Cuevas v. Rosal AC No. 9202 July 29, 2019 (Resolution)
Cabanag and Panal
FACTS:
Atty. Ulysses M. Rosal was found liable for dishonesty for denying the existence of a lawyer-client rela-
tionship between him and Bayani G. Cuevas — evidenced by the former’s receipt of 50,000 pesos as
legal fee
Atty. Rosal was eventually suspended from practice of law and ordered b\y the court to return the
amount he received from Cuevas. — He however failed to do the same even after the lapse of 2 years
Atty. Rosal claimed that he has no intention of defying such order — He received 3 resolutions requir-
ing him to restate Cuevas of the Amount of 50,000. Pesos :
• IBP-Board ofGovernor's Resolutions dated April 18, 2015
• IBP-Board ofGovernor's Resolutions dated September 24, 2016
• Court's Resolution dated June 21, 2017
HELD:
Atty. Rosal cannot excuse himself from complying with the court’s directive to return to return to
Cuevas the full amount of 50,000 pesos
He claims that he was incapable of paying the amount even after 2 years. — He never before pleaded
this reason for the purpose of seeking this Court's consideration of his supposed financial predicament,
if at all it was true.
He simply ignored and continuous to ignore the Court's directive as if he could freely do so with impuni-
ty. ·
“…lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court orders and processes and are expected to stand
foremost in complying with court directives being themselves officers ofthe court. As an officer ofthe
court himself, respondent here is expected to know that a resolution of this Court is not a mere request
but a command which should be complied with promptly and completely.” ( Felipe v. Atty. Macapagal )
The court in the case of Murray v. Atty. Cervantes increased the penalty imposed on respondent for
failure to comply with its directive to return the amount he received as legal fees.
For every every month (or fraction) of delay incurred by Atty. Cervantes, one (1) month should
be added to the period of his suspension from the practice of law.
Rationale:
This approach hopefully underscores the burden that respondent must justly carry. By automatically
extending his suspension should he not return the amount, we save complainant, the victim from the
additional costs of having to find and retain another counsel to compel the return of what is due her.
Counsels who have caused harm on their clients must also suffer the costs of restitution. ( Murray v.
Atty. Cervantes )
National Power Corporation v.
FACTS:
Respondents Fraulein C. Cabanag and Jesus T. Panal2 were employed as Principal Chemists Analyst
C at the petitioner's Palinpinon Geothermal Power Plant located at Puhagan, Valencia, Negros Oriental
National Power Board (NPB) on Nov 18 2002 passed:
NPB Resolution No. 2002-124 — provided for the termination from employment of all
the petitioner's personnel effective January 31, 2003, as well as their entitlement to sepa-
ration benefits
NPB Resolution No. 2002 - 125 — constituted a Transition Team to manage and im-
plement the separation program. respondents were told that they could still apply for
positions under the reorganized plantilla —they respectively applied for the positions of
Principal Chemist Analyst C and Principal Chemist A.
Being licensed Chemists, the respondents felt confident on being rehired considering that the other
applicants were Chemical Engineers not qualified for the positions under the CSC — However, they
were not appointed and 4 of the appointees were Chemical Engineers
Respondents then sent a letter seeking clarification and requested the re-evaluation of the selection
and hiring processes under the New NPC Table of Organisation — They insist that they are more
qualified than the eventually appointed because the 1997 Revised Quality Standards for the posi-
tion of Principal Chemist specifically required a registered chemist, not a chemical engineer
Rodolfo C. Pacafia, then the Senior Plant Manager, replied that the decision to hire the other appli-
cants or the positions had been based on "behavioral traits."
The respondents ultimately filed against the petitioner a complaint for illegal dismissal in the Civil Ser-
vice Regional Office (CSRO) in Cebu City.
Atty. Martin Gerard S. Cornelio was then hired as counsel for respondents when the case reached
the CSC
While in the CA, Atty. Martin Gerard S. Cornelio filed a Notice of Death (with Withdrawal as Counsel
and Manifestation), informing the Court about the death of respondent Jesus T. Panal, and giving no-
tice of his withdrawal as counsel for Panal. He prayed that because his fees were only contingent, an
attorney's lien based on quantum meruit should be entered
HELD:
Ordinarily, the determination of the attorney's fees on the basis of quantum meruit involves a factual
matter, and is to be remanded to the lower court for such reason. Yet, because a remand will needless-
ly prolong the resolution of Atty. Cornelio's application, justice and equity necessitate our fixing now of
the attorney's fees.
Quantum meruit is used as basis for determining an attorney's professional fees in the absence of an
express agreement between him and his client.
The attorney must show his entitlement to a reasonable compensation for the effort expended in pursu-
ing the client's cause. — The Court may consider factors such as: Complainant then claimed that Atty. Leaban has no personality to file the motion for extension of time
1. The time spent to file motion for reconsideration, thus, he filed the instant complaint against Atty. Leaban for unethical
2. Extent of services rendered conduct.
3. Novelty and difficulty of the questions involved
4. Importance of the subject matter Case reached the IBP:
5. Skill demanded;
6. Probability of losing other employment as a result of the acceptance of the proferred case 2014: dismissed cased for insufficient of evidence
7. Customary charges for similar services
8. Amount involved in the controversy 2015: Board of Gov reversed the report and suspend Atty. Learn for 1 year.
9. Benefits resulting to the client
10. Certainty of compensation 2016: (Extended resolution) Atty. Leaban to be administratively liable for failing to comply with her duty
11. Character of the employment and to inform the court of the death of her client and was devoid of authority to file a motion for extension of
12. Professional standing of the attorney. time to file motion for reconsideration

