Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. L-363 July 31, 1962

IN RE: DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ATTY. DIOSDADO Q. GUTIERREZ, respondent.

Victoriano A. Savellano for complaint.

Nestor M. Andrada for respondent.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar, admitted to it on October 5,

1945. In criminal case No. R-793 of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro he was convicted
of the murder of Filemon Samaco, former municipal mayor of Calapan, and together with his co-
conspirators was sentenced to the penalty of death. Upon review by this Court the judgment of
conviction was affirmed on June 30, 1956 (G.R. No. L-17101), but the penalty was changed
to reclusion perpetua. After serving a portion of the sentence respondent was granted a conditional
pardon by the President on August 19, 1958. The unexecuted portion of the prison term was
remitted "on condition that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines."

On October 9, 1958 the widow of the deceased Filemon Samaco, victim in the murder case, filed a
verified complaint before this Court praying that respondent be removed from the roll of lawyers
pursuant to Rule 127, section 5. Respondent presented his answer in due time, admitting the facts
alleged by complainant regarding pardon in defense, on the authority of the decision of this Court in
the case of In re Lontok, 43 Phil. 293.

Under section 5 of Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime insolving moral turpitude.
Murder is, without doubt, such a crime. The term "moral turpitude" includes everything which is done
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. In re Carlos S. Basa, 41 Phil. 275. As used in
disbarment statutes, it means an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social
duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in general, contrary to the accepted rule of
right and duty between man and man. State ex rel. Conklin v. Buckingham, 84 P. 2nd 49; 5 Am. Jur.
Sec. 279. pp. 428-429.

The only question to be resolved is whether or not the conditional pardon extended to respondent
places him beyond the scope of the rule on disbarment aforecited. Reliance is placed by him
squarely on the Lontok case. The respondent therein was convicted of bigamy and thereafter
pardoned by the Governor-General. In a subsequent viction, this Court decided in his favor and held:
"When proceedings to strike an attorney's name from the rolls the fact of a conviction for a felony
ground for disbarment, it has been held that a pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and is a
bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has been granted."

It is our view that the ruling does not govern the question now before us. In making it the Court
proceeded on the assumption that the pardon granted to respondent Lontok was absolute. This is
implicit in the ratio decidendi of the case, particularly in the citations to support it, namely. In Re
Emmons, 29 Cal. App. 121; Scott vs. State, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 343; and Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 380.
Thus in Scott vs. State the court said:

We are of opinion that after received an unconditional pardon the record of the felony
conviction could no longer be used as a basis for the proceeding provided for in article 226.
The record, when offered in evidence, was met with an unconditional pardon, and could not,
therefore, properly be said to afford "proof of a conviction of any felony." Having been thus
cancelled, all its force as a felony conviction was taken away. A pardon falling short of this
would not be a pardon, according to the judicial construction which that act of executive
grace was received. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 344; Knote v. U.S., 95 U.S. 149, and cases
there cited; Young v. Young, 61 Tex. 191.

And the portion of the decision in Ex parte Garland quoted with approval in the Lontok case is as
follows:

A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the
offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out the existence
of guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed
the offense. It granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities,
 consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the
penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights it makes him, as it were, a
new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.

The pardon granted to respondent here is not absolute but conditional, and merely remitted the
unexecuted portion of his term. It does not reach the offense itself, unlike that in Ex parte Garland,
which was "a full pardon and amnesty for all offense by him committed in connection with rebellion
(civil war) against government of the United States."

The foregoing considerations rendered In re Lontok are inapplicable here. Respondent Gutierrez
must be judged upon the fact of his conviction for murder without regard to the pardon he invokes in
defense. The crime was qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having been committed in
hand, by taking advantage of his official position (respondent being municipal mayor at the time) and
with the use of motor vehicle. People vs. Diosdado Gutierrez, supra. The degree of moral turpitude
involved is such as to justify his being purged from the profession.

The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid standards
of mental and moral fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the bar the Rules of Court not only
prescribe a test of academic preparation but require satisfactory testimonials of good moral
character. These standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered after admission: the lawyer must
continue to adhere to them or else incur the risk of suspension or removal. As stated in Ex
parte Wall, 107 U.S. 263, 27 Law ed., 552, 556: "Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most
sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to
repudiate and override the laws, to trample them under foot and to ignore the very bonds of society,
argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and
dangerous elements of the body politic.

WHEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5, and considering the nature of the crime for which
respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez has been convicted, he is ordered disbarred and his name
stricken from the roll of lawyers.

Bengzon, C.J., Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 79690-707 October 7, 1988

ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be
and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondents.

G.R. No. 80578 October 7, 1988

ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman
ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

The following are the subjects of this Resolution:

1) a Motion, dated 9 February 1988, to Cite in Contempt filed by petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar
against public respondent Special Prosecutor (formerly Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzalez, in
connection with G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578. and 2) a Resolution of this Court
dated 2 May 1988 requiring respondent Hon. Raul Gonzalez to show cause why he should not
be punished for contempt and/or subjected to administrative sanctions for making certain
public statements.

The pertinent facts are as follows:

Petitioner Zaldivar is one of several defendants in Criminal Cases Nos.

12159-12161 and 12163-12177 (for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)
pending before the Sandiganbayan. The Office of the Tanodbayan conducted the preliminary
investigation and filed the criminal informations in those cases (originally TBP Case No. 86-
00778).

On 10 September 1987, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
mandamus (G.R. Nos. 79690-707) naming as respondents both the Sandiganbayan and Hon.
Raul M. Gonzalez. Among other things, petitioner assailed: (1) the 5 February 1987
Resolution 1 of the "Tanodbayan" recommending the filing of criminal informations against
petitioner Zaldivar and his co-accused in TBP Case No. 86-00778; and (2) the 1 September
1987 Resolution 2 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 1216312177
denying his Motion to Quash the criminal informations filed in those cases by the
"Tanodbayan." In this respect, petitioner alleged that respondent Gonzalez, as Tanodbayan
and under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, was no longer vested with power and
authority independently to investigate and to institute criminal cases for graft and corruption
against public officials and employees, and hence that the informations filed in Criminal
Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 12163-12177 were all null and void.

On 11 September 1987, this Court issued a Resolution, which read:

G.R. Nos. 79690-707 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan

and Honorable Raul M. Gonzalez, Claiming To Be and Acting as Tanodbayan-
Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution ).—Acting on the special civil action
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
with urgent motion for preliminary elimination injunction, the Court Resolved,
without giving due course to the petition, to require the respondents to
COMMENT thereon, within ten (10) days from notice.

The Court further Resolved to ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER,

effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court,
 ordering respondent Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST from hearing and
trying Criminal Cases Nos. 12159 to 12161 and 12163 to 12177 insofar as
petitioner Enrique Zaldivar is concerned and from hearing and resolving the
Special Prosecutor's motion to suspend dated September 3, 1987.

The parties later filed their respective pleadings.

Petitioner Zaldivar filed with this Court a second Petition for certiorari and Prohibition (G.R.
No. 80578) on 19 November 1987, initially naming only Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez as respondent.
That Petition assailed the 24 September 1987 Resolution 3 of the "Tanodbayan" in TBP Case No.
87- 01304 recommending that additional criminal charges for graft and corruption be filed against
petitioner Zaldivar and five (5) other individuals. Once again, petitioner raised the argument of the
Tanodbayan's lack of authority under the 1987 Constitution to file such criminal cases and to
investigate the same. Petitioner also moved for the consolidation of that petition with G.R. No.
79690-707.

In a Resolution dated 24 November 1987, 4 this Court, without giving due course to the second
petition: (1) required respondent Gonzalez to submit a comment thereon: and (2) issued a temporary
restraining order "ordering respondent Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE and DESIST from further
acting in TBP Case No. 87-01394 ... and particularly, from filing the criminal information consequent
thereof and from conducting preliminary investigation therein." In a separate resolution of the same
date, 5 G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578 were ordered consolidated by the Court.

In the meantime, however, on 20 November 1987 or four (4) days prior to issuance by this Court of a
temporary restraining order in G.R. No. 80578, the Office of the Tanodbayan instituted Criminal
Case No. 12570 6 with the Sandiganbayan which issued on 23 November 1987 an Order of
Arrest 7 for petitioner Zaldivar and his co-accused in Criminal Case No. 12570. Upon Motion 8 of
petitioner Zaldivar, this Court issued the following Resolution on 8 December 1987:

G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and
Sandiganbayan). The motion filed by the Solicitor General for respondents for an
extension of thirty (30) days from the expiration of the original period within which to
file comment on the petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction or restraining order is GRANTED.

Acting on the manifestation with motion to treat the Sandiganbayan as party-

respondent, the Court Resolved to (a) Consider IMPLEADED the Sandiganbayan as
party respondent; and (b) In pursuance of and supplementing the Temporary
Restraining Order of November 24, 1987 "ordering respondent Hon. Raul M.
Gonzalez to CEASE and DESIST from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-01304
entitled, "Commission on Audit vs. Gov. Enrique Zaldivar, et al." and particularly,
from filing the criminal information consequent thereof and from conducting
preliminary investigation therein" ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, ordering
respondents Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST
from further acting in Criminal Case No. 12570, entitled, "People of the Philippines
vs. Enrique M. Zaldivar, et al." and from enforcing the order of arrest issued by the
Sandiganbayan in said case.

The Solicitor General filed a Comment 9 on the petition in G.R. No. 80578, and we required the
petitioner to submit a Reply 10 thereto.

On 9 February 1988, petitioner Zaldivar filed with the Court a Motion to Cite in Contempt 11 directed
at respondent Gonzalez. The Motion cited as bases the acts of respondent Gonzalez in: (1) having
caused the filing of the information against petitioner in Criminal Case No. 12570 before the
Sandiganbayan; and (2) issuing certain allegedly contemptuous statements to the media in relation
to the proceedings in G.R. No. 80578. In respect of the latter, petitioner annexed to his Motion a
photocopy of a news article, reproduced here in toto, which appeared in the 30 November 1987
issue of the "Philippine Daily Globe:"

Tanod Scores SC for Quashing Graft Case

TANODBAYAN Justice Raul M. Gonzalez said yesterday the Supreme Court order
stopping him from investigating graft cases involving Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar
can aggravate the thought that affluent persons "an prevent the progress of a trial."

What I am afraid of (with the issuance of the order) is that it appears that while rich
and influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, it is difficult for
 an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course. Gonzalez told the Daily
Globe in an exclusive interview.

Gonzalez said the high tribunal's order '"eightens the people's apprehension over the
justice system in this country, especially because the people have been thinking that
only the small fly can get it while big fishes go scot-free."

Gonzalez was reacting to an order issued by the tribunal last week after Zaldivar
petitioned the court to stop the Tanodbayan from investigating graft cases filed
against him.

Zaldivar had charged that Gonzalez was biased in his investigations because the
latter wanted to help promote the political fortunes of a friend from Antique, lawyer
Bonifacio Alentajan.

Acting on Zaldivar's petition, the high court stopped Gonzalez from investigating a
graft charge against the governor, and from instituting any complaint with the
Sandiganbayan.

While President Aquino had been prodding me to prosecute graft cases even if they
involve the high and mighty, the Supreme Court had been restraining me. Gonzalez
said.

In accordance with the President's order, Gonzalez said he had filed graft cases
against two "very powerful" officials of the Aquino government-Commissioner Quintin
Doromal of the Presidential Commission on Good Government and Secretary Jiamil
I.M. Dianlan of the Office of Muslim Affairs and Cultural Communities.

While I don't wish to discuss the merits of the Zaldivar petition before the Supreme
Court, I am a little bit disturbed that (the order) can aggravate the thinking of some
people that affluent persons can prevent the progress of a trial, he said.

He disclosed that he had a talk with the Chief Executive over the weekend and that
while she symphatizes with local officials who are charged in court during election
time, 'She said that it might be a disservice to the people and the voters who are
entitled to know their candidates.

Gonzalez said that while some cases filed against local officials during election time
could be mere harassment suits, the Constitution makes it a right of every citizen to
be informed of the character of tile candidate, who should be subject to scrutiny.
(Emphasis supplied)

Acting on petitioner's Motion to Cite in Contempt, the Court on 16 February 1988 required
respondent Gonzalez "to COMMENT on aforesaid Motion within ten (10) days from notice." 12 On 27
April 1988, the Court rendered its Decision 13 (per curiam) in the Consolidated Petitions. The
dispositive portion thereof read:

WHEREFORE, We hereby:

(1) GRANT the consolidated petitions filed by petitioner Zaldivar and hereby
NULLIFY the criminal informations filed against him in the Sandiganbayan; and

(2) ORDER respondent Raul Gonzalez to cease and desist from conducting
investigations and filing criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan or otherwise
exercising the powers and functions of the Ombudsman.

SO ORDERED.

A Motion for Reconsideration 14 was filed by respondent Gonzalez the next day, 28 April 1988. In his
Motion, respondent Gonzalez, after having argued the legal merits of his position, made the
following statements totally unrelated to any legal issue raised either in the Court's Decision or in his
own Motion:

1. That he "ha(d) been approached twice by a leading member of the court ... and he
was asked to 'go slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him;' "
 2. That he "was approached and asked to refrain from investigating the COA report
on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it will embarass the Court;"
and

3. That "(i)n several instances, the undersigned respondent was called over the
phone by a leading member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the cases against
(two Members of the Court)."

Respondent Gonzalez also attached three (3) handwritten notes 15 which he claimed were sent by
"some members of this Honorable Court, interceeding for cases pending before this office (i.e., the
Tanodbayan)." He either released his Motion for Reconsideration with facsimiles of said notes to the
press or repeated to the press the above extraneous statements: the metropolitan papers for the
next several days carried long reports on those statements and variations and embellishments
thereof On 2 May 1988, the Court issued the following Resolution in the Consolidated Petitions:

G.R. No. 79690-707 (Enrique Zaldivar vs. The Hon. Sandiganbayan, et al. G.R. No.
80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, etc).

1. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Gonzalez under date
of April 28, 1988, the Court Resolved to REQUIRE the petitioner to COMMENT
thereon within ten (10) days from notice hereof.

2. It appearing that respondent Raul M. Gonzalez has made public statements to the
media which not only deal with matters subjudice but also appear offensive to and
disrespectful of the Court and its individual members and calculated, directly or
indirectly, to bring the Court into disrepute, discredit and ridicule and to denigrate and
degrade the administration of justice, the Court Resolved to require respondent
Gonzalez to explain in writing within ten (10) days from notice hereof, why he should
not be punished for contempt of court and/or subjected to administrative sanctions
for making such public statements reported in the media, among others, in the issues
of the "Daily Inquirer," the "Journal," the "Manila Times," the "Philippine Star," the
"Manila Chronicle" the "Daily Globe" and the "Manila Standard" of April 29 and 30,
and May 1, 1988, to wit:

(a) That the Court resolution in question is merely "an offshoot of the position he had
taken that the SC Justices cannot claim immunity from suit or investigation by
government prosecutors or motivated by a desire to stop him 'from investigating
cases against some of their proteges or friends;"

(b) That no less than six of the members of the Court "interceded for and on behalf of
persons with pending cases before the Tanodbayan," or sought "to pressure him to
render decisions favorable to their colleagues and friends;"

(c) That attempts were made to influence him to go slow on Zaldivar and not to be
too hard on him and to refrain from investigating the Commission on Audit report on
illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because it will embarass the Court;

(d) That there were also attempts to cause the dismissal of cases against two
Associate Justices; and

(e) That the Court had dismissed judges' without rhyme or reason' and disbarred
lawyers 'without due process.

3. It further appearing that three (3) affidavits relative to the purpose of and
circumstances attendant upon the notes written to said public respondent by three
(3) members of the Court have since been submitted to the Court and now form part
of its official records, the Court further Resolved to require the Clerk of Court to
ATTACH to this Resolution copies of said sworn statements and the annexes thereto
appended, and to DIRECT respondent Gonzalez also to comment thereon within the
same period of ten (10) days.

4. It finally appearing that notice of the Resolution of February 16, 1988 addressed to
respondent Gonzalez was misdelivered and therefore not served on him, the Court
Resolved to require the Clerk of Court to CAUSE SERVICE of said Resolution on the
respondent and to REQUIRE the latter to comply therewith.

Respondent Gonzalez subsequently filed with this Court on 9 May 1988 an Omnibus Motion for
Extension and Inhibition 16 alleging, among other things: that the above quoted 2 May 1988
Resolution of the Court "appears to have overturned that presumption [of innocence] against him:"
and that "he gravely doubts whether that 'cold neutrality [of an impartial judge] is still available to
him" there being allegedly "at least 4 members of this Tribunal who will not be able to sit in judgment
with substantial sobriety and neutrality." Respondent Gonzalez closed out his pleading with a prayer
that the four (4) Members of the Court Identified and referred to there by him inhibit themselves in
the deliberation and resolution of the Motion to Cite in Contempt.

On 19 May 1988 17 after receipt of respondent's Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. 18 this
Court in an extended per curiam Resolution 19 denied the Motion and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration. That denial was made "final and immediately executory.

Respondent Gonzalez has since then filed the following pleadings of record:

1. Manifestation with Supplemental Motion to Inhibition 20 dated 23 May 1988;

2. Motion to Transfer Administrative Proceedures to the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines 21 dated 20 May 1988

3. Urgent Motion for Additional Extension of Time to File Explanation Ex Abundante

Cautelam, 22 dated 26 May 1988;

4. Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion

(a) For Extension of Time

(b) For Inhibition and

(c) For Transfer of Administrative Proceedings to the IBP, Under Rule 139-B 23 dated
4 June 1988 (with Annex "A;" 24 an anonymous letter dated 27 May 1988 from the
alleged Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court and addressed to respondent):

5. Ex-Parte Manifestation 25 dated 7 June 1988;

6. Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration 26 1988; and

7. Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation with Motion 27 member 1988.

In compliance with the 2 May 1988 Resolution of this Court quoted earlier, respondent Gonzalez
submitted on 17 June 1988 an Answer with Explanation and Comment 28 offering respondent's legal
arguments and defenses against the contempt and disciplinary charges presently pending before
this Court. Attached to that pleading as Annex "A" thereof was respondent's own personal
Explanation/Compliance 29 second explanation called "Compliance," 30 with annexes, was also
submitted by respondent on 22 July 1988.

II

We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to discipline officers of the court and
members of the Bar. The Supreme Court, as regulator and guardian of the legal profession, has
plenary disciplinary authority over attorneys. The authority to discipline lawyers stems from the
Court's constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law, which includes as well
authority to regulate the practice itself of
law. 31 Quite apart from this constitutional mandate, the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court
over members of the Bar is an inherent power incidental to the proper administration of justice and
essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. 32 Moreover, the Supreme Court has inherent
power to punish for contempt, to control in the furtherance of justice the conduct of ministerial
officers of the Court including lawyers and all other persons connected in any manner with a case
before the Court. 33 The power to punish for contempt is "necessary for its own protection against an
improper interference with the due administration of justice," "(it) is not dependent upon the
complaint of any of the parties litigant. 34

There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into play in cases like that before us
here; the Court's inherent power to discipline attorneys and the contempt power. The disciplinary
authority of the Court over members of the Bar is broader than the power to punish for contempt.
Contempt of court may be committee both by lawyers and non-lawyers, both in and out of court.
Frequently, where the contemnor is a lawyer, the contumacious conduct also constitutes
professional misconduct which calls into play the disciplinary authority of the Supreme
Court. 35 Where the respondent is a lawyer, however, the Supreme Court's disciplinary authority over
lawyers may come into play whether or not the misconduct with which the respondent is charged
also constitutes contempt of court. The power to punish for contempt of court does not exhaust the
scope of disciplinary authority of the Court over lawyers. 36 The disciplinary authority of the Court
over members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court's exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A
lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer of the court and as such, he is called upon to
share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society. Any act
on his part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade the administration of
justice constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against
him, and contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt power.

It is sometimes asserted that in the exercise of the power to punish for contempt or of the
disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar, the Court is acting as offended party,
prosecutor and arbiter at one and the same time. Thus, in the present case, respondent Gonzalez
first sought to get some members of the Court to inhibit themselves in the resolution of this case for
alleged bias and prejudice against him. A little later, he in effect asked the whole Court to inhibit itself
from passing upon the issues involved in this proceeding and to pass on responsibility for this matter
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, upon the ground that respondent cannot expect due process
from this Court, that the Court has become incapable of judging him impartially and fairly.
Respondent Gonzalez misconceives the nature of the proceeding at bar as well as the function of
the members of the Court in such proceeding.

Respondent's contention is scarcely an original one. In In Re Almacen, 37 then Associate (later Chief)
Justice Fred Fruiz Castro had occasion to deal with this contention in the following lucid manner:

xxx xxx xxx

It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in the
premises, that, as Atty. Almacen would have it appear, the members of the Court are
the 'complainants, prosecutors and judges' all rolled up into one in this instance. This
is an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of the
proceeding at hand but also of our role therein.

Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui
generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not—and does not
involve—a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into
the conduct of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein.
It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective,
and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit
person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of
the legal profession and the property and honest administration of justice by purging
the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no
longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the
office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a
complainant or a prosecutor.

Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties.
Any tirade against the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so
against the individual members thereof But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers,
the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the individual personalities of
its members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual
members act not as such individuals but only as a duly constituted court. The distinct
individualities are lost in the majesty of their office. So that, in a very real sense, if
there be any complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the
individual members thereof—as well as the people themselves whose rights,
fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at grave hazard should the
administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit to
discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.

Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary
incident of the power to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this
power is vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as
it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. So that even if it
be conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that
fact alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of the power
because public policy demands that they, acting as a Court, exercise the power in all
cases which call for disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the
imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant,
prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.

xxx xxx xxx. 38

It should not be necessary for the members of this Court expressly to disclaim any bias or prejudice
against the respondent that would prevent them from acting in accordance with the exacting
requirements of their oaths of office. It also appears to the Court that for all the members to inhibit
themselves from sitting on this case is to abdicate the responsibility with which the Constitution has
burdened them. Reference of complaints against attorneys either to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines or to the Solicitor General is not mandatory upon the Supreme Court; such reference to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is certainly not an exclusive
procedure under the terms of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, especially where the charge
consists of acts done before the Supreme Court. There is no need for further investigation of facts in
the present case for it is not substantially disputed by respondent Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote
certain statements attributed to him. In any case, respondent has had the amplest opportunity to
present his defense; his defense is not that he did not make the statements ascribed to him but that
those statements give rise to no liability on his part, having been made in the exercise of his freedom
of speech. The issues which thus need to be resolved here are issues of law and of basic policy and
the Court, not any other agency, is compelled to resolve such issues.

III

It is necessary to become very explicit as to what respondent Gonzalez was saying in his statements
set out above. Respondent has not denied making the above statements; indeed, he acknowledges
that the newspaper reports of the statements attributed to him are substantially correct. 39

Respondent Gonzalez was in effect saying, firstly, that the Supreme Court deliberately rendered an
erroneous or wrong decision when it rendered its per curiam Decision dated 27 April 1988 in G.R.
Nos. 79690-707 and 80578. That decision according to respondent Gonzalez, was issued as an act
of retaliation by the Court against him for the position he had taken "that the (Supreme Court)
Justices cannot claim immunity from suit or investigation by government prosecutors," and in order
to stop respondent from investigating against "some of (the) proteges or friends (of some Supreme
Court Justices)." The Court cannot, of course, and will not debate the correctness of its Decision of
27 April 1988 and of its Resolution dated 19 May 1988 (denying respondent Gonzalez Motion for
Reconsideration) in the consolidated Zaldivar cases. Respondent Gonzalez, and anyone else for
that matter, is free intellectually to accept or not to accept the reasoning of the Court set out in its per
curiam Decision and Resolution in the consolidated Zaldivar cases. This should not, however,
obscure the seriousness of the assault thus undertaken by respondent against the Court and the
appalling implications of such assault for the integrity of the system of administration of justice in our
country. Respondent has said that the Court rendered its Decision and Resolution without regard to
the legal merits of the Zaldivar cases and had used the judicial process to impose private
punishment upon respondent for positions he had taken (unrelated to the Zaldivar cases) in carrying
out his duties. It is very difficult to imagine a more serious affront to, or a greater outrage upon, the
honour and dignity of this Court than this. Respondent's statement is also totally baseless.
Respondent's statements were made in complete disregard of the fact that his continuing authority to
act as Tanodbayan or Ombudsman after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, had been
questioned before this Court as early as 10 September 1987 in the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and mandamus filed against him in these consolidated Petitions 40 that is, more than seven (7)
months before the Court rendered its Decision. Respondent also ignores the fact that one day later,
this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order effective immediately ordering
the Sandiganbayan to cease and desist from hearing the criminal cases filed against petitioner
Zaldivar by respondent Gonzalez. Respondent also disregards the fact that on 24 November 1987,
upon the filing of a second Petition for certiorari for Prohibition by Mr. Zaldivar, the Court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order this time requiring the respondent to cease and desist from further
acting in TBP Case No. 87-0934. Thus, the decision finally reached by this Court in April 1988 on the
constitutional law issue pending before the Court for the preceding eight (8) months, could scarcely
have been invented as a reprisal simply against respondent.

A second charge that respondent Gonzalez hurled against members of the Supreme Court is that
they have improperly Id pressured" him to render decisions favorable to their "colleagues and
friends," including dismissal of "cases" against two (2) members of the Court. This particularly
deplorable charge too is entirely baseless, as even a cursory examination of the contents of the
handwritten notes of three (3) members of this Court addressed to respondent (which respondent
attached to his Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of this Court of 27 April 1988 in the
consolidated Petitions) win show. It is clear, and respondent Gonzalez does not pretend otherwise,
that the subject matters of the said notes had no relation at all to the issues in G.R. Nos. 79690-707
and 80578. This charge appears to have been made in order to try to impart some substance (at
least in the mind of respondent) to the first accusation made by respondent that the Court had
deliberately rendered a wrong decision to get even with respondent who had, with great fortitude,
resisted "pressure" from some members of the Court. Once again, in total effect, the statements
made by respondent appear designed to cast the Court into gross disrepute, and to cause among
the general public scorn for and distrust in the Supreme Court and, more generally, the judicial
institutions of the Republic.
Respondent Gonzalez has also asserted that the Court was preventing him from prosecuting "rich
and powerful persons," that the Court was in effect discrimination between the rich and powerful on
the one hand and the poor and defenseless upon the other, and allowing "rich and powerful"
accused persons to go "scot-free" while presumably allowing or affirming the conviction of poor and
small offenders. This accusation can only be regarded as calculated to present the Court in an
extremely bad light. It may be seen as intended to foment hatred against the Supreme Court; it is
also suggestive of the divisive tactics of revolutionary class war.

Respondent, finally, assailed the Court for having allegedly "dismissed judges 'without rhyme or
reason' and disbarred lawyers 'without due process.'" The Court notes that this last attack is not
without relation to the other statements made by respondent against the Court. The total picture that
respondent clearly was trying to paint of the Court is that of an "unjudicial" institution able and willing
to render "clearly erroneous" decisions by way of reprisal against its critics, as a body that acts
arbitrarily and capriciously denying judges and lawyers due process of law. Once again, the purport
of respondent's attack against the Court as an institution unworthy of the people's faith and trust, is
unmistakable. Had respondent undertaken to examine the records 'of the two (2) judges and the
attorney he later Identified in one of his Explanations, he would have discovered that the
respondents in those administrative cases had ample opportunity to explain their side and submit
evidence in support thereof. 41 He would have also found that there were both strong reasons for and
an insistent rhyme in the disciplinary measures there administered by the Court in the continuing
effort to strengthen the judiciary and upgrade the membership of the Bar. It is appropriate to recall in
this connection that due process as a constitutional precept does not, always and in all situations,
require the trial-type proceeding, 42 that the essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. 43 "To
be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings.
Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no
denial of procedural due process. 44

As noted earlier, respondent Gonzalez was required by the Court to explain why he should not be
punished for contempt and/or subjected to administrative discipline for making the statements
adverted to above. In his subsequent pleadings where he asked the full Court to inhibit itself and to
transfer the administrative proceedings to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, respondent made,
among others, the following allegations:

(a) That the Members of the Court "should inhibit [themselves] in the contempt and
administrative charges against the respondent, in the light of the manifest prejudice
and anger they hold against respondent as shown in the language of the resolution
on the Motion for Reconsideration;"

(b) That "the entire membership of the court has already lost that 'cold neutrality of
an impartial judge' [to] be able to allow fairness and due process in the contempt
citation as well as in the possible administrative charge;

(c) That "respondent honestly feels that this court as angry and prejudiced as it is,
respondent has no china man's chance to get fair hearing in the contempt and
possible administrative charges;"

(d) That one must consider "the milieu before this Tribunal with, perhaps passion and
obfuscation running riot;"

(e) That respondent, "after having been castigated with such venom by the entire
Court in its decision denying the Motion for Reconsideration, does not have
confidence in the impartiality of the entire Court" and that he "funds it extremely
difficult to believe that the members of this Tribunal can still act with unbiased
demeanor towards him;" and

(f) That "the Tribunal is determined to disbar [respondent] without due process" and
that a specified Member of the Court "has been tasked to be the ponente, or at least
prepare the decision." (Underscoring in the original)

Thus, instead of explaining or seeking to mitigate his statements earlier made, respondent sought to
heap still more opprobrium upon the Court, accusing it of being incapable of judging his acts and
statements justly and according to law. Once again, he paints this Court as a body not only capable
of acting without regard to due process but indeed determined so to act. A grand design to hold up
this Court to public scorn and disrespect as an unworthy tribunal, one obfuscated by passion and
anger at respondent, emerges once more. It is very difficult for members of this Court to understand
how respondent Gonzalez could suppose that judges on the highest tribunal of the land would be
ready and willing to violate their most solemn oath of office merely to gratify any imagined private
feelings aroused by respondent. The universe of the Court revolves around the daily demands of law
and justice and duty, not around respondent nor any other person or group of persons.
Whether or not the statements made by respondent Gonzalez may reasonably be regarded by this
Court as contumacious or as warranting exercise of the disciplinary authority of this Court over
members of the Bar, may best be assayed by examining samples of the kinds of statements which
have been held in our jurisdiction as constituting contempt or otherwise warranting the exercise of
the Court's authority.

1. In Montecillo v. Gica, 45 Atty. Quirico del Mar as counsel for Montecillo, who was accused in a
slander case, moved to reconsider a decision of the Court of Appeals in favor of the complainant
with a veiled threat that he should interpose his next appeal to the President of the Philippines. In his
Motion for Reconsideration, he referred to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on "knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment," and "judgment rendered through negligence" and implied that the
Court of Appeals had allowed itself to be deceived. Atty. del Mar was held guilty of contempt of court
by the Court of Appeals. He then sued the three (3) justices of the Court of Appeals for damages
before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, seeking to hold them liable for their decision in the
appealed slander case. This suit was terminated, however, by compromise agreement after Atty. del
Mar apologized to the Court of Appeals and the justices concerned and agreed to pay moral
damages to the justices. Atty. del Mar some time later filed with this Court a Petition for Review on
certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals in a slander case. This Court denied the Petition for
Review. Atty. del Mar then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and addressed a letter to the Clerk of
the Supreme Court asking for the names of the justices of this Court who had voted in favor of and
those who had voted against his Motion for Reconsideration. After his Motion for Reconsideration
was denied for lack of merit, Atty. del Mar filed a Manifestation in this Court saying:

I can at this time reveal to you that, had your Clerk of Court furnished me with
certified true copies of the last two Resolutions of the Supreme Court confirming the
decision of the Court of Appeals in the case entitled Francisco M. Gica vs. Jorge
Montecillo, I would have filed against the Justices supporting the same, civil and
criminal suits as I did to the Justices of the Court of Appeals who, rewarding the
abhorent falsification committed by Mr. Gica, reversed for him the decisions of the
City Court and the Court of First Instance of Cebu, not with a view to obtaining a
favorable judgment therein but for the purpose of exposing to the people the
corroding evils extant in our Government, so that they may well know them and work
for their extermination. (60 SCRA at 240;emphasis supplied)

Counsel was asked to explain why he should not be administratively dealt with for making the above
statements. In his additional explanation, Atty. del Mar made the following statements:

... Graft, corruption and injustice are rampant in and outside of the Government. It is
this state of things that convinced me that all human efforts to correct and/or reform
the said evils will be fruitless and, as stated in my manifestation to you, I have
already decided to retire from a life of militancy to a life of seclusion, leaving to God
the filling up deficiencies. (60 SCRA at 242)

The Court suspended Atty. del Mar, "until further orders," from the practice of law saying:

... Respondent is utilizing what exists in his mind as state of graft, corruption and
injustice allegedly rampant in and outside of the government as justification for his
contemptuous statements. In other words, he already assumed by his own
contemptuous utterances that because there is an alleged existence of rampant
corruption, graft and injustice in and out of the government, We, by Our act in G.R.
No. L-36800, are among the corrupt, the grafters and those allegedly committing
injustice. We are at a complete loss to follow respondent del Mar's logic ...

xxx xxx xxx

To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them that second only to
the duty of maintaining allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support
the Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys to
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial
officers (Sec. 20 (b) Rule 138, Rules of Court). But We do remind them of said duty
to emphasize to their younger brethren its paramount importance. A lawyer must
always remember that he is an officer of the court exercising a high privilege and
serving in the noble mission of administering justice.

xxx xxx xxx.

As already stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A G.R. No. 46504-R was
based on its evaluation of the evidence on only one specific issue. We in turn denied
in G.R. No. L-36800 the petition for review on certiorari of the decision because We
 found no reason for disturbing the appellate court's finding and conclusion. In both
instances, both the Court of Appeals and this Court exercised judicial discretion in a
case under their respective jurisdiction. The intemperate and imprudent act of
respondent del Mar in resorting to veiled threats to make both Courts reconsider their
respective stand in the decision and the resolution that spelled disaster for his client
cannot be anything but pure contumely for aid tribunals.

It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Court of
the land when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded
to challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered
unjust judgment. In short, his allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if
not with gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case of his client.

xxx xxx xxx

... To those who are in the practice of law and those who in the future will choose to
enter this profession, We wish to point to this case as a reminder for them to imprint
in their hearts and minds that an attorney owes it to himself to respect the courts of
justice and its officers as a fealty for the stability of our democratic institutions. (60
SCRA at 242-247: emphasis supplied)

2. In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 46 four (4) members of the bar, acting as counsel
for MacArthur International Minerals Company were required by this Court to explain certain
statements made in MacArthur's third Motion for Reconsideration:

d. ...; and I the Supreme Court I has overlooked the applicable law due to the mis-
representation and obfuscation of the petitioners' counsel. (Last sentence, par. 1,
Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).

e. ... Never has any civilized democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick (referring
to the "right to reject any and all bids") can be used by vulturous executives to cover
up and excuse losses to the public, a government agency or just plain fraud ... and it
is thus difficult, in the light of our upbringing and schooling, even under many of the
incumbent justices, that the Honorable Supreme Court intends to create a decision
that in effect does precisely that in a most absolute manner. (Second sentence, par.
7, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968). (31 SCRA at 6)

They were also asked to explain the statements made in their Motion to Inhibit filed on 21
September 1968 asking

Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit
themselves from considering, judging and resolving the case or any issue or aspect
thereof retroactive to January 11, 1967. The motion charges "It that the brother of the
Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a vice-president of the favored party who is
the chief beneficiary of the false, erroneous and illegal decision dated January 31,
1968" and the ex-parte preliminary injunction rendered in the above-entitled case, the
latter in effect prejudging and predetermining this case even before the joining of an
issue. As to the Chief Justice, the motion states [t]hat the son of the Honorable Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion was given a significant appointment in the Philippine
Government by the President a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was
rendered in this case. The appointment referred to was as secretary of the newly-
created Board of Investments. The motion presents a lengthy discourse on judicial
ethics, and makes a number of side comments projecting what is claimed to be the
patent wrongfulness of the July 31, 1968 decision. It enumerates "incidents" which,
according to the motion, brought about respondent MacArthur's belief that unjudicial
prejudice had been caused it and that there was 'unjudicial favoritism' in favor of
'petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored party directly benefited by the
said decision
(31 SCRA at 6-7)

Another attorney entered his appearance as new counsel for MacArthur and filed a fourth Motion for
Reconsideration without leave of court, which Motion contained the following paragraphs:

4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion when in fact he was outside the borders of the Republic of the
Philippines at the time of the Oral Argument of the above-entitled case—which
condition is prohibited by the New Rules of Court—Section 1, Rule 51, and we quote:
"Justices; who may take part—... . Only those members present when any matter is
submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication ... ."
 This requirement is especially significant in the present instance because the
member who penned the decision was the very member who was absent for
approximately four months or more. This provision also applies to the Honorable
Justices Claudio Teehankee and Antonio Barredo.

xxx xxx xxx

6. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company abandons its

quest for justice in the Judiciary of the Philippine Government, it will inevitably either
raise the graft and corruption of Philippine Government officials in the bidding of May
12, 1965, required by the Nickel Law to determine the operator of the Surigao nickel
deposits, to the World Court on grounds of deprivation of justice and confiscation of
property and/or to the United States Government, either its executive or judicial
branches or both, on the grounds of confiscation of respondent's proprietary vested
rights by the Philippine Government without either compensation or due process of
law and invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and
benefits to the Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting
to more than fifty million dollars annually, until restitution or compensation is made.
(31 SCRA at 10-11)

Finding their explanations unsatisfactory, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Sanchez, held
three (3) attorneys guilty of contempt:

1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In his third motion for
reconsideration, we, indeed, find language that is not to be expected of an officer of
the courts. He pictures petitioners as 'vulturous executives.' He speaks of this Court
as a 'civilized, democratic tribunal,' but by innuendo would suggest that it is not.

