A.C. No.

6655

PACITA CAALIM-VERZONILLA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. VICTORIANO G. PASCUA, Respondent.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before the Court is the verified affidavit-complaint1 of Pacita Caalim-Verzonilla seeking the disbarment
of respondent Atty. Victoriano G. Pascua for allegedly falsifying a public document and evading the
payment of correct taxes through the use of falsified documents.

Complainant alleges that on September 15, 2001, respondent prepared and notarized two Deeds of
Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Lope Caalim with Sale. The first deed2 was for a
consideration of ₱250,000 and appears to have been executed and signed by Lope’s surviving spouse,
Caridad Tabarrejos, and her children (complainant, Virginia Caalim-Inong and Marivinia Caalim) in favor
of spouses Madki and Shirley Mipanga. The second deed3was for a consideration of ₱1,000,000 and
appears to have been executed by and for the benefit of the same parties as the first deed. The two
deeds have identical registration numbers, page numbers and book numbers in the notarial portion.

Complainant avers that both deeds are spurious because all the heirs’ signatures were falsified. She
contends that her sister Marivinia does not know how to sign her name and was confined at the
Cagayan Valley Medical Center, Tuguegarao City, at the time the deeds were allegedly signed by her, as
shown by a certification4from said hospital. The certification, dated February 6, 2004 and signed by Dr.
Alice Anghad, Medical Officer IV, attested that Marivinia has been confined at the Psychiatry Ward of
the Cagayan Valley Medical Center since May 3, 1999 after being diagnosed of "Substance Induced
Psychosis" and "Schizophrenia, Undifferentiated Type."

Complainant further alleges that the two deeds were not presented to any of them and they came to
know of their existence only recently. She further claims that the Community Tax Certificates5 (CTCs) in
her name and in the names of her mother and her sister Marivinia were procured only by the vendee
Shirley and not by them. Complainant submits the affidavit6 executed by Edwin Gawayon, Barangay
Treasurer of C-8, Claveria, Cagayan, on August 3, 2002, attesting that the CTCs were procured at the
instance of Shirley and were paid without the complainant and her co-heirs personally appearing before
him. Gawayon stated that the signatures and thumbmarks appearing on the CTCs are not genuine and
authentic because it can be seen with the naked eyes that the signatures are similar in all three CTCs.

Lastly, complainant alleges that the two deeds were used by respondent and Shirley to annul a
previously simulated deed of sale7 dated June 20, 1979 purportedly executed by Lope in favor of the
spouses Madki and Shirley Mipanga. Said deed was likewise a complete nullity because at that time
Shirley Mipanga was only sixteen years old and still single.

In his comment,8 respondent admits having prepared and notarized the two disputed Deeds of Extra-
Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Sale (subject deeds), but denies any irregularity in their execution.
He claims that the preparation and notarization of the subject deeds were made under the following
circumstances:
In the morning of September 15, 2001, complainant, Caridad, Virginia and Shirley Mipanga went to his
house and requested him to prepare a deed of sale of a residential lot located in Claveria, Cagayan. He
was informed by the parties that the agreed purchase price is ₱1,000,000 and was presented the
certificate of title to the property. Upon finding that the registered owner is "Lope Caalim, married to
Caridad Tabarrejos" and knowing that Lope already died sometime in the 1980s, he asked for, and was
given, the names and personal circumstances of Lope’s surviving children. He asked where Marivinia
was, but Caridad told him that Marivinia remained home as she was not feeling well. As Caridad assured
him that they will fetch Marivinia after the deed of conveyance is prepared, he proceeded to ask the
parties to present their CTCs. Caridad and Pacita, however, told him that they have not secured their
CTCs while Virginia forgot to bring hers. So he instructed them to get CTCs from Claveria.

An hour later, Caridad and Shirley came back with the CTCs of Caridad, Virginia, complainant and
Marivinia. After he finished typing the deed and the details of the CTCs, Caridad said that she will bring
the deed with her to Claveria for her daughters to sign. He then told them that it was necessary for him
to meet them all in one place for them to acknowledge the deed before him as notary public. It was
agreed upon that they will all meet at the house of the Mipangas between 11:00 a.m. and 12:00 noon
on that same day.

Respondent arrived at the Mipanga residence shortly before 12:00 noon. There he saw Shirley, Caridad,
complainant, Pacita and Marivinia with two other persons whom he later learned were the instrumental
witnesses to the execution of the document. Upon being informed that the parties have already affixed
their signatures on the deed, he examined the document then inquired from the heirs if the signatures
appearing therein were theirs and if they were truly selling the property for ₱1,000,000. The heirs
answered in the affirmative, thereby ratifying and acknowledging the instrument and its contents as
their own free and voluntary act and deed. Thus, he notarized the document and then gave the original
and two carbon copies to Shirley while leaving two in his possession.

Respondent adds that Shirley thereafter asked him what steps were needed to effect registration of the
deed and transfer of the title in her and her husband’s name. He replied that all the unpaid land taxes
should be paid including the capital gains tax, documentary stamp taxes and estate tax to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) which will then issue the necessary clearance for registration. When asked how
much taxes are payable, he replied that it depends on the assessment of the BIR examiner which will be
based on the zonal value or selling price stated in the deed of sale. He added that the estate taxes due,
with interests and surcharges, would also have to be paid. Since the consideration for the sale is
₱1,000,000, the taxes payable was quite enormous. Shirley asked him who between the vendor and the
vendee should pay the taxes, and he replied that under the law, it is the obligation of the vendors to pay
said taxes but it still depends upon the agreement of the parties. He asked if there was already an
agreement on the matter, but the parties replied in the negative.

Shirley then told the vendors that they should shoulder the payment of taxes. Caridad and her co-
vendors, however, refused and said that a big portion of the ₱1,000,000 paid to them was already used
by them to pay and settle their other obligations. Shirley then offered to pay one-half of whatever
amount the BIR will assess, but Caridad insisted that another document be prepared stating a reduced
selling price of only ₱250,000 so that they need not contribute to the payment of taxes since Shirley was
anyway already willing to pay one-half of the taxes based on the selling price stated in the first deed.
This resulted in a heated discussion between the parties, which was, however, later resolved by an
agreement to execute a second deed. The prospect of preparing an additional deed, however, irritated
respondent as it meant additional work for him. Thus, respondent went home.

Later, the parties visited respondent at his house and pleaded with him to prepare the second deed with
the reduced selling price. Moved by his humane and compassionate disposition, respondent gave in to
the parties’ plea.

In the presence of all the heirs, the vendees and the instrumental witnesses, respondent prepared and
notarized the second deed providing for the lower consideration of only ₱250,000. He used the same
document number, page number and book number in the notarial portion as the first deed because
according to him, the second deed was intended by the parties to supplant the first.

Respondent denies complainant’s assertions that the two deeds are simulated and falsified, averring
that as stated above, all the parties acknowledged the same before him. Likewise, he and his clients, the
spouses Madki and Shirley Mipanga, presented the subject deeds as exhibits in Civil Case No. 2761-S
also pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, of Sanchez Mira, Cagayan.