Atty. Cornelio represented the respondents herein from the time when the case was in the CSC until
the filing of the petition for review on certiorari in this Court.31 In all that time, he took on the task of
preparing and filing several pleadings in behalf of both the respondents. Given the time and skill lent by
him in defending Panal's cause, as well as taking guidance from Article 111 of the Labor Code a pro-
vision that explicitly limits the recovery of attorney's fees in illegal dismissal situations in relation to pri-
vate employment to 10% of the amounts recovered by the client
Art. 111. Attorney's fees.
a. In cases of unlawful withholding of wages, the culpable party may be assessed attorney's fees
equivalent to ten percent o f the amount o f wages recovered.
b. It shall be unlawful for any person to demand or accept, in any judicial or administrative pro-
ceedings for the recovery of wages, attorney's fees which exceed ten percent of the amount of
wages recovered.
Thus it is proper to accord to Atty. Cornelio a charging lien of 10% of the amounts that would be
awarded in favor of Panal.
Nabarte v. Leaban AC No. 12404 August 19, 2019 (Resolution)
2017: ( June Extended resolution) Resolved to grant Atty. Leaban's motion for reconsideration, and
reverse its earlier decision.
2017: ( June Extended resolution) no basis for the charge that Atty. Leaban is guilty of unethical con-
duct in pursuing a case notwithstanding the death of her client.
— Complainant filed MR
2018: BOG granted MR
— Atty. Learn filed MR
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Leaban's act offiling the motion for extension after the death o f her client con-
stitutes unethical conduct.
HELD: NO.
Administrative proceedings are imbued with public interest. A case for disbarment or suspension is not
meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal
profession o f its undesirable members in order to protect the public and the courts.

FACTS:
in 2013, Petronilo J. Barayuga (Barayuga) filed a complaint for libel/intriguing against honor against
complainant with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Imus, Cavite. After the preliminary investiga-
tion, Investigating Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the complaint.
Said Resolution was later approved by the Acting Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite.
The said Resolution dated June 24, 2013 was received by Barayuga on July 20, 2013, thus, the latter
had ten (10) days to file a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Section 56 of the Manual for Prosecu-
tors. — However, Barayuga died of heart attack on August 1, 2013, as evidenced by death certificate3
issued on August 14, 2013.
Thereafter, Atty. Leaban, representing Barayuga filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor a
Motion for Extension ofTime to File Motion for Reconsideration dated August 5, 2013.
As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges proffered against
him until the contrary is proved, and that, as an officer of the corni, he has performed his duties in ac-
cordance with his oath.
The degree of proof indispensable in an administrative proceeding was not met.
Complainant repeated insistence on Atty. Leaban's lack of personality to file the subject motion for ex-
tension to file the motion for reconsideration will not stand in the absence of evidence proving such
allegation. — The presumption in favor of the counsel's authority to appear in behalf of a client is a
strong one.
A lawyer is not even required to present a written authorization from the client. In fact, the absence of a
formal notice of entry of appearance will not invalidate the acts performed by the counsel in his client's
name.

