G.R. No.

220389, December 06, 2017 - TERESITA BUGAYONG-SANTIAGO, EARL EUGENE SANTIAGO,

EDWARD SANTIAGO, AND EDGARDO SANTIAGO, JR., Petitioners, v. TEOFILO BUGAYONG, Respondent.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 220389, December 06, 2017

TERESITA BUGAYONG-SANTIAGO, EARL EUGENE SANTIAGO, EDWARD SANTIAGO, AND EDGARDO

SANTIAGO, JR., Petitioners, v. TEOFILO BUGAYONG, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated 29 September 2014 and the
Resolution3 dated 6 August 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 116322. The CA affirmed
the Decision4 dated 11 December 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, Branch 45
(RTC), which set aside the decision of the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Asingan-San Manuel, Asingan,
Pangasinan (MCTC) and dismissed petitioners' complaint for unlawful detainer.

The Facts

On 24 November 1993, petitioner Teresita Bugayong-Santiago (Teresita) and her husband Edgardo Santiago
(Edgardo), through a Deed of Absolute Sale, bought a 169 square meter commercial land with a building
structure located in Poblacion, Asingan, Pangasinan. The land was originally owned by Teresita's parents,
the late spouses Francisco Bugayong and Segundina Ventura-Bugayong, and covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 37637, which was issued to the late spouses on 9 November 1961.

On 23 May 2007, Edgardo died. He was survived by Teresita and their children, petitioners Earl Eugene,
Edward, and Edgardo, Jr. The children inherited one-half of the land.

In 2008, petitioners sent a letter dated 15 February 2008 to respondent Teofilo Bugayong (Teofilo),
Teresita's brother, demanding him to vacate the subject property within 15 days from receipt of the letter
and to pay the amount of P3,000 monthly. Respondent received the letter on 20 February 2008 but refused
to vacate the property.

Thus, petitioners filed a Complaint5 for Unlawful Detainer dated 15 March 2008 with the MCTC. Petitioners
alleged that since 2002, they have been tolerating the stay and occupation of Teofilo over the two-third
(2/3) eastern portion of the land and a part of the commercial building without paying any lease rental.
Petitioners added that Teofilo had been harassing Teresita whenever she went to Asingan, Pangasinan and
that on 3 June 2006, Teofilo slapped and pulled her hair which caused some injuries. Thus, she filed a
criminal case for physical injuries against him. Also, before they executed the complaint, petitioners exerted
serious efforts to settle the case amicably but to no avail.

In his Answer with Counterclaim, Teofilo alleged that his parents, Francisco Bugayong and Segundina
Ventura-Bugayong, were the absolute and registered owners of the subject parcel of land covered by TCT
No. 37637 where a commercial building had been erected. Prior to their death, the late spouses executed a
Deed of Quitclaim dated 21 December 1995 in favor of all their six children, namely: Antonio, Teofilo,
Erlinda, Teresita, Francisco, Jr., and Estrellita Bugayong-Cachola (Cachola). Teofilo stated that when he was
about to register the quitclaim with the Register of Deeds after paying the necessary taxes, petitioners
caused the annotation on the title of the Deed of Absolute Sale by way of Adverse Claim on 4 March 2004.
Teofilo also claimed that during the lifetime of his parents, they reported the Owner's Duplicate Copy of TCT
No. 37637 as lost and they executed an Affidavit of Loss on 16 November 1995 and had it annotated at the
back of the title. Consequently, a Second Owner's Duplicate Copy was granted by the RTC in lieu of the lost
title. Teofilo maintained that while the petitioners claimed that they purchased the subject property in 1993,
he had been paying the realty taxes of the subject property for the benefit of the estate of his deceased
parents and all the heirs, including the northwestern portion of the building occupied by Cachola, the sister
of both Teofilo and Teresita. Further, Teofilo contended that he had been in actual possession and
enjoyment of the subject property long before the execution of the assailed Deed of Absolute Sale between
his parents and Teresita and Edgardo.

In a Decision6 dated 29 September 2008, the MCTC ordered Teofilo to vacate the property. The MCTC
resolved the question of ownership in order to resolve the issue of possession. The MCTC reasoned that the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated 24 November 1993 should be given effect and validity since it was executed
before the Deed of Quitclaim was executed on 21 December 1995 and had been annotated at the back of
TCT No. 37637. Also, the MCTC considered Teofilo's occupation over the subject property as mere tolerance
and demanded that Teofilo vacate the property. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Ordering defendant or anyone acting in his behalf to vacate the two third (2/3) eastern
portion of the subject premises;
2. Ordering defendant to surrender possession of the subject premises to the plaintiff[s];
3. Ordering the dismissal of the counter-claim;
4. Ordering defendant to pay reasonable lease rental of the subject premises the amount of
P3,000 monthly starting from February 20, 2008 until he vacates and surrender[s]
possession to the plaintiffs and to pay P15,000.00 as attorney's fees and to pay the costs of
this suit.

SO ORDERED.7

Teofilo filed an appeal8 with the RTC. Teofilo averred that petitioners had failed to establish a cause of action
for unlawful detainer against him such that the MCTC had no jurisdiction over the complaint.

In a Decision9 dated 11 December 2009, the RTC reversed the decision of the MCTC. The RTC stated that
tolerance must be present right from the start of possession to bring the action within the ambit of unlawful
detainer. In this case, there was forcible entry at the beginning and tolerance thereafter; thus, there can be
no basis for the action for unlawful detainer.

The RTC declared that the remedy of the petitioners was either accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is set aside. Accordingly, the complaint is
dismissed.

SO ORDERED.10

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC, in an Order dated 7 September 2010, denied the
motion.

On 29 October 2010, petitioners filed a petition for review11 with the CA. In a Decision dated 29 September
2014, the CA denied the petition for lack of merit

Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration dated 24 October 2014 which the CA denied in a
Resolution12 dated 6 August 2015.
Hence, the instant petition.

The Issue

Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC which dismissed the unlawful detainer case
against respondent.

The Court's Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

Petitioners contend that from the start, they have tolerated and have been tolerating the stay and
occupation of respondent over two-third (2/3) portion of the commercial lot and the building situated
thereon. Petitioners explain that when they bought the land, it has been agreed upon between Teresita and
her husband Edgardo, that Teresita's parents would stay on the land until their death. Teresita's mother
passed away on 11 February 1997 and her father on 26 November 1999. Afterwards, Teresita allowed her
sister, Cachola, to occupy the subject property located in Asingan, Pangasinan since petitioners have been
residing in San Fernando, Pampanga since 1974. Petitioners allege that sometime in 2002, Teofilo, in the
presence of Cachola, just entered the prope1ty without their knowledge and consent and had been
occupying two-third (2/3) portion of the property without paying any lease rental. Since petitioners wanted
to take possession of the subject property, they sent a demand letter for Teofilo to vacate the premises.

Respondent, on the other hand, maintains that he had been in actual possession and enjoyment of the
subject property, being one of the forced heirs of the registered owners, his parents. Respondent contends
that the MCTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the complaint since the complaint failed to aver facts
constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer - how entry was affected or how and when dispossession
started. Thus, the complaint or case filed should not have been for unlawful detainer with the MCTC but one
for accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria in the proper RTC.

Ejectment or accion interdictal takes on two forms: forcible entry and unlawful detainer. The remedies for
forcible entry and unlawful detainer are laid down in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which states:

Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. - Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding
section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy,
or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building
is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any
contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or
other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully
withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of
such possession, together with damages and costs.

In Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals,13 the distinction between forcible entry and unlawful detainer had been
clearly explained:

Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are two distinct actions defined in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules
of Court. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means of force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof
after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. In
forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior
possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, the possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the
expiration or termination of the right to possess, hence the issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in
such action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiffs cause of action is the termination of the
defendant's right to continue in possession.

What determines the cause of action is the nature of defendant's entry into the land. If the entry is
illegal, then the action which may be filed against the intruder within one (1) year therefrom is forcible
entry. If, on the other hand, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter became illegal, the case is one
of unlawful detainer which must be filed within one (1) year from the date of the last demand. (Emphasis
supplied)

In the present case, petitioners filed an unlawful detainer case against respondent before the MCTC.
Petitioner Teresita alleges that she and her husband Edgardo bought the subject property from her parents
on 4 November 1993. Since her family stays in San Fernando, Pampanga she allowed her sister Cachola to
live in the property. However, sometime in 2002, without Teresita's knowledge and consent, respondent
Teofilo entered the property and occupied the two-third (2/3) eastern portion of the same. Teresita
maintains that she had been merely tolerating Teofilo's stay and occupation in that part of the property. In
2008, when petitioners were ready to make use of the property, they demanded that Teofilo vacate the
premises but he refused.

In Manila Electric Company v. Heirs of Spouses Deloy,14 we held that the only issue to be resolved in an
unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the property, independent of any claim of
ownership by any of the parties involved. However, as emphasized in the Sarmiento15 case above, what
determines the cause of action in ejectment cases is the nature of defendant's entry into the land.

Petitioners insist that Teofilo entered the property without their knowledge and consent. Meaning, Teofilo's
entry into the property had been illegal from the beginning. Later on, when they found out that he occupied
the subject property, petitioners merely tolerated his stay there.

The Rules are clear that if the entry into the property is illegal, the action which may be filed against the
intruder is forcible entry and this action must be brought within one (1) year from the illegal entry. But if the
entry is originally legal then became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess, an
unlawful detainer case may be brought within one (1) year from the date of the last demand. This action will
only prosper in a case where the plaintiff allows the defendant to use the property by tolerance without any
contract, and the defendant is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate on demand.

However, based on the record, petitioners claimed that respondent entered the property "without their
knowledge and consent"16 on one hand, and by mere "tolerance"17 on the other. It can be concluded then
that respondent occupied the subject property without petitioners' knowledge and consent and thereafter
petitioners tolerated respondent's stay in the property for many years. Thus, there was illegal entry into the
property at the start.

As correctly observed by the RTC, since here was forcible entry at the beginning and tolerance thereafter, an
action for unlawful detainer cannot prosper since a requisite for an action for unlawful detainer is that the
possession was originally lawful, but turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to possess.
In Spouses Valdez v. Court of Appeals,18 we held that to justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential
that the plaintiff’s supposed act of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession
which is later sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful at the start, an action for
unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy.

The complaint was not clear on how entry into the subject property was effected and how or when
dispossession started. The complaint merely states that "since 2002, plaintiff Teresita B. Santiago and her
late husband have been tolerating the stay and occupation of the defendant, brother of plaintiff Teresita B.
Santiago, over the two-third (2/3) eastern portion of the lot and portion of the commercial house thereon,
without paying [any] lease rental." 19 However, in succeeding pleadings, petitioners insisted that respondent
entered the property without their knowledge and consent. Also, no contract, whether express or implied,
existed between the parties and there were no other details submitted or evidence presented by petitioners
to show how respondent exactly entered the property and when petitioners were dispossessed of such. As
similarly held in the case of Zacarias v. Anacay:20

In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint do not contain any averment of fact that would
substantiate petitioners' claim that they permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by
respondents. The complaint contains only bare allegations that "respondents without any color of title
whatsoever occupie[d] the land in question by building their house [o]n the said land thereby depriving
petitioners the possession thereof." Nothing has been said on how respondents' entry was effected or how
and when dispossession started. Admittedly, no express contract existed between the parties. This failure of
petitioners to allege the key jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal. Since the complaint
did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court
had no jurisdiction over the case. It is in this light that this Court finds that the Court of Appeals correctly
found that the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the complaint.21

We have ruled in Rosario v. Alba22 that jurisdiction in ejectment cases is determined by the allegations of
the complaint and the character of the relief sought. The complaint should embody such statement of facts
as to bring the case clearly within the class of cases under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, as these
proceedings are summary in nature. Thus, since the complaint fell short of the jurisdictional facts to vest the
court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of respondent, the MCTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
petitioners' complaint and both the RTC and the CA correctly dismissed the unlawful detainer case against
respondent.

However, on a final note, this ruling is limited only to the determination of whether the complaint for
unlawful detainer was properly filed and whether the MCTC had jurisdiction over the case. This adjudication
is not a final determination of the issue of possession or ownership and thus, will not bar any party from
filing a case in the proper RTC for (1) accion publiciana, where the owner of the property who was
dispossessed failed to bring an action for ejectment within one (1) year from dispossession, or (2) accion
reivindicatoria alleging ownership of the property and seeking recovery of its full possession.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 29 September 2014 and the
Resolution dated 6 August 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 116322.

SO ORDERED.

