G.R. No.
100113 September 3, 1991 issue of the Business Star, that lawyers nowadays have
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA,
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON.
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary
of Budget and Management, respondents.
FACTS:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by
President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman
of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat
of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991.
Petitioner Renato Cayetano opposed the nomination
because allegedly Monsod does not possess the
required qualification of having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. Atty. Monsod has
worked as a lawyer in the law office of his father (1960-
1963); an operations officer with the World Bank Group
(1963-1970); Chief Executive Officer of an investment
bank (1970-1986); legal or economic consultant on
various companies (1986); Secretary General of
NAMFREL (1986); member of Constitutional
Commission (1986-1987); National Chairman of
NAMFREL (1987); and member of the quasi-judicial
Davide Commission (1990).
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments
confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC.On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office.
On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the
COMELEC.Challenging the validity of the confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s
nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the
instant petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that
said confirmation and the consequent appointment of
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be
declared null and void.
ISSUE
Whether or not Monsod has been engaged in the
practice of law for 10 years – YES
RULING
YES. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases or litigation in court. It embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions
and proceedings on behalf of clients, and other works
where the work done involves the determination of the
trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions (PLA vs. Agrava.) The records of the 1986
constitutional commission show that the interpretation of
the term practice of law was liberal as to consider
lawyers employed in the Commission of Audit as
engaged in the practice of law provided that they use
their legal knowledge or talent in their respective work.
The court also cited an article in the January 11, 1989
their own specialized fields such as tax lawyers,
prosecutors, etc., that because of the demands of their
specialization, lawyers engage in other works or
functions to meet them. These days, for example, most
corporation lawyers are involved in management policy
formulation. Therefore, Monsod, who passed the bar in
1960, worked with the World Bank Group from 1963-
1970, then worked for an investment bank till 1986,
became member of the CONCOM in 1986, and also
became a member of the Davide Commission in 1990,
can be considered to have been engaged in the practice
of law as lawyer-economist, lawyer-manager, lawyer-
entrepreneur, etc.
The Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Monsod possessed
the required qualification. In the case of Philippine
Lawyers Association vs. Agrava: The practice of law is
not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. In
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for
them in matters connected with the law incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services,
contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the
foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s
claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and
conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of
estate and guardianship have been held to constitute
law practice.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. “To engage in the
practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. In general, a practice of
law requires a lawyer and client relationship, it is
whether in or out of court. As such, the petition is
dismissed.
A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC March 8, 2011
RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED
"RESTORING INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE
FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE
PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE
ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND
MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT"
FACTS:
On April 28, 2010, the ponencia of Associate
Justice Mariano del Castillo (Justice Del Castillo) in
Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230)
was promulgated. On July 19, 2010, counsel for the
Malaya Lolas, Attys. H. Harry L. Roque, Jr. (Atty. Roque)
and Romel Regalado Bagares (Atty. Bagares), filed a
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No.
162230, where they posited for the first time their charge
of plagiarism as one of the grounds for reconsideration
of the Vinuya decision.
According to Attys. Roque and Bagares, the
works allegedly plagiarized in the Vinuya decision were
namely: (1) Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent’s
article "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens;" (2) Christian
J. Tams’ book Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in
International Law; and (3) Mark Ellis’ article "Breaking
the Silence: On Rape as an International Crime. On,
July 22, 2010, Justice Del Castillo wrote to his
colleagues on the Court in reply to the charge of
plagiarism contained in the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration.
In Memorandum Order No. 35-2010 issued on
July 27, 2010, the Court formed the Committee on Ethics
and Ethical Standards (the Ethics Committee) pursuant
to Section 13, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court. In an En Banc Resolution also dated
July 27, 2010, the Court referred the July 22, 2010 letter
of Justice Del Castillo to the Ethics Committee.
On August 9, 2010, a statement dated July 27,
2010, entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the
Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of
Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and
Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court" (the
Statement), was posted in Newsbreak’s website and on
Atty. Roque’s blog. A report regarding the statement
also appeared on various on-line news sites, such as the
GMA News TV and the Sun Star sites, on the same
date.
The text of the UP Law faculty Statement is
partly reproduced is as follows with emphasis:
RESTORING INTEGRITY
A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE
OF LAW
ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND
MISREPRESENTATION
IN THE SUPREME COURT
….An extraordinary act of injustice has again
been committed against the brave Filipinas who had
suffered abuse during a time of war.
XXXX --------XXXXX
…hopes crushed by a singularly reprehensible
act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest
Court of the land.
XXXX ------- XXXXX
…the High Court actually misrepresents the
conclusions of their work
XXXX ------ XXXX
…by transforming it into an act of intellectual
fraud by copying works in order to mislead and deceive.
XXXX ----- XXXX
…But instead of acting with urgency on this
case, the Court delayed its resolution for almost seven
years, oblivious to the deaths of many of the petitioners
seeking justice from the Court. When it dismissed the
Vinuya petition based on misrepresented and plagiarized
materials, the Court decided this case based on polluted
sources. By so doing, the Supreme Court added insult to
injury by failing to actually exercise its "power to urge
and exhort the Executive Department to take up the
claims of the Vinuya petitioners. Its callous disposition,
coupled with false sympathy and nonchalance, belies a
more alarming lack of concern for even the most basic
values of decency and respect.
XXXX - ---- XXXX
….clear and obvious plagiarism
XXXX ---- XXXX
….the Court cannot coldly deny relief and justice to the
petitioners on the basis of pilfered and misinterpreted
texts.
XXXX ----- XXXX
With these considerations, and bearing in mind
the solemn duties and trust reposed upon them as
teachers in the profession of Law, it is the opinion of the
Faculty of the University of the Philippine College of Law
that:
The plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya
v. Executive Secretary is unacceptable, unethical and in
breach of the high standards of moral conduct and
judicial and professional competence expected of the
Supreme Court;
The same breach and consequent disposition of
the Vinuya case does violence to the primordial function
of the Supreme Court as the ultimate dispenser of justice
to all those who have been left without legal or equitable
recourse, such as the petitioners therein;
In a Resolution dated October 19, 2010, the
Court en banc made the following observations
regarding the UP Law Faculty Statement:
Beyond this, however, the statement bore
certain remarks which raise concern for the Court. The
opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to the
institutional attack that lay ahead.
The insult to the members of this Court was
aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying the
resolution of said case, its dismissal on the basis of
“polluted sources”, the Court’s alleged indifference to the
cause of petitioners in the Vinuya case, as well as the
supposed alarming of lack of concern of the members of
the Court for even the most basic values of decency and
respect.
