legislative
approval.3
b. “Exchange of notes" and "executive agreements" have been
used interchangeably
i. Exchange of notes being considered a form of
executive agreement that becomes binding through
executive action.
ii. Executive agreements concluded by the President
"sometimes take the form of exchange of notes and at
other times that of more formal documents
denominated ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols’"
3
Definition based on The United Nations Treaty Collections (Treaty Reference Guide)
c. The NSBA be it viewed as the Non-Surrender Agreement itself,
or as an integral instrument of acceptance thereof or as consent
to be bound––is a recognized mode of concluding a legally
binding international written contract among nations.
d. There was no grave abuse of discretion
i. The right of the President to enter into or ratify binding
executive agreements has been confirmed by long
practice.
ii. In agreeing to conclude the NSBA thru E/N BFO-028-03,
then President GMA, represented by the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, acted within the scope of the authority
and discretion vested in her by the Constitution
because the President––by ratifying, thru her deputies,
the non-surrender agreement––did nothing more than
discharge a constitutional duty and exercise a
prerogative that pertains to her office.
iii. The power to ratify a treaty, the Statute in that instance,
rests with the President, subject to the concurrence of
the Senate, whose role relative to the ratification of a
treaty is limited merely to concurring in or withholding
the ratification.
iv. Concomitant with this treaty-making power of the
President is his or her prerogative to refuse to submit a
treaty to the Senate; or having secured the latter’s
consent to the ratification of the treaty, refuse to ratify
it. This prerogative is the President’s alone and cannot
be encroached upon via a writ of mandamus. Barring
intervening events, then, the Philippines remains to be
just a signatory to the Rome Statute. Under Art. 125
thereof, the final acts required to complete the treaty
process and, thus, bring it into force, insofar as the
Philippines is concerned, have yet to be done.
2. There is no need for any Senate concurrence for the NSBA.
a. Bayan Muna’s reliance on Eastern Sea Trading case is
misplaced
i. Almost half a century has elapsed since the Court
rendered its decision and the conduct of foreign affairs
has become more complex.
ii. Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those
entered into under the trade-agreement act, have been
negotiated with foreign governments. x x x They cover
such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation
dues, income tax on shipping profits, the admission of
 civil air craft, custom matters and commercial relations
generally, international claims, postal matters, the
registration of trademarks and copyrights, etc. x x x
iii. Save for the situation and matters contemplated in
Sec. 25, Art. XVIII of the Constitution4 - when a treaty is
required, the Constitution does not classify any subject,
like that involving political issues, to be in the form of,
and ratified as, a treaty. What the Constitution merely
prescribes is that treaties need the concurrence of the
Senate by a vote defined therein to complete the
ratification process.
iv. The primary consideration in the choice of the form of
agreement is the parties’ intent and desire to craft an
international agreement in the form they so wish to
further their respective interests. Verily, the matter of
form takes a back seat when it comes to effectiveness
and binding effect of the enforcement of a treaty or an
executive agreement, as the parties in either
international agreement each labor under the pacta
sunt servanda principle.
v. A treaty has greater "dignity" than an executive
agreement, because its constitutional efficacy is
beyond doubt, a treaty having behind it the authority of
the President, the Senate, and the people; a ratified
treaty, unlike an executive agreement, takes
precedence over any prior statutory enactment.
vi. The right of the Executive to enter into binding
agreements without the necessity of subsequent
Congressional approval has been confirmed by long
usage. From the earliest days of our history, we have
entered executive agreements covering such subjects
as commercial and consular relations, most favored-
nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright
protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the
settlement of claims. The validity of these has never
been seriously questioned by our courts.
b. Bayan Muna’s reliance on the Adolfo case is misplaced.
i. This is owing to different factual milieus. In Adolfo, the
Court held that an executive agreement couldn’t be
used to amend a duly ratified and existing treaty, i.e.,
the Bases Treaty. Indeed, an executive agreement that
4
Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the [RP-US Military Bases Agreement] foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly
concurred in by the Senate, and when Congress so requires, ratified x x x in a national
referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the contracting state.
does not require the concurrence of the Senate for its
ratification may not be used to amend a treaty that,
under the Constitution, is the product of the ratifying
acts of the Executive and the Senate. The presence of a
treaty, purportedly being subject to amendment by an
executive agreement, does not obtain under the
premises.
c. The NSBA does not contravene the Rome Statute because it is
not legally binding on the Philippines.
i. Under the VCLT, a signatory state is only obliged to
refrain from acts, which would defeat the object and
purpose of a treaty; whereas a State-Party, on the other
hand, is legally obliged to follow all the provisions of a
treaty in good faith.
ii. The Philippines is only a signatory to the Rome Statute
and not a State-Party for lack of ratification by the
Senate. Thus, it is only obliged to refrain from acts,
which would defeat the object and purpose of the
Rome Statute. Any argument obliging the Philippines to
follow any provision in the treaty would be premature.
iii. Thus, Bayan Muna’s argument that State-Parties with
non-surrender agreements are prevented from meeting
their obligations under the Rome Statute, specifically
Arts. 27, 86, 89 and 90, must fail. These articles are
only legally binding upon State-Parties, not signatories.
d. The NSBA is complementary to the Rome Statute.
i. Art. 90 would show that the NSBA is not incompatible
with the Rome Statute. Specifically, Art. 90(4) provides
that "[i]f the requesting State is a State not Party to this
Statute the requested State, if it is not under an
international obligation to extradite the person to the
requesting State, shall give priority to the request for
surrender from the Court. x x x"
ii. It must be noted that the US is neither a State-Party nor
a signatory to the Rome Statute
iii. Also, there is an international agreement between the
US and the Philippines regarding extradition or
surrender of persons, i.e., the Agreement.
iv. Clearly, even assuming that the Philippines is a State-
Party, the Rome Statute still recognizes the primacy of
international agreements entered into between States,
even when one of the States is not a State-Party to the
Rome Statute.
 Doctrine: 
[19] CHINA NATIONAL MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT CORP. (Group) vs. 
The Vienna Convention laid down the requirements to be considered an executive 
SANTAMARIA 
agreement: 
1. The agreement must be between states. 
GR No.185572 | February 7, 2012 | Executive Agreement | Sam 
2. It must be in writing 
Petitioner: ​China National Machinery & Equipment Corp.  3. It must be governed by international law. 
Respondents:  ​Hon.  Ceasr  D.  Santamaria,  in  his  official  capacity  as  Presiding 
Judge of Branch 145, RTC Makati, Harry Roque, Joel R. Butuyan, et. al. 
FACTS: 
 
Recit-Ready:   
1. On  April  14,  2002,  China  National  Machinery  &  Equipment  Corp.  (CNMEG), 
On  April  14,  2002,  CNMEG  entered  into  a  Memorandum  of  Understanding  with 
represented  by  its  chairperson,  Ren  Hongbin,  entered  into  a  Memorandum  of 
Northrail  to  conduct  a  feasibility  study  of  a  possible  railway  line  from  Manila  to 
Understanding  with  the  North  Luzon  Railways  Corporation  (Northrail), 
San  Fernando,  La  Union.  This  materailized  into  the  construction  of  Northrail 
represented  by  its  president,  Jose  Cortes,  Jr.  for  the  conduct  of  a  feasibility 
Project  Section  I,  Phase  I  from  Caloocan  to  Malolos,  with  the  Northrail  Project 
study  on  a  possible  railway  line  from  Manila  to  San  Fernando,  La  Union  (the 
pegged at USD 421 million. CNMEG was designated as the Prime Contractor of the 
Northrail Project).
Northrail  project  in  a  letter  of  the  Chinese  Ambassador  Wang  to  the  DOF.  The 
project  is  financed  by  the  Export  Import  Bank  of  China,  which  agreed  to  extend 
2. On  August  30,  2003,  The  Export  Import  Bank  of  China  and  the  DOF  of  the 
credit to the PH Gov’t in the amount of USD 400 million. 
Philippines  entered  into  a  Memorandum  of  Understanding  (Aug  30  MOU) 
On  Feb.  13,  2006,  the  respondents filed a complaint in the RTC of Makati assailing 
wherein  China  agreed  to  extend  Preferential  Buyer’s  Credit  to  the  PH  gov’t  to 
that  the  contract  agreement  and  the  loan  agreement  to  be  void  in  violation  of the 
finance  the  Northrail  Project.  The  bank  agreed  to  extend  an  amount  not 
Constitution,  The  Government  Procurement  Reform  Act,  the  Government  Auditing 
exceeding  USD  400,000,000  in  favor  of  DOF,  payable  in  20  years,  with  a  5yr 
Code, and the Administrative Code. 
grace period, and at the rate of 3% per annum.
The  case  was  set  for  hearing  on  the  issuance  of  injunctive  reliefs  on  March  17, 
2006.  CNMEG  filed  an  urgent  motion  for reconsideration and later filed for Motion  3. On  Oct. 1, 2003, The Chinese Ambassador, Mr. Wang Chungui, wrote a letter to 
to  Dismiss  assailing  that  the  court  does  not  have  jurisdiction  over  it  for  being  DOF  Secretary  Camacho  informing  him  of  CNMEG’s  designation  as the Prime 
immune  from  suit  and  the  subject  matter was product of an executive agreement.  Contractor for the Northrail Project.
This  motion  was  denied  and  so  was  the  MR.  CNMEG  then  filed  a  Petition  for 
Certiorari  with  the  CA  but  was  dismissed  and  the MR denied. Hence, CNMEG filed  4. Dec.  30,  2003,  CNMEG  and  Northrail  executed  a  contract  agreement  for  the 
a Petition from Review on Certiorari with the SC, which is the instant case.  construction  of  Section  I,  Phase  I  of  the  North  Luzon  Railway  System  from 
The  issue  (​most related to PIL​) is Whether the Contract Agreement is an executive  Caloocan  to  Malolos  on  a  turnkey  basis.  The  contract  price  for  the  Northrail 
agreement,  such  that  it  cannot  be questioned by or before a local court. The Court  Project is USD 421,050,000.
held  that  the  contract  agreement  is  not  an  executive  agreement  because  it  lacks 
the  first  and  last  requirement  to  be  considered  an  executive  agreement laid down  5. On  Feb.  26,  2004,  EXIM  Bank  and  the  PH  gov’t  entered  into  a  counterpart 
by  the  Vienna  Convention:  ​1.  The  agreement  must  be  between  states​.  This  is  financial  agreement—  Buyer  Credit Loan Agreement No. BLA 04055, where the 
lacking  because  it  was  established under the first issue that CNMEG was acting in  bank  agreed  to  extend  credit  in  the  amount  of  USD  400,000,000  in  order  to 
purely  proprietary  nature  and  does  not  represent  the  Chinese  government.  ​2.  ​It  finance the construction of Phase I of the Northrail Praoject.
must  be  in  writing.  ​3.  It  must  be  governed  by  international  law​.This  is  lacking 
because  the  contract  between  CNMEG  and  Northrail  Project  is  governed  in  6. On  Feb. 13, 2006, the respondents filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract 
accordance  with  PH  laws  as  in  provided  in  Art.  2  of  the  Conditions  of  Contract,  and  Injunction  with  Urgent  Motion  for  Summary  Hearing  to  Determine  the 
which is under Art. 1.1 of the Contract Agreement.  Existence  of  Facts  and  Circumstances  Justifying  the  Issuance  of  Writ  of 
  Preliminary  Prohibitory  and  Mandatory  Injunction and/or TRO against CNMEG, 
 office  of  the  Exec.  Secretary,  the  DOF,  the  Dept.  Of  Budget  and  Management, 
the  Nat’l  Economic  Dev’t Authority and Northrail. The respondents alleged that  a. The  restrictive  application:  the  immunity  of  the  sovereign  is 
the  Contract  Agreement  and  the  Loan  agreement were void for being contrary  recognized only with regard to the public acts or acts jure imperii of a 
to  (a)  the  Constitution,  (b)  Government  Procurement  Reform  Act,  (c)  state,  but  not  with  regard  to  private  acts or acts jure gestionis. (Holy 
Government Auditing Code, and (d) Administrative Code. See v. Rosario)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:  b. Since  the  PH  applies  the  restrictive  theory,  it  is  crucial  to  ascertain 
the  legal  nature  of  the  act  involved—  whether  the  entity  claiming 
1. The  case  was  filed  by  the  respondents  to  the  RTC  of  Makati  Br.  145,  which  immunity  from  suit  performs  a  governmental,  as  opposed  to 
issued  an  order  setting  the  case  for  hearing  on  the  issuance  of  injunctive  proprietary, functions.
reliefs.
c. CNMEG  performs  purely  commercial  and  engaged  in  a  proprietary 
2. CNMEG  filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the order. But before the  activity. As proven by the ff:
Court  can  rule  on this, CNMEG filed for Motion to Dismiss arguing that the trial 
court  did  not  have jurisdiction over its person, as an agent of the Chinese gov’t  1. Memorandum  of  Understanding  Sept.  14,  2002  —  it  was 
and  hence,  immune  from  suit  and  that  the  subject matter was a product of an  CNMEG,  who  initiated  the  project  not  the  Chinese Gov’t, as 
executive agreement. seen  in  the  relevant  part  of  the  Agreement.  “CNMEG  has 
expressed interest in rehabilitation and/or modernization of 
3. RTC  Br.  145,  on  May  15,  2007,  denied  the  Motion  to  Dismiss  and  setting  the  MNL”
case for summary hearing. CNMEG filed an MR but was also denied.
2. Letter  of  Ambassador  Wang Oct. 1, 2003 — it confirms that 
4. CNMEG  filed  before  the  CA  a  Petition  for  Certiorari  with  Prayer  for  the  the  Northrail  Project  was  initiated  by  CNMEG.  It  is  also 
Issuance of TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated April 4, 2008. purely  commercial  and  for  profit  since  CNMEG  even 
pegged the price of the project to USD $421, 050, 000.
5. On  Sept.  30,  2008,  CA  dismissed  the  the  Petition for Certiorari. CNMEG filed a 
MR, which was denied by the CA. 3. The  Loan  Agreement  —  provides  that  the  contract  is  a 
commercial  activity  and  there  is  a  waiver  of  immunity  and 
6. CNMEG  then  filed  the  instant  Petition  for  Review  on  Certiorari  dated  Jan.  21,  that  the  proceedings  to  enforce  agreement will be the laws 
2009.  of the PH.

