CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASE DIGEST COMPILATION

Article 1 (National Territory)

1) Magallona v. Ermita

FACTS: RA 3046 was passed in 1961 which provides among others the
demarcation lines of the baselines of the Philippines as an archipelago. This is in
consonance with UNCLOS I.

RA 5446 amended RA 3046 in terms of typographical errors and included Section

2 in which the government reserved the drawing of baselines in Sabah in North
Borneo.

RA 9522 took effect on March 2009 amending RA 5446. The amendments, which
are in compliance with UNCLOS III in which the Philippines is one of the signatory,
shortening one baseline while optimizing the other and classifying Kalayaan
Group of Island and Scarborough Shoal as Regimes of Island.

Petitioners in their capacity as taxpayer, citizen and legislator assailed the

constitutionality of RA 9522:- it reduces the territory of the Philippines in violation
to the Constitution and it opens the country to maritime passage of vessels and
aircrafts of other states to the detriment of the economy, sovereignty, national
security and of the Constitution as well. They added that the classification of
Regime of Islands would be prejudicial to the lives of the fishermen.

ISSUE(S):

1. WON the petitioners have locus standi to bring the suit; and
2. WON RA 9522 is unconstitutional

RULING:

Petition is dismissed.

1st Issue:
The SC ruled the suit is not a taxpayer or legislator, but as a citizen suit, since it is
the citizens who will be directly injured and benefitted in affording relief over the
remedy sought.

2nd Issue:
The SC upheld the constitutionality of RA 9522.

First, RA 9522 did not delineate the territory the Philippines but is merely a
statutory tool to demarcate the country’s maritime zone and continental shelf
under UNCLOS III. SC emphasized that UNCLOS III is not a mode of acquiring or
losing a territory as provided under the laws of nations. UNCLOS III is a multi-
lateral treaty that is a result of a long-time negotiation to establish a uniform sea-
use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from
the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive
economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves.
In order to measure said distances, it is a must for the state parties to have their
archipelagic doctrines measured in accordance to the treaty—the role played
by RA 9522. The contention of the petitioner that RA 9522 resulted to the loss of
15,000 square nautical miles is devoid of merit. The truth is, RA 9522, by optimizing
the location of base points, increased the Philippines total maritime space of
145,216 square nautical miles.

Second, the classification of KGI and Scarborough Shoal as Regime of Islands is

consistent with the Philippines’ sovereignty. Had RA 9522 enclosed the islands as
part of the archipelago, the country will be violating UNCLOS III since it
categorically stated that the length of the baseline shall not exceed 125 nautical
miles. So what the legislators did is to carefully analyze the situation: the country,
for decades, had been claiming sovereignty over KGI and Scarborough Shoal
on one hand and on the other hand they had to consider that these are located
at non-appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine
archipelago. So, the classification is in accordance with the Philippines
sovereignty and State’s responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda
obligation under UNCLOS III.

Third, the new base line introduced by RA 9522 is without prejudice with
delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah,
situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired
dominion and sovereignty.

And lastly, the UNCLOS III and RA 9522 are not incompatible with the
Constitution’s delineation of internal waters. Petitioners contend that RA 9522
transformed the internal waters of the Philippines to archipelagic waters hence
subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passages,
exposing the Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards.
The Court emphasized that the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of
water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the
submarine areas underneath, regardless whether internal or archipelagic waters.
However, sovereignty will not bar the Philippines to comply with its obligation in
maintaining freedom of navigation and the generally accepted principles of
international law. It can be either passed by legislator as a municipal law or in
the absence thereof, it is deemed incorporated in the Philippines law since the
right of innocent passage is a customary international law, thus automatically
incorporated thereto.

This does not mean that the states are placed in a lesser footing; it just signifies
concession of archipelagic states in exchange for their right to claim all waters
inside the baseline. In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the
Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to the
Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone.
Such a maritime delineation binds the international community since the
delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is
contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of course reject it and will
refuse to be bound by it.

The Court expressed that it is within the Congress who has the prerogative to
determine the passing of a law and not the Court. Moreover, such enactment
was necessary in order to comply with the UNCLOS III; otherwise, it shall backfire
on the Philippines for its territory shall be open to seafaring powers to freely enter
and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our
archipelago and it will weaken the country’s case in any international dispute
over Philippine maritime space.

The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine
archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an
internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’ maritime
zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of
the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution
and our national interest

Article 2, Section 1 (Government)

2) Funa v, MECO

FACTS:.
- The Philippines subscribes to the “One China Policy” of the Communist
People’s Republic of China (PROC) under the Joint Communique
between RP and PROC.
- The Philippines ended its diplomatic relations with the government of
Taiwan (nationalist Republic of China ) on June 9 1975.
- Despite this the Philippines and Taiwan maintained an unofficial
relationship facilitated by the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office for
Taiwan and the MANILA ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL OFFICE(MECO) for
the Philippines
- MECO was organized on Dec 16 1997 as a non-stock non-profit
corporation. from then on MECO became the corporate entity entrusted
by the Philipine Government with maintaining the friendly and unofficial
relations with the People of Taiwan.
- In order to carry out its functions, MECO was authorized by the
Government to perform certain consular and other functions that relate to
the promotion, protection and facilitation of Philippine interests in Taiwan
o At present, MEco oversees the rights and interests of OFWs in
Taiwan, promotes the Philippines as a tourist and investment
destination for the Taiwanese and facilitates travel of Filipinos and
Taiwanese from Taiwan to the Philippines and vice versa.
- Dennis AB Funa wrote to COA requesting for the latest financial and audit
report of MECO. HE invoked his constitutional right to information on
matters of public concern. He believed that MECO was under the
 supervision of DTI and is a GOCC thus subject to the audit jurisdiction of
COA.
- COA asst. Commissioner Naranjo issued a memorandum which stated
that MECO is not among the agencies audited by any of the three
clusters of the Corporate Government Sector.
- This prompted Funa to file this mandamus petition in his capacity as
"taxpayer, concerned citizen, a member of the Philippine Bar and law
book author” he alleged that COA neglected its duty under Sec. 2(1) Art
IX-D of the Constitution. He claimed that MECO was a GOCC or at least a
government instrumentality whose funds partake the nature of public
funds.
- To support his argument he presented the following points
o It is a non-stock corporation vested with governmental functions
relating to public needs
o It is controlled by the government thru a board of directors
appointed by the Philippine President
o It is under the operational and policy supervision of DTI
- He also compared MECO with the American Institute in Taiwan. AIT is
supposedly audited by the US Comptroller General.
- MECO: prayed for the dismissal of the mandamus petition on procedural
and substantial grounds.
o Procedural: prematurely filed. Funa never demanded for COA to
make an audit. The only action he took was to request for a copy
of the financial and audit report of MECO. This request was not
finally disposed of by the time the petition was filed
o Substantial: MECO is not a GOCC. The “desire letter” of the
President sends to MECO is merely recommendatory and not
binding on the corporation (in relation to the election of the Board
of MECO). In the end the members are the ones who elect the
directors and these directors are private individuals and not
government officials. MECO also argued that the government
merely has a policy supervision over it. The government merely sees
to it that the activities of MECO are in tune with the One China
Policy under the PROC. The day-to-day operations of MECO are still
under the control of the Board.
o It also argued that for MECO to be considered a GOCC would be
a violation of the One China Policy of the PROC
- COA: wanted the petition to be dismissed on procedural grounds and
that the issue is already moot
o Procedural: lacks locus standi Funa wasn’t shown to have been
aggrieved or prejudiced by COA’s failure to Audit MECO. Also, that
the case violated the doctrine of hierarchy of Courts. Funa failed to
justify a direct petition to SC
o Moot: COA Chair already sent a team to Taiwan to audit MECO
and other government agencies based there.
o Although the COA concedes that MECO is within its jurisdiction, it
maintains that MECO is not a GOCC nor is it a Government
instrumentality, instead MECO is a non-governmental entity.
  MECO may still be audited with respect to Verification Fees.
These fees are what MECO collects from Taiwanese
employers. A portion of these fees are remitted to DOLE.
‘Under Sec 26 of PD 1445 or the STATE AUDIT CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, MECO is a non-governmental entity required to
pay government share and is subject to partial audit

ISSUES & RATIO.

Whether MECO is a Governmental entity and is subject to the audit jurisdiction of
COA.
MECO is not a GOCC nor is it a Governmental entity, however, certain
transactions of MECO are subject to the audit jurisdiction of COA (verification
fees and consular fees)

Procedural issues:
Mootness: the issue is not moot. Despite the existence of supervening events( the
eventual auditing done by COA in Taiwan), the issue is within the exceptions of
rule on dismissal of moot cases.
-The issue deals with a supposed grave violation of the constitution ( Funa
alleged that COA neglected to audit MECO),
-that the issue is of paramount public interest (the failure of COA to audit
MECO if it was supposed to audit MECO shows that COA failed to fulfill its
duties as guardian of the public treasury AND the status of MECO has a
direct bearing on the country’s commitment to the One China Policy)
-and that it is susceptible to repetition (COA suddenly decided to audit
MECO, unless the issue is decided, the successor of the current COA chair
might decide to not auditing MECO)

Standing: the instant petition raises issues of transcendental importance

Principle of Hierarchy of Courts: transcendental importance of the issues raised in

the mandamus petition, hence the court waives this procedural issue

MAIN ISSUE

Jurisdiction of COA
Under SEC 2(1) ART IX-D of the constitution, COA was vested with the power,
authority and duty to examine, audit and settle the accounts(revenue,"
"receipts," "expenditures" and "uses of funds and property") of the following
entitites:
- Government , or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities
- GOCCs with original charters
- GOCCs without original charters
- Constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted
fiscal autonomy under the Constitution and
- Non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly
from or through the government, which are required by law or the
 granting institution to submit to the COA for audit as a condition of subsidy
or equity.

Complementing the constitutional power of the COA to audit accounts of "non-

governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity xxx from or through the
government" is Section 29(1)80 of the Audit Code, which grants the COA visitorial
authority over the following non-governmental entities:
1. Non-governmental entities "subsidized by the government";
2. Non-governmental entities "required to pay levy or government share";
3. Non-governmental entities that have "received counterpart funds from the
government"; and
4. Non-governmental entities "partly funded by donations through the
government."

The Administrative Code also empowers the COA to examine and audit "the
books, records and accounts" of public utilities "in connection with the fixing of
rates of every nature, or in relation to the proceedings of the proper regulatory
agencies, for purposes of determining franchise tax."

SC: MECO is not a GOCC or Governmental Instrumentality

Government instrumentalities are agencies of the national government that, by

reason of some "special function or jurisdiction" they perform or exercise, are
allotted "operational autonomy" and are "not integrated within the department
framework. They include:
1.regulatory agencies; 2.chartered institutions; 3.government corporate entities
or government instrumentalities with corporate powers (GCE/GICP); and 4.
GOCCs

GOCCs: "stock or non-stock" corporations "vested with functions relating to

public needs" that are "owned by the Government directly or through its
instrumentalities."

By definition, three attributes thus make an entity a GOCC: first, its organization as
stock or non-stock corporation; second, the public character of its function; and
third, government ownership over the same. Possession of all three attributes is
necessary to deem an entity a GOCC

MECO is a non-stock corporation based on the records and based on the

fact that its earnings are not distributed as dividends to its members

MECO performs functions with a Public Aspect. MECO was "authorized" by

the Philippine government to perform certain "consular and other
functions" relating to the promotion, protection and facilitation of
Philippine interests in Taiwan. The functions of the MECO are of the kind
that would otherwise be performed by the Philippines’ own diplomatic
and consular organs, if not only for the government’s acquiescence that
they instead be exercised by the MECO.
 The MECO Is Not Owned or Controlled by the Government. The "desire
letters" that the President transmits are merely recommendatory and not
binding on it. Under its by-laws, the election of its directors are done by
the members themselves, its officers are elected by the directors and
members are admitted through a unanimous board resolution. None of
the incorporators of MECO were government officials and up to this day,
none of the members, directors or officers are government appointees or
public officers designated by reason of their office.

SC: it is a sui generis entity

Since MECO is not a GOCC, it cannot also be either of the other government
instrumentalities primarily because these instrumentalities are creatures of law
(meaning an actual law was passed for their creation) while MECO was
incorporated under the Corporation code.

The reason behind it being under the supervision of the DTI is because its
functions may result in it engaged in dealings or activities that can directly
contradict the Philippines’ commitment to the One China Policy. This scenario
can be avoided if theExecutive exercises some sort of supervision over it. But this
aspect was not questioned by the petitioner, so this was deemed irrelevant to
the issue by the SC.

Certain accounts may be audited by the COA

MECO should be subjected to the auditing of COA as regards its collection of
verification and consular fees.
Pertinent is the provision of the Administrative Code, Section 14(1), Book V
thereof, which authorizes the COA to audit accounts of non–governmental
entities “required to pay xxx or have government share” but only with respect to
“funds xxx coming from or through the government.” The said fees collected by
MECO are receivables of DOLE.

As to the verification fees("service fee for the verification of overseas

employment contracts, recruitment agreement or special powers of attorney"):
Under Section 7 of EO No. 1022, DOLE has the authority to collect verification
fees. But it entered into a series of MoA with MECO authorizing the latter to
collect such fees since the PH does not have an official post in Taiwan.

As to the consular fees: The authority behind “consular fees” is Section 2(6) of EO
No. 15, s. 2001. The said section authorizes the MECO to collect “reasonable
fees” for its performance of consular functions. Evidently, and just like the
peculiarity that attends the DOLE “verification fees,” there is no consular office
for the collection of the “consular fees.” Thus, the authority for the MECO to
collect the “reasonable fees,” vested unto it by the executive order (EO No. 15,
s. 2001)
Update of PCA Judgment

3) Permanent Court of Arbitration, South China Sea (SCS) Dispute Between

Philippines and People`s Republic of China

Article 2; Section 3 (AFP as Protector) in Relation to Article 3, Section 1 and Article

14, Section 5 (2) (Academic Freedom)

4) First Class Cadet Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia of the PMA v, The Superintendent of
the PMA

Facts:
Petitioner, Cadet First Class Cudia, was a member of the Siklab Diwa Class of
2014 of the Philippine Military Academy. He was supposed to graduate with
honors as the class salutatorian, receive the Philippine Navy Saber as the top
Navy Cadet graduate and be commissioned as an ensign of the Navy.

Petitioner was issued a Delinquency Report (DR) because he was late for two
minutes in his ENG 412 class, other cadets were also reported late for 5 minutes.
The DRs reached the Department of Tactical Officers and were logged and
transmitted to the Company of Tactical Officers (TCO) for explanation. Cudia
incurred the penalty of 11 demerits and 13 touring hours.

Several days after, Cudia was reported to the Honor Committee (HC) per
violation of the Honor Code. Lying that is giving statements that perverts the truth
in his written appeal stating that his 4th period class ended at 3:00 that made him
late for the succeeding class.

Cudia submitted his letter of explanation on the honor report. The HC constituted
a team to conduct the preliminary investigation on the violation, it
recommended the case be formalized. Cudia pleaded not guilty. The result was
8-1 guilty verdict and upon the order of the Chairman, the HC reconvened in the
chambers, after, the Presiding Officer announced a 9-0 guilty verdict.