Peralta, Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

REYES, JR., J:
Under the law and the Rules of Court, an owner is given an assortment of
legal remedies to recover possession of real property from the illegal
occupant. The choice of which action to pursue rests on the owner. Should
he/she elect to file a summary action for unlawful detainer, he/she must
prove all the essential jurisdictional facts for such action to prosper. The
most important of which, is the fact that the respondent's entry into the
land was lawful and based on the former's permission or tolerance.
Absent this essential jurisdictional fact, the action for unlawful detainer
must be dismissed.
This treats of the Petition for Review on Certiorari[2] under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision[3]dated March
30, 2012, and Resolution[4] dated October 30, 2012, rendered by the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 03115, which dismissed the case for
unlawful detainer filed by Cecilia T. Javelosa (petitioner).
The Antecedents
The petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Sitio
Pinaungon, Barangay Balabag, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan (subject
property). The subject property contains an area of 10,198 square meters,
more or less, and is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
35394.[5] The subject property was originally covered by Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) No. 2222, which the petitioner acquired by donation from
her predecessor-in-interest Ciriaco Tirol (Tirol).[6]
The subject property was occupied by Ezequiel Tapus (Ezequiel), Mario
Madriaga (Mario), DannyM. Tapuz (Danny), Juanita Tapus (Juanita) and
Aurora Madriaga (Aurora) (collectively referred to as the respondents).
Allegedly, the respondents' predecessor was assigned as a caretaker of the
subject property, and therefore possessed and occupied a portion thereof
upon the tolerance and permission of Tirol.[7]
Sometime in 2003, the petitioner's daughter, Diane J. Jimenez (Jimenez),
learned that Expedito Tapus, Jr., a relative of the respondents offered the
subject property for sale.[8] Alarmed, Jimenez sought the assistance of the
Office of Barangay Balabag, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan. Thereafter, the
case was referred to the Office of the Lupong Tagapamayapa for a possible
alternative resolution of the conflict. However, the parties failed to reach an
amicable settlement.[9]
In October 2003, the petitioner sent a demand letter to the respondents
ordering them to vacate the subject property. The demand was
unheeded.[10] This prompted the petitioner to file a case for unlawful
detainer.
Juanita filed her Answer[11] claiming that she and her predecessors-in-
interest have been occupying the subject property since time immemorial.
She emphasized that they are actual, adverse and exclusive possessors
under a claim of ownership. She further averred that they are indigenous
occupants and tribal settlers of the land in dispute, and hence their rights
are protected by law. In contrast, the petitioner and Jimenez have never
even set foot on the property.
The other respondents, Ezequiel, Mario, Danny and Aurora, filed a separate
Answer with Counterclaim and Motion to Dismiss[12] dated March 18, 2004.
They claimed that they inherited the subject property from their late
grandfather Antonio Tapus. Consequently, they are the lawful and actual
possessors of the subject property. In fact, they have been occupying the
said property for 60 years. They likewise claimed that the petitioner and
her predecessors are land grabbers, whose title over the property was fake
and spurious.[13]
Ruling of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
In its Decision[14] on November 18, 2005, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) awarded the subject property in favor of the petitioner, and
consequently, ordered the respondents to vacate, and pay the petitioner a
monthly rental of Php 500.00. To properly determine the issue of
possession, the MCTC first provisionally delved into the issue of ownership.
In this regard, the MCTC held that the petitioner, being the registered
owner of the subject property is entitled to its possession.[15]
Likewise, the MCTC gave credence to the petitioner's contention that the
respondents' stay in the subject property was merely upon the permission
granted by her predecessor to the respondents. Accordingly, the
respondents' possession became illegal from the moment the petitioner
ordered them to vacate. [16]
Moreover, the MCTC noted that the respondents did not submit any proof
to establish their purported claim of ownership. Neither were they able to
prove their allegation that the source of the petitioner's title was spurious.
At any rate, the MCTC held that such a defense constituted a collateral
attack on the petitioner's title, which shall not be permitted in an action for
unlawful detainer. Consequently, the MCTC regarded the petitioner's title
as valid, unless declared null and void by a court of competent
jurisdiction.[17]
The dispositive portion of the MCTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
1. Declaring that the [petitioner] has a better right to physical possession of
the land in question;
2. Ordering the [respondents] and all other persons claiming rights under
them to immediately vacate the land in question designated as Lot 30-G-5
in the Commissioner's Sketch and to turn over the possession thereof to the
[petitioner]
3. Ordering the [respondents] to pay the [petitioner] monthly rental of Php
500.00, reckoned from the filing of the complaint on February 27, 2004,
until the [petitioner] shall have been completely restored in actual
possession thereof; and
4. Ordering the [respondents] to pay the [petitioner] the sum of Php
10,000.00 as attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.[18]
Aggrieved, the respondents filed an appeal against the MCTC decision.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On August 8, 2007, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered a
Decision[19] affirming the ruling of the MCTC.
First, the RTC affirmed the jurisdiction of the MCTC over the case. It
observed that the allegations of the complaint sufficiently made out a case
for unlawful detainer. As to the merits of the case, the RTC agreed with the
MCTC's conclusion that the petitioner, being the owner of the subject
property is entitled to possess the same. It noted that the respondents
merely occupied the subject property upon the tolerance of the petitioner.
Consequently, they must vacate as soon as the said permission was
withdrawn.[20]
The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding no reversible error, the
decision appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.[21]
Dissatisfied with the ruling, the respondents filed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
On March 30, 2012, the CA rendered the assailed Decision,[22] reversing the
disquisitions of the MCTC and the RTC.
The CA ratiocinated that although the MCTC had jurisdiction over the
unlawful detainer case, the trial court however erred in upholding the
petitioner's right to possess the subject property. The CA pointed out that
the petitioner failed to prove the fact that the respondents indeed occupied
the subject property through her permission and tolerance. It stressed that
to make out a case for unlawful detainer, the petitioner must concomitantly
prove that the respondents' prior lawful possession has become unlawful
due to the expiration of the right to possess the property. The petitioner
failed to show that the respondents occupied the subject property pursuant
to her tolerance, and that such permission was present from the very start
of their occupation. Absent the fact of tolerance, the remedy of unlawful
detainer would be inappropriate.[23]
The decretal portion of the assailed CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby GRANTED and the Decision, dated August 8, 2007, of the RTC
Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 2 relative to Civil Case No. 7652 for Unlawful
Detainer is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. A new one is entered in its
stead declaring respondent's case as DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[24]
Aggrieved by the ruling of the CA, the petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in its Resolution[25]dated
October 30, 2012.
Undeterred, the petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari[26] before the Court.
The Issues
The main issue raised for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA
erred in dismissing the case for unlawful detainer.
In praying for the reversal of the assailed CA decision, the petitioner claims
that she had proven her ownership of the subject property, and
consequently, her right to possess the same.[27] She points out that she
submitted a verified consolidated position paper, which supported the
allegations in her complaint, as well as copies of TCT No. T-35394 and OCT
No. 2222, which established her ownership over the subject
property.[28] The petitioner bewails that in contrast to the evidence she
submitted, the respondents failed to present affidavits of their witnesses or
any evidence- documentary or otherwise, that would prove their right to
possess the subject property.[29] Aside from the photocopy of a Sketch Plan,
the respondents did not have any evidence to support their claim of
purported ownership of over 60 years.[30] Also, the respondents' prior
physical possession does not automatically entitle them to the subject
property, especially as against her- the lawful owner of the same.[31]
Likewise, the petitioner avers that her failure to reside in the property
should not be taken against her. The subject property was an agricultural
land, which was not meant for residential purposes. In fact, it was precisely
for this purpose that the respondents' predecessors-in-interest were
employed as caretakers of the land.[32] Finally, the petitioner asserts that
her tolerance of the respondents' occupation was obvious from the fact that
she allowed them to stay in the subject property for several years, without
ordering them to vacate the premises, or filing an action to eject them. This
allegedly proves her acquiescence to the respondents' occupation.[33]
On the other hand, the respondents pray for the outright dismissal of the
instant petition due to the petitioners' failure to raise a question of law, and
show that the CA committed a reversible error.[34] Particularly, the CA
correctly ruled that the petitioner failed to prove her supposed tolerance of
the respondents' stay in the subject property.[35] In fact, the respondents
point out that the purported tolerance by the petitioner of their occupation
for over 71 years is contrary to human experience.[36] The respondents
further aver that tolerance can only exist insofar as there is a recognition of
the right asserted by the tolerating party.[37] Their predecessor-in-interest
never recognized the ownership of the petitioner or any of her
predecessors-in-interest.[38]
Similarly, the respondents counter that the petitioner could not acquire a
better right to possess, as she has in fact never been in actual physical
possession of the subject property, while they have been occupying the
same property since time immemorial.[39] The petitioner anchors her claim
from the right of her predecessor-in-interest Tirol, who himself never
occupied the subject property.[40]
Finally, the respondents claim that the MCTC should have dismissed the
action for unlawful detainer considering that the principal issue determined
before the MCTC was the ownership of the property. As such, jurisdiction
should have been with the RTC considering that the assessed value of the
subject property exceeded Php 20,000.00.[41]
Ruling of the Court
The instant petition is bereft of merit.
It must be noted at the outset that the jurisdiction of the Court in a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is
limited only to reviewing errors of law, not of fact.[42] A question of law
arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain set of facts,
while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or
falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must
not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented
by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely
on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear
that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed
is one of fact.[43] Essentially, the issue as to who between the parties has a
better right of possession will necessarily entail a review of the evidence
presented, which is beyond the province of a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45.
At any rate, the CA did not commit any error that would warrant a reversal
of its assailed decision.
The owner of real property
cannot wrest possession from
the occupant, through the
simple expedient of filing an
action for unlawful detainer
without sufficiently proving the
essential requisites for such
action to prosper.
It is an elementary principle of civil law that the owner of real property is
entitled to the possession thereof as an attribute of his or her ownership. In
fact, the holder of a Torrens Title is the rightful owner of the property
thereby covered, and is entitled to its possession.[44]This notwithstanding,
"the owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof from whoever is in
actual occupation of the property."[45]Rather, to recover possession, the
owner must first resort to the proper judicial remedy, and thereafter, satisfy
all the conditions necessary for such action to prosper.[46]
Accordingly, the owner may choose among three kinds of actions to recover
possession of real property - an accion interdictal, accion publiciana or
an accion reivindicatoria.
Notably, an accion interdictal is summary in nature, and is cognizable by
the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court. It comprises
two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry (detentacion) and
unlawful detainer (desahuico). In forcible entry, one is deprived of the
physical possession of real property by means of force, intimidation,
strategy, threats, or stealth, whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally
withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold
possession under any contract, express or implied. An action for forcible
entry is distinguished from an unlawful detainer case, such that in the
former, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the very beginning,
whereas in the latter action, the possession of the defendant is originally
legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to
possess. Both actions must be brought within one year from the date of
actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last
demand, in case of unlawful detainer. The only issue in said cases is the
right to physical possession.[47]
On the other hand, an accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the
right of possession, which should be brought in the proper regional trial
court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an
ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of
realty independently of title.[48]
Lastly, an accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership, also
brought in the proper RTC in an ordinary civil proceeding.[49]
In the case at bar, the petitioner, claiming to be the owner of the subject
property, elected to file an action for unlawful detainer. In making this
choice, she bore the correlative burden to sufficiently allege, and thereafter
prove by a preponderance of evidence all the jurisdictional facts in the said
type of action. Specifically, the petitioner was charged with proving the
following jurisdictional facts, to wit:
(i) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or
by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(ii) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to
defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession;
(iii) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and
deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(iv) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the
property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.[50]
Particularly, the complaint stated that (i) the respondents occupied the
subject property upon the tolerance of the petitioner; (ii) the petitioner sent
the respondents a demand to vacate sometime in October 2003; (iii) the
same demand was unheeded; and (iv) the action for unlawful detainer was
filed within one year from the date of the demand.[51] Verily, the following
jurisdictional facts properly vested the MCTC of Buruanga, Aklan, with
jurisdiction over the case.
However, in order for the petitioner to successfully prosecute her case for
unlawful detainer, it is imperative upon her to prove all the assertions in
her complaint. After all, "the basic rule is that mere allegation is not
evidence and is not equivalent to proof."[52] This, the petitioner failed to do.
As correctly observed by the CA, the petitioner failed to adduce evidence to
establish that the respondents' occupation of the subject property was
actually effected through her tolerance or permission. Unfortunately, the
petitioner failed to prove how and when the respondents entered the
subject lot, as well as how and when the permission to occupy was
purportedly given. In fact, she was conspicuously silent about the details on
how the permission to enter was given, save for her bare assertion that the
respondents' occupied the premises as caretakers thereof. The absence of
such essential details is especially troubling considering that the
respondents have been occupying the subject property for more than 70
years, a fact which was not disputed by the petitioner. In this regard, it is
must be shown that the respondents first came into the property due to the
permission given by the petitioner or her predecessors.
It cannot be gainsaid that the fact of tolerance is of utmost importance in an
action for unlawful detainer. Without proof that the possession was legal at
the outset, the logical conclusion would be that the defendant's possession
of the subject property will be deemed illegal from the very beginning, for
which, the action for unlawful detainer shall be dismissed.[53]
Remarkably, in Quijano v. Atty. Amante,[54] the Court ruled that in an
action for unlawful detainer, the plaintiff must show that the possession
was initially lawful, and thereafter, establish the basis of such lawful
possession. Similarly, should the plaintiff claim that the respondent's
possession was by his/her tolerance, then such acts of tolerance must be
proved. A bare allegation of tolerance will not suffice. At least, the plaintiff
must point to the overt acts indicative of his/her or predecessor's
permission to occupy the disputed property. Failing in this regard, the
occupant's possession could then be deemed to have been illegal from the
beginning. Consequently, the action for unlawful detainer will fail. Neither
may the ejectment suit be treated as one for forcible entry in the absence of
averments that the entry in the property had been effected through force,
intimidation, threats, strategy or stealth.[55]
Similarly, in Suarez v. Sps. Emboy,[56] the Court warned that "when the
complaint fails to aver the facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful
detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when
dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria."[57]
The same ruling was rendered in the case of Dr. Carbonilla v. Abiera, et
al.,[58] where the Court laid the important dictum that the supposed acts of
tolerance should have been present right from the very start of the
possession—from entry to the property. "Otherwise, if the possession was
unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an
improper remedy."[59] This same ruling was echoed in Jose v. Alfuerto, et
al.,[60] where the Court even emphasized its consistent and strict holding
that in an unlawful detainer case, "tolerance or permission must have been
present at the beginning of possession; if the possession was unlawful from
the start, an action for unlawful detainer would not be the proper remedy
and should be dismissed."[61]
Perforce, guided by all the foregoing cases, an action for unlawful detainer
fails in the absence of proof of tolerance, coupled with evidence of how the
entry of the respondents was effected, or how and when the dispossession
started.[62] This rule is so stringent such that the Court categorically
declared in Go, Jr. v. CA[63] that tolerance cannot be presumed from the
owner's failure to eject the occupants from the land.[64] Rather, "tolerance
always carries with it 'permission' and not merely silence or inaction for
silence or inaction is negligence, not tolerance."[65] On this score, the
petitioner's tenacious claim that the fact of tolerance may be surmised from
her refusal for many years to file an action to evict the respondents is
obviously flawed.
Furthermore, it must be stressed that the fact that the petitioner possesses
a Torrens Title does not automatically give her unbridled authority to
immediately wrest possession. It goes without saying that even the owner of
the property cannot wrest possession from its current possessor. This was
precisely the Court's ruling in Spouses Munoz v. CA,[66] viz.:
If the private respondent is indeed the owner of the premises and that
possession thereof was deprived from him for more than twelve years, he
should present his claim before the Regional Trial Court in an accion
publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria and not before the Municipal Trial
Court in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer or forcible entry. For
even if he is the owner, possession of the property cannot be
wrested from another who had been in possession thereof for
more than twelve (12) years through a summary action for
ejectment.
Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the
muniments of title it presented, such evidence does not responsibly address
the issue of prior actual possession raised in a forcible entry case. It must
be stated that regardless of actual condition of the title to the
property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be
turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Thus, a party
who can prove prior possession can recover such possession
even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his
prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security
that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a
person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria.[67] (Citations omitted and emphasis and underscoring
Ours)
As a final note, an important caveat must be laid down. The Court's ruling
should not in any way be misconstrued as coddling the occupant of the
property, at the expense of the lawful owner. Rather, what this resolution
seeks to impress is that even the legal owner of the property cannot
conveniently usurp possession against a possessor, through a summary
action for ejectment, without proving the essential requisites thereof.
Accordingly, should the owner choose to file an action for unlawful
detainer, it is imperative for him/her to first and foremost prove that the
occupation was based on his/her permission or tolerance. Absent which,
the owner would be in a better position by pursuing other more appropriate
legal remedies. As eloquently stated by Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin
in the case of Quijano,[68] "the issue of possession between the parties will
still remain. To finally resolve such issue, they should review their options
and decide on their proper recourses. In the meantime, it is wise for the
Court to leave the door open to them in that respect. For now, therefore,
this recourse of the petitioner has to be dismissed."[69]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack
of merit. Accordingly, the Decision dated March 30, 2012, and Resolution
dated October 30, 2012, rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-
SP No. 03115, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson),[*] Peralta, Perlas-Bernabe, and Caguioa, JJ.,
concur.

G.R. No. 161589 November 24, 2014

PENTA PACIFIC REALTY CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
LEY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.

DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:

Jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action is determined from the allegations of the initiatory
pleading.

The Case

Under review is the decision promulgated on October 9, 2003,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the judgment rendered on June 10, 2002 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 58, in
Makati City2 nullifying for lack of jurisdiction the decision rendered on January 12, 2000 by the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 64, in Makati City.3

Antecedents

The petitioner owned the 25th floor of the Pacific Star Building located in Makati City with an area of
1,068.67 square meters. The respondent leased 444.03 square meters of the premises (subject
property) through the petitioner’s authorized agent, Century Properties Management, Inc. (Century
Properties). Under the terms of the contract of lease dated January 31, 1997, the petitioner gavethe
respondent possession of the subject property under a stipulation to the effect that in case of the
respondent’s default in its monthly rentals, the petitioner could immediately repossess the subject
property.

On March 19, 1997, the respondent expressed the intention to purchase the entire 1,068.67 square
meters, including the subject property. The parties executed a contract to sell, denominated as a
reservation agreement, in which they set the purchase price at US$3,420,540.00, with the following
terms of payment: 20%down payment equivalent of US$684,108.00 payable within eight months;
and US$85,513.00/monthly for eight months with interestof 9.75%, commencing on the 6th month.
The 80% balance was to be paid in 13 installments beginning on March 1, 1997 until March 1, 1998.
The reservation agreement contained the following cancellation or forfeiture provision, viz:

Any failure on [the respondent’s] part to pay the full downpayment, or deliver the post-dated checks
or pay the monthly amortization on the due date, shall entitle [the petitioner], at its option, to impose
a penalty interest at the rate of three percent (3%) per month on the outstanding balance or to
cancel this agreement without need of any court action and to forfeit, in its favor, any reservation
deposits or payments already made on the unit, without prior notice.4

After paying US$538,735.00, the respondent stopped paying the stipulated monthly amortizations.
An exchange of letters ensued between Janet C. Ley, President of the respondent, or Efren Yap,
Assistant to the President of the respondent, on one hand, and Jose B.E. Antonio, ViceChairman of
the petitioner, and the petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Reynaldo Dizon, on the other. In the September 23,
1997 letter,5 the respondent asked the petitioner to modify the terms of the reservation agreement to
allow it to purchase only the subject property. In the February 5, 1998 letter,6the petitioner’s counsel
reminded the respondent of its US$961,546.50 liability to the petitioner under the terms of the
reservation agreement. In another letter dated February 5, 1998,7 the petitioner’s counsel informed
the respondent of its failure to pay its amortizations since August 1997, and demanded the payment
of US$961,564.50.

Through its letter of February 17, 1998,8 the respondent submitted the following proposals, namely:
(1) that the US$538,735.00 paid under the reservation agreement be applied asrental payments for
the use and occupation of the subject property in the period from March 1997 to February 28, 1998;
(2) that the balance of US$417,355.45 after deducting the rental payments from March 1997 to
February 28, 1998 should be returned to it; and (3) that the respondent be allowed to lease the
subject property beginning March 1998.

The petitioner, through its counsel’s letter of March 9, 1998,9 rejected the respondent’s proposals,
and demanded the payment of US$3,310,568.00, representing the respondent’s unpaid balance (as
of March 2, 1998) under the reservation agreement. The petitioner further evinced its intention to
cancel the contract to sell, and to charge the respondent for the rentals of the subject property
corresponding to the period from August 1997 to March 1998, during which no amortization
payments were made.

In the letter dated February 4, 1999,10 the petitioner’s counsel informed the respondent of the
cancellation of the reservation agreement and the forfeiture of the respondent’s payments; and
demanded that respondent pay the rentals of ₱9,782,226.50 and vacate the subject property.

