RULE 113: ARREST identified his team and asked accused-appellant Chua Shilou Hwan (Hwan) what they

identified his team and asked accused-appellant Chua Shilou Hwan (Hwan) what they were loading on the van. Hwan replied
that it was shabu and pointed to accused-appellant Raymond Tan as the leader. A total of 172 bags of suspected shabu were
1.) VIUDEZ II vs. CA G.R. No. 152889 then confiscated.

FACTS:
A laboratory report prepared later by Police Inspector Mary Jean Geronimo on samples of the 172 confiscated bags showed
● Honorato Galvez and his driver were fatally shot.
the white substance to be shabu.
● A complaint for the alleged murder of the victims was filed against: Cirilo dela Cruz, Guilberto Chico, Edmund
Fernando, two persons named Ronald and Gerry, three John Does, and Eulogio Villanueva
● On another date, a complaint for muder was filed against Enrique Viudez II by Estrella Galvez, widow of Mayor On January 10, 2001, an Amended Information for violation of Sec. 16, Article III of RA 6425 was filed against
Honorato Galvez. accused-appellants, who entered a plea of not guilty upon re-arraignment.
● Two informations for murder were filed, which then issued warrants of arrests on the same day.
● Viudezz filed a Motion to Suspend Proceeding and to Suspend the Implementation of the Warrant of Arrest,
RTC convicted accused-appellants of the crime charged. In questioning the RTC Decision before the CA, accused-appellants
arguing that all the accused in the said criminal case had filed a timely petition for review with the Secretary of
alleged that the trial court erred when it held as valid the warrantless search, seizure and subsequent arrest of the
Justice. And pursuant to Sec. 9 of Department Circular No. 70, the implementation of the warrant of arrest against
accused-appellants despite the non-concurrence of the requisite circumstances that justify a warrantless arrest. CA affirmed
Viudez should be suspended and/or recalled pending resolution of said petition for review.
decision of RTC. Hence this appeal to the SC. Accused-appellants claim that no valid in flagrante delicto arrest was made
● RTC denied petitioner’s motion.
prior to the seizure and that the police officers placed accused-appellants under arrest even when there was no evidence
● A series of reconsiderations and appeals was filed by Viudez all contending that the implementation of his warrant
that an offense was being committed. Since there was no warrant of arrest, they argue that the search sans a search warrant
of arrest shall be recalled pending the petition for review filed before the Sec. of Justice.
subsequently made on them was illegal. They contend that a seizure of any evidence as a result of an illegal search is
inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose.
ISSUE:
W/N a pending resolution of a petition for review filed with the Sec. of Justice concerning a finding of probable cause will
suspend the proceedings in the trial court, including the implementation of a warrant of arrest. ISSUE: ​ Was the warrantless arrest valid?

HELD: RULING: ​YES.

NO. There is a distinction between preliminary inquiry, which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest; and preliminary investigation proper, which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be released.
The determination of probable cause for purposes of issuing a warrant of arrest is made by the judge. The preliminary
investigation proper - whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged -
is the function of the investigating prosecutor.
The function of the judge to issue a warrant of arrest upon the determination of probable cause is exclusive; thus, the
consequent implementation of warrant of arrest cannot be deferred pending the resolution of a petition for review by the
Secretary of Justice as to the finding of probable cause, a function that is executive in nature. To defer the implementation of
the warrant of arrest would be an encroachment on the exclusive prerogative of the judge.
2.) PEOPLE vs. NG YIK BUN G.R. No. 180452
FACTS: ​On August 24, 2000, around 9pm, Capt. Danilo Ibon of Task Force Aduana received information from an operative
that there was an ongoing shipment of contraband in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya, Quezon Province. Upon instructions from
his superior,Capt. Ibon formed a team to intercept the transaction.
Art. III, SEC. 2 of the Constitution provides that “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.”
A settled exception to the right guaranteed in the aforequoted provision is that of an arrest made during the commission of
a crime, which does not require a warrant. Such warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and valid under Rule 113, Sec.
5(a) of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which states:
“Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;”XX

The members of the team were able to observe the goings-on at the resort from a distance of around 50 meters. They
spotted six Chinese-looking men loading bags containing a white substance into a white van. Having been noticed, Capt. Ibon
The foregoing proviso refers to arrest in flagrante delicto. In the instant case, contrary to accused-appellants’ contention,
there was indeed a valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto. A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to
a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property described therein and to bring it before the court.
According to Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, the validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors:
3.) TAN vs, GUE G.R. No. 174570
(1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the
applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or
The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of
affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly
conviction requires after trial on the merits. Probable cause is concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral
describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.
certainty. Whether or not it exists as to justify the issuance of a search warrant is left to the sound discretion of a judge.

Jurisprudence dictates that probable cause, as a condition for the issuance of a search warrant, is such reasons supported by
FACTS:
facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man to believe that his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are
legally just and proper. Probable cause requires facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to
Information for the crime of robbery was filed against respondents Sy Tiong Gue, Felicidad Chan Sy, Sy Chim, Sy Tiong San, Sy
believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place to be
Yu Bun, Sy Yu Shiong, Sy Yu San and Bryan Sy Lim (Sy Tiong Gue, et al.) for the alleged taking of P6,500,000.00 cash, 268
searched.
postdated checks, five boxes of Hennessy Cognac, a television set, a computer set, and other documents from the Guan Yiak
Hardware in Binondo, Manila.
In this case, the Court found that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Lanzanas in issuing the subject
search warrants. A perusal of the records of the case reveals that said Judge, through searching and probing questions, was
Consequently, Police Inspector Edgar A. Reyes (P/Insp. Reyes) filed two separate applications for the issuance of a search
satisfied that there were good reasons to believe that respondents took five boxes of Hennessy XO owned by the Guan Yiak
warrant before the Regional Trial Court. He alleged that he had personal knowledge that one of the respondents had in their
Hardware and brought them to the 8​th​floor of 524 T. Pinpin St., Binondo, Manila, and that they likewise took various checks
possession five boxes of Hennessy XO, and 286 company checks taken from Guan Yiak Hardware. In support of his
from the company’s vault, which was later brought to the 7​th​floor of 524 T. Pinpin St., Binondo, Manila.
applications, P/Insp. Reyes submitted the sworn statements of petitioner Romer Sy Tan (Tan) and two witnesses.

The power to issue search warrants is exclusively vested in the trial judges in the exercise of their judicial functions. A finding
Thereafter, Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas (Judge Lanzanas) issued Search Warrant Nos. 03-3611 and 03-3612 (search warrants)
of probable cause, which would merit the issuance of a search warrant, needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more
directing any peace officer to make an immediate search of the 8​th​floor, 524 T. Pinpin, Binondo, Manila for five boxes of
likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. This was established by the
Hennessy XO, and the 7​th​floor, 524 T. Pinpin, Binondo, Manila for various checks payable to Guan Yiak Hardware,
Sinumpaang Salaysay and the testimonies, consisting of no less than 37 pages, given by witnesses who had personal
respectively. The warrants were later served. Under the first warrant, three boxes containing twelve Hennessy XOs and one
knowledge of facts indicating that the crime of robbery had been committed and that the objects sought in connection with
box containing seven Hennessy XOs were seized. However, the enforcement of the second warrant yielded negative results.
the offense were in the place sought to be searched.

Sy Tiong Gue, et al. filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrants. However, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) denied it and the
It is to be noted, however, that the guilt of the accused still remains to be determined in the appropriate criminal action
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration of the said order. Aggrieved, respondents herein filed a Petition for Certiorari under
against them, not in the present case which is limited only to the propriety of the issuance of the subject search warrants by
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court granted the Petition. It opined that while the
the RTC.
quashing of the search warrants for lack of personal knowledge was unwarranted, the description of the items to be seized
complied with the requirement of particularity, and the inquiries made by the judge to be sufficiently probing, there was no
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is ​GRANTED​. The Decision and Resolution dated 29 December 2005 and 18
probable cause for the issuance of the subject search warrants, thus, the respondents’ motion to quash should have been
August 2006, respectively of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81389 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders of the
granted.
RTC dated 1 September 2003 and 28 October 2003 are REINSTATED. The validity of Search Warrants Nos. 03-3611 and
03-3612 is SUSTAINED.
As a consequence, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision, but it was denied by the CA. Hence, this
petition.

4.) JUDGE FELIMON vs. DORIA et. al G.R. No. 174570

ISSUE:

FACTS:
Whether or not there was probable cause warranting the issuance by the Regional Trial Court of the subject search warrants.
● Judge Abelita III (petitioner) filed a complaint for Damages under Articles 32(4) and (9) of the Civil Code
against Police Supt. German B. Doria and SPO3 Ramirez
RULING: YES
 ● Petitioner alleged in his complaint that he and his wife were on their way to their house in Bagumbayan,
Masbate when Supt. Doria and SPO3 Ramirez accompanied by 10 unidentified police officers, requested
them to proceed to the Provincial PNP Headquarters at Camp Boni Serrano, Masbate.
● Petitioner alleged that when he parked his car in front of their house, SPO3 Ramirez grabbed him,
forcibly took the key to his Totoya van, barged into the vehicle, and conducted a search without a
warrant.
● The search resulted to the seizure of a licensed shotgun. Petitioner presented the shotgun’s license to
respondents.
● Thereafter, SPO3 Ramirez continued his search and then produced a 45-caliber pistol which he allegedly
found inside the vehicle. Respondents arrested petitioner and detained him without any appropriate
charge
● Supt. Doria alleged that his office received a telephone call from a relative of Rosa Sia about a shooting
incident in ​Barangay Nursery. He dispatched a team headed by SPO3 Ramirez to investigate the incident.
SPO3 Ramirez later reported that a certain William Sia was wounded while petitioner, who was
implicated in the incident, and his wife just left the place of the incident.
● Doria requested petitioner to go with him to the police headquarters as he was reported to be involved
in the incident. Petitioner agreed but suddenly sped up his vehicle and proceeded to his residence.
● Doria and his companions chased petitioner. Upon reaching petitioner’s residence, they caught up with
petitioner as he was about to run towards his house.
● The police officers saw a gun in the front seat of the vehicle beside the driver’s seat as petitioner opened
the door. They also saw a shotgun at the back of the driver’s seat. The police officers confiscated the
firearms and arrested petitioner
● Petitioner was charged with illegal possession of firearms and frustrated murder. An administrative case
was also filed against petitioner before this Court.
RTC: The trial court ruled that the police officers who conducted the search were of the belief, based on reasonable grounds,
that petitioner was involved in the incident and that the firearm used in the commission of the offense was in his possession.
The trial court ruled that petitioner’s warrantless arrest and the warrantless seizure of the firearms were valid and legal.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied. Hence, this petition
ISSUE: ​Whether the warrantless arrest and warrantless search and seizure were illegal under Section 5 of Rule 113 of Rules
on Criminal Procedure
HELD: ​The warrantless arrest and warrantless search and seizure were legal.
For the warrantless arrest under this Rule to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the offender has just committed an
offense; and (2) the arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure does not require the arresting officers to personally witness the
commission of the offense with their own eyes. In this case, P/Supt. Doria received a report about the alleged shooting
incident. SPO3 Ramirez investigated the report and learned from witnesses that petitioner was involved in the incident. They
were able to track down petitioner, but when invited to the police headquarters to shed light on the incident, petitioner
initially agreed then sped up his vehicle, prompting the police authorities to give chase. Petitioner’s act of trying to get away,
coupled with the incident report which they investigated, is enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on the part of the police
authorities as to the existence of probable cause.
The seizure of the firearms was justified under the plain view doctrine.
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that
view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites
concur: (1) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position
from which he can view a particular area; (2) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (3) it is
immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject
to seizure
5.) PEOPLE vs. TAPERE G.R. No. 178065
FACTS:
The information dated September 3, 2002 charged Tapere with illegally selling ​shabu ​in violation of Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 (​Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002)
At around 7:30 p.m. on September 2, 2002, elements of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) arrested Tapere for
selling ​shabu ​to a poseur buyer during a buy-bust operation conducted against him in Purok San Antonio, Iligan City. Prior to
the buy-bust operation, Tapere was already included in the PDEA’s drug watch list as a drug pusher based on the frequent
complaints made against him by residents of Purok San Antonio, Iligan City. It appears that SPO2 Diosdado Cabahug of the
PDEA, a neighbor, had warned Tapere to stop his illegal activities, but he apparently ignored the warning and continued to
sell ​shabu ​in that locality. Such continuing activity on the part of Tapere was the subject of the report of PDEA informant
Gabriel Salgado.
Consonant with their standard procedure, the agents first secured a certification from the Office of the City Prosecutor
regarding the buy-bust money to be used during the buy-bust operation. Armed with the certification, the agents went back
to their office and held a pre-operation briefing. The team instructed Salgado to act as the poseur buyer, and gave to him the
₱100.00 bill (Exhibit E-1) earlier certified by the public prosecutor.
The agents spotted Tapere vending ​lanzones ​along that side of the road to Tipanoy, outside the row of stalls.
With each agent being strategically posted, Salgado was signalled to approach Tapere according to the plan. Salgado went
towards Tapere. The agents saw the two conversing for a brief while before Salgado handed money to Tapere. In turn,
Tapere took a small heat-sealed plastic sachet from his pocket and gave it to Salgado. After accepting the sachet, Salgado
made the pre-arranged signal of scratching his head to signify the consummation of the transaction. The agents rushed
towards Tapere, introduced themselves as PDEA agents, and placed him in custody. They searched him and recovered the
₱100.00 bill (Exhibit E-1) from his right pocket. At that point, he voluntarily produced three more sachets of ​shabu f​ rom his
pocket and handed them to SPO2 Bastatas. The agents brought Tapere to the PDEA headquarters in Camp Cabili, Tipanoy,
Iligan City.
On the other hand, Tapere denied the accusation. He and his wife rendered their own version of the incident that led to his
arrest.
​ ear the fish stalls. His wife followed him there to ask what she
Tapere went to his usual place in Tubod to vend ​lanzones n
would prepare for their lunch. While he was there, Salgado, his neighbor of four years whom he knew to be a drug user
currently under probation, and with whom in the past he had sniffed ​shabu ​in Salgado’s house, approached and requested
him to buy ​shabu f​ or Salgado’s use.
When he returned after an hour, Tapere did not find Salgado in the stall but in a nearby small store. He handed the ​shabu
there. Salgado then immediately left. Tapere went back to his stall after buying a bottle of Coca Cola at the store. Upon
returning to his stall, a multi-cab vehicle came to stop there and five men alighted, all armed, surrounded him, pointing their
.45 caliber pistols at him. They frisked him, put handcuffs on him, and took him to the PDEA office. There, they produced a
bill, noted its serial number and confirmed that it was the bill used in the transaction. They next brought him to the PNP
Central Office in Iligan City where he was detained.
RTC: After trial, on April 15, 2003, the RTC rendered judgment convicting Tapere as charged. The RTC pointed out that the
PDEA agents had arrested Tapere following a legitimate buy-bust operation conducted in a methodical manner.
CA: CA affirmed the conviction of Tapere, ​declaring that the Prosecution competently established the details of the illegal
sale of ​shabu ​between Tapere, as the seller, and Salgado, as the poseur buyer; that the PDEA agents were not shown to have
harbored any malicious motives for arresting Tapere; and that the non-presentation of Salgado as the poseur buyer did not
weaken the case against Tapere considering that the members of the buy-bust team who testified against Tapere had
witnessed the consummation of the illegal sale of ​shabu​.
ISSUE:
1. WON​ his apprehension was the product of an instigation, not entrapment;
2. WON he should consequently be acquitted because instigation was an absolutory cause.
HELD: No​. The appeal has no merit.
1) To establish the crime of illegal sale of ​shabu a​ s defined and punished under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165, the Prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt (​a​) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
identity of the object and the consideration of the sale; and (​b​) the delivery of the thing sold and of the payment
for the thing. The commission of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like ​shabu​, requires simply the
consummation of the selling transaction, which happens at the moment the buyer receives the drug from the
seller. In short, the Prosecution must show that the transaction or sale actually took place, and present in court the
thing sold as evidence of the ​corpus delicti.​ 21
​ Doctrine
The State conclusively established the concurrence of the foregoing elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Firstly, the
members of the buybust team identified Tapere as the person with whom Salgado had contracted on the purchase of the
shabu​. Secondly, the subject of the sale was one plastic sachet of ​shabu ​that the PNP Crime Laboratory later on confirmed in
due course to contain methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. It is of no consequence that three other sachets
of ​shabu ​recovered from Tapere’s possession at the time of his arrest were also presented as evidence during the trial, or
that the Prosecution failed to specify which of the four sachets was the sachet involved in the transaction between him and
Salgado, because what is decisive is that one of the four sachets was definitely the subject of the transaction between
Tapere and the poseur buyer. Thirdly, the consideration of the sale was ₱100.00, and the actual payment of that amount
through the ₱100.00 bill bearing serial number YU859011 covered by the public prosecutor’s certification ensured the
identification of it as the consideration. And, fourthly, the Prosecution’s witnesses fully described the details of the
consummated sale of ​shabu b ​ etween Tapere as seller and Salgado as buyer.
This procedure underscores the value of preserving the integrity of the confiscated, seized, or surrendered dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, instruments, paraphernalia and laboratory
equipment. It puts into focus the essentiality of the confiscated articles as the ​corpus delicti t​ hat the State must establish
during the trial, as a means of avoiding the commission of abuses by the lawmen in their enforcement of the laws against
illegal drug trade.
The members of the buy-bust team substantially complied with the requirements.
2) Still, Tapere contends that his arrest resulted from an instigation, not from a legitimate entrapment. He insists that
poseur buyer Salgado, then acting as a covert PDEA civilian agent or informant, a fact unknown to him, made him
purchase the ​shabu ​for Salgado. Hence, being instigated to sell the ​shabu,​ he was entitled to be acquitted because
the instigation was an absolutory cause.
Instigation takes place when a peace officer induces a person to commit a crime. Without the inducement, the crime would
not be committed. Hence, it is exempting by reason of public policy; otherwise, the peace officer would be a co-principal. It
follows that the person instigating must not be a private person, because he will be liable as a principal by inducement. On
the other hand, entrapment signifies the ways and means devised by a peace officer to entrap or apprehend a person who
has committed a crime. With or without the entrapment, the crime has been committed already. Hence, entrapment is not
mitigating. Although entrapment is sanctioned by law, instigation is not. The difference between the two lies in the origin of
the criminal intent – in entrapment, the ​mens rea ​originates from the mind of the criminal, but in instigation, the law officer
conceives the commission of the crime and suggests it to the accused, who adopts the idea and carries it into execution.​25
In light of the foregoing differentiation between instigation and entrapment, the Court rejects the contention of Tapere for
its being contrary to the established facts.
RULE 114: BAIL
1) Leviste V. CA, GR No. 189122, March 2010
In our jurisdiction, the trend towards a strict attitude towards the allowance of bail pending appeal is anchored on the
principle that judicial discretion — particularly with respect to extending bail — should be exercised not with laxity but
with caution and only for strong reasons.
Facts
Antonio Leviste was charged before the Makati RTC for murder. He was convicted for the lesser crime of homicide. Pending
appeal, ​he filed an urgent application for admission to bail, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the
absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.
CA denied his application for bail invoking bedrock principle that the discretion to extend bail pending appeal should be
exercised “with grave caution and only for strong reasons.”
Leviste questioned the denial under Rule 65 citing Rule 114, Section 5, par 3 in that, ​if any such circumstance is present, then
bail will be denied. Otherwise, bail will be granted pending appeal.
Issue
Whether or not bail pending appeal is automatically granted absent any of the five bail-negating circumstances mentioned in
Rule 114, Section 5, paragraph 3.
Ruling
Grant of bail, pending appeal, even absent the five or similar circumstances cited in Rule 114, Section 5, par 3, is not
automatic.
Leviste’s theory reduces the appellate court into a mere fact-finding body whose authority is limited to determining whether
any of the five circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 exists. This unduly constricts its
"discretion" into merely filling out the checklist of circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 in all instances
where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years.
Citing Justice Regalado, ​under the present revised Rule 114, the availability of bail to an accused (pending appeal) may be
summarized in the following rules:
1. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more
than 20 years is imposed, and not one of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is
present and proved, bail is a matter of discretion (Sec. 5);
2. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court imposing a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more
than 20 years, and any of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is present and
proved, no bail shall be granted by said court (Sec. 5); x x x (emphasis supplied)
In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in
the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail. An
application for bail pending appeal may be denied even if the bail-negating circumstances in the third paragraph of Section
5, Rule 114 are absent. In other words, the appellate court’s denial of bail pending appeal where none of the said
circumstances exists does not, by and of itself, constitute abuse of discretion.
Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending appeal should be viewed from the perspective
of two stages: (1) the determination of discretion stage, where the appellate court must determine whether any of the
circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether or not the appellate court
will exercise sound discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2) the exercise
of discretion stage where, assuming the appellant’s case falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of sound
discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph
of Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity and justice; on the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail.
On the other hand, if the appellant’s case falls within the second scenario, the appellate court’s stringent discretion requires
that the exercise thereof be primarily focused on the determination of the proof of the presence of any of the circumstances
that are prejudicial to the allowance of bail. This is so because the existence of any of those circumstances is by itself
sufficient to deny or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically
result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach.
In short, petitioner’s interpretation severely curbs the discretion of the appellate court by requiring it to determine a singular
factual issue — whether any of the five bail-negating circumstances is present.
Moreover, to limit the bail-negating circumstances to the five situations mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule
114 is wrong. By restricting the bail-negating circumstances to those expressly mentioned, petitioner applies the ​expressio
unius est exclusio alterius rule in statutory construction. However, the very language of the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule
114 contradicts the idea that the enumeration of the five situations therein was meant to be exclusive. The provision
categorically refers to "the following or other similar circumstances." Hence, under the rules, similarly relevant situations
other than those listed in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 may be considered in the allowance, denial or
revocation of bail pending appeal.
Ratio
In our jurisdiction, the trend towards a strict attitude towards the allowance of bail pending appeal is anchored on the
principle that judicial discretion — particularly with respect to extending bail — should be exercised not with laxity but with
caution and only for strong reasons.
Judicial discretion has been defined as "choice." Choice occurs where, between "two alternatives or among a possibly infinite
number (of options)," there is "more than one possible outcome, with the selection of the outcome left to the decision
maker." On the other hand, the establishment of a clearly defined rule of action is the end of discretion. Thus, by severely
clipping the appellate court’s discretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere fact-finding body in applications for bail
pending appeal in all instances where the penalty imposed by the trial court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six
years, petitioner’s theory effectively renders nugatory the provision that "upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary."

2) PEOPLE vs. LUIS PLAZA G.R. No. 176933
FACTS: ​Raising only questions of law, the People’s petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision of the CA which
affirmed the Order of the RTC fixing bail for the temporary liberty of Luis Bucalon Plaza who was indicted for Murder. The
defense contended that in view of Judge Buyser’s ruling that the prosecution evidence is sufficient to prove only Homicide,
he could be released on bail. He thus prayed that the bail bond for his temporary liberty be fixed at ​P​40,000.00 which he
claimed was the usual bond for Homicide in the RTC of Surigao City and Surigao del Norte.
In its Opposition to Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond, the prosecution contended that the case being for Murder, it is
non-bailable as the imposable penalty is ​reclusion temporal to death; that it is the public prosecutor who has exclusive
jurisdiction to determine what crime the accused should be charged with; that the accused should have filed a
motion/application to bail and not just a motion to fix the amount of the bail bond; that the accused had already waived his
right to apply for bail at that stage of the proceedings; that Judge Buyser’s March 14, 2002 Order, being a mere opinion and
not a ruling or a dispositive part thereof, produced no legal effect inasmuch as it had no jurisdiction to rule on a matter
outside the Demurrer; and that under the Rules, the prosecution could still prove the existence of treachery on rebuttal after
the defense has rested its case.
ISSUE: ​Is bail available to an accused charged of a capital offense before conviction?
HELD: ​Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, provides that all persons in custody shall, before
conviction by a regional trial court of an offense not punishable by death, ​reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be
admitted to bail as a matter of right.
The exercise by the trial court of its discretionary power to grant bail to an accused charged with a capital offense thus
depends on whether the evidence of guilt is strong. “[W]hen bail is discretionary, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise
in the discretion of the court, should first be conducted to determine the existence of strong evidence or lack of it, against
the accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence presented by the parties. A summary
hearing is defined as “such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and
consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for the purposes of bail.”
The People’s recourse to Section 5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to support its contention that
respondent should be denied bail is unavailing, for said Section clearly speaks of an application for bail filed by the accused
after​ a judgment of conviction has already been handed down by the trial court.
3) WINSTON MENDOZA vs. FERNANDO ALARMA G.R. No. 151970
FACTS:
● Spouses Fernando and Fausta Alarma (respondents) are the owners of an 11.7-hectare parcel of land
(land) located in Iba, Zambales.
● The land was posted as a property bond for the provisional liberty of a certain Joselito Mayo, charged
with illegal possession of firearms
● When the accused failed to appear in court as directed on 19 March 1984, the trial court ordered his
arrest and the confiscation of his bail bond in favor of the government.
● It also directed the bondsmen to produce within a period of 30 days the person of the accused and to
show cause why judgment should not be entered against the bail bond. However, without a judgment
being rendered against the bondsmen, the trial court issued a writ of execution against the land in an
Order dated 14 April 1986.
● The land was eventually sold at public auction and petitioners Winston Mendoza and Fe Miclat emerged
as the highest bidders. Thus, the land was awarded to petitioners and they immediately took possession
of the same.
● Sometime thereafter, respondents filed a complaint for recovery of property against petitioners with the
Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales
● During the pre-trial conducted on 3 May 1988, the parties agreed that the property would be placed in
the possession of respondents
RTC: the court rendered its decision dismissing the complaint and declaring that the Order dated 14 April 1986 was a
judgment on the bond.
CA:​ the appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court and nullified the proceedings on the execution
Hence, this petition for certiorari
ISSUE​: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding a defect in the proceedings and in ordering the annulment of OCT No.
O-7249.
HELD: NO
Section 21, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the procedure to be followed before a bail
bond may be forfeited and judgment on the bond rendered against the surety.
In Reliance Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. Amante, Jr., we outlined the two occasions upon which the trial court judge may
rule adversely against the bondsmen in cases when the accused fails to appear in court.
First,​ the non-appearance by the accused is cause for the judge to summarily declare the bond as forfeited. ​Second, the
bondsmen, after the summary forfeiture of the bond, are given 30 days within which to produce the principal and to show
cause why a judgment should not be rendered against them for the amount of the bond.
It is only after this 30-day period, during which the bondsmen are afforded the opportunity to be heard by the trial court,
that the trial court may render a judgment on the bond against the bondsmen. Judgment against the bondsmen cannot be
entered unless such judgment is preceded by the order of forfeiture and an opportunity given to the bondsmen to produce
the accused or to adduce satisfactory reason for their inability to do so.
In the present case, it is undisputed that the accused failed to appear in person before the court and that the trial court
declared his bail forfeited. The trial court gave the bondsmen, respondents in this case, a 30-day period to produce the
accused or a reasonable explanation for their non-production.
However, two years had passed from the time the court ordered the forfeiture and still no judgment had been rendered
against the bondsmen for the amount of the bail. Instead, an order of execution was issued and the property was put up for
sale and awarded to petitioners, the highest bidders.
These turn of events distinctly show that there was a failure of due process of law. The execution was issued, not on a
judgment, because there was none, but simply and solely on the declaration of forfeiture.
An order of forfeiture of the bail bond is conditional and interlocutory, and merely requires the appellant “to show cause
why judgment should not be rendered against it for the amount of the bond.” This is different from judgment on the bond.
The judgment on the bond is the one that ultimately determines the liability of the surety, and when it becomes final,
execution may issue at once. However, in this case, no such judgment was ever issued and neither has an amount been fixed
for which the bondsmen may be held liable.
4) ENRILE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 213847
FACTS:
● On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others with plunder in the
Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations under
the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF).
● On June 10, 2014 and June 16, 2014, Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus Motion and Supplemental Opposition,
praying, among others, that he be allowed to post bail should probable cause be found against him.
● On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its resolution denying Enrile’s motion, particularly on the matter of bail,
on the ground of its prematurity considering that Enrile had not yet then voluntarily surrendered or been placed
under the custody of the law. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile.
● On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily surrendered to Director Benjamin
Magalong of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and was later on
confined at the Philippine National Police (PNP) General Hospital following his medical examination.
● Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital, and his Motion to Fix Bail. In support
of the motions, Enrile argued that he should be allowed to post bail because: (a) the Prosecution had not yet
established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) although he was charged with plunder, the penalty as to
him would only be reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua; and (c) he was not a flight risk, and his age and
physical condition must further be seriously considered.
● On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its first assailed resolution denying Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail (See
Annex). On August 8, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its second assailed resolution to deny Enrile’s motion for
reconsideration (MFR) filed vis- à-vis the July 14, 2014 resolution. Hence, this petition.
● Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as matter of right; that it is the duty
and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile comes under the exception (i.e.,
Offense punishable by Reclusion Perpetua + Evidence of guilt strong); that the Prosecution has not come forward
with proof showing that his guilt for the crime of plunder is strong; and that he should not be considered a flight
risk taking into account that he is already over the age of 90, his medical condition, and his social standing.
ISSUE: ​W/N Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail
HELD: YES
1. BAIL PROTECTS RIGHT OF ACCUSED TO DUE PROCESS AND TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT
Presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is safeguarded by the constitutional right
to be released on bail. The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever
so required by the trial court. The amount of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused
when so required, but it should be no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. Thus, bail acts as a
reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s interest in his provisional liberty before or during the
trial, and the society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence at trial.
2. BAIL MAY BE GRANTED AS A MATTER OF RIGHT OR DISCRETION
The general rule is, any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is
charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the
evidence of his guilt is strong. Once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall
be recognized.
On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment or (2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section
5, Rule 114 is present (See Annex).
3. ADMISSION TO BAIL IN OFFENSES PUNISHED BY DEATH, OR LIFE IMPRISONMENT, OR RP IS SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL
DISCRETION
For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is strong in criminal cases
involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the
discretion of the trial court. Such discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree
of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty (Concerned
Citizens v. Elma) It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion on
the part of the trial court unless there has been a hearing with notice to the Prosecution.
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of evidence and reasonable opportunity for
the prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature and circumstances of the crime, character and reputation
of the accused, the weight of the evidence against him, the probability of the accused appearing at the trial,
whether or not the accused is a fugitive from justice, and whether or not the accused is under bond in other cases.
HEARING DETERMINES W/N EVIDENCE OF GUILT AGAINST ACCUSED IS STRONG
It is highly doubtful if the trial court can appreciate these guidelines in an ex-parte determination where the Fiscal
is neither present nor heard. The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, in the discretion of the
court, should primarily determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. In resolving
 bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral,
(See Annex).
4. ENRILE’S POOR HEALTH JUSTIFIES HIS ADMISSION TO BAIL
We do not determine now the question of whether or not Enrile’s averment on the presence of the two mitigating
circumstances could entitle him to bail despite the crime alleged against him being punishable with reclusion
perpetua, simply because the determination, being primarily factual in context, is ideally to be made by the trial
court.
Nonetheless, in now granting Enrile’s petition for certiorari, the Court is guided by the earlier mentioned principal purpose of
bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The Court is
further mindful of the Philippines’ responsibility in the international community arising from the national commitment under
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of
every person which is enshrined in Sec II, Art II of the Constitution. The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of
protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can
participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order
their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person
under detention such remedies, which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be
admitted to bail. This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity
of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees
upon a clear and convincing showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that
there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.
ENRILE’S SOCIAL AND POLITICAL STANDING, VOLUNTARY SURRENDER INDICATE THAT RISK OF HS FLIGHT IS UNLIKELY
In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the authorities upon his being
charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition
from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes
of this country. Also, many years ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder,
he already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the
pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation in both his public and his private lives,
his long years of public service, and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted bail.
ENRILE’S FRAGILE HEALTH IS ANOTHER COMPELLING REASON TO GRANT BAIL
The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another compelling justification for his admission to bail, but which the
Sandiganbayan did not recognize.
In his testimony in the Sandiganbayan, Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical conditions, singly or collectively,
could pose significant risks to the life of Enrile, to wit: (1) uncontrolled hypertension, because it could lead to brain or heart
complications, including recurrence of stroke; (2) arrhythmia, because it could lead to fatal or non-fatal cardiovascular
events, especially under stressful conditions; (3) coronary calcifications associated with coronary artery disease, because
they could indicate a future risk for heart attack under stressful conditions; and (4) exacerbations of ACOS, because they
could be triggered by certain circumstances (like excessive heat, humidity, dust or allergen exposure) which could cause a
deterioration in patients with asthma or COPD.
Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that Enrile’s advanced age and ill health required special medical attention.
His confinement at the PNP General Hospital, albeit at his own instance, was not even recommended by the officer-in-charge
(OIC) and the internist doctor of that medical facility because of the limitations in the medical support at that hospital.
BAIL REGARDLESS OF CRIME CHARGED SHOULD BE ALLOWED IF INCARCERATION ENDANGERS HIS LIFE
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed independently of the
merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his
life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive
incarceration during the trial.
GRANTING BAIL TO ENRILE NOT UNPRECEDENTED
Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not unprecedented. In Dela Rama v. The People’s Court:
“[U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the particular case, the illness of the prisoner, independently of the merits
of the case, is a circumstance, and the humanity of the law makes it a consideration which should, regardless of the charge
and the stage of the proceeding, influence the court to exercise its discretion to admit the prisoner to bail;”
GRANTING BAIL WILL GIVE HIM ACCESS TO BETTER TREATMENT AND THUS GUARANTEE HIS APPEARANCE AT TRIAL
It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to have his medical condition be
properly addressed and better attended to by competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his
adequate preparation of his defense but, more importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.
CONCLUSION
Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the appearance of the accused during the trial; and
unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile health and advanced age of Enrile. As such, the Sandiganbayan
gravely abused its discretion in denying Enrile’s Motion To Fix Bail.
5) GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG vs. OLALIA G.R. No. 153675
RULE 115: RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
1.) BRIONES vs. PEOPLE GR No. 152009
FACTS
● S/G Dabbin Molina (S/G Molina) is a security guard of Fuentes Security and Allied Services, owned by
Johnny Fuentes (Fuentes). n the course of his employment with the security agency, S/G Molina was
issued a .38 caliber revolver (firearm).
 ● On Jan. 6, 1998, at around 11:00 p.m., S/G Molina and S/G George Gual (S/G Gual) were manning the
northwest gate of BF Homes Northwest, Parañaque. Somewhere on Jakarta Street, they noticed Romulo
Bersamina (a homeowner) being mauled by 4 individuals, 2 of whom were later identified as the accused
Rommel Briones (Rommel) and his brother, Vicente Briones (Vicente), who were both residents of BF
Homes.
● S/G Molina and S/G Gual approached the group to stop the mauling; it was at this point that S/G Molina
lost his firearm to Rommel. How he lost it – whether there was accompanying violence or intimidation –
is the submitted issue in this case.
● S/G Molina subsequently reported the incident to his supervisor, Arthur Alonzo, and to SPO1 Manuel
Plete. The police arrested Rommel after conducting an investigation.
● However, Rommel denied any participation in the mauling and the firearm grabbing, and claimed that he
was in his house when the incident happened.
● On Jan. 8, 1998, a criminal information was filed against Rommel before the RTC of Parañaque for
robbery​. It states that Rommel ​“with intent to gain and against the will of the complainant S/G Dabbin
Molina, and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously divest from him a .38 cal. gun worth P8,000, more or less.”
● With the assistance of counsel, Rommel pleaded "not guilty.” (denial and alibi)
RTC Ruling– Guilty of ​simple theft​, as the elements of violence and intimidation – the attendant circumstances that must be
present in the crime of robbery – were not duly proven. RTC gave greater weight to the prosecution’s evidence consisting of
the positive testimony of S/G Gual. The RTC found that the principal prosecution witness, S/G Gual, merely testified that he
(Briones) grabbed the firearm of S/G Molina.
Appeal to CA: ​Briones argued that:
(1) his conviction was based solely on the testimony of S/G Gual who was not present at the scene and did not really see
what happened; and
(2) he cannot be convicted of simple theft under a criminal charge of robbery.
CA Ruling – Robbery; The CA turned down Briones’ arguments and ruled that S/G Gual’s testimony is a credible eyewitness’
account of the incident. S/G Gual was also categorical in his testimony; ​t​he defense did not even try to impugn his
credibility as a witness since it opted not to cross-examine him.
Briones thereafter filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, Motion for New Trial and Motion to Dismiss, and
Supplemental Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, Motion for New Trial and Motion to Dismiss (collectively, Omnibus
Motion)
ISSUE:
(1) Whether a new trial is justified under the circumstances; and
(2) Whether there are factual and legal bases to support his conviction of the crime of robbery.
RULING:
(1) Whether a new trial is justified under the circumstances. NO.
Under the present facts, Briones’ defenses of denial and alibi were without corroboration.
On the contrary, Briones and his new counsel desperately now move to try the case again ​at the expense of Briones’ former
counsel;​ based on allegedly newly discovered evidence. They blame the former counsel’s allegedly erroneous legal strategy
when he raised denial and alibi as Briones’ defenses, instead of invoking self-defense or defense of a relative.
An error or mistake committed by a counsel in the course of judicial proceedings is not a ground for new trial.
It has been repeatedly enunciated that "a client is bound by the action of his counsel in the conduct of a case and cannot be
heard to complain that the result might have been different if he proceeded differently. A client is bound by the mistakes of
his lawyer. If such grounds were to be admitted as reasons for reopening cases, there would never be an end to a suit so
long as new counsel could be employed who would allege and show that prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent or
experienced or learned. x x x Mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of a witness, the sufficiency, relevancy or
irrelevancy of certain evidence, the proper defense, or the burden of proof, x x x failure to introduce certain evidence, to
summon witnesses, and to argue the case are not proper grounds for a new trial, unless the incompetency of counsel is so
great that his client is prejudiced and prevented from properly presenting his case. (​People v. Mercado)
From the facts, it does not appear that Briones was denied competent legal representation in the proceedings before the
RTC.
(2) Whether there are factual and legal bases to support his conviction of the crime of ​robbery.
We agree with the RTC that only the crime of ​THEFT ​was committed in the case as S/G Gual's testimony does not show that
violence or intimidation attended the taking of the firearm; S/G Gual only testified that Briones merely grabbed the firearm
and ran away with it.
Under the circumstance, we are left to consider the nature of the crime committed, as proven by the evidence on record.
Thus, we can only convict Briones for the crime of theft for taking S/G Molina’s firearm without his consent. Theft is
produced the moment there is deprivation of personal property due to its taking with intent to gain.​36
In arriving at this conclusion, we are keenly aware that the accused was indicted under a charge for robbery, not theft.
The failure to specify the correct crime committed, however, will not bar Briones’ conviction for the crime of theft.​37 The
character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the information, or by the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated. The crime committed is determined by the recital of the ultimate facts and
circumstances in the complaint or information.​38 In this case, the allegations in the Information are sufficient to make out a
charge of theft.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated July 17, 2002 and Resolution dated
November 13, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 24127 are hereby MODIFIED. Petitioner Rommel Briones is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of THEFT under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. He
is sentenced to suffer a straight penalty of imprisonment of four (4) months of arresto mayor.
2.) DANTE T. TAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 173637
FACTS: ​A Panel of Prosecutors of the DOJ, on behalf of the People, filed 3 Informations against Dante Tan before RTC Pasig.
Crim Case (CC) No. 1198303 pertains to allegations that Tan employed manipulative devises in the purchase of Best World
Resources Corp. (BW) shares. On the other hand, CC Nos. 1198314 and 1198325 involve the alleged failure of Tan to file with
the SEC a sworn statement of his beneficial ownership of BW shares.
In 2 other related cases, 2 Informations were filed against Jimmy Juan and Eduardo Lim for violation of the Revised
Securities Act involving BW shares of stock. (CC Nos. 119828 and 119829)
On the same day, the DOJ, through Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Nilo C. Mariano, filed a Motion for Consolidation praying
that CC Nos. 119830, 119831 and 119832 be consolidated together with 119828 and 119829, which the RTC granted.
On Dec. 21, 2000, all of the 5 Criminal Cases were raffled off to the Pasig RTC, Br. 153. Tan was arraigned on Jan. 16, 2001,
and pleaded not guilty to the charges. On Feb. 6, 2001, the pre-trial was concluded, and a pre-trial order set, the first date of
trial is on Feb. 27, 2001.
The People insists that during the pendency of the initial hearing, the parties agreed that CC Nos. 119831 and 119832 would
be tried ahead of CC No. 119830, and that Tan would not interpose any objection to its manifestation, nor would the RTC
disapprove it.
Thereafter, the People presented evidence for CC Nos. 119831 and 119832. On Sept. 18, 2001, the prosecution completed
the presentation of its evidence and was ordered by the RTC to file its formal offer of evidence within 30D. After being
granted extensions to its filing of a formal offer of evidence, the prosecution was able to file said formal offer for the
aforementioned Criminal Cases.
Tan moved to dismiss CC No. 119830 due to the People’s alleged failure to prosecute. Claiming violation of his right to
speedy trial, Tan faults the People for failing to prosecute the case for an unreasonable length of time and without giving any
excuse or justification for the delay​. According to Tan, he was persistent in asserting his right to speedy trial, which he had
allegedly done on several instances. Finally, he claimed to have been substantially prejudiced by this delay.
The prosecution opposed the Motion, insisting on its claim that the parties had an earlier agreement to defer the trial of CC
No. 119830 until after that of CC Nos. 119831-119832, as the presentation of evidence and prosecution in each of the 5
cases involved were to be done separately. The presentation of evidence in CC Nos. 119831-119832, however, were done
simultaneously, because they involved similar offenses of non-disclosure of beneficial ownership of stocks proscribed under
Rule 36(a)-19 in relation to Secs. 32(a)-110 and 5611 of the "Revised Securities Act." Criminal Case No. 119830 pertains to
alleged violation of Sec. 27 (b), in relation to Section 56 of said act.
RTC ruled that the delays which attended the proceedings of CC No. 119830 were vexatious, capricious and oppressive,
resulting in violation of Tan’s right to speedy trial. Hence, the dismissal of CC No. 119830. The prosecution’s MR was also
denied.
On appeal, CA granted the petition and held that CC No. 119830 is reinstated. RTC is ordered to conduct further proceedings
in said case immediately. Tan’s MR and motion for inhibition of the Justices who decided the case were both denied by the
CA. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether there was a violation of Dante Tan’s right to speedy trial.
2. Whether the petition for certiorari violated Tan’s right against double jeopardy.
RULING:
1. NO.
An accused’s right to "have a speedy, impartial, and public trial" is guaranteed in criminal cases by Sec. 14(2) Article III of the
Constitution. This right to a speedy trial may be defined as ​one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays​, its
"​salutary objective​" being ​to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or,
if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and
consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. On the evolution of the right to speedy trial, SC reiterate
the old legal maxim, "​justice delayed is justice denied.​ " This oft-repeated adage requires the expeditious resolution of
disputes, much more so in criminal cases where an accused is constitutionally guaranteed the right to a speedy trial.
RA 8493 or "The Speedy Trial Act of 1998," was enacted, with Sec. 6 of said act limiting the trial period to 180D from the 1st
day of trial. Aware of problems resulting in the clogging of court dockets, the Court implemented the law by issuing SC
Circular No. 38-98, which has been incorporated in the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, Sec. 2 Rule 119.
The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against him was designed to prevent the
oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in
the administration of justice by mandating the courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. Such
right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays. The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied such right is not susceptible
by precise qualification.
In determining ​whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial,​
four factors must be considered: (a) ​length of delay​; (b) the ​reason for the delay​; (c) the ​defendant’s assertion of his right;​
and (d) ​prejudice to the defendant.​
From the initial hearing until the time the prosecution filed its formal offer of evidence for CC Nos. 119831-119832, both
prosecution and defense admit that no evidence was presented for CCC 119830. Hence, for almost 2Y and 8 months, the
prosecution did not present a single evidence for CC No. 119830.
The question SC have to answer now is whether there was vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delay. To this, SC apply the
four-factor test.
SC emphasize that in determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts are required to do more than a mathematical
computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. A mere mathematical reckoning of the
time involved is clearly insufficient, and particular regard must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
Tan’s objection to the prosecution’s stand that he gave an implied consent to the separate trial of CC No. 119830 is belied by
the records of the case. No objection was interposed by his defense counsel when this matter was discussed during the
initial hearing. Tan’s conformity thereto can be deduced from his non-objection at the preliminary hearing when the
prosecution manifested that the evidence to be presented would be only for CC Nos. 119831-119832. ​His failure to object to
the prosecution’s manifestation that the cases be tried separately is fatal to his case​. The acts, mistakes and negligence of
counsel bind his client, except only when such mistakes would result in serious injustice. In fact, Tan’s acquiescence is
evident from the TSN during the initial presentation of the People’s evidence in the 5 BW cases.
As to the assertion that delay in the presentation of evidence for CC No. 119830 has prejudiced Tan because the witnesses
for the defense may no longer be available at this time, suffice it to say that the burden of proving his guilt rests upon the
prosecution. Should the prosecution fail for any reason to present evidence sufficient to show his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, Tan will be acquitted.
In the cases involving Tan, the length of delay, complexity of the issues and his failure to invoke said right to speedy trial at
the appropriate time tolled the death knell on his claim to the constitutional guarantee. More importantly, in failing to
interpose a timely objection to the prosecution’s manifestation during the preliminary hearings that the cases be tried
separately, one after the other, Tan was deemed to have consented and waived his objection thereto.
There is clearly insufficient ground to conclude that the prosecution is guilty of violating Tan’s right to speedy trial​. Grave
abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but generally refers to "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." Any capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment in dismissing a criminal case is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. This is true in the instant case.
2. No. There is also no merit to Tan’s claim that a reversal of the RTC’s Order dismissing CC No. 119830 is a violation of his
constitutional right against double jeopardy which dismissal was founded on an alleged violation of his right to speedy trial.
The constitutional protection against double jeopardy shields one from a 2nd or later prosecution for the same offense. Art.
III, Sec. 21 of the 1987 Constitution declares that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense, providing further that if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
For double jeopardy to attach, the following elements in the 1st criminal case must be present:
(a) The complaint or information or other formal charge was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction;
(b) The court had jurisdiction;
(c) The accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and
(d) ​He was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused
Among the above-cited elements, the 4th element is crucial since, as a gen. rule, the ​dismissal of a criminal case resulting in
acquittal, made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion, will not place the accused in double
jeopardy​. This rule, however, admits of 2 exceptions, namely: ​insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to speedy trial.
While indeed Tan was in fact the one who filed the Motion to Dismiss CC No. 119830, the dismissal thereof was due to an
alleged violation of his right to speedy trial, which would otherwise put him in double jeopardy should the same charges be
revived. Tan’s situation is different. Double jeopardy has not attached, considering that the dismissal of CC No. 119830 on
the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial was without basis and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Where the right of the accused to speedy trial has not been violated, there is no reason to
support the initial order of dismissal.
Where the dismissal of the case was allegedly capricious, certiorari lies from such order of dismissal and does not involve
double jeopardy, as the petition challenges not the correctness but the validity of the order of dismissal; such grave abuse of
discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction, which prevents double jeopardy from attaching.
Dismissal of cases on the ground of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of
the accused for the same offense. These dismissals were predicated on the clear right of the accused to speedy trial.
From the foregoing, it follows that Tan cannot claim that double jeopardy attached when said RTC order was reversed by CA.
Double jeopardy does not apply to this case, considering that there is no violation of Tan’s right to speedy trial.
The rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields, not weapons. Courts are tasked to give
meaning to that intent.
SC dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision and resolution of the CA. The instant case is remanded to RTC Pasig, Br.
153, for further proceedings in CC No. 119830 with reasonable dispatch.
3.) PEOPLE vs. BENIGNO G.R. No. 181246
Doctrine​: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused is entitled to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.
Brief Summary: ​Appellant Begino, the common law husband of BBB was charged with statutory rape for having carnal
knowledge with 8 y/o AAA, daughter of BBB. RTC found him guilty of statutory rape aggravated by the fact that the victim is
below eighteen (18) years old and that the offender is the common law husband of BBB, which CA affirmed. The Court ruled
that the Begino may not be indicted for qualified rape. The Information alleged that Begino is the stepfather of AAA,
however, it was proven that he was only the common law husband of BBB. It would deny the accused of his right to be
informed if he is convicted of qualified rape.
FACTS:
● Appellant Remeias Begino, stepfather of complainant AAA was charged with rape for having carnal knowledge with the
8 y/o girl against her consent on August 2, 1994 at Sitio WWW.
Prosecution:
● AAA testified when she was 14 y/o, stating the ff. –
○ She was born on Feb 28, 1986
○ That on Aug 2, 1994 she and Begino were alone in their house. Begino was sharpening his bolo, while AAA’s
mother BBB was out of the house.
○ Begino closed all doors and windows of the house and approached AAA and removed her shirt, panties, and bra.
○ Begino forcefully committed the act while AAA fought to resist the same. AAA felt pain and blood oozed out of
her vagina. After satisfying himself, appellant warned AAA that he would kill her and her mother BBB if she would
tell anybody about the incident.
○ AAA only told her mother of the incident on November 1998. She claimed she was raped 4 times (when she was
8 y/o, in Gr. 3, Gr. 4, and Gr. 5)
○ BBB brought AAA to DSWD where she was interviewed.
○ A medical examination was conducted and Dr. Barasona explained that the lacerations on AAA's hymen were
caused by penetrations of an erected and turgid sex organ.
○ AAA also testified that she had stopped studying since 1998. She felt ashamed of what happened to her and
transferred to Daet.
Defense:
● Begino presented himself, Camilo Begino (first cousin). And Reynaldo Esturas as witnesses.
● He denied the accusations and claimed that AAA and her siblings were treated like his own children.
● He claimed to have only started living with BBB in 1991.
● The accusation was also a ploy to get rid of him because BBB was already romantically linked with the Chief of the DAR in
Daet.
● He also claimed that from 6:00am to 6:00pm of Aug 2, 1994 he was at the coconut plantation of Apolinario Malaluan
with Camilo and Reynaldo husking coconuts. He never left the plantation even for lunch because the distance of the
house from the plantation was 2 KM which would require a 30 min. walk.
● Witnesses corroborated the testimony.
RTC: found Begino guilty of statutory rape aggravated by the fact that the victim is below eighteen (18) years old and that
the offender is the common law husband of BBB. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. He was likewise ordered
to pay the victim ₱75,000 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000 as moral damages, and ₱30,000 as exemplary damages. Moreover,
there were inconsistencies in the testimonies of the defense witnesses. Camilo testified that he owned the coconut
plantation where appellant worked but he was not certain as to the exact date appellant went to work at the coconut
plantation. Reynaldo testified that appellant worked at the coconut plantation of Apolinario and not in the alleged coconut
plantation of Camilo, Lastly, it took only 30 minutes to walk going to appellant's house from the coconut plantation where he
was husking. The trial court ruled that it was not physically impossible for appellant to have been at the scene of the crime at
the time of its commission.
CA:​ affirmed RTC but reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE​: Whether or not the Appellant Begino is guilty of rape – YES, but not in the qualified form.
RULING:​: We agree with the findings and conclusion of the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, that, as the
evidence undoubtedly proved, rape was committed by appellant against AAA.
The trial court found appellant guilty of "statutory rape aggravated by the fact that the victim is below eighteen (18) years
old" and "the offender is the common law husband" of the mother of the victim. Thus, it imposed the death penalty
pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article 266-B. The appellate court agreed with the trial court but reduced the penalty imposed
from death to reclusion perpetua. However, we hold that appellant could not be indicted for qualified rape and penalized
under paragraph 1 of Article 266-B.
● Under Article 266-B, paragraph 1, the death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed when the
victim is under 18 years old and the offender is a "parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim." This
Court has ruled that the circumstances that qualify a crime should be alleged and proved beyond reasonable doubt
as the crime itself.
● The age of the victim and her relationship with the offender must be both alleged in the information and proven
during the trial, otherwise, the death penalty cannot be imposed.
The age of the victim was sufficiently proved. AAA was undeniably below 18 years old at the time she was raped. Although
she claimed she was born on 28 February 1986, her birth certificate and the Social Case Study Report showed that she was
born on 28 March 1986. The rape was committed on 2 August 1994 or when AAA was eight years and four months old.
However, the Information stated that appellant is the "stepfather" of AAA. A "stepfather" is the husband of one's mother by
virtue of a marriage subsequent to that of which the person spoken of is the offspring. It presupposes a legitimate
relationship between the appellant and the victim's mother. The evidence adduced by the prosecution showed that
appellant is not the stepfather of AAA but the common law spouse of BBB, mother of AAA.
● RTC found that appellant and BBB were not married and therefore he is not the stepfather of AAA. During the trial,
AAA, when asked why she kept calling appellant "Tiyo," testified that appellant is the third husband of her mother
and that the name of her real father is CCC, who at that time was in Manila. She explained that her mother lived
separately from CCC since she was eight months old and on 2 August 1994, her mother was living with appellant.
Her birth certificate and the Social Case Study Report likewise showed that her father is CCC, not appellant. CCC
was married to BBB and appellant was never married to BBB. There was no proof of marriage between BBB and
appellant.
Since appellant is not the stepfather of AAA, the prosecution's failure to prove the qualifying circumstance bars conviction
for rape in its qualified form.
What the prosecution clearly proved was that appellant was the common law spouse of BBB, but such circumstance was not
alleged in the Information.
As we have ruled in People v. Garcia, qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded in the indictment. If the same are
not pleaded but proved, they shall be considered only as aggravating circumstances since the latter admit of proof even if
not pleaded.
It would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him and consequently, a denial of due
process, if he is charged with simple rape and be convicted of its qualified form, although the attendant circumstance
qualifying the offense and resulting in the capital punishment was not alleged in the indictment on which he was arraigned.
The qualifying circumstance of relationship not having been properly pleaded, appellant should be convicted only of
statutory rape under paragraph (d) of Article 266-A, for having carnal knowledge of a woman "under twelve (12) years of
age." Statutory rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua.
W/N Olbes’ right to speedy trial was violated because he was not brought to trial within 80 days from his arraignment.
HELD:
NO. A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels the court to approach
speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis. In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy
disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) reason for the delay; (c)
the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant. Also, speedy trial is a relative and flexible term.
The limits set by the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 do not thus preclude justifiable postponments and dealys when so warranted
by the situation. The resetting of the pre-trial to Oct. 23 appears to have been occassioned by oversight or simple negligence
which, standing alone, does not prove fatal to the prosecution’s case.
5.) RAFAEL COSCOLLEULLA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 191411
FACTS: ​Coscolluela served as governor of the Province of Negros Occidental (Province) for three (3) full terms which ended
on June 30, 2001.

Dispositive Portion: Wherefore, we find appellant REMEIAS BEGINO y GRAJO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of The Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas received a letter-complaint requesting to investigate the anomalous purchase
statutory rape and sentence him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is further ordered to pay the victim ₱50,000 of medical and agricultural equipment for the Province in the amount of P20M which allegedly happened around a month
as civil indemnity, ₱50,000 as moral damages, and ₱30,000 as exemplary damages. before Coscolluela stepped down from office.

The Ombudsman conducted its investigation, resulting in the upgrade of the complaint into a criminal case against
4.) OLBES vs. HON. BUEMIO G.R. No. 173319 petitioner.​ ​Consequently, petitioner filed their respective counter-affidavits.

FACTS:
March 27, The assigned Graft Investigation Officer prepared a Resolution (March 27, 2003 Resolution) finding
● Federico Miguel Olbes was indicted for Grave Coercion.
2003 probable cause against petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) of the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
● Olbes posted bailed and was released. Denying his motion to defer or suspend his arraignment in light of his
Act,” recommended the filing of the information.
pending petition for review before the DOJ, Judge dela Vega proceeded with his arraignment, in which he pleded
not guilty.
The Information was prepared and signed by the Graft Investigation Officer and submitted to Deputy
● Pre-trial was set to May 28, however, was declared a non-working day due to the occurence of the typhoon
Ombudsman for the Visayas for recommendation.
“Chedeng”. Pre-trial was reset to Oct. 23, 2003.
● At the scheduled pre-trial, Olbes failed to appear, prompting the trial court to issue a warrant for his arrent, which
warrant was, however, later recalled on discovery that neither petition nor his counsel was notified of said
schedule. Pre-trial again was reset to Jan. 21, 2004.
● Before the scheduled pre-trial, Olbes filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of violation of his right to a speedy
trial. June 5, Deputy Ombudsan recommended the approval of the Information.
● He argued that he was not without any fault on his part - brought to trial within 80 days from the date he was 2003
arraigned, but this case should be dismissed.
● Judge Buemio denied Olbes’ Motion to Dismiss. Holding that Olbes played a big part in the delay of the case, and
that technical rules of procedure were meant to secure, not override, substantial justice. May 21, Final approval of Acting Ombudsman
2009
ISSUE:

June 19, The Information was finally filed
2009
Petitioners alleged that they learned about the March 27, 2003 Resolution and Information only when they received a copy
of the latter shortly after its filing with the SB.
Coscolluela filed a Motion to Quash, ​arguing, among others, that his constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases was
violated as the criminal charges against him were resolved only after almost eight (8) years since the complaint was
instituted.
In reply, the respondents filed their Opposition to Motion to Quash​13 dated August 7, 2009, explaining that although the
Information was originally dated March 27, 2003, it still had to go through careful review and revision before its final
approval. It also pointed out that petitioners never raised any objections regarding the purported delay in the proceedings
during the interim.
ISSUE: ​Was the petitioner’s constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases violated?
HELD:​ YES.
A person’s right to the speedy disposition of his case is guaranteed under Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution. It must be noted, however, that the right to speedy disposition of cases should be understood to be a relative
or flexible concept such that a mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not be sufficient. Hence, in the
determination of whether the defendant has been denied his right to a speedy disposition of a case, the following factors
may be considered and balanced: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert
such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.
First​, it is observed that the preliminary investigation proceedings took a protracted amount of time to complete (8 years).
Second,​ the delay in the Ombudsman’s resolution of the case largely remains unjustified.
Third​, the Court deems that petitioners cannot be faulted for their alleged failure to assert their right to speedy disposition
of cases. ​Petitioner in this case, not have urged the speedy resolution of their case because they were completely unaware
that the investigation against them was still on-going​. ​After giving their explanation and after four long years of being in the
dark, petitioners, naturally, had reason to assume that the charges against them had already been dismissed.
Fourth​, the Court finally recognizes the prejudice caused to the petitioner by the lengthy delay in the proceedings against
them.
There is already prejudice if the defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately the events of the distant past. Even if the
accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of
anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His financial resources may be drained, his association is curtailed, and he is subjected
to public scorn​.
CASE DISMISSED.
RULE 116: ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA
1.) DAAN vs. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 163972-77
The acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable by the accused as a matter or right but is a
matter that is addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court. However, the court’s exercise of its discretion
should neither be arbitrary nor should it amount to a capricious and whimsical exercise of discretion.
FACTS
Petitioner-accused Joselito Raniero J. Daan (Daan) together with Municipal Mayor Benedicto E. Kuizon of Bato, Leyte (Mayor
Kuizon) were charged with three counts of malversation of public funds involving sums of P3,293.00, P1,869.00, and
P13,528.00, respectively, for concealing by falsifying the time book and payrolls for given period, making it appear that some
laborers worked on the construction of the new municipal hall building and collected their respected salaries thereon when
they did not. In addition, they were also indicted for three counts of falsification of public document by a public officer or
employee.
In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of not guilty and substitute the same with a plea of
guilty, provided the mitigating circumstances of confession or plea of guilt and voluntary surrender will be appreciated in his
favor, and if such proposal is not acceptable, he proposed to substitute their plea of not guilty to said crime with a plea of
guilty, but to the lesser crime of falsification of a public document by a private individual. Likewise, in the malversation cases,
the accused also offered to substitute his plea of not guilty with a plea of guilty to the lesser crime of failure of an
accountable officer to render accounts.
Insofar as the falsification cases are concerned, the prosecution found the proposal of the accused to plead guilty to the
lesser crime of falsification of public document by a private individual acceptable as it will strengthen their cases against the
principal accused, Mayor Kuizon, who appeared to be the mastermind behind the criminal acts. Similarly, insofar as the
malversation cases are concerned, the prosecution was amendable to the offer of said accused to plead guilty to the lesser
crime of failure of an accountable officer to render accounts since Daan already restituted the total amount of P18,860.00
issued by the provincial government.
However, respondent Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s Motion to Plea Bargain, despite favorable recommendation by the
prosecution, on the main ground that no cogent reason was presented to justify its approval. The Motion for
Reconsideration of said Resolution was also denied. Hence, this present case for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Daan’s plea bargaining offer.
RULING
Yes. ​Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory
disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant’s pleading to a lesser offense or to only
one or some of the counts of multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge. Section
2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure authorize this. Accordingly, at arraignment, the accused with the
consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead to a lesser offense which is
necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead
guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty.
Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 118 of the Rules of
Court require plea bargaining to be considered by the trial court at the pre-trial conference. But it may also be made during
the trial proper and even after the prosecution has finished presenting its evidence and rested its case. Thus, it is immaterial
that the plea bargaining was not made during the pre-trial stage or that it was made only after the prosecution already
presented several witnesses.
Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents the basic requisites upon which plea bargaining may be made: (1) that it
should be made with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor; and (2) that the plea of guilt should be to a
lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. ​The rules however used the word “may” in the second
sentence of Section 2, denoting an exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused to make
such plea.
But as regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, as in the present case, the trial court’s exercise of its discretion
should neither be arbitrary nor should it amount to a capricious and whimsical exercise of discretion. ​In the present case,
the Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner’s plea offer on the ground that petitioner and prosecution failed to demonstrate that
the proposal would redound to the benefit of the public. Respondent believed that approving the proposal would only serve
to trivialize the seriousness of the charges against them and send the wrong signal to potential grafter in public office.
While the Sandiganbayan proffered valid reasons in rejecting petitioner’s plea offer, subsequent events and higher
interests of justice and fair play dictate that petitioner’s plea offer should be accepted. ​The present case called for the
judicious exercise of the Court’s equity jurisdiction. Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do
complete justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power adapt their judgments to the
special circumstances, are incompetent so to do.
In ​People of the Philippines v. Estrada,​ the Sandiganbayan approved the Plea Bargaining Agreement entered into by the
prosecution and one of the accused, Charlie “Atong” Ang. The agreement provided that the accused undertakes to assist in
the prosecution of the case and promises to return the amount of P25,000,000.00. In approving said Agreement, the
Sandiganbayan took into consideration the timeliness of the plea bargaining and whether the agreement complied with the
requirements of Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court. The Court saw no reason why the standards applied by the
Sandiganbayan to ​Estrada ​should not be applied to the present case despite favorable recommendation by the Office of the
Special Prosecutor to approve petitioner’s motion to plea bargain.
There was no dispute that petitioner-accused Daan voluntarily surrendered in the present case. Moreover, the accused is
also willing to plead guilty to lesser offense which merits consideration. With respect to the falsification cases, the act of the
accused in pleading guilty for a lesser offense of falsification by private individual will strengthen the cases against the
principal accused, Mayor Kuizon. Afterall, petitioner herein was merely designated as draftsman detailed as
foreman/timekeeper of the Municipality of Bato, Leyte. Moreover, said lesser offenses of falsification by private individuals
and failure to render account by an accountable officer are necessarily included in the crimes of falsification of public
documents and malversation of public funds, respectively.​[1]
Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court states that an offense may said to necessarily include another when some of the
essential elements or ingredients of the former as alleged in the complaint or information constitute the latter. And vice
versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
In this case, the allegations in the Informations filed against petitioner are sufficient to hold petitioner liable for the lesser
offenses. Thus, in the charge of falsification of public documents, petitioner may plead guilty to the lesser offense of
falsification by private individuals inasmuch as it does not appear that petitioner took advantage of his official position in
allegedly falsifying the timebook and payroll of the Municipality of Bato, Leyte. In the same vein, with regard to the crime of
malversation of public funds, while the Informations contain allegations which make out a case for malversation against
petitioner, nevertheless, absent the element of conversion, theoretically, petitioner may still be held liable for failure to
render account by an accountable officer if it is shown that the failure was in violation of a law or regulation that requires
him to render such an accounting within the prescribed period.
Given that some of the essential elements of offenses charged in this case likewise constitute the lesser offenses, then
petitioner may plead guilty to such lesser offenses. It must be noted that petitioner is not an accountable officer in that the
nature of his duty as foreman/timekeeper does not permit or require possession or custody of local government funds, not
to mention that he already restituted the amount involved in this case. Thus, under the peculiar circumstances of the
present case, where gross inequity will result in a discriminatory dispensation of justice, the Court did not hesitate to
intervene in order to equalize the imbalance.
WHEREFORE​, the petition is ​GRANTED​. The Resolution dated 25 March 2004 and 31 May 2004 are ​SET ASIDE​. The
Sandiganbayan is hereby ​ORDERED to grant petitioner’s Motion to Plea Bargain. Let records of this case be ​REMANDED to
the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
[1]​
Under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), for the crime of falsification of public documents through
an untruthful narration of facts to be established, the following elements must concur: (a) the offender makes in a document
untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) the offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts
narrated; (c) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and (d) the perversion of truth in the narration of facts
was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person.
On the other hand, falsification by private individuals under Article 172, paragraph 1 of the RPC has the following elements:
(a) the offender isa private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position; (b)
the offender committed any acts of falsification enumerated under Article 171 of the RPC; and (c) the falsification was
committed in a public or official or commercial document.
As regards the crime of malversation of public funds under Artile 217 of the RPC, the elements are as follows: (a) the
offender is a public officer; (b) he has custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (c) the
funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and (d) he has appropriated, taken or
misappropriated, or has consented to, or through abandonment or negligence permitted, the taking by another person of
such funds or property.
Meanwhile, under Article 218 of the RPC, failure to render account by an accountable officer, the lesser offense which
petitioner seeks to plead guilty of, the following elements must concur: (a) the offender is a public officer; (b) the offender
must be an accountable officer for public funds or property; (c) the offender is required by law or regulation to render
accounts to the COA or to a provincial auditor; and (d) the offender fails to render account for a period of two months after
such accounts should be rendered.
2.) PEOPLE vs. JANJALANI G.R. No. 188314
FACTS:
● An RRCG bus was plying its usual southbound route, from its Navotas bus terminal towards its Alabang
bus terminal ​via EDSA. While they were about to move out of the Guadalupe-EDSA southbound bus stop,
the bus conductor noticed two men running after the bus. The two insisted on getting on the bus, so the
conductor obliged and let them in.
● According to the bus conductor (Andales) he immediately became wary of the two men, the two sat
away from each other one sat two seats behind the driver, while the other sat at the back of the bus. At
the time, there were only 15 passengers inside the bus. He also noticed that the eyes of one of the men
were reddish.
● Andales said he became more certain that the two were up to no good, and that there might be a
holdup.
● Afterwards, Andales said he became more suspicious because both men kept on asking him if the bus
was going to stop at Ayala Avenue. The witness also noticed that the man at the back appeared to be
slouching, with his legs stretched out in front of him and his arms hanging out and hidden from view as if
he was tinkering with something.
● As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the corner of Ayala Avenue and EDSA, the two men insisted
on getting off the bus. According to Andales, the bus driver initially did not want to let them off the bus,
because a Makati ordinance prohibited unloading anywhere except at designated bus stops.
● Eventually, the bus driver gave in and allowed the two passengers to alight. The two immediately got off
the bus and ran towards Ayala Avenue. Moments after, Andales felt an explosion. He then saw fire
quickly engulfing the bus. He ran out of the bus towards a nearby mall. After a while, he went back to
where the bus was. He saw their bus passengers either lying on the ground or looking traumatized.
● A few hours after, he made a statement before the Makati Police Station narrating the whole incident.
● The prosecution presented documents confirming that shortly before the explosion, the spokesperson of
the Abu Sayyaf announced over radio station DZBB that the group had a Valentine’s Day “gift” for former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
● During pretrial, accused Trinidad gave ABS-CBN News Network an exclusive interview confessing his
participation in the Valentine’s Day bombing incident.
● In another exclusive interview on the network, accused Baharan likewise admitted his role in the
bombing incident. Finally, accused Asali gave a television interview, confessing that he had supplied the
explosive devices for the valentines day bombing.
● The bus conductor identified the accused Baharan and Trinidad, and confirmed that they were the two
men who had entered the RRCG bus on that day.
● Members of the Abu Sayyaf Group were then charged with multiple murder and multiple frustrated
murder.
● Only Baharan, Trinidad, Asali, and Rohmat were arrested, while the other accused remain at-large.
● On their arraignment for the multiple murder ​charge Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all entered a plea of
guilty.
● On the other hand, upon arraignment for the m ​ ultiple frustrated murder charge accused Asali pled
guilty. Accused Trinidad and Baharan pled not guilty. Rohmat pled not guilty to both charges.
● In the light of the pretrial stipulations, the trial court asked whether accused Baharan and Trinidad were
amenable to changing their “not guilty” pleas to the charge of multiple frustrated murder, considering
that they pled “guilty” to the heavier charge of multiple murder, creating an apparent inconsistency in
their pleas.
● After the Information was read to them, Baharan and Trinidad pled guilty to the charge of ​multiple
frustrated murder
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in accepting Trinidad and Baharan plea of guilt despite insufficiency of
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the said plea.
HELD: ​We have reiterated in a long line of cases that the conduct of a searching inquiry remains the duty of judges, as they
are mandated by the rules to satisfy themselves that the accused had not been under coercion or duress; mistaken
impressions; or a misunderstanding of the significance, effects, and consequences of their guilty plea. This requirement is
stringent and mandatory.
The Court observes that accused Baharan and Trinidad previously pled guilty to another charge—multiple murder—based on
the same act relied upon in the multiple frustrated murder charge. The Court further notes that prior to the change of plea
to one of guilt, accused Baharan and Trinidad made two other confessions of guilt—one through an extrajudicial confession
(exclusive television interviews, as stipulated by both accused during pretrial), and the other via judicial admission (pretrial
stipulation). Considering the foregoing circumstances, we deem it unnecessary to rule on the sufficiency of the “searching
inquiry” in this instance. Remanding the case for re-arraignment is not warranted, as the accused’s plea of guilt was not the
sole basis of the condemnatory judgment under consideration.
3.) RAMISCAL vs. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 172476-99
FACTS​: Petitioner Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr. was a retired officer of the AFP, with the rank of Brigadier General, when he served as
President of the AFP-Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS). During petitioners term as president of
AFP-RSBS, the Board of Trustees of AFP-RSBS approved the acquisition of 15,020 square meters of land for development as
housing projects.
AFP-RSBS executed and signed bilateral deeds of sale over the subject property, at the agreed price of P10,500.00 per square
meter. Petitioner forthwith caused the payment to the individual vendors of the purchase price of P10,500.00 per square
meter of the property. Subsequently, Flaviano executed and signed unilateral deeds of sale over the same property. The
unilateral deeds of sale reflected a purchase price of only P3,000.00 per square meter instead of the actual purchase price of
P10,500.00 per square meter. Flaviano presented the unilateral deeds of sale for registration. The unilateral deeds of sale
became the basis of the transfer certificates of title issued by the Register of Deeds to AFP-RSBS.
Luwalhati R. Antonino, Congresswoman filed in the Ombudsman a complaint-affidavit against petitioner, along with 27 other
respondents, for (1) violation of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; and (2)
malversation of public funds or property through falsification of public documents. After preliminary investigation, the
Ombudsman found petitioner probably guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and falsification of public documents.
Ombudsman filed in the Sandiganbayan 12 informations for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and 12 informations for
falsification of public documents against petitioner and several other co-accused.
Petitioner filed his first motion for reconsideration with a supplemental motion of the Ombudsmans finding of probable
cause against him.
Office of the Special Prosecutor (OMB-OSP) recommended that petitioner be excluded from the informations. On review,
the Office of Legal Affairs (OMB-OLA) recommended the contrary, stressing that petitioner participated in and affixed his
signature on the contracts to sell, bilateral deeds of sale, and various agreements, vouchers, and checks for the purchase of
the subject property.
OMB-Military recommended the dropping of petitioners name from the informations. Acting Ombudsman Margarito
Gervacio approved the recommendation of the OMB-Military. However, the recommendation of the OMB-Military was not
manifested before the Sandiganbayan as a final disposition of petitioners first motion for reconsideration. The panel of
prosecutors concluded that probable cause existed for petitioners continued prosecution. Meanwhile, Petitioner filed his
second motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause against him.
Petitioner was arraigned. For his refusal to enter a plea, the Sandiganbayan entered in his favor a plea of not guilty.
Petitioner filed a motion to set aside his arraignment pending resolution of his second motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsmans finding of probable cause against him.
SGB Ruling: Petitioner’s second motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause against him was a
prohibited pleading. Whatever defense or evidence petitioner may have should be ventilated in the trial of the case. The
Sandiganbayan denied for lack of merit petitioners motion to set aside his arraignment.
ISSUE: Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners motion to set aside his
arraignment pending resolution of his second motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause
against him?
RULING:​ No.
Respondent Sandiganbayan counters that it correctly denied petitioners motion to set aside his arraignment. Respondent
court argues that petitioners motion for reconsideration and pending with the Ombudsman at the time of his arraignment,
violated Section 7, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended. Respondent court
maintains that the memorandum of the panel of prosecutors finding probable cause against petitioner was the final decision
of the Ombudsman.
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order No. 15, Series of 2001,
sanction the immediate filing of an information in the proper court upon a finding of probable cause, even during the
pendency of a motion for reconsideration.
If the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the resolution finding probable cause cannot bar the filing of the
corresponding information, then neither can it bar the arraignment of the accused, which in the normal course of criminal
procedure logically follows the filing of the information.
An arraignment is that stage where, in the mode and manner required by the Rules, an accused, for the first time, is granted
the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. The accused is formally informed of the charges against him,
to which he enters a plea of guilty or not guilty.
Under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known as the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, the court must proceed with the
arraignment of an accused within 30 days from the filing of the information or from the date the accused has appeared
before the court in which the charge is pending, whichever is later.
Section 1(g), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court and the last clause of Section 7 of RA 8493 mean the same thing, that the 30-day
period shall be counted from the time the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, which is when the
accused appears before the court.
The grounds for suspension of arraignment are provided under Section 11, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which applies
suppletorily in matters not provided under the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman or the Revised Internal
Rules of the Sandiganbayan, thus:
Sec. 11. Suspension of arraignment. Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in the following
cases:
1. The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable to
fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his
mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose.
2. There exists a prejudicial question; and
 3. petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department of Justice, or the Office
of the President; provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of
the petition with the reviewing office.
Petitioner failed to show that any of the instances constituting a valid ground for suspension of arraignment obtained in this
case. Thus, the Sandiganbayan committed no error when it proceeded with petitioners arraignment, as mandated by Section
7 of RA 8493.
Further, as correctly pointed out by the Sandiganbayan in its assailed Resolution, petitioners motion for reconsideration filed
was already his second motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause against him. The
Ombudsman, in its 19 December 2005 memorandum, has already denied petitioners first motion for reconsideration,
impugning for the first time the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause against him. Under Section 7, Rule II of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner can no longer file another motion for reconsideration questioning yet
again the same finding of the Ombudsman. Otherwise, there will be no end to litigation.
We agree with the Sandiganbayan that petitioners defenses are evidentiary in nature and are best threshed out in the trial
of the case on the merits. Petitioners claim that the Ombudsman made conflicting conclusions on the existence of probable
cause against him is baseless. The memorandum of the OMB-Military, recommending the dropping of the cases against
petitioner, has been effectively overruled by the memorandum of the panel of prosecutors.
As the final word on the matter, the decision of the panel of prosecutors finding probable cause against petitioner prevails.
This Court does not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause. The Ombudsman is endowed with
a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory prerogatives in the exercise of its power to pass upon criminal complaints.
Significantly, while it is the Ombudsman who has the full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be
filed in the Sandiganbayan, once the case has been filed with said court, it is the Sandiganbayan, and no longer the
Ombudsman, which has full control of the case.
In this case, petitioner failed to establish that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it denied petitioners motion to set aside his arraignment. There is grave abuse of discretion when
power is exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so
patent and gross as to amount to evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.
Absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion, this Court will not interfere with the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction and control
over a case properly filed before it. The Sandiganbayan is empowered to proceed with the trial of the case in the manner it
determines best conducive to orderly proceedings and speedy termination of the case. There being no showing of grave
abuse of discretion on its part, the Sandiganbayan should continue its proceedings with all deliberate dispatch.
Notes:
Alba v. Hon. Nitorreda: Moreover, this Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the exercise by the
Ombudsman of his constitutionally mandated investigatory and prosecutory powers. Otherwise stated, it is beyond the
ambit of this Court to review the exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed
before it. Such initiative and independence are inherent in the Ombudsman who, beholden to no one, acts as the champion
of the people and preserver of the integrity of the public service.
​Ocampo, IV v. Ombudsman (rationale behind this policy): The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and
prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise,
the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory
proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way
that the courts would be extremely swamped if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of
the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private
complainant.
Republic v. Sandiganbayan: mere filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court does not by itself merit
a suspension of the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan, unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction has been issued against the Sandiganbayan.
4.) PEOPLE vs DOCUMENTO, G.R. No. 188706, March 17, 2010
Doctrine
Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial
court relied on sufficient and credible evidence in finding the accused guilty, the judgment must be sustained, because then it
is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but also on evidence proving his commission of the offense charged.
Facts
Documento was charged before the RTC with 2 counts of Rape, as defined and punished underArticle 335 of the Revised
Penal Code. He was accused of raping his daughter AAA, a minor, 16years of age. One information was for the alleged rape
committed on April 22, 1996 at Ochoa Avenue, Butuan City, and another information was for the alleged rape committed on
October15, 1995 at Barangay Antongalon, Butuan City. Upon arraignment, Documento pled not guilty. Subsequently,
however, he changed his earlier plea to one of guilt. Thus, the RTC ordered a re-arraignment and entered appellant’s plea of
guilt to the charges.
Thereafter, the prosecution presented evidence consisting of the testimonies of private complainant herself, AAA, her
mother, BBB, and DR. Johann Hugo which established that Documento raped AAA.Documento testified as the sole witness
for the defense. He asseverated that he p pled guilty to the crime of Rape only because Prosecutor Salise convinced him to
do so. Documento contended that he did not rape AAA, and that, to the contrary, they had a consensual, sexual relationship.
He further alleged that the incident did not happen in Butuan City, but in Clarin, Misamis Occidental. Finally, on
cross-examination, Documento disowned the handwritten letters he had supposedly written to his wife and to AAA, asking
for their forgiveness. The RTC convicted Documento of both counts of Rape. CA affirmed.
Issue
Whether or not the Court gravely erred in failing to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension by accused of the consequences of his plea
Ruling
It is true that the appellate court noted the trial court’s failure to conduct the prescribed "searching inquiry" into the matter
of whether or not Documento’s plea of guilt was improvidently made. Nonetheless, it still found the conviction of appellant
proper.
Nothing in the records of the case at bench shows that the trial court complied with the guidelines set forth by the Supreme
Court in a number of cases after appellant’s re-arraignment and guilty plea. The questions propounded to appellant during
the direct and cross-examinations likewise fell short of these requirements. The appellant was not duly apprised of the
consequences of his guilty plea.
In fact, as argued by appellant, "the trial court should have informed him that his plea of guilt would not affect or reduce the
imposable penalty, which is death as he might have erroneously believed that under Article 63, the death penalty, being a
single indivisible penalty, shall be applied by the court regardless of any mitigating circumstances that might have attended
the commission of the deed." Moreover, the trial court judge failed to inform appellant of his right to adduce evidence
despite the guilty plea.
With the trial court’s failure to comply with the guidelines, appellant’s guilty plea is deemed improvidently made and thus
rendered inefficacious. This does not mean, however, that the case should be remanded to the trial court. This course of
action is appropriate only when the appellant’s guilty plea was the sole basis for his conviction.
Notwithstanding the incautiousness that attended appellant’s guilty plea, the court chose not to remand the case to the trial
court as suggested by appellant.
Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial
court relied on sufficient and credible evidence in finding the accused guilty, the judgment must be sustained, because then it
is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but also on evidence proving his commission of the offense charged.
5.) KUMMER vs. PEOPLE G.R. No. 174461
FACTS: ​The CA decision affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) finding the petitioner and her co-accused
Freiderich Johan I. Kummer guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.
Prosecution's evidence revealed that on June 19, 1988 Jesus Mallo, Jr., accompanied by Amiel Malana, went to the house of
the petitioner. Mallo knocked at the front door with a stone and identified himself by saying, "Auntie, ako si Boy Mallo.” The
petitioner opened the door and at this point, her son and co-accused, Johan, using his left hand, shot Mallo twice using a gun
Malana, who was with Mallo and who witnessed the shooting, immediately ran towards the west, followed by Mallo. When
Malana turned his back, he saw the petitioner leveling and firing her long gun at Mallo, hitting the latter's back and causing
him to fall flat on the ground.
The prosecution filed an information for homicide against the petitioner and Johan. Both accused were arraigned and
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. They waived the pre-trial, and the trial. The petitioner claims that she was not
arraigned on the amended information for which she was convicted. The records of the case evidently show that the
amendment in the complaint was from July 19, 1988 to June 19, 1988, or a difference of only one month.
ISSUE: ​Whether or not the amendment was substantial or formal.
HELD: ​Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court permits a formal amendment of a complaint even after the plea but only if
it is made with leave of court and provided that it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. A mere
change in the date of the commission of the crime, if the disparity of time is not great, is more formal than substantial. Such
an amendment would not prejudice the rights of the accused since the proposed amendment would not alter the nature of
the offense. It is not even necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at which the offense was
committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense.
Arraignment is indispensable in bringing the accused to court and in notifying him of the nature and cause of the accusations
against him. The importance of arraignment is based on the constitutional right of the accused to be informed. This however
pertains only to substantial amendments and not to formal amendments that, by their very nature, do not charge an offense
different from that charged in the... original complaint or information; do not alter the theory of the prosecution; do not
cause any surprise and affect the line of defense; and do not adversely affect the substantial rights of the accused, such as an
amendment in the date of the commission of the offense.
RULE 117: MOTION TO QUASH
Herrera and Maraino v. Sandiganbayan GR No. 119660-61 (2009)
Liezl Co v. Harold go GR No. 164669-70 (2009)
People v. Odtuhan GR No. 191566 (2013)
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp v. Romars International Gases Corp. GR No. 189669 (2015)
Galzote v. Briones GR No. 164682 (2009)
RULE 118: PRE TRIAL
Estiposa, Jr. v. Judge Lobrigo GR No. 226679 (2017)
RULE 119: TRIAL
Asistio v. People GR No. 200465 (2015)
Vda. De Manguerra v. Risos GR No. 152643 (2008)
People v. Sandiganbayan GR No. 185729-32 (2013)
Ampatuan v. Sec. De Lima GR No. 197291 (2013)

Olbes v. Hon. Buemio GR No. 173319 (2009)