ISSUES:    d. CNMEG  failed  to  present a certification from DFA, who is recognized 

to  have  the  competence and authority to issue such, certifying that it 
1. Whether  CNMEG  is  entitled  to  immunity,  precluding  it  from  being sued before  is  entitled  to  sovereign  or  diplomatic immunity, what it only adduced 
the local court. [​ NO] was  a  certification  executed  by  Economic  and Commercial Office of 
the  Embassy  of  China,  stating  that  the  Northrail  Project  is  in pursuit 
2. Whether  the  Contract  Agreement  is  an  executive  agreement,  such  that  it  of sovereign activity.
cannot be questioned by or before a local court. ​[NO] 
1. The Contract Agreement is NOT an executive agreement. 
RATIO: 
a. Art.  2(1)  of  the  Vienna  Convention  on  the  Law  of  Treaties  defines  a 
1. CNMEG is not entitled to immunity. treaty  as  follows:  An  international  agreement  concluded  between 
States  in  written  form  and  governed  by  international  law,  whether 
 embodied  in  a  single  instrument  or  in  two  or  more  related 
instruments and whatever its particular designation. 

b. In  Bayan  vs.  Romulo,  this  Court  held  that  an  executive  agreement  is 
similar  to  a  treaty,  except  that  former  a.  Does  not  require  legislative 
concurrence;  b.  Usually  less  formal;  and  c.  Deals  with  a  narrower 
range of subject matter. 

c. The  Vienna  Convention  laid  down  the  requirements to be considered 

an executive agreement: 

1. The  agreement  must  be  between  states​.  This  is  lacking 

because  it  was  established  under  the  first  issue  that 
CNMEG  was  acting  in  purely  proprietary  nature  and  does 
not represent the Chinese government. 

2. It must be in writing 

3. It  must  be  governed  by  international  law​.This  is  lacking 

because  the  contract  between  CNMEG  and  Northrail 
Project  is  governed  in  accordance  with  PH  laws  as  in 
provided  in  Art.  2  of  the  Conditions  of  Contract,  which  is 
under Art. 1.1 of the Contract Agreement. 
 
 [19.5] Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch v. CIR remittance tax withheld at source in accordance with Philippine law but
GR No. 188550 | Aug. 19, 2013 | Tax Treaty | AJ shall not exceed 10% of the gross amount of the profits remitted by that
branch to the head office.
3. On the other hand, BIR issued RMO2 No. 1-2000, which requires that any
Petitioner: Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch
availment of the tax treaty relief must be preceded by an application with
Respondents: Commissioner Of Internal Revenue
International Tax Affairs Division (ITAD) at least 15 days before the
transaction.
Recit-Ready:
4. Believing that it made an overpayment of the BPRT, DB filed with the BIR
Under the RP-Germany Tax Treaty, Deutsche Bank (DB) is entitled to the benefit of
a refund claim of PHP 22,562,851.17. DB also requested from the
a preferential rate equivalent to 10% BPRT. Believing it made an overpayment, DB
International Tax Affairs Division (ITAD) a confirmation of its entitlement
filed with the BIR a refund.1 However, CTA denied the refund claim because DB
to the preferential tax rate of 10% under the RP-Germany Tax Treaty.
failed to file an application with the International Tax Affairs Division 15 days
5. Alleging the inaction of the BIR on its administrative claim, DB filed a
before availing tax treaty relief, in accordance with RMO No. 1-2000 of the BIR.
Petition for Review with the CTA.
6. CTA 2nd Division and En Banc Ruling: Denied the refund claim. The
The issue is whether failure to comply with RMO No. 1-2000 will deprive DB the
requirement of 15-days prior application under RMO No. 1-2000 is
benefit of a tax treaty. The SC held that the obligation to comply with a tax treaty
mandatory. Noncompliance is fatal to the taxpayer’s availment of the
must take precedence over an administrative order. By virtue of the RP-Germany
preferential tax rate. It cited Mirant v. CIR, where the CTA En Banc ruled
Tax Treaty, we are bound to extend to a branch in the Philippines, remitting to its
that before the benefits of the tax treaty may be extended to a foreign
head office in Germany, the benefit of a preferential rate equivalent to 10% BPRT.
corporation, the latter should first invoke the provisions of the tax treaty
The BIR must not impose additional requirements that would negate the availment
and prove that they indeed apply to the corporation.
of the reliefs provided for under international agreements.
7. DB argues that, considering that it has met all the conditions under
Article 10 of the RP-Germany Tax Treaty, the CTA erred in denying its
Doctrine:
claim solely on the basis of RMO No. 1-2000.
Pacta sunt servanda: Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties, and
obligations under the treaty must be performed by them in good faith.
ISSUE: W/N the failure to strictly comply with RMO No. 1-2000 will deprive
persons or corporations of the benefit of a tax treaty. NO
FACTS:
1. In accordance with the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, RULING: DB is entitled to a refund PHP 22,562,851.17.
Deutsche Bank remitted to CIR PHP 67,688,553.51, which represented
the fifteen percent (15%) branch profit remittance tax (BPRT) on its RATIO:
regular banking unit (RBU) net income remitted to Deutsche Bank 1. The obligation to comply with a tax treaty must take precedence over the
Germany (DB Germany) for 2002 and prior taxable years. objective of RMO No. 1-2000. Noncompliance with tax treaties has
2. Under Article 10 of the RP-Germany Tax Treaty, where a resident of the negative implications on international relations, and unduly discourages
Federal Republic of Germany has a branch in the Republic of the foreign investors. While the consequences sought to be prevented by
Philippines, this branch may be subjected to the branch profits

1 2
DB paid 15% BPRT, but the treaty says 10% lang, so dapat irefund yung 5% Revenue Memorandum Order
 RMO No. 1-2000 involve an administrative procedure, these may be
remedied through other system management processes.
2. By virtue of the RP-Germany Tax Treaty, we are bound to extend to a
branch in the Philippines, remitting to its head office in Germany, the
benefit of a preferential rate equivalent to 10% BPRT.
3. Our Constitution provides for adherence to the general principles of
international law as part of the law of the land. The international principle
of pacta sunt servanda demands the performance in good faith of treaty
obligations on the part of the states that enter into the agreement.
Treaties have the force and effect of law in this jurisdiction.
4. Tax treaties are entered into to minimize, if not eliminate the harshness
of international juridical double taxation, which is why they are also
known as double tax treaty or double tax agreements.
5. The BIR must not impose additional requirements that would negate the
availment of the reliefs provided for under international agreements.
More so, when the RP-Germany Tax Treaty does not provide for any pre-
requisite for the availment of the benefits under said agreement.
6. The minute resolution in the Mirant case cited by the CTA is not a binding
precedent. Nothing in RMO No. 1-2000 which would indicate a
deprivation of entitlement to a tax treaty relief for failure to comply with
the 15-day period.
7. Also, the underlying principle of prior application with the BIR becomes
moot in refund cases, where the very basis of the claim is excessive
payment arising from non-availment of a tax treaty relief In this case, DB
should not be faulted for not complying with RMO No. 1-2000. It could
not have applied for a tax treaty relief 15 days prior to the payment of its
BPRT, precisely because it erroneously paid the BPRT not on the basis
of the preferential tax rate under the RP-Germany Tax Treaty, but on the
regular rate as prescribed by the NIRC.
 The  duty  to  faithfully  execute  the  laws  of  the  land  is  inherent in executive power and 
[20] Saguisag v. Executive Secretary 
is intimately related to the other executive functions. These functions include the duty 
G.R. No. 212426 GR No. | Jan 12, 2016 | Treaties | Lii  to  ensure  compliance  with  treaties,  executive  agreements  and  executive  orders. 
Congress  cannot  limit  or take over the President's power to adopt implementing rules 
Petitioner: Saguisag et. al.  and  regulations  for  a  law  it  has  enacted.  The  import  of  this  characteristic  is  that  the 
Respondents: Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, et. al.  manner  of  the  President's  execution  of  the  law,  even  if  not  expressly  granted  by  the 
  law,  is  justi fied  by  necessity  and  limited  only  by  law,  since  the  President  must  take 
Recit-Ready:    necessary and proper steps to carry into execution the law. 
Due to the impending expiration of the 1947 Military Bases Agreement (MBA) in 1991,   
the  Philippines  and  the  U.S.  agreed  to  hold  joint  military  exercises  at  a  substantially  Despite  the  President's  roles  as  defender  of  the  State  and  sole  authority  in  foreign 
reduced  level.  The  military  arrangements  between  them  were  revived  in  1999  when  relations,  the  1987  Constitution  expressly  limits  his  ability  in  instances  when  it 
they  concluded  the  first  Visiting  Forces  Agreement  (VFA).  As  a  rearmation  of  the  involves  the  entry of foreign military bases, troops or facilities. The initial limitation is 
obligations  under  the  Mutual  Defense  Treaty  (MDT)  of  1951,  the  VFA  has  laid  down  found  in  Section  21  of  the  provisions  on  the  Executive  Department:  "No  treaty  or 
the  regulatory  mechanism  for  the  treatment  of  U.S.  military  and  civilian  personnel  international  agreement  shall  be  valid  and  effective  unless  concurred  in  by  at  least 
visiting  the  country.  The  Philippines  and  the  U.S.  also  entered  into  a  second  two-  thirds  of  all  the  Members of the Senate." The President, however, may enter into 
counterpart  agreement  (VFA  II),  which  in  turn  regulated  the  treatment  of  Philippine  an  executive  agreement  on  foreign  military  bases,  troops,  or  facilities,  if  (a)  it  is  not 
military  and  civilian personnel visiting the U.S. The Philippine Senate concurred in the  the  instrument  that  allows  the  presence of foreign military bases, troops, or facilities; 
fi rst VFA.   or (b) it merely aims to implement an existing law or treaty. 
   
