G.R. No.

183700 October 13, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
PABLITO ANDAYA y REANO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The non-presentation of the confidential informant as a witness does not ordinarily weaken the State's case
against the accused. However, if the arresting lawmen arrested the accused based on the pre-arranged signal
from the confidential informant who acted as the poseur buyer, his nonpresentation must be credibly explained
and the transaction established by other ways in order to satisfy the quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt
because the arresting lawmen did not themselves participate in the buy-bust transaction with the accused.

Antecedents

On February 7, 2003, an information for violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 91651 (RA 9165) was filed
charging Pablito Andaya y Reano (Andaya). The accusatory portion of the information reads:

That on or about December 16, 2002 at around 9:50 o'clock in the evening at Brgy. San Jose Sico, Batangas
City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being
authorized by law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, sell, dispense or deliver, more or less
0.09 gram(s) of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, which is a clear violation of the
above-cited law. CONTRARY TO LAW.2

Upon arraignment,3 Andaya pleaded not guilty to the charge. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The CA summed up the versions of the parties, as follows:4

Five (5) witnesses were presented by the prosecution, namely: SPO4 Delfin Alea, SPO3 Nelio Lopez, SPO2
Danilo Mercado, SPO4 Protasio Marasigan and Jupri Delantar.

SPO2 Delfin Alea testified that at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of December 16, 2002, their asset who was
conducting surveillance of Pablito Andaya in Barangay San Jose Sico, Batangas City, arrived at their station.
Said asset reported that he had arranged to buy shabu from Pablito. A team composed of SPO1 Aguila, SPO1
Cabungcal, Eric de Chavez, PO1 Lindberg Yap, Edwalberto Villar and asset Bagsit was constituted to conduct a
buy-bust. Two (2) pieces of ₱100.00 bills both duly marked "X" were recorded in the police blotter. Alea gave the
marked bills to the asset. Upon reaching the designated place, the team members alighted from their vehicles
and occupied different positions where they could see and observe the asset. The asset knocked on the door of
Pablito's house. Pablito came out. Pablito and the asset talked briefly. The asset gave Pablito the marked
money. The asset received something from appellant. The pre-arranged signal signifying consummation of the
transaction was given. The team members approached Pablito and the asset, introduced themselves as police
officers and arrested accused. He was brought to the police station. The arrival of the team was recorded in the
police blotter. The merchandise handed by accused to the asset was sent to the Regional Crime Laboratory in
Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna. The specimen was positive for methampethamine Hydrochloride
(shabu), a dangerous drug.

SPO2 Lopez received the person of the accused, the marked money and the item accused handed to the asset.
Lopez prepared the request for laboratory examination. He also prepared the documents required for filing of the
case with the Public Prosecutor.

SPO2 Danilo Mercado recorded the marked bills in the police blotter before the buy-bust. Upon the team's
return, the marked money and the merchandise from accused were turned over to SPO2 Mercado. He prepared
a complaint sheet. Thereafter, he turned over accused and the evidence to the Police Investigator.

SPo4 Protacio Marasigan received a written request for laboratory examination of the subject merchandise. He
brought the request to the crime laboratory in Laguna.
Jupri Delantar, a Forensic Chemical Officer in Camp Vicente Lim, Laguna, conducted the examination. The
merchandise tested positive for shabu.

Accused-appellant denied the charge. He stated that at about 9: 15 in the evening of December 16, 2002 he was
at home watching TV with his family when police officers arrived. When he opened the door, a police officer
poked his gun at him. Somebody else held a long firearm. Pablito was handcuffed and brought outside. He
refused to negotiate and asked for a warrant. The policemen searched the house, turned over the beddings and
uncovered their furniture. No gun nor shabu was found. Pablito was brought to the police station and detained.
After three (3) days he was released. He received a subpoena from the Public Prosecutor afterwards.

His wife Crisanta, corroborated appellants' testimony. She added having told her husband about the loss of their
cellphone and the money in his wallet. She was asked to produce ₱5,000.00 which she was unable to do. She
was able to raise only ₱2,000.00.

Judgment of the RTC

On February 21, 2006, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, in Batangas City (R TC) rendered its judgment
convicting Andaya as charged, and meted him the penalty of life imprisonment,5 viz:

In the case at bar, the buy-bust operation conducted on the night of December 16, 2002 is supported by the
police blotter wherein not only was the depaiiure and arrival of the operatives have been duly recorded but also
the two (2) pieces of marked one hundred peso bills. The arrest of the accused was made after the police asset
had given the pre-arranged signal outside his house. The marked money was recovered from the very hand of
the accused while the deck of crystalline substances given to the asset upon the latter's handing over to the
accused the marked money has been turned over to the police by the asset. The crystalline substance when
examined at the police crime laboratory was found to contain methamphetamine hydrochloride a dangerous and
prohibited drug and weighed 0.09 gram.

These foregoing facts have been clearly testified to by the Prosecution witnesses who are members of the
Philippine Integrated National Police Force stationed at Batangas City. No ill-motive has been imputed to any of
these police officers prior to and at the time the herein accused was arrested on the night of December 16, 2002.

The accused and his wife as a defense denied the sale of shabu that fateful night. There were allegations in their
testimonies that the police demanded money from them. The wife of the accused even testified that she gave P
1,500.00 to the police officer who then eventually released said accused. And early on, she even claimed money
and a cellphone were missing after the accused was arrested in their house.

The testimonies of the accused and his wife are bereft of any corroborating evidence emanating from a
disinterested source. It is no less than self-serving devoid of any credence considering the following
circumstances:

1. Scrutinizing the entirety of the testimony of the accused and his wife Crisanta Andaya, there are
material variances gleaned therefrom. The accused himself never testified that he was pushed to a chair
and yet witness Crisanta Andaya said she saw her husband pushed to a chair. Also, the accused said
there were two guns poked at him when he opened the door but his wife said only one was holding a
gun while another had a long firearm on his shoulder.

2. The testimony of the accused was that only ₱500.00 was taken by the police before his release. But
the wife said ₱1,500.00 was given to the police before the accused was released. 3. The accused and
his wife never made any complaint to the proper authorities as regards the alleged loss of money and
cellphone when the accused was arrested on December 16, 2002. Neither was there any complaint filed
by them for the alleged ₱500.00 or Pl1500.00 demanded from and given by them to the police.

4. The accused was a resident of Barangay San Jose Sico, Batangas City since the 1980's why was it
that it was at Rosario, Batangas where the accused was arrested. The Defense gave no evidence to
contest the presumption of guilt based on flight.

5. It is significant to note also that the accused never bothered to ask who was knocking at his door past
9:00 o'clock in the evening. While his family was already lying in bed to sleep he was still watching T.V.
These actuations of the accused tend to support the fact that the police asset had made a deal with the
accused for the sale of shabu and was expecting the asset to come that night.
In the light of all foregoing considerations, the Court is left with no alternative than to find the herein accused
criminally liable for the offense charged in the information.

Wherefore, accused Pablito Andaya y Reano is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. He is therefore sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and to pay the costs
of this action. The 0.09 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride subject of this case is confiscated and directed
to be proceeded against pursuant to law.

The accused may be credited with his preventive imprisonment if he is entitled to any.

SO ORDERED.6

Decision of the CA

In his appeal, Andaya contended:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S SEARCH
AND ARREST AS ILLEGAL.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME

CHARGED DESPITE THE FAIL URE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.7

On February 11, 2008, the CA promulgated its assailed decision affirming the conviction,8 viz:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is DISMISSED. The decision of Branch IV, RTC, Fourth
Judicial Region, Batangas City, in Criminal Case No. 12771 is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.9

Issues

Hence, Andaya appeals, insisting that the search of his house and his person and his arrest by the police
officers violated his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and that the Prosecution's
nonpresentation of the confidential informant was adverse to the Prosecution, indicating that his guilt was not
proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

To secure the conviction of the accused who is charged with the illegal sale of dangerous drugs as defined and
punished by Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002), the State must
establish the concurrence of the following elements, namely: (a) that the transaction or sale took place between
the accused and the poseur buyer; and ( b) that the dangerous drugs subject of the transaction or sale is
presented in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.10

We reiterate that a buy-bust operation is a valid and legitimate form of entrapment of the drug pusher.11 In such
operation, the poseur buyer transacts with the suspect by purchasing a quantity of the dangerous drug and
paying the price agreed upon, and in turn the drug pusher turns over or delivers the dangerous drug subject of
their agreement in exchange for the price or other consideration. Once the transaction is consummated, the drug
pusher is arrested, and can be held to account under the criminal law. The justification that underlies the
legitimacy of the buy-bust operation is that the suspect is arrested in jlagranti delicto, that is, the suspect has just
committed, or is in the act of committing, or is attempting to commit the offense in the presence of the arresting
police officer or private person.12 The arresting police officer or private person is favored in such instance with
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty.
Proof of the transaction must be credible and complete. In every criminal prosecution, it is the State, and no
other, that bears the burden of proving the illegal sale of the dangerous drug beyond reasonable doubt.13 This
responsibility imposed on the State accords with the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused, who has
no duty to prove his innocence until and unless the presumption of innocence in his favor has been overcome by
sufficient and competent evidence.14

Here, the confidential informant was not a police officer. He was designated to be the poseur buyer himself. It is
notable that the members of the buy-bust team arrested Andaya on the basis of the pre-arranged signal from the
poseur buyer. The pre-arranged signal signified to the members of the buy-bust team that the transaction had
been consummated between the poseur buyer and Andaya. However, the State did not present the confidential
informant/poseur buyer during the trial to describe how exactly the transaction between him and Andaya had
taken place. There would have been no issue against that, except that none of the members of the buy-bust
team had directly witnessed the transaction, if any, between Andaya and the poseur buyer due to their being
positioned at a distance from the poseur buyer and Andaya at the moment of the supposed transaction.

The CA did not find anything wrong or odd in the non-presentation of the poseur buyer as a witness against the
accused. In fact, it justified the non-presentation as follows:

Appellant also questioned the failure of the prosecution to present the informer. The court is aware of the
considerations why confidential informants are usually not presented by the prosecution. There is the need to
hide their identity and preserve their invaluable service to the police. (People v. Khor, 307 SCRA 295 [1999],
citing People v. Gireng, 241 SCRA 11 [1995].) Foremost is the desire to protect them from being objects or
targets of revenge by the criminals they implicate once they become known. (People vs. Ong, G.R. No. 137348,
June 21, 2004.)

In People vs Lopez (214 SCRA 323), it was held that there was no need for the prosecution to present the
confidential informer as the poseur buyer himself positively identified the accused as the one who sold to him
one deck of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu." The trial court then properly relied on the testimonies
of the police officers despite the decision of the prosecution not to present the informer.15

The foregoing justification by the CA was off-tangent and does not help the State's cause any.1âwphi1 It is
obvious that the rulings cited to supp01i the need to conceal the confidential infonnants' identities related to the
confidential informants who gave information against suspected drug dealers. The presentation of the
confidential informants as witnesses for the Prosecution in those instances could be excused because there
were poseur buyers who directly incriminated the accused. In this case, however, it was different, because the
poseur buyer and the confidential informant were one and the same. Without the poseur buyer's testimony, the
State did not credibly incriminate Andaya.

Indeed, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 punishes "any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or
shall act as a broker in any of such transactions." Under the law, selling was any act "of giving away any
dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical whether for money or any other
consideration;"16 while delivering was any act "of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another, personally or
otherwise, and by any means, with or without consideration."17 Given the legal characterizations of the acts
constituting the offense charged, the members of the buy-bust team could not incriminate Andaya by simply
declaring that they had seen from their positions the poseur buyer handing something to Andaya who, in turn,
gave something to the poseur buyer. If the transaction was a sale, it was unwarranted to infer from such
testimonies of the members of the buy-bust team that what the poseur buyer handed over were the marked
₱100.00 bills and that what Andaya gave to the poseur buyer was the shabu purchased.

Another mark of suspicion attending the evidence of guilt related to the reliance by the members of the buy-bust
team on the pre-arranged signal from the poseur buyer. To start with, the record does not show what the
prearranged signal consisted of. It is fundamental enough to expect the State to be clear and definite about its
evidence of guilt, particularly here where the conviction of Andaya would require him to spend the rest of his
natural life behind bars. Nothing less should be done here. Secondly, the reliance on the supposed signal to
establish the consummation of the transaction between the poseur buyer and Andaya was unwarranted because
the unmitigatedly hearsay character of the signal rendered it entirely bereft of trustworthiness. The arresting
members of the buy-bust team interpreted the signal from the anonymous poseur buyer as the sign of the
consummation of the transaction. Their interpretation, being necessarily subjective without the testimony of the
poseur buyer, unfairly threatened the liberty of Andaya. We should not allow that threat to perpetuate itself. And,
lastly, the reliance on the signal would deprive Andaya the right to confront and test the credibility of the poseur
buyer who supposedly gave it.

We should look at the situation of Andaya with utmost caution because of what our judicial experience through
the years has told us about unscrupulous lawmen resorting to stratagems of false incrimination in order to arrest
individuals they target for ulterior reasons. In this case, the arrest did not emanate from probable cause, for the
formless signal from the anonymous poseur buyer did not establish beyond reasonable doubt the elements of
illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165.1âwphi1

In affirming the RTC's conviction of the accused, the CA observed that the defense of frame-up put up by the
accused was discredited by the absence of proof of "any intent on the paii of the police authorities to falsely
impute such crime against the accused, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
stands."18 Such outright rejection by the lower courts of Andaya's defense of frame-up is not outrightly binding.
For sure, the frame-up defense has been commonly used in prosecutions based on buy-bust operations that
have led to the an-est of the suspects.19 Its use might be seen as excessive, but the failure of the accused to
impute any ill motives to falsely incriminate them should not deter us from scrutinizing the circumstances of the
cases brought to us for review. We should remind ourselves that we cannot presume that the accused
committed the crimes they have been charged with. The State must fully establish that for us. If the imputation of
ill motive to the lawmen is the only means of impeaching them, then that would be the end of our dutiful vigilance
to protect our citizenry from false arrests and wrongful incriminations. We are aware that there have been in the
past many cases of false arrests and wrongful incriminations, and that should heighten our resolve to strengthen
the ramparts of judicial scrutiny.

Nor should we shirk from our responsibility of protecting the liberties of our citizenry just because the lawmen are
shielded by the presumption of the regularity of their performance of duty. The presumed regularity is nothing but
a purely evidentiary tool intended to avoid the impossible and time-consuming task of establishing every detail of
the performance by officials and functionaries of the Government. Conversion by no means defeat the much
stronger and much firmer presumption of innocence in favor of every person whose life, property and liberty
comes under the risk of forfeiture on the strength of a false accusation of committing some crime.20 The criminal
accusation against a person must be substantiated by proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Court should
steadfastly safeguard his right to be presumed innocent. Although his innocence could be doubted, for his
reputation in his community might not be lily-white or lustrous, he should not fear a conviction for any crime,
least of all one as grave as drug pushing, unless the evidence against him was clear, competent and beyond
reasonable doubt. Otherwise, the presumption of innocence in his favor would be rendered empty.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on February 11, 2008;
ACQUITS accused Pablito Andaya y Reano for failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and ORDERS
his immediate release from confinement at the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa City.

The Court DIRECTS that the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to implement the immediate release of
Pablito Andaya y Reano, unless he is confined for any other lawful cause; and to report his compliance within
ten days from receipt.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 180661 December 11, 2013

GEORGE ANTIQUERA y CODES, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about a supposed warrantless arrest and a subsequent search prompted by the police officers'
chance sighting through an ajar door of the accused engaged in pot session.

The Facts and the Case

On January 13, 2004 the second Assistant City Prosecutor of Pasay City charged the accused George Codes
Antiquera* and Corazon Olivenza Cruz with illegal ·possession of paraphernalia for dangerous drugs 1 before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City in Criminal Case 04-0100-CFM. 2 Since the accused Cruz jumped
bail, the court tried her in absentia. 3

The prosecution evidence shows that at around 4:45 a.m. of February 11, 2004, PO1 Gregorio Recio, PO1
Laurence Cabutihan, P/Insp. Eric Ibon, PO1 Rodelio Rania, and two civilian operatives on board a patrol car and
a tricycle were conducting a police visibility patrol on David Street, Pasay City, when they saw two unidentified
men rush out of house number 107-C and immediately boarded a jeep.