The HC denied Cudia’s appeal. The Headquarters Tactics Group (HTG)

conducted a formal review and checking of findings. Special orders were issued
placing Cudia on indefinite leave of absence and pending approval of
separation from the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Cudia submitted a letter to
the Office of the Commandant of Cadets requesting his re-instatement. The
matter was referred to Cadet Review and Appeals Board (CRAB) and it upheld
the decision.

Cudia wrote a letter to President Aquino but the President sustained the findings
of the CRAB. CHR-CAR issued a resolution finding probable cause for Human
Rights Violations.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the PMA committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
Cudia in utter disregard of his right to due process and in holding that he
violated the Honor Code through lying.
2. Whether or not the court can interfere with military affairs

Ruling:
1. No. The determination of whether the PMA cadet has rights to due
process, education, and property should be placed in the context of the
Honor Code. All the administrative remedies were exhausted. A student of
a military academy must be prepared to subordinate his private interest
for the proper functioning of the institution. The PMA may impose
disciplinary measures and punishments as it deems fit and consistent with
the peculiar needs of the institution. PMA has regulatory authority to
administratively dismiss erring cadets. PMA has a right to invoke
academic freedom in the enforcement of the internal rules and
regulations.
2. Yes. The court is part of the checks-and-balance machinery mandated by
Article VIII of the Constitution. The court’s mandate (according to Section
1, Article 8) is expanded that the duty of the courts is not only to “settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable” but also “to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government” even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-
judicial, or ministerial functions. No one is above the law, including the
military, especially in violations of Constitutionally guaranteed rights.

Dispositive:
The petition is denied. The dismissal was affirmed.

ISSUE(s):
(1) Whether or not the PMA, the Honor Committee, and the Cadet Review and
Appeals Board committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing cadet first
class Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia from the academy in utter disregard of his right to due
process. [NO]
(2) Whether the PMA, the Honor Committee, and the Cadet Review and
Appeals Board committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that cadet first
class Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia lied, thereby violating the Honor Code. [NO]

(3) Whether the result of the fact-finding investigation independently conducted

by the CHR is of such great weight and persuasive nature that the Court may
honor, uphold, and respect. [NO]

RULING:

AFP Code of Ethics, Oath of Cadet Corps to the Honor Code and the Honor
System, military professionalism, and, in general, military culture.

Section 31, Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 1 (also known as "The National
Defense Act")

o Sections 30 and 31 of C.A. No. 1, only President Aquino as the Commander-in-

Chief has the power to appoint and remove a cadet for a valid/legal cause. The
law gives no authority to the HC as the sole body to determine the guilt or
innocence of a cadet. It also does not empower the PMA to adopt the guilty
findings of the HC as a basis for recommending the cadet’s dismissal. In the case
of Cadet 1CL Cudia, it is claimed that the PMA blindly followed the HC’s finding
of guilt in terminating his military service.

Section 1 Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution expanded the scope of judicial
power by mandating that the duty of the courts of justice includes not only “to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable” but also “to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government”

Section 3, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 178 (as
amended by E.O. No. 1005),

Art. XIV, Sec 5 (2) of the Constitution provides that "academic freedom shall be
enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning."

As the premiere military educational institution of the AFP in accordance with

Section 30, Article III of C.A. No. 1 and Sections 58 and 59, Chapter 9, Subtitle II,
Title VIII, Book IV of E.O. No. 292, the PMA is an institution that enjoys academic
freedom guaranteed by Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution.

APPLICATION:

In this case, as shown in the previous discussions, there is no evidence that the
findings of the investigating and reviewing bodies below are not supported by
evidence or vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; that the procedure which
led to the findings is irregular; that palpable errors were committed; or that a
grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest.

With respect to the core issue whether lying is present in this case, all
investigation and reviewing bodies are in consonance in holding that Cadet 1CL
Cudia in truth and in fact lied. Respondent insist that violation of the Honor Code
warrants separation of the guilty cadet from the cadet corps, under the Cadet
Corps Armed Forces of the Philippines Regulation, a violation of the Cadet Honor
Code is considered Grave (class 1) delinquency which merits a
recommendation for a cadet`s dismissal from the PMA Superintendent. The same
is likewise clear from the Honor Code and Honor System Handbook.

Cadet Cudia has necessarily and voluntarily relinquished certain civil liberties by
virtue of his entry to the PMA. The PMA enjoys Academic Freedom which
authorized it to impose disciplinary measures and punishment as it deems fit and
consistent with the peculiar needs of the academy. Cadet Cudia was properly
afforded due process. The Court Differs with Petitioners. Petition is Denied
Dismissal of Cadet First Class Cudia was affirmed by the SC.

Article 2, Sec. 14 (Equality Between Women and Men) in Relation to Article 3,

Sec. 1 (Equal Protetion) and Article 8, Section 1 (Judicial Power)

5) Garcia v. Hon Judge Drilon

FACTS: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City
a Temporary Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262,
entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing
for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other
Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological and
economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children
and of financial support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of
petitioner.

The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the
conditions set forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another application
for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO and
extended the same when petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO should
not be modified. After the given time allowance to answer, the petitioner no
longer submitted the required comment as it would be an “axercise in futility.”

Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction
and TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due
process and equal protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for
being “an unwanted product of an invalid law.”

The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the
petition for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the
trial court and the petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the
trial court constituted collateral attack on said law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is
filed.

ISSUES:

WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of
constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition
constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the law.

WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is

discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal protection clause.

WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter
to the due process clause of the Constitution

WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the
state to protect the family as a basic social institution

WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional

because it allows an undue delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials.

RULING:

1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction,
inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality. Family Courts have
authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute. The
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible time so that if
not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if not raised in the
trial court, it may not be considered in appeal.

2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal
protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers’ Union, the Court ruled that all that is
required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real
differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to
existing conditions only; and apply equally to each member of the class.
Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid classification and did not violate the equal
protection clause by favouring women over men as victims of violence and
abuse to whom the Senate extends its protection.

3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The
essence of due process is in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit
any evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. The grant of the TPO
exparte cannot be impugned as violative of the right to due process.

4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioner’s

contention that by not allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of the
State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum of the Court, it ruled that the
court shall not refer the case or any issue therof to a mediator. This is so because
violence is not a subject for compromise.

5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials. Judicial

power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the Government
while executive power is the power to enforce and administer the laws. The
preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an executive, not a
judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by
Brgy. Officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty
executive function.

HELD:

RA 9262 is NOT UNCONSITUTIONAL.

1. RA 9262 - compliance with the CEDAW

It has been acknowledged that "gender-based violence is a form of

discrimination that seriously inhibits women's ability to enjoy rights and freedoms
on a basis of equality with men." RA 9262 can be viewed therefore as the
Philippines’ compliance with the CEDAW, which is committed to condemn
discrimination against women and directs its members to undertake, without
delay, all appropriate means to eliminate discrimination against women in all
forms both in law and in practice.

CEDAW

Known as the International Bill of Rights of Women, the CEDAW is the central and
most comprehensive document for the advancement of the welfare of women.
The CEDAW, in its preamble, explicitly acknowledges the existence of extensive
discrimination against women, and emphasized that such is a violation of the
principles of equality of rights and respect for human dignity.

RA 9262 justified under the Constitution

The Constitution abundantly authorize Congress or the government to actively
undertake ameliorative action that would remedy existing inequalities and
inequities experienced by women and children brought about by years of
discrimination. The equal protection clause when juxtaposed to this provision
provides a stronger mandate for the government to combat such discrimination.
Indeed, these provisions order Congress to "give highest priority to the
enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to
human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities and remove
cultural inequities."

The gender-based classification of RA 9262 does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause (application of the substantive equality model)

The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute
prohibition against classification. The non-identical treatment of women and
men under RA 9262 is justified to put them on equal footing and to give
substance to the policy and aim of the state to ensure the equality of women
and men in light of the biological, historical, social, and culturally endowed
differences between men and women.

RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children,

who are vulnerable victims of domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the
important governmental objectives of protecting human rights, insuring gender
equality, and empowering women. The gender-based classification and the
special remedies prescribed by said law in favor of women and children are
substantially related, in fact essentially necessary, to achieve such objectives.
Hence, said Act survives the intermediate review or middle-tier judicial scrutiny.
The gender-based classification therein is therefore not violative of the equal
protection clause embodied in the 1987 Constitution.

The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.

Article 2, Sec. 12 in Relation to Article 3, Sec. 1, Article 3, Sec. 3, Article 3, Sec. 6,

Article 3, Sec. 18, Article 6, Sec. 1 and Article 6 Sec. 26.

6) Imbong v. Hon. Ochoa

FACTS: Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by
Congress on December 21, 2012. Challengers from various sectors of society are
questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The petitioners are assailing the
constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
1. The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.
2. The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against
hazardous products.
 3. The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
4. The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.
5. The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.
6. The RH Law violates the right to free speech.
7. The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process clause
of the Constitution.
8. The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family protected by
the Constitution

PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over
the controversy.
1. Power of Judicial Review
2. Actual Case or Controversy
3. Facial Challenge
4. Locus Standi
5. Declaratory Relief
6. One Subject/One Title Rule

ISSUES:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is
unconstitutional for violating the:
1. Right to life
2. Right to health
3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech
4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom
6. Due process clause
7. Equal protection clause
8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude

PROCEDURAL:
Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
1. Actual Case or Controversy
2. Facial Challenge
3. Locus Standi
4. Declaratory Relief
5. One Subject/One Title Rule

RULING:

SUBSTANTIAL
1. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when
life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at
this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. However, they agreed
that individual Members could express their own views on this matter.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the
sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the
mother and the life of the unborn from conception.” In its plain and
ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional
meaning of “conception” according to reputable dictionaries cited by
the ponente is that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also support
the view that conception begins at fertilization. The framers of the
Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer to the moment of
“fertilization” and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization.
In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being
unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be
prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male
sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take action before
fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally
permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the
unborn child was to prevent the Legislature from passing a measure
prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is
in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word
“or” in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only
drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also those that induce
abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb.
The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that
the State has a bounded duty to protect it.

However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they
redefined the meaning of abortifacient by using the term “primarily”.
Recognizing as abortifacients only those that “primarily induce abortion or
the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of
the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb”
(Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of
contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of contraceptives under
the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term “primarily”, must be struck
down.

2. The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729
in place, the Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only
safe contraceptives are made available to the public. In fulfilling its
mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the
provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a
duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual
 distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done
following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. Meanwhile,
the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered
“mandatory” only after these devices and materials have been tested,
evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that
contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective”.

3. The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or

participation in support of modern RH measures (a) is moral from a
religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to one’s dogma or
belief. However, the Court has the authority to determine whether or not
the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious
freedom. The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without
being dictated upon the policies of any one religion. To allow religious
sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III,
Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would
cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus, establishes a
state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control program
through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary
to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.

4. Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with
only the consent of the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding
spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and goes
against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social
institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates
the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in
accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of
responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family associations
to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and
programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual
decision-making, and endanger the institutions of marriage and the
family. The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor
undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had a miscarriage
(Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section
12 of the Constitution, which states: “The natural and primary right and
duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.” In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads “in
the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in
their absence, persons exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be
required only in elective surgical procedures” is invalid as it denies the
right of parental authority in cases where what is involved is “non-surgical
procedures.” However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to
procedures) about family planning services. Parents are not deprived of
parental guidance and control over their minor child in this situation and
may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information
 received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening
procedures.

5. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH

Law, which mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-
Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although educators might
raise their objection to their participation in the RH education program,
the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department
of Education has not yet formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate
reproductive health education. Section 12, Article II of the Constitution
places more importance on the role of parents in the development of
their children with the use of the term “primary”. The right of parents in
upbringing their youth is superior to that of the State. The provisions of
Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR
supplement (rather than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in
the moral development of their children. By incorporating parent-teacher-
community associations, school officials, and other interest groups in
developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the
program will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners.

6. The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as
the definitions of several terms as observed by the petitioners are not
vague. The definition of “private health care service provider” must be
seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a “public
health service provider”. The “private health care institution” cited under
Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to “private health care service
provider. The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to
include providing of information and rendering of medical procedures.
Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering
RH service and modern family planning methods (as provided for by
Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and
procedures. The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used
together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms “incorrect” and
“knowingly” connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or
misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and
services on reproductive health.

7. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s RH

program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is
pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the
State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly,
disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor to provide
medical care to paupers. The RH Law does not only seek to target the
poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor
and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire
to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number
 of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon
couples who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to provide
priority to the poor. The exclusion of private educational institutions from
the mandatory RH education program under Section 14 is valid. There is a
need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational
institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider
their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.

8. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-
government health care service providers to render 48 hours of pro
bonoRH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two
reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public
interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to control and
regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Second,
Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH service
providers to render pro bono Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no
penalty is imposed should they do otherwise. However, conscientious
objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do not
allow them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise

PROCEDURAL

Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial
review is limited by four exacting requisites: (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.

Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing case or

controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.
It must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue.
There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific
relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion
advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. Corollary to
the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness.
A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a
direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be
considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then
been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come
into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show
that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury
as a result of the act complained of
Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment
Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not
only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment. These
include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to
peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the
press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one’s
freedom of expression, as they are modes which one’s thoughts are externalized.

Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and

substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. It requires a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that “the rule on
standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional
plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest
so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.”

One Subject-One Title: The “one title-one subject” rule does not require the
Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as
to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein.
The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to
include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here,
the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of
the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted
a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule “so as not to cripple or
impede legislation.” The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that
the title of a law must not be “so uncertain that the average person reading it
would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its
contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject
where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any
expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act.”
Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act is not a
law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no
office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been
passed. Modern view: Under this view, the court in passing upon the question of
constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the
Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and determines the rights of the
parties just as if such statute had no existence. But certain legal effects of the
statute prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality may be recognized.
Requisites for partial unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature must be willing to
retain the valid portion(s), usually shown by the presence of a separability clause
in the law; and (2) The valid portion can stand independently as law.
1. In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy
exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that
the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that
budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is
evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As
stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged
to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a
duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute. Moreover, the petitioners have
shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical
providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law
for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are
threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement
and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter now.

2. In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has
been generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While the
Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal
statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating
free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other
fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification is simple.
For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded
jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the
framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant
with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution. Consequently,
considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the
constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other
fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed
legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred
petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional
scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist
no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive
branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been
transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.

3. Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an

“as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally
on the locus standi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals
standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest
affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of
transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all,
a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one
occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such
as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public
interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation
 of a law or any other government act. The present action cannot be
properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental
importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that the Court set
aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition
at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially
pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation,
specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an
imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle
that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay,
but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and
rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate,
rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.

4. Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court
would just consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over
which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching
implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them
as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.

5. The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In this case, a
textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both
“reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” are interrelated and
germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As
expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law: SEC. 2.
Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the human
rights of all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination
of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to
health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and
information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in
accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and
the demands of responsible parenthood. Considering the close intimacy
between “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” which
bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving “sustainable human
development” as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to
believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the
contents of the assailed legislation.

6. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT

UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions which
are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a)

require private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and
hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344,
to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow
minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem
 methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or
guardian/s;

2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly

Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider
who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and
services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as

they allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case,
as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health
procedures without the consent of the spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as

they limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical
procedures.

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly

Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider
who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health
care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently
accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly

Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to
support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full
implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her
religious beliefs;

7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the

rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the
conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and

8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the
qualifier “primarily” in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are
ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the
RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution

Article 2, Sec. 16, in relation to Article 8, Sec. 5 (2) (a); Article 10, Sec. 2, and Sec.
59 of the Indigenous People`s Rights Act.

7) Paje v. Casino et al

FACTS:
 In February 2006, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), a government
agency organized and established under Republic Act No. (RA) 7227, and
 Taiwan Cogeneration Corporation (TCC) entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) expressing their intention to build a power plant in
Subic Bay which would supply reliable and affordable power to Subic Bay
Industrial Park (SBIP).
 On July 28, 2006, SBMA and TCC entered into another MOU, whereby TCC
undertook to build and operate a coal-fired power plant.
 On April 4, 2007, the SBMA Ecology Center issued SBFZ Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC) in favor of Taiwan Cogeneration
International Corporation (TCIC), a subsidiary of TCC, for the construction,
installation, and operation of 2x150-MW Circulating Fluidized Bed (CFB)
Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant at Sitio Naglatore.
 On June 6, 2008, TCC assigned all its rights and interests under the MOU
dated July 28, 2006 to Redondo Peninsula Energy, Inc. (RP Energy).
 RP Energy then contracted GHD Pty., Ltd. (GHD) to prepare an
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the proposed coal-fired power
plant and to assist RP Energy in applying for the issuance of an ECC from
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
 The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Olongapo City issued Resolution No.
131, Series of 2008, expressing the city government’s objection to the coal-
fired power plant as an energy source and urging the proponent to
consider safer alternative sources ofenergy for Subic Bay.
 On December 22, 2008, the DENR, through former Secretary Jose L.
Atienza, Jr., issued an ECC for the proposed 2x150-MW coal-fired power
plant.
 Sometime thereafter, RP Energy decided to include additional
components in its proposed coal-fired power plant. On July 8, 2010, the
DENR-EMB issued an amended ECC (first amendment) allowing the
inclusion of additional components, among others.
 Several months later, RP Energy again requested the DENR-EMB to amend
the ECC. Instead of constructing a 2x150-MW coal-fired power plant, as
originally planned, it now sought to construct a 1x300-MW coal-fired
power plant.
 On May 26, 2011, the DENR-EMB granted the request and further
amended the ECC (second amendment).
 The Sangguniang Panglalawiganof Zambales issued Resolution No. 2011-
149, opposing the establishment of a coal-fired thermal power plant.
 The Liga ng mga Barangayof Olongapo City issued Resolution No. 12,
Series of 2011, expressing its strong objection to the coal-fired power plant
as an energy source.
 Hon. Casino’s group filed for a writ of kalikasan against RP energy, SBMA,
DENR. The Casiño Group alleged, among others, that the power plant
project would cause environmental damage. that it would adversely
affect the health of the residents of the municipalities of Subic, Zambales,
Morong, Hermosa, and the City of Olongapo.
 While the case was pending in the CA, RP Energy applied for another
amendment to its ECC proposing the construction and operation of a
2x300-MW coal fired power plant
 CA:
Denied the writ of kalikasan due to the failure of the Casiño Group to prove
that its constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology was violated
or threatened
- no reason also to nullify sec 8.3 of DAO 2003-30) which allows
amendments of ECCs. Not ultra vires, as the express power of the
Secretary of DENR, director and regional directors of the EMB to issue an
ECC impliedly includes the incidental power to amend the same.
- The validity of the said section cannot be collaterally attacked in a
petition for a writ of kalikasan
But invalidated the ECC for non-compliance with the IPRA law and LGC and
failure to affix the signature in the sworn statement of full responsibility
- Non-compliance with sec 59 of IPRA Law (enjoins all departments and
other governmental agencies from granting any lease without a prior
certification that the area affected does not overlap with any ancestral
domain)
- The CA also invalidated the LDA entered into by SBMA and RP Energy as it
was issued without the prior consultation and approval of all the
sanggunians concerned as required under Sections 26 and 27 of the LGC
- For failure of Luis Miguel Abolitz, director of RP Energy to affix his signature
in the sworn statement of full responsibility (integral part of the ECC)
- The first and second amendment for failure to comply with the restrictions
in the ECC which requires that any expansion of the project beyond the
project description or any change in the activity shall be subject to a new
environmental impact assessment
Invalidated the LDA entered into by SBMA and RP Energy
- Issued without prior consultation and approval of all the sanggunians
concerned as under secs 26 and 27 of the LGC
- In violation of sec 59 chapter VIII of the IPRA Law which enjoins all
departments and other governmental agencies from granting any lease
without a prior certification that the area affected does not overlap with
any ancestral domain
- no CNO was secured from the NCIP prior to the execution of the
LDA and that the CNO dated October 31, 2012 was secured during
the pendency of the case and was issued in connection with RP
Energy’s application for a 2x300 MW Coal fired plant
ISSUE

1. Whether the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a
writ of Kalikasan; and
2. Whether the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan

Ruling
1. Yes, the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a writ of
Kalikasan because the Rules on the Writ of kalikasan (Rule 7, Section 16 of the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases) allow the parties to raise, on
appeal, questions of fact— and, thus, constitutes an exception to Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court— because of the extraordinary nature of the circumstances
surrounding the issuance of a writ of kalikasan.

2. Yes, the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan because
such writ is principally predicated on an actual or threatened violation of the
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology, which involves
environmental damage of a magnitude that transcends political and territorial
boundaries.

A party, therefore, who invokes the writ based on alleged defects or irregularities
in the issuance of an ECC must not only allege and prove such defects or
irregularities, but must also provide a causal link or, at least, a reasonable
connection between the defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC and
the actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology of the magnitude contemplated under the Rules. Otherwise,
the petition should be dismissed outright and the action re-filed before the
proper forum with due regard to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies.

In the case at bar, no such causal link or reasonable connection was shown or
even attempted relative to the aforesaid second set of allegations. It is a mere
listing of the perceived defects or irregularities in the issuance of the ECC.
The appellate court correctly ruled that the Casino group FAILED to substantiate
its claims that the construction and operation of the power plant will cause
environmental damage of the magnitude contemplated under the writ of
kalikasan. On the other hand, RP Energy presented evidence to establish that
the subject project will not cause grave environmental damage through its
environmental management plan which will ensure that the project will operate
within the limits of existing environmental laws and standars.

OTHER ISSUES:
 CA erred in invalidating the ECC on the ground of lack of signature of Mr.
Abolitz in the ECC’s statement of accountability relative to the copy of
the ECC submitted by RP Energy to the CA. The circumstance of the case
show that the DENR and RP Energy were not properly apprised of the issue
of lack of signature in order for them to present controverting evidence
and arguments on this point, as the issue only arose during the course of
the proceedings upon clarificatory questions from the CA.
 CA erred when it ruled that the first and second amendments to the ECC
were invalid for failure to comply with a new EIA and for violating DAO
2003-30 and the Revised Manual. DENR reasonably exercised its discretion
 in requiring an ERMP and a PDR for the first and second amendment
respectively. Through these documents which the DENR reviewed, a new
EIA was conducted relative to the proposed project modifications. No
showing of grave abuse of discretion or patent illegality.
 CA erred when it invalidated ECC for failure to comply with sec 59 of the
IPRA Law. The ECC is not the license or permit contemplated under sec 59.
There is no necessity to secure the Certificate of Non Overlap (CNO) under
sec 59 before and ECC may be issued and the issuance of the subject
ECC without first securing the aforesaid certification does not render it
invalid.
 CA erred when it ruled that compliance with sec 27 in relation to sec 26 of
the LGC (approval of the concerned sanggunian requirement) is
necessary prior to issuance of the subject ECC) issuance of the ECC does
not, by itself, result in the implementation of the project. Hence, there is no
necessity to secure prior compliance with the approval of the concerned
sanggunian requirement and the issuance of the subject ECC without first
complying with the aforesaid requirement does not render it invalid.

8) West Tower Condominium Corporation v. FPIC

9) LNL v. Agham Party List

FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Amended Decision
dated 13 September 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00012.
1. Petitioner LNL Archipelago Minerals, Inc. (“LAMI”) is the operator of a mining
claim located in Sta. Cruz, Zambales. LAMI embarked on a project to build a
private, non-commercial port in Brgy. Bolitoc which is about 25 kilometers away
from the mine site.
a. A port is a vital infrastructure to the operations of a mining company to ship
out ores and other minerals extracted from the mines.
. LAMI secured the following permits and compliance certificates for the
port project:
DENR Environmental Compliance Certificate 

DENR provisional foreshore lease agreement with LAMI 

Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) Clearance to Develop a Port 

PPA Permit to Construct a Port 

PPA Special Permit to Operate a Beaching Facility 

Tree Cutting Permit/Certification from the Community 
 Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR. 

. LAMI was supported by the Zambales Alliance, Bolitoc community, and
even the Sangguniang Bayan of Sta. Cruz. However, the local
government refused to issue business and mayor’s permits despite
complying with the requirements. Mayor Marty issued an order directing
LAMI to refrain from continuing with its clearing works.
. DENR Environmental Management Bureau in Region III (DENR-EMB R3)
received a letter dated from Mayor Marty inquiring if the ECC the DENR
issued in favor of LAMI allowed LAMI to cut trees and level a mountain. It
was found that LAMI violated some of its conditions under the ECC. A
 Notice of Violation (NOV) was issued against LAMI for violation of certain
conditions of the ECC with a cease and desist order from further
constructing and developing until such time that the ECC conditions were
fully complied. 

. However, DENR found that LAMI's activities in its property would not result
to any environmental damage to its surrounding communities and lifted
the cease and desist order after LAMI was found to have complied with
the requirements. 

. Respondent Agham Party List (Agham), through its President, former
Representative Angelo B. Palmones (Rep. Palmones), filed a Petition for
the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan. Agham alleged that: Section 68 of PD
No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, or the Revised Forestry
Code; and 
 Sections 57 and 69 of RA No. 7942, or the Philippine Mining
Act of 1995 (Philippine Mining Act). 
 LAMI cut mountain trees and
flattened a mountain which serves as a natural protective barrier from
typhoons and floods not only of the residents of Zambales but also the
residents of some nearby towns located in Pangasinan. 


ISSUES:
1. Is LAMI’s project violative of the environmental laws as alleged by
Agham? NO, LAMI did not violate laws as alleged by Agham.

2. Did LAMI flatten any mountain and cause environmental damage of such
magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or
more cities or provinces? NO, LAMI did not flatten any mountain which caused
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or
property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.

[Revised Forestry Code] LAMI was given a Tree Cutting Permit 
 45 by the CENRO
dated 17 April 2012. 

[Philippine Mining Act] These two provisions are inapplicable 
 to this case. First,
LAMI is not conducting any mining activity on the port site. LAMI's mine site is
about 25 kilometers away from the port site. Second, LAMI secured all the
necessary permits and licenses for the construction of a port and LAMI's activity
was limited to preparatory works for the port's construction. 

The Philippine Mining Act deals with mining operations and other mining
activities. Sections 57 and 69 deal with the development of a mining community
and environmental protection covering a mineral agreement or permit.

[Section 2 of Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases] The Rules are clear
that in a Writ of Kalikasan petitioner has the burden to prove the (1)
environmental law, rule or regulation violated or threatened to be violated; (2)
act or omission complained of; and (3) the environmental damage of such
magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or
more cities or provinces.
. In accusing that LAMI allegedly flattened a mountain, Agham did not cite
any law allegedly violated by LAMI in relation to this claim. 

 . Agham did not present any proof to demonstrate that the local residents
in Zambales, and even the nearby towns of Pangasinan, complained of
any great danger or harm on the alleged leveling of the land formation
which may affect their lives, health or properties. Neither was there any
evidence showing of a grave and real environmental damage to the
barangay and the surrounding vicinity. 

1. Witnesses claim that the project “does not in any way affect or cannot affect
the Province of Pangasinan as alleged.”
b. [Existence of a mountain] Mines and Geosciences Bureau, Geosciences
Division of the DENR concluded that the "mountain" is only an elongated mound.

DECISION:
Petition GRANTED. Ammended CA decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Original CA
decision, which DENIED the petition for the issuance of the privilege of the Writ of
Kalikasan. Is REINSTATED AND AFFIRMED

10) International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications v.

Green Peace Southeast Asia, et al.