EDCA  authorizes  the  U.S.  military  forces  to  have  access  to  and  conduct  activities  A  plain  textual  reading  of  Article  XIII,  Section  25  of  the  Constitution  leads  to  the 
within  certain  "Agreed  Locations"  in  the  country.  It  was not transmitted to the Senate  conclusion  that the requirement for EDCA to be submitted to the Senate in the form of 
on  the  executive's  understanding  that  to  do  so  was  no  longer  necessary.  In  June  a  treaty  for  concurrence  by  at  least  two-thirds  of  all  its  members  applies  only  to  a 
2014,  the  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs  (DFA)  and  the  U.S.  Embassy  exchanged  proposed  agreement  between  our  government  and  a  foreign  government,  whereby 
diplomatic  notes  confirming the completion of all necessary internal requirements for  military  bases,  troops,  or  facilities  of  such  foreign  government  would  be "allowed" or 
the agreement to enter into force in the two countries.   would "gain entry" Philippine territory. 
   
According  to  the  Philippine  government,  the  conclusion  of  EDCA  was  the  result  of  Executive  agreements  may  cover  the  matter  of  foreign  military  forces  if  it  merely 
intensive  and  comprehensive  negotiations  in  the  course  of  almost  two  years.  After  involves  detail  adjustments.  The  practice  of  resorting  to  executive  agreements  in 
eight  rounds  of  negotiations,  the  Secretary  of  National  Defense  and  the  U.S.  adjusting  the  details  of  a  law  or  a  treaty  that  already  deals  with  the  presence  of 
Ambassador  to  the  Philippines signed the agreement. President Benigno S. Aquino III  foreign  military  forces  is  not  at  all  unusual  in  this  jurisdiction.  The Court has already 
ratified EDCA.  implicitly acknowledged this practice in Lim v. Executive Secretary. 
   
The issues of this case are:  EDCA  is  consistent  with  the  content,  purpose,  and  framework  of  the  MDT  and  the 
1.  Whether  the  President  may  enter  into  an  executive  agreement  on  foreign  military  VFA.  Even  if  EDCA  was  borne  of  military  necessity,  it  has  not strayed from the intent 
bases, troops, or facilities  of the VFA since EDCA's combat-related components are allowed under the treaty.  
2.  Whether  the  provisions  under EDCA are consistent with the Constitution, as well as   
with existing laws and treaties  The  Constitutional  Commission  articulated  three  legal  standards  to  allow  foreign 
  military  bases,  troops,  or  facilities,  subject  to  the  provisions  of  Section  25:  (1) 
As  it  is,  EDCA  is  not  constitutionally  infi rm.  As  an  executive  agreement,  it  remains  independence  from  foreign  control,  (2)  sovereignty  and  applicable  law,  and  (3) 
consistent with existing laws and treaties that it purports to implement.  national security and territorial integrity. 
   
First standard: independence from foreign control  The  same  section  also  recognizes  that  "[t]itle  to  such  property  shall  remain" with the 
EDCA,  in  respect  of  its  provisions  on  Agreed  Locations,  is  essentially  a  contract  of  US  and  that  they  have  the discretion to "remove such property from the Philippines at 
use  and  access.  Under  its  pertinent  provisions,  it  is  the  Designated  Authority  of  the  any  time."  There  is  nothing  novel,  either,  in  the  EDCA provision on the prepositioning 
Philippines  that  shall,  when  requested, assist in facilitating transit or access to public  and  storing  of  "defense  equipment,  supplies,  and  material,"  since  these  are 
land  and  facilities.  The  activities  carried  out  within  these  locations  are  subject  to  sanctioned  in  the  VFA.  There  is  no  basis to invalidate EDCA on fears that it increases 
agreement  as  authorized  by  the  Philippine  government. Granting the U.S. operational  the threat to our national security.  
control over these locations is likewise subject to EDCA's security mechanisms, which   
are  bilateral  procedures  involving  Philippine  consent  and  cooperation.  Finally,  the  Doctrine: 
Philippine Designated Authority or a duly designated representative is given access to  Executive  agreements  may  cover  the  matter  of  foreign  military  forces  if  it  merely 
the  Agreed  Locations.  Thus,  the  legal  concept  of  operational  control  involves  involves detail adjustments. 
authority  over  personnel  in  a  commander-subordinate  relationship  and  does  not 
include control over the Agreed Locations in this particular case.  
FACTS: 
 
Second standard: retain sovereignty and jurisdiction over its territory  Due  to  the impending expiration of the 1947 Military Bases Agreement (MBA) in 
EDCA  states  in  its  Preamble  the  "understanding  for the United States not to establish  1991,  the  Philippines  and  the  U.S.  negotiated  for  a  possible  renewal  of  their 
a permanent military presence or base in the territory of the Philippines." Further on, it  defense  and  security  relationship  through  the  proposed  Treaty  of  Friendship, 
likewise  states  the  recognition  that  "all  United  States  access  to  and  use  of  facilities  Cooperation  and  Security.  One  of  the  proposed  provisions  included  an 
and  areas  will  be  at  the  invitation  of  the  Philippines  and  with  full  respect  for  the  arrangement  in  which  U.S.  forces  would  be  granted  the  use  of  certain 
Philippine  Constitution  and  Philippine  laws."  From  the  text  of  EDCA  itself,  Agreed  installations  within  the  Philippine  naval  base  in  Subic.  The  Senate  rejected  the 
proposed treaty.  
Locations  are  territories  of  the  Philippines  that  the  U.S.  forces  are allowed to access 
and  use.  By  withholding  ownership  of  these  areas  and  retaining  unrestricted  access   
to them, the government asserts sovereignty over its territory. That sovereignty exists 
so  long  as  the  Filipino  people  exist.  Significantly,  the  Philippines  retains  primary  The  respective  governments  of  the  two  countries  agreed  to  hold  joint  military 
responsibility  for  security with respect to the Agreed Locations. Hence, Philippine law  exercises  at  a  substantially  reduced  level.  The  military  arrangements  between 
remains in force therein, and it cannot be said that jurisdiction has been transferred to  them  were  revived  in  1999  when  they  concluded  the  first  Visiting  Forces 
the  U.S.  EDCA  retains  the  primary  jurisdiction  of  the  Philippines  over  the  security  of  Agreement  (VFA).  As  a  reaffirmation  of  the  obligations  under  the  Mutual 
the  Agreed  Locations,  an  important  provision  that  gives  it  actual  control  over  those  Defense  Treaty  (MDT)  of  1951,  the  VFA  has  laid  down  the  regulatory 
mechanism  for  the  treatment  of  U.S.  military  and  civilian personnel visiting the 
locations.  Previously,  it  was  the  provost  marshal  of  the  U.S.  who  kept  the peace and 
country.  It  contains  provisions  on the entry and departure of U.S. personnel; the 
enforced Philippine law in the bases. 
purpose,  extent,  and  limitations  of  their  activities;  criminal  and  disciplinary 
  jurisdiction;  the  waiver  of  certain  claims;  the  importation  and  exportation  of 
Third standard: respect national security and territorial integrity  equipment,  materials,  supplies,  and  other  pieces  of  property  owned  by the U.S. 
The  VFA  serves  as the basis for the entry of U.S. troops in a limited scope. It does not  government;  and  the  movement  of  U.S.  military  vehicles,  vessels,  and  aircraft 
allow,  for  instance,  the  re-establishment  of  the  military  bases. Instead of authorizing  into  and  within  the  country.  The  Philippines  and  the  U.S.  also  entered  into  a 
the  building  of  temporary  structures  as  previous  agreements  have  done,  EDCA  second  counterpart  agreement (VFA II), which in turn regulated the treatment of 
authorizes  the  U.S.  to  build  permanent  structures  or  alter  or  improve  existing  ones  Philippine  military  and  civilian  personnel  visiting the U.S. The Philippine Senate 
concurred in the first VFA. 
 
for,  and  to  be  owned  by,  the  Philippines.  EDCA  is  clear  that  the  Philippines  retains 
ownership  of  altered  or  improved  facilities  and  newly  constructed  permanent  or   
non-relocatable  structures.  Concerns  on  national  security  problems  that  arise  from 
foreign  military  equipment  being  present  in  the  Philippines  must  likewise  be  The  Philippines  and  the  U.S.  entered  into  the  Mutual  Logistics  Support 
contextualized.  Most  significantly,  the  VFA  already  authorizes  the  presence  of  U.S.  Agreement  to  further  the  interoperability,  readiness,  and  effectiveness  of  their 
military  equipment  in  the country. Article VII of the VFA already authorizes the U.S. to  respective  military  forces  in  accordance  with  the  MDT,  the  Military  Assistance 
Agreement  of  1953,  and  the  VFA.  The new agreement outlined the basic terms, 
conditions,  and  procedures  for  facilitating  the  reciprocal  provision  of  logistics  expressly granted by the law, is justified by necessity and limited only by law, since 
support,  supplies, and services between the military forces of the two countries.  the President must take necessary and proper steps to carry into execution the law. 
The  phrase  "logistics  support  and  services"  includes  billeting,  operations   
support,  construction  and  use  of  temporary  structures,  and  storage  services  Despite the President's roles as defender of the State and sole authority in foreign 
during an approved activity under the existing military arrangements.
 
relations, the 1987 Constitution expressly limits his ability in instances when it 
  involves the entry of foreign military bases, troops or facilities. The initial limitation 
is found in Section 21 of the provisions on the Executive Department: "No treaty or 
EDCA  authorizes  the  U.S.  military  forces  to  have  access  to  and  conduct  international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least 
activities  within  certain  "Agreed  Locations"  in  the  country.  It  was  not  two- thirds of all the Members of the Senate." The President, however, may enter 
transmitted  to  the  Senate on the executive's understanding that to do so was no  into an executive agreement on foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, if (a) it is 
longer  necessary.  In  June  2014,  the  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs  (DFA)  and  not the instrument that allows the presence of foreign military bases, troops, or 
the  U.S.  Embassy  exchanged  diplomatic  notes  confirming  the  completion of all  facilities; or (b) it merely aims to implement an existing law or treaty. 
necessary  internal  requirements for the agreement to enter into force in the two 
 
countries. 
 
A plain textual reading of Article XIII, Section 25 of the Constitution leads to the 
  conclusion that the requirement for EDCA to be submitted to the Senate in the form 
of a treaty for concurrence by at least two-thirds of all its members applies only to a 
According  to  the  Philippine  government,  the  conclusion  of EDCA was the result  proposed agreement between our government and a foreign government, whereby 
of  intensive  and  comprehensive  negotiations in the course of almost two years.  military bases, troops, or facilities of such foreign government would be "allowed" or 
87  After  eight rounds of negotiations, the Secretary of National Defense and the  would "gain entry" Philippine territory. 
U.S.  Ambassador to the Philippines signed the agreement. President Benigno S.   
Aquino III ratified EDCA  It is evident that the constitutional restriction refers solely to the initial entry of the 
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities. Once entry is authorized, the subsequent 
ISSUES:   
acts are thereafter subject only to the limitations provided by the rest of the 
1.  Whether  the  President  may  enter  into  an  executive  agreement  on  foreign  Constitution and Philippine law, and not to the Section 25 requirement of validity 
military bases, troops, or facilities  through a treaty. The VFA, which was ratified by the Senate, has already allowed the 
entry of troops in the Philippines. The President may generally enter into executive 
2.  Whether  the  provisions  under  EDCA  are  consistent  with  the  Constitution,  as  agreements subject to limitations defined by the Constitution and may be in 
well as with existing laws and treaties  furtherance of a treaty already concurred in by the Senate. 
 
