CATINGUB, LOURDES ANGELA B.

LLB October 30, 2019

Accountability of Public Officers and National Patrimony – Case Digests
Constitutional Law 1 Sun 8:00 am – 12:30 pm

A. ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS

FRANCISCO vs HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

GR No 160261
Petitioner: ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR
Petitioners – in – intervention: NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA
MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, WORLD WAR II
VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
Respondent: THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G.
DE VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX
WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA
Respondents – in – intervention: JAIME N. SORIANO, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL
Ponente: CARPIO MORALES, J

Facts:

On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and
approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House
Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress. Then on 22 July 2002, the House of
Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice “to conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, former
President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint)
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court
for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” The
complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee
on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The
House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was
“sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in
substance. The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was
filed with the Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-
mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
“Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House
of Representatives. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the
Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that
the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of
Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a period of one year.”
Issues:
1. Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid
impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
2. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by
the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI
of the Constitution.
3. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of
the Constitution.

Rulings:

1. This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of the judicial
power of the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
1. Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a determination of
what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political
question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation.
Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
2. Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and
is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.

2. The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is unconstitutional.

1. Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Clearly, its power
to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase “to effectively carry
out the purpose of this section.” Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very
purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out.
Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on
its power to make rules.
2. It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the
fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it
would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of
the Constitution without need of referendum.

3. It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.

1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial
action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear.
Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner,
another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following
Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
2. Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President
Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate
justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on
Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by
 Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the
Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against
the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer
within a one-year period.

Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings

which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are
unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B.
Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October
23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
GUTTIEREZ vs COMMITTEE on JUSTICE
GR No 193459
Petitioner: MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ
Respondent: THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, RISA
HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, DANILO D. LIM, FELIPE PESTAÑO, EVELYN PESTAÑO,
RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN
(BAYAN); MOTHER MARY JOHN MANANZAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON OF PAGBABAGO;
DANILO RAMOS, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS
(KMP); ATTY. EDRE OLALIA, ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL UNION
OF PEOPLE'S LAWYERS (NUPL); FERDINAND R. GAITE, CHAIRPERSON,
CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES (COURAGE); and JAMES TERRY RIDON OF THE LEAGUE OF FILIPINO
STUDENTS (LFS)
Respondent – intervenor: FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR.
Ponente: CARPIO MORALES, J

Facts:

Two impeachment complaints were filed against Ombudsman Gutierrez, both were based
betrayal of public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution. The House Plenary referred the
two complaints to the House of Representative Committee on Justice. After hearing, the House
of Representative Committee on Justice issued a Resolution finding both complaints sufficient in
form and substance. Consequently, Ombudsman Gutierrez contended that the issued the
Resolution violated the one-year bar provision under Article XI, Section 3, paragraph 5 of the
Constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not the HR Committee on Justice violated the one-year bar provision when it issued
the Resolution.

Ruling:

No. Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution provides that, no impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.
The act of initiating the complaint means the filing of the impeachment complaint and the referral
by the House Plenary to the Committee on Justice. Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one
year period. Therefore, the one-year period ban is reckoned not from the filing of the first
complaint, but on the date it is referred to the House Committee on Justice. Hence, in this case,
the HR Committee did not violate the one-year bar provision of the Constitution when it accepted
the second impeachment complaint after the first impeachment complaint was filed.

Also, it was held that the HR committee did not abuse its discretion in finding the complaints
sufficient in form in substance. The Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional
requirements and providing that there must be a verified complaint or resolution, and that the
substance requirement is met if there is a recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of September 1, 2010 and
September 7, 2010 of public respondent, the House of Representatives Committee on Justice,
are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on September
14, 2010 is LIFTED.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs MADRIAGA
GR No 164316
Petitioner: OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
Respondent: GERTRUDES MADRIAGA and ANA MARIE BERNARDO
Ponente: CARPIO MORALES, J

Facts:

The San Juan School Club filed a letter-complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman
charging Gertrudes Madriaga, school principal of San Juan Elementary School and Ana Marie
Bernardo, Canteen Manager of the same school, with violation of Section 1 of Rule IV and Section
1 of Rule VI of the Rules Implementing Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 otherwise known as the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. They were
subsequently found guilty of the offense charged. Consequently, they were meted out the penalty
of six (6) months imprisonment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals declared that the six-month
suspension meted out by the Office of the Ombudsman to Madriaga and Bernardo (Gertrudes) is
merely recommendatory to the Department of Education, the Office of the Ombudsman filed the
present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to impose administrative sanctions
over public officials

Ruling:

Article XI, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution grants the Ombudsman administrative disciplinary
power to direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or
employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or
prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.

