DE LA CRUZ V.

CA

G.R. No. 139442. December 6, 2006

FACTS:

- ACTION: A case to nullify the resolution of the CA which re affirmed the MeTC ruling. The ruling
ordered petitioner Dela Cruz to vacate the subject lot in favor of respondent Tan Te

1. The Reyes family owned a piece of land that De La Cruz was leasing. — There were other leasees

- Location : No. 1332 Lacson St. Sampaloc, Manila

- De La Cruz leased it for over 40 years

2. There was a Fire the struck the lot and it destroyed the houses built there on. Including the house of De
La Cruz.

3. After the fire De La Cruz went back and tried to rebuild his house on the land, but Reyes Fam, wanted
them to vacate , but De La Cruz fervently resisted. Reyes never filed a case in court.

- The demand to leave were Verbal in the beginning

- On February 21, 1994 Reyes served a written demand to vacate,

4. On November 26, 1996 Reyes sold the land to Tan Te ( TT) ( Private respondent ) .

- through an Absolute deed of sale

- bought for residential purposes

5. De La Cruz still would not leave the lot.

6. On January 14, 1997, TT sent a written demand to leave the premises De La Cruz being an asshole
or a guy who has no other house ignored it. So barangay conciliation proceeding were initiated.

7. The barangay proceedings failed because De La Cruz was being an asshole again—- so a
CERTIFICATE TO FILE AN ACTION was issued to TT

- TT offered financial assistance to help him find a new place to stay, so that the dispute will be settled
—- De La Cruz countered by saying you give me 500k for my house—— dili kaya ni TT —- it was too
large an amount.

MeTC
8. On September 8, 1997, TT filed an ejectment complaint with damages in the Manila MeTC

- What were the averments in the TT’s complaint :

(i) Reyes was the previous owner and to was sold to them in 1996 Nov, 26

(ii) Before the sale, De La Cruz Forcibly entered the property with STRATEGY OR STEALTH.

(iii) De La Cruz unlawfully deprived TT of physical possession of the property and continues to do
so

(iv) several written demands to petitioner to vacate the premises but refused to do so.

9. De La Cruz counter the complaint and it said :

(i) RTC has no JD—- RTC na ni —- 1 year has elapsed from the forcible entry.

(ii) she was a rent- paying tenant protected by PD 20

(iii) her lease was a legal encumbrance

(iv) the lot was subject of expropriation

10. MeTC Ruling : TT wins : The court ordered :

(i) De La Cruz to vacate the premises and peacefully return possession to TT ; THaDAE

(ii) De La Cruz to pay P360.00 a month from December 1996 to November 1997; P432.00 a month
from December 1997 to November 1998, plus 20% for each subsequent year until they vacate

(iii) De La Cruz to pay TT the amount of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and, the costs of the suit.

11. APPEAL SI ASSHOLE (, De La Cruz ) to the NLRC hahahah joke RTC.

RTC

12. RULING : the Metc is wrong, because they never had JD because one year had already lapsed—- so
action publican na daw.

- Reyes discovered the Forcible entry on Feb 21 1994 and he did not file a case with in the the one year
prescriptive period Feb 21 1995.

- The ejectment case as only filed by TT in 1997 will beyond the 1 year period.
13. APPEAL SI TT, na yawa na to the CA.

CA

14. TT is correct

15. De La Cruz filed a motion for reconsideration —— DENIED.

16. Dela Cruz now seeks legal remedy through the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari before the
SC

- the Court. NOT sure pero i think rule 45 ni.

ISSUE /RULING: the petition is bereft of merit

I. CA went beyond the issues in the case

- the case did not say anything else about this.

II. CA erred nulling in favor of TT

A. NO, but this was actually an unlawful detainer case through tolerance case

III. What was the Nature of the case and how was the nature of the action determined ?

- the Court ruled that the cluster-fuck of allegations point to this case being one of unlawful detainer since
there was an admission that Dela Cruz was a former lessee. The occupation of Dela Cruz was legal at
first and became illegal once Reyes asked them to vacate the lot following the fire.

- Reyes however TOLERATED their stay and when Tan Te purchased the lot, ALSO TOLERATED Dela
Cruz. Since the last demand was filed on January 14, 1997 and the action was filed with the MeTC on
September 8, 1997, it was well within the one year period for filing HENCE, after all this shit, the MeTC
DID have jurisdiction over the complaint and the complaint was one for unlawful detainer.

- To Determine the nature of the case that was filed and to determine which court has Jurisdiction the
court analyzed the complaint and the answer to that complaint and when they read it the said allegations
of the complaint are vague and iffy. Why did they do this because it is the factual allegations in the
complaint and not the designation of complaint that will reveal it true nature.

- the settled rule is jurisdiction is based on the allegations in the initiatory pleading and the defenses in
the answer are deemed irrelevant and immaterial in its determination
IV. Which court actually has JD ? The MeTC had JD since as deduced from the factual allegations in the
complaint this was actually a complaint for unlawdetained since D La Cruz was formerly a tenant.

- Thus, an ejectment complaint based on possession by tolerance of the owner, like the Tan Te complaint,
is a specie of unlawful detainer cases.

- We all know that the lower court MeTC, has JD over ejectment cases which should be filed within One
year

- It is with the RTC when the 1 year period has lapsed, because now you have to file an action publicianna
or reinvindicatoria.

- Section 33 of Chapter III B.P. No. 129 provides:

Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in civil cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts shall exercise

Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when,
in such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be
resolved only to determine the issue of possession.

V. WON De La Cruz can be EJECTED.

- Yes, I n Calubayan v. Pascual It has been held that a person who occupies the land of another at the
latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied
promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper
remedy against them.

- De La Cruz admitted in her Answer that she was a rent-paying tenant

- De La Cruz fully knows that her stay in the subject lot is at the leniency and magnanimity of Mr. Lino
Reyes and later of respondent Tan Te

NOTES’
1. How were procedural rules relaxed in this case ? and What is the rationale for the relaxation of
procedural rules ?

- it was relaxed when they looked at the answer of the respondent to determine the nature of the suit when
you are in reality only supposed to look at the INITIATORY COMPLAINT.

- The rationale is that, Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided
Barnes v. Padilla

2. The petitioner also argued that the lot was subject to expropriation proceedings however, the Court
ruled that this was immaterial to the case and that it was not presented before the CA and cannot be
presented on the first time on appeal

- Also, the intended expropriation might not even be implemented since it is clear from the ordinance that
the City Mayor will still locate available funds for project, meaning the said expense is not a regular item
in the budget.

3. This is clari􏰀ed in Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure Forcible entry , where one
is deprived of physical possession of any land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth.

4. What are the requisites of forcible entry ?

First, the plaintiffs must allege their prior physical possession of the property.

Second, they must also assert that they were deprived of possession either by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth.

Third, the action must be 􏰀led within one (1) year from the time the owners or legal possessors learned
of their deprivation of physical possession of the land or building. TAIESD