  Treaties are formal documents which require rati cation with the approval of 
two-thirds of the Senate while executive agreements become binding through 
RATIO: 
executive action without the need of a vote by the Senate or by Congress. There are 
As it is, EDCA is not constitutionally infi rm. As an executive agreement, it remains 
two very important features that distinguish treaties from executive agreements and 
consistent with existing laws and treaties that it purports to implement. 
translate them into terms of art in the domestic setting. 
 
First, executive agreements must remain traceable to an express or implied 
The duty to faithfully execute the laws of the land is inherent in executive power and 
authorization under the Constitution, statutes, or treaties. The absence of these 
is intimately related to the other executive functions. These functions include the 
precedents puts the validity and effectivity of executive agreements under serious 
duty to ensure compliance with treaties, executive agreements and executive 
question for the main function of the Executive is to enforce the Constitution and the 
orders. Congress cannot limit or take over the President's power to adopt 
laws enacted by the Legislature, not to defeat or interfere in the performance of 
implementing rules and regulations for a law it has enacted. The import of this 
these rules. In turn, executive agreements cannot create new international 
characteristic is that the manner of the President's execution of the law, even if not 
obligations that are not expressly allowed or reasonably implied in the law they 
purport to implement. Second, treaties are, by their very nature, considered superior 
to executive agreements. Treaties are products of the acts of the Executive and the  The Constitutional Commission articulated three legal standards to allow foreign 
Senate unlike executive agreements, which are solely executive actions. Because of  military bases, troops, or facilities, subject to the provisions of Section 25: (1) 
legislative participation through the Senate, a treaty is regarded as being on the  independence from foreign control, (2) sovereignty and applicable law, and (3) 
same level as a statute. If there is an irreconcilable conflict, a later law or treaty  national security and territorial integrity. 
takes precedence over one that is prior. An executive agreement is treated   
differently. Executive agreements that are inconsistent with either a law or a treaty  First standard: independence from foreign control 
are considered ineffective. Both types of international agreement are nevertheless  EDCA, in respect of its provisions on Agreed Locations, is essentially a contract of 
subject to the supremacy of the Constitution.   use and access. Under its pertinent provisions, it is the Designated Authority of the 
  Philippines that shall, when requested, assist in facilitating transit or access to 
This rule does not imply, though, that the President is given carte blanche to  public land and facilities. The activities carried out within these locations are subject 
exercise this discretion. Although the Chief Executive wields the exclusive authority  to agreement as authorized by the Philippine government. Granting the U.S. 
to conduct our foreign relations, this power must still be exercised within the  operational control over these locations is likewise subject to EDCA's security 
context and the parameters set by the Constitution, as well as by existing domestic  mechanisms, which are bilateral procedures involving Philippine consent and 
and international laws.  cooperation. Finally, the Philippine Designated Authority or a duly designated 
  representative is given access to the Agreed Locations. Thus, the legal concept of 
The President had the choice to enter into EDCA by way of an executive agreement  operational control involves authority over personnel in a commander-subordinate 
or a treaty. No court can tell the President to desist from choosing an executive  relationship and does not include control over the Agreed Locations in this particular 
agreement over a treaty to embody an international agreement, unless the case falls  case. Though not necessarily stated in EDCA provisions, this interpretation is readily 
squarely within Article VIII, Section 25.  implied by the reference to the taking of "appropriate measures to protect United 
  States forces and United States contractors." Despite this grant of operational 
Executive agreements may cover the matter of foreign military forces if it merely  control to the U.S., it must be emphasized that the grant is only for construction 
involves detail adjustments. The practice of resorting to executive agreements in  activities. The narrow and limited instance wherein the U.S. is given operational 
adjusting the details of a law or a treaty that already deals with the presence of  control within an Agreed Location cannot be equated with foreign military control, 
foreign military forces is not at all unusual in this jurisdiction. The Court has already  which is so abhorred by the Constitution. The clear import of the provision is that in 
implicitly acknowledged this practice in Lim v. Executive Secretary.  the absence of construction activities, operational control over the Agreed Location 
  is vested in the Philippine authorities. Limited control does not violate the 
In light of the President's choice to enter into EDCA in the form of an executive  Constitution. The fear of the commissioners was total control, to the point that the 
agreement, respondents carry the burden of proving that it is a mere implementation  foreign military forces might dictate the terms of their acts within the Philippines. 
of existing laws and treaties concurred in by the Senate.   More important, limited control does not mean an abdication or derogation of 
  Philippine sovereignty and legal jurisdiction over the Agreed Locations. It is more 
EDCA is consistent with the content, purpose, and framework of the MDT and the  akin to the extension of diplomatic courtesies and rights to diplomatic agents, which 
VFA. Even if EDCA was borne of military necessity, it has not strayed from the intent  is a waiver of control on a limited scale and subject to the terms of the treaty. 
of the VFA since EDCA's combat- related components are allowed under the treaty.   
Moreover, both the VFA and EDCA are silent on what these activities actually are.  Second standard: retain sovereignty and jurisdiction over its territory 
Both the VFA and EDCA deal with the presence of U.S. forces within the Philippines,  EDCA states in its Preamble the "understanding for the United States not to 
but make no mention of being platforms for activity beyond Philippine territory.  establish a permanent military presence or base in the territory of the Philippines." 
While it may be that, as applied, military operations under either the VFA or EDCA  Further on, it likewise states the recognition that "all United States access to and 
would be carried out in the future, the scope of judicial review does not cover  use of facilities and areas will be at the invitation of the Philippines and with full 
potential breaches of discretion but only actual occurrences or blatantly illegal  respect for the Philippine Constitution and Philippine laws." Sovereignty is the 
provisions. Hence, we cannot invalidate EDCA on the basis of the potentially abusive  possession of sovereign power, while jurisdiction is the conferment by law of power 
use of its provisions.  and authority to apply the law. From the text of EDCA itself, Agreed Locations are 
  territories of the Philippines that the U.S. forces are allowed to access and use. By 
withholding ownership of these areas and retaining unrestricted access to them, the 
government asserts sovereignty over its territory. That sovereignty exists so long as 
the Filipino people exist. Significantly, the Philippines retains primary responsibility 
for security with respect to the Agreed Locations. Hence, Philippine law remains in 
force therein, and it cannot be said that jurisdiction has been transferred to the U.S. 
EDCA retains the primary jurisdiction of the Philippines over the security of the 
Agreed Locations, an important provision that gives it actual control over those 
locations. Previously, it was the provost marshal of the U.S. who kept the peace and 
enforced Philippine law in the bases. 
 
Third standard: respect national security and territorial integrity 
The VFA serves as the basis for the entry of U.S. troops in a limited scope. It does 
not allow, for instance, the re-establishment of the military bases. In this context, 
therefore, this Court has interpreted the restrictions on foreign bases, troops, or 
facilities as three independent restrictions. Instead of authorizing the building of 
temporary structures as previous agreements have done, EDCA authorizes the U.S. 
to build permanent structures or alter or improve existing ones for, and to be owned 
by, the Philippines. EDCA is clear that the Philippines retains ownership of altered or 
improved facilities and newly constructed permanent or non-relocatable structures. 
Under EDCA, U.S. forces will also be allowed to use facilities and areas for "training; 
. . .; support and related activities; . . .; temporary accommodation of personnel; 
communications” and agreed activities. Concerns on national security problems that 
arise from foreign military equipment being present in the Philippines must likewise 
be contextualized. Most significantly, the VFA already authorizes the presence of 
U.S. military equipment in the country. Article VII of the VFA already authorizes the 
U.S. to import into or acquire in the Philippines “equipment, materials, supplies, and 
other property" that will be used "in connection with activities" contemplated therein. 
The same section also recognizes that "[t]itle to such property shall remain" with the 
US and that they have the discretion to "remove such property from the Philippines 
at any time." There is nothing novel, either, in the EDCA provision on the 
prepositioning and storing of "defense equipment, supplies, and material," since 
these are sanctioned in the VFA. In fact, the two countries have already entered into 
various implementing agreements in the past that are comparable to the present 
one. The Balikatan 02-1 Terms of Reference mentioned in Lim v. Executive 
Secretary speci cally recognizes that Philippine and U.S. forces "may share . . . in 
the use of their resources, equipment and other assets." There is no basis to 
invalidate EDCA on fears that it increases the threat to our national security. If 
anything, EDCA increases the likelihood that, in an event requiring a defensive 
response, the Philippines will be prepared alongside the U.S. to defend its islands 
and ensure its territorial integrity pursuant to a relationship built on the MDT and 
VFA. 
 