FACTS

 On 24 September 2010, a Memorandum of Undertaking was executed

between International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech
Applications, Inc. (ISAAA), University of the Philippines Los Baños
Foundation, Inc. (UPLBFI) and UP Mindanao Foundation, Inc. (UPMFI), in
pursuance of a collaborative research and development project on
eggplants that are resistant to the fruit and shoot borer. Other partner
agencies involved were UPLB through its Institute of Plant Breeding,
Maharastra Hybrid Seed Company (MAHYCO) of India, Cornell University
and the Agricultural Biotechnology Support Project II (ABSPII) of USAID.
 The UPLB Field Trial Proposal states that the pest-resistant crop subject of
the field trial was described as a “bio-engineered eggplant.” The crystal
toxin genes from the soil bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) were
incorporated into the eggplant genome to produce the protein CrylAc
which is toxic to target insect pests. The latter is said to be highly specific
to lepidopteran larvae such as fruit and shoot borer (FSB), the most
destructive insect pest of eggplant.
 NCBP issued a Certificate of Completion of Contained Experiment which
was conducted from 2007 to 3 March 2009 stating that during the
conduct of experiment, all the biosafety measures have been complied
with and no untoward incident has occurred.
 On 16 March 2010 and 28 June 2010, the Bureau of Plant Industry (BPI)
issued biosafety permits to UPLB.
 Field testing commenced on various dates in the following approved trial
sites: Kabacan, North Cotabato; Sta. Maria, Pangasinan; Pili, Camarines
Sur; Bago Oshiro, Davao City; and Bay, Laguna.
 On 26 April 2012, Greenpeace, MASIPAG and individual respondents
(Greenpeace, et.al.) filed a petition for writ of kalikasan and writ of
continuing mandamus with prayer for the issuance of Temporary
Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) alleging that the Bt talong field
trials violate their constitutional right to health and a balanced ecology
considering that:
- The required Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) under
PD 1151 was not secured prior to the project implementation
- There is no independent, peer-reviewed study on the safety of Bt
talong for human consumption and the environment
- There was a study conducted showing adverse effects on rats who
were fed Bt corn, local scientists likewise attested to the harmful
effects of GMOs to human and animal health
- Bt crops can be directly toxic to non-target species
- There is a failure to comply with the required public consultation
under Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government Code
- The case calls for the application of the precautionary principle, it
being a classic environmental case where scientific evidence as to
the health, environmental and socio-economic safety is insufficient
or uncertain and preliminary scientific evaluation indicates
reasonable grounds for concern that there are potentially
dangerous effects on human health and the environment
 The following reliefs are prayed for by Greenpeace, et.al., to wit:
- Issuance of a TEPO enjoining BPI and Fertilizer and Pesticide
Authority (FPA) of the Department of Agriculture (DA) from
processing for field testing and registering as herbicidal product Bt
talong in the Philippines, stopping all pending field testing, and
ordering the uprooting of planted Bt talong; and
- Issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus commanding the
ISAAAI, et.al.: (1) to submit to an environmental impact statement
system under the Environmental Management Bureau of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR-EMB); (2)
to submit an independent, comprehensive, and rigid risk
assessment, field tests report, and regulatory compliance reports;
(3) to submit all issued certifications on public information, public
consultation, public participation and consent from the LGUs
affected by the field testing; (4) to submit an acceptable draft of
an amendment of the NBF and DAO 2002-08; and (5) for BPI of DA
to conduct balanced nationwide public information on the nature
of Bt talong and Bt talong field trial, and a survey of its social
acceptability.
 On 2 May 2012, the SC issued the writ of kalikasan against ISAAA, EMB, BPI,
FPA and UPLB, ordering them to file a verified return.
 The contentions of the respondents are as follows:
- All environmental laws were complied with, including public
consultations in the affected communities
- The Bt talong project is not covered by the Philippine Environmental
Impact Statement Law
 - There is a plethora of scientific works and literature, peer-reviewed,
on the safety of Bt talong for human consumption
- Allegations regarding the safety of Bt talong are irrelevant in the
field trial stage as none of the eggplants will be consumed by
humans or animals
- There is a non-observance of the rule on hierarchy of courts
- Greenpeace, et.al. have no legal standing as they do not stand to
suffer any direct injury as a result of the Bt talong field tests
- The precautionary principle does not apply since the field testing is
only a part of a continuing study to ensure that the field trials have
no significant and negative impact on the environment
 SC, in a Resolution dated 10 July 2012, referred the case to the Court of
Appeals.
 On 12 September 2012, the parties submitted the following procedural
issues before the CA: (1) whether Greenpeace, et.al. has legal standing to
file the petition for writ of kalikasan; (2) whether the petition has been
rendered moot and academic by the alleged termination of the Bt talong
field testing; and (3) whether the case presented a justiciable controversy
 CA, in a Resolution dated 12 October 2012, resolved that: (1) the
Greenpeace, et.al. possess legal standing; (2) the case is not yet moot
since it is capable of repetition yet evading review; and (3) the alleged
non-compliance with environmental and local government laws present
justiciable controversies for resolution by the court.
 On 17 May 2013, CA rendered a decision in favor of the Greenpeace,
et.al. finding that the precautionary principle set forth in Section 1, Rule 20
of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (the Rules) finds
relevance in the case.
 CA rejected the Motions for Reconsideration filed by ISAAA, EMB/BPI/FPA,
UPLB and UPLBFI rejecting the argument that CA violated UPLB’s right to
academic freedom. The writ stops the field trials of Bt talong as a
procedure, it does not stop Bt talong research. Thus, there is no assault on
academic freedom.
 CA further justified its ruling by expounding on the theory that introducing
a genetically modified plant into our ecosystem is an “ecologically
imbalancing act.”
 Before the SC is a consolidated petition of ISAAAI, EMB/BPI/FPA, UPLB and
UPLBFI to reverse the CA decision permanently enjoining the conduct of
field trials for Genetically Modified eggplants.

ISSUES

1. WON the law on environmental impact statement/assessment applies on

projects involving the introduction and propagation of GMOs in the
country
2. WON there is neglect or unlawful omission committed by the public
respondents in the processing and evaluation of the applications for Bt
talong field testing
3. WON the Precautionary Principle applies
RULING

1. Yes. EO 514 mandates that concerned departments and agencies, most

particularly petitioners DENR-EMB, BPI and FPA, to make a determination
whether the EIS system should apply to the release of GMOs into the
environment and issue joint guidelines on the matter.

The Philippine EIS System (PEISS) is concerned primarily with assessing the
direct and indirect impacts of a project on the biophysical and human
environment and ensuring that these impacts are addressed by appropriate
environmental protection and enhancement measures. It aids proponents in
incorporating environmental considerations in planning their projects as well
as in determining the environment’s impact on their project.” There are six
stages in the regular EIA process. The proponent initiates the first three stages
while EMB takes the lead in the last three stages. Public participation is
enlisted in most stages.

Even without the issuance of EO 514, GMO field testing should have at
least been considered for EIA under existing regulations of EMB on new and
emerging technologies, to wit:
g) Group V (Unclassified Projects): These are the projects not
listed in any of the groups, e.g. projects using new
processes/technologies with uncertain impacts. This is an interim
category – unclassified projects will eventually be classified into
their appropriate groups after EMB evaluation. (Emphasis
supplied)

All government agencies as well as private corporations, firms and entities

who intend to undertake activities or projects which will affect the quality of
environment are required to prepare a detailed Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) prior to undertaking such development activity.

An environmentally critical project (ECP) is considered by the EMB as

“likely to have significant adverse impact that may be sensitive, irreversible
and diverse” and which “include activities that have significant
environmental consequences.”

In this context, and given the overwhelming scientific attention worldwide

on the potential hazards of GMOs to human health and the environment,
their release into the environment through field testing would definitely fall
under the category of ECP.

2. Yes. It must be stressed that DAO 2002-08 and related DA order are not the
only legal bases for regulating field trials of GM plants and plant products. EO
514 clearly provides that the NBF applies to the development, adoption and
implementation of all biosafety policies, measures and guidelines and in
making biosafety decisions concerning the research, development, handling
and use, transboundary movement, release into the environment and
management of regulated articles.

The NBF requires the use of precaution, as provided in Section 2.6 which
reads:

2.6. Using Precaution. – In accordance with Principle 15 of the

Rio Declaration of 1992 and the relevant provisions of the
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, in particular Article 1, 10 (par.
6) and 11 (par. 8), the precautionary approach shall guide
biosafety decisions. The principles and elements of this
approach are hereby implemented through the decision-
making system in the NBF.

It likewise contains general principles and minimum guidelines that the

concerned agencies are expected to follow and which their respective rules
and regulations must conform with. In cases of conflict in applying the
principles, the principle of protecting the public interest and welfare shall
always prevail, and no provision of the NBF shall be construed as to limit the
legal authority and mandate of heads of departments and agencies to
consider the national interest and public welfare in making biosafety
decisions.

Notably, Section 7 of NBF mandates a more transparent, meaningful and

participatory public consultation on the conduct of field trials beyond the
posting and publication of notices and information sheets, consultations with
some residents and government officials, and submission of written
comments, provided in DAO 2002-08.
The Supreme Court found that ISAAAI, et.al. simply adhered to the
procedures laid down by DAO 2002-08 and no real effort was made to
operationalize the principles of NBF in the conduct of field testing of Bt talong.
Said failure means that the DA lacks mechanisms to mandate applicants to
comply with international biosafety protocols. For these reasons, the DAO
2002-08 should be declared invalid.

Parenthetically, during the hearing at the CA, Atty. Segui of the EMB was
evasive in answering the questions on whether his office undertook the
necessary evaluation on the possible environmental impact of Bt talong field
trials and the release of GMOs into the environment in general. While he
initially cited lack of budget and competence as reasons for their inaction,
he later said that an amendment of the law should be made since projects
involving GMOS are not covered by Proclamation No. 2146, entitled
“Proclaiming Certain Areas and Types of Projects as Environmentally Critical
and Within the Scope of the Environmental Impact Statement System
Established Under Presidential Decree No. 1586”.

The Supreme Court took the above as an indication of the DENR-EMB’s

lack of serious attention to their mandate under EO 514 to ensure that
 environmental assessments are done and impacts identified in biosafety
decisions.

Section 6 of EO 514 likewise directed the DOST, DENR, DA and DOH to

ensure the allocation of funds for the implementation of the NBF as it was
intended to be a multi-disciplinary effort involving the different government
departments and agencies.

The petitioners government agencies clearly failed to fulfil their mandates

in the implementation of the NBF.

3. Yes. The precautionary principle originated in Germany in the 1960s,

expressing the normative idea that governments are obliged to “foresee and
forestall” harm to the environment. The Rules incorporated the principle in
Part V, Rule 20, which states:

SEC.1. Applicability. – When there is a lack of full scientific

certainty in establishing a causal link between human activity
and environmental effect, the court shall apply the
precautionary principle in resolving the case before it.

The constitutional right of the people to a balanced and

healthful ecology shall be given the benefit of the doubt.

SEC 2. Standards for application. – In applying the

precautionary principle, the following factors, among others,
may be considered: (1) threats to human life or health; (2)
inequity to present or future generations; or (3) prejudice to the
environment without legal consideration of the environmental
rights of those affected.

When the features of uncertainty, possibility of irreversible harm, and

possibility of serious harm coincide, the case for the precautionary principle is
strongest. The Supreme Court found all three (3) conditions present.

While the goal of increasing crop yields to raise farm incomes is laudable,
independent scientific studies revealed uncertainties due to unfulfilled
economic benefits from Bt crops and plants, adverse effects on the
environment associated with the use of GE technology in agriculture, and
serious health hazards from consumption of GM foods. For a biodiversity-rich
country like the Philippines, the natural and unforeseen consequences of
contamination and genetic pollution would be disastrous and irreversible.

Alongside the aforesaid uncertainties, the non-implementation of the NBF

in the crucial stages of risk assessment and public consultation, including the
determination of the applicability of the EIS requirements to the GMO field
testing, are compelling reasons for the application of the precautionary
principle.
 There exists a preponderance of evidence that the release of the GMOs
into the environment threatens to damage our ecosystems and not just the
field trial sites, and eventually the health of our people once the Bt eggplants
are consumed as food.

Adopting the precautionary approach, the Supreme Court ruled that the
principles of the NBF need to be operationalized first by the coordinated
actions of the concerned departments and agencies before allowing the
release into the environment of genetically modified eggplant.

Further, the precautionary approach entailed inputs from stakeholders,

including marginalized famers, not just the scientific community. This
proceeds from the realization that acceptance of uncertainty is not only a
scientific issue, but is related to public policy and involves an ethical
dimension.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

1. The conduct of Bt talong field testing is permanently enjoined.

2. DAO 2002-08 is declared null and void.
3. Any application for contained use, field testing, propagation and
commercialization, and importation of GMOs is temporarily enjoined
until a new administrative order is promulgated in accordance with
law.

Article 2 Sec. 16 in relation to Art. 7, Sec. 21, Art 16, Sec. 3 and Article 18, Sec. 25

11) Pedro Arigo v. Scott Swift

FACTS

 Tubbataha was declared a National Marine Park by virtue of

Proclamation No. 306 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on 11 August
1988.
 In 1993, Tubbataha was inscribed by the United Nations Educational
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a World Heritage Site. It
was recognized as one of the Philippines’ oldest ecosystems.
 On 6 April 2010, Congress passed R.A. No. 10067 (RA 10067), otherwise
known as the “Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009”, to
ensure protection and conservation of the Tubbataha Reefs into
perpetuity for the enjoyment of present and future generations.
 Under the “no take” policy, entry into the waters of the TRNP is strictly
regulated and many human activities are prohibited, penalized or fined,
including fishing, gathering, destroying and disturbing the resources within
the TRNP.
 In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic
clearance for the USS Guardian (the ship) “to enter and exit the territorial
waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the
purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty.”
 On 6 January 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on
13 January 2013. Two days later, it departed Subic Bay for its next port of
call in Makassar, Indonesia.
 On 17 January 2013, while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on
the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs. No one was
injured in the incident and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or
oil.
 On 20 January 2013, US 7th Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Scott Swift
expressed regret for the incident in a press statement.
 On 4 February 2013, US Ambassador to the Philippine Harry Thomas, Jr.
met with Department of Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert del Rosario
regarding the compensation for damage to the reef caused by the ship.
 By 30 March 2013, the US Navy-led salvage team had finished removing
the last piece of the grounded ship from the coral reef.
 On 17 April 2013, petitioners Arigo, et.al. on their behalf and in
representation of their respective sector/organization and others,
including minors or generations yet unborn filed a petition for the issuance
of a Writ of Kalikasan with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary
Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) under the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases. Their contentions are:
- The grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the ship
cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such
magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antiques, Aklan,
Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboaga
del Norte, Basilan, Sulu and Taw-Tawi which events violate their
constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology
- There should be a directive from the Supreme Court for the
institution of civil, administrative and criminal suits for acts
committed in violation of environmental laws and regulations in
connection with the grounding incident
- US respondents committed the following violations under RA 10067:
unauthorized entry; non-payment of conservation fees; obstruction
of law enforcement officer; damages to the reef; and destroying
and disturbing resources
- The VFA provides for a waiver of immunity from suit
 The respondents consist of the following: Scott Swift in his capacity as
Commander of the US 7th Fleet; Mark Rice as the Commanding Officer of
the ship; President Benigno Aquino III as the Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines; Hon. Albert del Rosario as the DFA
Secretary; Hon. Paquito Ochoa as the Executive Secretary; Hon. Ramon
Paje as the DENR Secretary; Vice Admiral Jose Luis Alano as the Philippine
Navy Flag Officer in Command; Admiral Rodolfo Isorena as Commandant
of the Philippine Coast Guard, Commodore Enrico Efren Evangelista as
the Philippine Coast Guard Palawan, Major Gen. Virgilio Domingo as
 Commandant of the AFP and Lt. Gen. Terry Robling as Co-Director of the
US Marine Corps. Forces. The Philippine respondents contend that:
- The grounds relied upon by petitioners for the issuance of TEPO or
writ of Kalikasan have become fait accompli as the salvage
operations on the ship were already completed
- The petition is defective in form and in substance
- The petition improperly raises issues involving VFA between
Philippines and USA
- The determination of the extent of responsibility of the US
Government regarding the damage to the Tubbataha Reefs rests
exclusively with the executive branch

ISSUES

1. WON the Court has jurisdiction over the US respondents

2. WON the waiver of immunity provisions of the VFA applies
3. WON the petition has become moot
4. WON the Court can determine the extent of responsibility of the US
Government

RULING

1. None. The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as

commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision
over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting
in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was
committed while they were performing official military duties. Considering
that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require
remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the
suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State
immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court over the
persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.

It is worthy to note that during the deliberations, Justice Antonio

Carpio took the position that the conduct of the US in this case, when its
warship entered a restricted area in violation of RA 10067 and caused
damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of
Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS).

While historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as

extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of UNCLOS creates an exception to
this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of
the coastal State regarding passage through the latter’s internal waters
and the territorial sea.

Although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of

long-standing policy, the US considers itself bound by customary
 international rules on the “traditional uses of the oceans” as codified in
UNCLOS.

The Court concurs with Justice Carpio’s view that non-membership

in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the rights of the
Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea.
The Court thus expects the US to bear “international responsibility under
Art. 31 of UNCLOS in connection with the USS Guardian grounding which
adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs.

2. No. The waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal
jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for
issuance of a writ of Kalikasan.

In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules of

Procedure for Environmental Cases that a criminal case against a person
charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately:

“SEC. 17. Institution of separate actions. – The filing of a

petition for the issuance of the writ of kalikasan shall not
preclude the filing of separate civil, criminal or administrative
actions.”