As to the allegation that Marivinia did not appear before him as she was allegedly under confinement at
the Cagayan Valley Medical Center on September 15, 2001, respondent cites a medical
certificate9stating that Marivinia was confined in said hospital from May 3, 1999 to August 10, 1999. He
also points out that Marivinia is one of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2836-S pending before the RTC,
Branch 12, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan, for the annulment of the subject deeds, and nothing in the complaint
states that she is mentally or physically incapacitated. Otherwise, her co-plaintiffs would have asked the
appointment of a guardian for her.

By Resolution10 dated August 10, 2005, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

In a Report and Recommendation11 dated May 3, 2007, Commissioner Jose Roderick F. Fernando found
respondent administratively liable on account of his indispensable participation in an act designed to
defraud the government. He recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
three months and that his notarial commission, if still existing, be revoked and that respondent be
prohibited from being commissioned as a notary public for two years.

According to Commissioner Fernando, respondent did not offer any tenable defense to justify his
actions. As a notary, it was his responsibility to ensure that the solemnities of the act of notarization
were followed. As a lawyer, it was likewise incumbent upon him that the document he drafted and
subsequently notarized was neither unlawful nor fraudulent. Commissioner Fernando ruled that
respondent failed on both counts since he drafted a document that reflected an untruthful
consideration that served to reduce unlawfully the tax due to the government. Then he completed the
act by likewise notarizing and thus converting the document into a public document.

On June 26, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved Commissioner Fernando’s report
and recommendation but imposed a higher penalty on respondent. Its Resolution No. XVII-2007-285
reads:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A;" and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent’s violation of Notarial Law and for his
participation to a transaction that effectively defrauded the government, Atty. Victoriano G. Pascua is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years and SUSPENSION of his Notarial
Commission for two (2) years with Warning that a similar violation in the future will be dealt with
severely.12

The above resolution is well taken.

By respondent’s own account of the circumstances surrounding the execution and notarization of the
subject deeds of sale, there is a clear basis for disciplining him as a member of the bar and as notary
public.

Respondent did not deny preparing and notarizing the subject deeds. He avers that the true
consideration for the transaction is ₱1,000,000 as allegedly agreed upon by the parties when they
appeared before him for the preparation of the first document as well as the notarization thereof. He
then claimed to have been "moved by his humane and compassionate disposition" when he acceded to
the parties’ plea that he prepare and notarize the second deed with a lower consideration of ₱250,000
in order to reduce the corresponding tax liability. However, as noted by Commissioner Fernando, the
two deeds were used by respondent and his client as evidence in a judicial proceeding (Civil Case No.
2671-S), which only meant that both documents still subsist and hence contrary to respondent’s
contention that the second deed reflecting a lower consideration was intended to supersede the first
deed.

As to the charge of falsification, the Court finds that the documents annexed to the present complaint
are insufficient for us to conclude that the subject deeds were indeed falsified and absolutely simulated.
We have previously ruled that a deed of sale that allegedly states a price lower than the true
consideration is nonetheless binding between the parties and their successors in interest.13
Complainant, however, firmly maintains that she and her co-heirs had no participation whatsoever in
the execution of the subject deeds. In any event, the issues of forgery, simulation and fraud raised by
the complainant in this proceeding apparently are still to be resolved in the pending suit filed by the
complainant and her co-heirs for annulment of the said documents (Civil Case No. 2836-S).

With his admission that he drafted and notarized another instrument that did not state the true
consideration of the sale so as to reduce the capital gains and other taxes due on the transaction,
respondent cannot escape liability for making an untruthful statement in a public document for an
unlawful purpose. As the second deed indicated an amount much lower than the actual price paid for
the property sold, respondent abetted in depriving the Government of the right to collect the correct
taxes due. His act clearly violated Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
reads:

CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Xxxx

Rule 1.02. – A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.
Not only did respondent assist the contracting parties in an activity aimed at defiance of the law, he
likewise displayed lack of respect for and made a mockery of the solemnity of the oath in an
Acknowledgment. By notarizing such illegal and fraudulent document, he is entitling it full faith and
credit upon its face, which it obviously does not deserve considering its nature and purpose.

In Gonzales v. Ramos,14 we elucidated on how important and sacrosanct the notarial act is:

By affixing his notarial seal on the instrument, the respondent converted the Deed of Absolute Sale,
from a private document into a public document. Such act is no empty gesture. The principal function of
a notary public is to authenticate documents. When a notary public certifies to the due execution and
delivery of a document under his hand and seal, he gives the document the force of evidence. Indeed,
one of the purposes of requiring documents to be acknowledged before a notary public, in addition to
the solemnity which should surround the execution and delivery of documents, is to authorize such
documents to be given without further proof of their execution and delivery. A notarial document is by
law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large
must be able to rely upon the acknowledgement executed before a notary public and appended to a
private instrument. Hence, a notary public must discharge his powers and duties, which are impressed
with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity.15

Moreover, while respondent’s duty as a notary public is principally to ascertain the identity of the affiant
and the voluntariness of the declaration, it is nevertheless incumbent upon him to guard against any
illegal or immoral arrangement or at least refrain from being a party to its consummation.16Rule IV,
Section 4 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice in fact proscribes notaries public from performing any
notarial act for transactions similar to the herein document of sale, to wit:

SEC. 4. Refusal to Notarize. – A notary public shall not perform any notarial act described in these Rules
for any person requesting such an act even if he tenders the appropriate fee specified by these Rules if:

(a) the notary knows or has good reason to believe that the notarial act or transaction is unlawful or
immoral;

xxxx

In this case, respondent proceeded to notarize the second deed despite knowledge of its illegal purpose.
His purported desire to accommodate the request of his client will not absolve respondent who, as a
member of the legal profession, should have stood his ground and not yielded to the importunings of his
clients. Respondent should have been more prudent and remained steadfast in his solemn oath not to
commit falsehood nor consent to the doing of any.17 As a lawyer, respondent is expected at all times to
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might
lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the integrity of the legal profession.18

Respondent also failed to comply with Section 2, Rule VI of the 2004Rules on Notarial Practice when he
gavethe second document the same document number, page number and book number as the first:

SEC. 2. Entries in the Notarial Register. – x x x

xxxx
(e) The notary public shall give to each instrument or document executed, sworn to, or acknowledged
before him a number corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also state on the instrument or
document the page/s of his register on which the same is recorded. No blank line shall be left between
entries.

Xxxx

Respondent admitted having given the second deed the same document number, page number and
book number as in the first deed, reasoning that the second deed was intended to supplant and cancel
the first deed. He therefore knowingly violated the above rule, in furtherance of his client’s intention of
concealing the actual purchase price so as to avoid paying the taxes rightly due to the Government.

Even assuming that the second deed was really intended to reflect the true agreement of the parties
and hence superseding the first deed they had executed, respondent remains liable under the afore-
cited Section 2(e) which requires that each instrument or document, executed, sworn to, or
acknowledged before the notary public shall be given a number corresponding to the one in his register.
Said rule is not concerned with the validity or efficacy of the document or instrument recorded but
merely to ensure the accuracy and integrity of the entries in the notarial register.