In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our decision of July 31, 1968
as 'false, erroneous and illegal' in a presumptuous manner. He then charges that the
ex parte preliminary injunction we issued in this case prejudiced and predetermined
the case even before the joining of an issue. He accuses in a reckless manner two
justices of this Court for being interested in the decision of this case: Associate
Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, because his brother is the vice president of the favored
party who is the chief beneficiary of the decision, and Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, whose son was appointed secretary of the newly-created Board of
Investments, 'a significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the
President, a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered.' In this
backdrop, he proceeds to state that 'it would seem that the principles thus
established [the moral and ethical guidelines for inhibition of any judicial authority by
the Honorable Supreme Court should first apply to itself.' He puts forth the claim that
lesser and further removed conditions have been known to create favoritism, only to
conclude that there is no reason for a belief that the conditions obtaining in the case
of the Chief Justice and Justice Castro would be less likely to engender favoritism
and prejudice for or against a particular cause or party.' Implicit in this at least is that
the Chief Justice and Justice Castro are insensible to delicadeza, which could make
their actuation suspect. He makes it plain in the motion that the Chief Justice and
Justice Castro not only were not free from the appearance of impropriety but did
arouse suspicion that their relationship did affect their judgment. He points out that
courts must be above suspicion at all times like Ceasar's wife, warns that loss of
confidence for the Tribunal or a member thereof should not be allowed to happen in
our country, 'although the process has already begun.

xxx xxx xxx

What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's accusations have no basis in fact and in
law. The slur made is not limited to the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Castro. It
sweepingly casts aspersion on the whole court. For, inhibition is also asked if, we
repeated any other justices who have received favors or benefits directly or indirectly
from any of the petitioners or any members of any board-petitioner or their agents or
principals, including the president.' The absurdity of this posture is at once
apparent. For one thing, the justices of this Court are appointed by the President and
in that sense may be considered to have each received a favor from the President.
Should these justices inhibit themselves every time a case involving the
Administration crops up? Such a thought may not certainly be entertained. The
consequence thereof would be to paralyze the machinery of this Court. We would in
fact, be wreaking havoc on the tripartite system of government operating in this
country. Counsel is presumed to know this. But why the unfounded charge? There is
the not too-well concealed effort on the part of a losing litigant's attorney to
downgrade this Court.
 The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy to discern.
Such disrespect detracts much from the dignity of a court of justice. Decidedly not an
expression of faith, counsel's words are intended to create an atmosphere of distrust,
of disbelief.

xxx xxx xxx

The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar to lawyers.
and yet, this Court finds in the language of Atty. Santiago a style that undermines
and degrades the administration of justice. The stricture in Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of
the Rules against improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice
is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is guilty of contempt of court.

xxx xxx xxx

Third. The motion contained an express threat to take the case to the World Court
and/or the United States government. It must be remembered that respondent
MacArthur at that time was still trying to overturn the decision of this Court of July 31,
1968. In doing so, unnecessary statements were in ejected. More specifically, the
motion announced that McArthur 'will inevitably ... raise the graft and corruption of
the Philippine government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965 ... to the World
Court' and would invoke 'the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all
aid and benefits to the Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium,
amount to more than fifty million dollars annually ...

This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the blind of this Court to decide the case'
in its favor. A notice of appeal to the World Court has even been embodied in Meads
return. There is a gross inconsistency between the appeal and the move to
reconsider the decision. An appeal from a decision presupposes that a party has
already abandoned any move to reconsider that decision. And yet, it would appear
that the appeal to the World Court is being dangled as a threat to effect a change of
the decision of this Court. Such act has no aboveboard explanation.

xxx xxx xxx

The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never be protected where
infraction of ethics meets with complacency rather than punishment. The people
should not be given cause to break faith with the belief that a judge is the epitome of
honor amongst men. To preserve its dignity, a court of justice should not yield to the
assaults of disrespect. Punctilio of honor, we prefer to think, is a standard of behavior
so desirable in a lawyer pleading a cause before a court of justice. (31 SCRA at 13-
23; emphasis supplied)

3. In In re Almacen, supra, Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, in protest against what he asserted was "a
great injustice committed against his client by the Supreme Court," filed a Petition to Surrender
Lawyer's Certificate of Title. He alleged that his client was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust
judgment," and had become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy," saying that
"justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court [was) not only blind, but also
deaf and dumb." Atty. Almacen vowed to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum" so that
"the people may know of this silent injustice committed by this Court' and that "whatever mistakes,
wrongs and injustices that were committed [may] never be repeated." Atty. Almacen released to the
press the contents of his Petition and on 26 September 1967, the "Manila Times" published
statements attributed to him as follows:

Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did not expose the
tribunal's 'unconstitutional and obnoxious' practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or
appeals without any reason.

Because of the tribunal's 'short-cut justice.' Almacen deplored, his client was
condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.

xxx xxx xxx

There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, 'where our
Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of justice, who
ignore without reason their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations
of the Constitution with impunity.'

xxx xxx xxx

 He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his
living, the present members of the Supreme Court 'will become responsible to all
cases brought to its attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those
unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit' or "denied resolutions. (31 SCRA at
565566; emphasis supplied)

Atty. Almacen was required by this Court to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken
against him. His explanation, which in part read:

xxx xxx xxx

The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolized in paintings that can be found in all courts
and government offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is also deaf
and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court has ever heard our cries
for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and for justice; dumb in the
sense, that inspire of our beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons
why our appeals has been DENIED, not one word was spoken or given ... We refer
to no human defect or ailment in the above statement. We only described the
impersonal state of Things and nothing more.

xxx xxx xxx

As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this
Court and for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN
TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the
offer was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to
when we must end our self- sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing
ourselves to have faith and confidence in the members of the Court but disregard our
Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the members of
this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter. (31 SCRA at 572; emphasis
supplied)

was found by the Court to be "undignified and cynical" and rejected. The Court indefinitely
suspended Almacen from the practice of law holding, through Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, that
Almacen had exceeded the boundaries of "fair criticism."

4. In Paragas V. Cruz, 47 Counsel, whose Petition for Ceriorari ran was dismissed by this Court,
made the following statements in his Motion for Reconsideration:

The petitioner respectfully prays for a reconsideration of the resolution of this

Honorable Court dated April 20,1966 on the ground that it constitutes a violation of
Section 14 of Rule 11 2 of the Rules of Court promulgated by this very Hon.
Supreme Court, and on the further ground that it is likewise a violation of the most
important right in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the Philippines, a culpable
violation which is a ground for impeachment.

... The rule of law in a democracy should always be upheld and protected by all
means, because the rule of law creates and preserves peace and order and gives
satisfaction and contentment to all concerned. But when the laws and the rules are
violated, the victims resort, sometimes, to armed force and to the ways of the
cavemen We do not want Verzosa and Reyes repeated again and again, killed in the
premises of the Supreme Court and in those of the City Hall of Manila. Educated
people should keep their temper under control at all times! But justice should be
done to all concerned to perpetuate the very life of Democracy on the face of the
earth. (14 SCRA at 810; emphasis supplied)

The Court considered the above statements as derogatory to the dignity of the Court and required
counsel to show cause why administrative action should not be taken against him. Counsel later
explained that he had merely related factual events (i.e., the killing of Verzosa and Reyes) and to
express his desire to avoid repetition of such acts. The Court, through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
found these explanations unsatisfactory and the above statements contumacious.

... The expressions contained in the motion for reconsideration ... are plainly
contemptuous and disrespectful, and reference to the recent killing of two employees
is but a covert threat upon the members of the Court. ... That such threats and
disrespectful language contained in a pleading filed in courts are constitutive of direct
contempt has been repeatedly decided (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724; People
vs. Venturanza, 52 Off. Gaz. 769; Medina vs. Rivera, 66 Phil. 151; De Joya vs. Court
of First Instance of Rizal, 1, 9785, September 19,1956; Sison vs. Sandejas L- 9270,
 April 29,1959; Lualhati vs. Albert, 57 Phil. 86). What makes the present case more
deplorable is that the guilty party is a member of the bar; for, as remarked in People
vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 580-

Counsel should conduct himself towards the judges who try his cases with that
courtesy all have a right to expect. As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral
duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards
the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice.

It in light and plausible that an attorney in defending the cause and rights of his client,
should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and
never will be so, for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or
proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts require.
(Salcedo vs. Hernandez, [In re Francisco], 61 Phil. 729)' (1 4 SCRA at 811-812;
emphasis supplied)

5. In In re Sotto, 48 a newspaper reporter, Mr. Angel Parazo, invoking the Press Freedom Law,
refused to divulge the source of the news item which carried his by-line and was sent to jail for so
refusing. Atty. Vicente Sotto, a senator and author of said law, caused the publication of the
following item in a number of daily newspapers in Manila:

As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53), interpreted by the
Supreme Court in the case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who now has to
suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge the source of a news
published in his paper, I regret to say that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously
interpreted said law, but that it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency or
narrow mindedness of the majority of its members. In the wake of so many blunders
and injustices deliberately committed during these last years, I believe that the only
remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme
Court. To this effect, I announce that one of the first measures, which I will introduce
in the coming congressional sessions, will have as its object the complete
reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now constituted, the Supreme Court of
today constitutes a constant peril to liberty and democracy. It need be said loudly,
very loudly, so that even the deaf may hear: The Supreme Court of today is a far cry
from the impregnable bulwark of Justice of those memorable times of Cayetano
Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the
honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary. (82 Phil. at 597-598; emphasis supplied)

In finding Atty. Sotto in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation
of the constitutional guarantee of free speech and in requiring him to show cause
why he should not be disbarred, the Court, through Mr. Justice Feria, said-

To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing
deliberately so many blunders and injustices that is to say, that it has been deciding
in favor of one party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse
party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases
decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the coincidence
of the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and
consequently to lower and degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The
Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which
the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their
rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the
honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot
expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their hands, and
disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an
officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the
dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he
has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which
without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation. (82 Phil. at 601-
602; emphasis supplied)

6. In Salcedo v. Hernandez, 49 Atty. Vicente Francisco filed a Motion before the Supreme Court which
contained the following paragraph (in translation):

We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of this
court, denying our motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and constitutes
an outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular
will expressed at the polls in the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust
all the means within our power in order that this error may be corrected by the very
 court which has committed it, because we should not want that some citizen,
particularly some voter of the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press
publicly to denounce, as he has a right to do, the judicial outrage of which the herein
petitioner has been the victim, and because it is our utmost desire to safeguard the
prestige of this honorable court and of each and every member thereof in the eyes of
the public. But, at the same time we wish to state sincerely that erroneous decisions
like these, which the affected party and his thousands of voters will necessarily
consider unjust, increase the proselytes of sakdalism and make the public lose
confidence in the administration of justice. (61 Phil. at 726; emphasis supplied)

When required by the Court to show cause why he should not be declared in contempt, Atty.
Francisco responded by saying that it was not contempt to tell the truth. Examining the statements
made above, the Court held:

... [they] disclose, in the opinion of this court, an inexcusable disrespect of the
authority of the court and an intentional contempt of its dignity, because the court is
thereby charged with no less than having proceeded in utter disregard of the laws,
the rights of the parties, and of the untoward consequences, or with having abused
its power and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client,
because the acts of outraging and mocking from which the words 'outrage' and
mockery' used therein are derived, means exactly the same as all these, according to
the Dictionary of the Spanish Language published by the Spanish Academy
(Dictionary of the Spanish Language, 15th ed., pages 132-513).

The insertion of the phrases in question in said motion of Attorney Vicente J.

Francisco, for many years a member of the Philippine bar, was neither justified nor in
the least necessary, because in order to call the attention of the court in a special
way to the essential points relied upon in his argument and to emphasize the force
thereof, the many reasons stated in his said motion were sufficient and the phrases
in question were superfluous. In order to appeal to reason and justice, it is highly
improper and amiss to make trouble and resort to threats, as Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco has done, because both means are annoying and good practice can ever
sanction them by reason of their natural tendency to disturb and hinder the free
exercise of a serene and impartial judgment, particularly in judicial matters, in the
consideration of questions submitted for resolution.

There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's motion

contains a more or less veiled threat to the court because it is insinuated therein,
after the author shows the course which the voters of Tiaong should follow in case he
fails in his attempt, that they will resort to the press for the purpose of denouncing,
what he claims to be a judicial outrage of which his client has been the victim;
and because he states in a threatening manner with the intention of predisposing the
mind of the reader against the court, thus creating an atmosphere of prejudices
against it in order to make it odious in the public eye, that decisions of the nature of
that referred to in his motion to promote distrust in the administration of justice and
increase the proselytes of sakdalism a movement with seditious and revolutionary
tendencies the activities of which, as is of public knowledge, occurred in this country
a few days ago. This cannot mean otherwise than contempt of the dignity of the court
and disrespect of the authority thereof on the part of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco,
because he presumes that the court is so devoid of the sense of justice that, if he did
not resort to intimidation, it would maintain its error notwithstanding the fact that it
may be proven, with good reasons, that it has acted erroneously.

As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as
any attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority and to defend its
integrity, not only because it had conferred upon him the high privilege, not a right
(Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what he now is: a priest of justice (In
re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St., Rep., 492, 669), but also because in so doing, he neither
creates nor promotes distrust in the administration of justice, and prevents anybody
from harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of
disorder, thus undermining the foundation upon which rests that bulwark called
judicial power to which those who are aggrieved turn for protection and relief (61 Phil.
at 727-728; emphasis supplied)

It should not be supposed that the six (6) cases above discussed exhaust our case law on this
matter. In the following cases, among others, the Supreme Court punished for contempt or
administratively disciplined lawyers who had made statements not very different from those made in
the cases discussed above:

1) In re Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382 (1987);

 2) Borromeo v. Court of appeals, 87 SCRA 67 (1978);

3) Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, 20 SCRA 441 (1967);

4) Malolos v. Reyes, 1 SCRA 559 (1961);

5) De Joya, et al. v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, 99 Phil. 907
(1956);

6) People v. Venturanza, et al., 98 Phil. 211 (1956);

7) In re Suzano A. Velasquez, per curiam Resolution (unreported), Promulgated 29

April 1955;

8) Cornejo v. Tan, 85 Phil. 772 (1950);

9) People v. Carillon, 77 Phil. 572 (1946);

10) Intestate Estate of Rosario 0lba; Contempt Proceedings against Antonio Franco,
67 Phil. 312 (1939); and

11) Lualhati v. Albert, 57 Phil. 86 (1932).

Considering the kinds of statements of lawyers discussed above which the Court has in the past
penalized as contemptuous or as warranting application of disciplinary sanctions, this Court is
compelled to hold that the statements here made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute
contempt and call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. Respondent's
statements, especially the charge that the Court deliberately rendered an erroneous and unjust
decision in the Consolidated Petitions, necessarily implying that the justices of this Court betrayed
their oath of office, merely to wreak vengeance upon the respondent here, constitute the grossest
kind of disrespect for the Court. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme
Court and, through the Court, the entire system of administration of justice in the country. That
respondent's baseless charges have had some impact outside the internal world of subjective intent,
is clearly demonstrated by the filing of a complaint for impeachment of thirteen (13) out of the then
fourteen (14) incumbent members of this Court, a complaint the centerpiece of which is a repetition
of the appalling claim of respondent that this Court deliberately rendered a wrong decision as an act
of reprisal against the respondent.

IV

The principal defense of respondent Gonzalez is that he was merely exercising his constitutional
right of free speech. He also invokes the related doctrines of qualified privileged communications
and fair criticism in the public interest.

Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to
deny him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of
speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of
expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of
equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of
the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between
free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection and
maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning
and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent
institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general community. As Mr. Justice
Frankfurter put it:

... A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an independent

judiciary to a free press. Neither has primacy over the other; both are indispensable
to a free society. The freedom of the press in itself presupposes an independent
judiciary through which that freedom may, if necessary be vindicated. And one of the
potent means for assuring judges their independence is a free press. 50

Mr. Justice Malcolm of this Court expressed the same thought in the following terms:

The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech and press. This constitutional
right must be protected in its fullest extent. The Court has heretofore given evidence
of its tolerant regard for charges under the Libel Law which come dangerously close
to its violation. We shall continue in this chosen path. The liberty of the citizens must
be preserved in all of its completeness. But license or abuse of liberty of the press
 and of the citizens should not be confused with liberty ill its true sense. As important
as is the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the rights of
the citizens is the maintenance of the independence of the Judiciary. Respect for the
Judiciary cannot be had if persons are privileged to scorn a resolution of the court
adopted for good purposes, and if such persons are to be permitted by subterranean
means to diffuse inaccurate accounts of confidential proceedings to the
embarassment of the parties and the courts. 51 (Emphasis supplied)

Only slightly (if at all) less important is the public interest in the capacity of the Court effectively to
prevent and control professional misconduct on the part of lawyers who are, first and foremost,
indispensable participants in the task of rendering justice to every man. Some courts have held,
persuasively it appears to us, that a lawyer's right of free expression may have to be more limited
than that of a layman. 52

It is well to recall that respondent Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is
also a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to this Court
as the embodiment and the repository of the judicial power in the government of the Republic. The
responsibility of the respondent "to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court' and "not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice 53 is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer.

Respondent Gonzalez claims to be and he is, of course, entitled to criticize the rulings of this Court,
to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error. Once more, however, the right of
criticism is not unlimited. Its limits were marked out by Mr. Justice Castro in In re Almacen which are
worth noting

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bonafide and shall
not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair
criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof,
on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of
respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.

The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the
orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights,
lawyers even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.

xxx xxx xxx 54

(Emphasis supplied)

The instant proceeding is not addressed to the fact that respondent has criticized the Court; it is
addressed rather to the nature of that criticism or comment and the manner in which it was carried
out.

Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and denigrate the Court. The subjectivities of the
respondent are irrelevant so far as characterization of his conduct or misconduct is concerned. He
will not, however, be allowed to disclaim the natural and plain import of his words and acts. 55 It is
upon the other hand, not irrelevant to point out that respondent offered no apology in his two (2)
explanations and exhibited no repentance. 56

Respondent Gonzalez also defends himself contending that no injury to the judiciary has been
shown, and points to the fact that this Court denied his Motion for Reconsideration of its per
curiam Decision of 27 April 1988 and reiterated and amplified that Decision in its Resolution of 19
May 1988. In the first place, proof of actual damage sustained by a court or the judiciary in general is
not essential for a finding of contempt or for the application of the disciplinary authority of the Court.
Insofar as the Consolidated Petitions are concerned, this Court after careful review of the bases of
its 27 April 1988 Decision, denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration thereof and rejected the
public pressures brought to bear upon this Court by the respondent through his much publicized acts
and statements for which he is here being required to account. Obstructing the free and undisturbed
resolution of a particular case is not the only species of injury that the Court has a right and a duty to
prevent and redress. What is at stake in cases of this kind is the integrity of the judicial institutions of
the country in general and of the Supreme Court in particular. Damage to such institutions might not
be quantifiable at a given moment in time but damage there will surely be if acts like those of
respondent Gonzalez are not effectively stopped and countered. The level of trust and confidence of
the general public in the courts, including the court of last resort, is not easily measured; but few will
dispute that a high level of such trust and confidence is critical for the stability of democratic
government.

Respondent Gonzalez lastly suggests that punishment for contempt is not the proper remedy in this
case and suggests that the members of this Court have recourse to libel suits against him. While the
remedy of libel suits by individual members of this Court may well be available against respondent
Gonzalez, such is by no means an exclusive remedy. Moreover, where, as in the instant case, it is
not only the individual members of the Court but the Court itself as an institution that has been
falsely attacked, libel suits cannot be an adequate remedy. 57

The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court in facie curiae and
of gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the Bar.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Raul M. Gonzalez from the practice of law
indefinitely and until further orders from this Court, the suspension to take effect immediately.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman, the Secretary of
Justice, the Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals for their information and guidance.

Fernan C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo of G.R. Nos. 79690-707, pp. 98-111, Annex "H-1 " of Petition

2 Id., pp. 126-129, Annex "I" of Petition.

3 Rollo of G.R. No. 80578, pp. 28-38, Annex "B" of Petition.

4 Id., P. 39.

5 Id., P. 48.

6 Id., pp. 57-58, Information.

7 Id., pp. 59-60.

8 Id., pp. 51-56.

9 Id., pp. 75-94.

10 Id., p. 96.

11 Id., pp. 98-106.

12 Id., p. 117.

13 Id pp. 123-129.

14 Id., pp. 131-135.

15 Id., P. 136.

16 Id., pp. 168-170.

17 A Constancia was also filed be respondent on this day arguing the merits of his
motion and supplemental motion for reconsideration.

18 Rollo of G.R. No. 80578, pp. 172-178.

19 Id., pp. 179-188.

20 Id., pp. 193-206.

21 Id., pp. 208-210.

22 Id., pp. 211-216.

23 Id., pp. 218-224.

24 Id., p. 225.

25 Id., p. 227.

26 Id., pp. 228-229.

27 Id., pp. 348-352.

28 Id pp. 235-278.

29 Id., pp. 279-301.

30 Id., pp. 314-321.

31 Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 138, Sections 27, 28
and 29, Revised Rules of Court.

32 Rule 71, Section 3 (d) Revised Rules of Court; Halili vs. Court of Industrial
Relations. 136 SCRA 112 (1985); Montalban vs. Canonoy, 38 SCRA, 971
Commissioner of Immigration vs. Cloribel, 20 SCRA 1241 (1967); Slade Perkins vs.
Director of Prisons, 58 Phil. 271 (1953); In re Vicente Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567 (1923);

33 In re Kelly, 35 Phil. 944 (1916). 33 In Re Kelly, supra; In Re Severino Lozano and

Anastacio Quevedo, 54 Phil. 801 (1930); In Re Vicente Pelaez, supra; Slade Perkins
v. Director of Prisons, supra; and In Re Vicente Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 (1949).

34 Halili vs. Court of Industrial Relations, supra; Andres vs. Cabrera, 127 SCRA 802
(1984); Montalban vs. Canonoy, supra; Commissioner of Immigration vs. Cloribel,
supra; Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons, 76 Phil. 630 (1946).

35 See Section 3 (a), (c) and (d), Rule 71 and Section 27, Rule 138, Revised Rules
of Court.

36 The same rule obtains in other jurisdictions, E.g., In re Isserman, 87 A. 2d 903

(1951) certificate denied Isserman v. Ethics Committee of Essex County Bar Assn.,
345 U.S. 927, 97 L. Ed. 1357 (1953):

... The right or power of suspension or disbarment is different and distinct from the
power to punish for contempt, and the exercise of the power to punish for contempt
does not prevent disbarment.

37 31 SCRA 564 (1970).

38 31 SCRA at 598-602. The same contention was made and rejected or

disregarded in e.g., De Joya, et al. v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, 99 Phil. 907
(1956).

39 Answer with Explanation and Comment, Annex A pp. 7-1 0.

40 The question was raised by petitioner Zaldivar even earlier, on 27 August 1987,
before the Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Quash in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-
12177.

41 See Prudential Bank v. Judge Jose P. Castro and Atty. Benjamin M. Grecia Adm.
Case No. 2756, prom. November 12,1987; Consolidated Bank v. Hon. Dionisio M.
Capistrano, etc., Adm. Matter No. RTJ, prom. March 18,1988.

42 Torres v. Gonzales, 152 SCRA 272 (1987).

43 Tajonera v. Lamaroza, 110 SCRA 438 (1981); and Richards v. Asoy 152 SCRA
45 (1987).

44 Juanita Yap Say, et al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73451, March
28,1988.

45 60 SCRA 234 (1974).

46 31 SCRA 1 (1970).

47 14 SCRA 809 (1965).

48 82 Phil. 595 (1949).

49 61 Phil. 724 (1935).

50 Concurring in Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 at 354-356 (1946).

51 In Re Severino Lozano and Anastacio Quevedo, 54 Phil. 801 at 807 (1930).

52 In the Matter of the Citation of Atty. C.A. Frerichs 238 N.W. 2d 764 (1976),
respondent attorney charged the Supreme Court of Iowa with willfully avoiding
constitutional questions raised by him thus violating the constitutional rights of his
clients. In answering the citation for contempt, respondent argued that he was merely
fulfilling his duty to be critical and exercising his freedom of expression. The
Supreme Court of Iowa said:

A lawyer, acting in a professional capacity, may have some fewer rights of free
speech than would a private citizen. As was well explained in In re Woodward, 300
S.W. 2d 385. 393-394 Mo. 1957):

...Neither the right of free speech nor the right to engage in "political" activities can be
so construed or extended as to permit any such liberties to a member of the bar;
respondent's action was in express and exact contradiction of his duties as a lawyer.
A layman may, perhaps, pursue his theories of free speech or political activities until
he runs afoul of the penalties of libel or slander, or into some infraction of our
statutory law. A member of the bar can, and will, be stopped at the point where he
infringes our Canons of Ethics; and if he wishes to remain a member of the bar he
will conduct himself in accordance therewith. ... .

The United States Supreme Court had before it an attorney disciplinary proceeding in
In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 79 S. Ct. 1376. 3 L. ED. 2d 1473 (1959). On the "free
speech" issue respondent raises here, Mr. Justice Stewart, concurring in result,
clearly was speaking for at least five members of the court when he said:

.....A lawyer belongs to a profession with inherited standards of propriety and honor,
which experience has shown necessary in a calling dedicated to the accomplishment
of justice. He who would follow that calling must conform to those standards.

Obedience to ethical precepts may require abstention from what in other

circumstances might be constitutionally protected speech. ... ."' (238 N.W. 2d at 769;
italics supplied)

In In re Raggio 487 P. 2d 499 (1971), the Supreme Court of Nevada said:

We are never surprised when persons, not ultimately involved with the administration
of justice, speak out in anger or frustration about our work and the manner in which
we perform it, and shall protect their right to so express themselves. A member of the
bar, however, stands in a different position by reason of his oath of office and
standards of conduct which he is sworn to uphold conformity with those standards
has proven essential to the administration of justice in our courts." ... ."((487 P.2d at
5OO-501; emphasis supplied)

53 In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 at 602 (1949).

54 SCRA at 580-581.

55 Borromeo v. Court of Appeals, 87 SCRA 67 (1978).

56 Subsequent public statements and acts of respondent Gonzalez fully document

the lack of repentance and the absence of bonafides so essential for legitimate
criticism and fair comment. E.g., he repeated before a Committee of the House of
Representative his charge that the Court was promoting "unequal opportunity (for)
justice in the country" by issuing restraining orders against criminal prosecution of
"big cases" (Daily Globe, May 4, 1988; Evening Star, May 4, 1988). He threatened
personally to file impeachment proceeding against three (3) members of the Court
whom he had accused of "pressuring" him to render decisions favorable to their
friends (Philippine Star, May 4, 1988). He accused the Court of "malversation of
public funds" for using "public funds" to pay premiums on "private [group
hospitalization] insurance policies" of its members (Manila Chronicle, May 4, 1988).
He asserted that four (4) members of the Court could not dispense justice to him with
"the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" (Malaya, May 6, 1988; Manila Chronicle,
May 10, 1988).

57 This was underscored by then Mr. Justice Moran in his dissenting opinion in
People v. Alarcon It might be suggested that judges who are unjustly attacked have a
remedy in action for libel. This suggestion has, however, no rational basis in
principle. In the first place, the outrage is not directed to the judge as a private
individual but to the judge as such or to the court as an organ of the administration of
justice. In the second place, public interests will gravely suffer where the judge, as
such, will, from time to time, be pulled down and disrobed of his judicial authority to
face his assailant on equal grounds and prosecute cases in his behalf as a private
individual. The same reasons of public policy which exempt a judge from civil liability
in the exercise of his judicial functions, most fundamental of which is the policy to
confine his time exclusively to the discharge of his public duties, applies here with
equal, if not superior, force. ... (69 Phil. 265 at 278 [1939]).
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

Piatt September 1, 1933

C.E. PIATT, Chief of Police of Manila, complainant,

vs.
PERFECTO ABORDO, respondent.

The Respondent in his own behalf.

Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for the Government.

MALCOLM, J.:

On February 19, 1932, Perfecto Abordo, a member of the Philippine Bar, accepted the offer of two
individuals to sell him a quantity of opium, a prohibited drug, and agreed to pay P1.50 per tin for the
opium. On the afternoon of the same day, Abordo was picked up at the corner of Taft Avenue
extension and Vito Cruz in the City of Manila, by one of the individuals who had made him the opium
proposition, and was taken to Rizal Avenue Extension outside of the city limits where they found a
number of persons awaiting them in an automobile. A can was disclosed to Abordo as containing
opium, and believing that it was opium, he delivered to one Cabrales the amount of P600 in payment
of the stuff. The can was loaded in the automobile which brought Abordo to the scene of the
delivery, but in returning to Manila another automobile overtook them and the parties riding therein,
pretending to be constabulary soldiers, told Abordo to stop. Instead Abordo drew his revolver and
commanding the driver of the car to turn into Calle Vito Cruz was able to evade his pursuers and to
arrive safely at his home in Pasay. Once in his home Abordo examined the contents of the can and
found it to contain fake opium and sand. Thereupon Abordo reported to the Luneta Police Station of
Manila that he had been robbed of P600. Two individuals were later arrested, charged with the crime
of estafa, and convicted.

Abordo admits that he entered into the transaction detailed above, adding that "he is sincerely sorry
for it and vows not to repeat". His defense is that "there being no evidence in the record establishing
the relationship of attorney and client between the respondent and the malefactors", and "the act
complained of not having been committed in the exercise of his profession of attorney-at-law", the
acts he committed could not affect his status as attorney-at-law and could not, therefore, constitute a
ground for disciplinary action.

Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure enumerates the grounds for the suspension or disbarment
of a lawyer. Nevertheless, it is well settled that a member of the bar may be suspended or removed
from his office as lawyer for other than statutory grounds. However, as a general rule, a court will not
assume jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers for misconduct alleged to be committed in his
private capacity. The exception to the rule is that an attorney will be removed not only for
malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his
professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which
his license and the law confer upon him. (In re Pelaez [1923], 44 Phil., 567.)

The courts are not curators of the morals of the bar. At the same time the profession is not
compelled to harbor all persons whatever their character, who are fortunate enough to keep out of
prison. As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, when
the attorney's character is bad in such respect as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted
with the powers of an attorney, the courts retain the power to discipline him.

It will be recalled that Perfecto Abordo, a member of the Philippine Bar, attempted to engage in an
opium deal in direct contravention of the criminal law of the Philippine Islands. All that kept the
nefarious plan from succeeding was the treacherous conduct of his co-conspirators. The intention to
flaunt the law was present even if consummation of the overt act was not accomplished. In the eyes
of the canons of professional ethics which govern the conduct of attorneys, the act was as
reprehensible as if it had been brought to a successful culmination. "Of all classes and professions,
the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws" said the United States Supreme Court in the
well known case of Ex Parte Wall ( [1882], 107 U.S., 265), and to that doctrine we give our
unqualified support.

The Solicitor-General submits that the respondent should be reprimanded and warned that a
repetition of similar conduct in the future will be dealt with more severely. To our minds such
leniency on the part of the Supreme Court would serve merely to condone a pernicious example set
by a member of the bar, and would result in action entirely inadequate considering the aggravated
nature of the case. In this respect we are not without judicial precedents to guide us. Thus, in the
case of In re Terrel ( [1903], 2 Phil., 266), although the respondent had been acquitted on the charge
of estafa, yet it was held that, since the promotion of an organization for the purpose of violating or
evading the penal laws amounted to such malpractice on the part of an attorney as will justify
removal or suspension, the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a term of one
year. Again, In re Pelaez, supra, where an attorney-at-law who, as a guardian, pledged the shares of
stock belonging to his ward to guarantee the payment of his personal debt, although this was
misconduct committed in his private capacity, the court nevertheless suspended the respondent
from the legal profession for one year. We think the instant case grave, and meriting as severe a
sentence.

It is the order of the court that the respondent Perfecto Abordo be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of one year to begin on September 1, 1933.

Street, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, and Imperial, JJ., concur.
ADM. CASE No. 3319 June 8, 2000

LESLIE UI, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent.

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio for allegedly
carrying on an immoral relationship with Carlos L. Ui, husband of complainant, Leslie Ui.

The relevant facts are:

On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the Our Lady of Lourdes Church
in Quezon City1 and as a result of their marital union, they had four (4) children, namely, Leilani,
Lianni, Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all surnamed Ui. Sometime in December 1987, however,
complainant found out that her husband. Carlos Ui, was carrying on an illicit relationship with
respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot a daughter sometime in 1986, and that they had
been living together at No. 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang Village in Muntinlupa City.
Respondent who is a graduate of the College of Law of the University of the Philippines was
admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1982.

Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the respondent. Complainant then visited
respondent at her office in the later part of June 1988 and introduced herself as the legal wife of
Carlos Ui. Whereupon, respondent admitted to her that she has a child with Carlos Ui and alleged,
however; that everything was over between her and Carlos Ui. Complainant believed the
representations of respondent and thought things would turn out well from then on and that the illicit
relationship between her husband and respondent would come to an end.

However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship between her husband and
respondent continued, and that sometime in December 1988, respondent and her husband, Carlos
Ui, had a second child. Complainant then met again with respondent sometime in March 1989 and
pleaded with respondent to discontinue her illicit relationship with Carlos Ui but to no avail. The illicit
relationship persisted and complainant even came to know later on that respondent had been
employed by her husband in his company.

A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was then filed on August 11, 1989 by
the complainant against respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter, Commission) on the ground of immorality, more
particularly, for carrying on an illicit relationship with the complainant's husband, Carlos Ui. In her
Answer,2 respondent averred that she met Carlos Ui sometime in 1983 and had known him all along
to be a bachelor, with the knowledge, however, that Carlos Ui had children by a Chinese woman in
Amoy, China, from whom he had long been estranged. She stated that during one of their trips
abroad, Carlos Ui formalized his intention to marry her and they in fact got married in Hawaii, USA in
19853 . Upon their return to Manila, respondent did not live with Carlos Ui. The latter continued to live
with his children in their Greenhills residence because respondent and Carlos Ui wanted to let the
children gradually to know and accept the fact of his second marriage before they would live
together.4

In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii and she would only return
occasionally to the Philippines to update her law practice and renew legal ties. During one of her
trips to Manila sometime in June 1988, she was confronted by a woman who insisted that she was
the lawful wife of Carlos Ui. Hurt and desolate upon her discovery of the true civil status of Carlos Ui,
respondent then left for Honolulu, Hawaii sometime in July 1988 and returned only in March 1989
with her two (2) children. On March 20, 1989, a few days after she reported to work with the law
firm5 she was connected with, the woman who represented herself to be the wife of Carlos Ui again
came to her office, demanding to know if Carlos Ui has been communicating with her.

It is respondent's contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they were
married abroad and that after June 1988, when respondent discovered Carlos Ui's true civil status,
she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived with her in Alabang,
and that he resided at 26 Potsdam Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. It was respondent
who lived in Alabang in a house which belonged to her mother, Rosalinda L. Bonifacio; and that the
said house was built exclusively from her parents' funds.6 By way of counterclaim, respondent sought
moral damages in the amount of Ten Million Pesos (Php10,000,000.00) against complainant for
having filed the present allegedly malicious and groundless disbarment case against respondent.

In her Reply7 dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others, that respondent knew perfectly
well that Carlos Ui was married to complainant and had children with her even at the start of her
relationship with Carlos Ui, and that the reason respondent went abroad was to give birth to her two
(2) children with Carlos Ui.