Section 21, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court :
“Section 21. Authority of attorney to appear. - an attorney is presumed to he properly authorized to
represent any cause in which he appears xxx”
We find that Atty. Leaban's assertion that she was the legal representative of the Spouses Barayuga in
their legal battle against the Adventist University of the Philippine (AUP) to be more persuasive, as
shown by:
(1) official receipt of 13,000.00 from Barayuga as payment for the filing of a motion for reconsidera-
tion on July 29, 2013, and
(2) the Special Power of Attomey issued to her by the Spouses Barayuga.
It can, thus, be presumed that Atty. Leaban was, likewise, authorized to file the subject motion, consid-
ering that the subject motion appears to be an offshoot of the legal controversy between the Barayugas
and the AUP, as represented by complainant.
We also find nothing on record that would show that the filing of the subject motion was motivated by
bad faith, fraud, malice or dishonesty, or was meant to harass the complainant. The subject motion
mentioned the fact of Barayuga's death and that is sufficient notice to complainant and the prosecuting
investigator which dispels any allegations of bad faith or deceit.
Moreover, as Atty. Leaban pointed out, what she actually filed was a motion for the extension to file a
motion for reconsideration which is still subject to the prosecutor's discretion to approve or deny. It was
not a motion for reconsideration. Thus, considering that the subject motion was still subject to the ap-
proval of the investigating prosecutor, it is premature to conclude that complainant was prejudiced by
the mere filing of it.
As to complainant's claim that Atty. Leaban violated the Code of Professional Responsibility for her
failure to inform the Court of the death of her client and her filing of a belated motion for extension, we
are also unconvinced.
While it is true that it is the duty of the attorney to inform the court of his client's death pursuant to Sec-
tions 16 and 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, it must be pointed out that the subject case was yet to be
filed in court at the time of the filing of the complaint, thus, said duty is inapplicable. It is also worth
reiterating that Atty. Leaban did not conceal the fact of her client's death as she mentioned it on the
subject motion.
The primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are to protect the public; to foster
public confidence in the Bar; to preserve the integrity of the profession; and to deter other lawyers from
similar misconduct.
Disciplinary proceedings are means of protecting the administration of justice by requiring those who
carry out this important function to be competent, honorable and reliable men in whom courts and
clients may repose confidence.
While it is discretionary upon the Court to impose a particular sanction that it may deem proper against
an erring lawyer, it should neither be arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or
prejudice, but should ever be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and
independence of the bar and to exact from the lawyer strict compliance with his duties to the court, to
his client, to his brethren in the profession and to the public.
Malabon Central Market Development Cooperative v. Sioco-Fernandez AC No. 11172 August 14,
2019 (Resolution)
FACTS:
Malabon Central Market Development Cooperative (MCMDC), through its Chairman of the Board,
Edgardo F. Virtudes, charging Atty. Cecilia S. Sioco-Femandez with betrayal of trust and violation of the
rule against conflict o f interest.
MCMDC alleged that it engaged the services of Atty. Sioco-Fernandez as its retained lawyer for more
than ten (10) years.
Her services included, among others, the giving of legal advice in matters relating to disciplinary ac-
tions against its employees and execution of contracts. — She likewise handled an actual case for
nullity of anomalous bidding process and drafted demand letters for unlawful occupation of MCMDC's
property.
Sometime in 2010, former Chairman of the Board, Francisco Lopez, asked Atty. Sioco-Femandez for
legal advice regarding purported irregularities in the transactions managed by its then General Manag-
er, Cynthia Donato (Donato).
Atty. Sioco- Femandez allegedly advised MCMDC to place Donato under indefinite suspension pend-
ing investigation, to which MCMDC complied.
Apparently, Donato filed a case for illegal suspension against MCMDC. — While the case was on ap-
peal, MCMDC learned that Atty. Sioco-Fernandez represented Donato.
MCMDC claimed that in representing Donato, Atty. Sioco-Fernandez had betrayed MCMDC's trust and
was guilty o f violation o f the rule on conflict o f interest.
Atty. Sioco-Fernandez admitted to being a consultant for MCMDC from 1995-2005. That the two actual
cases were were isolated legal services since she had no exclusive contract with MCMDC; that she did
not give the advice to place Donato under indefinite suspension; that said advice was recommended
by the Audit and Inventory Committee; and that with the termination of her legal services in 2005, she
had no obligation to get any written consent from MCMDC to represent Donato.
IBP-CBD found Atty. Sioco-Fernandez guilty of representing conflicting interest.
HELD:
Canon 15 of the CPR mandates lawyers to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all their dealings
and transactions with their clients.
Rule 15.03 of the same Code commands that: "[a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests ex-
cept by written consent o f all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts."
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing
parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or
claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument
will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been be-
stowed or will be used. ( Hornilla vs. Salunat )
No written agreement is necessary to generate a lawyer-client relationship; it commences from the
moment the client seeks the lawyer's advice upon a legal concern, which may be for consultation on
transactions or other legal matters, or for representation in court. The lawyer is thereafter bound to
respect the relationship and to maintain the trust and confidence of his client
Atty. Sioco-Femandez violated the rule against representing conflicting interests. It would be immaterial
that the lawyer-client relationship between the complainant and the respondent had not been reduced
into writing. The fact that Atty. Sioco-Femandez rendered legal services for the complainant for ten (10)
years and represented the latter in the cases it filed before the courts sufficiently established lawyer-
client relationship.
By representing a party in a labor case whose interest was opposed to that of MCMDC without consult-
ing the latter on her representation, Atty. Sioco-Femandez indubitably breached Rule 15.03 ofthe
Code.
Gabucan v. Narido Jr. AC No. 12019 September 3, 2019 (Resolution En Banc)
FACTS:
Complainant Jose Antonio G. Gabucan filed a complaint against Atty. Florencio A. Nardio for violation
of the CPR:
• Rule 1.01 —A lawyer shali not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
• Canon 1, Rule 18.04 — A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.
• Canon 18, Rule 20.04 — A lawyers shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compen-
sation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice, or fraud
Gabucan alleged that he was the owner of a parcel of land located in Camiguin. He hired the services
of Atty. Narido Jr. to initiate an ejectment case against Rogelio Ebalang.
Atty. Narido, Jr. entered into a Contract of Lease with the complainant over a property that would be
the subject of the unlawful detainer- case.— Thereafter, Atty. Narido, Jr. took possession of the litigated
property and introduced improvements by building a shanty made up of mixed materials
MCTC rendered a Decision in favor of the complainant and ordered the ejectment of Ebalang.
The RTC on appeal dated Feb 15, 2006 dismissed the appeal and remanded the case to the MCTC for
execution
Ebalang, however, filed a Petition for Review before the CA.
Pending review by the CA, Atty. Narido, Jr. failed to communicate to complainant, to at least apprise or
report the status of the case.— He likewise, failed to file a comment or memorandum as required by
the CA.
February 28, 2008, the CA granted the petition and remanded the case to the MCTC for further pro-
ceedings.
Complainant felt aggrieved such that he was forced to hire the services of another lawyer to continue
prosecuting the remanded case before the MCTC. — Atty. Narido, Jr. did not object to the termination
of his services.
On April 2, 2011, complainant amicably settled the attorney's fees of Atty. Narido, Jr., fixing the 35%
contingent fee of the latter at P70,000.00:
The partial payment of P35,000.00 to be paid on that day —while the other P35,000.00 to be
paid 15 days after the initial payment but not later than the end of June 2011.
Atty. Narido, Jr. further agreed to voluntarily relinquish, abandon, or waive all and whatever interest he
had over Lot , together with all improvements he introduced therein, and further agreed that the costs
of the demolition shall be on his account. The same was evidenced by his Quitclaim
On November 4, 2011, the complainant, through his representative Evangelisto Z. Almonia (Almonia),
sought to pay the remaining P35,000.00—However, the he refused to accept the same, unless an ad-
ditional amount of PI0,000.00 would be paid, as payment for the materials of his improvements that
were demolished
Atty. Narido, Jr., by coercion and intimidation, re-entered the property and had his men build a structure
thereon purposely to obstruct and to prevent the passage of the dump trucks of Guani.— The incident
was reported eventually to the police station
In his Answer: Atty. Narido, Jr. admitted that he was engaged by the complainant in a semi-contin-
gency basis to file a case for unlawful detainer against Ebalang
Atty. Narido, Jr. claimed that of all the hearings he attended for the complainant's case, com-
plainant only paid his appearance fee once.
When Ebalang appealed the decision of the MCTC, Atty. Narido, Jr. informed Almonia to ad-
vise the complainant that a separate professional fee for the appeal has to be agreed upon but he
never heard from the complainant or Almonia despite repeated reminders.
Despite the absence of a separate agreement, Atty. Narido, Jr still represented the complainant in the
RTC and CA.
Atty. Narido, Jr. stated that he was already confident that the CA will uphold the rulings of the MCTC
and the RTC, which is why he did not see the need to file a comment or a memorandum.— When the
CA decision remanded the case to the MCTC, it was only at this point that the complainant communi-
cated with him that he will engage the services of a new lawyer.
When the MCTC rendered a decision in the remanded case in favor of the complainant, the latter im-
mediately had it executed
Without his knowledge, Atty. Narido, Jr. learned that the complainant conveyed the subject property to
Guani for an undisclosed sum of money without informing him that his share, totalling to about 76
square meters of the property, was included in the disposition.— Despite this, Atty. Narido, Jr. did not
confront the complainant because he still has his house built on the property.
Thus, complainant had no choice but to negotiate with Atty. Narido Jr. if he was willing to sell his por-
tion of the lot —Thereafter, they agreed that complainant was to pay Atty. Narido, Jr. P35,000.00 ini-