A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.19 Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds _herefore. – A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, of for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

Xxxx

In Gonzales, the notary public who notarized the document despite the non-appearance of one of the
signatories was meted the penalties of revocation of his notarial commission and disqualification from
re-appointment for two years. The notary in Gonzales was likewise suspended from the practice of law
for one year. Said penalty was in accord with the cases of Bon v. Ziga,20Serzo v. Flores,21Zaballero v.
Montalvan22 and Tabas v. Mangibin.23 The Court found that by notarizing the questioned deed, the
respondent in Gonzales engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.24

In the instant case, we hold that respondent should similarly be meted the penalty of suspension and
revocation of his notarial commission for having violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. In line
withcurrent jurisprudence, and as recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, the revocation of his
notarial commission and disqualification from re-appointment as notary public for two years is in order.

With respect, however, to his suspension from the practice of law, we hold that the one-year suspension
imposed in Gonzales and the other cases is not applicable considering that respondent not only failed to
faithfully comply with the rules on notarial practice, he also violated his oath when he prepared and
notarized the second deed for the purpose of avoiding the payment of correct amount of taxes, thus
abetting an activity aimed at defiance of the law. Under these circumstances, we find the two-year
suspension recommended by the IBP Board of Governors as proper and commensurate to the infraction
committed by respondent.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. VICTORIANO G. PASCUA is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of two (2) years. In addition, his present notarial commission, if any, is hereby REVOKED,
and he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as a notary public for a period of two (2) years. He is
further WARNED that any similar act or infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the Office of the Court
Administrator, as well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant, and
recorded in the personal records of the respondent.

SO ORDERED.
Adm. Case No. 1424 October 15, 1991

ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JOSE MONTALVO, JR., respondent.

PER CURIAM:

This is a complaint filed by Ismaela Dimagiba against Atty. Jose Montalvo for Malpractice, for stretching
to almost a half a century a litigation arising from the probate of a will of the late Benedicta de Los Reyes
which instituted Ismaela Dimagiba as the sole heir of all the properties.

The letter of the private complainant, Ismaela Dimagiba, received on January 15,1975 by the Supreme
Court, states:

xxx xxx xxx

The clients of Atty. Montalvo, namely: Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes, Luisa Reyes, Mariano Reyes,
Cesar Reyes, Leonor Reyes, filed a case against me with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in 1946 for
annulment of sale and was docketed as Civil Case No. 108 of said Court. This case was terminated
annulling the sale, as per decision in 1954 in G.R. No. L-5618 and L-5620.

On January 19, 1955, 1 filed a case for Probate of Will with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
regarding the same property subject of the annulment of sale and was docketed with the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan as Sp. Proc. No. 831-M. Luckily, the said case was terminated on June 20, 1958,
probating the said will. The oppositors in this case who are the same persons mentioned above
appealed this case to the Higher Court of the Philippines and was decided by the Hon. Supreme Court of
the Philippines on October 12, 1967 in G.R. No. L-23638 and L-23662, affirming the decision of the Lower
Court;

That after the decision of the above-mentioned case was promulgated, the same parties filed on June 5,
1968 Civil Case No. 3677-M with the CFI of Bulacan for annulment of will; this case was filed through
their counsel, Atty. Gregorio Centeno.

Said case was dismissed by the Court on February 11, 1970 without pronouncement of costs;

That on August 13,1971, again, the clients of Atty. Montalvo filed Civil Case No. 4078 with the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan for annulment of the said will; this case was again dismissed by the Court on
December 21, 1971;

That on April 22, 1972, again the same parties, through their counsel Atty. Montalvo, filed another case
with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, allegedly for Partition of the same property mentioned in the
probate of will which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4151. This case was again dismissed by the Court in
its Order dated October 11, 1972;

That on May 25, 1972, still another case was filed by the same parties, through Atty. Montalvo, for
specific performance, with the CFI of Bulacan and was docketed as Civil Case No. 4188-M. This case was
again dismissed by the Court in its Order dated October 24,1973. On August 12, 1974, the said case was
remanded to the Court of Appeals, Manila, by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan;

Still on April 5, 1974, I was again surprised to know that there was another case filed by the same
persons mentioned above through Atty. Montalvo with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan and was
docketed as Civil Case No. 4458. This case is still pending before said court.

In view of the numerous cases filed against me by the same parties, through their counsel, Atty.
Montalvo, I am constrained to report to that [sic] Honorable Court of the actuation of said lawyer who is
a member of the Philippine Bar attending to cases of non suit, which cause harassment on may part.

The parties in this case are the ones in possession of the property Subject of Sp. Proc. No. 831 of the CFI,
Bulacan. They can not be ejected from the land holdings because they claim that the case filed by Atty.
Montalvo is still pending in Court.

In all the foregoing [sic] I respectfully submit to this Honorable Court for appropriate action.

xxx xxx xxx 1

In the Resolution of the Second Division of the Supreme Court dated January 27, 1975, the respondent
Montalvo was required to file an Answer within ten days from notice. 2

In his Answer dated March 3, 1975, Montalvo, claims that the case filed against the complainant were
done.

xxx xxx xxx

at the instance of different parties; or by reason of different causes of action and all the pleadings filed
by the undersigned were and/or the result of a very painstaking, diligent, and careful study and
evaluation of the facts and law involved therein such that even before signing the same, the
undersigned has always been of the honest and sincere belief that its filing is for the interest of justice
— certainly never for harassment; (2) that the reason why the parties tenant could not be ejected from
their land as stated by complainant in her complaint is because of the passage of Presidential Decree
No. 27 which emancipated the farmers from their bondage and declared them as owners of the rice and
corn land they tilled upon the passage of the decree coupled with the very acts of the complainant
herself; and that (3) the complainant by filing this instant complaint for disbarment wants to cow and
intimidate the undersigned in order to withdraw as counsel of his clients because she has been thwarted
in her erroneous belief that she owns exclusively all the properties comprising the estate of the late
Benedicta de Los Reyes and could not accept and take into account the reality that by virtue of the final
decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 5618 and 5620 she is not the sole owner of the present estate
of the deceased but only a co-owner with the clients of the undersigned. 3

In addition, Montalvo stated that it was Dimagiba who refused to be bound by the Supreme Court
Decision in G.R. Nos. 5618 and 5620. 4

As a Rejoinder to the Respondent's Answer, the complainant Dimagiba stated that in Civil Case No.
3677-M, the plaintiffs are the same parties-oppositors who opposed the petition for probate of the Last
Will and Testament of the deceased Benedicta De Los Reyes in Special Proceeding No. 831. The same
case was dismissed by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan on the ground that the issue raised had
been decided by the Court. 5

Likewise Civil Case No. 4078-M was also dismissed by Branch 2 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
presided by Judge Ricardo C. Pronove, Jr., in the order of August 24, 1973 on the ground of res judicata.

xxx xxx xxx

But a closer analysis [sic) it is clear that this action is merely a rehash of the other cases previously
litigated between the plaintiffs and the defendant and already settled by final judgment. 6

In fact, in that case, Atty. Jose Montalvo, Jr., included himself as one of the defendants.

xxx xxx xxx

Finally, the fact that plaintiffs counsel, Jose Montalvo, Jr., had decided to join cause with the other
plaintiffs in this case does no mean that there is no Identity of parties between this case and Civil Case
No. 3677-M. Atty. Jose Montalvo, Jr., is not alleged to be are party in interest in this case so that Ills
inclusion herein as a p plaintiff can not produce any legal significance. 7

This notwithstanding, Montalvo filed another case against Dimagiba which was docketed as Civil Case
No. 4458-M of the CFI Bulacan where the plaintiffs and causes of action were again the same as 3677-M
and 4188-M. Again, the CFI Bulacan dismissed the cases.

