1) Alawi v. Alauya A.M. SDC-97-2-P.

February 24, 1997

FACTS: Petitioner Sophia Alawi is a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa &

Partners in Davao, a real estate and housing company. While respondent
Alauya is the executive clerk of court in Marawi City.

The two were classmates and used to be friends. Alauya purchased on

installments one housing unit belonging to the firm where Alawi is working,
in connection therewith is a housing loan granted by the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corp. (NHMFC).

On Dec. 15, 1995, Alauya, through a letter expressed his intention to

terminate the contract with the real estate firm. He raised the ground that
, his consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence by Alawi, furthermore, he alleged
that Alawi acted in bad faith making the contract an Onerous one
prejudicial to his rights and interests.

Alauya also alleged that the real estate firm agreed to mutually rescind
the contract and reiterated that he was fooled by Alawi, the firms sales
agent, hence the need to annul the contract.

Alauya also wrote to the NHMFC, repudiating as fraudulent and void his
contract with the real estate firm, and also asked for the cancellation of
his housing loan, being payable from salary deductions.

Alauya also narrated the anomalous actuations of Alawi to the President

of NHMFC being the reason for his request of cancelling the housing loan.

NHMFC wrote to the SC requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya`s

Housing Loan, and start negotiating with the real estate firm, for the buy-
back of the property and refund of payments.

Alawi filed with the Court a complaint alleging the following: (1) Malicious
and libelous charges with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance
and evident bad faith, (2) Causing undue injury, blemishing her honor and
reputation, (3) Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage,
(4) Usupration of the title of “Attorney”, which only regular members of the
Philippine Bar may Properly use.

Alawi expressed a strong feeling of condemnation on Alauya’s referene

to her as “unscrupulous, swindler, forger, manipulator, etc.” without even
a bit of evidence to back-up his allegations.
The court ordered Alauya to comment on the complaint, and the notice
of resolution in the case was signed by Atty. Alfredo Marasigan, Assitant
Division, Clerk of Court. Alauya on the other hand, questioned the
authority of Atty. Marasigan to require an explanation of him saying that
this power should only come from the District Judge, the Court
Administrator, or the Chief Justice. He further alleged the the complaint
had no factual basis.

Alauya justified his use of the title, “Attorney,” by the asserting that it is
“lexically synonymous” with “ Counsellors-at-law,” a title to which Shari’a
lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of “attorney”
because “counselor” is often mistaken for “councilor,” “konsehal” ot the
Maranao term “consial,” albeit he does not consider himself a lawyer.

He pleads for the court`s compassion, alleging that what he did is

expected from any man unduly prejudiced and injured. Reiterating that
he was induced to sign a blank contract on Alawi`s assurance that she
would show the completed document to him later for correction, but she
had since avoided him. He also said that Alawi got his GSIS policy from his
wife, and that his signature was forged on certain documents regarding
the down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt of the key of the house,
salary deduction, none of which he ever saw.

Alauya prays for the complaint to be dismissed averring no malice on his

part and for lack of merit.

ISSUE: WON Alauya is entitled to use the title “attorney” even he is not a
regular member of the Philippine Bar.

RULING: Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had
occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-
fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law
before Shari'a courts.

While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has
been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered
"counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a
professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney"
is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the
study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been
admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members
thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to
practice law in this jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-
law," because in his region, there are pejorative (judgmental)
connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to local
legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His disinclination
to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of
attorney.

Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking

privilege, the record contains no evidence adequately establishing the
accusation.

The law requires that he exercise that right with propriety, without malice
or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a manner consistent with
good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, supra; or
otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith." Righteous indignation, or vindication of
right cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or downright name-
calling.

As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject

to a standard of conduct more stringent than for most other government
workers. As a man of the law, he may not use language that is abusive,
offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper.

As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the

person and the rights of others at all times, and that his every act and
word should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity.

WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the

use of excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e.,
language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of
attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other impropriety or
misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.
2) Cayetano v. Monsod G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991.

Black defines “practice of law” as “The rendition of services requiring the

knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve
the interest of another with his consent.

It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the

conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing,
the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal
advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for
them in matters connected with the law.

An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office

where he is held out to be an attorney, using a letterhead describing
himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with
opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees
for services rendered by his associate.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land
title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken)

The practice of law is defined as "the performance of any acts . . . in or

out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar
Ass’n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A. 2d 863, 870
[1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A. 2d 623,
626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the
commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously
be too global to be workable. (Wolfram, op. cit.)