In the same Resolution, the Court went on to
state that:
While most agree that the right to criticize the
judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and democratic
society, there is also a general consensus that healthy
criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism leveled
at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and
irresponsible attacks. These potentially devastating
attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the
independence of the judiciary. The court must "insist on
being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its
business in an orderly manner, free from outside
interference obstructive of its functions and tending to
embarrass the administration of justice."
Thus, the Court directed the respondents to
show cause, within ten (10) days from receipt of the
copy of the Resolution, why they should not be
disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of
Canons 1, 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
On November 19, 2010, within the extension for
filing granted by the Court, respondents filed several
pleadings.
By way of explanation, the respondents
emphasized the following points:
(a) Noble intention
Respondents assert that their intention was not
to malign the Court but rather to defend its
integrity and credibility and to ensure continued
confidence in the legal system.
(b) The "correctness" of respondents’ position
that Justice Del Castillo committed
plagiarism and should be held accountable
in accordance with the standards of
academic writing
A significant portion of the Common Compliance
is devoted to a discussion of the merits of
respondents’ charge of plagiarism against
Justice Del Castillo. Relying on University of the
Philippines Board of Regents v. Court of
Appeals52 and foreign materials and
jurisprudence, respondents essentially argue
that their position regarding the plagiarism
charge against Justice Del Castillo is the correct
view and that they are therefore justified in
issuing their Restoring Integrity Statement.
(c) Respondents’ belief that they are being
"singled out" by the Court when others have
likewise spoken on the "plagiarism issue"
In the Common Compliance, respondents
likewise asserted that "the plagiarism and
misrepresentation allegations are legitimate
public issues.
(d) Freedom of expression
(e) Academic freedom
ISSUES
Based on the Show Cause Resolution and a
perusal of the submissions of respondents, the material
issues to be resolved in this case are as follows:
1.) Does the Show Cause Resolution deny
respondents their freedom of expression?
2.) Does the Show Cause Resolution violate
respondents’ academic freedom as law professors?
3.) Do the submissions of respondents
satisfactorily explain why they should not be disciplined
as Members of the Bar under Canons 1, 11, and 13 and
Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility?
4.) Does the separate Compliance of Dean
Leonen satisfactorily explain why he should not be
disciplined as a Member of the Bar under Canon 10,
Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03?
RULING
(1) No. A reading of the Show Cause Resolution
will plainly show that it was neither the fact that
respondents had criticized a decision of the Court nor
that they had charged one of its members of plagiarism
that motivated the said Resolution. It was the manner of
the criticism and the contumacious language by which
respondents, who are neither parties nor counsels in the
Vinuya case, have expressed their opinion in favor of the
petitioners in the said pending case for the "proper
disposition" and consideration of the Court that gave rise
to said Resolution. The Show Cause Resolution
painstakingly enumerated the statements that the Court
considered excessive and uncalled for under the
circumstances surrounding the issuance, publication,
and later submission to this Court of the UP Law
faculty’s Restoring Integrity Statement.
To be sure, the Show Cause Resolution itself
recognized respondents’ freedom of expression when it
stated that:
While most agree that the right to criticize the
judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and democratic
society, there is also a general consensus that healthy
criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism leveled
at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and
irresponsible attacks. These potentially devastating
attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the
independence of the judiciary. The court must "insist on
being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its
business in an orderly manner, free from outside
interference obstructive of its functions and tending to
embarrass the administration of justice."
Indeed, in a long line of cases, this Court has
held that the right to criticize the courts and judicial
officers must be balanced against the equally primordial
concern that the independence of the Judiciary be
protected from due influence or interference. In cases
where the critics are not only citizens but members of
the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed the
authority of this Court to discipline lawyers whose
statements regarding the courts and fellow lawyers,
whether judicial or extrajudicial, have exceeded the limits
of fair comment and common decency.
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal
system has tempted members of the bar to use strong
language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests
of their clients.
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present
his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm
does not justify the use of offensive and abusive
language. Language abounds with countless
possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful,
convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not
offensive.
(2) No. There is nothing in the Show Cause
Resolution that dictates upon respondents the subject
matter they can teach and the manner of their
instruction. Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the
principle of academic freedom for this Court to subject
lawyers who teach law to disciplinary action for
contumacious conduct and speech, coupled with undue
intervention in favor of a party in a pending case, without
observing proper procedure, even if purportedly done in
their capacity as teachers.
A novel issue involved in the present
controversy, for it has not been passed upon in any
previous case before this Court, is the question of
whether lawyers who are also law professors can invoke
academic freedom as a defense in an administrative
proceeding for intemperate statements tending to
pressure the Court or influence the outcome of a case or
degrade the courts.
Applying by analogy the Court’s past treatment
of the "free speech" defense in other bar discipline
cases, academic freedom cannot be successfully
invoked by respondents in this case. The implicit ruling
in the jurisprudence discussed above is that the
constitutional right to freedom of expression of members
of the Bar may be circumscribed by their ethical duties
as lawyers to give due respect to the courts and to
uphold the public’s faith in the legal profession and the
justice system. To our mind, the reason that freedom of
expression may be so delimited in the case of lawyers
applies with greater force to the academic freedom of
law professors.
It would do well for the Court to remind
respondents that, in view of the broad definition in
Cayetano v. Monsod,134 lawyers when they teach law
are considered engaged in the practice of law. Unlike
professors in other disciplines and more than lawyers
who do not teach law, respondents are bound by their
oath to uphold the ethical standards of the legal
profession. Thus, their actions as law professors must
be measured against the same canons of professional
responsibility applicable to acts of members of the Bar
as the fact of their being law professors is inextricably
entwined with the fact that they are lawyers.
(3) Yes. With respect to good faith,
respondents’ allegations presented two main ideas: (a)
the validity of their position regarding the plagiarism
charge against Justice Del Castillo, and (b) their pure
motive to spur this Court to take the correct action on
said issue.
The Court has already clarified that it is not the
expression of respondents’ staunch belief that Justice
Del Castillo has committed a misconduct that the
majority of this Court has found so unbecoming in the
Show Cause Resolution. No matter how firm a lawyer’s
conviction in the righteousness of his cause there is
simply no excuse for denigrating the courts and
engaging in public behavior that tends to put the courts
and the legal profession into disrepute. This doctrine,
which we have repeatedly upheld in such cases as
Salcedo, In re Almacen and Saberong, should be
applied in this case with more reason, as the
respondents, not parties to the Vinuya case, denounced
the Court and urged it to change its decision therein, in a
public statement using contumacious language, which
with temerity they subsequently submitted to the Court
for "proper disposition."
Whether or not respondents’ views regarding the
plagiarism issue in the Vinuya case had valid basis was
wholly immaterial to their liability for contumacious
speech and conduct. These are two separate matters to
be properly threshed out in separate proceedings. The
Court considers it highly inappropriate, if not tantamount
to dissembling, the discussion devoted in one of the
compliances arguing the guilt of Justice Del Castillo.
As for the claim that the respondents’ noble
intention is to spur the Court to take "constructive action"
on the plagiarism issue, the Court has some doubts as
to its veracity. For if the Statement was primarily meant
for this Court’s consideration, why was the same
published and reported in the media first before it was
submitted to this Court? It is more plausible that the
Statement was prepared for consumption by the general
public and designed to capture media attention as part of
the effort to generate interest in the most controversial
ground in the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
filed in the Vinuya case by Atty. Roque, who is
respondents’ colleague on the UP Law faculty.
In this regard, the Court finds that there was
indeed a lack of observance of fidelity and due respect
to the Court, particularly when respondents knew fully
well that the matter of plagiarism in the Vinuya decision
and the merits of the Vinuya decision itself, at the time of
the Statement’s issuance, were still both sub judice or
pending final disposition of the Court. These facts have
been widely publicized.
This Court takes into account the nature of the
criticism and weighs the possible repercussions of the
same on the Judiciary. When the criticism comes from
persons outside the profession who may not have a full
grasp of legal issues or from individuals whose personal
or other interests in making the criticism are obvious, the
Court may perhaps tolerate or ignore them. However,
when law professors are the ones who appear to have
lost sight of the boundaries of fair commentary and
worse, would justify the same as an exercise of civil
liberties, this Court cannot remain silent for such silence
would have a grave implication on legal education in our
country.
Thus, the 35 respondents named in the
Common Compliance should, notwithstanding their claim
of good faith, be reminded of their lawyerly duty, under
Canons 1, 11 and 13, to give due respect to the courts
and to refrain from intemperate and offensive language
tending to influence the Court on pending matters or to
denigrate the courts and the administration of justice.
(4) No. In his Compliance, Dean Leonen
essentially denies that Restoring Integrity II was not a
true and faithful reproduction of the actual signed copy,
Restoring Integrity I, because looking at the text or the
body, there were no differences between the two. He
attempts to downplay the discrepancies in the signature
pages of the two versions of the Statement (i.e.,
Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II) by
claiming that it is but expected in "live" public manifestos
with dynamic and evolving pages as more and more
signatories add their imprimatur thereto. He likewise
stresses that he is not administratively liable because he
did not misrepresent the members of the UP Law faculty
who "had agreed with the Restoring Integrity Statement
proper and/or who had expressed their desire to be
signatories thereto.
The Court cannot subscribe to Dean Leonen’s
implied view that the signatures in the Statement are not
as significant as its contents. Live public manifesto or
not, the Statement was formally submitted to this Court
at a specific point in time and it should reflect accurately
its signatories at that point.
Further, in our assessment, the true cause of
Dean Leonen’s predicament is the fact that he did not
from the beginning submit the signed copy, Restoring
Integrity I, to this Court on August 11, 2010 and, instead,
submitted Restoring Integrity II with its retyped or
"reformatted" signature pages. It would turn out,
according to Dean Leonen’s account, that there were
errors in the retyping of the signature pages due to
lapses of his unnamed staff. First, an unnamed
administrative officer in the dean’s office gave the dean
inaccurate information that led him to allow the inclusion
of Justice Mendoza as among the signatories of
Restoring Integrity II. Second, an unnamed staff also
failed to type the name of Atty. Armovit when encoding
the signature pages of Restoring Integrity II when in fact
he had signed Restoring Integrity I.
We are willing to accept that the reformatting of
documents meant for posting to eliminate blanks is
necessitated by vandalism concerns.
However, what is unusual is the submission to a
court, especially this Court, of a signed document for the
Court’s consideration that did not contain the actual
signatures of its authors. In most cases, it is the original
signed document that is transmitted to the Court or at
the very least a photocopy of the actual signed
document. Dean Leonen has not offered any explanation
why he deviated from this practice with his submission to
the Court of Restoring Integrity II on August 11, 2010.
Dean Leonen cannot claim fears of vandalism
with respect to court submissions for court employees
are accountable for the care of documents and records
that may come into their custody. Yet, Dean Leonen
deliberately chose to submit to this Court the facsimile
that did not contain the actual signatures and his silence
on the reason therefor is in itself a display of lack of
candor.
We are surprised that someone like Dean
Leonen, with his reputation for perfection and stringent
standards of intellectual honesty, could proffer the
explanation that there was no misrepresentation when
he allowed at least one person to be indicated as having
actually signed the Statement when all he had was a
verbal communication of intent to sign. In the case of
Justice Mendoza, what he had was only hearsay
information that the former intended to sign the
Statement. If Dean Leonen was truly determined to
observe candor and truthfulness in his dealings with the
Court, we see no reason why he could not have waited
until all the professors who indicated their desire to sign
the Statement had in fact signed before transmitting the
Statement to the Court as a duly signed document. If it
was truly impossible to secure some signatures, such as
that of Justice Mendoza who had to leave for abroad,
then Dean Leonen should have just resigned himself to
the signatures that he was able to secure.
In sum, the Court likewise finds Dean Leonen’s
Compliance unsatisfactory. However, the Court is willing
to ascribe these isolated lapses in judgment of Dean
Leonen to his misplaced zeal in pursuit of his objectives.
In due consideration of Dean Leonen’s professed good
intentions, the Court deems it sufficient to admonish
Dean Leonen for failing to observe full candor and
honesty in his dealings with the Court as required under
Canon 10.
G.R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959
PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of
the Philippines Patent Office, respondent.
SYLLABUS:
1. ATTORNEYS AT LAW; PRACTICE OF
LAW; BEFORE PATENT OFFICE. — Practice of law
in the Philippines includes such appearance before
the Patent Office, the representation of applicants,
oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution
of their applications for patent, their oppositions
thereto or the enforcement of their rights in patent
cases.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WITHOUT FURTHER
EXAMINATION. — A member of the bar, because of
his legal knowledge and training should be allowed
to practice before the Patent Office, without further
examination or other qualification.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; REASON. — Under the
present law, members of the Philippine Bar
authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law,
and in good standing, may practice their profession
before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of
the business in said office involves the interpretation
and determination of the scope and application of
the patent law and other laws applicable as well as
the presentation of evidence to establish facts
involved. That part of the functions of the Patent
Director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that
appeals from his orders and decision are under the
law taken to the Supreme Court.
FACTS:
On May 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular
announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an
examination for the purpose of determining who are
qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the
Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to
cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of
practice before said office. According to the circular,
members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other
persons with sufficient scientific and technical training
are qualified to take the said examination. It would
appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been
holding similar examinations.
It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's
Association that one of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's
Association that one who has passed the
bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court
to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good
standing, is duly qualified to practice before the
Philippines Patent Office, and that consequently, the act
of the respondent Director requiring members of the
Philippine Bar in good standing to take and pass an
examination given by the Patent Office as a condition
precedent to their being allowed to practice before said
office, such as representing applicants in the preparation
and prosecution of applications for patent, is in excess
of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.
ISSUES
(1) Whether or not a lawyer can be a Patent Attorney
even without taking the said examination
(2) Whether or not the respondent Director acted in
excess jurisdiction is issuing the said circular
RULING
(1) YES, a lawyer can become such without taking the
said examination. The Director of Patents, exercising as
he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is
reasonable to hold that a member of the bar, because of
his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to
practice before the Patent Office, without further
examination or other qualification. Of course, the
Director of Patents, if he deems it advisable
or necessary, may require that members of the
bar practising before him enlist the assistance of
technical men and scientists in the preparation of papers
and documents, such as, the drawing or technical
description of an invention or machine sought to be
patented, in the same way that a lawyer filing an
application for the registration of a parcel of land on
behalf of his client, is required to submit a plan and
technical description of said land, prepared by a licensed
surveyor.
(2) YES, he acted in excess of his jurisdiction. Section
551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every
chief of bureau to prescribe forms and make regulations
or general orders not inconsistent with law, to secure the
harmonious and efficient administration of his branch of
the service and to carry into full effect the laws relating to
matters within the jurisdiction of his bureau. Section 608
of Republic Act1937, known as the Tariff and Customs
Code of the Philippines, provides that the Commissioner
of Customs shall, subject to the approval of the
Department Head, make all rules and regulations
necessary to enforce the provisions of said code.
Section 338 of the National Internal Revenue Code,
Commonwealth Act No. 466 as amended, states that the
Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the
Collector of Internal Revenue, shall promulgate all
needful rules and regulations for the effective
enforcement of the provisions of the code. We
understand that rules and regulations have been
promulgated not only for the Bureaus of Customs and
Internal Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the
Government, to govern the transaction of business in
and to enforce the law for said bureaus.
Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an
express and clear provision of law giving the necessary
sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and pass on
examination prescribed by it before they are allowed to
practice before said Patent Office, then there would be
no reason why other bureaus specially the Bureaus of
Internal Revenue and Customs, where the business in
the same area are more or less complicated, such as the
presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc.,
assessments exemptions, depreciation, these as
regards the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the
classification of goods, imposition of customs duties,
seizures, confiscation, etc., as regards the Bureau of
Customs, may not also require that any lawyer practicing
before them or otherwise transacting business with them
on behalf of clients, shall first pass an examination to
qualify. In conclusion, we hold that under the present
law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this
Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may
practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the
reason that much of the business in said office involves
the interpretation and determination of the scope and
application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable,
as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts
involved; that part of the functions of the Patent Director
are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals
from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken
to the Supreme Court.
Resolution March 18, 1954
In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the
Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.
Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. C
FACTS:
Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly
known as the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.” In accordance
with the said law, the Supreme Court then passed and
admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained
an average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar
candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar
invoking its provisions, while other motions for the
revision of their examination papers were still pending
also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground
for admission. There are also others who have sought
simply the reconsideration of their grades without,
however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice
to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the
motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or
not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.
ISSUE
WON RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid? NO
RULING
RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to
admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from
insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate
preparation.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved,
the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the
profession and their supervision have been indisputably
a judicial function and responsibility. We have said that
in the judicial system from which ours has been derived,
the admission, suspension, disbarment or reinstatement
of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is
concededly judicial.
The power of admitting an attorney to practice having
been perpetually exercised by the courts, it having been
so generally held that the act of the court in admitting an
attorney to practice is the judgment of the court, and an
attempt as this on the part of the Legislature to confer
such right upon any one being most exceedingly
uncommon, it seems clear that the licensing of an
attorney is and always has been a purely judicial
function, no matter where the power to determine the
qualifications may reside.
On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction
between the functions of the judicial and legislative
departments of the government.
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant
license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this
Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is
of permissive character, or as other authorities may say,
merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license
As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared
unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955 was
declared in force and effect. The portion that was
stricken down was based under the following reasons:
1. The law itself admits that the candidates for
admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952
had inadequate preparation due to the fact that this
was very close to the end of World War II;
2. The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the
resolution of the court on the petitions of the said
candidates;
 3. The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary
prerogative to determine who may be admitted to
practice of law and, therefore, in excess of
legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement
the Rules of Court. The rules laid down by
Congress under this power are only minimum
norms, not designed to substitute the judgment of
the court on who can practice law; and
4. The pretended classification is arbitrary and
amounts to class legislation.
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court
could not muster enough votes to declare it void.
Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in
1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme Court
resolutions denying admission to the bar of an
petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within the
power to Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules
of admission to the practice of law.
A.M. No. P-06-2177 June 27, 2006
(Formerly A.M. No. 06-4-268-RTC)
RE: REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL AUDIT
CONDUCTED ON THE BOOKS OF ACCOUNTS OF
ATTY. RAQUEL G. KHO, CLERK OF COURT IV,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, ORAS, EASTERN SAMAR
. A.C. No. 7766
FACTS:
Atty. Kho is a former clerk of court of the RTC in Eastern
Samar. He was found guilty of gross misconduct for his
failure to make a timely remittance of judiciary funds in
his custody. She was fined P10k. Since his malfeasance
prima facie contravened Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, the Supreme Court
ordered him to show cause why he should not be
disciplined as a lawyer and as an officer of the court. In
his explanation, Atty. Kho admitted that his failure to
make a timely remittance of the cash deposited with him
was inexcusable. He maintained, however, that he kept
the money in the court’s safety vault and never once
used it for his own benefit.
ISSUE
Whether Atty. Kho is guilty of violating Canon 1, Rule
1.01.
RULING
Atty. Kho’s apparent good faith and his ready admission
of the infraction, although certainly mitigating, cannot
negate the fact that his failure to remit P65,000 in
judiciary funds for over a year was contrary to the
mandatory provisions of OCA Circular 8A-93.
That omission is a breach of his oath to obey the laws as
well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
and of his duties under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
Canon 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution,
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and for legal processes
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
As servants of the law and officers of the court, lawyers
are required to be at the forefront of observing and
maintaining the rule of law. They are expected to make
themselves exemplars worthy of emulation.
The least a lawyer can do in compliance with Canon 1 is
to refrain from engaging in unlawful conduct. By
definition, any act or omission contrary to law is
unlawful. It does not necessarily imply the element of
criminality although it is broad enough to include it. Thus,
the presence of evil intent on the part of the lawyer is not
essential in order to bring his act or omission within the
terms of Rule 1.01 which specifically prohibits lawyers
from engaging in unlawful conduct.
Atty. Kho’s conduct was not only far from exemplary, it
was unlawful as well. For this, he must be called to
account. Atty. Kho is ordered to pay FINE of P5,000.00.
August 5, 2014
JOSE ALLAN TAN, Complainant,
vs.
PEDRO S. DIAMANTE, Respondent.
FACTS:
On April 2, 2003, complainant, claiming to be a
recognized illegitimate son of the late Luis Tan, secured
the services of respondent in order to pursue a case for
partition of property against the heirs of the late spouses
Luis and Natividad Valencia-Tan.[2] After accepting the
engagement, respondent filed the corresponding
complaint[3] before the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod
City, Branch 46 (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 03-
11947. The complaint was eventually dismissed by the
RTC in an
Order[4] dated July 25, 2007 for lack of cause of action
and insufficiency of evidence.[5] While respondent was
notified of such dismissal as early as August 14, 2007,[6]
complainant learned of the same only on
August 24, 2007 when he visited the former's office.[7]
On such occasion, respondent allegedly asked for the
amount of P10,000.00 for the payment of appeal fees
and other costs, but since complainant could not
produce the said amount at that time,... respondent,
instead, asked and was given the amount of P500.00
purportedly as payment of the reservation fee for the
filing of a notice of appeal before the RTC.[8] On
September 12, 2007, Tan handed the amount of
P10,000.00 to respondent, who on even date,... filed a
notice of appeal[9] before the RTC.
It was then that he discovered that the November 9,
2007 Order was spurious, as certified by the RTC's
Clerk of Court.[13]
Complainant also found out that, contrary to the
representations of respondent, his appeal had long been
dismissed.[14] Aggrieved, he filed the instant
administrative complaint for disbarment against
respondent.
respondent alleged that it was complainant's failure to
timely produce the amount of P1,400.00 to pay for the
appeal fees that resulted in the late filing of his appeal.
According to him, he informed... complainant of the
lapse of the reglementary period to appeal, but the latter
insisted in pursuing the same. He also claimed to have
assisted complainant "not for money or malice" but being
a desperate litigant, he was blamed for the court's
unfavorable decision.
In a Report and Recommendation[17] dated September
21, 2010, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Investigating Commissioner found respondent
administratively liable, and accordingly recommended
that the penalty of suspension for a period of one (1)...
year be meted out against him.[
ISSUE
whether or not respondent should be held
administratively liable for violating the CPR.
RULING
the Court concurs with the IBP's findings, subject to the
modification of the recommended penalty to be imposed
upon respondent.
Under Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR, it is the
lawyer's duty to keep his client constantly updated on
the developments of his case as it is crucial in
maintaining the latter's confidence, to wit:
As an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney to
inform his client of whatever important information he
may have acquired affecting his client's case. He should
notify his client of any adverse decision to enable his
client to decide whether to seek an appellate... review
thereof. Keeping the client informed of the developments
of the case will minimize misunderstanding and loss of
trust and confidence in the attorney. The lawyer should
not leave the client in the dark on how the lawyer is
defending the client's interests.[22] In this connection,
the lawyer must constantly keep in mind that his actions,
omissions, or nonfeasance would be binding upon his
client. Concomitantly, the lawyer is expected to be
acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal
procedure, and a client who deals... with him has the
right to expect not just a good amount of professional
learning and competence but also a whole-hearted fealty
to the client's cause.
In the case at bar, records reveal that as of August 14,
2007, respondent already knew of the dismissal of
complainant's partition case before the RTC. Despite
this fact, he never bothered to inform complainant of
such dismissal as the latter only knew of the same on
August 24,... 2007 when he visited the former's office.
To add insult to injury, respondent was inexcusably
negligent in filing complainant's appeal only on
September 12, 2007, or way beyond the reglementary
period therefor, thus resulting in its outright dismissal.
Clearly, respondent failed... to exercise such skill, care,
and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly
possess and exercise in such matters of professional
employment.[
Worse, respondent attempted to conceal the dismissal of
complainant's appeal by fabricating the November 9,
2007 Order which purportedly required a DNA testing to
make it appear that complainant's appeal had been
given due course, when in truth, the same had long been
denied. In... so doing, respondent engaged in an
unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct that caused
undue prejudice and unnecessary expenses on the part
of complainant. Accordingly, respondent clearly violated
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, which provides:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey
the laws of the land and promote respect for law and
legal processes.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain
not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of
morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing,[25] failing in
which whether in his personal or private capacity, he
becomes unworthy to... continue his practice of law.[26]
A lawyer's inexcusable neglect to serve his client's
interests with utmost diligence and competence as well
as his engaging in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful
conduct in order to conceal such neglect should never
be... countenanced, and thus, administratively
sanctioned.
In view of the foregoing, respondent's conduct of
employing a crooked and deceitful scheme to keep
complainant in the dark and conceal his case's true
status through the use of a falsified court order evidently
constitutes Gross Misconduct.[27] His acts... should not
just be deemed as unacceptable practices that are
disgraceful and dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral
flaw that makes him unfit to practice law
However, in cases where lawyers engaged in unlawful,
dishonest, and deceitful conduct by falsifying
documents, the Court found them guilty of Gross
Misconduct and disbarred them. In Brennisen v.
Contawi,[33] the Court disbarred the lawyer who...
falsified a special power of attorney in order to mortgage
and sell his client's property. Also, in Embido v. Pe,[34]
the penalty of disbarment was meted out against the
lawyer who falsified an inexistent court decision for a fee
As already discussed, respondent committed acts of
falsification in order to misrepresent to his client, i.e.,
complainant, that he still had an available remedy in his
case, when in reality, his case had long been dismissed
for failure to timely file an appeal, thus,... causing undue
prejudice to the latter. To the Court, respondent's acts
are so reprehensible, and his violations of the CPR are
so flagrant, exhibiting his moral unfitness and inability to
discharge his duties as a member of the bar. His actions
erode rather than enhance the... public perception of the
legal profession. Therefore, in view of the totality of his
violations, as well as the damage and prejudice caused
to his client, respondent deserves the ultimate
punishment of disbarment.
A.C. No. 6788 August 23, 2007
(Formerly, CBD 382)
DIANA RAMOS, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG, Respondent.
COMPLAINT:
In 1992, the complainant sought the assistance of
respondent in filing civil and criminal actions against the
spouses Jovellanos. She gave respondent P8,500 as
attorney's fees but the latter issued a receipt for P5,000
only.
The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings
of her cases against the Jovellanos. Oddly, respondent
never allowed her to enter the courtroom and always told
her to wait outside. He would then come out after
several hours to inform her that the hearing had been
cancelled and rescheduled. This happened six times
and for each "appearance" in court, respondent charged
her P350.
After six consecutive postponements, the complainant
became suspicious. She personally inquired about the
status of her cases in the trial courts of Biñan and San
Pedro, Laguna. She was shocked to learn that
respondent never filed any case against the
Jovellanoses and that he was in fact employed in the
Public Attorney's Office (PAO).
RESPONDENT'S DEFENSE:
 Complainant knew that he was in the
government service from the very start.
 He advised complainant to consult Atty. Ungson.
Atty. Ungson, however, did not accept the
complainant's case as she was unable to come
up with the acceptance fee agreed upon. Afraid
that she "might spend" the cash on hand, the
complainant asked respondent to keep the
P5,000 while she raised the balance of Atty.
Ungson's acceptance fee.
 Complainant was the one who requested for
respondent to issue an antedated receipt.
SC RULING:
Atty. Jose R. Imbang is hereby DISBARRED from the
practice of law and his name is ordered stricken from
the Roll of Attorneys. He is also ordered to return to
complainant the amount of P5,000 with interest at the
legal rate reckoned from 1995.
Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with
honesty and integrity. More specifically, lawyers in
government service are expected to be more
conscientious of their actuations as they are subject to
public scrutiny. They are not only members of the bar
but also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to public
service.
Government employees are expected to devote
themselves completely to public service. Thus, lawyers
in government service cannot handle private cases for
they are expected to devote themselves full-time to the
work of their respective offices. (Respondent's
admission that he accepted money from the complainant
and the receipt confirmed the presence of an attorney-
client relationship between him and the complainant.)
Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity
and good moral character required of all lawyers,
specially one occupying a public office. Lawyers in public
office are expected not only to refrain from any act or
omission which tend to lessen the trust and confidence
of the citizenry in government but also uphold the dignity
of the legal profession at all times and observe a high
standard of honesty and fair dealing. A government
lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is burdened with a
high degree of social responsibility, higher than his
brethren in private practice
G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division),
ET.AL, Respondents.
FACTS:
On February 1991, Former Solicitor General Estelito
Mendoz, who has currently resumed the private practice
of law, was sought to be disqualified from representing
the Lucio Tan group, in the 1987 case involving General
Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) as one of those
properties subject to a writ of sequestration by PCGG
being alleged to be ill –gotten wealth acquired during the
Marcos Regime. It was averred by the PCGG that there
exists an adverse interest on Mendoza since he was the
one who filed a petition praying for assistance and
supervision of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK
when he was still a Solicitor General, which bank was
subsequently owned by the Lucio Tan group when it
submitted the winning bid.
PCGG invokes Rule 6.03of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which prohibits former government
lawyers from accepting “engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened
while in said service.”
Sandiganbayan rejects PCGG’s motion by arguing that
CGG failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency
between respondent Mendoza’s former function as
Solicitor General and his present employment as
counsel of the Lucio Tan group and that Mendoza’s
appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was
beyond the one-year prohibited period under Section
7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be
Solicitor General in the year 1986.
ISSUE
WON Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza – NO
RULING
No, Rule 6.03 of the CPR is inapplicable in the case.
Rule 6.03 – A lawyer shall not, after leaving government
service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he
had intervened while in said service. The motion for
disqualification should be dismissed for the following
reasons:
1) After discussing the history of the present Code
of Professional Responsibility which revealed
that the word “intervene” is applicable to both
adverse interest conflicts and congruent interest
conflicts, it has been found that neither of these
conflicts exists in the liquidation case and the
sequestration case.
2) The legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is
not an issue in the sequestration cases.
The “matter” where he got himself involved was
in informing Central Bank on
the procedure provided by law to liquidate
GENBANK through the courts and in filing the
necessary petition in the then Court of First
Instance. The subject “matter” of the special
proceeding, therefore, is not the same nor is
related to but is different from the subject
“matter” in the civil case. The civil case involves
the sequestration of the stocks owned by
respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on the
alleged ground that they are ill-gotten. The case
does not involve the liquidation of
GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale of
GENBANK to Allied Bank. Whether the shares
of stock of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-
gotten is far removed from the issue of the
dissolution and liquidation of
GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated by the
Central Bank due, among others, to the alleged
banking malpractices of its owners and officers.
3) Mendoza’s intervention in the liquidation of
Genbank is not substantial and significant to
warrant disqualification.
The petition in the special proceedings is
an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to be signed
by respondent Mendoza as the then sitting
Solicitor General. For another, the record is
arid as to the actual participation of respondent
Mendoza in the subsequent
proceedings. Moreover, the petition filed merely
seeks the assistance of the court in the
liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role of
the court in this type of proceedings is to assist
the Central Bank in determining claims of
creditors against the GENBANK.
It is worthy to note that in construing the words of such
rule in this case, the Court balanced the two policy
considerations of having a chilling effect on government
recruitment of able legal talent and the use of former
government employment as a litigation tactic to harass
opposing counsel.
A.C. No. 11113, August 09, 2016
CLEO B. DONGGA-AS, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROSE
BEATRIX CRUZ-ANGELES, ATTY. WYLIE M. PALER,
AND ATTY. ANGELES GRANDEA, OF THE
ANGELES, GRANDEA & PALER LAW
OFFICE, Respondent.
FACTS:
In May 2004, complainant engaged the law firm of
respondents to handle the annulment of his marriage.
From then on, he constantly followed-up its progress but
respondents were unable to produce a petition , with
various excuses including that there was no record of
marriage. Utterly frustrated with the delay, complainant
decided to terminate their engagement and demanded
for a refund of the amount he paid. To the complainant's
surprise, they responded by sending two (2) billing
statements in the amounts of P258,000.00 and
P324,000.00. Thus, he filed a complaint.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondents should be held
administratively liable for violating the CPR.
RULING
Yes. Despite the passage of more than five (5) months
from the engagement, respondents failed to file the
appropriate pleading to initiate the case before the
proper court. Such neglect of the legal matter entrusted
to them by their client constitutes a flagrant violation of
Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, to wit: CANON 18-A
LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. Rule 18.03 -A lawyer
shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.
A.C. No. 1481 October 17, 2008
REBECCA B. ARNOBIT, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. PONCIANO P. ARNOBIT, respondent.
FACTS:
Rebecca B. Arnobit, filed an affidavit-complaint, praying
that the Court exercise its disciplinary power over her
husband, respondent Atty. Ponciano Arnobit, on the
grounds of Immorality and Abandonment.
Complainant and respondent were married with 12
children. Several years after passing the
bar, respondent left the conjugal dwelling and cohabited
with Benita Buenafe, a married woman, who bore him 4
more children. Rebecca filed a complaint for legal
separation and support. A criminal case of adultery
against respondent and Benita later followed.
Respondent denied the allegation that he cohabited with
Benita. Instead, he alleged that it was Rebecca who was
the cause of their separation due to her frequent travels
around the country without his consent and thereby
neglecting her obligations toward her family.
Hearings were conducted before the Office of the
Solicitor General and subsequently, before the IBP-CBD.
Complainant presented both oral and documentary
evidence to support her allegations of abandonment and
immorality, 2 witnesses and affidavits from NBI agents to
show the existence of prima facie case for adultery.
Respondent, however, failed to present evidence to
support his claim and failed to personally attend
hearings.
The Commission found respondent liable for
abandonment and recommended his suspension from
the practice of law to the IBP Board Governors for 3
months. It was accepted and adopted by the IBP Board
of Governors.
ISSUE
Does leaving the conjugal home and cohabiting with a
married woman a ground for disbarment?
RULING
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct: CANON 7 – A
lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be
of good moral character but must also be seen to be of
good moral character and leading lives in accordance
with the highest moral standards of the community. A
member of the bar and an officer of the court is not only
required to refrain from adulterous relationships or
keeping a mistress but must also so behave himself as
to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the
impression that he is flouting those moral standards.
The fact that respondent’s philandering ways are far
removed from the exercise of his profession would not
save the day for him. For a lawyer may be suspended or
disbarred for any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to
the actual practice of his profession, would show him to
be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges with
which his license and the law invest him. To borrow from
Orbe v. Adaza, "[t]he grounds expressed in Section 27,
Rule 138,9 of the Rules of Court are not limitative and
are broad enough to cover any misconduct x x x of a
lawyer in his professional or private capacity." To
reiterate, possession of good
moral character is not only a condition precedent to the
practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all
members of the bar.
Undoubtedly, respondent’s act of leaving his wife and 12
children to cohabit and have children with another
woman constitutes grossly immoral conduct. And to add
insult to injury, there seems to be little attempt on the
part of respondent to be discreet about his liaison with
the other woman.As we have already ruled, disbarment
is warranted against a lawyer who abandons his lawful
wife to maintain an illicit relationship with another woman
who had borne him a child.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Ponciano P. Arnobit is hereby
DISBARRED
A.C. No. 10676 September 8, 2015
ATTY. ROY B. ECRAELA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. IAN RAYMOND A.
PANGALANGAN, Respondent.
FACTS:
This is a case for disbarment against Atty. Pangalangan
for his illicit relations, chronic womanizing, abuse of
authority as an educator, and "other unscrupulous
activities" which cause "undue embarrassment to the
legal profession."
Complainant and respondent were best friends and both
graduated from the University of the Philippines (UP)
College of Law in 1990, where they were part of a peer
group or barkada with several of their classmates. After
passing the bar examinations and being admitted as
members of the Bar in 1991, they were both registered
with the IBP Quezon City.
Respondent was formerly married to Sheila P. Jardiolin
(Jardiolin) with whom he has three (3) children.
Complainant avers that while married to Jardiolin,
respondent had a series of adulterous and illicit relations
with married and unmarried women between the years
1990 to 2007. These alleged illicit relations involved:
1. AAA, who is the spouse of a colleague
in the UP College of Law, from 1990 to 1992,
which complainant had personal knowledge of
such illicit relations;
2. BBB, sometime during the period from
1992 to 1994 or from 1994 to 1996, despite
being already married to Jardiolin;
3. CCC, despite being married to Jardiolin
and while also being romantically involved with
DDD;
4. DDD, sometime during the period from
2000 to 2002, despite still being married to
Jardiolin and while still being romantically
involved with CCC;
5. EEE, who is related to complainant,
sometime during the period from May 2004 until
the filing of the Petition, while still being
romantically involved with CCC.
ISSUE
Should Atty. Pangalangan be disbarred?
RULING
Atty. Pangalangan was disbarred by the SC for
grossly immoral conduct.
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES
UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he, whether in public or private life. behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
The practice of law is a privilege given to those who
possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications
for the profession. Good moral character is not only
required for admission to the Bar, but must also be
retained in order to maintain one's good standing in this
exclusive and honored fraternity.
In the case at bar, complainant alleged that respondent
carried on several adulterous and illicit relations with
both married and unmarried women between the years
1990 to 2007, including complainant's own wife. Through
documentary evidences in the form of email messages,
as well as the corroborating testimonies of the witnesses
presented, complainant was able to establish
respondent's illicit relations with DOD and CCC by
preponderant evidence.
In sum, Atty. Pangalangan displayed deplorable
arrogance by making a mockery out of the institution of
marriage, and taking advantage of his legal skills by
attacking the Petition through technicalities and refusing
to participate in the proceedings. His actions showed
that he lacked the degree of morality required of him as
a member of the bar, thus warranting the penalty of
disbarment.
A.C. No. 6672 September 4, 2009
PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondent.
FACTS:
Atty. Pedro Linsangan filed a disbarment case against
Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and
encroachment of professional services alleging that
respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano,
convinced his clients to transfer legal representation to
Tolentino with the promise of financial assistance and
expeditious collection on their claims. To induce them to
hire his services, he persistently called them and sent
them text messages. Linsangan presented the sworn
affidavit of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano
convinced him to sever his lawyer-client relations with
Linsangan and use Tolentino’s services instead, in
exchange for a loan of P50,000.00. Further, Linsangan’s
calling card was also attached wherein it appeared that
aside from legal services, financial assistance was
offered as well.
ISSUE
Whether Tolentino is guilty of misconduct
RULING
Yes. The court adopted the IBP’s finding of unethical
conduct, whereby it found Tolentino to have encroached
on the professional practice of Linsangan violating Rule
8.02, which prohibits a lawyer from stealing another
lawyer’s client or induce the latter’s client to retain him
by a promise of better service, good result or reduced
fees for his services.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending
venture with his clients as borrowers, Tolentino violated
Rule 16.04
The court further added that Tolentino violated
Rule 2.03 of the CPR which provides “A LAWYER
SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY ACT
DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL
BUSINESS.” Hence, lawyers are prohibited from
soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally
or through paid agents or brokers. Such actuation
constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment.
Moreover, Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with
Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides: Rule 1.03. A
LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE
OR INTEREST, ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR
PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MAN’S CAUSE. This
rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of
almost any kind of legal business by an attorney,
personally or through an agent in order to gain
employment) as a measure to protect the community
from barratry and champerty.
The calling card contained with the phrase
financial assistance, was clearly used to entice clients to
change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their
legal actions. This crass commercialism degraded the
integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal
profession.
Additionally, the court said that a lawyer’s best
advertisement is a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his
character and conduct. For this reason, lawyers are only
allowed to announce their services by publication in
reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards.
Hence, Atty. Tolentino was suspended from the practice
of law for a period of one year.
A.C. No. 7325 January 21, 2015
DR. DOMICIANO F. VILLAHERMOSA,
SR., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ISIDRO L. CARACOL, Respondent.
FACTS:
OCT No. 433 was a homestead patent granted to Micael
Babela who had two sons, Fernando and Efren. When
the agrarian reform law was enacted, emancipation
patents and titles were issued to Hermogena and Danilo
Nipotnipot, beneficiaries of the program, who in turn sold
the parcels of land to complainant’s spouse, Raymunda
Villahermosa. The Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) issued a decision ordering
the cancellation of the emancipation patents and TCTs
derived from OCT No. 433 stating that it was not
covered by the agrarian reform law. This decision was
appealed to and affirmed by the DARAB Central Board
and the Court of Appeals. Atty. Caracol, as “Add’l
Counsel for the Plaintiffs-Movant,” filed a motion for
execution with the DARAB, Malaybalay, Bukidnon
praying for the full implementation of the decision. Atty.
Caracol filed a Motion for Issuance of Second Alias Writ
of Execution and Demolition which he signed as
“Counsel for the Plaintiff Efren Babela.” Villahermosa
filed this complaint alleging that Atty. Caracol had no
authority to file the motions since he obtained no
authority from the plaintiffs and the counsel of record.
Villahermosa posited that Efren could not have
authorized Atty. Caracol to file the second motion
because Efren had already been dead for more than a
year. He claimed that Atty. Caracol’s real client was a
certain Ernesto I. Aguirre, who had allegedly bought the
same parcel of land. Atty. Caracol insists that Efren and
Ernesto authorized him to appear as “additional
counsel”. He said that he had consulted Atty. Aquino
who advised him to go ahead with the filing. Moreover,
he stated that he was not aware that there was a waiver
of rights executed in Ernesto Aguirre’s favor. In its
Report and Recommendation, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD)
found that Atty. Caracol committed deceitful acts and
misconduct.
ISSUE
Is Atty. Caracol guilty of deceit, gross misconduct and
violation of oath under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court?
RULING
YES. The Rules of Court under Rule 138, Section 21
provides for a presumption of a lawyer’s appearance on
behalf of his client, hence:
SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. – An attorney
is presumed to be properly authorized to represent
any cause in which he appears, and no written power
of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court
for his client, but the presiding judge may, on motion of
either party and on reasonable grounds therefor
being shown, require any attorney who assumes the
right to appear in a case to produce or prove the
authority under which he appears, and to disclose,
whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the person
who employed him, and may thereupon make such
order as justice requires. An attorney willfully appearing
in court for a person without being employed, unless by
leave of the court, may be punished for contempt as an
officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official
transactions. (Emphases supplied)
Lawyers must be mindful that an attorney has no
power to act as counsel for a person without being
retained nor may he appear in court without being
employed unless by leave of court. If an attorney
appears on a client’s behalf without a retainer or the
requisite authority neither the litigant whom he purports
to represent nor the adverse party may be bound or
affected by his appearance unless the purported client
ratifies or is estopped to deny his assumed authority. If
a lawyer corruptly or willfully appears as an attorney for
a party to a case without authority, he may be disciplined
or punished for contempt as an officer of the court who
has misbehaved in his official transaction.
Atty. Caracol knew that Efren had already
passed away at the time he filed the Motion for Issuance
of Second Alias Writ of Execution and Demolition. As an
honest, prudent and conscientious lawyer, he should
have informed the Court of his client’s passing and
presented authority that he was retained by the client’s
successors-in-interest and thus the parties may have
been substituted.
Atty. Caracol was found guilty of deceit, gross
misconduct and violation of oath under Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, he was
suspended from the practice of law for one year.
Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993
MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
FACTS:
Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this Court "to order
the respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., to cease and
desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the
same tenor as that of Annexes `A' and `B' (of said
petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities
from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of
the law profession other than those allowed by law.” The
advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as
follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
Please call: 521-0767,
LEGAL5217232, 5222041
CLINIC, INC.8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam
Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to
Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration
Problems, Visa Ext.
Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa.
Declaration of Absence.
Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in
the Phil. US/Foreign
Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.
LEGALErmita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232521-7251522-2041; 521-
0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements
above reproduced are champertous, unethical,
demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the
members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal
profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said
advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition advise him or her on the proper course of action to be
as herein before quoted. taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what
its advertisements represent and for which services it will
consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice
of publication of said advertisements at its instance, but of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact
claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in that respondent corporation does not represent clients in
the rendering of "legal support services" through court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds,
paralegals with the use of modern computers and is not limited merely to court appearances but extends to
electronic machines. Respondent further argues that legal research, giving legal advice, contract drafting, and
assuming that the services advertised are legal services, so forth. That fact that the corporation employs
the act of advertising these services should be allowed paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling.
supposedly in the light of the caseof John R. Bates and What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of
Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, reportedly law by virtueof the nature of the services it renders which
decidedby the United States Supreme Court on June 7, thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory
1977. prohibitions against the advertisements which it has
caused to be published and are now assailed in this
ISSUE proceeding. The standards of the legal profession
condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. (SEE
Whether or not the services offered by respondent, The CANON 2) A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics
Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a
of law and, in either case, whether the same can manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The
properly be the subject of the advertisements herein proscription against advertising of legal services or
complained of. solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental
postulate that the practice of law is a profession. The
RULING canons of the profession tell us that the best advertising
possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the services offered
professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be
by the respondent constitute practice of law. The
earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good
definition of “practice of law” is laid down in the case of
and efficient service to a client as well as to the
Cayetano vs. Monsod, as defined:Black defines
community has a way of publicizing itself and catching
"practice of law" as:"The rendition of services requiring
public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of
the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
effective service which is rightand proper. A good and
technique to serve the interest of another with his
reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate
consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or
it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the
advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but
difference between a normal by-product of able service
embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers
and the unwholesome result of propaganda.
incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all
kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for
them in matters connected with thelaw." The contention
of respondent that it merely offers legal support services
can neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said
proposition is belied by respondent's own description of
the services it has been offering. While some of the
services being offered by respondent corporation merely
involve mechanical and technical know-how, such as the
installation of computer systems and programs for the
efficient management of law offices, or the
computerization of research aids and materials, these
will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation
gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its
contention that such function is non-advisory and non-
diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing
information, for example, about foreign laws on
marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of
this Court that all that respondent corporation will simply
do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client,
and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its
attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily
have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and