Suspecting that a crime had been committed, the police officers approached the house from where the men
came and peeked through the partially opened door. PO1 Recio and PO1 Cabutihan saw accused Antiquera
holding an improvised tooter and a pink lighter. Beside him was his live-in partner, Cruz, who was holding an
aluminum foil and an improvised burner. They sat facing each other at the living room. This prompted the police
officers to enter the house, introduce themselves, and arrest Antiquera and Cruz.4

While inspecting the immediate surroundings, PO1 Cabutihan saw a wooden jewelry box atop a table. It
contained an improvised burner, wok, scissors, 10 small transparent plastic sachets with traces of white
crystalline substance, improvised scoop, and seven unused strips of aluminum foil. The police officers
confiscated all these and brought Antiquera and Cruz to the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Philippine National
Police in Pasay City for further investigation and testing.5

A forensic chemical officer examined the confiscated drug paraphernalia and found them positive for traces of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu."6

Accused Antiquera gave a different story. He said that on the date and time in question, he and Cruz were
asleep in their house when he was roused by knocking on the door. When he went to open it, three armed police
officers forced themselves into the house. One of them shoved him and said, "D’yan ka lang, pusher ka." He
was handcuffed and someone instructed two of the officers to go to his room. The police later brought accused
Antiquera and Cruz to the police station and there informed them of the charges against them. They were shown
a box that the police said had been recovered from his house.7

On July 30, 2004 the RTC rendered a Decision8 that found accused Antiquera and Cruz guilty of the crime
charged and sentenced them to a prison term ranging from six months and one day to two years and four
months, and to pay a fine of ₱10,000.00 each and the costs of the suit.

The RTC said that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the police caught accused Antiquera
and Cruz in the act of using shabu and having drug paraphernalia in their possession. Since no ill motive could
be attributed to PO1 Recio and PO1 Cabutihan, the court accorded full faith and credit to their testimony and
rejected the self-serving claim of Antiquera.

The trial court gave no weight to accused Antiquera’s claim of illegal arrest, given PO1 Recio and PO1
Cabutihan’s credible testimony that, prior to their arrest, they saw Antiquera and Cruz in a pot session at their
living room and in possession of drug paraphernalia. The police officers were thus justified in arresting the two
without a warrant pursuant to Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.9

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered a Decision10 on September 21, 2007 affirming in full the decision
of the trial court. The accused moved for reconsideration but the CA denied it.11 The accused is now before this
Court seeking acquittal.

The Issue Presented

The issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in finding accused Antiquera guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of illegal possession of drug paraphernalia based on the evidence of the police officers that they saw him
and Cruz in the act of possessing drug paraphernalia.

Ruling of the Court

The prosecution’s theory, upheld by both the RTC and the CA, is that it was a case of valid warrantless arrest in
that the police officers saw accused Antiquera and Cruz through the door of their house, in the act of having a
pot session. That valid warrantless arrest gave the officers the right as well to search the living room for objects
relating to the crime and thus seize the paraphernalia they found there.

The prosecution contends that, since the seized paraphernalia tested positive for shabu, they were no doubt
used for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing dangerous drug into the body in
violation of Section 12 of Republic Act 9165. That the accused tested negative for shabu, said the prosecution,
had no bearing on the crime charged which was for illegal possession of drug paraphernalia, not for illegal use of
dangerous drugs. The prosecution added that even assuming that the arrest of the accused was irregular, he is
already considered to have waived his right to question the validity of his arrest when he voluntarily submitted
himself to the court’s jurisdiction by entering a plea of not guilty.12

Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a "peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." This is an arrest in flagrante delicto.13 The overt act
constituting the crime is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.14

But the circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest made in flagrante delicto.

1. The police officers claim that they were alerted when they saw two unidentified men suddenly rush out of 107
David Street, Pasay City. Since they suspected that a crime had been committed, the natural thing for them to
do was to give chase to the jeep that the two fleeing men boarded, given that the officers were in a patrol car
and a tricycle. Running after the fleeing suspects was the more urgent task but the officers instead gave priority
to the house even when they heard no cry for help from it.

2. Admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything amiss going on in the house from the street where they
stood. Indeed, even as they peeked through its partially opened door, they saw no activity that warranted their
entering it. Thus, PO1 Cabutihan testified:

THE COURT:

Q – By the way, Mr. Cabutihan, when you followed your companion towards the open door, how was the door
open? Was it totally open, or was it partially open?

A – It was partially open Your Honor.

Q – By how much, 1/3, 1/2? Only by less than one (1) foot?

A – More or less 4 to 6 inches, Your Honor.

Q – So how were you able to know, to see the interior of the house if the door was only open by 6
inches? Or did you have to push the door?

A – We pushed the door, Your Honor.

xxxx

Q – Were you allowed to just go towards the door of the house, push its door and peeped inside it, as a police
officer?

A – Kasi po naghinala po kami baka may…

Q – Are you not allowed to – Are you not required to get a search warrant before you can search the interior of
the house?

A – Yes, Your Honor.

Q – What do you mean by yes? Would you first obtain a search warrant before searching the interior of the
house?

A – Yes, Your Honor.

Q – So why did you not a [sic] secure a search warrant first before you tried to investigate the house,
considering your admission that you suspected that there was something wrong inside the house?

A – Because we saw them that they were engaged in pot session, Your Honor.

Q – But before you saw them, you just had to push the door wide open to peep through its opening
because you did not know what was happening inside?

A – Yes, Your Honor.15 (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that authorized the arrest of accused
Antiquera without warrant under the above-mentioned rule. Considering that his arrest was illegal, the search
and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal.16 Consequently, the various drug paraphernalia that the
police officers allegedly found in the house and seized are inadmissible, having proceeded from an invalid
search and seizure. Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the
Court has no choice but to acquit the accused.17

One final note. The failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest by itself is not enough to
sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.18

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated September 21, 2007 and
Resolution dated November 16, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 28937 and ACQUITS the accused
George Antiquera y Codes of the crime of which he is charged for lack of evidence sufficient to establish his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.1âwphi1 The Court further ORDERS the cancellation and release of the bail bond he
posted for his provisional liberty.

SO ORDERED.

G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI, defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Herminio T. Llariza counsel de-officio for defendant-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:

The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches but he was nonetheless arrested, tried and
found guilty of illegally transporting marijuana. The trial court, disbelieving him, held it was high time to put him
away and sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00. 1

Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30
in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted him, inspected his
bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. The two
bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination.
When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed
against him. 2 Later, the information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested
with him that same evening and likewise investigated. 3 Both were arraigned and pleaded not
guilty. 4 Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn
statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough investigation." 5 The motion was granted, and
trial proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted .6
According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their informers that the
accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. 7 He was Identified
by name. 8 Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and approached him as he
descended from the gangplank after the informer had pointed to him. 9 They detained him and inspected the bag
he was carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI
forensic examiner, 10 who testified that she conducted microscopic, chemical and chromatographic tests on
them. On the basis of this finding, the corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.

In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing
consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. 11 He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and
immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was
manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of
wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. 12 He insisted he did not
even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was selling watches and sometimes
cigarettes. 13 He also argued that the marijuana he was alleged to have been carrying was not properly Identified
and could have been any of several bundles kept in the stock room of the PC headquarters. 14

The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the accused that he claimed to have come
to Iloilo City to sell watches but carried only two watches at the time, traveling from Jolo for that purpose and
spending P107.00 for fare, not to mention his other expenses. 15 Aminnudin testified that he kept the two
watches in a secret pocket below his belt but, strangely, they were not discovered when he was bodily searched
by the arresting officers nor were they damaged as a result of his manhandling. 16 He also said he sold one of
the watches for P400.00 and gave away the other, although the watches belonged not to him but to his
cousin, 17 to a friend whose full name he said did not even know. 18 The trial court also rejected his allegations of
maltreatment, observing that he had not sufficiently proved the injuries sustained by him. 19

There is no justification to reverse these factual findings, considering that it was the trial judge who had
immediate access to the testimony of the witnesses and had the opportunity to weigh their credibility on the
stand. Nuances of tone or voice, meaningful pauses and hesitation, flush of face and dart of eyes, which may
reveal the truth or expose the lie, are not described in the impersonal record. But the trial judge sees all of this,
discovering for himself the truant fact amidst the falsities.

The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's conclusion that the accused-appellant was not
really beaten up because he did not complain about it later nor did he submit to a medical examination. That is
hardly fair or realistic. It is possible Aminnudin never had that opportunity as he was at that time under detention
by the PC authorities and in fact has never been set free since he was arrested in 1984 and up to the present.
No bail has been allowed for his release.

There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it is Aminnudin's claim that he was arrested
and searched without warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found in his possession inadmissible in evidence
against him under the Bill of Rights. The decision did not even discuss this point. For his part, the Solicitor
General dismissed this after an all-too-short argument that the arrest of Aminnudin was valid because it came
under Rule 113, Section 6(b) of the Rules of Court on warrantless arrests. This made the search also valid as
incidental to a lawful arrest.

It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the prosecution, that they had no
warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying. Their only justification was the tip
they had earlier received from a reliable and regular informer who reported to them that Aminnudin was arriving
in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their testimony varies as to the time they received the tip, one saying it was two
days before the arrest, 20 another two weeks 21 and a third "weeks before June 25." 22 On this matter, we may
prefer the declaration of the chief of the arresting team, Lt. Cipriano Querol, Jr., who testified as follows:

Q You mentioned an intelligence report, you mean with respect to the coming of
Idel Aminnudin on June 25, 1984?

A Yes, sir.

Q When did you receive this intelligence report?

A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it was supported by reliable sources.
Q Were you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9 and the possible trafficking of
marijuana leaves on that date?

A Yes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984 when we received this information
from that particular informer, prior to June 25, 1984 we have already reports of
the particular operation which was being participated by Idel Aminnudin.

Q You said you received an intelligence report two days before June 25, 1984
with respect to the coming of Wilcon 9?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you receive any other report aside from this intelligence report?

A Well, I have received also other reports but not pertaining to the coming of
Wilcon 9. For instance, report of illegal gambling operation.

COURT:

Q Previous to that particular information which you said two days before June 25,
1984, did you also receive daily report regarding the activities of Idel Aminnudin

A Previous to June 25, 1984 we received reports on the activities of Idel

Aminnudin.

Q What were those activities?

A Purely marijuana trafficking.

Q From whom did you get that information?

A It came to my hand which was written in a required sheet of information, maybe

for security reason and we cannot Identify the person.

Q But you received it from your regular informer?

A Yes, sir.

ATTY. LLARIZA:

Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were more or less sure that Idel Aminnudin is
coming with drugs?

A Marijuana, sir.

Q And this information respecting Idel Aminnudin's coming to Iloilo with marijuana
was received by you many days before you received the intelligence report in
writing?

A Not a report of the particular coming of Aminnudin but his activities.

Q You only knew that he was coming on June 25,1984 two days before?

A Yes, sir.

Q You mean that before June 23, 1984 you did not know that minnudin was
coming?

A Before June 23,1984, I, in my capacity, did not know that he was coming but on
June 23, 1984 that was the time when I received the information that he was
 coming. Regarding the reports on his activities, we have reports that he was
already consummated the act of selling and shipping marijuana stuff.

COURT:

Q And as a result of that report, you put him under surveillance?

A Yes, sir.

Q In the intelligence report, only the name of Idel Aminnudin was mentioned?

A Yes, sir.

Q Are you sure of that?

A On the 23rd he will be coming with the woman.

Q So that even before you received the official report on June 23, 1984, you had
already gathered information to the effect that Idel Aminnudin was coming to Iloilo
on June 25, 1984?

A Only on the 23rd of June.

Q You did not try to secure a search warrant for the seizure or search of the
subject mentioned in your intelligence report?

A No, more.

Q Why not?

A Because we were very very sure that our operation will yield positive result.

Q Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield positive result you do not need
a search warrant anymore?

A Search warrant is not necessary. 23

That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement, especially as it comes from a mere lieutenant of the PC. The
Supreme Court cannot countenance such a statement. This is still a government of laws and not of men.

The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the government, the
accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just been
committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even expediency could
not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant as in the case of Roldan v. Arca, 24 for example.
Here it was held that vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the
customs law because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant
can be secured.

The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear
that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin
who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was Identified. The date of its
arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge that there
was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to
comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of
the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary."

In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs
Act, it has always been shown that they were caught red-handed, as a result of what are popularly called "buy-
bust" operations of the narcotics agents. 25 Rule 113 was clearly applicable because at the precise time of arrest
the accused was in the act of selling the prohibited drug.

In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it
shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the
gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all
appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only
when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so
subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The Identification by the informer was
the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon
Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.

Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country after fourteen years of the despised
dictatorship, when any one could be picked up at will, detained without charges and punished without trial, we
will have only ourselves to blame if that kind of arbitrariness is allowed to return, to once more flaunt its disdain
of the Constitution and the individual liberties its Bill of Rights guarantees.

While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own words suggest that he is
lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty. The constitutional presumption is that he is
innocent, and he will be so declared even if his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not strong enough
to convict him.

Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the prosecution must fall.
That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have been considered by the trial court for the simple fact
is that the marijuana was seized illegally. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree, to use Justice Holmes' felicitous
phrase. The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because there was no warrant of arrest and the
warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless
search was also illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible.

The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the efforts
of our law-enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people, especially the
susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the
Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals.
The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of
high- handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in the
name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said, "I think it a less
evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part." It is simply not
allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution
itself.

We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the accused-appellant, his
guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must therefore be discharged on the presumption
that he is innocent.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is ACQUITTED. It is so
ordered.

G.R. No. 87059 June 22, 1992

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS, accused-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:

Accused-appellant Rogelio Mengote was convicted of illegal possession of firearms on the strength mainly of the
stolen pistol found on his person at the moment of his warrantless arrest. In this appeal, he pleads that the
weapon was not admissible as evidence against him because it had been illegally seized and was therefore the
fruit of the poisonous tree. The Government disagrees. It insists that the revolver was validly received in
evidence by the trial judge because its seizure was incidental to an arrest that was doubtless lawful even if
admittedly without warrant.

The incident occurred shortly before noon of August 8, 1987, after the Western Police District received a
telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and
North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the
place. As later narrated at the trial by Patrolmen Rolando Mercado and Alberto Juan, 1 they there saw two men
"looking from side to side," one of whom was holding his abdomen. They approached these persons and
identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run away but were unable to escape because
the other lawmen had surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One of them, who turned out to be
the accused-appellant, was found with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver with six live bullets in the
chamber. His companion, later identified as Nicanor Morellos, had a fan knife secreted in his front right pants
pocket. The weapons were taken from them. Mengote and Morellos were then turned over to police
headquarters for investigation by the Intelligence Division.

On August 11, 1987, the following information was filed against the accused-appellant before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila:

The undersigned accuses ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS of a violation of Presidential Decree

No. 1866, committed as follows:

That on or about August 8, 1987, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control
a firearm, to wit:

one (1) cal. 38 "S & W" bearing

Serial No. 8720-T

without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the proper authorities.

Besides the police officers, one other witness presented by the prosecution was Rigoberto Danganan, who
identified the subject weapon as among the articles stolen from him during the robbery in his house in Malabon
on June 13, 1987. He pointed to Mengote as one of the robbers. He had duly reported the robbery to the police,
indicating the articles stolen from him, including the revolver. 2 For his part, Mengote made no effort to prove that
he owned the firearm or that he was licensed to possess it and claimed instead that the weapon had been
"Planted" on him at the time of his arrest. 3

The gun, together with the live bullets and its holster, were offered as Exhibits A, B, and C and admitted over the
objection of the defense. As previously stated, the weapon was the principal evidence that led to Mengote's
conviction for violation of P.D. 1866. He was sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. 4

It is submitted in the Appellant's Brief that the revolver should not have been admitted in evidence because of its
illegal seizure. no warrant therefor having been previously obtained. Neither could it have been seized as an
incident of a lawful arrest because the arrest of Mengote was itself unlawful, having been also effected without a
warrant. The defense also contends that the testimony regarding the alleged robbery in Danganan's house was
irrelevant and should also have been disregarded by the trial court.

The following are the pertinent provision of the Bill of Rights:

 Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Sec. 3 (1). The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.

There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is inadmissible in any
proceeding for any purpose. That is the absolute prohibition of Article III, Section 3(2), of the Constitution. This is
the celebrated exclusionary rule based on the justification given by Judge Learned Hand that "only in case the
prosecution, which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will the wrong be
repressed." The Solicitor General, while conceding the rule, maintains that it is not applicable in the case at bar.
His reason is that the arrest and search of Mengote and the seizure of the revolver from him were lawful under
Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court reading as follows:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person;

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases failing under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall
be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.

We have carefully examined the wording of this Rule and cannot see how we can agree with the prosecution.

Par. (c) of Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as Mengote was not an escapee from a penal institution when he
was arrested. We therefore confine ourselves to determining the lawfulness of his arrest under either Par. (a) or
Par. (b) of this section.

Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at
least attempting to commit an offense, (2) in the presence of the arresting officer.

These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the
accused-appellant was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen," according to the arresting
officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that had just been committed or was being actually
committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their presence.

The Solicitor General submits that the actual existence of an offense was not necessary as long as Mengote's
acts "created a reasonable suspicion on the part of the arresting officers and induced in them the belief that an
offense had been committed and that the accused-appellant had committed it." The question is, What offense?
What offense could possibly have been suggested by a person "looking from side to side" and "holding his
abdomen" and in a place not exactly forsaken?

These are certainly not sinister acts. And the setting of the arrest made them less so, if at all. It might have been
different if Mengote bad been apprehended at an ungodly hour and in a place where he had no reason to be,
like a darkened alley at 3 o'clock in the morning. But he was arrested at 11:30 in the morning and in a crowded
street shortly after alighting from a passenger jeep with I his companion. He was not skulking in the shadows but
walking in the clear light of day. There was nothing clandestine about his being on that street at that busy hour in
the blaze of the noonday sun.