Section 15(3) of R.A. No. 6770 echoes the constitutional grant to the Ombudsman of the power
to ―recommend‖ the imposition of penalty on erring public officials and employees and ensure
compliance therewith.

The Court notes that the proviso above qualifies the "order" "to remove, suspend, demote, fine,
censure, or prosecute" an officer or employee — akin to the questioned issuances in the case at
bar. That the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with such an order of the
Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action, is a
strong indication that the Ombudsman's "recommendation" is not merely advisory in nature but is
actually mandatory within the bounds of law. This should not be interpreted as usurpation by the
Ombudsman of the authority of the head of office or any officer concerned. It has long been settled
that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any
public official is not an exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the
offense charged. By stating therefore that the Ombudsman "recommends" the action to be taken
against an erring officer or employee, the provisions in the Constitution and in R.A. 6770 intended
that the implementation of the order be coursed through the proper officer, which in this case
would be the head of the BID.

The word "recommend" in Sec. 15(3) must thus be read in conjunction with the phrases "ensure
compliance therewith" or "enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21" of R.A. No.
6770. In fine, the Ombudsman's authority to impose administrative penalty and enforce
compliance therewith is not merely recommendatory. It is mandatory within the bounds of the law.
The implementation of the order imposing the penalty is, however, to be coursed through the
proper officer.

WHEREFORE, the challenged Court of Appeals Decision of May 28, 2004 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.

Let the records of the case be remanded to the office of origin, Office of the Ombudsman, for
appropriate action consistent with the ruling in this case.
UY vs SANDIGANBAYAN
248 SCRA 566
Petitioner: George Uy
Respondent: The Hon. Sandiganbayan, The Hon. Ombudsman and The Hon. Roger C.
Berbano, Sr., Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Special Prosecutor
Ponente: PUNO, J.

Facts:

Uy, who was Deputy Comptroller of the Philippine navy and designated as Assistant Chief of
Naval Staff for Comptrollership was charged with estafa through falsification of official documents
and violation of RA 3019. The petitioner filed a motion to quash, arguing that the Sandiganbayan
had no jurisdiction over the offense charged and that the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor
had no authority to file the offense.

The court ruled that:

1. It is the court-martial, not the Sandiganbayan, which has jurisdiction to try petitioner since he
was a regular officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and fell squarely under Article 2 of
the Articles of War mentioned in Section 1(b) of P.D. 1850, “Providing for the trial by courts-martial
of members of the Integrated National Police and further defining the jurisdiction of courts-martial
over members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines”

2. As to the violations of Republic Act No. 3019, the petitioner does not fall within the “rank”
requirement stated in Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, thus, exclusive jurisdiction over
petitioner is vested in the regular courts , as amended by R.A. No. 8249, which states that “In
cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade ‘27’ or
higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned
above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court,
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be,
pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.”

In this connection, it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the authority to file the
corresponding information/s against petitioner in the regional trial court. The Ombudsman
exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. In February 20,
2000, a motion for clarification which in fact appeared to be a partial motion for reconsideration
was filed by the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor filed, which was denied. The instant
case is a Motion for Further Clarification filed by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto of the Court's
ruling in its decision dated August 9, 1999 and resolution dated February 22, 2000.

Issue:

Whether or not the prosecutory power of the Ombudsman extends only to cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan and that the Ombudsman has no authority to prosecute cases falling within
the jurisdiction of regular courts.
Ruling:

No. The Ombudsman is clothed with authority to conduct preliminary investigation and to
prosecute all criminal cases involving public officers and employees, not only those within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, but those within the jurisdiction of the regular courts as
well. The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and
unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make a distinction
between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has
been held that the clause "any illegal act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to
embrace all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public officers
and employees during their tenure of office.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court's ruling in its decision dated August 9, 1999 and its resolution
dated February 20, 2000 that the Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is SET ASIDE.
 B. NATIONAL PATRIMONY