“Private practice” – An individual or organization engaged in the business

of delivering legal services. Lawyers who practice alone are of the called
“Sole practitioners.” “Groups of lawyers are called “firms.” The firm is
usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms
may be organized as professional corporations and the members called
shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced
attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried
attorneys called "associates."

FACTS: The case stemmed from a controversy as regards the qualifications

of the members of the CoA among others, the qualifications provided for
by Section 1 is that `They must be members of the Philippine Bar`.
“Engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years”.
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C.
Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received
by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991.
Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not
possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the

nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991,
he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as
Chairman of the COMELEC.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the

nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991,
he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as
Chairman of the COMELEC.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed

the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues
paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception
in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer
for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo).

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the
bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in
the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations
officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved
getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries, negotiating loans
and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon
returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group,
served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently
of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to
various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive
officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987)
of NAMFREL. Monsod’s work involved being knowledgeable in election
law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the
Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and
as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen’s Conference for
Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such
as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and
engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the
urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a
member of the Davide Commission, a quasi-judicial body, which
conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the
Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President
of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable
amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms
and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of
Representative." (pp. 128-129 Rollo) (Emphasis supplied)

ISSUE: WON Atty. Monsod met the qualification of practice of law for at
least 10 years.

RULING: YES. Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term
"practice of law", particularly the modern concept of law practice, and
taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers
of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod past work experiences as a lawyer-
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich
and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement —
that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
"To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give
notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the
use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23).

DISSENT:

The professional life of the respondent follows:

"1.15.1 Respondent Monsod’s activities since his passing the Bar

examinations in 1961 consist of the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of

Pennsylvania

2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry Department;

Operations, Latin American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and
Middle East, International Finance Corporation

3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group Executive of various companies, i.e.,

Meralco Securities Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation,
Philippine Electric Corporation
4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital Development
Corporation and affiliated companies

5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer

6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies Chief Executive Officer

7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member

8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup

Attempt — Member

9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the

following companies:

a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.

b. Dataprep, Philippines

c. Philippine SUN systems Products, Inc.

d. Semirara Coal Corporation

e. CBL Timber Corporation

Member of the Board of the Following

a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines

b. First Philippine Energy Corporation

c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation

d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation

e. Graphic Atelier

f. Manila Electric Company

g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.

h. Philippine Electric Corporation

i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises

j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation

k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation

l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation"

(Rollo, pp. 21-22)

There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that
respondent Monsod has given the law enough attention or a certain
degree of commitment and participation as would support in all sincerity
and candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten
years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him.
Instead of giving legal advice of legal services, he was the one receiving
that advice and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.

The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort

to equate "engaged in the practice of law" with the use of legal
knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic
work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such
knowledge would be helpful.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even
an ordinary layman accepts as having a familiar and customary well-
defined meaning. Every resident of this country who has reached the age
of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in his
life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business executive,
legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer,
fisherman, market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can
these people honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in the
practice of law?.

The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years." It is not satisfied with having been "a member of the
Philippine bar for at least ten years.."

". . . Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in

frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In
other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87
Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of
statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one’s self
out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services.
. . ." (at p. 112)

It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes

habituality as a required component of the meaning of practice of law in
a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. Habituality. The term ‘practice of law’ implies customarily or habitually

holding one’s self out to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14
SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one
sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the
general practice of law (U S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one
takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a
manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to
practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 .
3) IN THE MATTER OF THE IBP January 9, 1973.

FACTS: A petition praying for the Court to order the integration of the
Philippine Bar, giving recognition to existing provincial and other local Bar
associations.

There had grown a strong nationwide sentiment in favor of Bar Integration,

the Court created the Commission on Bar Integration for the purpose of
ascertaining the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar.

September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill NO. 3277 entitled “An Act
Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds
Therefor." The measure was signed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on
September 17, 1971 and took effect on the same day as Rep. Act 6397.

ISSUE(s):
(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar
(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional
(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time

RULING:

Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire
lawyer population of the Philippines. This requires membership and
financial support (in reasonable amount) of every attorney as conditions
sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the
Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.

The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear
in the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or Unified Bar) perforce must
include all lawyers.
Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with
power to do so: the State. Bar integration, therefore, signifies the setting
up by Government authority of a national organization of the legal
profession based on the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the
court.

Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice

and the Rule of Law, integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and
ensures, through their own organized action and participation, the
promotion of the objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to the
principle of maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and
regulation by the Supreme Court.
The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are:
(1) Assist in the administration of justice;
(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity,
learning, professional competence, public service and conduct;
(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members;
(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood;
(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law reform,
pleading, practice and procedure, and the relations of the Bar to the
Bench and to the public, and publish information relating thereto;
(6) Encourage and foster legal education;
(7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and
adjective law, and make reports and recommendations thereon; and
(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively.
Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it possible for the
legal profession to:
(1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law;
(2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical judges
and prosecuting officers;
(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the disciplining and/or
removal of incompetent and unworthy judges and prosecuting officers;
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except
within its own forum, from the assaults that politics and self-interest may
level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and
independence;
(5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting
officers;
(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any monopoly
of local practice maintained through influence or position;
(7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers;
(8) Provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices and set up
lawyer reference services throughout the country so that the poor may
not lack competent legal service;
(9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to
obtain in many of our provinces;
(10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education for
practising attorneys in order to elevate the standards of the profession
throughout the country;
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum fees
schedules;
(12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal research;
(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights and
obligations, on the importance of preventive legal advice, and on the
functions and duties of the Filipino lawyer; and
(14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wide
involvement of the lawyer population in the solution of the multifarious
problems that afflict the nation.

Issue 1: YES. The Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine
Bar in the exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the
Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law." Indeed,
the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court's constitutional
authority over the Bar. In providing that "the Supreme Court may adopt
rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act
6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts the Court's inherent power,
but is a mere legislative declaration that the integration of the Bar will
promote public interest or, more specifically, will "raise the standards of
the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the
Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively."

Issue 2: In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has
been put in issue, the Courts have upheld their constitutionality.

- Courts have the inherent power to supervise and regulate the

practice of law.
- Practice of law is a privilege, clothed with public interest.
- Exercise of the privilege be regulated through integration to assure
compliance with the lawyer`s public responsibilities.
- Public responsibilities can be discharged through collective action,
and no collective action can be maintained without an organized
body, and this body cannot operate effectively without incurring
expenses, which led to the contribution by lawyers to support the
organized body. The most efficient means of doing so is by
integrating the Bar through a rule of court that requires all lawyers to
pay annual dues to the Integrated Bar.
- Does not violate freedom to associate, Integration does not make a
lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a
member. One become a member of the Bar when he passed the
Bar examinations.
- What integration actually does is to provide an official national
organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive
group of which every lawyer is already a member.
- Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with
anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his
integrated Bar Chapter.
- Membership in the Unified Bar imposes only duty to pay dues in
reasonable amount.
 - Compulsion in to be a member of the Integrated Bar is an exercise
of the police power of the state. SC has the inherent power to
regulate the Bar, which includes the authority to integrate the Bar.
- A membership fee is not a form of tax but an exaction for
regulation.

3. Freedom of Speech.

A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on any subject
in any manner he wishes, even though such views be opposed to
positions taken by the Unified Bar.
For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote measures to
which said member is opposed, would not nullify or adversely affect his
freedom of speech.

Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to practice law upon
membership in the Integrated Bar, it is difficult to understand why it should
become unconstitutional for the Bar to use the member's dues to fulfill the
very purposes for which it was established.

The objection would make every Governmental exaction the material of

a "free speech" issue. Even the income tax would be suspect. The
objection would carry us to lengths that have never been dreamed of.
The conscientious objector, if his liberties were to be thus extended, might
refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of war or of any other end
condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right of
private judgment has never yet been exalted above the powers and the
compulsion of the agencies of Government.

Issue 3: YES.

In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and the United

States, Bar integration has yielded the following benefits: (1) improved
discipline among the members of the Bar; (2) greater influence and
ascendancy of the Bar; (3) better and more meaningful participation of
the individual lawyer in the activities of the Integrated Bar; (4) greater Bar
facilities and services; (5) elimination of unauthorized practice; (6)
avoidance of costly membership campaigns; (7) establishment of an
official status for the Bar; (8) more cohesive profession; and (9) better and
more effective discharge by the Bar of its obligations and responsibilities
to its members, to the courts, and to the public. No less than these salutary
consequences are envisioned and in fact expected from the unification
of the Philippine Bar.
The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of
all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative
materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive
Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the
Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable,"
within the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has
become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively.
4) IN RE: The matter of proceedings for disciplinary action against Atty.
Vicente Almacen. G.R. No. L-27654 Feb. 18, 1970

FACTS: This case stemmed from a civil case Virgina Y. Yaptinchay v.

Antonio Calero, where Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The
trial court enforced judgment against his client. He then moved for its
reconsideration. Plaintiff moved for execution of judgment. Court denied
both motions for lack of proof of service. He then filed a second MR. But
was withdrawn by the trial court. Atty Almacen filed an appeal to the CA
where te CA dismissed the appeal. Another MR for the CA`s decision, but
was again denied. Atty. Almacen appealed to the SC via certiorari. The
SC refused to take the case denied the appeal.

Atty. Almacen vent to his disappointment by filing a petition to Surrender

Lawyer`s Certificate of Title” which is a pleading that is interspersed from
beginning to the end with the insolent contemptuous, grossly disrespectful
and derogatory remarks against the SC as well as its individual members,
a behavior which was quoted by the Court as unprecedented and
unprofessional.

Atty. Almacen's statement that

There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition,
"where our Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our
pleas for justice, who ignore without reason their own applicable decisions
and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.

He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he

earns his living, the present members of the Supreme Court "will become
responsive to all cases brought to its attention without discrimination, and
will purge itself of those unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit" or
"denied resolutions. (Emphasis supplied)

In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for
contumely and gross misconduct, this Court on November 17, 1967
resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause "why no disciplinary
action should be taken against him." Denying the charges contained in
the November 17 resolution, he asked for permission "to give reasons and
cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him ... in an
open and public hearing." This Court resolved (on December 7) "to require
Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from notice hereof, his reasons for
such request, otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed waived and
incident submitted for decision." To this resolution he manifested that since
this Court is "the complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to be
heard and to answer questions "in person and in an open and public
hearing" so that this Court could observe his sincerity and candor. He also
asked for leave to file a written explanation "in the event this Court has no
time to hear him in person." To give him the ampliest latitude for his
defense, he was allowed to file a written explanation and thereafter was
heard in oral argument.

ISSUE: WON Atty. Almacen should be disciplined

RULING: YES.

Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the
present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this
proceeding is not — and does not involve — a trial of an action or a suit,
but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. 27
Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor
therein It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio.

Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for
his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving
the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration
of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct
have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties
and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 29 In such
posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a
prosecutor.

As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941,
Atty. Almacen knew — or ought to have known — that for a motion for
reconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal, the movant
must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which
he did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and place of hearing
(which admittedly he did not). This rule was unequivocally articulated in
Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co., supra:

As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941,
Atty. Almacen knew — or ought to have known — that for a motion for
reconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal, the movant
must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which
he did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and place of hearing
(which admittedly he did not). This rule was unequivocally articulated in
Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co., supra:

Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the
actuations of public officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the
criticism is aimed at a judicial authority,4 or that it is articulated by a
lawyer.5 Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns
a concluded litigation,6 because then the court's actuations are thrown
open to public consumption.7 "Our decisions and all our official actions,"
said the Supreme Court of Nebraska,8 "are public property, and the press
and the people have the undoubted right to comment on them, criticize
and censure them as they see fit. Judicial officers, like other public
servants, must answer for their official actions before the chancery of
public opinion."

The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on

one's integrity, competence and honesty, with "imminent danger to the
administration of justice," is the reason why courts have been loath to
inflict punishment on those who assail their actuations.9 This danger lurks
especially in such a case as this where those who Sit as members of an
entire Court are themselves collectively the aggrieved parties.
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical
evaluation of their performance. 13 For like the executive and the
legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic
society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is
expected to serve.

Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the

court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through
legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. The reason is that
An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place
accorded to him in the administration of justice, his right as a citizen to
criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and
the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always been
encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487) .

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide,
and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm
exists between fair criticism, on the One hand, and abuse and slander of
courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair
criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is Such a
misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is
essential to the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the — assertion
of their clients' rights, lawyers — even those gifted with superior intellect
are enjoined to rein up their tempers.

The misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity

cannot be overemphasized. However, heeding the stern injunction that
disbarment should never be decreed where a lesser sanction would
accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may not perhaps be
futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will
realize that abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an advocate
and that in every effervescence of candor there is ample room for the
added glow of respect, it is our view that suspension will suffice under the
circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither
manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefor leave us no way of
determining how long that suspension should last and, accordingly, we
are impelled to decree that the same should be indefinite. This, we are
empowered to do not alone because jurisprudence grants us discretion
on the matter 33 but also because, even without the comforting support of
precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude a
person from the practice of law, there is no reason why indefinite
suspension, which is lesser in degree and effect, can be regarded as
falling outside of the compass of that authority. The merit of this choice is
best shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to
determine for himself how long or how short that suspension shall last. For,
at any time after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to this
Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of law.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul

Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended from the practice of law until
further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.
5) Mauricio Ulep v. The Legal Clinic, Inc Bar Matter No. 553. June 17, 1993

FACTS: Pettioner prays this Court to order the respondent to cease and
desist from issuing advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law
profession other than those allowed by law.

