Handout #2: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.3 Phil 309, Dr. T.

Hoffmann

Problem of moral weakness:

We know what is your good, but we do not do it. But how can we act against better
knowledge? According to the supposition, we are not ignorant of what is good (for us)! If
we know what is good (for us), why do we fail to do it?*

Do morally weak persons act knowingly? — Aristotle’s solution:

Aristotle’s answer develops the idea that knowledge and ignorance are involved contem-
poraneously, but in different respects. Three steps lead to the fourth and final solution.
1. We have knowledge, but we do not use it (EN 7.3.1146b 31–35).
2. Practical syllogisms presuppose knowledge of the (universal) major premise and of the
(particular) minor premise. The morally weak person uses the universal premise, but
not the minor premise. (1146b 36–1147a9)**
Example (of when things go right)
Major premise: “No harmful things should be tasted.”
Minor premise: “This piece of chocolate is harmful to me” (I am a diabetic)
Conclusion: I do not eat it.
What happens in the case of moral weakness (i.e., when things go wrong)?
When I am morally weak, I do not use the knowledge expressed in the minor
premise (that this chocolate is harmful to me).
3. Under the influence of desire and passion, my practical knowledge becomes
ineffective (1147a10–23). I may still be able to say what is the right or wrong, but I have
not fully appropriated this knowledge; so deep down it does not have a grip on me.
4. Under the influence of appetite, I choose among the most “convenient” major
premise (1147a23–32).
Aristotle’s Example
(1) I know that you should not eat sweet things. (Sweet things are unhealthy)
(2) I also know it is pleasurable to eat sweets.
Under the influence of your appetite, I prefer to act according to the second
premise (“It is pleasurable to eat sweets”). Thus my reasoning is as follows:
Major premise: “Everything sweet should be tasted.”
Minor premise: “This candy-bar is sweet.” (The minor premise is due to sense
perception, 1147a26)
Conclusion: I eat it.

* Aristotle phrases the problem in the following terms: “[H]ow can a man be morally weak in his
actions, when his basic assumption is correct <as to what he should do>?” EN 7.2.1145b21–22.
** Ostwald’s translation (Englewood Cliffs, N. J. 1962) is confusing here. On p. 182, line 3–5 he writes:
“… because the <minor> premise which he uses is universal rather than particular.” The more exact
translation is: “… because he uses the universal premise rather than the particular one.”
 Had I used the other major premise (“Sweet things are harmful”), the reasoning
would have been:
Major premise: “Sweet things should not be tasted.”
Minor premise: “This candy-bar is sweet.”
Conclusion: I do not eat it.

My Example:
I know that it is dangerous and forbidden to drink too much when I drive.
I also know that to drink is pleasant.
Under the influence of your appetite for a drink, I prefer to act according to
the second premise. Thus, your reasoning is as follows:
Major premise: “To drink good whiskey is pleasant.”
Minor premise: “This 20 years old oak cask single malt Lagavulin is good whiskey.”
Conclusion: I drink it.
Had I used the other major premise (“I must not drink and drive”), I would have
either renounced to drive or to drink, and my reasoning would have been:
Major premise: “It is bad to drink alcohol and drive.”
Minor premise: “This whiskey is alcohol.”
Conclusion: I do not drink it.
In short: Under the influence of desire or passion, the morally weak person has
knowledge, but does not use it. Thus the understanding of either the universal major
premise or of the particular minor premise of the syllogism may become ineffective in the
presence of desire or passion.

Aristotle’s solution is based upon two distinctions:

(1) having vs. using knowledge;
(2) universal (intellectual, ‘scientific’) knowledge vs. particular (sense-) knowledge.

Aristotle’s account allows him to uphold Socrates’ view that we cannot act against our
knowledge in the strict sense: “Moral weakness does not occur in the presence of
knowledge in the strict sense, and it is sensory knowledge, not science, which is dragged
about by emotion.” (1147b15–17) His solution also shows that practical knowledge does
not “affect me” until I apply it to a particular case; it is here that my emotions interfere
with my knowledge. Moral or practical knowledge must be internalized, and that takes
time (1147a 22.)