 LAND BANK of the PH v ATLANTA INDUSTRIES
GR No 193796 | July 2, 2014| Executive Agreement| Wayne Novera
Petitioner: LANDBANK of the PH
Respondents: ATLANTA INDUSTRIES
Recit-Ready: Land Bank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD) entered into Loan Agreement and was conditioned that there
should be participation of a local government unit (City of Iligan) by way of SLA
(Subsidiary Loan Agreement). The SLA expressly provided that services to be financed
out of the proceeds of the loan with Land Bank were to be "procured in accordance
with the provisions of Section I of the 'Guidelines: Procurement under IBRD Loans
and IDA Credits. The City of Iligan followed this rule and conducted its public bidding,
which Atlanta came 2nd to the lowest bid. Atlanta filed a case with RTC and said that the
bidding was not in accordance to RA 9184(check footnote). The RTC agreed with Atlanta
and said that City Government of Iligan cannot validly provide for the use of bidding
procedures different from those provided under RA 9184 because the said SLA is not in
the nature of an international agreement similar to the Loan Agreement with the IBRD.
ISSUE: W/N the SLA between the Land Bank and the City Government of Iligan is
an executive agreement similar to Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH such that the
procurement of water pipes by the BAC of the City Government of Iligan should be
deemed exempt from the application of RA 9184? YES
HELD/DOCTRINE: The RA 1984 recognizes the country's commitment to abide by
its obligations under any treaty or international or executive agreement. This is
pertinently provided in Section 4 of RA 1984 (check ratio). The Loan Agreement in
this case is in the nature of an executive agreement. Being an executive
agreement, they do not require legislative concurrence and are usually less
formal and deal with a narrower range of subject matters than treaties.
The Government of the Philippines is therefore obligated to observe its terms and
conditions under the rule of pacta sunt servanda,
FACTS:
• Land Bankand the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD) entered into Loan Agreement for the implementation of the IBRD's
"Support for Strategic Local Development and Investment Project" (S2LDIP).
o The loan facility in the amount of JP¥11,710,000,000.00 was fully
guaranteed by the Government of the Philippines and conditioned
upon the participation of at least two (2) local government units by
way of a Subsidiary Loan Agreement (SLA) with Land Bank
1 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE MODERNIZATION, STANDARDIZATION AND REGULATION
OF THE PROCUREMENT ACTIVITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
• Land Bank entered into an SLA with the City Government of Iligan to finance
the development and expansion of the city's water supply system
• The SLA expressly provided that the goods, works, and services to be
financed out of the proceeds of the loan with Land Bank were to be "procured
in accordance with the provisions of Section I of the 'Guidelines: Procurement
under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits' . . ., and with the provisions of [the]
Schedule 4."
o Accordingly, the City Government of Iligan, through its Board and
Awards Committee (BAC), conducted a public bidding using the
IBRD Procurement Guidelines
• Respondent Atlanta Industries, Inc. (Atlanta) participated in the said bidding and
came up with the second to the lowest bid
o Board and Awards Committee (BAC) informed Atlanta of its
disqualification from the bidding because it lacked several
documentary requirements.
• BAC deemed it futile to reconsider Atlanta's disqualification in view of the fact that
the bidding had already been declared a failure because of noted violations of the
IBRD Procurement Guidelines and that, unless the BAC conducts a new bidding
on the project, it would not be able to obtain a "no objection" from the World Bank
• ATLANTA
o Atlanta, in a called the BAC's attention to its use of Bidding
Documents 19 which, as it purported, not only failed to conform with
the Third Edition of the Philippine Bidding Documents for the
Procurement of Goods (PBDs) prescribed by the Government
Procurement Policy Board (GPPB) but also contained numerous
provisions that were not in accordance with RA 9184 1 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)
o Due to this fact, Atlanta filed a case in RTC of Manila to preclude the
bidding
• RTC:
o the City Government of Iligan cannot claim exemption from the
application of RA 9184 and its IRR by virtue of Loan Agreement with
the IBRD because it was Land Bank, and not the City Government
of Iligan, which was the party to the same.
o It added that the SLA subsequently executed by Land Bank with the
City Government of Iligan cannot validly provide for the use of
bidding procedures different from those provided under RA 9184
because the said SLA is not in the nature of an international
agreement similar to the Loan Agreement with the IBRD.
• Hence, this petition to the SC
ISSUE: W/N the SLA between the Land Bank and the City Government of Iligan
is an executive agreement similar to Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH such that the
procurement of water pipes by the BAC of the City Government of Iligan should be
deemed exempt from the application of RA 9184? YES
RATIO: • The Government of the Philippines is therefore obligated to
observe its terms and conditions under the rule of pacta sunt
• The RA 1984 recognizes the country's commitment to abide by its servanda, a fundamental maxim of international law that
obligations under any treaty or international or executive agreement. requires the parties to keep their agreement in good faith
This is pertinently provided in Section 4 of RA 1984 which reads as • The terms and conditions of the Loan Agreement being a
follows: project-based and government-guaranteed loan facility, were
Sec. 4. Scope and Application. — This Act shall incorporated and made part of the SLA that was
apply to the Procurement of Infrastructure Projects, Goods subsequently entered into by Land Bank with the City
and Consulting Services, regardless of source of funds, Government of Iligan. Consequently, this means that the SLA
whether local or foreign, by all branches and cannot be treated as an independent and unrelated contract but
as a conjunct of, or having a joint and simultaneous occurrence
instrumentalities of the government, its department, offices
with, Loan Agreement. Its nature and consideration, being a
and agencies, including government owned and/or -
mere accessory contract of Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH,
controlled corporations and local government units, subject
are thus the same as that of its principal contract from
to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 138. Any treaty which it receives life and without which it cannot exist as
or international or executive agreement affecting the an independent contract
subject matter of this Act to which the Philippine • PETITION GRANTED; RTC’s DECISION IS REVERSED
government is a signatory shall be observed.
• Atlanta argues that that a provision in the SLA between Land
Bank and the City Government of Iligan providing for
procurement procedures different from that required under
RA 9184 would not be valid since it is not a treaty or an
executive agreement in the way that Loan Agreement is.|||
o SC said this argument lacks merit
• The Loan Agreement in this case is in the nature of an
executive agreement.
• the Court defined an international agreement as one
concluded between states in written form and governed by
international law, "whether embodied in a single instrument
or in two or more related instruments and whatever its
particular designation," and further expounded that it may
be in the form of either (a) treaties that require legislative
concurrence after executive ratification; or (b) executive
agreements that are similar to treaties, except that they
do not require legislative concurrence and are usually
less formal and deal with a narrower range of subject
matters than treaties
• Examining its features, the Loan Agreement between the
IBRD and the Land Bank is an integral component of the
Guarantee Agreement executed by the Government of the
Philippines as a subject of international law possessed of a
treaty-making capacity, and the IBRD, which, as an
international lending institution organized by world
governments to provide loans conditioned upon the
guarantee of repayment by the borrowing sovereign state, is
likewise regarded a subject of international law and
possessed of the capacity to enter into executive
agreements with sovereign states
 for  the  implementation  of  the  Calaca  II  Coal-Fired  Thermal  Power  Plant 
[22] MITSUBISHI v CIR  Project (Project). 
a. Par.  5  (2)  of  the  Exchange  of  Notes, the Philippine Government, 
GR No. 175772| June 5, 2017 | Exchange of Notes as a form of Exec. Agreement  by  itself  or  through  its  executing  agency,  undertook  to  assume 
| Nufuar  all  taxes  imposed  by  the  Philippines  on  Japanese  contractors 
Petitioner: ​Mitsubishi Corporation - Manila Branch  engaged in the Project: 
Respondents: ​Commissioner on Internal Revenue 
(2)  The  Government  of  the  Republic of the Philippines will, ​itself 
 
