Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
t
A
Increase in
Knowledge
xt
New Goods
at t
t
A
Increase in
Knowledge
xt Increased
New Goods
at t
Productivity
t
A
Increase in
Knowledge
xt Increased
New Goods
at t
Productivity
t
A
Increase in
Knowledge
δ H A (At + A t )
R&D Productivity
xt Increased
New Goods
at t
Productivity
t
A
Increase in
Knowledge
δ H A (At + A t ) t +1
A
Future Knowledge
R&D Productivity
xt Increased
New Goods
at t
Productivity
t
A Appropriated
Increase in
Knowledge
δ H A (At + A t ) t +1
A
Future Knowledge
R&D Productivity
xt Increased
New Goods
at t
Productivity
t
A Appropriated
Increase in
Knowledge
δ H A (At + A t ) t +1
A
Future Knowledge
R&D Productivity
Spillover
Yes
Considerations
of use?
No
No Yes
Quest for fundamental understanding?
Saturday, 4 December 2010
Stokes’ Classification of Research
Yes
Considerations
of use?
No
No Yes
Quest for fundamental understanding?
Saturday, 4 December 2010
Stokes’ Classification of Research
Yes
Considerations
of use?
No
No Yes
Quest for fundamental understanding?
Saturday, 4 December 2010
Stokes’ Classification of Research
Yes
Considerations
of use?
No
No Yes
Quest for fundamental understanding?
Saturday, 4 December 2010
Stokes’ Classification of Research
Yes
Considerations
of use?
No
No Yes
Quest for fundamental understanding?
Saturday, 4 December 2010
Stokes’ Classification of Research
Yes
Considerations
of use?
No
No Yes
Quest for fundamental understanding?
Saturday, 4 December 2010
Stokes’ Classification of Research
Assumed in
endogenous
Yes growth theory
Considerations
of use?
No
No Yes
Quest for fundamental understanding?
Saturday, 4 December 2010
Papers associated with patents
#pair with
Funding #papers % paired
patents
Mixed 70 41 59%
Private 36 24 67%
Starting with publications: From a sample of 341 research publications (all the
research articles from the leading life science journal Nature Biotechnology between
1997 and 1999). Examine which publications are also disclosed in patents. (Murray and
Stern 2007).
#pair with
Funding #patents % paired
papers
Starting with patents: From the full population of human gene patents (US patents
identified using bioinformatics methods that disclose and claim a human gene sequence
or fragment; Jensen and Murray 2005), which patents are also disclosed in
publications? (Huang and Murray 2008 )
S
Money Customers
F
Money Customers
Knowledge
S
F
Money Customers
S Knowledge Imitator
F
Money Customers
S Knowledge Imitator
F Money Customers
S Knowledge Imitator
F Money Customers
S Knowledge Imitator
F Money Customers
S Knowledge Imitator
F Money Customers
S Knowledge Imitator
F Money Customers
• Role of disclosure
• Potentially fosters imitative entry (reducing commercial returns) – can happen
through patent and/or publication disclosures
• Generates scientific kudos (through publication only) although scientists also care
about income
• Patent and publication disclosures might overlap
• Role of disclosure
• Potentially fosters imitative entry (reducing commercial returns) – can happen
through patent and/or publication disclosures
• Generates scientific kudos (through publication only) although scientists also care
about income
• Patent and publication disclosures might overlap
• Disclosure strategy
• Outcome of negotiation between (academic) scientist and firm over payments, IP
strategy and publication rights
• Scientist assumed to be wealth constrained
• Role of disclosure
• Potentially fosters imitative entry (reducing commercial returns) – can happen
through patent and/or publication disclosures
• Generates scientific kudos (through publication only) although scientists also care
about income
• Patent and publication disclosures might overlap
• Disclosure strategy
• Outcome of negotiation between (academic) scientist and firm over payments, IP
strategy and publication rights
• Scientist assumed to be wealth constrained
• Simplifying assumptions
• Single scientist and single firm (bilateral monopoly)
• Single project (more about funding an academic scientist than scientist-employee)
• No outside options (relaxed in the paper)
Commercial Patent-Paper
1
Science Pairs
Patent
(i)
0 Secrecy Open Science
• Scientist
U= w + bS d