On the other hand, there could have been a number of reasons, all of them innocent, why his eyes were darting
from side to side and be was holding his abdomen. If they excited suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers,
as the prosecution suggests, it has nevertheless not been shown what their suspicion was all about. In fact, the
policemen themselves testified that they were dispatched to that place only because of the telephone call from
the informer that there were "suspicious-looking" persons in that vicinity who were about to commit a robbery at
North Bay Boulevard. The caller did not explain why he thought the men looked suspicious nor did he elaborate
on the impending crime.

In the recent case of People v. Malmstedt, 5 the Court sustained the warrantless arrest of the accused because
there was a bulge in his waist that excited the suspicion of the arresting officer and, upon inspection, turned out
to be a pouch containing hashish. In People v. Claudio, 6 the accused boarded a bus and placed the buri bag
she was carrying behind the seat of the arresting officer while she herself sat in the seat before him. His
suspicion aroused, be surreptitiously examined the bag, which he found to contain marijuana. He then and there
made the warrantless arrest and seizure that we subsequently upheld on the ground that probable cause had
been sufficiently established.

The case before us is different because there was nothing to support the arresting officers' suspicion other than
Mengote's darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. By no stretch of the imagination could it have been
inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or was actually being committed, or was at
least being attempted in their presence.

This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin, 7 where the Court held that the warrantless arrest of the accused
was unconstitutional. This was effected while be was coming down a vessel, to all appearances no less innocent
than the other disembarking passengers. He had not committed nor was be actually committing or attempting to
commit an offense in the presence of the arresting officers. He was not even acting suspiciously. In short, there
was no probable cause that, as the prosecution incorrectly suggested, dispensed with the constitutional
requirement of a warrant.

Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements have also not been satisfied. The
prosecution has not shown that at the time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in fact just been committed and
that the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote had committed it. All they had
was hearsay information from the telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet to be committed.

The truth is that they did not know then what offense, if at all, had been committed and neither were they aware
of the participation therein of the accused-appellant. It was only later, after Danganan had appeared at the
Police headquarters, that they learned of the robbery in his house and of Mengote's supposed involvement
therein. 8 As for the illegal possession of the firearm found on Mengote's person, the policemen discovered this only after he had been searched and the
investigation conducted later revealed that he was not its owners nor was he licensed to possess it.

Before these events, the Peace officers had no knowledge even of Mengote' identity, let alone the fact (or
suspicion) that he was unlawfully carrying a firearm or that he was involved in the robbery of Danganan's house.

In the landmark case of People v. Burgos, 9 this Court declared:

Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of the fact. The
offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80
Phil. 859). (Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or
actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential
precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the
commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the
identity of the perpetrator. (Emphasis supplied)
This doctrine was affirmed in Alih v. Castro, 10 thus:

If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court in connection with a
crime about to be committed, being committed, or just committed, what was that crime? There is
no allegation in the record of such a falsification. Parenthetically, it may be observed that under
the Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b), the officer making the arrest must have personal knowledge
of the ground therefor as stressed in the recent case of People v. Burgos. (Emphasis supplied)

It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily arrested and searched just because he is
holding his abdomen, even if it be possibly because of a stomach-ache, or if a peace officer could clamp
handcuffs on any person with a shifty look on suspicion that he may have committed a criminal act or is actually
committing or attempting it. This simply cannot be done in a free society. This is not a police state where order is
exalted over liberty or, worse, personal malice on the part of the arresting officer may be justified in the name of
security.

There is no need to discuss the other issues raised by the accused-appellant as the ruling we here make is
sufficient to sustain his exoneration. Without the evidence of the firearm taken from him at the time of his illegal
arrest, the prosecution has lost its most important exhibit and must therefore fail. The testimonial evidence
against Mengote (which is based on the said firearm) is not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime imputed to him.

We commend Atty. Violeta Calvo-Drilon for her able and spirited defense of the accused-appellant not only in
the brief but also in the reply brief, which she did not have to file but did so just the same to stress the
constitutional rights of her client. The fact that she was acting only as a counsel de oficio with no expectation of
material reward makes her representation even more commendable.

The Court feels that if the peace officers had been more mindful of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, the
prosecution of the accused-appellant might have succeeded. As it happened, they allowed their over-
zealousness to get the better of them, resulting in their disregard of the requirements of a valid search and
seizure that rendered inadmissible the vital evidence they had invalidly seized.

This should be a lesson to other peace officers. Their impulsiveness may be the very cause of the acquittal of
persons who deserve to be convicted, escaping the clutches of the law because, ironically enough, it has not
been observed by those who are supposed to enforce it.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant is ACQUITTED
and ordered released immediately unless he is validly detained for other offenses. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 128587 March 16, 2007

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 18, RTC, Manila, and
LAWRENCE WANG Y CHEN, Respondents.

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

On pure questions of law, petitioner People of the Philippines has directly come to this Court via this petition for
review on certiorari to nullify and set aside the Resolution1 dated 13 March 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 18, in Criminal Case Nos. 96-149990 to 96-149992, entitled People of the Philippines v.
Lawrence Wang y Chen, granting private respondent Lawrence C. Wang’s Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting
him of the three (3) charges filed against him, namely: (1) Criminal Case No. 96-149990 for Violation of Section
16, Article III in relation to Section 2(e)(2), Article I of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act); (2)
Criminal Case No. 96-149991 for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms); and
(3) Criminal Case No. 96-149992 for Violation of Comelec Resolution No. 2828 in relation to R.A. No. 7166
(COMELEC Gun Ban).

The three (3) separate Informations filed against Lawrence C. Wang in the court of origin respectively read:

Criminal Case No. 96-149990 (Violation of Dangerous Drugs Act):

That on or about the 17th day of May 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control a bulk of white
and yellowish crystalline substance known as SHABU contained in thirty-two (32) transparent plastic bags
weighing approximately 29.2941 kilograms, containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug,
without the corresponding license or prescription therefor.

Contrary to law.2

Criminal Case No. 96-149991 (Illegal Possession of Firearms):

That on or about the 17th day of May 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control one (1)
DAEWOO Cal. 9mm, automatic pistol with one loaded magazine and one AMT Cal. .380 9mm automatic backup
pistol with magazine loaded with ammunitions without first having secured the necessary license or permit
therefor from the proper authorities.

Contrary to law. 3

Criminal Case No. 96-149992 (Violation of Comelec Gun Ban):

That on or about the 17th day of May 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control one (1)
DAEWOO Cal. 9mm automatic pistol with one loaded magazine and one (1) AMT Cal. 380 9mm automatic
backup pistol with magazine loaded with ammunitions, carrying the same along Maria Orosa St., Ermita, Manila,
which is a public place, on the date which is covered by an election period, without first securing the written
permission or authority from the Commission on Elections, as provided by the COMELEC Resolution 2828 in
relation to Republic Act 7166.

Contrary to law. 4

During his arraignment, accused Wang refused to enter a plea to all the Informations and instead interposed a
continuing objection to the admissibility of the evidence obtained by the police operatives. Thus, the trial court
ordered that a plea of "Not Guilty" be entered for him.5 Thereafter, joint trial of the three (3) consolidated cases
followed.

The pertinent facts are as follows:

On 16 May 1996, at about 7:00 p.m., police operatives of the Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime of
the Department of Interior and Local Government, namely, Captain Margallo, Police Inspector Cielito Coronel
and SPO3 Reynaldo Cristobal, arrested SPO2 Vergel de Dios, Rogelio Anoble and a certain Arellano, for
unlawful possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug popularly known as shabu. In the
course of the investigation of the three arrested persons, Redentor Teck, alias Frank, and Joseph Junio were
identified as the source of the drug. An entrapment operation was then set after the three were prevailed upon to
call their source and pretend to order another supply of shabu.

At around 11:00 p.m. that same date, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio were arrested while they were about to
hand over another bag of shabu to SPO2 De Dios and company. Questioned, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio
informed the police operatives that they were working as talent manager and gymnast instructor, respectively, of
Glamour Modeling Agency owned by Lawrence Wang. Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio did not disclose their
source of shabu but admitted that they were working for Wang.6 They also disclosed that they knew of a
scheduled delivery of shabu early the following morning of 17 May 1996, and that their employer (Wang) could
be found at the Maria Orosa Apartment in Malate, Manila. The police operatives decided to look for Wang to
shed light on the illegal drug activities of Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio. Police Inspector Cielito Coronel and
his men then proceeded to Maria Orosa Apartment and placed the same under surveillance.
Prosecution witness Police Inspector Cielito Coronel testified that at about 2:10 a.m. of 17 May 1996, Wang,
who was described to the operatives by Teck, came out of the apartment and walked towards a parked BMW
car. On nearing the car, he (witness) together with Captain Margallo and two other police officers approached
Wang, introduced themselves to him as police officers, asked his name and, upon hearing that he was Lawrence
Wang, immediately frisked him and asked him to open the back compartment of the BMW car.7 When frisked,
there was found inside the front right pocket of Wang and confiscated from him an unlicensed AMT Cal. 380
9mm automatic Back-up Pistol loaded with ammunitions. At the same time, the other members of the operatives
searched the BMW car and found inside it were the following items: (a) 32 transparent plastic bags containing
white crystalline substance with a total weight of 29.2941 kilograms, which substance was later analyzed as
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug locally known as shabu; (b) cash in the amount of
₱650,000.00; (c) one electronic and one mechanical scales; and (d) an unlicensed Daewoo 9mm Pistol with
magazine. Then and there, Wang resisted the warrantless arrest and search.8

On 6 December 1996, the prosecution rested its case and upon motion, accused Wang was granted 25 days
from said date within which to file his intended Demurrer to Evidence.9 On 19 December 1996, the prosecution
filed a Manifestation10 to the effect that it had rested its case only in so far as the charge for Violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act in Criminal Case No. 96-149990 is concerned, and not as regards the two cases for Illegal
Possession of Firearms (Crim. Case No. 96-149991) and Violation of the Comelec Gun Ban (Crim. Case No. 96-
149992). Accordingly, trial continued.

On 9 January 1997, Wang filed his undated Demurrer to Evidence,11 praying for his acquittal and the dismissal of
the three (3) cases against him for lack of a valid arrest and search warrants and the inadmissibility of the
prosecution’s evidence against him. Considering that the prosecution has not yet filed its Opposition to the
demurrer, Wang filed an Amplification12 to his Demurrer of Evidence on 20 January 1997. On 12 February 1997,
the prosecution filed its Opposition13 alleging that the warrantless search was legal as an incident to the lawful
arrest and that it has proven its case, so it is now time for the defense to present its evidence.

On 13 March 1997, the respondent judge, the Hon. Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr., issued the herein assailed
Resolution14 granting Wang’s Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of all charges for lack of evidence, thus:

WHEREFORE, the accused's undated Demurrer to Evidence is hereby granted; the accused is acquitted of the
charges against him for the crimes of Violation of Section 16, Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act, Illegal
Possession of Firearms, and Violation of Comelec Gun Ban, for lack of evidence; the 32 bags of shabu with a
total weight of 29.2941 kilograms and the two unlicensed pistols, one AMT Cal. .380 9mm and one Daewoo Cal.
9mm. are ordered confiscated in favor of the government and the branch clerk is directed to turn over the 32
bags of shabu to the Dangerous Drugs Board in Intramuros, Manila, and the two firearms to the Firearms and
Explosive Units, PNP, Camp Crame, Quezon City, for proper disposition, and the officer-in-charge of PARAC,
Department of Interior and Local Government, is ordered to return the confiscated amount of P650,000.00 to the
accused, and the confiscated BMW car to its registered owner, David Lee. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, this petition15 for review on certiorari by the People, submitting that the trial court erred -

XXX IN HOLDING THAT THE UNDISPUTED FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES DID NOT CONSTITUTE
PROBABLE CAUSE WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF SECTION 2, ARTICLE III OF THE CONSTITUTION,
AND IN HOLDING THAT SUCH FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES NEITHER JUSTIFIED THE WARRANTLESS
SEARCH OF ACCUSED'S VEHICLE AND THE SEIZURE OF THE CONTRABAND THEREIN.

ll

XXX IN HOLDING, IN EFFECT, THAT A WARRANTLESS SEARCH IS CONSTITUTIONALLY ALLOWABLE

AND CAN ONLY BE VALID AS AN INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL ARREST.

lII

XXX IN DECLARING THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF THE ACCUSED AND THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE
OF HIS HANDGUNS UNLAWFUL.
 IV

XXX IN NOT DECLARING THE ACCUSED AS HAVING WAIVED, AS A RESULT OF HIS SUBMISSION AND
FAILURE TO PROTEST THE SEARCH AND HIS ARREST, HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND HIS OBJECTION TO THE ADMISSION OF THE EVIDENCE
SEIZED.

XXX IN NOT ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE EVIDENCE SEIZED AND OFFERED BY THE PROSECUTION
AND IN NOT DENYING ACCUSED'S DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE.

In its Resolution16 of 9 July 1997, the Court, without giving due course to the petition, required the public and
private respondents to comment thereon within ten days from notice. Private respondent Wang filed his
comment17on 18 August 1997.

On 10 September 1997, the Court required the People to file a reply,18 which the Office of the Solicitor General
did on 5 December 1997, after several extensions.19

On 20 October 2004, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit
their respective memoranda,20 which they did.

The case presents two main issues: (a) whether the prosecution may appeal the trial court’s resolution granting
Wang’s demurrer to evidence and acquitting him of all the charges against him without violating the
constitutional proscription against double jeopardy; and (b) whether there was lawful arrest, search and seizure
by the police operatives in this case despite the absence of a warrant of arrest and/or a search warrant.

First off, it must be emphasized that the present case is an appeal filed directly with this Court via a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 in relation to Rule 41, Section 2, paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court raising
only pure questions of law, ordinary appeal by mere filing of a notice of appeal not being allowed as a mode of
appeal directly to this Court. Then, too, it bears stressing that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a
part of due process, it being merely a statutory privilege which may be exercised only in the manner provided for
by law (Velasco v. Court of Appeals21). Although Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states
that any party may appeal, the right of the People to appeal is, in the very same provision, expressly made
subject to the prohibition against putting the accused in double jeopardy. It also basic that appeal in criminal
cases throws the whole records of the case wide open for review by the appellate court, that is why any appeal
from a judgment of acquittal necessarily puts the accused in double jeopardy. In effect, the very same Section 2
of Rule 122 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, disallows appeal by the People from judgments of acquittal.

An order granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence is a resolution of the case on the merits, and it amounts to
an acquittal. Generally, any further prosecution of the accused after an acquittal would violate the constitutional
proscription on double jeopardy. To this general rule, however, the Court has previously made some exceptions.

The celebrated case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan22 presents one exception to the rule on double jeopardy,
which is, when the prosecution is denied due process of law:

No court whose Presiding Justice has received "orders or suggestions" from the very President who by an
amendatory decree (disclosed only at the hearing of oral arguments on November 8, 1984 on a petition
challenging the referral of the Aquino-Galman murder cases to the Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan instead of
to a court martial, as mandatorily required by the known P.D. 1850 at the time providing for exclusive jurisdiction
of courts martial over criminal offenses committed by military men) made it possible to refer the cases to the
Sandiganbayan, can be an impartial court, which is the very essence of due process of law. As the writer then
wrote, "jurisdiction over cases should be determined by law, and not by preselection of the Executive, which
could be much too easily transformed into a means of predetermining the outcome of individual cases." This
criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret Malacañang
conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified
respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. This renders moot and irrelevant for now the
extensive arguments of respondents accused, particularly Generals Ver and Olivas and those categorized as
accessories, that there has been no evidence or witness suppressed against them, that the erroneous
conclusions of Olivas as police investigator do not make him an accessory of the crimes he investigated and the
appraisal and evaluation of the testimonies of the witnesses presented and suppressed. There will be time and
opportunity to present all these arguments and considerations at the remand and retrial of the cases herein
ordered before a neutral and impartial court.

The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to stand unrectified. The
courts of the land under its aegis are courts of law and justice and equity. They would have no reason to exist if
they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the
truth, instead of repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn and committed to render impartial justice
to all alike who seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear
or favor and removed from the pressures of politics and prejudice. More so, in the case at bar where the people
and the world are entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake. In life, as an
accused before the military tribunal Ninoy had pleaded in vain that as a civilian he was entitled to due process of
law and trial in the regular civil courts before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. In death, Ninoy, as
the victim of the "treacherous and vicious assassination" and the relatives and sovereign people as the
aggrieved parties plead once more for due process of law and a retrial before an impartial court with an
unbiased prosecutor. The Court is constrained to declare the sham trial a mock trial — the non-trial of the
century — and that the predetermined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio.

1. No double jeopardy. — It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's
setting aside of the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution which represents the
sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process. As the Court stressed in the 1985 case of People vs.
Bocar,

Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is
thereby violated.