or  ​through  its  executing  agencies  ​or  instrumentalities,  assume 
Recit-Ready:  ​Japan  and  Philippines  entered  into an Exchange of Notes where the 
all  fiscal  levies  or  taxes  imposed  in  the  Republic  of  the 
former  agreed  to  extend  a  ​¥40.4  B  loan  to  the  Philippines  for  the  implementation 
Philippines  ​on  Japanese  firms  and  nationals  operating  as 
of  the  Calaca  II  Coal-fired  Thermal  Power  Plant.  Par.  5(2)  provided  that  the 
suppliers,  contractors  or  consultants  ​on  and/or  in  connection 
Philippines  will  assume  all  fiscal  levies  or  taxes  imposed  ​on  Japanese  firms  and 
with  ​any  income ​that may accrue from the supply of products of 
nationals  operating  as  suppliers,  contractors  or  consultants  ​on  and/or  in 
Japan  and  services  of  Japanese  nationals to be provided under 
connection  with  ​any  income  ​that  may  accrue  from  the  supply  of  products  and 
the Loan 
service  of  Japanese  nationals  provided  under  the  Loan.  After  Mitsubishi 
completed  the  project,  it  filed  its  ITR,  which  included  the  P44M  income  form  the 
2. Consequently,  the  OECF  and  the  Philippine  Government  entered  into 
project  and  Monthly  Remittance Return of P8M as BPRT branch profits remitted to 
Loan  Agreement  No.  PH-P76  for  ¥40,400,000,000.  Due  to  the  need  for 
Japan.  Mitsubishi,  then  filed  for  a  refund  with  the  CIR claiming that the P44M and 
additional  funding  for  the  Project,  they  also  executed  Loan  Agreement 
P8M  were  erroneously paid. CTA Division held that Mitsubishi was not entitled to a 
No. PH-P141 for ¥5,513,000,000. 
refund,  but  CTA  en  Banc  reversed  saying  that the amounts were erroneously paid. 
3. On  June  21,  1991,  the  National  Power  Corporation  (NPC),  as  the 
The  SC  ruled  that  the  amounts  were erroneously paid thus Mitsubishi was entitled 
executing  government  agency,  entered  into  a  contract  with  Mitsubishi 
to  a  refund.  The  obligation  to  pay  the  same  had  already  been  assumed  by  the  Corporation  for  the  engineering,  supply,  construction,  installation, 
Philippine  Government  by  virtue  of  its  Exchange  of  Notes  with  the  Japanese  testing,  and  commissioning  of  a  steam  generator,  auxiliaries,  and 
Government.  Case  law  explains  that  an  exchange  of  notes  is  considered  as  an  associated  civil  works  for  the  Project  (Contract).  The  Contract's  foreign 
executive  agreement,  which  is  binding  on  the  State  even  without  Senate  currency portion was funded by the OECF loans.  
concurrence.  The  Philippine Government's assumption under Par. 5(2) of "all fiscal  a. In  line  with  the  Exchange  of  Notes,  Article  VIII  (B)  (1)  of  the 
levies  and  taxes,"  which  includes the subject taxes, is clearly a form of concession  Contract  indicated  NPC'  s  undertaking  to  pay  any  and  all forms 
of taxes that are directly imposable under the Contract: 
given  to  Japanese  suppliers,  contractors  or  consultants  in  consideration  of  the 
OECF Loan, which proceeds were used for the implementation of the Project.   Article VIII (B) (1) 
  B. FOR ONSHORE PORTION. 
Doctrine:  ​An  exchange  of  notes  is  considered  a  form  of  an  executive  agreement,  1.)  [The]  CORPORATION  (NPC)  shall,  subject  to  the  provisions 
which  becomes  binding  through executive action without the need of a vote by the  under  the  Contract  [Document]  on  Taxes,  pay  any and all forms 
Senate or Congress.  of  taxes  which  are  directly  imposable  under  the  Contract 
including  VAT,  that  may  be  imposed  by  the  Philippine 
Government, or any of its agencies and political subdivisions. 
FACTS: 
4. Mitsubishi  completed  the  project  on  December  2,  1995,  but  it  was  only 
1. On  June  11,  1987,  Japan  and  the  Philippines  executed  an  Exchange  of  accepted  by  NPC  on  January  31,  1998  through  a  Certificate  of 
Notes,  whereby  the  former  agreed  to  extend  a  loan  amounting  to  Completion and Final Acceptance. 
¥40,400,000,000  to  the  latter  through  the  then  Overseas  Economic  5. On  July  15,  1998,  Mitsubishi  filed  its  Income  Tax  Return  (ITR)  for  the 
Cooperation  Fund (OECF, now Japan Bank for International Cooperation)  fiscal  year  that  ended  on  March  31,  1998  with  the  BIR,  which  included 
the  amount  of  ₱44,288,712.00,  representing  income  from  the 
 OECF-funded  portion  of  the  Project.  On  the  same  day,  Mitsubishi  also 
filed  its  Monthly  Remittance  Return  of  Income  Taxes  Withheld  and  1. W/N Mitsubishi is entitled to a refund? - YES 
remitted  ₱8,324,100.00  as  BPRT  for  branch  profits  remitted  to  its  head 
office  in  Japan  out  of  its  income for the fiscal year that ended on March  RATIO: 
31, 1998 
6. Petitioner  Mitsubishi filed with the CIR an administrative claim for  1. In  this  case,  it  is  fairly  apparent  that  the  subject  taxes  in  the  amount  of 
refund  of  P52,612,812.00,  representing  the  erroneously  paid  ₱52,612,812.00  was  erroneously  collected  from  petitioner,  considering 
amounts  of  P44,288,712.00  as  income  tax and ₱8,324,100.00 as  that  the  obligation  to  pay  the  same  had  already  been  assumed  by  the 
BPRT corresponding to the OECF-funded portion of the Project.  Philippine  Government  by  virtue  of  its  Exchange  of  Notes  with  the 
a. Petitioner  anchored  its  claim  for  refund  on  BIR  Ruling  Japanese  Government.  Case  law  explains  that  an  exchange  of  notes  is 
No.  DA-407-98  dated  September  7,  1998,  which  considered  as  an  executive  agreement,  which  is  binding  on  the  State 
interpreted paragraph 5 (2) of the Exchange of Notes1  even without Senate concurrence. 
7. CTA Division granted the petition and ordered the CIR to refund to  a. Abaya  v.  Ebdane:  ​An "exchange of notes" is a record of a routine 
petitioner  the  amounts  it  erroneously  paid  as  income  tax  and  agreement  that  has  many  similarities  with  the  private  law 
BPRT  ruling  that  based  on  the  Exchange  of  Notes,  the  Philippine  contract.  The  agreement  consists  of  the  exchange  of  two 
Government,  through  the  NPC  as  its  executing  agency,  bound  documents,  each  of  the  parties  being  in  the  possession  of  the 
itself  to  assume  or  shoulder  petitioner's  tax  obligations.  one  signed  by  the  representative  of  the  other.  Under  the  usual 
Therefore,  petitioner's  payments  of  income  tax  and  BPR  T  to the  procedure,  the  accepting  State  repeats  the  text  of  the  offering 
CIR,  when  such  payments  should  have  been  made  by  the  NPC,  State  to  record  its  assent.  The  signatories  of the letters may be 
undoubtedly constitute erroneous payments.  government  Ministers,  diplomats  or  departmental  heads.  The 
8. CTA  ​En  Banc  ​reversed  the  CTA  Division's  rulings  and  declared  technique  of  exchange  of  notes  is  frequently  resorted  to, either 
that  petitioner  is  not entitled to a refund of the taxes it paid to the  because  of  its  speedy  procedure,  or,  sometimes,  to  avoid  the 
CIR  because  Mitsubishi  failed  to  establish  that  its  tax  payments  process of legislative approval. 
were  "erroneous"  under  the  law  to  justify  the  refund,  adding  that  b. It  is  stated  that  "treaties,  agreements,  conventions,  charters, 
the  CIR  has  no  power  to  grant  a  refund  under  Section  229 of the  protocols,  declarations,  memoranda  of  understanding,  modus 
NIRC  absent  any  tax  exemption.  It  further  observed  that  by  its  vivendi  and  exchange  of  notes"  all  refer  to  "international 
clear  terms,  the  Exchange  of  Notes  granted  no  tax  exemption  to  instruments binding at international law." 
petitioner  c. Significantly,  an  exchange  of  notes  is  considered  a  form  of  an 
a. In  addition,  it  also  ruled  that  the  Exchange  of  Notes  executive  agreement, which becomes binding through executive 
cannot  be  read  as a treaty validly granting tax exemption  action without the need of a vote by the Senate or Congress. 
considering  the  lack  of  Senate  concurrence  as  required  2. In  Par.  5(2)  of  the  Exchange  of  Notes,  To  "assume"  means  "to  take  on, 
under Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution  become  bound  as another is bound, or put oneself in place of another as 
to  an  obligation  or  liability.”  This  means  that  the  obligation  or  liability 
ISSUES:    remains,  although  the same is merely passed on to a different person. In 
this  light,  the  concept  of  an  assumption  is  therefore  different  from  an 
exemption,  the  latter  being  the  "freedom  from  a  duty,  liability  or  other 
1
  ​the  aforequoted  provisions  of  Notes-NAIA  and  Notes-Calaca  are  not  grants  of  direct  tax  requirement"  or  "a  privilege  given  to  a  judgment  debtor  by  law,  allowing 
exemption  privilege  to  Japanese  firms,  Mitsubishi  in  this  case,  and  Japanese  nationals  the debtor to retain a certain property without liability. 
operating  as  suppliers,  contractors  or consultants involved in either of the two projects because  3. Philippine  Government,  through  its  executing  agencies  particularly 
the  said  provisions  state  that  it  is  the  Government  of  the  Republic  of  the  Philippines  that  is 
obligated  to  pay  whatever  fiscal  levies  or  taxes  they  may  be  liable  to.  Thus,  there  is  no  tax 
assumed  "all  fiscal  levies  or  taxes  imposed  in  the  Republic  of  the 
exemption  to  speak  of  because  the  said  taxes  shall  be  assumed by the Philippine Government;  Philippines  on  Japanese  firms  and  nationals  operating  as  suppliers, 
hence,  the  said  provision  is  not  violative  of  the  Constitutional  prohibition  against  the  grants  of  contractors  or  consultants on and/or in connection with any income that 
tax exemption without the concurrence of the majority of the members of Congress. 
 may  accrue  from  the  supply  of  products  of  Japan  and  services  of 
Japanese  nationals  to  be provided under the OECF Loan." The Philippine 
Government's  assumption  of  "all  fiscal  levies and taxes," which includes 
the  subject  taxes,  is  clearly  a  form  of  concession  given  to  Japanese 
suppliers,  contractors  or  consultants  in  consideration of the OECF Loan, 
which  proceeds were used for the implementation of the Project. As part 
of  this,  NPC  entered  into  the  June  21,  1991  Contract  with  Mitsubishi 
Corporation  for  the  engineering,  supply,  construction,  installation, 
testing,  and  commissioning  of  a  steam  generator,  auxiliaries,  and 
associated  civil  works  for  the  Project,  which  foreign  currency  portion 
was funded by the OECF loans. 
4. Considering  that  petitioner  paid  the  subject  taxes  in  the  aggregate 
amount  of  ₱52,612,812.00,  which  it  was  not  required  to  pay,  the  BIR 
erroneously  collected  such  amount.  Accordingly,  petitioner  is entitled to 
its refund. 
 [23] DPWH V CMC 2. While the project was ongoing, the JV’s truck and equipment were set on
GR No. 179732 | Sep 13 2017 | International Agreements | Jacob fire. Almost a year after, a bomb exploded in its vicinity, allegedly caused
by the MILF.
Petitioner: DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS
3. The JV made several written demands for the extension and payment of
Respondents: CMC/MONARK/PACIFIC/HI-TRI JOINT VENTURE
the foreign component of the contract. There were efforts to settle the local
component (~P26M), hence the foreign component (~$358k) was up for
Recit-Ready:
negotiations.
The DPWH and the JV entered into a contract agreement for a road project in
4. BCEOM recommended that the DPWH promptly pay the amounts due to
Mindanao. The JV’s truck and equipment were set on fire and a bomb exploded in
the JV, saying that the project was 80% complete when it was halted.
their area caused by the MILF. The JV demanded from the DPWH the extension
5. The JV filed a complaint against DPWH before the Construction Industry
and payment for the contract. The JV then filed a complaint against the DPWH
Arbitration Commission (CIAC), claiming ~ P77M
before the CIAC for its money claims and price adjustment, arguing that the DPWH
6. The JV sent a Notice of Mutual Termination of Contract to DPWH
delayed the issuance of the Notice to Proceed, hence a price adjustment should be
requesting the mutual termination of the contract subject of the arbitration
granted as provided by PD 1594. The CIAC and the CA denied the price adjustment.
case due to its diminished financial capability due to DPWH’s late
payments and peace and order problems, among others
W/N PD 1594 is applicable with regard to price adjustments – NO
a. DPWH Acting Secretary Soriquez accepted the request
7. The CIAC promulgated an Award directing DPWH to pay the JV its money
The SC upheld the CA in holding that the ADB Guidelines are applicable in this case.
claims plus legal interest. But, it denied the JV’s claim for price adjustment
The Construction Contract is clear that in case of price adjustments, Clause 70 of
due to the delay in the issuance of a Notice to Proceed under P.D. No.
the Conditions Contract will apply. It is unclear whether the ADB Guidelines was
15943
substantially the same as Clause 70, but, it should be the guidelines that the parties
a. The Award was appealed to the CA
have agreed upon, i.e. the ADB Guidelines, that should govern in case of issues
8. The CA sustained the CIAC’s Award, and that it did not err in not awarding
arising in the contract. The JV failed to provide any evidence on what the ADB
the price adjustment sought by the JV under P.D. No. 1594 since it was
Guidelines provide in the event of a delay in the issuance of a Notice to Proceed.
the Asian Development Bank’s Guidelines on Procurement that was
applicable
Doctrine:
9. The JV claims that the delay in the DPWH’s issuance of the Notice to
“This Court has held that a foreign loan agreement with international financial
institutions, such as a multilateral lending agency organized by governments like the Proceed entitles it to a price adjustment under PD 1594.
Asian Development Bank, is an executive or international agreement contemplated The DPWH claims that the JV did not question the findings regarding the
by our government procurement system.” price adjustment, hence it cannot question it further.

FACTS:

ISSUES:
1. The DPWH and CMC/Monark/Pacific/Hi-Tri J.V. (the Joint Venture/JV)
executed a Contract Agreement1 for a road project in Zamboanga del Sur,
(relevant)4 W/N the ADB Guidelines or PD 1594 applies with regard to price
amounting to ~ P713M.
adjustments due to the delay of the issuance of the Notice to Proceed – ADB
a. The Conditions of Contract2 formed part of the contract
Guidelines
agreement
b. DPWH hired BCEOM French Engineering Consultants to
oversee the project.

1 3
Contract Agreement for the Constrcution of Contract Package 6MI-9, Pagadian-Buug Section, Zamboanga del Sur, Sixth Road Policies, Guidelines, Rules, and Regulations for Government Infrastruction Projects
4
Project, Road Improvement Component Loan No. 1473-PHI There were multiple issues covering the money claims, delays in payment, damages, and interests (CredTrans stuff + Nacar
2
A standard contract prepared by the Federation International Des Ingenieurs Conseils (FDIC). The standard contract is case)
recommended for general use for the purpose of construction of such works where tenders are invited on an international basis
RATIO:

The Construction Contract is clear that in case of price adjustments, Clause 70 of

the Conditions Contract will apply. It is unclear whether the ADB Guidelines was
substantially the same as Clause 70, but, it should be the guidelines that the parties
have agreed upon, i.e. the ADB Guidelines, that should govern in case of issues
arising in the contract. The JV failed to provide any evidence on what the ADB
Guidelines provide in the event of a delay in the issuance of a Notice to Proceed.

As the CA held: “The Arbitral Tribunal finds that the Guidelines of the Asian
Development Bank govern this subject Project. Moreover, P.D. 1594 honors the
treaties and international or executive agreements to which the Philippine
Government is a signatory. Loan agreements such as those entered into with
international funding institutions like ADB are considered to be within the ambit of
DOJ opinion No. 46, S. 1987 and are therefore exempt from the application of P.D.
No. 1594 as amended”

“This Court has held that a foreign loan agreement with international financial
institutions, such as a multilateral lending agency organized by governments like
the Asian Development Bank, is an executive or international agreement
contemplated by our government procurement system.”

“In Abaya v. Ebdane, Jr., this Court upheld the applicability of the Japan Bank for
International Cooperation's Procurement Guidelines to the implementation of the
projects to be undertaken pursuant to the loan agreement between the Republic
of the Philippines and Japan Bank for International Cooperation.”

“While the Implementing Rules and Regulations 104 of Presidential Decree No.
1594 provide the formula for price adjustment in case of delay in the issuance of a
notice to proceed, the law does not proscribe parties from making certain
contractual stipulations.”

“WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated

September 20, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 88953 and 88911 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION as follows: (1) that the order remanding the case to the
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission for proper disposition is REVERSED
for being moot and academic; and (2) that the legal interest rate is pegged at twelve
percent (12%) per annum until June 30, 2013, and then at six percent (6%) per
annum until full satisfaction.”
 Issue:​ W/N China’s nine-dashed claim is valid under international law? NO 
[24] The Republic of the Philippines v The People’s Republic of China 
 
Doctrine:  China’s  nine-dashed  line  claim  is  bereft  of  basis  under  international 
PCA Case No. 2013-19 | 12 July 2016 | Definition of Islands | Binky 
law.  The  well-entrenched  doctrine in international law is that “land dominates the 
Petitioner: The Republic of the Philippines  sea,”  and  all  maritime  entitlements  must  be  measured  from  baselines  along  the 
Respondents: The People’s Republic of China  coast  of  continental  land,  island  or  rock  above  water  at  high  tide.  China’s 
  nine-dashed line does not comply with this basic requirement of UNCLOS. 
Recit-Ready:   
This  arbitration  concerned  the  role  of  historic  rights  and  the  source  of  maritime 
FACTS: 
entitlements  in  the  South  China  Sea,  the  status  of  certain  maritime  features  and 
the  maritime  entitlements  they  are  capable  of  generating,  and  the  lawfulness  of 
1. The  Parties  to  this  arbitration  are  the  Republic  of  the  Philippines  (the 
certain  actions  by  China  that  were  alleged  by  the  Philippines  to  violate  the 
“Philippines”) and the People’s Republic of China (“China”). 
Convention.  In  light  of  limitations  on  compulsory  dispute  settlement  under  the 
Convention,  the  Tribunal  has  emphasized  that  it  does  not  rule  on  any  question  of  2. This  arbitration  concerns  disputes  between  the  Parties  regarding  the 
sovereignty  over  land  territory  and  does  not  delimit  any  boundary  between  the  legal  basis  of  maritime  rights  and  entitlements  in  the  South  China  Sea, 
Parties.  the  status  of certain geographic features in the South China Sea, and the 
  lawfulness of certain actions taken by China in the South China Sea. 
China  has  repeatedly  stated  that  “it  will  neither  accept  nor  participate  in  the 
arbitration  unilaterally  initiated  by  the  Philippines.”  Annex  VII,  however,  provides  3. The  South  China  Sea  is  a  semi-enclosed  sea  in  the  western  Pacific 
that  the  “absence  of  a  party  or  failure  of  a  party  to  defend  its  case  shall  not  Ocean,  spanning  an  area  of  almost  3.5  million  square kilometres, and is 
constitute  a  bar  to  the proceedings.” Annex VII also provides that, in the event that  depicted  in  Map  1  on  page  9  below.  The  South  China  Sea  lies  to  the 
a  party  does  not  participate  in  the  proceedings,  a  tribunal  “must  satisfy  itself  not  south  of  China;  to  the  west  of  the  Philippines;  to  the  east  of  Viet  Nam; 
only  that  it  has  jurisdiction  over  the  dispute but also that the claim is well founded  and  to  the  north  of  Malaysia,  Brunei,  Singapore,  and  Indonesia.  The 
in fact and law.” Accordingly, throughout these proceedings, the Tribunal has taken  South  China Sea is a crucial shipping lane, a rich fishing ground, home to 
steps  to  test  the  accuracy  of  the  Philippines’  claims,  including  by  requesting  a  highly  biodiverse  coral  reef  ecosystem,  and  believed  to  hold 
further  written  submissions  from  the  Philippines,  by  questioning  the  Philippines  substantial  oil  and  gas  resources.  The  southern  portion  of  the  South 
both  prior  to  and  during  two  hearings, by appointing independent experts to report  China  Sea  is  also  the  location  of  the  Spratly  Islands,  a  constellation  of 
to  the  Tribunal  on  technical  matters,  and  by  obtaining  historical  evidence  small  islands  and  coral  reefs,  existing  just  above  or  below  water,  that 
concerning  features  in  the  South  China  Sea  and  providing  it  to  the  Parties  for  comprise  the  peaks  of  undersea  mountains  rising  from  the  deep  ocean 
comment.  floor.  Long  known  principally  as  a hazard to navigation and identified on 
  nautical  charts  as  the  “dangerous  ground”,  the  Spratly  Islands  are  the 
China  has  also  made  clear—through  the  publication  of  a  Position  Paper  in  site of longstanding territorial disputes among some of the littoral States 
December  2014  and  in  other  official  statements—that,  in  its  view,  the  Tribunal  of the South China Sea. 
lacks  jurisdiction  in  this matter. Article 288 of the Convention provides that: “In the 
event  of  a  dispute  as  to  whether  a  court  or  tribunal  has  jurisdiction,  the  matter  4. The  basis  for  this  arbitration  is  the  1982  United  Nations  Convention  on 
shall  be  settled  by  decision  of  that  court  or  tribunal.”  Accordingly,  the  Tribunal  the  Law  of  the  Sea  (the“Convention”  or  “UNCLOS”). Both the Philippines 
convened  a  hearing  on  jurisdiction  and  admissibility  in  July 2015 and rendered an  and  China  are  parties  to  the Convention, the Philippines having ratified it 
Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility on 29 October 2015, deciding some issues  on  8  May  1984, and China on 7 June 1996. The Convention was adopted 
of  jurisdiction  and  deferring  others  for  further  consideration.  The  Tribunal  then  as  a  “constitution  for  the oceans,” in order to “settle all issues relating to 
convened a hearing on the merits from 24 to 30 November 2015.  the law of the sea,” and has been ratified by 168 parties. 
 
5. The  Convention,  however,  ​does  not  address  the  sovereignty  of  States  c. Third,  the  Philippines  has  asked  the  Tribunal  to resolve a series 
over  land  territory​.  Accordingly,  this Tribunal has not been asked to, and  of  disputes  between  the  Parties  concerning  the  lawfulness  of 
does  not  purport  to,  make  any  ruling  as  to  which  State  enjoys  China’s actions in the South China Sea; and  
sovereignty  over  any  land  territory  in  the  South  China  Sea,  in  particular 
with  respect  to  the  ​disputes  concerning  sovereignty  over  the  Spratly  d. Fourth,  the  Philippines  has  asked  the Tribunal to find that China 
Islands  or  Scarborough  Shoal.  None  of  the  Tribunal’s  decisions  in  this  has  aggravated  and  extended  the  disputes  between  the Parties 
Award  are  dependent  on  a  finding  of sovereignty, nor should anything in  during  the  course  of  this  arbitration  by  restricting  access  to  a 
this  Award  be  understood  to  imply  a  view  with  respect  to  questions  of  detachment  of  Philippine  marines  stationed  at  Second Thomas 
land sovereignty.  Shoal  and  by  engaging  in  the  large-scale  construction  of 
artificial  islands  and  land  reclamation  at  seven  reefs  in  the 
6. The  disputes  that  the  Philippines  has  placed  before  the  Tribunal  fall  Spratly Islands. 
broadly within four categories:  
ISSUES: ​The five major issues that the Philippines raised in the arbitration are: 
a. First,  the  Philippines  has asked the Tribunal to resolve a dispute 
between  the  Parties  concerning  the  source  of  maritime  rights  1. China’s  Historic  Rights  Claim  —  China’s  claim  to  historic  rights  beyond 
and  entitlements  in  the  South  China  Sea.  Specifically,  the  its  territorial  sea  is  contrary  to  UNCLOS.  The  nine-dashed  line  has  no 
Philippines  seeks  a  declaration  from  the  Tribunal  that  China’s  legal  basis and cannot generate any maritime entitlement (territorial sea, 
rights  and  entitlements  in  the  South  China  Sea  must  be  based  exclusive economic zone or extended continental shelf). 
on  the  Convention and not on any claim to historic rights. In this 
respect,  the  Philippines  seeks  a  declaration  that  China’s  claim  2. Geologic  Features  in  the  Spratlys  —  No  geologic  feature  in  the Spratlys 
to  rights  within the ‘nine-dash line’ marked on Chinese maps are  is  capable  of  human  habitation  or  economic  life  of  its  own  so  as  to 
without  lawful  effect  to  the  extent  that  they  exceed  the  generate a 200 NM EEZ that can overlap with Palawan’s EEZ. 
entitlements that China would be permitted by the Convention. 
3. China-Occupied  Geologic  Features  in  the  Spratlys  ​—  The  Arbitral 
b. Second,  the  Philippines  has  asked  the  Tribunal  to  resolve  a  Tribunal  has  jurisdiction  to  rule  on  the  maritime  entitlement  and  status 
dispute  between  the  Parties  concerning  the  entitlements  to  (whether  LTE  or  High-Tide Elevation) of geologic features. These are not 
maritime  zones  that  would  be  generated  under  the  Convention  sovereignty  disputes.  A  claim  to  an  EEZ  is  not  a  claim  to  sovereignty 
by  Scarborough  Shoal  and  certain  maritime  features  in  the  because  a  state  cannot  exercise  sovereignty  over  its  EEZ,  which  is  a 
Spratly  Islands  that  are  claimed  by  both  the  Philippines  and  maritime  entitlement  first  created  and  governed  by UNCLOS. The status 
China.  The  Convention  provides  that  submerged  banks  and  of  an  LTE  beyond  the  territorial  sea  cannot  involve  any  sovereignty 
low-tide  elevations  are  incapable on their own of generating any  dispute  because  such  LTE  is  incapable  of  sovereign  ownership. 
entitlements  to  maritime  areas  and  that  “[r]ocks  which  cannot  Moreover,  maritime  entitlement  is  separate  from  sea  boundary 
sustain  human  habitation  or  economic  life  of  their  own”  do  not  delimitation  because  a  geologic  feature’s  maritime  entitlements  do  not 
generate  an  entitlement  to  an  exclusive  economic  zone  of  200  always  or  necessarily  overlap  with  the  maritime  entitlements of another 
nautical  miles  or  to  a  continental  shelf.  The Philippines seeks a  state. 
declaration  that  all  of  the  features  claimed  by  China  in  the 
Spratly  Islands,  as  well  as  Scarborough  Shoal,  fall within one or  4. Scarborough  Shoal  ​—  Scarborough  Shoal  is  a  rock  above  water  at  high 
the  other  of  these  categories  and  that  none  of  these  features  tide,  and  is  entitled  only  to  a  12  NM  territorial  sea.  Filipino  fishermen 
generates  an  entitlement  to  an  exclusive economic zone or to a  have  traditional  fishing  rights  in  the territorial sea of Scarborough Shoal, 
continental shelf.  regardless of which state exercises sovereignty over the shoal. 
 5. (Not  impt)  Harm  to  the  Marine  Environment  —  China  caused  severe  China  Sea  beyond  the  limits  of  the  maritime  zones  that  it  is  entitled  to pursuant 
harm to the marine environment.  to the Convention. 