On April 16, 1975, the Second Division, following the procedure then obtaining for the resolution of
disciplinary case against lawyers, referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report, and
recommendation. 8

It was only on May 4,1990, or almost fifteen years later, that the entire records of Adm. Case No. 1424
involving Ismaela Dimagiba versus Atty. Jose Montalvo was returned to the Clear of Court of the
Supreme Court by the Office of the Solicitor General through Solicitor Aurora P. Cortes.

In summary, the following are the litigations that ensue from the probate of the Will of De Los Reyes as
found by the Solicitor General involving the same parties and the same cause of action:

1. Special Proceedings No. 831 instituted on January 1 1955. The Will was admitted to probate but was
subsequently appealed.

2. CA-G.R. No. 31221-R. This was an appeal of the decision in Spec. Proc. No. 831. The decision
was affirmed.

3. G.R. Nos. L-23638 and L-23662. This decision dated October 12, 1967, in the Supreme Court,
upheld the decision CA-G.R. No. 31221-R, in effect, affirming the due execution the Will and the capacity
of the Testator as well as the institution of the complainant.

4. Civil Case No. 3677-M. Filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan on June 4, 1968, this was a
petition for the nullification of the Will. This was dismissed.
5. Civil Case No. 200 which was redocketed as Civil Case No. 4078-M. This complaint dated
November 3, 1970 was again dismissed.

6. Civil Case No. 4151-M. This case, filed on February l6, 1972, for the partition of the property
left by the deceased Benedicta De los Reyes on the ground of the nullity of the Will, was again dismissed
for failure to prosecute.

7. Civil Case No. 4188-M. Filed on May 25,1972, with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
Branch 2, the respondent Atty. Montalvo, Jr., joined the descendants of the collateral relatives of the
deceased De Los Reyes against herein complainant Dimagiba. This case was dismissed.

8. Civil Case No. 4458-M. Civil Case No. 4188-M was appealed. But without waiting for the
outcome, Atty. Montalvo, Jr., filed Civil Case No. 4458-M on April 5, 1974 which was a complaint for the
cancellation of the transfer certificates of title in the name of Ismaela Dimagiba and the issuance of new
certificates of title in the name of the late Benedicta de los Reyes.

Clearly, the respondent Montalvo, Jr. repetitively filed several complaints in various forms involving the
same parties and the same subject matter, persistently raising issues long laid to rest by final judgment.

This misbehavior in facie curia consisting of a stubborn refusal to accept this Court's pronouncements is
in fact even summarily punishable under Rule 71, Suction 1 of the Rules of Court. 9

Any lawyer who assumes the responsibility for a client' cause has the duty to know the entire history of
a case, specially if any litigation has commenced. In the case at bar, even Atty. Montalvo does not deny
the fact that the probate of the will o the late Benedicta de los Reyes has been an over-extended an
contentious litigation between the heirs.

A lawyer should never take advantage of the seemingly end less channels left dangling by our legal
system in order wangle the attention of the court. Atty. Montalvo may have thought that lie could get
away with his indiscriminate filing o suits that were clearly intended to harass Ismaela Dimagiba When
court dockets get clogged and the administration of justice is delayed, our judicial system may not be
entirely blame less, yet the greater fault lies in the lawyers who had take their privilege so lightly, and in
such mindless fashion.

The Code of Professional Responsibility states that:

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.03 — A lawyer shall not for any corrupt motive or interest encourage any suit or proceeding or
delay any man's cause.

On the basis of the foregoing, we find him guilty of malpractice as charged. He has violated his oath not
to delay any ma for money or malice, besmirched the name of an honorable profession, and has proven
himself unworthy of the trust repose in him by law as an officer of the Court. We have not
countenanced other less significant infractions among the ranks of our lawyers. He deserves the
severest punishment of DISBARMENT.
WHEREFORE on the basis of the foregoing, and consisted with the urgent need to maintain the high
traditions an standards of the legal profession and to preserve undiminished public faith in attorneys-at-
law, the Court Resolved to DISBAR the respondent Atty. Jose Montalvo, Jr. from the practice law. His
name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

Copies of this Resolution shall be circulated to all courts of the country and entered in the personal
record of respondent Atty. Jose Montalvo, Jr.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 3056 August 16, 1991

FERNANDO T. COLLANTES, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. VICENTE C. RENOMERON respondent.

PER CURIAM:p

This complaint for disbarment is related to the administrative case which complainant Attorney
Fernando T. Collantes, house counsel for V & G Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V & G for short), filed
against Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron, Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, for the latter's irregular
actuations with regard to the application of V & G for registration of 163 pro forma Deeds of Absolute
Sale with Assignment of lots in its subdivision. The present complaint charges the respondent with the
following offenses:

1. Neglecting or refusing inspite (sic) repeated requests and without sufficient justification, to act
within reasonable time (sic) the registration of 163 Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment and the
eventual issuance and transfer of the corresponding 163 transfer certificates of titles to the GSIS, for the
purpose of obtaining some pecuniary or material benefit from the person or persons interested therein.

2. Conduct unbecoming of public official.

3. Dishonesty.

4. Extortion.

5. Directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with pending official
transaction before him.

6. Causing undue injury to a party, the GSIS [or] Government through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.

7. Gross ignorance of the law and procedure. (p. 10, Rollo.)

As early as January 15, 1987, V & G had requested the respondent Register of Deeds to register some
163 deeds of sale with assignment (in favor of the GSIS) of lots of the V & G mortgaged to GSIS by the lot
buyers. There was no action from the respondent.

Another request was made on February 16, 1987 for him to approve or deny registration of the uniform
deeds of absolute sale with assignment. Still no action except to require V & G to submit proof of real
estate tax payment and to clarify certain details about the transactions.

Although V & G complied with the desired requirements, respondent Renomeron suspended the
registration of the documents pending compliance by V & G with a certain "special arrangement"
between them, which was that V & G should provide him with a weekly round trip ticket from Tacloban
to Manila plus P2,000.00 as pocket money per trip, or, in lieu thereof, the sale of respondent's Quezon
City house and lot by V & G or GSIS representatives.

On May 19, 1987, respondent confided to the complainant that he would act favorably on the 163
registrable documents of V & G if the latter would execute clarificatory affidavits and send money for a
round trip plane ticket for him.

The plane fare amounting to P800 (without the pocket money of P2,000) was sent to respondent
through his niece.

Because of V & G's failure to give him pocket money in addition to plane fare, respondent imposed
additional registration requirements. Fed up with the respondent's extortionate tactics, the complainant
wrote him a letter on May 20, 1987 challenging him to act on all pending applications for registration of
V & G within twenty-four (24) hours.

On May 22, 1987, respondent formally denied registration of the transfer of 163 certificates of title to
the GSIS on the uniform ground that the deeds of absolute sale with assignment were ambiguous as to
parties and subject matter. On May 26, 1987, Attorney Collantes moved for a reconsideration of said
denial, stressing that:

... since the year 1973 continuously up to December 1986 for a period of nearly fifteen (15) years or for
a sum total of more than 2,000 same set of documents which have been repeatedly and uniformly
registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City under Attys. Modesto Garcia and Pablo
Amascual Jr., it is only during the incumbency of Atty. Vicente C. Renomeron, that the very same
documents of the same tenor have been refused or denied registration ... (p. 15, Rollo.)