A ruling on the application or non-application of criminal

jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found
responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature
and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan. The Court
found it unnecessary to determine whether such waiver of State immunity
is indeed absolute.

In the same vein, the Court cannot grant damages which have
resulted from the violation of environmental laws. Section 15, Rule 7 of the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases enumerates the reliefs which
may be granted in a petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan, to wit:

Section 15. Judgment. - Within sixty (60) days from the time
the petition is submitted for decision, the court shall render
judgment granting or denying the privilege of the writ of
kalikasan.

The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the
following:

(a) Directing respondent to permanently cease and desist

from committing acts or neglecting the performance of a
duty in violation of environmental laws resulting in
environmental destruction or damage;
 (b) Directing the respondent public official, government
agency, private person or entity to protect, preserve,
rehabilitate or restore the environment;

(c) Directing the respondent public official, government

agency, private person or entity to monitor strict compliance
with the decision and orders of the court;

(d) Directing the respondent public official, government

agency, or private person or entity to make periodic reports
on the execution of the final judgment; and

(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people
to a balanced and healthful ecology or to the protection,
preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of the environment,
except the award of damages to individual petitioners.
(Emphasis supplied)

3. Yes, in the sense that the salvage operation sought to be enjoined or

restrained had already been accomplished. However, insofar as the
directives to Philippine respondents to protect and rehabilitate the coral
reef structure and marine habitat adversely affected by the grounding
incident are concerned, petitioners are entitled to these reliefs
notwithstanding the completion of the removal of the USS Guardian from
the coral reef.

The Court is mindful of the fact that the US and Philippine

governments both expressed readiness to negotiate and discuss the
matter of compensation for the damage caused by the USS Guardian.
After all, exploring avenues for settlement of environmental cases is not
proscribed by the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.

4. No. The Court deferred to the Executive Branch the matter of

compensation and rehabilitation measures through diplomatic channels.
Resolution of these issues impinges on our relations with another State in
the context of common security interests under the VFA.

It is settled that the conduct of the foreign relations of our

government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and
legislative – “the political” departments of the government, and the
propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not
subject to judicial inquiry or decision.

Art. 2, Sec. 25 and 26, Art. 6, Sec. 1, 25(4), 25(6), 29(1), Article 10, Sec. 2 and 3
and Article 11, Sec. 1
 12) Belgica v. Hon. Ochoa et al

FACTS: This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251.
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about
1922. Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the
members of the Congress. It underwent several legal designations from
“Congressional Pork Barrel” to the latest “Priority Development Assistance Fund”
or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the annual General
Appropriations Act (GAA).

Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to – P40 million
for “hard projects” (infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and
P30 million for “soft projects” (scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood
programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects,
P100 million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to – P100 million for hard
projects, P100 million for soft projects.

The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby
certain cabinet members may request for the realignment of funds into their
department provided that the request for realignment is approved or concurred
by the legislator concerned.

Presidential Pork Barrel

The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA.
The so-called presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a)
the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project – this has been around
since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the
earnings of PAGCOR – this has been around since about 1983.

Pork Barrel Scam Controversy

Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of
corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that
for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system had been facilitated
by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in funneling their
pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGO’s (non-government organizations)
which would make it appear that government funds are being used in legit
existing projects but are in fact going to “ghost” projects. An audit was then
conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred with
the exposes of Luy et al. Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several
others, filed various petitions before the Supreme Court questioning the
constitutionality of the pork barrel system.

ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is
unconstitutional because it violates the following principles:

a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds
(power of the purse). The executive, on the other hand, implements the laws –
this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may
implement the law but under the pork barrel system, what’s happening was that,
after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to
which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to – a clear act of
implementing the law they enacted – a violation of the principle of separation of
powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork
barrel, then called as CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund, was
constitutional insofar as the legislators only recommend where their pork barrel
funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will
still have to get the concurrence of the legislator concerned.

b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power

As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The
Constitution does grant the people legislative power but only insofar as the
processes of referendum and initiative are concerned). That being, legislative
power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate further that
which was delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve
purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to
carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other national
emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework
of the national development program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the
projects to which his PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-
delegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate funds is solely lodged
in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the
individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the
Congress can delegate the power to the individual member of Congress.

c. Principle of Checks and Balances

One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the
president to veto items in the GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate. But
this power is already being undermined because of the fact that once the GAA
is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to which he will
appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto the
appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is made after the
approval of the GAA – again, “Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting
which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President
useless.”

d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs.
Through their Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their
own programs and policies concerning their localities. But with the PDAF,
particularly on the part of the members of the house of representatives, what’s
happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by
the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national
government (note, a congressman is a national officer) meddles with the affairs
of the local government – and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in
the Constitution on local autonomy. It’s good if that’s all that is happening under
the pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on
the part of legislators.

II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.

The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it
is unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution
which provides: No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law.

Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of
the Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular
legislation.

The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the
Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which
amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from
certain energy-related ventures shall form part of a special fund (the
Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy resource
development and for other purposes which the President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCOR’s
earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund)
which shall be used in government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of
the Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a
particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case of PD
910 and PD 1869.

Issue on political dynasties

NO. Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is considered as not self-
executing due to the qualifying phrase “as may be defined by law.” Therefore,
since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on
political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue.
In any event, the above-stated argument on this score is largely speculative
since it has not been properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would
be able to propagate political dynasties.

6.) …local autonomy

YES. The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually
belies the avowed intention of “making equal the unequal.” The gauge of PDAF
and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking
into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator
represents. As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis
gets the same amount of funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural
province which would be relatively “underdeveloped” compared to the
former. To add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List
Representatives – and in some years, even the Vice-President – who do not
represent any locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF
and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various Local Development Councils
(LDCs), instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared towards
managing local affairs. The programs, policies and resolutions of LDCs should not
be overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are national officers
that have no law-making authority except only when acting as a body.

Article 2, Sec. 28

13) En Banc Resolution. Re: Production of Court Records and Documents and
the Attendance of Court Officials and Employees as Witnesses Under the
Subpoena of February 10, 2012 and the Various Letters of Impeachment
Prosecution Panel Dated January 19 and 25, 2012

Article 2 Sec. 28 and Article 3, Sec. 1 (Full Public Disclosure)

14) Philippine Savings Bank and Pascual M Garcia III v. Senate Impeachment
Court

FACTS: Philippine Savings Bank (PS Bank) and its President, Pascual M. Garcia III,
filed before the Supreme Court an original civil action for certiorari and
prohibition with application for temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. The TRO was sought to stop the Senate, sitting as
impeachment court, from further implementing the Subpoena Ad Testificandum
et Duces Tecum, dated February 6, 2012, that it issued against the Branch
Manager of PS Bank, Katipunan Branch. The subpoena assailed by petitioners
covers the foreign currency denominated accounts allegedly owned by the
impeached Chief Justice Renato Corona of the Philippine Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Should a TRO be issued against the impeachment court to enjoin it from further
implementing the subpoena with respect to the alleged foreign currency
denominated accounts of CJ Corona?

THE RULING:

[The Court en banc ISSUED A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER enjoining the

respondents from implementing the subpoena. It also REQUIRED the respondents
to COMMENT on the [merits of the] petition.]

YES, a TRO should be issued against the impeachment court to enjoin it from
further implementing the subpoena with respect to the alleged foreign currency
denominated accounts of CJ Corona.

There are two requisite conditions for the issuance of a preliminary injunction:

(1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and

(2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven
that the violation sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable injustice.

A clear right to maintain the confidentiality of the foreign currency deposits of

the Chief Justice is provided under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, otherwise
known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act of the Philippines (RA 6426). This law
establishes the absolute confidentiality of foreign currency deposits:

xxx xxx xxx

Under R.A. No. 6426 there is only a single exception to the secrecy of foreign
currency deposits, that is, disclosure is allowed only upon the written permission
of the depositor. In Intengan v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that where the
accounts in question are U.S. dollar deposits, the applicable law is not Republic
Act No. 1405 but RA 6426. Similarly, in the recent case of Government Service
Insurance System v. 15th Division of the Court of Appeals, the Court also held
that RA 6426 is the applicable law for foreign currency deposits and not Republic
Act No. 1405. xxx.

xxx xxx xxx

The written consent under RA 6426 constitutes a waiver of the depositor’s right to
privacy in relation to such deposit. In the present case, neither the prosecution
nor the Impeachment Court has presented any such written waiver by the
alleged depositor, Chief Justice Renato C. Corona. Also, while impeachment
may be an exception to the secrecy of bank deposits under RA 1405, it is not an
exemption to the absolute confidentiality of foreign currency deposits under RA
6426.

Article 3, Sec. 1 (Right to Life, Liberty and Security; Writ of Amparo; Writ of Habeas
Data)

15) Burgos v. PGMA et al

FACTS:
 In 2007, Jonas Burgos was abducted at about 1:30 pm by 4 armed men
and a woman in civilian clothes while having lunch at the HapagKainan
Restaurant in Ever Gotesco Mall, Quezon City.
 On the same year, Jonas’s family files a complaint at the Commission on
Human Rights alleging military involvement in the abduction of Jonas after
tracing the license plate number of the vehicle used in the abduction to a
vehicle impounded in the 56th Infantry Battalion of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines. The Burgos family also filed a complaint with the
Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and Task
Force-USIG – National Capital Region.
 The Burgos family files a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Philippine
Court of Appeals asking that the government produce Jonas to the court
which was denied, however, by the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
 Almost five years since the disappearance of Jonas Burgos, the Burgos
family concluded their presentation of witnesses and evidences for the
Habeas Corpus Petition. The defense shall start presenting their witnesses
in May 2012.
 In light of the latest developments on the abduction case of Jonas Burgos,
the Supreme Court reviews the Court of Appeal’s decision on the
consolidated petitions of Edita Burgos for Habeas Corpus, Contempt and
Writ of Amparo.
 The assailed CA decision dismissed the petition for the issuance of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus; denied the petitioner's motion to declare the
respondents in Contempt; and partially granted the privilege of the Writ of
Amparo
 Last 2010, the Supreme Court issued a resolution ordering the Commission
on Human Rights to continue the investigation regarding the abduction of
Jonas Burgos. The Court tasked the CHR to conduct further investigations
because of the lapses by the PNP-CIDG
 In this same Resolution, we also affirmed the CA's dismissal of the petitions
for Contempt and for the issuance of a Writ of Amparowith respect to
President Macapagal-Arroyo, as she is entitled as President to immunity
from suit.
 March 15, 2011 – The Commission on Human Rights submits its report to the
Supreme Court
 The Commission Submitted the following findings:
a. Based on the facts developed by evidence obtaining in this
case, the CHR finds that the enforced disappearance of Jonas Joseph T.
 Burgos had transpired; and that his constitutional rights to life liberty and
security were violated by the Government have been fully determined.

b. In his SinumpaangSalaysay, Jeffrey had a clear recollection of

the face of HARRY AGAGEN BALIAGA, JR. as one of the principal
abductors, apart from the faces of the two abductors in the cartographic
sketches that he described to the police, after he was shown by the Team
the pictures in the PMA Year Book of Batch Sanghaya 2000 and group
pictures of men taken some years thereafter. The same group of pictures
were shown to detained former 56th IB Army trooper Edmond M. Dag-
uman (Dag-uman), who also positively identified Lt. Harry Baliaga, Jr.
Daguman'sSinumpaangSalaysaystates that he came to know Lt. Baliaga
as a Company Commander in the 56th IB while he was still in the military
service (with Serial No. 800693, from 1997 to 2002) also with the 56th IB but
under 1Lt. UsmalikTayaban, the Commander of Bravo Company

c. Most if not all the actual abductors would have been identified
had it not been for what is otherwise called as evidentiary difficulties
shamelessly put up by some police and military elites. The deliberate
refusal of TJAG Roa to provide the CHR with the requested documents
does not only defy the Supreme Court directive to the AFP but ipso facto
created a disputable presumption that AFP personnel were responsible for
the abduction and that their superiors would be found accountable, if not
responsible, for the crime committed. This observation finds support in the
disputable presumption "That evidence willfully suppressed would be
adverse if produced." (Paragraph (e), Section 3, Rule 131 on Burden of
Proof and Presumptions, Revised Rules on Evidence of the Rules of Court
of the Philippines).
d. As regards the PNP CIDG, the positive identification of former 56th IB
officer Lt. HARRY A. BALIAGA, JR. as one of the principal abductors has
effectively crushed the theory of the CIDG witnesses that the NPAs abducted
Jonas. Baliaga's true identity and affiliation with the military have been
established by overwhelming evidence corroborated by detained former
Army trooper Dag-uman.

e. Interview with VirgilioEustaquio, Chairman of the Union Masses for

Democracy and Justice (UMDJ), revealed that the male abductor of
Jonas Burgos appearing in the cartographic sketch was among the
raiders who abducted him and four others, identified as Jim Cabauatan,
Jose Curament, Ruben Dionisio and Dennis Ibona otherwise known as
ERAP FIVE.

ISSUE:

 WON the CHR report on the disappearance of Jonas Burgos is sufficient

enough for the SC to issue a final ruling and to:
1) Issue a writ of Habeas corpus— YES
2) Declare respondents in contempt— NO
3) Issue a writ of Amparo— NO

Court’s Ruling AMPARO

1. After reviewing the evidence in the present case, the CA findings and our
findings in our June 22, 2010 Resolution heretofore mentioned, including the
recent CHR findings that Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr., (Lt. Baliaga) of the 56th Infantry
Battalion, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army is one of the abductors of Jonas,
we resolve to hold in abeyance our ruling on the merits in the Amparoaspect of
the present case and refer this case back to the CA in order to allow Lt. Baliaga
and the present Amparo respondents to file their respective Comments on the
CHR Report within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of
this Resolution.
2. The Court of Appeals shall continue hearing on the Amparo petition.
3. On the non-compliance of the Office of the Judge Advocate General (TJAG)
to provide the CHR with copies of documents relevant to the case of Jonas, and
thereby disobeyed our June 22, 2010 Resolution.
4. Acting on the CHR's recommendation and based on the above
considerations, we resolve to require General Roa of TJAG, AFP, and the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Personnel, JI, AFP, at the time of our June 22, 2010 Resolution,
and then incumbent Chief of Staff, AFP, to show cause and explain, within a
non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution, why
they should not be held in contempt of this Court for defying our June 22, 2010
Resolution.

