Huey Ranz Krizza R.

Calabines
February 23, 2019 Assignment #13

Judicial review is a type of court proceeding in which a judge reviews the

lawfulness of a decision or action made by a public body. In other words, judicial
reviews are a challenge to the way in which a decision has been made, rather than
the rights and wrongs of the conclusion reached.
It is not really concerned with the conclusions of that process and whether
those were ‘right’, as long as the right procedures have been followed. The court will
not substitute what it thinks is the ‘correct’ decision. This may mean that the public
body will be able to make the same decision again, so long as it does so in a lawful
way. If you want to argue that a decision was incorrect, judicial review may not be
best for you. There are alternative remedies, such as appealing against the decision
to a higher court.
The court or the quasi-judicial agency must be detached and impartial, not
only when hearing and resolving the case before it, but even when its judgment is
brought on appeal before a higher court. The judge of a court or the officer of a
quasi-judicial agency must keep in mind that he is an adjudicator who must settle
the controversies between parties in accordance with the evidence and the applicable
laws, regulations, and/or jurisprudence. His judgment should already clearly and
completely state his findings of fact and law. There must be no more need for him
to justify further his judgment when it is appealed before appellate courts. When the
court judge or the quasi-judicial officer intervenes as a party in the appealed case, he
inevitably forsakes his detachment and impartiality, and his interest in the case
becomes personal since his objective now is no longer only to settle the controversy
between the original parties (which he had already accomplished by rendering his
judgment), but more significantly, to refute the appellant’s assignment of errors,
defend his judgment, and prevent it from being overturned on appeal.
Mamauag, it must be borne in mind that this Court is not merely a Court of
law but of equity as well. Justice dictates that the DAR Secretary must determine
with deliberate dispatch whether indeed no notice of coverage was furnished to
respondents and payment of just compensation was unduly withheld from them
despite the fact that the assailed CLOAs were already registered, on the premise that
respondents were unaware of the CARP coverage of their properties; hence, their
right to protest the same under the law was defeated. Respondents’ right to due
process must be equally respected. Apropos is our ruling in Heir of Nicolas Jugalbot
v. Court of Appeals:

It may not be amiss to stress that laws which have for their object the
preservation and maintenance of social justice are not only meant to favor the poor
and underprivileged. They apply with equal force to those who, notwithstanding
their more comfortable position in life, are equally deserving of protection from the
courts. Social justice is not a license to trample on the rights of the rich in the guise
of defending the poor, where no act of injustice or abuse is being committed against
them.

As the court of last resort, our bounden duty to protect the less privileged
should not be carried out to such an extent as to deny justice to landowners whenever
truth and justice happen to be on their side. For in the eyes of the Constitution and
the statutes, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER THE LAW remains the bedrock principle
by which our Republic abides.

Rules governing appeals from judgements of quasi-judicial agencies

An appeal may be taken to the Court of Appeals within the period of 15 days
from notice of the award, judgement, final order or resolution or from the date of its
last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial
of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the
governing law of the court agency.

Appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition for review in seven legible
copies with the Court of Appeals, with proof of service of a copy thereof on the
adverse party and on the court or agency. Upon filing the petition for review, the
petitioner shall pay to the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals the docketing and
other lawful fees and deposit the sum of P500.00 for costs.

Administrative finality doctrine

Administrative finality is the concept that a determination or decision

becomes final and binding when rendered, unless it is timely appealed or later
reopened and revised for special reasons.
Timeliness of application to courts
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its
determination requires the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of
the proper administrative bodies, relief must first be obtained in an
administrative proceeding before a remedy is supplied by the courts even if
the matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction.22 It applies where a
claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever
enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a
regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an
administrative agency. In such a case, the court in which the claim is sought
to be enforced may suspend the judicial process pending referral of such
issues to the administrative body for its view or, if the parties would not be
unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice.23

The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the

court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction
until after an administrative agency has determined some question or some
aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court.24.

It has been consistently held by the Supreme Court, in a long line of cases,
that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition
that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded
him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to
by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a
matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first
before the court’s judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of a
court’s intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action as aptly explained by the
Supreme Court in the case of University of the Philippines v. Catungal, Jr., et al.,
(G.R. No. 121863, May 5, 1997), to wit:

“The underlying principle of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies rests

on the presumption that the administrative agency, if afforded a complete chance to
pass upon the matter, will decide the same correctly. There are both legal and
practical reasons for the principle. The administrative process is intended to provide
less expensive and more speedy solutions to disputes. Where the enabling statute
indicates a procedure for administrative review and provides a system of
administrative appeal or reconsideration, the courts – for reasons of law, comity, and
convenience – will not entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies
have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given an opportunity
to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum.”