During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar, complainant also charged her
husband, Carlos Ui, and respondent with the crime of Concubinage before the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but the same was dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged. The resolution
dismissing the criminal complaint against respondent reads:

Complainant's evidence had prima facie established the existence of the "illicit relationship"
between the respondents allegedly discovered by the complainant in December 1987. The
same evidence however show that respondent Carlos Ui was still living with complainant up
to the latter part of 1988 and/or the early part of 1989.

It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the "relationship" of respondents started
and was discovered by complainant sometime in 1987 when she and respondent Carlos
were still living at No. 26 Potsdam Street, Northeast Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila and
they, admittedly, continued to live together at their conjugal home up to early (sic) part of
1989 or later 1988, when respondent Carlos left the same.

From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho (sic) the relationship, illicit as
complainant puts it, had been prima facie established by complainant's evidence, this same
evidence had failed to even prima facie establish the "fact of respondent's cohabitation in the
concept of husband and wife at the 527 San Carlos St., Ayala Alabang house, proof of which
is necessary and indispensable to at least create probable cause for the offense charged.
The statement alone of complainant, worse, a statement only of a conclusion respecting the
fact of cohabitation does not make the complainant's evidence thereto any better/stronger
(U.S. vs. Casipong and Mongoy, 20 Phil. 178).

It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents in support of their respective
positions on the matter support and bolster the foregoing conclusion/recommendation.

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant complaint be dismissed

for want of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.8

Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to the Secretary of
Justice, but the same was dismissed9 on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to prove her
allegation that respondent and Carlos Ui lived together as husband and wife at 527 San Carlos
Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.

In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant filed a Motion to Cite
Respondent in Contempt of the Commission 10 wherein she charged respondent with making false
allegations in her Answer and for submitting a supporting document which was altered and
intercalated. She alleged that in the Answer of respondent filed before the Integrated Bar,
respondent averred, among others, that she was married to Carlos Ui on October 22, 1985 and
attached a Certificate of Marriage to substantiate her averment. However, the Certificate of
Marriage 11 duly certified by the State Registrar as a true copy of the record on file in the Hawaii State
Department of Health, and duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate General in Honolulu,
Hawaii, USA revealed that the date of marriage between Carlos Ui and respondent Atty. Iris
Bonifacio was October 22, 1987, and not October 22, 1985 as claimed by respondent in her Answer.
According to complainant, the reason for that false allegation was because respondent wanted to
impress upon the said IBP that the birth of her first child by Carlos Ui was within the wedlock. 12 It is
the contention of complainant that such act constitutes a violation of Articles 183 13 and 184 14 of the
Revised Penal Code, and also contempt of the Commission; and that the act of respondent in
making false allegations in her Answer and submitting an altered/intercalated document are
indicative of her moral perversity and lack of integrity which make her unworthy to be a member of
the Philippine Bar.

In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in Contempt), 15 respondent averred that she did
not have the original copy of the marriage certificate because the same was in the possession of
Carlos Ui, and that she annexed such copy because she relied in good faith on what appeared on
the copy of the marriage certificate in her possession.

Respondent filed her Memorandum 16 on February 22, 1995 and raised the lone issue of whether or
not she has conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred from the
practice of law. Respondent averred that the complaint should be dismissed on two (2) grounds,
namely:
 (i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with the requirement of good moral
character for the practice of the legal profession; and

(ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent conducted herself in an
immoral manner.

In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she who was the victim in this case
and not Leslie Ui because she did not know that Carlos Ui was already married, and that upon
learning of this fact, respondent immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos Ui. She stated that there
was no reason for her to doubt at that time that the civil status of Carlos Ui was that of a bachelor
because he spent so much time with her, and he was so open in his courtship. 18

On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged that it was highly incredible for
her to have knowingly attached such marriage certificate to her Answer had she known that the
same was altered. Respondent reiterated that there was no compelling reason for her to make it
appear that her marriage to Carlos Ui took place either in 1985 or 1987, because the fact remains
that respondent and Carlos Ui got married before complainant confronted respondent and informed
the latter of her earlier marriage to Carlos Ui in June 1988. Further, respondent stated that it was
Carlos Ui who testified and admitted that he was the person responsible for changing the date of the
marriage certificate from 1987 to 1985, and complainant did not present evidence to rebut the
testimony of Carlos Ui on this matter.

Respondent posits that complainant's evidence, consisting of the pictures of respondent with a child,
pictures of respondent with Carlos Ui, a picture of a garage with cars, a picture of a light colored car
with Plate No. PNS 313, a picture of the same car, and portion of the house and ground, and
another picture of the same car bearing Plate No. PNS 313 and a picture of the house and the
garage, 19 does not prove that she acted in an immoral manner. They have no evidentiary value
according to her. The pictures were taken by a photographer from a private security agency and who
was not presented during the hearings. Further, the respondent presented the Resolution of the
Provincial Fiscal of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427 dismissing the complaint filed by Leslie Ui
against respondent for lack of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged 20 and
the dismissal of the appeal by the Department of Justice21 to bolster her argument that she was not
guilty of any immoral or illegal act because of her relationship with Carlos Ui. In fine, respondent
claims that she entered the relationship with Carlos Ui in good faith and that her conduct cannot be
considered as willful, flagrant, or shameless, nor can it suggest moral indifference. She fell in love
with Carlos Ui whom she believed to be single, and, that upon her discovery of his true civil status,
she parted ways with him.

In the Memorandum 22 filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant Leslie Ui, she prayed for the
disbarment of Atty. Iris Bonifacio and reiterated that respondent committed immorality by having
intimate relations with a married man which resulted in the birth of two (2) children. Complainant
testified that respondent's mother, Mrs. Linda Bonifacio, personally knew complainant and her
husband since the late 1970s because they were clients of the bank where Mrs. Bonifacio was the
Branch Manager. 23 It was thus highly improbable that respondent, who was living with her parents as
of 1986, would not have been informed by her own mother that Carlos Ui was a married man.
Complainant likewise averred that respondent committed disrespect towards the Commission for
submitting a photocopy of a document containing an intercalated date.

In her Reply to Complainant's Memorandum 24 , respondent stated that complainant miserably failed
to show sufficient proof to warrant her disbarment. Respondent insists that contrary to the
allegations of complainant, there is no showing that respondent had knowledge of the fact of
marriage of Carlos Ui to complainant. The allegation that her mother knew Carlos Ui to be a married
man does not prove that such information was made known to respondent.

Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar Discipline submitted its Report and
Recommendation, finding that:

In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was courted by Carlos Ui, the
latter represented himself to be single. The Commission does not find said claim too difficult
to believe in the light of contemporary human experience.

Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he represents himself to be
single, separated, or without any firm commitment to another woman. The reason therefor is
not hard to fathom. By their very nature, single women prefer single men.

The records will show that when respondent became aware the (sic) true civil status of
Carlos Ui, she left for the United States (in July of 1988). She broke off all contacts with him.
When she returned to the Philippines in March of 1989, she lived with her brother, Atty.
 Teodoro Bonifacio, Jr. Carlos Ui and respondent only talked to each other because of the
children whom he was allowed to visit. At no time did they live together.

Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find any act on the part of
respondent that can be considered as unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a
high degree. To be sure, she was more of a victim that (sic) anything else and should
deserve compassion rather than condemnation. Without cavil, this sad episode destroyed
her chance of having a normal and happy family life, a dream cherished by every single girl.

xxx xxx xxx

Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a Notice of
Resolution dated December 13, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, the complaint
for Gross Immorality against Respondent is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio
is REPRIMANDED for knowingly and willfully attaching to her Answer a falsified Certificate of
Marriage with a stern warning that a repetition of the same will merit a more severe penalty.

We agree with the findings aforequoted.

The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice of the
legal profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject
to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics. The
requisites for admission to the practice of law are:

a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;

b. a resident thereof;

c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;

d. a person of good moral character;

e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, are filed or pending in
court;

f. possess the required educational qualifications; and

g. pass the bar examinations. 25 (Emphasis supplied)

Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant
must possess good moral character. More importantly, possession of good moral character must be
continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss
thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. It has been held —

If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued
possession of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal
profession. Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good
moral character. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).

A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition
to professional probity.

It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly
immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer
unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be
unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants
disbarment.

Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless,
and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members
of the community." (7 C.J.S. 959). 26
In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she met Carlos Ui, she
knew and believed him to be single. Respondent fell in love with him and they got married and as a
result of such marriage, she gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her knowledge of the true civil
status of Carlos Ui, she left him.

Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of respondent are not only
far from simple, they will have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners
should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be
before. This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with
a higher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle their personal affairs with greater
caution. The facts of this case lead us to believe that perhaps respondent would not have found
herself in such a compromising situation had she exercised prudence and been more vigilant in
finding out more about Carlos Ui's personal background prior to her intimate involvement with him.

Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused respondent's suspicion that
something was amiss in her relationship with Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing questions.
For instance, respondent admitted that she knew that Carlos Ui had children with a woman from
Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she never exerted the slightest effort to find out if Carlos Ui and
this woman were indeed unmarried. Also, despite their marriage in 1987, Carlos Ui never lived with
respondent and their first child, a circumstance that is simply incomprehensible considering
respondent's allegation that Carlos Ui was very open in courting her.

All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent in
managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui,
clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered
immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and
the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. 27 Moreover, for such conduct to
warrant disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and
false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree. 28

We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from
adulterous relationships . . . but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by
creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards." 29 Respondent's act of immediately
distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged moral
indifference and proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of
the legal profession. Complainant's bare assertions to the contrary deserve no credit. After all, the
burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary powers only if
she establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. 30 This, herein complainant
miserably failed to do.

On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent to her Answer, we find
improbable to believe the averment of respondent that she merely relied on the photocopy of the
Marriage Certificate which was provided her by Carlos Ui. For an event as significant as a marriage
ceremony, any normal bride would verily recall the date and year of her marriage. It is difficult to
fathom how a bride, especially a lawyer as in the case at bar, can forget the year when she got
married. Simply stated, it is contrary to human experience and highly improbable.

Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an attachment to her
pleading, especially so when she has personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances contained
therein. In attaching such Marriage Certificate with an intercalated date, the defense of good faith of
respondent on that point cannot stand.

It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality. The
1avv phi 1

legal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the
integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions
as officers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of morality.

WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged
immorality, is hereby DISMISSED.

However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a photocopy of her
Marriage Certificate, with an altered or intercalated date thereof, with a STERN WARNING that a
more severe sanction will be imposed on her for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the
future.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1
Records, Vol. I, p. 5.

2
Records, Vol. III, p. 8.

3
Records, Vol. III, p. 17.

4
Records, Vol. III, pp. 10-11.

5
Rilloraza Africa De Ocampo & Africa Law Offices.

6
Records, Vol. III, p. 12.

7
Records, Vol. III, p. 26.

8
Records, Vol. III, pp. 71, 73-74.

9
Records, Vol. III, pp. 75-78.

10
Records, Vol. III, pp. 113-117.

11
Records, Vol. III, pp. 125-126.

12
Records, Vol. III, pp. 114-115.

13
Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation. — The penalty
of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be
imposed upon any person who, knowingly making untruthful statements and not being
included in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under oath, or make an
affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an
oath in cases in which the law so requires.

Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an oath, shall
commit any of the falsehoods mentioned in this and the three preceding articles of
this section, shall suffer respective penalties provided therein.

Art. 184. Offering false testimony in evidence. — Any person who shall knowingly offer in
14

evidence a false witness or testimony in any judicial or official proceeding, shall be punished
as guilty of false testimony and shall suffer the respective penalties provided in this section.
SBC Case No. 519 July 31, 1997

PATRICIA FIGUEROA, complainant,

vs.
SIMEON BARRANCO, JR., respondent.

RESOLUTION

ROMERO, J.:

In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that respondent Simeon
Barranco, Jr. be denied admission to the legal profession. Respondent had passed the 1970 bar
examinations on the fourth attempt, after unsuccessful attempts in 1966, 1967 and 1968. Before be
could take his oath, however, complainant filed the instant petition averring that respondent and she
had been sweethearts, that a child out of wedlock was born to them and that respondent did not
fulfill his repeated promises to many her.

The facts were manifested in hearings held before Investigator Victor F. Sevilla in June and July
1971. Respondent and complainant were townmates in Janiuay, Iloilo. Since 1953, when they were
both in their teens, they were steadies. Respondent even acted as escort to complainant when she
reigned as Queen at the 1953 town fiesta. Complainant first acceded to sexual congress with
respondent sometime in 1960. Their intimacy yielded a son, Rafael Barranco, born on December 11,
1964.1 It was after the child was born, complainant alleged, that respondent first promised he would
marry her after he passes the bar examinations. Their relationship continued and respondent
allegedly made more than twenty or thirty promises of marriage. He gave only P10.00 for the child
on the latter's birthdays. Her trust in him and their relationship ended in 1971, when she learned that
respondent married another woman. Hence, this petition.

Upon complainant's motion, the Court authorized the taking of testimonies of witnesses by
deposition in 1972. On February 18, 1974, respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss
the case citing complainant's failure to comment on the motion of Judge Cuello seeking to be
relieved from the duty to take aforesaid testimonies by deposition. Complainant filed her comment
required and that she remains interested in the resolution of the present case. On June 18, 1974, the
Court denied respondent's motion to dismiss.

On October 2, 1980, the Court once again denied a motion to dismiss on the ground of
abandonment filed by respondent on September 17, 1979.2 Respondent's third motion to dismiss
was noted in the Court's Resolution dated September 15, 1982.3 In 1988, respondent repeated his
request, citing his election as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Janiuay, Iloilo from 1980-
1986, his active participation in civic organizations and good standing in the community as well as
the length of time this case has been pending as reasons to allow him to take his oath as a lawyer.4

On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for failure of complainant to
prosecute the case for an unreasonable period of time and to allow Simeon Barranco, Jr. to take the
lawyer's oath upon payment of the required fees.5

Respondent's hopes were again dashed on November 17, 1988 when the Court, in response to
complainant's opposition, resolved to cancel his scheduled oath-taking. On June 1, 1993, the Court
referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.

The IBP's report dated May 17, 1997 recommended the dismissal of the case and that respondent
be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.

We agree.

Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer's oath in 1971 because of the charge of gross
immorality made by complainant. To recapitulate, respondent bore an illegitimate child with his
sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who also claims that he did not fulfill his promise to marry her after he
passes the bar examinations.

We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the permanent exclusion of
respondent from the legal profession. His engaging in premarital sexual relations with complainant
and promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on his part but the same does not
constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the
act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. "A grossly immoral act is one that
is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be
reprehensible to a high degree."6 It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community.7

We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang8 quite relevant because mere intimacy between a man and
a woman, both of whom possess no impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any
deceit on the part of respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant the
imposition of disciplinary sanction against him, even if as a result of such relationship a child was
born out of wedlock.9

Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations were evidently consensual.
We do not find complainant's assertions that she had been forced into sexual intercourse, credible.
She continued to see and be respondent's girlfriend even after she had given birth to a son in 1964
and until 1971. All those years of amicable and intimate relations refute her allegations that she was
forced to have sexual congress with him. Complainant was then an adult who voluntarily and actively
pursued their relationship and was not an innocent young girl who could be easily led astray.
Unfortunately, respondent chose to marry and settle permanently with another woman. We cannot
castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual
bond which should be entered into because of love, not for any other reason.

We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act of revenge of a woman scorned, bitter and
unforgiving to the end. It is also intended to make respondent suffer severely and it seems,
perpetually, sacrificing the profession he worked very hard to be admitted into. Even assuming that
his past indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six years that respondent has been prevented from
being a lawyer constitute sufficient punishment therefor. During this time there appears to be no
other indiscretion attributed to him.10 Respondent, who is now sixty-two years of age, should thus be
allowed, albeit belatedly, to take the lawyer's oath.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. is
ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer upon payment of the proper fees.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT

SECOND DIVISION

Adm. Case No. 4680 August 29, 2000

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., complainant,

vs.
ATTYS. ANTONIO M. LLORENTE and LIGAYA P. SALAYON, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment against respondents Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon
for gross misconduct, serious breach of trust, and violation of the lawyer's oath in connection with
the discharge of their duties as members of the Pasig City Board of Canvassers in the May 8, 1995
elections. Salayon, then election officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), was
designated chairman of said Board, while Llorente, who was then City Prosecutor of Pasig City,
served as its ex oficio vice-chairman as provided by law.1 Complainant, now a senator, was also a
candidate for the Senate in that election.

Complainant alleges that, in violation of R.A. No. 6646, §27(b),2 respondents tampered with the votes
received by him, with the result that, as shown in the Statements of Votes (SoVs) and Certificate of
Canvass (CoC) pertaining to 1,263 precincts of Pasig City, (1) senatorial candidates Juan Ponce
Enrile, Anna Dominique Coseteng, Gregorio Honasan, Marcelo Fernan, Ramon Mitra, and Rodolfo
Biazon were credited with votes which were above the number of votes they actually received while,
on the other hand, petitioner's votes were reduced; (2) in 101 precincts, Enrile's votes were in
excess of the total number of voters who actually voted therein; and (3) the votes from 22 precincts
were twice recorded in 18 SoVs. Complainant maintains that, by signing the SoVs and CoC despite
respondents' knowledge that some of the entries therein were false, the latter committed a serious
breach of public trust and of their lawyers' oath.

Respondents denied the allegations against them. They alleged that the preparation of the SoVs
was made by the 12 canvassing committees which the Board had constituted to assist in the
canvassing. They claimed that the errors pointed out by complainant could be attributed to honest
mistake, oversight, and/or fatigue.

In his Consolidated Reply, complainant counters that respondents should be held responsible for the
illegal padding of the votes considering the nature and extent of the irregularities and the fact that
the canvassing of the election returns was done under their control and supervision.

On December 4, 1998, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, to which this matter had been referred
pursuant to Rule 139-B, §13, in relation to §20 of the Rules of Court, recommended the dismissal of
the complaint for lack of merit.3 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on March 11, 1999, but
his motion was denied in a resolution of the IBP Board of Governors dated April 22, 1999. On June
4, 1999, he filed this petition pursuant to Rule 139-B, §12(c).

It appears that complainant likewise filed criminal charges against respondents before the
COMELEC (E.O. Case No. 96-1132) for violation of R.A. No. 6646, §27(b). In its resolution dated
January 8, 1998, the COMELEC dismissed complainant's charges for insufficiency of evidence.
However, on a petition for certiorari filed by complainant,4 this Court set aside the resolution and
directed the COMELEC to file appropriate criminal charges against respondents. Reconsideration
was denied on August 15, 2000.

Considering the foregoing facts, we hold that respondents are guilty of misconduct.

First. Respondent Llorente seeks the dismissal of the present petition on the ground that it was filed
late. He contends that a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under Rule 139-B,
§12(c)5 and, therefore, the filing of such motion before the IBP Board of Governors did not toll the
running of the period of appeal. Respondent further contends that, assuming such motion can be
filed, petitioner nevertheless failed to indicate the date of his receipt of the April 22, 1999 resolution
of the IBP denying his motion for reconsideration so that it cannot be ascertained whether his
petition was filed within the 15-day period under Rule 139-B, §12(c).

The contention has no merit. The question of whether a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited
pleading or not under Rule 139-B, §12(c) has been settled in Halimao v. Villanueva,6 in which this
Court held:
 Although Rule 139-B, §12(C) makes no mention of a motion for reconsideration, nothing in
its text or in its history suggests that such motion is prohibited. It may therefore be filed within
15 days from notice to a party. Indeed, the filing of such motion should be encouraged before
resort is made to this Court as a matter of exhaustion of administrative remedies, to afford
the agency rendering the judgment an opportunity to correct any error it may have committed
through a misapprehension of facts or misappreciation of the evidenced.7

On the question whether petitioner's present petition was filed within the 15-day period provided
under Rule 139-B, §12(c), although the records show that it was filed on June 4, 1999, respondent
has not shown when petitioner received a copy of the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors
denying his motion for reconsideration. It would appear, however, that the petition was filed on time
because a copy of the resolution personally served on the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court
was received by it on May 18, 1999. Since copies of IBP resolutions are sent to the parties by mail, it
is possible that the copy sent to petitioner was received by him later than May 18, 1999. Hence, it
may be assumed that his present petition was filed within 15 days from his receipt of the IBP
resolution. In any event, the burden was on respondent, as the moving party, to show that the
petition in this case was filed beyond the 15-day period for filing it.

Even assuming that petitioner received the IBP resolution in question on May 18, 1999, i.e., on the
same date a copy of the same was received by the Office of the Bar Confidant, the delay would only
be two days.8 The delay may be overlooked, considering the merit of this case. Disbarment
proceedings are undertaken solely for public welfare. The sole question for determination is whether
a member of the bar is fit to be allowed the privileges as such or not. The complainant or the person
who called the attention of the Court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and
generally has no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice.9 For this reason, laws dealing with double jeopardy10 or prescription11 or with
procedure like verification of pleadings12 and prejudicial questions13 have no application to disbarment
proceedings.

Even in ordinary civil actions, the period for perfecting appeals is relaxed in the interest of justice and
equity where the appealed case is clearly meritorious. Thus, we have given due course to appeals
even though filed six,14 four,15 and three16 days late. In this case, the petition is clearly meritorious.

Second. The IBP recommends the dismissal of petitioner's complaint on the basis of the following:
(1) respondents had no involvement in the tabulation of the election returns, because when the
Statements of Votes (SoVs) were given to them, such had already been accomplished and only
needed their respective signatures; (2) the canvassing was done in the presence of watchers,
representatives of the political parties, the media, and the general public so that respondents would
not have risked the commission of any irregularity; and (3) the acts dealt with in R.A. No. 6646,
§27(b) are mala in se and not mala prohibita, and petitioner failed to establish criminal intent on the
part of respondents.17

The recommendation is unacceptable. In disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar, only
clear preponderance of evidence is required to establish liability.18 As long as the evidence presented
by complainant or that taken judicial notice of by the Court1 9 is more convincing and worthy of belief
than that which is offered in opposition thereto,20 the imposition of disciplinary sanction is justified..

In this case, respondents do not dispute the fact that massive irregularities attended the canvassing
of the Pasig City election returns. The only explanation they could offer for such irregularities is that
the same could be due to honest mistake, human error, and/or fatigue on the part of the members of
the canvassing committees who prepared the SoVs.

This is the same allegation made in Pimentel v. Commission on Elections.21 In rejecting this allegation
and ordering respondents prosecuted for violation of R.A. No. 6646, §27(b), this Court said:

There is a limit, we believe, to what can be construed as an honest mistake or oversight due
to fatigue, in the performance of official duty. The sheer magnitude of she error, not only in
the total number of votes garnered by the aforementioned candidates as reflected in the CoC
and the SoVs, which did not tally with that reflected in the election returns, but also in the
total number of votes credited for senatorial candidate Enrile which exceeded the total
number of voters who actually voted in those precincts during the May 8, 1995 elections,
renders the defense of honest mistake or oversight due to fatigue, as incredible and simply
unacceptable.22

Indeed, what is involved here is not just a case of mathematical error in the tabulation of votes per
precinct as reflected in the election returns and the subsequent entry of the erroneous figures in one
or two SoVs23 but a systematic scheme to pad the votes of certain senatorial candidates at the
expense of petitioner in complete disregard of the tabulation in the election returns. A cursory look at
the evidence submitted by petitioner reveals that, in at least 24 SoVs involving 101 precincts, the
votes for candidate Enrile exceeded the number of voters who actually voted in the said precincts
and, in 18 SoVs, returns from 22 precincts were-tabulated twice. In addition, as the Court noted in
Pimentel, the total number of votes credited to each of the seven senatorial candidates in question,
as reflected in the CoC, markedly differ from those indicated in the SoVs.24

Despite the fact that these discrepancies, especially the double recording of the returns from 22
precincts and the variation in the tabulation of votes as reflected in the SoVs and CoC, were
apparent on the face of these documents and that the variation involves substantial number of votes,
respondents nevertheless certified the SoVs as true and correct. Their acts constitute misconduct.

Respondent Llorente's contention that he merely certified the genuineness and due execution of the
SoVs but not their correctness is belied by the certification which reads:

WE HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing Statement of Votes by . . . [p]recinct is true and
correct. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we sign these presents at the City/Municipality of
___________ Province of ________ this _______ day of May, 1995. (Emphasis added)

Nor does the fact that the canvassing was open to the public and observed by numerous individuals
preclude the commission of acts for which respondents are liable. The fact is that only they had
access to the SoVs and CoC and thus had the opportunity to compare them and detect the
discrepancies therein.

Now, a lawyer who holds a government position may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official.25 However, if the misconduct also
constitutes a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility or the lawyer's oath or is of such
character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or shows moral delinquency on his part, such
individual may be disciplined as a member of the bar for such misconduct.26

Here, by certifying as true and correct the SoVs in question, respondents committed a breach of
Rule 1.01 of the Code which stipulates that a lawyer shall not engage in "unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct." By express provision of Canon 6, this is made applicable to lawyers in
the government service. In addition, they likewise violated their oath of office as lawyers to "do no
falsehood."

Nowhere is the-need for lawyers to observe honesty both in their private and in their public dealings
better expressed in Sabayle v. Tandayag27 in which this Court said:

There is a strong public interest involved in requiring lawyers to behave at all times in a
manner consistent with truth and honor it is important that the common caricature that
lawyers by and large do not feel compelled to speak the truth and to act honestly, should not
become a common reality . . .28

It may be added that, as lawyers in the government service, respondents were under greater
obligation to observe this basic tenet of the profession because a public office is a public trust.

Third. Respondents' participation in the irregularities herein reflects on the legal profession, in
general, and on lawyers in government in particular. Such conduct in the performance of their official
duties, involving no less than the ascertainment of the popular will as expressed through the ballot,
would have merited for them suspension were it not for the fact that this is their first administrative
transgression and, in the case of Salayon, after a long public service.29 Under the circumstances, a
penalty of fine in the amount of P10,000.00 for each of the respondents should be sufficient.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondents Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon GUILTY of
misconduct and imposes on each of them a FINE in the amount of P10,000.00 with a WARNING
that commission of similar acts will be dealt with more severely. 1âw phi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 1203 May 15, 1903

In the matter of the suspension of HOWARD D. TERRELL from the practice of law.

Solicitor-General Araneta for Government.

W. A. Kincaid for defendant.

PER CURIAM:

Howard D. Terrell, an attorney-at-law, was ordered to show cause in the Court of First Instance, in
the city of Manila, on the 5th day of February, 1903, why he should not be suspended as a member
of the bar of the city of Manila for the reasons:

First, that he had assisted in the organization of the "Centro Bellas Artes" Club, after he had been
notified that the said organization was made for the purpose of evading the law then in force in said
city; and,

Secondly, for acting as attorney for said "Centro Bellas Artes" during the time of and after its
organization, which organization was known to him to be created for the purpose of evading the law.

The accused appeared on the return day, and by his counsel, W. A. Kincaid, made answer to these
charges, denying the same, and filed affidavits in answer thereto. After reading testimony given by
said Howard D. Terrell, in the case of the United States vs. H. D. Terrell,1 wherein he was charged
with estafa, and after reading the said affidavits in his behalf, and hearing his counsel, the court
below found, and decided as a fact, that the charges aforesaid made against Howard D. Terrell were
true, and thereupon made an order suspending him from his office as a lawyer in the Philippine
Islands, and directed the clerk of the court to transmit to this court a certified copy of the order of
suspension, as well as a full statement of the facts upon which the same was based.

We have carefully considered these facts, and have reached the conclusion that they were such as
to justify the court below in arriving at the conclusion that the knowledge and acts of the accused in
connection with the organization of the "Centro Bellas Artes" Club were of such a nature and
character as to warrant his suspension from practice.

The promoting of organizations, with knowledge of their objects, for the purpose of violating or
evading the laws against crime constitutes such misconduct on the part of an attorney, an officer of
the court, as amounts to malpractice or gross misconduct in his office, and for which he may be
removed or suspended. (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 21.) The assisting of a client in a scheme
which the attorney knows to be dishonest, or the conniving at a violation of law, are acts which justify
disbarment.

In this case, however, inasmuch as the defendant in the case of the United States, vs. Terrell was
acquitted on the charge of estafa, and has not, therefore, been convicted of crime, and as the acts
with which he is charged in this proceeding, while unprofessional and hence to be condemned, are
not criminal in their nature, we are of opinion that the ends of justice will be served by the
suspension of said Howard D. Terrell from the practice of law in the Philippine Islands for the term of
one year from the 7th day of February, 1903.

It is therefore directed that the said Howard D. Terrell be suspended from the practice of law for a
term of one year from February 7, 1903. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. 159486-88 November 25, 2003

PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN [SPECIAL DIVISION], HON. MINITA CHICO-NAZARIO,
HON. EDILBERTO SANDOVAL, HON. TERESITA LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

On 23 September 2003, this Court issued its resolution in the above-numbered case; it read:

"The case for consideration has been brought to this Court via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court filed by Joseph Ejercito Estrada, acting through his counsel Attorney Alan F.
Paguia, against the Sandiganbayan, et al. The Petition prays –

"1. That Chief Justice Davide and the rest of the members of the Honorable Court disqualify
themselves from hearing and deciding this petition;

"2. That the assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan be vacated and set aside; and

"3. That Criminal Cases No. 26558, No. 26565 and No. 26905 pending before the
Sandiganbayan be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

"Attorney Alan F. Paguia, speaking for petitioner, asserts that the inhibition of the members of the
Supreme Court from hearing the petition is called for under Rule 5.10 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct prohibiting justices or judges from participating in any partisan political activity which
proscription, according to him, the justices have violated by attending the ‘EDSA 2 Rally’ and by
authorizing the assumption of Vice-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to the Presidency in violation
of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that the justices have thereby prejudged a case that
would assail the legality of the act taken by President Arroyo. The subsequent decision of the Court
in Estrada v. Arroyo (353 SCRA 452 and 356 SCRA 108) is, petitioner states, a patent mockery of
justice and due process.

"Attorney Paguia first made his appearance for petitioner when he filed an Omnibus Motion on 19
May 2003, before the Sandiganbayan, asking that ‘the appointment of counsels de officio (sic) be
declared functus officio’ and that, being the now counsel de parte, he be notified of all subsequent
proceedings in Criminal Cases No. 26558, No. 26565 and No. 26905 pending therein. Finally,
Attorney Paguia asked that all the foregoing criminal cases against his client be dismissed.

"During the hearing of the Omnibus Motion on 30 May 2003, petitioner presented to the court several
portions of the book, entitled ‘Reforming the Judiciary,’ written by Justice Artemio Panganiban, to be
part of the evidence for the defense. On 9 June 2003, petitioner filed a motion pleading, among other
things, that –

"a) x x x President Estrada be granted the opportunity to prove the ‘truth’ of the statements
contained in Justice Artemio Panganiban’s book, ‘REFORMING THE JUDICIARY,’ in relation
to the prejudgment committed by the Supreme Court justices against President Estrada in
the subject case/s of Estrada v. Arroyo, 353 SCRA 452 and 356 SCRA 108; and,

"b) A subpoena ad testificandum and duces tecum be issued to Justice Artemio Panganiban,
Justice Antonio Carpio, Justice Renato Corona, Secretary Angelo Reyes of the Department
of National Defense, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Senator Aquilino Pimentel,
Jr., and Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. for them to testify and bring whatever supporting
documents they may have in relation to their direct and indirect participation in the
proclamation of Vice President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on January 20, 2001, as cited in the
book of Justice Panganiban, including the material events that led to that proclamation and
the ruling/s in the Estrada vs. Arroyo, supra.’ (Rollo, pp. 6-7.)

"The ‘truth’ referred to in paragraph a) of the relief sought in the motion of petitioner pertains
to what he claims should have been included in the resolution of the Sandiganbayan; viz:

‘The request of the movant is simply for the Court to include in its Joint Resolution the TRUTH of the
acts of Chief Justice Davide, et al., last January 20, 2001 in:

‘a) going to EDSA 2;

 ‘b) authorizing the proclamation of Vice-President Arroyo as President on the ground of
‘permanent disability’ even without proof of compliance with the corresponding constitutional
conditions, e.g., written declaration by either the President or majority of his cabinet; and

‘c) actually proclaiming Vice-President Arroyo on that same ground of permanent disability.

‘It is patently unreasonable for the Court to refuse to include these material facts which are obviously
undeniable. Besides, it is the only defense of President Estrada.’ (Petition, Rollo, pp. 13-14.)

"On 2 July 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued an order denying the foregoing motion, as well as the
motion to dismiss, filed by petitioner. Forthwith, petitioner filed a ‘Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon’ of
the foregoing order. According to Attorney Paguia, during the hearing of his ‘Mosyong
Pangrekonsiderasyon’ on 11 June 2003, the three justices of the Special Division of the
Sandiganbayan made manifest their bias and partiality against his client. Thus, he averred,
Presiding Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario supposedly employed foul and disrespectful language
when she blurted out, ‘Magmumukha naman kaming gago,’ (Rollo, p. 13.) and Justice Teresita
Leonardo-De Castro characterized the motion as insignificant even before the prosecution could file
its comments or opposition thereto, (Rollo, p. 12.) remarking in open court that to grant Estrada’s
motion would result in chaos and disorder. (Ibid.) Prompted by the alleged ‘bias and partial attitude’
of the Sandiganbayan justices, Attorney Paguia filed, on 14 July 2003, a motion for their
disqualification. On 31 July 2003, petitioner received the two assailed resolutions, i.e., the resolution
(Promulgated on 30 July 2003.) of 28 July 2003, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of 6
July 2003; viz:

‘WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused-movant Joseph Ejercito Estrada’s ‘Mosyong

Pangrekonsiderasyon’ (Na tumutukoy sa Joint Resolution ng Hulyo 2, 2003) dated July 6, 2003 is
DENIED for lack of merit.’ (Rollo, p. 37.)

"and the resolution (Promulgated on 30 July 2003.) of 25 July 2003, denying petitioner’s motion for
disqualification of 14 July 2003; viz:

‘WHEREFORE, prescinding from all the foregoing, the Court, for want of merit, hereby DENIES the
Motion for Disqualification.’ (Rollo, p. 48.)

"The instant petition assailing the foregoing orders must be DISMISSED for gross insufficiency in
substance and for utter lack of merit. The Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion,
an indispensable requirement to warrant a recourse to the extraordinary relief of petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. On the one hand, petitioner would disclaim
the authority and jurisdiction of the members of this tribunal and, on the other hand, he would
elevate the petition now before it to challenge the two resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. He
denounces the decision as being a patent mockery of justice and due process. Attorney Pagula went
on to state that-

‘The act of the public officer, if LAWFUL, is the act of the public office. But the act of the public
1awp++i1

officer, if UNLAWFUL, is not the act of the public office. Consequently, the act of the justices, if
LAWFUL, is the act of the Supreme Court. But the act of the justices, if UNLAWFUL, is not the act of
the Supreme Court. It is submitted that the Decision in ESTRADA vs. ARROYO being patently
unlawful in view of Rule 5.10 of the CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, is not the act of the Supreme
Court but is merely the wrong or trespass of those individual Justices who falsely spoke and acted in
the name of the Supreme Court. (Urbano vs. Chavez, 183 SCRA [347]). Furthermore, it would seem
absurd to allow the Justices to use the name of the Supreme Court as a shield for their UNLAWFUL
act.’ (Petition, Rollo, p. 11.)

"Criticism or comment made in good faith on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or

unsoundness, of a decision of the Court would be welcome for, if well-founded, such reaction can
enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed. (In Re Sotto, 82 Phil
595.)

"The ruling in Estrada v. Arroyo, being a final judgment, has long put to end any question pertaining
to the legality of the ascension of Arroyo into the presidency. By reviving the issue on the validity of
the assumption of Mme. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to the presidency, Attorney Paguia is vainly
seeking to breathe life into the carcass of a long dead issue.

"Attorney Paguia has not limited his discussions to the merits of his client’s case within the judicial
forum; indeed, he has repeated his assault on the Court in both broadcast and print media. Rule
13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a member of the bar from making such
public statements on any pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party. By his
acts, Attorney Paguia may have stoked the fires of public dissension and posed a potentially
dangerous threat to the administration of justice.
"It is not the first time that Attorney Paguia has exhibited similar conduct towards the Supreme Court.
In a letter, dated 30 June 2003, addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., and Associate
Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, he has demanded, in a clearly disguised form of forum shopping, for
several advisory opinions on matters pending before the Sandiganbayan. In a resolution, dated 08
July 2003, this Court has strongly warned Attorney Alan Paguia, on pain of disciplinary sanction, to
desist from further making, directly or indirectly, similar submissions to this Court or to its Members.
But, unmindful of the well-meant admonition to him by the Court, Attorney Paguia appears to persist
on end.

"WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED, and the Court hereby orders
Attorney Alan Paguia, counsel for petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, to SHOW CAUSE, within ten
days from notice hereof, why he should not be sanctioned for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an
officer of the Court."

On 10 October 2003, Atty. Paguia submitted his compliance with the show-cause order. In a three-
page pleading, Atty. Paguia, in an obstinate display of defiance, repeated his earlier claim of political
partisanship against the members of the Court.

Canon 5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which Atty. Paguia has tirelessly quoted to give some
semblance of validity for his groundless attack on the Court and its members, provides -

"Rule 5.10. A judge is entitled to entertain personal views on political questions. But to avoid
suspicion of political partisanship, a judge shall not make political speeches, contribute to party
funds, publicly endorse candidates for political office or participate in other partisan political
activities."

Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code defines the term "partisan political activities;" the law
states:

"The term ‘election campaign’ or ‘partisan political activity’ refers to an act designed to promote the
election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office which shall include:

"(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons for
the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate;

"(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar
assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against a candidate.

"(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or against

the election of any candidate for public office;

"(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or oppose

the election of any candidate; or

"(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate."

It should be clear that the phrase "partisan political activities," in its statutory context, relates to acts
designed to cause the success or the defeat of a particular candidate or candidates who have filed
certificates of candidacy to a public office in an election. The taking of an oath of office by any
incoming President of the Republic before the Chief Justice of the Philippines is a traditional official
function of the Highest Magistrate. The assailed presence of other justices of the Court at such an
event could be no different from their appearance in such other official functions as attending the
Annual State of the Nation Address by the President of the Philippines before the Legislative
Department.

The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; it will not denounce criticism made by anyone against
the Court for, if well-founded, can truly have constructive effects in the task of the Court, but it will
not countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the erosion of our people’s faith in the judicial system, let
alone, by those who have been privileged by it to practice law in the Philippines. 1âw phi 1

Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that the lawyer should observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers and, indeed, should insist on similar
conduct by others. In liberally imputing sinister and devious motives and questioning the impartiality,
integrity, and authority of the members of the Court, Atty. Paguia has only succeeded in seeking to
impede, obstruct and pervert the dispensation of justice.

The attention of Atty. Paguia has also been called to the mandate of Rule 13.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility prohibiting a member of the bar from making such public statements on
a case that may tend to arouse public opinion for or against a party. Regrettably, Atty. Paguia has
persisted in ignoring the Court’s well-meant admonition.

On the 7th September 2003 issue of the Daily Tribune, Atty. Paguia wrote to say -

"What is the legal effect of that violation of President Estrada’s right to due process of law? It renders
the decision in Estrada vs. Arroyo unconstitutional and void. The rudiments of fair play were not
observed. There was no fair play since it appears that when President Estrada filed his petition,
Chief Justice Davide and his fellow justices had already committed to the other party - GMA - with a
judgment already made and waiting to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the
charade of a formal hearing. After the justices had authorized the proclamation of GMA as president,
can they be expected to voluntarily admit the unconstitutionality of their own act?"

Unrelentingly, Atty. Paguia has continued to make public statements of like nature.

The Court has already warned Atty. Paguia, on pain of disciplinary sanction, to become mindful of
his grave responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court. Apparently, he has chosen not
to at all take heed.

WHEREFORE, Attorney Alan Paguia is hereby indefinitely suspended from the practice of law,
effective upon his receipt hereof, for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the Court.

Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all courts of the land through the Office of the Court Administrator.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,

Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., no part.
A.C. No. 5704 May 8, 2009

WILLEM KUPERS, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JOHNSON B. HONTANOSAS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

This administrative case against respondent Atty. Johnson B. Hontanosas was triggered by a letter-
complaint1 dated April 15, 2002 of complainant Willem Kupers to the Court through the Court
Administrator. The Court Administrator referred the letter to the Bar Confidant on April 25, 2002.2 On
May 7, 2002, the Acting Bar Confidant wrote complainant that for the court to take cognizance of an
administrative case against a lawyer, a verified complaint must be filed in nineteen (19) copies
together with supporting documents.3 Thus, complainant was told to submit an additional thirteen
(13) copies of his complaint. On May 25, 2002, complainant complied and submitted an additional
thirteen (13) copies of his complaint.

Complainant alleged that respondent4 had: (1) prepared and notarized contracts that are both invalid
and illegal as these contracts violated the limitations on aliens leasing private lands; (2) served
conflicting interests since he performed legal services for adverse parties; (3) refused to furnish
copies of the contracts he notarized to the parties thereof; (4) notarized documents without keeping
copies thereof and (5) failed to properly discharge his duty to his client Karl Novak, particularly when
respondent allegedly refused to accept his dismissal as counsel for Novak, failed to turn over
Novak’s documents thereafter, handled legal matters without adequate preparation, betrayed
Novak’s trust and refused to see Novak with a translator of Novak’s choice.

Complainant claimed that as counsel for Hans and Vivian Busse, respondent had prepared a
memorandum of agreement and a contract of lease between the spouses Busse and Hochstrasser,
a Swiss national. Under said agreement, Hochstrasser would lease Vivian Busse’s property in Alcoy,
Cebu for fifty (50) years, renewable for another fifty (50) years.5 Complainant added that respondent
had acted despite conflict of interest on his part since the Spouses Busse and Hochstrasser were
both his clients. Respondent prepared a similar agreement and lease contract between the spouses
Busse and Karl Emberger, a Swiss national, over another parcel of land in Alcoy, Cebu. This time
the lease contract was for a period of forty nine (49) years renewable for another forty nine (49)
years.6 All four (4) documents were notarized by respondent. It was also averred that respondent
drafted two deeds of sale over the leased properties of Spouses Busse to Naomie Melchior, a
Filipina, and Karl Novak, a German National.

The Court required respondent to comment on the charges.7 He answered that if anyone should be
penalized, it should be respondent for meddling in the affairs of his clients and otherwise making a
mockery of the Philippine legal system by deceitfully passing as material facts opinionated, baseless
and false allegations as well as a falsified document.8 Respondent also moved that complainant be
made to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt.

Complainant filed a reply on November 6, 2002, in which he stated among other things that
respondent is like Pontius Pilatus [sic].9

On February 10, 2003, the Court resolved to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.10

In lieu of hearings, Commissioner Doroteo Aguila required the parties to file their respective
memoranda due to the limited time period given by the Court. The parties did. The Commissioner
found that respondent had prepared and notarized contracts that violated Presidential Decree No.
471 (P.D. No. 471) since leases of private lands by aliens cannot exceed twenty five (25) years,
renewable for another twenty five (25) years.11 Nonetheless, complainant failed to prove the other
charges he had hurled against respondent as the former was not privy to the agreements between
respondent and the latter’s clients. Moreover, complainant failed to present any concrete proof of the
other charges. The commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for two (2) months.

Upon review, the IBP Board of Governors disregarded the recommendation of the commissioner and
dismissed the complaint on February 27, 2004.12 The Board of Governors ratiocinated that
suspension was not warranted since respondent did not really perform an illegal act. The act was not
illegal per se since the lease agreement was likely made to reflect the agreement among the parties
without considering the legality of the situation. While admittedly respondent may be guilty of
ignorance of the law or plain negligence, the Board dismissed the complaint out of compassion.
We reject the Board’s recommendation. We stress that much is demanded from those who engage
in the practice of law because they have a duty not only to their clients, but also to the court, to the
bar, and to the public.13 The lawyer’s diligence and dedication to his work and profession ideally
should not only promote the interests of his clients. A lawyer has the duty to attain the ends of justice
by maintaining respect for the legal profession.14

The investigating commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors both found that the majority of the
charges against the respondent lack proof. Our own review of the records confirms that most of the
charges are unsupported by evidence. Such charges are simply the unsubstantiated accusations in
the complaint with nary a whit of concrete proof such as affidavits of the clients whose trust
respondents had allegedly breached.

However, administrative cases against lawyers are sui generes and as such the complainant in the
case need not be the aggrieved party. Thus even if complainant is not a party to the contracts, the
charge of drafting and notarizing contracts in contravention of law holds weight. A plain reading of
these contracts clearly shows that they violate the law limiting lease of private lands to aliens for a
period of twenty five (25) years renewable for another twenty five (25) years.

In his defense, respondent avers that the assailed contracts are valid under Republic Act No. 7652
(R.A. No. 7652), entitled "An Act Allowing The Long-Term Lease of Private Lands by Foreign
Investors." They add that these contracts should not be viewed purely as lease contracts since they
allow the leasor to nominate a Filipino citizen or corporation to purchase the subject property within
the lease period. Respondent’s defenses are frivolous. Assuming that it can be duly established that
his foreign clients are indeed "foreign investors" as contemplated under R.A. No. 7652,15 said law
allows the lease for the original period of fifty (50) years, renewable for another period of twenty five
(25) years, well below the periods of fifty (50) years renewable for another fifty (50) years, and forty-
nine (49) years renewable for another forty-nine (49) years respectively, stipulated in the two lease
agreements. 1avv phi 1

Respondent, by drafting the questioned lease agreements, caused his clients to violate Section 7 of
R.A. No. 7652 which states:

Sec. 7. Penal Provision. — Any contract or agreement made or executed in violation of any of the
following prohibited acts shall be null and void ab initio and both contracting parties shall be
punished by a fine of not less than One Hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000) nor more than One
million pesos (₱1,000,000), or imprisonment of six (6) months to (6) years, or both, at the discretion
of the court:

(1) Any provision in the lease agreement stipulating a lease period in excess of that provided
in paragraph (1) of Section 4;

(2) Use of the leased premises for the purpose contrary to existing laws of the land, public
order, public policy, morals, or good customs;

(3) Any agreement or agreements resulting is the lease of land in excess of the area
approved by the DTI: Provided, That, where the excess of the totality of the area leased is
due to the acts of the lessee, the lessee shall be held solely liable therefor: Provided, further,
That, in the case of corporations, associations, or partnerships, the president, manager,
director, trustee, or officers responsible for the violation hereof shall bear the criminal liability.
(Emphasis ours)

In preparing and notarizing the illegal lease contracts, respondent violated the Attorney’s Oath and
several canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility. One of the foremost sworn duties of an
attorney-at-law is to "obey the laws of the Philippines." This duty is enshrined in the Attorney’s
Oath16 and in Canon 1, which provides that "(a) lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of
the land and promote respect for law and legal processes." Rule 1.02 under Canon 1 states: "A
lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at decreasing confidence in
the legal systems."

The other canons of professional responsibility which respondent transgressed are the following:

CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.

xxx

Rule 15.07- A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of
hairness.
CANON 17 – A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE
MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

Aside from constituting violation of the lawyer’s oath, the acts of respondents also amount to gross
misconduct under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. ― A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney
for a party to a case without authority so to do. x x x

The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously
affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. While we will not hesitate to
remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence calls for it,
we will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.

We cannot accept, however, the plea of leniency expressed by the IBP Board of Governors in behalf
of respondent. We also find that the suspension for two (2) months recommended by the IBP
Investigating Commissioner too light. We find six (6) months suspension to be a sufficient sanction
against respondent.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Johnson B. Hontanosas, is found GUILTY of violating the lawyer’s
oath and gross misconduct. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months with
a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Respondent’s suspension is effective upon notice hereof. Let notice of this Resolution be spread in
respondent’s record as an attorney in this Court, and notice of the same served on the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts
concerned.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA J. LEONARDO DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

Footnotes

* Acting chairperson as replacement of Associate Justice Leonardo Quisumbing who is on

official leave per Special Order No. 618.

** Additional member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 619.

1 Rollo (Vol. 1), pp. 5-6.

2 Id. at 4.

3 Id. at 2.

4 Records (Vol. 1), pp. 5-21, with annexes.

5 Id. at 21-28.
6 Id. at 29-34.

7 Id. at 162.

8 Id. at 168-216, with annexes.

9 Id. at 286- 328, with annexes.

10 Id. at 376.

11 Records (Vol. V), pp. 72-76.

12 Id. at 70-71.

13 Endaya v. Atty. OCA, 547 Phil. 314, 329 (2003).

14 Santiago v. Fojas, A.C. No. 4103, 7 September 1995, 248 SCRA 68, 75-76.

15
See Section 3(1), Rep. Act No. 7652. "Investing in the Philippines" shall mean making an
equity investment in the Philippines through actual remittance of foreign exchange or transfer
of assets, whether in the form of capital goods, patents, formulae, or other technological
rights or processes, upon registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission."

See also Section 5(1) of the same law. "Foreign individuals, corporations,
associations, or partnerships not otherwise investing in the Philippines as defined
herein shall continue to be covered by Presidential Decree No. 471 and other
existing laws in lease of land to foreigners."

16 Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec. 20(a).

 FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 6738, August 12, 2015

GABRIELA CORONEL, Petitioner, v. ATTY. NELSON A. CUNANAN, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

A lawyer who proposes to his client a recourse or remedy that is contrary to law, public
policy, public order and public morals, or that lessens the public confidence in the legal
system is guilty of gross misconduct, and should be suspended from the practice of law,
or even disbarred.

Antecedents

On May 17, 2005, the complainant initiated this disbarment case against Atty. Nelson
A. Cunanan, alleging that he had advised and convinced her to engage him for the
transfer of Original Certificate of Title No. 9616 and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
72074, which were both registered in the name of their deceased grandparents, to her
name and to the names of her co-heirs by direct registration with the Office of the
Register of Deeds in violation of the proper legal procedure; that following the
engagement, he had received from her the amount of P70,000.00 for the payment of
the transfer and other fees, and had misappropriated the same; and that he had not
returned the money and the owner's duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-72074.1 cralawrednad

The Court ordered the respondent to comment on the complaint on July 11, 2005,2 but
he complied only on March 7, 2006.3 In turn, the complainant submitted her reply on
March 20, 2006.4 cralawrednad

Proceedings before the IBP

On July 31, 2006, the Court referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.5 cralawrednad

On February 21, 2007, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline set the mandatory
conference on April 11, 2007, and notified the parties thereof.6 At the hearing, the
parties defined the issues upon which they would submit their position papers. The
complainant stated the issue to be whether or not the actions of the respondent
constituted malpractice, deceit or gross misconduct. The respondent defined the issue
to be whether or not he had acted in a deceitful manner or committed any misconduct
by entering into the contract of legal services with the complainant based on terms
mutually agreed upon between them. Only the complainant submitted her verified
position paper.7 cralawrednad

On February 20, 2008, the complainant requested the early resolution of her
complaint.8 On September 1, 2009, however, she submitted an affidavit of
desistance,9 whereby she stated that she had meanwhile made amends with the
respondent, and that the disbarment complaint had been due to a misunderstanding
between them. A few days later, the parties also submitted their Joint Motion To
Dismiss dated September 15, 2009,10 which the Court referred to the IBP on November
18, 2009.11 cralawredna d

On May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued its resolution adopting and
approving, with modification, the report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner finding the respondent guilty of malpractice and negligence;
recommending his suspension from the practice of law for six months; and requiring his
return of the P70,000.00 to the complainant.12 cralaw rednad

On August 8, 2011, the respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration,13 citing the
affidavit of desistance executed by the complainant and their Joint Motion to Dismiss.
The IBP Board of Governors denied the Motion for Reconsideration on December 15,
2012.14cralawred nad
 Report and Recommendation of the IBP

The report of the Investigating Commissioner recited the following summary of the
factual antecedents, to wit:
cralawlawlibra ry

Complainant recounts that sometime in October 2003, she engaged the services
Respondent to transfer to her name and her co-heirs the parcels of land covered under
TCT No. T-72074 and OCT. No. 9616, which certificates of title are both registered
under the name of Complainant's deceased grandparents. Respondent advised
Complainant that for the registration of TCT. No. T-72074, the transfer may be effected
by two means namely: first, by way of "ordinary procedure"; and second, by way of
"direct registration". Ordinary procedure involves transfer by way of execution of Deed
of Extrajudicial Settlement, publication, payment of capital gains tax, etc., and
registration with the Register of Deeds. Transfer by this means will cost Complainant an
estimate of Php56,000.00 with the amount of Php50,000.00 more or less to be spent
for the payment of taxes. Transfer by this means may take a period of at least five (5)
months. Direct registration, on the other hand, involves preparing documents upon
advise of the Register of Deeds and will involve an estimated cost to be negotiated with
the officials or employees of the Register of Deeds to a flat amount of Php50,000.00.
Transfer by this means will take only one (1) month or less. As for the transfer of OCT
No. 9616, Respondent advised Complainant of the filing of a petition for issuance of
Owner's Duplicate Copy and thereafter, to proceed with the transfer in the same
manner as that outlined in the transfer of TCT. No. T-72074.

It appears that Complainant and Respondent agreed on the direct registration approach
because sometime thereafter, Respondent billed Complainant with the following fees:
Php50,000.00 as package deal for the direct transfer of title for TCT. No. T-72074;
another Php50,000 as package deal for the transfer of title for OCT No. 9616; Php5,000
for litigation expenses for issuance of duplicate copy of OCT 9616 and another
Phpl5,000 as professional fees, to which Complainant agreed.

On October 28, 2003, Complainant paid Respondent Php70,000.00 pesos [sic].

According to Complainant, she thereafter tried to contact Respondent but the latter
cannot be contacted. Thus, she was constrained to write Respondent a letter dated
March 5, 2004 asking the latter to contact her.

Subsequently, Respondent sent to Complainant an Extra-judicial Settlement

Agreement. Complainant had it signed and sent back to Respondent. Thereafter,
Respondent asked Complainant for the owner's duplicate copy of TCT. No. T-72074,
which complainant, likewise, sent to Respondent.

Afterwards, Complainant heard nothing from Respondent. When her request for a call
from Respondent was not heeded, Complainant wrote Respondent demanding that the
amount of Php70,000 which she paid to Respondent be returned to her as well as the
owner's duplicate copy of TCT. No. 72074. When Respondent refused, Complainant filed
the instant disbarment case charging the former with deceit, malpractice and gross
misconduct.

In his Comment, Respondent admitted most of the allegations of Complainant.

However, he denied that there was deceit on his part insisting that he clearly outlined
to Complainant the available procedures for the transfer of title and afforded
Complainant the opportunity to think about the options. He claimed that there was
nothing illicit in suggesting the direct registration scheme as the same was advised to
him by the officials and employees of the Register of Deeds upon his inquiry thereto.
Respondent further argued that he was in constant communication with Complainant
and that he processed the transaction for the transfer of registration but that the
transfer could not be effected because the documents were inadequate and due, also,
to the fact that several officials and employees of the Register of Deeds with whom he
was transacting were transferred to other offices due to a revamp in the said office.
Respondent added that he continued with the processing of the transfer and that he
submitted the matter anew for the approval of the new officials of the Register of
Deeds. However, the new officers have not yet approved the same.15
Ruling of the Court

We AFFIRM the findings and recommendations of the IBP.

A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for law and legal processes.16 He shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct;17 or counsel or abet activities aimed at a defiance of the law or at a
lessening of confidence in the legal system.18 He should advise his client to uphold the
law, not to violate or disobey it. Conversely, he should not recommend to his client any
recourse or remedy that is contrary to law, public policy, public order, and public
morals.

Although the respondent outlined to the complainant the "ordinary procedure" of an

extrajudicial settlement of estate as a means of transferring title, he also proposed the
option of "direct registration" despite being fully aware that such option was actually a
shortcut intended to circumvent the law, and thus patently contrary to law. The transfer
under the latter option would bypass the immediate heirs of their grandparents (i.e.,
the complainant's parent and her co-heirs parents), and consequently deprive the
Government of the corresponding estate taxes and transfer fees aside from requiring
the falsification of the transfer documents. He assured that he could enable the direct
transfer with the help of his contacts in the Office of the Register of Deeds and other
relevant agencies of the Government, which meant that he would be bribing some
officials and employees of those offices. The proposal of "direct registration" was
unquestionably unlawful, immoral and deceitful all at once.

The respondent argues that his proposal did not deceive the complainant because he
had informed her on all the "steps" to be taken on her behalf. His argument misses the
point, which is that he made the proposal despite its patent illegality in order to take
advantage of the complainant's limited legal knowledge of the regular procedures for
the transfer of title under circumstances of intestacy. In other words, he made her
agree to the "direct registration" through deceitful misrepresentation. He then ignored
the written demands from her, which forced her in the end to finally charge him with
disbarment. He thereby abused his being a lawyer to the hilt in order to cause not only
his client but also the public in general to doubt the sincerity of the members of the Law
Profession, and consequently diminish the public's trust and confidence in lawyers in
general.

Lastly, the respondent pleads for the Court to consider in his favor the fact that the
complainant subsequently executed the affidavit of desistance, and later on the Joint
Motion To Dismiss.

His plea is unworthy of consideration.

An administrative case proceeds independently from the interest, or lack thereof, of the
complainant, who only sets the case in motion through the filing of the complaint. Upon
her doing so, she becomes a witness to testify against the respondent lawyer. The
disciplinary proceedings against the lawyer do not involve private interests, but only
how the lawyer conducts himself in his public and private lives. Accordingly, neither the
affidavit of desistance nor the Joint Motion To Dismiss should bear any weight, or be
relevant in determining whether or not the respondent was fit to remain as a member
of the Law Profession. The desistance by the complainant was a matter that was the
concern only of the parties, and was non-binding on the Court. What will be decisive in
this administrative proceeding are the facts borne out by the evidence competently
adduced herein.19 cralawredna d

The complainant testified that the respondent had proposed to her two methods to
transfer title, and one was patently contrary to law. She presented documentary proof
to her testimony against him. She established that he had not communicated with her
after receiving the money and the documents. The affidavit of desistance and the Joint
Motion To Dismiss only came about after the complainant had completed her testimony,
a true indication that their submission was done in hindsight and insincerely. His
remorse, if it was that, came too late.

In Bengco v. Bernardo,20 the respondent lawyer was suspended for one year from the
practice of law because he had represented that he could expedite the titling of the
clients' property with the help of his contacts in various government offices, including
the Department of Natural Resources, the Community Environment Office, and Register
of Deeds. After convincing his clients through such representations, and taken their
money for that purpose, he did not bother to even update them on the progress of the
undertaking. In that regard, he was also convicted of estafa.

In Espinosa v. Omaña,21 the respondent lawyer was also suspended for one year from
the practice of law for advising her clients that they could legally live separately and
dissolve their marriage by executing the Kasunduan ng Paghihiwalay (Agreement to
Separate) that she had drafted. Her advice was blatantly contrary to law and public
policy.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court ADOPTS and AFFIRMS the Resolution dated May, 14,
2011 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors, WITH
MODIFICATION as to the recommended penalty by suspending respondent Atty.
Nelson A. Cunanan from the practice of law for one year effective immediately upon his
receipt of this decision.

The Court ORDERS respondent Atty. Cunanan to RETURN to the complainant the
amount of P70,000.00 within 10 days from receipt of this decision, and to report on his
compliance within five days thereafter.

Let copies of this decision be entered in the personal records of respondent Atty.
Cunanan in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts
in the country.

SO ORDERED. chanrobles virtuallawlibrary

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-28546 July 30, 1975

VENANCIO CASTANEDA and NICETAS HENSON, petitioners,

vs.
PASTOR D. AGO, LOURDES YU AGO and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Quijano and Arroyo for petitioners.

Jose M. Luison for respondents.

CASTRO, J.:

The parties in this case, except Lourdes Yu Ago, have been commuting to this Court for more than a
decade.

In 1955 the petitioners Venancio Castañeda and Nicetas Henson filed a replevin suit against Pastor
Ago in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover certain machineries (civil case 27251). In
1957 judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering Ago to return the machineries or pay
definite sums of money. Ago appealed, and on June 30, 1961 this Court, in Ago vs. Castañeda, L-
14066, affirmed the judgment. After remand, the trial court issued on August 25, 1961 a writ of
execution for the sum of P172,923.87. Ago moved for a stay of execution but his motion was denied,
and levy was made on Ago's house and lots located in Quezon City. The sheriff then advertised
them for auction sale on October 25, 1961. Ago moved to stop the auction sale, failing in which he
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the petition and
Ago appealed. On January 31,1966 this Court, in Ago vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-19718, affirmed
the dismissal. Ago thrice attempted to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff
from enforcing the writ of execution "to save his family house and lot;" his motions were denied, and
the sheriff sold the house and lots on March 9, 1963 to the highest bidders, the petitioners
Castañeda and Henson. Ago failed to redeem, and on April 17, 1964 the sheriff executed the final
deed of sale in favor of the vendees Castañeda and Henson. Upon their petition, the Court of First
Instance of Manila issued a writ of possession to the properties.

However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now joined by his wife, Lourdes Yu Ago, as his co-plaintiff,
filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City (civil case Q-7986) to annul the
sheriff's sale on the ground that the obligation of Pastor Ago upon which judgment was rendered
against him in the replevin suit was his personal obligation, and that Lourdes Yu Ago's one-half
share in their conjugal residential house and lots which were levied upon and sold by the sheriff
could not legally be reached for the satisfaction of the judgment. They alleged in their complaint that
wife Lourdes was not a party in the replevin suit, that the judgment was rendered and the writ of
execution was issued only against husband Pastor, and that wife Lourdes was not a party to her
husband's venture in the logging business which failed and resulted in the replevin suit and which
did not benefit the conjugal partnership.

The Court of First Instance of Quezon City issued an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction
restraining the petitioners, the Register of Deeds and the sheriff of Quezon City, from registering the
latter's final deed of sale, from cancelling the respondents' certificates of title and issuing new ones
to the petitioners and from carrying out any writ of possession. A situation thus arose where what
the Manila court had ordered to be done, the Quezon City court countermanded. On November 1,
1965, however, the latter court lifted the preliminary injunction it had previously issued, and the
Register of deeds of Quezon City cancelled the respondents' certificates of title and issued new ones
in favor of the petitioners. But enforcement of the writ of possession was again thwarted as the
Quezon City court again issued a temporary restraining order which it later lifted but then re-
restored. On May 3, 1967 the court finally, and for the third time, lifted the restraining order.

While the battle on the matter of the lifting and restoring of the restraining order was being fought in
the Quezon City court, the Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with this Court under
date of May 26, 1966, docketed as L-26116, praying for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the
sheriff from enforcing the writ of possession. This Court found no merit in the petition and dismissed
it in a minute resolution on June 3, 1966; reconsideration was denied on July 18, 1966. The
respondents then filed on August 2, 1966 a similar petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. 37830-R), praying for the same preliminary injunction. The Court of
Appeals also dismissed the petition. The respondents then appealed to this Court (L-27140). We 1äwphï1.ñët

dismissed the petition in a minute resolution on February 8, 1967.

The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of Appeals where they filed another petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. 39438-R). The said court gave due
course to the petition and granted preliminary injunction. After hearing, it rendered decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, writ of preliminary injunction from enforcement of the writ of

possession on and ejectment from the one-half share in the properties involved
belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago dated June 15, 1967 is made permanent pending
decision on the merits in Civil Case No. Q-7986 and ordering respondent Court to
proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. Q-7986 on the merits without unnecessary
delay. No pronouncement as to costs.

Failing to obtain reconsideration, the petitioners Castañeda and Henson filed the present petition for
review of the aforesaid decision.

1. We do not see how the doctrine that a court may not interfere with the orders of a co-equal court
can apply in the case at bar. The Court of First Instance of Manila, which issued the writ of
possession, ultimately was not interfered with by its co-equal court, the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City as the latter lifted the restraining order it had previously issued against the enforcement
of the Manila court's writ of possession; it is the Court of Appeals that enjoined, in part, the
enforcement of the writ.

2. Invoking Comilang vs. Buendia, et al.,1 where the wife was a party in one case and the husband
was a party in another case and a levy on their conjugal properties was upheld, the petitioners would
have Lourdes Yu Ago similarly bound by the replevin judgment against her husband for which their
conjugal properties would be answerable. The case invoked is not at par with the present case.
In Comilang the actions were admittedly instituted for the protection of the common interest of the
spouses; in the present case, the Agos deny that their conjugal partnership benefited from the
husband's business venture.

3. Relying upon Omnas vs. Rivera, 67 Phil. 419, the Court of Appeals held that a writ of possession
may not issue until the claim of a third person to half-interest in the property is adversely determined,
the said appellate court assuming that Lourdes Yu Ago was a "stranger" or a "third-party" to her
husband. The assumption is of course obviously wrong, for, besides living with her husband Pastor,
she does not claim ignorance of his business that failed, of the relevant cases in which he got
embroiled, and of the auction sale made by the sheriff of their conjugal properties. Even then, the
ruling in Omnas is not that a writ of possession may not issue until the claim of a third person is
adversely determined, but that the writ of possession being a complement of the writ of execution, a
judge with jurisdiction to issue the latter also has jurisdiction to issue the former, unless in the
interval between the judicial sale and the issuance of the writ of possession, the rights of third parties
to the property sold have supervened. The ruling in Omnas is clearly inapplicable in the present
case, for, here, there has been no change in the ownership of the properties or of any interest
therein from the time the writ of execution was issued up to the time writ of possession was issued,
and even up to the present.

4. We agree with the trial court (then presided by Judge Lourdes P. San Diego) that it is much too
late in the day for the respondents Agos to raise the question that part of the property is unleviable
because it belongs to Lourdes Yu Ago, considering that (1) a wife is normally privy to her husband's
activities; (2) the levy was made and the properties advertised for auction sale in 1961; (3) she lives
in the very properties in question; (4) her husband had moved to stop the auction sale; (5) the
properties were sold at auction in 1963; (6) her husband had thrice attempted to obtain a preliminary
injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution; (7) the sheriff executed the deed
of final sale on April 17, 1964 when Pastor failed to redeem; (8) Pastor had impliedly admitted that
the conjugal properties could be levied upon by his pleas "to save his family house and lot" in his
efforts to prevent execution; and (9) it was only on May 2, 1964 when he and his wife filed the
complaint for annulment of the sheriff's sale upon the issue that the wife's share in the properties
cannot be levied upon on the ground that she was not a party to the logging business and not a
party to the replevin suit. The spouses Ago had every opportunity to raise the issue in the various
proceedings hereinbefore discussed but did not; laches now effectively bars them from raising it.

Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and

unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned it or declined to assert it.2
5. The decision of the appellate court under review suffers from two fatal infirmities.

(a) It enjoined the enforcement of the writ of possession to and ejectment from the one-half share in
the properties involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago. This half-share is not in esse, but is merely an
inchoate interest, a mere expectancy, constituting neither legal nor equitable estate, and will ripen
into title when only upon liquidation and settlement there appears to be assets of the
community.3 The decision sets at naught the well-settled rule that injunction does not issue to protect
a right not in esse and which may never arise.4

(b) The decision did not foresee the absurdity, or even the impossibility, of its enforcement. The Ago
spouses admittedly live together in the same house5 which is conjugal property. By the Manila court's
writ of possession Pastor could be ousted from the house, but the decision under review would
prevent the ejectment of Lourdes. Now, which part of the house would be vacated by Pastor and
which part would Lourdes continue to stay in? The absurdity does not stop here; the decision would
actually separate husband and wife, prevent them from living together, and in effect divide their
conjugal properties during coverture and before the dissolution of the conjugal union.

6. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of the sheriff's sale (civil
case Q-7986), elementary justice demands that the petitioners, long denied the fruits of their victory
in the replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos, abetted by their lawyer Jose M.
Luison, have misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of
the judgment, to the extended prejudice of the petitioners. The respondents, with the assistance of
counsel, maneuvered for fourteen (14) years to doggedly resist execution of the judgment thru
manifold tactics in and from one court to another (5 times in the Supreme Court).

We condemn the attitude of the respondents and their counsel who,

far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use
them to subvert the very ends of justice.6

Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an officer of the
court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy and a predator of
conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality
in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice.

A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause
must be encouraged and is to be commended; what we do not and cannot
countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his client's position,
as in the case at bar.

It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies
and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his
client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to
acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist
the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his clients propensity to litigate. A
lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its
primacy is indisputable.7

7. In view of the private respondents' propensity to use the courts for purposes other than to seek
justice, and in order to obviate further delay in the disposition of the case below which might again
come up to the appellate courts but only to fail in the end, we have motu proprio examined the
record of civil case Q-7986 (the mother case of the present case). We find that

(a) the complaint was filed on May 2, 1964 (more than 11 years ago) but trial on the merits has not
even started;

(b) after the defendants Castañedas had filed their answer with a counterclaim, the plaintiffs Agos
filed a supplemental complaint where they impleaded new parties-defendants;

(c) after the admission of the supplemental complaint, the Agos filed a motion to admit an amended
supplemental complaint, which impleads an additional new party-defendant (no action has yet been
taken on this motion);

(d) the defendants have not filed an answer to the admitted supplemental complaint; and

(e) the last order of the Court of First Instance, dated April 20, 1974, grants an extension to the
suspension of time to file answer. (Expediente, p. 815)
We also find that the alleged causes of action in the complaint, supplemental complaint and
amended supplemental complaint are all untenable, for the reasons hereunder stated. The
Complaint

Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that the sheriff levied upon conjugal properties of the
spouses Ago despite the fact that the judgment to be satisfied was personal only to Pastor Ago, and
the business venture that he entered into, which resulted in the replevin suit, did not redound to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. The issue here, which is whether or not the wife's inchoate share
in the conjugal property is leviable, is the same issue that we have already resolved, as barred by
laches, in striking down the decision of the Court of Appeals granting preliminary injunction, the
dispositive portion of which was herein-before quoted. This ruling applies as well to the first cause of
action of the complaint.

Upon the second cause of action, the Agos allege that on January 5, 1959 the Castañedas and the
sheriff, pursuant to an alias writ of seizure, seized and took possession of certain machineries,
depriving the Agos of the use thereof, to their damage in the sum of P256,000 up to May 5, 1964.
This second cause of action fails to state a valid cause of action for it fails to allege that the order of
seizure is invalid or illegal.

It is averred as a third cause of action that the sheriff's sale of the conjugal properties was irregular,
illegal and unlawful because the sheriff did not require the Castañeda spouses to pay or liquidate the
sum of P141,750 (the amount for which they bought the properties at the auction sale) despite the
fact that there was annotated at the back of the certificates of title a mortgage of P75,000 in favor of
the Philippine National Bank; moreover, the sheriff sold the properties for P141,750 despite the
pendency of L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the amount of P99,877.08 out of the judgment
value of P172,923.37 in civil case 27251; and because of said acts, the Agos suffered P174,877.08
in damages.

Anent this third cause of action, the sheriff was under no obligation to require payment of the
purchase price in the auction sale because "when the purchaser is the judgment creditor, and no
third-party claim has been filed, he need not pay the amount of the bid if it does not exceed the
amount of his judgment." (Sec. 23, Rule 39, Rules of Court)

The annotated mortgage in favor of the PNB is the concern of the vendees Castañedas but did not
affect the sheriff's sale; the cancellation of the annotation is of no moment to the Agoo.

Case L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the sum of P99,877.08 out of the amount of the
judgment was dismissed by this Court on January 31, 1966.

This third cause of action, therefore, actually states no valid cause of action and is moreover barred
by prior judgment.

The fourth cause of action pertains to moral damages allegedly suffered by the Agos on account of
the acts complained of in the preceding causes of action. As the fourth cause of action derives its life
from the preceding causes of action, which, as shown, are baseless, the said fourth cause of action
must necessarily fail.

The Counterclaim

As a counterclaim against the Agos, the Castañedas aver that the action was unfounded and as a
consequence of its filing they were compelled to retain the services of counsel for not less than
P7,500; that because the Agos obtained a preliminary injunction enjoining the transfer of titles and
possession of the properties to the Castañedas, they were unlawfully deprived of the use of the
properties from April 17, 1964, the value of such deprived use being 20% annually of their actual
value; and that the filing of the unfounded action besmirched their feelings, the pecuniary worth of
which is for the court to assess.

The Supplemental Complaint

Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that after the filing of the complaint, the defendants, taking
advantage of the dissolution of the preliminary injunction, in conspiracy and with gross bad faith and
evident intent to cause damage to the plaintiffs, caused the registration of the sheriff's final deed of
sale; that, to cause more damage, the defendants sold to their lawyer and his wife two of the parcels
of land in question; that the purchasers acquired the properties in bad faith; that the defendants
mortgaged the two other parcels to the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation while the defendants'
lawyer and his wife also mortgaged the parcels bought by them to the Rizal Commercial Bank; and
that the bank also acted in bad faith.
The second cause of action consists of an allegation of additional damages caused by the
defendants' bad faith in entering into the aforesaid agreements and transactions.