The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their
jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue (Gumabon
vs. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, L-30026, 37 SCRA 420 [Jan. 30, 1971]) which cannot be glossed over or
disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in
disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction (Aducayen vs. Flores, L-30370 [May 25, 19731, 51 SCRA 78;
Shell Co. vs. Enage, L-30111-12, 49 SCRA 416 Feb. 27, 1973]). Any judgment or decision rendered
notwithstanding such violation may be regarded as a "lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain
at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head" (Aducayen vs. Flores, supra).

Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7, 1967 being null and void for lack of jurisdiction, the same
does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy (Serino vs. Zosa, supra).

xxx xxx xxx

Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d)
a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower court was not competent as it was ousted of
its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process.

In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or
trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the
accused to a second jeopardy.

Another exception is when the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion in dismissing a criminal case by
granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence. In point is the fairly recent case of People v. Uy,23 which involved
the trial court’s decision which granted the two separate demurrers to evidence filed by the two accused therein,
both with leave of court, resulting in their acquittal of their respective charges of murder due to insufficiency of
evidence. In resolving the petition for certiorari filed directly with this Court, we had the occasion to explain:

The general rule in this jurisdiction is that a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. People v. Court of
Appeals explains the rationale of this rule:

In our jurisdiction, the finality-of-acquittal doctrine as a safeguard against double jeopardy faithfully adheres to
the principle first enunciated in Kepner v. United States. In this case, verdicts of acquittal are to be regarded as
absolutely final and irreviewable. The cases of United States v. Yam Tung Way, People v. Bringas, Gandicela v.
Lutero, People v. Cabarles, People v. Bao, to name a few, are illustrative cases. The fundamental philosophy
behind the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy is to afford the defendant, who has been
acquitted, final repose and safeguard him from government oppression through the abuse of criminal processes.
As succinctly observed in Green v. United States "(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least
the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be
allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity,
as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty." (Underscoring supplied)

The same rule applies in criminal cases where a demurrer to evidence is granted. As held in the case of People
v. Sandiganbayan:

The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed after the prosecution had rested its
case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution
and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the
merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to
evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double-jeopardy. The verdict being
one of acquittal, the case ends there. (Italics in the original)

Like any other rule, however, the above-said rule is not absolute. By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in
a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon a clear
showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors
of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due
process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void. (Emphasis supplied.)

In Sanvicente v. People,24 the Court allowed the review of a decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) which
reversed the accused’s acquittal upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with leave of court, the CA
ruling that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in preventing the prosecution from establishing the
due execution and authenticity of certain letter marked therein as Exhibit "LL," which supposedly "positively
identified therein petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime charged." The Court, in a petition for certiorari,
sustained the CA’s power to review the order granting the demurrer to evidence, explaining thus:

Under Rule 119, Section 23 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, the trial court may
dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence upon a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused
with or without leave of court. In resolving accused’s demurrer to evidence, the court is merely required to
ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or support a verdict of guilt.

The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and its ruling on the
matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion. Significantly, once the court grants
the demurrer, such order amounts to an acquittal and any further prosecution of the accused would violate the
constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. This constitutes an exception to the rule that the dismissal of a
criminal case made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion bars a plea of double
jeopardy. The finality-of-acquittal rule was stressed thus in People v. Velasco:

The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into the "humanity
of the laws and in jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizens, when brought in unequal contest with the
State xxx. Thus Green expressed the concern that "(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least
the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be
allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense thereby subjecting him to
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity,
as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty."

It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of
repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule establishing
the absolute nature of acquittals is "part of the paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to the
protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction." The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined
exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for "repose", a desire to know the exact
extent of one’s liability. With this right of repose, the criminal justice system has built in a protection to insure that
the innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a jury’s leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent
proceeding.

Given the far-reaching scope of an accused’s right against double jeopardy, even an appeal based on an
alleged misappreciation of evidence will not lie. The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when
the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the
prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham. However, while
certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding
must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its
very power to dispense justice. (Emphasis supplied.)

By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial courts granting an accused’s
demurrer to evidence. This may be done via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 based on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being
considered void judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of dismissal is annulled or set aside
by an appellate court in an original special civil action via certiorari, the right of the accused against double
jeopardy is not violated.

Unfortunately, what petitioner People of the Philippines, through then Secretary of Justice Teofisto T. Guingona,
Jr. and then Solicitor General Silvestre H. Bello, III, filed with the Court in the present case is an appeal by way
of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 raising a pure question of law, which is different from a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65.

In Madrigal Transport Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation,25 we have enumerated the distinction between the
two remedies/actions, to wit:

Appeal and Certiorari Distinguished

Between an appeal and a petition for certiorari, there are substantial distinctions which shall be explained below.

As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of
judgment. In Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC, we explained the simple reason for the rule in this light:

"When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the
jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive
it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The
administration of justice would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correct[a]ble through the original civil action of certiorari."

The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be exercised for the
purpose of reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower court -- on the basis either of the law or
the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision. Even if the findings of the court are
incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is normally beyond the province of
certiorari. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact -- a mistake of judgment --
appeal is the remedy.

As to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal, the CA exercises its appellate jurisdiction and power of review. Over
a certiorari, the higher court uses its original jurisdiction in accordance with its power of control and supervision
over the proceedings of lower courts. An appeal is thus a continuation of the original suit, while a petition for
certiorari is an original and independent action that was not part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of
the judgment or order complained of. The parties to an appeal are the original parties to the action. In contrast,
the parties to a petition for certiorari are the aggrieved party (who thereby becomes the petitioner) against the
lower court or quasi-judicial agency, and the prevailing parties (the public and the private respondents,
respectively).

As to the Subject Matter. Only judgments or final orders and those that the Rules of Court so declared are
appealable. Since the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be directed against an
interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the judgment; or where there is no appeal or any
plain, speedy or adequate remedy.

As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appeals should be filed within fifteen days from the notice of judgment or final
order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant must file a notice of appeal and a
record on appeal within thirty days from the said notice of judgment or final order. A petition for review should be
filed and served within fifteen days from the notice of denial of the decision, or of the petitioner’s timely filed
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In an appeal by certiorari, the petition should be filed also
within fifteen days from the notice of judgment or final order, or of the denial of the petitioner’s motion for new
trial or motion for reconsideration.
On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty days from the notice of judgment,
order, or resolution. If a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration was timely filed, the period shall be
counted from the denial of the motion.

As to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration is generally required prior to the
filing of a petition for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an opportunity to correct the alleged errors. Note
also that this motion is a plain and adequate remedy expressly available under the law. Such motion is not
required before appealing a judgment or final order.

Also in Madrigal, we stressed that the special civil action of certiorari and appeal are two different remedies
mutually exclusive; they are neither alternative nor successive. Where appeal is available, certiorari will not
prosper. In the dismissal of a criminal case upon demurrer to evidence, appeal is not available as such an
appeal will put the accused in double jeopardy. Certiorari, however, is allowed.

For being the wrong remedy taken by petitioner People of the Philippines in this case, this petition is outrightly
dismissible. The Court cannot reverse the assailed dismissal order of the trial court by appeal without violating
private respondent’s right against double jeopardy.

Even assuming that the Court may treat an "appeal" as a special civil action of certiorari, which definitely this
Court has the power to do, when there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by the lower
court, the instant petition will nevertheless fail on the merits as the succeeding discussion will show.

There are actually two (2) acts involved in this case, namely, the warrantless arrest and the warrantless search.
There is no question that warrantless search may be conducted as an incident to a valid warrantless arrest. The
law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made; the process cannot be
reversed.26 However, if there are valid reasons to conduct lawful search and seizure which thereafter shows that
the accused is currently committing a crime, the accused may be lawfully arrested in flagrante delicto27 without
need for a warrant of arrest.

Finding that the warrantless arrest preceded the warrantless search in the case at bar, the trial court granted
private respondent's demurrer to evidence and acquitted him of all the three charges for lack of evidence,
because the unlawful arrest resulted in the inadmissibility of the evidence gathered from an invalid warrantless
search. The trial court’s ratiocination is quoted as follows:

The threshold issue raised by the accused in his Demurrer to Evidence is whether his warrantless arrest and
search were lawful as argued by the prosecution, or unlawful as asserted by the defense.

Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the New Rules of Court, a peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant: (a)
when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense; (b) when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it, and (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while being transferred from one confinement to another. None of these circumstances were present when the
accused was arrested. The accused was merely walking from the Maria Orosa Apartment and was about to
enter the parked BMW car when the police officers arrested and frisked him and searched his car. The accused
was not committing any visible offense at the time of his arrest. Neither was there an indication that he was
about to commit a crime or that he had just committed an offense. The unlicensed AMT Cal.380 9mm Automatic
Back-up Pistol that the accused had in his possession was concealed inside the right front pocket of his pants.
And the handgun was bantam and slim in size that it would not give an outward indication of a concealed gun if
placed inside the pant's side pocket as was done by the accused. The arresting officers had no information and
knowledge that the accused was carrying an unlicensed handgun, nor did they see him in possession thereof
immediately prior to his arrest.

Ditto on the 32 bags of shabu and the other unlicensed Daewoo Cal. 9mm Pistol with magazine that were found
and seized from the car. The contraband items in the car were not in plain view. The 32 bags of shabu were in
the trunk compartment, and the Daewoo handgun was underneath the driver’s seat of the car. The police
officers had no information, or knowledge that the banned articles were inside the car, or that the accused had
placed them there. The police officers searched the car on mere suspicion that there was shabu therein.

On this matter, pertinent portions of the testimonies of Police Inspector Cielito Coronel and SP03 Reynaldo are
hereunder quoted:
POLICE INSPECTOR CIELITO CORONEL’S TESTIMONY

"PROSECUTOR TO WITNESS: Direct-Examination

Q. Mr. Witness, what was your role or participation in this case?

A. I am one of those responsible for the arrest of the accused.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Where did you make that arrest, Mr. Witness?

A. The apprehension was made in front of an apartment along Maria Orosa Street, Ermita, Manila.

Q. What date was that when you arrested the accused?

A. It was on May 17, 1996, at about 2:10 a.m.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. What was the reason why you together with other policemen effected the arrest of the accused?

A. We arrested him because of the information relayed to us by one of those whom we have previously
apprehended in connection with the delivery of shabu somewhere also in Ermita, Manila.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. When you established that he was somewhere at Maria Orosa, what did you do?

A. We waited for him.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. You yourself, Mr. Witness, where did you position yourself during that time?

A. I was inside a vehicle waiting for the accused to appear.

Q. What about your other companions where were they?

A. They were position in strategic places within the area.

Q. What happened when you and your companions were positioned in that place?

A. That was when the accused arrived.

Q. How many of your approached him.

A. Inspector Margallo, myself and two other operatives.

Q. What happened when you approached the accused, Mr. Witness?

A. We introduced ourselves as police officers and we frisked him and we asked him to open the back
compartment of his car.

Q. You said you frisked him, what was the result of that?

A. He was found in possession of one back-up pistol with one loaded magazine and likewise when the
compartment was opened several plastic bags containing white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu
(were found).
Q. What did you do when you found out Mr. Witness?

A. When the car was further search we later found another firearm, a Daewoo Pistol at the place under the seat
of the driver.

Q. Then what happened?

A. He was brought to our headquarters at Mandaluyong for further investigation.

Q. What about the suspected shabu that you recovered, what did you do with that?

A. The suspected shabu that we recovered were forwarded to the NBI for laboratory examination.

Q. Did you come to know the results?

A. It was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. (TSN, pp. 3-8, November 15, 1996).

ATTY. LOZANO TO WITNESS: CROSS

Q. You arrested Joseph Junio and Redentor Teck for alleged transporting of shabu on May 16, 1996, at 11:00
p.m., is it not?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You asked Redentor Teck where he is employed, is it not?

A. Yes, Sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Redentor Teck told you that he is a talent manager at the Glenmore Modeling Agency, is it not?

A. Yes, Sir.

.Q. The Glenmore Modeling Agency is owned by Lawrence Wang, is it not?

A. I supposed, Sir.

Q. And that is why immediately after Redentor Teck told you that he is an employee of the Glenmore Modeling
Agency owned by Lawrence Wang, naturally, you and your companions look for Lawrence Wang to shed light
on the transporting of shabu by Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio, is it not?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Thereafter, you spotted a person previously described by Redentor Teck as Lawrence Wang, is it not?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. While you were arresting Lawrence Wang, your companions at the same time searched the BMW car
described in your affidavit of arrest, is it not?

A. Yes, Sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Lawrence Wang was not inside the BMW car while the same was searched, is it not?

A. He was outside, Sir.

Q. The driver of the car was inside the car when the arrest and search were made, is it not?

A. He was likewise outside, Sir.

Q. Lawrence Wang did resist arrest and search is it not?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. When you effected the arrest, there was no warrant of arrest, is it not?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. When the search was made on the BMW car, there was no search warrant, is it not?

A. Yes, none, Sir. (TSN, pp. 3-12, November 15, 1996)

SPO3 REYNALDO CRISTOBAL’S TESTIMONY

PROSECUTOR TO WITNESS: DIRECT EXAMINATION

Q. What is you role or participation in this case?

A. I was one of the arresting officers and investigator, Sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. What kind of specific offense did the accused allegedly do so that you arrested him, Mr. Witness?

A. He was arrested on the basis of the recovered drugs in his possession placed inside his car.

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Q. Mr. witness, you said that you recovered drug from the car of the accused, please tell us the antecedent
circumstances which led you to recover or confiscate these items?

A. Earlier in the evening about 11:00 p.m. of May 16, we arrested one Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio.

COURT: Where did you arrest these people?

A They were arrested in Metro Manila also.

COURT: The same date?

A. May 16, about 11:00 p.m. They were arrested and when they were investigated, Teck mentioned the name of
Lawrence Wang as his employer.

COURT: Why were these people, arrested?

A. For violation of R.A. 6425.

COURT: How were they arrested?

A. They were arrested while in the act of transporting shabu or handling shabu to another previously arrested
person. It was a series of arrest.

COURT: So, this involved a series of operation?

A. Yes, Your Honor. About 11:00 p.m. of May 16, we arrested three (3) persons, SPO2 Vergel de Dios, a certain
Arellano and a certain Rogelio Noble. When they were arrested they divulged the name of the source.
COURT: They were arrested for what, for possession?

A. Yes, Your Honor. For unlawful possession of shabu . Then they divulged to us the name of the person from
whom they get shabu.

COURT: Whose name did they mention:

A. One Alias Frank, who turned out to be Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio. We let them call Redentor Teck and
Joseph Junio thru the cellphone and pretend and to order another supply of shabu.

COURT: So there was an entrapment?

A. Yes, Your Honor.

COURT: So, these two (2) were arrested?

A. While they were about to hand over another bag of shabu to Noble and company.

COURT: And these two reveals (revealed) some information to you as to the source of the shabu?

A. Yes, Your Honor.

COURT: What was the information?

A. Teck told us that he is an employee of Lawrence Wang.

COURT: What did you do when you were told about that?

A. They also told us that there was an ongoing delivery of shabu on that morning.

COURT: When?

A. Of that date early morning of May 17, 1996.

COURT: At what place?

A. We asked them where we could find Lawrence Wang and Teck lead us to Maria Orosa Apartment where we
conducted a stake out which lasted up to 2:00 a.m.

xxx xxx xxx

COURT: What happened during the stake out?

A. When the person of the accused was identified to us, we saw him opening his car together with his driver.

COURT: So, he was about to leave when you saw him?

A. Probably, Sir.

COURT: What did you do?

A. We saw him opened his car and we have a suspicion that there was a shabu inside the compartment of the
car.

xxx xxx xxx

COURT: All right, when you saw the accused opened his car, what did you do?

A. We approached him.
COURT: What happened when you approached him?

A. We suspected the shabu inside the compartment of his car.

COURT: And this shabu that you saw inside the compartment of the car, what did you do with that?

A. Well, he was first arrested by Captain Margallo and Lt. Coronel while I was the one who inspected and
opened the compartment of the car and saw the shabu. (TSN, pp. 15-24, December 16, 1996).

CLARIFICATORY QUESTIONING OF SPO3 CRISTOBAL BY THE COURT

COURT: From your testimony and that of Police Inspector Cielito Coronel, this Court has gathered that prior to
the arrest of the accused there were three (3) men that your team arrested. One of whom is a police officer.

A: Yes, Sir.

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COURT: And on the occasion of the arrest of these three men shabu were confiscated from them?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: And in the course of the investigation of these three men, you were able to discover that Redentor Teck and
Joseph Junio were the source of the regulated drug that were confiscated from the three men that you have
arrested?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Now, thru entrapment base[d] on your testimony you were able to apprehend also these two men, Redentor
Teck and Joseph Junio?

A: Yes, Sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: These two men, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio they were also investigated by your team?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: You were present while they were investigated?

A: I was the one whom investigated them.

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Q: Did you ask Redentor and Joseph the source of shabu that you confiscated from them at the time of the
(their) arrest?

A: Yes, Sir. They refuse to say the source, however, they told me that they were working for the accused.

