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1, 2008 1
R.M. Woodhead
Technology Management,
School of Technology,
Oxford Brookes University,
Oxford, UK
E-mail: roy.woodhead@eds.com
M.A. Berawi*
Faculty of Built Environment,
University of Malaya,
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
E-mail: maberawi@um.edu.my
*Corresponding author
Abstract: This paper seeks to stimulate further research into ‘practical’ idea
generation by challenging the current. It builds on many years of Action
Research (Argyris, 1999) in major technology projects which eventually led to
a doctoral study where formal logic was used to develop a framework to
improve invention. This paper draws on those findings that were proven
statistically with a ‘one-proportion test’ and a survey (Berawi, 2006). It argues
that the field of Innovation Management has become detached from the act of
invention (i.e. idea generation) because of an assumption brought by cognitive
theories of creativity that hold the location of ideas ‘exclusively’ within the
human brain. This ‘assumption’, grounded in cognitive theory, is believed to be
the reason for low levels of research, as it seems like a problem area already
solved. This position has caused a lack of research into idea generation, and is
challenged by way of an alternative view based on a relationship between
intentionality and causality, which is offered as a way to develop new
perspectives that open the field to further enquiry.
Dr. M.A Berawi received his PhD in Value Management looking at the
relationship between functionality and innovation. He currently researches
value management and innovation in the context of major civil engineering
projects.
1 Introduction
Central to Innovation Management is the ability to produce worthy ideas for R&D.
Surprisingly, ‘Idea Generation’ is an under-researched topic (Sowrey, 1990; Alam, 2003).
Whilst there are many idea-generating techniques, the way they are evaluated seems
serendipitous. We aim to address that situation by undermining the key constraint and
then offering an alternative theory to prove there are ways managers can influence better
idea generation, and appraise the quality of ideas.
We argue the paucity of research is a product of systemic commitment to cognitive
theories of creativity. In the main, idea generation techniques assume ideas begin
in the minds of people. Such techniques attempt to stimulate the brain’s conscious or
subconscious processing. We argue this aim excludes managers and forces them into a
trial-and-error process where they try out various idea generation techniques.
We will share findings that offer the field of Innovation Management a different lens
to view the relationship between ideas, invention and innovation. The paper distinguishes
different types of ideas and assembles them in a framework that links intentionality
(purpose and function) to causality (outcome and process).
The paper begins by explaining the research methods used before reviewing the
relationship between Innovation Management and idea generation techniques. A number
of well-known idea generation techniques are questioned. We will explain how their
founding assumption, based on cognitive theory, prevents an adequate appraisal of them.
Examples of ‘poor performance’ are seen as a weakness of individuals involved, rather
than the assumptions each technique uses. As such, under-performance of better idea
generation is unquestioned.
2 Research methodology
This paper combines the product of doctoral research with insights gained from Action
Research carried out through consulting episodes with major technological organisations,
predominantly from the oil industry. The basis for different types of ideas that will be
discussed were proven using predicate calculus logic and a survey using a statistical test
known as the one-proportion test (Berawi, 2006).
Many research methods into idea generation have been considered over the years, but
a few can overcome the main hurdle of access. Accessing idea generation in industrial
innovation settings is difficult. It has taken many years to build up levels of trust with
some major companies. Confidentiality agreements severely reduce the ability to share
experiences with other researchers but show how trust is an essential prerequisite for
research into this topic.
About seven years ago, we created artificially contrived experiments where members
of the public were invited into an oil major’s innovation workshops using a particular
innovation method called Value Engineering. Whilst they were fairly easy to set up,
members of the public lacked a sense of real consequence and commitment. They also
lacked basic engineering knowledge necessary for innovating a fairly simple chemical
plant planned for Korea. In addition, the oil major was reluctant to elaborate specific
information in a public forum.
The actual outcome did not meet our preconceived expectation and so we abandoned
this approach. This decision was made in an action research framework where we made
An alternative theory of idea generation 3
our intentions explicit and then reviewed the ‘real’ outcome against what we had
expected.
Action Research involves judgement, and mistakes are inevitable. Often we were
blind to the assumptions we held and repeated. For example, at one time our ‘guiding
propositions’ revolved around group psychology and the role a facilitator and facilitation
skills play in idea generation techniques. We believed anyone skilled in facilitation
could help any team that needed to invent and innovate. However, ‘evidence’ in the form
of post-workshop feedback revealed many ideas that were later seen as tame or already
known. As paid facilitators receiving positive feedback in the sessions, this was a
difficult and confusing realisation. Our theories were lacking and this led to
the realisation that the facilitator’s lack of content knowledge encouraged superficial
enquiry. In an evolutionary process, another proposition was developed to deal with
the facilitator’s ‘content knowledge’ requiring substantial background reading and
unstructured interviews with managers from a particular industry before engaging in the
design of workshops and the selection of appropriate idea generation techniques. We
moved away from seeing ourselves as facilitators to innovation catalysts.
This reflective process within Action Research is based on the work of Argyris (1999,
pp.67–91):
What was the intention? For example, in the case of a chemical plant we were
trying to reduce capital expenditure and schedule, whilst at the same time
reduce downtime and increase throughput.
What was the theory of action? For example, we believed competency in
facilitation was sufficient for success.
What was the theory in action? What did we actually do?
What was the outcome? For example, we achieve the intention in part but this
was by taking the oil major’s managers off line from the public and in effect
running two workshops in parallel. We had to adapt because our theory of
action was inadequate.
What assumptions were at play? We naively thought members of the public
could bring new insights to technologically complex problems. We had heard
of people knowing little about a subject offering new ideas but had over
estimated their ability to do so. We also believed facilitation skills alone would
be key to success.
What did you learn? For example, we changed the way we selected participants
so that sufficient content knowledge was present, and revised the importance
we attached to facilitation skills.
Even though some of our earlier workshops could have produced better ideas, we were
popular and so started to work directly for companies. Using a similar action research
framework around each episode, we uncovered other assumptions that impact idea
generation such as managers needing to avoid upsetting bosses who had made investment
decisions (i.e. potentially embarrassing sunk costs), the role of peer opinion and
investment constraints. What we had still not fully grasped was that we were engaging in
systems; cognitive theories blinded us.
We doubt our insights today could have been achieved with the arm’s length
approaches to traditional research. Furthermore, academic papers and research projects
are often seen as irrelevant by people working in real projects. Action Research allowed
us to be relevant and at the same time to step back and untangle what was going on in
4 R.M. Woodhead and M.A. Berawi
order to find better ways to invent and innovate. In one project we were involved in, an
oil industry Joint Venture spent over $300,000 running 16 workshops in London, Milan
and Den Haag over a four-month period. The manager who led this innovation process
was fully absorbed in making sure that the ideas generated were far more valuable than
the costs incurred. To such managers, any research agenda not focused on ‘their’ short-
term imperatives are of little importance.
Our current theory of action sees valuable ideas stemming from techniques that
deepen and widen the understanding of systemic causal processes. This is a view that
accommodates natural science and social science and is not evident in the literature
related to idea generation techniques, but is evident in other fields such as the philosophy
of science.
Enquiries grounded in Action Research allowed us to develop and test our
understanding. After an episode we would generate a theory that would feed into the
design of the next episode. Here, research feeds into learning which feeds back into
research and this led to an early recognition of weaknesses in the literature associated
with idea generation techniques.
Our founding premise is deeper research into ‘idea generation’, which is necessary for
better innovation management. Managers need better ways to generate good ideas but the
research agenda in this area is wanting (Sowrey, 1990; Alam, 2003). Stepping back and
looking at the situation systemically, we offer a causal model that, we believe, explains
what is going on. In Figure 1, we should see recognition of anomalies between theory and
practice, producing a positive correlation effect on the ‘need to ask research questions’.
The reality is anomalies are present but the number of researchers moving into this area
seems to be falling; this is the opposite of what we would expect. What seems to be
happening is rather than asking more research questions we see a profusion of new idea
generation techniques – a behaviour suggesting the fundamental research questions have
been addressed.
The outer loop (see Figure 1) forms an explanation of causal effects that lead to
generative learning, as we would expect in an active research agenda. The more we find
out, the more questions we need to answer. The inner loop reveals a different story of a
converging research agenda and a lowering need to ask questions. We believe this is what
is going on in idea generation research. It seems the fundamental questions that lead to a
productive research agenda have already been answered; we disagree with this view.
If we are to move from the inner loop of today to the generative outer loop, then we
have to understand what is causing convergence and question whether that is adequate for
Innovation Management.
A common assumption in most idea generation techniques is a singular belief that
ideas come from within the heads of people. This places the role of cognition centrally as
a dominant source of good and bad ideas. If all researchers support cognitive theories of
creativity then why would they look to rival theories? We believe this is the cause of the
current lack of research into idea generation. The commitment to cognition suggests that
further research into idea generation should be explored within the fields of psychology
and the neurosciences. Such a programme excludes managers and the subject of
management. We want to challenge this.
An alternative theory of idea generation 5
To stimulate more research into idea generation, we have to explain the inadequacy of
the current perspectives. The literature portrays a history of reductionism and detachment
which we believe is a critical factor as to why research in this area is wanting. For
example, Cumming (1998) separates creativity and innovation:
“Most authors now agree that the process of idea generation is ‘creativity’. And
although creativity is an important precursor to innovation the two terms are
not synonymous.”
“Since the late 1960s the meaning of the term innovation has seemingly been
refined. The implication that a new concept had to be brought into use before
innovation could be said to have taken place became widely accepted.”
(Cumming, 1998, p.22)
6 R.M. Woodhead and M.A. Berawi
That ‘most authors now agree’ suggests the convergent commitment shown in the inner
loop of Figure 1.
The detachment of ‘idea’ from ‘innovation’ is an important choice from a
management perspective. Cumming (1998) examines innovation as a process and cites
Marquis (1969) who defined innovation as ‘a unit of technological change’. So, idea
generation leads to technological change. Howells (2005) sees innovation as the process
by which ideas are brought to the market. Idea generation leads to technological change
that is valued in a market. This becomes more useful to managers, as we view idea
generation in terms of ‘how to do things’; how to improve the way things are achieved.
Ahmed (1998) states that:
“‘Innovation is holistic in nature’ and that it ‘covers the entire range of
activities necessary to provide value to customers and a satisfactory return to
the Business’.” (Ahmed, 1998, p.30)
Ahmed’s paper discusses how the outputs of idea generation are managed through
a life-cycle framework. Many authors describe idea generation within an overarching
innovation process (e.g. Schmidt-Tiedemann, 1982; Udwadia, 1990; Pavia, 1991; Twiss,
1992; Ragatz et al., 1997; Ahmed, 1998; Amabile, 1988; Cumming, 1998; Urabe, 1998;
Man, 2001; Tidd et al., 2001; Trott, 2002; Oetinger, 2004; Birdi, 2005; Muller et al.,
2005). It is seen in terms of:
• idea generation in the creativity stage
• innovation processes and
• the successful application of concepts in terms of output or product.
Viewing innovation as an overarching process may diminish the importance attached to
idea generation as a research topic. Perhaps the reason we have so many idea generation
techniques is because it is seen as a trial-and-error process (i.e. we do not really
understand the mechanisms by which ideas originate). However, to separate ‘how we get
ideas’ from ‘what we do with ideas once we have them’ is to sever developmental
stages that are inextricably joined. It also assumes a strict life-cycle model where ideas
are generated at a specific point in the overarching innovation management process;
organisation procedures often force this to be the case but ideas do emerge out of
sequence and often struggle to win support. We argue Innovation Management needs a
theory of idea generation that enquires into a way we can systematically increase the
capability to generate new ideas and develop them into real-world phenomena, into real
solutions.
The origins of idea generation processes can be traced back many years. Wallas (1926)
argued that the stages of idea generation included:
1 preparation stage
2 incubation stage
3 inspiration stage
4 verification stage.
An alternative theory of idea generation 7
These steps locate the source of idea generation within cognitive processes (Perkins,
1981). The dominance of the psychology lens feeds into theories of personality and
notions of a ‘creative individual’ (Vernon, 1975) or ‘creative champion’ (Getzels and
Jackson, 1962; Belbin, 1981). Goodman (1995) argued that ‘creativity’ was an inherent
characteristic of people, and he said:
“So the question is not so much how did it happen but rather one of how it is
used? It is not a chance happening, a piece of sheer serendipity, although it can
sometimes appear as such. It originates from natural expression unrepresented
by conventional rules or social norms. It is a manifestation that is usually
accompanied by sheer joy.” (Goodman, 1995, p.87)
That he says it is not a ‘chance happening’ implies there is a mechanism at work.
Goodman then goes on to talk of Sperry’s (1975) right brain and left brain, and in doing
so, firmly positions the source of ideas in cognition.
Divergent and convergent thinking are often discussed in relation to idea generation
and again it focuses on what happens inside our heads (Razoumnikova, 2000). Jensen
(1978) argued for five key categories of metaphor, Restoration, Journey, Unification,
Creational and Nature, and here we see a theory of conceptual associations, but it still
places cognition as the critical cause of ideas.
The use of innovation techniques to generate new ideas such as brainstorming,
mind-mapping, morphological analysis or lateral thinking (e.g. Allen, 1962; Parnes et al.,
1977; Rawlinson, 1981; De Bono, 1984; Proctor, 1995; Buzan and Buzan, 1995) cannot
estimate the quality of ideas they yield, since they assume ideas emerge out of cognitive
processes. There is no basis to assess the ‘worth’ of an idea with cognitive theories. They
have to be evaluated in terms of ‘fit’ with external measures such as investment appraisal,
legislation, technical feasibility, etc.
An additional approach built around a core cognitive theory seeks to create the ‘right’
context for people. Some techniques play around with contextual perspectives, thinking
that a change in the way we view a situation will unlock latent insights (Perry and
Shalley, 2003). If we examine these techniques in terms of ‘learning about something’
then we believe there is merit. However, learning is more than a singular focus on
cognitive processing, as it involves a relationship with a world outside our heads.
De Bono (1984) called for “Lateral Thinking” and again holds a theory of ideas as
springing from random connections and associations in the mind. Buzan and Buzan
(1995) echo this core theory and offer the technique of Mind-Mapping as a means to
arrange associated concepts drawn out of the mysterious black box of the human brain.
Most idea generation techniques are directed at some aspect of cognition as the cause
of new ideas. Psychologists have anchored the origin of idea generation within the mind
(Koestler, 1964; Sternberg, 1988; Garnham and Oakhill, 1994; Mukerjea, 1997), and
there is little investigation outside such a ‘paradigm’. Research into an objective theory of
idea generation seems unnecessary, as the core puzzle is already solved. However, we
believe otherwise.
The ‘cognitive’ view separates the act of idea generation from the act of managing
ideas in an innovation process. Can idea generation and idea management be separated in
the day-to-day working of organisation? We do not hold with this singular ‘mind-
location’ view, as our work sees ideas and innovation combining a theory of (1) what
goes on in the world and (2) knowledge as a measure of how well any individual is
equipped to understand and improve mechanisms such as ‘how to improve traffic flows’
or ‘how to defeat a new virus’ or ‘how to create healthy sweets children will like’.
8 R.M. Woodhead and M.A. Berawi
6 Changing perspective
The case for something more than ‘cognitive theory’ is evident. The history of
technology provides examples of simultaneous invention by unconnected actors (e.g.
Swann and Edison’s invention of the light bulb). This suggests that common sets of
circumstances exist in different locations, and as such cannot reside in the heads of
individuals. There is an external systemic mechanism at play and this realisation allows
the possibility of a management system.
We believe our potential to generate new possibilities has been reduced by the view
that ideas originate within an individual. We would not expect ten-year-old children to be
capable of designing a nuclear power station. Here, then, is a clue to what makes for
better idea generation. It is something to do with the way external systems work, our
knowledge of their workings and an ability to conceive of alternative ways to make
things happen. For us, the mind is where an idea is codified into language but its origin is
found within a relationship between mind and world. Cognitive theory needs to be
extended to accommodate this relationship.
The intent of new ideas is directed towards a notion of progress. Intentional action is
purposive action, and purposes can originate either inside or outside of an agent’s will
(Searle, 1995). Intentional facts may become social facts by collective intentionality such
as society’s agreement on a particular price for a barrel of oil. What we need to take into
account is that the agent’s intention exists within boundaries and constraints given by
causal mechanisms from nature and/or socially constructed systems such as the economy.
The mind does not exist independently of nature’s mechanisms. The background of
everyday life is a systemic interaction between functioning and the outcome of such
functioning. Attempts to theorise this background in the act of model-building by a team
enables better understanding and better team-knowledge. Ideas come from recognition of
causal mechanisms (Bunge, 1997) from which informed understanding follows. Ideas
begin outside our heads.
To change the way we view idea generation requires a more precise schema. If we
cannot distinguish between types of ideas then our ability to articulate new perspectives
is limited. For example, given the phenomenon of global warming, many people would
offer the idea of ‘save the environment’ but such an ‘idea as outcome’ tells us little about
An alternative theory of idea generation 9
how to actually achieve it. We have to distinguish between types of ideas in order to
improve the way we manage idea generation.
Polanyi (1958) stated:
“It has been authoritatively stated that the moments of greatest creative
advancement in science frequently coincide with the introduction of new
notions by means of a definition.” (Polanyi, 1958, p.189)
We argue the word idea (I) in usage can mean purpose (P), outcome (O), process (Ps) or
function (F). For the sake of clear communication, it should only take one of the
meanings at any one time.
I = P v O v Ps v F
This distinction aids an ability to manage idea generation. Let us show how this word has
different meanings with different consequences for innovation managers. Alexander
Fleming understood the bacteriological mechanisms he observed and this led him to
discover ‘penicillium’ which killed staphylococcus. He had an ‘idea as outcome’ in
mind but could not move beyond this stage. It was a further ten-year period before
this could be manufactured as ‘penicillin’, and the work of Howard Walter Florey and
Ernst Boris Chain involved many other types of ideas (e.g. ideas as purposes related
to mass production, ideas as processes related to the means of production and ideas
as functions related to the way the processes were arranged in order to make the
penicillin).
Distinguishing idea types leads to deeper and wider understanding and enables old
solutions to be swapped for new ones. Clearer meaning drawn from deeper understanding
also allows us to anticipate outcomes not already in existence. In our action research, we
distinguished types of ideas in order to unlock idea generation. In one episode with R&D
managers, engineers and scientists put forward the idea of accessing some technically
difficult to access oil and gas reservoirs (idea as outcome to achieve idea as purpose). We
had to coach them towards defining the means to achieve an outcome (idea as process
that performs idea as function). Our theory views ideas in terms of humans rearranging
phenomena in response to some kind of systemic theory of value. New ideas are only
adopted if they add more value than old ones.
Downs, 2001; Woodhead and McCuish, 2002; Berawi, 2004). This is why we need to
look for more than cognitive theories of idea generation.
8 Emphasising function
Most idea generation techniques fail to recognise functional theories. Miles (1961) argues
that the first step in product engineering is to identify the functions at play. In doing so,
the relationship between mind and world is developed as insight and understanding. But
how can managers achieve this?
will be no value derived from that system. The emergence of ideas resides within
contemplation of this set of relationships but its origin is external to the mind.
10 Practical example
Given we do not really know what makes a good idea at this stage of the research project,
let us build a hypothetical case where we can demonstrate how the above model could be
used to improve organisational learning. Our aim here is to show that our alternative view
of the source of good ideas opens the way to the management of idea generation. Its
value is achieved by making our theories visible, explicit, testable and subsequently open
to improvement. That is, it empowers the management of innovation by making explicit
those causal theories that make us believe such and such is a good idea. We will assume
there is little market-data that we could use to form frequency-type probabilities. If there
were market data, then our model would become even more reliable and even more
useful. However, in the early stages of new product development such data is often
missing. We will use subjective probabilities to reflect the degree of belief we hold. A
manager is faced with a choice of developing a new product which he is assured is a good
idea. The manager begins by assigning a probability to his initial belief that it is a good
idea. Let us say he assigns a 90% likelihood because the engineering manager has backed
the idea and he has been right in the past. There is no need to wonder whether the number
assigned (i.e. 90%) is precise, as it will be shown shortly that the trend which emerges is
what is important.
Pr(Ig) = 0.9 and conversely the probability of it not being a good idea is Pr(~Ig) = 0.1
so that the combined probabilities sum to one.
14 R.M. Woodhead and M.A. Berawi
He calls the trusted engineering manager and asks how the product works and how
customers will use it. The engineering manager presents a functional model and explains
the design team have fully thought things through. However, there is a small chance
customers will use the product in ways they have not considered. The manager asks for a
summary of why he should believe the functional understanding is both adequate and
complete. This ‘explicit theory’ can be used to revisit the decision-making process and
spot ‘thinking’ errors they might be making today; organisational learning is enabled. At
this stage the manager thinks there is good chance the engineering manager has it right
and cautiously assigns a value of 70% to this belief.
Pr(I g ) Pr(Fc /I g )
Pr(I g /Fc )=
Pr(I g ) Pr(Fc /I g )+Pr(~I g ) Pr(Fc /~I g )
0.9× 0.7
Pr(I g /Fc )= =0.955
(0.9× 0.7)+(0.1× 0.3)
So, following this investigation he has increased his belief by around 5% that it really is a
good idea. What is more, the reasons why he has increased his belief have been made
explicit and if it later turns out this is wrong then there is a means to revisit and repair the
thinking processes that misled.
The manager now looks at the specific processes proposed to design, develop and
deliver the new concept from raw materials through to invoicing and payment.
Discussions with the various managers reveal that some aspects are uncertain. For
example, a key supplier has let them down with late deliveries and poor-quality levels
and a distributor they would need to use is proving slow to pay invoices. Again, all the
theories of action are made explicit so that later they can be revisited. Given what he has
found out, he believes this part of the idea is only about 40% reliable.
0.955× 0.4
Pr(I g /Fc , Po )= =0.93
(0.955× 0.4)× (0.045× 0.6)
Even though there is room for process improvements, he still believes this is a good idea.
The view of the engineering manager is still holding a strong influence on his beliefs and
that is clearly understood in a way that can be revisited after ‘real’ data from the market
place has been collected.
Finally, he discusses things with the marketing managers and the sales managers.
They seem very sceptical and suggest the idea is poor. They argue customers do not want
An alternative theory of idea generation 15
such a product and they are difficult to sell. The manager gets them to make their reasons
explicit so they too can later be tested. Given this conversation, he assigns a low
probability to their view of the alignment between purpose and outcome.
11 Conclusion
Our aim was to stimulate new research into idea generation and we offered a theory to
weaken the grip of the dominant cognitive theory. In doing so, we hope to open the door
to further research.
Given ideas are the seeds of innovation, lack of research into idea generation should
be a concern for Innovation Management. We believe the current situation exists because
the dominant premise is related to cognition and a view that ideas begin in the minds of
people. As such, few research questions have been created that look outside cognitive
explanations. Furthermore, there has been a profusion of idea-generating techniques
founded on different ways to improve cognition but none has achieved outright
supremacy. We have challenged the dominance of psychological theories and argue for a
widening of scope to include technological theories and a keener understanding of the
relationship between cognition and the way external systems work.
16 R.M. Woodhead and M.A. Berawi
The distinction of the word ‘idea’ into one of the four mutually exclusive categories
aids the management of idea generation:
• ideas as purposes
• ideas as outcomes
• ideas as processes
• ideas as functions.
Idea generation techniques that do not adequately explore the relationship between mind
and world make key assumptions about prior knowledge and the ability of teams to
generate new ideas. We believe this has to be questioned.
The word ‘idea’ is used ambiguously and the need for research is inhibited due to a
lack of appreciation of a deeper and richer understanding of a relationship between
purpose and outcome, as well as between function and process. We have offered a
schema as one way to form systematic approaches to idea generation, as we believe this
is a desire of managers of innovation. We have offered a line of enquiry, based on an
alternative theory, that is not restricted to psychological theories that currently underpin
idea-generating techniques. We hope other researchers will follow this call and begin
more research in reliable ways to generate better ideas that are practical and useful for
managers.
This paper has offered an alternative theory as to where ideas originate, and hopes to
stimulate further research into the act of idea generation and the exploration of why some
idea generation techniques are better than others. It has also offered one way to manage
such a process using Bayesian logic.
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