The Amended Supplemental Complaint

The amendment made pertains to the first cause of action of the supplemental complaint, which is,
the inclusion of a paragraph averring that, still to cause damage and prejudice to the plaintiffs, Atty.
& Mrs. Juan Quijano, in bad faith sold the two parcels of land they had previously bought to Eloy
Ocampo who acquired them also in bad faith, while Venancio Castañeda and Nicetas Henson in bad
faith sold the two other parcels to Juan Quijano (60%) and Eloy Ocampo (40%) who acquired them
in bad faith and with knowledge that the properties are the subject of a pending litigation.

Discussion on The Causes of Action

of The Supplemental Complaint And
The Amended Supplemental Complaint

Assuming hypothetically as true the allegations in the first cause of action of the supplemental
complaint and the amended supplemental complaint, the validity of the cause of action would
depend upon the validity of the first cause of action of the original complaint, for, the Agos would
suffer no transgression upon their rights of ownership and possession of the properties by reason of
the agreements subsequently entered into by the Castañedas and their lawyer if the sheriff's levy
and sale are valid. The reverse is also true: if the sheriff's levy and sale are invalid on the ground
that the conjugal properties could not be levied upon, then the transactions would perhaps prejudice
the Agos, but, we have already indicated that the issue in the first cause of action of the original
complaint is barred by laches, and it must therefore follow that the first cause of action of the
supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint is also barred.

For the same reason, the same holding applies to the remaining cause of action in the supplemental
complaint and the amended supplemental complaint.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is set aside. Civil case Q-7986
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal is ordered dismissed, without prejudice to the re-filing of the
petitioners' counterclaim in a new and independent action. Treble costs are assessed against the
spouses Pastor Ago and Lourdes Yu Ago, which shall be paid by their lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Luison.
Let a copy of this decision be made a part of the personal file of Atty. Luison in the custody of the
Clerk of Court.

Makasiar, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., is on leave.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-23815 June 28, 1974

ADELINO H. LEDESMA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, Branch I, Silay City, respondent.

Adelino H. Ledesma in his own behalf.

Hon. Rafael C. Climaco in his own behalf.

FERNANDO, J.:p

What is assailed in this certiorari proceeding is an order of respondent Judge denying a motion filed by petitioner to be allowed to withdraw
as counsel de oficio.1 One of the grounds for such a motion was his allegation that with his appointment as Election Registrar by the
Commission on Elections, he was not in a position to devote full time to the defense of the two accused. The denial by respondent Judge of
such a plea, notwithstanding the conformity of the defendants, was due "its principal effect [being] to delay this case." 2 It was likewise noted
that the prosecution had already rested and that petitioner was previously counsel de parte, his designation in the former category being
precisely to protect him in his new position without prejudicing the accused. It cannot be plausibly asserted that such failure to allow
withdrawal of de oficio counsel could ordinarily be characterized as a grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. There is, however,
the overriding concern for the right to counsel of the accused that must be taken seriously into consideration. In appropriate cases, it should
tilt the balance. This is not one of them. What is easily discernible was the obvious reluctance of petitioner to comply with the responsibilities
incumbent on the counsel de oficio. Then, too, even on the assumption that he continues in his position, his volume of work is likely to be
very much less at present. There is not now the slightest pretext for him to shirk an obligation a member of the bar, who expects to remain in
good standing, should fulfill. The petition is clearly without merit.

According to the undisputed facts, petitioner, on October 13, 1964, was appointed Election Registrar
for the Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental. Then and there, he commenced to
discharge its duties. As he was counsel de parte for one of the accused in a case pending in the sala
of respondent Judge, he filed a motion to withdraw as such. Not only did respondent Judge deny
such motion, but he also appointed him counsel de oficio for the two defendants. Subsequently, on
November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio,
premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require full time service as well as on the
volume or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from handling adequately the
defense. Respondent Judge, in the challenged order of November 6, 1964, denied said motion. A
motion for reconsideration having proved futile, he instituted this certiorari proceeding.3

As noted at the outset, the petition must fail.

1. The assailed order of November 6, 1964 denying the urgent motion of petitioner to withdraw as
counsel de oficio speaks for itself. It began with a reminder that a crime was allegedly committed on
February 17, 1962, with the proceedings having started in the municipal court of Cadiz on July 11,
1962. Then respondent Judge spoke of his order of October 16, 1964 which reads thus: "In view of
the objection of the prosecution to the motion for postponement of October 15, 1964 (alleging that
counsel for the accused cannot continue appearing in this case without the express authority of the
Commission on Elections); and since according to the prosecution there are two witnesses who are
ready to take the stand, after which the government would rest, the motion for postponement is
denied. When counsel for the accused assumed office as Election Registrar on October 13, 1964,
he knew since October 2, 1964 that the trial would be resumed today. Nevertheless, in order not to
prejudice the civil service status of counsel for the accused, he is hereby designated counsel de
oficio for the accused. The defense obtained postponements on May 17, 1963, June 13, 1963, June
14, 1963, October 28, 1963, November 27, 1963, February 11, 1964, March 9, 1964, June 8, 1964
July 26, 1964, and September 7, 1964."4 Reference was then made to another order of February 11,
1964: "Upon petition of Atty. Adelino H. Ledesma, alleging indisposition, the continuation of the trial
of this case is hereby transferred to March 9, 1964 at 8:30 in the morning. The defense is reminded
that at its instance, this case has been postponed at least eight (8) times, and that the government
witnesses have to come all the way from Manapala."5 After which, it was noted in such order that
there was no incompatibility between the duty of petitioner to the accused and to the court and the
performance of his task as an election registrar of the Commission on Elections and that the ends of
justice "would be served by allowing and requiring Mr. Ledesma to continue as counsel de oficio,
since the prosecution has already rested its case."6
2. What is readily apparent therefore, is that petitioner was less than duly mindful of his obligation as
counsel de oficio. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. It could be that for some lawyers, especially the neophytes in the profession, being
appointed counsel de oficio is an irksome chore. For those holding such belief, it may come as a
surprise that counsel of repute and of eminence welcome such an opportunity. It makes even more
manifest that law is indeed a profession dedicated to the ideal of service and not a mere trade. It is
understandable then why a high degree of fidelity to duty is required of one so designated. A recent
statement of the doctrine is found in People v. Daban:7 "There is need anew in this disciplinary
proceeding to lay stress on the fundamental postulate that membership in the bar carries with it a
responsibility to live up to its exacting standard. The law is a profession, not a trade or a craft. Those
enrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid in the performance of one of the basic purposes of the
State, the administration of justice. To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an
indigent defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio. The fact that his services
are rendered without remuneration should not occasion a diminution in his zeal. Rather the contrary.
This is not, of course, to ignore that other pressing matters do compete for his attention. After all, he
has his practice to attend to. That circumstance possesses a high degree of relevance since a
lawyer has to live; certainly he cannot afford either to neglect his paying cases. Nonetheless, what is
incumbent upon him as counsel de oficio must be fulfilled."8

So it has been from the 1905 decision of In re Robles Lahesa,9 where respondent was de
oficio counsel, the opinion penned by Justice Carson making clear: "This Court should exact from its
officers and subordinates the most scrupulous performance of their official duties, especially when
negligence in the performance of those duties necessarily results in delays in the prosecution of
criminal cases ...."10 Justice Sanchez in People v. Estebia11 reiterated such a view in these words: "It
is true that he is a court-appointed counsel. But we do say that as such counsel de oficio, he has as
high a duty to the accused as one employed and paid by defendant himself. Because, as in the case
of the latter, he must exercise his best efforts and professional ability in behalf of the person
assigned to his care. He is to render effective assistance. The accused-defendant expects of him
due diligence, not mere perfunctory representation. For, indeed a lawyer who is a vanguard in the
bastion of justice is expected to have a bigger dose of social conscience and a little less of self-
interest."12

The weakness of the petition is thus quite evident.

3. If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, it was only due to the apprehension that
considering the frame of mind of a counsel loath and reluctant to fulfill his obligation, the welfare of
the accused could be prejudiced. His right to counsel could in effect be rendered nugatory. Its
importance was rightfully stressed by Chief Justice Moran in People v. Holgado in these words: "In
criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard
by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by
counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of law,
particularly in the rules of procedure, and; without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is
guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more
easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by
counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented
that under rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have
an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential
that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a
reasonable time to procure an attorney of his
own."13 So it was under the previous Organic Acts.14 The present Constitution is even more emphatic.
For, in addition to reiterating that the accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel,"15 there is this new provision: "Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No
force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used
against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence."16

Thus is made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of an accused.
Such a consideration could have sufficed for petitioner not being allowed to withdraw as counsel de
oficio. For he did betray by his moves his lack of enthusiasm for the task entrusted to him, to put
matters mildly. He did point though to his responsibility as an election registrar. Assuming his good
faith, no such excuse could be availed now. There is not likely at present, and in the immediate
future, an exorbitant demand on his time. It may likewise be assumed, considering what has been
set forth above, that petitioner would exert himself sufficiently to perform his task as defense counsel
with competence, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the
profession in good standing. The admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks of legal
practitioners that there are times, and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes
precedence over the promptings of self-interest.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs against petitioner.

Zaldivar (Chairman), Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., took no part.

Footnotes

1 Petition, Annex B.

2 Ibid, Annex C.

3 Petition, pars. 3-9.

4 Petition, Annex C.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid..

7 L-31429, January 31, 1972, 43 SCRA 185.

8 Ibid, 186. Cf. People v. Apduhan, L-19491, Aug. 30, 1968, 24 SCRA 798; People v.
Solacito, L-29209, Aug. 25, 1969, 29 SCRA 61; People v. Serafica, L-29092-93, Aug.
28, 1969, 29 SCRA 123; People v. Englatera, L-30820, July 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 245;
People v. Aguilar, L-30932, Jan. 29, 1971, 37 SCRA 115; People v. Estebia, L-
26868, July 29, 1971, 40 SCRA 90; People v. Flores, L-32692, July 30, 1971, 40
SCRA 230; People v. Alincastre, L-29891, Aug. 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 391; People v.
Valera, L-30039; Feb. 8, 1972, 43 SCRA 207; People v. Francisco, L-30763, June
29, 1972, 45 SCRA 451; People v. Espiña, L-33028, June 30, 1972, 45 SCRA 614;
People v. Esteves, L-34811, Aug. 18, 1972, 46 SCRA 680; People v. Simeon, L-
33730, Sept. 28, 1972, 47 SCRA 129; People v. Daeng, L-34091, Jan. 30, 1973, 49
SCRA 221; People v. Ricalde, L-34673, Jan. 30, 1973, 49 SCRA 228; People v.
Martinez, L-35353, April 30, 1973, 50 SCRA 509; People v. Silvestre, L-33821, June
22, 1973, 51 SCRA 286; People v. Busa, L-32047, June 25, 1973, 51 SCRA 317;
People v. Alamada, L-34594, July 13, 1973, 52 SCRA 103; People v. Andaya, L-
29644, July 25, 1973, 52 SCRA 137; People v. Duque, L-33267, Sept. 27, 1973, 53
SCRA 132; People v. Saligan, L-35792, Nov. 29, 1973, 54 SCRA 190; People v.
Bacong, L-36161, Dec. 19, 1973, 54 SCRA 288.

9 4 Phil. 298.

10 Ibid, 300.

11 L-26868, February 27, 1969, 27 SCRA 106.

12 Ibid, 109-110, Cf. Javellana v. Lutero, L-23956, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 717;
Blanza v. Arcangel, Adm. Case No. 492, Sept. 5, 1967, 21 SCRA 1.

13 85 Phil. 752, 756-757 (1950).

14 Cf. United States v. Gimeno, 1 Phil. 236 (1902); United States v. Palisoc, 4 Phil.
207 (1905); United States v. Go-Leng, 21 Phil. 426 (1912); United States v. Laranja,
21 Phil. 500 (1912); United States v. Ramirez, 26 Phil. 616 (1914); United States v.
Labial, 27 Phil. 82 (1914); United States v. Custan, 28 Phil. 19 (1914); United States
v. Kilayco, 31 Phil. 371 (1915); United States v. Escalante, 36 Phil. 743 (1917);
People v. Abuyen, 52 Phil. 722 (1929).

15 Cf. Article IV, Section 19.

16 Section 20.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

March 23, 1929

In re LUIS B. TAGORDA,

Duran & Lim for respondent.

Attorney-General Jaranilla and Provincial Fiscal Jose for the Government.

MALCOLM, J.:

The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practising attorney and a member of the provincial board of
Isabela, admits that previous to the last general elections he made use of a card written in Spanish
and Ilocano, which, in translation, reads as follows:

LUIS B. TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public
CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER
Province of Isabela

(NOTE. — As notary public, he can execute for you a deed of sale for the purchase
of land as required by the cadastral office; can renew lost documents of your
animals; can make your application and final requisites for your homestead; and can
execute any kind of affidavit. As a lawyer, he can help you collect your loans
although long overdue, as well as any complaint for or against you. Come or write to
him in his town, Echague, Isabela. He offers free consultation, and is willing to help
and serve the poor.)

The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in
his home municipality written in Ilocano, which letter, in translation, reads as follows:

ECHAGUE, ISABELA, September 18, 1928

MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to inform you of the approaching date for our
induction into office as member of the Provincial Board, that is on the 16th of next
month. Before my induction into office I should be very glad to hear your suggestions
or recommendations for the good of the province in general and for your barrio in
particular. You can come to my house at any time here in Echague, to submit to me
any kind of suggestion or recommendation as you may desire.

I also inform you that despite my membership in the Board I will have my residence
here in Echague. I will attend the session of the Board of Ilagan, but will come back
home on the following day here in Echague to live and serve with you as a lawyer
and notary public. Despite my election as member of the Provincial Board, I will
exercise my legal profession as a lawyer and notary public. In case you cannot see
me at home on any week day, I assure you that you can always find me there on
every Sunday. I also inform you that I will receive any work regarding preparations of
documents of contract of sales and affidavits to be sworn to before me as notary
public even on Sundays.

I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some people are
in the belief that my residence as member of the Board will be in Ilagan and that I
would then be disqualified to exercise my profession as lawyer and as notary public.
Such is not the case and I would make it clear that I am free to exercise my
profession as formerly and that I will have my residence here in Echague.

I would request you kind favor to transmit this information to your barrio people in any
of your meetings or social gatherings so that they may be informed of my desire to
live and to serve with you in my capacity as lawyer and notary public. If the people in
your locality have not as yet contracted the services of other lawyers in connection
 with the registration of their land titles, I would be willing to handle the work in court
and would charge only three pesos for every registration.

Yours respectfully,

(Sgd.) LUIS TAGORDA

Attorney
Notary Public.

The facts being conceded, it is next in order to write down the applicable legal provisions. Section 21
of the Code of Civil Procedure as originally conceived related to disbarments of members of the bar.
In 1919 at the instigation of the Philippine Bar Association, said codal section was amended by Act
No. 2828 by adding at the end thereof the following: "The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice."

The statute as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of Professionals Ethics adopted by the
American Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. Canons 27 and 28
of the Code of Ethics provide:

27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT. — The most worthy and effective

advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is
the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust.
This cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of character and conduct. The publication or
circulation of ordinary simple business cards, being a matter of personal taste or local
custom, and sometimes of convenience, is not per se improper. But solicitation of business
by circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications or interview not warranted by
personal relations, is unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional to procure business by
indirection through touters of any kind, whether allied real estate firms or trust companies
advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or offering retainers in exchange for
executorships or trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect advertisement for
business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning the manner of their
conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and
all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the tone of our high calling, and are
intolerable.

28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION, DIRECTLY OR THROUGH AGENTS. — It is unprofessional

for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood,
relationship or trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring up strife and litigation is not only
unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law. It is disreputable to hunt up defects in
titles or other causes of action and inform thereof in order to the employed to bring suit, or to
breed litigation by seeking out those with claims for personal injuries or those having any
other grounds of action in order to secure them as clients, or to employ agents or runners for
like purposes, or to pay or reward directly or indirectly, those who bring or influence the
bringing of such cases to his office, or to remunerate policemen, court or prison officials,
physicians, hospital attaches or others who may succeed, under the guise of giving
disinterested friendly advice, in influencing the criminal, the sick and the injured, the ignorant
or others, to seek his professional services. A duty to the public and to the profession
devolves upon every member of the bar having knowledge of such practices upon the part of
any practitioner immediately to inform thereof to the end that the offender may be disbarred.

Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits and quarrels between individuals was a
crime at the common law, and one of the penalties for this offense when committed by an attorney
was disbarment. Statutes intended to reach the same evil have been provided in a number of
jurisdictions usually at the instance of the bar itself, and have been upheld as constitutional. The
reason behind statutes of this type is not difficult to discover. The law is a profession and not a
business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others for to do so
would be unprofessional. (State vs. Rossman [1909], 53 Wash., 1; 17 Ann. Cas., 625;
People vs. Mac Cabe [1893], 19 L. R. A., 231; 2 R. C. L., 1097.)

It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice of solicitation of cases by
lawyers. It is destructive of the honor of a great profession. It lowers the standards of that profession.
It works against the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar. It results
in needless litigation and in incenting to strife otherwise peacefully inclined citizens.

The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension. That should
be distinctly understood.

Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the admitted facts, the respondent stands
convicted of having solicited cases in defiance of the law and those canons. Accordingly, the only
remaining duty of the court is to fix upon the action which should here be taken. The provincial fiscal
of Isabela, with whom joined the representative of the Attorney-General in the oral presentation of
the case, suggests that the respondent be only reprimanded. We think that our action should go
further than this if only to reflect our attitude toward cases of this character of which unfortunately the
respondent's is only one. The commission of offenses of this nature would amply justify permanent
elimination from the bar. But as mitigating, circumstances working in favor of the respondent there
are, first, his intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts, second, his youth and
inexperience at the bar, and, third, his promise not to commit a similar mistake in the future. A
modest period of suspension would seem to fit the case of the erring attorney. But it should be
distinctly understood that this result is reached in view of the considerations which have influenced
the court to the relatively lenient in this particular instance and should, therefore, not be taken as
indicating that future convictions of practice of this kind will not be dealt with by disbarment.

In view of all the circumstances of this case, the judgment of the court is that the respondent Luis B.
Tagorda be and is hereby suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of one
month from April 1, 1929,

Street, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

Johnson, J., reserves his vote.

Separate Opinions

OSTRAND, J., dissenting:

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,

vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.

R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements
similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually
prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law
profession other than those allowed by law."

The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:

Annex A

SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.

THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am— 6:00
pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE.

DON PARKINSON

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal
Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-

quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina
Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina
Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.

THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC,
INC.1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in
the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed
and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore
quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its
instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support
services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines.
Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of
advertising these services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona,2 reportedly
decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we required
the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine
Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers
Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to
submit their respective position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The
said bar associations readily responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of
which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.

The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by
respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case,
whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.

Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and
enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the
aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in
this bar matter.

1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:

xxx xxx xxx

Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish

the two terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense
would readily dictate that the same are essentially without substantial distinction. For
who could deny that document search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in
need of basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies
like birth, marriage, property, or business registration, obtaining documents like
clearance, passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?

xxx xxx xxx

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with
respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position
manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the
effect that today it is alright to advertise one's legal services).

The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act
of establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same through
newspaper publications.

The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable
Court to perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities
in the field of law practice as aforedescribed.4

xxx xxx xxx

A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent
corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services.

While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the
advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is offering legal
services. The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned,
apparently because this (is) the effect that the advertisements have on the reading
public.

The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all,
to the very name being used by respondent — "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name,
it is respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for legal
problems, just like a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical problems.
More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic
connotes doctors.

Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of

the present case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces
the impression that it is being operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal
services. In addition, the advertisements in question appear with a picture and name
of a person being represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes
whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature of the service or services being
offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support
services" as claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively
engaged in law practice does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a distinction
between "legal services" and "legal support services," as the respondent would have
it. The advertisements in question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the
reading public that legal services are being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.

B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts

contrary to law, morals, public order and public policy.

It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question

are only meant to inform the general public of the services being offered by it. Said
advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law student ought to
know that under the Family Code, there is only one instance when a foreign divorce
is recognized, and that is:

Article 26. . . .

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly

celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.

It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:

Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a

man and woman entered into accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property
relation during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message

being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage
celebrated in accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is
not only misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law.
At the very least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where
certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is
outright malpractice.

Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at

defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that
shown in Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with
the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to address those planning a
"secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the "special
contract of permanent union," the inviolable social institution," which is how the
Family Code describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability.
Worse, this particular advertisement appears to encourage marriages celebrated in
secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a marriage
license.

If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded
that the above impressions one may gather from the advertisements in question are
accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the
advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged
or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the
jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime is
committed.

Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent offers
do not constitute legal services as commonly understood, the advertisements in
question give the impression that respondent corporation is being operated by
lawyers and that it offers legal services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical
consequence is that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the
bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which are
contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good, thereby destroying and
demeaning the integrity of the Bar.

xxx xxx xxx

It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the

publication of the advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar
thereto. It is also submitted that respondent should be prohibited from further
performing or offering some of the services it presently offers, or, at the very least,
from offering such services to the public in general.

The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic
data gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for
gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession and
should not be stifled but instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of such
business by non-members of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of law, there can
be no choice but to prohibit such business.

Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed
by specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of their
having devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting
requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the
legal profession will deny the profession of the great benefits and advantages of
modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a computer will be doing better than a
lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.

Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the
illegal practice of law in any form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar
but also, and more importantly, for the protection of the public. Technological
development in the profession may be encouraged without tolerating, but instead
ensuring prevention of illegal practice.

There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its

services, but only if such services are made available exclusively to members of the
Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not legal
services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between
which service may be offered to the public in general and which should be made
available exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may
require further proceedings because of the factual considerations involved.

It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be

prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad
of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law.
While respondent may not be prohibited from simply disseminating information
regarding such matters, it must be required to include, in the information given, a
disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that certain course of action may
be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a legal
opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which course of action
to take, and that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself
to possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.

If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at

members of the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized
to practice law or perform legal services.

The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should
be allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being
clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without any adequate and effective means
of regulating his activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form may prove to be
advantageous to the legal profession, but before allowance of such practice may be
considered, the corporation's Article of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to
each and every provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of
Court.5

2. Philippine Bar Association:

xxx xxx xxx.

Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in
giving legal support services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals,
with the use of modern computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3,
Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding out itself to
the public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment
for its enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice which thus yields itself
to the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is
merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's own
commercial advertisement which announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be
handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all indications, respondent "The
Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal services through its reserve of
lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and
advising clients as to their legal right and then take them to an attorney and ask the
latter to look after their case in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed.,
p. 39).

It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and
such limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers to
practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which respondent "The
Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits employment of its legal
services. It is an odious vehicle for deception, especially so when the public cannot
ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the
limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as members of
the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to
the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its business name,
the persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline. The practice
of law is not a profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned
to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to persons who have
qualified themselves under the law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the
persons who are acting for respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law
practice.6

3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:

The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated herein,
are wit:

1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;

2. Such practice is unauthorized;

3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and
patently immoral; and

4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal
Clinic and its corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its
unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely
renders "legal support services" to answers, litigants and the general public as
enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See
pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its advertised services, as enumerated
above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit
outside of court.

As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and
Family Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of
marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly
on visa related problems, immigration problems; the Investments Law of the
Philippines and such other related laws.

Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law, the
legal principles and procedures related thereto, the legal advices based thereon and
which activities call for legal training, knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities
of respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally
term as "the practice of law."7

4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:

In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should
be given to the protection of the general public from the danger of being exploited by
unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in the practice of law.

At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of

study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and
pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.

While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the

administration of justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or
standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the general public as
such. While it may now be the opportune time to establish these courses of study
and/or standards, the fact remains that at present, these do not exist in the
Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to make measures to
protect the general public from being exploited by those who may be dealing with the
general public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.

In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers
which may be brought about by advertising of legal services. While it appears that
lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of Professional Responsibility from
advertising, it appears in the instant case that legal services are being advertised not
by lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly, measures should be
taken to protect the general public from falling prey to those who advertise legal
services without being qualified to offer such services. 8

A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give

the impression that information regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of
marriage, immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and foreign
investment, which are in essence, legal matters , will be given to them if they avail of
its services. The Respondent's name — The Legal Clinic, Inc. — does not help
matters. It gives the impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal
problems brought to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely
by paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression that there are lawyers involved
in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only
"paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.

Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President
and majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and
main purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek" article."9

5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:

Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the
purpose of gain which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal and
against the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.

Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit
cases, but it is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc.,
could work out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal but
immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one has to go to said agency and
pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid marriages in
the Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under the law.
And to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary.

No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is
towards allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain
from qualified practitioners legal services for their particular needs can justify the use
of advertisements such as are the subject matter of the petition, for one (cannot)
justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The law has yet
to be amended so that such act could become justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret
marriages and divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so,
are highly reprehensible.

It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about
having a secret marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and
seek advice on divorce, where in this country there is none, except under the Code
of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good morals and is
deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be able to do that which by our
laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not be done.

In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for
clients by an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses
of this character justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10

6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:

xxx xxx xxx

1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management
consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the
services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that
the business of respondent (assuming it can be engaged in independently of the
practice of law) involves knowledge of the law does not necessarily make respondent
guilty of unlawful practice of law.

. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render

effective service unless he is familiar with such statutes and
regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course of conduct
which the law forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the consultant's)
knowledge of the law, and his use of that knowledge as a factor in
determining what measures he shall recommend, do not constitute
the practice of law . . . . It is not only presumed that all men know the
law, but it is a fact that most men have considerable acquaintance
with broad features of the law . . . . Our knowledge of the law —
accurate or inaccurate — moulds our conduct not only when we are
acting for ourselves, but when we are serving others. Bankers, liquor
dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise knowledge of
the laws touching their particular business or profession. A good
example is the architect, who must be familiar with zoning, building
and fire prevention codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and
who draws plans and specification in harmony with the law. This is
not practicing law.

But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower,
replies that it is required by the statute. Or the industrial relations
expert cites, in support of some measure that he recommends, a
decision of the National Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing
law? In my opinion, they are not, provided no separate fee is charged
for the legal advice or information, and the legal question is
subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem.

It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.

If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to

engage a lawyer to advise him and the architect in respect to the
building code and the like, then an architect who performed this
function would probably be considered to be trespassing on territory
reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial relations
field had been pre-empted by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer
always at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is not the case.
The most important body of the industrial relations experts are the
officers and business agents of the labor unions and few of them are
lawyers. Among the larger corporate employers, it has been the
practice for some years to delegate special responsibility in employee
matters to a management group chosen for their practical knowledge
and skill in such matter, and without regard to legal thinking or lack of
it. More recently, consultants like the defendants have the same
service that the larger employers get from their own specialized staff.
 The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized
profession for which appropriate courses are offered by our leading
universities. The court should be very cautious about declaring [that]
a widespread, well-established method of conducting business is
unlawful, or that the considerable class of men who customarily
perform a certain function have no right to do so, or that the technical
education given by our schools cannot be used by the graduates in
their business.

In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider

his work for any particular client or customer, as a whole. I can
imagine defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to the law
defining his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client's
obligations to his employees, to guide his client along the path
charted by law. This, of course, would be the practice of the law. But
such is not the fact in the case before me. Defendant's primarily
efforts are along economic and psychological lines. The law only
provides the frame within which he must work, just as the zoning
code limits the kind of building the limits the kind of building the
architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or information
defendant may give, does not transform his activities into the practice
of law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he
performed services which are customarily reserved to members of
the bar, he would be practicing law. For instance, if as part of a
welfare program, he drew employees' wills.

Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the

employer in the adjustment of grievances and in collective bargaining,
with or without a mediator. This is not per se the practice of law.
Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and may select an agent
particularly skilled in the subject under discussion, and the person
appointed is free to accept the employment whether or not he is a
member of the bar. Here, however, there may be an exception where
the business turns on a question of law. Most real estate sales are
negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. But if the value of the
land depends on a disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the
negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the dispute and
persuade the opposite party to the same opinion, then it may be that
only a lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy between
an employer and his men grows from differing interpretations of a
contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that defendant should not
handle it. But I need not reach a definite conclusion here, since the
situation is not presented by the proofs.

Defendant also appears to represent the employer before

administrative agencies of the federal government, especially before
trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. An agency of
the federal government, acting by virtue of an authority granted by the
Congress, may regulate the representation of parties before such
agency. The State of New Jersey is without power to interfere with
such determination or to forbid representation before the agency by
one whom the agency admits. The rules of the National Labor
Relations Board give to a party the right to appear in person, or by
counsel, or by other representative. Rules and Regulations,
September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here means a licensed
attorney, and ther representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase of
his work, defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board
allows, even arguing questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53
A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp.
154-156.).

1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling
(which may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law
provided that:

(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.

(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .

(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.

All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a
whole.

1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional
Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct:

Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation

concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is
acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.

1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See
Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a
marriage license, and making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not
constitute practice of law. However, if the problem is as complicated as that
described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-
Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is actually the practice of law. If a
non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services then it is engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.

1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence,
annulment of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving
informational materials may not constitute of law. The business is similar to that of a
bookstore where the customer buys materials on the subject and determines on the
subject and determines by himself what courses of action to take.

It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the
Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the client, and
give legal advice. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law.

It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which

publication of a legal text which purports to say what the law is
amount to legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles or rules
stated in the text may be accepted by a particular reader as a solution
to his problem does not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is urged that the
conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the forms, with advice as
to how the forms should be filled out, constitutes the unlawful practice
of law. But that is the situation with many approved and accepted
texts. Dacey's book is sold to the public at large. There is no personal
contact or relationship with a particular individual. Nor does there
exist that relation of confidence and trust so necessary to the status
of attorney and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL
PRACTICE — THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A
PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most
the book assumes to offer general advice on common problems, and
does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem
peculiar to a designated or readily identified person. Similarly the
defendant's publication does not purport to give personal advice on a
specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person
in a particular situation — in their publication and sale of the kits,
such publication and sale did not constitutes the unlawful practice of
law . . . . There being no legal impediment under the statute to the
sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for the injunction against
defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to persons
seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or separation agreement
any printed material or writings relating to matrimonial law or the
prohibition in the memorandum of modification of the judgment
against defendant having an interest in any publishing house
publishing his manuscript on divorce and against his having any
personal contact with any prospective purchaser. The record does
fully support, however, the finding that for the change of $75 or $100
for the kit, the defendant gave legal advice in the course of personal
contacts concerning particular problems which might arise in the
preparation and presentation of the purchaser's asserted matrimonial
cause of action or pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in
the preparation of necessary documents (The injunction therefore
sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the practice of law, particularly
with reference to the giving of advice and counsel by the defendant
relating to specific problems of particular individuals in connection
with a divorce, separation, annulment of separation agreement
 sought and should be affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270
[1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).

1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-
advisory. "It is not controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving legal
advice or counselling," such would constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It
is in this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the
judicious disposition of this case.

xxx xxx xxx

2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or
perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities,
formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code),
no Philippine marriage can be secret.

2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph
thereof (which is not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the
limitation that only "paralegal services?" or "legal support services", and not legal
services, are available." 11

A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the
proper determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the
clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The
courts have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the
term, some of which we now take into account.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or
render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and
counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured,
although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13

In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types
of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and
obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not
possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess
power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to
assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14

When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of
law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business
to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving
advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with
respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the proper
interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18

In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid
down the test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not
limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but
embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds,
and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co.
v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice of law
when he:

. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,

associations or corporations as to their right under the law, or appears in a
 representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective,
before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights
under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside
of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v.
C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).

This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's
claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters or estate and guardianship have been held to constitute
law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work
done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts
and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).

Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects and
the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have
no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become
involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and
complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law
bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid
distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn
between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and
that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral
character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which
rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.],
pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in
Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).

The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the
aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of
the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice
of law."

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously
considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services
it has been offering, to wit:

Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained

paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory,
through the extensive use of computers and modern information technology in the
gathering, processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of information and
communication, such as computerized legal research; encoding and reproduction of
documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search;
evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding
investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from
government or non-government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business
registrations; educational or employment records or certifications, obtaining
documentation like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving information
about laws of other countries that they may find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage
or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to emigration to the foreign
country, and other matters that do not involve representation of clients in court;
designing and installing computer systems, programs, or software for the efficient
 management of law offices, corporate legal departments, courts and other entities
engaged in dispensing or administering legal services. 20

While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and
technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient
management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not
suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.

What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and
lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than
real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it
strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law,
furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys
and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and
advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law.
That is what its advertisements represent and for the which services it will consequently charge and
be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a
conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in
court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice,
contract drafting and so forth.

The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991
issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal
Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent
corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:

This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with
offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No
matter what the client's problem, and even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-
Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like
doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc.
has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation,
and family law. These specialist are backed up by a battery of paralegals,
counsellors and attorneys.

Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical
field toward specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the
big law firms.

The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by
analyzing the problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you how you
contracted what's bothering you, they take your temperature, they observe you for
the symptoms and so on. That's how we operate, too. And once the problem has
been categorized, then it's referred to one of our specialists.

There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up
treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like
preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our
staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or the interns. We can take care of these
matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi
kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty.
Nogales.

Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If
you had a rich relative who died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to
inherit millions of pesos of property, we would refer you to a specialist in taxation.
There would be real estate taxes and arrears which would need to be put in order,
and your relative is even taxed by the state for the right to transfer her property, and
only a specialist in taxation would be properly trained to deal with the problem. Now,
if there were other heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then you would need a
litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and gather
evidence to support the case. 21

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is
important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders
which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which
it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts
sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for
various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to
complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the
domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 22

It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which
constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a
member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of
Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23

Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in
education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional
conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the incompetence
or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the
court. 24

The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to draw
support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who
meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules
specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful business except for members of the bar
who have complied with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of court. Only those
persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired through
education and study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of
legal science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or liabilities
of their clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The
justification for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the
protection of the bar from competition, but in the protection of the public from being advised and
represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial
department can exercise little control.27

We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United
States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this
jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a
matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.

Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are
schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there
are none in the Philippines. 28 As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the
United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the major
standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for
the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to
certify legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own
code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the
American Paralegal Association. 29

In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be
considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice
law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal services,
but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting
permission therefor. 30

Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or
statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the
proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized
and unskilled person into the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging
persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from
persons licensed to practice law in the state. 32

Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest,
fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit
the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement
or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value
to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal
business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of
Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for
professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his
photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or
concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the
lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation. 36

The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer
cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner
similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription against advertising of legal services
or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law is
a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an
advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the present proceeding, 39 was
held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.

The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the

respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business
from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that
"the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an
attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a
profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who
stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or
offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice
with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of
Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young
lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of
character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).

We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a
well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the
outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community
has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of
effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus
to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-
product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40

Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession
enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which
they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those which are
expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41

The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data
must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his
professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law
practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of
graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor;
legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and
committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other
reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the
names of clients regularly represented." 42

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally
for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and
informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer
permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management or contents of which are
calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the
profession. 43

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the
opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being
for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in
a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. 44

Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent
is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent
corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do not and
conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.

The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and
constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar.
Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an
exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees
for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate
of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or
impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional
Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the
exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such
authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being
invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such
an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.

It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in
Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found
that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of lawyers:

Trustworthy from 71% to 14%

Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%

Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow
the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what
is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been
under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost
importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that
level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high
esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.

In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to
advertise his services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice
of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder
and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded,
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will
be dealt with more severely.

While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which
the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are constrained to
refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative
parameters of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It is, of course,
imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since,
under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or
engage in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical
advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the
alleged support services.

The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province of
the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due
ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate charter, in
light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the
Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under the circumstances.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal
Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form
which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from
conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code
of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for
appropriate action in accordance herewith.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo,
Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur
# Footnotes

1 Rollo, 5. A facsimile of the scales of justice is printed together with and on the left
side of "The Legal Clinic, Inc." in both advertisements which were published in a
newspaper of general circulation.

2 433 U.S. 350, 53 L Ed 2d 810, 97 S Ct. 2691.

3 Resolution dated January 15, 1991, Rollo, 60; Resolution dated December 10,
1991, Rollo, 328.

4 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Basilio H. Alo, IBP Director for Legal Affairs, 1,
10; Rollo, 209, 218.

5 Memorandum prepared by Atty. Jose A. Grapilon, Chairman, Committee on Bar

Discipline, and Atty. Kenny H. Tantuico, 16-18, 27-29, Rollo 414-416, 425-427.

