TORTS & DAMAGES (2019) FINALS REVIEWER
RASHID VEDRA PANDI
TORTS & DAMAGES
PART I - TORTS
LIABILITY FOR ACT OR OMISSION
Vicarious Liability
Vehicle Owner
DUAVIT VS. CA
Facts:
There was a collision between a car owned by Petitioner Duavit,
driven by Sabiniano. The private respondents are Sarmiento and
Catuar. The private respondents filed a case for quasi-delict
against the driver and the Petitioner registered owner. The driver
admitted that he was not the owner of the said car, and he is using
the vehicle without the consent and authorization of Petitioner
Duavit. Duavit also cited that he did not authorize the driver to use
the car, however he also did not deny that he was the owner of
the vehicle. For his part, the driver Sabiano interposed a defense
that he was not negligent in the operation of the car.
CA:
o Registered owner rule applies – petitioner is also liable.
Issue:
WON register owner rule is applicable? NO
Ruling + RVP:
An earlier case from the 1930’s was cited – that the registered
owner rule does not apply when the driver of the said car took it
without the authorization and permission of the owner. The
provision under the NCC provides that if the owner was in the
vehicle, and he had the chance to desist the driver from anything
negligent, then he would have been also negligent. But in this
case, the owner was not in the vehicle, so Article 2184 does not
apply, which also refers back to Article 2180 of the NCC on the ER-
EE relationship. However, in this case, since there was no ER-EE
relationship, then Petitioner Duavit was found not to be liable.
JUANIZA VS. JOSE
Facts:
Jose was the registered owner and operator of the passenger
jeepney involved in an accident of collision with a freight train of
the Philippine National Railways, which resulted to 7 deaths and 5
physical injuries to its passengers. Jose was legally married to
Ramos but had been cohabiting with Arroyo, for 16 years in a
relationship akin to that of husband and wife.
Court of First Instance of Laguna
ü Jose and Arroyo are jointly and severally to pay Juaniza;
ü Jose and Arroyo are jointly and severally liable to pay the
respective heirs of the deceased passengers.
ü based Arroyo’s liability on Article 144 of the Civil Code which
reads: "When a man and woman living together as husband
and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void
from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of
them through their work or industry or their wages and
salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership."
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ATTY.
CA
ü Arroyo is not liable
Issue:
WON Article 144 of the Civil Code is applicable in a case where one
of the parties in a common-law relationship is incapacitated to
marry? NO
Ruling + RVP:
(Take note this case was decided in 1979, wen the governing law
as to property regime was still the New Civil Code.)
Art. 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and
wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the
beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through
their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed
by the rules on co-ownership.
The co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of the Civil Code
requires that the man and the woman living together must not in
any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. Since Jose is legally
married to Ramos, there is an impediment for him to contract
marriage with Arroyo. Consequently, Arroyo cannot be a co-
owner of the jeepney. The jeepney belongs to the conjugal
partnership of Jose and his legal wife. There is therefore no basis
for the liability of Arroyo for damages arising from the death of,
and physical injuries suffered by, the passengers of the jeepney
which figured in the collision.
It is settled in our jurisprudence that only the registered owner of
a public service vehicle is responsible for damages that may arise
from consequences incident to its operation, or may be caused to
any of the passengers therein. However, in this case, Arroyo is not
the registered owner.
Additional Notes: (Governing law: Family Code – Effectivity Date:
August 3, 1988)
§ Art. 147 and 148, FC – articles relating to co-ownership
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry
each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and
the property acquired by both of them through their work or
industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while
they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by
their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in
equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property
shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition
thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or
her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned
in common, without the consent of the other, until after the
termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith,
the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be
forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or
waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants,
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each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall
belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take
place upon termination of the cohabitation.
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding
Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall
be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal.
The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share
in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or
conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party
who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or
her shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last
paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both
parties are in bad faith.
Assuming that the governing law was already the Family Code,
Article 148 may still not be applied because both Articles 147 and
148 are rules of equity. It would be totally unfair to deprive the
other one of his/her legitimate share in the gains of the
cohabitation or of the partnership. When you impose the rule of
equity, it is designed really to benefit the party. So, it will not make
sense to impose it in cases of imposing liability to a particular
individual.
FGU INSURANCE CORP VS. CA
Facts:
There was a 2-car collision at around 3am. One car was owned by
Soriano and was being driven at the outer lane of the highway by
Jacildone. The other one was owned by FILCAR Transport, Inc.
(FILCAR), being driven by Dahl-Jensen as lessee, at the center lane.
Upon approaching the corner of Pioneer Street, the car owned by
FILCAR swerved to the right hitting the left side of the car of
Soriano. At that time Dahl-Jensen, a Danish tourist, did not
possess a Philippine driver's license. As a consequence, FGU
Insurance Corporation, in view of its insurance contract with
Soriano, paid the latter. By way of subrogation, it sued Dahl-
Jensen and FILCAR as well as Fortune Insurance Corporation
(FORTUNE) as insurer of FILCAR for quasi-delict. Unfortunately,
summons was not served on Dahl-Jensen since he was no longer
staying at his given address; in fact, upon motion of petitioner, he
was dropped from the complaint.
Trial court
ü dismissed the case for failure of petitioner to substantiate its
claim of subrogation.
CA
ü affirmed the ruling of the trial court
ü only the fault or negligence of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently
proved but not that of FILCAR.
ü IOW, petitioner failed to establish its cause of action for sum
of money based on quasi-delict.
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FGU Insurance Corp
o The registered owner of a vehicle is liable for damages
suffered by third persons although the vehicle is leased to
another.
Issue:
For damages suffered by a third party, may an action based on
quasi-delict prosper against a rent-a-car company and,
consequently, its insurer for fault or negligence of the car lessee in
driving the rented vehicle? NO
Ruling + RVP:
To sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the following requisites
must concur: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or
negligence of the defendant; and, (c) connection of cause and
effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the
damage incurred by the plaintiff.
Petitioner failed to prove the existence of the second requisite,
i.e., fault or negligence of FILCAR, because only the fault or
negligence of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently established, not that of
FILCAR. The damage caused on the vehicle of Soriano was brought
about by the circumstance that Dahl-Jensen swerved to the right
while the vehicle that he was driving was at the center lane. It is
plain that the negligence was solely attributable to Dahl-Jensen
thus making the damage suffered by the other vehicle his personal
liability.
Article 2180 of the same Code which deals also with quasi-delict
provides: The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable
not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible. The responsibility treated of
in this article shall cease when the persons therein mentioned
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage. The liability arises by virtue of a
presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the persons
made responsible thereunder, derived from their failure to
exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of subordinates to
prevent them from causing damage. However, in this case,
FILCAR, being engaged in a rent-a-car business, was only the
owner of the car leased to Dahl-Jensen. As such, there was no
vinculum juris between them as ER and EE. FILCAR cannot in any
way be responsible for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen, the
former not being an employer of the latter.
We now correlate par. 5 of Art. 2180 with Art. 2184 of the same
Code which provides: "In motor vehicle mishap, the owner is
solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the
vehicle, could have by the use of due diligence, prevented the
misfortune . . . If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the
provisions of article 2180 are applicable." Obviously, this provision
of Art. 2184 is neither applicable because of the absence of
master-driver relationship between FILCAR and Dahl-Jensen.
Clearly, petitioner has no cause of action against respondent
FILCAR on the basis of quasi-delict; logically, its claim against
respondent FORTUNE can neither prosper.
IOW, the question really to fall under 2180 is WON there is
control, power to regulate, supervise etc. You must have the
ability to control or regulate the behavior of the person who
committed the injury because if wala kay control all over the
person, it’s unfair for you to be held liable.
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TORTS & DAMAGES (2019) FINALS REVIEWER
CADIENTE VS. MACAS
Facts:
Eyewitness Palero testified that at about 4pm at an intersection, a
15-year old high school student Macas was standing on the
shoulder of the road. She was about 2.5 meters away from him
when he was bumped and run over by a Ford Fiera, driven by
Cimafranca. Cimafranca rushed the boy to a medical center. In
order to save his life, the surgeon had to amputate both legs up to
the groins. Cimafranca had since absconded and disappeared.
Records showed that the car was registered in the name of Atty.
Cadiente. The victim's father filed a complaint for torts and
damages against Cimafranca and Cadiente. Macas argued that
when he was hit by the vehicle, he was standing on the
uncemented portion of the highway, which was exactly where
pedestrians were supposed to be.
Atty. Cadiente:
The victim's negligence contributed to his own mishap. If Palero,
who was only 2.5m away from the victim, was not hit by the Ford
Fiera, then the victim must have been so negligent as to be
bumped and run over by the said vehicle. Furthermore, when the
accident happened, he was no longer the owner of the car. He sold
it to Engr. Jalipa, and turned over the OR/CR, with the
understanding that the latter would be the one to cause the
transfer of the registration. He later filed a third-party complaint
against Jalipa.
Jalipa:
He was no longer the owner of the car at the time of the accident.
He sold it to Abubakar and thus filed a fourth-party complaint
against the latter.
Issue:
WON Cadiente is liable? YES
Ruling + RVP:
A victim of recklessness on the public highways is usually without
means to discover or identify the person actually causing the
injury or damage. He has no means other than by a recourse to
the registration in the Motor Vehicles Office to determine who is
the owner. The policy behind vehicle registration is the easy
identification of the owner who can be held responsible in case of
accident, damage or injury caused by the vehicle. This is so as not
to inconvenience or prejudice a third party injured by one whose
identity cannot be secured. Therefore, since the Ford Fiera was
still registered in Cadiente’s name at the time when the
misfortune took place, he cannot escape liability for the
permanent injury it caused the respondent.
Disabuse yourself on the idea of the registered owner rule,
because it applies only in circumstances when: (1) you cannot
pinpoint liability to a definite individual. So if you do know, and
the person who committed the tort is alive and kicking, you can
identify him, you just go straight to the person. Because the
registered owner rule was enacted under the pretext that maybe
the victim might not have any recourse, because wala gyud siya’y
ma-sue before the courts. It’s a matter of convenience on the part
of the victim.
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State
REPUBLIC VS. PALACIO
Facts:
The Irrigation Service Unit (ISU) was sued by Ortiz for allegedly
invading a portion of its land. The lower court ruled in favor of
Ortiz, being the owner of the land, and declared the Republic to
be in default for failure to answer the complaint. In the decision
of lower court, it allowed the garnishment of the funds of the said
Irrigation Service Unit, particularly the Pump Irrigation Trust Fund.
Ortiz
o The State can be sued and be subsequently held liable because
it engages in a proprietary activity.
Issues:
Whether or not the fund can be garnished? NO
What is the source of the liability of the Republic?
Ruling + RVP:
§ The subject account cannot be garnished as it is a public fund.
§ The SC even traced the history of the subject trust fund and
found that it actually came from the Counterpart Fund –
Special Account of the Republic, which is made up of aids from
American Government, of deposits accruing to the Philippine
(PH) Government from sale of commodities and systems, and
of any advance deposits made by the PH Government. The
Pump Irrigation Trust Fund, to which all authorized releases to
the ISU from the Counterpart Fund – Special Account were
transferred, was established to finance the peso-cost of the
Irrigation Pump Project. This effectively makes the subject
fund a public fund.
§ The source of liability is tort and not contract. In case of quasi-
delict, as embodied in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the State
is only liable for torts caused by its special agents, specially
commissioned to carry out the acts complained as outside of
such agent’s regular duties. There being no proof that the
making of the tortuous act was authorized, neither the State
nor its funds can be made liable therefor.
Additional Note:
Now, there is this Commonwealth Act, which talks about the
general source of liability of the State wherein if you have a claim
(this means that the court has already ruled that you have a claim
against the State), you can course it through the CA, passing
through the Commission on Audit. But then again, this
presupposes that the State has already waived its consent to be
sued and subsequently on the liability aspect.
MERITT VS. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
Facts:
The plaintiff was riding a motorcycle along Taft Avenue when he
was suddenly bumped by an ambulance owned by General
Hospital. By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so
severely injured that, as a consequence, he suffered in the
efficiency of his work as a contractor – because of this, he was
constrained to dissolve his partnership with an engineer, and
withdrew from a contract. So now, he wanted to sue the Republic,
but there’s a settled rule that you cannot sue the Republic without
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TORTS & DAMAGES (2019) FINALS REVIEWER
its consent. In 1915 however, the Republic enacted Act No. 2457.
Section 1 of this particular act states that Meritt is authorized to
file a suit against the Republic in order to fix and determine the
responsibilities of the parties. The lower court rendered a decision
where the amount of damages was less than what was prayed for
by the plaintiff. Meritt assailed the same upon appeal.
Issue:
WON the State is liable? NO
Ruling + RVP:
The Supreme Court construed RA 2457 to determine whether or
not the State had in fact waived its immunity, and in the course of
waiving immunity, is the State conceding to liability. As to the
matter of the State waiving its immunity, the State had in fact
waived its immunity by enacting said law; however, there was no
suggestion in the same law which suggests that the State was
conceding to liability against Meritt. To determine the matter of
WON the State is conceding to liability (TN: This is an old case,
there is already a settled rule on the matter), the SC referred to
American Jurisprudence, and decided that the person responsible
was the chauffer, or the person who drove the ambulance.
However, the Court could not say in certain that indeed the State
has made itself liable to that particular collision.
But the more important ruling, I think, is on the matter of WON it
could make the chauffer liable. Here, the SC distinguished special
agents vis-a-vis executive agents. An executive is one who
performs governmental acts on behalf of an active administration;
whereas, a special agent is someone who performs an act that is
determinable or fixed, ordered, or commissioned, or if it is a public
official, they perform an act which is foreign or outside of their
governmental functions. In this case, the SC held that the State
can only be liable for the acts of its special agents. However, in this
case, the SC could not determine with certainty WON the chauffer
who drove the ambulance was a special agent, so the State could
not be held liable.
Settled naman na nga rule nga suability does not equate to
liability. IOW, there has to be a separate waiver of liability. The
basis of the State’s immunity from suit is the doctrine of “royal
prerogative of dishonesty” – it basically means that no right can
be taken against the very entity that created such right.
Teachers
EXCONDE VS. CAPUNO
Facts:
The accused was charged with homicide. One of the deceased’s
mother filed a separate civil action under Article 1902 of the
Spanish Civil Code which provides that the father shall be liable to
the acts or torts committed by the minor living with them. The
father said that the minor was not under his supervision at the
time of the accident. The minor, Dante, was a student of
Balintawak National High School and was a member of the boy
scout. The students were required to attend a parade to
commemorate the death of Dr. Rizal. Dante boarded a jeep along
with his classmates and then the jeep turned turtle. The
classmates died.
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Issue:
WON the father of Dante would be liable?
Ruling + RVP:
The mother had a claim because Dante was under the supervision
of the father. The teachers and the directors of the school cannot
be held liable because the law makes teachers and directors liable
only if the school is one of trade and arts. In this case, Balintawak
school was an academic institution.
PALISOC VS. BRILLANTES
Facts:
This case involves 3 students in Manila Technical Institute. These
3 students are automotive students where Dominador Palisoc was
the deceased. His classmates were Cruz and Daffon. MTI was
incorporated sometime in 1962 from a single proprietorship. And
sometime in 1966, during recess time, Cruz and Daffon was
working on a machine and Palisoc was just watching the 2. In fact,
in the text of the SC, he was acting like a foreman. So, the 2
students who were working on the machine felt insulted and told
the deceased that he was acting like a foreman. The Palisoc
slapped Daffon, which resulted to a fight and eventually led to the
death of the former as he fell on a machine which fractured his
ribs due to a fist blow. The parents of Palisoc filed a case against
Brillantes (member of the board), the president, and the
instructor.
RTC
ü It only held Mr. Daffon liable and not the parents as he was
already of age. It also absolved the director, instructor and
president, basing the ruling on Mercado v. CA: For these
teachers, in accordance with Art. 2180 to be held liable, it is
necessary that the students must live and board together
within the school or with the teacher. Hence, there was proof
that Mr. Daffon, in this case, was going home after dismissal.
Thus, the case of Mercado does not apply.
ü It also quoted the older case of Exconde that liability of
teachers under Article 2180 does not apply to any school, but
it can only apply to school of arts and trades.
Ruling + RVP:
Since this is a non-technical school, the SC in this case upon appeal
said that the doctrines in Mercado and Exconde must be set aside,
saying that what we mean by loco parentis is not living together
or boarding with the teacher. But rather, protective custody over
the student. In this case, it was proved that the instructor was
negligent because as held in many cases, even during recess time,
the teacher must still supervise the workings of the student.
Brillantes was not held liable in this case because he was
improperly impleaded. There was no showing that he was
negligent. In fact, the reason why he was impleaded was because
he was held to be the single proprietor. Palisoc’s parents wanted
the school to be liable but the SC said that they wrongly impleaded
Brillantes because there was a separate personality between the
BOD and the corporation itself which is MTI.
However, take note of those instances where you can pierce the
veil of the corporate fiction. (Review RCC)
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TORTS & DAMAGES (2019) FINALS REVIEWER
AMADORA VS. CA
Facts:
This involves a charge of Reckless Imprudence resulting to
Homicide against a student of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos.
Alfredo Amadora, who was a prospective graduating high school
student of the said school, went to the school 3 days prior to the
graduation rites to submit a Physics Report. But according to his
parents, he went there for an experiment in Physics, which is a
requirement for his graduation. When he was at the auditorium,
a classmate of his fired a gun which mortally killed him. So, the
petitioners, as the victim’s parents, filed a criminal case against
Daffon, the one who shot him, and a civil case against the school,
its rector, the high school principal, the dean of boys, the physics
teacher, Daffon and two other students through their respective
parents.
In the Civil case filed by the Petitioners, the charges for the
students were later dropped and the Trial Court held the
remaining defendants liable. So, they appealed and the
respondent Appellate Court reversed the decision and ruled that
the defendants cannot be made liable because the vicarious
liability under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, with regard to that of
Teachers and Heads of Schools of Arts and Trade, only arises when
the school involved is an Institution of Arts and Trade. This is
pursuant to the ruling of Exconde. The respondent court also held
that the students were not in the custody of the school at the time
of the incident as the semester has already ended.
Issue:
WON the defendants can be made liable? NO
Ruling + RVP:
§ The aforesaid vicarious liability arises to all kinds of
institutions, may it be academic and non-academic. There is
really no substantial distinction between the academic and
non-academic schools insofar as torts committed by their
students are concerned since the same vigilance is expected
from the teacher over the students whatever nature of the
school maybe. So, the ruling of Exconde is now set aside.
§ Where the school is academic, responsibility for the tort
committed by the student will attach to the teacher-in-charge
following the first part of the provision. Where the school is
that of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who
shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule.
§ IOW, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their
students EXCEPT where the school is technical in nature, in
which case, it is the head thereof that shall be answerable.
§ The teacher-in-charge is the one designated by the dean,
principal or other administrative superior to exercise
supervision over the pupils.
§ It is not necessary that at the time of the injury, the teacher
be physically present and in a position to prevent it. Custody
does not connote immediate and actual physical control but
refers more to the influence exerted on the child and the
discipline instilled in him as a result of such influence.
§ In the case, the rector, the principal and the dean of boys
cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher
in charge as each of them was exercising only a general
authority.
§ The mere fact that Alfredo had gone to school in connection
with his physics report did not necessarily make the Physics
teacher the teacher-in-charge of Alfredo’s killer (Daffon).
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§ Even assuming that he is the teacher-in-charge, there is no
showing that he was negligent in enforcing discipline upon
Daffon or that he had waived observance of the rules and
regulations of the school. His absence during the tragedy
cannot be taken against him since he is not required to report
to school on that day. While it is true that the offending
student was still in the custody of the teacher-in-charge even
if the latter was physically absent, it has not been established
that it was caused by his laxness in enforcing discipline. On the
contrary, the private respondents have proved that they had
exercised due diligence through the enforcement of the
school regulations and in maintaining that discipline.
§ Even if it’s already at the end of the semester, the student was
still under the custody of the school as long as it can be shown
that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a
legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate
student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate
student privilege. Indeed, even if the student should be doing
nothing more than relaxing in the campus and enjoying the
ambience of the school, he is still within the custody and
subject to the discipline of the school authorities.
§ It was immaterial if Alfredo was in the school to finish his
physics experiment or submit his physics report for what is
important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose.
§ As previously observed, even the mere savouring in the
premises of the school is a legitimate purpose that would have
also brought him in the custody of the school authorities.
§ The School cannot be made liable. SC noted that the liability
imposed by the aforesaid article is supposed to fall directly on
the teacher or head of the school of arts and trades and not
on the school.
§ Teachers here would apply to the students or pupils while the
heads of establishments of the arts and trade would apply to
the apprentices.
§ It was also explained in the previous case of Mercado that
teachers were not held liable because the student was not
living with the teacher. Meaning, the student was not under
their custody. So, in that case it meant that for the student to
be under the custody of the teacher, the former must be living
and boarding with the teacher. So, it was also set aside and
clarified in the case of Palisoc and explained as to why the
disparity. It is because the heads of the establishments of the
arts and trade historically are likened to masters who are close
to their students where the latter usually live and work
together with their masters. So that was the reason why
because they have more influence over the students as they
have the control over their actions.
§ However, in this case, the Dean could not be held liable
because there was no necessary link that the gun used in the
killing was the one confiscated earlier. Moreover, a physics
teacher cannot also be made liable because he was not there
when the incident happened and there was no negligence also
to his acts. In addition, he was not the teacher-in-charge. The
school cannot also be made liable because there was no
negligence on the part of the employees, the school teacher,
and the dean.
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TORTS & DAMAGES (2019) FINALS REVIEWER
SALVOSA VS. IAC
Facts:
At 8pm, Abon killed Castro using a gun found in the office he was
assigned. The heirs of Castro filed against Abon, the Chariman of
the ROTC, and the college foundation itself.
Issue:
WON they can be held liable together with Abon? NO
Ruling + RVP:
The teacher and head of the establishment of arts can only be held
liable if the students or apprentices are under its custody which
means that they must be considered to be present in the
‘attendance’ in the school. The person must be under the
influence of the school and the teachers. This includes recess.
However, it no longer includes when the class is already dismissed.
In this case, it happened at 8pm. So this case was brought outside
the coverage.
ST. MARY’S ACADEMY VS. CARPITANOS
Facts:
St. Mary allowed James, a minor who is 15 y/o, to drive the
vehicle. Prior to this, St. Mary had an enrollment drive. Sherwin
volunteered and went to Dapitan. They boarded the vehicle.
James drove the vehicle and then it went turtle. Sherwin died as a
result. The parents of Sherwin filed a case against St. Mary,
parents of James and Villanueva, owner of vehicle. There was an
admission made by Villanueva and the parents of James during the
traffic investigation that the cause of the accident was the
detachment of the steering wheel.
Issue:
WON St. Mary’s Academy should be held liable? NO
Ruling + RVP:
The respondents failed to substantiate the negligence of St. Mary.
In order for St. Mary to be liable, their liability must be the
proximate cause of the death. However, in this case, the liability
was only remote. The proximate cause was the detachment of the
steering wheel, not the driving of the minor. Villanueva was held
liable based on registered-owner rule.
Provinces, Cities and Municipalities
JIMENEZ VS. CA
Facts:
Jimenez went to the Sta Ana public market to buy bagoong. The
public market was flooded because of the storm. After he
successfully purchased the bagoong, he fell into an uncovered
opening so he injured himself. There was a nail so it caused him a
lot of pain and suffering. Because of that, he was not able to
attend to his business, which was operating school buses. He was
also admitted to the Veterans Hospital. He sued the City of Manila
as well as Asiatique Integrated Corporation (AIC), the one in
charged in managing and operating the market.
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City of Manila
It cannot be held liable because first under its Revised Chapter
Section 4, it cannot be held liable for the negligence arising/
committed by its city officers or for any negligence in general. It
also said that under its contract, AIC assumed all the responsibility
and that Jimenez should not have gone to the market when he
knew that it was flooded.
Issue:
WON the City of Manila is solidarily liable with AIC for the injured
suffered by Jimenez? YES
Ruling + RVP:
The Revised Charter of Manila applies in general while the
provision in the Civil Code, specifically Art. 2189 applies
particularly to defective conditions, purchase, roads, public works
under the control and supervision of the province/city or
municipality. What is required under this article is control and
supervision. Such control and supervision were present in this
case specifically under the terms of their contract:
ü If AIC had to do something, it needs approval of the City of
Manila.
ü There was also a letter by the mayor sent to the Secretary of
Finance where it mentioned that the City of Manila regained
control and supervision under the terms of their contract.
ü The City of Manila also hired a market master who is in charge
of the direct supervision and control specifically the
maintenance of the public market.
ü There was also a provision in the Local Tax Code regarding the
duty of the local treasurer to administer and supervise the
market.
As to the contention that Jimenez should not have gone to the
market, the SC held that as a customer, Jimenez had the right to
assume that he could purchase safely so no negligence is
imputable to him. Also, as a defense, the diligence of a good father
of a family should have been exercised by the City of Manila, which
it failed. It was found that even before the accident occurred, the
opening was not closed and even after 5 months, it is still not
closed so there was negligence.
The contention that it does not belong to the city is not relevant
because what is important is control and supervision. Here, the
public market is under the control and supervision of the City of
Manila, so it should be liable for the damages suffered by the
plaintiff.
CITY OF MANILA VS. TEOTICO
Facts:
A man fell in a manhole and because of that, he had an injury. As
a consequence thereof, he sued the City of Manila, its engineer,
the City Health Officer, Treasurer and Chief of Police. The RTC
dismissed the case. Meanwhile the CA reversed it but not as to the
liability of the City of Manila.
Issue:
WON the City of Manila can be held liable?
Ruling + RVP:
In this case there are two laws that are pertinent:
1. RA 409 – As to the charter of manila
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2. Civil Code Art. 2189
As to the territorial jurisdiction, it is RA 409 that is above the Civil
Code because it is a special law. The Civil Code is only a general
legislation. But as to the subject matter, it is the Civil Code that
supersedes RA 409 because the latter merely establishes the
general liability of the city. Art 2189 is very specific as to the
liability of a city in cases of injury, death, defective roads, streets
and highways. It was Art 2189 that made the City of Manila liable
because like in the case of Jimenez, it is not also the ownership or
as to the ownership of the city that prevails but it is as to the
control and supervision of such city that makes them liable.
GUILATCO VS. CITY OF DAGUPAN
Facts:
Guilatco was about to board a motorcycle in Perez Blvd., a
national highway and under the control and custody of the City of
Dagupan. Gelato fell into a manhole and she was hospitalized and
operated on. She was not able to report to her work as a court
interpreter and then she filed a complaint for damages against the
City of Dagupan. The RTC rendered the decision in her favor but
the CA reversed the decision on the ground that the petitioner
failed to present evidence that the highway was under the control
and custody of the City of Dagupan.
Issue:
WON the City of Dagupan has control and custody of this national
highway? YES
WON it is liable for the damages to the petitioner? YES
Ruling + RVP:
Under Art. 2189 of the Civil Code, it does not require that the
province or LGU has the ownership of the road. It must at least
have the control or custody. The City Charter of Dagupan provided
that the City Engineer has jurisdiction to construct and maintain
these roads. So, there is no question that the City of Dagupan has
control and custody.
The City of Dagupan is not liable for damages for failure of an
officer to enforce the provision of the City Charter. However, the
SC addressed this that the provision of the City Charter is general
as to its subject matter for the liability, while the provision of the
Civil Code is more particular where it provides that the city is liable
for the defective roads, public works under its custody and
control.
Why is it that ownership should not be the proper standard? Why
should it be supervision and control?
When we speak of proximity and we speak of maximizing
responsibility and accountability, you want to be able to point
liability on the local government units (LGUs); OW, they can just
find a way out on saying "oi this is owned by the national
government" so makahugas kamay sila ba. What we want is for
maximum accountability and responsibility on the part of the
LGUs.
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Proprietors of Buildings, Etc.
DE ROY VS. CA
Facts:
There was a firewall of the building that collapsed and injured the
family adjacent to that firewall. Prior to the collapse of the
firewall, the owner of the firewall already warned the family to
vacate. However, the family did not heed the warning so
unfortunately the firewall collapsed, eventually the spouses were
injured and their daughter died. One of the defenses of the
proprietor of the firewall is that there was already a prior warning
so the spouses had the last clear chance to avoid the accident. Any
prior negligence of the proprietor of the firewall was already
dispensed with the subsequent negligence of the spouses.
Issue:
WON the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable? NO
Ruling + RVP:
Article 2190 of the Civil Code:
"The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the
damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be
due to the lack of necessary repairs."
The doctrine of last clear chance is not applicable in this case since
it is applicable only to vehicular accidents. We should not apply
that doctrine of last clear chance in this specific case because then,
it's very easy for them to evade liability by saying "I informed you."
So the responsibility really is on the very first day of the process of
creating or making the building itself. You cannot dispense with
the responsibility by subsequent notices and warnings to whoever
might be affected by your defective construction of the building in
itself. Always, always again ask what's the reason for the law and
the law is generally logical.
Collateral Source Rule
This rule is applied in American jurisprudence and applied in Torts
where the defendant is prevented from benefiting from the
plaintiff's receipt of money from other sources. So, it means that
the injured party can receive any indemnification from other
sources as long as it is wholly independent from the tortfeasor and
the tortfeasor cannot use as a defense that this injured party has
already been paid by other parties.
MITSUBISHI MOTORS PHILIPPINES SALARIED EMPLOYEES
UNION (MMPSEU) VS. MITSUBISHI MOTORS PHILIPPINES
CORPORATION
Facts:
This case arises from the dispute between the labor union group
of the Mitsubishi and the corporation of Mitsubishi itself. In the
CBA, they adopted that the employees have insurance wherein if
they are hospitalized or their dependents are hospitalized, they
are alloted P40,000 and P300 for the doctor fees. After the
expiration of that CBA, they signed another agreement adopting
the same and they increased it to P50,000 and P475.
There were 3 employees wherein their dependents were
hospitalized. The 3 employees claimed reimbursement from the
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Mitsubishi but Mitsubishi denied their reimbursement saying that
it will amount to double insurance. The employees argued that
they have the right to be reimbursed for the expenses. Citing the
CBA that they had, they should exercise the right to be reimbursed
by the expenses.
Both parties wrote a letter to the Insurance Commission to ask for
opinion. The IC only replied to the labor union saying that they
have the right to receive for both sources – the insurance itself
and the company.
These 3 employees who claimed reimbursement and their
dependents also have independent insurance outside from the
insurance of the company.
Voluntary Arbitrator
ü favored the labor union employees and it based its decision
on the opinion given by Atty. Funk from the Insurance
Commission
ü The EEs have the right, applying the jurisprudence in America
Samsel vs Allstate.
CA:
ü reversed the decision of the VA, emphasizing that the
American jurisprudence does not apply in this case because in
the very first place, the American case does not have any
limitations on their contract.
Ruling + RVP:
It was actually stated in the American case cited by the VA that the
Allstate will give directly to the insured persons the money.
However, in this case, the CBA agreement with Mitsubishi clearly
had a limitation that was provided in one of its provisions which
states that the Mitsubishi as a corporation, if their employees or
their dependents are hospitalized, they will give it directly to the
hospital or the doctor. That’s why the collateral source rule was
not applied in this case.
Additional Note:
There's another collateral source rule but that's in legal ethics. But
that's in relation to whether a judge is partial or the judge has
been partial in giving out the judgment or whether the judge
properly inhibited himself/herself from the proceedings. So, the
bias that must be proved is bias coming from the outside. I think
that's important because that's a new principle that is embraced
under legal ethics in the same way that it is embraced in the civil
law context.
STRICT LIABILITY TORTS
Possessor of Animals
VESTIL VS. CA
Facts:
Theness (3 y.o.) was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a
child of the petitioners in the house of the late Miranda, the father
of Vestil. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she
was treated for "multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead" and
administered an anti-rabies vaccine by Dr. Tautjo. She was
discharged after 9 days but was re-admitted 1 week later due to
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"vomiting of saliva." The following day, the child died. The cause
of death was certified as broncho-pneumonia.
7 months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils
were liable to them as the possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit
and eventually killed their daughter. The Vestils rejected the
charge, insisting that the dog belonged to the deceased Miranda,
that it was a tame animal, and that in any case no one had
witnessed it bite Theness.
The possession of the defendants was proven by a testimony by
one of the boarders. Apparently, there were boarders who paid
the Vestils for the rentals. So, they were the ones administering
the property because they were the only heirs of Miranda in Cebu
and they only lived 6 km away from the said property. There were
also other testimonies which proved that they go there once or
twice a week and they in fact hired a helper. There was also a
testimony by the mother of Miranda which also supplanted the
fact that the Vestils were indeed administering the house.
RTC: dismissed the complaint.