In its letter of May 25, 1999,11 the petitioner’s counsel wrote to the respondent thuswise:

We write in behalf of our client, Penta Pacific Realty Corporation, regarding the Reservation
Agreement and/or sale between you and our client over the latter’s unit located at the 25th Floor,
Pacific Star Building, Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue corner Makati Avenue, Makati City.

We regret to inform you that inview of your continued refusal and/or failure to pay to our client the
balance of the agreed-upon purchase price of the office unit you are currently occupying, our client is
constrained to make a notarial cancellation of the Reservation Agreement and/or sale of the above-
mentioned unit and to forfeit the payments you made in favor of our client.

In this connection, there is no more valid reason for you to continue occupying the subject premises.
Hence, final and formal demand is hereby made upon you to peacefully and quietly vacate the same
within ten (10) days from receipt hereof. Otherwise, we shall be constrained to file the appropriate
legal action to protect our client’s interests.

Lastly, we would like to inform you that our client will also be constrained to charge you the amount
of ₱9,782,226.50 corresponding to reasonable rentals and other charges as of January 22, 1999.

Trusting that you are guided accordingly.

On July 9, 1999, the petitioner filed the complaint for ejectment in the MeTC following the
respondent’s failure to comply with the demands to pay and vacate.

The respondent resisted the complaint,12 arguing that the contract of lease dated January 31, 1997
had been simulated or, in the alternative, had been repealed, negated, extinguished and/or novated
by the reservation agreement; that the petitioner had failed to observe its undertaking to allow the
respondent to collect rentals from the other lessees of the subject property; that the petitioner had
unjustifiably refused to renegotiate or to amend the reservation agreement; and that the petitioner
had violated the rule on non-forum shopping considering the pendency of another case between the
parties in Branch 57 of the RTC in Makati City.13

Decision of the MeTC

On January 12, 2000, the MeTC, ruling in favor of the petitioner, found that the respondent’s lawful
possession of the property had been by virtue of the contract of lease, but had become unlawful
when the respondent had failed to comply with its obligation to pay the monthly rentals for the
subject property; and that, in any event, the reservation agreement proved that the petitioner had
held the better right to possess the subject property as the owner thereof. The MeTC disposed:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered ordering defendant Ley Construction and Development

Corporation and all persons claiming rights under it to vacate and surrender the possession of the
Property to the plaintiff; to pay the sum of ₱32,456,953.06 representing unpaid rentals and other
charges as of June 23, 1999; the further amount of ₱443,741.38 starting July, 1999, and the same
amount every month thereafter as reasonable compensation for the continued and illegal use and
occupancy of the Property, until finally restituted to the plaintiff; the sum of ₱100,000.00 for as (sic)
attorney’sfees plus cost of suit.14

The respondent appealed to the RTC.

In the meantime, on November 6, 2001, the respondent turned over the possession of the leased
premises to the petitioner.

Judgment of the RTC

On June 10, 2002, the RTC rendered its judgment nullifying the MeTC’s decision on the ground of
lackof jurisdiction, holding that the appropriate action was either accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria over which the MeTC had no jurisdiction. It found that the basis of recovery of
possession by the petitioner was the respondent’s failure to pay the amortizations arising from the
violations of the reservation agreement; that the complaint did not specifically aver facts constitutive
of unlawful detainer, i.e., it did not show how entry had been effected and how the dispossession
had started; and that the requirement of formal demand had not been complied with by the
petitioner.

Decision of the CA

The petitioner appealed to the CA.

By its decision promulgated on October 9, 2003, the CA affirmed the judgment of the
RTC,15 declaring that the respondent’s possession was not by virtue of the contract of lease but
pursuant to the reservation agreement, which was more of a "contract of sale."16 It concluded that the
petitioner’s action was not unlawful detainer, but another kind of action for the recovery of
possession.17

Not in agreement with the decision of the CA, the petitioner filed the present petition.

Issue

The decisive question is whether the complaint was for unlawful detainer, or accion publiciana, or
accion reivindicatoria.

The petitioner submits that the MeTC had jurisdiction because its complaint made out a clear case of
unlawful detainer, emphasizing that the basis of the complaint was the failure of the respondent to
pay the stipulated monthly rentals under the revived contract of lease; that even if the cause of
action was upon the nonpayment of the purchase price under the reservation agreement, the MeTC
still had jurisdiction over the action because an unlawful detainer case could also arise from a
vendor-vendee relationship; and that, accordingly, the nonpayment ofrentals or of the purchase price
sufficiently established its better right to possess the subject property.
In contrast, the respondent maintains that it had not violated any existing contract of lease with the
petitioner because the contract of lease dated January 31, 1997 was based on the agreement
between the respondent and Century Properties; that it had entered into the possession of the
subject property as the buyer-owner pursuant tothe reservation agreement; and that the recovery of
possession should have been by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria, not unlawful detainer.

Ruling

The appeal has merit.

1. Kinds of Possessory Actions

There are three kinds of real actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest
therein, namely: accion de reivindicacion, accion publiciana and accion interdictal. The first seeks
the recovery of ownership as well as possession of realty.18 The second proposes to recover the right
to possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding.19 The third refers to the recovery of
physical or actual possession only (through a special civil action either for forcible entry or unlawful
detainer).

If the dispossession is not alleged totake place by any of the means provided by Section 1,20 Rule 70,
Rules of Court, or, if the dispossession allegedly took place by any of such means but the action is
not brought within one year from deprivation ofpossession, the action is properly a plenary action of
accion publiciana or accion de reivindicacion. The explanation is simply that the disturbance of the
peace and quiet of the local community due to the dispossession did not materialize; hence, the
possessor thus deprived has no need for the summary proceeding of accion interdictal under Rule
70.

The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) has exclusive original jurisdiction over accion interdictal. Until April
15, 1994, the MTC had no original jurisdiction over the other possessory actions. By such date, its
jurisdiction was expanded to vest it with exclusive original jurisdiction over the other possessory
actions ofaccion publiciana and accion de reivindicacion where the assessed value of the realty
involved did not exceed ₱20,000.00, or, if the realty involved was in Metro Manila, such value did not
exceed ₱50,000.00. The expansion of jurisdiction was by virtue of the amendment by Section 1 of
Republic Act No. 769121 to make Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 pertinently provide thusly:

Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:

xxxx

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00)
or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00)
except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction
over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts;

xxxx
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7691 similarly revised Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (the
provision defining the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC over civil actions) to make the latter
provision state, pertinently, thus:

Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in Civil Cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts shall exercise:

xxxx

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does
not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages
of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not
declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed
value of the adjacent lots.

xxxx

As can be seen, the amendments have made the assessed value of the property whose possession
or ownership is in issue, or the assessed value of the adjacent lots if the disputed land is not
declared for taxation purposes determinative of jurisdiction. The allegation of the assessed value of
the realty must be found in the complaint, if the action (other than forcible entry or unlawful detainer)
involves title to or possession of the realty, including quieting of title of the realty. If the assessed
value is not found in the complaint, the action should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because
the trial court is not thereby afforded the means of determining from the allegations of the basic
pleading whether jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action pertains to it or to another court.
Courts cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market value of the realty.22

2. MeTC had jurisdiction over

the complaint of the petitioner

The settled rule is that the nature of the action as appearing from the averments in the complaint or
other initiatory pleading determines the jurisdiction of a court; hence, such averments and the
character of the relief sought are to be consulted.23 The court must interpret and apply the law on
jurisdiction in relation to the averments of ultimate facts in the complaint or other initiatory pleading
regardless ofwhether or not the plaintiff or petitioner is entitled to recover upon all or some of the
claims asserted therein.24 The reliefs to which the plaintiff or petitioner is entitled based on the facts
averred, although not the reliefs demanded, determine the nature of the action.25 The defense
contained in the answer of the defendant is generally not determinant.26

Is this present action onefor unlawful detainer?

A suit for unlawful detainer is premised on Section 1, Rule 70, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, of
which there are two kinds, namely: (1) that filed against a tenant, and (2) that brought against a
vendee or vendor, or other person unlawfully withholding possession of any land or building after the
expiration or termination of the rightto hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied.
"In an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer, the main issue is possession de facto,
independently of any claim of ownership or possession de jurethat either party may set forth in his
pleading."27 The plaintiff must prove that it was in prior physical possession of the premises until it
was deprived thereof by the defendant.28 The principal issue must be possession de facto, or actual
possession, and ownership is merely ancillary to such issue. The summary character of the
proceedings is designed to quicken the determination of possession de factoin the interest of
preserving the peace of the community, but the summary proceedings may not be proper to resolve
ownership of the property. Consequently, any issue on ownership arising in forcible entry or unlawful
detainer is resolved only provisionally for the purpose of determining the principal issue of
possession.29 On the other hand, regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property and
whatever may be the character of the plaintiff’s prior possession, if it has in its favor priority in time, it
has the security that entitles it to remain on the property until it is lawfully ejected through an accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria by another having a better right.30

In unlawful detainer, the complaint must allege the cause of action according to the manner set forth
in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. – Subject to the provisions of the next
succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom
the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the
rightto hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or
assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year
after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal
Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any
person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with
damages and costs. (Emphasis supplied)

The complaint must further allege the plaintiff’s compliance with the jurisdictional requirement of
demand as prescribed by Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, viz:

Section 2. Lessor to proceed against lessee only after demand. — Unless otherwise stipulated,
suchaction by the lessor shall be commenced only after demand to pay orcomply with the conditions
of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee, or by serving written notice of such demand
upon the person found on the premises, or by posting such notice on the premises if no person be
found thereon, and the lessee fails to comply therewith after fifteen (15) days in the case of land or
five (5) days in the case of buildings.

For the action to come under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, therefore, the complaint
must allege that: (a) the defendant originally had lawful possession of the property, either by virtue of
a contract or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (b) the defendant’s possession of the property eventually
became illegal or unlawful upon notice by the plaintiff to the defendant of the expiration or the
termination of the defendant’s right of possession; (c) the defendant thereafter remained in
possession of the property and thereby deprived the plaintiff the enjoyment thereof; and (d) the
plaintiff instituted the action within one year from the unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession.31

The complaint herein sufficientlyalleged all the foregoing requisites for unlawful detainer, to wit: x x x
x

3. On January 31, 1997, the defendant and the plaintiff’s authorized agent, Century Properties
Management Inc. (CPMI), a corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws
of the x x x Philippines x x x entered into a Contract of Lease whereby the latter leased from the
former a portion of the 25th Floor of the PSB (hereinafter referred to as the PROPERTY). x x x.

4. On March 19, 1997, the defendant decided to purchase from the plaintiff the 25th Floor of the PSB
by virtue of a Reservation Agreement of the same date. x x x.

5. However, on August 1997, the defendant started to default in its amortization payments on the
above-mentioned purchase. x x x.

xxxx

8. Sometime in March 1999, the defendant requested from the plaintiff and CPMI that the
Reservation Agreement be cancelled and in lieu thereof, the above-mentioned Contract of Lease be
revived. The plaintiff and CPMI acceded to such request x x x.

9. However, contrary to the express provisions of the Contract of Lease, the defendant failed to pay
to the plaintiff the rentals for the use of the PROPERTY when they fell due.

10. x x x the plaintiff also formally made a notarial cancellation of the aforementioned purchase and
demanded that defendant peacefully vacate the PROPERTY. x x x.

11. However, despite such demand, the defendant has failed and/or refused and continues to refuse
and fail to peacefully vacate the PROPERTY. x x x.32

As earlier shown, the final letter dated May 25, 1999 of the petitioner’s counsel demanded that the
respondent vacate the subject property,33 to wit:

In this connection, there is no more valid reason for you to continue occupying the subject
premises. Hence,final and formal demand is hereby made upon you to peacefully and quietly
1âwphi1

vacate the same within ten (10) days from receipt hereof. Otherwise, we shall be constrained to file
the appropriate legal action to protect our client’s interests.

Lastly, we would like to inform you that our client will also be constrained to charge you the amount
of ₱9,782,226.50 corresponding to reasonable rentals and other charges as of January 22, 1999.

After the demand went unheeded, the petitioner initiated this suit in the MeTC on July 9, 1999, well
within the one-year period from the date of the last demand.

The aforequoted allegations of the complaint made out a case of unlawful detainer, vesting the
MeTC with exclusive original jurisdiction over the complaint. As alleged therein,the cause of action of
the petitioner was to recover possession of the subject property from the respondent upon the
latter’s failure to comply with the former’s demand tovacate the subject property after the latter’s right
to remain thereon terminated by virtue of the demand to vacate. Indeed, the possession of the latter,
although lawful at its commencement, became unlawful upon its non-compliance with the former’s
demand to vacate.

The jurisdiction of the MeTC was not ousted by the fact that what was ultimately proved as to how
entry by the respondent had been made or when the dispossession had started might have departed
from that alleged in the complaint. As earlier stated, jurisdiction over the subject matter was
determined from the allegations of the complaint, which clearly set forth a cause of action for
unlawful detainer.34
The MeTC correctly exercised its authority in finding for the petitioner as the plaintiff. In unlawful
detainer, the possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of
the right to possess; hence, the issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in the action, the
defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiffs cause of action is the termination of the
defendant's right to continue in possession.35

A defendant's claim of possession de Jure or his averment of ownership does not render the
ejectment suit either accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. The suit remains an accion
interdictal, a summary proceeding that can proceed independently of any claim of ownership.36 Even
when the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the
issue of ownership is to be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.37

WHEREFORE, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision promulgated on October 9, 2003 by the
Court of Appeals affirming the decision rendered on June 10, 2002 by the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 58; REINSTATE the decision rendered on January 12, 2000 by the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch 64, of Makati City; and ORDER the respondent to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 195814, April 04, 2018 - EVERSLEY CHILDS SANITARIUM, REPRESENTED BY DR. GERARDO M.
AQUINO, JR. (NOW DR. PRIMO JOEL S. ALVEZ) CHIEF OF SANITARIUM, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES ANASTACIO
AND PERLA BARBARONA, Respondents.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 195814, April 04, 2018

EVERSLEY CHILDS SANITARIUM, REPRESENTED BY DR. GERARDO M. AQUINO, JR. (NOW DR.
PRIMO JOEL S. ALVEZ) CHIEF OF SANITARIUM, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES ANASTACIO AND PERLA
BARBARONA, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

A case for unlawful detainer must state the period from when the occupation by tolerance started and the
acts of tolerance exercised by the party with the right to possession. If it is argued that the possession was
illegal from the start, the proper remedy is to file an accion publiciana, or a plenary action to recover the
right of possession. Moreover, while an ejectment case merely settles the issue of the right of actual
possession, the issue of ownership may be provisionally passed upon if the issue of possession cannot be
resolved without it. Any final disposition on the issue of ownership, however, must be resolved in the proper
forum.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Court of Appeals February 17, 2011 Decision,2which
upheld the judgments of the Municipal Trial Court and Regional Trial Court ordering Eversley Childs
Sanitarium (Eversley) to vacate the disputed property. Eversley assails the August 31, 2011 Resolution3of
the Court of Appeals for resolving its Motion for Reconsideration despite its earlier submission of a Motion to
Withdraw the Motion for Reconsideration.

Eversley is a public health facility operated by the Department of Health to administer care and treatment to
patients suffering from Hansen's disease, commonly known as leprosy, and to provide basic health services
to non-Hansen's cases.4 Since 1930, it has occupied a portion of a parcel of land denominated as Lot No.
1936 in Jagobiao, Mandaue City, Cebu.5

Spouses Anastacio and Perla Barbarona (the Spouses Barbarona) allege that they are the owners of Lot No.
1936 by virtue of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 53698. They claim that they have acquired the
property from the Spouses Tarcelo B. Gonzales and Cirila Alba (the Spouses Gonzales),6 whose ownership
was covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-824. Per the Spouses Barbarona's verification, OCT
No. RO-824 was reconstituted based on Decree No. 699021, issued to the Spouses Gonzales by the Land
Registration Office on March 29, 1939.7

On May 6, 2005, the Spouses Barbarona filed a Complaint for Ejectment (Complaint)8 before the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities of Mandaue City against the occupants of Lot No. 1936, namely, Eversley, Jagobiao
National High School, the Bureau of Food and Drugs, and some residents (collectively, the occupants). The
Spouses Barbarona alleged that they had sent demand letters and that the occupants were given until April
15, 2005 to vacate the premises. They further claimed that despite the lapse of the period, the occupants
refused to vacate; hence, they were constrained to file the Complaint.9

In their Answer,10 the occupants alleged that since they had been in possession of the property for more
than 70 years, the case was effectively one for recovery of possession, which was beyond the jurisdiction of
the Municipal Trial Court. They likewise claimed that the Spouses Barbarona were guilty of laches since it
took more than 60 years for them to seek the issuance of a Torrens title over the property. They also
averred that the Spouses Barbarona's certificate of title was void since they, the actual inhabitants of the
property, were never notified of its issuance.11

In its September 29, 2005 Decision,12 the Municipal Trial Court in Cities ordered the occupants to vacate the
property, finding that the action was one for unlawful detainer, and thus, within its jurisdiction. It likewise
found that the Spouses Barbarona were the lawful owners of Lot No. 1936 and that the occupants were
occupying the property by mere tolerance.13

The Municipal Trial Court in Cities also held that a titled property could not be acquired through laches. It
found that even the occupants' tax declarations in their names could not prevail over a valid certificate of
title.14 The dispositive portion of its Decision read:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [the Spouses Barbarona] and against all the
[occupants] and ordering the latter to peacefully vacate the portion of the premises in question and remove
their houses, structures or any building and improvements introduced or constructed on said portion on Lot
1936 covered by TCT No. 53698.