Q: You also testified that Redentor informed you that there was another delivery of shabu scheduled that
morning of (stop) was it May 16 or 17? The other delivery that is scheduled on?

A: On the 17th.

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Q: Did he tell you who was to make the delivery?

A: No, Sir.

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Q: At that time when you decided to look for the accused to ask him to shed light on the matter concerning the
arrest of these two employees in possession of shabu. Did you and did your team suspect the accused as being
involved in the transaction that lead (led) to the arrest of Redentor and Joseph?

A: Yes, Sir. We suspected that he was the source of the shabu.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: When you saw the accused walking towards his car, did you know whether he was carrying a gun?

A: No, Sir. It cannot be seen.

Q: It was concealed?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: So, the only time that you and your team learned that he was in possession of the gun is when he was bodily
search?

A: Yes, Sir. That is the only time that I came to know about when Capt. Margallo handed to me the gun.

Q: Other than walking towards his car, the accused was not doing anything else?

A: None, Sir.

Q: That would invite your suspicion or give indication that he was intending to do something unlawful or illegal?

A: No, Sir.

Q: When you searched the car, did the accused protest or try to prevent your team from searching his car?

A: No, Sir." (TSN pp. 3-16, Feb. 26, 1997)

Clearly therefore, the warrantless arrest of the accused and the search of his person and the car were without
probable cause and could not be licit. The arrest of the accused did not fall under any of the exception to the
requirements of warrantless arrests, (Sec. 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court) and is therefore, unlawful and derogatory
of his constitutional right of liberty. x x x

The trial court resolved the case on the basis of its findings that the arrest preceded the search, and finding no
basis to rule in favor of a lawful arrest, it ruled that the incidental search is likewise unlawful. Any and all pieces
of evidence acquired as a consequence thereof are inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the trial court dismissed the
case for lack of evidence.

Contrary to its position at the trial court, the People, however, now posits that "inasmuch as it has been shown in
the present case that the seizure without warrant of the regulated drugs and unlicensed firearms in the
accused’s possession had been validly made upon probable cause and under exigent circumstances, then the
warrantless arrest of the accused must necessarily have to be regarded as having been made on the occasion
of the commission of the crime in flagrante delicto, and therefore constitutionally and statutorily permissible and
lawful."28 In effect, the People now contends that the warrantless search preceded the warrantless arrest. Since
the case falls under an exception to the general rule requiring search warrant prior to a valid search and seizure,
the police officers were justified in requiring the private respondent to open his BMW car’s trunk to see if he was
carrying illegal drugs.

The conflicting versions as to whether the arrest preceded the search or vice versa, is a matter of credibility of
evidence. It entails appreciation of evidence, which may be done in an appeal of a criminal case because the
entire case is thrown open for review, but not in the case of a petition for certiorari where the factual findings of
the trial court are binding upon the Court. Since a dismissal order consequent to a demurrer to evidence is not
subject to appeal and reviewable only by certiorari, the factual finding that the arrest preceded the search is
conclusive upon this Court. The only legal basis for this Court to possibly reverse and set aside the dismissal
order of the trial court upon demurrer to evidence would be if the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
in excess of jurisdiction when it ruled that there was no legal basis to lawfully effect a warrantless arrest.

The pertinent provisions of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on warrantless arrest provide:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:

a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

Section 5, above, provides three (3) instances when warrantless arrest may be lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a
suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer,
there is probable cause that said suspect was the author of a crime which had just been committed; (c) arrest of
a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending.

For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to be valid,
two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.29
1awphi 1.nét

The facts and circumstances surrounding the present case did not manifest any suspicious behavior on the part
of private respondent Lawrence Wang that would reasonably invite the attention of the police. He was merely
walking from the Maria Orosa Apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW car when the police
operatives arrested him, frisked and searched his person and commanded him to open the compartment of the
car, which was later on found to be owned by his friend, David Lee. He was not committing any visible offense
then. Therefore, there can be no valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5. It
is settled that "reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the
presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would
justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.30

Neither may the warrantless arrest be justified under paragraph (b) of Section 5. What is clearly established from
the testimonies of the arresting officers is that Wang was arrested mainly on the information that he was the
employer of Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio who were previously arrested and charged for illegal transport of
shabu. Teck and Junio did not even categorically identify Wang to be their source of the shabu they were caught
with in flagrante delicto. Upon the duo’s declaration that there will be a delivery of shabu on the early morning of
the following day, May 17, which is only a few hours thereafter, and that Wang may be found in Maria Orosa
Apartment along Maria Orosa Street, the arresting officers conducted "surveillance" operation in front of said
apartment, hoping to find a person which will match the description of one Lawrence Wang, the employer of
Teck and Junio. These circumstances do not sufficiently establish the existence of probable cause based on
personal knowledge as required in paragraph (b) of Section 5.

And doubtless, the warrantless arrest does not fall under paragraph (c) of Section 5.

The inevitable conclusion, as correctly made by the trial court, is that the warrantless arrest was illegal. Ipso jure,
the warrantless search incidental to the illegal arrest is likewise unlawful.

In People v. Aminnudin,31 the Court declared as inadmissible in evidence the marijuana found in appellant’s
possession during a search without a warrant, because it had been illegally seized, in disregard of the Bill of
Rights:
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it
shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the
gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all
appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only
when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became a suspect and so
subject to apprehension. It was the fugitive finger that triggered his arrest. The identification of the informer was
the probable cause as determined by the officer (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon
Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.

The People’s contention that Wang waived his right against unreasonable search and seizure has no factual
basis. While we agree in principle that consent will validate an otherwise illegal search, however, based on the
evidence on record, Wang resisted his arrest and the search on his person and belongings.32 The implied
acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given
under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the
constitutional guarantee.33 Moreover, the continuing objection to the validity of the warrantless arrest made of
record during the arraignment bolsters Wang’s claim that he resisted the warrantless arrest and search.

We cannot close this ponencia without a word of caution: those who are supposed to enforce the law are not
justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of
liberty. As Justice Holmes once said, "I think it is less evil that some criminals should escape than that the
government should play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce
another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself.34

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-63630 April 6, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MEDEL TANGLIBEN Y BERNARDINO, defendant-appellant.

The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Katz N. Tierra for defendant-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Third Judicial Region at San
Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 41, finding appellant Medel Tangliben y Bernardino guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended) and
sentencing him to life imprisonment, to pay a fine of P20,000 and to pay the costs.

The information filed against the appellant alleged:

That on or about the 2nd day of March, 1982, in the municipality of San Fernando, Province of
Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
MEDEL TANGLIBEN y BERNARDINO, knowing fully well that Marijuana is a prohibited drug, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have his possession, control and custody one (1) bag of
dried marijuana leaves with an approximate weight of one (1) kilo and to transport (sic) the same to
Olongapo City, without authority of law to do so. (At p. 6, Rollo)

The prosecution's evidence upon which the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt was based is narrated by
the trial court as follows:
 It appears from the evidence presented by the prosecution that in the late evening of March 2, 1982,
Patrolmen Silverio Quevedo and Romeo L. Punzalan of the San Fernando Police Station, together with
Barangay Tanod Macario Sacdalan, were conducting surveillance mission at the Victory Liner Terminal
compound located at Barangay San Nicolas, San Fernando, Pampanga; that the surveillance was aimed
not only against persons who may commit misdemeanors at the said place but also on persons who may
be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs based on informations supplied by informers; that it was
around 9:30 in the evening that said Patrolmen noticed a person caring a traveling bag (Exhibit G) who
was acting suspiciously and they confronted him; that the person was requested by Patrolmen Quevedo
and Punzalan to open the red traveling bag but the person refused, only to accede later on when the
patrolmen identified themselves; that found inside the bag were marijuana leaves (Exhibit B) wrapped in
a plastic wrapper and weighing one kilo, more or less; that the person was asked of his name and the
reason why he was at the said place and he gave his name as Medel Tangliben and explained that he
was waiting for a ride to Olongapo City to deliver the marijuana leaves; that the accused was taken to
the police headquarters at San Fernando, Pampanga, for further investigation; and that Pat. Silverio
Quevedo submitted to his Station Commander his Investigator's Report (Exhibit F).

It appears also from the prosecution's evidence that in the following morning or on March 3, 1982, Pat.
Silverio Quevedo asked his co-policeman Pat. Roberto Quevedo, who happens to be his brother and
who has had special training on narcotics, to conduct a field test on a little portion of the marijuana
leaves and to have the remaining portion examined by the PCCL at Camp Olivas, San Fernando,
Pampanga; that Pat. Roberto Quevedo conducted a field test (Exhibit H) on the marijuana leaves and
found positive result for marijuana (Exhibit E); that the remaining bigger quantity of the marijuana leaves
were taken to the PCCL at Camp Olivas by Pat. Roberto Quevedo that same day of March 3, 1982
(Exhibit A and A-1) and when examined, the same were also found to be marijuana (Exhibit C and C-1).
(At pp. 9-10, Rollo)

Only the accused testified in his defense. His testimony is narrated by the trial court as follows:

The accused declared that he got married on October 25, 1981 and his wife begot a child on June 10,
1982; that he was formerly employed in the poultry farm of his uncle Alejandro Caluma in Antipolo, Rizal;
that he is engaged in the business of selling poultry medicine and feeds, including chicks, and used to
conduct his business at Taytay, Rizal; that he goes to Subic at times in connection with his business and
whenever he is in Subic, he used to buy C-rations from one Nena Ballon and dispose the same in
Manila; that he never left his residence at Antipolo, Rizal, on March 2, 1982; that on March 3, 1982, he
went to Subic to collect a balance of P100.00 from a customer thereat and to buy C-rations; that he was
able to meet Nena Ballon at 6:00 o'clock in the evening and he stayed in Nena's house up to 8:00 o'clock
because he had a drinking spree with Nena's son; that he tried to catch the 8:00 o'clock trip to Manila
from Olongapo City but he failed and was able to take the bus only by 9:00 o'clock that evening that it
was a Victory Liner Bus that he rode and because he was tipsy, he did not notice that the bus was only
bound for San Fernando, Pampanga; that upon alighting at the Victory Liner Compound at San
Fernando, Pampanga he crossed the street to wait for a bus going to Manila; that while thus waiting for a
bus, a man whom he came to know later as Pat. Punzalan, approached him and asked him if he has any
residence certificate; that when he took out his wallet, Pat. Punzalan got the wallet and took all the
money inside the wallet amounting to P545.00; that Pat. Punzalan told him that he'll be taken to the
municipal building for verification as he may be an NPA member; that at the municipal building, he saw a
policeman, identified by him later as Pat. Silverio Quevedo, sleeping but was awakened when he arrived
that Pat. Quevedo took him upstairs and told him to take out everything from his pocket saying that the
prisoners inside the jail may get the same from him; that inside his pocket was a fifty-peso bill and Pat.
Quevedo took the same, telling him that it shall be returned to him but that it was never returned to him;
that he was thereafter placed under detention and somebody told him that he is being charged with
possession of marijuana and if he would like to be bailed out, somebody is willing to help him; and, that
when he was visited by his wife, he told his wife that Patrolman Silverio Quevedo took away all his
money but he told his wife not to complain anymore as it would be useless. (Rollo, pp. 10-11)

Appellant, through counsel de oficio Atty. Enrique Chan, raised the lone assignment of error in his appeal:

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND FINDING HIM
GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED ON INSUFFICIENT AND DOUBTFUL EVIDENCE. (At p. 48, Rollo)

The Solicitor-General likewise filed his brief, basically reiterating ating the lower court's findings.
However, before this Court had the chance to act on appeal, counsel de oficio Atty. Enrique Chan died.
Thereafter, this court appointed a new counsel de oficio, Atty. Katz Tierra and pursuant thereto, the Deputy Clerk
of Court, in behalf of the Clerk of Court, required the new counsel to file her appellant's brief. The latter complied
and, in her brief, raised the following assignment of errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE PACKAGE OF MARIJUANA

ALLEGEDLY SEIZED FROM DEFENDANT-APPELLANT AS IT WAS A PRODUCT OF AN UNLAWFUL
SEARCH WITHOUT A WARRANT.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE ALLEGED PACKAGE OF

MARIJUANA LEAVES AS THE LEAVES SUPPOSEDLY SEIZED FROM ACCUSED WHEN IT WAS
NEVER AUTHENTICATED.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE THE
GUILT OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. (At pp. 92-93, Rollo)

It is contended that the marijuana allegedly seized from the accused was a product of an unlawful search without
a warrant and is therefore inadmissible in evidence.

This contention is devoid of merit.

One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant is a search incident to a lawful arrest. Thus,
Section 12 of Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Section 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search
warrant.

Meanwhile, Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) provides:

. . . A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.

Accused was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest. This case therefore
falls squarely within the exception. The warrantless search was incident to a lawful arrest and is consequently
valid.

In the case of People v. Claudia, 160 SCRA 646, [1988] this Court, confronted with the same issue, held that:

Appellant Claudio was caught transporting prohibited drugs. Pat. Daniel did not need a warrant to arrest
Claudio as the latter was caught in flagrante delicto. The warrantless search being an incident to a lawful
arrest is in itself lawful. (Nolasco V. Paño, 147 SCRA 509). Therefore, there was no infirmity in the
seizure of the 1.1 kilos of marijuana.

We are not unmindful of the decision of this Court in People v. Amininudin, 163 SCRA 402 [1988]. In that case
the PC officers had earlier received a tip from an informer that accused-appellant. was on board a vessel bound
for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. Acting on this tip, they waited for him one evening, approached him as
he descended from the gangplank, detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. Said bag contained
marijuana leaves. The Court held that the marijuana could not be admitted in evidence since it was seized
illegally. The records show, however, that there were certain facts, not sing in the case before us, which led the
Court to declare the seizure as invalid. As stated therein:
 The present case presented no such urgency From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is
clear that they had at react two days within which they could have obtained a warrant of arrest and
search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was
identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they could
have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet
they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether
because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority
that a "search warrant was not necessary."

In contrast, the case before us presented urgency. Although the trial court's decision did not mention it, the
transcript of stenographic notes reveals that there was an informer who pointed to the accused-appellant as
carrying marijuana. (TSN, pp. 52-53) Faced with such on-the-spot information, the police officers had to act
quickly. There was not enough time to secure a search warrant. We cannot therefore apply the ruling
in Aminnudin to the case at bar. To require search warrants during on-the-spot apprehensions of drug pushers,
illegal possessors of firearms, jueteng collectors, smugglers of contraband goods, robbers, etc. would make it
extremely difficult, if not impossible to contain the crimes with which these persons are associated.

Accused-appellant likewise asserts that the package of marijuana leaves supposedly seized from him was never
authenticated and therefore should not have been admitted as evidence. He capitalizes on the fact that the
marijuana package brought by patrolman Roberto Quevedo to the PC Crime Laboratory for examination did not
contain a tag bearing the name of the accused. We rule, however, that since Patrolman Quevedo testified that
he gave the marijuana package together with a letter-request for examination, and the forensic chemist Marilene
Salangad likewise testified that she received the marijuana together with the letter-request and said letter-
request bore the name of the accused, then the requirements of proper authentication of evidence were
sufficiently complied with. The marijuana package examined by the forensic checklist was satisfactorily identified
as the one seized from accused.

Even assuming arguendo that the marijuana sent to the PC Crime Laboratory was not properly authenticated,
still, we cannot discount the separate field test conducted by witness Roberto Quevedo which yielded positive
results for marijuana.

Lastly, the appellant claims that the evidence upon which he was convicted was insufficient and doubtful and
that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt.

In attacking the sufficiency of evidence, the appellant avers that the informer should have been presented before
the lower court. We discard this argument as a futile attempt to revive an already settled issue. This Court has
ruled in several cases that non-presentation of the informer, where his testimony would be merely corroborative
or cumulative, is not fatal to the prosecution's case. (People v. Asio, G.R. No. 84960, September 1, 1989;
(People v. Viola, G.R. No. 64262, March 16, 1989; People v. Capulong, 160 SCRA 533 [1988]; People v.
Cerelegia, 147 SCRA 538).

As to doubtfulness of evidence, well-settled is the rule that findings of the trial court on the issue of credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect and accorded the highest consideration by the
appellate court. Since credibility is a matter that is peculiarly within the province of the trial judge, who had first
hand opportunity to watch and observe the demeanor and behavior of witnesses both for the prosecution and
the defense at the time of their testimony (People v. Tejada, G.R. No. 81520, February 21, 1989; People v.
Turla, 167 SCRA 278), we find no reason to disturb the following findings:

The testimony of prosecution witnesses Patrolmen Silverio Quevedo and Romeo Punzalan are positive
and sufficiently clean to show the commission by the accused of the offense herein chatted. These
prosecution witnesses have no motive to fabricate the facts and to foist a very serious offense against
the accused. The knowledge on what these witnesses testified to were (sic) acquired by them in the
official performance of their duties and then, (sic) being no showing that they are prejudiced against the
accused, their testimonies deserve full credit.

The testimonies of the afore-mentioned petitioner that what they found in the possession of the accused
were marijuana leaves were corroborated by the examination findings conducted by Pat. October to
Salangad of the PCCL, with station at camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga (Exhibits C and C-1).
(Rollo, p. 11)

Moreover, if there is truth in the testimony of the accused to the effect that Pat. Punzalan got all the
money from his wallet when he was accosted at the Victory Liner Terminal and was told just to keep
 quiet otherwise he will be "salvaged" why will Pat. Punzalan still bring the accused to the municipal
Building for interrogation and/or verification? Would not Pat. Punzalan be exposing his identity to the
accused? This is unnatural. And this is also true on the testimony to the accused that Pat. Silverio
Quevedo got his fifty-peso bill arid never returned the same to him. If the policemen really got any money
from the accused and that the marijuana leaves do not belong to the accused, why will the two
policemen still produce in Court as evidence that expensive-looking traveling red bag (Exhibit G) taken
from the accused and which contained the marijuana in question if the instant case is a mere
fabrication?

As already stated, all the evidence, oral and documentary, presented by the prosecution in this case
were all based on personal knowledge acquired by the prosecution witnesses in the regular performance
of their official duties and there is nothing in their testimonies to show that they are bias (sic) or that they
have any prejudice against the herein accused. Between the testimonies of these prosecution witnesses
and that of the uncorroborated and self-serving testimony of the accused, the former should prevail.
(Rollo, p. 13)

Likewise, the appellant chose to limit his defense to his own testimony. He could have availed himself through
compulsory court processes of several witnesses to buttress his defense. Since not one other witness was
presented nor was any justification for the non-appearance given, the inadequacy of his lone and
uncorroborated testimony remains. It cannot prevail vis-a-vis the positive testimonies given by the prosecution
witnesses.

Moreover, the appellant's having jumped bail is akin to flight which, as correctly observed by the lower court, is
an added circumstance tending to establish his guilt.

We take exception, however, to the trial court's finding that:

The dried marijuana leaves found in the possession of the accused weighs one (1) kilo, more or less.
The intent to transport the same is clear from the testimony of Pat. Silverio Quevedo who declared,
among other things, that when he confronted the accused that night, the latter told him that he (accused)
is bringing the marijuana leaves to Olongapo City. Moreover, considering the quantity of the marijuana
leaves found in the possession of the accused and the place he was arrested which is at San Fernando,
Pampanga, a place where the accused is not residing, it can be said that the intent to transport the
marijuana leaves has been clearly established. (Rollo, pp. 13-14)

The alleged extrajudicial confession of the accused which, on the other hand, he categorically denied in court,
that he is transporting the marijuana leaves to Olongapo City cannot be relied upon. Even assuming it to be true,
the extrajudicial confession cannot be admitted because it does not appear in the records that the accused,
during custodial investigation, was apprised of his rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of
such rights. In People v. Duero 104 SCRA 379 [1981], the Court pronounced that "inasmuch as the prosecution
failed to prove that before Duero made his alleged oral confession he was informed of his rights to remain silent
and to have counsel and because there is no proof that he knowingly and intelligently waived those rights, his
confession is inadmissible in evidence. This ruling was reiterated in People v. Tolentino, 145 SCRA 597 [1986],
where the Court added that:

In effect, the Court not only abrogated the rule on presumption of regularity of official acts relative to
admissibility of statements taken during in-custody interrogation but likewise dispelled any doubt as to
the full adoption of the Miranda doctrine in this jurisdiction. It is now incumbent upon the prosecution to
prove during a trial that prior to questioning, the confessant was warned of his constitutionally protected
rights.

The trial judge likewise found the marijuana to weigh one kilo, more or less, and from this finding extracted a
clear intent to transport the marijuana leaves. It may be pointed out, however, that although the information
stated the weight to be approximately one kilo, the forensic chemist who examined the marijuana leaves testified
that the marijuana weighed only 600 grams Such amount is not a considerable quantity as to conclusively confer
upon the accused an intent to transport the marijuana leaves.

Nor can it be said that the intent to transport is clearly established from the fact that the accused was arrested at
San Fernando, Pampanga, a place which is not his residence. Conviction of a crime with an extremely severe
penalty must be based on evidence which is clearer and more convincing than the inferences in this case.
What was therefore proved beyond reasonable doubt is not his intent to transport the marijuana leaves but his
actual session.

The offense committed by the appellant is possession of marijuana under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended).

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED but MODIFIED. The appellant
is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years and fine of Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992

ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge, Branch 168, Regional
Trial Court, NCJR Pasig, M.M., and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:

According to the findings of the San Juan Police in their Investigation Report, 1 on 2 July 1991, Eldon Maguan
was driving his car along Wilson St., San Juan, Metro Manila, heading towards P. Guevarra St. Petitioner
entered Wilson St., where it is a one-way street and started travelling in the opposite or "wrong" direction. At the
corner of Wilson and J. Abad Santos Sts., petitioner's and Maguan's cars nearly bumped each other. Petitioner
alighted from his car, walked over and shot Maguan inside his car. Petitioner then boarded his car and left the
scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to take down petitioner's car plate number. The police
arrived shortly thereafter at the scene of the shooting and there retrieved an empty shell and one round of live
ammunition for a 9 mm caliber pistol. Verification at the Land Transportation Office showed that the car was
registered to one Elsa Ang Go.

The following day, the police returned to the scene of the shooting to find out where the suspect had come from;
they were informed that petitioner had dined at Cravings Bake Shop shortly before the shooting. The police
obtained a facsimile or impression of the credit card used by petitioner from the cashier of the bake shop. The
security guard of the bake shop was shown a picture of petitioner and he positively identified him as the same
person who had shot Maguan. Having established that the assailant was probably the petitioner, the police
launched a manhunt for petitioner.

On 8 July 1991, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news reports that he
was being hunted by the police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him. An
eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at that time, positively identified petitioner as the
gunman. That same day, the police promptly filed a complaint for frustrated homicide 2 against petitioner with the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Dennis Villa Ignacio
("Prosecutor") informed petitioner, in the presence of his lawyers, that he could avail himself of his right to
preliminary investigation but that he must first sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code. Petitioner refused to execute any such waiver.

On 9 July 1991, while the complaint was still with the Prosecutor, and before an information could be filed in
court, the victim, Eldon Maguan, died of his gunshot wound(s).

Accordingly, on 11 July 1991, the Prosecutor, instead of filing an information for frustrated homicide, filed an
information for murder 3 before the Regional Trial Court. No bail was recommended. At the bottom of the
information, the Prosecutor certified that no preliminary investigation had been conducted because the accused
did not execute and sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.

In the afternoon of the same day, 11 July 1991, counsel for petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus
motion for immediate release and proper preliminary investigation,4 alleging that the warrantless arrest of
petitioner was unlawful and that no preliminary investigation had been conducted before the information was
filed. Petitioner also prayed that he be released on recognizance or on bail. Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro,
acting on the omnibus motion, wrote on the last page of the motion itself that he interposed no objection to
petitioner being granted provisional liberty on a cash bond of P100,000.00.

On 12 July 1991, petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion for special raffle 5 in order to expedite action on the
Prosecutor's bail recommendation. The case was raffled to the sala of respondent Judge, who, on the same
date, approved the cash bond 6 posted by petitioner and ordered his release. 7 Petitioner was in fact released
that same day.

On 16 July 1991, the Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion for leave to conduct preliminary
investigation8 and prayed that in the meantime all proceedings in the court be suspended. He stated that
petitioner had filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal an omnibus motion for immediate
release and preliminary investigation, which motion had been granted by Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro,
who also agreed to recommend cash bail of P100,000.00. The Prosecutor attached to the motion for leave a
copy of petitioner's omnibus motion of 11 July 1991.

Also on 16 July 1991, the trial court issued an Order 9 granting leave to conduct preliminary investigation and
cancelling the arraignment set for 15 August 1991 until after the prosecution shall have concluded its preliminary
investigation.

On 17 July 1991, however, respondent Judge motu proprio issued an Order, 10 embodying the following: (1) the
12 July 1991 Order which granted bail was recalled; petitioner was given 48 hours from receipt of the Order to
surrender himself; (2) the 16 July 1991 Order which granted leave to the prosecutor to conduct preliminary
investigation was recalled and cancelled; (3) petitioner's omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary
investigation dated 11 July 1991 was treated as a petition for bail and set for hearing on 23 July 1991.

On 19 July 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Supreme Court
assailing the 17 July 1991 Order, contending that the information was null and void because no preliminary
investigation had been previously conducted, in violation of his right to due process. Petitioner also moved for
suspension of all proceedings in the case pending resolution by the Supreme Court of his petition; this motion
was, however, denied by respondent Judge.

On 23 July 1991, petitioner surrendered to the police.

By a Resolution dated 24 July 1991, this Court remanded the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to
the Court of Appeals.

On 16 August 1991, respondent Judge issued an order in open court setting the arraignment of petitioner on 23
August 1991.

On 19 August 1991, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion to restrain his arraignment.

On 23 August 1991, respondent judge issued a Commitment Order directing the Provincial Warden of Rizal to
admit petitioner into his custody at the Rizal Provincial Jail. On the same date, petitioner was arraigned. In view,
however, of his refusal to enter a plea, the trial court entered for him a plea of not guilty. The Trial court then set
the criminal case for continuous hearings on 19, 24 and 26 September; on 2, 3, 11 and 17 October; and on 7, 8,
14, 15, 21 and 22 November 1991. 11

On 27 August 1991, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus 12 in the Court of Appeals. He alleged that in view of public
respondent's failure to join issues in the petition for certiorari earlier filed by him, after the lapse of more than a month, thus prolonging his detention, he was
entitled to be released on habeas corpus.

On 30 August 1991, the Court of Appeals issued the writ of habeas corpus. 13 The petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, on the one hand, and the petition for habeas corpus, upon the other, were
subsequently consolidated in the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals, on 2 September 1991, issued a resolution denying petitioner's motion to restrain his
arraignment on the ground that that motion had become moot and academic.

On 19 September 1991, trial of the criminal case commenced and the prosecution presented its first witness.
On 23 September 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a consolidated decision 14 dismissing the two (2)
petitions, on the following grounds:

a. Petitioner's warrantless arrest was valid because the offense for which he was arrested and
charged had been "freshly committed." His identity had been established through investigation.
At the time he showed up at the police station, there had been an existing manhunt for him.
During the confrontation at the San Juan Police Station, one witness positively identified
petitioner as the culprit.

b. Petitioner's act of posting bail constituted waiver of any irregularity attending his arrest. He
waived his right to preliminary investigation by not invoking it properly and seasonably under the
Rules.

c. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it issued the 17 July 1991 Order because the
trial court had the inherent power to amend and control its processes so as to make them
conformable to law and justice.

d. Since there was a valid information for murder against petitioner and a valid commitment order
(issued by the trial judge after petitioner surrendered to the authorities whereby petitioner was
given to the custody of the Provincial Warden), the petition for habeas corpus could not be
granted.

On 3 October 1991, the prosecution presented three (3) more witnesses at the trial. Counsel for petitioner also
filed a "Withdrawal of Appearance" 15 with the trial court, with petitioner's conformity.

On 4 October 1991, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed. On 14 October 1991, the Court
issued a Resolution directing respondent Judge to hold in abeyance the hearing of the criminal case below until
further orders from this Court.

In this Petition for Review, two (2) principal issues need to be addressed: first, whether or not a lawful
warrantless arrest had been effected by the San Juan Police in respect of petitioner Go; and second, whether
petitioner had effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation. We consider these issues seriatim.

In respect of the first issue, the Solicitor General argues that under the facts of the case, petitioner had been
validly arrested without warrant. Since petitioner's identity as the gunman who had shot Eldon Maguan on 2 July
1991 had been sufficiently established by police work, petitioner was validly arrested six (6) days later at the San
Juan Police Station. The Solicitor General invokes Nazareno v. Station Commander, etc., et al., 16 one of the
seven (7) cases consolidated with In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Roberto Umil, etc.,
v. Ramos, et al. 17 where a majority of the Court upheld a warrantees arrest as valid although effected fourteen
(14) days after the killing in connection with which Nazareno had been arrested. Accordingly, in the view of the
Solicitor General, the provisions of Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court were applicable and because
petitioner had declined to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, the Prosecutor was
legally justified in filing the information for murder even without preliminary investigation.

On the other hand, petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant because he went to the
police station six (6) days after the shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner argues, the
crime had not been "just committed" at the time that he was arrested. Moreover, none of the police officers who
arrested him had been an eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan and accordingly none had the "personal
knowledge" required for the lawfulness of a warrantees arrest. Since there had been no lawful warrantless
arrest. Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which establishes the only exception to the right to preliminary
investigation, could not apply in respect of petitioner.

The reliance of both petitioner and the Solicitor General upon Umil v. Ramos is, in the circumstances of this
case, misplaced. In Umil v. Ramos, by an eight-to-six vote, the Court sustained the legality of the warrantless
arrests of petitioners made from one (1) to fourteen days after the actual commission of the offenses, upon the
ground that such offenses constituted "continuing crimes." Those offenses were subversion, membership in an
outlawed organization like the New People's Army, etc. In the instant case, the offense for which petitioner was
arrested was murder, an offense which was obviously commenced and completed at one definite location in time
and space. No one had pretended that the fatal shooting of Maguan was a "continuing crime."

Secondly, we do not believe that the warrantees "arrest" or detention of petitioner in the instant case falls within
the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides as follows:
 Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall
be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceed against in
accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.

Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The "arresting" officers obviously were
not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could
the "arrest" effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected "when [the shooting had]
in fact just been committed" within the meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had
any "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The
information upon which the police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the
shooting — one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman's
car's plate number which turned out to be registered in petitioner's wife's name. That information did not,
however, constitute "personal knowledge." 18

It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the meaning of Section
5 of Rule 113. It is clear too that Section 7 of Rule 112, which provides:

Sec. 7 When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. — When a person is lawfully arrested
without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the complaint or
information may be filed by the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a preliminary
investigation having been first conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or
arresting office or person

However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested may ask for a
preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a
waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the
assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his
choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for bail as provided in the corresponding rule
and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.

If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted,
the accused may within five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of the information, ask
for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his favor in the manner
prescribed in this Rule. (Emphasis supplied)

is also not applicable. Indeed, petitioner was not arrested at all. When he walked into San Juan Police Station,
accompanied by two (2) lawyers, he in fact placed himself at the disposal of the police authorities. He did not
state that he was "surrendering" himself, in all probability to avoid the implication he was admitting that he had
slain Eldon Maguan or that he was otherwise guilty of a crime. When the police filed a complaint for frustrated
homicide with the Prosecutor, the latter should have immediately scheduled a preliminary investigation to
determine whether there was probable cause for charging petitioner in court for the killing of Eldon Maguan.
Instead, as noted earlier, the Prosecutor proceed under the erroneous supposition that Section 7 of Rule 112
was applicable and required petitioner to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a
condition for carrying out a preliminary investigation. This was substantive error, for petitioner was entitled to a
preliminary investigation and that right should have been accorded him without any conditions. Moreover, since
petitioner had not been arrested, with or without a warrant, he was also entitled to be released forthwith subject
only to his appearing at the preliminary investigation.
Turning to the second issue of whether or not petitioner had waived his right to preliminary investigation, we note
that petitioner had from the very beginning demanded that a preliminary investigation be conducted. As earlier
pointed out, on the same day that the information for murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court, petitioner
filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation. The Solicitor
General contends that that omnibus motion should have been filed with the trial court and not with the
Prosecutor, and that the petitioner should accordingly be held to have waived his right to preliminary
investigation. We do not believe that waiver of petitioner's statutory right to preliminary investigation may be
predicated on such a slim basis. The preliminary investigation was to be conducted by the Prosecutor, not by the
Regional Trial Court. It is true that at the time of filing of petitioner's omnibus motion, the information for murder
had already been filed with the Regional Trial Court: it is not clear from the record whether petitioner was aware
of this fact at the time his omnibus motion was actually filed with the Prosecutor. In Crespo v. Mogul, 19 this Court
held:

The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether
a prima facie case exists to warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the
filing of the information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information
sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to
conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be
secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be
submitted to the Court for appropriate action. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-
judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once
the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be
proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court. The only
qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused.,
or the right of the People to due process of law.

xxx xxx xxx

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case [such] as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in
the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his
opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before
it. . . . 20 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied)

Nonetheless, since petitioner in his omnibus motion was asking for preliminary investigation and not for a
re-investigation (Crespo v. Mogul involved a re-investigation), and since the Prosecutor himself did file
with the trial court, on the 5th day after filing the information for murder, a motion for leave to conduct
preliminary investigation (attaching to his motion a copy of petitioner's omnibus motion), we conclude
that petitioner's omnibus motion was in effect filed with the trial court. What was crystal clear was that
petitioner did ask for a preliminary investigation on the very day that the information was filed without
such preliminary investigation, and that the trial court was five (5) days later apprised of the desire of the
petitioner for such preliminary investigation. Finally, the trial court did in fact grant the Prosecutor's
prayer for leave to conduct preliminary investigation. Thus, even on the (mistaken) supposition
apparently made by the Prosecutor that Section 7 of Rule 112 of the Revised Court was applicable, the
5-day reglementary period in Section 7, Rule 112 must be held to have been substantially complied with.