CA:
ü Vestils were in possession of the house and the dog and so
should be responsible under Article 2183 of the Civil Code for
the injuries caused by the dog
ü The child had died as a result of the dog bites and not for
causes independent thereof.
Vestil
o She is not the owner of the house or of the dog left by her
father as his estate has not yet been partitioned and there are
other heirs to the property.
o Pursuing the logic of the Uys, she claims, even her sister living
in Canada would be held responsible for the acts of the dog
simply because she is one of Miranda's heirs.
Issue:
WON the defendants are liable? YES
Ruling + RVP:
Possession is all you need. You don’t need ownership to be able to
ensure that the animal does not go wild. It does not necessary for
you to own the animal in order for you to exercise dominion or
control over the animal.
This strict liability torts on animals kay naay very interesting
question sa Bar. Kadtong iguana na nakabuhi sa iyang cage
because of a storm. So, the iguana was just roaming around the
streets, and here comes the victim. He threw a stone and so the
iguana was frightened, gi-attack syas iguana. Who shall be
responsible for the injuries? Was there sufficient provocation on
the part of the victim? Was it because of his own contributory
negligence?
(Way sure si atty sa answer. Check nalang daw sa Suggested
Answer sa internet)
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Manufacturers and Processors or Foodstuffs
PASCUAL VS. FORD MOTOR
Facts:
Pascual bought a second-hand Ford E-150 vehicle. One day, her
driver was driving at a moderate speed with passengers. During
the drive, the right axle of the car suddenly broke thereby injuring
the passengers. She filed a case for quasi-delict against the
manufacturer and the seller of Ford because of the defect of the
right axle which caused the accident.
Ford argued that they are not liable. They presented an expert
witness who showed that a leaf spring was actually altered by non-
Ford manufacturers to enable the car to carry more weight and
this caused the right axle to break.
RTC: Ford was liable because of the inherent defect of the product
CA: reversed the decision; gave credence to the testimony of the
expert witness
Issue:
WON the strict liability in tort is applicable against FMCI and FGPI?
NO
Ruling + RVP:
For a product to be defective, there must first be a defect on the
part of the product, the defect must have been there when the
seller parted ways with the product, and there must be no
substantial alteration in the product when it was on the hands of
the buyer. It gave credence to the testimony of the expert and to
the other corroborative evidence (documents) showing that there
was really an alteration that caused the accident.
Strict liability torts – the manufacturers of food, products,
toiletries, are responsible for the damages from harmful and
noxious substances in their products even though there was no
contractual relationship between the buyers and the end users. It
is called as Strict Liability because you do not have to prove the
negligence of manufacturer because it is strictly liable as a matter
of natural equity, because of the inherent risk that a certain
enterprise or product has to have in order for it to be sold into the
public. Strict liability does not apply in this case because the
weight that the car was supposed to have was exactly what Ford
held it out to be. And it was because of the alteration of Olivia
Pascual that the car broke.
Strict liability torts is a huge thing in the US. Remember the
McDonald case? You remember also the wife who successfully
sued a tobacco company for the death of the husband because of
the advertisement daw? So she was actually able to generate
millions of dollars because of that. That’s not so much about our
torts practice here because we are so in love with medical
malpractice.
CHIQUITA BRANDS, INC. VS. HON. OMELIO
Facts:
This case involves class suit, filed by banana plantation workers
from over 14 countries. They filed it in the US under the Alien Tort
Act. It’s against 11 foreign corporations, one is DOLE. They alleged
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that due to prolonged exposure with the pesticides called
dibromochloropropane (DBCP), they suffered serious and
permanent injuries to their reproductive systems. It was dismissed
in the US on the ground of forum non conveniens. So, they were
just asked to file cases within their respective countries. So, a civil
case was filed in the Philippines by the Filipino workers concerned.
While the case was pending, there was a worldwide settlement
which was executed by the corporations and the representatives
of all the workers involved. The Filipino workers were represented
by Atty. Callanta, so there was settlement already, that’s why the
civil case in the Philippines was dismissed. The case was filed first
in 1993, while the civil case in the Philippines was filed in 1996 in
Davao Del Norte, where the banana plantation was located. There
was supposed to be a compromise agreement, but the
Corporation opposed because according to such agreement, all
they had to do was to put the settlement amounts in escrow
accounts, and then there would be a mediator. and such mediator
will get on the condition that they will have the release signed by
the claimants. They upheld the Compromise Agreement which
actually allowed the claimants to claim from the mediator.
The fact that they were able to enforce the Compromise
Agreement, and the fact that there was global settlement actually
goes to show that indeed these corporations can be held
accountable for the damage they may have caused either in their
operation, production or in the manufacture of their products. So
that’s the reason why it was assigned under Strict Liability Torts –
because of the opportunity that it shows that it is possible to file
a claim even against multinational corporations like DOLE for
example, and bring their cases here in our own domestic courts
for you to enforce your rights under the strict liability torts.
Head of Family
DINGCONG VS. KAANAN
Facts:
There were 2 brothers, one owned the building and the other was
the manager of the hotel. They rented out the lower floor to 3
businessmen who have general merchandise, the American
Bazaar. At the same time, there was this guy, Echavaria, who was
renting room number 2 of the 4th floor. He had a leak in his pipe.
The manager knew there was a leak but he only gave him a basin
to put under the leak. Overnight, the basin spilled and the spillage
went into the shop which destroyed the merchandise. So, the
owners of the shop sued the brothers for the damage on their
merchandise.
Ruling + RVP:
SC did not hold liable the brother who was the manager but they
held liable the brother who was the owner as he lived on the top
floor and he should have known that he could have fixed the pipe.
The SC also said that he could have given some drainage and then
a basin after.
This case was assigned under head of the family because the
owner should have exercised the diligence of a good father of the
family. But in the provisions, the head of the family is usually liable
for damages happening when there is a thing falling off a building.
So, in this case, the water came from the ceiling of the building
and the owner should have known and prevented the thing from
happening.
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Regardless of the characteristics of the thing falling off the
building, the emphasis of the law is the responsibility of the owner
for whatever emanates from the structure itself. It may be solid,
liquid, or flying saucers, so long as there is a definite thing under
which you can claim liability for anything that is within or coming
from your structure. Because again, the policy of the law is to
optimize accountability on the part of those in control or in
possession of a certain instrument.
NATURE AND ENFORCEMENT OF LIABILITY
Tortfeasors – solidary as long as you can prove that there is a
contributing negligence on either of them
No double recovery for same act or omission
COCA-COLA VS. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION
There is no double recovery in this case because the SC have
discussed, in relation to forum shopping and in the choice of
remedy aspect, that in the choice of remedy, when an act or
omission may resort to civil action arising out of the delict or an
independent civil action from the quasi-delict, the litigant is
actually shopping for a forum. But the SC said that we have the
rule precluding double recovery which addresses the issue that
the litigant in that case is actually shopping for a forum. The SC
also said that just because an action, demand, or reliefs arises
from a same act or omission, it does not necessarily mean that the
litigant is actually shopping for a forum because the nature of the
demand for the reliefs arising from the same act or omission may
be different.
In this case, the case was filed before the NLRC and another case
was filed before the Social Securities Commission. Although the 2
cases filed before the courts arises out from the same retainer
agreement between the retainer physician and the Coca Cola Inc.,
the SC said that they are not actually the same relief because in
the NLRC case, the doctor sought for recognition as a regular
employee and he was demanding for the 13th month pay bonus
and other benefits as a regular employee. On the other hand, he
was seeking compulsory coverage for SSS before the SSC. IOW,
there is no litis pendencia and res judicata in relation to forum
shopping because the element that ‘it was the same act or
omission’ is absent. The same act or omission does not only cover
the contract, delict, or act which gave rise to the action but also
the demands and reliefs sought for.
Manner of Enforcement
o Culpa-criminal – Exhaust first all the properties and show that
the EE is actually no longer able to pay before reliefs can be
sought for from the employer because subsidiary ra sila.
o Culpa-contractual – just prove existence of the contract and
breach of the contract
SPECIAL TORTS
They are called special torts because they relate to human
relations. That's why you have to always prove malice or bad faith.
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QUEZON CITY GOVERNMENT ET AL. VS. DACARA
Facts:
There was a person who was driving along Matahimik St. He
rammed into a pile of earth/street diggings. His car turned turtle
and resulted to his physical injuries. The father of the injured filed
a complaint for damages against the Quezon City Government and
in defense, they said that they had exercised due diligence and
employed precautionary measures like the gasera.
It was ruled by the RTC and by the CA that the gasera was actually
not there according to the testimony of the police officer who
responded to the incident.
Ruling + RVP:
§ Special torts was not applied.
§ With respect to negligence, there was negligence on the part
of Quezon City, although the SC cannot review the facts and
evidence presented, the decisions of the lower and appellate
courts were already sufficient.
§ Article 2219 specifically mentions 'quasi-delicts causing
physical injuries,' as an instance when moral damages may be
allowed, thereby implying that all other quasi-delicts not
resulting in physical injuries are excluded, excepting of course,
the special torts referred to in Art. 309 (par. 9, Art. 2219) and
in Arts. 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35 on the chapter on
human relations (par. 10, Art. 2219).
§ For quasi-delicts, for there to be moral damages, there must
be physical injuries.
§ There was an allegation of physical injuries in this case but it
was not proven. They only relied on the claimant’s testimony
and no corroborative evidence sufficient to support the same
was adduced.
DBP VS. CA
Facts:
This case involves a loan contracted by the spouses Gotangco with
DBP and the 7 parcels of land of the spouses were executed as
collateral. Later on, the spouses entered a contract to sell with
Cucio and agreed that Cucio will pay DBP P50,000 for 2
installments. Upon full payment, DBP will return the titles of the
spouses, and in turn, the spouses will execute a deed of absolute
sale in favor of Cucio. When the spouses failed to comply with
their obligation, DBP informed them by sending demand letters,
but the spouses did not heed to such demands. Also, instead of
complying with the demands, they filed for a writ of preliminary
injunction which supported the extrajudicial foreclosure.
Ruling + RVP:
§ Abuse of right (acts contra bonus mores) means that a person
has a right and his exercise of such in bad faith injures another
person. It is anchored on Article 19 – on human relations.
§ Art. 19. “Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone
his due and observe honesty and good faith.”
§ Elements for the abuse of right principle:
1) There is an existence of the legal right or duty
2) Which is exercised in bad faith
3) It is for the sole intent of injuring or prejudicing another
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§ This principle is not present in this case. DBP has the legal right
but it was not exercised in bad faith because DBP has the right
to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage.
§ As to the moral damages, SC did not award because they were
not able to prove malice on the part of DBP. The wife did not
even testify.
§ The writ of preliminary injunction was also deleted by the SC.
§ Remember your abuse of rights principle because in practice,
sometimes you're at wit’s end and there's nothing you can
plead na especially if wala na jud pag-asa imo client so your
catch-basin or final default argument is the abuse of rights
principle. But remember it sets a very high threshold because
there's the phrase "for the sole intent of prejudicing the
other." So it must be impelled by malice or bad faith.
MVRS PUBLICATIONS, ET AL. VS. ISLAMIC DA’WAH COUNCIL OF
THE PHIL
Facts:
There was an article that was released by the Bulgar at a tabloid.
It stated that Muslims do not eat pork for the reason that they
claim it as their God. The Islamic Dawah then filed a case for
slander (oral) and libel (written) against the tabloid. The RTC said
that there was no specific individual affected by the statement. CA
reversed the decision and ruled that it was a general insult to the
Muslims of the Philippines.
Ruling + RVP:
SC discussed the freedom of speech. It said that when you speak
of defamation, it must affect a certain individual for you to have a
cause of action. If it does affect a group of individuals, they must
be so similarly situated that each one of them must be affected
such that you can have a class suit. Aside from the fact that the
statement can be taken out of context, the statement can be an
opportunity to educate individuals on why Muslims do not eat
pork. The statement cannot pinpoint to a specific individual on
whether it indeed insulted him/her. The relational test provides
that the statement should be made to incite hatred or change the
perception of a certain group of individuals. However, in this case,
it was not proven that the statement caused the harm or would
change the view of individuals on Muslims.
The SC did not take cognizance of the case since there was no
specific harm. The class of individuals being attacked should
respond to this kind of speech by just having to toughen it out
because we live in a pluralistic society. If the SC would take
cognizance of this case, they will encourage all suits of
fundamentalists from all walks of life because each faith has its
own fundamental groups in interpreting descriptions in such a
way to preclude outside religions. SC didn’t want that and said
that you just have to acknowledge the differences and toughen it
because if we take this suit, what will stop other fundamentalists
from attacking other class of religion so as to file a case. And also,
the freedom of speech – while they may be offensive, it has to
pass a certain test like the Ohio test so as to be able to incite
individuals’ outrage. Before you can file a tort of outrage, you have
to prove severe emotional or psychological suffering and associate
it with having to consult a professional who will testify as to the
severity of the suffering you went through.
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LAGON VS. CA, ET AL.
Facts:
This case is about tortuous interference. Lagon bought a parcel of
land from the estate of Bai Sepi. A case was then filed after a few
months that there was interference in the contract of lease with
Lapuz. In 1964, a lease contract was entered into and part of such
is that Lapuz can build commercial building and whatever he earns
from those commercial buildings, he will use it to pay his rental to
Sepi. In 1974, the lease contract ended but since the construction
of the commercial buildings had yet to be completed, the lease
contract was allegedly renewed. Eventually, the building was
transferred to somebody else. Lagon bought the land, and then
Lapuz still paid or remitted to the administrator when Septi died
but then he was told by the administrator to stop collecting rentals
from those people in the building and he then discovered that this
Lagon is the one claiming ownership of the land and the building
as well and then he is the one collecting rental from them. So
basically, in the answer to the complaint to Lapuz, Lagon said that
he actually did not interfere to the contract of the previous renter.
Before he bought it, he went to the lawyer who notarized the
contract and the lawyer told him that there is actually a contract
but it was not signed. When registry of records was checked, there
is no registered contract there. He also said that he denied that
he induced the heirs of Sepi because he said that when he bought
the land, he was never told that there was a contract of lease.
Elements of tortuous interference
In this case, SC got reference from the old case of Supunding. The
case said that there are three elements.
1. Valid contract – there is prima facie validity of the notarized
document; although with respect to its delivery and due
execution, naa syay value.
2. Knowledge – In this case, they were not able to pinpoint if
there is knowledge. However, the SC said even if there is
knowledge, then they go to the 3rd element.
3. It must be proven that there is bad motive to contract or
interfere – Even if they completed the 2 elements, the 3rd one
cannot be proven, because there is no proof of malice in
interfering. But he has a particular business interest over the
property, right? Lagon has a particular business interest over
the property. The reason why we bought it is because it will
give him yields.
What makes malice malice? The fact that there is financial benefit,
financial interest or anything economic that induced the 3rd
person to interfere with the contract will not amount to tortuous
interference because there has to be a specific intent to harm the
person. You wanted to harm the person, therefore you interfere
with their contract. Absent that, measures of self-preservation,
self-protection, self-benefit will not amount to tortuous
interference in the absence of a specific intent to harm the person.
And that is what is missing in this case..
U-BIX VS. MILLIKAN
There was no tortuous interference in this case because the
petitioner here failed to establish that there was a valid contract
that was entered into by CMB with U-BIX. U-BIX merely presented
arguments that they’re entitled to the dealership agreement as to
the furnishing of CMB because they failed to satisfy to present a
valid contract. SC ruled that there could be no tortuous
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interference because one of the requisites for malicious
interference is the existence of valid contract. There was no valid
contract because there was no agreement that was entered
between CMB with U-BIX since the contract was awarded to
Projexx because they failed to impress the interior designer as
well. This was not mentioned in the case but that is the
implication.
There was also an argument that was given by petitioner here
wherein Projexx poached Eser, who was part of the team of
Carmen Wang and who was employed by the petitioner. (Anti-
poaching in labor/poaching covenant: piracy, but valid na siya pag
limited by time and place). After the contract was awarded, Eser
moved to the respondent corporation. The petitioner alleged that
there was a malicious interference on the part of Projexx because
they interfered in the perfection of the contract between CMD
and the petitioner.
KINDRED TORTS: MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
REYES ET AL. VS. SISTERS OF MERCY HOSPITAL, ET AL.
Facts:
Reyes already had a recurring fever with chills at least 5 days
before his death. Since the home medication is not working, his
wife told him to go to the Mercy Community Clinic in Cebu City.
The Doctor concluded that he has a typhoid fever. He was
recommended to another doctor, and there was a skin test as to
the drug that was to be given to him. Knowing that there was no
adverse effect as to the drug, he was given 2 dozes. The first doze,
500mg of that drug, was during 9pm and the second doze was at
midnight. However, during 1am the next day, he was suddenly
shaking and eventually died at 2am. The cause of his death was
high fever.
The surviving spouse and children filed a case for medical
malpractice alleging that the cause of his death was due to the
wrongful administration of the chloromycetin and the
administration of widal test should not have been immediately
conducted. For the case of the wife, they had one expert witness.
However the defense had 2 expert witnesses. The RTC ruled in
favor of the clinic and so did the CA.
Issues:
WON the death was caused by the negligence, imprudence or lack
of foresight on the part of the doctors?
WON the case was under res ipsa loquitor?
WON they committed medical malpractice? NO
Ruling + RVP:
§ As to the expert witness, the expert witness that was given by
the wife and the child, although he had the experience, was
only able to administer in terms of typhoid fever involving only
one patient. His experience as to the autopsy of cadavers of
typhoid fever victim only involved one cadaver when he was
still training back in UP.
§ In medical malpractice, there are 4 requisites: duty, breach,
injury and proximate causation. As to this case there was no
problem as to any of it.
§ The main contention was that the widal test was incorrectly
used. However, the 1st witness of the defense said that they
usually use the widal test especially in cases where the typhoid
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area is common. The 2nd witness also testified that although
the widal test is no longer in use, he said that it can still be
used in some cases
§ There was a consensus that there was wrong diagnosis. There
was wrong administration of medicine. However, there was
no medical malpractice because I think if we follow res ipsa
loquitor, there is a second argument that there is no need of
expert witness especially unto the observation. This will be on
the subsequent case, under Ramos that you can be observed
especially under the intubation. However, res ipsa loquitor
couldn’t find application in this case because the death of
Reyes was just in the normal circumstances of the situation.
§ In determining WON there is a medical malpractice, the
standard we use is what would a reasonably prudent doctor
have done under the circumstances
§ It’s not unlikely that there should be diagnosis of typhoid
fever, because no. 1, it was prevalent in the area at that time.
No. 2, under normal circumstances, any other doctor would
have made the same conclusion.
§ Doctors are not supposed to make perfect diagnosis, so long
as they are consistent with, again remember the locality rule
– what would doctor facing the same circumstances have
done under the same patient brought before his
consideration.
§ In this case, admittedly, dili kayo perfect ang diagnosis but that
was reasonable under the circumstances because of the
factual predicate of the case. Maski kinsa dawn a doctor imo
pangutanon. In fact, the witnesses actually acknowledged that
they would have done the same thing, although other things
could have been done. But under the regular course of thing,
reasonable ang gibuhat sa doctor in this case.
§ So ang test actually, I know that whenever I ask you what
constitute medical malpractice you’ll give me the four
elements right? But in this case, giingon that there is medical
malpractice when a doctor has done something which he
should not be doing under or you failed to do something which
a reasonably prudent doctor would have done under the same
circumstances.
§ IOW, it’s doing something which should not have been done,
or failing to do something which should have been done by a
reasonably prudent doctor under the circumstances. That’s
another test for medical malpractice, aside from the 4
elements you usually gave me in your recitation.
JARCIA, JR. VS. PEOPLE
Facts:
Belinda Santiago logged a complaint with the NBI complaining
about the defendant in this case, Dr. Jarcia and Dr. Bastar. She
contended that the said doctors prolonged the suffering of her son
Roy Jr., who was hit by the taxi cab and was brought to Manila
Doctors Hospital. And then upon arrival in the ER, the son was
attended to by the defendant doctors in this case. What happened
was the doctors ordered only an x-ray of the victim’s ankles
because when they were interviewing the mother and the son,
they said it was only the ankle that was swollen. The result of the
x-ray showed no fracture so the doctors assured the mother that
everything was gonna be ok and sent Roy Jr. home. 11 days after,
the son developed fever and swelling of the whole leg. The mother
brought him back to Manila Doctor’s hospital. And upon x-ray of
the entire leg that was administered by a different doctor, (the
witness for the plaintiff), he found a fracture of the smaller bone.
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The mother went to the NBI and logged a complaint against the
doctors. NBI filed a case of reckless imprudence resulting to
serious physical injury.
RTC and CA ruled against the doctors, holding that they were
guilty not of reckless imprudence but of simple imprudence
resulting to serious physical injury. They discussed that the
standard for reckless imprudence has not been met in this case.
This standard is the ‘inexcusable lack of precaution’ standard and
that’s more than mere negligence. That is negligence that is so
wanton and no regard for the possible consequences. Since the
criminal case did not prosper, they only convicted the doctors with
simple negligence resulting to serious physical injuries. The
doctors appealed all the way to the SC.
Issues:
WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is applicable? NO
WON they were guilty of the criminal offense? NO
Ruling + RVP:
Res ipsa loquitor is not applicable because they only based it on
the testimony of the mother which the SC said that basing on the
facts of the case, an expert witness should have testified WON in
that specific circumstance, the injury would have incurred
because of the negligence that the doctors imputed.
SC also absolved them of the criminal charge. The defense of the
doctors were first, there was no physician-patient relationship and
second, they passed the liability to the taxi driver because the
prosecution was trying to prove the failure of the doctor to
diagnose immediately, which prolonged the suffering of the
patient. Third, they were just residents which in that specific
circumstance, when they examined the ankle, they assured the
mother that it was going to be okay. In the first defense, they
cannot just merely deny physician-patient relationship. There is a
physician-patient relationship the moment that you entertain the
patient coming to you merely for advice or consultation for
professional purposes. On the second defense, they cannot
merely pass the liability to the taxi driver because the facts of the
case clearly shows that they failed to properly endorse the case of
the son, which was clearly outside their expertise. And it doesn’t
make sense, people going to hospitals for refuge and the hospitals
would say, “We’re not primary, because we’re only here to help.