The [occupants] are further ordered to pay the following, to wit:

1. The amount of P10.00 per square meter for the area occupied by each [of the occupants]
as reasonable monthly compensation for the use of the portion of the property of [the
Spouses Barbarona] from the date of the filing of the complaint until [the occupants] shall
have actually vacated and turned over the portion of their possession to the [Spouses
Barbarona];

2. The amount of P20,000 as litigation expenses and P20,000 as reasonable attorney[']s fees;
and
 3. The cost of suit.

Counterclaims of the [occupants] are hereby ordered DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.15

The occupants appealed to the Regional Trial Court. In its November 24, 2006 Decision,16 the Regional Trial
Court affirmed in toto the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities. One of the occupants, Eversley, filed
a motion for reconsideration.17

During the pendency of Eversley's motion, or on February 19, 2007, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP
No. 01503 rendered a Decision, cancelling OCT No. R0-824 and its derivative titles, including TCT No.
53698, for lack of notice to the owners of the adjoining properties and its occupants.18

On April 23, 2007, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order denying Eversley's Motion for Reconsideration.19

Eversley filed a Petition for Review20 with the Court of Appeals, arguing that the Municipal Trial Court had no
jurisdiction over the action and that the Regional Trial Court erred in not recognizing that the subsequent
invalidation of the Spouses Barbarona's certificate of title was prejudicial to their cause of action.21

On February 17, 2011, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision,22 denying the Petition. According to the
Court of Appeals, the allegations in the Complaint were for the recovery of the physical possession of the
property and not a determination of the property's ownership. The action, thus, was one for unlawful
detainer and was properly filed with the Municipal Trial Court.23

The Court of Appeals held that the subsequent invalidation of the issuance of the certificate of title was
immaterial, stating:

Whether or not [the Spouses Barbarona are] holder[s] or not of a certificate of title is immaterial. The
matter of the issuance of the decree by the Land Registration Office in favor of [the Spouses Barbarona's]
predecessor[s-]in[-]interest has not been resolved on the merits by the RTC. [The Spouses Barbarona,]
having acquired all the rights of their predecessors-in-interest[,] have[,] from the time of the issuance of
the decree[,] also derived title over the property and nullification of the title based on procedural defects is
not tantamount to the nullification of the decree. The decree stands and remains a prima facie source of the
[Spouses Barbarona's] right of ownership over the subject property.24

Eversley, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Petition for Review25 with this Court
assailing the February 17, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals. It likewise prayed for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction26 to restrain the immediate execution of
the assailed judgment and to prevent impairing the operations of the government hospital, which had been
serving the public for more than 80 years.

In its May 13, 2011 Resolution,27 this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the
implementation of the Court of Appeals February 17, 2011 Decision. Respondents were also directed to
comment on the Petition.

In its Petition before this Court, petitioner argues that the nullification of TCT No. 53698 should have been
prejudicial to respondents' right to recover possession over the property. Petitioner claims that since the
Metropolitan Trial Court relied on respondents' title to determine their right of possession over the property,
the subsequent nullification of their title should have invalidated their right of possession. Petitioner
maintains that even if Decree No. 699021 was valid, the effect of its validity does not extend to respondents
since there is no evidence to prove that they have acquired the property from Tarcelo B. Gonzales, the
owner named in the decree.28

Petitioner points out that respondents' Complaint before the trial court was a case for accion publiciana, not
one for unlawful detainer, since respondents have not proven petitioner's initial possession to be one of
mere tolerance. It claims that respondents' bare allegation that they merely tolerated petitioner's possession
is insufficient in a case for unlawful detainer, especially with petitioner's possession of the property since
1930, which pre-dates the decree that was reconstituted in 1939.29 It argues that its long occupancy should
have been the subject of judicial notice since it is a government hospital serving the city for decades and is
even considered as a landmark of the city.30

On the other hand, respondents counter that the cancellation of TCT No. 53698 "does not ... divest
respondents of their rightful ownership of the subject property[,] more so their right of possession"31since
their predecessors-in-interest's title was still valid and protected under the Torrens system. They insist that
"petitioner has not shown . . . any sufficient evidence proving [its] ownership ... much less, [its] right of
possession."32

Respondents maintain that the Municipal Trial Court had jurisdiction over their complaint since prior physical
possession is not an indispensable requirement and all that is required is "that the one-year period of
limitation commences from the time of demand to vacate."33

While the Petition was pending before this Court, respondents raised a few procedural concerns before
submitting their Comment. In their Motion for Leave to File Comment/Manifestation,34 respondents informed
this Court that petitioner still had a pending and unresolved Motion for Reconsideration35 before the Court of
Appeals, in violation of the rule against forum shopping. Respondents, nonetheless, filed their
Comment/Manifestation,36 to which this Court ordered petitioner to reply.37

Petitioner filed its Reply38 and submitted a Manifestation,39 explaining that the Court of Appeals had issued a
Resolution40 on August 31, 2011, denying its Motion for Reconsideration despite its earlier filing on April 14,
2011 of a Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw its Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, it manifested its
intention to likewise question the Court of Appeals August 31, 2011 Resolution with this Court.

On November 28, 2011, this Court noted that petitioner's Reply and Manifestation and directed respondents
to comment on the Manifestation.41

In their Comment on Petitioner's Manifestation,42 respondents assert that while petitioner submitted a
Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw its Motion for Reconsideration, the Court of Appeals did not issue any
order considering petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration to have been abandoned. The Court of Appeals
instead proceeded to resolve it in its August 31, 2011 Resolution; hence, respondents submit that petitioner
violated the rule on non-forum shopping.43

Based on the arguments of the parties, this Court is asked to resolve the following issues:

First, whether or not the nullification of the Spouses Anastacio and Perla Barbarona's title had the effect of
invalidating their right of possession over the disputed property; and

Second, whether or not the Spouses Anastacio and Perla Barbarona's complaint against Eversley Childs
Sanitarium was for accion publiciana or for unlawful detainer.

Before these issues may be passed upon, however, this Court must first resolve the procedural question of
whether or not Eversley Childs Sanitarium violated the rule on non-forum shopping.

In City of Taguig v. City of Makati,44 this Court discussed the definition, origins, and purpose of the rule on
forum shopping:

Top Rate Construction & General Services, Inc. v. Paxton Development Corporationexplained that:

Forum shopping is committed by a party who institutes two or more suits in different courts, either
simultaneously or successively, in order to ask the courts to rule on the same or related causes or to grant
the same or substantially the same reliefs, on the supposition that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition or increase a party's chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action.
First Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals recounted that forum shopping originated as a
concept in private international law:

To begin with, forum-shopping originated as a concept in private international law, where non-resident
litigants are given the option to choose the forum or place wherein to bring their suit for various reasons or
excuses, including to secure procedural advantages, to annoy and harass the defendant, to avoid
overcrowded dockets, or to select a more friendly venue. To combat these less than honorable excuses, the
principle of forum non conveniens was developed whereby a court, in conflicts of law cases, may refuse
impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or available forum and the parties are
not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.

In this light, Black's Law Dictionary says that forum-shopping "occurs when a party attempts to have his
action tried in a particular court or jurisdiction where he feels he will receive the most favorable judgment or
verdict." Hence, according to Words and Phrases, "a litigant is open to the charge of 'forum shopping'
whenever he chooses a forum with slight connection to factual circumstances surrounding his suit, and
litigants should be encouraged to attempt to settle their differences without imposing undue expense and
vexatious situations on the courts."

Further, Prubankers Association v. Prudential Bank and Trust Co. recounted that:

The rule on forum-shopping was first included in Section 17 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines issued by
this Court on January 11, 1983, which imposed a sanction in this wise: "A violation of the rule shall
constitute contempt of court and shall be a cause for the summary dismissal of both petitions, without
prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel or party concerned." Thereafter, the Court
restated the rule in Revised Circular No. 28-91 and Administrative Circular No. 04-94. Ultimately, the rule
was embodied in the 1997 amendments to the Rules of Court.45

There is forum shopping when a party files different pleadings in different tribunals, despite having the same
"identit[ies] of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought."46 Consistent with the principle of fair
play, parties are prohibited from seeking the same relief in multiple forums in the hope of obtaining a
favorable judgment. The rule against forum shopping likewise fulfills an administrative purpose as it
prevents conflicting decisions by different tribunals on the same issue.

In filing complaints and other initiatory pleadings, the plaintiff or petitioner is required to attach a
certification against forum shopping, certifying that (a) no other action or claim involving the same issues
has been filed or is pending in any court, tribunal, or quasi-judicial agency, (b) if there is a pending action or
claim, the party shall make a complete statement of its present status, and (c) if the party should learn that
the same or similar action has been filed or is pending, that he or she will report it within five (5) days to
the tribunal where the complaint or initiatory pleading is pending. Thus, Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court provides:

Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. — The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in
the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed
thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed
any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or
claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the
same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days
therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint
or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless
otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance
with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the
corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute
willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and
shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, is alleged to have committed forum shopping when it
filed its Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, despite a pending Motion for Reconsideration with
the Court of Appeals.

According to the Solicitor General, it filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition for Review on
Certiorari with this Court on March 10, 2011 but that another set of solicitors erroneously filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals on March 11, 2011.47 Thus, it was constrained to file a
Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw its Motion for Reconsideration on April 14, 2011,48 the same date as
its Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court. Indeed, its Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, as
certified by State Solicitor Joan V. Ramos-Fabella, provides:

....

5. I certify that there is a pending Motion for Reconsideration erroneously filed in the Court of Appeals,
Special Eighteenth Division which we have asked to be withdrawn. Aside from said pending motion, I have
not commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-
judicial agency and, to the best of my knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; and
should I thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim is pending before any other court, tribunal
or quasi-judicial agency, I shall report such fact within five (5) days therefrom from the court wherein this
petition has been filed.49 (Emphasis supplied)

The Office of the Solicitor General, however, mistakenly presumed that the mere filing of a motion to
withdraw has the effect of withdrawing the motion for reconsideration without having to await the action of
the Court of Appeals. The Office of the Solicitor General's basis is its reading of Rule VI, Section 15 of the
2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals:

Section 15. Effect of Filing an Appeal in the Supreme Court. – No motion for reconsideration or rehearing
shall be acted upon if the movant has previously filed in the Supreme Court a petition for review on
certiorari or a motion for extension of time to file such petition. If such petition or motion is subsequently
filed, the motion for reconsideration pending in this Court shall be deemed abandoned.

This would have been true had the Office of the Solicitor General merely manifested that it had already
considered its Motion for Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals as abandoned, pursuant to its Internal
Rules. However, it filed a Motion to Withdraw, effectively submitting the withdrawal of its Motion for
Reconsideration to the Court of Appeals' sound discretion. A motion is not presumed to have already been
acted upon by its mere filing. Prudence dictated that the Office of the Solicitor General await the Court of
Appeals' action on its Motion to Withdraw before considering its Motion for Reconsideration as withdrawn.

Ordinarily, "a motion that is not acted upon in due time is deemed denied."50 When the Court of Appeals
denied the Office of the Solicitor General's Motion for Reconsideration without acting on its Motion to
Withdraw, the latter was effectively denied. Petitioner, thus, committed forum shopping when it filed its
Petition before this Court despite a pending Motion for Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals.

To rule in this manner, however, is to unnecessarily deprive petitioner of its day in court despite the Court of
Appeals' failure to apply its own Internal Rules. The Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals clearly provide
that a subsequent motion for reconsideration shall be deemed abandoned if the movant filed a petition for
review or motion for extension of time to file a petition for review before this Court. While the Office of the
Solicitor General can be faulted for filing a motion instead of a mere manifestation, it cannot be faulted for
presuming that the Court of Appeals would follow its Internal Rules as a matter of course.

Rule VI, Section 15 of the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals is provided for precisely to prevent forum
shopping. It mandates that once a party seeks relief with this Court, any action for relief with the Court of
Appeals will be deemed abandoned to prevent conflicting decisions on the same issues. Had the Court of
Appeals applied its own Internal Rules, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration would have been deemed
abandoned.

Moreover, unlike this Court, which can suspend the effectivity of its own rules when the ends of justice
require it,51 the Court of Appeals cannot exercise a similar power. Only this Court may suspend the
effectivity of any provision in its Internal Rules.52 Thus, it would be reasonable for litigants to expect that the
Court of Appeals would comply with its own Internal Rules.

Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration having been deemed abandoned with its filing of a Motion for
Extension of Time before this Court, the Court of Appeals' August 31, 2011 Resolution denying the Motion
for Reconsideration, thus, has no legal effect. It is as if no motion for reconsideration was filed at
all.53Considering that petitioner counted the running of the period to file its Petition with this Court from its
receipt of the Court of Appeals February 17, 2011 Decision, and not of the Court of Appeals August 31, 2011
Resolution, it does not appear that petitioner "wanton[ly] disregard[ed] the rules or cause[d] needless delay
in the administration of justice."54 In this particular instance, petitioner did not commit a fatal procedural
error.

II

By its very nature, an ejectment case only resolves the issue of who has the better right of possession over
the property. The right of possession in this instance refers to actual possession, not legal possession. While
a party may later be proven to have the legal right of possession by virtue of ownership, he or she must still
institute an ejectment case to be able to dispossess an actual occupant of the property who refuses to
vacate. In Mediran v. Villanueva:55

Juridically speaking, possession is distinct from ownership, and from this distinction are derived legal
consequences of much importance. In giving recognition to the action of forcible entry and detainer the
purpose of the law is to protect the person who in fact has actual possession; and in case of controverted
right, it requires the parties to preserve the status quo until one or the other of them sees tit to invoke the
decision of a court of competent jurisdiction upon the question of ownership. It is obviously just that the
person who has first acquired possession should remain in possession pending this decision; and the parties
cannot be permitted meanwhile to engage in a petty warfare over the possession of the property which is
the subject of dispute. To permit this would be highly dangerous to individual security and disturbing to
social order. Therefore, where a person supposes himself to be the owner of a piece of property and desires
to vindicate his ownership against the party actually in possession, it is incumbent upon him to institute an
action to this end in a court of competent jurisdiction; and he [cannot] be permitted, by invading the
property and excluding the actual possessor, to place upon the latter the burden of instituting an action to
try the property right.56

In ejectment cases, courts will only resolve the issue of ownership provisionally if the issue of possession
cannot be resolved without passing upon it. In Co v. Militar:57

We have, time and again, held that the only issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or
material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party
litigants. Moreover, an ejectment suit is summary in nature and is not susceptible to circumvention by the
simple expedient of asserting ownership over the property.

In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the defendant raises the question of ownership in his
pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the
lower courts and the Court of Appeals, nonetheless, have the undoubted competence to provisionally resolve
the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining the issue of possession.

Such decision, however, does not bind the title or affect the ownership of the land nor is conclusive of the
facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving
possession.58

In this instance, respondents anchor their right of possession over the disputed property on TCT No.
5369859 issued in their names. It is true that a registered owner has a right of possession over the property
as this is one of the attributes of ownership.60 Ejectment cases, however, are not automatically decided in
favor of the party who presents proof of ownership, thus:

Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession. However, the owner
cannot simply wrest possession thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the property. To recover
possession, he must resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once he chooses what action to file, he is
required to satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to prosper.

In the present case, petitioner opted to file an ejectment case against respondents. Ejectment cases —
forcible entry and unlawful detainer — are summary proceedings designed to provide expeditious means to
protect actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved. The only question that the
courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that
is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a party's title to
the property is questionable. For this reason, an ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor of
one who has presented proof of ownership of the subject property. Key jurisdictional facts constitutive of the
particular ejectment case filed must be averred in the complaint and sufficiently proven.61 (Emphasis
supplied)

Here, respondents alleged that their right of ownership was derived from their predecessors-in-interest, the
Spouses Gonzales, whose Decree No. 699021 was issued on March 29, 1939.62 The Register of Deeds
certified that there was no original certificate of title or owner's duplicate issued over the property, or if
there was, it may have been lost or destroyed during the Second World War. The heirs of the Spouses
Gonzales subsequently executed a Deed of Full Renunciation of Rights, Conveyance of Full Ownership and
Full Waiver of Title and Interest on March 24, 2004 in respondents' favor. Thus, respondent Anastacio
Barbarona succeeded in having Decree No. 699021 reconstituted on July 27, 2004 and having TCT No.
53698 issued in respondents' names on February 7, 2005.63

The Municipal and Regional Trial Courts referred to respondents' Torrens title as basis to rule the ejectment
case in their favor:

The complaint in this case sufficiently ... establish[es] beyond doubt that [the Spouses Barbarona] are the
lawful owners of Lot 1936, situated at Jagobiao, Mandaue City, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 53698....