On May 27, 1987, respondent elevated the matter en consulta to the Administrator, National Land Titles
and Deeds Registration Administration (NLTDRA) (now the Land Registration Authority [LRA]). In a
Resolution dated July 27,1987 (Consulta No. 1579), the NLTDRA ruled that the questioned documents
were registrable. Heedless of the NLTDRA's opinion, respondent continued to sit on V & Gs 163 deeds of
sale with assignment.

Exasperated by respondent's conduct, the complainant filed with the NLTDRA on June 4, 1987
administrative charges (docketed as Adm. Case No. 87-15), against respondent Register of Deeds.

Upon receipt of the charges, NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio directed respondent to explain
in writing why no administrative disciplinary action should be taken against him. Respondent was
further asked whether he would submit his case on the basis of his answer, or be heard in a formal
investigation.

In his answer dated July 9, 1987, respondent denied the charges of extortion and of directly receiving
pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with the official transactions awaiting his action.

Although an investigator was appointed by NLTDRA Administrator Bonifacio to hear Attorney Collantes'
charges against him, Attorney Renomeron waived his right to a formal investigation. Both parties
submitted the case for resolution based on the pleadings.
The investigator, Attorney Leonardo Da Jose, recommended dropping the charges of: (1) dishonesty; (2)
causing undue injury to a party through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; and (3) gross ignorance of the law and procedure. He opined that the charge of neglecting or
refusing, in spite repeated requests and without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time
on the registration of the documents involved, in order to extort some pecuniary or material benefit
from the interested party, absorbed the charges of conduct unbecoming of a public official, extortion,
and directly receiving some pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with pending official
transactions before him.

Brushing aside the investigator's recommendation, NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio on

February 22, 1988, recommended to Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez that the respondent: (1) be
found guilty of simple neglect of duty: (2) be reprimanded to act with dispatch on documents presented
to him for registration; and (3) be warned that a repetition of similar infraction will be dealt with more
severely.

After due investigation of the charges, Secretary Ordoñez found respondent guilty of grave misconduct.

Our study and consideration of the records of the case indicate that ample evidence supports the
Investigating Officer's findings that the respondent committed grave misconduct.

The respondent unreasonably delayed action on the documents presented to him for registration and,
notwithstanding representations by the parties interested for expeditious action on the said documents,
he continued with his inaction.

The records indicate that the respondent eventually formally denied the registration of the documents
involved; that he himself elevated the question on the registrability of the said documents to
Administrator Bonifacio after he formally denied the registration thereof, that the Administrator then
resolved in favor of the registrability of the said documents in question; and that, such resolution of the
Administrator notwithstanding, the respondent still refused the registration thereof but demanded from
the parties interested the submission of additional requirements not adverted to in his previous denial.

xxx xxx xxx

In relation to the alleged 'special arrangement,' although the respondent claims that he neither touched
nor received the money sent to him, on record remains uncontroverted the circumstance that his niece,
Ms. de la Cruz, retrieved from him the amount of P800.00 earlier sent to him as plane fare, not in the
original denomination of P100.00 bills but in P50.00 bills. The respondent had ample opportunity to
clarify or to countervail this related incident in his letter dated 5 September 1987 to Administrator
Bonifacio but he never did so.

... We believe that, in this case, the respondent's being new in office cannot serve to mitigate his
liability. His being so should have motivated him to be more aware of applicable laws, rules and
regulations and should have prompted him to do his best in the discharge of his duties. (pp. 17-18,
Rollo.)

Secretary Ordoñez recommended to President Corazon C. Aquino that Renomeron be dismissed from
the service, with forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and with prejudice to re-
employment in the government service, effective immediately.
As recommended by the Secretary of Justice, the President of the Philippines, by Adm. Order No. 165
dated May 3, 1990, dismissed the respondent from the government service (pp. 1419, Rollo).

Less than two weeks after filing his complaint against Renomeron in the NLTDRA, Attorney Collantes
also filed in this Court on June 16, 1987, a disbarment complaint against said respondent.

The issue in this disbarment proceeding is whether the respondent register of deeds, as a lawyer, may
also be disciplined by this Court for his malfeasances as a public official. The answer is yes, for his
misconduct as a public official also constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer.

The lawyer's oath (Rule 138, Section 17, Rules of Court; People vs. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968), imposes upon
every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer's oath is a source of his
obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action (Legal
Ethics, Ruben E. Agpalo, 1983 Edition, pp. 66-67).

As the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said:

A person takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar which is designed to impress upon him his
responsibilities. He thereby becomes an "officer of the court" on whose shoulders rests the grave
responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper. fair, speedy, and efficient administration of justice. As
an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that demands that in his every exertion the only
criterion he that truth and justice triumph. This discipline is what as given the law profession its nobility,
its prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected those
qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty, and the strictest
observance of fiduciary responsibility— all of which, throughout the centuries, have been
compendiously described as moral character.

Membership in the Bar is in the category of a mandate to public service of the highest order.1âwphi1 A
lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of
law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest of truth and justice, for which
he has sworn to be a fearless crusader. (Apostacy in the Legal Profession, 64 SCRA 784, 789- 790;
emphasis supplied.)

The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in government service in the discharge of
their official tasks (Canon 6). Just as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
requires public officials and employees to process documents and papers expeditiously (Sec. 5, subpars.
[c] and [d] and prohibits them from directly or indirectly having a financial or material interest in any
transaction requiring the approval of their office, and likewise bars them from soliciting gifts or anything
of monetary value in the course of any transaction which may be affected by the functions of their office
(See. 7, subpars. [a] and [d]), the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids a lawyer to engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), or
delay any man's cause "for any corrupt motive or interest" (Rule 103).

A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
(Rule 7.03, Code of Professional Responsibility.)
This Court has ordered that only those who are "competent, honorable, and reliable" may practice the
profession of law (Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293) for every lawyer must pursue "only the highest
standards in the practice of his calling" (Court Administrator vs. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269, 278).

The acts of dishonesty and oppression which Attorney Renomeron committed as a public official have
demonstrated his unfitness to practice the high and noble calling of the law (Bautista vs. Judge
Guevarra, 142 SCRA 632; Court Administrator vs. Rodolfo G. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269). He should
therefore be disbarred.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron be disbarred from the practice of
law in the Philippines, and that his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-35113 March 25, 1975

EUGENIO CUARESMA, petitioner,

vs.
MARCELO DAQUIS, PHHC, CESAR NAVARRO, NICANOR GUEVARRA, Sheriff of Quezon City or his Deputy
and JUDGE PACIFICO P. DE CASTRO, respondents. ATTORNEY MACARIO O. DIRECTO, respondent.

RESOLUTION

FERNANDO, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1

The predicament in which respondent Macario O. Directo, a member of the Philippine bar, now finds
himself is one of his own making. In a petition for certiorari filed with this Court on behalf of one
Eugenio Cuaresma, he included the following categorical allegations: "4. That your petitioner has no
knowledge of the existence of said case (Civil Case No. 12176, CFI of Rizal, Quezon City Branch)
aforecited between the respondents Marcelo Daquis, PHHC, and Cesar Navarro, and wherein the
respondent Judge, [gave] due course to the complaint, and the subject matter in litigation; 5. That on
May 26, 1972, the respondent Judge issued an order of demolition, ordering the respondent Sheriff of
Quezon City or his deputy to demolish the house of your petitioner etc., and on the same day May 26,
1972, the Sheriff of Quezon City through his deputy [gave] three (3) days to your petitioner to remove
his house or face demolition, ... ;6 ... 7. That your petitioner was not given a day in court to present his
side of the case, in violation of law, and of the dictum of due process of the constitution, ... "1
Thereafter, after receipt of the comments of respondents, it turned out, as set forth in a resolution of
this Court of August 4, 1972, "that petitioner was fully aware of the existence of said civil case because
on December 14, 1971 Atty. Macario Directo, as counsel of petitioner, addressed to respondent Marcelo
Daquis a letter which indicates that both counsel and petitioner were aware of the existence of the case.
It also appears that, before respondents Marcelo Daquis and Cesar Navarro filed a motion for a writ of
Possession in Civil Case No. Q-12176, petitioner Eugenio Cuaresma, along with the other occupants of
the lot in question, was given thirty (30) days notice to vacate the premises which period was even
extended for another thirty (30) days, but that, despite that notice, petitioner Eugenio Cuaresma
refused to vacate the lot involved in the case. It further appears that on May 3, 1972, Atty. Macario
Directo, as counsel for petitioner, filed a motion for intervention in the aforementioned Civil Case No. Q-
12176; and on May 13, 1972, same counsel filed a motion to quash or recall the writ of execution, and
an opposition to the issuance of a writ of demolition. On May 22, 1972, respondent Judge Pacifico de
Castro issued an order denying the motion to intervene as well as the motion to quash or recall the writ
of execution."2 It was then set forth in such resolution that there was no truth to the allegation that on
May 27, 1972, the date of the filing of the petition for certiorari in the present case, petitioner had no
knowledge of the existence of Civil Case No. 12176.

Respondent Macario O. Directo was then given ten days to show cause why no disciplinary action should
be taken against him for deliberately making false allegations in such petition. Thereafter, on August 16,
1972, came a pleading which he entitled Compliance. This is his explanation: "What your petitioner
honestly meant when he alleged that he [has] no knowledge of the existence of said Civil Case No.
12176, CFI of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, was from the time the plaintiff Marcelo Daquis instituted the
said case in June 1968 up to and after the time the Court issued the decision in the year 1970. The
plaintiff Marcelo Daquis entered into a conditional contract of sale of the lot involved in said Civil Case
No. 12176 with the PHHC. There were four (4) purchasers, the plaintiff, two others, and your petitioner.
Because of the requirement of the PHHC that only one of them should enter into the contract, Marcelo
Daquis was chosen by the others to enter into the same. Since this was a sale on installment basis, by
agreement of all the purchasers, duly acknowledged by the PHHC, the monthly dues of the petitioner
and the two others, were remitted to Marcelo Daquis, who in turn remits the same to the PHHC. In June
1968 plaintiff Marcelo Daquis instituted Civil Case No. 12176 in the CFI of Quezon City. From June 1968
up to the time and after the decision was issued by the court, plaintiff Marcelo Daquis never informed
your petitioner of the said case."3 He reiterated in a later paragraph that all he wanted to convey was
that his knowledge of the aforesaid civil case came only after the decision was issued. He closed his
Compliance with the plea that if there were any mistake committed, "it had been an honest one, and
would say in all sincerity that there was no deliberate attempt and intent on his part of misleading this
Honorable Court, honestly and totally unaware of any false allegation in the petition."4

The above explanation lends itself to the suspicion that it was a mere afterthought. It could very well be
that after his attention was called to the misstatements in his petition, he decided on such a version as a
way out. That is more than a bare possibility. There is the assumption though of good faith. That is in his
favor. Moreover, judging from the awkwardly worded petition and even his compliance quite indicative
of either carelessness or lack of proficiency in the handling of the English language, it is not
unreasonable to assume that his deficiency in the mode of expression contributed to the inaccuracy of
his statements. While a mere disclaimer of intent certainly cannot exculpate him, still, in the spirit of
charity and forbearance, a penalty of reprimand would suffice. At least, it would serve to impress on
respondent that in the future he should be much more careful in the preparation of his pleadings so that
the least doubt as to his intellectual honesty cannot be entertained. Every member of the bar should
realize that candor in the dealings with the Court is of the very essence of honorable membership in the
profession.

WHEREFORE, Attorney Macario O. Directo is reprimanded. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on his
record.

Barredo, Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.1äwphï1.ñët

A.C. No. 6353 February 27, 2006

SPOUSES DAVID and MARISA WILLIAMS, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. RUDY T. ENRIQUEZ, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Atty. Rudy T. Enriquez stands charged with "unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful acts in violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics, and with conduct
unbecoming an attorney." The charges are contained in the Joint Complaint-Affidavit for Disbarment1
filed by the spouses David W. Williams and Marisa B. Williams.

It appears that respondent is the counsel of record of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 134432 pending
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Dumaguete City where complainants are the defendants.
According to the complainant-spouses, Marisa Williams bought the lot subject of the controversy. A
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was then issued in her favor, stating that she is "Filipino, married to
David W. Williams, an American citizen."3 On January 8, 2004, respondent charged her with falsification
of public documents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dumaguete City. The complaint was
docketed as I.S. No. 2004-34.4

The spouses Williams further alleged, thus:

21. That, in malicious violation of the rules governing the practice of law, Attorney Rudy T. Enriquez
cited outdated material in his complaint-affidavit (Annex A-1) and in his comments to counter-affidavit
(Annex A-2). He then knowingly applied this stale law in a perverse fashion to argue that Marisa Batacan
Williams automatically lost her Filipino citizenship when she married an American, and was thus
prohibited to own land in the Philippines, thereby making her guilty of falsification in the Deed she
executed to buy property in Negros Oriental.

22. That in paragraph #1 of her counter-affidavit (Annex A-2) Marisa cites Article IV, Section 4 of the
1987 Constitution, which provides that she would not lose her citizenship when she married an
American unless she renounced it in a specific act.

23. That, in reply, Attorney Enriquez, quotes more outdated law, declaring that her "act of marrying" her
husband was equivalent to renouncing her citizenship. He also doggedly attempts to show that the 1987
Constitution supports his position, not Marisa’s (Annex A-4).5

Complainants pointed out that the respondent is a retired judge, who knows that the false charge (that
Marisa Williams is an American) "will not prevail in the end."6

In his "Comments by Way of Motion to Dismiss,"7 respondent enumerated matters which to his mind
were evidence of the acts of falsification of complainant Marisa Williams. He insisted that the complaint
for disbarment was a mere tactic to divert attention from the criminal charges against the complainants,
and that the charges against him were bereft of any factual basis.

On December 1, 2004, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.8 Forthwith, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline scheduled
the case for mandatory conference/hearing. However, only the respondent appeared. The parties were
then directed to submit their verified position papers.