That’s all we can give.” That’s not consistent with public policy,
logic and human experience that when you fail to deliver, you just
blame it to another. That’s not the functions of hospitals. Where’s
your Hippocratic oath now? As to the third defense, they were not
criminally liable but they were civilly liable because of their failure
to exercise the requisite diligence that they should have observed.
If they were mere residents and the concern was beyond their
expertise already, they should have endorsed it to the proper
doctor or orthopedic surgeon to really examine the foot of the
child. You should not overpromise in the same way that lawyers
should not overstate or understate the cause of their clients. For
doctors, if it is beyond your capacity, skill-set, you should be
endorsing it to the proper department. In this case, it should be
with the orthopedic department because they are merely general
surgeons who merely passed by. And that fact will not negate the
fact that they administered professional help to the patient which
gave rise to the physician-patient relationship.
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CRUZ VS. AGAS
Facts:
This case was filed by a doctor against another for serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence as well as medical
malpractice. One Dr. Cruz engaged the services of St. Luke’s
Medical Center for a medical check-up testing his blood, urine,
and other fluids. The following day, he was scheduled for a
colonoscopy test. The result was given to a female
anesthesiologist because the specialist was not around. After that,
the gastroscopy was then conducted to him but afterwards, he did
not feel well. He experienced pain in his abdomen and one time
when he went to the comfort room, he collapsed. He then
consulted another doctor, a cardiologist, who advised him to get
another check-up so an exploratory laparotomy (opening of
abdomen) was conducted on him. After the laparotomy, he
actually had a hemorrhage on his colon. Because of the
hemorrhage, the doctor sought to file a case against the doctor
who conducted the gastroscopy procedure who was Dr. Agas.
Dr. Cruz filed a case before the City Prosecutor but the latter
dismissed the case. He then went to the DOJ but again, the DOJ
dismissed the case also, thus to the CA. He appealed the case then
to the SC.
Issue:
WON Dr. Agas was guilty of medical malpractice and reckless
imprudence? NO
Ruling + RVP:
§ SC relied on the doctrine of non-interference of executive
functions on the findings of the Prosecutor and the DOJ.
§ On the issue of medical malpractice and negligence, the SC
also discussed the 4 elements which are: duty, breach, injury,
and proximate causation, all of which were not established in
this case.
§ Dr. Agas’ defense was that the colonoscopy was conducted on
the inner part of the colon but the hemorrhage happened on
the outer part which could not be discovered by prior X-ray or
CT-scan.
§ The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor does not apply in this case
because applying the 4 elements (injury, immediate control,
and the thing would not have happened, and absence of
negligence) were not present in this case because in the first
place, it will not be apparent to a layman that the procedures
done by Dr. Agas were not inconsistent with what was
required of him as a doctor.
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC. VS. AGANA
Facts:
The wife complained of pain in her reproductive system. Because
of difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal discharge, she
went to Medical General Hospital which is owned by Professional
Services Incorporated. She was diagnosed to be suffering cancer
in the sigmoid area. During the surgery, Dr. Ampil said that the
cancer had already spread to the left ovary, necessitating for a
removal of certain parts.
Issue:
WON PSI has vicarious liability or direct liability to the spouses?
WON Dr. Ampil is liable? YES
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WON Dr. Fuentes is liable? NO
Ruling + RVP:
§ As to the issue on the vicarious liability, there exists ER-EE
relationship because the hospital has the power to hire, to
fire, and to control the activities of its doctors.
§ In the 2010 case, the SC held that there was no ER-EE
relationship. But the hospital was still held liable and the
nature of the liability was a direct one, particularly on the
apparent authority and agency by estoppel – the fact of the
hospital’s endorsement of the doctor’s capacity, skills, the
promise that these are good individuals, and that you come to
them and they will treat you well.
§ SC discussed the 4 elements of medical malpractice, viz: (1)
the breach of duty; (2) the injury; and (3) the causal
connection.
§ Dr. Ampil was liable because of the fact that there were
foreign objects (gauzes) left inside the body of the patient.
Further, he was also made liable because of the captain of the
ship rule.
§ Dr. Fuentes is not liable because the surgery was not under his
control.
§ Res ipsa loquitor does not apply because the element of sole
management or that the injury is under the sole
administration of the defendant is not applicable. The victim
was passed through several doctors, right? So it could not be
said that he had the sole custody of the patient.
§ Generally, remember, there is no ER-EE relationship between
the physician and the hospital because the hospital cannot
control the means of how they do their work. But the SC has
crafted certain exceptions – we resorted to the Civil Code on
the doctrine of apparent authority. When you indorse
someone, when you hold out someone as being part of you,
as being an extension of your services, then that makes you
linked to that individual. I’m emphasizing this because there
are several cases now that made hospitals liable because of
the doctrine of apparent authority.
§ SC has extended the applicability of this doctrine in medical
malpractice cases, and for good reason – that is to give more
remedies to the patient.
§ For instance, those Insurance Companies like Maxicare, which
make referrals – based on their representations either
because you have the best doctors in the world or you have
highly capable specialists, etc., and that’s the link, the nexus.
§ Captain of the ship doctrine: In a major operation, there are
several persons involved, right? You have an anesthesiologist,
nurses, surgeons, etc. When things go wrong, we put the
blame on the captain of the ship because he has control over
everyone.
Q&A:
In the newspaper, when a person becomes a doctor, and the
hospital congratulates that individual, is that covered?
I submit so, because what is the interest of that big hospital?
Unless that person is the son of a director, or something like that,
because there is no other interest than to create a link between
that passer and the hospital.
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GARCIA-RUEDA VS. PASCASIO, ET AL.
Facts:
The husband underwent an operation to remove stones at the
UST hospital. The surgeon was Dr. Antonio and the
anesthesiologist was Dr. Reyes. After the operation, the husband
died for unknown cause. The wife asked for investigation from the
NBI. The NBI said that the death was caused by improper
administration of anesthesia by Dr. Reyes. A case was filed for
homicide and reckless imprudence against the doctor but in the
city prosecutor’s office, there was like pingpong of the case. The
case was transferred from one prosecutor to another until it
exonerated Dr. Reyes. Petitioner then resorted to filing for Anti-
Graft before the Ombudsman but it was dismissed. A certiorari
was then filed.
Ruling + RVP:
SC said in an obiter dictum that medical practice or medical
negligence is a type of remedy for a patient who suffered bodily
injury caused by a physician. In such a case, the complainant must
prove that the doctor failed to provide what a prudent health care
provider would have done or that he did something that a health
care provided would not have done and such caused injury to the
patient. We have 3 elements: (1) duty; (2) breach; and (3) injury.
The court only dismissed the case without prejudice to the filing
of an appeal with the Sec. of Justice. Nothing more.
RAMOS VS. CA, ET AL.
Facts:
Ramos was having complaints in her stomach and it was found out
that there were stones in her gallbladder. They went to Dr. Osaka
and scheduled to undergo cholesestectomy which is to remove
gallstones. And because they needed anesthesiologist and so Dr.
Osaka said that he’ll be the one to look for one. On the day of her
scheduled operation, upon request, the person who was there
with her in the operating room was her sister-in-law who was the
dean of a certain school and who was also a clinical nurse. She saw
everything, but her being there was questioned by the
respondents in this case. On that day when Herminda was asked
what she saw in the operating room, she testified that she saw Dr.
Gutierrez was the anesthesiologist and 3 other nurses were also
there, but Dr. Osaka was still not there. Late pa gyud sya ni abot.
It was only 3 hrs after when he arrived. During the conduct of the
operation, Herminda saw that when Erlinda was being intubated,
Dr Guttierrez suddenly said something along the lines of "ang
hirap naman e-intubate nito, lumalaki na ang tyan." After saying
those words, she looked at Erlinda and saw that the nail bed of
Erlinda turned bluish and she was in a trendelenburg position so
this is a position which according to the case is done when there
is decrease in oxygen in the brain. After this, Dr. Osaka checked
the patient and then he called for another anesthesiologist in the
name of Dr. Calderon. Fast forward, another intubation was
conducted. The operation did not push through and Erlinda was
already in comatose when she got out. A case was filed before the
RTC. The RTC ruled in favor of respondents however the CA
reversed the decision.
Issue:
WON this is in the nature of a medical malpractice case?
WON Dr. Gutierrez, Osaka and the De Los Santos Medical Center
are liable?
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Ruling + RVP:
There was in fact medical malpractice. SC cited the res ipsa
loquitur. It said that there are 3 requisites that have to be
complied with in order for the res ipsa loquitur to apply:
1. The accident must be of a kind which does not ordinarily occur
in the absence of the negligence of anyone.
- This is complied with because normally, a person who
undergoes anesthesia is not expected to come out
decerebrum. The only procedure that Erlinda underwent in
the OR was the administering of anesthesia to her and the
expected result is not wherein she would be in comatose.
Hence, there was an accident which does not ordinarily
occur.
2. It is caused by an instrumentality with in the exclusive control
of the defendant.
- This is complied with. Everything that happened in the OR
was under the control of the doctors.
3. The possibility of contributing conduct on the part of the of
the plaintiff is eliminated.
- This is complied with. When Erlinda was there in the OR, she
was actually just lying down, she didn’t do anything, and she
was just waiting for the doctors to administer on her. And
because of that, it is really impossible for her to contribute
anything because she was under the control of the
physician. She was under a procedure where she was
restrained to do anything.
The arguments of the doctors was that lisod man gud kaayo ka
tauran ug tube. That was the contirbutory negligence on the part
of the patient daw. Short neck nya dili daw kaayu danlog iyang
internal organ so lisod kaayu. SC said she was just there, you’re
supposed to administer everything. Just because naglisod mo
doesn’t mean iyaha tong sala because of the specific
configurations of her body.
Dr. Osaka’s Liability
He was held liable pursuant to the captain of the ship doctrine. He
was the surgeon in this case and was the one who chose Dr.
Gutierrez. By choosing Dr. Gutierrez, it was implied that he
vouched for his skills. They presented an expert witness that said
that it was not because of the anesthesia but because of the
allergic reaction of what was administered to her. But SC said that
the witness cannot be an expert witness on allergic mediated
processes because he is not an anesthesiologist, pulmonologist
and not an allergecologist.
Erminda's credibility to testify
SC upheld her credibility. She is a clinical nurse and she has been
appointed as dean because of her credibility. Ordinarily, only
physicians and surgeons are allowed to testify whether a patient
has been treated on with a reasonable degree of care. However,
if it is a testimony as to the statements or acts of the surgeon,
appearances, conditions in the OR, even a non-expert witness
such as Erminda can testify.
Liability of the hospital
SC gave credence to the defense of the hospital because they were
convinced that there was no EE-ER relationship that existed in the
case. It was found out that whenever a physician is admitted to
the hospital, it undergoes through a process wherein it is not
solely the hospital who selects the doctor who goes there. It goes
thru a credential committee who then would recommend to the
director of the hospital for the acceptance or rejection of the
doctor. Whenever a patient is admitted to the hospital, it is
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actually the doctor who tells what the patient must go through.