We believe and so hold that petitioner did not waive his right to a preliminary investigation. While that right is
statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament, since it has in fact been established by statute, it is a
component part of due process in criminal justice. 21 The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted
before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other
penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right. The accused in a criminal trial is
inevitably exposed to prolonged anxiety, aggravation, humiliation, not to speak of expense; the right to an
opportunity to avoid a process painful to any one save, perhaps, to hardened criminals, is a valuable right. To
deny petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him the full measure of his right to due
process.

The question may be raised whether petitioner still retains his right to a preliminary investigation in the instant
case considering that he was already arraigned on 23 August 1991. The rule is that the right to preliminary
investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at
arraignment. 22 In the instant case, petitioner Go had vigorously insisted on his right to preliminary
investigation before his arraignment. At the time of his arraignment, petitioner was already before the Court of
Appeals on certiorari, prohibition and mandamus precisely asking for a preliminary investigation before being
forced to stand trial.

Again, in the circumstances of this case, we do not believe that by posting bail petitioner had waived his right to
preliminary investigation. In People v. Selfaison, 23 we did hold that appellants there had waived their right to
preliminary investigation because immediately after their arrest, they filed bail and proceeded to trial "without
previously claiming that they did not have the benefit of a preliminary investigation." 24 In the instant case,
petitioner Go asked for release on recognizance or on bail and for preliminary investigation in one omnibus
motion. He had thus claimed his right to preliminary investigation before respondent Judge approved the cash
bond posted by petitioner and ordered his release on 12 July 1991. Accordingly, we cannot reasonably imply
waiver of preliminary investigation on the part of petitioner. In fact, when the Prosecutor filed a motion in court
asking for leave to conduct preliminary investigation, he clearly if impliedly recognized that petitioner's claim to
preliminary investigation was a legitimate one.

We would clarify, however, that contrary to petitioner's contention the failure to accord preliminary investigation,
while constituting a denial of the appropriate and full measure of the statutory process of criminal justice, did not
impair the validity of the information for murder nor affect the jurisdiction of the trial court. 25

It must also be recalled that the Prosecutor had actually agreed that petitioner was entitled to bail. This was
equivalent to an acknowledgment on the part of the Prosecutor that the evidence of guilt then in his hands was
not strong. Accordingly, we consider that the 17 July 1991 order of respondent Judge recalling his own order
granting bail and requiring petitioner to surrender himself within forty-eight (48) hours from notice, was plainly
arbitrary considering that no evidence at all — and certainly no new or additional evidence — had been
submitted to respondent Judge that could have justified the recall of his order issued just five (5) days before. It
follows that petitioner was entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right.

The final question which the Court must face is this: how does the fact that, in the instant case, trial on the merits
has already commenced, the Prosecutor having already presented four (4) witnesses, impact upon, firstly,
petitioner's right to a preliminary investigation and, secondly, petitioner's right to be released on bail? Does he
continue to be entitled to have a preliminary investigation conducted in respect of the charge against him? Does
petitioner remain entitled to be released on bail?

Turning first to the matter of preliminary investigation, we consider that petitioner remains entitled to a
preliminary investigation although trial on the merits has already began. Trial on the merits should be suspended
or held in abeyance and a preliminary investigation forthwith accorded to petitioner. 26 It is true that the
Prosecutor might, in view of the evidence that he may at this time have on hand, conclude that probable cause
exists; upon the other hand, the Prosecutor conceivably could reach the conclusion that the evidence on hand
does not warrant a finding of probable cause. In any event, the constitutional point is that petitioner
was not accorded what he was entitled to by way of procedural due process. 27 Petitioner was forced to undergo
arraignment and literally pushed to trial without preliminary investigation, with extraordinary haste, to the
applause from the audience that filled the courtroom. If he submitted to arraignment at trial, petitioner did so
"kicking and screaming," in a manner of speaking . During the proceedings held before the trial court on 23
August 1991, the date set for arraignment of petitioner, and just before arraignment, counsel made very clear
petitioner's vigorous protest and objection to the arraignment precisely because of the denial of preliminary
investigation. 28 So energetic and determined were petitioner's counsel's protests and objections that an
obviously angered court and prosecutor dared him to withdraw or walkout, promising to replace him with
counsel de oficio. During the trial, before the prosecution called its first witness, petitioner through counsel once
again reiterated his objection to going to trial without preliminary investigation: petitioner's counsel made of
record his "continuing objection." 29 Petitioner had promptly gone to the appellate court on certiorari and
prohibition to challenge the lawfulness of the procedure he was being forced to undergo and the lawfulness of
his detention.30 If he did not walk out on the trial, and if he cross-examined the prosecution's witnesses, it was
because he was extremely loath to be represented by counsel de oficio selected by the trial judge, and to run the
risk of being held to have waived also his right to use what is frequently the only test of truth in the judicial
process.

In respect of the matter of bail, we similarly believe and so hold that petitioner remains entitled to be released on
bail as a matter of right. Should the evidence already of record concerning petitioner's guilt be, in the reasonable
belief of the Prosecutor, strong, the Prosecutor may move in the trial court for cancellation of petitioner's bail. It
would then be up to the trial court, after a careful and objective assessment of the evidence on record, to grant
or deny the motion for cancellation of bail.
To reach any other conclusions here, that is, to hold that petitioner's rights to a preliminary investigation and to
bail were effectively obliterated by evidence subsequently admitted into the record would be to legitimize the
deprivation of due process and to permit the Government to benefit from its own wrong or culpable omission and
effectively to dilute important rights of accused persons well-nigh to the vanishing point. It may be that to require
the State to accord petitioner his rights to a preliminary investigation and to bail at this point, could turn out
ultimately to be largely a ceremonial exercise. But the Court is not compelled to speculate. And, in any case, it
would not be idle ceremony; rather, it would be a celebration by the State of the rights and liberties of its own
people and a re-affirmation of its obligation and determination to respect those rights and liberties.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Order of the trial court
dated 17 July 1991 is hereby SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED, and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23
September 1991 hereby REVERSED.

The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is hereby ORDERED to conduct forthwith a preliminary investigation of
the charge of murder against petitioner Go, and to complete such preliminary investigation within a period of
fifteen (15) days from commencement thereof. The trial on the merits of the criminal case in the Regional Trial
Court shall be SUSPENDED to await the conclusion of the preliminary investigation.

Meantime, petitioner is hereby ORDERED released forthwith upon posting of a cash bail bond of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). This release shall be without prejudice to any lawful order that the trial court
may issue, should the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor move for cancellation of bail at the conclusion of the
preliminary investigation.

No pronouncement as to costs. This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 131492 September 29, 2000

ROGER POSADAS, ROSARIO TORRES-YU, and MARICHU LAMBINO, petitioners,

vs.
THE HON. OMBUDSMAN, THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, and ORLANDO V. DIZON, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

Dennis Venturina, a member of Sigma Rho at the University of the Philippines, was killed in a rumble between
his fraternity and another fraternity on December 8, 1994. In a letter dated December 11, 1994, petitioner Roger
Posadas, then Chancellor of U.P. Diliman in Quezon City, asked the Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation for assistance in determining the persons responsible for the crime. In response to the request,
respondent Orlando V. Dizon, Chief of the Special Operations Group of the NBI, and his men went to U.P. on
December 12 and, on the basis of the supposed positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, Leandro
Lachica and Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., attempted to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag,
officers/members of the Scintilla Juris Fraternity, as suspects in the killing of Venturina. It appears that the two
suspects had come that day to the U.P. Police Station for a peace talk between their fraternity and the Sigma
Rho Fraternity.

Petitioners Posadas, Marichu Lambino, and Rosario Torres-Yu, also of U.P., and a certain Atty. Villamor,
counsel for the suspects, objected on the ground that the NBI did not have warrants of arrest with them.
Posadas and Atty. Villamor promised to take the suspects to the NBI Office the next day. As a result of their
intervention, Taparan and Narag were not arrested by the NBI agents on that day.1 However, criminal charges
were filed later against the two student suspects.2

Dizon then filed a complaint in the Office of the Special Prosecutor, charging petitioners Posadas, Torres-Yu,
Lambino, Col. Eduardo Bentain, Chief of the Security Force of the U.P. Police, and Atty. Villamor with violation of
P.D. 1829,3 which makes it unlawful for anyone to obstruct the apprehension and prosecution of criminal
offenders.

On May 18, 1995, an information4 was filed against them, alleging that:
 That on or about December 12, 1994 and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, namely: ROGER
POSADAS, Chancellor; ROSARIO YU — Vice Chancellor; ATTY. MARICHU LAMBINO — Asst. Legal
Counsel; and COL. EDUARDO BENTAIN — Chief, Security Force, all of the University of the
Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, all public officers, while in the performance of their respective official
functions, taking advantage of their official duties and committing the crime in relation to their office,
conspiring and confederating with each other and with a certain ATTY. VILLAMOR, did then and there
wilfully, knowingly and criminally obstruct, impede and frustrate the apprehension of FRANCIS CARLO
TAPARAN and RAYMUNDO NARAG, both principal suspects involved in the brutal killing of DENNIS
VENTURINA, a U.P. graduating student and Chairperson of the UP College of Administration, Student
Council, and delaying the investigation and prosecution of the said heinous case by harboring and
concealing said suspects thus, leading to the successful escape of suspects Narag and another principal
suspect JOEL CARLO DENOSTA; that said above acts were done by the above-named accused public
officials despite their full knowledge that said suspects were implicated in the brutal slaying of said
Dennis Venturina, thus preventing the suspects arrest, prosecution and conviction.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Later, on motion of petitioners, the Special Prosecutor's Office recommended the dismissal of the case. But the
recommendation was disapproved. In a memorandum, dated September 8, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman
directed the Special Prosecutor to proceed with the prosecution of petitioners in the Sandiganbayan. Hence this
petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the resolution of the Ombudsman's office ordering the
prosecution of petitioners.

Petitioners contend that:

I. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN HE

RULED THAT: 1) STUDENTS COULD BE ARRESTED WITHOUT WARRANT ON MERE SUSPICION;
2) PD 1829 INCLUDES ARRESTS WITHOUT WARRANTS ON MERE SUSPICION; AND WHEN HE
REVERSED THE FINDINGS AND RESOLUTION OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTION OFFICER, THE
DEPUTY SPECIAL PROSECUTOR AND THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, WHO CONDUCTED THE
REINVESTIGATION OF THE CASE; AND FINALLY WHEN HE RESOLVED THAT PETITIONERS
SHOULD BE SUBJECTED TO PUBLIC TRIAL WHEN THERE IS NO PROBABLE CAUSE AND NO
BASIS.

II. SECTION 1, PARAGRAPH C OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1829 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 5

Two issues are raised in this case, to wit: (1) Whether the attempted arrest of the student suspects by the NBI
could be validly made without a warrant; and (2) Whether there was probable cause for prosecuting petitioners
for violation of P.D. No. 1829. We answer these questions in the negative.

First. In view of Art. III, §2 of the Constitution, the rule is that no arrest may be made except by virtue of a
warrant issued by a judge after examining the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and after finding
probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed the crime. The exceptions when an
arrest may be made even without a warrant are provided in Rule 113, §5 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
which reads:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

There is no question that this case does not fall under paragraphs (a) and (c). The arresting officers in this case
did not witness the crime being committed. Neither are the students fugitives from justice nor prisoners who had
escaped from confinement. The question is whether paragraph (b) applies because a crime had just been
committed and the NBI agents had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Narag and Taparan were
probably guilty.
Respondents contend that the NBI agents had personal knowledge of facts gathered by them in the course of
their investigation indicating that the students sought to be arrested were the perpetrators of the crime.6 They
invoke the ruling in People v. Tonog, Jr. 7 in which it was held:

It may be that the police officers were not armed with a warrant when they apprehended Accused-
appellant. The warrantless arrest, however, was justified under Section 5 (b), Rule 133 (sic) of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure providing that a peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person "when
an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it." In this case, Pat. Leguarda, in effecting the arrest of Accused-
appellant, had knowledge of facts gathered by him personally in the course of his investigation indicating
that Accused-appellant was one of the perpetrators.

In that case, the accused voluntarily went upon invitation of the police officer who later noticed the presence of
blood stains on the pants of the accused. Upon reaching the police station, the accused was asked to take off
his pants for examination at the crime laboratory. The question in that case involved the admissibility of
the maong pants taken from the accused. It is clear that Tonog does not apply to this case. First, the accused in
that case voluntarily went with the police upon the latter's invitation. Second, the arresting officer found blood
stains on the pants of the accused, on the basis of which he concluded that the accused probably committed the
crime for which reason the latter was taken into custody. Third, the arrest was made on the same day the crime
was committed. In the words of Rule 113, §5(b), the crime had "just been committed" and the arresting officer
had "personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed it."

In contrast, the NBI agents in the case at bar tried to arrest Narag and Taparan four days after the commission
of the crime. They had no personal knowledge of any fact which might indicate that the two students were
probably guilty of the crime. What they had were the supposed positive identification of two alleged
eyewitnesses, which is insufficient to justify the arrest without a warrant by the NBI.

We have already explained what constitutes "personal knowledge" on the part of the arresting officers:

"Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without a warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be
based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion." The
grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the
suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual
facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of
guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause,
coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.8

Indeed, at the time Dennis Venturina was killed, these agents were nowhere near the scene of the crime. When
respondent Dizon and his men attempted to arrest Taparan and Narag, the latter were not committing a crime
nor were they doing anything that would create the suspicion that they were doing anything illegal. On the
contrary, Taparan and Narag, under the supervision of the U.P. police, were taking part in a peace talk called to
put an end to the violence on the campus.

To allow the arrest which the NBI intended to make without warrant would in effect allow them to supplant the
courts. The determination of the existence of probable cause that the persons to be arrested committed the
crime was for the judge to make. The law authorizes a police officer or even an ordinary citizen to arrest criminal
offenders only if the latter are committing or have just committed a crime. Otherwise, we cannot leave to the
police officers the determination of whom to apprehend if we are to protect our civil liberties. This is evident from
a consideration of the requirements before a judge can order the arrest of suspects. Art. III, §2 of the
Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

For the failure of the NBI agents to comply with constitutional and procedural requirements, we hold that their
attempt to arrest Taparan and Narag without a warrant was illegal.

Second. In ordering the prosecution of petitioners for violation of P.D. No. 1829, §1(c), the Office of the
Ombudsman stated in its memorandum dated September 8, 1997:
 From the facts adduced, it is submitted that respondents had reasonable ground to suspect that the SJ
members sought to be arrested participated in the clubbing of Dennis Venturina, eventually leading to
the latter's demise. It must be remembered that these SJ members were positively identified by two
eyewitnesses. A reasonably prudent mind could not just ignore this positive identification. In fact,
respondents do not dispute the identification made on the alleged participants in the clubbing of Dennis
Venturina.

Respondent U.P. officials justify their act of barring the apprehending officers from arresting the SJ
members on the ground that the warrantless arrest sought to be effected did not conform with Sec. 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court; thereby averting, what would be in their opinion, an illegal arrest. While
this justification may, at best, show their good faith, it does not detract from the fact that they had
reasonable ground to suspect that the SJ members sought to be arrested committed the heinous crime
of murder as a result of the positive identification made by two eyewitnesses. Besides, the reliance on
the alleged illegality of the arrest just shows the clear intent, on respondents' part, to wilfully obstruct,
frustrate or, at the least, delay the apprehension and investigation and prosecution of the SJ members
positively identified.

To be sure, respondents knew fully well that inquest proceedings follow warrantless arrests. It is in this
forum where the prosecutor conducting the inquest may rule on their opinion on whether or not the
warrantless arrest effected was valid; he having the quasi-judicial authority to rule on this matter. Of
course, there are various remedies under the law which respondents may have likewise availed of or
resorted to in order to secure the liberty of the SJ members had the latter been arrested, without
prejudice to any criminal or administrative actions that they may have filed against the arresting NBI
agents. However, it appears that they took the law into their own hands in a manner that obstructed and
delayed the investigation being conducted by a law enforcement agency like the NBI. They facilitated the
escape of the two SJ members pinpointed by eyewitnesses as among those who clubbed to death
Dennis Venturina.9

The question is not whether petitioners had reasonable grounds to believe that the suspects were guilty. The
question is whether the suspects could be arrested even in the absence of a warrant issued by a court,
considering that, as already explained, the attempted arrest did not fall under any of the cases provided in Rule
113, §5. Regardless of their suspicion, petitioners could not very well have authorized the arrest without warrant
of the students or even effected the arrest themselves. Only courts could decide the question of probable cause
since the students were not being arrested in flagrante delicto. As the Special Prosecutor stated in his
memorandum, dated May 18, 1995, in recommending the dismissal of the case against petitioners:

All told, the evidence adduced in this case do not show that on the night of December 12, 1994, the accused
knew or had reasonable ground to believe that the students who were then at the U.P. police headquarters had
committed a crime. Neither were the warrantless arrest being sought to be made on campus that night, legal.
The U.P. officials then present had every right to prevent the commission of illegal arrests of students on
campus.