wage kudos
Π
− k − w − Pr(Successful Entry)(Π − π )
Monopoly Capital Competitive
Profit Cost Profit
(1 − i ρ )π − iλ
0
(1 − i ρ )π − iλ + bE Pr(Disclosure)
(1 − i ρ )π − iλ
0
π
(1 − i ρ )π
(1 − i ρ )π − iλ + bE Pr(Disclosure)
(1 − i ρ )π − iλ
0
(1 − i ρ )π
(1 − i ρ )π − iλ + bE Pr(Disclosure)
(1 − i ρ )π − iλ
0
(1 − i ρ )π − iλ + bE Pr(Disclosure)
(1 − i ρ )π − iλ
0
(1 − i ρ )π − iλ + bE Pr(Disclosure)
(1 − i ρ )π − iλ
0
(1 − i ρ )π − iλ + bE (idPAT + d − α idPAT d)
(1 − i ρ )π − iλ
0
(1 − i ρ )π − iλ + bE (idPAT + d − α idPAT d)
0 0
Random
(1 − i ρ )π − iλ + bE (idPAT + d − α idPAT d) Fixed
Cost, θ
0 0
Random
(1 − i ρ )π − iλ + bE (idPAT + d − α idPAT d) Fixed
= Pr (entry) Cost, θ
0 0
Π
− k − w − Pr(successful entry)(Π − π )
Monopoly capital Competitive
Profit cost Profit
Π
− k − w − Pr(successful entry)(Π − π )
Monopoly capital Competitive
Profit cost Profit
Pr (successful entry)
= (1 − i ρ )Pr(entry)
= (1 − i ρ ) ( (1 − i ρ )π − iλ + bE (idPAT + d − α idPAT d))
Π
− k − w − Pr(successful entry)(Π − π )
Monopoly capital Competitive
Profit cost Profit
Pr (successful entry)
= (1 − i ρ )Pr(entry)
= (1 − i ρ ) ( (1 − i ρ )π − iλ + bE (idPAT + d − α idPAT d))
Returns
to d
Π − k − (1 − i ρ ) ( (1 − i ρ )π − iλ + bE idPAT ) (Π − π )
D>d=
bS + bE (1 − i ρ )(1 − α idPAT )(Π − π )
bS
Δd ≡ ≥ (1 − i ρ )(1 − α idPAT )
bE (Π − π )
bS
Δd ≡ ≥ (1 − i ρ )(1 − α idPAT )
bE (Π − π )
bS
Δd ≡ ≥ (1 − i ρ )(1 − α idPAT )
bE (Π − π )
Π − k − (1 − ρ ) ( (1 − ρ )π − λ + bE dPAT ) (Π − π )
Δi ≡ ≥1
Π − k − π (Π − π )
Π − k − (1 − ρ ) ( (1 − ρ )π − λ + bE dPAT ) (Π − π )
Δi ≡ ≥1
Π − k − π (Π − π )
Δi
Commercial Patent-Paper Pairs
Science
Open
Secrecy
Science
Δd
1 Δd
• D>d
• If publishing maximises joint surplus, w = 0
• Increase d until wage is constrained
• Beyond this point, d used as compensation.
d =
* ( )
Π − k − (1 − iρ ) (1 − iρ )π − iλ + bE id PAT (Π − π )
• Increasing λ and ρ i
2(1 − iρ )bE (1 − α id PAT )(Π − π )
• More likely to take out a patent
• If there is publication, negotiate more disclosure
• Increasing dPAT
• Less likely to take out a patent
• If there is a publication, increases disclosure
S S
S S
F F
Old New
S S
F F
Old New
S S
No flow of
knowledge
F or money F
Old New
S S
No flow of
knowledge
F or money F
Full Costs
Old New
S S
F F
Old New
S S
Knowledge
F F
Old New
S S
Knowledge
F F
Full Transfer
Old New
S S
F F
Old New
Knowledge
F
S
S
Old New
Knowledge
F
S
S
Money
F
Old New
Knowledge
F
S
S
Money
F
Full Transfer
Old New
S S
F F
Old New
Knowledge
F
S
S
Old New
Knowledge
F
S
S
Money
F
Old New
Knowledge
F
S
S
Money
F
Full Transfer
but partial transfer
if negotiations fail
Saturday, 4 December 2010
Patent-Paper Pairs
Old New
Knowledge
F
S
S
Money
Full Transfer
but partial transfer
if negotiations fail
Saturday, 4 December 2010
License Negotiations
Outcomes
If no patent, τ = 0
If patent but no publication, τ = k/3
If patent and past publication, τ = k(1-(1-γ)dt-1)/3
Outcomes
If no patent, τ = 0
If patent but no publication, τ = k/3
If patent and past publication, τ = k(1-(1-γ)dt-1)/3
Patent-Paper Pairs
For δ sufficiently high, patent-paper pairs can be an
equilibrium
Presence of patent reduces incentives for publication and
vice versa when γ < 1
Δi
Patent-Paper
Commercial Pairs
Science
1
Open
Secrecy
Science
1 Δd
Old New
S S
F F
Old New
Knowledge
S
S
F
F
Old New
Knowledge
S
S
F Money
F
Old New
Knowledge
S
S
F Money
F
Full Transfer
but partial transfer
if negotiations fail
Saturday, 4 December 2010
What if scientist owns IP?
Old New
Knowledge
S
S
F Money
Full Transfer
but partial transfer
if negotiations fail
Saturday, 4 December 2010
What if scientist owns IP?
Old New
Knowledge
S
S
F Money
Full Transfer
but partial transfer
if negotiations fail
Saturday, 4 December 2010
IP ownership
• Dynamic model assumes that the firm owns the IP rights and negotiates over
the license fee.
• What if the scientist owned those rights?
• It would then care about future publication in order to generate a citation.
• Consequences:
• A reduced future license fee when there is a publication
• In negotiations, the scientist and firm are less likely to publish as this will
reduce license revenues even further
• Openness may be facilitated by leaving IP rights in the firm’s hands.