6 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Rafael D. Abiera, Jr., Chairman, Committee on

Lawyers' Rights and Legal Ethics, and Atty. Arturo M. del Rosario, President, 5-
6; Rollo, 241-242.

7 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Lorenzo Sumulong, President, and Atty. Mariano
M. Magsalin, Vice-President, 2, 4-5; Rollo, 93, 95-96.

8 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Victoria C. de los Reyes, 1-2; Rollo, 105-106.

9 Memorandum prepared by Atty. Victoria C. de los Reyes, 10-11; Rollo, 370-371.

10 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Leticia E. Sablan, Officer-in-Charge, WLAP Free

Legal Aid Clinic, 1-2; Rollo, 169-170.

11 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Lily C. Limpe, President, and Atty. Barbara Anne
C. Migallos, 8-12, 23-24; Rollo, 139-143, 154-155.

12 Annotation: 111 ALR 23.

13 Howton vs. Morrow, 269 Ky. 1.

14 West Virginia State Bar vs. Earley, 109 S.E. 2d 420, 144 W.Va. 504; Rhode
Island Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R.I.) 179 A. 139, 144.

15 People vs. Castleman, 88 Colo. 229.

16 Depew, et al. vs. Witchita Assn. of Credit Men., Inc., 142 Kan. 403.

17 Fitchette vs. Taylor, 94 ALR 356.

18 Mandelaum vs. Gilbert and Barker Mfg. Co., 290 NYS 46218.

19 201 SCRA 210 (1991).

20 Comment of Respondent, 3; Rollo, 15.

21 Rollo, 130-131.

22 Memorandum of U.P. WILOCI, 12-13; Rollo, 372-373.

23 Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court.

24 Phil. Ass'n. of Free Labor Unions, et al. vs. Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Co., et al.,
42 SCRA 302 (1971).

25 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client, 863, 864.

26 Mounier vs. Regcinh, 170 So. 567.

27 Lowell Bar Ass'n. vs. Loeb. 52 N.E. 2d 27, 315 Mass. 176; 7 C.J.S., Attorney and
Client 64, 865.

28 Comment of Respondent, 2; Rollo, 14.

29 Position Paper, U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), 11-12, citing Statsky,
Introduction to Paralegalism, 214-224, West Publishing Co. (1974) and Shayne, The
Paralegal Profession, Oceana Publications, 1977, Appendix II and III; Rollo, 116-117.

30 Illustrations:

(a) A law student who has successfully completed his third year of the regular four-
year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical
legal education program approved by the Supreme Court (Rule 138-A, Rules of
Court);

(b) An official or other person appointed or designated in accordance with law to

appear for the Government of the Philippines in a case in which the government has
an interest (Sec. 33, Rule 138, id.);

(c) An agent or friend who aids a party-litigant in a municipal court for the purpose of
conducting the litigation (Sec. 34, Rule 138, id.);

(d) A person, resident of the province and of good repute for probity and ability, who
is appointed counsel de oficio to defend the accused in localities where members of
the bar are not available (Sec. 4, Rule 116, id.);

(e) Persons registered or specially recognized to practice in the Philippine Patent

Office (now known as the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer)
in trademark, service mark and trade name cases (Rule 23, Rules of Practice in
Trademark Cases);

(f) A non-lawyer who may appear before the National Labor Relations Commission or
any Labor Arbiter only if (1) he represents himself as a party to the case; (2) he
represents an organization or its members, provided that he shall be made to present
written proof that he is properly authorized; or (3) he is duly-accredited members of
any legal aid office duly recognized by the Department of Justice or the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines in cases referred thereto by the latter (New Rules of Procedure
of the National Labor Relations Commission);

(g) An agent, not an attorney, representing the lot owner or claimant in a case falling
under the Cadastral Act (Sec. 9, Act No. 2259); and

(h) Notaries public for municipalities where completion and passing the studies of law
in a reputable university or school of law is deemed sufficient qualification for
appointment (Sec. 233, Administrative Code of 1917). See Rollo, 144-145.

31 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client, 866; Johnstown Coal and Coke Co. of New York vs.
U.S., 102 Ct. Cl. 285.

32 Florida Bar vs. Brumbaugth, 355 So. 2d 1186.

33 Canon 3, Code of Professional Responsibility.

34 Rule 3.01, id.

35 Rule 3.04, id.

36 Canon 27, Canons of Professional Ethics.

37 People vs. Smith, 93 Am. St. Rep. 206.

38 74 Phil. 579 (1944).

39 The advertisement in said case was as follows: "Marriage license promptly

secured thru our assistance and the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if
desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free
for the poor. Everything confidential.".
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 6672 September 4, 2009

PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment1 filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan &
Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment
of professional services.

Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his
clients2 to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance3 and
expeditious collection on their claims.4 To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called
them and sent them text messages.

To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit5 of James Gregorio attesting
that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize
respondent’s services instead, in exchange for a loan of ₱50,000. Complainant also attached
"respondent’s" calling card:6

Front

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO

LAW OFFFICE

CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES

W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal

Tel: 362-7820
1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-
Fax: (632) 362-
01
7821
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar
Cel.: (0926)
Grace Park, Caloocan City
2701719

Back

SERVICES OFFERED:

CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE

TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.
1av vphi1
 (emphasis supplied)

Hence, this complaint.

Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of
the said calling card.7

The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.8

Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and recommendation,9 found
that respondent had encroached on the professional practice of complainant, violating Rule
8.0210 and other canons11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he
contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers
as stated in Section 27, Rule 13812 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that
respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty.

We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify the
recommended penalty.

The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into complainant’s
professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by respondent
in furtherance of the said misconduct themselves constituted distinct violations of ethical rules.

Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner by which a
lawyer’s services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:

CANON 3 - A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified
and objective information or statement of facts.

Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a
business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares.13 To allow a
lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession
in the public’s estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character of service to
which every member of the bar is called.14

Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:

RULE 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business.

Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers.15 Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment.16

Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:

RULE 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding
or delay any man’s cause.

This rule proscribes "ambulance chasing" (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an
attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment)17 as a measure to protect the
community from barratry and champerty.18

Complainant presented substantial evidence19 (consisting of the sworn statements of the very same
persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondent’s office) to prove that respondent indeed
solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals’ suits.

Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it during the
mandatory hearing.

Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed
to transfer representation on the strength of Labiano’s word that respondent could produce a more
favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03
and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. 1avv phi1

With regard to respondent’s violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer should
not steal another lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service,
good result or reduced fees for his services.20 Again the Court notes that respondent never denied
having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from Labiano’s "referrals." Furthermore,
he never denied Labiano’s connection to his office.21 Respondent committed an unethical, predatory
overstep into another’s legal practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.

Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent

violated Rule 16.04:

Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a
client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter
he is handling for the client.

The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the interest
of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographer’s fees for
transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is
handling for the client.

The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of mind so that the free exercise of his
judgment may not be adversely affected.22 It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he
is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the client’s cause. If the lawyer lends money
to the client in connection with the client’s case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the
subject matter of the case or an additional stake in its outcome.23 Either of these circumstances may
lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement
which may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty
of undivided fidelity to the client’s cause.24

As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice25 which calls for the exercise
of the Court’s disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for
initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment.26 Thus, in this
jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian machinations of
unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal profession.

Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on lending
money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the
wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate to its findings.

A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyer’s best
advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his
character and conduct.27 For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by
publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards.

Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:

(a) lawyer’s name;

(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;

(c) address;

(d) telephone number and

(e) special branch of law practiced.28

Labiano’s calling card contained the phrase "with financial assistance." The phrase was clearly used
to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to
finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from their original lawyers,
thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass
commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal profession.
However, in the absence of substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to
rule that respondent was personally and directly responsible for the printing and distribution of
Labiano’s calling cards.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04
and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one year effective
immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same
or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme
Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of
the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

Footnotes

1 Complaint dated February 1, 2005. Rollo, pp. 1-7.

2Overseas seafarers Cenen Magno, Henry Dy, James R. Gregorio and Noel Geronimo. Id.,
pp. 2-3, 9-14.

3 Id., p. 9.

4 Involved benefits and disability collection cases. Id., pp. 2-3.

5 Complaint, Annex "D." Id., pp. 12-14.

6 Complaint, Annex "A." Id., p. 8.

7 Answer dated April 26, 2005. Id., pp. 20-23.

8 Resolution dated August 15, 2005. Id., p. 24.

9Report and recommendation penned by Commissioner Lolita Quisumbing dated March 2,

2006. Id., pp. 106-111.

10 Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule 8.02 provides:

A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment
of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give
proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful
counsel.

11Rule 1.01; Canon 2; Rule 2.03; Canon 3; Rule 3.01; Canon 7; Rule 7.03; Canon 8; Rule
8.01; Canon 9; and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rollo, p. 110.

12 Rules of Court, Rule 138, Section 27 provides:

Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A

member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
 grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice. (emphasis supplied)

13 In Re: Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37 (1933).

14 Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 7th Edition (2002), p. 109.

15 Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. See supra note 12.

16 Supra note 13.

17 Agpalo. Supra note 14, p. 72.

18 McCloskey v. Tobin, 252 US 107, 64 L Ed 481, 40 S Ct 306 (1920).

19Or evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion
even if other equally reasonable minds might opine otherwise (Portuguez v. GSIS Family
Savings Bank, G.R. No. 169570, 2 March 2007, 517 SCRA 309; Bautista v. Sula, A.M. No.
P-04-1920, 17 August 2007, 530 SCRA 406; ePacific Global Contact Center, Inc. v.
Cabansay, G.R. No. 167345, 23 November 2007, 538 SCRA 498). Moreover, in In re:
Improper Solicitation of Court Employees – Rolando H. Hernandez, Executive Assistant 1,
Office of the Court Administrator, A.M. No. 2008-12-SC, 24 April 2009, the Court adopted the
OCA’s evaluation which relied on the sworn statements to support its conclusion that illegal
acts were committed by respondents in this case.

20 Supra note 14, p. 101.

21 Rollo, pp. 96-97.

22Agpalo, supra note 14, p. 240 citing comments of the IBP Committee that drafted the CPR,
p. 90.

23 Id.

24 Id.

25 Supra notes 10 and 12.

26 State Bar v. Kilpatrick, 874 SW2d 656 (1994, Tex). In this case, the lawyer was disbarred.

27 Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc., B.M. No. 553, 17 June 1993, 223 SCRA 378.

28 Id., p. 408.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 6622 July 10, 2012

MIGUEL G. VILLATUYA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. BEDE S. TABALINGCOS, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

In this Complaint for disbarment filed on 06 December 2004 with the Office or the Bar Confidant,
complainant Manuel G. Villatuya (complainant) charges Atty. Bcde S. 'L1halingcos (resrondent) with
unlawful solicitation of cases, violation of the ('ode or Professional Responsibility for nonpayment of
fees to complainant, and gross immorality for marrying two other women while respondent’s first
marriage was subsisting.1

In a Resolution2 dated 26 January 2005, the Second Division of this Court required respondent to file
a Comment, which he did on 21 March 2005.3 The Complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt
of the record.4

On 23 June 2005, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP (Commission) issued a
Notice5 setting the mandatory conference of the administrative case on 05 July 2005. During the
conference, complainant appeared, accompanied by his counsel and respondent. They submitted
for resolution three issues to be resolved by the Commission as follows:

1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by nonpayment of

fees to complainant

2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation, and

3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having married thrice.6

The Commission ordered the parties to submit their respective verified Position Papers. Respondent
filed his verified Position Paper,7 on 15 July 2005 while complainant submitted his on 01 August
2005.8

Complainant’s Accusations

Complainant averred that on February 2002, he was employed by respondent as a financial

consultant to assist the latter on technical and financial matters in the latter’s numerous petitions for
corporate rehabilitation filed with different courts. Complainant claimed that they had a verbal
agreement whereby he would be entitled to ₱ 50,000 for every Stay Order issued by the court in the
cases they would handle, in addition to ten percent (10%) of the fees paid by their clients. He alleged
that, from February to December 2002, respondent was able to rake in millions of pesos from the
corporate rehabilitation cases they were working on together. Complainant also claimed that he was
entitled to the amount of ₱ 900,000 for the 18 Stay Orders issued by the courts as a result of his
work with respondent, and a total of ₱ 4,539,000 from the fees paid by their clients.9 Complainant
appended to his Complaint several annexes supporting the computation of the fees he believes are
due him.

Complainant alleged that respondent engaged in unlawful solicitation of cases in violation of Section
27 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Allegedly respondent set up two financial consultancy
firms, Jesi and Jane Management, Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc., and used them as fronts
to advertise his legal services and solicit cases. Complainant supported his allegations by attaching
to his Position Paper the Articles of Incorporation of Jesi and Jane,10 letter-proposals to clients signed
by respondent on various dates11 and proofs of payment made to the latter by their clients.12

On the third charge of gross immorality, complainant accused respondent of committing two counts
of bigamy for having married two other women while his first marriage was subsisting. He submitted
a Certification dated 13 July 2005 issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar General-National
Statistics Office (NSO) certifying that Bede S. Tabalingcos, herein respondent, contracted marriage
thrice: first, on 15 July 1980 with Pilar M. Lozano, which took place in Dasmarinas, Cavite; the
second time on 28 September 1987 with Ma. Rowena Garcia Piñon in the City of Manila; and the
third on 07 September 1989 with Mary Jane Elgincolin Paraiso in Ermita, Manila.13

Respondent’s Defense

In his defense, respondent denied the charges against him. He asserted that complainant was not
an employee of his law firm – Tabalingcos and Associates Law Office14 – but of Jesi and Jane
Management, Inc., where the former is a major stockholder.15 Respondent alleged that complainant
was unprofessional and incompetent in performing his job as a financial consultant, resulting in the
latter’s dismissal of many rehabilitation plans they presented in their court cases.16 Respondent also
alleged that there was no verbal agreement between them regarding the payment of fees and the
sharing of professional fees paid by his clients. He proffered documents showing that the salary of
complainant had been paid.17

As to the charge of unlawful solicitation, respondent denied committing any. He contended that his
law firm had an agreement with Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., whereby the firm would handle the
legal aspect of the corporate rehabilitation case; and that the latter would attend to the financial
aspect of the case’ such as the preparation of the rehabilitation plans to be presented in court. To
support this contention, respondent attached to his Position Paper a Joint Venture Agreement dated
10 December 2005 entered into by Tabalingcos and Associates Law Offices and Jesi and Jane
Management, Inc.;18 and an Affidavit executed by Leoncio Balena, Vice-President for Operations of
the said company.19

On the charge of gross immorality, respondent assailed the Affidavit submitted by William Genesis, a
dismissed messenger of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., as having no probative value, since it had
been retracted by the affiant himself.20 Respondent did not specifically address the allegations
regarding his alleged bigamous marriages with two other women.

On 09 January 2006, complainant filed a Motion to Admit Copies of 3 Marriage Contracts.21 To the
said Motion, he attached the certified true copies of the Marriage Contracts referred to in the
Certification issued by the NSO.22 The appended Marriage Contracts matched the dates, places and
names of the contracting parties indicated in the earlier submitted NSO Certification of the three
marriages entered into by respondent. The first marriage contract submitted was a marriage that
took place between respondent and Pilar M. Lozano in Dasmarinas, Cavite, on 15 July 1980.23 The
second marriage contract was between respondent and Ma. Rowena G. Piñon, and it took place at
the Metropolitan Trial Court Compound of Manila on 28 September 1987.24 The third Marriage
Contract referred to a marriage between respondent and Mary Jane E. Paraiso, and it took place on
7 September 1989 in Ermita, Manila. In the second and third Marriage Contracts, respondent was
described as single under the entry for civil status.

On 16 January 2006, respondent submitted his Opposition to the Motion to Admit filed by
complainant, claiming that the document was not marked during the mandatory conference or
submitted during the hearing of the case.25 Thus, respondent was supposedly deprived of the
opportunity to controvert those documents.26 He disclosed that criminal cases for bigamy were filed
against him by the complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. Respondent
further informed the Commission that he had filed a Petition to Declare Null and Void the Marriage
Contract with Rowena Piñon at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Biñan, Laguna, where it was
docketed as Civil Case No. B-3270.27 He also filed another Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage Contract with Pilar Lozano at the RTC-Calamba, where it was docketed as Civil Case No.
B-3271.28 In both petitions, he claimed that he had recently discovered that there were Marriage
Contracts in the records of the NSO bearing his name and allegedly executed with Rowena Piñon
and Pilar Lozano on different occasions. He prayed for their annulment, because they were
purportedly null and void.

On 17 September 2007, in view of its reorganization, the Commission scheduled a clarificatory

hearing on 20 November 2007.29 While complainant manifested to the Commission that he would not
attend the hearing,30 respondent manifested his willingness to attend and moved for the suspension
of the resolution of the administrative case against the latter. Respondent cited two Petitions he had
filed with the RTC, Laguna, seeking the nullification of the Marriage Contracts he discovered to be
bearing his name.31

On 10 November 2007, complainant submitted to the Commission duplicate original copies of two
(2) Informations filed with the RTC of Manila against respondent, entitled "People of the Philippines
vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos."32 The first criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-257125,
was for bigamy for the marriage contracted by respondent with Ma. Rowena Garcia Piñon while his
marriage with Pilar Lozano was still valid.33 The other one, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-
257126, charged respondent with having committed bigamy for contracting marriage with Mary Jane
Elgincolin Paraiso while his marriage with Pilar Lozano was still subsisting.34 Each of the Informations
recommended bail in the amount of P24,000 for his provisional liberty as accused in the criminal
cases.35
On 20 November 2007, only respondent attended the clarificatory hearing. In the same proceeding,
the Commission denied his Motion to suspend the proceedings pending the outcome of the petitions
for nullification he had filed with the RTC–Laguna. Thus, the Commission resolved that the
administrative case against him be submitted for resolution.36

IBP’s Report and Recommendation

On 27 February 2008, the Commission promulgated its Report and

Recommendation addressing the specific charges against respondent.37 The first charge, for
dishonesty for the nonpayment of certain shares in the fees, was dismissed for lack of merit. The
Commission ruled that the charge should have been filed with the proper courts since it was only
empowered to determine respondent’s administrative liability. On this matter, complainant failed to
prove dishonesty on the part of respondent.38 On the second charge, the Commission found
respondent to have violated the rule on the solicitation of client for having advertised his legal
services and unlawfully solicited cases. It recommended that he be reprimanded for the violation. It
failed, though, to point out exactly the specific provision he violated.39

As for the third charge, the Commission found respondent to be guilty of gross immorality for
violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27 of Rule 138
of the Rules of Court. It found that complainant was able to prove through documentary evidence
that respondent committed bigamy twice by marrying two other women while the latter’s first
marriage was subsisting.40 Due to the gravity of the acts of respondent, the Commission
recommended that he be disbarred, and that his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys.41

On 15 April 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, through its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-154, adopted
and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.42 On 01 August
2008, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the recommendation to disbar him
was premature. He contends that the Commission should have suspended the disbarment
proceedings pending the resolution of the separate cases he had filed for the annulment of the
marriage contracts bearing his name as having entered into those contracts with other women. He
further contends that the evidence proffered by complainant to establish that the latter committed
bigamy was not substantial to merit the punishment of disbarment. Thus, respondent moved for the
reconsideration of the resolution to disbar him and likewise moved to archive the administrative
proceedings pending the outcome of the Petitions he separately filed with the RTC of Laguna for the
annulment of Marriage Contracts.43

On 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied the Motions for Reconsideration and affirmed
their Resolution dated 15 April 2008 recommending respondent’s disbarment.44

The Court’s Ruling

The Court affirms the recommendations of the IBP.

First Charge:

Dishonesty for nonpayment of share in the fees

While we affirm the IBP’s dismissal of the first charge against respondent, we do not concur with the
rationale behind it.

The first charge of complainant against respondent for the nonpayment of the former’s share in the
fees, if proven to be true is based on an agreement that is violative of Rule 9.0245 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is proscribed by the Code to divide or agree to divide the fees
for legal services rendered with a person not licensed to practice law. Based on the allegations,
respondent had agreed to share with complainant the legal fees paid by clients that complainant
solicited for the respondent. Complainant, however, failed to proffer convincing evidence to prove
the existence of that agreement.

We ruled in Tan Tek Beng v. David46 that an agreement between a lawyer and a layperson to share
the fees collected from clients secured by the layperson is null and void, and that the lawyer involved
may be disciplined for unethical conduct. Considering that complainant’s allegations in this case had
not been proven, the IBP correctly dismissed the charge against respondent on this matter.

Second Charge:

Unlawful solicitation of clients

Complainant charged respondent with unlawfully soliciting clients and advertising legal services
through various business entities. Complainant submitted documentary evidence to prove that Jesi &
Jane Management Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc. were owned and used as fronts by
respondent to advertise the latter’s legal services and to solicit clients. In its Report, the IBP
established the truth of these allegations and ruled that respondent had violated the rule on the
solicitation of clients, but it failed to point out the specific provision that was breached.

A review of the records reveals that respondent indeed used the business entities mentioned in the
report to solicit clients and to advertise his legal services, purporting to be specialized in corporate
rehabilitation cases. Based on the facts of the case, he violated Rule 2.0347 of the Code, which
prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the purpose of profit.

A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety arises,
though, when the business is of such a nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be
inconsistent with the lawyer’s duties as a member of the bar. This inconsistency arises when the
business is one that can readily lend itself to the procurement of professional employment for the
lawyer; or that can be used as a cloak for indirect solicitation on the lawyer’s behalf; or is of a nature
that, if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as the practice of law.48

It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi & Jane Management,
Inc., which purports to be a financial and legal consultant, was indeed a vehicle used by respondent
as a means to procure professional employment; specifically for corporate rehabilitation cases.
Annex "C"49 of the Complaint is a letterhead of Jesi & Jane

Management, Inc., which proposed an agreement for the engagement of legal services. The letter
clearly states that, should the prospective client agree to the proposed fees, respondent would
render legal services related to the former’s loan obligation with a bank. This circumvention is
considered objectionable and violates the Code, because the letter is signed by respondent as
President of Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., and not as partner or associate of a law firm.

Rule 15.0850 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the client whether the
former is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity. This duty is a must in those occupations related
to the practice of law. The reason is that certain ethical considerations governing the attorney-client
relationship may be operative in one and not in the other.51 In this case, it is confusing for the client if
it is not clear whether respondent is offering consultancy or legal services.

Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the degree of prevalence of this practice by
respondent, we affirm the recommendation to reprimand the latter for violating Rules 2.03 and 15.08
of the Code.

Third Charge:

Bigamy

The third charge that respondent committed bigamy twice is a serious accusation. To substantiate
this allegation, complainant submitted NSO-certified copies of the Marriage Contracts entered into
by respondent with three (3) different women. The latter objected to the introduction of these
documents, claiming that they were submitted after the administrative case had been submitted for
resolution, thus giving him no opportunity to controvert them.52 We are not persuaded by his
argument.

We have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui generis. Its focus is on the qualification and
fitness of a lawyer to continue membership in the bar and not the procedural technicalities in filing
the case. Thus, we explained in Garrido v. Garrido:53

Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure — such as the verification of pleadings and
prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance
by the complainant — do not apply in the determination of a lawyer's qualifications and fitness for
membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from this
ruling. First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice and is a
matter of public interest because it involves service to the public. The admission qualifications are
also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of
qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter
of public concern that the State may inquire into through this Court.

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. For the court to
1âwphi1

exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by convincing
and satisfactory proof.54 In this case, complainant submitted NSO-certified true copies to prove that
respondent entered into two marriages while the latter’s first marriage was still subsisting. While
respondent denied entering into the second and the third marriages, he resorted to vague assertions
tantamount to a negative pregnant. He did not dispute the authenticity of the NSO documents, but
denied that he contracted those two other marriages. He submitted copies of the two Petitions he
had filed separately with the RTC of Laguna – one in Biñan and the other in Calamba – to declare
the second and the third Marriage Contracts null and void.55

We find him guilty of gross immorality under the Code.

We cannot give credence to the defense proffered by respondent. He has not disputed the
authenticity or impugned the genuineness of the NSO-certified copies of the Marriage Contracts
presented by complainant to prove the former’s marriages to two other women aside from his wife.
For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Contracts bearing the name of
respondent are competent and convincing evidence proving that he committed bigamy, which
renders him unfit to continue as a member of the bar. The documents were certified by the NSO,
which is the official repository of civil registry records pertaining to the birth, marriage and death of a
person. Having been issued by a government agency, the NSO certification is accorded much
evidentiary weight and carries with it a presumption of regularity. In this case, respondent has not
presented any competent evidence to rebut those documents.

According to the respondent, after the discovery of the second and the third marriages, he filed civil
actions to annul the Marriage Contracts. We perused the attached Petitions for Annulment and found
that his allegations therein treated the second and the third marriage contracts as ordinary
agreements, rather than as special contracts contemplated under the then Civil Code provisions on
marriage. He did not invoke any grounds in the Civil Code provisions on marriage, prior to its
amendment by the Family Code. Respondent’s regard for marriage contracts as ordinary
agreements indicates either his wanton disregard of the sanctity of marriage or his gross ignorance
of the law on what course of action to take to annul a marriage under the old Civil Code provisions.

What has been clearly established here is the fact that respondent entered into marriage twice while
his first marriage was still subsisting. In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro,56 we held thus:

We have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar whom we found guilty of misconduct
which demonstrated a lack of that good moral character required of them not only as a condition
precedent for their admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their continued membership therein. No
distinction has been made as to whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyer’s professional
capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an
attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. He is expected to be competent, honorable and
reliable at all times since he who cannot apply and abide by the laws in his private affairs, can hardly
be expected to do so in his professional dealings nor lead others in doing so. Professional honesty
and honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other
relations. The administration of justice, in which the lawyer plays an important role being an officer of
the court, demands a high degree of intellectual and moral competency on his part so that the courts
and clients may rightly repose confidence in him.

Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of
the bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.57 His
acts of committing bigamy twice constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.58

Thus, we adopt the recommendation of the IBP to disbar respondent and order that his name be
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

WHEREFORE, this Court resolves the following charges against Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos as
follows:

1. The charge of dishonesty is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

2. Respondent is REPRIMANDED for acts of illegal advertisement and solicitation.

3. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos is DISBARRED for engaging in bigamy, a grossly immoral

conduct.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos in the
Office of the Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the name of Bede S. Tabalingcos from the Roll of
Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.
 ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On leave)
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

(On leave)
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
ROBERTO A. ABAD*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELLA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

Footnotes

*On leave

1
Rollo, p. 1.

2
Id. at 22.

3
Id. at 22-35.

4
Id. at 36.

5
Commission on Bar Discipline Records, Vol. II, p. 1.

6
Id. at 3.

7
Id. at 60.

8
Id. at 186.

9
Id. at 1.

10
Id. at 10-20.

11
Id. at 5 & 6.

12
Commission on Bar Discipline Records, Vol. II, pp. 202-212.

13
Id. at 195, 201.

14
Id. at 61.

15
Id. at 66.

16
Id. at 67.
17
Id. at 78-82.

18
Id. at 74.

19
Id. at 75.

20
Id. at 10.

21
Id. at 215.

22
Id. at 217-219.

23
Id. at 217.

24
Id. at 218.

25
Id. at 220.

26
Id. at 221.

27
Id. at 226.

28
Id. at 231.

29
Id. at 237.

30
Id. at 238.

31
Id. at 244.

32
Id. at 239.

33
Id. at 240.

34
Id. at 256.

35
Id. at 241 & 243.

36
Id. at 256.

Commission on Bar Discipline Records Vol. III, pp. 2-13. The Commission’s Report and
37

Recommendation dated 27 February 2008 was penned by Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E.

Reyes.

38
Id. at 8.

39
Id.

40
Id. at 9-10.

41
Id. at 13.

42
Id. at 1.

43
Id. at 14-27.

On the 36th page succeeding Commission on Bar Discipline Records, Vol. III (no
44

pagination on the rollo).

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Rule 9.02 - A lawyer shall not divide or

45

stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law, except:

(a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon
the latter's death, money shall be paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate
or to persons specified in the agreement; or
 (b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased
lawyer; or

(c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in a retirement plan
even if the plan is based in whole or in part, on a profit sharing agreement.

46
211 Phil. 547 (1983).

47
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Rule 2.03 - A lawyer shall not do or permit
to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.

RUBEN A. AGPALO, LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS, 124 (2009), citing A.B.A. Op. 57 (19
48

March 1932); Re, 97 A2d 627, 39 ALR2d 1032 (1953).

49
Rollo, p. 6.

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Rule 15.08. - A lawyer who is engaged in

50

another profession or occupation concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his
client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.

51
AGPALO, supra note 48.

52
Commission on Bar Discipline Records, Vol. II, p. 221.

53
A.C. No. 6593, 04 February 2010, 611 SCRA 508.

54
Aba v. De Guzman, A.C. No. 7649, 14 December 2011.

55
Commission on Bar Discipline Records Volume II, pp. 226-234.

56
A.C. No. 4256, 467 Phil. 139 (2004).

57
Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, A.C. No. 2474, 501 Phil. 1 (2005).

58
Rule 138, Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
therefor. — A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney
by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice,
or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
A.C. No. 5299 August 19, 2003

ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information
Office, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 157053 August 19, 2003

ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Petitioner,

vs.
IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his capacity as
Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000
issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: "ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE
Specialist 532-4333/521-2667."1

Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court,
called up the published telephone number and pretended to be an interested party. She spoke to
Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling
annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within four to six months, provided the case will
not involve separation of property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband
charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the time of filing of the case and the other
half after a decision thereon has been rendered.

Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information Office revealed
that similar advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin
and August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star.2

On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator
and Chief of the Public Information Office, filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T.
Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and
Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.3

In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising and
solicitation per se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to change our views about the
prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that the interest of the public is not served by the absolute
prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the Court can lift the ban on lawyer advertising; and that the
rationale behind the decades-old prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be
exonerated from all the charges against him and that the Court promulgate a ruling that
advertisement of legal services offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public
order as long as it is dignified.4

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation.5 On June 29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution No.
XV-2002-306,6 finding respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, and suspended him from
the practice of law for one (1) year with the warning that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt
with more severely. The IBP Resolution was noted by this Court on November 11, 2002.7

In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,8 which was denied by the
IBP in Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 20029

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053 entitled, "Atty.
Rizalino T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr.,
Asst. Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, Respondents." This petition was
consolidated with A.C. No. 5299 per the Court’s Resolution dated March 4, 2003.

In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest whether or not they
were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings.10 Complainant filed his
Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating that he is not submitting any additional pleading or evidence
and is submitting the case for its early resolution on the basis of pleadings and records
thereof. 11 Respondent, on the other hand, filed a Supplemental Memorandum on June 20, 2003.

We agree with the IBP’s Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.

Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:

Rule 2.03. – A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business.

Rule 3.01. – A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.

Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. – A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney
for a party without authority to do so.

It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business.12 It is a profession in which
duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to
be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits.13 The
gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration.14 The duty to public service and to the
administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their
personal interests or what they owe to themselves.15 The following elements distinguish the legal
profession from a business:

1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one may
attain the highest eminence without making much money;

2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the administration of justice involving thorough

sincerity, integrity and reliability;

3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;

4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to

resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or
dealing directly with their clients.16

There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admits that he
caused the publication of the advertisements. While he professes repentance and begs for the
Court’s indulgence, his contrition rings hollow considering the fact that he advertised his legal
services again after he pleaded for compassion and after claiming that he had no intention to violate
the rules. Eight months after filing his answer, he again advertised his legal services in the August
14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper.17 Ten months later, he caused the same
advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell.18 Such acts of respondent
are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Court’s authority.

What adds to the gravity of respondent’s acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled
"Annulment of Marriage Specialist," he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the
stability but also the sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary
climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an annulment
may be obtained in four to six months from the time of the filing of the case,19 he in fact encourages
people, who might have otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their
marriage bonds, to do so.

Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation
to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest
and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar.20 Thus, the use of simple
signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of
practice, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible.
Even the use of calling cards is now acceptable.21 Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner
consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and informative
data is likewise allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:22
Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer’s name and the
names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of
law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of
graduation, degrees and other educational distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor;
legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and
committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other
reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the
names of clients regularly represented.

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally
for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and
informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer
permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management, or contents of which are
calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower dignity or standing of the
profession.

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the
opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being
for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in
a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. (emphasis and italics
supplied)

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of

violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27
of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon
receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Vitug, (Acting Chairman),Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman ), abroad, on official business.
Adm. Case No. 2131 May 10, 1985

ADRIANO E. DACANAY, complainant

vs.
BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G. COLLAS JR., LUIS MA. GUERRERO, VICENTE A. TORRES,
RAFAEL E. EVANGELISTA, JR., ROMEO L. SALONGA, JOSE R. SANDEJAS, LUCAS M.
NUNAG, J. CLARO TESORO, NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and JOSE A. CURAMMENG,
JR., respondents.

Adriano E. Dacanay for and his own behalf.

Madrid, Cacho, Angeles, Dominguez & Pecson Law Office for respondents.

AQUINO, J.:

Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954, in his 1980 verified complaint, sought to
enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine other lawyers from practising law under the name of Baker &
McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois.

In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of Baker &
McKenzie, which contains the names of the ten lawyers, asked Rosie Clurman for the release of 87
shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client.

Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel.
He requested that he be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie "and if not,
what is your purpose in using the letterhead of another law office." Not having received any reply, he
filed the instant complaint.

We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec.
1, Rule 138, Rules of Court). As admitted by the respondents in their memorandum, Baker &
McKenzie is a professional partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members and
associates in 30 cities around the world. Respondents, aside from being members of the Philippine
bar, practising under the firm name of Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates of Baker &
Mckenzie.

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie
constitutes a representation that being associated with the firm they could "render legal services of
the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and
investment" (p. 3, respondents' memo). This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not
authorized to practise law here. (See Ruben E. Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983 Ed., p. 115.)

WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm name Baker &
McKenzie.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Acting CJ., Makasiar, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr.,
De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

Plana, J., took no part.

Fernando, C.J., and Concepcion, Jr., J., are on leave.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

July 30, 1979

PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "SYCIP, SALAZAR,
FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO." LUCIANO E. SALAZAR, FLORENTINO P.
FELICIANO, BENILDO G. HERNANDEZ. GREGORIO R. CASTILLO. ALBERTO P. SAN JUAN,
JUAN C. REYES. JR., ANDRES G. GATMAITAN, JUSTINO H. CACANINDIN, NOEL A. LAMAN,
ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ, ANGELITO C. IMPERIO, EDUARDO R. CENIZA, TRISTAN A.
CATINDIG, ANCHETA K. TAN, and ALICE V. PESIGAN, petitioners.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME
"OZAETA, ROMULO, DE LEON, MABANTA & REYES." RICARDO J. ROMULO, BENJAMIN M.
DE LEON, ROMAN MABANTA, JR., JOSE MA, REYES, JESUS S. J. SAYOC, EDUARDO DE
LOS ANGELES, and JOSE F. BUENAVENTURA, petitioners.

RESOLUTION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: ñé+.£ª wph!1

Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander
Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died
on February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the
names of partners who had passed away. In the Court's Resolution of September 2, 1976, both
Petitions were ordered consolidated.

Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments:

1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business under a firm name
which includes the name of a deceased partner; in fact, Article 1840 of the Civil Code explicitly
sanctions the practice when it provides in the last paragraph that: têñ.£îhqw â£

The use by the person or partnership continuing the business of the partnership
name, or the name of a deceased partner as part thereof, shall not of itself make the
individual property of the deceased partner liable for any debts contracted by such
person or partnership. 1

2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and engineering, the legislature has
authorized the adoption of firm names without any restriction as to the use, in such firm name, of the
name of a deceased partner; 2 the legislative authorization given to those engaged in the practice of
accountancy — a profession requiring the same degree of trust and confidence in respect of clients
as that implicit in the relationship of attorney and client — to acquire and use a trade name, strongly
indicates that there is no fundamental policy that is offended by the continued use by a firm of
professionals of a firm name which includes the name of a deceased partner, at least where such
firm name has acquired the characteristics of a "trade name." 3

3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the continued use of the name of a
deceased partner in the firm name of a law partnership because Canon 33 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association declares that: têñ.£îhqw â£

... The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible
by local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or
deception is practiced through this use. ... 4

4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of their respective deceased
partners were well-publicized in all newspapers of general circulation for several days; the
stationeries now being used by them carry new letterheads indicating the years when their
respective deceased partners were connected with the firm; petitioners will notify all leading national
and international law directories of the fact of their respective deceased partners' deaths. 5

5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner's name in a professional firm's
name; 6 there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila Area, which
recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily Identifies the individual members of the firm. 7
6. The continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships has been
consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted practice in the legal profession of most
countries in the world.8

The question involved in these Petitions first came under consideration by this Court in 1953 when a
law firm in Cebu (the Deen case) continued its practice of including in its firm name that of a
deceased partner, C.D. Johnston. The matter was resolved with this Court advising the firm to desist
from including in their firm designation the name of C. D. Johnston, who has long been dead."

The same issue was raised before this Court in 1958 as an incident in G. R. No. L-11964, entitled
Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation. The law firm of Perkins & Ponce Enrile
moved to intervene as amicus curiae. Before acting thereon, the Court, in a Resolution of April 15,
1957, stated that it "would like to be informed why the name of Perkins is still being used although
Atty. E. A. Perkins is already dead." In a Manifestation dated May 21, 1957, the law firm of Perkins
and Ponce Enrile, raising substantially the same arguments as those now being raised by
petitioners, prayed that the continued use of the firm name "Perkins & Ponce Enrile" be held proper.

On June 16, 1958, this Court resolved: têñ.£îhqw â£

After carefully considering the reasons given by Attorneys Alfonso Ponce Enrile and
Associates for their continued use of the name of the deceased E. G. Perkins, the
Court found no reason to depart from the policy it adopted in June 1953 when it
required Attorneys Alfred P. Deen and Eddy A. Deen of Cebu City to desist from
including in their firm designation, the name of C. D. Johnston, deceased. The Court
believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations between
attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of professional
ethics, no practice should be allowed which even in a remote degree could give rise
to the possibility of deception. Said attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the
name "PERKINS" from their firm name.

Petitioners herein now seek a re-examination of the policy thus far enunciated by the Court.

The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from the rulings thus laid down.

A. Inasmuch as "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo" and "Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon,
Mabanta and Reyes" are partnerships, the use in their partnership names of the names of deceased
partners will run counter to Article 1815 of the Civil Code which provides: têñ.£îhqw â£

Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which may or may not
include the name of one or more of the partners.

Those who, not being members of the partnership, include their names in the firm
name, shall be subject to the liability, of a partner.

It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm name of a partnership must either be
those of living partners and. in the case of non-partners, should be living persons who can be
subjected to liability. In fact, Article 1825 of the Civil Code prohibits a third person from including his
name in the firm name under pain of assuming the liability of a partner. The heirs of a deceased
partner in a law firm cannot be held liable as the old members to the creditors of a firm particularly
where they are non-lawyers. Thus, Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional Ethics "prohibits an
agreement for the payment to the widow and heirs of a deceased lawyer of a percentage, either
gross or net, of the fees received from the future business of the deceased lawyer's clients, both
because the recipients of such division are not lawyers and because such payments will not
represent service or responsibility on the part of the recipient. " Accordingly, neither the widow nor
the heirs can be held liable for transactions entered into after the death of their lawyer-predecessor.
There being no benefits accruing, there ran be no corresponding liability.

Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to allowing the use by law firms of the names
of deceased partners. The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create
undue advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer without
connections will have to make a name for himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who
can join an old firm, can initially ride on that old firm's reputation established by deceased partners.

B. In regards to the last paragraph of Article 1840 of the Civil Code cited by petitioners, supra, the
first factor to consider is that it is within Chapter 3 of Title IX of the Code entitled "Dissolution and
Winding Up." The Article primarily deals with the exemption from liability in cases of a dissolved
partnership, of the individual property of the deceased partner for debts contracted by the person or
partnership which continues the business using the partnership name or the name of the deceased
partner as part thereof. What the law contemplates therein is a hold-over situation preparatory to
formal reorganization.

Secondly, Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to protect rather than
of a professional partnership, with no saleable good will but whose reputation depends on the
personal qualifications of its individual members. Thus, it has been held that a saleable goodwill can
exist only in a commercial partnership and cannot arise in a professional partnership consisting of
lawyers. 9
têñ.£îhqw â£

As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a commercial partnership the succeeding

partners or parties have the right to carry on the business under the old name, in the
absence of a stipulation forbidding it, (s)ince the name of a commercial partnership is
a partnership asset inseparable from the good will of the firm. ... (60 Am Jur 2d, s
204, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, têñ.£îhqw â£

... a professional partnership the reputation of which depends or; the individual skill of
the members, such as partnerships of attorneys or physicians, has no good win to be
distributed as a firm asset on its dissolution, however intrinsically valuable such skill
and reputation may be, especially where there is no provision in the partnership
agreement relating to good will as an asset. ... (ibid, s 203, p. 115) (Emphasis
supplied)

C. A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other
professionals or for business. For one thing, the law on accountancy specifically allows the use of a
trade name in connection with the practice of accountancy.10 têñ.£îhqw â£

A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or
association for a particular purpose. ... It is not a partnership formed for the purpose
of carrying on trade or business or of holding property." 11 Thus, it has been stated
that "the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law practice is
improper. 12

The usual reason given for different standards of conduct being applicable to the
practice of law from those pertaining to business is that the law is a profession.

Dean Pound, in his recently published contribution to the Survey of the Legal
Profession, (The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times, p. 5) defines a profession
as "a group of men pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of public
service, — no less a public service because it may incidentally be a means of
livelihood."

xxx xxx xxx

Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from business are:

1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a byproduct, and in which one
may attain the highest eminence without making much money.

2. A relation as an "officer of court" to the administration of justice involving thorough

sincerity, integrity, and reliability.

3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary.

4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and

unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment
on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients. 13

"The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or
franchise. 14 It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly
ascertained and certified. 15 The right does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal
standing and attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and partaking of
the nature of a public trust." 16

D. Petitioners cited Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association"
in support of their petitions.
It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the name of a deceased
or former partner in the firm name of a law partnership when such a practice is permissible by local
custom but the Canon warns that care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced
through this use.

It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the continued use of a
deceased or former partner's name in the firm names of law partnerships. Firm names, under our
custom, Identify the more active and/or more senior members or partners of the law firm. A glimpse
at the history of the firms of petitioners and of other law firms in this country would show how their
firm names have evolved and changed from time to time as the composition of the partnership
changed. têñ.£îhqwâ£

The continued use of a firm name after the death of one or more of the partners
designated by it is proper only where sustained by local custom and not where by
custom this purports to Identify the active members. ...

There would seem to be a question, under the working of the Canon, as to the
propriety of adding the name of a new partner and at the same time retaining that of
a deceased partner who was never a partner with the new one. (H.S. Drinker, op.
cit., supra, at pp. 207208) (Emphasis supplied).

The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the name of a deceased
partner continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in search of legal counsel might be
guided by the familiar ring of a distinguished name appearing in a firm title.

E. Petitioners argue that U.S. Courts have consistently allowed the continued use of a deceased
partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships. But that is so because it is sanctioned by
custom.

In the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (33 N.Y.S. 2d 733) which petitioners
Salazar, et al. quoted in their memorandum, the New York Supreme Court sustained the use of the
firm name Alexander & Green even if none of the present ten partners of the firm bears either
name because the practice was sanctioned by custom and did not offend any statutory provision or
legislative policy and was adopted by agreement of the parties. The Court stated therein: têñ.£îhqw â£

The practice sought to be proscribed has the sanction of custom and offends no
statutory provision or legislative policy. Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics of both the American Bar Association and the New York State Bar Association
provides in part as follows: "The continued use of the name of a deceased or former
partner, when permissible by local custom is not unethical, but care should be taken
that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use." There is no question as
to local custom. Many firms in the city use the names of deceased members with the
approval of other attorneys, bar associations and the courts. The Appellate Division
of the First Department has considered the matter and reached The conclusion that
such practice should not be prohibited. (Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

Neither the Partnership Law nor the Penal Law prohibits the practice in question. The
use of the firm name herein is also sustainable by reason of agreement between the
partners. 18

Not so in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom that sanctions the practice. Custom has
been defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a
social rule, legally binding and obligatory. 19 Courts take no judicial notice of custom. A custom must
be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. 20 A local custom as a source of right cannot
be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent
evidence like any other fact. 21 We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the
elements requisite to constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a
matter of practice does not mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a
juridical custom. Juridical custom must be differentiated from social custom. The former can
supplement statutory law or be applied in the absence of such statute. Not so with the latter.

Moreover, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws form part of the legal system. 22 When
the Supreme Court in the Deen and Perkins cases issued its Resolutions directing lawyers to desist
from including the names of deceased partners in their firm designation, it laid down a legal rule
against which no custom or practice to the contrary, even if proven, can prevail. This is not to speak
of our civil law which clearly ordains that a partnership is dissolved by the death of any
partner. 23 Custom which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be
countenanced. 24

The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the administration of justice and should not
be considered like an ordinary "money-making trade." têñ.£îhqwâ£

... It is of the essence of a profession that it is practiced in a spirit of public service. A

trade ... aims primarily at personal gain; a profession at the exercise of powers
beneficial to mankind. If, as in the era of wide free opportunity, we think of free
competitive self assertion as the highest good, lawyer and grocer and farmer may
seem to be freely competing with their fellows in their calling in order each to acquire
as much of the world's good as he may within the allowed him by law. But the
member of a profession does not regard himself as in competition with his
professional brethren. He is not bartering his services as is the artisan nor
exchanging the products of his skill and learning as the farmer sells wheat or corn.
There should be no such thing as a lawyers' or physicians' strike. The best service of
the professional man is often rendered for no equivalent or for a trifling equivalent
and it is his pride to do what he does in a way worthy of his profession even if done
with no expectation of reward, This spirit of public service in which the profession of
law is and ought to be exercised is a prerequisite of sound administration of justice
according to law. The other two elements of a profession, namely, organization and
pursuit of a learned art have their justification in that they secure and maintain that
spirit. 25

In fine, petitioners' desire to preserve the Identity of their firms in the eyes of the public must bow to
legal and ethical impediment.

ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners advised to drop the names
"SYCIP" and "OZAETA" from their respective firm names. Those names may, however, be included
in the listing of individuals who have been partners in their firms indicating the years during which
they served as such.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur

Fernando, C.J. and Abad Santos, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:

The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes for granting them, seven of the Justices being
of the contrary view, as explained in the plurality opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera. It is
out of delicadeza that the undersigned did not participate in the disposition of these petitions, as the
law office of Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo started with the partnership of
Quisumbing, Sycip, and Quisumbing, the senior partner, the late Ramon Quisumbing, being the
father-in-law of the undersigned, and the most junior partner then, Norberto J. Quisumbing, being his
brother- in-law. For the record, the undersigned wishes to invite the attention of all concerned, and
not only of petitioners, to the last sentence of the opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera:
'Those names [Sycip and Ozaeta] may, however, be included in the listing of individuals wtes

AQUINO, J., dissenting:

I dissent. The fourteen members of the law firm, Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo, in
their petition of June 10, 1975, prayed for authority to continue the use of that firm name,
notwithstanding the death of Attorney Alexander Sycip on May 5, 1975 (May he rest in peace). He
was the founder of the firm which was originally known as the Sycip Law Office.

On the other hand, the seven surviving partners of the law firm, Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta
& Reyes, in their petition of August 13, 1976, prayed that they be allowed to continue using the said
firm name notwithstanding the death of two partners, former Justice Roman Ozaeta and his son,
Herminio, on May 1, 1972 and February 14, 1976, respectively.
They alleged that the said law firm was a continuation of the Ozaeta Law Office which was
established in 1957 by Justice Ozaeta and his son and that, as to the said law firm, the name
Ozaeta has acquired an institutional and secondary connotation.

Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of the use by the partnership of the name of a deceased
partner as part of the partnership name, is cited to justify the petitions. Also invoked is the canon that
the continued use by a law firm of the name of a deceased partner, "when permissible by local
custom, is not unethical" as long as "no imposition or deception is practised through this use"
(Canon 33 of the Canons of Legal Ethics).

I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted with the condition that it be indicated in the
letterheads of the two firms (as the case may be) that Alexander Sycip, former Justice Ozaeta and
Herminio Ozaeta are dead or the period when they served as partners should be stated therein.

Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the names of their deceased
founders is to retain the clients who had customarily sought the legal services of Attorneys Sycip and
Ozaeta and to benefit from the goodwill attached to the names of those respected and esteemed law
practitioners. That is a legitimate motivation.

The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That practice was followed before the war by the
law firm of James Ross. Notwithstanding the death of Judge Ross the founder of the law firm of
Ross, Lawrence, Selph and Carrascoso, his name was retained in the firm name with an indication
of the year when he died. No one complained that the retention of the name of Judge Ross in the
firm name was illegal or unethical.

# Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:

The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes for granting them, seven of the Justices being
of the contrary view, as explained in the plurality opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera. It is
out of delicadeza that the undersigned did not participate in the disposition of these petitions, as the
law office of Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo started with the partnership of
Quisumbing, Sycip, and Quisumbing, the senior partner, the late Ramon Quisumbing, being the
father-in-law of the undersigned, and the most junior partner then, Norberto J. Quisumbing, being his
brother- in-law. For the record, the undersigned wishes to invite the attention of all concerned, and
not only of petitioners, to the last sentence of the opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera:
'Those names [Sycip and Ozaeta] may, however, be included in the listing of individuals wtes

AQUINO, J., dissenting:

I dissent. The fourteen members of the law firm, Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo, in
their petition of June 10, 1975, prayed for authority to continue the use of that firm name,
notwithstanding the death of Attorney Alexander Sycip on May 5, 1975 (May he rest in peace). He
was the founder of the firm which was originally known as the Sycip Law Office.

On the other hand, the seven surviving partners of the law firm, Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta
& Reyes, in their petition of August 13, 1976, prayed that they be allowed to continue using the said
firm name notwithstanding the death of two partners, former Justice Roman Ozaeta and his son,
Herminio, on May 1, 1972 and February 14, 1976, respectively.

They alleged that the said law firm was a continuation of the Ozaeta Law Office which was
established in 1957 by Justice Ozaeta and his son and that, as to the said law firm, the name
Ozaeta has acquired an institutional and secondary connotation.

Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of the use by the partnership of the name of a deceased
partner as part of the partnership name, is cited to justify the petitions. Also invoked is the canon that
the continued use by a law firm of the name of a deceased partner, "when permissible by local
custom, is not unethical" as long as "no imposition or deception is practised through this use"
(Canon 33 of the Canons of Legal Ethics).

I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted with the condition that it be indicated in the
letterheads of the two firms (as the case may be) that Alexander Sycip, former Justice Ozaeta and
Herminio Ozaeta are dead or the period when they served as partners should be stated therein.

Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the names of their deceased
founders is to retain the clients who had customarily sought the legal services of Attorneys Sycip and
Ozaeta and to benefit from the goodwill attached to the names of those respected and esteemed law
practitioners. That is a legitimate motivation.

The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That practice was followed before the war by the
law firm of James Ross. Notwithstanding the death of Judge Ross the founder of the law firm of
Ross, Lawrence, Selph and Carrascoso, his name was retained in the firm name with an indication
of the year when he died. No one complained that the retention of the name of Judge Ross in the
firm name was illegal or unethical.

#Footnotes têñ.£îhq wâ£

1 See Memorandum of Salazar, et al., p. 5: see also Petition of Romulo, et al., p. 3.

2 Citing Sec, 16-A, Public Act No. 3105, as amended by Commonwealth Act No.
342; Sec. 39, Commonwealth Act No. 294; Sec. 23, Republic Act No. 318; Sec. 39,
Republic Act No. 184.

3 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., pp. 7-8.

4 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., pp. 8-10; Petition of Romulo, et al., pp. 3- 4.

5 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., p. 13; Petition of Romulo, et al., p. 4.

6 Petition of Romulo, et al., p. 4.

7 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., p. 11.

8 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., pp. 6-7 and pp. 16-18; Petition of Romulo. et al., p,
5.

9 Seddal vs. Keating, 8 App. Div. 2d 44, 185 NYS 2d 630, affd 7 NY 2d 846, 196
NYS 2d 986, 164 NE 2d 860.

10 Section 16-A, Commonwealth Act No. 342.

11 In re Crawford's Estate, 184 NE 2d 779, 783.

12 H.S. Drinker, Legal Ethics (1953), p. 206; see also Canon 33, par. 2, Canons of
Professional Ethics.

13 H.S, Drinker, Legal Ethics (1953) pp. 4-5.

14 7 C.J.S. 708.

15 Am Jur 270.

16 In re Lavine, 41 P2d 161, all cited in Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, Fifth Ed., p.
8.

17 Canons 1 to 32 which were adopted by the American Bar Association in 1908

were also adopted by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. The American Bar
Association adopted Canons 33 to 45 in 1928, Canon 46 in 1933 and Canon 47 in
1937. On April 20, 1946, when Canons 33 to 47 where already in effect, the Revised
Constitution of the Philippine Bar Association was approved and it provided that the
Association "adopts and makes its own the Code of Ethics of the American Bar
Association." (Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, Fifth Ed. p, 341).

18 33 N.Y.S. 2d 733, 734.

19 JBL Reyes & RC Puno, Outline of Philippine Civil Law. Fourth Ed., Vol. I, p. 7

20 Article 12, Civil Code.

21 Patriarca vs. Orate, 7 Phil. 390, 395 (1907).

22 Art. 8, Civil Code

23 Art. 1830, Civil Code.

24 Art. 11, Civil Code.

25 Roscoe Pound, The Lawyer From Antiquity To Modern Times, (1953), pp. 9-10.
A.C. No. 9896 March 19, 2014

MA. ELENA CARLOS NEBREJA, Petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. BENJAMIN REONAL, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

MENDOZA, J.:

For resolution is the administrative complaint for disbarment1 filed by Ma. Elena Carlos Nebreja
(complainant) against Atty. Benjamin Reonal (respondent) for his failure to file the contracted petition
for annulment of marriage in her behalf; for his misrepresentation on its status; and for his use of a
fictitious office address.

On June 26, 2006, complainant filed a verified Complaint-Affidavit before the Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBP) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines against respondent. Complainant alleged in
her complaint-affidavit and position paper that sometime in March 2004, she engaged respondent's
services to file her petition for annulment. She paid in cash and in checks,2 the various fees he asked
from her on several occasions which totalled ₱55,000.00.

After paying respondent, however, complainant did not receive any word from him with regard to the
status of her petition for annulment other than his claim that they needed to wait for her appointment
with the psychologist evaluation.

On April 4, 2005, respondent told complainant that her petition for annulment was dismissed for lack
of evidence. He then again asked for sums of money, on separate occasions, totalling ₱25,900.00,
to pay for the psychological test, the sheriff’s fee, the re-filing fee, and the publication.

Complainant again, despite respondent’s receipt of sums of money, failed to receive any update
from respondent. When complainant asked for the schedule of her psychological test, respondent
merely told her that the psychologist was unavailable. When she tried to ask for the number of her
case and to obtain copies of the records, respondent just told her that the records were kept in a
cabinet, the key to which was in the possession of his law partner who was out of town at that time.

On March 14, 2006, complainant met with respondent to secure copies of her annulment case file.
Respondent, however, merely handed to her photocopies of her marriage contract and her children’s
birth certificates. When she asked for copies of her case files, he just told her that his law office
could not let her use the pleadings of the case. She then asked for his office address to appeal to his
law partners, but respondent refused to give it.

Complainant checked her records and found respondent’s demand letter bearing the address of his
claimed law office, "18/f Century Towers Building, Legaspi St. corner de la Rosa, Makati." When
complainant tried to look for the said office, she discovered that there was no such building. She also
found respondent’s calling card bearing the address, "86 Magat Salamat Street, Project 4, Quezon
City," which, complainant found out, was respondent’s residential address.

When complainant tried again to obtain copies of her annulment case from respondent, he did not
give any and told her that her annulment case would just be re-filed. When she asked him to write a
letter to explain to the University of Perpetual Help-Rizal the discrepancy between the surnames
appearing in her children’s NSO-issued birth certificates and the school records, respondent did not
mention any pending annulment case in the letter, which he filed in complainant’s behalf. These
circumstances made complainant suspect that he did not file any petition for annulment at all.

In his answer and position paper, respondent denied having been engaged by complainant to handle
her petition for annulment and having been paid therefor. In particular, respondent averred that
complainant did not engage him to be her lawyer because she was unemployed and could not afford
his legal services; that he was the retained counsel of one Desiree Dee, complainant’s associate, in
the prosecution of labor, civil and criminal cases, but not for her annulment; that in the preparation of
the affidavit for the University of Perpetual Help, he did not mention her intention to pursue an
annulment proceeding against her husband upon her request; and that no psychological test was
conducted because she refused to allocate time to accommodate the schedule of the clinical
psychologist.

There are two principal issues to be resolved in this case. First, whether indeed respondent failed to
file the requisite petition for annulment for complainant and misrepresented its status; and second,
whether or not he used a fictitious office address.
With regard to the first issue, the CBD found that respondent was liable for inexcusable negligence
for failing to file her petition for annulment. There was no dispute that the parties met to discuss
about the filing of complainant’s intended petition for annulment of marriage. They, however,
disagreed on the engagement of his services to file the petition.

On the matter, CBD found as sufficient the documentary evidence of payment submitted by
complainant to prove the engagement of his legal services. During the clarificatory hearing,
complainant answered the questions on the purposes for which the payments were given in a
categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank manner, which demeanor was a badge of
credibility.3

The CBD did not give credence to respondent’s denials, which prevailed over the positive and
categorical statement of the complainant. It cited the well-settled rule that positive statement was
stronger and attained greater evidentiary weight than negative evidence.4 Moreover, he did not
submit any evidence to support or corroborate his denials and allegations or to refute complainant’s
evidence. In sum, his claims were merely supported by his allegations, which, by law, were not
equivalent to proof.5

With regard to the second issue, the CBD found that indeed, respondent used a fictitious office
address to deceive complainant. He did not submit any proof that such building existed or that he
held office at said address. He also did not deny either the due execution and authenticity of the
letter with his printed office address. By failing to controvert the evidence of the other party, the truth
of the said evidence was deemed to be admitted by the litigant.6 Such act, as held by the CBD, was
a violation of respondent’s lawyer’s oath to do no falsehood and which consequently rendered him
administratively liable.

On September 25, 2008, the CBD found respondent guilty of both charges and recommended his
suspension from the practice of law and ordered him to return the amounts taken from the
complainant. The dispositive portion of its report reads:

WHEREFORE, it is therefore respectfully recommended that respondent be: (a) suspended from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year; and (b) ordered to return to complainant, within five (5)
days from notice, the sum of ₱80,900.00 with 12% interest per annum from the date when this
recommendation is affirmed by the Supreme Court until the full amount shall have been returned.

On December 11, 2008, a resolution was passed by the Board of Governors of the IBP, which
adopted and approved the recommendation of the CBD. The IBP Resolution is hereby quoted as
follows:

RESOLUTION NO. XVIII-2008-652

CBD Case No. 06-1767

Ma. Elena Carlos Nebreja vs.

Atty. Benjamin Reonal

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent’s violation of Rule 18.03,
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for his inexcusable negligence by failure to file
the annulment petition and for misrepresentation, Atty. Benjamin Reonal is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for one (1) year and Ordered to return the amount of Eighty Thousand Nine
Hundred Pesos (₱80,900.00)* to complainant within five (5) days from notice with 12% interest per
annum from the date this recommendation is affirmed by the Supreme Court.

Complainant and respondent filed their motions for reconsideration on April 25, 2009 and April 27,
2009 respectively, but both were denied in a resolution, dated January 3, 2013.

After a thorough review of the records, the Court agrees with the resolution of the IBP except with
respect to the order to return the amount of ₱80,900.00.

Despite the engagement of his services, respondent did not file the contracted petition. His conduct,
as held in Vda. De Enriquez v. San Jose,7 amounted to inexcusable negligence. This was found to
be contrary to the mandate prescribed in Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which enjoined a lawyer not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.

Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides for the rule on negligence
and states:
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

This Court has consistently held, in construing this Rule, that the mere failure of the lawyer to
perform the obligations due to the client is considered per se a violation.8 Thus, a lawyer was held to
be negligent when he failed to do anything to protect his client's interest after receiving his
acceptance fee.9 In another case,10 this Court has penalized a lawyer for failing to inform the client of
the status of the case, among other matters. In another instance, for failure to take the appropriate
actions in connection with his client's case, the lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for a
period of six months and was required to render accounting of all the sums he received from his
client.11

With regard to respondent’s misrepresentation of his office address, the case of Porac Trucking, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals,12 sets an example. In the said case, the Court imposed a six-month suspension
on the lawyer after it was established that the said lawyer indeed claimed to be a lawyer of Porac
Trucking, Inc. when, in truth and in fact, he was not. Still, in another case,13 the same six (6) month
suspension was inposed on the erring lawyer after it was established that he claimed before the trial
court to be a member of Citizens Legal Assistance Office when in truth, he was not.

In this case, respondent clearly received his acceptance fee, among others, and then completely
neglected his client’s cause. Moreover, he failed to inform complainant of the true status of the
petition. His act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in handling the
complainant's case and, subsequently, failing to render the services, was a clear violation of Canon
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.14

For all of respondent's acts - failure to file the contracted petition for annulment of marriage in behalf
of the complainant, his misrepresentation on its status and his use of a fictitious office address, he
deserves the penalty imposed upon him by the IBP.

The Court, however, deletes the aforementioned order stated in the resolution of the IBP, to wit, "To
return the amount of Eighty Thousand Nine Hundred Pesos (₱80,900.00) to complainant within five
(5) days from notice with 12% interest per annum from the date this recommendation is affirmed by
the Supreme Court." The Court has recently adopted the policy to let the complainant claim and
collect the amount due from the respondent in an independent action, civil or criminal. 1âw phi 1

Nevertheless, the Court looks with disfavor at the non-payment by a lawyer of his due obligations.

WHEREFORE, the December 11, 2008 Resolution of the IBP adopting and approving the
September 25, 2008 Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP that Atty.
Benjamin Reonal be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year is hereby APPROVED. The
order to return the amounts received from complainant is hereby DELETED. This decision is
immediately executory and is without prejudice to the filing of any civil or criminal action against
respondent.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be included in the records of the
respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of
the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. P-99-1292 February 26, 1999

JULIETA BORROMEO SAMONTE, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ROLANDO R. GATDULA, Branch Clerk of Court, respondent.

RESOLUTION

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

The complaint filed by Julieta Borremeo Samonte charges Rolando R. Gatdula, RTC, Branch 220,
Quezon City with grave misconduct consisting in the alleged engaging in the private practice of law
which is in conflict with his official functions as Branch Clerk of Court.

Complainant alleges that she is the authorized representative of her sister Flor Borromeo de Leon,
the plaintiff, in Civil Case No. 37-14552 for ejectment, filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 37. A typographical error was committed in the complaint which stated that the
address of defendant is No. 63-C instead of 63-B, P. Tuazon Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City. The
mistake was rectified by the filing of an amended complaint which was admitted by the Court. A
decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff who subsequently filed a motion for execution.
Complainant, however, was surprised to receive a temporary restraining order signed by Judge
Prudencio Castillo of Branch 220, RTC, Quezon City, where Atty. Rolando Gatdula is the Branch
Clerk Court, enjoining the execution of the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court. Complainant
alleges that the issuance of the temporary restraining order was hasty and irregular as she was
never notified of the application for preliminary injunction.

Complainant further alleges that when she went to Branch 220, RTC, Quezon City, to inquire about
the reason for the issuance of the temporary restraining order, respondent Atty. Rolando Gatdula,
blamed her lawyer for writing the wrong address in the complaint for ejectment, and told her that if
she wanted the execution to proceed, she should change her lawyer and retain the law office of
respondent, at the same time giving his calling card with the name "Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon,
Dimailig and Celera" with office at Rm. 220 Mariwasa Bldg., 717 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City;
otherwise she will not be able to eject the defendant Dave Knope. Complainant told respondent that
she could not decide because she was only representing her sister. To her consternation, the RTC
Branch 220 issued an order granting the preliminary injunction as threatened by the respondent
despite the fact that the MTC, Brach 37 had issued an Order directing the execution of the Decision
in Civil Case No. 37-14552.

Asked to comment, respondent Atty. Gatdula recited the antecedents in the ejectment case and the
issuance of the restraining order by the Regional Trial Court, and claimed that contrary to
complainant Samonte's allegation that she was not notified of the raffle and the hearing, the Notice
of Hearing on the motion for the issuance of a Temporary Retraining Order was duly served upon
the parties, and that the application for injunctive relief was heard before the temporary restraining
order was issued. The preliminary injunction was also set for hearing on August 7, 1996.

The respondent's version of the incident is that sometime before the hearing of the motion for the
issuance of the temporary restraining order, complainant Samonte went to court "very mad" because
of the issuance of the order stopping the execution of the decision in the ejectment case.
Respondent tried to calm her down, and assured her that the restraining order was only temporary
and that the application for preliminary injunction would still be heard. Later the Regional Trial Court
granted the application for a writ of preliminary injunction. The complainant went back to court
"fuming mad" because of the alleged unreasonableness of the court in issuing the injunction.

Respondent Gatdula claims that thereafter complainant returned to his office, and informed him that
she wanted to change counsel and that a friend of hers recommended the Law Firm of "Baligod,
Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera," at the same time showing a calling card, and asking if he
could handle her case. Respondent refused as he was not connected with the law firm, although he
was invited to join but he choose to remain in the judiciary. Complainant returned to court a few days
later and told him that if he cannot convince the judge to recall the writ of preliminary injunction, she
will file an administrative case against respondent and the judge. The threat was repeated but the
respondent refused to be pressured. Meanwhile, the Complainant's Motion to Dissolve the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction was denied. Respondent Gatdula claims that the complainant must have filed
this administrative charge because of her frustration in procuring the ejectment of the defendant
lessee from the premises. Respondent prays for the dismissal of the complainant against him.

The case was referred to Executive Judge Estrella Estrada, RTC, Quezon City, for investigation,
report and recommendation.
In her report, Judge Estrada states that the case was set for hearing three times, on September 7,
1997, on September 17, and on September 24, 1997, but neither complainant nor her counsel
appeared, despite due notice. The return of service of the Order setting the last hearing stated that
complainant is still abroad. There being no definite time conveyed to the court for the return of the
complainant, the investigating Judge proceeded with the investigation by "conducting searching
question" upon respondent based on the allegations in the complaint, and asked for the record of
Civil Case No. Q-96-28187 for evaluation. The case was set for hearing for the last time on October
22, 1997, to give complainant a last chance to appear, but there was again no appearance despite
notice.

The respondent testified in his own behalf to affirm the statements in his Comment, and submitted
documentary evidence consisting mainly of the pleadings in MTC Civil Case No. 37-14552, and in
RTC Civil Case No. Q-9628187 to show that the questioned orders of the court were not improperly
issued.

The investigating judge made the following findings:

For failure of the complainant to appear at the several hearings despite notice, she
failed to substantiate her allegations in the complaint, particularly that herein
respondent gave her his calling card and tried to convince her to change her lawyer.
This being the case, it cannot be established with certainty that respondent indeed
gave her his calling card even convinced her to change her lawyer. Moreover, as
borne by the records of the Civil Case No. Q-96-28187, complainant was duly
notified of all the proceedings leading to the issuance of the TRO and the
subsequent orders of Judge Prudencio Altre Castillo, Jr. of RTC, Branch 220.
Complainant's lack of interest in prosecuting this administrative case could be an
indication that her filing of the charge against the respondent is only intended to
harass the respondent for her failure to obtain a favorable decision from the Court.

However, based on the record of this administrative case, the calling card attached
as Annex "B" of the complainant's affidavit dated September 25, 1996 allegedly given
by respondent to complainant would show that the name of herein respondent was
indeed include in the BALIGOD, GATDULA, TACARDON, DIMAILIG & CELERA
LAW OFFICES. While respondent denied having assumed any position in said office,
the fact remains that his name is included therein which may therefore tend to show
that he has dealings with said office. Thus, while he may not be actually and directly
employed with the firm, the fact that his name appears on the calling card as partner
in the Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig & Celera Law Offices give the impression
that he is connected therein and may constitute an act of solicitation and private
practice which is declared unlawful under Republic Act. No. 6713. It is to be noted,
however, that complainant failed to establish by convincing evidence that respondent
actually offered to her the services of their law office. Thus, the violation committed
by respondent in having his name included/retained in the calling card may only be
considered as a minor infraction for which he must also be administratively
sanctioned.

and recommended that Atty. Gatdula be admonished and censured for the minor infraction
he has committed.

Finding: We agree with the investigating judge that the respondent is guilty of an infraction. The
complainant by her failure to appear at the hearings, failed to substantiate her allegation that it was
the respondent who gave her calling card "Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera Law
Offices" and that he tried to convince her to change counsels. We find however, that while the
respondent vehemently denies the complainant's allegations, he does not deny that his name
appears on the calling card attached to the complaint, which admittedly came into the hands of the
complainant. The respondent testified before the Investigating Judge as follows:

Q: How about your statement that you even gave her a calling card of
the "Baligod, Gatdula, Pardo, Dimailig and Celera law Offices at
Room 220 Mariwasa building?

A: I vehemently deny the allegation of the complainant that I gave her

a calling card. I was surprised when she presented (it) to me during
one of her follow-ups of the case before the court. She told me that a
friend of hers recommended such firm and she found out that my
name is included in that firm. I told her that I have not assumed any
position in the law firm. And I am with the Judiciary since I passed the
bar. It is impossible for me to enter an appearance as her counsel in
the very same court where I am the Branch Clerk of Court.
 The above explanation tendered by the Respondent is an admission that it is his name
appears on the calling card, a permissible form of advertising or solicitation of legal
services. 1 Respondent does not claim that the calling card was printed without his
knowledge or consent, and the calling card 2 carries his name primarily and the name
"Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera with address at 220 Mariwasa Bldg., 717
Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City" in the left corner. The card clearly gives the impression
that he is connected with the said law firm. The inclusion/retention of his name in the
professional card constitutes an act of solicitation which violates Section 7 sub-par. (b)(2) of
Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for the
Public Officials and Employees" which declares it unlawful for a public official or employee
to, among others:

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession

unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided
that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict
with official functions.

Time and again this Court has said that the conduct and behavior of every one connected with an
office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should
be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times must only be
characterized by propriety and decorum but above all else must be above suspicion. 3

WHEREFORE, respondent Rolando R. Gatdula. Branch Clerk of Court, RTC, Branch 220, Quezon
City is hereby reprimanded for engaging in the private practice of law with the warning that a
repetition of the same offense will be dealt with more severely. He is further ordered to cause the
exclusion of his name in the firm name of any office engaged in the private practice of law.

SO ORDERED.

Romero, Vitug, Panganiban and Purisima, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc., 223 SCRA 378, Bar, Matter No. 553, June 17, 1993

2 Annex B, Complaint

3 Annang vs. Vda de Blas., 202 SCRA 635, Mirano vs. Saavedra, 225 SCRA 77.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-12871 July 25, 1959

TIMOTEO V. CRUZ, petitioner,

vs.
FRANCISCO G. H. SALVA, respondent.

Baizas and Balderrama for petitioner.

City Attorney Francisco G. H. Salva in his own behalf.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by Timoteo V. Cruz
against Francisco G. H. Salva, in his capacity as City Fiscal of Pasay City, to restrain him from
continuing with the preliminary investigation he was conducting in September, 1957 in connection
with the killing of Manuel Monroy which took place on June 15, 1953 in Pasay City. To better
understand the present case and its implications, the following facts gathered from the pleadings
and the memoranda filed by the parties, may be stated.

Following the killing of Manuel Monroy in 1953 a number of persons were accused as involved and
implicated in said crime. After a long trial, the Court of First Instance of Pasay City found Oscar
Castelo, Jose de Jesus, Hipolito Bonifacio, Bienvenido Mendoza, Francis Berdugo and others guilty
of the crime of murder and sentenced them to death. They all appealed the sentence although
without said appeal, in view of the imposition of the extreme penalty, the case would have to be
reviewed automatically by this Court. Oscar Castelo sought a new trial which was granted and upon
retrial, he was again found guilty and his former conviction of sentence was affirmed and reiterated
by the same trial court.

It seems that pending appeal, the late President Magsaysay ordered a reinvestigation of the case.
The purpose of said reinvestigation does not appear in the record. Anyway, intelligence agents of
the Philippine Constabulary and investigators of Malacañang conducted the investigation for the
Chief Executive, questioned a number of people and obtained what would appear to be confession,
pointing to persons, other than those convicted and sentenced by the trial court, as the real killers of
Manuel Monroy.

Counsel for Oscar Castelo and his co-defendants wrote to respondent Fiscal Salva to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case presumably on the basis of the affidavits and confessions obtained by
those who had investigated the case at the instance of Malacañang. Fiscal Salva conferred with the
Solicitor General as to what steps he should take. A conference was held with the Secretary of
Justice who decided to have the results of the investigation by the Philippine Constabulary and
Malacañang investigators made available to counsel for the appellants.

