LOVINA VS.
MORENO ALEGRE VS COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS
FACTS:
Numerous residents of Macabebe, Pampanga complained that appellees had blocked the "Sapang Bulati", a
navigable river in the same municipality and asked that the obstructions be ordered removed, under the
provisions of Republic Act No. 2056. After notice and hearing to the parties, the said Secretary of Public
Works and Communications found the constructions to be a public nuisance in navigable waters, and
ordered the landowners, spouses Lovina, to remove five (5) closures of Sapang Bulati. After receipt of the
decision, the appellees filed a petition in CFI of Manila to restrain the Secretary from enforcing his decision.
The trial court, after due hearing, granted a permanent injunction. It held that Republic Act No. 2056 is
unconstitutional and that Sapang Bulati is not a navigable river but a private stream.
The appellees’ contention is that Republic Act No. 2056 is unconstitutional because it invests the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications with sweeping, unrestrained, final and unappealable authority to pass
upon the issues of whether a river or stream is public and navigable, whether a dam encroaches upon such
waters and is constitutive as a public nuisance, and whether the law applies to the state of facts, thereby
Constituting an alleged unlawful delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications.
ISSUE: Whether there is an unlawful delegation of judicial power.
HELD:
The contentions of the appellees are not tenable. R.A. 2056 merely empowers the Secretary to remove
unauthorized obstructions or encroachments upon public streams, constructions that no private person was
anyway entitled to make, because the bed of navigable streams is public property, and ownership thereof is
not acquirable by adverse possession.
It is true that the exercise of the Secretary's power under the Act necessarily involves the determination of
some questions of fact, such as the existence of the stream and its previous navigable character; but these
functions, whether judicial or quasi-judicial, are merely incidental to the exercise of the power granted by
law to clear navigable streams of unauthorized obstructions or encroachments, and authorities are clear that
they are, validly conferable upon executive officials provided the party affected is given opportunity to be
heard, as is expressly required by Republic Act No. 2056, section 2.
The mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire the existence of certain facts and to apply the law
thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect private,
rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial powers. Accordingly, a statute may give to non-judicial
officers the power to declare the existence of facts which call into operation its provisions, and similarly
may grant to commissioners and other subordinate officer, power to ascertain and determine appropriate
facts as a basis for procedure in the enforcement of particular laws.
It is noteworthy that Republic Act 2605 authorizes removal of the unauthorized dikes either as "public
nuisances or as prohibited constructions" on public navigable streams, and those of appellees clearly are in
the latter class.
In fine, it is held that Republic Act No. 2056 does not constitute an unlawful delegation of judicial power to
the Secretary of Public Works; that the findings of fact of the Secretary of Public Works under Republic Act
No. 2056 should be respected in the absence of illegality, error of law, fraud, or imposition, so long as the
said, findings are supported by substantial evidence submitted to him.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the writs of injunction issued therein are annulled and set aside.
G.R. L-30783
FACTS
The petitioner for a number of years has been and is now engaged in the production of abaca and its
exportation to foreign markets. November 8, 1927, he applied to the respondent for a permit to export one
hundred bales of abaca to England, which was denied, and advised that he would not be permitted to export
the abaca in question without a certificate of the Fiber Standardization Board. He then filed in the Court of
First Instance of Manila a petition for a writ of mandamus, alleging that the provisions of the Administrative
Code for the grading, inspection and certification of fibers and, in particular, sections 1772 and 1244 of that
Code, are unconstitutional and void.
The Insular Deputy Collector of Customs, answered the above letter of the petitioner informing him that he
would not be permitted to export the said one hundred bales of abaca unless the export entry covering the
exportation is accompanied by a certificate of the Fiber Standardization Board, or a notation is written on
the face of the triplicate of the export entry signed by the fiber inspector who made the inspection indicating
that the abaca covered thereby has complied with the provisions of the law relative to the shipment of such
product. Copies of the said letter and its enclosure are attached to, and made a part of, this answer marked as
Exhibits A, B, and C.
It will thus be noted that the purpose and intent of the original law was to provide in detail for the inspection
grading and baling of abaca, maguey, sisal and other fibers, and for a uniform scale for grading, and to issue
official certificates as to the kind and quality of the hemp, so that an intending purchaser from an
examination of the certificates might be assured and know the grade and quality of the hemp offered for
sale.
The original law, as enacted, was later amended and carried into, and made a part of, the Administrative
Code, section 1244 of which is as follows:
A collector of customs shall not permit abaca, maguey, or sisal or other fibrous products for which standard
grades have been established by the Director of Agriculture to be laden aboard a vessel clearing for a
foreign port, unless the shipment conforms to the requirements of law relative to the shipment of such fibers.
ISSUE
Whether or not the law in question delegates to the Fiber Board legislative powers or administrative
functions to carry out the purpose and intent of the law for its more efficient administration.
RULING
NO. It is a delegation of administrative power.
The maxim that power conferred upon Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to any other authority
does not preclude the Legislature from delegating any power not legislative which it may itself rightfully
exercise. This means that the Legislature must declare the policy of the law and fix the legal principles,
which are to control in given cases; but an administrative officer or body may be invested with the power to
apply principles. This is done not only to avoid confusion in the laws, but also not to miss sufficiency both
in provision and execution in an effort to detail and to particularize.
IN OTHER WORDS, though legislative power cannot be delegated to boards and commissions, the
Legislature may delegate to them administrative functions in carrying out the purposes of a statute and
various governmental power for the more efficient administration of the laws.
Congress legislated on the subject as far as was reasonably practicable. However, the necessities of the case
compelled them to leave to executive officials the duty of bringing about the result pointed out by the
statute. To deny the power of Congress to delegate such a duty would amount to declaring that the power
vested in Congress to regulate foreign commerce could not be efficaciously exerted.
IN THIS CASE, the Legislature, by enacting Act No. 2380, is saying that before any hemp is exported from
the Philippines it must be inspected, graded and baled, and it has created a board for that purpose and vested
it with the power and authority to do the actual work.
Applying the principles mentioned above, such a delegation is not a delegation of legislative power. Rather,
it is a delegation of administrative power in the Fiber Board, to carry out the purpose and intent of the law.
That is because in the very nature of things, the Legislature could not perform such tasks.
CAWAD VS ABAD
G.R. NO. 207145
JULY 28, 2015
FACTS
PPHAI – Philippine Public Health Association
On March 26, 1992, Republic Act (RA) No. 7305, otherwise known as The Magna Carta of Public
Health Workers was signed into law in order to promote the social and economic well-being of health
workers, their living and working conditions and terms of employment, to develop their skills and
capabilities to be better equipped to deliver health projects and programs, and to encourage those with
proper qualifications and excellent abilities to join and remain in government service. Accordingly, public
health workers (PHWs) were granted the following allowances and benefits, among others:
Section 20. Additional Compensation. - Notwithstanding Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6758, public
health workers shall receive the following allowances: hazard allowance, subsistence allowance, longevity
pay, laundry allowance and remote assignment allowance.
Pursuant to Section 355 of the Magna Carta, the Secretary of Health promulgated its Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) in July 1992. Thereafter, in November 1999, the DOH, in collaboration with various
government agencies and health workers' organizations, promulgated a Revised IRR consolidating all
additional and clarificatory rules issued by the former Secretaries of Health dating back from the effectivity
of the Magna Carta.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondents’ issuance of DBM-DOH Joint Circular No.1, s.2012 is null and void for being
an undue exercise of legislative powers?
RULING
The Court finds the petition partly granted. The DBM-DOH Joint Circular, insofar as it lowers the hazard
pay at rates below the minimum prescribed by Section 21 of RA No. 7305 and Section 7.1.5 (a) of its
Revised IRR, is declared INVALID. The DBM-CSC Joint Circular, insofar as it provides that an official or
employee authorized to be granted Longevity Pay under an existing law is not eligible for the grant of Step
Increment Due to Length of Service, is declared UNENFORCEABLE. The validity, however, of the DBM-
DOH Joint Circular as to the qualification of actual exposure to danger for the PHW's entitlement to hazard
pay, the rates of P50 and P25 subsistence allowance, and the entitlement to longevity pay on the basis of the
PHW' s status in the plantilla of regular positions, is UPHELD
WALTER E. OLSEN & CO. V. ALDANESE
G.R. NO. L-18740.
MARCH 29, 1922
FACTS:
The petitioners assail the validity of the Act No. 2613 of the Philippine Legislature entitled "an act to
improve the methods of production and the quality of tobacco in the Philippine and to develop the export
trade therein”. The Collector of Internal Revenue is authorized to certify to the Insular Collector of Customs
that the standard tobacco exported is the growth and product of the Philippine Islands. Paragraph 5 of the
petition alleges that under clause B of section 6 of the Act, the Collector of Internal Revenue promulgated
Administrative Order No. 35, known as "Tobacco Inspection Regulations," in which it is said:
To be classed as standard, cigars must be manufactured under sanitary conditions from good, clean, selected
tobacco, properly cured and seasoned, of a crop which has been harvested at least six months, exclusively
the product of the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela, or Nueva Vizcaya. The cigars must be well made, with
suitable spiral wrapper and with long filler, etc.
The petitioner applied to the Collector of Internal Revenue for a certificate of origin covering a consignment
of 10,000 machine-made cigars to San Francisco, and as the petitioner himself stated on making such
application that the cigars sought to be exported have been manufactured from short-filler tobacco which
was not the product of the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela, and Nueva Vizcaya. The Collector of Internal
Revenue did not deem it necessary to make an actual examination and inspection of said cigars in view of
the fact that the cigars were not made with long-filler nor were they made from tobacco exclusively the
product of any of the three mentioned provinces.
ISSUE:
Whether or not A.O No. 35 and Act No. 2613, as well as the refusal of the Collector of Internal Revenue to
issue a certificate of origin, are constitutional.
HELD:
Yes. Under the provisions of Act No. 2613, the Collector of Internal Revenue of the Philippine Islands
promulgated Administrative Order No. 35, known as "Tobacco Inspections Regulations." Such rules and
regulations, having been promulgated by that officer, the court has a right to assume that he was acting
under such rules and regulations when he refused to issue the certificate of origin. It appears from the record
that the cigars in question were not long-filler cigars, and that they were not manufactured from tobacco
grown in one of the three provinces. By the express terms and provisions of such rules and regulations
promulgated by the Collector of Internal Revenue, it was his duty to refuse petitioner's request, and decline
the certificate or origin, because the cigars tendered were not of the specified kind, and the court have a right
to assume that he performed his official duty as the understood it. After such refusal and upon such grounds,
it would indeed, have been a vain and useless thing for the Collector of Internal Revenue to his examined or
inspected the cigars. Having refused to issue the certificate of origin for the reason above assigned, it is very
apparent that a request thereafter made examine or inspect the cigars would also have been refused.
SYMAN VS. CIR
FACTS
Collector of customs ordered the seizure of shipments imported by SYMAN. After due hearing, the
collector rendered a decision that those previously seized be delivered to the importer upon payment of
customs duty except the sewing machines which are forfeited to the government. Sy man's counsel sent a
letter to the collector asking for the execution of decision and it has become final and no longer be reviewed
by the commissioner as they did not appeal the decision. However, the collector submitted the decision to
the commissioner arguing that a memorandum order was issued in accordance to sec 1152 of the revised
admin code giving the commissioner the power to review such.
ISSUE
Whether or not the memorandum order is valid
HELD
No. The actions of the Commissioner can’t find support in the Memorandum Order itself as it was never
approved by the department head and was never published by in Official Gazette. Such approval and
