RE: MEMORANDUM DATED JULY 10, 2017 FROM ASSOCIATE

JUSTICE TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

RE: LETTER OF RESIGNATION OF ATTY. BRENDA JAY ANGELES
MENDOZA, PHILJA CHIEF OF OFFICE FOR THE PHILIPPINE
MEDIATION CENTER
A.M. NO. 17-07-55-SC, JULY 3, 2018
A.M. NO. 18-02-13-SC, JULY 3, 2018
EN BANC, LEONEN
Power of Appointment within the Judiciary in the Supreme
Court

In her Memorandum, AJ De Castro pointed out that key positions in the

Supreme Court have not been filled up and such is prejudicial to the
best interest of the service. It also presented that the appointment of
the incumbent PHILJA Chief is not in accordance with AO No. 33-2008
which requires appointment by the Supreme Court upon
recommendation of PHILJA. The appointment was only signed by the
Chief Justice and the two most senior Associate Justices.
It was the position of AJ De Castro that since the Constitution vest in
the SC the power of appointment of all officials and employees of the
judiciary, this power can only be exercised by the SC En Banc, unless
duly delegated by a court resolution.
CJ Sereno offered a contrary view stating that the SC Human Resource
Manual expressly provides that third-level positions – shall be appointed
by the Chief Justice with the concurrence of the Chairpersons of the
Divisions.
TO WHOM DOES THE 1987 CONSTITUTION VESTS THE POWER OF
APPOINTMENT WITHIN THE JUDICIARY IN THE SUPREME COURT.
Supreme Court En Banc. The Court’s nature as a collegial body requires
that the appointing power be exercised by the Court En Banc consistent
with Article VIII, Section I of the Constitution that the judicial power
shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law.
The only exception to such rule is when the SC En Banc itself delegates
the exercise of some of its powers. Further, any ambiguity in the
delegation of powers must be resolved in favor of non-delegation. To do
otherwise is to permit an abdication of the “duty to be performed by the
delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not
through the intervening mind of another.”
In this case, the vagueness in what constitutes as the prerequisites for
a valid appointment as the PHILJA Chief, if any, should have prompted
a referral of the matter to the Court En Banc.

AJ De Castro proposed that the Resolution in AM No. 99-12-08-SC be

clarified as to the scope of the authority to appoint that is delegated to
the Chief Justice and the Chairpersons of the Divisions. Such Resolution
states that appointment and revocation of regular, temporary, casual,
or contractual personnel in the Supreme Court shall be referred to the
Chairpersons of the Divisions. It is the view of De Castro that
“personnel” should exclude high-ranking officials of the highly-technical
and/or policy determining third-level position below the Chief Justice
and Associate Justices.
ISSUE: