Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. by Robert O. Keohane; Joseph S.

Nye
Review by: Peter F. Cowhey
Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 93, No. 1 (Spring, 1978), pp. 132-134
Published by: The Academy of Political Science
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132 | POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

rather the political organization of capitalism in nation-state form. "Capitalism has pro-
duced an obsession . . . with being the most or least 'advanced' nation" (p. 266). The sub-
ordination of a national population to the goal of becoming an advanced nation, as well
as the imperialist tendency of capitalism, derive from the "egotistical" or invidious qual-
ity of the nation-state (p. 251). Consequently, social democratic reform which avoids the
Scylla of communism and the Charybdis of statism is the only possible passage to so-
cialism. Not surprisingly, therefore, Revel thought of giving his book the "didactic"
title: "Of the Inevitable Advance of Stalinism in the World and the Sure Failure of the Ef-
forts That Will Be Made to Oppose It" (p. 285). So much for a future "without Marx or
Jesus."
In other words, this is trivial, pop-journalistic reformism, a thinly disguised defense of
capitalism. It takes serious issues and reduces them to their most banal forms. The rela-
tion of reform to revolution is a serious issue, as is the relation of the nation-state to an
increasingly transnational, world economic system. The psychology of totalitarian ad-
herency is likewise an important subject. Moreover, it is possible to write intelligently on
these and the other topics which appear in this book from differing political perspec-
tives. One learns a great deal, after all, from a discerning political opponent. But Revel
has learned,only the elementary lessons taught by his friends and foes, and therefore has
little to teach us.
EUGENE VICTOR WOLFENSTEIN
University of California, Los Angeles

Power and Interdependence:World Politics in Transition by Robert 0. Keohane

and Joseph S. Nye. Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1977. 273 pp.
Cloth, $11.95; paper, $5.95.
Since RobertKeohaneand JosephNye's initialwork on transnationalrelationsin 1971,
their analysishas developed from a description of the elementsof an interdependent
politicalsystem, one in which nonstate actors and governmentbureaucracieswere in-
creasinglyimportant in international to
affairs, a theoreticaltreatmentof the consequences
of complexinterdependence for politicalleadership and regime maintenanceandchange.
and
In Power Interdependence they develop four models to explain"regimes,"that is,
the rulesof the gamegoverning decision making and operations in internationalrelations
on particularproblems, like money, or between specifiedcountries, like Canadaand the
United States. Each model has differentpredictions about regimestability, the likely
instruments of statepower,agendaformation,and issuelinkage.In the "economicprocess"
model regimesreflectefforts to maximizeeconomic gains, and states shift policies to
matcheconomicdynamics.The "structural" modelarguesthat the internationaldistribu-
tion of power(andthusthe dominantpowers)shapesthe regime'sworkingsand contents.
This approachis modified in the "issuestructural"model which suggeststhat the fit
betweenthe powerbalancespecificto a givenissueand the overallglobalpowerconfigu-

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 BOOK REVIEWS | 133

ration determines regimes. In the "international organization" model transnational net-

works and particular bargaining tactics dominate regime operations.
Using the histories of monetary and ocean regimes and American relations with
Canada and Australia, Keohane and Nye conclude that, as complex interdependence
increases, the saliency of issue structural and international organizational models rises.
And complex interdependence occurs when the use of force is a negligible factor; there
is no clear hierarchy among state goals; and states have very numerous channels of
contact. While warning that no unilinear trend toward complex interdependence exists,
they argue that its increase means that the United States must seek more collective
leadership arrangements to cope with world problems and emphasize positive-sum strate-
gies for coordinating all major actors.
This brief synopsis omits many important hypotheses developed in the book. But it
does suggest the book's importance, richness, ingenuity, and care in presenting competing
explanations. It is also well written. In short, it is a major contribution to the literature.
Nonetheless, I have three reservations about the work.
First, the study's tests of rival models are sometimes unsatisfactory. For example, it
argues that a structural model that predicts influence within regimes should conform to
the international structure. I doubt this. A structuralprediction would argue that influence
within regimes should conform to structure if the issue is highly salient to the top powers.
And issues are salient only if they appear to threaten fundamental security or prosperity.
Thus most ocean space issues may not be vital to the United States while international
monetary anarchy may be, thereby explaining the latter's closer conformity to a structural
model.
Second, one can challenge the authors' idea of regime by examining their conceptual-
ization of a "non-regime." (The concept of "quasi-regime" is treated too briefly to be
useful.) Keohane and Nye argue that abandonment of substantial compliance with existing
rules without major agreement on new rules, like resort to de facto floating rates
from 1971 to 1975, constitutes a "non-regime." This implicitly suggests that stable, co-
operative positive-sum games exhaust the regime category. But this fails to capture a
large set of cases, including the monetary situation just mentioned, involving games with
limited cooperation in the form of consultation and commitment to avoid serious crisis.
Put differently, the regime concept covers only strong cooperation and thus does not
illuminate limited ordering arrangements so common to international politics. And this
limit leads to a third difficulty.
The ultimate question confronting grand theory's necessary simplification of reality is
"why is the theory needed?" The initial justification here seems compelling, the need to
clarify the consequences of complex interdependence. But then one wonders whether
"regime" is a useful organizing concept for this purpose. Knowing that a regime exists
tells little theoretically about the consequences for the actual management of a given
economic or technological problem. Knowing it exists under complex interdependence
helps only if one has confidence in predictions about the effects of interdependence on
agenda setting or issue linkage or leadership. Unfortunately, this may be the weakest part
of the case because the particular rules and mechanics of regimes make the general pre-
dictions very fragile guides.

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134 | POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

Correction of these problems will require considerable reworking of the theory. Few
books are intellectuallypowerful enough to enrich a field by serving as a target for criticism
and correction. This is one of them.
PETER F. COWHEY
University of California, San Diego

Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commit-

ment by Irving Janis and Leon Mann. New York, The Free Press, 1977.
488 pp. $15.95.
This is a disappointingyet worthwhilebook. Disappointingbecauseit is wordy, is diffi-
cult to apply to politicaldecisionmaking,and becauseit fails to addressmany important
questions;worthwhile(especiallythe firstfour chapters)becauseit is one of the few books
to pull together much of the researchin this area, to present a thought-provoking
model, and to focus on the question of the conditions under which various thinking
processes(forexample,defensiveavoidance)occurratherthan to take the less satisfactory
approachof seekingunconditionalandunboundedgeneralizations.
The authorsisolatefour defectivepatternsof copingwith informationthat is discrepant
with prevailingbelief and policies-unconflicted inertia, unconflictedchange to a new
course of action, defensive avoidance of the implicationsof the information,hyper-
vigilance(panic)-and one effectivecoping pattern-vigilance (thoroughsearchfor in-
formation,carefulconsiderationof relevantfactors,and thoughtfulweighingof alterna-
tives). It is quite probablethat thesepatternsare distinct,but thereremainsa disturbing
elementof subjectivityin determininghow any given decisionshouldbe classified.I also
suspectthatmanycasesmay fall on the borderlines.
In what is probablytheirmost importantcontribution,Janisand Mannarguethat the
five patternsare associatedwith differentanswersthat the person gives to a series of
questions.If he feels thereare no seriousrisksfrom his currentpolicy, he will respond
by unconflictedinertia.If he feels thereare risks in continuing,but none in adoptinga
new policy, he will changewithout experiencingconflict. If he feels the currentpolicy
is failing,but no alternativeis available,he will cope by defensiveavoidance.If he thinks
theremay be a good alternativebut lacks time to searchfor it, he will be hypervigilant.
Only if he sees risksin both his presentpolicy and the obvious alternativeto it, believes
thereis a superiorcourseof action, and has sufficienttime to think, will he be properly
vigilant. This conflictmodel, as the authorscall it, incorporatesthe first two stages of
a five stagemodelof decisionmaking,the last stagesbeingtheweighingof the alternatives,
deliberatingaboutcommitment,and adheringto the decisionin the face of setbacks.
Althoughthesemodelscan help us understandsome decisions,thereare severalprob-
lems. First,the authorsdo not presentconvincingevidencethatmost decisionsfollow the
stagesthey set forth. They acknowledgethat the sequenceis not "anironcladlaw," but
rather "a useful framework,"(p. 178) yet little of their later analysis depends on it.
Most importantis theirargumentthat the impactof discrepantinformationvariesas the
decisionmakerprogressesthroughthe decision-makingprocess(pp. 180-1, 212-15), but

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