In their Position Paper, complainants claimed that respondent had maliciously and knowingly filed
fabricated cases against them and that his acts were forms of attempted extortion. They also adopted
their joint complaint-affidavit by way of incorporation, along with their other pleadings.

For his part, respondent maintained that complainant Marisa Williams was no longer a citizen of the
Republic of the Philippines as a result of her marriage to David Williams.

In her Report and Recommendation dated June 10, 1995, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala ruled
that respondent was guilty of gross ignorance of the law and should be suspended for six (6) months.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline adopted the foregoing recommendation in its Resolution No. XVII-
2005-114 dated October 22, 2005, with the modification that respondent be "reprimanded, with a
warning and advice to study each and every opinion he may give to his clients."

The Court agrees that respondent is administratively liable for his actuations. As found by the
Investigating Commissioner:

There is no evidence shown by respondent that complainant Marisa Bacatan-Williams has renounced
her Filipino citizenship except her Certificate of Marriage, which does not show that she has
automatically acquired her husband’s citizenship upon her marriage to him. The cases cited by
respondent are not applicable in this case as it is clear that they refer to aliens acquiring lands in the
Philippines.

The Bar has been integrated for the attainment of the following objectives: (a) elevate the standards of
the legal profession, (b) improve the administration of justice, and (c) to enable the bar to discharge its
public responsibility more effectively (In re: Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, 49 SCRA 22). In line
with these objectives of the Integrated Bar, lawyers must keep themselves abreast of legal
developments. To do this, the lawyer must walk with the dynamic movements of the law and
jurisprudence. He must acquaint himself at least with the newly promulgated laws, the recent decisions
of the Supreme Court and of the significant decisions of the Court of Appeals. There are other executive
orders, administrative circulars, regulations and other rules promulgated by other competent
authorities engaged in the administration of justice. The lawyer’s life is one of continuous and laborious
study, otherwise, his skill and knowledge of the law and related disciplines will lag behind and become
obscure due to obsoleteness (Canon 5, Code of Professional Responsibility.)9

As pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
requires that a lawyer be updated in the latest laws and jurisprudence.10 Indeed, when the law is so
elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.11
As a retired judge, respondent should have known that it is his duty to keep himself well-informed of the
latest rulings of the Court on the issues and legal problems confronting a client.12 In this case, the law
he apparently misconstrued is no less than the Constitution,13 the most basic law of the land.14 Implicit
in a lawyer’s mandate to protect a client’s interest to the best of his/her ability and with utmost
diligence is the duty to keep abreast of the law and legal developments, and participate in continuing
legal education programs.15 Thus, in championing the interest of clients and defending cases, a lawyer
must not only be guided by the strict standards imposed by the lawyer’s oath, but should likewise
espouse legally sound arguments for clients, lest the latter’s cause be dismissed on a technical
ground.16 Ignorance encompasses both substantive and procedural laws.17 lavvph!1.net

We find too harsh the recommended penalty of the Investigating Commissioner. It must be stressed that
the power to disbar or suspend must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct
that seriously affects the standing and character of a lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of
the bar will disbarment or suspension be imposed as a penalty.18 Pursuant to the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline’s Guidelines for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions,19 and considering further that this is
respondent’s first infraction, we find that the penalty of reprimand as recommended by the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline, will suffice.

We likewise note that in their pleadings in this case, the parties repeatedly invoked their arguments in
their pending cases below. Thus, we find it unnecessary to rule over such arguments, which have yet to
be determined on the merits in the courts a quo.

WHEREFORE, for gross ignorance of the law, Atty. Rudy T. Enriquez is REPRIMANDED and ADVISED to
carefully study the opinions he may give to his clients. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a
similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 9684, September 18, 2013 - MARY ROSE A. BOTO, Complainant, v. SENIOR ASSISTANT CITY
PROSECUTOR VINCENT L. VILLENA, CITY PROSECUTOR ARCHIMEDES V. MANABAT AND ASSISTANT CITY
PROSECUTOR PATRICK NOEL P. DE DIOS, Respondents.:
A.C. No. 9684, September 18, 2013 - MARY ROSE A. BOTO, Complainant, v. SENIOR ASSISTANT CITY
PROSECUTOR VINCENT L. VILLENA, CITY PROSECUTOR ARCHIMEDES V. MANABAT AND ASSISTANT CITY
PROSECUTOR PATRICK NOEL P. DE DIOS, Respondents.
PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 9684, September 18, 2013

MARY ROSE A. BOTO, Complainant, v. SENIOR ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR VINCENT L. VILLENA, CITY
PROSECUTOR ARCHIMEDES V. MANABAT AND ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR PATRICK NOEL P. DE DIOS,
Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This administrative matter stemmed from an information for Libel against complainant Mary Rose A.
Boto (Boto) filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch LXXIV, Taguig City (MeTC). The information
was prepared by Assistant City Prosecutor Patrick Noel P. De Dios (De Dios), the investigating
prosecutor; and approved by City Prosecutor Archimedes Manabat (Manabat). Senior Assistant City
Prosecutor Vincent Villena (Villena) was the trial prosecutor assigned to Branch LXXIV.

In her Complaint-Affidavit,1 Boto charged respondents Villena, Manabat and De Dios with gross
ignorance of the law for filing the information for libel before the MeTC and for opposing the motion to
quash despite the knowledge that the said first level court had no jurisdiction over the case.

Boto alleged that on January 13, 2012, the Information2 charging her with libel was filed before the
MeTC; that on the same day, the MeTC issued a warrant for her arrest;3 that on January 25, 2012, she
posted bail4 and was informed that the arraignment and trial were scheduled on February 13, 2012;
that before the scheduled arraignment, she filed the Motion to Quash5 the information on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction as the crime of libel falls within, the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) and not with the MeTC and that there was no crime as internet libel; that acting thereon,
the MeTC, instead of dismissing the case, issued the Order6 requiring the trial prosecutor to file his
comment within ten (10) days and resetting the arraignment to April 13, 2012; that despite the lapse of
the period granted, Villena failed to file the required comment within the period prompting the MeTC to
extend the filing of the same and reset the hearing on June 27, 2012, thereby, delaying the process by
five (5) months; that the delay violated her constitutional right to a speedy trial; and that in his
Comment7 filed before the MeTC, Villena opposed the motion to quash and contended that "the court
had already determined probable cause when it issued the warrant of arrest, thus, it has effectively
mooted the resolution of any issue concerning jurisdiction, venue and sufficiency of evidence against
the complainant."8cralawlibrary

Boto further averred that she had previously filed a libel case against one George Tizon (Tizon) and
others, but the said case was dismissed by Villena without conducting an investigation; that Tizon was
the Administrative Officer V of the Department of Education Division, Taguig City, and the "godson" of
Hon. Senator Allan Peter Cayetano, spouse of Taguig City Mayor, Lani Cayetano; that she received the
resolution of the case only in January 2012 after the period to appeal had lapsed; that, however, when
Tizon filed a complaint for libel against her, his complaint was immediately acted upon by the Taguig
City prosecutors; and that so much interest was shown in the case, from its filing to the issuance of the
warrant of arrest on the same day the case was filed before the MeTC.