....
A certificate of title is a conclusive evidence of ownership and as owners, the [the Spouses Barbarona] are
entitled to possession of the property....

This Court however cannot just simply closed (sic) its eyes into the fact presented before the trial court that
the subject lot owned by [the Spouses Barbarona] is covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title. Until such
time or period that such title is rendered worthless, the same is BINDING UPON THE WHOLE WORLD in
terms of ownership[.]64 (Emphasis in the original)

During the interim, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a
Petition for Annulment of Judgment before the Court of Appeals to assail the reconstitution of Decree No.
699021, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 01503. On February 19, 2007,65 the Court of Appeals in that case
found that the trial court reconstituted the title without having issued the required notice and initial hearing
to the actual occupants, rendering all proceedings void. The dispositive portion of the Decision read:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the instant petition and
SETTING ASIDE the Order of Branch 55 of the Regional Trial Court, Mandaue City in Case No.3 G.L.R.O.,
Record No. 4030.

SO ORDERED.66

As a consequence of this ruling, TCT No. 53698 was cancelled by the Register of Deeds on January 25,
2011.67

Despite these developments, the Court of Appeals in this case proceeded to affirm the Municipal Trial Court's
and Regional Trial Court's judgments on the basis that Decree No. 699021 was still valid, stating:

Whether or not [the Spouses Barbarona are] holder[s] or not of a certificate of title is immaterial. The
matter of the issuance of the decree by the Land Registration Office in favor of [the Spouses Barbarona's]
predecessor[s-]in[-]interest has not been resolved on the merits by the RTC. [The Spouses Barbarona,]
having acquired all the rights of their predecessors-in-interest[,] have[,] from the time of the issuance of
the decree[,] also derived title over the property and nullification of the title based on procedural defects is
not tantamount to the nullification of the decree. The decree stands and remains a prima facie source of the
[Spouses Barbarona's] right of ownership over the subject property.68

Blinded by respondents' allegedly valid title on the property, the three (3) tribunals completely ignored how
petitioner came to occupy the property in the first place.

Petitioner, a public hospital operating as a leprosarium dedicated to treating persons suffering from Hansen's
disease, has been occupying the property since May 30, 1930. According to its history:

The institution was built by the Leonard Wood Memorial with most of the funds donated by the late Mr.
Eversley Childs of New York, USA, hence the name, Eversley Childs Sanitarium, in honor of the late donor.
The total cost was about 400,000.00 which were spent for the construction of 52 concrete buildings (11
cottages for females and 22 for males, 5 bathhouses, 2 infirmaries, powerhouse, carpentry shop, general
kitchen and storage, consultation and treatment clinics and offices), waterworks, sewerage, road and
telephone system, equipment and the likes.

The construction of the building [was] started sometime on May 1928 and was completed 2 years later. It
was formally turned over the Philippine government and was opened [on] May 30, 1930 with 540 patients
transferred in from Caretta Treatment Station, now Cebu Skin Clinic in Cebu City.69

Proclamation No. 507 was issued on October 21, 1932, "which reserved certain parcels of land in Jagobiao,
Mandaue City, Cebu as additional leprosarium site for the Eversley Childs Treatment Station."70Petitioner's
possession of the property, therefore, pre-dates that of respondents' predecessors-in-interest, whose Decree
No. 699021 was issued in 1939.

It is true that defects in TCT No. 53698 or even Decree No. 699021 will not affect the fact of ownership,
considering that a certificate of title does not vest ownership. The Torrens system "simply recognizes and
documents ownership and provides for the consequences of issuing paper titles."71

Without TCT No. 53698, however, respondents have no other proof on which to anchor their claim. The
Deed of Full Renunciation of Rights, Conveyance of Full Ownership and Full Waiver of Title and Interest
executed in their favor by the heirs of the Spouses Gonzales is insufficient to prove conveyance of property
since no evidence was introduced to prove that ownership over the property was validly transferred to the
Spouses Gonzales' heirs upon their death.

Moreover, Proclamation No. 507, series of 1932, reserved portions of the property specifically for petitioner's
use as a leprosarium. Even assuming that Decree No. 699021 is eventually held as a valid Torrens title, a
title under the Torrens system is always issued subject to the annotated liens or encumbrances, or what the
law warrants or reserves. Thus:

Under the Torrens system of registration, the government is required to issue an official certificate of title to
attest to the fact that the person named is the owner of the property described therein, subject to such liens
and encumbrances as thereon noted or what the law warrants or reserves.72 (Emphasis supplied)

Portions occupied by petitioner, having been reserved by law, cannot be affected by the issuance of a
Torrens title. Petitioner cannot be considered as one occupying under mere tolerance of the registered
owner since its occupation was by virtue of law. Petitioner's right of possession, therefore, shall remain
unencumbered subject to the final disposition on the issue of the property's ownership.

III

There are three (3) remedies available to one who has been dispossessed of property: (1) an action for
ejectment to recover possession, whether for unlawful detainer or forcible entry; (2) accion
publiciana oraccion plenaria de posesion, or a plenary action to recover the right of possession; and
(3) accion reivindicatoria, or an action to recover ownership.73
Although both ejectment and accion publiciana are actions specifically to recover the right of possession,
they have two (2) distinguishing differences. The first is the filing period. Ejectment cases must be filed
within one (1) year from the date of dispossession. If the dispossession lasts for more than a year, then
an accion publiciana must be filed. The second distinction concerns jurisdiction. Ejectment cases, being
summary in nature, are filed with the Municipal Trial Courts. Accion publiciana, however, can only be taken
cognizance by the Regional Trial Court.74

Petitioner argues that the Municipal Trial Court has no jurisdiction over the case since respondents' cause of
action makes a case for accion publiciana and not ejectment through unlawful detainer. It asserts that
respondents failed to prove that petitioner occupied the property by mere tolerance.

Jurisdiction over subject matter is conferred by the allegations stated in the complaint.75 Respondents'
Complaint before the Municipal Trial Court states:

That [the occupants] are presently occupying the above-mentioned property of the [Spouses Barbarona]
without color [of] right or title. Such occupancy is purely by mere tolerance. Indeed, [the occupants']
occupying the lot owned by [the Spouses Barbarona] is illegal and not anchored upon any contractual
relations with the [Spouses Barbarona.]76

Indeed, no mention has been made as to how petitioner came to possess the property and as to what acts
constituted tolerance on the part of respondents or their predecessors-in-interest to allow petitioner's
occupation. In Carbonilla v. Abiera:77

A requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case is that possession must be originally
lawful, and such possession must have turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to possess. It
must be shown that the possession was initially lawful; hence, the basis of such lawful possession must be
established. If, as in this case, the claim is that such possession is by mere tolerance of the plaintiff, the
acts of tolerance must be proved.

Petitioner failed to prove that respondents' possession was based on his alleged tolerance. He did not offer
any evidence or even only an affidavit of the Garcianos attesting that they tolerated respondents' entry to
and occupation of the subject properties. A bare allegation of tolerance will not suffice. Plaintiff must, at
least, show overt acts indicative of his or his predecessor's permission to occupy the subject property....
....

In addition, plaintiff must also show that the supposed acts of tolerance have been present right from the
very start of the possession — from entry to the property. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from
the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy. Notably, no mention was made in
the complaint of how entry by respondents was effected or how and when dispossession started. Neither
was there any evidence showing such details.

In any event, petitioner has some other recourse. He may pursue recovering possession of his property by
filing an accion publiciana, which is a plenary action intended to recover the better right to possess; or
an accion reivindicatoria, a suit to recover ownership of real property. We stress, however, that the
pronouncement in this case as to the ownership of the land should be regarded as merely provisional and,
therefore, would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the land.78

The same situation is present in this case. Respondents failed to state when petitioner's possession was
initially lawful, and how and when their dispossession started. All that appears from the Complaint is that
petitioner's occupation "is illegal and not anchored upon any contractual relations with [respondents.]"79

This, however, is insufficient to determine if the action was filed within a year from dispossession, as
required in an ejectment case. On the contrary, respondents allege that petitioner's occupation was illegal
from the start. The proper remedy, therefore, should have been to file an accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria to assert their right of possession or their right of ownership.

Considering that respondents filed the improper case before the Municipal Trial Court, it had no jurisdiction
over the case. Any disposition made, therefore, was void. The subsequent judgments of the Regional Trial
Court and the Court of Appeals, which proceeded from the void Municipal Trial Court judgment, are likewise
void.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The February 17, 2011 Decision and August 31, 2011 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 02762 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Temporary
Restraining Order dated May 13, 2011 is made PERMANENT.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Martires, and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.

MENDOZA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the June
14, 2012 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its November 14, 2012
Resolution[2] which reversed the April 18, 2011 Decision[3] of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 6, Baguio City (RTC), and reinstated the September 15,
2009 Decision[4] of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, Baguio
City (MTCC), in Civil Case No. 13209, a complaint for recovery of
possession.

The Facts

Records show that Carmeling Crisologo (Crisologo), represented by her

attorney-in-fact, Pedro Isican (Isican), filed her complaint[5] for Recovery of
Possession and/or Ownership with Damages against Juliet B. Pulkera, Paul
P. Gabriel, Ireneo C. Calwag, and Thomas L. Tingga-an (petitioners) before
the MTCC.

Crisologo alleged, among others, that she was the registered owner of two
parcels of land with a total area of approximately 2,000 square meters,
described in, and covered by, two (2) certificates of title Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) Nos. T-13935 and T-13936; that the properties were covered
by an Assessment of Real Property; that the payments of realty taxes on the
said properties were updated; that sometime in 2006, she discovered that
petitioners unlawfully entered, occupied her properties by stealth, by force
and without her prior consent and knowledge, and constructed their houses
thereon; that upon discovery of their illegal occupation, her daughter, Atty.
Carmelita Crisologo, and Isican personally went to the properties and
verbally demanded that petitioners vacate the premises and remove their
structures thereon; that the petitioners begged and promised to buy the
said properties for ?3,500.00 per square meter; that she gave petitioners
time to produce the said amount, but they reneged on their promise to buy
them; that petitioners refused to vacate the subject properties despite
several demands; that the petitioners knew full well that the subject
premises they were occupying were titled properties but they insisted on
unlawfully holding the same; and that she was unlawfully dispossessed and
displaced from the subject properties due to petitioners' illegal occupation.

On the other hand, petitioners countered that the titles of Crisologo were
products of Civil Registration Case No. 1, Record 211, which were declared
void by the Supreme Court in Republic v. Marcos,[6] and reiterated
in Republic v. Marcos;[7] that the said case was later enacted into law,
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1271, entitled "An Act Nullifying Decrees of
Registration and Certificates of Title within the Baguio Townsite
Reservation Case No.1, GLRO Record No. 211, pursuant to Act No. 931, as
amended, but Considering as Valid Certain Titles of Lands that are
Alienable and Disposable Under Certain Conditions and For Other
Purposes" which took effect on December 22, 1977; that Crisologo failed to
comply with the conditions provided in Section 1 of P.D. No. 1271 for the
validation of said titles, hence, the titles were void; that petitioners had
been in open, actual, exclusive, notorious, uninterrupted, and continuous
possession of the subject land, in good faith; and that Crisologo was never
in prior possession and had no valid title over the subject land.[8]

MTCC Ruling

On September 15, 2009, the MTCC rendered a decision in favor of

Crisologo, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court renders JUDGMENT in favor of the plaintiff

directing the defendants, their heirs, assigns, representatives and/or any
person acting for and in their behalves to:

a) Immediately vacate the subject properties, and to demolish/dismantle all

their houses and other structures on the properties; should defendants
refuse to comply, the plaintiff may demolish/dismantle them at the expense
of the defendants;
b) Pay reasonable rentals of the use and occupation of the subject
properties at Php4,000.00 per month from January 2006 for each of the
defendants;

c) Pay Php20, 000.00 as attorney's fees, and

d) Costs of litigation.
SO ORDERED.

The MTCC ruled that Crisologo was the registered owner of the subject
parcels of land, who, as such, had declared these properties for taxation
purposes since 1969 and regularly paid the realty taxes thereon. It stated
that with Crisologo being the owner, petitioners were illegally occupying the
land.

The MTCC added that petitioners could not question Crisologo's titles over
the subject parcels of land in an ordinary civil action for recovery of
possession because such defense was a collateral attack which was
prohibited under P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree. Thus, it could not inquire into the intrinsic validity of
Crisologo's titles.

Ruling of the RTC

On April 18, 2011, the RTC reversed and set aside the decision of the
MTCC. It was of the view that petitioners' assertion of the TCTs' invalidity
was not a collateral attack. It cited the rulings in Republic v.
Marcos,[9] and Republic v. Marcos,[10] which perpetually prohibited the
reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1, LRC Rec. No. 211, and, therefore,
the registration of parcels of lands. For said reason, the titles of Crisologo
were products of illegal proceedings nullified by this Court. She also failed
to comply with the conditions set forth in P.D. No. 1271. Accordingly, the
titles were void and the same could not be a legal basis for Crisologo to
justify the eviction of petitioners from the subject premises. Having been
nullified, these certificates of title ceased to be the best proof of ownership.

Ruling of the CA

On June 14, 2012, the CA rendered the assailed decision, setting aside the
RTC decision and reinstating that of the MTCC.
The CA held that Crisologo was entitled to the possession of the subject
parcels of land. It explained that her possession was established when she
acquired the same by sale sometime in 1967 and when the certificates of
title covering the properties were subsequently issued. It added that her
payment of realty taxes due on the said properties since 1969 further
strengthened her claim of possession. Moreover, her appointment of Isican
as administrator of the subject properties and her offer to sell the lots to the
petitioners showed that she had control over the same. Accordingly, the CA
concluded that Crisologo's right to remain in possession of the subject lots
should be preferred over the petitioners' possession regardless of the actual
condition of her titles. Hence, the petitioners, who used force in occupying
her properties, should respect, restore and not disturb her lawful
possession of the subject parcels of land.

Unsatisfied with the CA decision, the petitioners instituted this petition

anchored on the following

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

(1)

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A

REVERSIBLE ERROR IN LAW WHEN IT RULED THAT
RESPONDENT HAS ACTUAL OR WAS IN PRIOR POSSESSION
OF THE LANDS INVOLVED CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE,
THE FACTS AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.

(2)

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A

SERIOUS ERROR IN FINDING THAT THE PURPORTED
EXECUTION AND REGISTRATION OF THE PUBLIC
INSTRUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE SALE IN 1967 OF THE
SUBJECT LANDS AND THE SUBSEQUENT ISSUANCE OF THE
TITLES IN HER NAME ESTABLISH POSSESSION.
 (3)

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A

SERIOUS ERROR IN FINDING THAT THE TAX DECLARATIONS
AND RECEIPTS IN THE NAME OF THE RESPONDENT
ESTABLISH HER POSSESSION OVER THE SUBJECT LOTS.

(4)

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A

SERIOUS ERROR IN FINDING THAT THE SUPPOSED
APPOINTMENT OF PEDRO ISICAN AS ADMINISTRATOR
ESTABLISHES HER POSSESSION OVER THE LANDS IN
DISPUTE.

(5)

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN

RULING THAT RESPONDENT IS THE PRESENT POSSESSOR OF
THE SUBJECT LANDS REGARDLESS OF THE ACTUAL
CONDITION OF HER TITLES, IGNORING THE PRINCIPLE OF
STARE DECISIS AND ADHERENCE TO LAW.

(6)

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN

FINDING THAT PETITIONERS DISTURBED THE POSSESSION
OF HEREIN RESPONDENT BY FORCE.

(7)

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN

RULING THAT RESPONDENT'S SUPPOSED POSSESSION OVER
THE SUBJECT LOTS SHOULD BE PREFERRED DESPITE THE
NATURE OR CONDITION OF THE PROPERTY AS PART OF THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN.[11]

Petitioners' position

Petitioners aver that Crisologo failed to show documentary or testimonial

evidence that she acquired the subject properties by sale or by any other
mode of acquisition from its previous owner. Her only bases in claiming
them were the titles issued in her name, without a deed of sale.

Petitioners further argue that assuming that there was really a sale that
took place, its execution and registration cannot establish her right of
possession, whether actual or constructive. First, the validity of the subject
titles was stricken down by Republic vs. Marcos cases and P.D. No. 1271.
Hence, the TCTs could not be sources of legal rights. Second, Crisologo
never took actual possession of the subject properties after the alleged sale
in 1967. She appointed an administrator over the said property only in
2006.