Habeas Corpus
1. In light of the new evidence, the Court hereby dismisses the Court of Appeal’s
decision to dismiss the habeas corpus petition.
2. For this purpose, we also order that Lt. Baliaga be impleaded as a party to the
habeas corpus petition and require him - together with the incumbent Chief of
Staff, AFP; the incumbent Commanding General, Philippine Army; and the
Commanding Officer of the 56th IB at the time of the disappearance of Jonas,
Lt. Col. Feliciano - to produce the person of Jonas and to show cause why he
should not be released from detention

Petition of Contempt
1. Two types of Contempt: Criminal contempt is "conduct directed against the
authority and dignity of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act
obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into
disrepute or disrespect." On the other hand, civil contempt is the failure to do
something ordered to be done by a court or a judge for the benefit of the
opposing party therein and is therefore, an offense against the party in whose
behalf the violated order was made. If the purpose is to punish, then it is criminal
in nature; but if to compensate, then it is civil.
2. In proceedings for criminal contempt, the defendant is presumed innocent
and the burden is on the prosecution to prove the charges beyond reasonable
doubt. The presumption of innocence can be overcome only by proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, which means proof to the satisfaction of the court
and keeping in mind the presumption of innocence that precludes every
reasonable hypothesis except that for which it is given. It is not sufficient for the
proof to establish a probability, even though strong, that the fact charged is
more likely true than the contrary. It must establish the truth of the fact to a
reasonable certainty and moral certainty - a certainty that convinces and
satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act upon it.
3. For the petitioner to succeed in her petition to declare the respondents in
contempt for filing false returns in the habeas corpus proceedings before the
CA, she has the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the
respondents had custody of Jonas.
4. In light of the dismissal of the petitions against President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo who is no the longer the President of the Republic of the Philippines, she
should now be dropped as a party-respondent in these petitions.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND: Court of Appeals: Petition for the Issuance of the

Writ of Habeas Corpus

FACTS:
At around 1:00 in the afternoon of April 28, 2007, Jonas Joseph T. Burgos – a
farmer advocate and a member of Kilusang Magbubukid sa Bulacan was
forcibly taken and abducted by a group of four (4) men and a woman from the
extension portion of Hapag Kainan Restaurant, located at the ground floor of
Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.
On April 30, 2007, the petitioner, Edita Burgos, held a press conference and
announced that her son Jonas was missing. That same day, the petitioner sought
confirmation from the guard if the person abducted was her son Jonas. In a
subsequent police investigation and Land Transportation Office (LTO)
verification, it was discovered that plate number TAB 194 was registered to a
1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle owned by a certain Mauro B. Mudlong. The said vehicle
was seized and impounded on June 24, 2006 for transporting timber without
permit. However, in May 2007, right after Jonas’ abduction was made public, it
was discovered that plate number TAB 194 of this 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle was
missing, and the engine and other spare parts were “cannibalized.” The police
was likewise able to generate cartographic sketches of two of the abductors of
Jonas based on its interview of eyewitnesses.
On August 29, 2007, the Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (PNP-CIDG) presented Emerito Lipio a.k.a. Ka Tibo/Ka Cris,
Marlon D. Manuel a.k.a. Ka Carlo, and Melissa Concepcion Reyes a.k.a. Ka
Lisa/Ramil to support the theory that elements of the New People’s Army (NPA)
perpetrated the abduction of Jonas.
In its July 17, 2008 decision, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition for
the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, denied the petitioner’s motion to
declare the respondents in contempt; and partially granted the privilege of the
Writ of Amparo in favor of the petitioner. Essentially, the CA found that the
evidence the petitioner presented failed to establish her claimed direct
connection between the abductors of Jonas and the military. It also found that
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the PNP did not fully exert their
effort in the conduct of investigation. The CA ruled that the AFP has the burden
of connecting certain loose ends regarding the identity of Ka Ramon and the
allegation that Ka Ramon is indeed Jonas in the “Order of Battle.” As for the PNP-
CIDG, the CA branded its investigation as “rather shallow” and “conducted
haphazardly.”

PERTINENT ISSUE: Whether or not the failure of the PNP and AFP to conduct an
exhaustive and meaningful investigation and to exercise extraordinary diligence
in the performance of their duties is a fatal to the grant of the privilege of the Writ
of Amparo.
ANSWER: Yes.
SUPREME COURT RULINGS:
ON PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO
Effect of the failure of the PNP and AFP to conduct an exhaustive and meaningful
investigation and to exercise extraordinary diligence in the performance of their
duties – Considering the findings of the CA and our review of the records of the
present case, we conclude that the PNP and the AFP have so far failed to
conduct an exhaustive and meaningful investigation into the disappearance of
Jonas Burgos, and to exercise the extraordinary diligence (in the performance of
their duties) that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires. Because of these
investigative shortcomings, we cannot rule on the case until a more meaningful
investigation, using extraordinary diligence, is undertaken.
DISPOSITIVE:
In disposing of the case, the Supreme Court issued the following directives:
1. DIRECTED the Commission on Human Rights to conduct appropriate
investigative proceedings, including field investigations – acting as the
Court’s directly commissioned agency for purposes of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo
2. REQUIRE the incumbent Chiefs of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine National Police to make available and to provide copies, to the
Commission on Human Rights, of all documents and records in their
possession and as the Commission on Human Rights may require, relevant to
the case of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos, subject to reasonable regulations
consistent with the Constitution and existing laws;
3. DIRECTED the PNP-CIDG and its incumbent Chief to submit to the Commission
on Human Rights the records and results of the investigation the PNP-CIDG
claimed to have forwarded to the Department of Justice, which were not
included in their previous submissions to the Commission on Human Rights,
including such records as the Commission on Human Rights may require,
pursuant to the authority granted under this Resolution;
4. DIRECTED the PNP-CIDG to provide direct investigative assistance to the
Commission on Human Rights as it may require, pursuant to the authority
granted under this Resolution;
5. AUTHORIZED the Commission on Human Rights to conduct a comprehensive
and exhaustive investigation that extends to all aspects of the case (not
limited to the specific directives as outlined above), as the extraordinary
measures the case may require under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo; and
6. REQUIRED the Commission on Human Rights to submit to this Court a Report
with its recommendations, copy furnished the petitioner, the incumbent
Chiefs of the AFP, the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and all the respondents, within
ninety (90) days from receipt of the Resolution.
In light of the retirement of Lt. General Alexander Yano and the reassignment of
the other respondents who have all been impleaded in their official capacities,
all subsequent resolutions and actions from the Supreme Court were served on,
and directly enforceable by, the incumbents of the impleaded offices/units
whose official action is necessary. The present respondents shall continue to be
personally impleaded for purposes of the responsibilities and accountabilities
they may have incurred during their incumbencies.
The Supreme Court likewise affirmed the dismissal of the petitions for Contempt
and for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with respect to President Gloria
Macapagal -Arroyo.

16) Boac v. Cadapan

FACTS: June 26, 2006, armed men abducted Sherlyn Cadapan (Sherlyn), Karen
Empeño (Karen) and Manuel Merino (Merino) (abductees) from a house in San
Miguel, Hagonoy, Bulacan. The three were herded onto a jeep bearing license
plate RTF 597 that sped towards an undisclosed location.Spouses Asher and
Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeño filed a petition for habeas corpus
before the Court, impleading then Generals Romeo Tolentino and Jovito
Palparan (Gen. Palparan), Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac (Lt. Col. Boac), Arnel Enriquez
and Lt. Francis Mirabelle Samson (Lt. Mirabelle) as respondents. The Court issued
a writ of habeas corpus, returnable to the Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals. By Return of the Writ, the respondents in the habeas corpus petition
denied that abductees are in the custody of the military. Trial thereupon ensued
at the appellate court. The Court of Appeals dismissed the habeas corpus
petition. The Court, however, further resolves to refer the case to the Commission
on Human Rights, the National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine
National Police for separate investigations and appropriate actions as may be
warranted by their findings and to furnish the Court with their separate reports on
the outcome of their investigations and the actions taken thereon. Petitioners
moved for a reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision. Erlinda Cadapan
and Concepcion Empeño filed before this Court a Petition for Writ of Amparo
With Prayers for Inspection of Place and Production of Documents The petition
impleaded the same respondents in the habeas corpus petition, with the
 addition of then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, then Armed Forces of the
Phil. (AFP) Chief of Staff Hermogenes Esperon Jr., then Phil. National Police (PNP)
Chief Gen. Avelino Razon (Gen. Razon), Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado (Lt. Col.
Anotado) and Donald Caigas. Then President Arroyo was eventually dropped as
respondent in light of her immunity from suit while in office. By Resolution the
Court issued a writ of amparo returnable to the Special Former Eleventh Division
of the appellate court, and ordered the consolidation of the amparo petition
with the pending habeas corpus petition. By Decision of the appellate court
granted the Motion for Reconsideration and ordered the immediate release of
Sherlyn, Karen and Merino.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the testimony of Raymond Manalo is credible;

2. Whether the chief of the AFP, the commanding general of the Philippine Army,
as well as the heads of the concerned units had command responsibility over
the abduction and detention of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino;
3. Whether there is a need to file a motion for execution to cause the release of the
aggrieved parties; and
4. Whether Court of Appeals erred in dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
as party respondent in this case.

RULING:

1. Yes, Raymond’s affidavit and testimony were corroborated by the affidavit of

respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and medical reports prepared by
forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of the scars left by the physical
injuries inflicted on respondents, also corroborate respondents’ accounts of the
torture they endured while in detention. Respondent Raymond Manalo’s
familiarity with the facilities in Fort Magsaysay such as the “DTU,” as shown in his
testimony and confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be the “Division Training Unit,”
firms up respondents’ story that they were detained for some time in said military
facility. The corroborative testimonies, in the same case, of Manalo’s brother
Reynaldo and a forensic specialist, as well as Manalo’s graphic description of the
detention area. There is thus no compelling reason for the Court to disturb its
appreciation in Manalo’s testimony. The outright denial of petitioners Lt. Col.
Boac, et al. thus crumbles.
2. No, The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the
development of laws of war and armed combats. Command responsibility in its
simplest terms, means the “responsibility of commanders for crimes committed
by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their
control in international wars or domestic conflict.” In this sense, command
responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of
1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility, foreshadowing the
present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities
committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over
 them. As then formulated, command responsibility is “an omission mode of
individual criminal liability,” whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes
committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators
(as opposed to crimes he ordered). (citations omitted; emphasis in the original;
underscoring supplied). It bears stressing that command responsibility is properly
a form of criminal complicity, and thus a substantive rule that points to criminal or
administrative liability. An amparo proceeding is not criminal in nature nor does it
ascertain the criminal liability of individuals or entities involved. Neither does it
partake of a civil or administrative suit. Rather, it is a remedial measure designed
to direct specified courses of action to government agencies to safeguard the
constitutional right to life, liberty and security of aggrieved individuals. An
amparo proceeding does nor determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for
the disappearance or threats thereof or extrajudicial killings; it determines
responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance…for
purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance…
3. No, Contrary to the ruling of the appellate court, there is no need to file a motion
for execution for an amparo or habeas corpus decision. Since the right to life,
liberty and security of a person is at stake, the proceedings should not be
delayed and execution of any decision thereon must be expedited as soon as
possible since any form of delay, even for a day, may jeopardize the very rights
that these writs seek to immediately protect. The Solicitor General’s argument
that the Rules of Court supplement the Rule on the Writ of Amparo is misplaced.
The Rules of Court only find suppletory application in an amparo proceeding if
the Rules strengthen, rather than weaken, the procedural efficacy of the writ. As
it is, the Rule dispenses with dilatory motions in view of the urgency in securing
the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party. Suffice it to state that a motion
for execution is inconsistent with the extraordinary and expeditious remedy being
offered by an amparo proceeding. In fine, the appellate court erred in ruling
that its directive to immediately release Sherlyn, Karen and Merino was not
automatically executory. For that would defeat the very purpose of having
summary proceedings in amparo petitions. Summary proceedings, it bears
emphasis, are immediately executory without prejudice to further appeals that
may be taken therefrom.
4. No, the Court finds the appellate court’s dismissal of the petitions against then
President Arroyo well-taken, owing to her immunity from suit at the time the
habeas corpus and amparo petitions were filed. Settled is the doctrine that the
President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in
any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution
or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of
State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such.
Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment,
hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his
official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one
constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the
discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the
Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government.
Parenthetically, the petitions are bereft of any allegation that then President
Arroyo permitted, condoned or performed any wrongdoing against the three
missing persons.

17) Mison v. Hon Gallegos

FACTS: 
 On 23 December 2013, the International Criminal Police Organization

(Interpol) of Seoul, Republic of Korea sent a Notice to Interpol Manila requesting
assistance in the location and deportation of respondent Ja Hoon Ku (Ku) for
arbitrarily spending money allotted as reserve fund of Phildip Korea Co., Ltd.
Hence, asked Hon. Siegfred Mison, Chairperson of the Bureau of Immigration (BI),
for the immediate arrest and deportation of Ku to Korea for being an undesirable
alien.

Special Prosecutor Maria Antonette Bucasas-Mangrobang charged Ku for being

a risk to public interest pursuant to Sec. 69, Act No. 2711. BI officers, with the
assistance of the Manila Police District-Warrant and Subpoena Section, arrested
Ku. Upon arrival at the BI detention center, Ku was detained
On 17 January 2014, the Republic of Korea voided Ku’s passport. Ku filed a
Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with Interim Remedies. Judge
Gallegos, in an Order dated 22 January 2014, issued a Writ of Amparo. Also,
Judge Gallegos issued the first assailed Order granting the motion for issuance of
TPO, entrusting Ku’s custody to the Philippine National Red Cross and/or its
Chairman CEO Richard Gordon, and directing the Philippine National Police-
Police Security and Protection Group (PNP-PSPG) to protect Ku and his
immediate family


ISSUE: WON Writ of Amparo should prosper

RULING: Writ of Amparo not proper.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule)39 provides: SECTION
1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity.

The Court promulgated the Amparo Rule "in light of the prevalence of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances." It was an exercise for the first time of the
Court’s expanded power to promulgate rules to protect our people’ s
constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance in the 1987 Constitution
in response to the Filipino experience of the martial law regime.
This pronouncement on the coverage of the writ was further cemented in the
latter case of Lozada, Jr. v. Macapagal-Arroyo41 where this Court explicitly
declared that as it stands, the writ of amparo is confined only to cases of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof. As to
what constitutes "enforced disappearance," the Court in Navia v. Pardico
enumerated the elements constituting "enforced disappearances" as the term is
statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9851,43 to wit:
 (a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation
of
liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence
of, the State or a political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to
acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person
subject of the amparo petition; and
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove the subject person from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time

Although Ku claims that he was arbitrarily arrested and detained by agents of

the BI, that he was not read his rights under the constitution and was not
informed of the reason for hi s arrest, nor provided a copy of any document
leading to his arrest and detention,46 the arresting officers are all consistent in
testifying that, upon Ku’s arrest, they introduced themselves as agents of the BI,
presented to Ku the Warrant of Deportation, and informed him of his
constitutional rights as well as the expiration of his visa. More importantly, there
was no attempt on the part of the BI to conceal Ku or his whereabouts.
Section 5 of the Amparo Rule enumerates what an amparo petition should
contain, among which is the right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved
party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the
respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant
circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits.
Ku claims that he fears for his life and feels the serious danger of being detained
for a long period of time without any cause, and that he fears that the BI will
fabricate criminal cases against him to hold him under detention. The allegations
of Ku, though, are specious. It is to be noted that the Amparo Rule requires the
parties to establish their claims by substantial evidence. t is to be additionally
observed that Ku is guilty of forum shopping. Being the subject of a Warrant of
Deportation and a Summary Deportation Order, Ku’s proper recourse is with the
BI and, thereafter, with the DOJ and the OP.