The rule in administrative law is that parties requesting judicial action must
first exhaust their remedies in the executive branch. This is premised not only on
practical considerations but also on the comity existing between different
departments of the government, which comity requires the court to stay their hands
until the administrative processes have been completed. (Madrinan vs. Sinco, 110
Phil. 160) Further, under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
recourse through court action, as a general rule, cannot prosper until all the remedies
have been exhausted at the administrative level, (Pacana vs. Consunji, 108 SCRA
631[1981]; Pestañas et al. v. Dyogi, et al., 81 SCRA 574 [1978]; Antonio v. Tanco,
65 SCRA 448 [1975]).

Thus, in Abe-Abe et al. v. Manta (90 SCRA 524, 531 [1979]), the Supreme Court
emphatically declared:

“When an adequate remedy may be had within the Executive Department of the
government, but nevertheless, a litigant fails or refuses to avail himself of the same,
the judiciary shall decline to interfere. This traditional attitude of the courts is based
not only on convenience but likewise on respect; convenience of the party litigants
and respect for a co-equal office in the government. If a remedy is available within
the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made
to (the) court. (citing Cruz vs. Del Rosario, 119 Phil. 63, 66).”

There is no question that a statute may vest exclusive original jurisdiction in an

administrative agency over certain disputes and controversies falling within the
agency’s special expertise. For example, the constitutionality of such grant of
exclusive jurisdiction to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board over cases
involving the sale of lots in commercial subdivisions was upheld in Tropical Homes
Inc. v. National Housing Authority (152 SCRA 540 [1987]) and again sustained in
a later decision in Antipolo Realty Corporation v. National Housing Authority (153
SCRA 399 [1987]) where the Supreme Court restated that the HLURB shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance
with the terms of PD 957 which defines the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial
powers of the said agency.

As a result, the HLURB, in the exercise of its powers and functions, is authorized to
interpret and apply contracts, determine the rights of the parties under these
contracts, and even award damages, such as moral and exemplary, whenever
appropriate. Thus, it has been held that one of the thrusts of the multiplication of
administrative agencies is the interpretation of such contracts and agreements and
that the determination of private rights under these agreements is no longer a
uniquely judicial function.

Moreover, if a remedy is very much available within the administrative machinery

of the administrative agency, then this alternative should first be utilized before
resort can be made to the courts, not only to give the administrative agency the
opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly, but also to avoid the very
pernicious evil the doctrine itself seeks to prevent – the unnecessary and premature
resort to courts and the clogging of its dockets.

It is also important to note that the primordial effect of non-compliance and failure
to exhaust administrative remedies is that it deprives the complainants of a cause of
action, which is, under the Rules of Court, a ground for a motion to dismiss. Such
failure, therefore, is fatal and calls for the dismissal of the case.

The doctrine of ripeness for judicial review, determines the point at which
courts may review administrative action except that the former applies to
administrative action other than adjudication. The basic principle of ripeness is that
the judicial machinery should be conserved for problems which are real and present
or imminent, and should not be squandered on problems which are future, imaginary
or remote.

Statutory and Non statutory method of reviews

Judicial review is the power given to the courts to examine the actions of the
legislative, executive, and administrative spheres of the government. It also
determines whether such actions are consistent with the Constitution.
Basically, there are two types of judicial review of administrative actions, statutory
and nonstatutory. In statutory review, Congress explicitly authorizes review of
specified administrative actions. However, statutory review does not always provide
an adequate remedy. Nonstatutory review, in the administratve context, is based
upon a statute that does not explicitly refer to an administrative action.
Generally, review of federal agency action is specifically authorized by the enabling
statute of the agency. At the same time, a statute can contain express language
establishing legislative intent to preclude judicial review of agency actions under a
statute.
In Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (U.S. 1977), it was observed that the
Administrative Procedure Act does not provide federal jurisdiction. However, to
what extent a statute precludes judicial review is determined not only from its
express language, but also from the structure of the statutory scheme, objectives,
legislative history, and the nature of the administrative action involved.[i]
State legislative practice also provides judicial review for administrative
adjudications. Statutory review generally precludes nonstatutory review either
expressly or impliedly. There is no right to judicial review of an administrative order
unless a statute provides a right or unless the order adversely affects a vested
property right or otherwise violates a constitutional right.