Petitioner alleged that advertisements are considered champterous,

unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar
and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and
offended by the said advertisements.

Respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement, but

claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering if
“legal support services” through paralegals with the use of modern
computers and electronic machines. Respondents alleged that such
advertising should be allowed citing the case of John Bates and Van
O`Steen v. State Bar of Arizona.

The court required different bar associations to submit their position

papers.

ISSUE(s):

(1) WON services offered by respondent as advertised by it constitutes

practice of law. (YES)
(2) WON such legal services offered are properly advertised in
accordance with law. (YES)

RULING:

A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that
respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it
renders legal

While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services

to the public, the advertisements in question give the impression
that respondent is offering legal services. The Petition in fact simply
assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned, apparently because this
(is) the effect that the advertisements have on the reading.

The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced,

first of all, to the very name being used by respondent - "The Legal Clinic,
Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of
legal services for legal problems, just like a medical clinic connotes
medical services for medical problems. More importantly, the term "Legal
Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes.

Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements

subject of the present case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which
all the more reinforces the impression that it is being operated by
members of the bar and that it offers legal services. In addition, the
advertisements in question appear with a picture and name of a person
being represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes
whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature of the service or services
being offered.

B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the

performance of acts contrary to law, morals, public order and
public

It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in

question are only meant to inform the general public of the services being
offered by it. Said advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce,
and any law student ought to know that under the Family Code, there is
only one instance when a foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:

Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
have capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.

By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the

message being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal
consequences of a marriage celebrated in accordance with our law, by
simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only misleading, but
encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very
least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where
certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At
worst, this is outright malpractice.

Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services"

respondent offers do not constitute legal services as commonly
understood, the advertisements in question give the impression that
respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it offers
legal services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is
that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar
themselves are encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which
are contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good, thereby
destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.

The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation
by the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen
solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly
provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise
his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession
and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who
stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his
services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles
the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of
old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment
of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust.
This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and
conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).

The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation

by the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen
solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly
provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise
his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession
and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who
stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his
services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles
the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of
old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment
of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust.
This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and
conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).

Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The

canons of the profession enumerate exceptions to the rule against
advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which they may be
undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those
which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from
the restrictions.

1) The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in

a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the
canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data must
not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's
name and the names of his professional associates; addresses,
telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced;
date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended
with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinction;
public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships;
legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar
associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific
societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable
law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their
written consent, the names of clients regularly represented.

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that
purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper,
magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally
for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly
publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper,
magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer
permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct,
management or contents of which are calculated or likely to
deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or
standing of the profession

2) The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted.

The card may contain only a statement of his name, the name of
the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a
simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in
the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for
the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may
likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under
a designation of special branch of law.

In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject

to disciplinary action, to advertise his services except in allowable
instances 48or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law.
49Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator,
major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of
the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding
will be dealt with more severely.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein

respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication
or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or
similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from
conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction
proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor
General for appropriate action in accordance herewith.
6) Valencia v. Cabanting April 26, 1991

FACTS: In 1933, complainant Paulino Valencia (Paulino in short) and his

wife Romana allegedly bought a parcel of land, where they built their
residential house, from a certain Serapia Raymundo, an heir of Pedro
Raymundo the original owner. However, they failed to register the sale or
secure a transfer certificate of title in their names.

In 1933, complainant Paulino Valencia (Paulino in short) and his wife

Romana allegedly bought a parcel of land, where they built their
residential house, from a certain Serapia Raymundo, an heir of Pedro
Raymundo the original owner. However, they failed to register the sale or
secure a transfer certificate of title in their names.

On December 15, 1969 Serapia, assisted by Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting,

filed a complaint against Paulino for the recovery of possession with
damages.

On January 22, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V,

rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff, Serapia Raymundo. The lower
court expressed the belief that the said document is not authentic.

Paulino, thereafter, filed a Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 65, with
Preliminary Injunction before the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial
court failed to provide a workable solution concerning his house. While
the petition was pending, the trial court, on March 9, 1973, issued an order
of execution stating that "the decision in this case has already become
final and executory" . On March 14, 1973, a writ of execution was issued.