Boto added that Manabat, De Dios, and Villena had all been practicing law for quite a number of years
and it would be impossible for them not to know that the crime of libel falls within the jurisdiction of the
RTC. She asserted that the respondents were all ignorant of the law, whose incompetence was a
disgrace not only to the Department of Justice but to the legal profession as a whole.

The records further disclose that on October 17, 2012, the Information was properly filed with the RTC,
Taguig City.9cralawlibrary

On December 12, 2012, the Court issued the Resolution10 requiring the respondents to file their
comment within ten (10) days from receipt thereof.

Positions of the Respondents

Being not similarly situated, the respondents filed their separate comments. In his Comment,11 De Dios,
the investigating prosecutor, averred that the information for libel against complainant was filed before
the MeTC due to inadvertence and that no malice or gross ignorance of the law attended it. He added
that the information was later on filed with the RTC-Pasig, Branch 266, docketed as Criminal Case No.
149408, after the case filed before the MeTC was quashed.

In his separate Comment,12 Manabat, the City Prosecutor who approved the Information, stated that
the libel was filed based on the uncontroverted evidence of the complainant therein; that the
information, however, was filed inadvertently with the MeTC; that there was no ignorance of the law or
malice involved as they had previously filed cases of libel with the RTC; that the inadvertent filing was
already corrected when the information was later on filed with the RTC; and that after the filing of the
information with the RTC, the said court issued an order finding that probable cause existed to hold
Boto for trial.

The trial prosecutor, Villena, in his Comment,13 countered that the filing of the information was not
within his discretion as he was not the investigating prosecutor and that it was not his duty to review
the resolution of the investigating prosecutor as he had no authority to approve or disapprove an
information or its filing in court. His participation commenced only after it was filed with the MeTC. He
averred that the "Supreme Court had been very clear that once the information was filed in court, what
to do with it is solely the court's prerogative and discretion. No one else can impose on the court, not
even the Secretary of Justice much more this respondent."14 Thus, he could not be expected to call the
court's attention that it erred in taking cognizance of the case. He could not be charged with gross
ignorance of the law since he was not the person whose judgment was called on to decide on whether
or not the court had jurisdiction.

On the libel case filed by Boto against one Tizon, he denied being biased when he dismissed it. He
claimed that in his ten (10) years as a practicing lawyer, he had been conscientious and judicious in all
his actions:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Court's Ruling

The Court finds that Boto has valid reasons to file this complaint against the respondents who, being
prosecutors, are members of the bar and officers of the court.

Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) explicitly provides that jurisdiction over libel cases are
lodged with the RTC. The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations shall be
filed simultaneously or separately with the RTC of the province or city where the libelous article is
printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense. Jurisprudence is replete with decisions on the exclusive jurisdiction of the
RTC to hear and try libel cases. In fact, the language of the law cannot be any clearer; its meaning is free
from doubt. All that is required is application.15cralawlibrary

De Dios candidly admitted that inadvertence attended the filing of the information for libel with the
MeTC. He did not, however, proffer any justification or explanation for the error. He did not claim that
the mistake was either typographical or was a result of the application of a default form or template. In
the Court's view, it was plain carelessness. As no malice can be attributed, he merely deserves a
reprimand.

Manabat, on the other hand, should have been more cautious and careful in reviewing the report and
recommendation of his subordinate. He should not have approved the information and its filing in the
wrong court considering that his office was very knowledgeable of the law that jurisdiction in libel cases
lies with the RTC. In fact, he cited several libel cases which his office filed with the proper court. As the
head of office, he should be admonished to be more careful as his office is in the forefront in the
administration of criminal justice.

While De Dios and Manabat can validly claim inadvertence, Villena cannot invoke the same defense in
his handling of the case. Indeed, he did not file the information with the MeTC as he was not the
investigating prosecutor, but merely the trial prosecutor. He, however, mishandled the case which
prejudiced the complainant.

When the motion to quash was filed by Boto for lack of jurisdiction, Villena should have immediately
acted on it by not opposing the dismissal of the case. The records disclose that in his Comment,16
Villena prayed that the motion to quash be DENIED. His Comment reads:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The undersigned prosecutor respectfully states that:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

1. For lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, insufficiency of evidence, and that the allegations contained
information do not constitute an offense, accused moves for the quashal of the information.

2. As to the first three (3) grounds relied upon by the accused, the Honorable Court had already
determined probable cause when it issued a warrant of arrest against the accused. Thus, it has
effectively mooted the resolution of any issue concerning jurisdiction, venue and sufficiency of evidence
against the accused.

3. Accused herself contended that there is no jurisprudence yet defining the extent of the coverage of
the crime of libel over social network. Thus, with more reason, the findings of the undersigned's office
must be respected.
Wherefore, premises considered, the undersigned respectfully prays of this Honorable Court to DENY
accused's motion to quash.

xxxx.17 [Italicization supplied]

Patently, this responsive pleading of Villena demonstrates that he did not know the elementary rules on
jurisdiction. Fundamental is the rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law and is not within the courts, let
alone the parties themselves, to determine or conveniently set aside.18 It cannot be waived except for
those judicially recognizable grounds like estoppel. And it is not mooted by an action of a court in an
erroneously filed case. It has been held in a plethora of cases that when the law or procedure is so
elementary, not to know, or to act as if one does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law,
even without the complainant having to prove malice or bad faith.19cralawlibrary

Villena should have even initiated the move for the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. Instead of taking the initiative, he even opposed the motion to quash the information. At
any rate, respondents are not barred from refiling the case before the proper court if probable cause to
hold the complainant liable really exists. His dismal failure to apply the basic rule on jurisdiction
amounts to ignorance of the law and reflects his lack of prudence, if not his incompetence, in the
performance of his duties.20cralawlibrary

Moreover, by not immediately filing a comment, he cannot blame the complainant for claiming that her
right to a speedy trial was violated. It cannot be argued that no prejudice was caused against her
because the error was immediately corrected and the information was properly filed with the RTC. Boto
was adversely affected not because the MeTC immediately issued a warrant for her arrest, but because
the prosecution of the case, meritorious or not, was considerably delayed. The Court takes judicial
notice that proceedings at the first level courts, especially in cities and capital towns, are relatively
slower than those at the RTC because of its more numerous pending cases.

As a responsible public servant, a prosecutor's primary duty is not to simply convict but to see that
justice is done.21 He is obliged to perform his duties fairly, consistently and expeditiously, and respect
and protect human dignity and uphold human rights in contributing to ensuring due process and the
smooth functioning of the criminal justice system.22 As such, he should not initiate or continue
prosecution, or shall make every effort to stay the proceedings when it is apparent that the court has no
jurisdiction over the case. This is where Villena failed.

As lawyers, the respondents are officers of the court with the duty to uphold its dignity and authority
and not promote distrust in the administration of justice.23 No less than the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates all lawyers to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.24cralawlibrary

WHEREFORE, Senior Assistant City Prosecutor Vincent L. Villena is found liable for Ignorance of the Law
and is hereby FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos, payable within 30 days from
receipt of this resolution with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt
with more severely.

Assistant City Prosecutor Patrick Noel P. De Dios, for his negligence, is REPRIMANDED with a warning
that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
City Prosecutor Archimedes V. Manabat is admonished to be more careful and circumspect in the review
of the actions of his assistants.

SO ORDERED.