Based on all the foregoing, the obvious conclusion is that, there is no probable cause to charge Posadas,
Torres-Yu, Lambino, Bentain and Atty. Villamor of violating Section 1(c) of P.D. 1829. Probable cause is defined
as "sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a crime cognizable by the court has been committed
and that the respondents are probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial" (Section 1, Rule 12, Rules of
Court). The absence of an arrest warrant, the absence of knowledge or reasonable ground on the part of the
accused to believe that the students had committed a crime, the absence of any law punishing refusal to attend
an investigation at the NBI, all show that there is no sufficient ground to charge the accused with Obstruction of
Justice. On the contrary, the circumstances show that the accused, in safeguarding the rights of students, were
acting within the bounds of law.10

Third. Petitioners are being prosecuted under the following provision of P.D. No. 1829:

SEC. 1. The-penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000
pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or wilfully obstructs, impedes,
frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal
cases by committing any of the following acts:

xxx xxx xxx

 (c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has reasonable
ground to believe or suspect, has committed any offense under existing penal laws in order to
prevent his arrest, prosecution and conviction;

The rule, of course, is that a criminal prosecution cannot be enjoined.11 But as has been held, "[i]nfinitely more
important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal procedure is respect for the citizen's right to
be free not only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious prosecution."12 As
we held in the similar case of Venus v. Desierto:13

Conformably with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained either through a
preliminary or final injunction or a writ of prohibition, this Court ordinarily does not interfere with the
discretion of the Ombudsman to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a
crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the
corresponding information with the appropriate courts. There are, however, settled exceptions to this
rule, such as those enumerated in Brocka v. Enrile, to wit:

a. To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused (Hernandez vs. Albano, et al. L-
19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95);

b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity
of actions (Dimayuga, et al. vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez vs. Albano, supra; Fortun
vs. Labang, et al., L-38383, May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA 607);

c. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice (De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202);

d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil. 62);

e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation (Young vs. Rafferty, 33
Phil. 556; Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389);

f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang vs. People and Alvendia, 109 Phil.
1140);

g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez vs. City Judge, L-25795, October
29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616);

h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia vs. Ocampo, CA-G.R. No.
4760, March 25, 1960);

i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance (Recto vs.
Castelo, 18 L.J. (1953), cited in Rañoa vs. Alvendia, CA G.R. No. 30720-R, October 8, 1962; Cf.
Guingona, et al. vs. City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA 577);

j. Where there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that
ground has been denied (Salonga vs. Paño, et al., L-59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438);
and

k. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened
unlawful arrest of petitioners (Rodriguez vs. Castelo, L-6374, August 1, 1953) cited in Regalado,
Remedial Law Compendium, p. 188, 1988 Ed.)

In this case, petitioners' objection to the arrest of the students cannot be construed as a violation of P.D. No.
1829, §1(c) without rendering it unconstitutional. Petitioners had a right to prevent the arrest of Taparan and
Narag at the time because their attempted arrest was illegal. Indeed, they could not have interfered with the
prosecution of the guilty parties because in fact petitioner Posadas had asked the NBI for assistance in
investigating the death of Venturina. On the other hand, just because petitioners had asked for assistance from
the NBI did not authorize respondent Dizon and his men to disregard constitutional requirements.

The Office of the Ombudsman, however, found that the intervention by petitioners resulted in the escape of the
student suspects as petitioner Posadas and Atty. Villamor failed in their undertaking to surrender the students
the following day.14 Hence, the information against them charged that petitioners willfully obstructed the
apprehension of the suspects Taparan and Narag, leading to the successful escape of these students and
another principal suspect, a certain Joel Carlo Denosta.15 The student suspect mentioned by both the resolution
dated May 18, 1995 and the information, a certain Joel Carlo Denosta, was not one of the students whose arrest
by the NBI agents petitioners prevented on December 12, 1994. Moreover, whether or not petitioner Posadas
surrendered the student suspects to the NBI agents the following day is immaterial. In the first place, they were
not sureties or bondsmen who could be held to their undertaking. In the second place, the fact remains that the
NBI agents could not have validly arrested Taparan and Narag at the U.P. Police Station as they did not have a
warrant at that time. Hence, only the NBI agents themselves could be faulted for their inability to arrest Taparan
and Narag. If the NBI believed the information given to them by the supposed eyewitnesses, the NBI should
have applied for a warrant before making the attempted arrest instead of taking the law into their own hands.
That they chose not to and were prevented from making an arrest for lack of a warrant is their responsibility
alone. Petitioners could not be held accountable therefor.

We understand that the highly publicized death of Dennis Venturina caused a public clamor to bring to justice
those responsible therefor. We also recognize the pressures faced by law enforcement agencies to effect
immediate arrests and produce results without unnecessary delay. But it must be remembered that the need to
enforce the law cannot be justified by sacrificing constitutional rights. The absence of probable cause for the
filing of an information against petitioners is evident from the records. They cannot be indicted because they
dared to uphold the rights of the students. Hence, we see no other recourse but to enjoin the Sandiganbayan
and the Ombudsman from proceeding with the case against petitioners.

Fourth. The conclusion we have thus far reached makes it unnecessary to consider petitioners' challenge to P.D.
No. 1829, §1(c). For a cardinal rule of constitutional adjudication is that the Court will not pass upon a
constitutional question although properly presented by the record if the case can be disposed of on some other
ground such as the application of a statute or general law.16

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Ombudsman and his agents are hereby prohibited from
prosecuting petitioners for violation of P.D. No. 1829 §1(c) as a result of the incident complained of in Criminal
Case No. 22801 and the Sandiganbayan is ORDERED to dismiss the information in Criminal Case No. 22801
against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 106288-89 May 17, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
TIRSO ACOL Y BARNUBAL and PIO BOSES Y DOLFO, defendants, PIO BOSES, appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

MELO, J.:

Two passengers who were apprehended after they supposedly staged a hold-up inside a passenger jeepney on
September 29, 1990 were haled to court, not for the felonious asportation, but for possession of the two
unlicensed firearms and bullets recovered from them which were instrumental in the commission of the robo (pp.
7-8, Rollo.)

Of the two persons accused, only Pio Boses interposed an appeal from the trial court's judgment (p. 23, Rollo)
inasmuch as Tirso Acol y Barnubal had escaped from incarceration (p. 5, Brief for the Accused-Appellant, p.
60, Rollo ) thereby abating any review of his culpability for the misdeed.

The People's inculpatory accusations during the joint trial were to the effect that at around 3:45 in the morning of
September 29, 1990, when Percival Tan was driving his jeepney, two men boarded the vehicle in Cubao. When
they crossed Pasay Road, the two wayfarers, together with two other companions, announced a hold-up.
Percival Tan was instructed to proceed atop the Magallanes interchange where the other passengers were
divested of their personal belongings, including the jacket of passenger Rene Araneta. Thereafter, the robbers
alighted at the Shell Gas Station near the Magallanes Commercial Center after which Percival Tan and his
passengers went to Fort Bonifacio to report the crime. A CAPCOM team was forthwith formed to track down the
culprits. Victim Rene Araneta who went with the responding police officers, upon seeing four persons, one of
whom was wearing his stolen jacket, walking casually towards Fort Bonifacio, told the police authorities to accost
said persons. After the CAPCOM officers introduced themselves, the four men scampered to different directions
but three of them, namely, Tirso Acol, Pio Boses, and Albert Blanco, were apprehended. Tirso Acol and Pio
Boses were each found in possession of an unlicensed .38 caliber revolver with bullets. After the arrest, the
three men were brought to Fort Bonifacio and were identified by Percival Tan and the passengers who ganged
up on the accused.

To reinforce the theory of unauthorized possession of firearms, Sgt. Garcia presented a certification (Exhibit I)
issued by the Firearms and Explosives Unit stating that the accused are not licensed firearm holders.

On the other hand, Pio Boses and Tirso Acol pleaded innocent to the charges levelled against them, proferring a
general denial.

Accused-appellant Pio Boses asserted on the witness stand that after establishing his residence at Pasay City
for about six months, he engaged in the business of vending "balut". During the incident in question, he recalled
that while so engaged in his trade, three persons allegedly acosted him, took his money, "balut" and "penoy",
and that he was thereafter brought to a cell where he was forced to confess ownership of one gun which was
shown to him. He nonetheless denied participation in the hold up.

For his part, Tirso Acol, a laborer and at that time having resided in Metro Manila for about two months,
recollected that he spent the night at his cousin's house in Parañaque on September 28, 1990, and that he left
Parañaque at around 5 in the morning of September 29, 1990. According to him, the jeepney he was then riding
developed engine trouble, and alighting therefrom he was arrested for no apparent reason. When he was
brought to the cell, he was allegedly coerced into admiting possession of the other gun. Just like his co-accused,
he too, denied knowledge of the hold up.

The court a quo was unpersuaded by these general denials, observing:

As can be gathered from the foregoing testimonies of the accused, the line of defense they have
adopted is one of denial. Indeed, they denied that the firearms and ammunition in question were
found in their persons in the early morning of September 29, 1989. They also denied the truth of
the testimonies of Sgt. Faltado, Percival Tan, and Rene Araneta. The defense however did not
cite any valid reasons for the Court not to give credence to the testimonies. In the circumstance,
the Court is constrained to consider the testimonies of the accused to be self-serving. In the face
of the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the Court can only take their denials with
the proverbial grain of salt. Verily, it is simply hard for the Court to believe that the accused are
simple provincial who are lost in the big city; that accused Pio Boses who is a resident of Pasay
City, does not know well-known places in Metro Manila such as the South Super Highway and
the Fort Bonifacio-Nichols interchange; that he did not know the streets where he plied his trade
as a balut vendor. Indeed, how can this be true when he himself admitted that from 7:00 p.m. of
September 28, 1989, he spent his time walking in the street in the area and yet he never claimed
he had ever lost his way.

The same is true with accused Tirso Acol. The Court is convinced that he lied on the witness
stand. He claimed that he was in the place where he was arrested because he had just come
from the residence of his cousin, Genny Acol, and the passenger jeepney he had boarded on his
way home just happened to break down at that place. In the mind of the Court this alibi of the
accused is too much of a coincidence, and too convenient an excuse, for the Court to believe. In
this connection, the Court notes his testimony on cross examination that he was unable to get in
touch with his relatives, including Genny Acol, for possible assistance and to get Genny Acol to
corroborate his testimony, because the latter had already left for the province and that none of
his other relatives knew that he had been charged in this case. But when queried how he was
able to say this, he testified that he had written to his uncle and that he received a reply letter
from him and that it was from this reply letter of his uncle that he learned that Genny Acol had
already left for the province. This testimony of accused Tirso Acol, if it accomplished anything,
helped convinced the Court that he is given to lying. For sure, if he had written to his uncle and
that the latter had replied to him, it is plain that he must have informed his uncle about the case
and that the latter knew about the case and the fact that he was in jail and needed help. In any
event, established jurisprudence dictates that between the positive testimonies of prosecution
 witnesses and the denials of the accused the Court must place its reliance on the former. As a
matter of fact, jurisprudence also indicates that greater weight must be given to the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses when they are officers of the law. (People vs. Mostoles, Jr., 124
SCRA 906; People vs. Patog, 144 SCRA 129).

(pp. 21-22, Rollo.)

As initially intimated herein, Tirso Acol escaped from detention during the trial below, thus obviating any review
of his conviction, as indeed, even if he had appealed and thereafter escaped, he would be considered as having
abandoned his appeal (People vs. Quinitan, 197 SCRA 32 [1991]; Section 8, Rule 124, Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure).

With respect to Pio Boses, he chose to articulate his protestation of innocence by claiming that the trial court
below erred:

. . . IN NOT GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE URGENT MOTION OF ACCUSED PIO BOSES TO
REOPEN THE CASE HENCE DEPRIVING HIM TO PRESENT HIS WITNESSES WHOSE
TESTIMONIES WOULD HAVE BEEN MATERIAL TO HIS DEFENSE THEREBY AMOUNTING
TO A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS.

II

. . . IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF BOTH ACCUSED PIO BOSES

AND TIRSO ACOL; INSTEAD, IT RELIED SOLELY ON THE TESTIMONIES OF THE
PROSECUTION'S WITNESSES.

III

. . . IN ADMITTING THE PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE CONSISTING OF EXHIBITS "E", "F", "F-

1" TO "F-5", "G", "G- 1" TO "G-5", SINCE THE ARRESTING OFFICERS ADMITTED THEY
WERE NOT ARMED WITH A WARRANT OF ARREST, NOR A SEARCH WARRANT WHEN
THEY CHASED AND FRISKED ACCUSED-APPELLANTS AND PROCEEDED TO ARREST
THEM.

IV

. . . IN CONVICTING BOTH ACCUSED AS THERE WAS NOT CLEAR SHOWING THAT

EXHIBITS "F", "F-1" TO "F-5", "G", "G-1" TO "G-4" WERE THE ONES USED BY THE
ROBBERS IN COMMITTING THE CRIME OF ROBBERY/HOLD UP.

(p. 1, Appellant's Brief; p. 60, Rollo.)

But the appeal leaves much to be desired.

It is axiomatic to the point of being elementary that herein accused- appellant can not feign denial of due process
where he had the opportunity to present his defense, through his own narration on the witness stand (Domingo
vs. Development Bank of the Philippines, 207 SCRA 766 [1992]; Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 595
[1992]. Withal, and as correctly pointed out by the People, the omission of a party to present witnesses to
corroborate the principal basis for exculpation, on account of the witnesses' admitted tardiness in arriving in
court, is a puerile proposition to support re-opening of the case.

In regard to the second ascription aired by the accused-appellant, emphasis is laid on the fact that the court
a quo should have relied more on the explanation offered by the defense rather than giving credence to the
testimony of the People's witnesses. For one thing, accused- appellant asseverates that they could not have
been positively identified by Percival Tan and Rene Araneta considering that it was then still dark when the
accused boarded the jeep, up to the time they were apprehended. But counsel for accused-appellant concedes
that the jeep was lighted subject to the caveat that it was not well lighted (p. 12, Brief for Accused-Appellant)
which does not entirely foreclose positive identification of the culprits who admittedly shared a ride with their
victims and were thus seated within the closed quarters of the jeepney. Moreover, it was established by the
prosecution that Rene Araneta's jacket was one of the items which was asported, that it was worn by one of the
felons, and that the jacket was recognized by Rene Araneta from a distance of 1-1/2 meters (p. 7, Brief for
Accused-Appellant). To lessen the impact of the affirmative statements uttered against accused- appellant, it is
argued that the immediate propensity of a criminal is to move out from the scene of the locus criminis and not
merely to walk casually within the vicinity. We said in People vs. Ocampo (G.R. No. 80262, September 1, 1993)
that indeed, there can be no legal dispute to the legal proposition that flight from the scene of the felony is one of
the indicia of a guilty conscience, but it is equally true, we proceeded to say, that culprits, in exceptional cases,
have become bolder by returning to the scene of the crime to feign innocence. At any rate, it has been
repeatedly stressed by this Court that the factual findings of the trial court and the conclusions drawn therefrom
are accorded utmost respect since the magistrate at the court of origin had the first hand impression of the
demeanor and deportment of witnesses (People vs. Lim, 206 SCRA 176 [1992]; People vs. Castillo, 208 SCRA
62).

With respect to the so-called warrantless arrest of accused--appellant, we are of the view that the search falls
within the purview of Section 5(b) of Rule 113 which serves as an exception to the requisite warrant prior to
arrest:

When an offense has in fact been committed, and the has

personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;

inasmuch as the police team was formed and dispatched to look for the persons responsible for the crime on
account of the information related by Percival Tan and Rene Araneta that they had just been robbed (People vs.
Gerente, 219 SCRA 756 [1993]; People vs. Tonog, Jr., 205 SCRA 772 [1992]). And since accused-appellant's
arrest was lawful, it follows that the search made incidental thereto was valid (People vs. Tanilon, 221 SCRA
671 [1993]). Moreover, the unlicensed firearms were found when the police team apprehended the accused for
the robbery and not for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition (People vs. Cruz, 165 SCRA 135 [1988]).
The principle imparted by Justice Padilla in Cruz was based on the ruling of this Court in Magoncia vs.
Palacio (90 Phil. 771 [1948]) that:

. . . When, in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense, the offending
police officers should happen to discover a criminal offense being committed by any person, they
are not precluded from performing their duties as police officers for the apprehension of the guilty
person and the taking of the corpus delicti.

Nonetheless, the penalty of "reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment" as erroneously imposed by the lower court
must be modified to read only as reclusion perpetua, as provided by Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866,
said penalty being distinct from life imprisonment.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed with the slight modification that the proper penalty
to be imposed is reclusion perpetua. Further, the court orders the forfeiture of the firearms and other incidental
paraphernalia in favor of the Philippine National Police to be disposed of in accordance with law.

No pronouncement is made as to costs.

SO ORDERED