I.

REFERENCE

a. Title: WILLIAM F. PERALTA vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS,

Citation: G.R. No. L-49 November 12,1945

II. BODY

a. Facts:

Willaim Peralta was a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary of Manila. He was prosecuted
and found guilty for the crime of robbery and was sentenced to life imprisonment by the Court of
Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. The court was created in Section 1 of Ordinance No.
7 that the President of the Republic of the Philippines promulgated. The said ordinance laid out
the procedure to be followed in the trial.

Peralta petitioned for habeas corpus arguing that Ordinance No. 7 violates his constitutional rights
and that he was punished by a law created to serve the political purpose of the Japanese Imperial
Army.

The Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondent, contended that the Court of Special and
Exclusive Jurisdiction was created with political complexions. It impairs the Constitutional rights
of the accused as it does not afford a fair trial.

The City of Fiscal of Manila denied the petition for habeas corpus declaring that the said court
was not created for a political complexion, that the heavy penalties were in response to urgent
necessity, and that the right to appeal is not a constitutional right. Therefore, ordinance No. 7 did
not violate Article III, Section 1(18) of the Constitution of the Commonwealth. This article provides
that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself, nor of the provision of section
1(1) of the same Article that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.

b. Issue:
Whether or not the creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction and its
procedures and penalties were valid.

c. Ruling:

The Republic of the Philippines, being a governmental instrumentality of the belligerent

occupation, had therefore the power or was competent to create the Court of Special and
Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. No question may arise as to whether or not a court is of political

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complexion, for it is mere governmental agency charged with the duty of applying the law to cases
falling within its jurisdiction.

Internal law provides, “The criminal jurisdiction established by the invader in the occupied territory
finds its source neither in the law of the conquering or conquered state—it is drawn entirely from
the law martial. The authority thus derived can be asserted either through the special tribunals,
whose authority and procedure is defined in the military code of the conquering state, or through
the ordinary courts and authorities of the occupied district.

Regarding the procedures followed, there is no question to the power of competence of the
belligerent occupant to promulgate the law providing for such procedure. A belligerent occupant
may where necessary, set up military courts instead of ordinary courts; and in case, and in so far
as, he admits the administration of justice by the ordinary courts, he may nevertheless temporarily
alter the laws, especially the Criminal Law, on the basis of which justice is administered as well
as the laws regarding procedure.

No objection can be set up to the legality of the provisions of the Commonwealth Constitution
because it was not in force during the period of the Japanese military occupation. Nor may the
Constitution may be applied upon its revival at the time of the reoccupation of the Philippines by
virtue of the principle of posliminium because a constitution should operate prospectively only,
unless the words employed show a clear intention that it should have a retrospective effect.
However, the crime to which the petition was convicted was of political complexion. The court
held that all judgments of political complexion of the courts during the Japanes regime, ceased to
be valied upon the reoccupation of the islands by virtue of the principle or right of postliminium.
Therefore, it has ceased considering the proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur declaring
null and void all laws.