Moreover, petitioners claim that her tax declarations and receipts

evidencing payment of taxes cannot prove her possession or ownership
over the subject properties without proof of actual possession.

Finally, petitioners submit that there are facts and circumstances that
militate against her claim of possession. They point out that the titles over
the subject properties have no encumbrances or annotations whatsoever;
that for more than forty (40) years, the subject lots have not been subjected
to any deed, agreement, contract, mortgage or any other property dealings;
that the said titles are not validated up to the present as certified by the
Register of Deeds of Baguio City; that she presented no witnesses to prove
her intention to possess the subject lots; that the documents she presented
are not reliable because they were issued only in 2008; that no
improvements were introduced by her; and that she is guilty of laches due
to her inaction to validate her titles.

Respondent's position

Crisologo opposes the petition mainly on technical grounds. First, she

argues that the supposed representatives of the petitioners who filed this
petition and signed the certification on non-forum shopping have no
authority to do so. Hence, they have no standing to prosecute because they
are not the real parties in interest. Second, she claims that the petitioners
failed to furnish the CA a copy of their motion for extension of time to file
this petition for review.

The Court's Ruling

The only question that needs to be resolved in this petition is who between
petitioners and respondent Crisologo have a better right of possession over
the subject parcels of land. Both contending parties claim that they have a
superior possessory right over the disputed lands.

After a careful review of the records, the Court holds that Crisologo has a
better right of possession over the subject parcels of land.

Accion Publiciana: its nature and purpose

Also known as accion plenaria de posesion, accion publiciana is an

ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of
realty independently of title. It refers to an ejectment suit filed after the
expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the
unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.

The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to

recover possession only, not ownership. When parties, however, raise
the issue of ownership, the court may pass upon the issue to determine who
between the parties has the right to possess the property. This adjudication,
nonetheless, is not a final and binding determination of the issue of
ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession,
where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of
possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is
not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the
property. The adjudication, in short, is not conclusive on the issue of
ownership.[12]

In her complaint, Crisologo prayed that she be declared in prior actual

possession of the properties in dispute and that petitioners vacate the same
and demolish their houses therein. She alleged, among others, that she was
the registered owner of the subject parcels of land and that petitioners
unlawfully entered her properties by stealth, force and without her prior
consent and knowledge. Clearly, she primarily wanted to recover
possession of the subject parcels of land from petitioners. Hence, the case is
an accion publiciana.

Nonetheless, the petitioners have raised the issue of ownership in their

pleadings. They mainly argue that Crisologo's titles on the subject
properties are void and that they have been in open, actual, exclusive,
notorious, uninterrupted and continuous possession over the subject
properties in good faith.

The nullity of the decrees of registration

and certificates of titles in Section 1 of
P.D. No. 1271 is not absolute

Although Section 1 of P.D. No. 1271[13] invalidated decrees of registration

and certificates of title within the Baguio Townsite Reservation Case No. 1,
GLRO Record No. 211, the nullity, however, is not that sweeping. The said
provision expressly states that "all certificates of titles issued on or before
July 31, 1973 shall be considered valid and the lands covered by them shall
be deemed to have been conveyed in fee simple to the registered owners"
upon 1) showing proof that the land covered by the subject title is not
within any government, public or quasi-public reservation, forest, military
or otherwise, as certified by appropriating government agencies; and 2)
compliance by the title holder with the payment to the Republic of the
Philippines of the correct assessed value of the land within the required
period.

In the case at bench, the records show that the subject parcels of land were
registered on August 24, 1967. The titles are, thus, considered valid
although subject to the conditions set. But whether or not Crisologo
complied with the said conditions would not matter because, this would be
a collateral attack on her registered titles, as would be discussed later.

At any rate, petitioners, as private individuals, are not the proper parties to
question the status of the respondent's registered titles. Section 6 of P.D.
No. 1271[14] expressly states that the "Solicitor General shall institute
such actions or suits as may be necessary to recover possession of lands
covered by all void titles not validated under this Decree."
The respondent's certificates of title
give her the better right to possess
the subject parcels of land

It is settled that a Torrens title is evidence of indefeasible title to property in

favor of the person in whose name the title appears. It is conclusive
evidence with respect to the ownership of the land described therein. It is
also settled that the titleholder is entitled to all the attributes of ownership
of the property, including possession. Thus, in Arambulo v. Gungab,[15] this
Court declared that the "age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens
title over a land is entitled to possession thereof."[16]

The records show that TCT No. T-13935[17] and TCT No. T-13936[18] bear the
name of Carmeling P. Crisologo, as the registered owner. Petitioners do not
dispute the fact that she has a Torrens title over the subject parcels of land.

The respondent's Torrens certificates of title

are immune from a collateral attack.

As a holder of a Torrens certificate of title, the law protects Crisologo from a

collateral attack on the same. Section 48 of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known
as the Property Registration Decree, provides that a certificate of title
cannot be the subject of a collateral attack. Thus:

SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. A certificate of title

shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered,
modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.

This rule has been applied in innumerable cases, one of which

was Francisco Madrid v. Spouses Mapoy,[19] where it was written:

Registration of land under the Torrens system, aside from perfecting the
title and rendering it indefeasible after the lapse of the period allowed by
law, also renders the title immune from collateral attack. A collateral attack
transpires when, in another action to obtain a different relief and as an
incident of the present action, an attack is made against the judgment
granting the title. This manner of attack is to be distinguished from a direct
attack against a judgment granting the title, through an action whose main
objective is to annul, set aside, or enjoin the enforcement of such judgment
if not yet implemented, or to seek recovery if the property titled under the
judgment had been disposed of. To permit a collateral attack on
respondents-plaintiffs' title is to water down the integrity and guaranteed
legal indefeasibility of a Torrens title.

The petitioners-defendants' attack on the validity of respondents-plaintiffs'

title, by claiming that fraud attended its acquisition, is a collateral attack on
the title. It is an attack incidental to their quest to defend their
possession of the properties in an "accion publiciana," not in a
direct action whose main objective is to impugn the validity of
the judgment granting the title. This is the attack that possession of a
Torrens Title specifically guards against; hence, we cannot entertain, much
less accord credit to, the petitioners-defendants' claim of fraud to impugn
the validity of the respondents-plaintiffs' title to their property.

As the lawful possessor, the respondent

has the right to eject the petitioners

The Court agrees with the CA that the only question that needs to be
resolved in this suit to recover possession is who between the parties is
entitled to the physical or material possession of the subject parcels of land.
Therefore, the foremost relevant issue that needs to be determined here is
simply possession, not ownership.

The testimonial and documentary evidence on record prove that Crisologo

has a preferred claim of possession over that of petitioners. It cannot be
denied that she bought the subject properties from the previous owner in
1967, which was why the transfer certificates of title were subsequently
issued in her name. Records further show that she has been paying the
realty taxes on the said properties since 1969. She likewise appointed Isican
as administrator of the disputed lands. More importantly, there is no
question that she offered to sell to petitioners the portions of the subject
properties occupied by them. Hence, she deserves to be respected and
restored to her lawful possession as provided in Article 539 of the New Civil
Code.[20]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Villarama, Jr.,* and Leonen, JJ.,
concur.

G.R. No. 210504, January 24, 2018 - HEIRS OF ALFONSO YUSINGCO, REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-
IN-FACT, TEODORO K. YUSINGCO, Petitioners, v. AMELITA BUSILAK, COSCA NAVARRO, FLAVIA CURAYAG
AND LIXBERTO1 CASTRO, Respondents.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 210504, January 24, 2018

HEIRS OF ALFONSO YUSINGCO, REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, TEODORO K.

YUSINGCO, Petitioners, v. AMELITA BUSILAK, COSCA NAVARRO, FLAVIA CURAYAG AND
LIXBERTO1 CASTRO, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), Cagayan de Oro City, dated July 31, 2013 in CA-G.R. SP No. 04500.
The questioned CA Decision set aside the Joint Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30,
Surigao City, dated August 17, 2011, which affirmed with modification the February 25, 2011 Omnibus
Judgment4 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Surigao City, in five (5) consolidated
cases for accion publiciana and/or recovery of possession.

The pertinent factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:

On August 11, 2005, herein petitioners filed five separate (5) Complaints5 for accion publiciana and/or
recovery of possession against herein respondents and a certain Reynaldo Peralta. The suits, which were
subsequently consolidated, were filed with the MTCC of Surigao City, which were later raffled to Branch 1
thereof. Petitioners uniformly alleged in the said Complaints that: they are owners of three (3) parcels of
land, denominated as Lot Nos. 519, 520 and 1015, which are all located at Barangay Taft, Surigao City; they
inherited the lots from their predecessor-in-interest, Alfonso Yusingco; they were in possession of the said
properties prior to and at the start of the Second World War, but lost possession thereof during the war;
after the war, petitioners discovered that the subject properties were occupied by several persons, which
prompted petitioners to file separate cases for accion reivindicatoria and recovery of possession against
these persons; during the pendency of these cases, herein respondents entered different portions of the
same properties and occupied them without the knowledge and consent of petitioners; petitioners were
forced to tolerate the illegal occupation of respondents as they did not have sufficient resources to protect
their property at that time and also because their ownership was still being disputed in the earlier cases
filed; subsequently, the cases which they earlier filed were decided in their favor and they were declared the
owners of the subject properties; thereafter, petitioners demanded that respondents vacate the said
properties, but the latter refused.
In their Answer, respondents raised essentially similar defenses, contending, in essence, that: they have
been in possession of the subject properties for more than thirty (30) years; petitioners never actually
possessed the said parcels of land and that they never had title over the same; thus, petitioners' claim
would be in conflict with and inferior to respondents' claim of possession.

After the issues were joined, trial ensued.

On February 25, 2011, the MTCC, Branch 1, Surigao City issued an Omnibus Judgment in favor of herein
petitioners and disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, Heirs of Alfonso
Yusingco, represented by their attorney-in-fact Teodoro E. Yusingco, against defendants Flavia Curayag,
Cosca Navarro, Amelita Busilak, Lexberto Castro, Reynaldo Peralta and Adriano Solamo ordering:

1. Defendants Flavia Curayag, Cosca Navarro, Amelita Busilak, Lexberto Castro, Reynaldo Peralta and
Adriano Solamo and all those claiming rights under them to vacate the premises of the lots respectively
occupied by them and to remove their improvements from the premises and restore possession to the
plaintiffs;

2. Defendant Amelita Busilak to pay the plaintiffs a monthly compensation of 1,200.00 for the use of the
property occupied by her at 2763 P. Reyes cor. Narciso Sts., Surigao City, computed from the time of the
filing of the complaint on August 11, 2005 until she vacates the subject property;

3. Defendant Cosca Navarro to pay the plaintiffs a monthly compensation of P2,120.00 for the use of the
property occupied by her located at 03240 Borromeo St., Surigao City, computed from the time of the filing
of the complaint on August 11, 2005 until she vacates the subject property;

4. Defendant Flavia Curayag to pay the plaintiffs a monthly compensation of P1,760.00 for the use of the
property occupied by her located at 03818, Narciso St., Surigao City, computed from the time of the filing of
the complaint on August 11, 2005 until she vacates the subject property;

5. Defendant Lexberto Castro to pay the plaintiffs a monthly compensation of P1,500.00 for the use of the
property occupied by her located at SLB Pension House, Borromeo St., Surigao City, computed from the
time of the filing of the complaint on November 27, 2007 until he vacates the subject property;

6. Defendants Reynaldo Peralta and Adriano Solamo to pay the plaintiffs a monthly compensation of
P2,000.00 for the use of the property occupied by them located at 04286, Navarro St., Surigao City,
computed from the time of the filing of the complaint on November 27, 2007 until they vacate the subject
property

7. All the defendants to pay the cost of the suit.

SO ORDERED.6

The MTCC held that: in an earlier case for accion reivindicatoria (Civil Case No. 1645) decided by the Court
of First Instance of Surigao Del Norte on June 8, 1979 and affirmed by the CA in its Decision dated August
30, 1982 (CA-G.R. No. 66508-R), which became final and executory on December 18, 1986, herein
petitioners were declared the true and lawful co-owners of the subject properties; on the other hand,
evidence showed that respondents were mere intruders on the lots in question; thus, as judicially-declared
owners of the said lots, petitioners are entitled to possession thereof as against respondents whose entries
into the said properties are illegal.

Herein respondents filed an appeal with the RTC of Surigao City.

On August 17, 2011, the RTC, Branch 30, Surigao City, rendered a Joint Decision, which affirmed, with
modification, the Omnibus Judgment of the MTCC. The dispositive portion of the RTC Joint Decision reads,
thus:

WHEREFORE, the assailed Omnibus Judgment dated February 25, 2011 of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Branch 1, Surigao City is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION as to the judgment against defendants
Reynaldo Peralta and Adriano Solamo who did not file an appeal therefrom. x x x

SO ORDERED7

Herein respondents then filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court assailing
the abovementioned Joint Decision of the RTC.

On July 31, 2013, the CA promulgated its Decision granting the petition of herein respondents. The CA
disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Joint Decision dated August 17, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court,
10th Judicial Region, Branch 30, Surigao City is SET ASIDE and a new one rendered: (1) SETTING ASIDE the
Omnibus Judgment dated February 25, 2011 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, Surigao City, in
consolidated civil cases for Accion Publiciana and/or Recovery of Possession, and (2) DISMISSING the
consolidated cases for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.8

The CA ruled that the RTC and CA Decisions used by the MTCC in holding that herein petitioners are owners
of the subject properties and are, thus, entitled to legal possession thereof, are based on a previous accion
reivindicatoria, which is a suit in personam. The CA held that, being an action in personam, the judgments in
the said case binds only the parties properly impleaded therein. Since respondents were not parties to the
said action, the CA concluded that they could not be bound by the judgments declaring petitioners as
owners of the disputed properties. Hence, petitioners' present actions to recover possession of the said
properties from respondents, on the basis of the said judgments, must fail.

Aggrieved by the CA Decision, herein petitioners are now before this Court via the instant petition for review
on certiorari contending that the assailed CA Decision is replete with legal infirmities, to wit:

1. When Honorable Court of Appeals held that the prior judgments declaring herein petitioners as the true
and lawful co-owners of the property did not bind herein respondents, as they were not parties to the
actions, saying that these were an accion reivindicatoria and an action for recovery of possession, hence in
personam, and as such, they bound only the parties properly impleaded and duly heard or given an
opportunity to be heard; even if such principle is inapplicable in the instant case.

2. When Honorable Court of Appeals impliedly ruled that herein respondents would have a better right of
possession over the subject matter property over herein petitioners, despite the rulings in the prior
judgments showing the contrary.

The petition is meritorious.

The issues raised in the instant petition boil down to the basic question of whether or not the final and
executory decisions rendered in a previous accion reivindicatoria, finding petitioners to be the lawful owners
of the subject properties, are binding upon respondents.

This Court rules in the affirmative.

At the outset, the Court finds it proper to look into the nature of the actions filed by petitioners against
respondents. A perusal of the complaints filed by petitioners shows that the actions were captioned
as "Accion Publiciana and/or Recovery of Possession." However, the Court agrees with the ruling of the lower
courts that the complaints filed were actually accion reivindicatoria.

In a number of cases,10 this Court had occasion to discuss the three (3) kinds of actions available to recover
possession of real property, to wit:

x x x (a) accion interdictal; (b) accion publiciana; and (a) accion reivindicatoria

Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry (detentacion) and unlawful
detainer (desahuico) [sic]. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of real property by
means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally
withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract,
express or implied. The two are distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry, the possession of the
defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the issue is which party has prior de factopossession while
in unlawful detainer, possession of the defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration
or termination of the right to possess.

The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the proper municipal trial court or
metropolitan trial court. Both actions must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the
land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer. The issue in
said cases is the right to physical possession.

Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be brought in the
proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil
proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. In other words, if at
the time of the filing of the complaint more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff
out of possession or defendant's possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one of the forcible
entry or illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is an action to
recover ownership also brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil proceeding.

Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion is, thus, an action whereby the plaintiff alleges ownership
over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession.11 It is a suit to recover possession of a parcel
of land as an element of ownership.12 The judgment in such a case determines the ownership of the
property and awards the possession of the property to the lawful owner.13 It is different from accion
interdictal or accion publiciana where plaintiff merely alleges proof of a better right to possess without claim
of title.14

On the basis of the above discussions, it is clear that the lower courts did not err in ruling that the suits filed
by petitioners are accion reivindicatoria, not accion publiciana, as petitioners seek to recover possession of
the subject lots on the basis of their ownership thereof.

Proceeding to the main issue in the instant petition, there is no dispute that the RTC Decision in Civil Case
No. 1645 and the CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 66508-R used by the MTCC in the present case as bases in
holding that herein petitioners are owners of the subject properties and are, thus, entitled to legal
possession thereof, are judgments on a previous case for accion reivindicatoria, which was filed by
petitioners against persons other than herein respondents.

It is settled that a judgment directing a party to deliver possession of a property to another is in

personam.15 It is conclusive, not against the whole world, but only "between the parties and their successors
in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action."16 An action to recover a parcel of land is
a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the
right to a tangible thing.17 Any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and
duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard.18 However, this rule admits of the exception that even a
non-party may be bound by the judgment in an ejectment suit19 where he is any of the following: (a)
trespasser, squatter or agent of the defendant fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the
judgment; (b) guest or occupant of the premises with the permission of the defendant; (c)
transferee pendente lite; (d) sublessee; (e) co-lessee; or (f) member of the family, relative or privy of the
defendant.20

In the instant case, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings and conclusions of the
MTCC, as affirmed by the RTC, that respondents are mere intruders or trespassers who do not have a right
to possess the subject lots. Thus, the Court adopts the discussion of the MTCC on the matter, to wit:

On the other hand, the evidence for the defendants showed that they are mere intruders on the lots in
question. They are occupying their respective portions simply as places to stay with intention of acquiring
the said properties in the event that they are public lands and not owned by any private person.

It is noted that while the defendants had declared their houses and improvements for tax purposes, not one
of them had declared in his name the lot in which his house or improvement is built on. They just waited for
the Yusingcos to show proof of their ownership of the lot.
It was indeed revealing that while professing that the lots are public land, the defendants never bothered to
apply under any of the legal modes of acquiring land of the public domain for the portion occupied by them.
Obviously, their physical possession of the premises was not under claim of ownership or in the concept of
an owner. Hence, the defendants' possession cannot ripen into ownership by prescription as claimed by
them. They are intruders, plain and simple, without any right of possession to be protected.

The plaintiff[s] [herein petitioners] prayed that their right of possession of the lots is entitled to protection
under the law. In the case at bar, the evidence showed that the defendant's [herein respondents'] entry into
and possession of the disputed premises was illegal from the beginning and remain to be so until the
present. There is no question, therefore, that as between the plaintiffs [herein petitioners] who had been
judicially declared the owners of the land and the defendants [herein respondents] who are mere squatters
therein, the former are entitled to such legal protection.21

On the basis of the foregoing, the CA erred in ruling that the judgments of the RTC (in Civil Case No. 1645)
and the CA (in CA-GR. CV No. 66508-R) on the suit for accion reivindicatoria filed by petitioners against
persons other than herein respondents are not binding upon the latter. Respondents, being trespassers on
the subject lots are bound by the said judgments, which find petitioners to be entitled to the possession of
the subject lots as owners thereof.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The July 31, 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 04500 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Omnibus Judgment of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Branch 1, Surigao City, dated February 25, 2011, is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

G.R. No. 187633

HEIRS OF DELFIN and MARIA TAPPA, Petitioners,

vs.
HEIRS OF JOSE BACUD, HENRY CALABAZARON and VICENTE MALUPENG, Respondents.

DECISION

JARDELEZA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the
Decision2dated February 19, 2009 and Resolution3 dated April 30, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 90026, which reversed and set aside the Decision4 dated July 6, 2007 of Branch
5, Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofTuguegarao City, Cagayan in Civil Case No. 5560 for Quieting of
Title, Recovery of Possession and Damages.

The Facts

On September 9, 1999, petitioners Delfin Tappa (Delfin)5 and Maria Tappa (Spouses Tappa) filed a
complaint6 for Quieting of Title, Recovery of Possession and Damages (Complaint) against
respondents Jose Bacud (Bacud),7Henry Calabazaron (Calabazaron), and Vicente Malupeng
(Malupeng).8 The property subject of the complaint is a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 3341, Pls-
793 with an area of 21,879 square meters, located in Kongcong, Cabbo, Pefiablanca, Cagayan (Lot
No. 3341).9

In their complaint, Spouses Tappa alleged that they are the registered owners of Lot No. 3341,
having been issued an Original Certificate of Title No. P-69103 (OCT No. P-69103) on September
18, 1992, by virtue of Free Patent No. 021519-92-3194. 10 Delfin allegedly inherited Lot No. 3341
from his father, Lorenzo Tappa (Lorenzo). Spouses Tappa claimed that both Delfin and Lorenzo
were in open, continuous, notorious, exclusive possession of the lot since time immemorial. 11

In their Answer, 12 respondents Bacud, Calabazaron and Malupeng claimed that the original owner of
Lot No. 3341 was Genaro Tappa (Genaro) who had two children, Lorenzo and Irene. Upon Genaro's
death, the property passed on to Lorenzo and Irene by operation of law; and they became ipso
facto co-owners of the property. As co-owners, Lorenzo and Irene each owned 10,939 square
meters of the lot as their respective shares. Lorenzo had children namely, Delfin, Primitiva, and
Fermina. Upon the death of Irene, her share in tum passed to her heirs, Demetria, Juanita,
Pantaleon and Jose Bacud. 13

Respondents presented before the RTC a joint affidavit dated April 29, 1963 (1963 Affidavit) signed
by Delfin, his sisters, Primitiva and Fermina, and their mother, Modesta Angoluan. 14 The 1963
affidavit stated that Genaro originally owned Lot No. 3341. It further stated that one-half (Yz) of the
property was owned by Lorenzo; but that the whole property was declared as his, only for taxation
purposes.

Calabazaron claimed that he became the owner of 2,520 square meters of Lot No. 3341 by virtue of
two Deeds of Sale executed in his favor, one dated October 12, 1970 executed by Demetria, and
another dated August 22, 1971 executed by Juanita. 15 After the sale, Calabazaron entered into
possession of his portion and paid the real property taxes. 16 He remains in possession up to this
date. 17

Malupeng, on the other hand, claimed that he became the owner of 210 square meters of Lot No.
3341 by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed on November 30, 1970 by Pantaleon in his favor. 18 After
the sale, Malupeng entered into possession of his porcion of propeny and paid the real property
taxes. 19 He remains in possession up to this date. 20

Bacud claimed ownership over 1,690 square meters of Lot No. 3341 in his own right as heir of
Irene.21

Respondents started occupying their respective portions after the sale made to each of them. They
continued to occupy them despite several demands to vacate from Spouses Tappa.22

Spouses Tappa claimed that the 1963 Affidavit was executed through force and intimidation.23 Bacud
and Malupeng denied this allegation.24

The Ruling of the RTC

The RTC issued its Decision,25 the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and the Court hereby orders:

1. Plaintiffs to be the owners of Lot 3341, Pls 793 and unqualifiedly vests in them the full and
untrammeled rights of ownership:
 2. All the defendants must, if still in possession of portions of the lot in issue, convey the
same to the plaintiffs;

3. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.26

The R TC ruled that the basic requirement of the law on quieting of title under Article 447 of the Civil
Code was met, thus:

Delfin and Maria's title is clear and unequivocal, and its validity has never been assailed by
the defendants – nor has any evidence been adduced that successfully overcomes the
presumption of validity and legality that the title of Delfin and Maria enjoys.27 (Emphasis in the
original.)

The RTC ruled that there was no document in the hands of respondents as strong and persuasive
as the title in the name of the Spouses Tappa that will support respondents' claim of ownership and
Irene's antecedent ownership.28The RTC stated that the 1963 Affidavit contains nothing more than
the allegations of the affiants and does not, by itself, constitute proof of ownership of land, especially
as against documents such as titles.29

Respondents appealed to the CA, raising the following arguments:

First, respondents alleged that Spouses Tappa fraudulently applied for, and were issued a free
patent over Lot No. 3341, and eventually OCT No. P-69103 dated September 18, 1992.30 They
alleged that Spouses Tappa committed fraud because they were not in possession of the lot since
1963, which possession was required for an applicant for a free patent under the law. 31

Second, respondents argued that the complaint should be dismissed because both extinctive and
acquisitive prescription have already set in.32 Respondents claimed that both ordinary acquisitive
prescription of 10 years, and extraordinary acquisitive prescription of 30 years in claiming ownership
of immovable property apply in the case.33They argued that more than 30 years have already lapsed
from the time they entered possession of the subject lot in 1963 up to the filing of the complaint on
September 9, 1999.34 They also pointed out that Spouses Tappa admitted in their complaint that
respondents were in possession of the lot since 1963. 35

Particularly, Calabazaron argued that the 10-year prescriptive period under Article 1134 of the Civil
Code applies to him by virtue of the two duly executed Deeds of Sale in his favor. 36 It was never
alleged that he had any participation in the alleged duress, force and intimidation in the execution of
the 1963 Affidavit.37 Hence, he is a purchaser in good faith and for value. Calabazaron entered
possession of the lot after the sale to him in 1970, thus, the prescriptive period of l0 years had long
lapsed. 38

Bacud and Malupeng claimed that, even assuming that the execution of the 1963 Affidavit was
attended with force and intimidation, the complaint against them should have been dismissed
because the extraordinary acquisitive prescriptive period of 30 years under Article 1137 of the Civil
Code applies to them.39 They also argued that the action for quieting of title had already prescribed
since the possession of Bacud and Malupeng started in 1963, which fact was allegedly admitted by
Spouses Tappa in their complaint.40 Thus, Spouses Tappa had only until 1993 to file a complaint,
which they failed to do.
All respondents claimed that from the start of their possession, they (1) have paid real taxes on the
lot, (2) have planted crops, and (3) have continued to possess the lot in the concept of owners. 41

Third, respondents alleged that Spouses Tappa failed to prove their right over the subject lot
because they cannot rely on the certificate of title issued to them on September 18, 1992 by virtue of
a free patent.42 They asserted that Spouses Tappa fraudulently obtained the free patent on Lot No.
3341 by concealing material facts; specifically the fact of not being in possession of the lot since
1963. 43

The Ruling of the CA

The CA set aside the decision of the RTC.44 The relevant dispositive portion of the CA decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision dated
July 6, 2007 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another one entered DISMISSING the
complaint.

SO ORDERED.45

On the issue of prescription, the CA ruled in favor of respondents and explained that their
possession over Lot No. 3341 already ripened into ownership through acquisitive prescription.46 The
CA noted that Spouses Tappa acknowledged in their complaint that they have not been in
possession of the lot, and that respondents have been continuously occupying portions of it since
1963. 47 It explained:

The substantial length of time between 1963, up to the time of filing of the present complaint on
September 9, 1999, which is more than 30 years, should be considered against [S]pouses Tappa,
and in favor of defendants-appellants. Settled is the rule that an uninterrupted adverse possession of
the land for more than 30 years could ripen into ownership of the land through acquisitive
prescription, which is a mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable property.
Hence, appellants' possession of the land has ripened into ownership by virtue of acquisitive
prescription.48 (Citation omitted.)

On the merits of the case, the CA ruled that the two indispensable requisites for an action to quiet
title under Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code were not met. 49

The first requisite is absent because Spouses Tappa do not have a legal or an equitable title to or an
interest in the property. The CA explained that the free patent granted to Spouses Tappa produced
no legal effect because Lot No. 3341 was a private land, thus:

As heretofore discussed, the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession by appellants of
the subject parcel of land within the period prescribed by law has effectively converted it into a
private land. Consequently, the registration in the name of Maria Tappa on September 18, 1992
under OCT [No.] P-69103, by vi1iue of Free Patent No. 021519-92-3194, produces no legal effect.
Private ownership of land-as when there is a prima facie proof of ownership like a duly registered
possessory information or a clear showing of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession,
by present or previous occupants-is not affected by the issuance of a free patent over the same
land, becam,e the Public Land [L]aw applies only to lands of the public domain.50 (Citation omitted.)
The CA further stated that while Spouses Tappa were able to obtain a free patent over the property,
and were able to register it under the Torrens system, they have not become its owners. The CA
said that "[r]egistration has never been a mode of acquiring ownership over immovable prope1ty---it
does not create title nor vest one but it simply confirms a title already vested, rendering it forever
indefeasible."51

The second requisite that the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud
on the title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of
validity is likewise unavailing. The CA ruled that no other evidence (aside from Delfin's own
testimony) was presented to prove the allegation of fraud and intimidation, making the testimony
self-serving.52 The CA further noted that Delfin's own sister, Fermina, one of the signatories of the
1963 Affidavit, belied his testimony. Fermina testified that they went to the house of one Atty. Carag
to sign the affidavit and they did so, on their own. 53

Spouses Tappa filed a Motion for Reconsideration,54 which the CA denied.55

Hence, spouses Tappa filed a petition for review on certiorari before this court, raising the following
issues:

I. Whether the CA erred in dismissing Spouses Tappa's complaint for quieting of title against
respondents;56

II. Whether the CA erred in not finding that Spouses Tappa's certificate of title cannot be
collaterally attacked in this case;57 and

III. Whether the CA erred in finding that respondents have acquired the property through
acquisitive prescription. 58

The Ruling of the Court

We affirm the decision of the CA.

The action for quieting of title

should not prosper.

The action filed by Spouses Tappa was one for quieting of title and recovery of possession.
In Baricuatro, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 59 an action for quieting of title is essentially a common law
remedy grounded on equity, to wit:

x x x Originating in equity jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure"... an adjudication that a claim of

title to or an interest in property, adverse to that of the complainant, is invalid, so that the
complainant and those claiming under him may be forever afterward free from any danger of hostile
claim." In an action for quieting of title, the competent court is tasked to determine the respective
rights of the complainant and other claimants, "... not only to place things in their proper place, to
make the one who has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for
the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property
dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire,
to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems best. x x x. "60 (Emphasis in the original.)

In our jurisdiction, the remedy is governed by Article 476 and 477 of the Civil Code, which state:
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in
truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title,
an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any
interest therein.

Art. 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the
subject-matter of the action. He need not be in possession of said property.

From the foregoing provisions, we reiterate the rule that for an action to quiet title to prosper, two
indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an
equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact
invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.61

Spouses Tappa failed to meet these two requisites.

First, Spouses Tappa's claim of iegal title over Lot No. 3341 by virtue of the free patent and the
certificate of title, OCT No. P-69103 issued in their name cannot stand. The certificate of title
indjcates that it was issued by virtue of Patent No. 021519-92-3194. We agree with the CA that at
the time of the application for free patent, Lot No. 3341 had already become private land by virtue of
the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession by respondents. Hence, Lot No. 3341
had been removed from the coverage of the Public Land Act,62 which governs public patent
applications.

The settled rule is that a free patent issued over a private land is null and void, and produces no
legal effects. whatsoever. Private ownership of land-as when there is a prima facie proof of
1awp++i 1

ownership like a duly registered possessory information or a clear showing of open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession, by present or previous occupants-is not affected by the
issuance of a free patent over the same land, because the Public Land Law applies only to lands of
the public domain. The Director of Lands has no authority to grant free patent to lands that have
ceased to be public in character and have passed to private ownership.63

In Magistrado v. Esplana, 64 we cancelled the titles issued pursuant to a free patent after finding that
the lots involved were privately owned since time immemorial. A free patent that purports to convey
land to which the Government did not have any title at the time of its issuance does not vest any
title in the patentee as against the true owner. 65

In this case, the parties were able to show that Lot No. 3341 was occupied by, and has been in
possession of the Tappa family, even before the 1963 Affidavit was executed. After the execution of
the 1963 Affidavit, respondents occupied their respective portions of the property. Delfin testified that
before his father, Lorenzo, died in 1961, Lorenzo had been occupying the lot since before the war,
and that Delfin was born there in 1934.66

Records show that Lorenzo declared Lot No. 3341 for taxation purposes as early as 1948, and paid
the real property taxes (evidenced by real property tax payment receipts in the name of Lorenzo
from 1952 until his death in 1961).67 Spouses Tappa were likewise shown to pay the real property
taxes from 1961 to 2000.68 Similarly, respondents also declared their respective portions of Lot No.
3341 for taxation in their names in 1994, and paid real property taxes on those portions from 1967 to
2004.69 Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no one in his right mind
would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive possession. They
constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. 70

Spouses Tappa also admitted in their complaint that sometime in 1963, Bacud and Malupeng started
occupying portions of Lot No. 3341 and planted crops on the property, while Calabazaron did the
same on another portion of the lot in the 1970's.71 The complaint stated further that since 1963. the
respondents "continuously occupied portion of the subject land." 72

In view of the foregoing circumstances that show open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of Lot No. 3341, the property had been segregated from the public
domain. 73 At the time the patent and the certificate of title were issued in 1992, Spouses Tappa and
their predecessors-in-interest were already in possession, at least to the half of the lot, since 1934;
and respondents were also in possession of the other half since 1963. Therefore, the free patent
issued covers a land already segregated from the public domain.