CRUZ vs DENR
GR. No. 135385
Petitioners: ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA
Respondents: SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
Intervenors: HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA,
EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO
CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI
KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-
ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU
EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY,
TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG
MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY
DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU
MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY,
LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA
GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES,
LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING
DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN, VIRGILIO CAYETANO,
CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR,
MAURO VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO, WALTER
N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA,
ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE
SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE
G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB,
SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG
MALID, MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID,
MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY
SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR.,
JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M.
GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS
MARICEL MALID, represented by her father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA,
represented by her father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her father
TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA, represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA,
EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S
ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLE'S EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN
VISAYAS
Intervenors: COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and
HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, INC
Ponente: Per Curiam
FACTS:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens
and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371,
otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules
and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the
ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the
public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian
doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisions of IPRA contravenes the Constitution

RULING:

No. The provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is
nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their
ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with
the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their
ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the
resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same
time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain.
They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private
land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of
ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of
ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.

As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case
was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same.
Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is
DISMISSED.
LEE HONG KOK vs DAVID
48 SCRA 372
Petitioner: PEDRO LEE HONG HOK, SIMEON LEE HONG HOK, ROSITA LEE HONG HOK and
LEONCIO LEE HONG HOK
Respondent: ANIANO DAVID, THE HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and COURT OF APPEALS
Ponente: FERNANDO, J

FACTS:

Petitioners in this appeal by certiorari seek to reverse a decision of respondent Court of Appeals
affirming a lower court judgment dismissing their complaint to have the Torrens Title of respondent
Aniano David declared null and void. According to the Stipulation of Facts, since the filing of the
sales application of Aniano David and during all the proceedings in connection with said
application, up to the actual issuance of the sales patent in his favor, the plaintiffs appellants did
not put up any opposition or adverse claim thereto. David acquired lawful title pursuant to his
miscellaneous sales application in accordance with which an order of award and for issuance of
a sales patent was made by the Director of Lands on June 18, 1958, covering Lot 2892 containing
an area of 226 square meters, which is a portion of Lot 2863 of the Naga Cadastre, On the basis
of the order of award of the Director of Lands the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources issued on August 26, 1959, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-1209 pursuant to which
OCT No. 510 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Naga City to defendant-appellee Aniano
David on October 21, 1959.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued
pursuant to a void patent?

RULING:

NO. Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands, or the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to
a void patent Whether the grant was in conformity with the law or not is a question which the
government may raise, but until it is raised by the government and set aside, the defendant cannot
question it. The legality of the grant is a question between the grantee and the government.

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of January 31, 1969 and its resolution
of March 14, 1969 are affirmed.
LA BUGAL B’LAAY TRIBAL ASSOCIATION vs DENR
GR No 127882
Petitioners: LA BUGAL B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC. et. al
Respondents: V. O. RAMOS, Secretary Department of Environment and Natural Resources; H.
RAMOS, Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB-DENR); R. TORRES, Executive
Secretary; and WMC (PHILIPPINES) INC.
Ponente: Panganiban, J

FACTS

The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAA is a exception to the rule
that participation in the nation’s natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Provision
must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos.
RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995. Before the effectivity of RA 7942,
or on March 30, 1995, the President signed a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement
(FTAA) with WMCP, a corporation organized under Philippine laws, covering close to 100,000
hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. On
August 15, 1995, the Environment Secretary Victor Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order
95-23, which was later repealed by DENR Administrative Order 96-40, adopted on December 20,
1996.

Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and the FTAA between the government
and WMCP be declared unconstitutional on ground that they allow fully foreign owned
corporations like WMCP to exploit, explore and develop Philippine mineral resources in
contravention of Article XII Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Charter.
In January 2001, WMC – a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration company – sold its
whole stake in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is owned by Filipinos while 40% of
which is owned by Indophil Resources, an Australian company. DENR approved the transfer
and registration of the FTAA in Sagittarius‘ name but Lepanto Consolidated assailed the same.

The latter case is still pending before the Court of Appeals.

EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987, authorizes the DENR to accept,
consider and evaluate proposals from foreign owned corporations or foreign investors for
contracts or agreements involving wither technical or financial assistance for large scale
exploration, development and utilization of minerals which upon appropriate recommendation of
the (DENR) Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent. WMCP likewise
contended that the annulment of the FTAA would violate a treaty between the Philippines and
Australia which provides for the protection of Australian investments.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully foreign-owned
corporations to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.

2. Whether or not the FTAA between the government and WMCP is a ―service contract that
permits fully foreign owned companies to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.
RULING:
1. Yes. RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting fully
foreign owned corporations to exploit the Philippine natural resources.
Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian Doctrine which states
that ―All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the
State. The same section also states that, ―the exploration and development and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.
Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973 Constitution
authorizing the State to grant licenses, concessions, or leases for the exploration,
exploitation, development, or utilization of natural resources. By such omission, the
utilization of inalienable lands of the public domain through license, concession or lease
is no longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution.

Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity investment for
the purpose of exploiting a particular natural resource within a given area. The concession
amounts to complete control by the concessionaire over the country‘s natural resource,
for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a particular resource at the point of
extraction.

The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase ―management or

other forms of assistance in the 1973 Charter. The present Constitution now allows only
―technical and financial assistance. The management and the operation of the mining
activities by foreign contractors, the primary feature of the service contracts was precisely
the evil the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to avoid.

The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an exception to
the rule that participation in the nation‘s natural resources is reserved exclusively to
Filipinos. Accordingly, such provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment
by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA 7942 is invalid insofar as the said act authorizes service
contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase ―financial and
technical agreements in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, its pertinent
provisions actually treat these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial
ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law.

The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign contractor
manages the mineral resources just like the foreign contractor in a service contract. By
allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all the aspects of the mining operation,
RA 7942 has, in effect, conveyed beneficial ownership over the nation’s mineral resources
to these contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title thereto.

The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of the

constitutionally ordained 60-40% capitalization requirement for corporations or
 associations engaged in the exploitation, development and utilization of Philippine natural
resources.

When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions,

considerations, inducements or compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that
the legislature intended them as a whole, then if some parts are unconstitutional, all
provisions that are thus dependent, conditional or connected, must fail with them.
Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations are limited
only to merely technical or financial assistance to the State for large scale
exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils.

2. Yes. The FTAA between he WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise
unconstitutional since the agreement itself is a service contract.
Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP a fully foreign owned corporation, the exclusive
right to explore, exploit, utilize and dispose of all minerals and by-products that may be
produced from the contract area. Section 1.2 of the same agreement provides that EMCP
shall provide all financing, technology, management, and personnel necessary for the
Mining Operations.

These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken together, grant
WMCP beneficial ownership over natural resources that properly belong to the State and
are intended for the benefit of its citizens. These stipulations are abhorrent to the 1987
Constitution. They are precisely the vices that the fundamental law seeks to avoid, the
evils that it aims to suppress. Consequently, the contract from which they spring must be
struck down.

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondents' and the intervenors' Motions
for Reconsideration; to REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Court's January 27, 2004 Decision; to
DISMISS the Petition; and to issue this new judgment declaring CONSTITUTIONAL (1) Republic
Act No. 7942 (the Philippine Mining Law), (2) its Implementing Rules and Regulations contained
in DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 9640 -- insofar as they relate to financial and technical
assistance agreements referred to in paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution;
and (3) the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated March 30, 1995
executed by the government and Western Mining Corporation Philippines Inc. (WMCP), except
Sections 7.8 and 7.9 of the subject FTAA which are hereby INVALIDATED for being contrary to
public policy and for being grossly disadvantageous to the government.
CHAVEZ vs PEA – AMARI (2002)
GR No. 133250
Petitioner: FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ
Respondent: PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
Ponente: CARPIO, J

Facts:

The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake
reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR
(Department of Environmental and Natural Resources) insofar as reclaimed or about to be
reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned.
PEA sought the transfer to the Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation, a private
corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have
290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to Amari.

Issue:

Whether or not the transfer is valid.

Ruling:

No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to Amari as
private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom
Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public
domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural
resources of the public domain. The transfer (as embodied in a joint venture agreement) to
AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, is void for
being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Furthermore, since
the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to Amari ownership of 290.156 hectares of still
submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural
lands of the public domain.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay
Development Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing the Amended
Joint Venture Agreement which is hereby declared NULL and VOID ab initio.
CHAVEZ vs PEA – AMARI (2003)
GR No. 133250
Petitioner: FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ
Respondent: PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
Ponente: CARPIO, J

Facts:

In July 2002, Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation lost a case (PEA-Amari Scandal)
before the Supreme Court involving certain reclaimed lands. Upon receipt of the adverse decision,
Amari filed a Motion for Inhibition asking the ponente of said case, Justice Antonio Carpio, to
inhibit from the case on the ground that before Justice Carpio was appointed to the Supreme
Court, he wrote a column in the Manila Times newspaper where he questioned the legality of the
agreement between the Public Estates Authority and Amari regarding the said reclaimed property
(PEA-Amari deal). Amari insists that Justice Carpio already prejudged the issue as his bias and
prejudice were already apparent. Amari also prays for a re-deliberation after Justice Carpio
inhibits.

Issue:

Whether or not Justice Carpio should inhibit from the case by reason of the said Manila Times
column.

Ruling:

No. In the first place, the decision was already promulgated when Amari filed its motion requesting
Justice Carpio to inhibit. The rule is that a motion to inhibit must be denied if filed after a member
of the Court had already given an opinion on the merits of the case. Reason: a litigant cannot be
permitted to speculate upon the action of the Court (only to) raise an objection of this sort after a
decision has been rendered.

Second, judges and justices are not disqualified from participating in a case just because they
have written legal articles on the law involved in the case.

Third, looking at Justice Carpio’s Manila Times article, his article questioned the legality of the
PEA Amari deal on the basis of the lack of public bidding. In this particular case before the
Supreme Court, the issue of the absence of public bidding was not raised by any of the parties
involved hence, Justice Carpio’s write up had nothing to do with the very merits of the case.

WHEREFORE, the second Motions for Reconsideration filed by Public Estates Authority and
Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation are DENIED for being prohibited pleadings. In any
event, these Motions for Reconsideration have no merit. No further pleadings shall be allowed
from any of the parties.
GODINEZ vs PAK LUEN
120 SCRA 223
Petitioner: VICENTE GODINEZ, ET AL.
Respondent: FONG PAK LUEN ET AL., defendants, TRINIDAD S. NAVATA
Ponente: GUTIERREZ, JR., J

Facts:

The plaintiffs filed a case to recover a parcel of land sold by their father Jose Godinez to defendant
Fong Pak Luen. Said defendant executed a power of attorney in favour of his co-defendant Kwan
Pun Ming, who conveyed and sold the above described parcel of land to co-defendant Trinidad
S. Navata. The latter is aware of and with full knowledge that Fong Pak Luen is a Chinese citizen
as well as Kwan Pun Ming, who under the law are prohibited and disqualified to acquire real
property; that Fong Pak Luen has not acquired any title or interest in said parcel of land as
purported contract of sale executed by Jose Godinez alone was contrary to law and considered
non-existent.

The defendant filed her answer that the complaint does not state a cause of action since it appears
from the allegation that the property is registered in the name of Jose Godinez so that as his sole
property he may dispose of the same; that the cause of action has been barred by the statute of
limitations as the alleged document of sale executed by Jose Godinez on November 27, 1941,
conveyed the property to defendant Fong Pak Luen as a result of which a title was issued to said
defendant; that under Article 1144(1) of the Civil Code, an action based upon a written contract
must be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues; that the right of action
accrued on November 27, 1941 but the complaint was filed only on September 30, 1966, beyond
the 10-year period provided by law.

The trial court issued an order dismissing the complaint. A motion for reconsideration was filed
by plaintiffs but was denied.

Issue:
Whether or not the sale was null and void ab initio since it violates applicable provisions of the
Constitution and the Civil Code.

Ruling:

No. Prescription may never be invoked to defend that which the Constitution prohibits. However,
we see no necessity from the facts of this case to pass upon the nature of the contract of sale
executed by Jose Godinez and Fong Pak Luen whether void ab initio, illegal per se, or merely
prohibited. It is enough to stress that insofar as the vendee is concerned, prescription is
unavailing. But neither can the vendor or his heirs rely on an argument based on imprescriptibility
because the land sold in 1941 is now in the hands of a Filipino citizen against whom the
constitutional prescription was never intended to apply.
As earlier mentioned, Fong Pak Luen, the disqualified alien vendee later sold the same property
to Navata, a Filipino citizen qualified to acquire real property. Navata, as a naturalized citizen,
was constitutionally qualified to own the subject property.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby denied. The orders dismissing the complaint and
denying the motion for reconsideration are affirmed.
TEJIDO vs ZAMACOMA
138 SCRA 78
Petitioner: EMILIO TEJIDO and JOSE TEJIDO, JR
Respondent: JUAN URIARTE ZAMACOMA, ET AL, LUIS CALIBUT, ET AL, ESTATE OF
RAFAEL P. GUERRERO, SR., PRUDENCIA HECHANOVA VDA. DE ESPARTERO ET AL,
NUMERIANO RAMOS, ET AL, VICENTE URIARTE, ETAL, PEDRO BEDAYO ET AL, ELACIO
DEBULGADO ET AL.
Ponente:

FACTS

The instant appeal seeks the review and reversal of the Order of the then Court of First Instance
of Negros Occidental dated April 18, 1973, dismissing plaintiffs-appellants complaint for
"Recovery of Inheritance, Accounting and Damages".

Two (2) big tracts of land, situated in the then municipality of La Carlota and Pontevedra Negros
Occidental, otherwise known as Hacienda "Candelaria" and "Caridad" were originally registered
under the Torrens system as early as June 14, 1907 in the names of the predecessors-in-interest
of the plaintiffs-appellants.

Prior to March 20, 1925, the said registered owners obtained a loan from the late Pedro Uriarte,
mortgaging in consideration thereof, the aforementioned Haciendas "Candelaria" and "Caridad"
in favor of said Pedro Uriarte. They failed to pay the loan and so an ejectment case was later filed.
The parties then entered into a Compromise Agreement in Feb 26, 1926.

On February 16, 1971, plaintiffs-appellants filed before the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental a complaint for "Recovery of Inheritance, Accounting and Damages" against several
defendants.

The trial court dismissed the complaint and was later upheld by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUES

Whether or not the sale of the land to Pedro Uriarte, who was a Spanish citizen at the time of
acquisition of land was void ab initio

Whether or not the acquisition by Juan Uriarte from his father is likewise illegal

Whether or not the plaintiffs are guilty of laches in being delayed in filing the action

RULING

On the acquisition
YES. Sale is valid. Pedro Uriarte was not disqualified by reason of his alien citizenship from
acquiring Haciendas Candelaria and Caridad as the Philippine Constitution of 1935, which
prohibited absolutely aliens from acquiring public or private agricultural and residential lands,
became effective only on November 15, 1935.

Nor can Act 2874 of the Philippine Legislature be invoked to support plaintiffs' cause of
action because Act 2874 was only applicable to public agricultural lands, not to private lands.

On the validity of the reconveyance to heirs

NO it is not illegal. The litigated property is now in the hands of Filipino citizens. Defendant Juan
Uriarte Zamacoma who owns the bigger portions of subject properties became a Filipino citizen
as of October 20, 1936.

The issue on LACHES

YES. It is likewise inescapable that plaintiffs had slept on their rights for about forty-five (45) years
(from 1926 to 1971) when the complaint in this case was filed. By their long inaction or inexcusable
neglect, they should be held barred from asserting their rights to the litigated property.

Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it
is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

It follows from the foregoing that defendants-appellees must be declared as they are hereby
declared the lawful owners of the disputed parcels involved in the case at bar.

WHEREFORE, the Order of the lower court dated April 18, 1973, dismissing the complaint is
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against plaintiffs-appellants.
RAMIREZ vs VDA DE RAMIREZ
111 SCRA 704
Petitioner: TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS,
Administratrix
Respondent: MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and ROBERTO
RAMIREZ
Ponente: ABAD SANTOS, J

FACTS:

Jose Ramirez a Filipino, died in Spain leaving only his widow Marcelle Ramirez, a French. In the
project partition, the property was divided into 2 parts: 1st part to the widow, and 2nd part to the
grandnephews the naked ownership. Furthermore, as to the usufruct of the 2nd part, 1/3 was given
to the widow and 2/3 to Wanda de Wrobleski, an Austrian. The grandnephews opposed on the
ground that usufruct to Wanda is void because it violates the constitutional prohibition against the
acquisition of lands by aliens.

ISSUE:

WON the ground for the opposition is correct.

RULING:

No, it is not correct.

The SC held that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands
does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and
meaningless. The SC upheld the usufruct in favor of Wanda because although it is a real right, it
does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of
aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is hereby ordered distributed
as follows:

One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;

One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked
ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor of
Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez.

The distribution herein ordered supersedes that of the court a quo.

NADECO vs PVB
192 SCRA 257
Petitioner: NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY AND NEW AGRIX, INC
Respondent: PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, THE EX-OFFICIO SHERIFF and GODOFREDO
QUILING, in his capacity as Deputy Sheriff of Calamba, Laguna
Ponente: CRUZ, J

FACTS:

The particular enactment in question is Presidential Decree No. 1717, which ordered the
rehabilitation of the Agrix Group of Companies to be administered mainly by the National
Development Company.