tially. As evidence of their agreement, Atty. Narido, Jr. executed an Acknowledgment with Quitclaim.
Atty. Narido, Jr. claimed that he agreed to undertake the demolition of the house in order to allow him
to salvage materials therefrom. However, even if the complainant had not paid in full and without prior
notice to Atty. Narido, Jr., the latter asserted that the complainant caused the demolition of the house
scattering all the materials.
Because of the dump trucks of Guani that entered the property, Atty. Narido, Jr. claimed that his mate-
rials were buried and he cannot retrieve and use them for his purpose. Consequently, Atty. Narido, Jr.
demanded that complainant pay the amount of Pl0,000.00 to compensate him for the valuable materi-
als, which were buried. Atty. Narido Jr. claimed that the Pl0,000.00 was a meager amount considering
that the construction ofhis house amounted to P260,000.00.28
Atty. Narido, Jr. claimed that the lease of the property between him and complainant was merely a
strategy to prevent Guani to take possession of the property. That even before the filing of the unlawful
detainer case, it appeared that a certain Mrs. Banaag sold the subject property to Guani. The strategy
proved to be successful because Guani was not able to enter the property.
Atty. Narido, Jr. asserted that he was not remiss in his obligation to keep his client informed of the sta-
tus of his case. He gave constant updates to Almonia due to complainant's constant absence from the
country.
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline and IBP Board of Governors suspended him for 2 years
HELD:
In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, public interest is the primary objective. The Court is called
upon to determine whether a lawyer is still fit to be allowed the privileges of the practice of law. Thus,
the Court calls upon the lawyer to account for his actuations as an officer of the court, with the end in
view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice
by purging the profession of members, who by their misconduct is not worthy to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities that pertain to a lawyer.
Atty. Narido Jr. violated Rule 18.04 of the CPR by failing to inform the complainant of the status
of the case.
A lawyer's duty to keep his client constantly updated on the developments of his case is crucial in
maintaining the client's confidence. The lawyer needs to inform his client, timely and adequately, impor-
tant updates and status affecting the client's case. He should not leave his client in the dark as how to
he is defending the client's interest. ( Mendoza vda de Robosa v. Atty. Mendoza )
Atty. Narido, Jr. claims that he has constantly updated complainant through his representative Almonia.
However, Atty. Narido, Jr. did not present any document establishing such fact. It is logical that Atty
Narido, Jr. should have at least a document formally infonning the complainant of the status of the
case. He stated that he knew that the complainant was hardly in the Philippines, then it would have
been more prudent, in keeping with his duty to inform his client of the status of the case, to formally
inform the complainant in writing and not merely verbally through Almonia, which Atty. Narido, Jr. has
not proven.
Atty. Narido, Jr. admitted that he did not file any comment or memorandum before the CA, since he
was already confident that it was no longer necessary because the CA will affirm the findings of the
MCTC and the RTC. This is arrogance on the part of Atty. Narido, Jr. He has no way of knowing that
the CA will indeed rule in favor of his client. In fact, the CA reversed the rulings ef the fv1CTC and the
RTC.
The least that Atty. Narido, Jr. could have done was to file a manifestation stating that his client, com-
plainant, is waving his right to file a comment or memorandum, since the pleadings he filed before the
lower courts sufficiently established the cause of complainant. Atty. Narido, Jr. should not have simply
disregarded the filing of the comment or memorandum.
He owes it to his client to exert his best and diligent efforts to protect the client's interest.
A contingent fee contract is valid and binding but the same must be reasonable and just under
the circumstances
A contingency fee agreement has been generally rendered as valid and binding in this jurisdiction. It
is a contract in writing in which the fee, generally a fixed percentage of what may be recovered in an
action, is made to depend upon the success of the case. —The terms of the contingency fee contract
largely depends upon the reasonableness of the amount fixed as contingent fee under the circum-
stances of the case.
Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics states that a contract for a contingent fee, when sanc-
tioned by law, should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case including the risk and un-
certainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision ofthe court as to its rea-
sonableness
Atty. Narido, Jr. claims that the contingency fee agreement between him and the complainant is only
limited at the MCTC level and a separate contingency fee is required in the appeal before the RTC and
another separate contingency fee is required in the appeal before the CA.— Be it noted that the
amount of contingency fee in the instant case is 35% of the property or its value.
A separate contingency fee for the appeal before the RTC and another separate contingency fee for
the appeal before the CA is clearly unreasonable, unjustified and unconscionable.
The practice of law is not a business. Public service, not profit, should be the primary consideration.
Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that
necessarily yields profits. To serve and administer Justice must be the primary purpose of lawyers and
their personal interest should be subordinate.


Atty. Narido, Jr. violated the prohibition provided under Article 1646 of the Civil Code.
A lawyer's relationship to his client demands a highly fiduciary relationship. It requires a high standard
of conduct and demands utmost fidelity, candor, fairness and good faith.
Atry. Narido, Jr. cannot be faulted from demanding PJ0,000.00 for his buried materials and pre-
venting the
dump trucks o f Guani from entering the leased premises as he was only protecting his interest
over his materials
It is undisputed that the professional fee of Atty. Narido, Jr. in the amount of P10,000.00 was not yet
fully paid.
Only the first installment, amounting to P35,000.00 was paid by the complainant. As provided in their
agreement, the complainant was obligated to pay the other P35,000.00, 15 days after the complainant
leaves for the United States of America, but not later than June 2011.

Atty. Narido, Jr. acquired for himself, interest over complainant's property, which is the subject of litiga- Further, the parties agreed that the cost of demolition of materials will be undertaken by Atty. Narido, Jr.
tion. in order to salvage his materials.

The prohibition, which rests on considerations o f public policy and interests is intended to curtail any However, in contravention with the agreement, complainant offered to pay Atty. Narido, Jr. only on No-
undue influence of the lawyer upon his client on account of his fiduciary and confidential relationship vember 4, 2011. —Worse, the complainant immediately demolished the improvement of Atty. Narido,
with him. Jr. and scattered the materials of the latter all over the leased premises.

Plainly, these acts are in direct contravention of Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code which forbids lawyers
from acquiring, by purchase or assignment, the property that has been the subject of litigation in which
they have taken part by virtue of their profession. While Canon 10 of the old Canons of Professional
Ethics, which states that [t]he lawyer should not purchase any interests in the sub,ject matter
of the litigation which he is conducting, is no longer reproduced in the new Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility (CPR), such proscription still applies considering that Canon 1 of the CPR
is clear in requiring that a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect.for law and legal process and Rule 13 8, Sec. 3 which requires every lawyer to
take an oath to "obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
therein." (Heirs of Juan De Dias E. Carlos v. Atty. Linsangan )
Further, the dump trucks and boulders of Guani filled the area and buried the materials of Atty. Narido,
Jr. Because of this, Atty. Narido, Jr. was not able to salvage any materials that were of value.
The complainant cannot just simply demolish the improvements without notice to Atty. Narido, Jr. and
without paying in full the latter's professional fee.
Atty. Narido Jr. was only acting within his rights and was protecting his interest when he returned to the
premises to salvage his materials and prevent the dump trucks of Guani from further burying it.

Atty. Narido, Jr., to excuse himself from his unlawful act, claims that the lease is merely a strategy to
prevent Guani to take possession of the property

This allegation is flawed in many points.

1. First, if the same was merely a strategy, Atty. Narido, Jr. should not have asserted that his lease
was to expire only on December 14, 2014.50
2. Second, if it was true that Guani already bought the property, why would the latter agree to
merely leasing the property?
3. Third, the Police Blotter itself indicated that the "lot owned by formerly Ex Mayor Antonio Gabu-
can which was rented by Mr. Bernard Guani."

The fact that Atty. Narido, Jr. will go through such lengths to fabricate facts show his unethical conduct
and unfitness to be a member of the Bar. Atty. Narido, Jr. took an oath that he will obey the laws, do no
falsehood and conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion.

Further, Rule 10.01 of the CPR provides that "A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice".