S.

1(1)(b)
A leashold is a 'term of years absolute'
LPA 1925

Facchin v Bryson Courts adopt an objective approach -

landlords cannot simply call a lease a
1952 licence.

Cs enters into agreement with house owner to use double-bed in

the sitting room, each person paying a licence fee. The
agreement statting that they share the room with other licensees
Somma v Hazelhurst and that the licensor shall from time to time use the room.

Contrary to Facchin v Bryson, the court adopts a subjective

1978 approach when determining if an agreement is a licence or a
lease (it is based upon the intention of the parties). So the
agreement is concsidered to be a licence.

S grants M exclusive occupation of 2 rooms at a 'licence fee' of £32 per week. Either party could terminate the notice
with 14 days notice. The agreement stated that it was a licence - if it were a lease, S would have been obliged to accept
anyn rent deemed to be 'fair' under the Rent Acts. M claims that rent was unfair, so applies to council for rent to be
assessed (thinking it was a lease). As a result, S wanted to evict M immediately.

HoL said that despite the intention as a licence in the agreement, it was a lease.

Lord Templeman set outs the test for a lease being:

Street v Mountford "Exclusive possession, for a rent, at a term."

This sets out and reaffirms the subjective test.

Lord Templeman also said that:

"An occupier of residential accommodation at a rent for a term is either a lodger or a tenant" - so lodgers do not have a

1985
lease:
"A lodger is entitled to live in the premises but cannot call the place his own."

This cases also said that the court should be astute to detect and frustrate sham devices.

It was also said that:

"It may be difficult to discover whether, on the true construction of the agreement, exclusive possession is conferred.
Sometimes it may appear from the surrounding circumstances that there was no intention to create legal relationships"
- may be used to rebut a finding of exclusive possession where there is exclusive occupation.

Also set out that a finding of exclusive possession can be rebutted if there is service occupany - where an occupier
enjoys exclusive possession as a consequence of his or her employment

4 people enter into 4 separate licence agreements with the

owner of a 4 bed flat, all of which made at different times, have
different rents and different periods. All share with other
occupiers being granted 'licences'. Each licensee had sole use of
AG Securities v Vaughan their bedroom but shared use of the kitchen, bathroom and living
room.

1990 Lord Templeman said the occupiers were just licenses, as the
owner would have had the right to replace an occupier if one
left - the others had not exclusive occupation, as they would
earn no right to the empty room.
 Villiers and partner enter into identical licence
agreements at the same time. Antoniades purports to
retain rights (use the flat at the same time as VIlliers and
Antoniades v Villiers introduce a limitless number of licensees to share the
flat), but he never acted on these purported rights. In
this sense, the claues were riddled with pretence and
1990 according to Lord Templeman, these clauses were not
intended to have any practical purpose (only to avoid
the finding of a lease). Once these clauses were
stripped away, however, a lease was clearly found.

C owned basement room suitable only for 1 person to live in. This was seemingly exlusively occupied by
D, yet the agreement stated that there was only a licence. According to the agreement, C retained the
key and D had to vacate the room for 1 hour 30 minutes each day for cleaning.

Aslan v Murphy The question was whether there was exclusive occupation. Lord Donaldson said the following:
"Provisions as to keys, if not a pretence (which they often are) do not have any magic in themselves" - as
often needed for emergencies etc. - "What matters os wjay underlies the provision as to keys. Why
does the owner want the key?"

1990 If the retention of keys is the result of a provision of some for of genuine service not of ordinary reason
(emergencies etc.), then a licence is more likely to be found.

As the provision that the defendant was required to vacate the room for cleaning was never acted upon,
the provision was a pretence, and so exclusive occupation was found and there was a lease.

Ex parte Beswick
Woman living at the YMCA was held not
to be a licensee.
1976

Bruton v London and Quadrant Housing
London Borough of Lambeth Council owned Oval House, Brixton, which it wanted to demolish - though
there were delays. During this time delay, London Quandrant Housing Trust (LQHT) is granted a licence
to use Oval House by the council, so as to provide accommodation for the homeless. It was only a
licence as councils do not have the statutory powers to grant leases. The licence agreement stated that
LQHT must vacate the premises upon recieving reasonable notice. Yet, an occupier at the House, Bruton,
takes LQHT to court for disgusting conditions in the flats, attempting to impose a statutory repairing

Trust
obligation. Yet this remedy is only applicable to leases. LQHT says that it no power to grant Bruton lease,
as LQHT itself had not proprietary in the proprietary as occupied Oval House only on licence - nemo dat
quad no habet.

Lord Hoffman blurs the distinction between leases and licenses by saying that there was exlucsive
possession and therefore Bruton had a lease. This meant that:
1999 a) A lease is not always a proprietary right;
b) A lease can simply be contract between a landlord and tenant and nothing more.

This decision is also probelmatic as what is the difference in this case between a Bruton non-proprietary
lease and a contractual licence? No certainty in the law, in this respect.

Both of these cases applied the Bruton

non-proprietary lease, however decided
Kay v London Borough of Lambeth and
that it is purely contractual and that it
London Borough of Islington v Green
has not third-party effect. Once again
very similar to contractual licences. The
2006 and 2005
Bruton non-proprietary lease is a 'non-
estate' tenancy.
 This case is noticeable because the court
came to the complete opposite decision
London Development Agency v Nidai
to Bruton, even though it should have
been applied. The court and the
2009
barristers completely ignored the
deicision, showing its uncertain nature.

This case also recognises that the Bruton

non-proprietary lease has no third party
Mitchell v Watkinson
impact, even though it is referred to as a
'contract of tenancy' - tenancy would
2013
imply similar features to a proprietary
lease.

Agreement to not use property between

10:30am to 12pm and to remove furniture.
Crancour v Da Silvesa This was obviously so unrealistic that it
was a sham, however the agreement was
1986 still a licence as other provisions were
acted upon (in contrast to Aslan v
Murphy).

Concerned whether a priest was a

service occupier.
Glasgow Corp v Johnstone
HoL said he was and so was not a tenant
- the house was integral to his duties.

Ice cream manufacturer allowed his assistant

to occupy his house in return for rent.
Facchini v Bryson
There was a lease as the occupancy of the
1952
assistant in the house was not required for his
job. Contrast this case with Glasgow Corp.
 Mechanic was allowed occupation of a house close to a depot
on the condition that he would work towards a PSV licence. Yet
the mechanic did not inform his employers that he was
disqualified from driving. They find out and take him to court.
Norris v Checksfield
The court found that there was no lease. Although the house was
not necessary for his job, it was on the condition was he work
1991 towards a PVC licence and become a coach driver - so there
was still a degree of permanence which meant that the mechanic
was under a service occupancy. He was genuinely required to
occupy the premises for the better perfomance of his duties.

A brother lived rent-free for 13 years.

Cobb v Lane There was no lease as the presumption
of exclusive possession could be
1952 rebutted due to the lack of an intention
to create a legal relationship.

Man renovated a house owned on land

owned by his in-laws. He moved in with
Nunn v Dalrymple
his family and paid rent.
1974
Despite the family relationship, there was
a lease.

Heslop v Burns
There was no intention to create a legal
relationship, so a licence only was found.
1974

Rhodes v Dalby
There was no intention to create a legal
relationship, so a licence only was found.
1971
 Woman occupies a house administrated by a trust whose aim
was to provide shelter to poor people over 60.

Gray v Taylor She was decided only to be a licencee. The exclisive possession
was rebutted on the grounds that the aim of the trust was
founded upon charitable interests. If the woman won the lottery,
1998 she would no longer be able to stay - if there was a proprietary
interest however she could stay (explaining why is was
necessary to not grant a proprietary interest).

With regards to the second element for

Marshall v Berridge
a lease (a term certain), this case said
that there must be a certain beginning
1881
and a certain ending.

Brilliant v Michaels If a lease begins on an event for which

the date is uncertain, as long as that
1945 event occurs, that will be okay.

S.149(3) The limit at which a lease can begin in

the future (a reversionary lease) is 21
LPA 1925 years.

Lease was said to end at the end of

WWII.
Lace v Chandler
CoA said this was not a term certain as
the duration of the lease was uncertain -
when would WWII end?
 A lease was granted, lasting until '3 months notice' given by the landlord. The question was whether this
could constitute a term certain with regards to the certain of the ending of the lease.

CoA said that the true principle was not that there must be a fixed end date, but that there must be a
sufficiently certain event. This contrasts Lace v Chandler as the end of WWII itself was not sufficiently

Ashburn Anstalt v Arnold certain. In this case, the 3 months notice was deemed to be sufficiently certain.

Also states that rent is relevant for a lease, but not a requirement.

Lord Denning said no. Contractual rights are person rights only. However, the case also says that just

1989
because there is no interest in the land, this does not means that a contractual licence cannot bind a
purchaser. It depends on the purchaser's conduct and if a personal constructive trust exist. It is binding
only because of the purchaser's conduct. In order for this trust to be created, the purchaser must
conduct themselves in a way which would be inequitable and unconscionable if the licence were to be
denied (e.g. if the purchaser buys the land at a lower price as a consequence of a promise to keep the
licence, it would be unequitable to revoke the licence). Yet this does not mean that the licence has
become a proprietary interest.

Owner of a strip of land next to a highway enters into an agreement with a council in 1930 to sell the strip
of land to the CC so long as CC leases it back to the original owner until the CC needs to use the strip of
land for road-widening. Yet in the 1980s, land is sold to Prudential Assurance so Prudential Assurance
owns the lease. PA then attempt to end the lease, but the leesee claimed that it could not as no road-
widening had occurred (the stipulated end date in the original lease agreement).

Prudential Assurance v London

HoL criticised Ashburn, and then claimed in this that there was no certain end date. Yet this approach
goes against the intention of the original parties. This affirms that a lease must have a certain end date
from the outset.

Residuary Body Also decided that whether the original lease is invalid, an implied tenancy will be used instead - so there
was an implied tenancy in this case. The implied tenancy was one of periodic tenancy, made by reference
to when rent is paid.

Lord Browne-Wilkinson said that periodic tenancies are essentially governed by each period. Because
each period is certain, then the whole period is, by logic, certain. It is as if there is a new agreement at
the start of each period.

B sells house to M as in desperate need of money. M allows B to occupy the house for the rest of her life
for lower rent. Occupany agreement, clause 1 stated that the house was to be let from 'month to month',
and clause 5 stated that occupation would continue until she longer needed the property, died, or gave 1
month's notice in writing. Clause 6 stated that B had to meet certain conditions - e.g. rent. M later
attempted to evict B arguing that B's death was no term certain and therefore there was no lease.

Berrisford v Mexfield Housing Co-op Ltd This case is very odd. If affirms Prudential, yet states that clause 5 concerns an ancient common law rule:

Doe on the demise of Warner v Brown (1807) - a lease with no certain end date (prior to 1925) is treated
as a tenancy for life. Therefore, before 1925, B would have had a tenancy for life.

2011 However S.149(6) LPA 1925 automically converts all tenancies for life into leases for 9o years. The
Supreme Court applied this in the present case. As B would have had a lease for life, she is therefore
granted a 90 year lease under s.149(6).

This rule does not apply to companies as they do not have 'lives'.

In this case, Lord Mance called for a change in the law.

A resulting lease of 90 years can be

Sterling v Cyron Housing Co-operative terminated by the earlier death of the
tenant or in accordance with the terms
2013 of the tenancy agreement (e.g. not
paying rent).

Cs were housing co-ops and Ds were members of the co-op occupied

under a tanency agreement. Clause 4(2) of the tenncy agreement
stated that a notice to quit will be issued on non-payment of rent
Southward Housing Co-operative v (clause 7). Ds fell into arrears and could not show that they could pay
off the arrears and make future payments on time. Ds claimed
Walker Berrisford - that they had a 90-year lease which could only end
through forfeiture or death. Yet there was no forfeiture clause.

2015 The judges nevertheless decided that Berrisford can only apply where
the parties originally intended a lease for life. Interestingly, this
interprets leases subjectively rather than objectively, narrowing
massively the scope of Berrisford.
 Concerned implied tenancies where
Javad v Mohammed Aqil there is a periodic rent - periodic
tenancies.

D grants lease to P of cottom mill for 30 shillings per year for 7 years -
payable in advance each year. Yet no deed is signed. P is in arrears and D
claims the remedy of distrss (allowing the landlord to go into the house, take
Walsh v Lonsdale items of value and them sell them). P claims that this remedy was unlawfully
exercised - siad that there was an implied periodic tenancy which would
allow rent to be paid in arrears (at the end of each period).

1882 CoA rejected P's claims on the basis that equitable leases take primacy over
an implied periodic tenancy and occur on the same terms as a legal lease -
there is still a valid contract. This meant that P was bound to the terms to
pay rent in advance and so the remedy of distress was not unlawful.

All conveyances of estates must be done by deed to exist at law.

Unless (s.52(2)(d)) the lease is not required by law to be in

S.52 writing (less than 3 years in duration).

So leases longer than 3 years require a deed. Furthermore,

LPA 1925 pursuant to s.27 of the LRA 2002 (registrable dispositions) and
Section 4 of the same Act (first registration), leases longer than 7
years must also be registered.

S.1
Sets out the requirements for a deed.
LP(MP)A 1989

S.54(2)

LPA 1925
 There must be avalid contract to create
a legal lease (for those under 3 years)
S.2
Also required as a general formality
LP(MP)A 1989
requirement for equitable proprietary
rights (equitable leases above 3 years)

A licence "properly passeth no interest

Thomas v Sorrell
nor alters or transfers property in any
thing, but only makes an action lawful,
(1673)
which without it had been unlawful"

P purchased four day ticket for race meeting a

Doncaster. When P refused to leave, he was removed
by force. P claimed that this amounted to an assault and
Wood v Leadbitter that he had an irrevocable licence for the duration of the
races. It was held that, as he did not enjoy a licence
coupled with a grant (only a contractual licence), it was
1845 irrevocable. He could apply for damages, but as soon as
the licence was revoked (which it can be at any time
usually under the common law), he was a trespasser.

shows the ability of equity to restrain a breach of contract and make a licence irrevocable. In this case, D
had granted P a licence to use their theatre for 6 months, with the option to re-new. Yet after several
years, D revoked the licence. CoA held that licence was irrevocable, because the contract granted D no
express power to revoke it.

Winter Garden Theatre (London) Ltd v Lord Greene:

Millennium Productions "The general rule is that before equity such an injunction, there must be, on the construction of the
contract, a negative clause, express or implied."

Whilst HoL could not find this, term they accepted this approach. So injunctions can be granted in equity.

1946 HoL said that cinema could (as the licence wasn't intended to go on forever) revoke the licence, but only
on reasonable notice (a year in advance).

For casual notice (not family and friends), notice of the termination of a licence is pretty much non-
existent

D council agreed to allow National Front

to use its hall for its annual conference.
Veral v Great Yarmouth BC
Yet council revokes the contract after a
change in political party. Held that the
1981
principle in Winter Gardens was
applicable.
 Termination of a licence can be through
Robson v Hallet
reasonable notice.

Reversionary leases need a deed to be

legal and to be protected under s.52(2)
Long v London Tower Hamlets of the LPA 1925 (be protected when
under 3 years, despite not being
registered).