The only obligation of the hospital is to provide the room,
facilities, etc. Hence, the hospital is not solidarily liable with the
doctors.
TN: Careful ta aning solidary liability sa hospital ha kay there are
other cases where in the SC said that the fact that the hospital
provides the nurses, anesthesiologist, and the equipment itself is
enough to create the nexus or the link which will make them liable
under the doctrine of apparent authority. Just look very carefully
along these lines in the exams if ever it will be asked.
SPS. FLORES VS. SPS. PINEDA
Facts:
Teresita Pineda is a 31-yo woman who consulted with her town
mate Dr. Flores for her medical condition because she was
experiencing general body weakness, loss of appetite, frequent
urination and thirst, and on-and-off vaginal bleeding. Dr. Flores
advised her to return the next day but she failed to do so. 11 days
later, her medical condition worsened so she was brought to
United Doctor's Medical Center (UDMC) by her sister and she was
admitted. Urine and blood samples were taken from her for the
conduction of certain lab tests. The next day, she underwent a
DNC operation, an operation usually for profuse vaginal bleeding
(raspa). The procedure lasted for about 10-15 minutes by the wife
of Dr Flores (Dr. Felisima Flores). A few days later, her conditioned
worsened and eventually died. The family of Teresita filed this
case for medical negligence. Petitioners contended that they
exercised due diligence as medical professionals.
There was a resort to 2 expert witnesses because in a civil case,
for medical negligence, the burden of proof falls to the plaintiff
who will allege that there was medical negligence. 2 expert
witnesses were presented in this case. Both expert witnesses said
that the high blood sugar level of Teresita should have been taken
into consideration.
Issue:
WON the spouses doctors and the hospital should be held solidary
liable? YES
Ruling + RVP:
There were 3 errors on the part of spouses Flores:
(1) They said that there was no indication of high sugar levels
but the first time that Teresita was brought to them, Dr.
Flores already suspected that there was high blood sugar
level. The results of the urine and blood tests indicated that
there was indeed a high blood sugar level. She was later on
diagnosed with diabetes.
(2) The mere fact that there was general body weakness,
frequent urination and thirst – those were already
symptoms of high sugar level and they failed to take that
into consideration and that should have alerted the spouses.
(3) They said that their principal concern was the vaginal
bleeding that's why they immediately conducted a DNC
operation. The expert witnesses, taken into consideration
by the SC, correctly said that reasonable prudence would
have shown that these signs would have been considered
before, during, and after the DNC operation and that the
DNC operation is merely an elective procedure and not an
emergency case. They should have taken into consideration
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the high blood sugar level and that they should have first
addressed the hyperglycemic state immediately before they
conducted the DNC procedure.
That was the causal connection so the spouses were liable and the
hospital was made jointly and severally liable.
DR. RUBI LI VS. SPOUSES SOLIMAN
Facts:
11-year old Angelica was diagnosed with a high-grade (highly
malignant) cancer of the bone. Her right leg was amputated.
However, the orthopedic surgeon in performing the amputation
told the parents that it was not enough to cut off the part where
the cancer cells originated and that the child must undergo
chemotherapy in order to completely eliminate the cancer cells
and to prevent such from spreading throughout the rest of her
body. Hence, Dr. Rubi Li entered into the picture. She is a medical
oncologist, a doctor specializing in cancer treatment.
The very issue in this case was the consultation between the
parents and the doctor because according to the parents, they
were misled into allowing or consenting to the chemotherapy
session as they were told that the child has 95% chance of survival
if she undergoes chemotherapy. When asked regarding the side
effects, the Doctor mentioned only slight vomiting, hair loss and
weakness. On the part of the doctor, she said that she did not only
inform the parents of the three possible side effects, but she also
told them of the possible skin discoloration, sterility, damage to
the heart, lungs and kidney as well as low white and red blood
cells, and platelet counts due to the administration of
chemotherapy session. Nonetheless, the parents consented to the
chemotherapy despite financial constraint and the child only lived
until the first session. On the day of the scheduled chemotherapy
session, Angelica was administered with 3 chemo drugs with the
assistance of Dr. D and 3 other doctors. However, on the second
day, the child was experiencing skin discoloration and had a hard
time breathing. There was blood in the child’s urine and she was
also suffering from convulsion. The parents asked to stop the
chemotherapy because the child was in pain. The child was
admitted to the ICU. On the 11th day, the child expired. A damage
suit was filed by the parents against Dr. D and St. Lukes Medical
Center because they were not informed about the possible effect
of chemotherapy.
The issue is the extent of the information which the doctor must
relay to the patient or the parents.
Ruling + RVP:
The responsibility of the doctor is not only to treat the patient with
due diligence and care but also to inform the patient about the
possible extent and effect if the patient undergoes the chemo. The
court called it the doctrine of implied consent and cited 3 foreign
jurisprudence. First, the right of the patient to determine the kind
of treatment and not for the doctor to treat the patient without
consent. It is very important to inform them because they are
presumed not to have knowledge on medicine so the doctor
needs to tell the patient the danger, consequence or risk etc. in
layman’s term or in a language that the patient understands.
Second, in this case, there was no negligence such that the doctor
failed to disclose the important things. There is no legal
requirement to disclose the statistical chance of survival. What is
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required is that there be a reasonable notice. The parents in this
case argued that they were not informed but the court said that
the parents could not be said unaware and that the specialists or
doctors that they presented were not anthologist or that they are
just from DOH. Remember this doctrine of informed consent does
not require the doctor to disclose everything to the patient. What
must be disclosed are the material information that would affect
the decision-making process of the patient or possible
consequence that are reasonable from the operation. And that
the disclosure must be in the language that the patient
understands because remember, the rationale for this doctrine is
to allow the patient to have enough informed decision on his body
(self-determination).
MENDOZA VS. CASUMPANG, ET AL.
Facts:
The wife in this case have died leaving the husband and her
children due to medical negligence of the surgeon attending her.
On Feb 13 1990, Josephine went to Dr Mendoza for a surgery for
hysterectomy and myomectomy. 3 months after the surgery, she
continued experiencing recurring fever, nausea, and vomiting.
When she was taking a bath, she noticed that something is
protruding in her genital. After that, she tried to call Dr. Mendoza.
Unfortunately, the doctor was unavailable so she went to another
doctor and that doctor extracted a partially foul-smelling rolled
gauze from her cervix. This prompted her to file a damage suit
against Dr Mendoza. Unfortunately, while the case was ongoing,
she died so she was substituted by her husband and children.
Issue:
WON Dr. Mendoza who operated her was negligent? YES
Ruling + RVP:
In the case of Professional Services vs. Agana, a surgical operation
is not complete until all the materials or sponges are removed and
totally accounted for and it is settled that leaving foreign materials
after a session is a prima facie negligence. In this case, there was
no evidence that Josephine had undergone any other surgical
operation and it is highly unlikely for her or for any woman to
insert a roll of gauze into her cervix.
CASUMPANG VS. CORTEJO
Facts:
One morning, Mrs. Cortejo brought her 11-year old son, Edmer, to
the ER of San Juan De Dios Hospital (SJDH) because of difficulty in
breathing, chest pain, stomach pain and fever. In the hospital,
they were referred to Dr. Casumpang whose diagnosis states that
the sickness of the boy is “bronchopneumonia”. However, Mrs.
Cortejo was hesitant on the findings of the Doctor because Edmer
had a high fever, and had no colds or cough. But Dr. Casumpang
merely told her that her son’s “blood pressure is just being active,”
and remarked that “that’s the usual bronchopneumonia, no colds,
no phlegm”. The next day, still suspicious about her son’s illness,
Mrs. Cortejo again alerted Dr. Casumpang and stated that Edmer
had a fever, throat irritation, chest and stomach pain, and that
there are traces of blood in Edmer’s sputum. Despite these, the
Doctor merely nodded and reassured Mrs. Cortejo that Edmer’s
illness is bronchopneumonia. Later in the morning, Edmer
vomited “phlegm with blood streak”. This prompted Mr. Cortejo
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to request for a doctor at the nurses’ station. Dr. Miranda, one of
the resident physicians of SJDH, then arrived. Dr. Miranda
conducted a physical check-up of Edmer and found that Edmer
had a low-grade non-continuing fever, and rashes that were not
typical of dengue fever. At 3pm, Edmer once again vomited blood
and upon seeing Dr. Miranda, Mr. Cortejo showed her Edmer’s
blood specimen and reported that Edmer had complained of
severe stomach pain and difficulty in moving his right leg. Dr.
Miranda then examined Edmer’s “sputum with blood” and noted
that he was bleeding. Suspecting that the boy could be afflicted
with dengue, he conducted some procedures and informed Dr.
Casumpang, the attending physician of Edmer, about the latter’s
condition. Upon being informed, Dr. Casumpang ordered several
procedures and the blood test results showed that Edmer was
suffering from “Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever”. The spouses Cortejo
then decided to admit Edmer to the Makati Medical Center, and it
was there when it was found out that Edmer had “Dengue
Hemorrhagic Fever IV” which was already in its irreversible stage.
Edmer died the next day in the morning. Believing that Edmer’s
death was caused by the negligent and erroneous diagnosis of his
doctors, Mr. Cortejo instituted an action for damages against
SJDH, and the attending physicians: Dr. Casumpang and Dr.
Miranda.
Issues:
WON Dr. Miranda is liable? NO
WON Dr. Casumpang is liable? YES
WON SJDH is liable? YES
Ruling + RVP:
Although there was physician-patient relationship between Dr.
Miranda and Edmer (as there was an implied consent by Dr.
Miranda when he administered some treatments and diagnosis on
Edmer), and although there was a finding of negligence on the
doctor’s part, the negligence made still does not tantamount to
medical malpractice. This is because of the fact that Dr. Miranda
was on his first year of residency and he has no authority to
administer further medical tests because again, they recognize
that the authority belongs to Dr. Casumpang. Even if he could have
conducted other diagnosis and could have treated the boy in
another way, he could not have imposed such over Dr.
Casumpang’s authority, because in the end, the call was on Dr.
Casumpang.
The consultants actually determine what to do and after the initial
diagnosis, they refer them to the residents; and the residents just
follow and obey the initial diagnosis made by the consultants. In
this case, Dr. Miranda cannot go beyond the authority of Dr.
Casumpang. Although we have some inclinations na murag sayup
gyud ni siya, but yet again, he is limited to the authority vested on
him by the Consultant (Dr. Casumpang).
The following are the elements of Medical Malpractice: (1) duty,
(2) breach, (3) injury, and (4) proximate causation. Basically,
Breach of duty is both factual and legal issues and as a factual
issue, it requires a presentation of an expert witness on what
actually is the proper standard that should be followed by the
doctor.
In the present case, expert testimony is crucial in determining, (1)
the standard medical examinations, tests, and procedures that the
attending physicians should have undertaken in the diagnosis and
treatment of dengue fever; and (2) the dengue fever signs and
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symptoms that the attending physicians should have noticed and
considered.