18) Hon Zarate et al v. H.E. Aquino III

FACTS: Petitioners aver that they are members of various progressive party-lists
that have been wrongfully tagged by the military and the police as "communist
front organizations. As alleged in the petition, sometime in March 2014, the
Government commenced intensified military offensives in Talaingod, Davao del
Norte under the rubric of counterinsurgency. About 1,300 Manobos allegedly
evacuated to Davao City to escape the effects of said military operations
evacuees.

Beginning January 2015, however, some of the Manobos started going back to
Davao City. By July 2015, approximately 700 Manobos were at the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines (UCCP) Haran. Petitioners claimed that these
Manobos sought refuge at UCCP Haran due to the persisting militarization of their
communities and their forcible recruitment to the paramilitary group, Alamara
Certain Manobos claimed, on the other hand, that they were deceived into
going to Davao City; that, upon reaching UCCP Haran, they were deprived of
their freedom of locomotion and were held there against their will from 3
February 2015 to 25 February 2015; that during said period they were forced to
listen to lectures and join rallies; until a fellow tribe member was found dead,
hanging lifeless on a tree, inside the UCCP Haran compound; and that it was
only then that they were allowed to go home with the body of the deceased.
Filed a complaint for (Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention), and Republic
Act No. 9208 (Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003).

To determine who would be charged in the complaint, the complainants were

shown "lists" from which they purportedly identified the defendants. Petitioners
now aver that the inclusion of their names and photographs in the "lists" indicates
that they are and have been the subject of State surveillance. incriminate them
in fabricated criminal charges, and insinuations of their links with the New
People's Army. petitioners argue that their inclusion in the "lists" are threats to their
life, liberty, and security warranting the protection of the writ of amparo.
Additionally, petitioners claim that as there is absolutely no basis for the inclusion
of their names and photographs in the "lists," then respondents should be
compelled via the writ of habeas data to disclose and to provide petitioners with
copies of all information and evidence pertaining to them which respondents
have in their files or records, and for such information to be destroyed.

ISSUE: WON Petitioner`s complaint should prosper

RULING: Dismissed. Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires substantial evidence.

"only actual threats, as may be established from all the facts and circumstances
of the case, can qualify as a violation that may be addressed under the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo. Mere membership in organizations or sectors historically
involved in EJKs cannot equate to an actual threat that would warrant the
issuance of a writ of amparo. We note, however, that the matter of petitioner
Zarate's supposed inclusion in the military's OB has already been addressed by
the Court in the consolidated cases of In re: Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Amparo in favor of Lilibeth 0. Ladaga, et al. As for the pending cases against
petitioner Zarate, suffice it to say that the complaints were duly supported by
affidavits,20 police blotters,21 medical records,22 and reports of social workers.

Petitioners Mariano and Casino, on the other hand, cite their previous charge of
rebellion,24 and their earlier implication in a kidnapping with murder case. The
filing of cases, however, cannot be characterized as an unlawful act or omission
in the context of the Amparo Rule. Of all the petitioners, it is only petitioner
Balabapersonalwhoalleged circumstances claiming threatened violations of her
right to life, liberty and security. However, The instances cited by petitioner
Balaba fail to demonstrate an actual threat to her life, liberty, and security.
The writ of habeas data is a "remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting, or storing of data or information regarding
the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. The
extraordinary writ of habeas data "provides a judicial remedy to protect a
person's right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances
where such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to
achieve unlawful ends. Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data) provides that the
petition should aver "the manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened
and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party." The
Habeas Data Rule likewise requires substantial evidence. In the present petition,
petitioners fail to show how their right to privacy is violated given that the
information contained in the "lists" are only their names, their positions in their
respective organizations, and their photographs. All these data are of public
knowledge and are readily accessible even to civilians.

Although the petition for a writ of habeas data may be filed by family member,
or even relatives, on behalf of the aggrieved party,35 the Habeas Data Rule
presupposes that the aggrieved party is still alive.

Article 3, Sec 1 (Substantive Due Process)

19) Valentino L. Legaspi v. City of Cebu et al

FACTS: On January 27, 1997 the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu
enacted Ordinance No. 1664 to authorize the traffic enforcers of Cebu City to
immobilize any motor vehicle violating the parking restrictions and prohibitions
defined in the Traffic Code of Cebu City.

On July 29, 1997, Atty. Bienvenido Jaban (Jaban,Sr.) and his son Atty. Bienvenido
Douglas Luke Bradbury Jaban (Jaban,Jr.) brought suit in the RTC against the City
of Cebu, then represented by Hon. Alvin Garcia, its City Mayor, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cebu City and its Presiding Officer, Hon. Renato V. Osme, and the
chairman and operatives or officers of the City Traffic Operations Management
(CITOM),seeking the declaration of Ordinance No. 1644 as unconstitutional for
being in violation of due process and for being contrary to law, and damages.

Their complaint alleged that on June 23, 1997, Jaban Sr. had properly parked his
car in a paying parking area on Manalili Street, Cebu City to get certain records
and documents from his office and after less than 10 minutes, he had found his
car being immobilized by a steel clamp. His car was impounded for three days,
and was informed at the office of the CITOM that he had first to pay P4,200.00 as
a fine to the City Treasurer of Cebu City for the release of his car but such
imposition the fine was without any court hearing and without due process of
law. He was also compelled to payP1,500.00 (itemized as P500.00 for the
clamping andP1,000.00 for the violation) without any court hearing and final
judgment;

That on May 19, 1997, Jaban, Jr. parked his car in a very secluded place where
there was no sign prohibiting parking; that his car was immobilized by CITOM
operative and that he was compelled to pay the total sum ofP1,400.00 for the
release of his car without a court hearing and a final judgment rendered by a
court of justice.

On August 11, 1997, Valentino Legaspi (Legaspi) likewise sued in the RTC the City
of Cebu, demanded the delivery of personal property, declaration of nullity of
theTraffic Code of Cebu City, and damages.

He averred that on the morning of July 29, 1997, he had left his car occupying a
portion of the sidewalk and the street outside the gate of his house to make way
for the vehicle of theanayexterminator, upon returning outside, his car was
towed by the group even if it was not obstructing the flow of traffic.

The cases were consolidated. The RTC rendered its decision declaring Ordinance
No. 1664 as null and void. The City of Cebu and its co-defendants appealed to
the CA. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC declaring the Ordinance No.
1664 valid. Upon the denial of their respective motions for reconsideration the
Jabans and Legaspi came to the Court via separate petitions for review on
certiorari. The appeals were consolidated.

ISSUES
1. Whether Ordinance No. 1664 was enacted within the ambit of the
legislative powers of the City of Cebu - YES

2. Whether Ordinance No. 1664 complied with the requirements for validity
and constitutionality, particularly the limitations set by the Constitution and
the relevant statutes - YES

RULING:
Tests for a valid ordinance (formal: 1 and 2; substantive: 3)
1. must be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to
enact
2. must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law,
3. must also conform to the following substantive requirements
1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable

Compliance of Ordinance No. 1664 with the formal requirements

- Was the enactment of Ordinance No. 1664 within the corporate powers of the
LGU of the City of Cebu? Yes
- no issues were raised against the formalities of the enactment of the ordinance,
so compliance is presumed
- Congress enacted the LGC as the implementing law for the delegation to the
various LGUs of the State’s great powers, namely: the police power, the power of
eminent domain, and the power of taxation, but with parameters and limitations
- police power cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not
possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate
this power to the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking
bodies of municipal corporations or local government units.

LGC Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Composition. – (a) The
sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare
of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the
proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under
Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
(5) Approve ordinances, which shall ensure the efficient and effective delivery of
the basic services and facilities as provided for under Section 17 of this Code,
and in addition to said services and facilities, shall:
(v) Regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, parks and
other public places and approve the construction, improvement repair and
maintenance of the same; establish bus and vehicle stops and terminals or
regulate the use of the same by privately-owned vehicles which serve the public;
regulate garages and operation of conveyances for hire; designate stands to be
occupied by public vehicles when not in use; regulate the putting up of signs,
signposts, awnings and awning posts on the streets; and provide for the lighting,
cleaning and sprinkling of streets and public places;
(vi) Regulate traffic on all streets and bridges; prohibit encroachments or
obstacles thereon and, when necessary in the interest of public welfare,
authorize the removal of encroachments and illegal constructions in public
places;

- the LGUs would be in the best position to craft their traffic codes because of
their familiarity with the conditions peculiar to their communities.

Compliance of Ordinance No. 1664with the substantive requirements

- the first substantive requirement for a valid ordinance is the
adherence to the constitutional guaranty of due process of law.
-
- 2 kinds of due process
1. procedural due process - procedures that the government must follow
before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property  notices and
hearings
2. substantive due process - adequate reason for taking away a person’s
life, liberty, or property. In other words, substantive due process looks to
whether there is sufficient justification for the government’s action.
- Ordinance No. 1664 met the substantive tests of validity and constitutionality by
its conformity with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well
as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public
policy.
- terms encroachment and obstacles used in Section 458 of the LGC, supra, were
broad enough to include illegally parked vehicles or whatever else obstructed
the streets, alleys and sidewalks

- Petitioners say that they were not accorded the opportunity to protest the
clamping, towing, and impounding of the vehicles, or even to be heard and to
explain their side prior to the immobilization of their vehicles; and that the
ordinance was oppressive and arbitrary for that reason.
- any vehicle owner may protest such action of a traffic enforcer or PNP
personnel enforcing the ordinance. – the ordinance permits the release of a
vehicle upon a protest directly made to the Chairman of CITOM; or to the
Chairman of the Committee on Police, Fire and Penology of the City of Cebu; or
to Asst. City Prosecutor Felipe Belciña, even without payment of the fine
- none of the petitioners resorted to this - did not diminish the fairness and
reasonableness of the escape clause written in the ordinance.
- the immobilization of a vehicle by clamping pursuant to the ordinance was not
necessary if the driver or vehicle owner was around at the time of the
apprehension. In that situation, the enforcer would simply either require the driver
to move the vehicle or issue a traffic citation
- the towing away of the immobilized vehicle was not equivalent to a summary
impounding, but designed to prevent the immobilized vehicle from obstructing
traffic

As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are divided into the formal (i.e., whether the
ordinance was enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU, and whether it
was passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law), and the
substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance
with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the
requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy).

InMetropolitan Manila Development Authorityv. Bel-Air Village Association,Inc.,

G.R. No. 135962, March 27, 2000the Court cogently observed that police power
is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any
group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National
Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President and
administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations
or local government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such
legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.
(emphasis supplied)

In the present case, delegated police power was exercised by the LGU of the
City of Cebu.

The CA opined, and correctly so, that vesting cities like the City of Cebu with the
legislative power to enact traffic rules and regulations was expressly done
through Section 458 of the LGC, and also generally by virtue of the General
Welfare Clause embodied in Section 16 of the LGC.

The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised
with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal
protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or
despotically as its exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction
demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription of the
fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual
rights, it bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent that may
fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.
Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of
the person to his life, liberty and property.

Judged according to the foregoing enunciation of the guaranty of due process

of law, the contentions of the petitioners cannot be sustained. Even under strict
scrutiny review, Ordinance No. 1664 met the substantive tests of validity and
constitutionality by its conformity with the limitations under the Constitution and
the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its
consistency with public policy.

The subject of Ordinance No. 1664 is to ensure "a smooth flow of vehicular traffic
in all the streets in the City of Cebu at all times".

To reiterate, the clamping of the illegally parked vehicles was a fair and
reasonable way to enforce the ordinance against its transgressors; otherwise, the
transgressors would evade liability by simply driving away. DENIED.

20) Bienvenido P. Jaban Sr. et al v. CA et al

FACTS: An ordinance authorizing the traffic enforcers to immobilize any motor

vehicle violating the parking restrictions and prohibitions defined in the Traffic
Code of Cebu City was enacted to ensure "a smooth flow of vehicular traffic in
all the streets in the City of Cebu at all times".

The Jaban’s brought suit in the RTC against the City of Cebu, City Traffic
Operations Management (CITOM), et al., seeking the declaration of Ordinance
No. 1644 as unconstitutional for being violative of due process and for being
contrary to law., and for damages. Atty. Legaspi likewise sued in the RTC the
City of Cebu, demanded the delivery of personal property, declaration of nullity
of the Traffic Code of Cebu City, and damages.

In separate answers for the City of Cebu and its co-defendants, the City Attorney
of Cebu presented similar defenses, essentially stating that the traffic enforcers
had only upheld the law by clamping the vehicles of the plaintiffs; and that
Ordinance No. 1664 enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality and validity.
The cases were consolidated. The RTC rendered its decision declaring Ordinance
No. 1664 as null and void. The City of Cebu and its co-defendants appealed to
the CA. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC declaring the Ordinance No.
1664 valid. Upon the denial of their respective motions for reconsideration the
Jabans and Legaspi came to the Court via separate petitions for review on
certiorari. The appeals were consolidated.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 1664 is valid and constitutional.

HELD: The Court of Appeal’s decision is sustained.

A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not
only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and
must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also
conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive;(3) must not be
partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be
general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.

In the present case, delegated police power was exercised by the LGU of the
City of Cebu. The CA opined, and correctly so, that vesting cities like the City of
Cebu with the legislative power to enact traffic rules and regulations was
expressly done through Section 458 of the LGC, and also generally by virtue of
the General Welfare Clause embodied in Section 16 of the LGC.

Judged according to the foregoing enunciation of the guaranty of due process

of law, the contentions of the petitioners cannot be sustained. Even under strict
scrutiny review, Ordinance No. 1664 met the substantive tests of validity and
constitutionality by its conformity with the limitations under the Constitution and
the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its
consistency with public policy.

To reiterate, the clamping of the illegally parked vehicles was a fair and
reasonable way to enforce the ordinance against its transgressors; otherwise, the
transgressors would evade liability by simply driving away.

DENIED.

Article 3 Sec 1 (Substantive Due Process; Equal Protection; Police Power) in

Relation to Article 6 Sec 26 (Riders in Bills)

21) Remman Enterprises Inc v. Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate

Service

FACTS: This case involves a petition for review under Rule 45 on the subject of the
Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines. R.A. 9646 (Real Estate Service Act of
the Philippines) was passed. Its purpose is to professionalize the real estate
service sector under regulatory scheme of 
 licensing, registration and supervision
of real estate service practitioners. 
 The supervision was likewise lodged under
the authority of the Professional Regulatory 
 Commission (PRC). 
 The law
required that companies providing real estate services must transact with the
employ 
 of duly licensed real estate brokers. 
 Petitioner assails the
constitutionality of the law, alleging that it violates the due process clause 
 and
infringes the ownership rights of real estate developers enshrined in Art. 428 of the
Civil Code. Furthermore, they claim that it violates the equal protection clause as
owners of private properties are allowed to sell their properties without the need
of a licensed real estate broker. 


The provisions in question are –
 o Section 29. Prohibition Against the

Unauthorized Practice of Real Estate Service. o Section 32. Corporate Practice of
the Real Estate Service. 
 The RTC denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction. ISSUES AND HOLDING 


ISSUE: Whether the assailed provisions are in violation of the due process clause,
particularly substantive due process. No.

RULING: The requirements for substantive due process are – Lawful government
purpose; and 
 Reasonable means necessary for the accomplishment of the
lawful purpose. 
 The lawful purpose of R.A. 9646 is to professionalize the real
estate service and increase its standards. 
 § The law recognizes the role of real
estate practitioners in spearheading the continuous flow of capital, in boosting
investor confidence, and in promoting national progress. 


The requirement of employing a duly licensed real estate broker for transactions
is reasonable as it merely regulates the conduct of business, and does not curtail
the exercise of petitioners’ ownership rights. 


[YAP, K.] C2020 | 1

Lastly, there is a substantial distinction between real estate developers and

owners of private who want to sell their private property.

Unlike individuals or entities having isolated transactions over their own property,
real estate developers sell lots, houses and condominium units in the ordinary
course of business, a business which is highly regulated by the State to ensure the
health and safety of home and lot buyers.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. RTC decision AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

22) Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council

FACTS: Presiding Judge Ferdinand R. Villanueva (petitioner) directly came to this

Court via a Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus, and Certiorari, and Declaratory
Relief[1] under Rules 65 and 63 of the Rules of Court,... respectively, with prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction, to assail the policy of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), requiring five
years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant
to... second-level courts, on the ground that it is unconstitutional, and was issued
with grave abuse of discretion.

The petitioner was appointed on September 18, 2012 as the Presiding Judge of
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion,
Compostela Valley Province, Region XI, which is a first-level court. On September
27, 2013, he applied for the vacant position of Presiding Judge in the following
Regional Trial Courts (RTCs): Branch 31, Tagum City; Branch 13, Davao City; and
Branch 6, Prosperidad, Agusan Del Sur. In a letter[2] dated December 18, 2013,
JBC's Office of Recruitment, Selection and Nomination, informed the petitioner
that he was not included in the list of candidates for the said stations. On the
same date, the petitioner sent a letter, through... electronic mail, seeking
reconsideration of his non-inclusion in the list of considered applicants and
protesting the inclusion of applicants who did not pass the prejudicature
examination.

The petitioner was informed by the JBC Executive Officer, through a letter dated
February 3, 2014, that his protest and reconsideration was duly noted by the JBC
en banc. However, its decision not to include his name in the list of applicants
was... upheld due to the JBC's long-standing policy of opening the chance for
promotion to second-level courts to, among others, incumbent judges who have
served in their current position for at least five years, and since the petitioner has
been a judge only for more than a year, he... was excluded from the list.

This caused the petitioner to take recourse to this Court. In his petition, he argued
that: (1) the Constitution already prescribed the qualifications of an RTC judge,
and the JBC could add no more; (2) the JBC's five-year requirement violates the
equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution; and (3) the JBC's
five-year... requirement violates the constitutional provision on Social Justice and
Human Rights for Equal Opportunity of Employment. The petitioner also asserted
that the requirement of the Prejudicature Program mandated by Section 10[4] of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8557[5] should not be merely directory and should be
fully implemented. He further alleged that he has all the qualifications for the
position prescribed by the Constitution and by Congress, since he has already
complied with the requirement of 10 years of... practice of law. In compliance
with the Court's Resolution[6] dated April 22, 2014, the JBC[7] and the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG)[8] separately submitted their Comments.

Summing up the arguments of the JBC and the OSG,... they essentially stated
that the petition is procedurally infirm and that the assailed policy does not
violate the equal protection and due process clauses. They posited that: (1) the
writ of certiorari and prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC from performing
its... principal function under the Constitution to recommend appointees to the
Judiciary because the JBC is not a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
function; (2) the remedy of mandamus and declaratory relief will not lie because
the petitioner has no clear legal right... that needs to be protected; (3) the equal
protection clause is not violated because the classification of lower court judges
who have served at least five years and those who have served less than five
years is valid as it is performance and experience based; and (4) there is no...
violation of due process as the policy is merely internal in nature.

Issues: The crux of this petition is whether or not the policy of JBC requiring five
years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant
to second-level courts is constitutional.

Ruling: Ruling of the Court Procedural Issues: Before resolving the substantive
issues, the Court considers it necessary to first determine whether or not the
action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and declaratory relief
commenced by the petitioner was proper. One. The remedies of certiorari and
prohibition are tenable. "The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions
for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. These are the special civil actions for... certiorari and
prohibition, and both are governed by Rule 65."[9] As discussed in the case of
Maria Carolina P. Araullo, etc., et al. v. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, etc., et
al.,[10] this Court explained that: Two. The remedy of mandamus cannot be
availed of by the petitioner in assailing JBC's policy.

The petitioner insisted that mandamus is proper because his right was violated
when he was not included in the list of candidates for the RTC courts he applied
for. He said that... his non-inclusion in the list of candidates for these stations has
caused him direct injury. Three. The petition for declaratory relief is improper. "An
action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed,
a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a
statute, an executive order, a regulation or... an ordinance. The relief sought
under this remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the validity of
the written instrument and the judicial declaration of the parties' rights or duties
thereunder."[16] "[T]he purpose of the action is to... secure an authoritative
statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed,
contract, etc., for their guidance in its enforcement or compliance and not to
settle issues arising from its alleged breach." In this case, the petition for
declaratory relief did not involve an unsound policy. Rather, the petition
specifically sought a judicial declaration that the petitioner has the right to be
included in the list of applicants although he failed to meet JBC's five-year
requirement... policy. Again, the Court reiterates that no person possesses a legal
right under the Constitution to be included in the list of nominees for vacant
judicial positions. The opportunity of appointment to judicial office is a mere
privilege, and not a judicially enforceable right... that may be properly claimed
by any person. The inclusion in the list of candidates, which is one of the incidents
of such appointment, is not a right either. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim any
right that could have been affected by the assailed policy. Furthermore, the
instant petition must necessarily fail because this Court does not have original
jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are
involved.[18] The special civil action of declaratory relief falls under... the
exclusive jurisdiction of the appropriate RTC pursuant to Section 19[19] of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A.No. 7691.[20] Therefore, by virtue of the
Court's supervisory duty over the JBC and in the exercise of its expanded judicial
power, the Court assumes jurisdiction over the present petition. But in any event,
even if the Court will set aside procedural infirmities, the instant petition should...
still be dismissed.

Substantive Issues As an offspring of the 1987 Constitution, the JBC is mandated

to recommend appointees to the judiciary and only those nominated by the JBC
in a list officially transmitted to the President may be appointed by the latter as
justice or judge in the judiciary. Thus, the JBC is... burdened with a great
responsibility that is imbued with public interest as it determines the men and
women who will sit on the judicial bench. While the 1987 Constitution has
provided the qualifications of members of the judiciary, this does not preclude
the JBC from having its... own set of rules and procedures and providing policies
to effectively ensure its mandate. The functions of searching, screening, and
selecting are necessary and incidental to the JBC's principal function of
choosing and recommending nominees for vacancies in the judiciary for
appointment by the President. However, the Constitution did not lay down in
precise terms... the process that the JBC shall follow in determining applicants'
qualifications. In carrying out its main function, the JBC has the authority to set
the standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary,
subject only to the minimum qualifications... required by the Constitution and law
for every position. The search for these long held qualities necessarily requires a
degree of flexibility in order to determine who is most fit among the applicants.
Thus, the JBC has sufficient but not unbridled license to act in performing... its
duties. JBC's ultimate goal is to recommend nominees and not simply to fill up
judicial vacancies in order to promote an effective and efficient administration
of justice. Given this pragmatic situation, the JBC had to establish a set of uniform
criteria in order to ascertain whether an... applicant meets the minimum
constitutional qualifications and possesses the qualities expected of him and his
office. Thus, the adoption of the five-year requirement policy applied by JBC to
the petitioner's case is necessary and incidental to the function conferred by the
Constitution to the JBC.

23) Ferrer,Jr. v. Mayor Bautista et al

FERRER V. CITY MAYOR BAUTISTA

FACTS: Quezon City Council enacted Ordinance No. SP-2095, S-2011, or

the Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City, Section 3 of which provides:

SECTION 3. IMPOSITION. A special assessment equivalent to one-half percent

(0.5%) on the assessed value of land in excess of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(Php100,000.00) shall be collected by the City Treasurer which shall accrue to the
Socialized Housing Programs of the Quezon City Government.
“Effective for five (5) years, the Socialized Housing Tax (SHT) shall be utilized by
the Quezon City Government for the following projects: (a) land purchase/land
banking; (b) improvement of current/existing socialized housing facilities; (c) land
development; (d) construction of core houses, sanitary cores, medium-rise
buildings and other similar structures; and (e) financing of public-private
partnership agreement of the Quezon City Government and National Housing
Authority (NHA) with the private sector. “

On the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-20135 was enacted on December
16, 2013 and took effect ten days after when it was approved by respondent
City Mayor.6 The proceeds collected from the garbage fees on residential
properties shall be deposited solely and exclusively in an earmarked special
account under the general fund to be utilized for garbage collections.7 Section 1
of the Ordinance set forth the schedule and manner for the collection of
garbage fees:
The collection of the garbage fee shall accrue on the first day of January and
shall be paid simultaneously with the payment of the real property tax, but not
later than the first quarter installment.8 In case a household owner refuses to pay,
a penalty of 25% of the garbage fee due, plus an interest of 2% per month or a
fraction thereof, shall be charged. ChanRoblesVi
Petitioner Ferrer claims that the annual property tax is an ad valorem tax, a
percentage of the assessed value of the property, which is subject to revision
every three (3) years in order to reflect an increase in the market value of the
property. The SHT and the garbage fee are actually increases in the property tax
which are not based on the assessed value of the property or its reassessment
every three years; hence, in violation of Sections 232 and 233 of the LGC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the tax ordinances are valid

RULING: Ordinance No. SP-2095, S-2011, the Socialized Housing Tax is valid.
Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013, which collects an annual garbage fee on all
domestic households in Quezon City, is hereby declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL
AND ILLEGAL

RATIO:
1. The 1987 Constitution explicitly espouses the view that the use of property
bears a social function and that all economic agents shall contribute to
the common good. Property has not only an individual function, insofar as
 it has to provide for the needs of the owner, but also a social function
insofar as it has to provide for the needs of the other members of society.
The principle is this:
Police power proceeds from the principle that every holder of property, however
absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that
his use of it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an
equal right to the enjoyment of their property, no r injurious to the right of the
community.
Property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order
to fulfill the objectives of the government in the exercise of police power. In this
jurisdiction, it is well-entrenched that taxation may be made the implement of
the state’s police power.
The SHT charged by the Quezon City Government is a tax which is within its
power to impose. Cities are allowed to exercise such other powers and
discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate,
or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and
facilities which include, among others, programs and projects for low-cost
housing and other mass dwellings. The collections made accrue to its socialized
housing programs and projects.
The tax is not a pure exercise of taxing power or merely to raise revenue; it is
levied with a regulatory purpose. The levy is primarily in the exercise of the police
power for the general welfare of the entire city. It is greatly imbued with public
interest. Removing slum areas in Quezon City is not only beneficial to the
underprivileged and homeless constituents but advantageous to the real
property owners as well. The situation will improve the value of the their property
investments, fully enjoying the same in view of an orderly, secure, and safe
community, and will enhance the quality of life of the poor, making them law-
abiding constituents and better consumers of business products.

2. In the subject ordinance imposing garbag collection fee, the rates of the
imposable fee depend on land or floor area and whether the payee is an
occupant of a lot, condominium, social housing project or apartment. For
easy reference, the relevant provision is again quoted below:
The rates being charged by the ordinance are unjust and inequitable: a resident
of a 200 sq. m. unit in a condominium or socialized housing project has to pay
twice the amount than a resident of a lot similar in size; unlike unit occupants, all
occupants of a lot with an area of 200 sq. m. and less have to pay a fixed rate of
Php100.00; and the same amount of garbage fee is imposed regardless of
whether the resident is from a condominium or from a socialized housing project.
Indeed, the classifications under Ordinance No. S-2235 are not germane to its
declared purpose of "promoting shared responsibility with the residents to attack
their common mindless attitude in over-consuming the present resources and in
generating waste." Instead of simplistically categorizing the payee into land or
floor occupant of a lot or unit of a condominium, socialized housing project or
apartment, respondent City Council should have considered factors that could
truly measure the amount of wastes generated and the appropriate fee for its
collection. Factors include, among others, household age and size, accessibility
to waste collection, population density of the barangay or district, capacity to
pay, and actual occupancy of the property. R.A. No. 9003 may also be looked
into for guidance. Under said law, WM service fees may be computed based on
minimum factors such as types of solid waste to include special waste,
amount/volume of waste, distance of the transfer station to the waste
management facility, capacity or type of LGU constituency, cost of construction,
cost of management, and type of technology. With respect to utility rates set by
municipalities, a municipality has the right to classify consumers under
reasonable classifications based upon factors such as the cost of service, the
purpose for which the service or the product is received, the quantity or the
amount received, the different character of the service furnished, the time of its
use or any other matter which presents a substantial difference as a ground of
distinction.

24) 1-UTAK v. COMELEC

Article 3, Sec. 1 (Right to Property) in Relation to Article 3, Sec. 2 (Search and

Seizure), Article 3, Sec. 3; Article 3, Sec. 4, Article 3, Sec. 21 and Article 3, Sec. 22,
and Article 6, Sec. 1

25) Disini v. Secretary of Justice

Article 3, Sec. 1 (Procedural Due Process; Trial by Publicity) in Relation to Article

3, Sec. 4 (Freedom of the Press) and Article 3, Sec 14 (Rights of the accused;
Public Trial)

26) Petition for Radio and Television Coverage of the multiple Murder Cases
Against Maguindanao Governor Zaldy Ampatuan et al

Article 3, Sec. 2 (Search and Seizure) in Relation to Article 3, Sec. 3 (Right to

Privacy) Article, 2 Sec. 28 (Full Public Disclosure)

27) Pollo v. Chairperson Constantino – David (Civil Service Commission)

Article 3, Sec. 2 (search and Seizure; Standards Applied to Buses)

28) Saluday v. People

Article 3, Sec. 3 (Right to Privacy)

29) Spouses Bill and Victoria Hing v. Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan
Choachuy

Article 3. Sec. 3 (Right to privacy; writ of amparo; writ of habeas data)

30) Rhoda Ave. S. Vivares v. St. Theresas`s College

31) Dr. Joy Margate Lee v. P/Supt. Neri A. Ilagan

Article 3, Sec. 4 (Expression)

32) GMA Network Inc v. COMELEC et al
33) Diocese of Bacolod et al v. COMELEC
34) SWS and Pulse Asia v. COMELEC
35) Davao City Water District v. Aranjuez, et al

Article 3, Sec. 5 (Freedom of Religion)

36) Perfecto v. Esidera

37) Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of
Justice Building in Quezon City

Article 3, Sec. 6 (liberty of abode and Freedom to travel) in relation to article 3,

Sec 1 (due process), Article 3, Sec. 4 (Speech, Expression and Assembly),
Article, 3 Sec, 5 (Religion) and Article 2, Sec. 12 (Primary Right of Parents to Rear
their Children)
38) SPARK et al v. Quezon City

Article 3, Sec. 6 (Right to Travel and HDO)

39) Genuino v. De Lima

Article 3, Sec 7 (Right to Information) in relation to Article 2, Sec. 28 (Public

Disclosure)

40) Sereno v. Committee

41) DFA v. BCA International

Article 3, Sec. 10 (Non-impairment Clause)

42) Goldenway v. Equitable Bank