The law outlined the procedure for filling claims against the Agrix Companies and created a claims
committee to process these claims.

Especially relevant to this case, and noted at the outset, is section 4(1) thereof providing that “all
mortgages and other liens presently attaching to any of the assets of the dissolved corporations
are hereby extinguished.”

Earlier, the Agrix Marketing Inc. had executed in favor of private respondent Philippine Veterans
Bank a real estate mortgage dated July 7, 1978 over three parcels of land situated in Los Baños,
Laguna.

During the existence of the mortgage, Agrix went bankrupt. It was the expressed purpose of
salvaging this and the other Agrix companies that the aforementioned decree was issued by
President Marcos.

Pursuant thereto, the private respondent filed a claim with the AGRIX Claims Committee for the
payment of its loan credit. In the meantime, the New Agrix, Inc. and the National Development
Company, petitioners herein, invoking Sec. 4 (1) of the decree, filed a petition with the Regional
Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, for the cancellation of the mortgage lien in favor of the private
respondent. For its part, the private respondent took steps to extrajudicially foreclose the
mortgage, prompting the petitioners to file a second case with the same court to stop the
foreclosure. The two cases were consolidated.

After the submission by the parties of their respective pleadings, the trial court rendered the
impugned decision. Judge Francisco Ma. Guerrero annulled not only the challenged provision,
viz., Sec. 4 (1), but the entire Pres. Decree No. 1717 on the grounds that:

(1) the presidential exercise of legislative power was a violation of the principle of
separation of powers;
(2) The law impaired the obligation of contracts; and
(3) the decree violated the equal protection clause. The motion for reconsideration of this
decision having been denied, the present petition was filed.
The Court granted the petitioner's prayer for a temporary restraining order and instructed the
respondents to cease and desist from conducting a public auction sale of the lands in question.
The petitioners contend that the private respondent is now estopped from contesting the validity
of the decree.

The Court, after noting that the petitioners had already filed their claims with the AGRIX Claims
Committee created by the decree, had simply dismissed the petition on the ground of estoppel.
The petitioners stress that in the case at bar the private respondent also invoked the provisions
of Pres. Decree No. 1717 by filing a claim with the AGRIX Claims Committee. Failing to get
results, it sought to foreclose the real estate mortgage executed by AGRIX in its favor, which had
been extinguished by the decree. It was only when the petitioners challenged the foreclosure on
the basis of Sec. 4 (1) of the decree, that the private respondent attacked the validity of the
provision. At that stage, however, consistent with Mendoza, the private respondent was already
estopped from questioning the constitutionality of the decree.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Philippine Veterans Bank as creditor of Agrix is still entitled for payment without
prejudice to PD 1717.

RULING:

YES. A mortgage lien is a property right derived from contract and so comes under the protection
of Bill of rights so do interests on loans, as well as penalties and charges, which are also vested
rights once they accrue. Private property cannot simply be taken by law from one person and
given to another without just compensation and any known public purpose. This is plain
arbitrariness and is not permitted under the constitution.

The court also feels that the decree impairs the obligation of the contract between Agrix and the
private respondent without justification. While it is true that the police power is superior to the
impairment clause, the principle will apply only where the contract is so related to the public
welfare that it will be considered congenitally susceptible to change by the legislature in the
interest of greater number.

Our finding in sum, is that PD 1717 is an invalid exercise of the police power, not being in
conformity with the traditional requirements of a lawful subject and a lawful method. The extinction
of the mortgage and other liens and of the interest and other charges pertaining to the legitimate
creditors of Agrix constitutes taking without due process of law, and this is compounded by the
reduction of the secured creditors to the category of unsecured creditors in violation of the equal
protection clause. Moreover, the new corporation being neither owned nor controlled by the
government, should have been created only by general and not special law. And in so far as the
decree also interferes with purely private agreements without any demonstrated connection with
the public interest, there is likewise an impairment of the obligation of the contract.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Pres. Decree No. 1717 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The temporary restraining order dated August 30, 1988, is LIFTED.
ALBANO vs REYES
175 SCRA 264
Petitioners: RODOLFO B. ALBANO
Respondent: HON. RAINERIO O. REYES, PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY,
INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES, INC., E. RAZON, INC., ANSCOR
CONTAINER CORPORATION, and SEALAND SERVICES. LTD.
Ponente: PARAS, J