publication are required for the memorandum order to have legal effect.
Moreover, a regulation promulgated by a Bureau Chief must not be inconsistent with law. If the law does
not give the Commissioner the power to review and revise unappealed decisions of the Collector of Customs
in seizure cases, then the memorandum order even if duly approved and published would equally have no
effect for being inconsistent with law.
POWER PHILIPPINE LAWYERS VS AGRAVA
G. R. NO. L-12426
FEBRUARY 16, 195
FACTS:
This is a petition filed by the Philippine Lawyers Association for prohibition and
injunction against Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity s Director of the Philippines Patent
Office. On May 23, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had
scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are
qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the said office. Petitioner contends that
one who has passed the bar examinations, and is in good standing, is duly qualified to
practice before the Philippines Patent Office and that the respondent Director's holding
an examination for the purpose is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the
law. The respondent, in reply, maintains that the prosecution of patent cases "does not
involve entirely or purely the practice of law but include the application of scientific
and technical knowledge and training as a matter of actual purpose so as to include
engineers and other individuals who passed the examination can practice before the
Patent Office. Furthermore, respondent contends that he has previously conducted
such examinations and that this is the first time that he is questioned formally.
ISSUES:
W/N the Dir of Patent’s Office has the right to impose qualifications on lawyers for
practicing before said office
RULING:
No. a. The Philippine Patent Law is silent about the power of the Director to impose
qualifications such as sufficient knowledge and expertise in the scientific and technical
matters related to patent application that may take the form of an examination. Unlike
the US Patent Law, our own law only requires that the rules and regulations
promulgated by the Dir of Patent are not inconsistent with law.
b. If the Patent Dir will be allowed as the head of the Patent Office to require
examinations for the practice of lawyers before his office, then other bureaus chiefs
may also be allowed to conduct similar examinations.
c. The functions of the Patent Director are judicial and quasi-judicial in nature so much
so that his orders and decisions are subject to be taken before the Supreme Court.
- Lawyers authorized by SC to practice law and are in good standing may practice
their profession before the Patent’s Office.
TOLEDO VS CSC/COMELEC
G.R. NO. 135864
NOVEMBER 24, 1999
FACTS
Petitioner Atty. Augusto Toledo was appointed by the COMELEC Chairman as Manager
of the Education and Information Department of the COMELEC when he was more than
57 years old. This was his first time to join government service.
No prior request for exemption from the provisions of Section 22, Rule III of the Civil
Service Rules on Personnel Action and Policies (CSRPAP) was secured. Said provision
prohibits the appointment of persons 57 years old or above into the government
service without prior approval by the CSC.
Atty. Toledo officially reported for work and assumed the functions of his office.
COMELEC, upon discovery of the lack of authority required under the CSRPAP issued
Resolution No. 2066, which declared Toledo’s appointment as void ab initio. Toledo
appealed the foregoing Resolution to the CSC.
CSC Resolution No. 89-468 disposed of the appeal by declaring the appointment of
Toledo as merely voidable and not void ab initio and declaring Toledo as a de facto
officer from the time he assumed office to the time of the issuance of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2066.

ISSUE

Whether or not Sec. 22, Rule III is valid.

HELD

NO. The provision on 57-year old persons in the Revised Civil Service Rules
implementing RA 2260 cannot be accorded validity. It is entirely a creation of the Civil
Service Commission, having no basis in the law itself which it was meant to implement.

The statute itself (RA 2260) contained no provision prohibiting the appointment or
reinstatement in the government service of any person who was already 57 y/o. The
provision at issue is an unauthorized act on the part of CSC- a supererogation – since it
has no relation or connection with any provision of the law supposed to be carried in
effect.

The power vested on the CSC was to implement the law or put it into effect, not to add
to it; to carry the law into effect or execution, not to supply perceived omissions on it.

Apart from this, the CSRPAP cannot be considered effective as of the time of
the application to Toledo of a provision thereof, for the reason that said rules were
never published