NOTE:​ It’s stated in the syllabus to focus on the definition of islands only  The  Tribunal  examined  the  history  of  the  Convention  and  its  provisions 
concerning  maritime  zones  and  concluded  that  the  Convention  was  intended  to 
RATIO:  comprehensively  allocate  the  rights  of  States  to  maritime  areas.  The  Tribunal 
noted  that  the  question  of  pre-existing  rights  to  resources  (in  particular  fishing 
CHINA’S BASIS FOR ITS CLAIM:    resources)  was  carefully  considered  during  the  negotiations  on  the  creation  of 
the  exclusive  economic  zone  and  that  a  number  of  States  wished  to  preserve 
In  December  1947,  the  Kuomintang  Government  of  China  adopted  the  historic  fishing  rights  in  the  new  zone.  ​This  position  was rejected, however, and 
nine-dashed  line  claim.  The  claim was embodied in a map, entitled Location Map  the  final  text  of  the  Convention  gives  other States only a limited right of access 
of  the  South  Sea  Islands,  released  within  China  in  February  1948,  with  eleven  to  fisheries  in  the  exclusive  economic  zone  (in  the  event  the  coastal  State 
dashes  forming  a  broken  U-shaped  line  covering  almost  the  entire  South  China  cannot  harvest  the  full  allowable  catch)  and  no  rights  to  petroleum  or  mineral 
Sea.  resources.  ​The  Tribunal  found  that  China’s  claim  to  historic  rights  to  resources 
was  incompatible  with  the  detailed allocation of rights and maritime zones in the 
The  title  of  the  map  indicates  a  claim  to  islands,  not  the  sea.  China  did  not  Convention  and  concluded  that,  to  the  extent  China  had  historic  rights  to 
explain  the  meaning  or  basis  of  the  eleven  dashes,  nor  did  China  give  the  resources  in  the  waters  of the South China Sea, such rights were extinguished by 
coordinates  of  the  eleven  dashes.  China  claimed  the  islands  enclosed  by  the  the  entry  into  force  of  the  Convention  to  the  extent  they  were  incompatible  with 
eleven  dashes,  namely  Dongsha  Islands  (Pratas),  Xisha  Islands  (Paracels),  the Convention’s system of maritime zones. 
Zhongsha  Island  (Macclesfield  Bank),  and  Nansha  Islands  (Spratlys).  China was 
silent on any claim to the surrounding waters.  The  Tribunal  also  examined  the  historical  record  to  determine  whether  China 
actually  had  historic  rights  to  resources  in  the  South  China Sea prior to the entry 
Significantly,  Huangyan  Island  (Scarborough  Shoal),  or  its  previous  name  into  force  of  the  Convention.  The  Tribunal  noted  that  there  is  evidence  that 
Min’zhu,  is  not  mentioned  in  the  map.  Thus,  Scarborough Shoal is not one of the  Chinese  navigators  and  fishermen,  as  well  as  those  of  other  States,  had 
islands  that  China  claimed  under  its  1947  eleven-dashed  line  map.  Further,  historically  made  use  of the islands in the South China Sea, although the Tribunal 
Zhongsha  Island  (Macclesfield  Bank)  is  not  an  island  because  it  is  fully  emphasized  that  it  was  not  empowered  to  decide  the  question  of  sovereignty 
submerged, its highest peak being 9.2 meters below sea level.  over  the  islands.  However,  the  Tribunal  considered  that  prior  to  the  Convention, 
the  waters  of  the  South  China  Sea  beyond  the  territorial  sea  were  legally  part of 
In  1950,  China,  under  communist  rule,  announced  the  removal  of  two  dashes  in  the  high  seas,  in  which  vessels  from  any  State  could  freely  navigate  and  fish. 
the  Gulf  of  Tonkin  without  any  explanation.  The  line  became  known  as  the  Accordingly,  the  Tribunal  concluded  that  historical  navigation  and  fishing  by 
nine-dashed line.  China  in  the  waters  of the South China Sea represented the exercise of high seas 
freedoms,  rather  than  a  historic  right,  and  that  there  was  no evidence that China 
ARBITRATION RULING ON CHINA’S CLAIM:  had  historically  exercised  exclusive  control  over  the  waters  of  the  South  China 
Sea or prevented other States from exploiting their resources. 
China’s  nine-dashed  line  claim  is  bereft  of  basis  under  international  law.  The 
well-entrenched  doctrine  in  international  law  is  that  “land  dominates  the  sea,”  Accordingly,  the  Tribunal  concluded that, as between the Philippines and China, 
and  all maritime entitlements must be measured from baselines along the coast  there  was  no  legal  basis  for  China  to  claim  historic  rights  to  resources,  in 
of  continental  land,  island  or rock above water at high tide. China’s nine-dashed  excess  of  the  rights  provided  for  by the Convention, within the sea areas falling 
line does not comply with this basic requirement of UNCLOS.  within the ‘nine-dash line’. 

In  its  Award  of  12  July  2016,  the  Tribunal  considered the implications of China’s   
‘nine-dash  line’  and  whether  China  has  historic  rights  to  resources  in  the  South 
DISCUSSION ON ISLANDS:  1. Territorial  sea:  12  NM  from  baselines;  like  land  territory  except  there  is 
right of innocent passage for foreign ships. 
The  United  Nations  Convention  on  the  Law  of  the  Sea  or  UNCLOS  is  the 
constitution  for  the  oceans  and  seas  of  our  planet.  UNCLOS  governs  maritime  2. Contiguous  Zone​:  12  NM  from  the  outer  limit  of  12  NM  territorial  sea; 
disputes  among  member  states.  UNCLOS  codified  customary  international  law,  limited  jurisdiction  for  immigration,  fiscal,  customs,  and  sanitation 
introduced  novel  concepts  like  the  exclusive  economic  zone  and  the  extended  purposes. 
continental  shelf,  and  institutionalized  the  common  heritage  of  mankind.  It  is 
considered  the  most  comprehensive  treaty  ever  devised  by  man  —  with  its  own  3. Exclusive  Economic  Zone  or  EEZ​:  200 NM measured from the baselines 
dispute settlement mechanism. UNCLOS was adopted on 10 December 1982 and  or  188  NM  measured  from  the  outer  limit  of  the  12  NM  territorial  sea; 
entered  into  force  on  16  November  1994.  To  date,  UNCLOS  has  been  ratified by  specific  sovereign  rights  and  jurisdiction  only  within  the  188  NM  area. 
167 states and the European Union. All the states involved in the South China Sea  The  EEZ  is  a  legal  concept  based  on  distance  from  the  baselines  and 
dispute have ratified UNCLOS.  does not depend on the geomorphology of the continental shelf. 

4. Extended  Continental  Shelf or (ECS): the outer limits of a coastal state’s 

The  well-entrenched  doctrine  in  the  Law  of  the  Sea  is  that  “land  dominates  the 
continental shelf beyond 200 NM; not exceeding 150 NM measured from 
sea.”  Simply  put, all maritime zones or entitlements are measured from the coast 
the  outer  limit  of  the  EEZ,  or  if  there  is  a  drop  to  a  2,500  meter  isobath 
of  continental  land,  island  or  rock  above  water  at  high  tide  (Articles  3,  57  &  76, 
before  the  150  NM  limit,  the  ECS  shall  not  exceed  100  NM  from  such 
UNCLOS).  As  stated  in  the  North  Sea  Continental  Shelf  Cases  (Germany  v. 
2,500  meter  isobath;  living  resources  belong  to  all  mankind,  while 
Denmark,  Germany  v.  Netherlands),24  “the  land  is  the  legal  source  of  the  power 
non-living  resources  and  sedentary  species  belong  to  the  adjacent 
which  a  State  may  exercise  over  territorial  extensions  to  seaward.” The rights of 
coastal  state.  The  ECS  is  a  geomorphological  concept starting from the 
a  coastal  state  over  the  continental  shelf do not depend on occupation, effective 
outer limit of the EEZ at 200 NM from the baselines. 
or notional, or on any express proclamation [Article 77(3), UNCLOS]. If the coastal 
state  does  not  explore  the  continental  shelf  or  exploit  its  natural  resources,  no 
5. High  seas:  beyond  the EEZ; living resources belong to all mankind; in the 
one  may  undertake  such  activities  without  the  express  consent  of  the  coastal 
ECS,  non-living  resources  and  sedentary  species  belong  to  the  adjacent 
state [Article 77(2), UNCLOS]. 
coastal state. 

“The  high  seas  are  open  to  all  states,  whether  coastal  or  land-  locked. 
Freedom  of  the  high  seas  ...  comprises,  inter  alia,  ... freedom of fishing” 
(Article 87, UNCLOS). 

“No  state  may  validly  purport  to  subject  any  part  of  the  high  seas  to  its 
sovereignty” (Article 89, UNCLOS). 

6. The  Area:  beyond  the  ECS;  all  the  living and non-living resources belong 

to  all  mankind.  The  Area  is  administered  by  the  International  Seabed 
Authority  (ISA),  a  creation  of  UNCLOS.  Member-  states  wishing  to 
explore  and  exploit  the  seabed  in  the  Area  must  secure  a  permit  from 
the ISA. 
 
 
 A  r​ock  above  water  at  high  tide​,  even  if  it  protrudes  only a few inches above the 
water,  is  entitled  to  a  12  NM  territorial  sea  around  it  and  a  territorial  airspace 
above  the  rock and the territorial sea.25 The surface area of this 12 NM territorial 
sea  is  155,165  hectares  of  maritime  space,  more  than  twice  the  land  area  of 
Metro  Manila of 63,000 hectares. All the living and non-living resources within the 
territorial sea belong to the state that has sovereignty over such tiny rock. 

APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPTS TO THE ARBITRATION CASE: 

There  are  about  750 geologic features lying off the coast of Palawan, collectively 

referred  to  as  the  Spratlys.  Most  are  submerged  at  all  times  while  others  are 
 
above  water  only  at  low  tide.  Only  twenty-eight  features  remain  above  water  at 
high  tide.  The  largest  high-tide  feature,  Itu  Aba,  is  only 0.43 square kilometer (43 
Continental  land​,  ​islands​,  and  ​rocks  above  water  at  high  tide  are  entitled  to  a 
hectares).  The  rest  of  the  geologic  features  range  in  size  from  0.36  square 
territorial  sea  of  12  NM  measured  from  baselines  along  the  coast  (Article  3, 
kilometer (Pagasa or Thitu) to less than 2 square kilometers. 
UNCLOS). 

On  whether  the  geologic  features  in  the  Spratlys  generate  any  EEZ,  the  Arbitral 
Continental  land  and  islands  capable  of  human  habitation  or  economic  life  of 
Tribunal upheld the Philippine position that: 
their  own  are  entitled  to  a  200  NM  EEZ  measured  from  the  baselines  along  the 
coast  (or 188 NM measured from the outer limit of the territorial sea). In addition, 
1. None  of  the  geologic  features  (rocks  and  islands)  in  the  Spratlys  is 
such  continental  land  or  island  is  entitled  to  an  ECS not exceeding 150 NM from 
capable  of  “human  habitation  or  economic  life  of  [its]  own”  so  as  to  be 
the  outer  limit  of  its  EEZ.  If  there  is  a  drop  to  a  2,500  meter  isobath  before  the 
entitled to a 200 NM EEZ. 
150  NM  limit,  the  ECS  cannot  exceed  100 NM from the 2,500 meter isobath. The 
2. Since  no  geologic  feature  claimed  by  China  has  an  EEZ  that  overlaps 
maximum maritime zone a coastal state can claim is 150 NM from the outer limit 
with  Palawan’s  EEZ,  the  Arbitral  Tribunal  has  jurisdiction  to  rule  on  the 
of  its  200  NM  EEZ  or  100  NM  from  the  2,500  meter  isobath  (Articles  57  &  76, 
maritime disputes in the Spratlys. 
UNCLOS). 
3. The  Spratlys  cannot  be  taken  as  a  single  unit  to  determine  capability to 
sustain human habitation or economic life. 
An  ​island  is  defined  as  a  “naturally  formed”  area  of  land,  surrounded  by  water, 
4. To  be  entitled to a 200 NM EEZ, there must be the “(a) objective capacity 
and  above  water  at  high tide (Article 121, UNCLOS). Rocks not capable of human 
of  a  feature,  (b)  in  its  natural  condition,  to  sustain  either  (c)  a  stable 
habitation  or  economic  life  of  their  own  are  only  entitled to a territorial sea of 12 
community  of  people  or  (d)  economic  activity  that  is  neither  dependent 
NM (Article 121, UNCLOS). 
on outside resources nor purely extractive in nature.” 
5. Itu  Aba,  the  largest  geologic  feature  in the Spratlys, does not satisfy this 
A  low-tide  elevation  (LTE)  is  a  naturally  formed  area  of  land  (rock,  reef,  atoll,  or 
requirement. Thus, Itu Aba is entitled only to a 12 NM territorial sea. 
sandbar)  surrounded  by  water,  above  water  at  low  tide  but  submerged  at  high 
tide. An LTE is part of the continental shelf, and is not land or 
The Arbitral Tribunal stated: 
territory,  and  thus  has  no  territorial  sea,  territorial  airspace  or any maritime zone 
If  the  historical  record  of  a  feature  indicates  that  nothing  resembling  a 
(Article  13,  UNCLOS).  An  LTE  beyond  the  territorial  sea  is  not  subject  to 
stable  community  has  ever  developed  there,  the  most  reasonable 
appropriation or sovereignty by any state. 
conclusion  would  be that the natural conditions are simply too difficult for 
 such  a  community  to  form  and  that  the  feature  is  not  capable  of 
sustaining such habitation. 

Since  none  of  the  Spratly  features  generates  an  EEZ,  the  remaining  disputed 
waters  in  the  Spratlys  refer  only  to  the  territorial  seas  around  the  geologic 
features  above  water  at  high  tide.  These  remaining  disputed  waters  in  the 
Spratlys  comprise  not  more  than  1.5 percent of the 3.5 million square kilometers 
of maritime space in the South China Sea.