Facts:

On April 20, 1987, the PPA (Philippine Ports Authority) Board adopted its Resolution No. 850
directing PPA management to prepare the Invitation to Bid and all relevant documents and
technical requirements necessary for the public bidding of the development, management and
operation for the MICT (leasing as well as to implement this project. Respondent Secretary Reyes
created a 7 man “Special MICT Bidding Committee” charged with all bid proposals. After
evaluation of the seven companies that submitted bids, the committee recommended the award
of the contract to ICTSI for having offered the best technical and financial proposal. However,
before the MICT contract could be signed, 2 cases were filed against respondents which assailed
the legality and regularity of the bidding. But on May 18, 1988, the President of the Philippines
approved the proposed MICT Contract with specific directives on the part of the PPA and the
contractor ICTSI. Meanwhile, Rodolfo Albano, the petitioner filed a petition assailing the award of
the MICT contract to ICTSI claiming that the former is a public utility and therefore needs a
legislative franchise before it can legally operate as a public utility, pursuant to Article 12, Sec 11
of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not the MICT needs a legislative franchise from Congress to legally operate as a
public utility

Ruling:

NO. EO No. 30 dated July16, 1986 provides for the immediate recall of the franchise granted to
the Manila International Port Terminals Inc., and authorize the PPA to take over, manage and
operate the Manila International Port Complex at North Harbor, Manila and undertake the
provision of cargo handling and port related services thereat, in accordance with PD 857 and
other applicable laws and regulations.

Sec. 6 of PD 857 otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the PPA provides as one of the
corporate duties of the PPA is to provide services ( whether on its own, by contract, or otherwise
) within the Port Districts and the approaches thereof including but not limited to…

As stated above, PPA has been tasked under EO No. 30, with the management and operation of
the Manila International Port Complex in accordance with PD 857 and other applicable laws and
regulations. However, PD 857 itself authorizes the PPA to perform the service by itself, by
contracting it out, or through other means. Reading EO No. 30 and PD 857 together, the
inescapable conclusion is that the lawmaker has empowered the PPA to undertake by itself the
operation and management of the MICP or to authorize its operation and management by another
by contract or other means at its option. The latter power having been delegated to the PPA, a
franchise from Congress to authorize an entity other than the PPA to operate and manage the
MICP becomes unnecessary. Therefore, PPA’s act of privatizing the MICT and awarding the
Contract to ICTSI are wholly within its jurisdiction under its Charter which empowers the PPA to
“supervise, control, regulate, construct, maintain, operate and provide such facilities necessary in
the ports vested”.

Hence, SC dismissed the petition.

REPUBLIC vs PLDT
26 SCRA 620
Petitioner: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Respondent: PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY
Ponente: REYES, J.B.L., J

Facts:

The plaintiff Republic of the Philippines is a political entity exercising government powers through
one of its branches, the Bureau of Telecommunication. Herein defendant, PLDT is a public
service corporation holding a franchise to install operates and maintains a telephone system.
After its creation, the BOT set up its own government telephone system by utilizing its own
appropriations and other equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable the govt
offices to call privately. BOT entered into an agreement with the RCA communications for joint
overseas telephone service whereby BOT would convey overseas calls received by RCA to local
residents. PLDT complained to the BOT that it was a violation of the condition of their agreement
since the BOT had used trunk lines only for the use of government offices but even to serve
private persons or the general public in competition with the business of PLDT. Subsequently, the
plaintiff commenced suit against PLDT asking the court judgment be rendered ordering the PLDT
to execute a contract with the plaintiff, through the BOT for the use of the facilities of PLDT's
telephone system throughout the country under such conditions as the court may consider
reasonable. The CFI rendered judgment stating that it could not compel PLDT to enter into such
agreement. Hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or Not PLDT may be compelled to enter into such agreement.

Ruling:

Yes. The state may, in the interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon
payment of just compensation, there is no reason why the state may not require a public utility to
render services in the general interest provided just compensation is paid.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance, now under appeal, is affirmed, except
in so far as it dismisses the petition of the Republic of the Philippines to compel the Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Company to continue servicing the Government telephone system
upon such terms, and for a compensation, that the trial court may determine to be just, including
the period elapsed from the filing of the original complaint or petition. And for this purpose, the
records are ordered returned to the court of origin for further hearings and other proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.