In Heirs of Simplicio Santiago v. Heirs of Mariano E. Santiago,74 we ruled, thus:

Considering the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land by
respondents and their predecessors in interests, they are deemed to have acquired, by operation of
law, a right to a government grant without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land
was thus segregated from the public domain and the director of lands had no authority to issue a
patent. Hence, the free patent covering Lot 2344, a private land, and the certificate of title issued
pursuant thereto, are void.75

Records also show that Spouses Tappa were aware of respondents' possession of the disputed
portions of Lot No. 3341. They even admitted such possession (since 1963) by respondents in their
complaint filed in 1999. Despite this, Spouses Tappa were able to obtain a free patent of
the whole property even if they were not in possession of some of its portions. Therefore, Free
Patent No. 021519-92-3194 and OCT No. P-69103 are void not only because it covers a private
land, but also because they fraudulently included76 respondents' portion of the property. In Avila v.
Tapucar, 77 we held that "[i]f a person obtains a title under the Torrens system, which includes by
mistake or oversight land which can no longer be registered under the system, he does not, by virtue
of the said certificate alone, become the owner of the lands illegally included."78

In an action to quiet title, legal title denotes registered ownership, while equitable title means
beneficial ownership. 79As discussed, the free patent and the certificate of title issued to Spouses
Tappa could not be the source of their legal title.

The second requisite for an action to quiet title is likewise wanting. We find that although an
instrument (the 1963 Affidavit) exists, and which allegedly casts cloud on Spouses Tappa's title, it
was not shown to be in fact invalid or ineffective against Spouses Tappa's rights to the property.

A cloud on a title exists when (1) there is an instrument (deed, or contract) or record or claim or
encumbrance or proceeding; (2) which is apparently valid or effective; (3) but is, in truth and in fact,
invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable or extinguished (or terminated) or barred by extinctive
prescription; and (4) and may be prejudicial to the title.80

The 1963 Affidavit it is no doubt an instrument, which appears to be valid. It is dated and appears to
be executed and signed by Delfin, his mother, and sisters. It is also notarized by a public notary. It
states that Genaro originally owns the land described, and that one-half (l/2) of which is actually
owned by Irene as a co-heir. This is contrary to the claim of
Spouses Tappa that the property was solely Lorenzo's. Respondents' argue that this affidavit
evidences the title of their predecessor-in-interest over Lot No. 3341 and effectively, theirs.81

The 1963 Affidavit however, was not proven to be, in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable, or extinguished (or terminated) or barred by extinctive prescription. The CA correctly
found that Spouses Tappa's claim of force and intimidation in the execution of the 1963 Affidavit was
"unsubstantiated."82 The CA pointed out that, "[a]side from the testimony of Delfin Tappa, no other
evidence was presented to prove the claim of force and intimidation, hence, it is at most, self-
serving."53 Also, the 1963 Affidavit was duly notarized and, as such, is considered a public document,
and enjoys the presumption of validity as to its authenticity and due execution.

Thus, we affirm the ruling of the CA that the requisites for an action to quiet title are wanting in this
case.84

There is no collateral attack

on the Certificate of Title.

Spouses Tappa argue that respondents collaterally attacked the certificate of title of Lot No. 3441
when they raised the issue of its validity. Spouses Tappa used the same argument against the CA
when it declared the certificate of title to be without legal effect. 85

Spouses Tappa's argument is without merit. The certificate of title was not collaterally attacked.
Section 48 of PD 1529,86 provides that "[a] certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It
cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law." This
rule is not applicable in this case.

We reiterate our ruling in Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals,87 where we stated that, "[ w ]hat cannot
be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title. The certificate referred to is that
document issued by the Register of Deeds x x x. By title, the law refers to ownership which is
represented by that document."88 Ownership is different from a certificate of title, the latter being only
the best proof of ownership of a piece of land. 89 Title as a concept of ownership should not be
confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are
interchangeably used.90

In Vda. de Figuracion v. Figuracion-Gerilla, 91 citing Lacbayan v. Samay, Jr., 92 we reaffirm this ruling,
and stated that:

Mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that
the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate, or that the
registrant may only be a trustee, or that other parties may have acquired interest over the property
subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. Stated differently, placing a parcel of land under
the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed.
The certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership.93

In this case, what respondents dispute, as raised in their Answer, is Spouses Tappa's claim of sole
ownership over Lot No. 3341. As affirmative defense, respondents claimed that Spouses Tappa
were owners of only one-half (1/2) of the lot since it was originally owned by Genaro, the father of
Lorenzo and Irene. 94 Respondents claim that Lorenzo and Irene became ipso facto co-owners of the
lot. 95 Thus, respondents claim that, by virtue of a valid transfer from Irene's heirs, they now have
ownership and title over portions of Lot No. 3341, and that they have been in continuous, exclusive,
and uninterrupted possession of their occupied portions.96 Malupeng and Calabazaron claim
ownership and title over their respective portions by virtue of a valid sale. Bacud claims ownership
and title by virtue of succession. Therefore, it is the ownership and title of Spouses Tappa which
respondents ultimately attack. OCT No. P-69103 only serves as the document representing Spouses
Tappas' title.

Respondents cannot likewise argue that the certificate of title of Spouses Tappa is indefeasible.97 We
have already ruled that the one-year prescriptive period does not apply when the person seeking
annulment of title or reconveyance is in possession of the property.98 This is because the action
partakes of a suit to quiet title, which is imprescriptible.99 In this case, respondents have been proved
to be in possession of the disputed portions of Lot No. 3341. Thus, their claim against Spouses
Tappa cannot be barred by the one-year prescriptive period.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90026 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated
March 19, 2009 and the Resolution[3] dated September 3, 2009 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 86266, which set aside the
Order[4] dated October 10, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,
Branch 61 (RTC Br. 61), and consequently, remanded the case to the latter
court for trial.

The Facts

The instant case stemmed from a Complaint[5] dated August 12, 2004 for
Quieting of Title with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction filed by
respondents Estela Ay-Ay, Andres Acop, Jr., Felicitas Ap-Ap, Sergio Ap-Ap,
John Napoleon A. Ramirez, Jr., and Ma. Teresa A. Ramirez (respondents)
against petitioners Bernadette S. Bilag, Erlinda Bilag-Santillan, Dixon
Bilag, Reynaldo B. Suello, Heirs of Lourdes S. Bilag, Heirs of Leticia Bilag-
Hanaoka, and Heirs of Nellie Bilag before the RTC Br. 61, docketed as Civil
Case No. 5881-R. Essentially, respondents alleged that Iloc Bilag,
petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, sold to them separately various
portions of a 159,496-square meter parcel of land designated by the Bureau
of Lands as Approved Plan No. 544367, Psu 189147 situated at Sitio Benin,
Baguio City (subject lands), and that they registered the corresponding
Deeds of Sale[6] with the Register of Deeds of Baguio City. According to
respondents, Iloc Bilag not only acknowledged full payment and
guaranteed that his heirs, successors-in-interest, and executors are to be
bound by such sales, but he also caused the subject lands to be removed
from the Ancestral Land Claims. Respondents further alleged that they
have been in continuous possession of the said lands since 1976 when they
were delivered to them and that they have already introduced various
improvements thereon. Despite the foregoing, petitioners refused to honor
the foregoing sales by asserting their adverse rights on the subject lands.
Worse, they continued to harass respondents, and even threatened to
demolish their improvements and dispossess them thereof. Hence, they
filed the instant complaint to quiet their respective titles over the subject
lands and remove the cloud cast upon their ownership as a result of
petitioners' refusal to recognize the sales.[7]

For their part, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss[8] dated November 4,

2004 on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, prescription/laches/estoppel,
and res judicata. Anent the first ground, petitioners averred that the
subject lands are untitled, unregistered, and form part of the Baguio
Townsite Reservation which were long classified as lands of the public
domain. As such, the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case as it is the Land
Management Bureau (formerly the Bureau of Lands) which is vested with
the authority to determine issues of ownership over unregistered public
lands.[9]

As to the second ground, petitioners argued that it is only now, or more

than 27 years from the execution of the Deeds of Sale, that respondents
seek to enforce said Deeds; thus, the present action is already barred by
prescription and/or laches.[10]

Regarding the final ground, petitioners pointed out that on January 27,
1998, respondents had already filed a complaint against them for
injunction and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 3934-R before the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 5 (RTC Br. 5), wherein they
principally asserted their ownership over the subject lands. However, RTC
Br. 5 dismissed Civil Case No. 3934-R for lack of merit on the ground of
respondents' failure to show convincing proof of ownership over the
same,[11] which Order of dismissal was then affirmed by the CA on
appeal.[12] Eventually, the Court issued a Resolution dated January 21,
2004[13] declaring the case closed and terminated for failure to file the
intended petition subject of the Motion for Extension to file the same. In
view of the foregoing, petitioners contended that due to the final and
executory ruling in Civil Case No. 3934-R, the filing of Civil Case No. 5881-
R seeking to establish the ownership thereof is already barred by res
judicata.[14]

The RTC Br. 61 Ruling

In an Order[15] dated October 10, 2005, the RTC Br. 61 ruled in petitioners'
favor, and consequently, ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 5881-R on
the following grounds: (a) it had no authority to do so; (b) the Deeds of Sale
in respondents' favor could not as yet be considered title to the subject
lands, noting the failure of respondents to perfect their title or assert
ownership and possession thereof for the past 27 years; and (c) the filing of
the instant case is barred by res judicata considering the final and
executory Decision dismissing the earlier filed Civil Case No. 3934-R where
respondents similarly sought to be declared the owners of the subject
lands.[16]

Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the CA.[17]

The CA Ruling

In a Decision[18] dated March 19, 2009, the CA set aside the dismissal of
Civil Case No. 5881-R, and accordingly, remanded the case to the court a
quo for trial.[19] It held that Civil Case No. 3934-R was an action for
injunction where respondents sought to enjoin petitioners' alleged entry
into the subject lands and their introduction of improvements thereat;
whereas Civil Case No. 5881-R is an action to quiet title where respondents
specifically prayed, inter alia, for the removal of the cloud upon their
ownership and possession of the subject lands. In this light, the CA
concluded that while these cases may involve the same properties, the
nature of the action differs; hence, res judicata is not a bar to the present
suit. On the issue of laches, prescription or estoppel, the CA pointed out
that in view of respondents' allegation that they have been in possession of
the subject lands since 1976, their action to quiet title is imprescriptible.[20]

Dissatisfied, petitioners moved for reconsideration[21] which was, however,

denied in a Resolution[22] dated September 3, 2009; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly set
aside the dismissal of Civil Case No. 5881-R, and accordingly, remanded
the case to the court a quo for trial.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

At the outset, it must be stressed that in setting aside the Order of dismissal
of Civil Case No. 5881-R due to the inapplicability of the grounds of res
judicata and prescription/laches, the CA notably omitted from its
discussion the first ground relied upon by petitioners, which is lack of
jurisdiction.

Jurisprudence has consistently held that "[j]urisdiction is defined as the

power and authority of a court to hear, try, and decide a case. In order for
the court or an adjudicative body to have authority to dispose of the case on
the merits, it must acquire, among others, jurisdiction over the subject
matter. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power
to hear and determine the general class to which the proceedings in
question belong; it is conferred by law and not by the consent or
acquiescence of any or all of the parties or by erroneous belief of the court
that it exists. Thus, when a court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action."[23] Perforce, it is
important that a court or tribunal should first determine whether or not it
has jurisdiction over the subject matter presented before it, considering
that any act that it performs without jurisdiction shall be null and void, and
without any binding legal effects. The Court's pronouncement in Tan v.
Cinco,[24] is instructive on this matter, to wit:

A judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction is null and void and

may be attacked anytime. It creates no rights and produces no effect. It
remains a basic fact in law that the choice of the proper forum is crucial, as
the decision of a court or tribunal without jurisdiction is a total nullity. A
void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. All acts
performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal
effect.[25]

Now, on the issue of jurisdiction, a review of the records shows that the
subject lands form part of a 159,496-square meter parcel of land designated
by the Bureau of Lands as Approved Plan No. 544367, Psu 189147 situated
at Sitio Benin, Baguio City. Notably, such parcel of land forms part of the
Baguio Townsite Reservation, a portion of which, or 146, 428 square
meters, was awarded to Iloc Bilag due to the reopening of Civil Reservation
Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211, as evidenced by a Decision[26] dated April
22, 1968 promulgated by the then-Court of First Instance of Baguio City.

In a catena of cases,[27] and more importantly, in Presidential Decree No.

(PD) 1271,[28] it was expressly declared that all orders and decisions issued
by the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet in connection with the
proceedings for the reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO
Record 211, covering lands within the Baguio Townsite Reservation are null
and void and without force and effect. While PD 1271 provides for a means
to validate ownership over lands forming part of the Baguio Townsite
Reservation, it requires, among others, that a Certificate of Title be issued
on such lands on or before July 31, 1973.[29] In this case, records reveal that
the subject lands are unregistered and untitled, as petitioners' assertion to
that effect was not seriously disputed by respondents. Clearly, the award of
lots 2 and 3 of the 159,496-square meter parcel of land designated by the
Bureau of Lands as Approved Plan No. 544367, Psu 189147 – which
includes the subject lands – to Iloc Bilag by virtue of the reopening of Civil
Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record 211, is covered by the blanket
nullification provided under PD 1271, and consistently affirmed by the
prevailing case law. In view of the foregoing, it is only reasonable to
conclude that the subject lands should be properly classified as lands of the
public domain as well.

Therefore, since the subject lands are untitled and unregistered public
lands, then petitioners correctly argued that it is the Director of Lands who
has the authority to award their ownership.[30] Thus, the RTC Br. 61
correctly recognized its lack of power or authority to hear and resolve
respondents' action for quieting of title.[31] In Heirs of Pocdo v.
Avila,[32] the Court ruled that the trial court therein correctly dismissed an
action to quiet title on the ground of lack of jurisdiction for lack of authority
to determine who among the parties have better right over the disputed
property, which is admittedly still part of public domain for being within
the Baguio Townsite Reservation, viz.:

The DENR Decision was affirmed by the Office of the President which held
that lands within the Baguio Townsite Reservation belong to the
public domain and are no longer registrable under the Land
Registration Act. The Office of the President ordered the disposition of
the disputed property in accordance with the applicable rules of procedure
for the disposition of alienable public lands within the Baguio Townsite
Reservation, particularly Chapter X of Commonwealth Act No. 141 on
Townsite Reservations and other applicable rules.

Having established that the disputed property is public land, the

trial court was therefore correct in dismissing the complaint to
quiet title for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court had no
jurisdiction to determine who among the parties have better
right over the disputed property which is admittedly still part of
the public domain. As held in Dajunos v. Tandayag:

x x x The Tarucs' action was for "quieting of title" and necessitated

determination of the respective rights of the litigants, both claimants to a
free patent title, over a piece of property, admittedly public land. The law,
as relied upon by jurisprudence, lodges "the power of executive control,
administration, disposition and alienation of public lands with the Director
of Lands subject, of course, to the control of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources."
In sum, the decision rendered in civil case 1218 on October 28, 1968 is a
patent nullity. The court below did not have power to determine
who (the Firmalos or the Tarucs) were entitled to an award of
free patent title over that piece of property that yet belonged to
the public domain. Neither did it have power to adjudge the Tarucs as
entitled to the "true equitable ownership" thereof, the latter's effect being
the same: the exclusion of the Firmalos in favor of the Tarucs.

In an action for quieting of title, the complainant is seeking for "an

adjudication that a claim of title or interest in property adverse to the
claimant is invalid, to free him from the danger of hostile claim, and to
remove a cloud upon or quiet title to land where stale or unenforceable
claims or demands exist." Under Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code, the
two indispensable requisites in an action to quiet title are: (1) that the
plaintiff has a legal or equitable title to or interest in the real property
subject of the action; and (2) that there is a cloud on his title by reason of
any instrument, record, deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which
must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance of validity.

In this case, petitioners, claiming to be owners of the disputed property,

allege that respondents are unlawfully claiming the disputed property by
using void documents, namely the "Catulagan" and the Deed of Waiver of
Rights. However, the records reveal that petitioners do not have
legal or equitable title over the disputed property, which forms
part of Lot 43, a public land within the Baguio Townsite
Reservation. It is clear from the facts of the case that petitioners'
predecessors-in-interest, the heirs of Pocdo Pool, were not even
granted a Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim over Lot 43, which
remains public land. Thus, the trial court had no other recourse
but to dismiss the case.[33] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In conclusion, RTC Br. 61 has no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 5881-R as
the plaintiffs therein (herein respondents) seek to quiet title over lands
which belong to the public domain. Necessarily, Civil Case No. 5881-R must
be dismissed on this ground. It should be stressed that the court a
quo's lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the case renders it without
authority and necessarily obviates the resolution of the merits of the case.
To reiterate, when a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the
only power it has is to dismiss the action, as any act it performs without
jurisdiction is null and void, and without any binding legal effects. In this
light, the Court finds no further need to discuss the other grounds relied
upon by petitioners in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 19,

2009 and the Resolution dated September 3, 2009 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 86266 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil Case No. 5881-R is DISMISSED on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,
Branch 61.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Del

Castillo, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.