On March 20, 1973, Serapia sold 40 square meters of the litigated lot to
Atty. Jovellanos and the remaining portion she sold to her counsel, Atty.
Arsenio Fer. Cabanting, on April 25, 1973.

On March 4, 1974, Paulino filed a disbarment proceeding (docketed as

Administrative Case No. 1302) against Atty. Cabanting on the ground that
said counsel allegedly violated Article 1491 of the New Civil Code as well
as Article II of the Canons of Professional Ethics, prohibiting the purchase
of property under litigation by a counsel.

CA dismissed the petition of Paulino.

ISSUE: WON Atty. Cabanting purchased the subject property in violation

of Art. 1491 of the New Civil Code.
RULING: YES. Under Article 1491 of the New Civil Code:
The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public of
judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another:
xxx xxx xxx

(5) . . . this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and

shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may
be the object of any litigation in which they make take part by virtue of
their profession.

Public policy prohibits the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship

involved. It is intended to curtail any undue influence of the lawyer upon
his client. Greed may get the better of the sentiments of loyalty and
disinterestedness. Any violation of this prohibition would constitute
malpractice (In re: Attorney Melchor Ruste, 40 O.G. p. 78) and is a ground
for suspension. (Beltran vs. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248).

Art. 1491, prohibiting the sale to the counsel concerned, applies only while
the litigation is pending. (Director of Lands vs. Adaba, 88 SCRA 513;
Hernandez vs. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 775).

In the case at bar, while it is true that Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting
purchased the lot after finality of judgment, there was still a pending
certiorari proceeding. A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is
some contest or litigation over it in court, but also from the moment that it
becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge. (Gan Tingco vs.
Pabinguit, 35 Phil. 81). Logic indicates, in certiorari proceedings, that the
appellate court may either grant or dismiss the petition. Hence, it is not
safe to conclude, for purposes under Art. 1491 that the litigation has
terminated when the judgment of the trial court become final while a
certiorari connected therewith is still in progress. Thus, purchase of the
property by Atty. Cabanting in this case constitutes malpractice in
violation of Art. 1491 and the Canons of Professional Ethics. Clearly, this
malpractice is a ground for suspension.

The sale in favor of Atty. Jovellanos does not constitute malpractice. There
was no attorney-client relationship between Serapia and Atty. Jovellanos,
considering that the latter did not take part as counsel in Civil Case No. V-
2170. The transaction is not covered by Art. 1491 nor by the Canons
adverted to.

2. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six
months from finality of this judgment;
7) Petition for Leave to resume practice of law, Benjamin Dacanay
December 17, 2007.

FACTS: Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He

practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek
medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian
citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application
was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced

law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical
attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian
citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application
was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.

Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by
virtue of his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has
again met all the qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for
membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume the
practice of law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s
oath to remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a member of the
Philippine bar.

ISSUE: WON Petitioner can be readmitted to the Philippine Bar or can be

allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines.

RULING; YES.

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.2 It is so

delicately affected with public interest that it is both a power and a duty
of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to
protect and promote the public welfare.3

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the

highest degree of morality, faithful observance of the rules of the legal
profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education
requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good
standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any
breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the
trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the
continued exercise of his professional privilege.4
Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore duly admitted
as a member of the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance
with the provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is
entitled to practice law.
Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar
in accordance with the statutory requirements and who is in good and
regular standing is entitled to practice law.

Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court

mandates that an applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the
Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character
and a resident of the Philippines.5 He must also produce before this Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges
against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in
any court in the Philippines.6

Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing

satisfactory proof of educational, moral and other qualifications;7 passing
the bar examinations;8 taking the lawyer’s oath9 and signing the roll of
attorneys and receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate
of the license to practice.10

The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good

standing ― is a continuing requirement. This means continued
membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual membership dues in
the IBP;11 payment of the annual professional tax;12 compliance with the
mandatory continuing legal education requirement;13 faithful observance
of the rules and ethics of the legal profession and being continually
subject to judicial disciplinary control.14

Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still
practice law in the Philippines? No.

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the

Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by
law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar,
loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and,
consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other
words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to
practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to
foreigners.16
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization
as a citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to
RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]."17 Therefore, a Filipino lawyer
who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost
his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225.

Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in

the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the
Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its
provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit
to engage in such practice."18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who
reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law
practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so,
conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in
the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing
legal education; this is specially significant to refresh the
applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of
legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his
duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but
also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines.

Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a

member of the Philippine bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby

GRANTED, subject to compliance with the conditions stated above and
submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which
he may retake his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.
SO ORDERED.