Both the RTC and the CA relied largely on Dr. Jaudian’s expert
testimony on dengue diagnosis and management to support their
finding that the petitioning doctors were guilty of breach of duty
of care. Dr. Jaudian testified that Edmer's rapid breathing, chest
and stomach pain, fever, and the presence of blood in his saliva
are classic symptoms of dengue fever. According to him, if the
patient was admitted for chest pain, abdominal pain, and difficulty
in breathing coupled with fever, dengue fever should definitely be
considered. Furthermore, the standard of care according to him is
to administer oxygen inhalation, analgesic, and fluid infusion or
dextrose. If the patient had twice vomited fresh blood and
thrombocytopenia has already occurred, the doctor should order
blood transfusion, monitoring of the patient every 30 minutes,
hemostatic to stop bleeding, and oxygen if there is difficulty in
breathing.
The Court finds that Dr. Casumpang, as Edmer's attending
physician, did not act according to these standards. It will be
recalled that during Dr. Casumpang's first and second visits to
Edmer, he already had knowledge of Edmer's laboratory test
result (CBC), medical history, and symptoms (i.e., fever, rashes,
rapid breathing, chest and stomach pain, throat irritation,
difficulty in breathing, and traces of blood in the sputum).
However, these information did not lead Dr. Casumpang to the
possibility that Edmer could be suffering from either dengue fever
or dengue hemorrhagic fever, as he clung to his diagnosis of
bronchopneumonia.
All these manifestations were present and known to Dr.
Casumpang at the time of his first and second visits to Edmer.
While he noted some of these symptoms in confirming
bronchopneumonia, he did not seem to have considered the
patient's other manifestations in ruling out dengue fever or
dengue hemorrhagic fever. To our mind, Dr. Casumpang
selectively appreciated some, and not all of the symptoms; worse,
he casually ignored the pieces of information that could have been
material in detecting dengue fever.
Even assuming that Edmer's symptoms completely coincided with
the diagnosis of bronchopneumonia (so that this diagnosis could
not be considered "wrong", we still find Dr. Casumpang guilty of
negligence.
First, we emphasize that we do not decide the correctness of a
doctor's diagnosis, or the accuracy of the medical findings and
treatment. Our duty in medical malpractice cases is to decide –
based on the evidence adduced and expert opinion presented –
whether a breach of duty took place.
Second, we clarify that a wrong diagnosis is not by itself medical
malpractice. Physicians are generally not liable for damages
resulting from a bona fide error of judgment. Nonetheless, when
the physician's erroneous diagnosis was the result of negligent
conduct (e.g., neglect of medical history, failure to order the
appropriate tests, failure to recognize symptoms), it becomes an
evidence of medical malpractice.
Third, we also note that medicine is not an exact science; and
doctors, or even specialists, are not expected to give a 100%
accurate diagnosis in treating patients who come to their clinic for
consultations. Error is possible as the exercise of judgment is
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TORTS & DAMAGES (2019) FINALS REVIEWER
called for in considering and reading the exhibited symptoms, the
results of tests, and in arriving at definitive conclusions. But in
doing all these, the doctor must have acted according to
acceptable medical practice standards.
In the present case, evidence on record established that in
confirming the diagnosis of bronchopneumonia, Dr. Casumpang
selectively appreciated some and not all of the symptoms
presented, and failed to promptly conduct the appropriate tests
to confirm his findings. In sum, Dr. Casumpang failed to timely
detect dengue fever, which failure, especially when reasonable
prudence would have shown that indications of dengue were
evident and/or foreseeable, constitutes negligence.
Wrong diagnosis per se does not amount to medical malpractice.
However, if the wrong diagnosis is the result of negligence, it
becomes an evidence of medical malpractice. In this case, the
negligence was the selective consideration of symptoms which
caused the erroneous diagnosis of Elmer. Apart from failing to
promptly detect dengue fever, Dr. Casumpang also failed to
promptly undertake the proper medical management needed for
this disease. Dr. Casumpang failed to measure up to the standards
as testified by Dr. Jaudian. The evidence strongly suggests that he
ordered a transfusion of platelet concentrate instead of blood
transfusion. The tourniquet test was only conducted after Edmer's
second episode of bleeding, and the medical management (as
reflected in the records) did not include antibiotic therapy and
complete physical examination.
Athough there is no ER-EE relationship between SJDH and the
petitioning doctors, SJDH is still solidarily liable based on the
Doctrine of Apparent Authority. As a rule, hospitals are not liable
for the negligence of its independent contractors. However, it may
be found liable if the physician or independent contractor acts as
an ostensible agent of the hospital. This exception is also known
as the "doctrine of apparent authority”. Under this doctrine, a
hospital can be held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of a
physician (or an independent contractor) if the plaintiff can prove
these two factors: first, the hospital's manifestations; and second,
the patient's reliance. As regards the first factor, the hospital need
not make express representations to the patient that the
physician or independent contractor is an employee of the
hospital; representation may be general and implied. As regards
the second factor, the important consideration in determining the
patient's reliance is: whether the plaintiff is seeking care from the
hospital itself or whether the plaintiff is looking to the hospital
merely as a place for his/her personal physician to provide medical
care.
In the case, SJDH impliedly clothed Dr. Casumpang with apparent
authority leading the respondent to believe that he is an
employee or agent of the hospital. Based on the records, the
respondent relied on SJDH rather than upon Dr. Casumpang, to
care and treat his son Edmer. His testimony during trial showed
that he and his wife did not know any doctors at SJDH. They
brought their son to SJDH for diagnosis because of their family
doctor's referral which did not specifically point to Dr. Casumpang
or even to Dr. Miranda, but to SJDH. Significantly, the respondent
had relied on SJDH's representation of Dr. Casumpang's authority.
By referring Dr. Casumpang to care and treat for Edmer, SJDH
impliedly held out Dr. Casumpang as a member of its medical staff.
SJDH also failed to advise Mrs. Cortejo that Dr. Casumpang is just
an independent contractor.
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ALANO VS. MAGUD-LOGMAO
Facts:
Arnelito Logmao was brought to the East Avenue Medical Center
by sidewalk vendors who allegedly saw him fall from the overpass.
There, his patient’s data sheet identified him as Angelito Lugmoso.
Considering that his deterioration progressively deteriorated, and
no vacancy was available at the ICU of East Avenue Medical
Center, and upon recommendation by a resident physician of the
National Kidney Institute (NKI) who also does the rounds at EAMC,
Logmao/Lugmoso was transferred to NKI. His name was recorded
as Angelito Lugmoso at the NKI. Since there being no relatives
around, Jennifer Misa, the transplant coordinator, was instructed
to locate his family by enlisting the assistance of the police and the
media. Dr. Ona, requested the Laboratory Section to conduct
cross-matching and tissue typing, so that if the patient expires
despite the necessary medical care and management, and found
a suitable organ donor, provided his family would consent to it, his
organs could be detached and transplanted promptly to a
compatible beneficiary. Jennifer secured the patient data of
Angelito from EAMC and contacted several television and radio
stations for the purpose of locating the family of Lugmoso. She
also sought the assistance of the PNP to locate the whereabouts
of Angelito’s family. Angelito was eventually pronounced dead,
hence, Dr. Ona set in motion the removal of organs of Angelito for
organ transplantation. He sought permission from the Executive
Director, Dr. Alano, who issued a Memorandum approving the
transplant as long as all the requisite requirements had been
complied with and the NBI had been informed of the planned
transplant. The NBI thru Dr. Reyes gave verbal approval to the
planned transplant. One kidney and the pancreas were
transplanted to other patients. A doctor then made arrangements
with Funerario Oro for the embalmment of the remains of
Angelito for a period of 15 days to afford more time for the relative
of Angelito to locate his remains. When the NKI issued a press
release announcing the successful organ transplant, a cousin of
Angelito heard it on the radio. Sensing a vague resemblance to
Angelito Logmao’s name, she reported it to his mother. When
they went to Funeraria Oro to see the remains, it was there that
they discovered the remains of Angelito in a cheap casket.
Previously, Arnelito’s sister reported that her brother did not
return home after seeing a movie in Cubao. Because of this
discovery, the mother filed a complaint for damages. Plaintiff
alleged that defendants conspired to remove the organs of
Arnelito while the latter was still alive and that they concealed his
true identity.
Ruling + RVP:
A careful reading of the above shows that petitioner instructed his
subordinates to "make certain" that "all reasonable efforts" are
exerted to locate the patient's next of kin, even enumerating ways
in which to ensure that notices of the death of the patient would
reach said relatives. It also clearly stated that permission or
authorization to retrieve and remove the internal organs of the
deceased was being given ONLY IF the provisions of the applicable
law had been complied with. Such instructions reveal that
petitioner acted prudently by directing his subordinates to
exhaust all reasonable means of locating the relatives of the
deceased. He could not have made his directives any clearer. He
even specifically mentioned that permission is only being granted
IF the Department of Surgery has complied with all the
requirements of the law. Verily, petitioner could not have been
faulted for having full confidence in the ability of the doctors in
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the Department of Surgery to comprehend the instructions,

obeying all his directives, and acting only in accordance with the
requirements of the law.
Furthermore, as found by the lower courts from the records of the
case, the doctors and personnel of NKI disseminated notices of the
death of respondent's son to the media and sought the assistance
of the appropriate police authorities as early as March 2, 1988,
even before petitioner issued the Memorandum. Prior to
performing the procedure for retrieval of the deceased's internal
organs, the doctors concerned also the sought the opinion and
approval of the Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI. Thus, there can
be no cavil that petitioner employed reasonable means to
disseminate notifications intended to reach the relatives of the
deceased. The only question that remains pertains to the
sufficiency of time allowed for notices to reach the relatives of the
deceased.

If respondent failed to immediately receive notice of her son's

death because the notices did not properly state the name or
identity of the deceased, fault cannot be laid at petitioner's door.
The trial and appellate courts found that it was the EAMC, who
had the opportunity to ascertain the name of the deceased, who
recorded the wrong information regarding the deceased's identity
to NKI. The NKI could not have obtained the information about his
name from the patient, because as found by the lower courts, the
deceased was already unconscious by the time he was brought to
the NKI.

Ultimately, it is respondent's failure to adduce adequate evidence

that doomed this case. In civil cases, it is a basic rule that the party
making allegations has the burden of proving them by a
preponderance of evidence. The parties must rely on the strength
of their own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defense
offered by their opponent." 9 Here, there is to proof that, indeed,
the period of around 24 hours from the time notices were
disseminated, cannot be considered as reasonable under the
circumstances. They failed to present any expert witness to prove
that given the medical technology and knowledge at that time in
the 1980's, the doctors could or should have waited longer before
harvesting the internal organs for transplantation. Finding
petitioner liable for damages is improper. It should be emphasized
that the internal organs of the deceased were removed only after
he had been declared brain dead; thus, the emotional pain
suffered by respondent due to the death of her son cannot in any
way be attributed to petitioner. Neither can the Court find
evidence on record to show that respondent's emotional suffering
at the sight of the pitiful state in which she found her son's lifeless
body be categorically attributed to petitioner's conduct.

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