Taking advantage of this opportunity, counsel for the appellants filed a motion for new trial with this
Tribunal supporting the same with the so-called affidavits and confessions of some of those persons
investigated, such as the confessions of Sergio Eduardo y de Guzman, Oscar Caymo, Pablo
Canlas, and written statements of several others. By resolution of this Tribunal, action on said
motion for new trial was deferred until the case was studied and determined on the merits. In the
meantime, the Chief, Philippine Constabulary, head sent to the Office of Fiscal Salva copies of the
same affidavits and confessions and written statements, of which the motion for new trial was based,
and respondent Salva proceeded to conduct a reinvestigation designating for said purposes a
committee of three composed of himself as chairman and Assistant City Attorneys Herminio A.
Avendañio and Ernesto A. Bernabe.

In connection with said preliminary investigation being conducted by the committee, petitioner
Timoteo Cruz was subpoenaed by respondent to appear at his office on September 21, 1957, to
testify "upon oath before me in a certain criminal investigation to be conducted at the time and place
by this office against you and Sergio Eduardo, et al., for murder." On September 19, 1957, petitioner
Timoteo Cruz wrote to respondent Salva asking for the transfer of the preliminary investigation from
September 21, due to the fact that this counsel, Atty. Crispin Baizas, would attend a hearing on that
same day in Naga City. Acting upon said request for postponement, Fiscal Salva set the preliminary
investigation on September 24. On that day, Atty. Baizas appeared for petitioner Cruz, questioned
the jurisdiction of the committee, particularly respondent Salva, to conduct the preliminary
investigation in view of the fact that the same case involving the killing of Manuel Monroy was
pending appeal in this Court, and on the same day filed the present petition for certiorari and
prohibition. This Tribunal gave due course to the petition for certiorari and prohibition and upon the
filing of a cash bond of P200.00 issued a writ of preliminary injunction thereby stopping the
preliminary investigation being conducted by respondent Salva.

The connection, if any, that petitioner Cruz had with the preliminary investigation being conducted by
respondent Salva and his committee was that affidavits and confessions sent to Salva by the Chief,
Philippine Constabulary, and which were being investigated, implicated petitioner Cruz, even
picturing him as the instigator and mastermind in the killing of Manuel Monroy.

The position taken by petitioner Cruz in this case is that inasmuch as the principal case of People vs.
Oscar Castelo, et al., G.R. No. L-10794, is pending appeal and consideration before us, no court,
much less a prosecuting attorney like respondent Salva, had any right or authority to conduct a
preliminary investigation or reinvestigation of the case for that would be obstructing the
administration of justice and interferring with the consideration on appeal of the main case wherein
appellants had been found guilty and convicted and sentenced; neither had respondent authority to
cite him to appear and testify at said investigation.

Respondent Salva, however, contends that if he subpoenaed petitioner Cruz at all, it was because of
the latter's oral and personal request to allow him to appear at the investigation with his witnesses
for his own protection, possibly, to controvert and rebut any evidence therein presented against him.
Salva claims that were it not for this request and if, on the contrary, Timoteo Cruz had expressed
any objection to being cited to appear in the investigation he (Salva) would never have subpoenaed
him.

Although petitioner Cruz now stoutly denies having made such request that he be allowed to appear
at the investigation, we are inclined to agree with Fiscal Salva that such a request had been made.
Inasmuch as he, Timoteo Cruz, was deeply implicated in the killing of Manuel Monroy by the
affidavits and confessions of several persons who were being investigated by Salva and his
committee, it was but natural that petitioner should have been interested, even desirous of being
present at that investigation so that he could face and cross examine said witnesses and affiants
when they testified in connection with their affidavits or confessions, either repudiating, modifying or
ratifying the same. Moreover, in the communication, addressed to respondent Salva asking that the
investigation, scheduled for September 21, 1957, be postponed because his attorney would be
unable to attend, Timoteo Cruz expressed no opposition to the subpoena, not even a hint that he
was objecting to his being cited to appear at the investigation.

As to the right of respondent Salva to conduct the preliminary investigation which he and his
committee began ordinarily, when a criminal case in which a fiscal intervened though nominally, for
according to respondent, two government attorneys had been designed by the Secretary of Justice
to handle the prosecution in the trial of the case in the court below, is tried and decided and it is
appealed to a higher court such as this Tribunal, the functions and actuations of said fiscal have
terminated; usually, the appeal is handled for the government by the Office of the Solicitor General.
Consequently, there would be no reason or occasion for said fiscal to conduct a reinvestigation to
determine criminal responsibility for the crime involved in the appeal.

However, in the present case, respondent has, in our opinion, established a justification for his
reinvestigation because according to him, in the original criminal case against Castelo, et al., one of
the defendants named Salvador Realista y de Guzman was not included for the reason that he was
arrested and was placed within the jurisdiction of the trial court only after the trial against the other
accused had commenced, even after the prosecution had rested its case and the defense had
begun to present its evidence. Naturally, Realista remained to stand trial. The trial court, according
to respondent, at the instance of Realista, had scheduled the hearing at an early date, that is in
August, 1957. Respondent claims that before he would go to trial in the prosecution of Realista he
had to chart his course and plan of action, whether to present the same evidence, oral and
documentary, presented in the original case and trial, or, in view of the new evidence consisting of
the affidavits and confessions sent to him by the Philippine Constabulary, he should first assess and
determine the value of said evidence by conducting an investigation and that should he be
convinced that the persons criminally responsible for the killing of Manuel Monroy were other than
those already tried and convicted, like Oscar Castelo and his co-accused and co-appellants,
including Salvador Realista, then he might act accordingly and even recommend the dismissal of the
case against Realista.

In this, we are inclined to agree with respondent Salva. For, as contended by him and as suggested
by authorities, the duty and role of prosecuting attorney is not only to prosecute and secure the
conviction of the guilty but also to protect the innocent.

We cannot overemphasize the necessity of close scrutiny and investigation of the

prosecuting officers of all cases handled by them, but whilst this court is averse to any form
of vacillation by such officers in the prosecution of public offenses, it is unquestionable that
they may, in appropriate cases, in order to do justice and avoid injustice, reinvestigate
 cases in which they have already filed the corresponding informations. In the language of
Justice Sutherland of the Supreme Court of the United States, the prosecuting officer "is the
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice
shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape nor innocent suffer. He may prosecute with
earnestness and vigor — indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike had blows, he is
not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring
about a just one. (69 United States law Review, June, 1935, No. 6, p. 309, cited in the case
of Suarez vs. Platon, 69 Phil., 556)

With respect to the right of respondent Salva to cite petitioner to appear and testify before him at the
scheduled preliminary investigation, under the law, petitioner had a right to be present at that
investigation since as was already stated, he was more or less deeply involved and implicated in the
killing of Monroy according to the affiants whose confessions, affidavits and testimonies respondent
Salva was considering or was to consider at said preliminary investigation. But he need not be
present at said investigation because his presence there implies, and was more of a right rather than
a duty or legal obligation. Consequently, even if, as claimed by respondent Salva, petitioner
expressed the desire to be given an opportunity to be present at the said investigation, if he latter
changed his mind and renounced his right, and even strenuously objected to being made to appear
at said investigation, he could not be compelled to do so.

Now we come to the manner in which said investigation was conducted by the respondent. If, as
contended by him, the purpose of said investigation was only to acquaint himself with and evaluate
the evidence involved in the affidavits and confessions of Sergio Eduardo, Cosme Camo and others
by questioning them, then he, respondent, could well have conducted the investigation in his office,
quietly, unobtrusively and without much fanfare, much less publicity.

However, according to the petitioner and not denied by the respondent, the investigation was
conducted not in respondent's office but in the session hall of the Municipal Court of Pasay City
evidently, to accommodate the big crowd that wanted to witness the proceeding, including members
of the press. A number of microphones were installed. Reporters were everywhere and
photographers were busy taking pictures. In other words, apparently with the permission of, if not the
encouragement by the respondent, news photographers and newsmen had a filed day. Not only this,
but in the course of the investigation, as shown by the transcript of the stenographic notes taken
during said investigation, on two occasions, the first, after Oscar Caymo had concluded his
testimony respondent Salva, addressing the newspapermen said, "Gentlemen of the press, if you
want to ask questions I am willing to let you do so and the question asked will be reproduced as my
own"; and the second, after Jose Maratella y de Guzman had finished testifying and respondent
Salva, addressing the newsmen, again said, "Gentlemen of the press is free to ask questions as
ours." Why respondent was willing to abdicate and renounce his right and prerogative to make and
address the questions to the witnesses under investigation, in favor of the members of the press, is
difficult for us to understand, unless he, respondent, wanted to curry favor with the press and
publicize his investigation as much as possible. Fortunately, the gentlemen of the press to whom he
accorded such unusual privilege and favor appeared to have wisely and prudently declined the offer
and did not ask questions, this according to the transcript now before us.

But, the newspapers certainly played up and gave wide publicity to what took place during the
investigation, and this involved headlines and extensive recitals, narrations of and comments on the
testimonies given by the witnesses as well as vivid descriptions of the incidents that took place
during the investigation. It seemed as though the criminal responsibility for the killing of Manuel
Monroy which had already been tried and finally determined by the lower court and which was under
appeal and advisement by this Tribunal, was being retried and redetermined in the press, and all
with the apparent place and complaisance of respondent.

Frankly, the members of this Court were greatly disturbed and annoyed by such publicity and
sensationalism, all of which may properly be laid at the door of respondent Salva. In this, he
committed what was regard a grievous error and poor judgment for which we fail to find any excuse
or satisfactory explanation. His actuations in this regard went well beyond the bounds of prudence,
discretion and good taste. It is bad enough to have such undue publicity when a criminal case is
being investigated by the authorities, even when it being tried in court; but when said publicity and
sensationalism is allowed, even encouraged, when the case is on appeal and is pending
consideration by this Tribunal, the whole thing becomes inexcusable, even abhorrent, and this Court,
in the interest of justice, is constrained and called upon to put an end to it and a deterrent against its
repetition by meting an appropriate disciplinary measure, even a penalty to the one liable.
Some of the members of the Court who appeared to feel more strongly than the others favored the
imposition of a more or less severe penal sanction. After mature deliberation, we have finally agreed
that a public censure would, for the present, be sufficient.

In conclusion, we find and hold that respondent Salva was warranted in holding the preliminary
investigation involved in this case, insofar as Salvador Realista is concerned, for which reason the
writ of preliminary injunction issued stopping said preliminary investigation, is dissolved; that in view
of petitioner's objection to appear and testify at the said investigation, respondent may not compel
him to attend said investigation, for which reason, the subpoena issued by respondent against
petitioner is hereby set aside.

In view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted in part and denied in part.
Considering the conclusion arrived at by us, respondent Francisco G. H. Salva is hereby publicly
reprehended and censured for the uncalled for and wide publicity and sensationalism that he had
given to and allowed in connection with his investigation, which we consider and find to be contempt
of court; and, furthermore, he is warned that a repetition of the same would meet with a more severe
disciplinary action and penalty. No costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and Barrera, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 191837 September 19, 2012

MARIA CONSOLACION RIVERA-PASCUAL, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES MARILYN LIM and GEORGE LIM and the REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF VALENZUELA
CITY, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolutions dated October 15, 20091 and
March 11, 20102 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 109265.

The facts leading to the filing of this petition are undisputed.

Subject of the present controversy is a parcel of land with an approximate area of 4.4 hectares and
located at Bignay, Valenzuela City. The property is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
V-73892, registered in the names of George and Marilyn Lim (Spouses Lim).

On September 8, 2004, Maria Consolacion Rivera-Pascual (Consolacion) filed before the Office of
the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) for Region IV-A a petition to be recognized as a
tenant of a property located at Bignay, Valenzuela City against Danilo Deato (Deato). At that time,
the property, which has an approximate area of 4.4 hectares, was covered by TCT No. 24759 under
Deato’s name. During the pendency of the petition, Deato sold the property to Spouses Lim. The
sale was registered on December 21, 2004 leading to the issuance of TCT No. V-73892 in favor of
Spouses Lim. Considering this development, Consolacion filed a motion on March 3, 2005 to
implead Spouses Lim as respondents.3

The petition, which was docketed as DARAB Case No. R-0400-0012-04, was granted byRegional
Adjudicator Conchita C. Miñas (RA Miñas) in a Decision4 dated December 2, 2005, the dispositive
portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1) Declaring that petitioner is the tenant of the subject landholding by succession from her deceased
father;

2) Declaring respondents spouses George and Marilyn Lim to have subrogated to the rights and
substituted to the obligation of spouses Danilo and Divina Deato;

3) Ordering the respondents and all persons claiming rights under them to maintain petitioner in
peaceful possession and cultivation of the agricultural land subject hereof;

4) Declaring petitioner to have the right to exercise the right of redemption of the subject parcel of
agricultural land pursuant to Section 12 of RA 3844 as amended; and

5) Dismissing the petition against Louie Cruz, Fire Force Agency and Danny Boy Rivera for having
no proximate tenurial relationship with the petitioner hence beyond the jurisdictional ambit of this
Office.

SO ORDERED.5

On July 7, 2006, the foregoing decision became final.6

Upon Consolacion’s motion for execution filed on January 7, 2008, RA Miñas issued a writ of
execution on January 8, 2008.7

On January 21, 2008, Consolacion filed a petition against Spouses Lim and the Registrar of Deeds
of Valenzuela City praying for the issuance of an order directing Spouses Lim to accept the amount
of ₱ 10,000,000.00 which she undertook to tender during the initial hearing, declaring the property
redeemed, and cancelling TCT No. V-73892.8 Consolacion consigned with the RARAD the amount of
₱ 10,000,000.00 on March 3, 2008.9

Consolacion’s petition, which was docketed as DARAB Case No. R-0400-001-08, was given due
course by RA Miñas in a Decision10 dated June 2, 2008, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. As prayed for, declaring that the landholding subject of the petition as lawfully
redeemed;

2. Ordering respondent spouses to accept and withdraw the amount of the

redemption price consigned with this Office which was deposited for safekeeping
indicated in Manager’s Check No. 0000004518 issued by Allied Bank in the name of
Spouses Marilyn and George Lim and/or DAR Adjudication Board Region IV-A in the
amount of ten (10) million pesos;

3. Upon acceptance and the withdrawal of the redemption price as ordered in

paragraph 2 hereof, ordering respondent spouses to execute a Deed of Redemption
in favor of petitioner;

4. In case of refusal and/or failure of respondent spouses to execute the Deed of

Redemption as ordered above, the Regional Clerk of the Board is hereby ordered to
execute a Deed of Redemption in the name of the petitioner; and

5. Directing the Register of Deeds for Valenzuela City to cause the cancellation of
TCT No. V-73892 registered in the name of respondent spouses Marilyn and George
Lim and a new one issued in the name of petitioner upon presentment of the Deed of
Redemption.

SO ORDERED.11

On appeal, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) issued a Decision12 on
February 18, 2009 reversing RA Miñas Decision dated June 2, 2008. Specifically:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed Decision dated 02 June 2008 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby rendered:

1. DECLARING the landholding to be not lawfully redeemed;

2. DECLARING petitioner-appellee not a bona fide tenant of the subject landholding;

3. DECLARING that petitioner-appellee cannot redeem the subject parcel registered

in the names of the respondents-appellants;

4. ORDERING the respondents-appellants to be maintained in peaceful possession

of the subject landholding; and

5. DIRECTING the Clerk of the Board of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of
Region IV-A to return the Manager’s Check No. 0000004518 issued by Allied Bank in
the name of Spouses Marilyn and George Lim and/or DAR Adjudication Board
Region IV-A in the amount of Ten Million pesos to herein petitioner-appellee.

SO ORDERED.13

On April 13, 2009, Consolacion moved for reconsideration,14 which the DARAB denied in a
Resolution15 dated June 8, 2009 for being filed out of time.

SECTION 12 Rule X of the 2003 DARAB Rules provides that a Motion for Reconsideration shall be
filed within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice of the order, resolution, or decision of the Board or
Adjudicator. Records show that both the petitioner-appellee and her counsel received a copy of the
Decision dated 18 February 2009 on 27 February 2009 and that Legal Officer Nancy Geocada, the
alleged new counsel of the herein petitioner-appellee, filed the Motion for Reconsideration only on
13 April 2009, clearly the Motion for Reconsideration was filed beyond the fifteen (15) days (sic)
reglementary period thus the herein Decision has already become final and executory. x x x.16

On June 25, 2009, Consolacion filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court with
the CA.17

On July 1, 2009, the CA resolved to require Consolacion’s counsel to submit within five (5) days
from notice his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Certificate of Compliance or
Exemption and an amended Verification and Certification Against Non-Forum-
Shopping.18 Apparently, Consolacion’s counsel failed to indicate in the petition his MCLE Certificate
of Compliance or Exemption Number as required under Bar Matter No. 1922. Also, the jurat of
Consolacion’s verification and certification against non-forum-shopping failed to indicate any
competent evidence of Consolacion’s identity apart from her community tax certificate.

Considering the failure of Consolacion and her counsel to comply, the CA issued a Resolution19 on
October 15, 2009 dismissing the petition.

On July 7, 2009, the counsel for the petitioner received the above-mentioned Resolution. However,
the counsel for the petitioner failed to comply with the said Resolution which was due on July 19,
2009.

For failure of the counsel for the petitioner to comply with the Resolution dated July 1, 2009, despite
receipt of the notice thereof, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.20

Consolacion moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the CA in a Resolution21 dated March
11, 2010.

Consolacion is, before this Court, claiming that the CA’s summary dismissal of her petition on
technical grounds is unwarranted. Consolacion invoked substantial justice against the CA’s strict
1âwphi 1

application of the rule requiring her counsel to note his MCLE Compliance or Exemption Certificate
Number and the rule rendering the jurat of her verification and certification on non-forum-shopping
defective in the absence of the details of any one of her current identification document issued by an
official agency bearing her photograph and signature. That there was merit in her petition and that
she complied, albeit belatedly as her counsel’s MCLE Compliance Certificate Number was indicated
and a verification and certificate on non-forum-shopping with a proper jurat was attached to her
motion for reconsideration, should have sufficed for the CA to reverse the dismissal of her petition
and decide the same on its merits. Consolacion alleged that procedural rules or technicalities are
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice and their rigid application should be avoided if this
would frustrate rather than promote substantial justice.

The Court finds no merit in the petition. The Court sees no reversible error committed by the CA in
dismissing Consolacion’s petition before it on the ground of petitioner’s unexplained failure to comply
with basic procedural requirements attendant to the filing of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court. Notably, Consolacion and her counsel remained obstinate despite the opportunity
afforded to them by the CA to rectify their lapses. While there was compliance, this took place,
however, after the CA had ordered the dismissal of Consolacion’s petition and without reasonable
cause proffered to justify its belatedness. Consolacion and her counsel claimed inadvertence and
negligence but they did not explain the circumstances thereof. Absent valid and compelling reasons,
the requested leniency and liberality in the observance of procedural rules appears to be an
afterthought, hence, cannot be granted. The CA saw no compelling need meriting the relaxation of
the rules. Neither does this Court see any.

The Court is aware of the exceptional cases where technicalities were liberally construed. However,
in these cases, outright dismissal is rendered unjust by the presence of a satisfactory and
persuasive explanation. The parties therein who prayed for liberal interpretation were able to hurdle
that heavy burden of proving that they deserve an exceptional treatment. It was never the Court’s
intent "to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity."22

This Court will not condone a cavalier attitude towards procedural rules. It is the duty of every
member of the bar to comply with these rules. They are not at liberty to seek exceptions should they
fail to observe these rules and rationalize their omission by harking on liberal construction.

While it IS the negligence of Consolacion's counsel that led to this unfortunate result, she is bound
by such.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolutions dated October
15, 2009 and March 11, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 109265 are AFFIRMED.

Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DECASTRO ARTURO D. BRION*

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Acting member per Special Order No. 1305 dated September 10, 2012 vice Associate
Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr..

1
Penned by Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza (now a member of this Court), with
Associate Justices Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal and Romeo F. Barza, concurring; rollo, pp. 41-
42.

2
Penned by Associate Justice Romeo F. Barza, with Associate Justices Magdangal M. De
Leon and Ruben C. Ayson, concurring: id. at 44-45.

3
Id. at 59.

4
Id. at 55-67.

5
Id. at 66.

6
Id. at 68-69.

7
Id. at 70-71.

8
Id. at 73-75.

9
Id. at 106.

10
Id. at 97-108.

11
Id. at 107-108.

12
Id. at 140-155.

13
Id. at 153-154.
 14
Id. at 157-163.

15
Id. at 164-167.

16
Id. at 165-166.

17
Id. at 26.

18
Id. at 26-27.

19
Id. at 41-42.

20
Id. at 41.

21
Id. at 44-45.

Pates v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 184915, June 30, 2009, 591 SCRA 481, 487,
22

citing Hon. Fortich v. Hon. Corona, 359 Phil. 210, 220 (1998).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 8954 November 13, 2013

HON. MARIBETH RODRIGUEZ-MANAHAN, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court, San Mateo,
Rizal, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RODOLFO FLORES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Respondent Atty. Rodolto Flores (Atty. Flores) was counsel for the defendant in Civil Case No. 1863
captioned as Marsha Aranas plaintiff versus Arnold Balmores defendant a suit for damages filed
before the Municipal Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal and presided by herein complainant Judge
Maribeth Rodriguez-Manahan (Judge Manahan). During the proceedings in Civil Case No. 1863,
Judge Manahan issued an Order1 dated January 12, 2011, whereby she voluntarily inhibited from
hearing Civil Case No. 1863. The said Order reads in part, viz:

More than mere contempt do his (Atty. Flores) unethical actuations, his traits of dishonesty and
discourtesy not only to his own brethren in the legal profession, but also to the bench and judges,
would amount to grave misconduct, if not a malpractice of law, a serious ground for disciplinary
action of a member of the bar pursuant to Rules 139 a & b.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, furnish a copy of this Order to the Bar Discipline Committee, Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, to the Supreme Court en banc, for appropriate investigation and sanction.2

Upon receipt of the copy of the above Order, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) deemed the
pronouncements of Judge Manahan as a formal administrative Complaint against Atty. Flores.
Docketed as A.C. No. 8954, the case was referred to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Rizal for investigation, report and recommendation.3

In her Investigation, Report and Recommendation,4 Investigating Judge Josephine Zarate Fernandez
(Investigating Judge) narrated the antecedents of the case as follows:

A complaint for Damages was filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Mateo, Rizal
docketed as Civil Case No. 1863, entitled Marsha Aranas vs. Arnold Balmores. The Public
Attorney’s Office (PAO) thru Atty. Ferdinand P. Censon represented the complainant while Atty.
Rodolfo Flores appeared as counsel for the defendant.

x x x During the Preliminary Conference x x x, respondent Atty. Flores entered his appearance and
was given time to file a Pre-Trial Brief. x x x On May 24, 2010, respondent Atty. Flores filed his Pre-
Trial Brief but without proof of MCLE compliance hence it was expunged from the records without
prejudice to the filing of another Pre-Trial Brief containing the required MCLE compliance. x x x Atty.
Flores asked for ten (10) days to submit proof.

The preliminary conference was reset several times (August 11, September 8) for failure of
respondent Atty. Flores to appear and submit his Pre-Trial Brief indicating thereon his MCLE
compliance. The court a quo likewise issued Orders dated September 15 and October 20, 2010
giving respondent Atty. Flores a last chance to submit his Pre-Trial Brief with stern warning that
failure to do so shall be considered a waiver on his part.

Meanwhile, respondent Atty. Flores filed a Manifestation in Court dated September 14, 2010 stating
among others, the following allegations:

xxxx
 4. When you took your oath as member of the Bar, you promised to serve truth, justice and
fair play. Do you think you are being truthful, just and fair by serving a cheater?

5. Ignorance of the law excuses no one for which reason even Erap was convicted by the
Sandiganbayan. But even worse is a lawyer who violates the law.
1âwphi 1

6. Last but not the least, God said Thou shall not lie. Again the Philippine Constitution
commands: Give every Filipino his due. The act of refusal by the plaintiff is violative of the
foregoing divine and human laws.

xxxx

Respondent Atty. Flores later filed his Pre-Trial Brief bearing an MCLE number which was merely
superimposed without indicating the date and place of compliance. During the preliminary
conference on November 24, 2010, respondent Atty. Flores manifested that he will submit proof of
compliance of his MCLE on the following day. On December 1, 2010, respondent Atty. Flores again
failed to appear and to submit the said promised proof of MCLE compliance. In its stead, respondent
Atty. Flores filed a Letter of even date stating as follows:

If only to give your Honor another chance to prove your pro plaintiff sentiment, I am hereby filing the
attached Motion which you may once more assign to the waste basket of nonchalance.

With the small respect that still remains, I have asked the defendant to look for another lawyer to
represent him for I am no longer interested in this case because I feel I cannot do anything right in
your sala.5

The Investigating Judge found Atty. Flores to have failed to give due respect to the court by failing to
obey court orders, by failing to submit proof of his compliance with the Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE) requirement, and for using intemperate language in his pleadings. The
Investigating Judge recommended that Atty. Flores be suspended from the practice of law for one
year.6

The OBC adopted the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Judge.7

Our Ruling

There is no doubt that Atty. Flores failed to obey the trial court’s order to submit proof of his MCLE
compliance notwithstanding the several opportunities given him. "Court orders are to be respected
not because the judges who issue them should be respected, but because of the respect and
consideration that should be extended to the judicial branch of the Government. This is absolutely
essential if our Government is to be a government of laws and not of men. Respect must be had not
because of the incumbents to the positions, but because of the authority that vests in them.
Disrespect to judicial incumbents is disrespect to that branc the Government to which they belong,
as well as to the State which has instituted the judicial system."8

Atty. Flores also employed intemperate language in his pleadings. As an officer of the court, Atty.
Flores is expected to be circumspect in his language. Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility enjoins all attorneys to abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behavior before the Courts. Atty. Flores failed in this respect.

At this juncture, it is well to remind respondent that:

While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client full devotion to his client's genuine
interest and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, as well as the exertion
of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of law. A lawyer is entitled to
voice his c1iticism within the context of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech which
must be exercised responsibly. After all, every right carries with it the corresponding obligation.
Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. The lawyer's fidelity to
his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and orderly administration of justice. It must be
done within the confines of reason and common sense.9

However, we find the recommended penalty too harsh and not commensurate with the infractions
committed by the respondent. It appears that this is the first infraction committed by respondent.
Also, we are not prepared to impose on the respondent the penalty of one-year suspension for
humanitarian reasons. Respondent manifested before this Court that he has been in the practice of
law for half a century.10 Thus, he is already in his twilight years. Considering the foregoing, we deem
it proper to fine respondent in the amount of ₱5,000.00 and to remind him to be more circumspect in
his acts and to obey and respect court processes.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Rodolfo Flores is FINED in the amount of ₱5,000.00 with STERN
WARNING that the repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

Footnotes

1
Rollo. pp. 2-5.

2
Id. at 5.

3
Id. at 1, 7.

4
Id. at 28-31.

5
Id. at 28-30.

6
Id. at 31.

7
Id., unpaginated.

8
Lt. Villaflor v. Sarita, 367 Phil. 399, 407 (1999), citing De Leon v. Torres, 99 Phil. 462, 466
(1956).

9
Re: Letter dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel Sorreda, 502 Phil. 292, 301 (2005)

10
Rollo, p. 37.
G.R. No. 191837 September 19, 2012

MARIA CONSOLACION RIVERA-PASCUAL, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES MARILYN LIM and GEORGE LIM and the REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF VALENZUELA
CITY, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolutions dated October 15, 20091 and
March 11, 20102 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 109265.

The facts leading to the filing of this petition are undisputed.

Subject of the present controversy is a parcel of land with an approximate area of 4.4 hectares and
located at Bignay, Valenzuela City. The property is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
V-73892, registered in the names of George and Marilyn Lim (Spouses Lim).

On September 8, 2004, Maria Consolacion Rivera-Pascual (Consolacion) filed before the Office of
the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) for Region IV-A a petition to be recognized as a
tenant of a property located at Bignay, Valenzuela City against Danilo Deato (Deato). At that time,
the property, which has an approximate area of 4.4 hectares, was covered by TCT No. 24759 under
Deato’s name. During the pendency of the petition, Deato sold the property to Spouses Lim. The
sale was registered on December 21, 2004 leading to the issuance of TCT No. V-73892 in favor of
Spouses Lim. Considering this development, Consolacion filed a motion on March 3, 2005 to
implead Spouses Lim as respondents.3

The petition, which was docketed as DARAB Case No. R-0400-0012-04, was granted byRegional
Adjudicator Conchita C. Miñas (RA Miñas) in a Decision4 dated December 2, 2005, the dispositive
portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1) Declaring that petitioner is the tenant of the subject landholding by succession from her deceased
father;

2) Declaring respondents spouses George and Marilyn Lim to have subrogated to the rights and
substituted to the obligation of spouses Danilo and Divina Deato;

3) Ordering the respondents and all persons claiming rights under them to maintain petitioner in
peaceful possession and cultivation of the agricultural land subject hereof;

4) Declaring petitioner to have the right to exercise the right of redemption of the subject parcel of
agricultural land pursuant to Section 12 of RA 3844 as amended; and

5) Dismissing the petition against Louie Cruz, Fire Force Agency and Danny Boy Rivera for having
no proximate tenurial relationship with the petitioner hence beyond the jurisdictional ambit of this
Office.

SO ORDERED.5

On July 7, 2006, the foregoing decision became final.6

Upon Consolacion’s motion for execution filed on January 7, 2008, RA Miñas issued a writ of
execution on January 8, 2008.7

On January 21, 2008, Consolacion filed a petition against Spouses Lim and the Registrar of Deeds
of Valenzuela City praying for the issuance of an order directing Spouses Lim to accept the amount
of ₱ 10,000,000.00 which she undertook to tender during the initial hearing, declaring the property
redeemed, and cancelling TCT No. V-73892.8 Consolacion consigned with the RARAD the amount of
₱ 10,000,000.00 on March 3, 2008.9

Consolacion’s petition, which was docketed as DARAB Case No. R-0400-001-08, was given due
course by RA Miñas in a Decision10 dated June 2, 2008, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. As prayed for, declaring that the landholding subject of the petition as lawfully
redeemed;

2. Ordering respondent spouses to accept and withdraw the amount of the

redemption price consigned with this Office which was deposited for safekeeping
indicated in Manager’s Check No. 0000004518 issued by Allied Bank in the name of
Spouses Marilyn and George Lim and/or DAR Adjudication Board Region IV-A in the
amount of ten (10) million pesos;

3. Upon acceptance and the withdrawal of the redemption price as ordered in

paragraph 2 hereof, ordering respondent spouses to execute a Deed of Redemption
in favor of petitioner;

4. In case of refusal and/or failure of respondent spouses to execute the Deed of

Redemption as ordered above, the Regional Clerk of the Board is hereby ordered to
execute a Deed of Redemption in the name of the petitioner; and

5. Directing the Register of Deeds for Valenzuela City to cause the cancellation of
TCT No. V-73892 registered in the name of respondent spouses Marilyn and George
Lim and a new one issued in the name of petitioner upon presentment of the Deed of
Redemption.

SO ORDERED.11

On appeal, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) issued a Decision12 on
February 18, 2009 reversing RA Miñas Decision dated June 2, 2008. Specifically:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed Decision dated 02 June 2008 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby rendered:

1. DECLARING the landholding to be not lawfully redeemed;

2. DECLARING petitioner-appellee not a bona fide tenant of the subject landholding;

3. DECLARING that petitioner-appellee cannot redeem the subject parcel registered

in the names of the respondents-appellants;

4. ORDERING the respondents-appellants to be maintained in peaceful possession

of the subject landholding; and

5. DIRECTING the Clerk of the Board of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of
Region IV-A to return the Manager’s Check No. 0000004518 issued by Allied Bank in
the name of Spouses Marilyn and George Lim and/or DAR Adjudication Board
Region IV-A in the amount of Ten Million pesos to herein petitioner-appellee.

SO ORDERED.13

On April 13, 2009, Consolacion moved for reconsideration,14 which the DARAB denied in a
Resolution15 dated June 8, 2009 for being filed out of time.

SECTION 12 Rule X of the 2003 DARAB Rules provides that a Motion for Reconsideration shall be
filed within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice of the order, resolution, or decision of the Board or
Adjudicator. Records show that both the petitioner-appellee and her counsel received a copy of the
Decision dated 18 February 2009 on 27 February 2009 and that Legal Officer Nancy Geocada, the
alleged new counsel of the herein petitioner-appellee, filed the Motion for Reconsideration only on
13 April 2009, clearly the Motion for Reconsideration was filed beyond the fifteen (15) days (sic)
reglementary period thus the herein Decision has already become final and executory. x x x.16

On June 25, 2009, Consolacion filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court with
the CA.17
On July 1, 2009, the CA resolved to require Consolacion’s counsel to submit within five (5) days
from notice his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Certificate of Compliance or
Exemption and an amended Verification and Certification Against Non-Forum-
Shopping.18 Apparently, Consolacion’s counsel failed to indicate in the petition his MCLE Certificate
of Compliance or Exemption Number as required under Bar Matter No. 1922. Also, the jurat of
Consolacion’s verification and certification against non-forum-shopping failed to indicate any
competent evidence of Consolacion’s identity apart from her community tax certificate.

Considering the failure of Consolacion and her counsel to comply, the CA issued a Resolution19 on
October 15, 2009 dismissing the petition.

On July 7, 2009, the counsel for the petitioner received the above-mentioned Resolution. However,
the counsel for the petitioner failed to comply with the said Resolution which was due on July 19,
2009.

For failure of the counsel for the petitioner to comply with the Resolution dated July 1, 2009, despite
receipt of the notice thereof, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.20

Consolacion moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the CA in a Resolution21 dated March
11, 2010.

Consolacion is, before this Court, claiming that the CA’s summary dismissal of her petition on
technical grounds is unwarranted. Consolacion invoked substantial justice against the CA’s strict
1âwphi 1

application of the rule requiring her counsel to note his MCLE Compliance or Exemption Certificate
Number and the rule rendering the jurat of her verification and certification on non-forum-shopping
defective in the absence of the details of any one of her current identification document issued by an
official agency bearing her photograph and signature. That there was merit in her petition and that
she complied, albeit belatedly as her counsel’s MCLE Compliance Certificate Number was indicated
and a verification and certificate on non-forum-shopping with a proper jurat was attached to her
motion for reconsideration, should have sufficed for the CA to reverse the dismissal of her petition
and decide the same on its merits. Consolacion alleged that procedural rules or technicalities are
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice and their rigid application should be avoided if this
would frustrate rather than promote substantial justice.

The Court finds no merit in the petition. The Court sees no reversible error committed by the CA in
dismissing Consolacion’s petition before it on the ground of petitioner’s unexplained failure to comply
with basic procedural requirements attendant to the filing of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court. Notably, Consolacion and her counsel remained obstinate despite the opportunity
afforded to them by the CA to rectify their lapses. While there was compliance, this took place,
however, after the CA had ordered the dismissal of Consolacion’s petition and without reasonable
cause proffered to justify its belatedness. Consolacion and her counsel claimed inadvertence and
negligence but they did not explain the circumstances thereof. Absent valid and compelling reasons,
the requested leniency and liberality in the observance of procedural rules appears to be an
afterthought, hence, cannot be granted. The CA saw no compelling need meriting the relaxation of
the rules. Neither does this Court see any.

The Court is aware of the exceptional cases where technicalities were liberally construed. However,
in these cases, outright dismissal is rendered unjust by the presence of a satisfactory and
persuasive explanation. The parties therein who prayed for liberal interpretation were able to hurdle
that heavy burden of proving that they deserve an exceptional treatment. It was never the Court’s
intent "to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity."22

This Court will not condone a cavalier attitude towards procedural rules. It is the duty of every
member of the bar to comply with these rules. They are not at liberty to seek exceptions should they
fail to observe these rules and rationalize their omission by harking on liberal construction.

While it IS the negligence of Consolacion's counsel that led to this unfortunate result, she is bound
by such.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolutions dated October
15, 2009 and March 11, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 109265 are AFFIRMED.

Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DECASTRO ARTURO D. BRION*

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Acting member per Special Order No. 1305 dated September 10, 2012 vice Associate
Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr..

1
Penned by Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza (now a member of this Court), with
Associate Justices Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal and Romeo F. Barza, concurring; rollo, pp. 41-
42.

2
Penned by Associate Justice Romeo F. Barza, with Associate Justices Magdangal M. De
Leon and Ruben C. Ayson, concurring: id. at 44-45.

3
Id. at 59.

4
Id. at 55-67.